4.    Theological Conformity?

	Numerous philosophers have demonstrated a plethora of distinctions in a multiplicity of fields. Few philosophers, however, have ever attempted to show how these fields of concern could be made commensurable both with one another and collectively. Is it not the case that we all live before others in this same Life-World (of transcendental possibility). In the same manner, a theologian needs to make their topic dialectically amenable, and relevant, to the nature of the Life-World in a broad width of vision in order to be more deeply in conformity with a valid and responsible understanding of the reputed ways of the world. And where to start but upon this transcendental territory of the ‘same world’ shared by all persons as merely noted in the last chapter regardless of their specific attitudes towards this minimal theologicalization of the Life-World…? (553)

	In this chapter let us explore this new concept of theological conformity in order to ascertain if there is this transcendental territory shared by all persons living in this world, what its phenomenological nature might be, and, in what manner this coincidence could be characterized as theological in tenor? (554)

	Theological conformity is the transcendental concept that in order to operate in this world as ‘a’ world-with-others-before-others this-same-World-of-Life needs to be the-same-world-as-shared-by-others. Furthermore this ‘sharing’, in its intentionality, must be both ontological and epistemological (and hence transcendental) because of its inescapable phenomenal-phenomenological experience. The experience of the transcendental being experienced, and re-experienced, through the use of an overall transcendental suspension. As previously argued this involves the utilization of the full hermeneutic circle (which in the context of this topic of the theological is conducted within the frame of reference of a hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension – which is nothing mysterious but merely the recognition that the ambit of this topic or field is circumscribed by the dialectical range of its relationships betweens its parts-and-wholes in the context of the limits of that field itself; just as a book is read through the net interaction of its parts-and-wholes in the context of that associated meta-textual genre of activity, namely ‘book reading’). Now, in accordance with previous investigations the hermeneutic circle is analyzed in the light of three dialectical moments, namely, analysis or object, synthesis or world and the existentially balance suspension of the interaction and relationship between analysis-and-synthesis or ego. Then, analyzing the nature of the interaction between these moments through the relative suppression and/or the relative promotion of the same gave us our circular interpretation of the six orders (namely, the first order of the essential, then the aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and the factual). So, e.g., the ethical field arises through the relative promotion of the ego moment and the relative suppression of both the object and world moments. Or, on the other hand, the relative promotion of both the ego moment and the world moments and the relative suppression of the object moment simulates for us the field of the pragmatical. Now, in the field of ethical judgment, considered in its widest extent, the distinctions between the deontological nature of the ethical and the calculative nature of the pragmatical can be considered to be quite an advance in ethical judgment since some judgments considerably call for the former and others for the latter, and, that to confuse these two aspects of practical ethics is to make a very serious mistake. But ethicists also need to note in what manner these two distinct field also more deeply interact; an interaction that must occur by virtue of the fact that the same transcendental machinery is implicated in all types of judgment regardless of what fields or sub-fields our endeavours are critically analyzed and judged to distinctly fall within. (555)

	By these means we have at our disposal, altogether, the simulation/re-simulation of both distinctions and accommodations, and, the totality of our overall topic, namely, the Life-World; along with all possible manner of transformations between and within the same all within this open-ended World-of-Life. Let me illustrate this in-depth understanding of our transcendental psychology. (556)

	In this scheme ethics is one thing and aesthetics is another! We should not critically confuse these two distinctive fields of intentional activity (or any other). The former has been described as the relative promotion of the ego and the relative suppressions of both the object and world. On the other hand, the latter is the relative promotion of both the object and ego and the relative suppression of the world. But let us consider the following thought-experiment (assuming my reader is not a psychopath, or, more politely, a sociopath). Imagine we are watching the Shakespearean play Julius Caesar. We have seen numerous productions of this play. In spite of that, we find we are enjoying this production immensely. But, just after the great men is ‘stabbed’ we suddenly realize that he has, indeed, been truly stabbed by ‘Brutus’. No longer do we see a ‘play with a murder being re-enacted’. Instead we are now horrified to have found ourselves witness to a real murder… and no longer reviewing this scene as a play, as a work of ‘art’ in the field of the aesthetical. We are shocked by the fact of this crime, this ethical transgression, even though we were prepared to see it merely simulated. The transcendental illusion of a work of art is now completely shattered! Although absorbed in the ‘play’ of the play our absorption is shattered by a deeper level of concern which now intersects with the ethical, our feelings of empathy and concern for others. In this illustration of our transcendental depth psychology we find our aesthetical reviewing of this play dissolved and replaced by the upwelling of an ethical frame of reference (along with an intense pragmatical concern for how we should react to this same situation given the killer is still on stage, has a knife, could use it on the audience, etc.). So, although the aesthetical should not be confused with the ethical, given the gravity of this current situation, the ethical now re-writes our ]\==interpretation of these events that hitherto had been interpreted in an aesthetical light and, more or less, an aesthetical light only... But, if that was the case how could an ethical re-interpretation usurp this aesthetical reading of this play of events as they unfold before us if our attitude to these events were conducted purely in an aesthetical attitude since is it not also the case that drama is the aesthetics of human (or human-like) interactions and relationships… experiencing both the simulated dissonance of those relational differences and conflicts, and, the ongoing relief in their simulated resolution in so far as that type of process is found or allowed to occur? The implication being that in the aesthetical review of a work of drama ethical interaction is merely the material for the aesthetical process which has a relative supremacy over the transcendental nature of its materials (until such a time another transcendental sense-field, say the ethical, e.g., should irrupt before our intentional focus and, through persistence, over-ride our previous aesthetical considerations….). (557)

	As already noted the transcendental machinery of judgment is the same regardless of the distinct field of its application. So, in an aesthetical reading of a situation there must also be the relative suppression of an ethical reading… along with the relative suppressions of the pragmatical, the hermeneutical, the factual and the essential. Into such a world, a revision of our distinct attitudes is called for when another field suddenly or progressively appears to reveal and produce a greater degree or quantity of value. The revelation of the murder perpetrated by the actor playing the part of Brutus now urgently calls forth a re-evaluation of how we should disport ourselves to such events in the light of this change in attitude. (558)

	What works one way also works the other! In our being able to watch this play as a ‘play’ we have had to suppress our ethical judgment and supplant it with a relatively dominant aesthetical attitude. In art works we are often presented with rather horrible vistas of one sort or another. But we don’t let that get in the way of our aesthetic enjoyment if such is to be found, is being found. Unless we are critical of such displays of that type. Thence the advent of censorship. But, as demonstrated by our reactions in the recent realization that we were witnessing a piece of ‘snuff theatre’ there is still a role for censorship on these deeper grounds where we are witness to the natural, non-ideologically contaminated irruption of a responsive abhorrence for that, which in-depth, dramatically undercuts what might currently, from an overall aesthetic point of view, be relatively non-ethical in its simulated unfolding. (559)

	Now, just what implications do these in-depth psychological insights have for our hypothetical examination of this topic of the theological in general? (560)

	In the previous chapter-paper very briefly we looked into the gamut of theological value as it has impressed itself upon the fabric of the world and culture in general. There we saw that it encompassed everything from churches and temples to the aesthetics of religious rituals and pronouncements on a wide variety of ethical topics, etc. In other words the gamut of human experience including all six transcendental sense fields from the essential to the factual (as described by our six orders). That, the entire epistemological organization of the human psyche finds itself reflected in the religious way of life. Now, that being the case, the point I would like to make in reflection upon this observation is that religious value, theological value and all forms of value, whether religiously oriented or non-religiously oriented, are ‘grounded’ upon the interactions of relationships whose fundamental phenomenological basis is built upon those interactions simulated between the ideality of these three moments, poles or moments of the hermeneutic circle, namely, the modalities of the ego, object and world. These simulations and/or re-simulations being exercised through the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension (each of these moments beings types of transcendental suspension in their own right). These processes of ongoing resolution should not be seen as a system going towards a state of dynamic equilibrium but rather as a chaotic complex heading from one ideal state of equilibrium to some other without ever realizing any ideal state of equilibrium in between (through any form of an ‘overall; transcendental suspension) (mistreated in its ideality and/or qualified actuality through the imputation of a definitive ‘overall transcendental suspension’ when an ‘overall’ transcendental suspension can only partially reflect an attempt to mirror this passage from the unobtainable chaotic ideality of one transcendental equilibrium to the unobtainable chaotic ideality of some other). That the passage of life through this World-of-Life is more like the turbulence of a dangerous river to which we must existentially adapt to each and every moment (and not just to the ‘misrepresented’ perception of the apparently preserved stability and duration of the overall flow itself). Such an insightful recognition has seriously positive existential ramification which will be addressed elsewhere in this extended essay.  (561)

	In essence, theological value realizes an expression of our in-depth psychology to the extent that it seems to mirror the gamut of human experience. In truth, all forms of value, whether relatively distinctive in nature or broad spectrum in extent, all reflect this in-depth psychology by virtue of the fact that are generated from the use of the same transcendental machinery (even if apparently distinctive in nature, e.g., ethical or perceptual, etc.) (and this can be shown by various hermeneutical stratagems). Obviously, foundered on relationships the generation of value must be in conformity with that relational basis associated with that simulation/re-simulation of value. Therefore, the existential status of that value under examination must be in conformity with the existential status of its relational basis (in experience). In other words the existential status of a certain expression of value must be in conformity with the associated relational basis that generated that associated form of value. Or,  i.e., the expression of value must be in conformity with its relational basis, e.g., theological value must be in conformity with its theologically associated cultural basis as experienced in shared intentional consciousness, etc. That, moreover, an existentialization of this phenomenal-phenomenological basis will produce an existentialization of its relational expression, and v.v., and then, therein, refine this sense of conformity! Hence, e.g., theological concepts of purification or similar (or, rather, our re-interpretations of the same in keeping with that type of insight dealing with this topic of ‘conformity’). (562)

 In the light of these insights we must ask “just what is meant by theological conformity, relational conformity and that state of conformity that realizes a particular type of value along with a deeper understanding of the role of the existentialization of our experience of reality?” (563)

	Surely, a state of affairs is fully in conformity with itself in order to be what it is, where it is in the manner it is found presented/re-presented? But, no phenomenal-phenomenological state of affairs is absolutely in conformity with the envisaged nature of itself by virtue of the fact that it is always a work in progress as it passes from one state of dynamic equilibrium as expressed through one transcendental suspension to some other without realizing the full ideality of any of those polar modalities (as chaotic attractors) anywhere along the way! Indeed, full conformity would be an absolute death and even the lowest form of life cannot simulate such a state of affairs! Just as an apple rots away over time ‘death’, in all its forms, is merely the transformational transition to another state of affairs. Even the annihilation of antimatter by mater is mediated by material or material-like phenomena. Of course death does not have to be (the impossible realization) of) an absolute death to have been in a process of dying and its realization of a resultant state in the relativity of that state of death. Still, when you are dead you are appropriately disposed of by some means or other. But, the point I am making here is that there can be no absolute death by virtue of the fact that an absolute resolution of all dissonant forces cannot be absolutely realized in the reality of the Life-World! So, let us examine further what is meant by conformity when no form of absolute conformity or absolute non-conformity could be realized! (564)
	
	On one hand, surely a state of affairs is what it is and therefore must be in conformity with itself, and, on the other hand, how could something be in conformity with itself when it is already just itself!? All this, without doubt, is rather confusing.. Let me, therefore, in detail, and with some carefully sketched metaphors, clarify the nature and ramifications of this concept of conformity. (565)

	The world for-us is a mix of intentional experience and that experienced as intended, and, the reality of such experience experienced between these three ideal poles of the intentional ego and the intentional object(ive) as set in its intentional field or world. This phenomenal-phenomenological reality as experienced by-us is generated and simulated between these three ideal poles. Furthermore, because there is no simple equilibrium in the overall transcendental suspension by virtue of the fact that all systems and their content are expressed as coming from one non-obtained ideal transcendental suspension to some other it follows that no transformational product can be truly centered within the psychic product of a so-called ‘overall’ transcendental suspension. Hence, no intentional product can be in full conformity with itself. As an image we could compare this to the planets revolving around the sun. No planet could occupy a central role within the solar system, that is reserved for the sun. Then, at the same time, the sun is off centered by those very planets themselves too. Hence this system is wobbling about an unobtained sense of a ‘psychic centre’ without ever being able to realize the same. To complicate matters no system can be truly isolated from the rest of the Life-World, thence that sense of centre about which the solar system as a collective entity wobbles is also wandering, and wobbling, through space about a higher order virtual centre, etc., etc. What are the ramifications of this insight that we are never ‘merely’ centered in a definitive ‘overall’ transcendental suspension, i.e., in a mere system purely in a state of dynamic equilibrium with (the fiction of its) ‘itself’? (566)

	So, what is meant by this concept of conformity (when neither absolute conformity itself nor absolute non-conformity can ever be realized)? In acts of intentional distortion, realized through an imperfectly exercised transcendental suspensions, that system of thought-simulation is further off-centered than it would be if allowed to remain within an adequately, appropriately and validly exercised sense of an ‘overall’ transcendental suspension. So, conformity is a matter of degree where neither absolute conformity nor absolute non-conformity can ever be realized (and experienced… which is just as well since either option would spell the death of that interdependent sense of a specified particular, individual or institution). But, ideally, we should be moving as close to that state of conformity that would allow that state to more fully express its sense of a distinctive interdependence! By such means facilitating the fuller functioning of that state of affairs in such a distinctive manner in keeping with its own nature through a closer existential conformity with its own nature. E.g., the person should function as a person and neither as a god nor as an animal… for the person is first and foremost a person! So, let us discover our humanity! (567)

	How is such a state of closer conformity to be realized? Through the existential promotion of that (general, particular and specific) nature as entered into through the adequate exercise of an overall transcendental suspension. This process of existentialization being induced and fostered through the removal of those preconditions that impede this type of development and the application of those preconditions that promote this type of transformational authenticity. In a religious context this might be referred to as a process of purification (although not all religious processes of purification need be characterized by objective authenticity, etc.)? Then, intuitively divining what needs to be done for this existential process of (a spiritual) alignment how do we determine to what degree we should attempt to advance in this direction (of what has already been declared to be an unobtainable ideality)? The resolution of this sense of proportion is quite simple – to that extent wherein our investment realizes an existential excess of value greater than that of our investment itself. An ‘excess of value’ in excess of that being invested in this process facilitating our phenomenal-phenomenological absorption in our engagement in that investigational-process, the loss of such a differential being experienced in the difficulty of maintaining any form of an investigation beyond that already currently being undertaken in such an unproductive manner. In a similar manner, our various options being entertained virtually before being engaged or re-engaged…. (568)

	Relational conformity is the realignment experienced in a relationship with the relatively essential nature of that relationship. Existentialization is this process of relational realignment. Theological conformity is when the religious interpretation of a relationship is fundamentally realigned with the relatively essential nature of that relationship. This is conducted via the use of an adequate overall transcendental suspension that is allowed to reflect to that extent possible the full sense of the unique situatedness to be found in that relationship as found in its relational setting… (569)

	What are the implications and ramifications of this theological alignment with its relational alignment? By realigning the nature of the relationship with the relatively essential nature of that relationship in its current relational situation, with or without the supplementation of a religious interpretation, all subjected to an ongoing adequate overall transcendental suspension, the expression of that relationship is allowed to existentially align itself with the fundamental relational nature of that relationship. This same psychic territory is that same territory shared by other-with-us, and v.v! This same coincidence ensuing that this territory is essentially that aspect of the relational world shared-by-others and which has been spoken of as possessing this minimal degree of theologicalization… all other forms of religious characterization being supplementary to this necessary degree of a minimal theologicalization of the Life-World. In the exercise of any attitude there is always the inescapable overlay of an ideological perspective but that input subjected to an adequate overall transcendental suspension ensures this alignment is a (process of) re-alignment with the relatively essential relational nature of that relationship. All forms of ideological input not subjected to a thorough suspension to that same degree and in that same manner off-centre that relational expression and essentially supplement the expression of that relationship. In this ‘contribution’ the role of religious interpretation is no different, i.e., that treated as either complimentary and/or supplementary! But, when a religious contribution to a relationship is adequately suspended that relationship becomes relatively more open-ended and more responsive and complimentary to the existential nature of its own relational situatedness despite the addition or absence of such an overlay (albeit one that is also adequately suspended). On the other hand, all inputs not adequately suspended become de-centering factors in the realized expression of that relationship. All ideological inputs, religious or otherwise, not adequately rectified through suspension essentially de-centre that relational alignment through their non-existentially treated supplementariness. However, in the process of re-alignment the person becomes more in tune with this realized degree of relational conformity and therein more in tune with their relational situatedness regardless of whether that person has adopted and adapted a religious mode of life in this existential, non-supplementary manner. All else is supplementary to this minimal theologicalization of the Life-World and would need to be argued for by the theologian (despite their never being able to satisfactorily argue for it in non-existential terms of reference – there being this choice between an existential complimentary reading of the religious or theological and a non-existential supplementary reading of the religious or theological). A supplementary reading, however, is acceptable if and only if it is cast and exercised in hypothetical terms of reference, which, then, is in none other than a form of suspension which merely re-states this point on the transcendental necessity of the suspension as already argued for! Our relational re-alignment maintaining this sense of alignment only through the imposition of this sense of the suspension which must be in force to some degree or other in order to exercise any form of an intentional discernment. But, that the real point to be made here is the qualitative advancement that is realized through this awareness and the awareness of its need for an existential form of clarification (as a process of transcendental purification). Relational re-alignment returning us to a more direct relationship with that relationship (in this qualitative sense)… (with the puzzle: is the critical treatment of a supplementary extension merely an extension of the complimentary, that, as a result, there can be no existentially valid sense of the supplementary except in some provisional form or format as a metaphor or myth, as a theoretical symbolic structure, as the basis for a process of ritual enactment, etc?)…. (570)

	Let me now investigate what complimentary readings can be given in this general examination of this minimal theologicalization of the Life-World? ( 571)

	Our phenomenological reading of the phenomenal is always through a suspension of the ideological. Correctly attended to such research is critically approached when that suspension is adequately conducted, i.e., properly, appropriately and validly conducted. Now, the ideological can be religious or not religious in tenor and aspiration. Either way it makes no difference since the starting material is always ideological in nature, i.e., in the form of pre-judgmental prejudices. However, although we start with such prejudgment we do not end there contrary to the ways of most ideologues who set out merely to confirm, or rather, re-affirm, their prejudices. In contrast, the critical philosopher accepts the prejudicial nature of their beginning point in these transactions but in the application of an adequate overall transcendental suspension arrives at a responsible position by virtue of their becoming anchored in the very midst of the relational itself regardless of the nature of their ontological and epistemological commitments at the beginnings of this type of process. What ever ideological commitments are commenced with the thorough application of an adequate transcendental suspension will firmly ensure that our passage through this transcendental territory is firmly centered to a critical degree in a complimentary reading of ‘reality’ and not in the form of a supplementary reading. In such simulations/re-simulations a complimentary reading, indeed, is centered adequately in this transcendental reading of the relational as long as there is the continual re-imposition of this critical exercise of an adequate overall transcendental suspension. All else is speculative and supplementary. So, let us now attend to a general reading of this relational territory in such a manner so as to discern the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of this minimal theological reading of the Life-World. Just what can we say about such an understanding wherein the relational and the theological are in conformity, albeit as experienced in and through this critical and responsible exercise of the suspension and which allows us to stand-before-others in the same-World-of-Life? (572)

	This transcendental fact of our collective experience of the same world, albeit from each interdependent individuals own points of view, has various existential implications and ramifications. Implied is that such identity is also interdependent but equally encompassing of the life of those individuals in some manner or other. As we stand before others we are already witness to the emergence of the meta-textual dimension of the close interaction between our appreciation of genre and context. Within the generality of the intercultural (through the interaction of the interdependence of cultures) we experience the inescapable presence of the cultural. Not one thought can be thought apart from genre. Again, no sense of genre can be appreciated without an equal appreciation of an appropriate understanding of context, and v.v. So, e.g., I greet a passing friend… and they greet me. Here I am greeting a friend and not asking myself should I greet or not greet a stranger. Even if that person comes from another culture there is the same sort of an awareness along the same type of lines, namely, the perception of a stranger and the presence in some form or other of a mutual recognition even if those two strangers do not visibly or audibly acknowledge each other in passing since the very absence of a greeting in some form or other is in itself a sign of its absence and not the sign of its non-existence. Now, this all pervasive sense of culture, e.g., cannot be merely reduced to the living participants in that culture. Then, again, it cannot be reduced to all the inhabitants of that culture, whether dead or alive or not yet born. Indeed, no form of a reduction can encapture this emergent sense of the cultural. Because it cannot be reduced to its material basis in the mere lives of its inhabitants it effectively operates in a relatively spiritual dimension of the world-as-lived. Hence this concept of the Life-World. Such a concept is transcendental since no argument could be adopted and adapted in a world of debate without the necessary pre-existence of this sense of the world-as-lived! On the other hand, given this absolute failure of a materialist or realist interpretation this interpretation it should, equally, not be conducted in rationalistic or idealistic terms of reference! Put quite simply, the phenomenal-phenomenological fact of being-in-this-world-with-others demands that no form of a precedence or privilege be accorded to either party, indeed, to any party! Only through suspension, can we simulate/re-simulate the phenomenal-phenomenological reality that is in a reasonable degree of coincidence and conformity with the reality of that-reality-to-hand. Therein simulating the psychic centre of the hermeneutic circle in order to directly deal with that-to-hand. Any other approach must further de-centre, and perhaps drastically de-centre, the reality of such an endeavour and invite a proportional degree of a non-conformity between our ‘vision of reality’ and the ‘reality of that vision’. An intentional objective cannot function without an intentional field, and v.v. Then, no interactions within an intentional field can be consciously engaged without the simulated presence of a corresponding sense of self, etc. Thence the full integration of experience within the epistemological organization of the psyche. Moreover, through the element of the meta-textual generation, re-generation and sharing of genre, this dimension of the lived could not be there for-us without its transcendental precondition as that-Life-World-already-there-for-us! Furthermore, the nature of this pre-conditional element in the constitution of experience demands its emergent superiority to those of its specific participants, its relative interdependence, a vastly superior degree of epistemological organization and hence its theological constitution albeit in this minimal sense. (573)

Through re-invagination of fields within fields folding over onto each other this richness of the Life-World manifests itself as that world in which we must live within and must live together in some form or other. Can we say more about this ‘force of reality’ and the ‘reality of this force’ that moves us beyond the non-literal nature of the metaphorical? But, then no metaphor is merely a metaphor in a literary sense. Metaphor ‘metaphor’, also picture the world; i.e., simulate a world in a world of simulation (and through emptiness it is that world in which we simulate ourselves before other as they simulate themselves before us). Again, metaphors are a dialectical modes (or moments, polarities, etc.) of the hermeneutic circle and in that ‘space’ speak to us of the world, this world of simulation, this world that is there for-us to-be-before-others! (574)

	What allows us to speak of the Life-World as inherently theological, albeit in this minimal sense as discerned in a complimentary manner (and not in a form supplemented by a theologian)? This has already been attempted under a number of heading, namely, emergence, interdependence, greater sophistication of epistemological organization, etc. To this list let me add some additional concepts to explore, namely, integrity, reflection of integrity, self-organization, preservation of identity, continuation and preservation of value, teleological concerns, the simulation of sentience, relational bonding (realized in and through the form of a ‘Divine love’ whose hypothetical nature, in what ever form it might be expressed or might not be expressed, would be both an objective genitive and a subjective genitive in orientation), etc. Let me now elaborate upon these latter concepts (as generalized concepts that can be particularized and specified by theologians in complementary and/or supplementary frames of reference, but, which will be examined by us in only a general hypothetical frame of reference). (575)

	As already argued, minimal theological conformity is when this region of minimal theolgicalization of the Life-World is treated as in conformity with the region and nature of relational conformity. Essentially, I am arguing that the transcendental characteristics of a relationship are the same for all relationships, and, that the relationship of relationships effectively forms the transcendental ‘space’ of the Life-World. Moreover, through the non-isolation of any relationship this inter-relational ‘space’ is equally stamped upon the general fabric of all relationships. That, collectively, this generality can be quantified and qualified as that emergent sense of reality as it is constituted as that-reality-there-for-it just as that-reality-for-us is constituted as that-same-reality-there-for-us. That, various key concepts can applied to such all-encompassing territory whether as represented locally or globally, whether represented in egological or non-egological terms of reference (as persons, communities, institutions, congregations, Divine-congregations, possible forms of Divine-sentience…). Under such a heading we can consider the following sub-headings, e.g., accumulative epistemological organization/s, self-organized structure/s, qualified semi-integrated field/s, etc. All these sub-headings being merely phenomenological aspects for interpreting the phenomenal reality of the presentation/re-presentation of the processes of chaotic structures. First, let me approach this topic by examining certain aspects or traits that are typically representative of the nature of chaotic occurrences. (576)

	Imagine a sand-hill with steep sides. Pouring a few grains at a time on to its top will produce, from time to time, a sudden avalanche of varying intensity. We are witnessing here an instance of chaotic behaviour. Effectively, the sand-hill is a self-organized ‘entity’. With the addition of each grain of sand we cannot predict its consequences except in the form of a generalized probability. Some grains of sand will merely add to those slopes. Other grains of sand will produced an avalanche. Some avalanches will be greater than other avalanches. Hence this element of an indeterminacy of behaviour where inputs produce outputs that cannot be expressed in the form of  a fully determined linear equation. Evidence of this chaotic nature in the evolution of this sand-hill is in evidence in its demonstrated fractal symmetry, namely, the fact that the maximum angle of the slope of that mound will not exceed a certain degree, the fact that that mound will be conical if the sand grains are distributed only on its apex, that avalanches will proceed with certain characteristics, etc. What has this example to say when used as an analogy? (577)

It is my argument that all relationships, in their basic phenomenal constitution, will exhibit a chaotic phenomenology. The only apparent exceptions to this general rule are those structural-processes that suppress the same or have this element suppressed. But, that despite such suppression there can be no absolute suppression of this relatively more fundamental chaotic phenomenology. E.g., three bodies in a chaotic orbit about each other cannot be computed except through approximations. But, however, there are configurations where three bodies in orbit can be relatively non-chaotic in complexion. If a perfectly circular orbit had three bodies traveling at the same speed with respect to each other (with the same degree of acceleration if present) and were equidistant from each other and no other forces or factors upset this ideal arrangement then we could say that this system was effectively non-chaotic in complexion. However, through the slightest perturbation in any one of those orbiting bodies, if the slightest irregularity were to arise in the relative speed (and/or acceleration) in just one of those orbiting bodies, as it must in reality, then that system would degenerate ‘very quickly’ into a more naturally chaotic system which it really is since no such ideal situation could be perfectly maintained permanently, and, that this prior maintenance can only be maintained superficially. (578)

	How does this analogy apply to the fundamentally chaotic nature of relationships, and, ultimately, to any concept of the theological treated as a relatively interdependent complex-process(ed) state of affairs? (579)
	
	In this regard I am going to argue that identity is not possible without interdependence, and, that interdependence is not possible without a chaotic complexion, i.e., that identity is enabled chaotically (and that potential identity is enabled potentially through the appropriate chaotic mechanisms on the grounds that there can be no absolute demarcation between the potential and the actual). I am also going to argue that identity is, in some sense, an apparent emission engendered through the breakdown or disruption of a current within the context of its appropriate system, and, that all three of these factors cannot be absolutely demarcated. (580)

	Identity is realized in context, in the context of its generation and interaction. So, the tree is experienced as a part from the ground that supports it and at the same time not apart from the ground from whence it arose. In this dialectic the tree is relatively demarcated, i.e., interdependently. Interdependence is dialectical! There could be no pure dependence, there would be no tree. At the same time there could be no absolute isolation of the context of its generation (and interaction) because then there would be no arising of a tree. The dynamics of this dialectical interaction is realized through the changing dynamics of that discriminated in that context of support (and/or interaction). Identity is realized through relational contrast and changes in contrast realized in its gestation. Furthermore, its interdependence is also realized for-us as that identity-demarcated-by-us through such direct or indirect interactive discrimination. So, the tree is that seen as both similar and different from the ground of its support. Equally, a forest is seen as a group of individual trees within the confines of a certain area of land both defined by those trees being seen as close enough to each other to be defined as a forest. In that context an individual tree is both that different from the ground that supports it and the forest in which it appears to be an interdependent member. The individual tree is an emission from the soil through the disruption of currents that constitute that overall system of soil plus tree making biological material. In the dialectical destruction of the seed the tree sapling is born. In the destruction of living wood-material the trunk of the tree is enlarged, in the destruction of leaves the space is made at some time for the renewal of the same, etc. Through living dialectical interdependence the tree is born and the forest is grown. Into the world the tree is emitted and the forest is equally emitted when those trees that grow close together can create their own differential micro-climate, etc. If the tree was purely dependent upon the ground it could not be a tree. Then, if it were completely independent of the ground it could not grow (if no other medium for its growth is in place for it like the sides of a cliff, a hydroponic medium, etc.). I would like to argue that chaotic mechanisms are in play for this creation of a semi-independence of identity both at the level of its support and/or its manner of interaction. I walk into a forest and focus upon one tree. That tree is different from the other trees by not being the other trees, and, equally, is not the ground that supports it. Through such differentials the tree is emitted and regarded as different from that soil and that forest and at the same time as a part of that environment that brought it into existence and which allowed us to find ourselves being in interaction with it. How is this possible? How could it be otherwise?! (581)

	Into this tension between the-being-a-part-and-the-being-apart we find ourselves being allowed to discriminate these items like soil, tree, forest, etc. Such discrimination never being able to absolutely isolate their discriminative focus since that under focus is always that focused upon in the medium of that field of focus. Without that contrast of the field there could not be that focused upon as non-absolutely, i.e., relatively, different from that field. This interdependence of relative identity in effect being simulated by the nature of the field focused upon. Its re-iteration re-establishing the nature of that being relatively discriminated as both a-part-and-apart from that field of focus either in terms of its support and/or interaction. Now, as there can be no absolute demarcation between ‘support’ and ‘interaction’ its follows that support-is-engaged-through-our-interaction, and v.v. Hence the range of both possible supportive and interactive discriminations of ‘forest’, ‘half a forest’, ‘an individual tree’, ‘the forest floor’, ‘the soil beneath an individual tree’, etc. Now, all these simulated/re-simulated isolated points of focus oscillate between these two idealities of support and interaction. An interaction needs some form of relative support, and, some form of support is realized through the appropriate lens of interaction. Into this phenomenal-phenomenological continuum identity is emitted as that-there-for-us. Even in the mis-interpretation of a mirage, e.g., or the visual hallucinations experienced by a psychotic individual this continuum between ‘support’ and ‘interaction’ is maintained. Now, no mirage is a complete mirage, only the element of a mis-perceived water, e.g., is mis-interpreted. The rest of the landscape is correctly interpreted relatively speaking. Or, similarly, in a visual hallucination the integrity of its imagery is proportionally dependent upon the gestalt integrity of the person experiencing the visual hallucination. A loss of integrity and that image is experienced as surreal and not so real as a consequence. While, a vivid, non-surreal image implies that our powers of appreciation are such so as to find ourselves in a position to equally appreciate the self-constructed nature of that imagery, as an image alone created by our own self. Although at no stage implying the completely self-constructed nature of that imagery, etc. In other words, even the interactively ‘based’ hallucination has a support in the non-hallucinatory, i.e., our sense of self, our perception of the world, our expectations of the phenomenally oriented and phenomenologically oriented. For-us there can be no pure hallucination, and, equally, no pure, non-discriminated object-under-focus. Nor should we misconstrue this type of phenomenological attitude, as outlined in the course of this extended essay, as implying that there can be no existence of an object-state without our interactive support… a transcendental phenomenology privileges neither the intentional subject nor the intentional object (nor the intentional field etc.). Obviously, all textual elements like forests, trees, etc., are operating in their appropriately associated meta-textual fields and can only that-there-for-us in a corresponding phenomenal-phenomenological manner as intended (in and through those correctly corresponding hermeneutic circles of comprehension)…. (582)

	What establishes interdependence of identity? An asymmetry of power relations! An asymmetry ‘experienced’ moment by moment; an asymmetry ‘experienced’ through ‘resistance’ wherein the relative emission of interdependent identity is discharged (in accordance with the nature of that field and its intentional appreciation). That, in the same way, in general terms of reference, the experience of the Divine must also be engendered from both ‘its side/s’ and ‘our side/s’ of this equation (in the same manner all forms of identity might be discerned along with their associated senses of self involved in that type of experience regardless of the existence or non-existence of its theological implication). What are the implications of this position in this regard? (583)

	Although the apparent unity of the Life-World can be treated as implicating a theologicalization of the sense of World at no stage could it involve the absolute totalization of  the World. The emission of theological identity, regardless of its specification, must always be within the context of a theological field. That such identification is supported by that field through both its dialectical differentiation and integration. Moreover, on that basis it must reflect the relational nature of its interactive-support and supporting-interaction and hence its conformity with all senses of the relational. That, with the aid of the right interpretative perspective/s the theological imprint upon the relational, and v.v., should be able to be discerned generally, particularly and specifically… if it be the case that this theological attitude is right and we have the ability to appreciate such discrimination? But, then, surely our appreciation that the world is and remains the same world both for our-self and for-others would imply that we must ‘already be half-way there’ to the same extent that we have already appreciated this degree of integrity associated with our experience of the World… a differentiated complexity-of-world in an integrated world-of-complexity! The very dialectics of being in the world co-establishing these parallel senses of a differentiated-integrity and an integrated-differentiation… the ‘space’ between these two aspects simulating the chaotic instantiation of that under simulation as that-being-simulated… i.e., an interdependence of being/s…. (584)

	With ‘what’ or ‘whom’ is there this phenomenal-phenomenological sense of simulation as ‘that’ experienced ‘by-us’? Since both absolute dependence and absolute independence are ruled out simulation/s must be experienced in an interdependent experiential sense of ‘space’, i.e., in an interdependent sense of experience. The implication being that both a reductive materialism and a synthetic idealism must be equally dismissed as possibilities in the establishment of experience itself! On the other hand, interdependence does not rule out the apparent emission of identity, the establishment of asymmetrical relationships (as currents) and presentation/re-presentation of systematic simulations/re-simulations within a non-totalized, overall-like field of a systematic realm of support, i.e. the Life-World. In other words, through emptiness the experience of identity and the identity of experience cannot be reduced either to an experience of absolute substance/s nor an experience of absolute field/s nor that experienced as an absolute sense of self/set of selves/an overall sense of self, etc! Thence the simulation/re-simulation of identity, etc. Thence the very experience of an embodied-sense-of-self-in-a-sense-of-world; a chaotic experience of world in a chaotic world of beautiful complexity whose beauty is the very sine qua non of an ongoing processes of resolution in and through processes of re-alignment! (585)

	The dialectical processes engendered in support and/or interaction dictating our perception of this semblance of a simulated/re-simulated interdependence in both manner and degree. If we were to stand on a bridge over a river in the middle of a forest we might observe a ‘forest on the right-hand side’ and a ‘forest on the left-hand side’. But, on the top of a mountain in one of those ‘forests’ we might see those ‘two forests’ as but ‘one forest’, the same ‘forest’. Obviously, in some measure how we nominate the that-to-be-nominated decides how that received in interaction is to be viewed. On the other hand no reception can be purely self-created (as just argued). Hence dialectical processes engendered in both support-and-interaction will determine how we receive a certain state of affairs as that nominated ‘state-of-affairs’. This is an important point to recognize since the simulated/re-simulated appearance of interdependence is being viewed through such an ideological grid. Given this pre-conditional re-writing on our part we must ask to what extent any semblance of interdependence can find any degree of an interdependent objectivity in the Life-World? Or, then again, any recognition of a shared degree of communication answers that question for us. Indeed, interdependence of identity impresses itself upon us, individually and collectively, with varying degrees of definitiveness which in turn, usually, is a close measure of this natural degree of an objective interdependence, an existential fact reinforced through re-iteration (be that subjective and/or intersubjective). I am walking though the bush and see a snake. I blink and still see that same snake. Or, a friend sees it first and then I see it. Iteration of the same or similar experience reinforces its apparent objectivity in those fields of endeavour. The point I am making here is that interdependence of identity as a phenomenon is always an objective phenomenon to some degree or other (to the same extent it is subjective [and might possibly also implicate a direct intersubjectivity although always implicating an indirect intersubjectivity meta-textually]). Hence interdependence of identity always impresses itself upon us with a certain quantitative degree which through its phenomenal distinctness and uniqueness must also impress itself upon us with a certain qualitative sense of existence. Hence this phenomenal-phenomenological experience of apparent interdependence. (586)

	The reader might now ask this type of question: why this talk of simulation/re-simulation? Given this deconstruction of absolute dependence and absolute independence as states of affairs that are both impossible to engage phenomenologically and recognize phenomenally, and an insistence on the direct engagement in processes of interaction, why do I insist on these expressions of ‘simulation’/‘re-simulation’? First, identity is always constructed, i.e., thematized. Second, such processes of thematization are always conducted in and through their appropriate hermeneutic circles of engagement. Third, despite this directness of interaction between all parties in that same process of interaction, such ‘contact’ is neither seen as if through windows nor touched as if by means of the contact of, between or with ‘substances’. However, as these processes are processes of thematization it is through re-iteration that they are intentionally fixed in intentional consciousness, both subjective and intersubjective in orientation, and, allowed to return though processes of a re-iteration of those ‘iterations’ in act of memory or expectation, etc. Lastly, it is only through an emptiness of identity that there can be process of engagement whether that be subjectively, intersubjectively and/or objectively oriented in flavour. For the very same types of reasons that a classical theism or deism was dismissed for not being a viable theological philosophy for those same philosophical reasons we must equally dismiss all concepts that metaphorically invoke independent substances (realism/s) and all concepts that invoke one type of an independent substance (idealism/s)! In their place we should find the broad concept of an interdependence of identity within a meta-interdependence of identity, etc. (as a reflection of the degree/s of epistemological organization discerned as present in that type of situation). (587)

	Now, given this non-substantial philosophy of interdependence we now need to ask how is this talk of the essential, albeit a relativity of the essential, i.e., the relatively essential, conducted? Surely, the phenomenological concept of the essential is antithetical to such a non-substantial philosophy, and v.v? Although not substantially grounded, epistemological organization (whether phenomenally oriented and/or phenomenologically oriented) is still essentially distinctive in the manner of its interactions, thence the thematization of apparent interdependence of identities by virtue of that organization. Hence the differential modal complexity, e.g., of “a rock ‘sitting’ on the ground” and “a person ‘sitting’ on the ground”, etc. Each interdependent relationship establishing its own interdependent sense of identity by virtue of the epistemological organization being phenomenal-phenomenologically reviewed in that generalization/particularization/specification of situation. Hence this phenomenal-pheno-menological appearance of the relatively essential nature of that relationship being interactively reviewed (either through simulation in a current sense of time and/or re-simulation through retrospective and/or prospective senses of time). (588)

	So, all identity is discerned through interdependence! The character of that interdependent identity is or should be a direct reflection of its apparent epistemological organization. This is the first moment of our hermeneutic circle. The second and third moments concern the hermeneutical meaning or work of that discerned in the relevant context of that interdependence of identity and the existential meaningfulness or value of that articulation of work. Adequately simulated/re-simulated in the relevant hermeneutic circle in and through an adequate overall-like transcendental suspension establishes the overall value of that system, an expression that is not to be confused with its existential meaningfulness. In order to not confuse these two types of different but interrelated value let me refer to the former as its existential value (and in the context of this philosophical project as theological value) and the latter as its realized value or expressed value (or just value). What role then does interdependence play in the phenomenal-phenomenological discernment of theological work and theological value? (589)

	Without this element of interdependence there could be no discernment either of theological work or theological value, but, as a theological mode of life already has a phenomenal-phenomenological existence in the religious life of many communities we must assume it could be discerned regardless of its imputed objective validity. Similarly, without this element of interdependence, there could be no discernment of theological identity regardless of the objective status of its imputed reality. As all three dialectical facets are expressed through a hermeneutic circle of (theological) comprehension it follows that theological ‘identity’ is realized through its jointly contrasting relationship to the two opposing poles of ‘work’ and ‘value’. Collectively, however, these three poles interact to meet-and-be-met with a specific specificity to those phenomena under review. Just how is it that we find certain meta-textual expectations are met, or, certain meta-textual expectations are not met, and, that new unexpected-expectations/expected-non-expectations evolve and are realized in this very matrix of our very being in this world-with-others? In other words, in this active-passive phenomenal-phenomenological partnership how is it that the specificity of the world is engaged in a simulated fashion that can be re-simulated in some form or other? Without change there could be no phenomena! Without phenomena there could be no change! Change cannot be absolute change – something must change. It is this psychic element of the discernment of interdependence that establishes this sense of continuity in discontinuity, v.v. The dialectical appreciation of this phenomenological aspect establishes both the relativity and the absolutivity of essence, our experience of the essential; i.e., its non-transcendental characteristics and its transcendental characteristics simultaneously. But, as the transcendental can only be re-claimed through a transcendental transformation of the relatively non-transcendental, and v.v., it follows that these two aspects are mutually dependent! They can neither write nor be written without being placed in some respect of the other! What are the implications for a proper, appropriate and valid understanding of this phenomenal-phenomenological concept of essence? (590)

	Oak trees are oak trees and do not grow like poplars. Oak trees and poplars are both types of ‘tree’. In my phenomenal-phenomenological reception of an oak tree or a poplar in an active sense I create the nominal distinctions of ‘tree’ and ‘oak tree’ or ‘poplar’. At the same time, as a passive partner, I find myself engaging with the specific specificity of that tree be in an oak, a poplar or a tree of some other variety. Now, it is the case that in our engagement with a certain phenomenon when we subtract our meta-textual expectations from its textualized specific specificity we then find ourselves meeting with a non-textual existential excess of value. The application/s of nominal distinctions demonstrating their own apparent degree of viability through the relative presence or absence of an existential excess arising from such application/s. Then, in and through the interactions of these strains of textuality, in a hermeneutic circle of comprehension, our not-textually oriented engagement with that phenomenon then allows us to posit its overall sense of a distinctive interdependence as that simulated by-us; this aspect of our experience in turn becoming textualized in its own right as that simulated as a complex simulation (as an existential excess) overflowing into, between and from a variety of modes (e.g., perhaps in the terms of the visual field, in a tactile form, as a memory, in brain chemistry, as a verbal report, a poem, etc., etc.). Created/re-created in this space between the transcendental and the non-transcendental we find a vision of essence that is capable of performing this function of dealing both with ‘the phenomenon of change’ and ‘that phenomenon which apparently changes’. In any other form, without this equal degree of transcendental balance, this delicate, yet very durable, dialectical state of affairs could not simulate/re-simulate this sense of essential stability in the very manifestation of experience in and through such processes of experiential change. This resultant phenomenologicalization of interdependence allows us to both engage a distinctive sense of world and find therein a distinctive panorama of object-states, a collection of our own senses of self nested within a qualified overall sense of self, other agents, and, indeed, a distinctive sense of the world itself as that-there-for-us. This engaged phenomenological sense of distinctiveness ensures both a transcendental reading of the non-transcendental and a non-transcendental reading of the transcendental. Obviously, as argued previously elsewhere, there can be no transcendentally appreciated sense of the transcendental as the sense of the transcendental is only revealed through a transcendental transformation of the relatively non-transcendental, and v.v! Thus in a critical phenomenal-phenomenological philosophy there can be no place for a concept of the essential that is merely transcendental (and relatively transcendent) in scope, and, equally, there can be no concept of the essential written merely in terms of the non-transcendental (and relatively immanent in orientation). Hence our essential appreciation of the world is accomplished through this invocation of a dialectical approach that both is generated in and through the triple facets of the hermeneutic circle and the double facets of the trans-transcendental-non-transcendental specificity of the Life-World (although, correctly, the essential orientation is realized through the relative, provisional privileging of both the transcendent/transcendental facet in the Epistemological Aspect of the Trans-Epistemological-Ontological characterization of the Life-World and the intentional object-state facet of the hermeneutic circle)! As a consequence of a recognition of the nature of the dialectical constitution of the interdependence of phenomenal-phenomenological essence let us no more speak of this subject in impossible to obtain, non-relationally derived terms of reference. Just as much as intentional object-states, etc., are neither absolutely dependent nor absolutely independent of their originating factors let us no more speak of the essential in metaphysical terms whose imputations involve impossible processes of reification and projection, when, the World is obviously already there-for-us… as that-there-before-us… to the same extent that we-must-stand-before-it!  That accepted, we must now ask how do we appreciate the variety of this distinctive, interdependent sense of essential specificity we will meet in our passage through this World-of-Life?  (591)

	Through a determination of ‘sense’ we find ourselves mapping the distinctive-essential nature of that currently being engaged! Obviously, this can be done, more or less, automatically as learnt through the realization of all relevant expectations, or, upon careful critical reflection (and the deliberate invocation of an adequate overall transcendental suspension). How might our phenomenal-phenomenological reflections be conducted? No doubt through a transcendental clarification to that extent possible. To this end let me supply the following technique in order to help provisionally explicate, more or less, how this occurrence is more intuitively realized in the practices of “such careful critical reflection”. The application of this technique acting as a provisional descriptive-prescriptive modeling of phenomenal-phenomenological reflection. (592) 

	The discharge of this technique involves determining the epistemological organization of that situation under examination, i.e., the distinctive nature of those interdependent phenomena being investigated in their appropriate context/s of origination. E.g., let us compare the following situations. A small boulder is dislodged by the elements from the face of a cliff. It falls from that cliff face, rolls for short while and then hits another round rock; bumping the latter a few feet across this field. A farmer sees this second rock rolling across this field as a result of it being bumped. This observation inspires them, a few moments later, to hit it with their boot and cause it to roll a few more feet across this field. This latter rock was twice ‘hit’; first, by a moving boulder and, second, by the impact of the farmer’s boot.  Between these two situations there is a considerable degree of difference in the degree of epistemological organization involved here. Now, I am not saying that there is a difference in the net complexity of either situation from a material point of view. However, what I would like to note is that from an intentional point of view there is a considerable difference between these two types of situation. In the latter instance there is the involvement of intentionality; the involvement of an agent whose epistemological organization is infinitely more complex that a mere boulder hitting a rock. In order to re-simulate this occurrence as a necessary precondition the addition of an agent is called for. Even though this round rock has been merely rolled a short distance across this field twice the latter occurrence involved the intentionality of an agent. An adequate re-simulation of this later occurrence cannot properly be conducted without the recognition of this necessary element of agency. Hence this latter situation is epistemologically more organized than the former and cannot be re-presented/represented without the recognition of this considerably more epistemologically organized participant. Two sorts of ‘hitting’ are involved here even though the net result, in these two instances, is little different.  (593)

	In this type of analysis, this determination of the epistemological organization of all relevant inputs, effectively only the bare minimum of information is called for. To achieve this we merely seek to re-present/represent that situation by recognizing the epistemological organization of those inputs and the overall epistemological organization of the relevant interactions involved in those transformations of state under examination. The exact degree of epistemological organization present in those inputs and those relevant transformations under examination is not called for. Neither, if should it be present, are intentional questions of motivation. Perhaps the farmer doesn’t know why he gave that rock a kick other than having seen it rolling along the ground and the fact that he enjoyed being able to do so... Effectively, this type of analysis is pre-conditional in orientation, and, one that divides inputs into intentionally disposed and non-intentionally disposed (along with a rough, intuitive appreciation as to what degree this intentional disposition is in effect when added as a relevant input). Then, merely noted is a consequential analysis that mirrors the interpretation adopted in our explication of the apparent dynamics of that situation. In the course of this re-presentation we effectively derive a mapped-out representation of that situation-currently-to-hand; these dynamic structures acting as the scaffolding for other additional forms of analysis, etc. (594)

	The brief explication of this technique accomplished we must now ask ourselves to what extent such an interpretation mis-interprets that type of situation to hand, and, as complexity cannot be determined in a linear fashion what role does it play in processes of phenomenal-phenomenological transformation? In other words, given this natural ‘ground’ of complexity to what extent complexity complicates such issues? (595)

	The farmer’s boot connects with that round rock. This rock is rolled a few more feet across the field. Although the intentional centre of this relationship is with the farmer, the very centre of this relationship is off-centered by virtue of their interaction, i.e., somewhere psychically between the farmer and the rock itself. Consequently, we now find that a more natural reading of this situation is taking on a chaotic complexion. As previously noted elsewhere, no situation can ever be in a simple state of an overall transcendental suspension or even the eventual movement towards the same. Instead, moment by moment, there is a shift from one (ideal) state of transcendental equilibrium to some other; in other words, from one centre to another but never passing/re-passing exactly through the same sense of centre (which must be re-constituted moment to moment and, therein, constitutes the psychic nature of that sense of the momentary [as the relatively elemental unit in the transmission of information]). Hence, in this state of continual de-centering the recognition and determination of epistemological organization should really be the recognition of an epistemologically organized complexion instead! What are the consequences and ramifications of this important concept (both non-theologically and theologically)? (596)

	Our previous concept of epistemological organization can retrospectively be treated as a relatively provisional concept. Subjected to a conceptual transformation in the light of a need to take on board a chaotic complexion in order to do a greater justice to the very nature of the phenomenal as phenomenologically appreciated we now have a concept that effectively operates in a new dimension of ideological discourse. The nature of this ideological discourse, in this instance, is the attempt to produce/re-produce a closer reading of the phenomenal in the light of its chaotic complexion with consequences and ramifications for the construction/re-construction of, among a wide range of applications, a process-oriented theological discourse, etc. As a result, for a start, the expression complexion now takes on two parallel senses, namely, that aspect that pervades a certain state of affairs in a certain orientation or manner, and, the implication of an element of chaotic complexity in the disposition of that same state of affairs. Hence, in this regard, the expressions theological complexion and epistemological organized complexion can both be read through the same type of lens. Now, what are some of the consequences of this ideological shift in perspective, and, what are the ramifications of such shifts? First, let me look at some of the implications of such a shift from the perspective of our hypothetical theological investigations (into the transcendental possibility of sense, meaning and meaningfulness that might be found resident in that topic)? (597)

	In the continual de-centering of all senses of a centre it follows that in any sense of the Divine proposed by a theologian the ascription of an absolute sense of centre must be denied! That such could neither be obtained nor recognized - neither recognized nor found obtainable! In the same manner no sense of person could operate. Hence no sense of person could speak with but one absolutely definitive sense of  voice. Equally, there can be no definitive set of absolutely definite voices since not one such voice could be found and recognized. However, the human person can speak and hence their speech must be the result of this de-centered sense of self-expression. In effect, as an overall-choir of de-centered voices… where no one ‘voice’ is absolute; where no one voice can be absolutely proposed and/or privileged although not without relative degrees of promotion and/or demotion; where a harmonization of ‘voices’ is realized through a succession of provisional centres… All this is best perhaps ‘captured’ in the concept of a choir (of provisional voices)? That, the overall ‘overall’ sense of voice is that voice being expressed though this sense of a choir… Obviously, this has profound ramification in the construction/re-construction of a theological enterprise (along with our understanding of the sense of person and personhood, response and responsibility, etc.). (598) 

	Recognition of this complex senses of complexion and the role de-centerings/re-centerings play in the dynamic re-constitution of the evolving relationship allows us to contemplate the nature of relational conformity, re-alignment and their possible implication of a theologicalization of the Life-world, and, therein, as a consequence, the complimentary implication of a role for theological conformity. Let me examine the nature of these conceptual relationships. (599)

	As previously shown, in a relationship between an agent and another relational participant, the centre of the relationship is emergently engendered between and outside those parties. Such a centre in being invoked becomes thematized to that same extent there is this re-interpretation of that relationship. It is not as if the parties had not existed in some sense or other prior to their being recalled in and through that specifically invoked relationship. Moreover, as each moment in the life of that relationship is de-stabalized moment to moment each moment could also be viewed as a re-stabalization of the dynamic equilibriums that foster its specific specificity (whether invoked or non-invoked). The net result on a relatively unique momentary basis  being that as it phenomenally/phenomenologically is passively allowed to appear/actively makes its own appearance before-us. That which assists this assists its relational conformity through processes of re-alignment. Because such processes of de-centering/re-centering and re-alignment are emergent phenomena hence their implication in a theologicalization of the Life-World by extrapolation! Thence the need for the recognition of a parallel concept of theological conformity – that extent infinite-like processes of de-centering/re-centering effectively collectively constitute a distinctive sense of world with a sufficient epistemologically organized complexion whose distinctive sense of integrity, etc., therein, would allow us to propose a viable concept of a theological-like continuity, etc., in conformity with this relatively relational basis… but let us explore in closer detail the ramifications of this ‘speculative’ process of transcendental extrapolation…. (600)

	It could be argued that finding ourselves in a world of interdependent identities is proof enough that we are living on this transcendental edge between dependence and independence, an emergent sense of world that is neither absolutely one nor absolutely many, i.e., relatively one yet multiform at the same time. A dialectical sense of world where no identity could have a purity of identity (since pure identity could be neither ontologically met nor epistemologically recognized). In such a world whence essence? How could the phenomenologist, for a start, discuss the concept of essence let alone find the same in their research? But, as already noted, interdependence of identity however unique is still true to type since interdependence is hierarchically structured, i.e., all forms of identity are epistemologically organized, or, more correctly, possess an epistemologically organized complexion, indeed, a hierarchically enstructured complexion! Phenomenal-phenomenological essence merely recognizes this dependence upon type in the formation of all processes of identity. Furthermore, replication of phenomenal or phenomenological identity implies an underlying stability of typology whose relative collective integrity must also realizes a sense of world, namely, this same world wherein such replication of interdependent identity is possible… the implication then being drawn that the relative collective integrity of the world through self-organization must be able to act to some extent as if the world possessed a theological complexion. Of course, this theological complexion may not be adequate for the religious purposes of a partisan theologian. But, then again, on the other hand, may be welcomed as the starting territory for the serious theologian seeking enough territory to establish a complimentary theology within its theoretically examined confines. Towards the definition of such a pursuit we must now ask what difference is made between the exercise of a relatively transcendental form of speculative extrapolation and a relatively non-transcendental form of speculative extrapolation? Our research takes on a satisfactory transcendental flavour or complexion whenever an adequate overall transcendental suspension is put in place! Moreover, it is only through the invocation of a transcendental point of view or perspective that the relatively essential can be engaged and recognized. So, engagement and/or recognition of an interdependence of identity is in and off itself already a sign that such research has a transcendental complexion, that, therefore it only behooves us to purify that transcendental complexion to clarify and validate the findings of our research in that field of endeavour currently adopted and being adapted. In this task, then, theology would be no different. Let me clarify the implications and ramification of this concept of what is meant by such critical transcendental treatment of our philosophical investigations. (601)

	In effect, the world is both theologically integrated and theological differentiated. This is implicit in our concept of interdependence wherein identity is neither absolutely one nor absolutely many, and, at the same time, is relatively one (or relatively integrated theologically) and relatively multiform (or relatively differentiated theologically). But the relatively integrated can only be appreciated through differentiation and its re-integration, and, at the same time, the relatively differentiated can only be appreciated through its integration and re-differentiation (as already argued per our meta-transformational treatment-retreatment philosophy). Hence it follows that the theological complexion of the Life-World must be both, simultaneously, an integrated-differentiation of the world and a differentiated-integration of the world. Now, the Life-World is epistemologically organized imply some degree of intentionality in some form or format or other. Hence, to that degree it is intentionally oriented it must deposit such intentionality upon the fabric of the Life-World. Thence reflecting these paralleled senses of integrated-differentiation/differentiated-integration. Thence it behooves us to adopt and adapt the appropriate forms of hermeneutic research in order to find revealed before-us to what degree and in what manner we are able to find the world does indeed possess a theological complexion, and, to what extent, such research can be given or cannot be given a religious aura… could be found to adequately ‘ground’ religious forms of theological work and value (regardless of whether there is a coincidence or non-coincidence with traditional forms of religious commitment?)? (602)

	But, if such is our theoretical findings just where can we start in order to critically assess this religious and/or non-religious re-alignment in a state of theological conformity with relational conformity? Exactly where our religious or non-religious pre-judgmental commitments might want us to start, namely, with what we already seem to know and also, at the same time, find puzzling! But, what helps us to escape our ontological and epistemological habits and commitments is none other than the ongoing adequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension. (603)

	Quite rightly the skeptic, or anyone else, should ask is our reasoning here merely circular and philosophically and theologically vicious? To what extent are we merely uncovering what has been covered up by our very own selves? To rebut this claim, assuming the effective invocation and imposition of an adequate overall transcendental suspension, is the recognition of the phenomenal-phenomenological fact that the hermeneutic circle need not be merely circular and vicious in its replication of solutions, resolutions, defusing of dilemmas, etc! The invocation and exercise of such a circle is always productive of an existential excess of value (in keeping with the nature of that invoked field of operation). As long as that excess is re-discovered as an excess greatly in advance of the degree of psychic capital invested then we are assured that our current investigations are relatively productive. Hence the hermeneutic circle need not be effectively vicious! Furthermore, its productivity can be quite in advance of that invested, and, through replication can be re-evaluated as to its transcendental merit (through the careful re-imposition of an adequate overall transcendental suspension). So much for theory? However, are we currently in a critical position to approach and appreciate this topic of the ramifications of such a perspective? Is a recognition of the specific specificity of this experience of interdependence, etc., enough to assist us in this hypothetical, yet critical, task of a transcendental(ly based process of) speculation? (604)

	To fully appreciate the consequences and ramifications of this concept of the relatively essential, and its instantiation in the relatively interdependent, let me examine more deeply how the confluence of various factors ensure the preservation of this sense of distinctive identity. For a start, what maintains this sense of identificational continuity? Those factors that ensure a trueness of type and a maintenance of that sense of type. The uniqueness of that identity, set of identities, gives us its sense – our location of its sense of place in our psychic cultural-intercultural mapping of the world. At the same time the meta-textual invokes under which genre/s of interpretative activity we will be allowed to find that sense of sense. As to those factors that ensure the maintenance of a sense of continuity we must invoke our theoretical concept of existential descriptors – those factors that ensure the distinctive continuity and preservation of type along with a sense of the simulated uniqueness of that identity – like ‘threads’ or ‘streams’ woven and unwoven through time and space, virtual and or non-virtual in orientation, a complex of factors that are pre-conditionally strand together to fabricate a distinctive sense of identity until enough of those strands are separated and/or severed and/or not replaced with the resultant transformation of a new sense of identity/identities along with a loss of that sense of former uniqueness and/or overall typological conformity. Our philosophy of identity recognizing the collective import of these three interrelated concepts of the relatively essential, the relatively interdependent and existential descriptors. The fourth concept of the empty/ emptiness, recognizing that all substantial senses of identity are interdependently simulated/re-simulated in distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological frames of reference and not otherwise, i.e., as non-absolute presentations/re-presentations and not as absolutistic representations! (605)

	The simulation/re-simulation of a relatively stable sense of world ensures, and is ensured by, the preservation and evolution of that epistemological organized complexion and its associated field/s under examination. So, an oak tree becomes an oak tree, and, the human child develops their humanity in accordance with those factors that will assist them in the course of their development. As asked: what implications does this type of philosophy have for our hypothetical theological investigations, if at all? Obviously, if all forms of identity are dependent upon their associated fields, and v.v., and those fields in turn are dependent upon their associated meta-fields, and v.v., does not such organization cast a bright light on this emergent, process-oriented sense of the Divine, albeit a sense of divinity as conducted in this critical, hypothetical frame of reference as defined by these investigations? Cautiously, one must give one’s provisional assent to such a proposition since it does appear that the apparent stability of the world, that there is a world of relativity to find oneself engage within, the maintenance of personal integrity, the fact of intersubjectivity, existential richness of engaged interaction, the possibility of existential expression in the Life-World, etc., all seem to point to such a conclusion? Would one be right here? Through the natural limitation of the human condition all we can do here is critically assess, to that extent possible, the relative merits of this proposition in the comparative light of its counter-proposition (that the world has no theological compelxion)? (606)

	Obviously, there is a world; otherwise if our opponent were to argue the opposite they could, quite rightly be ignored, since, if they truly believed that position of theirs, they would not be able to argue for it in the first place with-us before-us! However, the protagonist in this argument, they who argue for the existence of an apparent world, must also recognize and operate within certain critical limitations beyond which they too cannot transgress, namely, accepting the semblance of world that is process oriented, emergent, empty, and fully consistent with a phenomenal-phenomenological vision of the Life-World that implies the directness of all forms of relations, an epistemologically organized complexion, an absence of absolute dichotomies (like the internally inconsistent concepts of internal worlds versus external worlds, empirical correlates, etc.), etc. That accepted, we must then ask how can we maintain an argument that preserves the middle ground of this debate and ensures that it is neither eternalistic nor nihilistic in tenor? As previously argued I have denied the viability of arguments that maintain either an absolute vision of the absolute or a relative vision of the relative. All semblances of identity, whether observed or merely argued about, can only enter into some form of a phenomenological existence through the relative transformation of the absolute and/or the absolute transformation of the relative. In other words, a denial respectively of the eternalistic vision of ‘the absolute vision of the absolute’, and, of the nihilistic vision of ‘the relative vision of the relative’! Basically, significance is only generated through relational difference or differing and, that, meta-terms of reference can never be identical to non-meta-terms of reference (automatically by definition), and v.v. Hence the non-acceptance of a doctrine of self-representation (wherein certain terms of reference are appreciated in exactly those same terms of reference, and, where the appreciation of certain terms of reference by other terms of reference can only result in processes of relative mis-representation (but, which, in time, can be defused through processes of de-misrepresentation)! (607)

	The consequences of such a vision is the type of philosophy of interdependence, etc., as outlined above. As for a reception of its ramifications that is a task that would involve our eternal tweaking of the consequences inherent in the dialectical ‘space’ between the mix of such ideas and those additional ideas that also are found to emerge from such a natural complexity of ideation. Much of the remainder of this extended essay will deal such issues. (608)

	For a start, we could argue that epistemological organization is an organized complexion that is just ‘one’ complex, i.e., that which completely corresponds with the world, i.e., the Life-World. All interdependent identity is an identity that is there-for-us in the one-World-of-Life. An identity that is both never absolutely independent of other identities nor absolutely dependent. In other words the essential-like nature of identity is map-able being already mapped in ‘a’ complex of identity, namely, our linguistic configuring of the Life-World (through an explication of the transcendental identity already established as possible in such a frame of reference). Hence the determination of sense but never the absolute determination of sense! Moreover, this also implies the simultaneous possibility of the determination of both meaning and meaningfulness since the latter pair mutually co-define sense as all three facets of the hermeneutic circle mutually co-define each other, and not otherwise! So, in the pursuit of an examination of the such ramifications let me continue to critically extrapolate the implications apparently embedded in this process of transcendental speculation. (609)

	Furthermore, the relative complexity of that part of the epistemological organization under examination is reflected in the corresponding nature of that complexity. So, the complexity of a stone is non-vegetative and non-intentional as generally understood, e.g. On the other hand, a cabbage is epistemologically more complex than a  mere stone (regardless of the fact that the entire information entailed in the specific structure of a specific stone is still too complex to record let alone intuit by some means or other. On the other hand, our engagement with another identity, as discerned intentionally on our part, is essentially abbreviated to a degree that is both practicable and applicable in that specific engagement (regardless of whether it is either realized non-virtually or virtually)! That is the nature of both re-simulation and re-simulation since to simulate the entirety of information entailed in a certain identity in a certain context as perceived from a certain intentional attitude could never be contemplated either idealistically or realistically. All that is necessary is an essential pragnatz of that situation to hand and no more. Information more than that merely leads to a confirmation of our current understanding of that identity and no more (unless a radical reconfiguration of our understanding of that identity were to ensue as a result of such a deeper engagement with the supporting process of that identity). The brackish taste of salty water is already understood once we have determined its essential nature to be salty. Additional inputs along these lines are essentially redundant! What other ramifications can be discerned in this process of investigation? (610)

	The specific nature of an identity is experienced on a specific level of information. Similarly, the general nature of an identity is experienced on a general level of identification, and, the particular nature of an identity is experienced on a particular level of identification. E.g., matter is experienced in a material mode; a tree is experienced as a tree in its particularity as a tree (and in the particularity of its species), and, the specific nature of that tree is experienced as that specific tree as shaped in that specific manner as a tree of a certain type within the uniqueness of its existential history. In this there is nothing unusual. But, if we were to regard the entirety of experience as occurring within this open-ended epistemologically organized complex called the Life-World, then, obviously, where we are in this natural scheme of things is where we are in terms of the nature of our involvement and in this we must recognize relatively incomprehensible shifts in engagement between different emergent levels of epistemological organization despite all forms of engagement as occurring within the same Life-World! Let me look into this phenomenon more closely. (611)

	This principle can be applied to emergent structural-processes as entailed within the Life-World. E.g, dealing with a material identity, say a rock, we find ourselves (more naturally) engaging it in a material mode (by virtue of the material nature of physical embodiment) (and by virtue of the fact that the most existential value to be gained is in and through a material mode). In a subtle difference when we are engaged with a tree or the grass we are dealing with it in its vegetative state (as well as with it in a material mode). Then, dealing with an animal, say a cat or dog, we find ourselves engaging it as an animal (and also as a living state of affairs and as a materially embodied state of affairs). In our engagement with another living person we meet the intentional nature of that embodied subject (beside other relatively less organized features like its materiality, etc.). Now, in our transcendental speculations, it must be ‘safe’ for us to ‘speculate’ on the complex nature of theological or theological-like forms of engagement given the adequate and critically conducted imposition of an overall transcendental suspension !? Hypothetically, such forms of experience, if available, would take the form of that which is super-intentional since the complex nature of Divine experience must be relatively more complex in its epistemological complexion than that of a human subject, etc. On the other hand, because the Divine is treated as that which emerges from an intentional level of organization it would seem safe to speculate to what extent Divine intentionality might also involve such a basis albeit one overlaid by its super-intentional origins? That hypothetical position granted, what implications might be observed in reverse? E.g., although the Divine is super-intentional in its epistemological organization to what extent might the intentional formation of prayers be received as prayers qua prayers in the process, albeit, initially, on a primitive, intentional level of reception? Of course, in non-hypothetical terms of reference this task of discernment would be one for the theologian and/or their congregation to determine? What has been suggested here is just such a mechanism that could be adopted and adapted for this type of task? Without wishing to convert this process of transcendental speculation, and its possibilities, to a process of mere speculation let us resist the temptation of crossing out the transcendental nature of those investigations (in lieu of existential evidence that might allow us to cross from the theoretical and hypothetical to the practical let us merely note this type of possibility). No doubt a number of other theological(-like)-experiential features could be subsumed under the same type of modeling? Let us now look more closely at a particular consequence of this approach, namely, the possibility of a Divine response-responsiveness-responsibility, albeit in a hypothetical mode (as critically exercised under the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension?). (612)

	In the previous chapter I discussed the concept of a trans-situational-objective state of authenticity and gave, as a hypothetical example, the existentially conducted practice of prayer to a Divine entity that actually existed whose actual(ized) nature included the ability to receive prayer (and, who, hopefully, is also able to respond in an appropriate religious(-like) manner?)? What are the pre-conditions that would be entailed here? (613)

	Since prayer is formulated in intentional terms of reference one would hope that its reception would be received, and hopefully responded to in a desired manner, in the same or similar fashion? Regardless of whether that is the case or not, in part or in whole, in hypothetical terms of reference what pre-conditions could be envisaged here? For a start, there must be some form of relational reciprocity. Prayer conducted in a one-way direction is not ‘prayer’ in its fullest sense. In essence, one or more agents is/are praying, in the form of an address or similar, to one or more other agents (that are more advanced in the complexion of ‘their’ epistemologically organization). In the context of our hypothetical theological project to date could this expectation be possibly met? I believe that this expectation is both reasonable and one that we would hope could be met. As already argued, the Divine in a process philosophy is realized through emergence in such a manner that an intentional stratum could be preserved for that type of purpose. On the other hand reciprocity might demand an intentional-like response that response need not be, nor could be, exactly symmetrical in that regard. In the philosophical problem of ‘the mother’s love for her child’ not being symmetrical with ‘the baby’s love for the mother’ the phenomenon of love here is still regarded as the ‘same’ regardless of its intentional direction and the intentional manner of its formulation and expression. A similar situation would need to prevail here since the two distinctive forms of agency implied are not in this process of prayer even closely symmetrical. One would speculate any divine response would, must involve, a super-intentional component by virtue of the nature of Divine existence/s as per its definition as being qualitatively in advance, by a dimension or two, than the level and manner of epistemological organization as possessed by the human agent/s. As the Divine complexion, by definition, is and must be more sophisticated than the human complexion it follows that its integrated responsiveness, should it be present, must be accordingly, although, part of that response could still be formulated and expressed on an intentional level (with or without a super-intentional aspect?). Still, if enacted on a super-intentional level of epistemological organization it follows its overall expression should reflect that degree of complexity, hence the implication of the super-intentional (either directly and/or indirectly). It follows that this super-intentional aspect could only be expressed and/or received on an intentional level through some process of (inter-dimensional) translation (just as three dimensional clouds cast two dimensional shadows on the ground, e.g.). It could be speculated that this super-intentional translation could be augmented in and through its intentional foundations (on the grounds that complexity is advanced through relatively less advanced components or elements being arranged in and through combinations and/or permutations in corresponding fields of increasing complexity that in turn may or may not radically impinge upon and alter the parts played by such elements hence its re-expression on different levels of its relative foundational enstructuralization). But this (embryonic) philosophy of response necessitates that responsiveness, in some form or other, is inevitable?! Let us examine this concept of responsive necessity. (614)

	In the light of the above it would be reasonable to assume that if I kick a rock that that rock should kick back. But a rock doesn’t have legs to kick back. Still, there is a reaction with every action. However, the response of the rock is passive in this regard. Are we allowed to perceive such passivity, or such activity when present, as essentially pure, i.e., as purely passive or purely active? As I have already argued: a pure state of affairs (in this sense) could be neither met (ontologically) nor recognized (epistemologically)! The rock may not ‘kick back’ still its inertia implies a reaction to the act of kicking that will have some impact upon the foot that did kick that rock. Without a shoe that foot might have damaged itself. With a boot on that piece of foot equipment might be scuffed in the process, etc. The transformation of that rock from a stationary state of affairs to a position of movement consequently is not without this degree of ‘mutual’ reciprocity. I address a friend and speak to them in their own language. Even if they do not reply, in knowing them to be awake I must assume they have understood my address to them. Their response was one of a no-response. Then, again, they may merely smile or nod their head. In the comparative situation of praying to the Divine (in some form or other) one assumes that the act of prayer could be received and responded to in some form or fashion (even if it includes the non-responsive response of an act of non-response). What right have we to assume the possibility of a response in any form (even including an act of non-response)? If prayer is treated as a form of address, and that address can be received in some form or other, then should we treat the possibility of a response as (approximately) symmetrical, non-symmetrical or completely absent (absolutely). In our argument to date the obvious reply would be the middle option of a responsiveness that is non-symmetrical. In the framework of our hypothetical theological project to date let me argue for the above on transcendental grounds (with all the qualifications that also must ensue). (615)

	In addressing the Divine, in the light of our hypothetical project, one should be able to argue on transcendental grounds, that there must be a non-symmetrical response in some form or other to some extent or other! Whether in a religious frame of reference such a response is adequate or not is another matter. Let me argue for this tentative position through the following arguments. To begin let me note that as the Divine subsumes, through emergence, all lesser levels of relative epistemological organization one must assume that its emergent complexion must, in some form or other, express the same at that level of organization and all other levels through processes of translational expression. What is meant by this concept? E.g., I form the idea of moving my leg. I go for a run, a long run of say one hour. As a result of running I have accumulated various by-products of such muscular activity (such as lactic acid, e.g.). The signs of such by-products being a feeling of slight discomfit in my leg muscles (the degree of discomfit reflecting my fitness and the degree of exercise entered into in that hour of relatively excessive activity, etc). So my intention of going for a run has expressed itself upon how I am experiencing my body after that run by virtue of the fact that that act of running has left an effect upon my musculature. An intentional act is always accompanied by multi-modal streams of co-deposition (footprints on the sand, memories, chemical reactions, feeling of tiredness in my body, etc., etc.). Hence these forms of translational expression (as co-depositions). All forms of co-deposition being expressed through their corresponding forms of textual depositional. Hence the intentional act of prayer must leave in its wake a co-depositional set of traces. As these traces are traced out upon the metaphorical body of the world they are also traced out upon the metaphorical body of the Divine, assuming a process-emergent definition of the same. Thus it follows that acts of prayer must be enregistered upon the fabric of the world and thence the metaphorical body of the Divine since the later subsumes all humans and their institutions, along with their direct and indirect foundations in the form of bodies, the worlds they live within, etc., etc. Now, it follows that although an act of prayer may not be registered as an act of prayer still that very act itself will trace itself out upon the emergent fabric of the Divine (as by definition, etc.). Now, it follows that despite the presence or absence of that intentional act being registered as that intentional act still such activity will be enregistered upon the being of the Divine by virtue of its subsuming such instances along with its co-depositions. Next, I would like to argue for the necessary non-symmetrical responsiveness of such activity in its enregistering (regardless of whether it was actively registered intentionally and/or super-intentionally). Because we cannot envisage meeting with or recognizing that which could have no responsiveness it follows that responsiveness must be a given in some form or other, or more correctly, various forms or other (by virtue of this concept of a multi-modal co-deposition of intentional activity as parallel co-textual traces). Then, as no two agents are identical it follows that this necessary state of responsiveness must be non-symmetrical! Thus, given the definition of the Divine as proposed, as a possibility it follows that on these ‘transcendental grounds’ (of sheer possibility) that prayer must be enregistered although not necessarily registered, that there must be a series of parallel co-responses to such multi-modal co-depositions, and, that as there is a manifest non-symmetry between the relatively intentional and the relatively super-intentional it follows that such reciprocity, such responsiveness must be non-symmetrical. But, as already noted, in religious terms of reference that responsiveness may well be ‘found’ not to be adequate, as inadequate, or, effectively, as not recognized, not recognizable, etc. That being the case, what right have I to judge this necessary, non-symmetrical process of a multi-modal reciprocity as an act of ‘Divine responsiveness’, and, furthermore, what right have I to judge such argumentation as ‘transcendental’ in orientation? (616)

	Let me deal with the second question first. Why is this process judged transcendental in complexion? The transcendental is approached through the imposition of an adequate overall transcendental suspension. An argument is judged transcendental in complexion when its possibility is judged as transcendentally necessary. E.g., a Euclidean triangle is a three-sided figure on a two dimensional plane in a Euclidean geometry. This necessity being both analytical and synthetical, respectively, by virtue of its co-definitional equivalence and to the extent that it can be envisaged in intentional consciousness! In this our definition of the divine is as a process of emergence that subsumes human organization in a level of epistemological complexity relatively greater than that demonstrated by either a person or as an organization or institution of the same. Furthermore, deposition is also assumed to be a process of deposition within the process-being of the Divine, and, that super-intentional processes subsume intentional processes, and v.v through processes of translation, and, that there can be no process of activity without a set of corresponding reactions, and, that there can be no process of an intentional address without some form of a response (albeit without implying the necessary existence of a religious frame of reference that is adequate in religious terms of reference). Hence this minimal theological concept of a Divine responsiveness. (617)

	Essentially, this complex argument revolves around the transcendent(ally necessary) fact that there can be no purity of state in any form since the same could be neither ontologically engaged nor epistemologically recognized. Hence this argument that prayer, on these transcendental grounds, is met in a non-symmetrical frame of responsiveness that may or may not be religiously adequate in the light of religiously formulated expectations… hence the essential outline of this transcendental or transcendental-like argument to this effect, even if this argument here is only minimally treated in a sketched-out form for the sake of the theologian, etc. Its full transcendental flavour being preserved and brought out when the same is conducted in and through an adequate transcendental suspension (that neither demands the full presence nor the full absence of those non-transcendental expectations, etc!)! (618)

	In the converse direction we have the topic of providence, i.e., divine intervention in some form or other that is either non-subjectively focused or subjectively directed, the latter being either subjective and/or intersubjective in scope. Through processes of self-organization on and from a perspective of greater epistemological organization we have intentionally-like directed intervention in the historical unfolding of the world from the receptive perspective of that subjected to such apparent re-direction of activity be that non-intentional and/or intentional in nature. E.g., just as the deciduous tree and its loosing of leaves in Autumn is a phenomenon orchestrated by the systematic and integrated nature of that tree so too could this analogy be called forth as a metaphor for this ideal concept of theological providence. As to when, approximately, that tree should loose its leaves, etc. Unlike non-deciduous trees (to some extent?) the trees orchestrates the stages of the life-cycle of its leaves in a collective pattern, namely, their being shed in Autumn. The collective shedding of leaves implies, in part at least, that the source of this phenomenon must lie outside the leaf itself; the loss of each leave being a non-exactly determined, chaotic phenomenon whose demise is expressed in the form of a probability whose function, it would seem, more or less, must apply to all those other leaves. As noted by the above definition, providential intervention, real or virtual, is either non-subjectively oriented towards physical processes in the world and/or epistemological processes of subjective/intersubjective intentionality. Now, to some extent, a bolt of lightening could fall under the first aspect, and, an act of religious or non-religious inspiration or insight could fall under the second aspect on either a subjective or intersubjective basis. Thus, in this manner, I have carved out the systematic hypothetical ideality of this topic. It would be the task of the theologian to thematize this topic in the light of their own religious imperatives or speculations; providing, when and where possible, transcendental or transcendental-like arguments for such definitions, etc., are properly, appropriately and validly supplied (i.e., adequately). Of course, whether such interventions actually constitute the implication of a theological or theological-like complexion that falls within the traditional or non-traditional compass of expected or speculated religious practice is another matter (and is correctly, in practical terms at least, the province of the  theologian/s and their congregations, etc. (619)

	In the form of an ideal demonstration how would one go about the formulation of a transcendental or transcendental-like argument for providential intervention? Without a doubt such techniques are not just the province of a theologian, etc. Their critical formulation and/or appreciation remain within the preserve of the expertise of the critical philosopher (without excluding the non-philosopher). (620)

	The possibility of a self-organized emission of activity onto a lower level of epistemological organization is already in evidence in the form of a lightening strike, e.g., etc. Therefore, the possibility of a re-direction of activity in the form of an emission from any level of epistemological organization to a lower level of organization. Hence the possibility of a theological or theological-like emission of directed activity in the form of an intervention whose consequence effectively is the direction/re-direction of chaotic activity (in moments of bifurcation). Granted the possibility that there can be no form of pure possibility alone it implies, therefore, in some form or other, in some manner or other, the ‘qualified actuality' of a theological or theological-like act of providence…. (621)

	Could the theologian, and their congregations, take any comfort from this transcendental(-like) argument, and, if so, what practical advice might they be able to deduce from such formulations portending such actualized-possibilities and possibilities of actualization? To stretch my primary metaphor further, if we want to be hit by a bolt of lightening we go outside into the presence of the storm should it be present. There we stand on higher ground, wear metal, ensure we are not insulated from the earth, and wait for our hair to stand on end… thence be struck, etc. Conversely, if we don't want to be struck by lightening we follow an opposite set of rules, ensuring therein our greater safety in that storm. Similarly, in the matter of prayer traditional and non-traditional practices would seem to call for a clarification of motivation and intentional expression of the same, repetition, intentional reinforcement of that prayerful act through ritual, intensity of need, its aesthetic investment, a synchronized multi-modal approach involving all the senses, various concepts of sacrifice, greater epistemological integration of intentional consciousness, etc., etc. For our purposes such suggestions being considered from a hypothetical point of view, whereas, for the theologian, they can make of them what they will although their formulations in these matters should attempt to remain as complimentary expressions rather than as supplementary considerations. Hence the necessity of the invocation of a continual and adequate overall transcendental suspension! (622)

	Between these general, hypothetical, yet transcendental, concepts of the apparent ‘power of prayer’ and ‘providential intervention’ we would naturally charter the hypothetical nature of Divine interaction, i.e., ‘the interaction we might be able to have with the Divine’ and ‘the interaction that the Divine might be able to have with us’ assuming the qualified actuality of the Divine in some form or other. The perfect metaphor of this ‘interaction’ is that of embodiment. As an embodied person in the world we find ourselves intentionality embedded in our-being-in-this-world in such a manner that experience of this world seems to flows backwards and forwards from-the-world-to-us and from-us-to-the-world in such a manner that our embodiment is forever mutually embedded and enriched in this cross-relationship; this relationship that naturally crosses different levels of epistemological complexity in the hierarchical organization of our intentional experience of being embodied-in-this-world, in an embodiedment that is forever-with-others (as experienced textually, meta-textually and non-textually, and, collectively in and through the semblance of that experienced not-textually), etc. (623)

	So, e.g., I decide to raise my arm and automatically lift my arm, or, e.g., my bare feet stand on something hot or sharp causes me to jump and remove myself from that spot. The first type of example mirroring this hypothetical concept of providential intervention wherein the macroscopic can influence the microscopic, and, the second type of example mirroring the microscopic power of prayer to influence the macroscopic ‘world at large’ albeit, therein, treated as some sense of the Divine; etc. For these two mutually connected concepts to function a middle ground of the asymmetrically interactive is assumed along with a panoply of speculative sub-concepts and their implication of sub-metaphors. E.g., how do we explain, metaphorically, the nature of the interaction between various levels of epistemological organization except through concepts like induction, instantiation, projection, translation, emanation, etc., etc. All such terminology obviously being importable to or exportable from a theology dealing with such issues (no doubt being the practical raison d’être for such an exercise to the extent that such explanations are to model patterns of religious behaviour in this world and other religious concerns). However, at this point let me now return to ask the question “to what extent is our minimal theologicalization of the Life-World, that granted for the sake of argument, actually theological in complexion (as traditionally understood in a more ‘religious’ frame of reference) and not merely theological-like?” (624)

	To begin with let us note the use of the transcendental argument that as no form of absolute identity can exist or not exist reality can only reside between such impossible to obtain polarities, thence the impossibility, e.g., of either absolute (or ‘pure’) possibility or absolute impossibility, and, the impossibility of either absolute (or pure’) actuality or absolute non-actuality. That being the case, what is possible cannot be dismissed as a pure possibility, thence its existence in some form or other. Of course what that existence ‘is’ needs to be defined in terms of reference that are either open or closed. Thus the possibility of the Divine implies by this transcendental argument that the Divine must exist in some form or other, of course what that ‘existence’ is needs to be further refined (and this is a task for the theologian and their philosophical critics, etc.). In our First Volume of Essay we have spelt out the fact that such a concept does make sense, i.e., is possible, hence its ‘existence’ in some form or other (in the sphere of this transcendental dialectic). Now, we should ask what evidence is there for this ‘existence’ since it could well be the case that the reality of the concept of the Divine only exists in the cultural sphere of the religious (just as Santa Claus, e.g., only exists in this mythical sense and through enactments of that cultural myth as in, e.g., department stores in a periods of time just before Xmas, as images on Xmas cards, etc.)? As already argued, the sense of the Divine that has been tentatively proposed is one based on the unity of ‘this’ World-of-Life, namely, ‘this-Life-World’, etc. That being the case then such ‘evidence’ should be stamped upon this world, this sense of ‘unity’, this ‘fact’ that there is this sense of ‘world’ in the first place. So, do we have this ‘evidence’, this essential estampment upon the fabric of the world of this essential flavour of the Divine. Or, do we have here merely a circular argument, namely, there is this sense of ‘the’ world about the ‘world’ and from this sense of ‘unity’ there must arise, to some degree in some manner or other, this sense of the ‘Divine’, that this sense of the ‘Divine’ is demonstrated as ‘that-there-for-us’ in and through this semblance of ‘unity’, etc? Of course the circular nature of this argument could be rendered in a more complicated fashion and, therein, allowed to obscure the circular nature of the fundamental nature of its structure. In reply, let me defend this type of argument by noting that, essentially, this type of argument is dialectical in nature and intent and not merely logical in scope. Here we are dealing with value generated in a hermeneutic circle and the manufacture of an existential excess of value, namely, sense or, i.e., theological identity, practical meaning in the form of work or, i.e., theological work and critical value in the form of theological value. Demonstrate that there is this excess of value and this circularity would effectively be countered since all value is generated within the confines of a hermeneutic circle, and, that to dismiss such value is to dismiss the possibility of all judgment, modes of practical participation, critical discernment, effective coursing of intentionality, etc. Given this transcendental necessity (underlying epistemological processes, and, thence, the complexity of epistemological organization) we now need to demonstrate that there is this surplus of value in the context of this type of argument structure. We have two courses of action here in this regard: we could hand this argument over to the theologian to demonstrate, and/or, we could take a philosophical stance on the ‘possibility’ of evidence itself and demonstrate the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the religious mode of life in the light of a demonstrable demonstration of the apparent, non-absolute/non-absolutist unity of the world. Let us take the latter path and explore the ramifications that would be involved in a demonstration of this qualified ‘unity’ of the world (as the precondition for the functioning of this argument, noting this need for the discovery and demonstration of an adequate surplus therein). (625)

	In order to be economical in this demonstration let me announce one of my findings in this regard rather than laboriously set out to elicit its demonstration and proof, namely, that this qualified sense of ‘unity’ is a dynamic affair and a sign of processes of harmonization that establish the integrity of the relationship in question. Furthermore, let us note that all forms of experience are experienced in their appropriate fields of reception. If we are to seek this sense of integrity we must look for it in this gestalt frame of reference, or, more correctly, in a theoretical field that encompasses all fields of relational interaction. Let me demonstrate this sense of ‘integrity’ or qualified ‘unity’ in the following sequence of arguments in the type of context as just noted. (626)

	This qualified sense of ‘unity’ is a semblance of unity that is arrived at in a critical, absolute, transcendental philosophy and not one that is non-critical, absolutist and non transcendental in orientation. We are neither seeking for absolute unity nor absolute disunity (and in this regard we have already positioned ourselves within an overall transcendental suspension). Accepting that all forms of experience are received in and through their appropriate fields of reception let us explore this gestalt concept in order to elicit this concept of the qualified unity of the Life-World. Experience is experienced in and through a hermeneutic circle of experience. This circular affair can be translated in terms of a gestalt philosophy and a harmonic philosophy along the following lines. Experience of a certain type is thematized in its appropriate field or background. The systematic nature of that field is essentially consonant in harmonic flavour. Against this field an emission of identity is received as relatively dissonant. Between the same is a relationship of harmony engendered between these two poles of consonance and dissonance. We experience this relationship in a meta-field of reception and, therein, a sense of agency in keeping with the distinctive nature of the first field, the object field of experience. This distinctive nature is schematized and realized in accordance with its epistemological hierarchical organization because each field is enveloped in its meta-field, etc., and v.v. (and hence the embodiment of that organization of identificational complexity in and through the unique encapsulation of such fields). In reflection we find that all forms of identity are processed within their appropriate packaging of fields from the perspective of their embodiment within this World-of-Life. Moreover, we should discover that all relationships entail their direct interaction between their various objects and/or subjects otherwise their could be no interaction in the first place! From this it follows that the harmonization of a particular field is experience as an appreciation of the harmony realized in process between consonant systems (as fields) and dissonant emissions (as points of identificational focus) and that their harmonic interaction establishes their interaction through a harmonization of their differences (through processes of differing, etc.). These simulated currents of direct interaction are nested within a hierarchical schematization of consciousness that is opened objectively, subjectively and intersubjectively. This transcendental unity of appreciation being perceived as the semblance of unity of that (general, particular and/or specific) field under review and thence all fields through their necessary nesting in this hierarchical schematization of consciousness that both structures subjective consciousness in a pre-given world of intersubjectivity that is meta-textually pre-established culturally and inter-culturally, etc. This aspect of ‘unity’ being experienced as an existential excess of value, through integrity, through an intuitive awareness of a harmonization of intentional process and intentional content that is realized and re-realized through an ongoing, continual process of psychic appropriation involved in the re-iterative renewal of ‘that’ experience as ‘that experience’ under focus. Hence in the simulation of all experience, and the re-simulation of the same, this semblance of a qualified unity is transcendentally stamped on all intentional processes and products. Indeed, our very existence as a ‘person’ is guaranteed by such a mechanism, hence the interdependent duration of our intentional existence and identity despite being encompassed by continual processes of change and, therein, its chaotic disruption of identity…. (627)
	
	Putting the fundamental convolutions of the above argument succinctly let me re-state its formulation in the following manner: identity is dialectically demarcated between the systematic nature of fields and their dissonant focal thematization, this is realized through direct processes of ongoing harmonization, the appreciation of such being in and through a meta-field of appreciation wherein a corresponding sense of agental identity is also simultaneously thematized in the context of the Life-World itself as the ‘unified’ transcendental ‘ground’ for the ‘congregation’ for all forms of identity. This world of identity is experienced as ‘one’ world of identity through being experienced in the directness of interaction within this one-World-of-Life. (628)

	By ‘ground’ is meant ‘ground’ in an absolute philosophy and not ‘ground’ in an absolutist philosophy. This concept is subjected to an ongoing, adequate, overall transcendental suspension, and, a recognition of the fact that all forms of appreciation are conducted in meta-fields of appreciation, etc., and thence their simulation/re-simulation of a qualified, relative sense of ‘unity’ by virtue of the directness of interaction. (629)

	In an absolute philosophy there is no absolute external world of objectivity and no absolute internal worlds of subjectivity. Nor are we excluded from a life lived directly with others however incomprehensible we might find the being of others since to comprehend them as potentially incomprehensible from time to time is to experience a relative absence of comprehension and not an absolute lack of comprehension (since to comprehend the other person as an ‘other person’ is to already enter into a process of comprehension, etc!)! (630)

	What are the theological ramifications of this type of position if any? (631)

	Theoretically, if we were to look at the proverbial grain of sand we should find the entire universe 'reflected' within it. That all the interdependently structured relationships that grain of sand actually has with the world would be essentially enstamped upon its being-in-this-world. Hypothetically, given the process-existence of the Divine, we should be able to see the Divine, or at least some trend towards the implication of Divine existence, written therein. If only we could see? If only we knew how to see and how to see such seeing?! I.e., how to interpret such 'seeing' granted that we could 'see' and such a 'sight' could be seen. Our perception of 'a' world, as 'the' world in part already starting us along this path of vision and revelation…? (632)

	However, before I follow the possibility of this type of path let me examine first the physicist's concept of (quantum) entanglement. Two 'particles', say two photons, or two electrons, or two ions, are generated in a certain interaction. These two aspects speed in opposite directions. In order to know which party is what we intervene and measure them. Each time we intervene and determine one of the parties we have inadvertently determined the other party to be the opposite in identity. It appears as if the determination of one of the parties has signaled the identity of the other at speeds greater than the speed of light. Now, various tensions are embedded in this type of reasoning. I would like to propose my own reading/s of this situation, if only for analogical purposes (regardless of the merit or absence of merit in my interpretations of this type of situation here). To this end let me propose my resolution of this type of puzzle (for the light it might throw on the relationship of the whole to the part and v.v.). (633)

	A relationship is a totality and throughout the effective space of that relationship the essential nature of that relationship permeates its transcendental 'space', the space of that relationship. A so-called 'entanglement' is born into such a space. Reading identity as a wave phenomenon we could envisage both or all the 'entangled' parties as they speed away from each other to be in various wave like suppositions of the overall state, that state of entanglement. So, if we have two parties then identity a could be in state + or - with the implication that identity b is in state - or +, the converse of a. Now, it could be argued, on dialectical grounds, that there can be neither absolutely pure identity nor absolutely pure non-identity, i.e., pure a or b as either + or -, or, a or b that is equally both + and - in the same moment of time (i.e., completely indeterminate as to + or -). So a could be more like one of these alternatives whilst b is a mirror of that possibility. Intervene to determine the identity of one of those parties and this suppositional inequality is then realized and expressed in more concrete terms of reference… the 'death' of the suppositional pattern transforming itself into more concrete terms of reference (through the disruption of that particular relationship's 'space' [through the transformation/intervention of another more dominant sense of space]). This pattern of inequality cannot be static so it could be cyclically alternating or merely fluctuating. So, in the light of this modeling, we may not know the 'real' identity of one of those parties until we intervene, such an identity demarcation has already occurred prior to intervention? Hence there can be no real signaling between these parties at speeds greater than the speed of light or at any speed less than the speed of light for that matter. Or, another way to model this type of situation could be to assume that the parties are situated in a self-organized sense of 'space' whose definitive thematization is determined about the centre of that relationship. Intervene and you discover how that space has self-organized about the centre of that relationship with opposing identities being thematized from probability inequalities already in situ (much in the same manner as found in my first model). Could this modeling be applies to the entirety of the universe itself (in order to explain the presence of handedness, its all-pervasive fractal symmetry and apparent self-organized self-identity, inflationary scenarios, etc?)? (634)

	Let us envisage an as-yet-undetermined-singularity… then the advent of (metaphorical) 'intervention' in some form or other that collapses that complex wave formation to create an entangled set of distinctive universes. Let us envisage these universes as sharing the same transcendental 'space' of that initial pre-interventional state. No longer entangled in an overall fashion we have the formation of a distinctive set of distinctive universes still entangled and overlapping on a more particular level of expression (without being able to directly observe such interaction/lack of interaction?)… In the process we find inflation followed by non-inflationary expansion, then a period of expansion that accelerates (until the universe attains an expansionary rate approaching the speed of light and its increased mass-effects cause those 'individual' universes to collapse in upon themselves (and each other at the same time)? Perhaps a clue to the mechanics of such processes could be found in the possibility that gravitation is very context dependent in the nature of its expression (hence treated to the recognition of the need for a unification of inflation, ordinary Newtonian gravitation, dark mass phenomena, dark energy phenomena, etc?). Such modeling also throwing light on the structural-functional nature of the vacuum as well? (635)

	The point of the above speculations hopefully throwing some light on the nature of the relationship a whole has with its parts and, by extension, the open totality of the Divine vis-à-vis the world from which it emerges and must equally inform all relevant parties (and enstamp this aspect of its emergent self-organized self-identity upon all relatively pre-emergent structural-functions)?! (636)

	To this end, although recognizing it as one that could not be possibly met in any form of a definitive answer, let me examine these concepts of emergence and informing of identity in the process (by the relative totality upon the relative non-totality, i.e., 'part'). For a start, emergence occurs in the epistemologically organized space that is pre-conditional to the same. So, when I wake in the morning my awakening consciousness is informed by the possibilities of its emergence, i.e., its re-emergence… in the process my sense of identity is re-discovered/discovered… for this sense of 'myself' is thematized and clarified in and through those possibilities… as a male, that needs to go to work in such and such a place, that I must soon travel from this current position to that place of employment, that I must be dressed accordingly, that I need to carry certain material for work, as a person who may or may not address certain issues, expectations, goals, etc. In a similar manner, the possible emergence of identity is to some extent pre-conditionally pre-determined existentially, etc. (by reference to those existential-descriptors that essentially define that historical sense of identity; just as on awakening I recover my previous historical sense of self and its socially expected sense of place in that type of social environment). Emergence, or rather, re-emergence, in this sense is already prepared or pre-prepared if I am allowed to use such a term. By an inspection of type we can determine its identity in the world; identity dividing to some extent along relatively natural and relatively non-natural lines; hence trees and, therein, oak trees and poplars, etc., and, books and tables, etc., etc. As already asked, how does this hierarchicalization of typology stamp itself upon those distinctive identities discerned in the world? By a determination of distinctive polar differences, in various typological hierarchies as prepared for-us and utilized by-us in a cultural and intercultural pre-mapping of the world already to hand. Various contextual arguments supporting such deliberations hinging on the envisaged 'perception' of existential descriptors and their existential progenitors. So, all trees are assumed to have evolved from proto-trees in the evolutional history of the earth (or, without evidence to that effect, put here immediately on Earth by the 'hands' of a creator God… amounting to the same thing, namely, through a process of an existential origination). But, what if some trees originally developed on an early Martian landscape to be transplanted by aliens and although they look like trees those transplanted species are not really trees in the sense of those as developed here on Earth. Say, for the sake of argument, oak trees originated on Mars in the manner as suggested. They look like trees but because their derivation is not in the same existential family as Earth-developed-trees (from their earthly prototypes) we could only argue that they look like trees; that, upon, closer examination in detail we should be able to show that their derivation is not like other trees on Earth. Why? Because they bear no common existential ancestry in this regard! Deeper, and deeper levels of examination revealing this lack of a common existential-progenitor-descriptor origination. This model transferred to a process theology (as hypothetically envisaged by us in this extended essay) would suggest that as the Divine is an emergent aspect of existence on a relatively more advanced level of epistemological organization of complexity we must now ask how could such complexity be regarded either speculatively and/or empirically? Given this 'story', how could this trend towards the Divine be traced out both in its simultaneous emergence from the world and from its informing/re-informing of the world? Indeed, are these two processes of emergence and informing both present and interrelated despite this asymmetry in power between the Divine aspect-orientation and the human subject upon the social and natural landscapes of the lived-world? Let me examine these hypothetical questions (from a transcendental perspective, i.e., from within an adequate overall transcendental suspension and from the perspective of a transcendental necessity in the relevant arguments brought to bear upon our transcendental phenomenological descriptions/prescriptions of that situation under critical hermeneutic focus conducted in the light of a recognition of a philosophy of interdependence and identificational emptiness). (637)

	What role does the recognition of a transcendental necessity play in this type of interpretation? The invocation of a transcendental(-like) argument is one that overcomes the distinction between the analytical and the synthetical spheres of operation. E.g., if I were to say "we can build houses on the surface of the Earth" then for that argument-observation to succeed, i.e., be valid, then there must exist, as a transcendental necessity, the surface of the earth arranged in such a manner that humans can build houses thereupon. Without this 'ground' there could be no houses being built by humans. This pre-conditional 'ground' is both analytically necessary and synthetically necessary, i.e., transcendental in the nature of its necessity since under a suspension it would encompass both aspects, namely, a formal logical-like reference-frame and the informal factual-like spheres of operation. Nothing mysterious is intended here, only the acceptance of a pre-conditional necessity that is both analytical and synthetical in the complexity of its phenomenal-phenomenological presentation/re-presentation. In this particular statement ‘the Earth’ is a transcendental necessity! Without it, quite simply, there would be no houses on Earth! (638)

Translated to a theological sphere, in our hypothetical process-theology, we can note that the world is a pre-condition for the emergence of the Divine, and, the Divine is a pre-condition for its informing the world in its 'image' so to speak metaphorically (and hypothetically). Hence the mutual relativity of these two co-dependent/correlative facets involved in this type of process-theology. Well, so much for theory… now we must ask can we go beyond the merely hypothetical to the evidential in some form or other? Or, is it the case that what counts for ‘evidence’ is purely the province of a committed theologian and their determinations? No! Surely, as we have already realized, any apparently sensible statement, or set of statements, made by any person, theologian or non-theologian, is the appropriate province of a committed critical philosopher since sense can only be built upon sense as already understood; meaning and meaningfulness depending upon the same, and v.v., and, the careful, critical ongoing collective extension of the same (through the appropriate medium of a corresponding hermeneutic circle adequate to that task).  (639) 

	To some extent one almost needs to privilege relationships since the differentiation of language appears to privilege the reductive, which, if conducted too much, can only end in absolute meaninglessness. On the other hand, privileging relationships must, equally, end in meaninglessness since meaningfulness can only arise in and through the relationship those relationships apparently have with each other. Into this natural balance (of the overall transcendental suspension) we find the hermeneutic circle in whose economy alone meaning is found to emerge. Moreover, because all identities are emergent relational artifacts of those corresponding relationships it follows that no identity can be self-contained and truly independent! But there is this sea of meaning and hence an ocean of interdependence since pure dependence is equally impossible to realize both epistemologically and ontologically! Into this theatre of shadows everything is a reflection of everything else, albeit from its own apparent point of view, since its very existence is the result of everything else and thence this sense of the historical, i.e., that sense of time and place as simulated from that point of view as simulated by some other point of view such as ours, e.g. Hence, moreover, a hierarchicalization of relationships with respect to each other, with respect to their interactions, etc., etc. So, a process theology embedded in this type of process scenario should recognize a number of points apposite to this question "in what manner does the holistic orientation towards the whole find itself reflected in that which is a relative part?" Therefore, with the above in mind, let us examine this problem - to what extent should/could/would the Divine find itself reflected in any or all of the relationships found in this world? (640)

	The very determination of an identity, in what ever form, implies both the existence of its field of presentation and its hermeneutic or hermeneutic-like economy within that field. Indeed, part of the presentation of that identity is the result of that economy directly within that field and, indirectly, the economy that that field has in the Life-World. In other words identity is stamped by the nature and manner of its presentation. Now, we must ask, is there some way of determining if the Divine, directly and/or indirectly, could be traced out in these traces of identity? In what direction should one look and in what manner should one try to see such a sign or series of signs? (641)

	When one builds a house and enters it, theoretically, if not practically, one should also be able to exit from that same house. Between the inside and the outside there is an economy, a traffic of production and re-production. The house is built, as a possibility actualized, and, then, possibly lived in, possibly left and possibly, re-entered. In this larger picture we observe the traffic. We see the house being built, entered, exited, re-entered, etc. It is these intentional flows inside and outside that make that house that particular house, and for me or you, that specific house; perhaps my house or your house? So, to move towards a seeing of the whole we must see the relationships enacted in those relationships centered upon that house (whether our conceptual net is focused generally, particularly and/or specifically). But, it might be objected, that this sense of the whole can never be arrived out since only that which is already immersed in a field of presentation can allow us to focus on that presented in and through that field of presentation and not that field itself which would necessitate the same set of preconditions, namely a meta-field of presentation, and so on, etc. Therefore, just as no point could be absolutely focused upon so too can the sense of the field itself be absolutely focused upon (since the observation of a field qua field is not a matter of intentional focus). (642)

	In the light of the above we must now ask how could a field be directly experience if at all? But, as the-field-must-be-there-for-us in order to intentionally focus upon its fabric so we must accept that it must be experienced in some form or other. What is the form of that experience? Or, rather, what are its transcendental preconditions for experience? None other that the presence of the overall transcendental suspension as conducted in and through the economy of the hermeneutic circle! And what do we find - nothing other than the lived immediacy of the Life-World! Thus our question now can be translated to what extent, if at all, should/could/would the Divine be experienced in the midst of such lived immediacy? Into such a milieu how is the Divine formed and, in turn, informs, this open matrix of intentional activity? How could it be met and recognized when our point of view is limited by the fact that my perception and appreciation of the world appears to be only 'my' perception and appreciation of the world? For a start my appreciation can never be just 'my' perception and appreciation! Through the intersubjectivity of a meta-textual input into the hermeneutic circle 'my' appreciation is never merely just mine and mine alone! If this intersubjectivity is overlooked what else might be overlooked? As argued elsewhere, there is the non-textual aspect of existentially-oriented experience along with the not-textual nature of the ‘total’ immediacy of lived experience by virtue of the apparent qualified harmony and unity of that lived experience. Moreover, there are the infinity of hermeneutic perspectives that could be adopted in the reading/s of experience wherein some readings might be found more relevant than others and where, it must be admitted, most of the other readings would contribute nothing to our current intentional goals.  Now, into such a complex milieu could the Divine even be traced… let alone met… recognized… and, importantly, be engaged? (643)

	How does the theologian read the apparent phenomenal unity of the Life-World as evidence of Divine Existence when it is not inconceivable that an anti-theologian could read the same information in a non-theological mode and thence as non-evidential in that regard? How is one to argue that this 'greater picture' is somehow essentially imprinted on all fragments of the world and only needs to be read in and through the proper mode of interpretation? Let me examine this problematic topic through the lens of the following metaphor… (644)

	When lightening strikes a trees it leaves a burn mark down the trunk of that tree. If the tree is not destroyed in that lightening strike what can one say about the nature of lightening through merely attending to the burnt marks on that tree? One could note that the mark from the lightening strike seems to resemble a burnt mark since wood when partially burnt appears to leave a similar carbon-like residue. Then one can note that other trees have had similar marks left upon them, that this sign of lightening is in the form of a streak from the top of the tree to the ground. One could assume, through repetition of signage, that this is a distinctive phenomenon, namely, 'trees seemingly struck by lightening', and, that this phenomenon is a sign that something fire-like was involved, indeed, that the 'phenomenon' of lightening is fiery by nature. But, without having witnessed a flash of lightening hitting a tree, without having ever witnessed a lightening strike or having someone describe for you what it looked like for them, how could one envisage what the existential nature of lightening is like under those impoverished circumstances when all one has are signs or traces of  lightening strikes that have never been seen? Or, continuing, how could one envisage that the 'harmless' sky could be 'fiery' at times if one were to never have witnessed a display of thunder and lightening? By extrapolation, let us now ask how could the Divine be interpreted from reading its imprints upon the world if no element of a direct experience of that imprinting was to be first had in order to 'see' the nature of the linkage between that 'sign' and the process in which it was 'being signed' as a phenomenal imprint of a certain type of phenomenal event that establishes that type of phenomenal trace upon the fabric of the world in the first place? Taking this metaphor at face-vale could there be a viable theology without that same theology also being an experientially based theology? (645)

	Extending the analysis of our lightening strike one could say, properly or improperly, that the act of lightening appears to be an intentional-like act? That this tree was 'chosen' and not that tree, that tree over there was 'chosen' last year, but these trees here never seem to have been struck. In this same vein we could then ask 'why' were these trees struck and not any of the other trees around them? Are we allowed to seek a reason for this type of 'behaviour'? Just what would count for a reason to be a reason, and, should we extend an intentional analysis to the same in this interpretation of choice, albeit, currently, through this metaphor of 'choice'? If the phenomenon of the lightening strike, more or less, was merely a chaotic phenomenon why interpret it as either intentional or intentional-like in character when we could equally assume trees are merely struck at random? That the nature of lightening is such that it definitively strikes its target but that such a target is not selected through any intentional act of 'choice'. Indeed, that there was no real element of choice in the first place! That the appearance of 'choice' is only an artifact of our metaphorical treatment of that interpretative situation wherein the metaphorical reading of that situation is improperly treated as a literal reading; i.e., we treat the partially burnt tree as if it were 'chosen'  by the lightening, in the process regarding that tree as 'chosen' by the lightening bolt observed or inferred. However, such a manoeuvre is illegal since the metaphorical 'like' is not normally an 'is' in a literal sense, and, that this type of transformation in this type of situation is an impossible one to obtain. Yet, there is one type of situation where 'like' can be transformed into an 'is'. E.g., that person looks like Ben and I can now see as he comes closer along the street that that he is indeed Ben. Here 'like' becomes 'is' by virtue of the fact that the referent 'Ben' is found to be completely entailed in 'that person who looks like Ben'. In other words, in an existential situation 'like x' and 'x' can coincide iff that which is 'like x' is 'x' (and not absolutely 'non-x' at the same time, etc.). So, in this light, lightening appears to exercise a real sense of choice iff that choice-like act is exercised in an intentionally exercised act of choice. Thus, similarly, it behooves the theologian to spell out in an adequate existential description how the appearance of unity is an actual, existential imprint of the Divine, i.e., something beyond the mere appearance of 'unity' of the world, i.e., mere world qua world. On behalf of the theologian we must ask is this type of approach still open? Could the theologian validly argue from the apparent unity of the mere world qua world to the additionally interpreted fact that this unity is evidence of the Divine? I believe, hypothetically, that this is still a possibility, under strictly controlled circumstances, through arguing that there is no absolute difference between 'intentional-like' and 'intentional' on the ontological grounds that there is no absolutely independent sense of an intentional agent in the first place (and that the requisite necessary transcendental conditions are already in place to allow us to successfully make that transformation from potential divine-agency to actual divine-agency in a non-absolute mode of agency). Let me examine the implications of this process-concept of an empty, non-absolute, non-independent, interdependent sense of agency (in the context of this theological examination of Divine agency and its hypothetical evidential imprinting upon the fabric of the world [that would then allow the theologian to make that type of claim when all necessary transcendental preconditions and necessary non-transcendental conditions, for the advancement of such a claim, were met]). If a process philosophy, and a process theology too, draws no absolute distinction between the relatively intentional act and the relatively non-intentional act what implications does this have for our understanding of subjectivity and thence for ethics, responsibility, agency, concepts of spirituality, etc? (646) 

	Let me first sketch where this complex set of arguments is headed. To some extent I am going to suggest that intentionality (and non-intentional activity) is like a lightening strike, a discharge headed in the direction of the intentional object-state. The direction my overall argument will take in this vein is as follows… that all forms of definitive phenomenal activity are epistemologically organized; that all forms of epistemological organization are in some sense ‘intentional’ (and realized in a process of harmonic resolution) in the light of that degree of organization present; that Divine agency would produce/re-produce phenomenal activity with a degree of 'intentional' organization more complex than that attendant upon non-Divine forms of intentionality; and, all that would be necessary to show the presence of Divine input would be demonstrate this greater degree of epistemological organization was present in the formation/re-formation of that attendant act of intentional deposition (or, rather, super-intentional deposition on the grounds that its formation/re-formation was expressed in and through a state of epistemological organization  more richly organized than that attendant upon acts of intentionality that have a relatively less complex, human-like level of organization). So much for the theoretical side of this argument which, I believe, appears harmless and sound enough on this hypothetical level of explication. The more important question must be - can it be given a practical, existential dimension by the theologian and/or their congregations, and, be demonstrated in an evidential light to the non-theologically inclined, or, must it be left solely and purely as a ‘metaphor’ or ‘analogy’ for the faithful to grapple with (in their existential thematization of the concept of the Divine)? (647)

	Answering a question is always a process and, as a process, this process must take place in time (even if answers once arrived at appear to be spontaneously realized, non-calculative in appearance and outside that historical sense of time that pertains to those interrogative acts of questioning). Moreover, the whole process is circular (as demonstrated in our analysis of the hermeneutic circle). This circularity enriches the contextual field in which the evidential nature of that quest is to be discerned. As a consequence further questions are also further enriched in the very being of their formulation/re-formulation. Even if a process of questioning cannot be definitively finalized still the process itself can be a worthwhile enterprise in and through the very thematization and enrichment of that process of (en)questioning. To this end let us persevere in this hope that we can arrive at a better understanding of the nature and value of the ramifications of an existentially applied theology, if only in hypothetical terms of reference. With this aspiration in mind let me open up a number of connected fronts that will try to eventually deal with this question “can an existentially valid theological interpretation of the Life-World be argued for?” Of course any theology could be proposed, what we asking instead is, more or less, can that theology in question actually augment, and not detract from, the quality of our existence in this World-of-Life? (648)

	One line of investigation examines, in the light of the above, the question “in what manner is the reflective process a direct engagement with the issues to hand and not a mere exercise in some form of passive reflection?” To what extent is the questioning process a direct engagement with the very objective of that topic itself? One approach adopted by myself is to see activity as issuing from the suspension of the overall suspension... A more subtle version seeing a more encompassing hermeneutic circle in which reflection and activity, and a balance of reflection and activity, are seen as dialectical moments co-present with each other. However, rather than seeing engagement as opposed to reflection, albeit in the cooperative space of a hermeneutic circle, I would like to supplement the above explanatory model with the following conceptual set, namely, that an overt act of engagement is more correctly realized as (not much more than) an expansion of the terms of reference already being applied in our overall reflective processes. Let me outline the essential detail of this conceptual approach operative in this more sophisticated phenomenological reading of this type of process. In simple terms, I am going to argue that a relatively more overt form of engagement is merely reflection conducted in wider terms of reference through the active phenomenological entry into a larger number of modalities of phenomenal-phenomenological engagement… (649)

	Contra the type of impossible position adopted by an empiricist who invokes a simple correspondence theory, a critical transcendental phenomenologist, et al, perceives our experience of reality as that which is coherently realized in a wider range of actively engaged phenomenal-phenomenological modalities. So, e.g., a dream apple might seem real, among many things, it cannot satisfy any real sense of hunger (being physiologically embodied and not just intellectually embodied). This then is the real difference between a dream apple and a non-dream apple, i.e., the latter is constructively engaged in a greater number of active modalities and thence in greater depth or degree. Reflection in this vision of engagement is, therefore, merely, an engagement with a wider range of modalities in which, overall, there is a qualitative enrichment of that process. This existential enrichment being that excess of value released in our re-engagement with those modalities, appropriate to that situation to hand, as realized in and through our direct re-engagements with the ongoing simulation of that intentional object-state; this existential excess being re-invested, in part, in that ongoing process, etc. Our overall engagement ceasing when this existential excess is no longer being realized or a new field of activity supplants the former, etc. In this modeling of reflection, etc., overt engagement, effectively, is merely an extension and endeepening of our current, relatively ideal engagement with that intentional object-state. In our engagement with a dream apple we are reflecting and engaging with that type of intentional object-state in modes associated more with its ideality, e.g., as an image, as a re-construction of apple-like memories, etc. When we are interacting with a non-dream apple we are reflecting and engaging with an intentional object-state relatively richer (subjectively, intersubjectively and objectively) in and through that extension that now includes modes of a more directly engaged nature. So, e.g., we can not only reflect (as in a dream) on what it would be like to touch that apple-image but we can also actively engage with it directly in and through the very simulation of our embodiment vis-à-vis the simulation of that apple-image. The relatively greater, and more satisfying, engagement with that intentional object-state being accounted for through the wider and deeper engagement of the appropriate modalities exercised in the relatively real encounter with an apple per se. Our engagement with a dream apple falling short of our expectations that would normally be attendant upon a relatively real-apple experience. In this, dream experiences are not to be considered less real, just comparatively less saturated and less satisfying overall. In effect, we note the simulation of reality through noting the relative reality of our simulations. In a sense we are always actively engaging with all our simulations, and, the relatively superficial distinction between passive reflection and active engagement is more a matter of degree as to the manner and extent modes are actively being engaged/re-engaged (along with the degree of epistemological organization actually being utilized therein in the coherent manufacture of our intentional constructions/re-constructions). (650)

	Active engagement, therefore, is reflection extended and engaged through the appropriate modalities in the appropriate manner and to the appropriate degree as expected to be encountered in that type of phenomenal-phenomenological engagement. Reflection is already an active process of engagement, albeit in restricted terms of modal reference, and, so, the appropriate expansion of the same realizes activity in a more overt frame of reference. Now, in the light of this (phenomenological analysis) could or should we continue to argue for an absolute distinction between the modalities of possibility and the modalities of actuality? No! How, then, do we deal with the factuality of non-actuality and the modality of impossibility (as a fact by default?)? Consider the following linguistically indicated distinctions: “Julius Caesar never visited Notre Dame in Paris”, and, “Julius Caesar may have trod the island in the Seine where the Gothic church Notre Dame would one day be erected”. The former is an impossibility and the latter is a probability assuming Julius Caesar could have visited this specific location and did visit this general region which would later be called Paris. An analysis of the nominal existential description applied to the logico-factual entity ‘Julius Caesar’ would ‘show’ that the temporal extent of that entity could not have him visiting the actual church of Notre Dame even though he may have visited the very region of that future church. In the latter, in the situation of not being able to more accurately define those existential descriptions/existential descriptors we are reduced to considering only the possibility of Julius Caesar having visited this island in the Seine where this church would one day stand. In the light of this analysis, we can now ascertain modality through an examination of the (latest) existential description of that under modal examination. Possibility being the non-impossibility of identificational coherence; impossibility being the forbidding of identificational coherence (through analytical-contradiction); probability being the possible possibility of that identificational coherence; and, the determination of relative actuality being the determination of the evidentially accepted actualization of that possible identificational coherence. In other words by these various transformations, between these modalities, we can arrive at these four interrelated senses of modality, namely, possibility, impossibility, probability and actuality; none of these modal states being treated as absolute in non-analytical terms of reference (with, as a result, no conventional recognition of an absolute distinction between the senses of the analytical and the synthetical). (651)

	Now we must ask, how can we conduct this examination of a theological interpretation of the Life-world in merely hypothetical terms of reference? Given that pure possibility (along with pure actuality; and pure probability, pure impossibility) is not allowed? The hypothetical attitude is one that is transcendentally suspended, i.e., should be read in this context as possibly possible and not actually actual, i.e., as being in between these two extremes (wherein these two modalities of relative possibility and relative actuality are considered as perfectly balanced, i.e., as equally probable and as equally non-probable, and, at the same time, as not impossible). Hence, in the overall suspension all four modal orientations are to be directly and/or indirectly invoked, in effect, treating the overall transcendental suspension as both non-impossible, and, equally probable/improbable. Entertained in this manner we are presented with the relatively hypothetical (through this sense of balance). Thence its distinction from the possible, (the impossibility of) the merely possible, the actual, (the impossibility of) the merely actual, a non-balanced probability-improbability (set of expectations/ascriptions), and, the merely impossible (as realized analytically). (651)

	But Julius Caesar could not have worshipped in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris! This apparently impossible state of affairs, therefore, should never be treated as possibly actual. Thus these modal categories cannot be mere stations in our passage from one to the other!? And if it is the case that Caesar could not visit this church, or any other for that matter, then it follows that it must be a 'fact', albeit a negative one. That the 'world' is no more than the mere sum of facts both positive and negative..? But, that would be wrong as the infinite openness of the world is such that it can never be merely reduced to some sum! No, what should be realized is that epistemologically we can travel from one modality to another through the nature of our focus in so far as we partially alter a transcendental sense of balance in and through a relative mix of privilege/non-privilege. Only when we construct and/or recognize a definitive sense of identity is the chosen modality blocked off from others by those constructive choices and/or recognitions. 'Doing history', essentially, is defining/re-defining the existential descriptors of those identities under examination/re-examination. Redefine your 'Julius Caesar' as a '13th Century monk living in the area of Paris' and you can then have that specific individual as a possible candidate for being a participant in the congregation of that cathedral of Notre Dame at some time during the life of that individual. Of course he may never have left his village in order to visit Paris, still, without an absolute, precisely-stated history of that individual we can only speculate upon the possibility for him to have visited this cathedral. So, the point we need to note is that prior to definitional construction these modal states all remain transformational open until such a time definitional conditions block our transition from one to the other both ontologically and/or epistemologically. (651)

	In the light of the above we now can appreciate history as the delineation of the construction/re-construction of existential descriptors. Hence a philosophy of history, in this light, would be the ascertainment of those methods that realize a proper, appropriate and valid delineation of those existential descriptors under such focus. That philosophy of history, in a general sense, is a focused delineation and critical appraisal of those methods adopted and adapted for historical research. That philosophy, in turn, is the discipline for investigating propriety, appropriateness and validity of  our critical methods, etc. (652)

	Of course the process of doing history is more the oscillation between the modalities of possibility and actuality wherein through arguments from our pre-interpreted textual depositions we attempt to build a consistent vision of the historical identities subjected to such treatment. Such research by its very nature is provisional, but, still, because our interpretations are built upon our cultural pre-interpretations of the world the envisaged sense of the historical can never be absolutely wrong. In this light historical revision is always a peripheral concern. Therefore, just because someone says "that x did not occur" is in and of itself not enough for us to reject our historical constructions that hitherto have stated that "that x did occur". Rather, a series of arguments must also be projected in such a manner that they demonstrate, given its validity, that this new re-interpretation is more valid. Not all facts have the same weight, and, certainly, most counter-facts don't have the same weight as their contra-counterparts. Therefore, the mere fact that a certain contrary hypothesis can be constructed is not in and off itself enough to dismiss our current historical treatment of that specific topic. All forms of value are generated within their appropriate economies of (e)valuation. All possible forms of reconstruction can be re-considered but not all forms of reconstruction are equal! Furthermore, even though historical re-construction is always piecemeal and peripheral, small quanta of re-construction can realize radical transformational consequences both within that system and outside its immediacy. But, still, overall, such chaotic transformational discontinuities remain relatively peripheral and never centrally oriented! (653)

	Returning to the question can the unity of the world, and thence the possibility of its theological complexion, be traced out and be discerned upon the fabric of the world? Let us examine the phenomenology of this type of reflection. (654)

	To begin with we can note that we are unable to have an experience of absolute unity. All experience is horizoned or scoped. Experience is experienced within a field and read within those limits through the limits of its own perspective or set of perspectives adopted in order to read that field. The intentional act is directed and set within those limits. In order to appreciate those limits, where possible, a new contextual field is entered in order to read that prior field as the new intentional object-state under focus. Effectively, the process of perception, apperception, etc., are entertained by this dialectical set of processes within fields and between fields. Then, through ongoing thematization, there is the ongoing collective emergence of that simulation/re-simulation subjected to such thematization. Simplistically, we might say, e.g., that perception involves a perceptual foreground, as the intentional object-state, and a perceptual background, in this instance the perceptual field whose character is in keeping with the nature of the intentional object under examination. Now, a sense of agency enters reflexively when the relationship between foreground and background is itself made the object of meta-focus. As a result the process of perception itself is also under focus, namely, meta-focus, and as a result a sense of self in keeping with the nature of this meta-field is co-thematized. Thence if a visual act is entailed we also arrive at a sense of a visual perceiver too. A complex, comprehensive sense of self emerging from an appreciation, in turn, of these specific fields (such as, e.g., hearing, feeling, tasting, etc.). Thence a complex sense of agency is allowed to emerge whose richness of reflexivity reflects the richness of recognitions realized through time in and through those specific fields in their collective mutual cooperation. The concept of appreciation, therefore, is realized within a complex hierarchical set of field such that x is appreciated in the appropriate fieldx by virtue of its focus within fieldx+1. In other words all forms of intentional appreciation are scoped (just as, in parallel, a semantic theory of truth recognizes a state x to be T(true) iff x', i.e., iff x' can be found in the meta-field…). Multiply this nesting of fields within meta-fields, and meta-fields within meta-meta-fields, etc., and the net result is the realization of a simulated/re-simulated state of affairs that cannot be merely reduced to any of its component ingredients in or between any particular level or specific aspect of epistemological organization within this epistemological hierarchy. Indeed, both consciousness and its intentional object-states are simulated, through emergence, within the constituted limits of this type of epistemological organization. At the same time, communication between different forms of agency is facilitated by virtue of a similarity of epistemological organization (just as coding necessitates the symmetrically inversed process of de-coding in order to appreciate the information intended to be read in its selective imprinting and retrieval). (655)

	At this juncture I have two directions to explore, namely, what are the implications of this scoping w.r.t. our being able to experience or not experience the imputed unity of the Life-World, and, just what relationship is born between the intentional object-state as intended and the apparently imputed object-state it may or may not represent? In regards to the latter one might well argue that increasing simulation/re-simulation effectively simulates/re-simulates the very intentional correlate itself as intended to the extent that when our relationships are normalized and in conformity with their own natures there can be little or no difference in this regard. When I am seeing an apple I am seeing that very apple itself, albeit in a frame of reference whose genre of activity is our ability to see 'real' apples. If I am seeing only a dream apple then that is exactly what I am 'perceiving', namely, a dream apple (because the modal constitution of the same only re-presents/represents no more than that!). However this avenue will be addressed at some later point of time. More importantly, let me examine the implications of this concept of appreciation. (656)

	As already noted the experience of the unity or integrity of a certain situation is always scoped. The visual integrity, coherence, conformity, intactness, preservation, etc., of a certain visual situation is always scoped. I am looking at this apple… I am looking at this apple on this apple tree… I am looking at this apple tree in this orchard of apple trees… this orchard in the context of the local countryside… the local countryside in the context of this region… this region in the context of this sovereign state… this state as situated in this world… this world as situated in the Solar System… etc., etc. Regardless of the nature of the examination, that under examination is forever scoped and intentionally directed or aspected. Appreciation is forever nested and we can never fly beyond that 'nest'. As soon as we try we find we are living within a bigger, more encompassing nest. Without respite we remain fledglings that can never free ourselves from the confines of a nest! What freedom have we if we cannot freely ‘fly’?! (657)
	
	All relationships entered into are directly engaged! Even indirect relationships are directly engaged on our behalf (so, e.g., I know x who knows y and x has told me about y hence my indirect knowledge about y even though I have as yet to meet y; have not directly met y assuming y to be still alive). When I see this apple I am seeing it as an apple on this apple tree… When I attend to the perception of this tree I see it as one apple tree in an orchard of apple trees… So, each and every intentional act of perceptual determination is scoped, i.e., bounded by the limits of its appropriate contextual field. Does the same apply to all intentional acts? Yes, because of the common particularity of all specific instances of perception, and, because of the generality of the intentional act itself (in accordance with this theoretical understanding). That being the case, how do we determine the imputed integrity and unity of the Life-World? What right have we to assume one transcendental world of intersubjective-subjective-objective experience? When I attend to something I find I am attending to it in its appropriate field of context and presentation. But, to attend to those terms of reference I am automatically presented with some form of a meta-field in order to context the same. But, this process becomes increasingly attenuated the more it is artificially contrived. I may see this apple, this apple tree, this orchard, perhaps the countryside around this orchard, but, I am not able to 'perceive' in the same manner how this countryside is related to this particular country, and, how this country is related to other countries on this planet Earth, etc. Repeat this process of examining this nesting of contexts and their modal apprehensions becomes increasing attenuated in terms both of the quantity of modes actively exercised and the individual quality of those modes as individually entered (either collectively or individually). Still, each and every context is promised the epistemological fact that it is already contexted if only in some non-overt, covert form or other. Is this (interpretation of a) promise (of eternal nesting) conducted in good faith? Can we be trustful of the epistemological fact that that all semblances of a context are in turn pre-contextually contexted, etc? A specific type of intentional object-state demands its corresponding specific type of contextual field. No type of intentional object-state is able to be discriminated and modally discerned if such appreciation is not conducted within the appropriate contextual field of appreciation. Indeed, no absolute contextual boundary could be appreciated because its appreciation would demand meta-terms of contextual reference which would mean that it was not an absolute boundary. Hence no absolute boundary could be directly appreciated? On the other hand, could an absolute boundary be indirectly imputed by virtue of the absence of its meta-contextual appreciation in contravention of this so-called promise of an infinite nesting of meta-fields? Since this process of testing this infinite repetition of meta-fields could not be put into currency again what right have we to perceive this promise of infinite horizons? (658)

	To theoretically examine this imputed promise of infinite horizons what transcendental machinery must be in place for us to be able to say "yea" or "nay". Indeed, is such a question properly formed and able to be answered in any transcendental frame of reference? My intuition tells here that such a question cannot be correctly asked let alone answered positively or negatively. Even if collectively treated as a tetralemma we should fail because of its still improper formulation. But, then, that being the case what right have we to claim an infinite horizon, and, an infinity of meta-horizons, etc? So, that being the case, what right have I of declaring that the Life-World possesses a certain integrity of being, that there can only be one transcendental World-of-Life (along with [this promise of] an infinite horizon and an infinity of such horizons)? (659)

	Yet, without the transcendental integrity of the Life-World how could this inter-subjective, subjective and objective world of lived-experience maintain itself as 'this' world-for-us? Indeed, different worlds presuppose a 'world' in which these different worlds can be included as worlds in this world-of-all-worlds. But, then, could the objection that the unity of the world (of all worlds), as the world per se, cannot be an intentional object-state for us by virtue of the fact that it cannot be entered into as a relationship in which that object-state itself can be exchanged? In effect, that as the world has no equivalence, it can have no double, no representation, no mirror, no verification and no reality...? That the world is only a ghostly imputation that cannot even be reflected upon because it can leave no image of itself? But, then, there is still an intuition that there is a world, that we live in 'this' world before others, and, so, we must be able to account for the existence of this phenomenon…? (660)

	To grab this bull by both horns we need to know how do we engage with this sense of the transcendental that underwrites the very existence of existence in the first place?  Or, is the transcendental transcendental to experience itself? Defined in a Kantian frame of reference that would be the case. However, re-defined in a phenomenal-phenomenological frame of reference grounds can be found for arguing the opposite. Although a transcendental sense of unity, etc., in a Kantian sense can be argued for, at the same time, we can also argue for a sense of the transcendental that enters into experience through its equivalence with the lived sense of that relationship itself. In this re-definition the transcendental is experienced as the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, the non-existential is experienced as the de-existentialization of the relatively existential. The existential being seen as the relationship from the perspective of the relationship itself, and, that this territory is 'transcendental'. Re-framed in this manner we must now ask how is the relationship as a relationship per se to be experienced? On one hand this is achieved through its contextualization… by looking at that relationship as one relationship in a world of relationships. On the other hand this is also achieved through this existentialization of the relatively non-existential, i.e., the relatively non-relational, i.e., the perceived components and parties that constitute that relationship (treated on either a specific, particular or general level of analysis). However, more correctly, the transcendental is entered in and through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension and that would entail a psychically entertained ongoing balance between both analysis or relative reduction and synthesis or relative re-construction and between all other forms of non-transcendental contrast such as ends and means, retention and protention, rights and obligations, foregrounds and backgrounds, etc., etc. Indeed, experience itself is dialectically engaged between the relatively transcendental and the relatively non-transcendental hence the experiential implication of both the relatively transcendental and the relatively non-transcendental. Indeed, into this mix of experiential-conceptual contrasts only this transcendental sense of a dynamic equilibrium is fully engaged since no sense of a contrast could be entertained without that same sense of contrast. In this sense the transcendental is engaged at the center of our relationships. Hence the transcendental unity of the Life-World is experienced through these various instances of a sense of transcendental balance at the very center of all forms of intentional experience. Thence this sense of the transcendental as being lived in and though the psychic center of all our relationships. (661)

	That granted, is a transcendental sense of unity actually experienced? Yes, and this is non-reductively experienced as the existential excess of value released in our interaction with a certain relationship to the same extent and in the same manner as the sense of that relationship is being engaged through its overt focus and simulation/re-simulation. Let me examine this claim in some depth. (662)

	I would like to argue that the experience of a relative sense of unity essentially and effectively is an experience of harmony and that this type of experience is central to the hermeneutic circle, i.e., is central to all intentional experience. But is intentional experience central to our being-in-the-world? To that extent that it characterizes a general sense of consciousness, intentional experience is central to intentional consciousness without denigrating or de-privileging any non-direct, non-intentional type of experience (such as the possibilities of the pre-intentional {nature of subconscious, substructural processes}, the post-intentional {nature of consequential processes}, the trans-intentional {nature of judgmental consciousness}, etc?)! The operation of the hermeneutic circle, central to epistemological organization of intentional consciousness, is fundamentally a harmonic process. As a field phenomenon it involves the relationship between the sense of a focused upon foreground in contrast from its appropriate background. This process is modeled as dialectical and the sense of the dialectical has been modeled through three ahistorical correlative moments, as already noted elsewhere, of a dissonant sense of foreground (parts), a consonant sense of background (wholes) and the resolution of a sense of a foreground-and-background (parts-and-wholes) without any one moment being able to absolutely exist independently from its co-determining correlatives. These three dialectical moments of consonance, dissonance, and resolution establishing the harmonic nature of intentional consciousness. Moreover, as already argued, this ongoing, dynamic sense of harmony is none other than the overall transcendental suspension, a state of affairs central to all forms of perceived-existence and their corresponding reflexive sense of a perceived-self-existence. Essentially, therefore, central to all intentional forms of expression is this ongoing, dynamic sense of harmonization… hence the experience of a ‘unity of experience’ is an intrinsic aspect of all forms of intentional experience. Indeed, our very consciousness of a something involves a relative unity of experience on all levels of its (overt conscious) functioning. Thence the close connection of intentional experience with all other forms of intentionally related experience (such as, e.g., emotions when experienced as affective consequences {in an ethical perspective}and as the pre-conditional experience of experience itself in so far as the transcendental suspension of the affective acts as a necessary precondition for cognitive experience, etc.). Therefore, central to all forms of experience (able to be related intentionally at least) is a sense of the harmonic, i.e., an ongoing process of resolution. (663)

	Of course, this experience of an ongoing process of harmonization is neither a process of absolute harmony nor a process of absolute disharmony. Moreover, as the consonant sense of a background can be seen as relatively static, spatial and structural hence its transcendent orientation. At the same time, the dissonant sense of a foreground is dynamic, temporal and the psychic-‘material’ of that-which-has-been-enstructured and that-which-is-to-be-enstructured hence its immanent orientation. An ongoing balance between these aspects of the relatively-transcendent and the relatively-immanent re-establishing this sense of the overall transcendental suspension. Thus (the) experience (of experience) is transcendentally predicated on the transcendent-immanent dialectics of the hermeneutic circle along with the dialectics of harmonization between relevant foregrounds and relevant backgrounds – these various dialectical frames of reference being inter-translatable and isomorphic (by virtue of the fact that, from different perspectives, they essentially deal with the same phenomenon, namely, the phenomenological constitution of phenomena). This same ‘type’ of description being implicitly prescriptive simultaneously; the ongoing sense of a balance between these polar moments being expressed through this sense of an overall transcendental suspension, and v.v. (664)

	Hence in our experience of the phenomenal there is already constituted within that same experience an intimate sense of the relative, non-absolute unity of the Life-World. However, can this sense of a harmonized unity within the very process of the intentional constitution of experience intimate a general, all-pervasive sense of the unity of the Life-World per se? Yes! Let me re-argue this more difficult point along with the necessary qualifications lest this point be mis-interpreted. For a start, because this sense of unity is not, cannot be purely transcendent, it therefore must also be immanent (and therefore within the orbit of our intentional grasp to that extent that it does not escape us/is not mis-represented, etc.). Now, that which-is-to-constituted must in some sense already be that which-has-been-constituted in order to be constituted, i.e., re-constituted. The overall transcendental suspension ensuring that an overall sense of unity is occasioned between these senses of the transcendent and the immanent. Then, accompanying this associated sense of an existential excess, the harmonization of experience must exist in order to allow us to experience the center of this relational sense of being-in-a-relationship (within a relational field in the context of the possible-actuality of all fields…) ensuring that this sense of ‘world’ is realized in and through this central, centered sense of the relationship being experienced at that moment of time as centered in this sense of ‘world’ (through its intentional discrimination and ongoing re-constitution). But, of course, this overflowing sense of an existential unity cannot be treated in any absolute sense nor in any absolutely non-absolute mode of consideration. Hence this complex of sense of unity or transcendental integrity is always qualified (and contextually bound). Our freedom arising through our ever-present ability to re-contextualize such contexts of freedom wherein the degree of freedom therein can be relatively experienced/re-experienced (and transcendentally discerned intuitively). The power differential of such a relationship ensuring an asymmetrical, non-symmetrical experience of that power from different perspectives in differing contexts, etc. (665)

	This transcendental ‘integrity’ of experience by extrapolation can be conceived of as that world-there-for-us, namely, a transcendental sense of world. As a relational ‘ground’, as the transcendental relationship of all relationships, it could be given a theological complexion (and hence its theological conformity with the world). Are we allowed to conduct this type of manoeuvre? First, let me establish this transcendental integrity by relatively systematic terms of reference; in the process exploring this inescapable, non-reductive dimension of existence. Second, let me demonstrate that this integrity is equivalent to a sense of world. Third, let me argue for its theological complexion in some form or other (regardless, at this stage of our investigations, as to whether this theological conformity with the world has any religious ramifications or not). (666)

	As already pointed out, central to our intentional existence is the operation of the overall transcendental suspension. This ensuing transcendental complexion at the center of all experience is also at the very center of our-being-in-the-world. The dialectics of one world, ensuing from that state of affairs, guaranteeing a correlativity between the epistemological and the ontological. Interpreting this transcendental domain is the heuristic device of the hermeneutic circle. Through this lens we both ‘experience’ this domain of transcendental integrity but also find ourselves allowed to interpret it as a realm of transcendental integrity, i.e. as the World. (667)

	As argued elsewhere, central to intentional existence is the hermeneutic circle as interpreted by myself as tri-polar in orientations. What are those orientations? There are various frames of reference for dealing with the same aspect of the phenomenalization of the phenomenal experience. Let us adopt, say, a gestalt approach and we arrive at the three orientations of focalization, backgrounding and an appreciaiton of the relationship between the first two modes or moments. These distinctions mutually co-defining each other. E.g., focalization is a focalization of the background, whilst backgrounding is a re-contextualization of acts of focalization, etc. Then, their appreciation must be both ‘a part’ of that to be appreciated and ‘apart’ from the same (since all forms of appreciation entail higher meta-terms of reference). Imagine, e.g., the perception of bubbles in water. A bubble is seen and focused upon. It is also seen as a bubble in the water. Then, when the relationship between the focal and the contextual is appreciated we have the perception of bubbles rising in the water. ‘Bubbles’ are perceived as different from the water, yet, a harmonization of this difference realizes that these are bubbles-in-the-water and as such are perceived as rising. Without the water there could be no bubbles. Bubbles in turn define water as a medium that may entail bubbles. Then, in the phenomenon of bubbles we find bubbles rise in water in a manner that could not be understood if we were to focus our understanding merely upon the nature of bubbles or merely upon the nature of water since this ‘emergent’ phenomenon is the result of the interaction of these two facets of bubbles and the medium of water (as interpreted under the rule that the lighter medium rises in a denser medium when there are no other conditions to the contrary). The phenomenality of rising bubbles cannot be reduced either to the nature of bubbles per se or the nature of water per se. Hence the unique, non-reductive nature of this phenomenon of rising bubbles, thence its distinctive essential integrity. Our perceptual appropriation of this phenomenon directly experiencing upon interpretative discernment something of the uniqueness of that type of interaction (between bubbles, water and our perceptual appreciation of the same). (668)

	Our appreciation of this phenomenon of bubbles in water also tells us something about the nature of the world, indeed, tells us something about the being (or the being-there) of the world, i.e., that there can be this phenomenon of bubbles (which need not be ‘just bubbles in water’). That, indeed, we live in a world of bubbles – from the sparkle of champagne to the rising of magna deep beneath the surface of the earth… we can even find a bubble-like phenomenon in heat inversions or thermal currents in oceans, etc., where the medium itself can act in a bubbling-like manner! Then, in higher frames of cognitive epistemological organization the metaphorical itself can be seen to take over a ‘bubbling’ or ‘bubbling-up’ or ‘bubbling-over’ like imprint, etc. Similarly, other fundamental-like metaphors at the basis of our phenomenological being in the world can also be eidetically invoked and utilized in our theoretical constructions of the world as they enter into perception, reconstruction of history, theoretical modeling of the world, the very domain(s) of the philosophical, etc. (669)

	Now, from this understanding of integrity at the center of our appreciation of the phenomenal world (through a harmonization of difference) can we further argue for an inevitable sense of world? Perception of bubbles involves a perceptual field, and, our appreciation of those bubbles as bubbles also involves a world of the ego able to appreciate this world of bubbles. So, this sense of world is that assortment of interconnected field that allow us to make forms of appreciation in just that type of manner. In other words, a world is that dimension able to support and interrelate a complexity of fields. Put simply, watching the bubbles in a glass of champagne, or similar, means we must be living in a world able to support (the interpretation of such phenomena). The transcendental ‘grounding’ the relative subjectivity, the relative inter-subjectivity and the relative objectivity of phenomena in none other than in a lived-sense-of-world! (670)

	Still, what right have we to assume that there-is-a-world there for-us merely from the fact that there is this apparent promise of a world that both entails that which encompasses that which we are currently dealing with and that there is also this promise of a beyond to the same that upon further inspection always appears to be instantiated in this discovery of horizons beyond horizons? All intentional activity appears, therefore, to be both scoped and able to be transcended (if only in part?)? Could not these two senses of ‘world’ be merely simulated, like, e.g., when one flies an aircraft in a flight simulator or enters and explores the possible simulations of a game-world? That, this sense of living in a world is none other than a series of simulations within a series of simulations? But, even if that were to be the case, does it make any difference? In a simulated frame of reference a world of simulation is still being simulated; even if as a simulation within some other possible frame of simulation since appreciation must always involve one frame of reference within another, i.e. as a world of experience in another world of experience higher in meta-status by one degree, etc. This complex nesting of frames of reference creating and/or re-creating that sense of a(n open-ended) world. That being the case, then it makes no difference if the world were merely simulated since there can be no transcendental difference between  a ‘world of simulation’ and the ‘simulation of a world’ (as long as we recognize this sense of complexity about the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of worldness, of what it means for there to be this complex sense of a world!)! As a transcendental condition of experience, that experience itself can be appreciated, thence this complex sense of a world (regardless of whether that world is misrepresented through its representation or re-presented through its re-presentation). (671) 

These two points granted (of a relative transcendental integrity through the relative harmonization of lived-experience and a lived-in-sense-of-world through the complexity of this sense of world as a seemingly open-ended appreciation of our-world-as-lived) are we allowed to claim that the world must also possess a theological complexion to some degree or other? (671)

	By what series of arguments can this complex question be broken into in order to definitively, and successfully, argue this type of point hypothetically (if such an avenue be found open to the theologian, etc.)? Let me tentatively propose the following scheme:

1.	That all experience is encompassed in its appropriate field of experience.
2.	That all fields are epistemologically organized, being higher by one degree in meta-status.
3.	Epistemological organization always entails the organization of less epistemologically organized material.
4.	Such an epistemologically organized differential, on each level, cannot be reduced to the status of its less epistemologically organized basis.
5.	Hence its theological-like implication to some degree or other in and on each and every level of epistemological organization.
6.	But the sense of the Divine is realized only when there is a dimension of difference in considerable advance of that degree of epistemological organization approximately attendant upon that of the human person.
7.	But an open-ended sense of world-complexity (in its nesting of epistemological levels of organization) can only imply that this relatively superior condition of the requisite degree of advanced epistemological organization could not but be met hence:
8.	The necessary implication of the Divine complexion of the Life-World in some form or other!

	…of course the issue as to whether that form of the Divine complexion has religious ramifications or does not have religious ramifications has yet to be explored in any depth. (672)

	In other words ‘the theological value of the world (i.e., its theological complexion) must be in conformity with ‘the world of theological value’(i.e., the open-ended nature of the Divine as a Divine process)! Only in transcendental-experiential terms of reference could this equation (of theological conformity with the world) be approached (as an aspect of phenomenal-experience in its phenomenologicalization). Hence the heuristic device of the overall transcendental suspension (and its explication through a hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension) must be both the door and the avenue through which an examination of this vexed question as to whether there can be this Divine-experience from both the points of views of the non-divine and the Divine and any possible relation between the same? In these explorations let us first begin with the possibility of such an interaction, as a possible interaction between both the non-divine and the Divine, and v.v. Could such an interaction be mutual given the degree of such a differential in power, its possibly impossible conceivability, and our non-recognition of an awareness or such experience should it be made available to us? Let us now, therefore, explore these various issues in the next section of this extended essay. (673)