8.    The Importance of the Theological Turn?*

	In the course of this extended essay the concept of a theological difference has evolved. Initially it was treated merely as the difference in vision between ‘a world conceived of as having a theological complexion’ and ‘a world conceived of as not having a theological complexion’. Later the (phenomenal) ‘world’ was treated as the (transcendental) ‘Life-World.’ The implication to be inferred was that this difference needed to be argued for by a theologian or similar in order for the theologist to be able to proclaim this supplementary/complementary way of seeing the world. Supplementary in the sense of being an addition to the phenomenal world, and, complementary in the sense that this addition is an inherent part of the world, i.e., that the phenomenal world in its transcendental ideality has an intimately associated theological complexion (be that argued for, successfully or unsuccessfully, by logic or metaphysics, by invoking analogy or a via negative, through revelation or personal testimony, indirectly through textual transmission or directly through other forms of inspiration, etc.). (1136)

	Later, a distinction between a mundane theological difference and a trans-mundane theological difference was introduced on the grounds that a mundane theology was more or less already accepted by most parties to this type of debate if only covertly or unintentionally by default. Through the perception of the world as ‘one’ world and the necessity of there being ‘one world’ in order for a person to be ‘a’ person with ‘one’ history (as expressed in and through its existential descriptor/description) despite the fact that there can be no absolute narratives nor an absolute grand narrative and that the interpretation of our life or the life of some other person is always open to an infinity of perspectives, intentional frames of reference, etc., and some associated form of a narrated version of events, then it followed that despite a miscellany of accounts that identity could still be threaded by this transcendental unity of the Life-World. That this unity of the Life-World therefore has a theological flavour if only in a mundane sense, i.e., in basically a non-religious form or format. For a theologian or theologist to perceive the world as having an irreducible theological flavour or residue that is also able to sustain a religious interpretation (either classical/orthodox and/or non-classical/non-orthodox in nature) they would then need to argue that this mundane theological basis also has a trans-mundane theological transcendent overlay/immanent underlay. That, this theological complexion is also able to sustain the features normally ascribed to a fully developed theology possessing and offering a foundation or basis for some of the following features such as, perhaps, an objective-subject of or for devotion, petition, emulation, personal interaction, inter-personal interaction, trans-personal interaction, etc., and/or, as a gifter of boons, dispenser of benediction, devolver of salvation, etc., etc. That in order for the theologian or similar to be able to argue for a truly religious theological-like dimension, in a classical and/or non-classical form or format, then it was necessary for them to argue from a mundane theology to a trans-mundane theological since it would be argued that a theological frame of reference could only be developed from a mundane theological basis and not from the mere theological treatment of the phenomenal or that merely created in the creation if a creationist position were also being argued for? 

*	For the latest version of this paper refer to my homepage site (doc: 2theoj.rtf):
www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelsrelphil.html
  	Would one be correct to adopt this subtlety in this regard? We see a hand-potted pot and know a potter made it. But would we know a potter had potted that pot if we were absolutely in the dark about its being potted by the hand of a potter? It is because we know that it has been potted by a potter that we see it as being potted or created. Without this knowledge we would be unable to make this conclusion from a mere inspection of the pot. But, by extension, just because pots are potted we are not allowed to infer that the world has been ‘potted’ or ‘created by the metaphorical hands of the Divine’. Then, again, by extrapolation from this knowledge of the potting of pots we might infer that all things are made through intentional acts which is an illegal supposition unless it could be argued for (by the assumption that all events are for a reason and that all reasons are intentionally guided in some form or other). It is not good enough to merely say that we ‘know’ that the world has been ‘potted’ by this Divine ‘hand’ because we have been merely told this… The mere telling of stories about Father Xmas, e.g., do not make them ‘real’ in the requisite sense even though there is an entire industry centered on this over-iterated mode-of-life (which as a meme has been very successfully disseminated)… Whether such theological arguments are valid or invalid, as I have often stated, is for a theologian or theological-philosopher or similar to carefully decide. For our part let us see, from a hypothetical point of view, whether there is room for this (type of) supposition or presupposition in a theological or theological-like position, i.e., that the Life-World has a theological complexion (beyond a mere mundane form or format). Hence the intent of this extended essay is to examine this type of question, albeit from this hypothetical, non-partisan point of view! (1137)

	Whether this implicit argument is invalid or invalid, namely, that a religiously viable theology needs to be developed from a mundane vision of the theological is a another matter entirely! Suffice to say that the extrapolation of a trans-mundane theology from a mundane theology would be or should be, in my estimation, an easier affair to orchestrate; although, I must quickly add, that degree of ‘ease’ is definitely a relative affair, and, for that matter, not something guaranteed of success. (1138)

	Essentially, the development of a trans-mundane theology, a theology with a viable religious basis, is put in play through the inauguration of a theological turn along with a thematization of the same (in the life of that theologically oriented religionist). Thus our understanding of a theological difference is now re-formulated through the lens of the person (whether nominated specifically, or treated as a particular person in general terms of reference) from an existential point of view to that extent and in that manner that such a re-orientation is seen to make a difference in the existential course of their existence. In this section of our essay let us look closely to see if this type of difference makes an actual difference in the life of the person who has adopted and adapted a theological mode-of-life? Is there a quantitative and/or qualitative difference, in an existential perspective, between a theologist and a non-theologist in this regard? In other words in our differentiation of this difference does this differentiated difference make a ‘real difference’ in the life of the individual from a hypothetical point of view? By ‘real difference’ is meant this sense of a theological difference that can be demonstrated hypothetically in the course of a person’s life, in particular or in general terms of intentional reference, through the adoption and adaptation of this theological re-orientation. Such a difference, in this type of investigation, being argued for in hypothetical terms of reference without direct reference to a ‘before’ that type of re-orientation or an ‘after’ this process of re-orientation; thence its hypothetical treatment despite its actual expression in the course of the life of the committed theologist. Such critical, philosophical considerations on our part operating without recourse to an ascertainment of the reality or non-reality of salvation or similar that might be claimed by a particular tradition. On the other hand, the concept of salvation or similar as a normative or prescriptive force must be considered in our evaluation of the theological difference this element of the theological might make in the life of an individual or community; albeit its exercise by us in those hypothetical, non-partisan terms of reference. (1139)

	For the sake of argument let me examine two provocative theses at the same time (in order to examine this concept of theological difference in a more sophisticated form and format), namely, is Buddhism a religion (completely divorced from theological speculation, etc.), and, is Christianity merely a form of superstition (as a number of social critics, philosophers, scientists, etc.,  would like to argue when the phenomenon of Christianity is re-viewed from a narrowly written scientific or sociological perspective, etc.)? (1140)

	Some theologists have argued that as Buddhism is atheistic, therefore, as a form of atheism it should be completely ignored if not abhorred. Other people see the Buddhist religion, without an overriding concern for a theological position, as a type of anomaly best ignored; to be treated, perhaps, more as a philosophy of life rather than as a religion. Then, again, some sociologists and anthropologists et al have argued that, when examined from a lived-perspective, the Buddhist faith is very much lived in a religious mode. Furthermore, some Buddhist traditions are very theologically oriented both theoretically and practically, e.g., as found in textual formulations of  a Pure Land orientation, Tathagatgarbha orientation, etc. In certain periods of history particular Buddhas and Bodhisattvas received vast outpourings of devotional energy with caves and cliff-sides being carved in their honour. Just when do devotional practices start or cease to be theological or theological-like in orientation? (1141)

	Just as we have some people simplifying the religious landscape by insisting that Buddhism is not a religion, we have, in contrast, other parties reducing religious belief merely to the status of superstition. Our criticisms of our own cultural phenomena should not be reduced to mere sound-bites, equally, our treatment of cultural phenomena in other cultures should not be expressed in the same simplified fashion. Although such essential comments may be insightful to some extent, often certainly provocative, they must conceal more than they reveal. The greater existential richness of reality can be neither eclipsed nor equaled by representations/misrepresentations of the same! No unqualified statement is ever going to be able to representatively sum up the rich complexity of any form of a cultural phenomenon – only the properly constructed addition of a series of insightful qualifications is going to be able to partly address this phenomenon of misrepresentation to any acceptable extent. On the other hand, misrepresentation must be able to be undone to some extent otherwise my representation of this phenomenon itself would be unable to be disseminated. And when we read the newspapers, e.g., we think we have some idea of what they are trying to disseminate (whether we agree with their apparent assessment or not). In these separate and contrasting analyses (of the possibility of a theologically influenced Buddhist theory and practice, and, the non-reductive treatment of the value of Christian theory and practice) let me explore to what extent a theological or theological-like turn may or may not contribute value to life as lived in accordance with certain religious visions of cultural reality. In essence I would like to argue that as the Buddhist faith, in all its forms, is not anywhere a mere philosophy, in the same manner, more or less, the Christian faith, in all its forms, cannot be reduced to the status of a merely ‘superstitious religion’. What then, in general, is the existential value of a religious life, and, in particular, to what extent and in what manner a theological turn contributes value to the value of a religious life. If we can determine an answer to this/these type of question/s then we might well be in a better position to answer this other question – what is a theological difference (and what difference does a theological difference make in the life of a religious person?)? (1142)

	Let us assume for the sake of argument that a theological or theological-like turn is a viable religious position, i.e., a type of attitude that can be exercised with a positivity of value to that extent that it existentially augments the nature of the existence of that individual or community professing that type of attitude. Could we then not argue that this theological difference, therefore, is also transformative? I.e., that a theological difference is also a theological differential capable of being taken up as a transformative differential to that extent that between the non-theological reality and the theological ideality the sense of a differential in the life of an individual or community can be reduced or minimized to some extent (even if that minimization of this difference is itself only minimal in relation to the source of that idealization, but, still, relative to the life of the individual or community could make quite a major degree of an existential difference by virtue of its apparent and/or professed ‘re-direction’ of the life of that individual or community, etc. By ‘re-direction’ is meant a considerable re-organization of the priorities exercised in the life of that individual or community [as discerned as being expressed through an interpretation of its textual depositions]). In other words, this re-direction of a culture (whether treated from a private and/or public perspective) is transformative in its aspirations. That, a theological difference is experienced as a theological differential that, as a consequence, is transformative, i.e., capable of heading the life of an individual or community in a different cultural direction, namely, one with theologically influenced aspirations. Now we are in a position to examine  the religious life of an individual or community in this regard in order to ascertain the transformative difference unleashed through the exercise of this type of meme in accordance with its ostensive memetic constitution. A sense of constitution that is both passive and active, i.e., is both constituted and constitutes. E.g., religious attitudes in their physical expression realize religious texts including the building of places of worship and all other forms of religious activity. The activities therein being constituted by the genres of religious activity taken up by that particular meme (in accordance with the priorities subsumed in the religious re-reorganization entailed). Now, with this transformative component in place we are in a position to better understand the theological differences and theological similarities between, say, (ostensively common) patterns of Buddhist religious practice and patterns of Christian religious practice. (1143)

	To demonstrate this type of comparison let us hypothetically and very briefly interview two articulate members of, respectively, a typical Buddhist community and a Christian community. (1144)

Let us ask the Buddhist why they bow before a statue of the historical Buddha? Let us say, that they say that it is because… this is traditional, is conducted as an act of reverence, in the spirit of humility… that it is done through our desire to be like the Buddha… aspire to a better life in this life; a better life after this life; hope to be born in a Buddha-field; that, ultimately, they seek enlightenment and the salvation that stems from the same… In this vein we can interpret the above as a desire for religious change and all that that entails for that individual in their particular religious context. (1145)

	Let us ask the Christian why they bow before a statue of the historical Jesus. Let us say, that they say that it is because… this is traditional, as an act of reverence… that it is done through our desire to be like Christ, in a spirit of humility… aspire to a better life in this life; a better life after this life; hope to be born (again) in heaven; that, ultimately, they seek the salvation that stems from the same… In this vein we can interpret the above as a desire for religious change and all that that entails for that individual in their particular religious context (and its specific denominational characteristics). (1146)

	Of course there are differences! The Buddhist might bow with hands place together whereas the Christian might bow and cross themselves at the same time. It would be wrong to assume that their intentions are the same even if, let us say, they both merely bowed in a similar manner. Then, there are theological differences. The Buddhist might say they aspire, ultimately, for enlightenment, whereas, in contrast, the Christian might say they aspire, ultimately, for salvation and the eternal life that is thought to entail. (1147)

	What is the purpose of my two parallel potted histories? I would like to argue that there are similarities and there are differences. That, the presence of a theological turn or a theological-like turn is a (hermeneutical) construct that not only has theoretical consequences but also practical (and critical) consequences by virtue of this transformative component embedded in this very type of a turn (or any other type of turn for that matter). This is the primary point I would like to make here, namely, that this theological difference is also a theological differential with an ensuing transformative component or aspect, and, that it is the presence of this transformational force that allows me to perceive a similarity between these two particular instances of a religious meme. That, in other words, a theological or theological-like turn can be assumed to be present in both potted versions of the Buddhist faith and the Christian faith as represented by myself even if left relatively unqualified. Thus, we can safely assume that a theological-turn is effectively identical with a theological-like turn by virtue of this theological difference entailed, that that difference acts as a differential with a transformative potential despite ideological differences, differences in practice, modes of critical reflection and commentary, etc., utilized by either tradition either w.r.t. themselves (in the form of a virtual monologue) or each other (in the form of a virtual dialogue to some degree or other). Are we right to assume this virtual equivalence between the religious existence of a theological difference, the same as a theological differential along with its transformative potential? Does our potted version of the Buddhist faith have room for a theological difference? (1048)

	Does the typical Buddhist perceive a difference between ‘a religious vision of their vision of the overall world’ and their perception of ‘a non-religious vision of the same world’? The answer must be a cautious (and well-qualified) “yes”. Otherwise, how could a theological-like differential manifest itself with a transformative component or aspect?! This sense of a transformation being called for in Buddhist polemics, etc., then we must safely assume the presence of a theological-like turn. Moreover, that theological-like turn, as a differential, being predicated on an actually perceived theological-like difference, must imply that this turn in effect is none other than a theological turn (albeit constituted with the spectrum of differences in keeping with its manifestation as a particular religious meme. Or, we might like to put this same ‘observation’ the other way round. That the Buddhist faith is a religious faith because of its transformative aspirations which are indicative of a religious-differential which in turn is indicative of a religious difference in their perception of the overall world thence the accepted presence of a theological turn or theological-like turn regardless of whether that perception of a difference is formulated and articulated or left relatively non-formulated and relatively non-articulated. Would I be correct in this surmise? I believe an appreciation of the historical developments of Buddhism in general would accept that Buddhist developments on the whole have taken an increasing theological or theological-like flavour, witness developments in the utilization of rituals in Buddhist liturgies, etc; the Yogacara and trends towards a purification of our being in the world, etc; the devotional trends in the Tathagatagarbha lineage of texts; overt devotional trends in other strands of Buddhist theory and practice; Tantric developments; the overall presence and dissemination of Buddhist iconography, ritual practice in all Buddhist traditions, etc., etc! (1049)

	What are we correctly allowed to surmise here? With some degree of ‘safety’ we should be allowed to surmise the following (operating in either direction): the semblance of a theological difference induces a theological differential whose potential is transformative! That this theological differential is embedded in the semblance of the numinous induced by all the means theoretically, practically and critically brought to bear upon our now religiously problematic re-positioning in this World-of-Life (subjected to the corresponding hermeneutic problematization associated with that particular expression of a religious meme). In these hypothetical theological/ (meta-)theological investigations, therefore, this element of the numinous, or, rather, its ‘perception’, actually establishes the culture of a theological perspective. Let us, therefore, attempt to discern how a numinous dimension is theoretically and practically established and discerned in a religious philosophy (in essence, establishes a religious philosophy rather than a relatively non-religious philosophy). (1050) 

	Short of developing a theory of mysticism we might like to examine why a theological difference produces or induces a certain style of theological differential in keeping with the tenor of that difference? In other words, a theological differential may be transformative; the nature of its distinctive transformation being dependent upon the manner of its problematization of that differential and the manner and degree of resolution realized therein. How is that problematization engineered? Through processes of disvaluation. A process that occurs at the same time as a processes of a positive re-valuation. How then is this double process of valuation, both positive and negative in orientation, engineered? Through re-simulating processes of religious narration wherein its mythological complexion is set up to be actively engaged, i.e., re-lived through the adoption and adaptation of a series of modes considered in the light of that problematization to re-engage that sense of ‘religious reality’. (1051)

	What are the essential points I am trying to make here. First, the existence of a theological difference is inductive of a sense of a theological differential. Second, that this differential is experienced as transformative (when it is directly experienced). Third, it is transformative because it both problematizes and sympathetically resolves that induction of religious distress. Fourth, it problematizes our-existence-in-the-world-before-this-sense-of-the-Divine through the induction of a negative aspect to that differential; e.g., that we are to painfully realize that we are sinners; or, spiritually defective; or, spiritually ignorant and unenlightened; or, need to be saved or born again, etc., etc. Then, through the exercise of a positive aspect in some form or other, there is an effective re-normalization of this existential equation so to speak. This sense of religious ‘re-normalization’ is achieved through offering various religious modes of activity/inactivity whose meaning and meaningfulness in a positive light are acquired through the religious aura of various religious myths which if and when re-lived appear to minimize or neutralize the induced negative aspects of that religiously specific problematization of our being-in-the-world-before-others in our-being-before-that-sense-of the-Divine. E.g., the Buddhist is instructed that the Buddha sat under a tree and meditated, and, that we too should do the same or its equivalent (as interpreted as valid in our busy urban lifestyles). That, as the Buddha became enlightened, so, too, we can share in some of that ‘enlightenment’ by doing as he did or its modern equivalent. However, fifth, this attempt at a resolution of this problematic review of our existence-in-the-world is also, in my opinion more often than not, from observation,  re-inductive of its re-problematization and, therein and thereafter, reinforces this apparent cycle of existential distress and relief, etc. However, sixth, re-iteration of this cycle of distress-relief, etc., is also probably inductive, more often than not, of new ways of seeing the world that may or may not be regarded as insightful by those devotees, their admirers, those neutral to such ways of re-seeing the world, and/or their detractors. Seventh, that new way/s of seeing the world, resulting from the individual and collective adoption of such practices, then presents its own problematics and processes of re-normalization, etc. Eighth, in essence, these parallel negative and positive streams of influence then hermeneutically re-configure perceptions of the numinous in that culture both actively and passively. Such ‘phenomena’ being constructed in the light of religious expectations engendered in that type of religious culture, and, in turn, also re-configure such hermeneutic processes in turn. Indeed, paralleling aspects of the numinous that induce a sense of psychic repulsion and attraction simultaneously (as noted by the German theologian Rudolf Otto in book The Idea of the Holy)? That, in effect, any reinforcement of those expectations is usually treated as ‘evidence’ for the adoption of that religious attitude that constructed those expectations in the first place; a type of faith that then needs to be re-iterated in order to maintain its apparent integrity (since the re-induction of the negative and problematic is usually restored/re-stored!). This ‘dialectical’ approach, as suggested above, however, should be treated as only a provisional tool and introductory sketch for investigating this aspect of religious behaviour and phenomena. No doubt those of a religious persuasion would want to re-evaluate the above in a more positive light (than the hypothetical neutrality of the overall transcendental suspension that, in my opinion should be adopted by all parties whether they be of a religious persuasion or not!)! In effect, we have an outline of an integrated method for re-viewing religious behaviour (and its modes of relief) and allied cultural practices (such as, e.g., ethical attitudes, legal philosophies, political expectations, etc.). (1052)

	As I have noted, by re-living those religious myths, adopted and adapted by the devotee, certain modes of re-normalization are engendered and brought to life therein. The following question can now be asked: why is it that most mythic re-enactments are inductive of multiple modalities of apparent renormalization? We have diverse spectra of practices, e.g., meditation, prayer, good behaviour, charity, good works, contemplation, mantras, rituals, divination, etc., that in outward appearance often cross denominational and cultural boundaries. Why this usual plethora of modalities in any denomination even if some modes are relatively more stressed than others when compared to other traditions and cultures? Why is there this ever-present abundance? Is there an unmet need for this proliferation of techniques, or, do such practices as memes cross these permeable boundaries through a co-induction of need induced through their own power of dissemination? Let me examine these questions in more depth. (1053)

	These types of questions all devolve around matters of value. As argued elsewhere, consideration of value is a transcendental affair. In determining and evaluating the value of this religious dimension brought about through the overt and/or covert use of a trans-mundane theological turn let me return to an appreciation of this transcendental dimension in our research. (1054)

	The use of this term ‘transcendental’ is not an exercise in mysticism or mystification. In Continental philosophy from just before the time of Kant to Kant himself, through Fichte and Hegel and on to the philosopher Husserl and beyond this term has had a considerable philosophical use and re-definition. My use of this term is through a re-definition of that adopted and adapted by Edmund Husserl. Its contrast is through the ‘non-transcendental’ defined as the natural, and as non-judgmental in epistemological orientation, and, invocative of the phenomenologically essential, etc. It is, namely, that realized and thematized through the use of the transcendental suspension. Moreover, my use of the transcendental suspension is usually in the sense of an overall transcendental suspension, i.e., a thorough transcendental suspension that is global in extent and incorporative of the local if that latter emphasis also be invoked. By ‘local’ is meant that under examination both phenomenologically and transcendentally, i.e., archetypally, essentially, phenomenal-phenomenologically… where we attempt to deal with the constitution of the phenomenon/phenomena under examination. In this we realize the essential nature of its intentional constitution; i.e., how the mind has put that set of meanings together in the appearance or simulation of that to-hand and now currently under local transcendental scrutiny. Put simply, in our understanding how is the appearance of that currently to-hand configured in our understanding? Little more than that and little less than that. In other words – what (transcendental) meaning or (transcendental) value has that configuration for-us under examination? This type of question is centered in the hermeneutic circle – the later being re-articulated by myself to co-opt three moments (taking a variety of names in accordance with the frame of reference being exercised). In discussing meaning or value those three moments revolve around, respectively, sense in an analytical sense as it divides textual meaning into its apparent molecular constituents and thereby maps out for us the type of transcendental content currently to-hand (this mapping as carved out in a cultural-intercultural linguistic mapping of our psychic universe); meaning proper in an intentional sense (as synthesized in the relevant frame of reference/s adopted and meta-textually forming that gestalt background of genre); and, meaningfulness as realized through a balanced suspension of the former two moments (wherein the value of that value is realized spontaneously as a non-textual experience). This latter suspension is treated as a ‘suspension’ through this ongoing balance exercised between analysis and synthesis. Furthermore, each of these other two moments is also a type of suspension, namely, metaphorical and rhetorical, and, then, as the overall hermeneutic circle is also exercised through an ongoing balance of all three moments I have had to deploy the expression of an ‘overall transcendental suspension’ in order to correctly nominate just what type of suspension is under focal examination and/or exercise. Then, the content of such examinations can also be localized and/or globalized; the later in the sense that all ontological commitments and all epistemological commitments are subject to this overall transcendental suspension (in the manner as articulated by Husserl, e.g. in his Ideas I). Acts of volition being realized in the not-textual experience of the overall transcendental suspension. The upshot of this type of research being a transcendental or trans-intentional focus on intentional constitution, i.e., how is that simulated appearance of the world and/or some part of it configured in intentional consciousness? This examination is done in depth and realizes that all surfaces, all appearances, etc., cannot be merely superficial in their constitution. On the other hand, there can be no absolute depth (other than that attendant upon the world-itself-as-it-is-found-there-for-us) because, although our investigations are essential in orientation, there can be no ultimate essence of the essential (as the essence of essence is no essence!)! Within the in-depth relatively of this channel engendered in and through appearances our researches are conducted with a degree of criticality by virtue of the relative stability of their relative re-iterability (in our simulation of these simulations, as re-simulations). (1055)

	This brings me to the following rhetorical question: is it possible to have religious faith in the context of an overall transcendental suspension since these two types of epistemological states might well be regarded as antithetical? I.e., how could we have faith and suspend it at the same time? In resolving this issue let me, in the process, define the nature of the trans-mundane theological turn necessary to establish this degree and kind of a religious transformation of this world-as-lived-in-with-others (who, collectively, will include all those people who have no demonstrable religious faith, some particular faith, or, a faith of the same or similar persuasion even within that same denomination amongst those who might proclaim that they maintain such a similar state of affairs). (1056)

	Why this particular type of philosophical concern? If the exercise of the overall transcendental suspension demands the suspension of all forms of belief is it then possible to maintain a sense of faith under such circumstances? Then, how would we determine the validity and/or authenticity of such a faith should it be ‘maintained’? In resolving this conundrum let me also examine the nature of this process of trans-mundane theologicalization involved in the exercise of the religious beliefs maintained within the exercise of a person’s religious faith since I would hold that all of these issues currently under examination are intimately interconnected. (1057)

	For a start, let me diffuse and remove the hoary chestnut of the controversy as to the priority between faith and belief – are these two things essentially the same or different, or, indeed, non-commensurable? To ‘have faith’ must mean we have a certain attitude of assuredness towards a certain state of affairs. In thematizing what that state of affairs is means we are thematizing a matter of belief , not that the same cannot be also be left in an open ultimately undefined mode of explication. ‘I have faith’ means ‘I have faith in x.’ Defining x is to define your beliefs as to what x entails. E.g., ‘to have faith in God’ is ‘to have an attitude of faith towards the invoked reality of “God”’. Whether ‘God’ actually exists or does not exist, in part or in whole, is not intentionally relevant to that act of faith. On the other hand, the intentional object of that faith qua an intentional object or objective must be in existence or inexistent even if left open or undefined. (1058)

	In the light of the above we can see that faith is a process and the intentional content of that process is belief. This is not to say that the thematization of either is to be conducted at the same rate, or, that given a certain context either of these parties need to be given the same degree of intentional focus. However, there is an in depth commensurability by virtue of their mutual intentional origination. Now let us examine what is to be correctly expected when subjecting these mutual parties to an overall transcendental suspension? (1059)

	A misnomer on the subject of the suspension is that to suspend something is to deny or negate that same sate of affairs. Such a position doesn’t make sense. How could one ‘suspend’ the world, in an act of global suspension, and still be around to conduct that suspension. What is put out of action by invoking the suspension? That subjected to its rhetorical actions. By questioning that under focus we are effectively calling it into question at the same time as we posit the same. There is a dual status here of both positing and negating… at the same time. All questions have that same form. ‘Is this x?’ is, correctly, ‘is this x or is this not x?’ If we can ask questions then we can do suspensions. We can ask questions, therefore, we can do suspensions! Now, when a question is resolved we first invoke a metaphorical reading. ‘Is this x?’ is answered by ‘this is like x’ or ‘this is not like x’ (or, we cannot currently decide between like x or not like x’ in which case there is no resolution of that question). Confirmation of this process of resolution then gives us ‘this is x’ or ‘this is not x’ (if that be appropriate since the question invoked might only want an apt metaphor). A suspension of faith then would entail not much more than our questioning whether we have ‘faith’ or whether we don’t have ‘faith’, what is this thing called ‘faith’ or what is it not, etc? Of course, the whole process is conducted within this vision of the hermeneutic circle as just re-outlined and so the process is more than just questioning since the whole process of the suspension is also subjected to enquestioning, etc., i.e., attempting to read that phenomenon or set of phenomena under focus through a parallel set of relevant texts, meta-texts and non-texts, etc., along with their contra texts, contra meta-texts, contra-non-texts, etc. However, the art of this suspension is more correctly conducted intuitively… a process that allows us to articulate to ourselves the nature of that phenomenon to-hand and thereby allows us to thematize to ourselves an assessment as to its prominent essential features that properly, appropriately and validly characterize this perception-conception as that type of phenomenal type apparently thought to be currently to-hand, etc. In this regard what could the religious philosopher or theologian say about this type of phenomenon of faith/belief? (1060)

	In this regard I would like to make some tentative suggestions. That an overall transcendental suspension is also a (balanced) suspension of both process and content. As previously noted, faith is an intentional process that need not rule out trans-intentional features and sources of origination or influence. Our ability to some extent to investigate this phenomenon transcendentally means we too can investigate it to some extent in and from a trans-intentional modality of the transcendental. Moreover, all phenomenal expression has a certain je ne sais pas by virtue of its not-textual experience as expressed through the overall transcendental suspension/hermeneutic circle, i.e., our inability to absolutely reduce a phenomenon in lived-reality reductively to a mere text or set of texts. The non-uni-vocal textuality of the hermeneutic circle must rule against this possibility for a start. As already noted, we can retrospectively examine the nature of the intentional objectivity associated with an act of faith or an verall set of faith-acts, i.e., the nature of the belief structures entailed in the gestation of that experience of faith-and-belief. It is at this juncture that I believe the philosopher/theologian might have something to say – either about how they come to believe and what they might come to believe as a result of that type of process. I mention ‘type’ because it is obviously that different religious people can have different forms of religious faith/belief even though enough territorial communality is in evidence phenomenologically for the ever present possibility of conducting an inter-faith dialogue in this regard (among those who feel they have some stake in this type of phenomenon). In this light let me examine what I perceive to be an augmentation of our view of the world when a trans-mundane theological difference/transformation is allowed to form and operate within and upon the context of a ‘prior’ natural mundane theological sense of ‘our’ positioning in the world. That there can be no ‘real’ philosophical problem of inter-subjectivity in this regard by virtue of the fact that this world is already ‘our’ world and not merely ‘my’ world, etc. (an existential fact guaranteed by the necessary, inter-subjective meta-textual strand of textuality already present in the hermeneutic circle/overall transcendental suspension)!  (1061)

	Let me state quite clearly that the presence of this religious augmentation of the world in our religious treatment of this being-in-the-world-with-others is evidence for a theological or theological-like turn. The very existence of a trans-mundane theological difference is reflected in this sense of augmentation, v.v., for that person or community of religious faith that is found/finds itself to possess the same. In other words: a trans-mundane theological difference implies a religious augmentation of their vision of the world, and v.v! Let me examine this observation and conclusion. (1062)

	Both the religious and the non-religious person live in a world with-others founded on a mundane theological(-like) difference. They experience the world as ‘a’ world with some semblance of relative unity. Then they also experience it as an assembly of different facets within this relative semblance of non-absolute unity. Thence this theological-like difference between the apparent unity of the world and an apparent fragmentation of the same at the same time, v.v. I.e., that there is an existential  difference to the extent this semblance of a world cannot be reduced merely to a set of fragments (because the unity of those fragments themselves in turn would need to be called into question. Moreover, various ‘fragments’ themselves fragment differently when spatially viewed in different perspectives and contexts, etc. Furthermore, temporal considerations also call for this semblance of unity). Indeed, this transcendental sense of world is a transcendental necessity in order to run any form of an argument one way or the other. Embedded in the very space-time of the intentional act a transcendental sense of unity allows not only one transcendental subject to correspond with another, and v.v., but also that same transcendental subject to correspond with their own apparent sense of self. Now, I would argue that a religious space is carved out of this sense of world by virtue of its religious problematization. That the very resolution of this problematization therein then realizes a religious sense of ‘world’ and hence the thematization of a trans-mundane sense of a theological difference is an augmentation of this vision of the world, and, is necessarily based upon he former (transcendentally, and v.v.). A religious sense of the world is only realized through the resolution and consequent augmentation realized its problematization. Thus the religious problematization of a mundane sense of world then, and thereafter, for the religious person/community establishes this sense of a trans-mundane theological difference. Associated questions in keeping with the religious nature of that problematization then distinctly augments it in a manner in keeping with the religious nature of its problematization. To me this is not problematic – the religious person works with concepts of self, world, community, etc., already established in their community although its should also be said that today communities are no longer culturally confined merely within their own cultures (hence the all pervasive extent of the inter-cultural as well).  Moreover, no culture can escape prior religious formulations already at work in its vision of such basic content as world/s, individuals, communities, ethical considerations, etc., etc. Such features might be minimized they also presuppose such features at work already within the cultures of the world. Thus one might say that the disseminated work of a religious fraternity is merely a re-focusing on trans-mundane elements and/or the introduction/re-introduction of relatively novel religious features (the later aspect being micro-incremental by nature by virtue of the need for the adoption and adaptation of genres/hybrid-genres in that regard and thence their transmission/re-transmission as memes, etc., when an instance of relative, non-absolute novelty is instigated/re-instigated). (1063)

	The micro-incremental nature of introduced/induced novelty of a religious nature is realized through a process of augmentation. In other words elements of a mundane theological-like nature are problematized and through processes of resolution re-instigated with a trans-mundane theological-like complexion. As I would argue that this is a feature in common with all forms of religious expression we then find ourselves with a comprehensive lens for viewing all forms of religious phenomena from this perspective of the trans-phenomenal-phenomenological. Let me examine this process of augmentation, etc., in some detail in order to arrive at a degree of understanding in this regard that might allow us to formulate a comprehensive method for phenomenologically appreciating the dynamic-structures involved in the dissemination of a religious point of view (regardless of denominational/trans-denominational differences, etc.). (1064)

	In a simplified, idealized vision of what is operating here let us divide this transformational process into three moments of the pre-transformational, transformational and the post-transformational. In the first moment elements for transformation (namely, world, individual, community, etc.) are invoked in either non-religious/religious oriented forms of presentation. In the second moment these invoked elements are problematized within a religious frame of reference. Certain elements might be removed and/or introduced by virtue of that religious frame of reference. Then, in the third moment the consequences of that religious treatment are enunciated explicitly and/or implicitly. However, for reasons yet to be examined, all religious frames of reference call for an ongoing re-iteration of that religious frame of reference along with a proliferation of other parallel processes of transformation to be instigated by that religious frame of reference in accordance with its current state of play. Briefly, let me give some simplified examples of these transformational instigations that accumulatively form/inform this process of augmentation, etc. (1065)

	It is obvious, on close examination of the relevant texts, that the promotion of a religious point of view is often conducted through a problematization of the Life-World. “Don’t you know the meaning of sin?” “Don’t you know the future karmic consequences of ignorance?” “Don’t you comprehend the ramification of not being chosen?” The ‘world’ can be questioned, i.e., our current cultural understanding can be questioned, or, culturally augmented through some form of intercultural questioning. However, the modus operandi of religious enquestioning is usually not a scientifically neutral form of interrogation. An answer has already been pre-arrived at, the question merely adopted to selectively focus on this pre-desired ‘solution’. In this process of directed resolution connotation overrides denotation with the induction of a differential between pre-delineated negative and positive outcomes; the induction of this differential, when appropriated or re-appropriated, then fostering a religious climate in sympathy with that religious vision of the Life-World. However, the existential anomaly created has an addictive-like component that often drives the indoctrinated individual and/or community to feel the need to repeat the same therapeutic-like religious process in order to re-experience the re-diminishment of that anomalous experience. A sense of anomaly  re-induced through a re-living of the context that drives this type of performance; the natural decay of this type of resultant experience needing reinforcement in order to consolidate this type of perceived progress, albeit a re-questioned sense of progress. Moreover, this same sense of existential angst, from being approached from different perspectives, and for a variety of other reasons, also seems to demand the proliferation of other techniques in parallel to the same type of end (albeit one that may well be more illusory than obtainable; certainly an objective that might meet forms of redefinition that promote it further beyond human forms of obtainablity and thence also promote the parallel induction of an increasing need for trans-human forms of intervention in order to hopefully achieve this same type of end, etc.). Now, as always, authenticity is a two-edge sword: this induction of a cognitive rift (a perceived dissonance between idealized and realized visions of one’s own personal sense of identity in this general type of religious enquestioning) need not be conducted in an inauthentic manner through the adoption and adaptation of the proper, appropriate and valid exercise of the overall transcendental suspension. In the adequate exercise of this mechanism of religious enquestioning, induction modes of resolution are existentialized in such a manner that an existential excess in value production re-normalizes attitudinal positions, transitions and transformations in such a manner so as to produce/reproduce existentially viable lifestyle scenarios. Viability being demonstrated through an emphasis upon the formation, preservation and augmentation of our relationships both with respect to these relationships individually and collectively. Breakdowns in this process of re-normalization metaphorically opening a door for forms of fundamentalism and other ideological varieties of existential distortion of the Life-World! This theoretical analysis, etc., therefore having both negative and positive implications in our coming to understand this problematization of religious phenomena. At this juncture let me map some of these possible conditions and potential consequences (from theoretical, practical and critical points of view [hopefully form the neutrality of a transcendentally oriented perspective?]). (1066)

	A variety of questions need to be asked? Is this problematization of a mundane theological(-like) difference necessary for the development of a trans-mundane theological(-like) difference? Would such a trans-mundane theological difference be authentically situated in our ‘extended’ understanding of the Life-World? Are there other avenues for the ‘siting’ of a trans-mundane theological(-like) difference? Then, would it not be the case that this progression from a mundane theological difference to its trans-mundane transformation is idealistically oriented, and, therefore, that being the case, is inauthentically oriented by virtue of this bias and thence forever open to forms of fundamentalism, etc., through the adoption and adaptation, i.e., application, of such a covert or implicit ‘extremism’? In examining these questions let us, therein, map the contours of this broad spectrum religious phenomenon of the theological or theological-like difference that seem to be explicitly entailed? (1067)
	
	To see if we can answer some of the above questions let me take the following detour. To be a transcendental phenomenologist means to treat phenomena qua phenomena from a transcendental point of view. That granted, then how is the transcendental phenomenologist to operate in a theological perspective if the phenomenon of the Divine qua a Divine phenomenon/phenomena cannot be evidentially ascertained? Is this a fatal barrier in their research in this regard? Furthermore, is this a fatal barrier for our research as a philosophical theologian or meta-theologian? (1068)

	As already stressed, as a critical transcendental phenomenological, meta-theologian we can concentrate our attention towards the topic of the phenomenon of the theological mode-of-life itself in the sense that it has a phenomenal form or imprint in our intentional passage through and appreciation of the world. Moreover, in such a light, that sense of world is also subjected to a re-writing in the light of the same hence the formulation/s of our concept of a theological difference as already discussed! However, is it possible to have an existentially satisfactory vision of the world if our interpretative schemes have no correspondence with reality as entertained in and through the wider terms of reference of the sheer transcendental openness of the Life-World itself? I.e., from the mode-of-life of the Life-World, as the intentional ground of our being-in-the-world-with-others, to what extent do transformation rules or rulings allow us to cut across the narrow confines of a theological mode-of-life to some other viable way of seeing the world? In other words, what viable senses of transformational correspondence could exist between a theological mode-of-life and others such as an ethical mode-of-life, the scientific mode-of-life, the world of literature, the art-world, etc., etc? Knowing that such interactive projects and their debates are already in existence then we must assume that some form of a transformational correspondence has been attempted (regardless of the relative successfulness of such accommodational ventures)? Processes of accommodation being based on epistemological regions of transformational isomorphism that essentially, and effectively, remain invariant under (such successful processes of) transformation. (1069)

	Consider if you world that one is staring at a pottery mug filled with hot tea. Obviously, if I consider myself ‘to be staring at a pottery mug filled with hot tea’ then I already have an interpretative scheme for understanding that type of situation and that, in all probability, know how to successfully operate in such terms of reference. That I am, indeed, staring at this type of object. Furthermore, as I perceive it to be my pottery mug I should avail myself of its hot tea (as I made it with that intention or was given it and accepted it with that same type of intention, namely, as something to drink). Here, I obviously have a phenomenon for inspection. Is the theologian as fortunate? Let me parallel these two types of imputed phenomena in order to see what differences, if any, exist when we take up a critical transcendental phenomenological capacity in our parallel examinations of these two types of ‘phenomena’. (1070)

	Obviously, in our natural existences, a cup of tea is evidentially treated as a ‘cup of tea’ when a cup of tea is found to be to-hand. We might notate this as: T (as the set ‘containing a cup of tea before me’) is true iff t! (i.e., if there does exist a cup of tea before me). Here there is a meta-textual difference in meta-status between the conceptual interpretation of what it means for ‘cup of tea to be before me’ and its verified perceptual instantiation. In other words, there is a symmetry between an epistemological transformation from the meta-textual conception to the textual perception and from the textual-perception to the meta-textual interpretative conception of the same (i.e., in terms of these phenomenological regions of transformational isomorphism). However, in a transcendental phenomenological perspective, in our treatment of evidence, positively treated evidential states must arise through a marked degree of experiential asymmetry. Let me explain. Because the transcendental perspective is realized and exercised in and though an overall transcendental suspension then it follows that in a transcendental perspective there is no asymmetry between an apparently viable interpretative position and its balanced contra-position(ing). However, in our suspension of the suspension, there is a marked discontinuity in that sense of transcendental balance; in direct proportion to the apparent evidential status of those phenomenal examinations. I may have entertained the (rhetorical-like) ‘non-existence of a non-pottery, non-cup of non-tea not being in front of me’ to overwhelming be of the contrary opinion, namely, there is, indeed, a pottery cup of tea in front of me. That, drinking from this cup confirms that it is tea and not coffee, etc. Could the theologian (or meta-theologian) experience this same type of asymmetry in respect to their topic of interest and therein assume it too could possess an evidential status; should possess an equally evidential status (as claimed by many theologians as articulated in their respective theological modes-of-life)? Or, should what counts for ‘evidence’ find different formulations in different modes-of-life, and, is this suspended asymmetry a necessary features of all types of evidential discernment? Let us, therefore, co-examine these issues (as arise in our comparison of normal evidential states of affairs and what appears or is claimed to occur in mundane and trans-mundane theological perspectives). (1071)

	Is there a point of commonality between these two types of treatment, between the non-theological world of the everyday and theological realms centered in various forms of theological discourse? In my direct interaction with this phenomenon of the cup of tea I am overwhelmed by the facticity of this relationship. It impinges upon me with such an excess of value that I am forced to accept its existence as that-there-for-me. Its meaning may be constituted by-me but its meaningfulness is jointly established for-us through my interaction with this cup of tea. Does the theologian also experience this degree of asymmetry or claim that this type of claim can be made, namely, that an excessive existential excess can also be experienced in a theologically constituted mode-of-life? Certainly this type of claim is argued for by the mundane theologian (as much as would be argued for by the natural non-theologian). This world is experienced as ‘this’ world, as ‘one’ world, ‘this same’ world… and that we each possess ‘one’ unique life within it, etc., etc! That we are thrown into the world, thrust from the natural world into the mundane theological by virtue of this facticity of being-in-the-world(-)with-others! That granted, how might this transcendental necessary commonality (between the natural non-theologian and the mundane theologian) assist the trans-mundane theologian if at all? (1072)

	To some extent, in line with a charitable interpretation of systems of thought, the systematization itself must be productive of an existential excess of value despite the merits of such an interpretative framework. A Postmodernist tack in thus taken in this sense to this extent – all systems of value have some positivity of value, i.e., must be productive of some degree of an existential excess of value. However, in comparative terms of reference, the question is now to what extent that existential excess has a value greatly in excess than that merely invested in the systematization of its terms of reference? A critical Contemporary position asking for an excess that is comparatively greater not only with respect to the quantum of value invested in the process of systematization but on a comparative level with other relevant systems. A relatively more valuable system being one that is comparatively more grounded in the reality of the Life-World, coherently constructed and processed, and, productive of a greater degree of comparative value (than that merely invested in the systematization of that frame of reference). In effect, motivated intentions meet an intentional satisfaction that have a degree of satisfaction greatly in excess of that invested in the systematization of those terms of reference. Here we have degree of commonality between the natural non-theologian and the mundane theologian. Our projects in the world meet with degrees of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) whilst, at the same time, our-being-in-this-world-with-others also meets with a certain degree of apparent self-evident satisfaction (in mundane terms of reference). Our being in the world may be suspended it is never denied! On the contrary through the suspension of each process of suspension it is further reinforced! To what extent then might this superabundance of existential value be able to flow over into a trans-mundane theological perspective, or, indeed, be created within those terms of reference? (1073)

	A ‘charitable view’ also takes into account the existential fact that because there is no absolute demarcation between potentiality and actuality it follows that to some extent, however minimal or marginal, a trans-mundane scenario, e.g., must apply to the complexion of the Life-World even if that degree of meaning generally lacks the requisite degree of meaningfulness sought for by a trans-mundane theologian, etc. Thus, within these terms of reference, a theologian would need to argue for a coherent trans-mundane theological picture of reality, argue for its necessity to some degree or other, and, then argue that the degree arrived at has the requisite degree of meaningfulness sought by that professional theologian, etc. Volume I has argued for a coherency of a theological complexion to the life-world in general terms of reference. In this Volume, Volume II, I have argued that some degree of necessity attaches itself to such a coherent concept. However, the professional theologian would need to argue (in a third volume) that a requisite degree of value can be argued for in this type of mode-of-life; in their vision of a theological mode-of-life. How might this be done if this type of project could be conducted? And, furthermore, would this type of project because of its holistic, idealistically oriented bias escape charges of extremism because of this (asymmetry between ‘whole and part’ in favour of the former) and resulting from this form of bias? (1074)

	As just noted, a phenomenologist must possess the relevant interpretative frame of reference in order to appreciate the intentional objects that fall within it topicality. Through coherency of intentional perspective, when present, in a theological frame of reference or perspective, we can argue that the natural non-theologian, the mundane theologian and the trans-mundane theologian must each possess an adequate degree of coherent framework construction (in meta-textual terms of reference). All that being the case, we now need to examine, albeit hypothetically, to what degree a suitable intentional objectivity can be discerned within its field of topicality, and, whether asymmetries in its formation contribute a fatal degree of extremism to this type of project (or any other instituted with this bias of an idealistic totality or its opposite of a realistic particularity?)? (1075)

	To begin with it is enough to note that from a meta-theological perspective it is not necessary for the meta-theologian to affirm the existence of a theological object (and subject) (other than to note the pre-existence of this type of field entailed in a relatively coherently or incoherently constituted intentional perspective as a theological mode-of-life). On the other hand, in general terms of reference we can determine if an idealistic bias (on totalities), or for that matter a realistic bias (on particulars), need present a permanent and permanently fatal foundation for extremist positions/positionings? That, when conducted adequately through the auspices of a properly, appropriately and validly conducted overall transcendental suspension, all forms of bias are effectively disabled in that regard. Indeed, all beginnings are biased, but, that, through the lens of an adequate overall suspension all foundations for forms of extremism are removed to that extent this attitude is properly exercised and maintained to that degree of transcendental openness. This being the key-insight in this regard – that we must start with prejudice/pre-judgment, but, that, through an adequate overall transcendental suspension bias is removed despite the existence or non-existence of an asymmetry in our suspended suspensions.. On the other hand we also need to note that having started from an idealistic position centered on totalities this prejudice can then go on to subvert the overall process intentional formation, etc., in this direction of the general and idealistic. Similarly, an initial prejudice towards the particularity of our topic could also spill over and re-invest itself in intentional outcomes of a realistic or atomistic positioning. However, ‘reality’ is better reflected in and through the balancing of extremes rather than their re-promotion. I.e., a greater degree of existential excess is to be realized in and through a well-exercised overall transcendental suspension. (1076)

	This detour now conducted let me answer, to that extent possible, the questions previously raised (in paragraph 1070). For a start, is this problematization of a mundane theological(-like) difference necessary for the development of a trans-mundane theological(-like) difference? Other possibilities might exist for the induction of a trans-mundane theological realm and mode-of-life, however, its beginnings must be found in the midst of the phenomenal, the phenomenality of this-world-for-us. Hence its necessary location, initially, in the natural and its mundane theological integrity! Off-centered though such initial biases, it would soon follow that adequate degrees of cognitive value were still being produced in our re-normalization of the same through this ongoing process of suspension, de-suspension, suspension, de-suspension, etc. Let me examine this more closely. (1077)

	Through the necessary imposition of the overall transcendental suspension for the very formation of intentional formulation and thematization we may surmise that the inadequate constitution of the same would similarly ‘infect’ the constitution of its production. In other words, through the normalization of the overall transcendental suspension, the suspension of the same and its ensuing ongoing re-normalization of this process of the overall transcendental suspension inadequate processes of re-normalization would be incrementally productive of non-existentially based formations of an extreme nature and consequent de-centered positioning. Such induced asymmetries being rectified through adequate processes of transcendental re-normalization. However, given that this ideality of rectification were to be observed, how would we be able to determine if the residual asymmetries resulted from the very nature of our topic, indeed, were the result of our interaction with the intentional objectivity/objectivities imputed to result in that associated mode-of-life? In other words, in our direct relationship with those imputed objective centers of focus would we be able to differentiate the apparent reality of such localizations both in that mode-of-life and in the generality of the Life-World itself? I believe we would have an avenue of possibility in this regard if we were able to ascertain the existential hallmarks of the same, or more correctly, ascertain both the existential hallmarks expected to be associated with such imputations given both their transcendental realty and empirical reality, and, more importantly, to what extent non-existential hallmarks are more present that would more contra-indicate the opposite? Thence this residue would need to be examined in both a positive light and in a negative light, namely, to ascertain to what extent existential/non-existential hallmarks are present/absent? What (else) might be entailed in this type of program (from a general point of view)? (1078)

	Obviously, it is a small step to go from a rhetorical denial conducted in the defective/non-defective balance of an overall transcendental suspension to a full-blown problematization of that field of endeavour. The question still remains, is a problematization of our topic necessary for the formation of a trans-mundane theology as seems to be the case? Then, to what extent is the desired resolution pre-configured by this process of problematization and its ongoing re-normalization? Or, is it the case that here too there is an unexpected residue that cannot be accounted for purely by the nature of this process itself. In other words, should one expect a non-reducible residue of an existential nature to be discovered that is not able to be undermined by co-arising non-existential factors that might also co-arise? Again such ‘observations’ are for the professional theologian, etc., to proffer. Suffice to say that given the adequacy of a mundane theology one might also expect some positive overflow into a trans-mundane theological frame of reference as long as this residue were found to be resident with a greater degree of existential hallmarks on balance? (1079)

	In the light of the above, what should one say that might address an inauthenticity in the production/re-production of a theological or theological-like difference? Or, to the same end, how does one determine the relative extent and relative balance/imbalance of such theologically induced features, etc? (1080)

	Of course this type of investigation is best conducted by a committed theologian, etc., but, in general terms of reference, what type of observations and highlights should one expect in this regard? For a start, in our engagement with the world of lived-experience there is, indeed, a residue of an existential excess that in its intentional deposition cannot be reduced to either its textual print (as a ‘text’ in some format) nor its meta-textual imprint (of an expected essential type). The question now devolves to what extent does such an irreducible residue reflects (passively and/or actively constitutes/re-constitutes) a viable trans-mundane theological insight (as a coherent, integrated set of insights into the same)? Then, furthermore, we would need to correctly ascertain the epistemological-ontological nature of such a residue lest our mis-understanding of this insight into lived-experience be mis-interpreted and lead this type of investigation astray (be that in the direction of the non-substantiated non-theological or various forms of unsubstantiable religious fundamentalism, etc.). Let us explore these new directions for our research in some detail. (1081)

	The three-part analysis of the hermeneutic circle acknowledges the crucial existence of a third moment that reflects a distinctive synthesis of the analytical and the synthetical, namely, the non-textual as an existential moment (realized through the existence of an irreducible existential excess). Let me illustrate this moment through an invocation of Wittgenstein’s broom. A broom is more than just the broom-head and a broom-handle! In lived-experienced, in our active engagement with a functioning broom, we experience a certain degree of freedom by virtue of this existential excess (however much we might detest having to use a broom to sweep). Imagine sweep a room or the footpath using merely the head of that broom only. Then imagine the relief we would experience in finding ourselves in a position to use the entire broom (as it was meant to be used). What might take a few minutes with a functioning broom would take much longer if we were to use the head of that broom only! This difference could be perceived as an existential excess (in just the same way we were told to sweep a path without either a broom or that detached broom-head and to do it entirely with our hands alone). Using the appropriate tool gives us a certain degree of freedom by allowing us to functioning more effectively in our passage through this world before-others. Just how does this degree of freedom arise? Intentional disposition realizes intentional acts as depositions upon the fabric of the world; intentional acts realized through resolution of competing intentional motivations. Hence the hermeneutic economy of the hermeneutic circle. Intentional acts are realized through sets of resolutions produced/re-produced through sequences (determined meta-textually through the appropriate application of genres). Such patterns deposit texts be they letters or footprints upon the sand, etc. Such depositions are also in sets of parallel co-depositions; e.g., when we walk along a beach we leave a set of footprints, a trail of sweat, the wearing away of skin cells, memories, movement of air around our bodies, splashing of water should we also wade through the surf, etc. In such an economy apparent ‘motivation’ is the resolution of conflicting motivations (or motivational cells). E.g., I want to get to the end of the beach – do I wade through the water, follow the water-logged sand, further up the beach, or through the dunes; how fast do I want to get there; do I really want to get there or am I merely out for the exercise and the realization of this goal is not so important, etc. Then, what am I going to think about as well? What do I want to look at? What are my overall ambitions today whilst walking along the beach, etc? Competing motivations are experienced as dissonant, and dissonance is always experienced as dissonance in the midst of a consonant field, namely, the meta-textuality of expected genre conformity. The result of a process of resolution is what I have defined as non-textual, that which cannot be reduced to a text (or a meta-text). These three moments then completely interacting together to form a sense of the not-textual, i.e., that unique moment in time as it is, has and was lived in our contextualized sense of our being-ourselves before-others. Limitations in the formation and experience of the moment constructing its experience in a unique momentary fashion along with a sense of wake that continues to re-constitute that stream of moments as they are constituted in that wake and constitute other moments and their wakes with an effect in degree related to the relative closeness of their connections, inter-connections, etc. Type is constituted meta-textually and the unique formation of textual deposition reinforces the same until such a time there is a dissipation of that textual-stream and/or the convergence/divergence of the same into or away from other genres relatively connected via super-genres. E.g., a cloud forms and is dissipated through rain, or, may either grow or merge with other clouds, or, break up into smaller clouds, or, just evaporate. This example being an analogy for textual interactions to the extent intentional processes are streamed through a continuance/dis-continuance of a particular genre/hybrid genre/s of activity, etc. Hence the import of a consequential analysis in this regard. Now, to what extent is the non-textual/not-textual non-reducible to a text and/or a meta-text? (1082)

	Another way to illustrate this phenomenal experience of the non-textual is to note how a train of thoughts in an integrated process of ongoing intentional resolution can capture our attention with an almost effortless sense of absorption. A certain degree of intentional interest is invested in the intentional process in question and a certain existential excess is experienced as some form of a dividend from that investment. Have we not experienced this degree of rapt concentration attendant upon this type of experiential absorption? A process made seemingly effortless through the re-investment of this sense of dividend produced/re-produced in this process of self-absorbing self-absorption, etc. It is in this manner that I perceive our awareness of this aspect of an existential excess in our intentional passage through the world. Now let us examine what sort of an irreducible this existential excess might be? (1083)

	This form of irreducibility is the result of a concatenation of intentionally directed causes that individually and collectively cannot be completely appreciated in full intentional awareness. Just as an iceberg floats by virtue of the nine-tenths that cannot be visible above the water-line so too intentionality can never be a completely transparent process in the sense of a full intentional awareness into the motivational basis of the same. Our motivations cannot be fully comprehended; we cannot be completely rational in that sense. However, a certain operative degree of responsibility is attendant upon the comporting/disporting of our intentionally directed responses in this lived sense of world with-others before-others. That a certain minimum degree of authenticity is called for in order to ensure our collective survival before-other with-others. This could be metaphorically treated as an ethical overflow or an overflow of value to-be-realized through our very engagement with all relevant contrasting sense of otherness already present, created or induced through intentional reactions to our passage through this world in the context of this surrounding and radiating and re-internalizing wake; a wake realized in part through bringing into existence of an existential excess or surplus of value (along with its attendant textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness). Given this understanding, let us now attend to the nature of this existential wake created in the midst of a theological mode-of-life? In what sense might it depict, passively reflect and/or actively constitute/re-constitute some sense of the Divine and its attendant surplus of value induced in that mode-of-life? Let me examine these potential possibilities? (1084)

	For the religious person the entire world, usually, is seen, and is to-be-seen, as a religious phenomenon (in whole or in part). Now, within this vision some religious people are going to see gradations of numinousity; some regions of the world being seen as more numinous than others, and, others might even perceive some regions of the world as completely lacking in this sense of the numinous. Regions being either locations and/or persons. All such differences defining the nature of that religious philosophy. On the other hand, the non-religious person naturally does not see the world as numinous even though through living in a culture that could not have escaped from this type of influence they will again, naturally, have some understanding of how their religious compatriots view this world. In turn, the religious person in their dealing with non-religiously-oriented persons will in turn come to see the world through their eyes in a non-religious fashion. In effect, a religious difference is experienced and understood by both parties, albeit from these ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ points of view. Essentially, a theological difference is experienced by both parties in a positive or a negative sense from their respective points of view. It can be argued that our lived-sense-of-world is constructed by those that share that type of world-experience. Furthermore, from such possibility its actuality is in some measure also arrived at by virtue of the existential fact there can be no absolute difference between possible states of affairs and actual states of affairs since there can be no absolute demarcation between such concepts epistemologically and both epistemologically and ontologically (by virtue of their non-absolute demarcation both epistemologically and ontologically). This argument could be put another way: just as the metaphorical cannot be completely divorced from the literal, and v.v., so too there is a seepage between the same to some extent (although, more correctly, a polarization takes place upon this mediate ground leaving this ‘seepage’ in effect as an irreducible residue). The philosopher, and theologian, now needing to ask themselves to what extent is a theological difference not a difference in fact? That in some measure just as our metaphorical images of the world must in some measure also reflect that world it then behooves such people to investigate in what sense and to what extent there is such an overcoming of metaphorically induced potentiality. In equal measure, but in an opposite sense, also questioning to what extent our cultural inventory of facts are not exactly as they seem in this complex world of ours. Both lines of questioning essentially qualifying our vision/s of the world as lived in with-others. (1085)

	By conducting our philosophical and/or theological investigations in both directions we are essentially investigating to what extent a theological difference is not a difference (after all)? Hence this (qualified) concept of a non-theological difference. Le me examine this new perspective. (1086)

	To argue whether the world (in its transcendental aspect as the Life-World) has a theological difference or has no theological difference implies that a theological complexion is understood if only in a de facto sense and by default. We may not understand what might be entailed in theological-being at least we understand what is not entailed through a via negative to the extent that we already have an understanding of the world as mere-world. However, the mere world in its sheer ideality of its unity, whether open or closed, already pre-configures a theological difference if only of a non-trans-mundane form, i.e., in a mundane format. Now, ‘treatment of the literal or factual as non-absolutely-literal and non-absolutely-factual’ and ‘treatment of the metaphorical or possible as non-absolutely-metaphorical and as non-absolutely-possible’ collectively opens us up to this qualified vision of the theological difference as possessing no actual theological difference (be that in either a mundane and/or trans-mundane orientation), i.e., as ultimately possessing a non-theological difference. As this argument applies equally to the co-existence of a mundane theological difference and a trans-mundane theological difference we would need to examine in what sense this necessity of a non-theological difference (within a theological difference) might manifest itself theoretically, practically and critically? Furthermore, accepting this dialectical vision that the lived-world (also in its transcendental ideality as the Life-World) is both ‘constructed through a theological lens and re-constructed by virtue of the same’ we should find ourselves positioned (in such a manner as) to ask in what sense does both the world construct a theology and that theological construct constructs that same world (without an obvious immediate reference to creation myths and their re-interpretation and application to a sense of the ongoing, existential moment)? (1087)

	Into his dialectical mix we need to ask a series of questions: in what sense does a theological difference ‘actually’ make in the reality of the world-as-lived, i.e., actually construct this theological vision of the world; then, in contrast, to what extent even this theological vision of the world per se can have no ‘real’ absolute theological existence, i.e., possess a non-theological difference from an ultimate point of view; etc? Let me re-introduce a concept that, I believe, can intermediate between these two seemingly contradictory states of affairs, namely, that the world is effectively also theological in complexion and that this complexion at the same time cannot be absolutely theological in essence? This concept is that of emptiness – that nothing can exist purely in and of itself (nor can anything exist purely in and of something else, and, that only through a non-absolute relativity of interaction can ontologically-oriented phenomena be manifested in and through epistemological experience, and v.v.)! With an adequate understanding of this concept we can declare that relative/non-absolute phenomenal states of affairs come into existence as phenomenal-for-us, that the world of such phenomena is a world-there-for-us, and, in the same manner, all theological or theological-like existence must equally be empty, i.e., exist-as-a-phenomenon/phe-nomena-for-us, and, that all such ‘existence’ is both relatively and non-absolutely productive/re-productive. In effect, all semblance of existence for-us is re-produced. E.g., stars at night are seen. Those stars are effectively re-reproduced by virtue of the fact that what is seen is what is seen now and that this now can only construct a re-produced vision of the same (since it is possible that a particular star seen now might not exist at the later moment of its perception). Similarly, our construction of all phenomena, effectively, is as a reconstruction (by virtue of this momentary gap or period [of moments]). However, even though it is as a re-construction, still, through the directness of relationships we stand directly related to the same. Given the emptiness of all phenomena what theological ramifications follow from the same? Furthermore, given this qualification of a non-absolute theologicalization of theologically oriented phenomena/non-theologically oriented phenomena (and a non-absolute phenomenalization of theologically oriented phenomena/non-theologically oriented phenomena) to what extent and in what manner should we expect this concept of a no-theological difference to manifest itself if at all (from both ultimate and non-ultimate points of view)? (1088)

	As a first point we should note that the only world-there-for-us is the lived world, the world as experienced by-us both individually and collectively (since through the commonality of language our world is intentionally lived. Second, this implies that the world-in-itself cannot exist for us and that there can be no pure world of actuality. Similarly, there can be no pure world of potentiality. Thence the sheer possibility of a theological difference must establish its theological existence as that theological-reality-as-lived-by-us in accordance with both our individual and collective points of view (and from both ultimate and non-ultimate points of view). Furthermore, the non-absolute relativity of the same must also imply the existence of a non-absolute non-theological difference? Hence this complex mix of non-absolute theological differences and non-differences (in the plural by virtue of our prior distinction between a mundane theological difference and a trans-mundane theological difference). (1089)

	Obviously such a complex attitude/attitudes towards religious phenomena cannot form a basis for forms of religious fundamentalism! Because such a complex attitude is realized through the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension, therefore, let it be realized that through the re-application of an adequate overall transcendental suspension such extremist attitudes can be made to dissolve, dissipate and effectively disappear! How might we convince the extremist, therefore, that the only viable attitude is through such a transcendental attitude as realized in and through the ongoing application of an adequate overall transcendental suspension? (1090)

	Such a program appears to be almost impossible. But, how might it be attempted? A religious person, to some extent, must have already accepted the existence of a transcendental attitude. Why? Through their acceptance of a theological difference (even if skewed excessively towards either the transcendent or the immanent). This being the case, how might one demonstrate a transcendental purification of such a transcendental attitude (even if only embryonic in orientation). There seems to be little recourse other than through a simplification of argument that collectively forces such obstinate adherents to see the impossibility of their positions and the only possibility for a religious position (however formulated) as one to be arrived at in and through an ongoing overall transcendental suspension?! How might such a program proceed? (1091)

	Effectively, in order to do this, i.e., defuse a fundamentalist project, we need to convert or transform a seemingly superlative economy into a comparative one! Superlative economies can only be analytically defined or left open as something that is potentially realizable in some analytically open framework. E.g., the best score realized in the multi-choice questions in the mathematical exam paper was ninety-five correct out of a possible one hundred. That was the best result in the exam. However, the very best result that could be obtained would have been one hundred correct. It would be impossible to score one hundred and one given the analytical nature of the construction of that exam. On the other hand, in phenomenal reality, there can be no absolute best (except by analytical definition in which case the ‘very best’ in then defined). Some comparative economies can be defined as open. E.g., absolute zero can never be reached but only approached in ever smaller increments. Or, even if absolute zero were achieved and surpassed then this new limit could only be approached and not superceded (unless by a new re-defined sense of absolute zero, say within the internal environment of a molecule or atom or other ‘particle’ rather than the external space between the same), etc. (1092)

	How is this conversion or transformation to be achieved? Let me outline an archetypal approach to this type of a non-absolute project (in religious ‘therapy’). Essentially, we are going to supply the need for an overall transcendental suspension without directly addressing it in those terms of reference, in that style of philosophical and phenomenological representation. (1093)

	First, we need to defuse all sense of an absolute dichotomy between the sense of the Divine and all senses of the non-Divine (in what ever manner that sense of the Divine might be defined in a particular culture or tradition under such interrogation). We could ask “does your vision of the Divine bear a relationship in some form or other to the world?” If there is no such relationship then ‘that vision of the Divine is not there for-us’ and, consequently, ‘we need not be there for-it’! Then, that possibility of a relationship not accepted, there would be no need for that particular religious philosophy as ‘the Divine therein could not be there-for-us’, and v.v! Therefore, there must exist in some form or other a relationship between the Divine and the non-Divine, and v.v., in order to maintain a religious economy (along with a religiously viable theological difference in this regard). In other words, by some means or other, the Divine is in ‘touch’ with us (and, in the same form or some other, wittingly and/or unwittingly, we can be in ‘touch’ with the same be that episodically or continually or continuously or through some form of transformation, etc.). In this (in a viable theology) there can be no wholly-other, only a sense of the holy-other that cannot be wholly other! Metaphorically, and non-literally, the concept of the wholly-other could be exercised through some form of qualification as a distinctively different realm of being, but not as an absolutely different realm of being; viable forms of mediation as a consequence being automatically affirmed in some appropriate phenomenological frame/s of reference. That being the case, then it behooves the religious person to realize that a superlative economy makes no religious sense and convert to a comparative one (if only by default, or, at least, cognitively if not emotionally, etc.) (given that a superlative economy makes neither epistemological sense nor religious sense and that its ontological formation could be neither formed nor recognized even if it were said to exist hypothetically or by fiat!)! (1094)

	Second, once we have argued, successfully or otherwise, that the Divine cannot be there-for-us and wholly-other at the same time, let us now proceed to concentrate on the perceived/re-perceived nature of this relationship. Although we have operated to date as meta-theologians or philosophical-theologians let us in these circumstances operate in the terms of reference supplied by the tradition of that religionist or community or culture in question. Let us look into this concept of being ‘touched’ by the Divine (or our being able somehow to be ‘in touch’ with the same) or adopt and adapt any other metaphor of interaction or contact proffered by the same (once the possibility of such a relationship is affirmed/re-affirmed). Let us note that we are defined in and through our relationships, e.g., as parent, sibling, friend, lover, etc., and, that no relationship need be exclusive of others (as long as there is no inherent unresolved/unresolvable contradictions in that articulated list). That being the case let us then declare that tentative provisional definition/s of the Divine should only concern those relationships directly or indirectly available to us. Through this re-focusing upon (hypothetical) relationships (with the Divine) we have in effect commenced a phenomenological approach to our topic. This has a number of consequences for our program of transformation (from a non-viable superlative religious economy to a potentially viable and non-fundamentalist comparative religious economy). By focusing on a potential relationship we are focusing on it as a possible phenomenon, i.e., as that constituted in intentional consciousness for-us by-us (regardless of the hypothetical actuality or otherwise of that sense of the Divine in their participation with ‘us’ in that equation, and v.v.). Moreover, through a focusing on the form of that potential relationship qua its relational form we are in effect beginning to concentrate on it ideal structure as a type of function (of possible experience in our passage through this world with-others). Furthermore, this shifting of our attention from the phenomenal qua phenomenal to an appreciation of the ‘form’ of the phenomenal is effectively creating a (shift towards a) transcendental perspective upon the same; the ‘appreciation of the phenomenal’ being ‘trans-phenomenal’ in orientation and thence ‘transcendental’ in orientation. In addition, this transcendental shift in perspective is both inductive of and conducive for the implementation of an overall transcendental suspension in the pursuit of our topic whether the implementer of this program is aware of this transition/transformation in progress. Hence by concentrating on the identity-defining nature of relationships we have commenced a program involving a de facto overall transcendental suspension (as well as a transcendental translation and potential transformation) whether instigated by default or by intent! Through such treatment we automatically transform an absolutist superlative religious economy into a non-absolutist comparative religious economy. So, let us re-direct this attention upon the nature of relationships in so far as they are intended to define/re-define the non-religious/religious person in accordance with this treatment of that tradition. The existential viability of that tradition in question, as evidenced through its survival as a tradition across time, guaranteeing that this aspect of a comparative economy is already present and must already be present within prior and current expressions of the same be they textual in a classical sense or non-classical (in the form of performances of ritual, aesthetic criteria for worship, the formulation and practice of spiritual exercises, pursuit of moral decisions, etc.). (1095)

	Third, let us refine and thematize this embryonic transcendental phenomenological approach in order to complete this process of de-fundamentalization in this project of a radical de-fundamentalism. Covertly, or overtly, we re-directing attention towards the religious relationship in question (in accordance with that tradition as re-seen through a comparative economic approach). In this process, religious-identity is seen to arise through the exercise of that relationship be that envisaged as a possibility or an actuality. Moreover, this production/re-production of value is focused through our attention, wittingly or unwittingly, being placed upon its phenomenal form, and, that focusing upon its phenomenal form effectively creates/recreates a shift towards the transcendental, and, all this is inductive of and conducive for the exercise of overall transcendental suspensions wherein beliefs, etc., become bracketed and therein non-superlative in orientation. That by such transformations a radical de-fundamentalism should be able to be put into effect if the individual, community or tradition in question is cooperative with such a re-visioning of their tradition or traditions. All this, hopefully, is to be achieved with a minimum of jargon or theory, etc. Even without mentioning words like ‘phenomenal’ or ‘transcendental’ or ‘suspension’, etc! (1096)

	Then, lastly, by breaking the suspensions achieved in and through this program the power of the metaphor committed to by that religious fraternity in question should then unleash and release a greater degree of value than that hitherto had through having supported non-viable features of a superlative overlay of that original underlying comparative economy in comparison to potentially viable features of a well-constructed/well-reconstructed comparative economy. This type of value, on the whole, supporting an integration/re-integration within the psyche of that individual or fraternity in question and between other individuals and fraternities be they identified with nor non-identified with the same. In all of this, I would like to observe, that fundamentalism grows out of a comparative economy and not the other way, and, that just as this growth grows upon this type of body politic it can also be excised through a reversal of that prior trend. Just as weeds grow in a garden so too can that garden be weeded! Indeed, a garden being a space that has been weeded implies it can be weeded again! That this type of pursuit is to be conducted across the whole spectrum of religious, political and cultural practice in this regard. (1097)

	Now, let me summarize these four main stages in this process of de-fundamentalization. First, there is a refusal to entertain an absolute dichotomy between the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine since a comparative economy must existentially underlay an already existent religious economy. Second, we (phenomenologically) focus upon the (phenomenal) type of that relationship in question through an examination of the metaphor/s that express the form of that relationship. Third, we examine processes of identity that are instigated/re-instigated through such forms of (transcendental trans-phenomenal) appreciation therein conducted. Lastly, through suspending this process of (an overall) suspension(s) we allow ourselves to be projected back into the world as lived with-others with a greater sense of response and responsibility, i.e., with a greater semblance of authenticity (through an ensuing and ongoing rectification of all our relationships)! Hence the following formula: non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion, etc; as exercised through its repetition, etc. I.e., non-exclusion from the sense of the Divine (in what ever comparative form it might be formulated); discerning the potential meaning of our inclusion therein; realizing what form of a conclusion we should make from our investigations; and, finding a process of re-inclusion through the suspension of the suspension and our existential projection back into the world-of-the-other as we make our passage through this World-of-Life and discover/re-discover a process of meaningfulness-for-us therein as the religious person finds themselves situated/re-situated before their vision of the Divine! (1098)

	This concept of re-inclusion is an interesting one for in my current understanding this concept in devolving from the transcendental treatment of conclusion (through the ongoing suspension of the suspension, etc. [in its attuned asymmetry of response]) realizes a much more broad spectrum phenomenon in its subsequent re-interpretation of allied and non-allied fields of intentionally exercised motivation, behaviour and consequential re-alignment. Such a concept need not be applied to just a theological mode-of-life nor would it seem to just apply itself to the primary field in which it is allowed to operate existentially by virtue of its adequately exercised overall transcendental suspension. This existential rippling or wave of value radiating beyond that field in which it is primarily centered induces forms of existential augmentation beyond those primary terms of reference. An examination of this existential effect (once accepted) might open up various dialogues, hitherto perceived as relatively incommensurable, between philosophers, theologians and various other representatives of disciplines such as, e.g., environmental philosophy, etc., historical research, political commentary, economic management, sociological insight, therapeutic psychology, etc., etc. (1099)

	Let me now return to this problematic consideration that theology via a mundane theological turn (to a trans-mundane theological position) is effectively idealistic in tenor and therein and thereafter corrupted by this lack of transcendental balance? That, in effect, theology is not and cannot be conducted in and through a transcendental perspective and as a consequence directly and indirectly exercises a series of judgments that are existentially defective. That, even a program of transcendental rectification would not be able to undo the consequently defective and disturbed nature of this overall type of project. However, although I believe this type of accusation has some degree of truth it is also my belief that this mode-of-life could not operate without a sense of value if this understanding (into the phenomenological nature of theological theory, practice and critique) were correct. Moreover, it is also my belief that as this mode-of-life, like all other modes-of-life, expresses positive forms of value that such value-production/re-production can be also be augmented through processes of transcendental rectification, etc., (i.e., in and through adequate overall transcendental suspensions, etc.)! Let me examine this type of meta-position (rather than merely see it as a contra-position). (1100)

	Now it is obvious atheists don’t belong to a church and, overall, are not anywhere as organized as religionists. Culturally, it would seem usually that the default mode is on ‘religion’ and when a dominant religion operates within a certain culture that it could well be seen as inseparably intertwined. My historical observation would be that separation is a painful phenomenon for all concerned. But, in this Contemporary era, it has occurred and is occurring all the time in a miscellany of cultures (and that the same applies to all processes of transformation and change). Certainly the dominance of any one religious model in a particular culture, regardless of its denominational variations, is breaking down through shifts in population, multi-culturalism, globalization, actively and passively exercised uses and influences of the Internet along with embryonic forms of political pluralism (wherein Contemporary identity is almost re-constructed from miscellaneous local and non-local, synchronous and non-synchronous, cultural inventories as if being treated as ‘ready to wear’ {prêt-à-porter}). In such a changing climate organized religion is sometimes in decline and sometimes not (by virtue of the fact that the very trends ‘that empty pews in one location somewhere else could be filling them’). Furthermore, people with minimal religio-cultural allegiances are now often in a better position to state whether they are believers or non-believers. Then, in coming to examine this mix of opinions I have come to form this general type of understanding, namely, that theological thinking left to its own devices, would more naturally tend towards the holistic dimension and thence be more conservative and idealistic in tenor, etc., despite the radical nature of some newly constituted/re-constituted forms or instances of theological projection. In this (gestalt) light what other models or orientations of practice might be applied at this juncture? (1101)

	Integration is a gestalt moment. It arises through dialectical-like contrasts with other moments in this archetypal scheme that I have utilized to portray the implication of field phenomena in the simulation/re-simulation of phenomena. Concentrating on this interpretative field would seem to produce an expansive note along with a bias towards the theological? On the other hand, a tendency to concentrate on the intentional object-state would seem to presuppose such a person to a realistic bias and perhaps a relatively non-religious outlook upon the world (when this orientation is seriously self-reflected upon and cultural default modes are bracketed). Then, as my gestalt scheme is tripartite in nature (in it parallelism with the hermeneutic circle, the process of the overall transcendental suspension, etc.) should we then not ask what our third moment might entail in so far as a preoccupation with the same might reflect itself, in turn, with a corresponding and contrasting sense of bias distinct to that degree from our other two biases of the idealist and the realistic in orientation? Here we might like to note the possibility of a relatively authentic sense of bias and a relatively non-authentic sense of bias (and that this sense of division would also apply to other disciplines and practices that fall under the sway of realistic or idealistic overtones, etc.). In this expectation of a third moment and its reflected bias let me tentatively suggest a few of the following possibilities. Inauthentically, we could have a stasic sense of moment wherein there is an overwhelming preoccupation with ritual and procedure, fine-tuning of detail, along with an overlooking of the overall picture coupled with an abhorrence of change? Authentically, there might be a sense of authenticity realized through a ‘hopeless’ search for both detail and a global integration of data, etc., but conducted within the bounds of appropriateness, etc. Or, one might like to observe that beyond an existential reading of the non-textual, an adequately organized overall transcendental suspension centered in the not-textual might offer itself as a candidate for an authenticity of natural experience despite interruptions from time to time in this type of transcendental-existential performance (when the relatively inauthentic irrupts into this sense of an ongoing existential equilibrium). (1102)

	If most religionists are idealistic in tenor then what have we to offer them in the form of sensible inducements to assist them in the changing of this or similar habits should they be relatively extreme and untenable in nature? The re-institution of adequate overall transcendental suspensions! Let me examine this therapeutic-like manoeuvre. (1103)

	It seems to me that a prime difference between relatively tenable or authentic positions and untenable or inauthentic positions in this regard is an ‘economic’ matter to the extent that the former more likely operate in a comparative economy and the later in a superlative economy or that the later economy is just constructed in a defective manner (with or without also implicating a superlative economy). Thus a moderate idealistic-holism or a moderate realistic-detailism (through an over-attention on detail) need not be defective and dysfunctional in a radically disruptive sense? Moreover, in a comparative economic form the application (of a series and/or a set) of adequate overall transcendental suspensions might well re-normalize this type of situation (just as in the same manner that slight biases produce/re-produce our ordered forms of judgment such as the essential, aesthetical, deontological, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual). Furthermore, the end-processes and intentional products of our cogitations can be normalized by the same type of transcendental process (in the same manner as biases in our ordered processes seem to be rectified in the formation and general expression of that form of cognitive productivity whether by design or by default?)? Hence we might assume that the overall process of transcendental renormalization probably entails, among other things, a resistance to the formation of a superlative economy and/or a de-emphasis upon the same should it be come operative to some degree along with a transcendental re-balancing of productive biases, etc. (also in conjunction with well-controlled properly conducted acts of personal emission or inter-personal dissemination within the context of appropriate meta-textual parameters expected to be used in that regard?). (1104)

	Now for something completely different. Yesterday, while walking along a street observed a bird that seemed to notice my progress along the street, ducking through the closely arrayed slats on a wooden fence. On that side of the fence it seemed to be with its mate and less concerned by the distance between it and me as I passed once it had gone through that fence. How should we analyze this type of behaviour that appears to be so intentionally directed? Can or should we apply an intentional analysis within the critical confines of a transcendental phenomenology? Or, should we somewhat throw caution to the wind and see what that type of analysis might have to offer us, what insights it might proffer even if heavily qualified by the fact that the apparent consciousness of a bird might not be finally judged as commensurable with that of human intellection? (1105)

	Let us imaginatively speculate on the possible intentional-like features that might be discerned within the functioning repertoire of that bird? The bird seems to see me as a possible threat hence its hurried return to the other side of the fence? Then, it remembers it had gone through that fence and, therefore, should be able to return exactly the same way or via a similar gap in that fence? This could well imply a number of associated propositions as to the relative invariance of its self-perceived embodiment to the effect that one’s body shape has not fundamentally changed, the gap in the fence has not altered, that gap is still there and that other gaps similar to the first one remain for the bird to equally pass through all things being equal more or less? It is almost as if that bird has a repertoire of phenomenological or phenomenological-like functions or essences with invariant eidetic-like structures that can be intuitively explored by that bird? Then, it must also have a concept of relative safety and/or less immanent sense of danger since at some distance from myself it removed itself from the street yet allowed me to pass quite close by when it was behind the relative safety of this fence? All during this I was observed in such a manner that the bird seemed to be calculating the relative friendliness or unfriendliness of my apparent intent or possible intent? (1106)

	Are we allowed to intuit a relatively sophisticated type of functioning intentionality here? Obviously, an intentionality in degree and nature appropriate to that species of bird, and, which has allowed it to survive for millions of years through adaptations both genetic and ‘behavioral’ acquired? There seem to a repertoire of phenomenological functions as just described along with, no doubt, a number of many other functions in keeping with the existence entailed in being that type of bird (now also situated in the urban Australian landscape)? Are we any different here? (1107)

	That same day when passing though a small grassy park I also noticed a sick looking gull with its mate dancing around it in what looked like a state of distress; a state of panic, anxiety and grief. To what extent should we read a parallel between the intentions and emotions of ourselves and our interpretations of the same type of phenomena in creatures other than our own species? Why should humans privilege their own intentionality and ability to experience emotions both personally and inter-personally? Perhaps we should accept some degree of commensurability when apparently present but qualify the same by not over-interpreting it along human lines. Such a qualification being constructed along the following lines ‘that a bird experiences the world as a bird in accordance with the manner and degree of its epistemological organization.’ Now, that granted, a theologian might like to seize this same type of opportunity to this effect in order to say ‘that the Divine experiences the world in accordance with the manner and degree of its epistemological organization’. That this type of philosophical utterance might be seen to have a certain provisional validity if two caveats are accepted, namely, this is predicated upon the pre-established existence or ‘actuality’ of the Divine (in the manner, more or less, as already previously defined by us) and that commensurability is limited to that extent there is a comparative dissimilarity in degree and kind of epistemological organization in question or under investigation. Of course the converse is also valid to some qualified extent, indeed, that there can be no absolute non-commensurability (given this phenomenal footprint of the Divine, in what ever form or forms envisaged, and, that epistemological organization in general is a comparatively open phenomenon, is inductive of intentional-like activity and intentional-like deposition despite the distinctive existential irreducibility of its emergent formations (to the same extent the life of a person cannot be reduced to a comparison with the life of a bird, and v.v.)! (1108)

	In the light of the above, and assuming that all things possess a certain manner and degree of epistemological organization be it a simple rock to a cluster of galactic nebulae, from a simple viral cell to a complex human organization entailed in a successful multinational, etc., should we not regard all phenomena, Divine phenomena inclusive, as all possessing intentional-like behaviour in accordance with their own distinctive existential irreduciblity? This granted, along with all attendant implications, should we then, therefore, not treat all phenomena as possessing in their own manner, a divine-like ability to transcend itself/themselves through forms of intentional appreciation (when intentional behaviour itself becomes the intentional objective of such intentional-like processes of appreciation)? That, there is a transcendental necessity for such by virtue of the existential fact that intentional formation demands this ability to deliberate between possibilities open to it since a merely deterministic vision of reality would not be able to produce any form of an appreciation of the same. This opening (of theological-like being) taking up an existence through the final ongoing determination of a chaotic indeterminability when and wherever there is an intentional-like emission of intent. The principle to be observed here is that intent/intentionality whatever its phenomenal form is realized through this process of chaotic determination. Hence our philosophical point to be observed here that although, of course, we can neither absolutely discount nor absolutely promote a deterministic vision to proceed within and from the relatively material aspects of the world the way is now open, in equal measure, for the theologian, the philosophical meta-theologian, their congregations and colleagues, etc., to seize upon this advantage in this respect, namely, that an intimation of the Divine is ‘expressed’ and ‘experienced’ when intentional-like behaviour is observed to issue from the relatively spontaneous resolution of a series or set of determinations induced within a chaotically oriented matrix of associated being! In other words “to think is to be divine, or their associated equivalents!” (1109)
	
	An exploration of this transcendental position, that all epistemological organization demonstrates intentional-like behaviour through a resolution of its chaotic material matrix and that this demonstrates relatively divine-like behaviour will, I believe, open up a profoundly different way of seeing the world whose outlines I would like to now explore in outline. (1110)
	
	For a start, we might suspect that the theologian can no long envisage the Divine as or merely as a uni-centric locus of divine power, etc., or, as either the result of a finalized process of epistemological hierarchicalization or absolute separation from the phenomenal world. Moreover, this sheer transfusion or pervasion of the divine/Divine with the phenomenal world would seem to imply that the topic of theology comprehensively treated (speculatively) would need to encompass a natural theology, a mundane theology and a trans-mundane theology and the overall theological interaction of a comprehensive theology that investigates the interaction of these three theologies of the natural, etc. Furthermore, we are now in a position to examine the hypothetical importance and ramification of this concept of a theological turn as it is taken up in our current topic of a hypothetical examination of the importance of the same. (1111)

	First, how should the theological turn be conducted, in what sort of economy? As much theology seems to be conducted in superlatives perhaps we should investigate this topic through the lens of a superlative economy? But as a superlative economy has been ruled out as non-viable except when defined as both analytically pre-defined and obtainable, which be by default a comparative economy, we should also ask if there is any other alternative economy, or are there other alternative economies in the plural, that are neither comparative nor superlative in orientation? To this I would answer that there are no other viable economies, indeed, there can only be one sort, namely, the comparative in nature! Let me briefly argue this position. (1112)

	In intentionality there is a relationship between the textual and meta-textual (as well as the non-textual and the not-textual) by virtue of their interdependent co-dependence for their identity upon the interacting contrast of each other (and their joint contrast with the non-textual and collective contrast with the not-textual) as theoretically situated in the overall hermeneutic circle (as examined elsewhere). Despite a contrast there is also a core transformational region of relative invariance in such situations. Translated into a gestalt field we might like to treat the textual as the intentional object or state, i.e., as the intentional objective (when and where ‘intent’ is treated as both the intentional object-state and as the intent intended). A contrasting comparison is set up between the textual and the meta-textual, etc. In other words, a comparative economy is entered into when the textual and the meta-textual interact, etc. When this comparative economy is overlooked we end up with the appearance of just the text (or the meta-textual rules for the formation of the genre-expectations under consideration treated as a text). But text is co-dependent upon meta-text, etc., and v.v., and so their phenomenal-phenomenological existence is in and through this comparative economy. Thus there can be no non-comparative economy in this instance. We can also rule out a superlative economy by virtue of the fact that when the superlative is defined and is obtainable it is therefore ascertained in a comparative economy. When it is defined but cannot be obtained or reached then it inhabits the region of a limit. If it defined as non-definable through an open-infinity, therefore, it cannot be reached, i.e., obtained. Hence non-viable in a superlative form. Thus the only viable economy must be a comparative one (by virtue of this matching of the intentional object with its meta-textual genre expectations or with other intentional objects of a similar or different type or chronologically depicted differences in the formation of that same identity or set of identities). Thence the only economy must be a comparative one (in either a viable form or format when adequately conducted, or, in a defective form or format when cast in a superlative mode or overlooked in a non-comparative mode or just inadequately prepared, executed and/or appreciated). Thus the theological turn (be it mundane, trans-mundane or given a natural form of expression) can only be conducted within a comparative economy. (1113)

	That acceptance of a comparative economy granted to what extent does an ascriptive economy function given that phenomenal states are identified and described, etc., without an obvious reference to a comparative economy (or  the ‘non-viability’ of a superlative economy)? As noted, such an ascriptive economy is realized through an overlooking of the nominated products defined in a comparative economy (although case relations [such as accusative, genitive, ablative, etc.] intimate the covert presence of a comparative economy). Identity and description are realized through the use of metaphorical responses to rhetorical interrogation. E.g., is that Jack or Jill or someone else in the distance? I can see now that it is Jack! In other words that looks like a person who looks like Jack or Jill or perhaps someone else. ‘Like’ implies a comparison: this phenomenon in the visual-perceptual field looks like this other phenomenon previously seen or described. Does ‘it’ (pre-ascertained identity) look like ‘this’ (phenomenon-to-hand), does ‘this’ (phenomenon-to-hand) look like ‘that’ (pre-ascertained identity)? Once identity is ascribed the same type of process occurs with questionable features of the same. Is this pot Chinese in origin, is it red, is in an antique, is it a genuine instance of type x? Yes, it is like x, indeed, is a genuine instance of x! This process entails a progression from the symmetry of the overall transcendental suspension to the asymmetry of the suspension of that same suspension. This progression proceeding though an act of fiat and/or evidential pressure, or, more correctly, somewhere on a spectrum between the same. Genre expectations dictate the nature of the phenomenon in question. Evidential demonstration reinforces such dictated expectations. In this insight we find here an avenue for the theologian or theological philosopher, etc., to examine or re-examine the nature of their formulations within this type of topic. Are their theological tenets to be dictated from the context of a theological system and/or demonstrated personally and/or interpersonally through some form of evidential pressure in turn confirming such dictated expectations, etc?  To what extent is such a progression to be judged as circular or linear or in some other terms of reference? Furthermore, in the proposition of forms of articulated theological engagement to what extent must such insights be initiated and guided by the adequate restoration of an apposite comparative economy wherein through simulation such engagement is hopefully to be sought, or, re-sought? Then, as a ‘simulation’ engagement is directly engaged by virtue of the fact that there can be no pre-simulated state of affairs within the transcendental unity of the Life-World. (1114)

	Given this experiential ‘ground’ within the transcendental unity of the Life-World and the formation of all identity, ascription, etc., through the breaking of the overall suspension (through the suspension of the suspension) what implications can be drawn from this insight in terms of the viability (or otherwise) of a comparative economy and the non-viability of both a shortsighted ascriptive economy and a longsighted superlative economy? What might be said in general (terms of reference), or, in particular (terms of a type of theological system), or, specifically (in relation to an instance of a well-articulated theological formulation)? That details are the immediate province of a theologian, or similar, etc., but, that broadly speaking, authenticity is to be engaged/re-engaged in direct proportion to the extent a comparative economy is simulated/re-simulated, i.e., instigated/re-instigated in and through the ongoing use of transcendental suspensions within the orbit of an overall transcendental suspension. Since the comparative economy in a state of ongoing equilibrium is none other than this dance of the suspension and the breaking of that suspension, and it re-instigation, etc. Thence the relative authenticity of this tenor of process within the internal confines of that adopted and adapted systematization in question along with the authenticity of its external relation to the overall sense of the Life-World itself to that extent it finds its representation, or rather, re-presentation, in and through the suspended nature of a comparative economy operative at the very existential core of such a process through this relative lack of privilege (since comparisons cannot be run in inverse proportion to the extent privilege is allowed to operate at the centre of such an economy)! Thence, also, in reverse, the existential viability of the transcendental economy through the center of a well-functioning comparative economy (through this relative absence of privilege at the center of such an existential economy). Obviously, we need to note the important ramifications this has for a theological economy or for any other form of economy for that matter! (1115)

	My such means we now could define the practice of an existential theology: as that centered in a comparative theological economy and operating between an ongoing transcendental  sense of positioning  and its suspension…. (1116)

	Let me examine the important points raised by this definition. (1117) 

First, a theological practice is either mundane and/or trans-mundane in exercise. Just what is distinctively involved, from a general perspective, in such a practice? A recognition that totalities cannot be reduced to the mere sum of their parts. A theology, in effect, deals with this existential differential or difference that as a residue cannot be reduced to the instantiation of its mere embodiment (despite the important centering this embodiment gives to that integrated or spiritual sense of an existential excess along with teleological indication/s of its apparent intentional directedness). In this vision of the spiritual landscape, obviously, all phenomena in their integrity can be regarded to have a theological aspect by virtue of that integrity and its non-reducibility (along with its hierarchical integration within the World-of-Life, etc.). Thence, by implication, a seamless transition from the mundane to the trans-mundane (albeit with a few dimensions of difference in epistemological organization from the perspective of our own individual embodiment in our ‘cultural embodiment’ with-others). (1118)

	Second, as per definition this practice is centered in a comparative economy by virtue of the transcendental suspension and the existential viability of the same. An ascriptive economy implies a comparative economy (in order for such ascriptions to be delivered). A truly superlative economy cannot function (except as a polarity or ideality, as an intentional sense of direction). However, in the breaking of the suspension, through the suspension of the suspension, a definitive ascription is realized or set up to be realized either as a possibility or as a null set to the extent impossibility should happen to be recognized as the only viable possibility for that particular class of phenomena under examination). (1119)

Hence, third, the definitive resolution, in principle, of a phenomenal examination subject to a process of transcendental de-suspension. Hence the existential attitude must straddle both the non-definitive, non-asymmetric, transcendental perspective and the definitive, asymmetric, non-transcendental perspective of the transcendental de-suspension. Thence our investigations can arrive at a definitive point of resolution despite also being provisional and remain being treated in this manner (from a transcendental perspective). Thus our understanding must recognize a sense in which our theological research, or any form of research for that matter, should take a bi-modal perspective, namely, from an ultimate transcendental perspective and a non-ultimate natural perspective (albeit critically exercised by virtue of its transcendental implication).  (1120)
	
	Overall, critical research, in what ever form it were to adopt, should recognize these bi-modal points of view between the relatively-ultimate and the relatively-non-ultimate. Research, properly exercised, then taking on a provisional facet and a definitive facet without these two points of view undermining each other. Indeed, conducted in a balanced transcendental manner these two perspective critically reinforce the validity of the other. (1121)

	What are the ramifications of an existentially conducted theological economy? Centered in a comparative economy (subjected to an ongoing overall transcendental suspension) all definitively derived ascription must remain provisional from an ‘ultimate’ transcendental point of view. Moreover, delineations of essential type in their transcendental ideality will act as critical templates for the formation/re-formation/reformation of theological identity (be it theoretical, practical and/or critical in aspiration, be it mundane and/or trans-mundane in tenor, be it phenomenal-phenomenological and/or trans-phenomenal-phenomenological in orientation, etc.). As a critical template theological integrity is pre-established in an ideal form against which non-transcendental exemplars would need to conform. From conformance other processes can be conducted upon such exemplifications such as, e.g., considerations of a teleological nature, providential orientation, valuative and trans-valuative transformations, and, ultimately for the theologian of descriptions/prescriptions of a soteriological interest. To this extent our hypothetical theological investigations merely noting their possibilities when and where relevant in our investigations into such features when claimed by a professional/non-professional theologian in that regard. Also embedded in such an understanding is an appreciation that this topic, and all exemplifications of a theological aspect, by nature, is effectively sui generis, i.e., non-reducible to their forms of mere phenomenal-phenomenological embodiment. That, essentially, all forms of identity in their totality implicate a theologically-oriented aspect whose identified theological difference (between the totality of that identity and its mere embodiment) that is irreducible (as a theological residue) and is also a hierarchically enstructured feature in its identified theological field of operation. That the ‘life’ of this theological implicate acts/reacts as an integrated participant/s in the Life-World in accordance with its internal consistency of constitution and the relatively external consistency of its interactive potentials/actualities as able to be exercised by the same. That this concept of an identified theological difference brings our concept of a theological difference (whether mundane or trans-mundane in orientation) to new level and aspect of significance. Hence the importance of this evolving concept of theological difference. Let me now look more closely at these latest developments in this regard. (1122)

	First, a theological difference was proposed as merely the difference between ‘a vision of the world with some sense of the theological’ and ‘a vision of the world without the latter’. Then, we noted a mundane - trans-mundane theological difference as a distinction wherein the transcendental necessity of world unity (to some extent or other) implied a vision of the world that was more than just the summation of its parts. However, a mundane sense of a theological difference did not necessarily contribute adequately to a sense of the Divine desired by a theologian. At this point in time I would like also to extend the concept of a mundane-theological difference to an identified theological difference to the extent that all identity in its apparent phenomenal-phenomenological totality (as an existential descriptor or as a recognizable set of descriptors) could be considered as possessing an encompassed sense of an identified theological difference as well as its avenues of integration into the Life-World and its participation into natural/mundane/trans-mundane senses of theological identity. Hence the importance of these various interlinked concepts of theological difference and the invitation or philosophical introduction to this modified complex concept of a theological turn. To examine these recent theological qualifications and the relative importance of a theological turn (in a complex sense) let me first deal with the philosophical problem of identity, i.e., just what contributes to the constitution of recognizable identity (and what hypothetical theological implications could follow upon this vision of identity). (1123)

	What exactly is identity (in the distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological continuance of the identity of an existential descriptor/s or set of existential descriptors)? How is identity preserved given that all compounded things change continually/continuously? Moreover, what differences, if at all, are there between subjects and objects, and, between subjects, and, between objects, etc? To this end let me re-examine the phenomenon of identity in order to present a new concept of the providential, therein and thereby, highlighting the impact and importance of our complex concept of a theological turn regardless of whether our natural inclinations in this respect are secular and/or non-secular by persuasion or by default. (1124)

	Imagine, if you would, that the world where we live-with-others as an economy but not just any mere materialistic or reductivist sense. In this economy of interaction with others in the environment of this engaged social space upon this planet (and beyond) some items or services therein are appropriated of which some are consumed and destroyed (e.g., food prepared in the form of meals to be consumed) whilst others items are not destroyed in being appropriated as items to be collected (e.g., works of art); then other items or services are merely transferred from one person, a set of persons, an institution or a set of institutions  to some other person, a set of persons, an institution or a set of institutions; or items or services are placed or performed but in such a manner that such content is lost to this economy either on a temporary basis or permanently. Such is the general nature of this archetypal economy. Now, our various acts within this economy contribute to the overall circulation of that economy. But, the ‘life’ of our economy cannot be reduced merely to the collective summation of those acts. Consequences, intended and unintended flow from the overall life of this system in which we as humans find our survival and our sense of place before others. We contribute and participate within this economy as an inescapable part of our lives in our being with others. But, this system must also ‘respond’ to our acts of contribution, whether through commission or omission, since the ‘life’ of this economy, its total circulation, cannot be reduced merely to its inputs (nor outputs or both). This type of contributive input has been described as providential. Let me explore the possibilities of this facet of our existence-with-others which cannot be reduced to the mere material inputs and performances, etc., socially circulated within this shared economy of the world. (1125)

	I believe the use of this term ‘providential’ is applicable here for what, in effect, cannot be reduced to the mere acts of circulation initiated by human participants. If we were to define ‘providence’ as ‘intervention by the Divine or intervention as if from the Divine’ then we have neutral grounds for the maintenance of our hypothetical theological investigations. What is providential here is those acts of contribution (and de-contribution) that cannot be reduced to the mere performances of human agents. In the world economy some processes of contribution (and de-contribution) will not be able to assigned to mere human agency by virtue of the emergence of phenomena that cannot be merely reduced to the performance of a sole agent or the mere performance of a set of agents. Are we entitled then to assume that such emergent contributions (and de-contributions) are performed just by the Divine through some form of divine agency/divine agent or divine agents? No! It is better that this set of possibilities be left open. It does not rule out the possibility of such a narrow reading, indeed, it remains an open possibility, just that we cannot do this concept of emergence justice by being exclusive in this manner of narrowing down such a possibility to that extent (and remain on hypothetical territory in this regard). The professional theologian can follow this type of path. However, even if the Divine, as a sole agent, were to intervene in the economy of the world then their intervention and participation would contribute to an enlarged emergent economy that still could not be reduced to the residue of their input or inputs by virtue of the absolutely non-reductive nature of the emergent economy that arises through such an enlarged form of circulation. Rather, it is better to leave this sense of the providential open in order to recognize this existential excess that cannot be reduced to the mere acts of participation and/or intervention whether by non-divine agents and/or divine forms of agency! Let us, therefore, treat this term of the providential as just noted, namely, ‘as an intervention by the Divine or an intervention as if from the Divine’ and thereby leave in place our hypothetical neutrality in this regard. A position, as noted, that is more philosophically sound given a non-reductivist acceptance of the emergent nature of any economy (along with the non-pre-simulated simulated nature of both the actor and ‘their’ action along with ‘providential’ surpluses) whether that economy under examination be considered divine or non-divine (in orientation). (1126)

	What other denotations and connotations might seem to flow from this type of open concept? ‘Providence’ also implies ‘forethought’ (and thence the companion concept of ‘prudence’). Such a formation appears to imply intentionality (in both senses of that word, i.e., an attitude towards an intentional object or objective, and, an objective intended as a change in the fabric of the world desired by the intentional agent/s concerned in that regard). Again, we might argue that intentional resolution, as a process of dialectical resolution of competing directions of motivation, is itself an emergent process that cannot be reduced to its merely calculated contributions (given the focused or diffused nature of  the intentionality of power relations), and, therefore, itself cannot be reduced merely to the same. Hence the implication of an apparent providentiality even in the mere exercise of a process of intentionality be it non-divine or Divine in orientation. Thus even Divine intentionality would be the emergent resultant of a process of resolution in whose existential excess an apparent element of the providential could also be presumed whose phenomenal nature could not be reduced to the mere intentional mechanics of the Divine as an agent in this regard. Hence the necessary semblance of an extra-providentiality even for Divine agency (and thence the theological importance of this concept in so far as Divine agency would also have to be treated as ‘open’, i.e., non-reductively engendered both epistemologically and ontologically). Important ramifications from this philosophical-theological providential frame of reference must also flow on when existential ascription deals with non-agental forms of identity and the nature of the various economies that deal with interaction between agents, agents and non-agents, and between non-agental forms of identity. (1127)

	What is ‘providential’ about this sense of the providential? A non-reductivist attitude implicates an emergent economy. This could be understood as an existential excess that cannot be reduced to the mere participation of the participants in a process of ‘economic’ interaction. This surplus of value occurring even in an economy without obvious forms of agency. And, of course, a derivation of value could be hypothetically subsumed even in forms of divine agency be they merely apparent or non-virtually simulated (since, I would argue, that from an absolute transcendental point of view there can be no absolute form of difference in this regard between divine and non-divine, relatively intentional and relatively non-intentional, etc.). In and through what aspect of ‘process’ does this semblance of emergent providentiality arise? In and through the resolution of chaotic aspects or facets of the apparently phenomenal and/or the apparently phenomenological in orientation (including Divine forms of agency). In our investigations a full spectrum of possibility is intended hypothetically. How does this implication of the chaotic operate in this regard? (1128)

	How might the ‘chaotic’ be defined? As ‘a phenomenal sense of process that cannot be adequately described through linear or linear-like equations and descriptions’. Or, ‘through the presentations of junctures of birfurcation that can only be retrospectively resolved, adequately, through being resolved in the manner of their apparent resolution or resolutional pathway or heading’. In effect, ‘chaotic phenomena’ is ‘that phenomenal/phenomenological facet that cannot be definitively pre-assigned except in the form of a probability distribution’. Thus, we are forced to assume that even providential phenomena, either non-divine and/or Divine in orientation/s, cannot be foretold except in the form of a general probability function. On the other hand, non-chaotic phenomena can be adequately ‘foretold’ given a reasonable description of their state of play and given an apparent absence of chaotically-oriented forms of ‘intervention’. In this regard a providential theology could be constructed with this type of intervention or attention being exercised in and through this chaotic facet to the phenomenal/phenomenological realities of the world, i.e., the transcendental-phenomenal/phenomenological realities of the Life-World (whose transcendental-existence is exposed in the range of possible possibilities indicated in this regard). Furthermore, this possibility or type of possible reading can be subsumed under the range of our hypothetical theology given this phenomena-phenomenological range of possibilities in this regard. (1129)

	Implied here is the fact that no open economy can be without an element of the providential emergence of an array of facts that could be reduced to their mere material basis. Indeed, we could say that an open economy is defined by the same and that there can be no closed economy capable of a true sense of circulation without an accompanying involvement of this facet of a providential sense of arrangement and/or re-arrangement. Thus a closed system is without circulation whereas, in contrast, an open system is effectively open in and through its non-virtual and/or virtual simulations of such an emergent input/output (or, rather, throughput). ‘Simulations’ by virtue of the fact that we are not concerned with the absolute reality of our phenomena, only concerned with the phenomenal-phenomenologicalization of the same as found to be constituted in consciousness, i.e., its transcendental form in regard to its type and/or the specification of such type and/or its relation to genres of activity involved in this regard (either subjectively and/or inter-subjectively in orientation and expression). Our interest, therefore, lies not so much in strategies as the emergent productivity of such strategies (in partial contrast, in this manner, to this degree, with a philosopher like Foucault, e.g?). (1130)

	From a providential perspective can we talk about inputs or outputs of a ‘providential’ nature as existential insertions of contribution an/or de-contribution? Realized through chaotic processes of resolution such inputs or outputs are more correctly throughputs by virtue of their spontaneous realization. If already to-hand then they might be seen as inputs after their realization, or, if to-be-realized through a process in play or to be put in play then they could be regarded as outputs (of that process in question). However, correctly, such novel forms of production or re-direction should be seen as throughputs by virtue of the spontaneous nature of their derivation as the resolution of dissonant features in their relevant relationship/s of origination. Now in what sense can they be seen as ‘insertions’ or as contributions to that economy and/or as de-contribution to the same? Such existential features will appear as ‘insertions’ by virtue of their apparent novelty in that economy under examination. Moreover, be framed in terms of that economy they will either contribute to its power-relations and/or de-contribute from the same. Too often the world is thought to operate to strict time-tables that could be expressed through a set of (interacting and non-interacting) linear equations. However, the real truth of an economy would be quite opposed to this simplistic vision of the world. Both spatial and temporal coordinates are correctly momentary and thence chaotic in between this granularity of the phenomenal. Moreover, the phenomenlogical is also constituted in a similar manner analogically, i.e., agency is motivated through the momentary progression of an epistemologically organized system that is progressed through the resolutional matrix of ongoing resolution that ensures its continued circulation (through self-organization, organization of the detail of the same [in space and time] and the replicational retention of the same that ensures the ongoing circulation of that economy within the transcendental environment of the Life-World/non-transcendental environment of the world-as-lived). However, as noted elsewhere, we cannot absolutely divide the phenomenal from the phenomenological, and v.v. Such apparent novelty augmenting identity in the course of its formation/re-formation. In what sense does this augmentation act as a contributing throughput or de-contributing throughput? Contribution or de-contribution is often a matter of relativity, i.e., the perspective adopted in question. E.g., a person wanders along the street takes their wallet out of their pocket and counts their money left within it. However, unbeknownst to them when they put this wallet back into their pocket they accidentally dislodge a one hundred dollar bill. A few minutes later a passerby finds this bill and decides to shout their partner and themselves to a meal in a new restaurant. It’s the restaurants first night and seeing these two people happily eating in the window encourages a large party of friends looking for a nice place to eat to eat there too… and thence seeing its popularity more people go to eat there… ensuring that restaurants continuing existence by word of mouth. Now, the inadvertent loss of one hundred dollars was a de-contributing event for that person who lost it in the first place, when they realized they must have dropped that bill when they put their wallet back into their pocket. On the other hand, for that couple and the restaurant we have contributing events whose overall existential significance is much greater than the mere inputs arrived at hitherto. The relationship of that couple was fostered by such an act and the restaurant truly had its existence assured by the arrival of their first customers… This is the existential nature of circulation to the extent that phenomenal-phenomenological existence is augmented through contribution and/or de-augmented through de-contribution. Indeed, our very life and death is a reflection of this phenomenon of augmentation/de-augmentation. Hence the absolutely unpredictable nature of existence despite the institutionalization of routinization (although leavened to some extent through the aesthetic nature of ritualization and its heightened sense of re-appreciation). (1131)

	In a natural theology, as defined and exercised in this extended essay, we look at the integrity of identity. This integrity is viewed as an existential richness of value above and beyond the mere inputs of value in the realization of that apparent phenomenal/phenomenological reality of simulation of identity/identity of simulation. This excess of value is then viewed in and through a mundane theology wherein such contributions in turn generally augment a world whose circulation gives a mundane thematization to the apparent unity of the Life-World. It is into this ‘living’ explication of the transcendental possibilities of the Life-World that the providential economy can be seen to circulate hypothetically above and beyond its mere replication? Such augmentation of value creation in turn being re-invested in a trans-mundane theological form of circulation. Given this scenario, and such accepted either, hypothetically and/or non-hypothetically, we can see how the theological turn is invoked at each stage of this complex argument. In this light emergent identity invokes a theological turn albeit on a natural level of exposition. The process continuing and re-emerging on higher levels of epistemological organization (so that through replication and re-emergence our definition of the relatively divine would at some point or other be realized?). And what works in one direction should be seen as operating in the opposite (invoking some degree of commutation in this regard). Thus all forms of identity could also be seen as emerging from within a matrix of higher epistemological organization to the extent that the field-of-value-creation should be regarded as having a higher degree of epistemological enstructuralization and that the same is in some sense imparted to all forms of identity discerned within that field, etc. Furthermore, in this holistic type of argument, it would also imply that all levels of epistemological organization would or should find themselves reflected at any point in any nominated level, in all forms of identity, but, that in order to discern the same we would need to have the appropriate experiential richness of hermeneutic insight to discern what we might be able to discern given the pre-existence of such pre-conditions. At least with refinement of a particular field of experiential engagement, and its associated discourse/s, we should find some increased sense of refinement in our discernment therein too. This being an existential fact of our existence to the extent that our interpretation of the world is directly dependent upon the incremental, discrete and exponentially accelerated nature of the development of our prior expertise in this regard. To what extent then need a theologian go in order to establish this existential fact as a fact of experience, namely, that a providential environment could be discerned in the course of human experience itself? Could such a position be argued for hypothetically (and trans-hypothetically?)? Let me examine the confluence of (necessary) concepts that might entitle us to consider whether such a theological reading is not only possible but also existentially fruitful? (1132) 

What set of concepts needs to be invoked in order to run this type of argument? A recognition of a ‘theological’ progression from natural to mundane to trans-mundane, and, reversed, through commutation, in the opposite direction; the positing of a theological turn at each new level of epistemological advancement; an overall augmentation of value-creation circulating as a providential economy with holistically self-organized acts of simulated intervention occurring in and through moments of chaotic bifurcation, etc? If this were a good phenomenal-phenomenological reading of the world in what manner might it be regarded as indicative of a theological complexion associated with the very being of the Life-World? All of this granted, might it also not be the case that we are left with two incommensurable readings in this regard? Say, from a holistic, self-organized point of view we might be able to run a serious argument for a  theological economy to some extent or other, but, from a phenomenal-phenomenological perspective only be able to run, merely, a natural theological economy to the extent that only non-theologically oriented forms of identity are available for presentation, examination, representation, etc? In essence, how is a hypothetical theological economy to be non-hypothetically extended into the midst of a natural theology through some form of commutative commensuration and, therein, demonstrated from an experiential and evidential set of perspectives? In this type of project (of identification of theologically-oriented experience and theologically oriented-evidence) just how might it be conducted without invoking forms of analytical identification and/or circular arguments. Or, put another way, how can parallel readings speak to each other in this regard, i.e., how might theological interpretations overlap and intersect non-theologically oriented readings? In what manner is this process of hermeneutic commensuration permitted to occur (that does not deconstruct either reading?)? (1133)

	From a hypothetical perspective how might this project of commensuration between theologically oriented readings and non-theologically oriented readings be set up so as not to merely parallel each other and ostensively intersect (from the perspective of both parties)? The solution to this type of problem should take either traditionalist and/or non-traditionalist positions or perspectives? Let the traditional theologian present their own case in this regard (as to how they might re-interpret experience also to have an actual theological reading; how they might believe history to have moments of theological intervention; whether the world could have spiritual persons or similar to act as mediators and interlocutors with the relatively Divine; what might count as ‘evidential, etc. In a non-traditionalist perspective how might modern cosmology, e.g., be read in this non-traditional theological light? Or, how might the providential economy be articulated or expressed (in both senses of either term, i.e., exercised from a relatively Divine point of view, and, find itself being formulated in an appropriate form of theological discourse), etc? Or, in effect, adopt and adapt some non-traditionalist genre/s already to hand, or, adopt and adapt some traditionalist genre/s in a non-traditionalist fashion in this regard? To this end I would like to proffer some hypothetical suggestions and leave it to the professional theologians to see whether they might like to adopt and adapt the same, etc., in order to run this type of argument? (1134)

	E.g., self-organized systems exhibit a holistic fractal nature. In this regard, a theological system should also exhibit a fractal nature in some form or other. In other words, demonstration of a functioning holism, and, a degree of epistemological organization greatly in advance of that exhibited in and through the human condition would be sufficient to argue for the existence of a theological or theological-like complexion in this regard. How might this type of state of affairs be recognized and interpreted? (1135)

	We have one model here that might be of help in this process of identification? As human epistemological organization is demonstrably intentional in flavour then could we extend this type of intentional functioning to our case in hand? In what manner might theological intentionality mirror (if not, of course, well-transcend) human instances and traces of an intentional exercise of consciousness? One key differential in this regard from the translational forces of relatively non-intentionally directed functions is that of re-direction. Billiard balls once hit by the cue seem to follow from fully determined functions of motion, the input of resistance itself functioning within the same overall system as a counter-function in this regard. Without the impedance of resistance they would keep on going around the billiard table for all eternity. The element of an intentional-like intervention is characterized through moments of re-direction. Initially the billiard balls are at rest. They are then re-directed around the table in a non-intentionally reactive fashion. On the other hand, put our cue on the table, as these balls are bouncing off the cuffs, and let these balls hit the same and we again intervene to re-direct the same. It is almost as if processes of re-direction are of an interventionist nature? In this light, a sand hill created by the fall of grains, one by one, would naturally reach a point where that conical hill must collapse and create an avalanche down the sides of its conical slopes. Could we treat this ‘act’ of spontaneous collapse and avalanche of this sand-hill, and the distinct uniqueness of each re-directed event, as an indication of an intentional or intentional-like process of phenomenal re-direction? To some extent yes, and, to some extent no. It does appear to be a spontaneous input to the overall system or, rather, throughput, yet, on the other hand, the level of epistemological organization is not sufficient to earmark it as intentional (and more like an act of chaotic bifurcation than something that is pre-intentional in orientation). In this light we might expect to find theological-like traces in the throughput of human interactions rather than in the natural world, or, only in and through the vastly organized complexity of the cosmological arena (which would also include the net, rich, complex medium of interactive human intentionality). To what extent is complexity indicative of intentional, trans-intentional, intentional-like and trans-intentional-like behaviour or activity? In what fashion is complexity to be measured, and, if complexity is holistically already present to the same degree, everywhere and equally everywhere from every point in space-and-time, do we have a problem at all (in this regard of needing to demonstrate, recognize, indicate theological or theological-like forms of articulation or expression?)? Indeed, if complexity is a given to what extent is non-theologically operative expression possible (along with, in turn, the ‘real’, non-virtual possibility of a theological turn)? Perhaps an analysis of the expression ‘expression’ might be of some help in this regard?  (1136)

	“Expression’ as already noted has two senses, namely, an active sense of ‘the act of that-to-be-expressed’ and a passive sense as ‘the resultant product of the expressive act’. Given the act of expression is in some manner intentionally directed and you would then find the passive expressive content could, or should, then be treated as a text. Furthermore, our ability to examine such expressions would then necessitate the relevant need for appropriate genres and their associated discourses. In all of this have we the necessary machinery, so to speak, that might allow us to run parallel, yet interactive, readings in this regard. We have ‘texts’ and we have ‘authors’. Texts are inscribed upon the fabric of the world by authors, and, authors inscribe texts upon the fabric of the world. Yet, both ‘authors’ and ‘texts’ would seem at first instance to be incommensurable entities or types (in a merely descriptive ontological cataloguing of the world). However, existentially we might also say that authors to be authors must have or have had the ability to inscribe texts in order to be declared authors (and v.v. from the perspective of a text to be a ‘text that is inscribed’). Authors have the potentiality of inscribing texts. Furthermore, if the intentionally directed consciousness of an author is inscribing texts (both classical and non-classical) continually in their conscious life then are we able to declare that author-and-text are linked by this process wherein through intentional direction, or, rather, re-direction, we might say either aspect is merely a facet of an overall process of authoring? In this regard ‘active author’ and ‘passive text’ are merely by-products of this process of authoring that should correctly be seen more as artificial artifacts of our reflections and resultant discourses re the same. That there can be no dichotomy between ‘author’ and ‘text’ since both are extracted as super-impositions upon the intentionally oriented processes of authoring (itself also an inter-subjective phenomena through the utilization of public genres in this regard, etc.). So, we might hazard a guess and say that theological descriptions of the world and non-theological descriptions of the same need not be incommensurable, indeed, could not be incommensurable when treated from an intermediate position and perspective of an overall sense of process itself (invoking theological processes, theological-oriented subjects, non-theologically-oriented products or content, etc.)? Could this same type of approach be adopted and adapted in dealing with discourses treating such incommensurable or ‘complementary’ discourses as those pertaining to quantum physics and non-quantum physics, matter versus light or energy, psychological forms of treatment versus sociological (and political) forms of treatment, etc? Furthermore, this need not be limited to processes of bi-modal complementarity but could be extended to tri-modal forms of translation and beyond to the extent that all texts could be seen as complementary (and potentially inter-translatable even if the hermeneutic effort that might be required might not be worth the effort). From a hypothetical theological perspective how might this theory or ‘doctrine’ of complemetarity or absolute non-commensuration operate? Indeed, be seen to operate with a considerable degree of an existential excess of value-formation in this regard (and actually illuminate a traditional and/or non-traditional theological discourse if that were possible?)? (1137)

	A key insight here might reside in how we could interface a mundane theology, on one hand, with a natural theology, and, on the other, with a trans-mundane theology. Already we have the link or model of the ‘author’. They walk through the world and they leave footprints so to speak. We have no problems here. In the formation of footprints we assume the intentional directedness (or rather intentional re-directedness) on the part of the walker whose footprints are the resultant depositions of their act of walking. We interpret ‘footprints’ as deposited through acts of intentional directedness to the extent their author has the intention of getting from a to b for some reason or set of reasons (this intentional resolution being the result of an act of intention resolution wherein competing intentions are resolved, etc., and therein and thereafter acted upon otherwise they would not be able to walk). What light does this model of the intentional author throw on this problem of complementariness, i.e., how can complementary artifacts be made commensurable, etc?  (1138)

	Too often we focus on a text, or set of texts, and see only the text or set of texts! We see the trail of footsteps, the letter, the object as a book, then some people address us by name or sometimes signal to us that we be there even if they do not know our name… On the bus today I saw a young guy, seemingly on his way to work,  with a metal ring through the middle of his right ear-lobe. It was just a metal ring… or was it? For a start, no intentional act is ever conceived of, let alone performed, without it being slotted into its associated meta-text? Why the right ear? Why a ring? Why treat the body as a text in this manner? And, are such questions relevant in this type of bodily discourse given the apparent invocation of semiotically significant significations in current Australian culture? All intentions have a degree of significance that cannot be found purely in their textuality, as deposited textual traces. Or, again, as an instance of a genre of activity, no performance is ever the same as some other. Then, in terms of a perceived significance of meaningfulness, a similarity of text is never a guarantee of a similarity of meaning and meaningfulness when inserted into some other moment of experience. E.g., when you feel happy a certain piece of music might make you feel even happier, whereas, the same piece of music when you feel sad might make you feel even more sad! Put simply, the economy of value-to-be-experienced cannot be reduced to a text, set of texts or hybrid text/s, cannot be reduced to the mere invocation of a genre or hybrid genre, set of genres, neither can it be reduced to the apparent meaningfulness of its mere existential interaction of a text-and-its-associated-genre/s as a non-text. Equating an ascriptive economy as textual, a superlative economy as meta-textual, and, a comparative economy as non-textual (as the existential balance and interaction between a text and its associated adoption and adaptation of a meta-text in order to intentionally form and thematize the ‘materiality’ of a text) we need to recognize that a full economy cannot be just a comparative economy (as an existential economy realized in and through the existential meaningfulness of the non-textual experience). So, even though a certain privileging of the comparative economy has hitherto been promoted vis-à-vis the ascriptive-content and the superlative-process, correctly, we should be privileging none (nor for that matter the mere overall transcendental suspension of the same as the not-textual experience). A text is a text qua text by virtue of its being seen as a text and being read as that type of text through the adequate invocation of its associated genre of formation and re-formation (in an act of re-reading, etc.). A book in a foreign language is still a ‘book’ despite our not being able to read that particular book through not be able to read that language. Learn that language and you might be able to read the same. What are the points being promoted through this paragraph? (1139)

	Mere textuality has no significance, no circulation of value. Even in the mere thought of attempting this impossible act of envisualization we can only find an empty emptiness of value. Equally, there can be no mere genre, set of genres or a hybrid genre. There can be no pure ascriptive economy and there can be no pure superlative economy. But, also, there can be no pure comparative economy! Only in the suspension of all three, and a suspension of that suspension, is there an engaged economy with a full, functioning circulation of value! In effect, this has been examined in and through our three dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension as examined elsewhere by myself. What are the implications of this richer vision of value-formation wherein we can no longer merely privilege the comparative economy? (1140)

	We might temper this by saying that a comparative economy is closer to the full economy than an orientation upon either the ascriptive or the superlative. That there can only be the most productive coinciding with the full economy only in and through an adequate overall suspension of the economy per se. Similarly, the fullest understanding of an economy in question must involve an adequate overall transcendental suspension of the economy in question and not merely the overall transcendental suspension of the comparative economy per se although being a better approximation of the same to some degree. It is into this difference between the word defying not-textuality of the adequate overall transcendental suspension of the economy, as a full economy, and an overall suspension of a comparative economy as a non-textual economy that more than enough room is made for all forms of complex value including the realm of the theological! In other words this potential theological territory is carved out through a recognition of the unity of manifested presence that arises through the existential investment of value that arises in and through a fully functioning economy. We, almost, might like to define this difference as a sense of psychic spirit wherein an inertness of meaning comes alive and finds itself invested with a open richness of possibility that cannot be reduced to the merely textual or the merely meta-textual, or, indeed, to the merely non-textual. That this semblance of ‘spirit’ is arrived at in and through this dimension of difference between the not-textual and the non-textual; that between the full economy of value and its imprint realized through a comparative economy. That, to this extent, the world-of-spirit, in its existential sense as indicated has both its imprint and its matrix of being. However, such terminology extracted out of this phenomenal-phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential context of the hermeneutic circle (of [theological] comprehension) can only open itself up to be mis-read (in much the same manner, I suspect, that traditional and non-traditional theological formulation and speculation is also to be misunderstood when removed to some degree or other from its matrix of formulation and re-formulation). What are the insights and consequences to be drawn from this neutral theological vision of value-formation? To what extent is a natural theology to be implicated in both mundane and trans-mundane theologies, and, in the possibility of their reversal vis-à-vis the non-transcendental life of the natural world? Or, should such artificial divisions be seen as truly non-existent within the ‘life’ of the Life-World; that the ‘spirit’ of such life overflows in and through, on and upon all identities therein discerned (in much the same manner that value is created within the total economy of the hermeneutic circle along with its three moment and their individual and collective suspensions within the overall transcendental suspension)? That, to put it bluntly, there can be no real difference between the relatively theological and the relatively non-theological in a world already awash with value, in a world that could not be a ‘world’ without this existential facet of the theological in the first place! That, for the existential theologian, there can be no true theological difference in the first place!! (1141)

	In a world awash with value there can be nothing without value! Everything is awash with value (even above and beyond that merely explored in an economy of words and language). Let us look again at that young guy on the bus with a metal ring in his ear. That young person, it would seem, has adopted and adapted a genre of inter-subjective intentional activity whose adequate significance is not necessarily fully open to the public at large. However, we can safely assume that this intentional action of having ‘a ring in his ear’ is something more than ‘just a ring in his ear’. Let the semioticians debate its apparent richness of significance, and, let that young guy be questioned, if necessary, so that he might give his own perspective on this type of hermeneutic task we set ourselves as we try to understand both our own path through this Life-World and the paths of others through this same World-of-Life (as, metaphorically, they run parallel, intersect or diverge from each other as we make ‘our’ passage through this ‘theological dimension of being’). (1142)

	In all of this, essentially, we live in a world of economic differences. Our own sense of difference is defined this way. On the other hand, we also live in the same world of economic value by virtue of this sense of an open relationship with the world at large. Worlds within worlds… layers of value between layers of value, etc. (1143)

	In all of this we might say we both live in a world of theological difference and but also in a world without such difference by virtue of its being also the same World-of-Life as that-there-for-us! The ‘opening up’ of an adequate and overall suspension realizes this richly emergent dialectical sense of a difference-without-(an-absolute-)difference! That, ultimately, there can be no ‘real’ theological difference of any kind! (1144)

	Is the comparative economy to be transcended in effect? Or should the comparative economy be seen as the true end of our endeavours? How might we prove this not to be the case as already indicated? (1145)

	Let us accept that a sense of ‘ascriptive-content (a)’ and a ‘superlative sense of process (s)’ mirror ‘text (t)’ and ‘meta-text (mt)’ respectively. In our hermeneutic circle, as a fully functioning economy (E), we can then match ‘non-text (~t)’ with a ‘comparative economy (c)’. In our tri-modal dialectics each moment can be defined as the negation of the other two. Moreover, the fully functioning hermeneutic economy E, equal to the not-textual (~T), has a greater sense of value-formation and cannot be equated with the perceived value of the three momentary inputs (individually integrated)(or, though, we might like to treat these facets as also ‘throughputs’ rather than as just inputs and/or outputs as previously noted). We could notate these insights as:

1.	t = a, mt = s, ~t = c
2.	E = Z( Z{a} + Z(s) + Z{c}) = ~T (not-textual)
3.	a = ~(s + c), s = ~(c + a), c = ~(s + a)
4.	c = {a + s}must be false because c = ~ {a + s}
5.	E = {a + s + c} must be false because of proposition 2.

Thus we an note that a comparative economy cannot be merely the addition of ascriptive and superlative economies, and, a fully functioning economy is neither a comparative economy nor the mere summation of the value of ascriptive, superlative and comparative economies. In other words, there is a difference between the value of a fully functioning economy (through the associated hermeneutic circle) and the individual summation of the perceived value of its tri-modal throughputs. As noted, it my suggestion to treat this ‘difference’ as a theological difference, albeit in terms of the natural, mundane and/or trans-mundane (despite the fact from an ultimate point of view that there can be no difference from a theological perspective!). Hence the importance of this concept of a theological difference (despite it being the case that there can be no ultimate difference in this regard!). Just as, in our dialectical progression, the temporary privileging of the comparative economy over both the superlative and the ascriptive has a sense of practice purpose and utility in the unfolding of our understanding, so too does the complex concept of difference have a sense of practical purpose and utility in the further unfolding of our progressive understanding (of the nature of complex value including theological value [in all its guises]). Hence the importance of this (complex) concept of theological difference (despite its ultimate non-importance!). (1146)

	What key point might we take away from this section of this extended essay (dealing with the importance of the theological turn)? Furthermore, how might I best argue for such possible insights? (1147)

	That God, or the relatively Divine, could not be a text, neither (epistemologically) recognized nor (ontologically) encountered as such! Neither as a set of texts nor as a hybrid text! Then, divinity, also, cannot be a genre or style of activity! Equally, it cannot be a mere process! Nor can it be the mere meaningfulness of the existential moment as expressed through the relatively non-textual! Then, on the other hand, it cannot be absolutely removed from the same if it were to entertain and maintain some semblance of phenomenal presence… that, in this light, the relatively Divine is expressed in and through the integrity of identity as indicated in a natural theology… thence expressed in and through the apparent integrity of the world as indicated in a mundane theology… and thence, hypothetically, through emergence and appropriate degrees of relative epistemological organization in and through the form of a trans-mundane theology… but, that being the case, it would naturally follow that a theological difference could have no existence since a state of affairs that could be conceived of as having no form of theological implication is just not possible! Thus, although a theological difference could be provisionally formulated and tentatively shown to possess considerable importance, ultimately, it would have no existence and thence no significance what so ever!! (1148)

	How might I be able to argue for this sudden about face, this change of fortune in the perceived merits of this concept of theological difference (as, hitherto, it would have been expressed on natural, mundane and trans-mundane levels of epistemological organization)? (1149)

	Re-stated we could say that from the absolute, transcendental point of view there can be no ‘real’ sense of a theological difference. Hence there can be no absolute theology! Then, from a relative, non-transcendental (mundane point of view) we can also say that there can be no theological point of view (through the absolute emptiness of all identity be it relatively divine or non-divine). Thence there can no (absolutely) relative mundane theology! But the professional or amateur theologian needn’t despair! Why? For the very reason that there can be no absolute point of view just from an absolute point of view, and, equally, no relative point of view just from a relative point of view. Perceiving the ‘absolute’ as ‘transcendental’ I have argued on numerous occasions that a transcendental attitude is realized through a transcendentialization of the relatively non-transcendental. Similarly, and conversely, the relatively non-transcendental is arrived at through a de-transcendentialization of the relatively transcendental. As a process the absolutely absolute point of view can not be realized in any form; be that in and through a relatively divine subject or a relatively non-divine subject. Equally, the relatively relative point of view (as an absolutely relative point of view) is just as untenable. The only points of view we are left with are: the absolutely-relative and the relatively-absolute, and, existentially, an ongoing balance or ‘suspension’ of these two ‘viable’ perspectives along with a suspension of such a suspension, etc. Correctly, we have only this latter perspective in to which through forms of relative privileging/de-privileging we arrive at various processes (forms/formats) of intentional thematization with varying degrees of authenticity/inauthenticity. In this clarification of perspective a theological complexion can be preserved or re-realized. Let me elaborate upon the nature of this ‘re-realization’ and examine the ramifications that would appear to flow both actively and passively from the same. (1150)

We might tentatively say that a relationship emerges from its relational basis be that between objects and objects, and/or subjects and objects, and/or, subjects and subjects. More correctly, however, we should say that from the emergence of a relationship its relational basis can be ideally extracted as provisional imputations under consideration with varying degrees of evidential support for or against the same. That such imputations can never be absolutely extracted from this phenomenological basis of its relational matrix (as realized in and through our phenomenological experience) by virtue of this fact that there can be neither a pure absolute point of view nor a pure relative point of view. Moreover, through the loss of overall value in an extreme reductive perspective, the existential surplus of value entailed in a more holistic reading of the phenomena necessitates an openness to its distinctive emergent features arrived at through higher degrees of epistemological organization apparently resident in our interaction with such phenomena. Such open openness implying that a theological-like complexion, of some form or other, could well be discerned on any level of epistemological discernment as long as such imputations are neither eternalistically treated as unchanging subsistents nor nihilistically treated (in a negative sense) as entirely without forms of identification (as absolutely empty). Into and through this ‘middle path’ we must carefully tend and wend the exercise of our philosophical acumen in order to judge what a theologian may or may not claim as a viable possibility in the course of their theological investigations. First let me proffer a metaphor for this type of research and then explore the hypothetical ramifications of what, effectively, is a relational theology and a theology of mediation. (1151)

	But, first, we could say that (the impossible idea of) an absolutely-absolute theology is like a blinding light so much so that we could not see, or, if we could see, we were to see no difference… anywhere. On the other hand, (the impossible idea of) a relatively-relative theology would be like sheer darkness to such an extent that, again, we could see nothing… no difference what so ever. Both metaphors have been used by theologians and in view of the above we might want to steer clear of the same (or at least carefully scope their use). Now, adopting this middle path (as suggested above) we might like to introduce the following metaphor, namely, that theological difference could be treated as a swirling sea of value whose intensity is subjected to flux and whose relative ‘presence’ or relative ‘absence’ could be treated as a form of potential difference. Now our concept of theological difference is no longer without some form of differentiation albeit in these terms of existential presence or absence (without being subjected to extreme forms of extrapolation and literalization). What ramifications would seem to flow from this hypothetical vision of a relational theology as a theology of mediation? (1152)

	Just as the relational identities are provisionally extracted (as provisional imputations) from relationships, so, too, relationships are contextually bound in a similar fashion within meta-relationships, etc., etc. Hence the raison d’être behind this description of a relational theology. Why, then, is such a philosophical approach equated as ‘mediational’ in tenor? Because such hypothetical differences in theological difference could be viewed as being mediated from more theologically oriented regions to less theologically oriented regions. Let me explore and make explicit this implicit concept of mediation. (1153)

	Consequently, in all forms of economy, from a transcendental perspective, value discerned therein is always subject to some form of regional differentiation and, thence, some form of potential difference. That, therefore, the simulation and/or re-simulation of such value is realized/re-realized through some form of mediation be that direct and/or indirect in its modus operandi. Why is it experienced/re-experienced through mediation? Because it is expressed/re-expressed through mediation! Let me explain. (1154)

	A basic premise behind the profession of theology is that of relevance: a finding and a giving of value that can be indicated and/or shared through dissemination. Or something to that effect. The sense of the divine, regardless of its envisioned formulation, must have some form of a direct and/or indirect phenomenal presence. Moreover, that sense of relative presence (and/or relative absence) must be something that-is-there-for-us (and to which the theologian will also add to which-we-should-be-for-it). In other words, in some sense or other, there must be a form of divine relationship with the world into which we must also find ourselves to be as participants. As all relationships are two-way, implicit in this passive participation must also be some form of active participation (for we logically could not have one without the other and also be aware of being in such a relationship [even if that ‘relationship’ were merely fanciful or the product of delusive thinking or the consequences of misinformation, etc.]). Such ground accepted it then devolves to us to decide whether that relationship is with some sense of person or personality or without the same (and since we are personally thought to be involved in this relationship as persons then it naturally seems to follow that with ‘whom’ that relationship is entered into with should also be similarly constituted or at least treated [and respected] as trans-personal in some sense to be defined or left undefined rather than without any vestiges of ‘personality’ whatsoever). Into such controversial quick-sands traditional theologies will quickly pour themselves… Rightly or wrongly, behind this necessary concept of participation is a concept of mediation. (1155)

	Participation between relational equals is usually regarded as non-mediated, whereas, on the other hand, relationships between relative non-equals necessitates processes of mediation in some appropriate form be that relatively overt or relatively covert by nature. A deeper analysis should reveal that all forms of participation are mediated. Let me illustrate both types of relationships where this difference is in terms of power or a considerable differential in power (versus a relationship without marked differentials in the dissemination of power). A king orders that all woodchoppers et al first need to obtain permission to enter the royal forests in order to harvest wood or any other products found therein. Will they seek permission directly from the king himself. Most unlikely, it would be obtained through some mediator (whose relationship with that king is in turn probably mediated, etc.). What types of mediation might occur in relationships with relatively non-differentiated power relations? By the presence or absence of gift-giving; through media of communication; through the co-adoption and co-adaptation of genres of mutual activity such as would be utilized in acts of communication, etc. So we shake hands; share a cup of tea; give an actual gift; trade/trade in obligations; smile or show our teeth; agree, disagree, agree to disagree, etc., etc. In all relationships participants have their relationships mediated in a variety of forms (on the grounds that no phenomenal object and/or subject is ever interacted with in one simple modality; that, therefore, all phenomenological interactions are complex in their nature and modes of transmission/mediation). Thus, having established this concept of mediation let me first explore how this subject matter might be ‘exploited’ by a theologian. (1156)

	Entertain, if you would, the following hypothetical exploration. Imagine, if you would, that the relatively Divine enters into some form of an unequal  relationship with the relatively non-divine. In some sense the relatively Divine ‘washes’ over the relatively non-divine through its assumed differential greatness in epistemological organization. From the transcendental perspective of a greater gestalt sense of unity and coherence one might say that the absolute, or transcendental loci of the same, is active and that the relatively non-divine in this relationship is effectively passive; i.e.acts/reacts as a passive participant. However, no relationship is one-way, moreover, all power is disseminated! Hence this investment of an existential excess from the greater epistemologically organized participant (the relatively Divine) is re-expressed by the relatively passive party in order for that power to be a transmission of power through its dissemination. Now all of the above is being examined hypothetically. Can we relate such a scheme to the phenomenal-phenomenological ways of the world? I have just come back from a week in India. I observed that even in the heart of the capital of New Delhi there were potholes in the roads and crumbling curbs beside those roads and pavements that were equally marred. What was I to make of this phenomenon. Might it not be the case that the ground under my feet in some way or other reflected the holistic totality that is called India? Is its political organization, or, rather, lack or subversion of the same, here being reflected throughout the land. That in effect, through corruption, wasting of resources, inadequate tax gathering, improper utilization of the same responsible for these characteristic features of such Indian infrastructure? Certain trends are ascertained and evaluated as statistical verities; certain hermeneutical genres of interpretation are adopted and adapted in order to explain those phenomena (such as the omnipresent presence of potholes and other features of inadequate road-building and road-maintenance)(by the invocation of corruption, excessive vote-buying, lack of political will, a different set of priorities, inadequate tax gathering/expenditure, general degree of poverty, lack of universal education, etc.). Then apposite genres of interpretation are adopted and adapted. With or without the critical evaluation and consequential rectification that follows upon a reflection of such facts and interpretative schema (where, in term, such procedures too can be summoned for critical re-evaluation). Into such a structured mix various hermeneutic principles being promoted, either overtly or covertly, namely, the apparent appreciation of the relative hermeneutic value of such proposals in view of this ‘living’ system of representation/re-presentation in the light of its perceived richness and/or poverty of value, etc. Thus, we should conclude, if we are in agreement with all the points above, that theological passivity must also be edged hypothetically by theological activity, and v.v., on and from the behalf of those participants in such a relationship through processes of mediation and re-mediation. Otherwise there would be no dissemination of that theological power! (1157)

	An important consequence of the above, whether regarded hypothetically or non-hypothetically, would be that if the sense of the Divine in some unspecified or specified form or format were found to be necessarily conceivable and actually realized through the acceptance of the inevitable reality of a theological turn then it would follow that processes of participation would be mediated in the general manner as indicated above, namely, as both active and passive in the transmission/re-transmission of the power-differentials to be found in that complex relationship/in the complexity of those relationships. Let us now turn our attention to this question of the theological turn – to what extent is the same ‘necessarily conceivable and actually realizable?’ Hence our current interest in this potentially-possible, primary ‘importance’ of the theological turn. (1158)

	Imagine, if you would, the following virtual situation. You have a remote control that can virtually stop all time but allow yourself to actually examine everything that has been so suspended around you. You attend a symphony orchestra and during a symphony of Mozart you decide to press the button marked ‘time-stop’. Tonight you are on a philosophic quest to the find the ‘music’ of this occasion. You get up out of your seat and wander over to the orchestra. You pass the first violinist seated and frozen with his bow and violin exactly the moment this virtual state of suspension was triggered by your use of that virtual remote. You hear no music and you can see no music here. You look closely at the bow and fiddle – no music here either. You wander around and conclude that ‘music’ cannot be reduced to the instruments, etc., utilized in its performance. You return to your seat and press the button marked ‘time-start’. And the music of the occasion continues on as if nothing had happened. The point of this thought-experiment is to show that higher order phenomena cannot be reduced to lower order phenomena. The epistemological organization of music, as a phenomenon-in-the-world exists in a sphere of experience that cannot be transferred to other spheres of organization nor be reduced to lower spheres of organization. So where is the so-called ‘music’? (1159)

	The use of the spatial word ‘where’ is somewhat misleading. In this type of phenomenal occurrence ‘when’ too can be misleading. We were listening to a symphony written by Mozart who is now dead. Before the 1800’s this composer inscribed a musical work in such a manner that his intentions were channeled by conventions into the form of a symphony which was later performed and through time disseminated in a variety of formats. A text was published, and, no doubt, re-published. I am sure this collection of scores have been critically edited and various performance scores have also been published. Then, not being a ‘newly rediscovered text’ that symphony has been re-played many times. But dissemination in the Modern world goes even further through recordings, tapings, reproductions on video’s, CD’s and DVD’s and whatever the latest fashion in electronics has tried to seduce us with. So we can now elicit another insight into the nature of this general phenomenon of music, this particular phenomenon of this particular Mozart symphony, and, the specific instance of this performance of that same work which we have just attended in our thought experiment. Generally, such a phenomenon arises in a certain cultural matrix with a certain style and degree of epistemological organization. Moreover, a relatively specific set of relationships are set up to effectively constitute the adequately expressed ideality of that phenomenon that can then be transformed through textual re-formation upon the fabric of the world in such a form or format that would allow us either to perform this work of music live or see itself reproduced in such a manner that would allow us at some future point in time to re-play that text through the use of some device or set of devices that would allow its phenomenal re-production. So, today, if we don’t go to a concert hall to hear music performed live we can listen instead to a record or CD or watch and listen to a video or DVD of the same piece of music if already pre-recorded. Thus we must conclude that the form (and format) of a certain piece of music has both the potential for the preservation of its relatively distinctive epistemological ordering and the possible potential for its transcribed transformation given the co-occurrence of the requisite machinery for the same. Hence, as a third condition, when the phenomenon of music is taking place, say an actual occurrence of this symphony, whether performed or re-produced, also needs its full compliment of apparatus that would allow this event to occur in this world-of-music (undoubtedly quite a difference sphere of being from the time of Mozart though not one, I suspect, if he were alive, that he would not have recognized to some extent or other). In other words, the full phenomenon of music, whether performed or re-produced, occurs and can only occur in an appropriate world-of-music! What parallels can be drawn here to the hypothetical functioning of a world with a certain imputed theological complexion (regarded as functioning along similar lines, i.e., as non-reducible, transcribable and functioning through its associated apparatus or machinery of embodiment and emplacement?)? (1160)

	For a start we might like to say that a theologically oriented realm of being must occur in a theological-world-of-life (as that there-for-us) with the same requisite conditions of epistemological preservation, transformational transcription and its co-arising compliment of theological apparatus and all of the above co-inhabit the corresponding theological world of that specific sense of the Divine. Now I do not suggest that this analogy can be perfectly extended, by virtue of the fallacy of the extended analogy or metaphor, but, would have much to commend itself to the serious theologian. With a certain degree of positive skepticism let me examine this analogy and investigate to what extent it might happily and hypothetically be able to be thought to be held to hold in this regard. (1161)

	Epistemological preservation would suggest that theological preservation can only occur through a preservation of the apposite and requisite epistemological organization (already defined as several degrees greater than that possessed by an individual person and/or community of persons). If the sense of senses of the Divine emerge/s from a phenomenal sense of world, and cannot be reduced to the same, then it follows that epistemological preservation must also be observed hence its corresponding concept of theological preservation. (1162)

	How do we deal with the concept of transcriptional transformation? In a certain sense the idea, the full intentionality behind its potential performance, of that Mozartian symphony, can be entertained and transcribed. Can an idea of the Divine function in the same sense. How could an ongoing functioning of the Divine be transcribed? Well, a CD of a Mozart symphony by itself does not enact the simulation of a Mozart Symphony. So, similarly, the textual entracement of the Divine organization would also be silent except when exactly emplaced within its apposite and requisite apparatus, i.e., being itself to that extent it functions within this world-of-the-theological (albeit the world-with-a-theological-complexion). By extension I am not arguing for a substantial (and reductive) reading of this simulation of the Divine phenomenon/phenomena. Now, that granted (hypothetically), to what extent could we refer to the same as a “re-simulation’? Easily, by virtue of the philosophical-perceived/apperceived existential fact that the ‘simulation of the Divine’ is not a simulation of something imputed as ‘pre-simulated’ to that simulation. Thence all simulation through continual co-arising must also be a re-simulation (with the same respect to all forms of replication as occurring through a process of harmonization between the moments of mere repetition, sheer repetition and bare repetition as examined elsewhere on numerous occasions). (1163)

	This Postmodern/Contemporary concept of simulation accepted (as re-simulation) then the concept of theological transcription needn’t appear too problematic. Given such ‘information’ and its apposite/requisite apparatus then the sense of the Divine, some general/particular/specific senses of the Divine are re-simulated. Of course the ramifications of such a shift from a substantial to a non-substantial/process-oriented reading/s may be none too unproblematic. Moreover, our appreciation necessitates the apposite/requisite hermeneutic readings (preferably in the plural) in order to re-capture a complex sense of divinity that can do considerable theological work (as defined by this extended essay, e.g.). The relatively greater value of some readings establishing those readings as more preferable, obviously, to work with, etc.  The possibility of such a framework granted hypothetically in what manner should the theologian deal with such textually-treated transcriptions? Indeed, what methods can they avail themselves of? The resolution of this puzzle is already in place if we realize that meta-textually we currently have to hand various cultural stratagems for dealing with this type of textual problematic given the existence of a theological world-of-life in the first place (as inhabited by the theologian, the theist, theologist, worshipper, etc.). In setting up my own complex reading of the theological turn (as necessary and important, etc.) I would like to proffer the following strand to this assortment of ‘tales’. Such treatment is certainly not to be seen as exhaustive, correctly, quite the opposite. I would like to nominate it as taking a specialized analogical approach. (1164)

	Already I have suggested that in the armory of the theologian, as for any philosopher, where proper and appropriate they should avail themselves of transcendental arguments as a starting point in a process for demonstrating actual-possibility and possible-actuality (effecting a transformation shift from one orientation to the other). Certainly, proffering a scaffold for the more important work of investigating its meta-textual underpinnings and consequential insights, etc. Let me elaborate. Suppose we argue for the transcendental unity of the world. That there is a world-for-us (and not just a world-for-oneself and/or no world whatsoever, etc.). That being able to demonstrate such an argument in and of itself already is a basis for this type of position. But this is just the beginning of a specialized approach. Our next step is to create an analogical parallel to this type of situation and demonstrate its relatively non-controversial intersection in the world as generally understood and accepted. So the world has a certain unity imprinted by and on its apparent phenomenal-phenomenological appearance, so too can the same be seen in its demonstrated analogue/s. E.g., a certain institution has certain features that persist through time albeit subject to mutations, migration of qualifies, discontinuity in relatively superficial features, etc., until such a point has been reached where we would no longer consider that institution as still persisting in its original existential state having ceased to function in the world as ‘that’ institution. Indeed, that such features are textually imprinted upon the fabric of the world and that relatively uncontroversial readings would declare such readings to be conventionally valid. So, we find various historical accounts of that institution, its continual indication through nomination, various relics associated with the same, etc., etc. Then, in a reversal, in a re-continuation of our argument we analogue in turn our transcendental analogy using the apparatus we found associated with the evidential establishment of our analogy. Thence, in this instance, if pursuing the concept of a transcendental unity of the world (in some as yet unstated form or format) we now search for links or fruitful comparisons wherein this transcendental unity of the world is now given a tentative imputation through hermeneutically read signs of evidence. E.g., establishing a demonstration of the presence of a fractal symmetry and using this evidence as evidence of some degree of self-organization, etc., using the same as tentative proof for our argument that the world has a unity about it (that cannot be reduced to its mere content, etc.). It is my suggestion that this complex dialectical process of going backwards and forwards between these various elements or stages of, namely, the transcendental position, analogues of the same, creation of positive analogues of those analogues, demonstration of analogical ‘evidence’ for these analogues of those initial analogues, co-demonstration of evidence of a similar nature attending upon the association of the initial analogues, etc. Let me diagrammatically present this type of argument in the light of the above example:

1.	Transcendental argument – e.g., tr. unity of world.
2.	Analogical example: historical unity of an institution.
3.	Evidence for the same demonstrated through hermeneutical treatment of relic texts, transcriptions, etc.
4.	Analogical treatment of the tr. unity of world along the same lines as an institution.
5.	Evidence presented in light of 4.
6.	Tentative demonstration of tr. argument in light of same.
7.	Repetition of this type of process…
8.	Accumulative result supporting transcendental contention in 1. (1165)

The above is only a tentative suggestion or outline of the type of complex procedure the theologian, theological-philosopher and/or philosopher might like to adopt or critique towards this type of end. In this same vein let me proceed to examine this (hypothetical, neutral and open) concept of a complement of a theological apparatus in my continual bid to establish the existential importance of a theological turn (in broad, hypothetical, non-partisan terms of reference). (1166)

	Just as the world of music along with its instances of musical phenomena, transcriptions, and apparatus cannot be reduced to a less epistemologically organized level of phenomenal-phenomenological organization, nor referred completely sideways to some other realm of existence, then it follows as an analogy that one would expect the theological realm of existence (to the extent that it actually implicates some instance of the Divine) to equally not be reducible nor completely transferable (in a successfully transplanted translation). This granted what sorts of things might we be able to say hypothetically? On this side of things I would like to look at the dissemination of power that occurs in a fully functioning world-of-existence (as a mode of life with its relatively integrated set/s of genres). In a world of music there is currently much fuss over who has the unfettered/partial right or access to musical performances and simulations of the same. Here we see a differential of power, i.e., a difference in the functioning of the power structures as organized within that particular (or specific) world of power. This would be the case (transcendentally) in all worlds of power, all life-worlds (with a small ‘l’) where power cannot be perfectly translated or disseminated, where there is no form of resistance to the same, since, if it were otherwise, there could be no dissemination of power (since power is disseminated through the crossing of a persisting potential difference, etc.). Can we import this form of modeling into our exploratory account? I believe we can and it offers us some insights into how power might be understand in the Contemporary world. Let me elabourate. In a world of music, music is disseminated through its reconstructive performance, etc. What controls performance is the presence of meta-textually informative genres for interpreting the transcriptions or that-music-about-to-be-transcribed upon the fabric of the world (either in the form of a performance and/or an indirect transcription like a CD, etc.). Moreover, the dissemination of the same would depend upon access to this world of music, i.e., performances and/or transcriptions and apparatus for performing the former. Furthermore, access is also dependent upon intentional desire to enter such a world (or at last recognize our active or passive entry into the same) and our ability to musically enter therein. This ‘entry’ is a differential state of affairs. In a concert hall, e.g., those that pay the most money often get the best seats. Or, those that pay can buy recordings in a recording shop. To what extent is this access not something that is purely active nor purely passive. When we pass a busker on the street who is playing a piece of music we cannot help but listen to them to some extent or other. On the other hand, this is usually not read as a performance that we must pay for. To what extent are we passive or active in this sense of participation. We might like to linger a little and listen to this musician. Or walk down the other side of the street. Or just speed pass in a world of our own. We are not completely passive in these regards. Nor are we complete active? We might like to listen to the music and proffer a suggestion for the musician who might not know the music of that request in order to perform it. In this sense, and others, we cannot be absolutely active either. Thus, in analogy, in our entry into a particular world of life we can neither absolutely be a passive participator nor be an absolutely active initiator. Thence the dissemination of power in such a world is never an absolutely directed affair. But that is the already understood nature in the nature of the dissemination of power which allows me to introduce the following concept of the implied democratic nature involved in the (witting and/or unwitting) dissemination of power, i.e., implied democratic power dissemination. Theological power, in this reading could not be disseminated in an absolute non-democratic frame of reference! Even if theological power were treated in a monarchical sense there can be no absolute monarchical form of power. Even in those instances of monarchy treated as ‘absolute’, e.g., under the reigns of Louis XIVth of France or the Emperor Qianlong of China, inherent limitations to their power were always recognized (and to some extent feared or at least taken into account). An ‘absolute ruler’ could instigate the death penalty, if it were traditionally called for, for some one who has appeared to have offended their rule of law in some manner or other, however, if they acted despotically they could not act too despotically towards those who the ruler wishes to disseminate their despotic style of governance. The executioner is paid to execute the prisoner, or even a guilty fellow executioner, but certainly not themselves merely at the whim of the so-called leader. The dissemination of power is a cooperative affair that co-opts the cooperation of others. Lose that sense of cooperation and the ruler no longer rules. So, “as for one, so for the other.” Hence, the implied democratic dissemination of theological power given the assertion of this premise of theological power in the world (whether wittingly or unwittingly disseminated through persons and communities, cultures and trans-cultural phenomena in this World-of-Life as equally a Life-World-for-us and for-us-altogether) . Of course how a theologian might wish to run with this (transcendentally necessary) concept is another matter. Suffice to say, in this Contemporary era, the theologian could arm themselves with a more subtle vision of theological power in this regard! What are the consequences of this concept given its acceptance or partial acceptance? (1167)

	Again, let me defer one more question in the hope that in asking others we might arrive at a system of valuation whose enquestioning could be more productive of this type of resolution. For a start what is the relationship between power and value? And what is the value of value? Perhaps power could be seen as a differential of value (whilst integrated over that field of value as a distinctive field of power effectively in the relative autonomy of that field as its own life-world-of-power). In the dissemination of power there is always this semblance of resistance by virtue of the fact that power can never be absolutely disseminated (since the initiator can be neither purely passive nor purely active, and, the to-be-receptive party or parties likewise can be neither purely active nor purely passive. Hence the interminable bugbear of incommensurability can be put to rest by realizing that although one life-world cannot be completely commensurate with some other it does not mean that they are absolutely non-commensurate by virtue of the fact that the transcendental possibility of the Life-World must intersect with the actual emergence all possible life-worlds and that no possible life-world could be, for that matter, just a matter of pure potentiality as in some sense or other it is already actualized in some manner or other. The Life-World at least guaranteeing some degree of an ‘indirect’ connection between all life-worlds be they musical, religious, theological, scientific, atheistic, cultural, etc., etc. Of course commensuration may not be a very profitable exercise, on the other hand, it must be to some degree or other be that elicited existential richness minute and infinitesimal in valuation or richly rewarding. (1168)

	What exactly is this ‘apparatus’ implicated in a world of life that allows the resident value of transcriptions to be simulated/re-simulated, etc. Could we see it as that sense of embodiment simulated and emergently manifested in a field-of-life that is implicated in this transmission and dissemination of power. As that which both disseminates power and is resistant to power in and through the reciprocity of relations that constitute that field? Into this discussion I would like to introduce two concepts of seepage or overlap and engagement. Although no field in any particular life-world is exactly coincident with any other, between fields we might perceive some degree of overlap as a form of seepage. E.g., the world of music overlaps the world of books and publishing. Score are published, and, scores are re-enacted musically. Hence between one field and some other, forms of seepage or overlap might play some part in our understanding their interaction or the interaction of participants in either one or both of those fields or worlds. Then, seepage could be experienced and/or reflected upon through a first person point of view, a second person point of view and/or a third person point of view. In a first person point of view, either singular or plural in nature, we invoke a sense of ‘I’ or ‘we’ in this process of interaction. Here seepage is more a ‘seepaging’ from one field to our own sense of ego-identification. Or, if one were to adopt a third person point of view one would see such interaction, through the light of this metaphor (and rhetorical trope) as a process of seepage with a certain content of seepage, in effect, as seepage. A seeping seepage from the sense of the other be that treated in either an individualized sense as ‘the other’ or in a plural sense of a multiplicity of power loci contained within ‘the others’. Or, in an existentially-oriented mode of ‘you’ we might experience seepage as a sheer ‘seeping’. Now, of course, these three senses cannot be exclusive since they derive their value from their contrasting senses of person(hood). Moreover, all value is transcendentally derived by virtue of the overall transcendental suspension embedded at the living center of all relationships in our intentional experience of the same. In other words, all three senses of person must be present in some sense or other hence an existential sense of seeping that might be defined as an enseeping (within and through the simulated/re-simulated embodied being-becoming of the relationship itself as defined in and through the nature of our engaged concern). Hence this other concept of engagement – that sense in which enactment and engagement is seen through all three senses of person within the full ambit of the overall transcendental suspension to that degree it can be focused upon without disestablishing the simulation/re-simulation of the relationship in question in which our concern is being focused. What ramifications might such subtleties have for our hypothetical theological research (and thence the professional theologian, etc.)? For a start we note that all life-worlds suffer seepage and exercise some form of seeping into the world at large and thence all other life-worlds. If we were to propose, on one hand, a world-of-religious-life, and on the other, a life-world of the theological, what might their relationship be to each other? How might they seep into each other, experience seepage from the one to the other, and, in what form would seepaging/seeping, etc., be enacted? In essence asking to what extent the sense or senses of the Divine might participate within the world and vice versa; the very bread and butter so to speak of the professional theologian? Or, to what extent is engagement theologically implicated and to what extent the sense of the Divine for-us is constituted in such an existential and experiential matrix of engagement. An engagement, we should add, that is realized in and through our very embodiment within a world of embodiment! That such value is realized in and through such engagement, and, thence theological power is herein invested and re-invested in and through human agency in a form of cooperative theological democracy whether elicited wittingly or unwittingly on the part of the agents co-opted therein. (1169)
 
	Are we to now assume, in the light of the above being granted, that given the transcendental necessity of world-unity to some degree or other, and, thence its necessary theological complexion, that its theological implication and imprint in the World-of-Life must be a given, but, and most importantly, does not imply that a commensurate degree of value can be elicited from this interaction between the world-of-theological-life and the world-of-religious-life, or, for that matter, all other worlds-of-life? That, in effect, there need be no considerable degree of overlap; a state of affairs which the humanitarian person might naturally suspect given so much religious persecution whether of others or even religious members of their own kind. Indeed, we might quake with the thought that these two worlds were to completely overlap or even considerably leak into each other given such an all too evident face of religious bigotry and religious persecution. So, it would seem, that into this vision of a non-theological difference, the professional or amateur theologian might want to jump into quickly in order to salvage from the religious-life-world what they might consider as existentially proper, appropriate and valid in its engaged interaction with the so-called world-of-the-theological, and v.v. To some extent this effort might be productive if a concept of authenticity could be resurrected and practically enshrined within such a project. In what sense the existential is invoked in an overlap of these two worlds, and, how might this overlapping be revealed and re-enacted, religiously utilized, etc? Should they despair at such a prospect? Perhaps not if the complexity of this type of interaction is already approached through the religious-life-world’s repertoire of genres for dealing with just this type of investigation? Such investigations then falling back on an archaeological hermeneutics (to discover the ongoing trends in this type of enquestioning) and a therapeutic hermeneutics (to the extent either approach can be cross-referenced in order to informatively contrast the other, etc., and therein re-writing such conventions in order to enact and engage a greater degree of existential value through which it would follow some form of theological empowerment would naturally be simulated/re-simulated and thereby found co-opted and found to be co-opting?). But, the question must be immediately asked – how would all this be recognized as evidentially implicating some sense of the theological, some sense/s of the Divine? Here, the theologian would need to present this case (which could be well nigh impossible given that they must also answer the correlative question/s “to what extent the theological also implicated an evidentially based and demonstrable basis in the formulation of a proper, appropriate and valid religious life?”)? (1170)

	Let us look more closely at this concept of a leakage or overlapping between theological, religious and spiritual fields of discourse (from the perspective of a hypothetical theologian in order to ascertain the hypothetical viability of this novel type of approach). (1171)

	A theological live-world is centered on the imputed reality of a theological reality; i.e., that there is a theological difference to the extent the world is not without some sense of the theological. This divine complexion is cashed out in and through the imputation of some sense of the Divine and/or senses of the Divine. The ‘Divine’ being defined as several orders of epistemological organization greater than that possessed by (normal or characteristic) human agency either individually or collectively. Moreover, as a live-world it must be there-for-us to the extent this imputed semblance of the Divine is directly or indirectly engaged with human agency, and v.v. A religious life-world is a world of religious life that may or may not impute a sense of the Divine and/or senses of the Divine although recognizing the possibility of a sense or senses of the numinous in some form or other. A spiritual life-world is a world-of-life that recognizes the sense of the spiritual without necessarily implicating some sense of the numinous (in either relatively theological and/or relatively non-theological forms or formats). The sense of the spiritual recognizing an existential residue of the ‘psychic’ or ‘psyche’ to the extent there is a sense of totality above and beyond the merely material or constitutional aspects of the human condition; i.e., the human condition is not one of mere embodiment. These three definitions are put forward as a recognition of the fact that religiousity need not be theologically oriented, and, that spirituality need not be primarily religious in its experiential focus. A phenomenologist, in this regard, might recognize a spectrum of possibilities here with the theological on one end and the spiritual on the other with continuities and discontinuities in between. (1172)

	Now, an important point of contention could arise in this typology of imputed and interpreted religious or religious-like phenomena! If a particular or specific life-world is a certain reality in the generality of the transcendental Life-World, and, life-worlds are human constructions (in the transcendental space [and time] of the Life-World) to what extent then could there be a theologically centered life-world, a life-world centered on some sense or senses of the Divine? Would this not be a contradiction? How could there be a theological life-world created in human discourse centered on the sense or senses of the Divine which is not created by human discourse? However, from a hypothetical point of view, there should be no difficulty here. Just as in an empirical perspective we find ourselves engaged with phenomena that are not us, and absolutely not crafted from our own point of view (to the extent they have their own point/s of view) and others can also engage with the same phenomenon, it implies within the overarching unity of the one world of the transcendental Life-World of transcendental possibility that we can directly engage with the intentional object-states thematized within our phenomenological discernment. So the non-dream apple can be seen by others when in their proximity. Non-dream apples are directly engaged and can be inferred to be phenomena from their own point so of view, moreover, they can also be engaged with by other human agents given their proximity to the same. On the other hand, dream apples, whilst being directly engaged with by their dreaming subjects, cannot be so engaged with by others agents (except indirectly through an account of that dream-like object retrospectively reported to some other person in a post dream-like state). So, the theologian here is able to impute a sense of the Divine and consider its imputed phenomenological existence from its own imputed point of view (rightly or wrongly). Thus this criticism can be obviated in the above manner. Furthermore, for a theology to be viable its imputation must take place through the viability of a theological world-of-life; through its presentation/re-presentation/representation of a theological life-world! If the Divine has some form of direct and/or indirect phenomenal-phenomenological implication in this world-of-human-experience then it must take place in a theological field of experience as presented in and though human discourse as a field of possibility in and through a genre of interpretative possibility that could pre-establish and re-establish that interpretative possibility as a possible possibility for-us. That only in such a field (of experiential engagement, discourse, etc.) could Divine possibility be thematized, etc., i.e., imputed as a possibility from both its own perspective and our perspective. In other words, a viable theology demands, hypothetically, a theologically oriented world-of-life, the imputation of a sense and/or senses of the Divine inhabiting a theologically-oriented life-world that can be experienced from our point/s of view whilst imputing its own point or points of view too! In such a frame of reference a theologian can now proceed to establish the topological shape of their discourses, its disciplines and critiques, etc. (1173)

	Within this frame of reference, a theologian can now establish the contours of their discourse. Into this field, possible and actual relationships can be discerned, such relationships essentially devolving about questions of power-relations. Inequalities of epistemological organization then presenting problematic issues of commensuration. (1174)

	Commensuration concerns to what extent disparate parties in a relationship can be aware of the same, etc., that they stand in a relationship to each other. Analogically speaking, the worms in a garden might be singing to the imputation of a gardener, could the latter hear them, or, the gardener might be singing could the worms in the garden hear that singing as the singing of the gardener? However, problems of commensuration aside, still power-relations must be democratically constituted to that extent they invite a mutuality of cooption with or without a recognition of that possibility or fact. A religiously viable theology within a viable religious life-world effectively demands that this types of issue be dealt with, namely, commensuration and degrees of democratically oriented cooption along with the problematic issues associated with their recognition (given these types of imputation, namely, the invocation of a sense or senses of the Divine in operations operating from both their own sense of perspective and our perspective/s, etc.). Thus (some of) the hypothetical elements of a theological life-world have now been articulated (along with the related issues of imputation, commensuration, associated apparatus, transcriptions, transformations, cooption, recognition, critical evaluation/re-evaluation, etc.). (1175)

	Upon this psychic stage are all roles enacted, acted out. Be they non-theological or theological. Even if this theological complexion is but the merest complexion it makes no difference to the extent that no subjectivity can be pure subjectivity. Furthermore, no subject can be purely active nor, for that matter, purely passive! In and through all relationships all acts of relating are disseminated as processes of reciprocity, wittingly or unwittingly, in such a manner that power both co-opts and is co-opted (but never equally, at least absolutely). The nature of this mixture determining relative activity and relative passivity of subjects, objects, etc. Moreover, into this mix is added an inevitable resistance since the transmission and dissemination of power is never symmetric (because replication can never be exactly reproduced thence this natural imbalance or asymmetry). In this regard, both intentional production and re-production are asymmetric both respect to themselves and each other. What are the hypothetical implications of these various insights? (1176)

	If the Divine complexion were able to effectively make decisions of an intentional-like nature and manner how could its power be disseminated non-theologically, i.e., in and through non-theologically oriented subjects? What analogical parallels might be examined in this hypothetical light in order to establish this type of possibility? Let me examine the following example in the hope that we can definitively cast some light on this possibility and establish the guide-lines necessary for this type of discussion. Imagine if you would a CEO of a large multi-national company relaxing on the beach with their family. This CEO is still a CEO even if they are merely swimming in the surf or lying in the sun upon their towel. In the powerful world of high finance and company matters how does such an individual function in this economic life-world? Through receiving information and issuing instructions to and from similar intentional entities, i.e., entities with a similar epistemological organization operating in a similarly constructed life-world. “Let there be light!” And lesser Gods would ensure that there was light… and ‘they’ were pleased (to paraphrase the Old Testament and its hermeneutic roots in a pre-polytheistic theological-linguistic environment). So, a CEO receives information and gives instructions to fellow CEO’s and other individuals with an organizational function closely approximate to that of that CEO. The dissemination of information and decisive functions continuing on through a nexus of relational connections with more or less the same or similar epistemological organization and status. Having framed this reply in this type of context we might now like to ask what difference is there between a CEO and any other individual on that beach? Obviously in a beach setting, more or less, there is little difference between these beach-going subjects. On the other hand, that CEO could not make effective decisions if they were merely to pass on their orders to the nearest beachgoer on that beach. What insights might the theologist or theological apologist adopt and adapt in order to advance their type of position? (1177)

	If our CEO has their mobile with them on the beach they could ring their organization or be rung by the same and issue instructions and/or receive information, etc. Using this analogy we might be more inclined to say that given theological-like subjectivity that dissemination and transmission occurs thorough a similarity of  intentional status. Thence the possibility of disseminational flows given these similarities of status along with due regard for adequate connectivity, receptivity, etc. In the light of this analogical insight let me now examine to what extent dissemination must flow wittingly and with intentional directedness? (1178)

	Intentional directivity of intent is achieved through resolution of the intentional process! This occurs subconsciously and/or consciously. Thoughts metaphorically well up into consciousness because they are resolved in that manner subconsciously. Then, consciously determined decisions appear to be made through conscious acts of determination; a sense of determination realized through resolution. More correctly, conscious determination through resolution is realized subconsciously as well since conscious intentional structures are supported through the emergence of subconscious structures (so to speak). In all of this there can be no real sense of an unconscious mind (which can be nothing other than an absolute contradiction in terms), however, there is a conscious-consciousness emerging from a subconscious-consciousness and all of this is determined intentionally through forms of intentional resolution, thence intentional directedness through those ongoing acts of resolution. How is this process of intentional resolution to be understood (both subconsciously and consciously?) (and related to intentional flows of dissemination?)? (1179)

	This sense of intentional determination (in all senses) can be both understood and realized through either the metaphorical reference of a harmonic theory or a gestalt theory as elaborated upon elsewhere (whilst both can be mediated and accommodated through the lens of a tri-modal hermeneutic circle of comprehension as delineated elsewhere in this extend essay, e.g.). In a gestalt frame of reference we have the relationships between an object of intentional foreground focus versus a field of background non-focus. This horizontal approach can then be made the intentional subject/object of our vertical focus by the invocation of an intentional perceiver in sympathy with the nature of its intentional objectivity, so, e.g., a visual field necessitates the visual perception of a visual perceiver, etc. This gestalt model can then be re-interpreted along harmonic lines, and v.v., through our treatment of intentional foreground focus as a dissonant text (preserved through retention) within the (prospective) meta-textual orientation of its associated background field (as a genre of activity within its requisite mode-of-life/life-world). The harmonization of this relationship realizes an existential sense of the ‘intensive’ present through a harmonic resolution of that relationship between foreground-text and background meta-textual invocation of genre. This ongoing sense of harmonization also realizing the semblance of its associated sense of intentional subjectivity along with a sense of resolve, intentional ‘determination’, response in and through the asymmetric breaking of the overall transcendental suspension, etc. Now, I would like to argue that this existential act of harmonic resolution realizes a sense of responsiveness that moves beyond the intentional object to a realm of intentional intent and thence beyond into an inter-social realm of inter-subjective interactions along with all its tidal flows of dissemination and reception/re-dissemination of power, re-reception, etc. All this is perceived by myself as occurring within the profound, all embracing transcendental unity of the Life-World albeit as refracted through the multiplicity of life-worlds wherein such intent is manufactured in acts of intentional thematization (on these three ‘levels’ of intentional objectives, motivations, and, disseminational responses and responsiveness; ‘levels’ by virtue of the relatively increasing degrees of epistemological organizational complexity entailed in this movement from the intentional-object-state/s to intentional objectives to and through intentional subjects). Thus, seen in this light, dissemination of power and its re-dissemination, etc., is all seen as occurring within the same transcendental world of the Life-World albeit in keeping with its refraction through its associated complex of life-worlds. By such means such intentional processes and associated thought-content can be shared, albeit indirectly between inter-subjectively related agents and not necessarily directly (just as memories are more or less indirectly recovered by their authoring agents along the same lines to how agents share communications and memories with each other?). Let me explore this onflowing nature of intentional formation in more detail, a process that travels through intentional object-states to intent to response, and v.v.). How is such intentional onflowingness engaged? Through simulation. Let me elabourate. (1180)

	An intentional flow is simulated to the extent that there is no real or actual non-virtual flow. Being simulated it can be simulated/re-simulated actively/passively by both instigators and recipients. Being simulated (whether experienced as virtual and/or non-virtual in those terms of reference) it is able to be inductively transmitted whether within the intentional world of the subject or between the intentional world of subjects. An analogy here, which should not be taken too far, is that of the ocean wave. Waves are transmitted as pressures or pressure-fronts without the actual transference of the water transmitting such waves of pressure (as an expressed potential difference). Waves appear to move but only the wave itself is transmitted. In a similar fashion the intentional ‘disturbance’ is disseminated and not some intentional substance per se. How is the totality of this process of transmission and reception orchestrated harmonically? How does the dissonant tension between text and meta-text find itself transmitted into an inter-subjective intentional arena? Through the intentional induction and manipulation of the same intentional medium, albeit both subjectively and inter-subjectively! In this light we perceive a transformation through process and not of substance per se. Therefore, with an interpretative orientation on process, how should we then perceived transformations, transcriptions, processes of engagement and cooption, critical forms of evaluation, etc? (1181)

	Hypothetically, on a superficial reading of the transcendental commonality of the Life-World, all this should be conducted without too much difficulty. All relationships have the same transcendental status (as potential possibilities, neither given to pure potentiality nor to pure actuality, ‘grounded’ in the transcendental unity of the Life-World without difference as to the divinity or non-divinity of all imputations exercised therein).  On the other hand, what might count as divine evidence, evidential evidence of the Divine, is another issue altogether). With this understanding as place to start we need only note that an adequate examination of mundane relations in general, i.e., phenomenologically, should act as a reliable template for relationships where one or more parties are relatively Divine in orientation. Furthermore, on the understanding that all intentional acts leave parallel, multi-modal intentional deposits upon the fabric of the world we need only look at these parallel traces in order to understand the nature of the relevant imputed parties. Moreover, we have an inbuilt correctional mechanism for our interpretative evaluation/s by virtue of the fact that re-evaluation of these parallel traces theoretically should be able to be read in parallel. E.g., in somebody walking along the beach, above the tide line, they will leave a relatively stable pair of footprints in a trail. In their mind, as a set of memories, a similar trail should be remembered. A scent trail in drops of sweat might also be left to that extent that could be read by a dog trained to follow such a trail. Then passersby would also have memories of this person walking alone the beach. They might have been photographed, mobiles could have electronically recorded their exact whereabouts using GPS systems inbuilt within their handsets, etc., etc. To that extent we can we can re-evaluate the apparent veracity of previous interpretations by noting, to that degree it is possible for such readings to be read, to what extent these readings remain in parallel and not absolutely contradictory. Such readings also need to be internally consistent (e.g., traveled from point a to point b with all footsteps in between) and contextually coherent (e.g., entered beach at point a time t1 and left at point b at t2), all conducted with some degree of intentional directedness (e.g., with just a desire to walk along the beach and enjoy the experience on that person’s day off or in their holidays). Of course, if this event of beach-walking occurred some decades ago and that person is now dead, textual trails to that effect could well be impossible to recover. Which brings me to ask the rhetorical question “is the Divine a ‘beach-goer’?” Assuming the imputation of the Divine in some form or other (in a set of theological manifestations), and, their intentional-like formation of transcriptions, and our ability to discern the same (through a competent understanding of the requisite and apposite theological apparatus that would enable us to do that in relevant theological life-world) to what extent might we be able to read (literally) the divine-footprints, (metaphorical) footprints of the Divine? Could we profitably augment this mediaeval reading when critical contemporary thought on this type of topic can only be read an exercise in repeated failure?)? How might we hope to redress this type of failure (if only hypothetically?)? (1182)

	The hypothetical theologian here, in the course of their investigations, has no ontological commitments and no epistemological commitments in their vision of what might count as a theological imputation. They then can be surprised if they find something more than the merest theological complexion, something with the semblance of theological value and work. On the other hand, the hypothetical theologian could also work with what is already to hand culturally and from its existential persistence through time attempt to isolate what does seem to be working in that matrix of material (as paralleled through genres associated with the same). Then, venturing into the seemingly impossible they might then like to see if they can discern connections between those former bottom-up approaches and these latter top-down approaches. ‘Approaches’ being read in the plural since we can no longer claim a univocal reading is possible or preferable (although accommodations can be always conducted). Obviously, this hypothetical search for existential value in this type of topic is not a achieved through a process of scientific reductionism and thus the we should clearly discern a difference between investigations conducted in a theological life-world (within a religious life-world) and a scientific life-world or any other type of life-world for that matter! (1183)

	Returning to our CEO on the beach are we allowed to extract other parallel insights that might illuminate the nature of our topic (the hypothetical nature of a theological life-world to that extent such constructions have a theological value and, hopefully for the theologian, enough material for an adequate degree of theological work). (1184)

	Our CEO is on the beach relaxing. However, in the back of his mind they are mulling over a particular problem or project currently occupying a considerable amount of time, effort and money. Unexpectedly, a solution suddenly presents itself to our executive, a solution that needs to be instantly acted upon. This person gets their mobile, rings the appropriate persons in this company and the requisite actions are acted upon. What can we be able to infer from this scenario that might have value in a theological setting? (1185)

	Communication between the CEO and their operative communicated with is entertained in a process of two-way communication. The CEO wants to speak to the person concerned, not merely order them to do x without knowing whether they are or are not actually listening. Then, the CEO wants to find out that that operative understands what they have been entrusted with. Perhaps, too, the CEO wants some form of recognition as to the viability of this plan of action, modifying it if necessary with advice from that operative? This channel of communication is also symmetric to the extent that the medium used by the CEO is the same for the operative (even though there is a difference in power between these two communicators). Communication is also resolved in and through a process of resolution posed both textually and meta-textually. The particular problem or project finds a solution. All this is mirrored both textually and meta-textually. This is reflected in the solution and how that solution is to be enacted as a response or set of responses. Either way whether as a particular response or set of responses, a process of sequence(s) is set up and that is controlled or determined meta-textually through genre. Harmony is realized in a matching of text with meta-text and vice versa along with a certain degree of an existential surplus of value whose extent would often determine the satisfactoriness of such a solution in that process of resolution (as determined meta-textually). ‘Successfulness’ can be read in non-textual terms of reference as that degree value is created beyond its mere (textual/meta-textual) inputs.   Moreover, the successfulness of the responses is also determined through the quality of the power relations possessed by both the initiator (CEO) and the initiated (operator). By ‘quality’ one could read here an adequate degree and manner of epistemological organization, etc., which refers in part to an existential equality of medium and an existential inequality of parties involved in that act of communication and subsequent acts of responsiveness despite the fact that inequality cannot be too great in this regard (given the equality involved in that communicational connection). In effect the operator is not much less ‘divine’ than the CEO in this regard even though these two parties also possess different obligations and forms of recompense, etc. Let me look more closely at these forms of equality and inequality, etc. (1186)

	Is communication always facilitated through this form of equality of connection? E.g., if we were to push the plunger on an electrically operated explosive device, would equality figure in this type of uni-directed sequence of command(s). Input is in the form of a switch, the switch is either off or turned on. At the point of initiation and at the point of being initiated a parallel state of affairs is achieved in a successful transmission of command. In this instance ‘on’ means ‘bang’. This expectation is met when we see and/or hear an explosion. Here, there is an isomorphic equivalence when the entire sequence is both enabled and enacted. All this equivalence granted one must now ask how communication is possible between epistemological states with different orders of magnitude in organization? (1187)

	In the light of the above we would want to know how this process of communication is both enabled and enacted. ‘Enabling’ seeks a continual connection from the beginning-point to the desired end-point. ‘Enacting’ seeks an effective transmission of intent from this beginning-point to the desired end-point. Communication also demands an interpretative frame of reference. ‘On’ in our explosive detonation scenario means ‘bang’. Surely a full comprehension of intent is a double act of interpretation to the extent that ‘initiation’ is comprehended as that ‘initiated’ by virtue of an isomorphic symmetry in this regard. Between two conscious subjects a transmission to the desired effect would need all of the above to be effectively in place, i.e., a distinctive change of affairs being read as a transmission of intent given a pre-meta-textual understanding to that effect. Here a parallel casual and intentional readings must also be operative within a pre-operative field of understanding. Moreover, consequential expectations can also be continued in the light of the same. So ‘on’ means ‘bang’ which means ‘destruction of x’; say a building, the side of a cliff, exposure of mineral ore, etc. Furthermore, this type of genre can be transferred to a military setting, the starting of a race with the use of a starter’s gun, etc., etc. However, how might the (hypothetical) theologian hypothetically utilize such a type of genre or scheme for an act of communication between Divine and non-divine entities or states? This would make for an interesting philosophical exploration; something I can only broach in passing. For a start how might a ‘thunder bolt’ be read? In ancient times it could have been read as the ‘wrath of the gods’ or the ‘particular wrath of a particular god’, etc. Would one be allowed to make this type of connection, and, if this type of connection cannot be properly drawn would we be allowed under some circumstances to read some phenomenal occurrences as an a signal from some numinous source meaning something other than its presence as a phenomenal occurrence, and, by extension, if this were not to be granted, are we then impelled to read ‘all forms of divine connection’ as invalid operations (and thereby reducing all forms of theological work to a mere residue associated with a merely residual theological complexion, albeit a complexion already pre-established transcendentally through the necessary unity of the Life-World?)? Let me examine this sequence of possible claims (and counter-claims). (1188)

	The possibility of communication is obviously established between subjects with the same degree of epistemological organization despite inequalities in power-relations. How might this actuality be extended to communicational acts between subjects with a non-equal degree of epistemological organization. E.g., instructions in the form of commands given to a dog? Here we have simple forms of classical and operant learning to fall back on (where learning processes are associated with acts of commission and omission, reward and punishment; all expressed either verbally and/or materially, e.g., food, etc.). In other words, in summary, we could see here that associations are connected that allow commands to operate with a directness of intent along with the transmission of the same given these built pre-associations and clarity of command, etc. How might the theologian extend this to revelation and other forms of divine exposure? However, all of the above suggests, by direct implication, that the Divine would need to first reveal themselves in order to establish these connections, commands, revelations, etc. On the other hand, traditional theologies have got around this controversial topic of pre-exposure by pre-establishing such forms of revelation as pre-revelatory to the extent that this type of genre is already established for the religious person or community; taking the form of direct exposure or exposure attested to through mediation by certain (relatively semi-divine) mediators. Even the mere establishment of this type of genre is enough to start this type of process whether that be virtually (in the semblance of a fact) or non-virtually (in the form of an actual fact whose positive truth value is known to us or not). E.g., a religious tradition might claim that ‘God spoke to Moses in and through the burning bush (that was not be consumed by those flames)’. Given such a ‘fact’ then the ‘possibility of God speaking again’ is assured (to that extent we assume that ‘fact’ to be a fact, and, that it can occur in some similar form or other again). Or, e.g., Moses, again, presents a certain text as ‘the word of the Lord’, namely, the Ten Commandments. In this later instance, Moses acts as a mediator between the Divine and the non-divine. Obviously, a religious tradition can claim this possibility since that type of possibility is pre-established as an example whether that ‘fact’ be merely virtual or non-virtual in part or in whole. Such appeals to religious authority merely reinforcing certain religious conventions and cannot in and of themselves establish these forms of acclaimed historical authenticity. However, traditions like to re-establish such possibilities through metaphorical or mythical re-enactments of those possibilities, virtually so to speak (although ‘actuality’ could also be claimed as in certain interpretations of the Eucharist, e.g.). Despite acclamation such claims of authenticity cannot be directly re-established at face-value. Other mechanisms are usually invoked in order to re-state claims of authenticity for the same, usually through transformative activities seen or interpreted to arise through such connections already established for the religious on grounds of authority (to be only truly tested through their powers of transformative re-ordering seen to flow from such authoritative states of empowerment [expected by the religious given the adequate performance of the necessary instructions associated with such acts of religious transformation]). E.g., being ‘born-again’ is not normally meant by that religious community concerned to be read as a metaphorical claim but also as a transformative possibility/actuality that can be arrived at in the here and now (or at least the here and now at some later point in time before, during, or, possibly, even after death). Given the pre-establishment of these types of communicative and authoritative metaphors and their associated genres along with our inability to confirm the same at face value should we question the sheer possibility of divine communication? Merely accept the impossibility of this type of communication? Of course a religious tradition would have to re-establish its religious identity by some other form or modus operandi? In other words, merely invoke some form of mediation (with or without transformative authentication/re-authentication). This type of sequence being: genre of possibility – mediation in some form or other – authentication established through transformative consequences (of that merely established as a possibility by genre [and reinforced through acclaimed mediation]). In this, evidence of transformation being often read as evidence of the imputed source of that transformation, etc. The overall consequences of such processes and the observation of such processes (whether by observation of oneself by oneself, or, by observation of some other or others whose transformations we would read as establishing both the authenticity of such claims and an authentic source for remaking such claims). The important question being: are such claims merely circular in a vicious, destructive sense or in a non-vicious, productive sense? Here the theologian needs to show that a considerable existential value is generated in and through such religious performances and their interpretations, and, that processes of authentication can be positively  attested to (in an act of valid validation). Religious genres attest to such a possibility or set of possibilities, and, through transformative acts make claims for their transformative authentication (through authentification) but the problem still remains for the philosophical theologian: “do such possibilities [of revelatory communication] [and its authentification] truly exist and in such a manner as to be adequately found to be open to us? Something that would keep a traditional or non-traditional theologian undoubtedly busy? However, despite the logical and ontical or factual merits of such schemes, existential value of a religious persuasion could still be discerned as occurring by virtue of the existential merit of the transformative power of such practices? In their appreciation, does the theologian have the right license so to speak in order to examine the nature of such religious phenomena? Does it really matter whether the Divine be merely nominal in value or considerable in merit in our examinations of the theological complexion of the Life-World? Would it not be the case that in merely establishing the possibility of religious communication and the divine source of that form of religious communication that its actuality is already absolutely assured, if only residually, through the logical impossibility of pure possibility in any regard, etc? (1189)

	In the light of possibility an interesting dilemma presents itself. The possibility of divine communication is just as conceivable as the possibility of no divine communication. Granted that that the latter is the negation of the former hence its dependence upon the former. Or, could the former be re-written through a double negation as the non-non possibility of divine communication. By ‘divine communication’ is meant communication between the Divine and non-divine, and v.v., and, between elements or aspects of the Divine. An interesting edge is posed through an acceptance of the concept that there can be neither pure possibility nor pure impossibility. Furthermore, such a concept, here, can only operate outside analytic considerations, i.e., in either a synthetic mode or modality or, if it were to be accepted, a synthetic a priori mode or modality. So, e.g., a four-sided triangle is absolutely impossible by definition. Hence, taking the above into consideration, and we grant a provisional acceptance of the same, we are left with something like the following, namely, the absolute non-analytic possibility of divine communication is countered by the absolute non-analytic non-possibility of divine communication, with, as a result, a dialectical state of affairs wherein the phenomenal-phenomenological reality of the world must possess some residual form of divine communication in some form or forms or other to the extent that the totality of the world as a phenomenal expression within the Life-World might or might not have some influence on the formation and expression of any particular life-world focused upon, constructed and thematized therein. Again, the problem that would present itself for the professional theologian, etc., is this, namely, to what extent does such residual ‘communication’ have theological value in a more traditional sense, i.e., a demonstrable interconnection and intersection with respect to traditional practices like prayer, ritual, liturgy, providential intercession, meditational insight formation, salvation (in what ever form it were to take), etc., etc. Obviously, for the professional theologian to follow the direction of this type of path they would need to concentrate on what this residual form of divinity might be for them, and, how such a feature might enter into the life of a religious person and/or v.v. (although we should assume that all communication is necessarily two-way, albeit necessarily asymmetrical). In essence we would need to ask how does a phenomenal-phenomenological totality intersect with its materially-oriented basis, and v.v., and, how this might be related hypothetically to forms of epistemological organization several orders greater than that exhibited by the human individual or community, and, to what extent this intersection has a traditional and/or non-traditional sense of religious value? In all of this, attempting to define (theoretical-identification of) theological sense, (practical functions and ‘benefits’ of)  theological work and (critical) theological value (all under the umbrella of theological Value). In other words, does theological difference make a difference? Although, we have also argued that there is no difference and it is this ‘non-difference’ that more importantly matters in this regard (as might be linked in and through allied concepts of emptiness, etc.). Or, the truly critical theologian might have argued, there is a theological difference between the world of the Divine and the world of the non-divine, but, as that difference is not absolute it is through its non-difference that divine communication is to be established, etc. Let me examine this type of complex argument (as just briefly outlined above). (1190)

	Communication is realized through the shared and co-simulated resolution of intent. Let me explain how this definition operates. (1191)

	A communicated emission is realized through the resolution of intent. That intent is signaled through the expected emission of a token or a set of tokens, or, through the expected non-emission of a token or set of tokens. Reception is realized when that emission is seen as a communicated emission qua communicated emission (i.e., as the result of communicated intent) and where emission is to be read through a change of state wherein a token or a set of tokens is/are either presented or absented. Expectation occurs within a meta-field of genre expectations wherein those expectations are delineated as expectations through an ability to differentiate between intentional and non-intentional-like emissions (as a type of background noise, e.g.). Fields determine a sense of psychic similarity wherein dissonant elements can be introduced, the resolution of such a contrast determining the apparent simulation of intent and its communication as a communicated process of (apparently intended) intent. (1192)

	A communicative act follows from the resolution of intent wherein a decision is definitively made, and, the intentional object-state is the emission of intent (through a discharge and/or non-discharge of a token or series of tokens). Le me exemplify this type of process. A jury is unanimous that ‘x is guilty’ (knowing that x will be hung if found guilty). The token emitted here is the statement read out by the jury-person nominated to represent that particular jury. Emitted is a statement in the form of the emission of a series of sounds interpreted to the effect that ‘x is guilty’. The symmetrical question ‘is x guilty or not guilty’ has been resolved and emitted in the non-symmetrical form of a definitive utterance (as an utterance definitely determined and distinctively interpreted in a form co-incident with its apparently intended emission). With resolution there is a resolve to act in a definitive manner, i.e., to formulate a decisive utterance and decisively emit the same in the form of a distinctive utterance (i.e., in the form of an utterance that is clearly formed in content and clearly emitted as a process in a process of communication in line with genre expectations [as to how a head juror is {expected} to pronounce the findings of their deliberations; i.e., as ‘guilty’, ‘not-guilty’, as ‘unable to make a decision or to make an unanimous decision’, etc.]). Resolution or resolve follows upon resolution of intent. If the jury were unanimous, had reached their decision, the head-juror’s resolve would then be to stand up and announce in court this ‘fact’ when asked by the judge to deliver the findings of that jury. In this type of example we discern the archetypal nature of deliberation, its definitively distinctive non-symmetrical resolution and accompanying resolve to announce that fact through some form of token-emission. This example of the deliberations of a jury leads me to examine the first part of our problem (in attempting to understand the concept of the possibility of divine-communication). (1193)

	The question we need to ask is in what manner is it the case or not the case that properties of a whole are shared by a part of that whole, and v.v? E.g., each member of a jury could be decisive in their deliberations and make a decisive judgment one way or the other. But, decisive members of a jury does not imply that a decisive jury will result. We could get a hung jury, e.g., six members of the jury voting in the affirmative and six members of that same jury voting in the negative. However, there is a degree of invariant transformational isomorphism between these two levels of the jury and the members of that jury, namely, this expectation that either state is productive of decisions in its/their deliberations. So, some properties of the jury are shared by members of that jury and v.v. (without confusing the consequences of these different states with different degrees of epistemological organization; the jury being seen as being more advanced epistemologically in this regard by virtue of the inclusion of its members and not being able to be reductively reduced merely to that basis). This example shows us that the possibility of communication is established when there is this demonstrated form of invariant transformational isomorphism between the members of a set and the totality of that set. Communication being established when a token or set of tokens is or is not emitted in line with the general expectations of pre-established intent (as defined meta-textually through the conventions of the relevant genre). So much for theory, but, how is the religious person to recognize and read these tokens emitted in line with intent, albeit of a Divine nature? (1194)

	For a start, a religious frame of reference, as culturally or inter-culturally established, usually deals with this type of question. We are told what to expect (whether that be adequate evidence or non-evidence of a divine form of communication, of course, is another question). Furthermore, it is necessary for us to discern some degree of isomorphism between the total state and the individualized state or aspect. Communication of intent also begs the question as to what degree the Divine should be or might be able to act as an intentional agent able to formulate through resolution a process of intent and/or recognize the same when emitted by its Divine self or by a non-divine sense of agency. Hence these necessary elements of agency, resolution of intent, resolve to emit, tokens, processes of emission and processes of receptions, processes of recognition, resolution and hermeneutic interpretation along with consequential consequences should they exist (to indicate and/or continue this process). (1195)

	Now we need to go to a deeper level of analysis in order to more fully comprehend what should be entailed in a process of intentional thematization and intentional emission (be that through tokens of presence and/or tokens of absence). This deeper level of explication is our recognition of that level of epistemological organization wherein we are witness to the implication of a chaotic bifurcation and its definitive discharge in an interpretable mode or modality along with the acceptance of a self-organized state of affairs and a re-self-organized change of state in that same state of affairs in and through that moment of emissive discharge (as the result of a broken current within a certain self-organized/re-self-organized system). (1196)

	Emissions are univocal-like discharges (of either presences and/or absences) through an interruption of a polarized current between two poles of differing potentials within a system of three or more elements. Such univocal, bi-focal and multiple aspects mutually co-define each other and, therefore, cannot be absolutely thematized apart from each other. Thence the hermeneutic-like circle of comprehension and/or thematization of state (since no absolute distinction can be made between epistemological and ontological distinctions as they too mutually co-thematize each other). The interruption or disruption of a current (as a non-symmetrical relationship between two poles or elements of identity) realizes an act of emission within and from that associated system of relational currents. Translated into an epistemological orientation we have the formation of intentional thematiztion through just such a mechanism. This mechanism translating to an ontological arena through our recognition of the ontological consequences of that discharge, etc., i.e., through an extension of that emissive disruption into and beyond an epistemological arena. Hence intentional acts discharged within the world along with the consequential actions, reactions and responses from the same (where by responses is meant epistemological reactions to such emissions be they intentional or non-intentional in differentiation although no absolute form of differentiation is possible through embodiment). (1197)

	The essential points being made here are that intentional processes are chaotic phenomena, that intentional discharges occur through bifircations and can be treated as intentional acts when their discharged emissions travel beyond their initial systems into the world at large. In this processes, transformations can be discerned when emissions primarily enter a different systematic state of affairs. E.g., the transformation of ice into water occurs through melting. Water in effect is emitted from an icy state of affairs through melting (as a change of state) through a re-self-organized transition from ice to water. Or, an intentional thematization becomes a response when it extends beyond merely being thought about and travels beyond a merely epistemological arena (even though intentional depositions also are multi-modal and paralleled in complexion and must also implicate physiological processes). (1198)

	An act of intentional deliberation is realized through the bifurcation of a symmetrical, overall transcendental suspension and its asymmetrical discharge as an intentional act through emission. As an act of communication such a discharged emission is set up to be read as a relevant change of state in and through a transformation in self-organization. Thus a so-called imputed act of divine communication must also take into account this apparently intended transition from one self-organized state of affairs to some other in such a manner as to be read as communicating some form of intent (by re-tracing that ‘text’ within an apparent re-creation of its emissive context). If it were the case that it was possible to read such an act of divine communication what necessary features in this process would the hypothetical theologian need to note before establishing the apparent process and content of such an apparent act of divine-communication? (1199)

	Self-organization is witnessed by fractal symmetry, etc. A communicative act would imply a holistic change in that fractal symmetry in such a manner that an apparent reading could be both articulated and demonstrated. Such a reading demonstrating an irreducible existential residue of intent that could not be interpreted as anything other than as ‘intent’ or its non-intentional equivalent (such as phenomenological-phenomenal changes that accompany intentional processes as demonstrated through intentional depositions). (1200)

	A communicative act is an act of communication and one can wonder if the Divine as defined as ‘several magnitudes of epistemological organization in advance of that possessed by either the person or a community of persons’ would have communications being capable of being received by a person or community of persons. Communication implies the possibility of being communicated and that entails a recognition of that act of communication as an act of communication qua communication. Even if one were to miss the point or content of the act of communication, one could still recognize it as an act of communication trying to communicate something. So, in this light, can there be an act of communication in which both the content and act cannot be recognized as an act of communication with content (or must one invoke subconscious pre-intentional forms of unwitting reception, etc?)? (1201)

	All of the above granted, and argued for, to what acceptable degree could a theologian isolate the traces of acts of divine communication as acts of divine communication? Perhaps by nominating those traces that are primarily non-divine in orientation and discerning an existential residue that cannot be reduced to its material basis? This differential or difference then being read in such a manner that the reading itself is substantially augmented through such a reading? Should we not despair that such a ‘reading’ should not be made at all (on the grounds that there were no ‘reading’ to be read in the first place?), or, despair that such reading is purported to be a reading of a ‘divine acts of communication’ with no real evidence being presented to support that manner and direction of apparent intent. Or, might we be able to discern theological intent by assuming that this component is ever-present, in parallel, in all processes of intentional formation and expression as well as in all forms of non-intentionally oriented processes in their collective constitution of this world-for-us as a world-of-embodiment, and, that such parallel streams of intentional thematization do directly impinge upon our embodied streams of consciousness and such residues need only be adequately interpreted, i.e., properly, appropriately and validly? How might such a process of all-encompassing interpretation be successfully initiated and completed if it were at all possible? That, in effect, all constitution re-constituted by-us has a parallel  divine implication by virtue of our being both an active and passive participant in the transcendental unity of the Life-World, this one World-of-Life! (1202)

	If we perceive intentional thematization as distinctively arrived at in states of re-self-organization, through incremental phase-changes, in what manner might periods of relative non-re-self-organization be perceived? Would it no be the case that these periods of relative uneventfulness (through a lack of events) might be treated as a confirmation for the phase changes already arrived at? (1203)

	Of course the professional theologian could seek to tick all the boxes so to speak in order to pursue this idea of divine-communication. In other words, nominate what tokens are emitted, with what intent, by who and for whom and establish in what sense communicative reciprocity is in evidence, etc. Or, they could discard this concept at face value and perceive from an ultimate-oriented point of view that there is no need for communication per se given a synchronicity between the totality in orientation and the relevant parts within that totality entering into this process of spontaneity. In all of this, through re-self-organization, there is only the appearance of communication, the apparent act entering into phenomenal-phenomenological existence in and through the psychic center/s of the very relationships themselves as involved. In this type of framework the theologian could then argue that the religious person or community of religious persons doing x facilitated process y or augmented its possibility of coming into existence (rather than non-y or some other effect z, etc., etc.). In such a holistic-process philosophy divine and/or non-divine responses are ‘initiated’ at the psychic center/s of the relevant relationships without full authorial intent in a classical sense. A full critique could be exercised to show that the classical sense of intent (x intends a and not b [as a certain re-arrangement of the world-to-hand] and responds by ensuring a if that possibility could be put into effect) is not something that could be put into effect as stated. If x intends a then what initiates that intention and its response that attempts to ensure a? If we were to invoke a pre-intentional state of affairs through some x1 then we would need to repeat this process in order to initiate the same, etc. Such an infinite redress cannot be a solution. Neither can the intention be retrospectively speculated upon as being in existence through the response occurring and our reading an intent i since processes can be inaugurated through bifurcation alone. Similarly, classical intent cannot be purely left to the present either since there is a transition that needs explanation and which is not purely bound by that sense of the present. Through an invocation of emptiness from a transcendental perspective, classical intent can be re-written along chaotic lines without a need for a classical sense of ego, egoistical initiation and a classical sense of intent. Similarly, the theologian can re-write their concept of Divine intentionality along the same lines. Moreover, furthermore, both holistic-process oriented concepts or aspects of ‘intentionality’ can be combined to form a relatively harmonious approach to inter/intra Divine-non-divine processes of apparent phenomenal-phenomenological intentionality along with its manifestation of apparent consequential processes of response, responsibility, etc. From an ultimate point of view the non-ultimate phenomenal-phenomenological appears to be responsible or not to be responsible or to lack responsibility as the case might be, and, from the opposite perspective, our non-ultimate ‘perception’ of the ultimate is such that there is no absolute sense of ego, no absolute sense of community, etc., despite a responsitivity and responsibility from the non-ultimate point of view for apparent and not so apparent parties. This model of a shared tempered harmonious intentional co-participation can get around many of the difficulties in a communicative modeling by ‘sourcing’ intent to the psychic center of relationships rather than agents (be they Divine and/or non-divine in orientation) within a chaotic framework of incremental enabling with relative degrees of harmonious fulfillment-non-fulfillment, etc. The professional theologian, then, re-writing classical concepts of prayer, petition, intercession, ritual re-enactment, meditation, mediation, salvation, etc., etc., in the light of the same. To my mind a much more profitable exercise and one with a religious future be that merely residual and/or re-headed back to a more traditional perspective and/or a relatively novel non-traditional trajectory.! (1204)

	What have such ideas on the emptiness of ego and intentionality, etc., to do with the ‘perception’ of a theological difference or the non-perception of a non-theological difference? (1205)

	If all senses of the Divine were to emerge with the phenomenal-phenomenological emergence of the world itself, to the extent that there is a nomination of the same within a natural framework, to what extent is the concept of a theological difference correctly a non-theological difference, i.e. between the world and all senses of the Divine, within the transcendental unity of the same Life-World, all aspects of a theological complexion would correctly be coterminous with all aspects of those emergent possibilities-actualities within that same Life-World. Through emptiness all identity is merely a manifestation of the unique relativity of an overall point of view (through the ongoing unification of (a) streaming set/s of points of view) within the ‘empty’ fabric of the Life-World itself. In such a reference frame there can be no real difference between a sense of a theological complexion and some other sense of a non-theological complexion (say the manifested historical appearance of a particular person or community, institution or nationality, etc., as expressed through the imputation of its existential descriptors, etc.). As to the importance of an imputed theological complexion one could say, in the light of the above, that there is no importance, and, that the only importance there is is in the fact that there is none! As all aspects of the world are coterminous with the world, it is in and through this non-importance of imputation that the importance of a non-theological difference can be allowed to manifest itself in consciousness, be that religious or non-religious in orientation, be that accepted either wittingly or unwittingly, be that recognized or not recognized that in such a framework we all be as co-participants in the responsibilities of the world. Such ‘responsibilities’ reflecting the manner and nature of our being in the world-with-others. Let me now explore in detail the implications of this (theological) vision of a non-theological difference. (1206)

	First, in one more detour, let me re-examine an apparent act of communication in the newer light of the above. I first examined an act of communication in what might be called a classical mode, i.e., transmitter/tokens/receiver along with requisite field of interpretation, etc. Then, going ‘deeper’ into the epistemological organization of intentionality (since communication is classically expressed through an intention to communicate along with an intention of recognizing one has been in an act of receiving a communication [since an act of communication demands a receiver, etc.]) I re-perceived such an act as then taking place through the chaotic bifurcation reflecting a re-self-organized state of intentional affairs. In other words, an apparent act of communication operates at the psychic center of our relationships and is enacted through a re-self-organization of the same. Then imputations are made of transmitters, receivers, tokens of information presented or absented from a stream of emission (as a standing wave or basic informational background upon which information is added and/or subtracted, reinforced (through the work of error correction mechanisms, essential-holistic re-iteration, etc.) or diffused (through de-specification of content and/or contextual-connections, etc.). In a hypothetical theological setting the whole concept of divine communication (as a hypothetical possibility) is effectively turned on its head. There is now no communication other than the relationship re-informing itself as to where it is currently present. All imputation and its imputed products and processes being seen as illusory and empty. Hence the Divine is just as empty as the non-divine, thence there can be no ‘real’ theological difference as differences can only be imputed and all imputation is an illusory illusion (with a limited and relative validity in only conventional and empirical-phenomenological terms of reference). Re-self-organization being a change of self-organizational state about a chaotic bifurcation through incremental additions and/or deletions of information that re-simulate this newer state of affairs (through a relatively slight alteration in its organized complexity. That complexity being multi-aspectival, multi-paralleled, hierarchically enstructured and complex in the ordered complexion of its presenting value). The question I would like to now ask is this, namely, is it possible that communication in all forms can be read along the same lines? I.e., as a re-self-organized transition in the organizational complexity of that relationship under examination with the associated appearance of an act of communication through its embodiment in the psychic field of that relationship. In this light we might say that a relationship, and equally that which defines it, is the extent a change in re-organizational complexity and self-organization is induced through an incremental addition and/or subtraction of quanta of information, that, through a change in self-organization an act of communication is effectively simulated. Hence this concept of communicational re-self-organization through incremental supply as exercised through simulation/re-simulation. That, in effect, all imputed acts of communication are simulated in and through embodied entanglement and its re-self-organization. Let me examine if this analysis of re-self-organization (as applied in my hypothetical theological exposition) can adequately re-interpret an apparent act of classical communication; i.e., that there is nothing actually communicated other than this simultaneous change in self-organization. Hence the apparent act of communication is a misnomer and can only exist circumscribed within the phenomenal-phenomenological realm of the empirical-conventional to that extent a classical-like attitude is invoked, i.e., imputed (being exactly limited to the same). (1207)
	
	In an apparent act of communication something is to be apparently communicated. What is apparently communicated is information. Now, obviously, if something is being communicated, its reception implies the reception of that communicated, i.e., the ability to interpret that apparent act of communication as an apparent act of communication. Communication implies the pre-setting up of such conventions (as to what is to be communicated and by whom or what, etc.). In this communicative relationship there must be pre-connections, etc., and both continuities and discontinuities in states of self-organization and re-self-organization. Re-self-organization implies a re-self-organization of ‘something’, namely, a re-self-organizational aspect of an underlying and continuing non-re-self-organized state of affairs. Implying that re-self-organization is not a fundamental discontinuity in the embodied nature of that communicative relationship under examination. (1208)

	Let me re-state my argument for this apparent transfer of information being read primarily through a chaotic bifurcated lens within the associated auspices of that communicative relationship. That, in effect, communication is a centrally placed affair and not a peripheral orchestrated affair. Then how do we explain the physical transmission of tokens? (1209)

	Tokens (as textual indicators of communication) are token per se by virtue of that communicative relationship and can only be read as ‘tokens’ within that relationship be that act of appreciation be directly and non-virtually entertained or entertained in a non-direct, virtually conducted manner (in memory, in imagination or fantasy of some form [either as a direct participant or as an indirect participant through non-direct involvement]). So, e.g., we receive a letter from a friend or an email. That act of communication can be seen as an ‘act of communication’ by someone else who gets to read that letter or email through their virtual recognition of it as a communication from someone to someone else in the form of a letter or email. The extent those third parties are privy to information already shared by the first and second parties then to that same extent the content of such transmissions can be understood more fully. Otherwise that communication can only be appreciated as a mere act of communication without a general and/or particular and/or specific understanding of that content, or, only the merest understanding of it indirectly through an appreciation of the genre-form apparently invoked, e.g., as a letter, a petition or essay, etc. Communication demands a state of continuity between the imputed subjects, expression of that content demands the resolution of its discontinuities within the totality of that continuity. Hence a harmonic theory of simulated communicative transmission, a transmission that occurs through the psychic center of all our (communicative) relationships. Tokens as ‘meaningful tokens’ can only be read in and through a simulation in whole or in part of that communicative relationship. To supply another style or substance of communicative content would be to set oneself up to seriously misinterpret those expressed tokens, i.e., the communicative value of those communicative residues or artifacts. Therefore, adequate construction/re-construction through simulation/re-simulation allows us to entertain/re-entertain communicative content (and, e.g., memory, history, etc., should all be appreciated within this type of interpretative matrix of simulation/re-simulation). (1210)

	Still, enacted within the embodiment of their emitting relationship, tokens are emitted, no more and no less!? Yes, because they can be seen (virtually and/or non-virtually) as transmitted artifacts (and read to the extent their communicated value can be adequately appreciated). (1211)

	As noted (in paragraph 1191) communication was defined as being realized through the shared and co-simulated resolution of intent. Re-self-organization at the center of the relationship in question establishes this sense of ‘sharing’ and thence a ‘co-simulated’ sense of experience at the heart and root of this type of relatively co-mutual experience. One might say that communication is either established or it is not established. On one hand, non-mutually there is no communication whilst, on the other, through a mutual co-simulation/re-simulation of processed intentional content communication takes on an apparitional like existence. In all of this ‘degrees of reality’ are entertained through our intuitive-like appreciation of the relative richness of that presentation/re-presentation. As defined elsewhere on numerous occasions, ‘richness’ is defined in two senses, i.e., to what relative degree, inter-modally, different modes are actively being engaged, and, intra-modally to what extent those inter-modal modes are being actively enriched through engagement. A greater richness in modes invoked (inter-modally) and a greater richness in their exercise (intra-modally) producing/re-producing a greater sense of reality; simulating a reproduction of reality with a greater sense of reality or ‘feeling’ for reality. (1212)

	Now, let me look into the temporal characteristics of apparent acts of communication. Re-self-organization is a momentary affair! I.e., moment by moment, be that on an intentional basis within the time needed for intentional recognition of a re-self-organized change of intentional state, or, down to the quantum level defined as a Planck unit. New intentions are arrived at through such re-organization. Re-iterational retention implies no radical re-organization on this level of distinctive intentional input. However, with incremental supply, changes of state are momentarily re-instituted when chaotic bifurcation is met and entered into and passed through. The momentary is also a non-existentially derivative amalgam of the historical past, present and future that arises in a transcendental sense of the present. However this ongoing, momentary sense of the present is also embedded in a transcendental sense of the totality of time through coinciding senses of (retrospective) retention, (future expectational) protention and (the existential immediacy of the intensity of) intention. Hence the value of the moment is correctly read through these three temporal lenses of the historic past, etc., and these two transcendental senses of time (of the relatively immediate and the relatively eternal). (1213)

	What are the ramifications of this inside-out way of trying to comprehend communicative acts? In the light of this extended essay they can be divided between the non-theologically oriented and the theologically oriented. Let me examine first some of the former. (1214)

	Seeing ‘communication’ as centered in the centrality of the communicative relationship implies that all aspects of the communicative act should be seen as imputed and conventional in orientation. That, correctly, a deeper appreciation of communication is realized through recognizing both the limitations of imputative language and the ramifications of the same, be that philosophically, theologically, existentially, ethically, socially, etc., etc. Let me use this provisional list to focus on some of the implications that arise in those complex fields of endeavour. (1215)

	Philosophically, we are alerted to take a sophisticated existential approach to this topic of communication. No longer are we to adopt uncritically a classical attitude of transmitter, transmitted tokens, reception, interpretation, response, etc. Instead, we are exhorted to see the simultaneous arising of communication in and through the center of that communicative relationship with the dispersal of communicative artifacts (as intentional deposits) from the radiation of that change in self-organization at the psychic center of that relationship and its recognition as an imputed act of communication with the ascription of certain imputed processes and content being seen and treated as co-occurring within that communicative circumscription of the communicative relationship itself. Crudely we might say that with each moment a partly isolated and focused upon moment reflects retrospectively where it/we have come from, prospectively where we/it intuit/s where it might go, and where we/it find/s a confirmation in its presented evidentialness within the holistic transcendental totality of the Life-World itself. In, through and from this resonance the communicative act is born, and radiates out within the life-world associated with its production/re-production and reproduction. Into this mix our appreciation of the historical, e.g., is not so much an appreciation of the sequences of distinctive changes in an existential descriptor but an appreciation of the glue that threads that very sense of a thread as it becomes woven within the fabric of the life-world into which it finds its closest association (and greatest interpretative valuation/evaluation). Radiating out from that life-world through seepage or leakage into all other life-worlds to that degree value is realized. Moreover, from communicative circumscription we are philosophically forced to adopt and adapt this type of approach lest we fall into the familiar philosophical traps and their interminable disruptions of controversy, etc., whereas, in contrast, we should be adopting a progressive philosophical approach with its dialectical openness to communicative harmonization of intentional processes and content, intentional fields, intentional subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, etc. (and the relatively non-controversial-like nature of the same to the extent that mistakes are realized only through wrongly conducted patterns of pre-information, sequentialization, and, interpretative treatment and critical evaluation/re-evaluation, etc. (1216)

	Theologically, we are given a hypothetical mechanism for apparent communicative programs and possibilities to be exercised without recourse to the invocation of a theological difference between the imputed sense of world and its imputed theological complexion,. etc. At the end of this chapter let me look more closely into this central aspect of our research. (1217) 

	Existentially, we are given both a philosophical framework and a frame of reference for existentially conducting our passage through this world before-others (before all absolute senses of the Holy Other which no more could be ‘wholly other’; i.e., absolutely absolute). From communicative action, arising from the psychic centers of our relationships, we endeavour to act on their behalf through our intuitive response to their central responsiveness. In this regard, from sensitivity arises a joint responsiveness and responsibility (in what I would like to term its/our responsitivity); in effect, a co-responsitivity with and within that relationship, and, all its actively engaged participants, and, thence, its radiation outwards throughout the theoretical entirety of the Life-World (even though, correctly, this ‘radiation outwards’ is itself an illusion in this regard!). From this critical perspective, and our readjustment to the same, flows an existentially oriented sense of the ethical (within a complex field of value). (1218)

	The ethical now takes on a purified existential complexion to that extent we are allowed and allow our relationships to conform to their existential communicative responsitivity at the psychic center of our communicative relationships and between the same (as [hypothetically] witnessed in their situatedness in that communicative relationship within its associated sense of a life-world as totally situated within the all-encompassing value of the Life-World itself)! Thence the harmonization of ethical value, etc., be it existentially oriented or non-existentially oriented by virtue of the fact that all value is realized through communicative harmonization to some extent or other. Thence our recognition of communicative complexity despite the appearances of communicative simplicity arrived at through the dialectics of an ongoing process of harmonized resolution! (1219)

	Our recognition of communicative complexity, etc., and our recognition of  a harmonized simplicity as central to apparent communicative acts unleashes a set of existential ramifications for how we should live, work and deal with others (through a sensitive responsitivity to the others in our relationships thereupon directly engaged (in turn, as found to be indirectly engaged and embedded in this World-of-Life) as intuitively apprehended from the perspective of each communicative relationship entered into. (1220)

	On one hand there is always a power differential in any relationship entered into. Then, on the other hand, there must also be some form of a symmetrical alignment (as analogued by the use of the mobile by our CEO on the beach). In this relationship between the asymmetrical and the symmetrical for a relationship to be in evidence there must be some form of resolution. But, harmonic resolution is always this overcoming of this tension between the dissonance of the asymmetrical and the consonance of the symmetrical! By such means we square the circle so to speak. Thence the asymmetries going into a relationship and the asymmetries of response in an engaged exiting from a relationship must be resolved in and through the metaphorical body of that relationship by virtue of the evidential existence of that relationship itself (without imputing the sheer absolute existence of that relationship, indeed, by virtue of its non-imputation). (1221)

	How might the theologian confront the problem of the commensuration of the devotee and the Divine (given our definition of the latter as realized through several orders of magnitude greater in epistemological organization, and consequent power, etc.)? Such a problematic issue must be realized, if it were to be realized in reality (whether hypothetically engaged or non-hypothetically engaged), in and through the very factual existence of their interactive relationships given their relationship being a relationship in the first place! (1222)

	Given that interpersonal relationships are always between agents with relative inequalities in power (and consequent status) might it not be profitable to see how such differences are resolved in a mundane frame of reference? E.g., how might a relationship come into existence between a teacher and their pupils, or, a mother and her child. Could a profitable comparison be hypothetically engineered between Divine agency and non-divine agency (along the same type of approaches found in more mundane interactions?)? (1223)

	A teacher and their class meet within the surrounds of a classroom. A mother and her child interact because they can share a physical intimacy through the contiguity of their respective embodiments. Should the theologian invite the same sort of comparison? That it is only through the embodiment of the Divine and the embodiment of the devotee, and an alignment between the same, that some form of divine communication could be entered into? How might this embodied contiguity and interaction be arranged and engaged, or, are such ideas just too heretical for the professional theologian? Would they have any other choice? Let me explore, hypothetically, some possible mechanisms here that might allow the theologist to have their cake and eat it in this regard without demanding the comparable embodiment of the Divine as a person in person? (1224)

	Complicating our investigations, be they phenomenal-phenomenological and/or hermeneutical and/or existential, are considerations of complexity. A phenomenologist can concentrate their examinations on the apparent simplicity of certain topics but in reality all experiences are rooted in complexity (be that contextually or transcendentally; be that interpretatively or existentially open-ended). Imagine, if you would, the simplicity of sticking a very thin, sterile needle into someone’s arm. The nerve endings for pain receptors are discrete and do not form a sheet perfectly coincident with the surface of the skin. If a stoic subject were informed about this fact and were to allow a simple experiment in which they would be gently stabbed, say twenty times, how many times, on average, would they report feeling pain? So, if they were to report on a number of occasions that they did not experience any form of painful stimuli we can safely say that this type of procedure does not always produce or reproduce a painful result. Or, if the recipient of this procedure was extremely happy, or perhaps sexually aroused, it has been reported that such stimuli of ‘pain’ has been reported as an intensification of pleasure. Or, if they were already experiencing pain, or were quite depressed in mood, this type of procedure might alternatively be experienced as an intensification of painfulness or sadness or depression. Or, if hypnotized to believe they were being merely being touched by the sharp quill end of a feather they might merely feel they were being touched and not pricked at all. Here we have the apparently simple phenomenology of being pricked by a needle but an assortment of differing reports about the same. The point here is that complexity is contextually controlled by the type of field it is being received within. Furthermore, I have argued that all acts of judgment have the same transcendental form, or underlying machinery, but that through patterns of privileging we arrive at distinctively different types of value-judgments (as analyzed in my ordered analysis and its six classifications of the pre-essential, essential-aesthetical, deontological, pragmatical, hermeneutical and ontical or factual). Furthermore, in reality, these classifications are not rigid and are usually bundled up in various proportions within each individual experiential situation (with genres of interaction pre-negotiating their complexity (and apparent simplicity of) of interaction in certain types of experiences, etc.). Then, hermeneutically, the frame of interpretative reference is important as to what is constructed or recognized in certain types of experience. Tell people to watch a certain infamous video of a basketball match and to closely watch and count the goals scored by both teams and every second viewer fails to notice the participant wandering on to the court wearing a gorilla suit! Existentially, the value experienced in a certain experience is also dependent upon the qualitative richness of that experience in the light of their motivation and pre-exposure to that type of experience (since prior exposure to a certain type of experience can prime the viewer to more richly appreciate the same). All in all, complexity needs to be taken into account, and, the phenomenologist, etc., needs to recognize that phenomenological simplicity is more an illusion than a reality! One moral that can be drawn here by the theologist is that complexity takes many forms and that theological experience, be that possibly non-virtual in nature or virtual or hypothetical in phenomenal-phenomenological experience would, indeed, in truth, more than likely take a complex form (in a pre-negotiated complex format of engagement and recognition). It would then be necessary to be able to disentangle such strands that positively lent their reception in a theological or theological-like orientation and valuation/evaluation. Again, the professional theologian would have to articulate such a program (along with the nature of its negotiated format and the form of those experience-type-aspects that it adequately could deal with). Then, a profound place to start would be in how a mundane theological frame of reference is experienced and is to be experienced and interpreted, i.e., how is the transcendental unity of the world qua world to be experienced and how might this humble beginning be transformed into a trans-mundane perspective, etc. Furthermore, they would then need to ask how the harmonization of these various strands, theologically oriented and/or non-theologically oriented, are to be interpreted and integrated in the course of our existence in and through the living matrix of the Life-World as expressed in and through our world of a multiplicity of live-worlds, etc., along with an ongoing harmonization of the same?)? How might or should the theologist thread and tread their way though this multi-dimensional maze of complexity. Is it possible for them to adopt and adapt a relatively more simple approach by constructing a simple existential philosophy in this regard? And asking, in retrospection, to what extent this might already be mapped out for them through their cultural and intercultural path/s taken in this world. (1225)
	
	In the same direction, they might wish to ask how current, apparent theological anomalies might be better dealt with (in and through an overall transcendental suspension)? To what extent world-unity (and divisions therein) are to be experienced in a theological-like light? To what extent existential peak-experiences might or might not implicate some sense of the Divine, etc., and, to what extent traditional and/or non-traditional experiences might or might not implicate the same type of harmonized interactive communication with the semblance of the Divine, etc? Thankfully these tasks can be performed by the professional theologian, etc. (1226)

	Let me now return to how a process of harmonization might be brought into effect when dealing with apparent anomalies and other forms of apparent theological-like complexity (be it contextually, transcendentally, interpretatively, existentially, etc). (1227)

	At this juncture, let us return to how processes of harmonization might be put in play between discordant elements in ‘our’ passage through this world ‘before-others’ as we course through the imputation of this world as a world of imputation.  By the expression ‘discordant elements’ is meant of different type and/or difference in power relations. (1228)

	All elements in a relationship must possess a difference in power even if only indiscernible in range or extent unless those elements be defined in an a priori fashion. In all non a priori relationships there is a natural inequality in power relations moment by moment. On the other hand too great a difference will also spell the end of that relationship in the form found to possess that too great a power differential. E.g., the detonation of a potentially explosive combination. Discordant elements are also discordant by virtue of a semblance of dissonance-and-consonance in that relationship. Indeed, it is only through the resolution of dissonance that a relationship can come into being. Hence different elements being dissonant are not absolutely dissonant nor, for that matter, absolutely consonant. It is in this existential fact of relationships (and their non-absoluteness of identity on all levels of relational organization) that we find a clue as to how we can deal with relationships with considerable differences in power relations. Dissonance is resolved within the ambit of the very relationship itself although not isolated from its relational context at the same time. For the relationship to come into existence some form of accommodation must already be in place in the ongoing resolution of the dissonance to be found within the being-becoming of that relationship itself. The relationship presupposes this triadic process of harmonization between these dialectical moments of the consonant, dissonant and their synthesized accommodation through resolution. Being dialectical, these moments effectively co-occur. (1229)

	How can the theologian utilize this theoretical understanding of the process of harmonization in order to explain extreme degrees of power relations say between a person and some sense or semblance of the Divine (in which we will explore from a hypothetical point of view)? (1230)

	The nature of the resolution in a relationship characterizes the essential nature of that type of relationship. In examining relationships with marked degrees of differentiated power-relations one might also like to note that meta-textual and/or contextual considerations already pre-determine how that power-differential is to be actually established and potentially interacted with. So a mother and her child is understood in such a fashion that the mother takes ‘charge’ of her charge. A monarch orders and is expected to be obeyed, etc. Of course a potentially democratic basis is still in play. The monarch’s subjects consent to be ruled. A baby ‘assents’ to being mothered to the extent it can and in the process signals this ‘assent’ with a smile or by some other means. Any experience of discomfit is signaled by a scowl or cry of upset, etc. The moral here for the theologian is to understand that in the very existence of an imputed relationship between some instance of the Divine and their subject as exemplified by a person implies that some degree of harmonization is already in effect, wittingly or unwittingly, indeed, must already be in place (moment by moment). Once a relationship is assumed then it behooves the theologian to explain by what mode or modes this power differential is harmonized. (1231)

	Hypothetically, there must be an infinite number of possible options at the disposal of the theologian. However, I am sure, proposing just one might be enough to begin this process of comprehension in this aspect of relationships. In this regard, one might like to look first at more traditional proposals, e.g., mediation. In Christianity, Christ acts like a mediator. Even then that form of mediation might need to be mediated in turn, say through the use of prayer or meditation and/or through the divine intervention of a lesser form of divinity say a ‘saint’ or a deceased member of your family and/or the intercession of a priest, etc., etc. By exaggerating the psychic distance between the instance of the Divine and their devotee, mediation needs to be suitably amplified, perhaps multi-channeled or relayed through a number of subsidiary points. Another solution also promotes itself when we give a chaotic reading to this type of situation (as in any other form of communication). Through processes of re-self-organization, all channels of communication must effectively occur at, in and through the psychic center of that relationship; this fact already being established in our reading of chaotic-orientated relationship. Nested, effectively, at the psychic center point of all our relationships are these axes of communication established at the very center of those relationships. Still, the difficulty then remains as to how such communication is ‘to be effectively put in play’ and ‘be recognized as such by all the parties concerned (with or without forms of co-opted mediation)’. (1232)

	Explicating what has been relatively implicit is the state of affairs that communication can only occur in relationships with an adequate power potential, i.e., a power differential that is neither zero and symmetrical nor so excessive that the potential gap cannot be crossed, resolved and harmonically incorporated within the relationship in question. Let me examine this conclusion re these three possibilities of symmetry, an asymmetrical relationship that can be accommodated, and, an asymmetrical relationship that cannot be effectively accommodated. In the first instance, power potentials are zero through a symmetrical equivalence between two or more imputed parties in a corresponding, imputed relationship. How, then, can two friends of a similar social status communicate one with the other? To do so implies that the communicating party has to realize a relative degree of superiority in power relations vis-à-vis the party-to-be-communicated-with. This is effectively achieved when the party-being-communicated-with takes on the role of both a passive receptor and an active interpreter. In this transient, simulated power differential, both parties cannot correctly communicate at the same time. Asymmetrical, simulated power surges (across the potential gap) and power reversals, from one period to some other, then ensure some degree of a communicative oscillation that allows parties to maintain a two-way relationship with their relational participants. In this regard induced power-asymmetries enables a relationship to take on a collective existential descriptor. Otherwise, given an absence of an adequate power differential there could no longer be established the ongoing projection of that relationship through an inability to resolve the presence of of now non-existent dissonant features in that relationship (regardless of whether it is merely ‘horizontally’ existential or ‘vertically’ communicative in its imputed characterizations). Conversely, given a positive power differential that cannot be crossed a relationship is either deconstructed (given a prior process of resolution and augmentation of that power differential) or fails to properly become established through an inadequate degree of ongoing harmonic resolution. There can be no other possibilities other than non-comparative non-symmetrical comparison in which case no viable relationship could be envisaged as being engendered (other than as mere, inescapable input into a World-of-Life). Moreover, the only viable state of affairs out of these three possibilities is the second option, namely, a scoped asymmetrical affair (be that either in an oscillating modality or non-oscillating modality). E.g., if two people were to talk at each other at the same time little would be communicated (as an example of a symmetrical encounter). On the other hand, power oscillations between two friends allows them to communicate one after the other in a relationship of friendship. Or, in a relationship between a mother and her baby there need be no oscillation since a potential difference already exists (since there can be neither a relationship nor communication without a potential difference that can be accommodated between the parties concerned). Lastly, if power potentials were too great to be adequately accommodated then one must assume that neither a relationship nor communication would be possible. That granted, how might a theologian cope with this seemingly self-evident fact that neither communication nor a relationship is possible between parties whose power potential is too great to be adequately accommodated within and between the speculative confines of a relationship hypothetically imputed between those disparate elements? Or, should one then envisage that the ongoing transcendental unity of the Life-World is impossible given such a power disparity between a holistic sense of an all-encompassing, over-arched identity and a fragmentary sense of identity dealing in identity conducted on a piece-meal basis. How might this theoretical anomaly be overcome given that the transcendental unity of the Life-World should be treated as a ‘given’. Because all identity is hierarchically constructed, in its identity and interaction such can be exercised and maintained on some of those levels in ontological and epistemological organization and re-ordering. Hence their existence-for-us as tools that can be appropriated by-us for-us. Thence this minimal requirement of a transcendental unity pervading the identity formation based within this overall, effective, transcendental unity of the Life-World. (1233)

	Given ongoing interaction through harmonized resolution of potential differences what are the theoretical implications of this for the relational landscape? Not only do we find the continual-continuation of existential descriptors on a horizontal level (as long as those existential relationships are in a state of continual-continuation, moment by moment) we should also find existential axes on a vertical dimension threading the hierarchical enstructuralization of the epistemological hierarchies that are aligned beneath therein. Truly, then, one could well say, that the fabric of the world is woven both horizontally and vertically. Or, such horizontal and vertical entracements collectively simulate the ‘simulation of a world’ as a ‘world of simulation’. The modal richness, as argued on numerous occasions elsewhere, determining the apparent phenomenal reality of the resolved texture being engaged with and as a consequence determining both the manner and degree of the apparent reality being so engaged. (1234)

	What enables a relationship to become vertically aligned and therein threaded (in this metaphorical sense)? How does an existential axis (in comparison to an existential descriptor) find its hypothetical imputation? Through the communicative alignment envisaged at the center of a relationship realized through resolution of those participating parties within that relationship and the resolution of that relationship per se within its context of presentation, etc. (ad infinitum). Hence the infinitely open-ended nature of such axes. The realization of that relationship establishing its psychic center within the immediacy of that relationship. Such vertical threading extending both immanently and transcendently; their coincidence establishing our current relational preoccupations. Existential axes thread relationships through their psychic center but can they ‘truly’ thread existential descriptors circulating around those centers of alignment. Yes, because once the relationship in question is existentially formed then the entire relational space of that relationship reflects the communicative nature of its resolution throughout the entirety of that relationship. By ‘communicative’ is implied the general communication of relational re-self-organizational inputs and outputs regardless of the relative presence or absence of a communicative agent or agents or set/s of agents. By ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ what is meant? Those factors, respectively, feeding into a state of resolutional interaction and emitted from the same. As discussed previously, (relatively uni-polar) emissions are the products of disrupted (relatively bi-polar) currents occurring in (relatively tri-polar) systematic contexts, i.e., relationships. Thence the simultaneous formation and de-formation of a relationship as it realizes a state of ongoing resolution through these dialectical moments of momentary, relatively dissonant emission, relatively consonant currents in the context of a existential, systematic relational space (or body or world) as manifested within the open-endedness of the overall Life-World itself – each moment communicating the nuances of a process of re-self-organization (be that effectively in an incremental linear-like form and formation or in a non-linear-like chaotic state of re-self-organization. (1235)

	Does this vision of the Life-World and its epistemological and ontological levels of organization have much relevance for the hypothetical theologian or non-hypothetical theologian? Can a theologian profitably mine this en-threaded vision of the world to produce an existential theology, i.e., a theologically oriented interpretation that can integrate the ‘discerned’ phenomenal meaning of our existence with the phenomenal nature of the world! To what extent is the manifestation of a certain degree of autonomy both an indication and a reflection of the same? (1236)

	In what manner should we attempt to visualize the relationship between the existentially horizontal and the vertical nature of chaotic communication? All processes of interactions occur in and through relationships. Thence the co-occurrence of both spheres. However, how might this mixture be differently emphasized or find a different sense of emphasis, and, is autonomy a possibility for identity within this woven matrix of (modal) simulation? (1237)

	Autonomy is put into effect through communicative re-self-organization. Such autonomy appears to possess elements of apparent freewill when the center of such processes of re-self-organization appear to occur relatively high in the epistemological organization of that relationship in question in organizations of relatively high epistemological organization (i.e., e.g., human subjectivity, and, by extension, divine subjectivity). So, e.g., billiard balls once moving on a billiard table appear to obey natural laws of motion and resistance, whereas, in contrast, an individual walking along a street could suddenly change direction and cross that street. Obviously, autonomy is concept that would need to be utilized by a theologian in their theological examinations of divine activity, human activity and any imputed relationships envisaged between the same. In such a framework, concepts of human and divine power could be co-defined as the relative impact realized through re-self-organization of some locus or set of loci in the corresponding epistemological hierarchical stratification/s of that in question. As a general rule perceiving a greater degree of power to devolve from relatively higher points in correspondingly treated epistemological hierarchies. So a baby struggles to grasp an object in its cot in comparison to a mathematician trying to grasp some type of mathematical process or object, etc. Personal power being augmented or resisted by the nature of our (currently focused) relationship with others. Power also being measured and ascertained through its degree of intentional re-direction (since communicative states are realized through re-self-organization of the intentional field hence re-direction of the direction hitherto being pre-enacted). So, e.g., I am walking along the street in this direction and, now, change direction by crossing over that street to the other side. (1238)

	To what extent is time implicated in such processes of re-direction? Or is time generated through processes of re-direction? I could be walking along the street. Decide to cross over that street to look into a shop-window on the other side of the street. I look at my watch. I headed across the street as such and such a time. I can evaluate this sense of time because my clock, as an instrument to measure time, is observed as ‘outside’ this event. So how could a universal sense of time be appreciated if one cannot ‘stand’ outside this phenomenal world. Phenomenal time is evaluated through its contextual determination (to that extent this is possible for an observer). If phenomenal time can be appreciated transcendentally, in transcendental time, how might transcendental time be appreciated? Or is that, correctly, not possible? Through resolution in a relationship, moment by moment, that state of affairs is realized through resolution moment by moment. How could transcendental time be experienced and measured? (1239)

	Parallel to this type of concern is the question of perspective and meta-perspectives, etc., and their interactions. I have argued elsewhere that we can appreciated the relative or phenomenal from an absolute or transcendental point of view, and, we can appreciated the absolute or transcendental from a relative or phenomenal point of view. However, we can neither appreciate the relative from a relative perspective nor appreciate the absolute from an absolute point of view. More correctly, appreciation is realized in and through an overall transcendental suspension wherein a joint balance of absolute and relative are entertained (in order to simulate/re-simulate the world-to-hand). Why are absolute perspectives on the absolute just as impossible to realize as relative perspectives on the relative?! Moreover, what ramifications apply to theologians in this regard (to the extent that the divine perspective cannot be appreciated from a divine perspective, etc., although a meta-divine perspective on a divine perspective might be considered acceptable?)? (1240)

	Appreciation is a doubly-edged affair. In a certain relational context R a feature x is noted. In turn this process of noting is noted. Both process and content are to be noted in a process of appreciation, moreover, appreciation necessitates meta-terms of reference by virtue of the fact that x is noted in R and can only be noted ‘outside’ R, i.e. R’. This interaction, in effect, is appreciated both immanently and transcendently. Indeed, appreciation is both immanently and transcendently structured. Intentionality is structured in the same manner: the intentional object is focused upon ‘in’ its intentional field, and, its relationship in this intentional field is also focused ‘upon’. This is the dialectical nature of intentionality, that appreciation is both immanent and transcendently oriented, and, in effect, mirrors the very nature of a transcendental suspension by mirroring this balance between content and process, the correlative senses of the immanent and the transcendent (more correctly as the-relative-immanent-with-the-relative-transcendent, and, v.v.). Indeed, a closer sense of reality is realized, simulated, when all relevant immanent and transcendent features are co-examined (through co-simulation/co-re-simulation). Now, this interpretation of intentional consciousness accepted, implies that we cannot appreciate an immanent sense of the immanent nor can we appreciate a transcendent sense of the transcendent. Similarly, there can be neither an absolute appreciation of the absolute nor a relative appreciation of the relative. Similarly, there can be neither a transcendental appreciation of the transcendental nor a phenomenal appreciation of the phenomenal. Similarly, there can be neither a divine appreciation of the divine nor a non-divine appreciation in a material sense of the non-divine in a material sense. However, in a transformational philosophy (as examined by myself) it is possible to appreciate a similarity of state through processes of treatment and/or re-treatment. What might be transcendently oriented can be subjected to a process of intentional focus and treated/re-treated on an immanently oriented level of examination, or v.v. Self-consciousness is best examined through this type of lens when, e.g., a transcendental sense of self examines its relationship with an embodied sense of an empirical ego. Or body is examined as body qua ‘body’ by virtue of this division between an object language and a meta-object language. Similarly, a meta-language can be examined from a meta-meta-language point of view, etc. Only in processes of re-treatment back onto the same material-level of the relative object-language does it appear that we can examine an object in an object-language or a meta-language in a meta-language, etc. Thus the very nature of intentional consciousness rules out some form of examination or investigational appreciation conducted in the same meta-terms of reference. Appreciation is always between two adjacent meta-levels of examination even if only one level is assumed, imputed or short-sightedly overlooked, etc! Hence the intentional impossibility of just examining object(-ive) x in (the terms of reference of an) object(-tive) x language. Processes of appreciation demands practically parallel (but never absolutely parallel), adjacent meta-levels of examination. In turn, meta-examinations demand practically parallel (but never absolutely parallel), adjacent meta-meta-levels of examination, etc, etc. Thence in intentional consciousness it is impossible to have an absolute point of view of an absolute point of view unless apposite adjacent meta-levels are actually invoked! (1241)

In a digression, albeit as a continuation of this insight, we can also note that in the formula “the x of x” we can only arrive at “non-x” by virtue of the fact that “x’ ” is “not-x” being “x’”.  So the blackness of black is not black; the emptiness of emptiness is not empty (not emptiness), the monetary nature of money is not money; the divine nature of the Divine is not Divine, etc. (1242)

	Theoretically, every act of appreciation of an act of appreciation of an act of appreciation, etc., should have its own meta-level of explication equivalent in level to level x + 1. E.g., if one were to appreciate a third meta-level of explication then that level of explication would be on a fourth level of explication. But could the mind actually appreciate a third meta-level, a fourth meta-level, etc. Need the mind appreciate a third meta-level, a fourth meta-level, etc. In transformational philosophy (alluded to in paragraph no. 1241) through processes of treatment and re-treatment the products formed in treatment can be returned through re-treatment to their original level of meta-explication. By such means (of treatment and re-treatment) we merely need two different adjacent meta-levels of explication, namely, a relative object language and a relative meta-language (wherein treatment of the object language can be expressed and returned to the object language through re-treatment). As long as the original meta-status of the products is preserved, treatment processes, re-treatment processes, etc., are critically noted, our explications can be left occupying these two adjacent meta-levels of the object-language and the meta-language albeit with a qualified encapsulation of their objective status (as to their non-compressed positioning in our critical mapping of the world). Moreover through treatment and re-treatment different products and processes can be prepared for processes of accommodations, operations, distinctions (as invoked through simulation), transformations, etc. Transformations being either synthetically oriented, analytically oriented and/or identificationally oriented. Processes of overall transcendental suspension occurring in an ongoing balance of all three process-types in parallel. Their interaction then can be accounted for through the invocation of a harmonic theory where consonant synthesis as a field background characterizes dissonance through an analytically oriented differential difference in the former, and, through a balance of both states in parallel, a third mode of identification is realized, which, in turn, held in parallel completes the harmonic process through (a process of ongoing) resolution. Now, all that need be shown (in a process of simulation/re-simulation) is that existential descriptors and existential axes together simulate/re-simulate a world of direct engagement whose modal richness is the existential mark of that (type of) engagement. Hence a difference in modal richness between dream apples and our engagement with non-dream apples, i.e., apples we consider to be real and whose truth value can be expressed through a Tarskian bi-modal equation, namely, P is T (true) iff P’.  Engagement being discerned as ‘direct’ through the very nature of relational involvement (by direct participation in that type of relationship invoked) and involving the modal characteristics of the type of engagement entered into through our appreciation of its modal complexion. Our appreciation of the modal complexion resonating within the nature of our epistemological organization to that extent such modalities exhibit a positive differentiation of associated modal activity. E.g., visual engagement with a visual apple should be a richer experience than our mere engagement with a visualized apple be that in the imagination or in a state of dream. Accompanying our ability to engage is the degree our epistemological organization is integrated in a gestalt fashion, i.e., to what extent we possess the requisite gestalt integration that can allow us to function in that type of intentional projection (be that oriented in a sensory modality or a conceptual modality, in a modality of visualization or a modality of dream-formation [be the latter in a relatively less integrated mode of hypnogogic/hypnpompic imagery, etc., or an even less integrated surreal-like mode subject to fragmentation, etc.]), etc. (1243)

	By such inputs and processes the world is woven for-us by-us given the intentional adoption and adaptation of inter-subjectively oriented meta-textual genres or conventions of intentional appropriation. So an experience of pain, e.g., is obviously a subjectively oriented experience, yet, its appreciation and expression is also an inter-subjective affair (through our intentional appreciation of what would both inter-subjectively and subjectively count for a painful experience). That accepted along with the directness of relational involvement, we should realize that we live in the same world with others, namely, the Life-World along with its actualized-transcendental possibilities of experience therein encountered by-us in this same one World-of-Life. (1244)

	What are the theological ramifications of this unified type of world-view that might be mustered by a theologian or theologist? Into this picture where does a theological difference fit and in what manner might it be found to possess some form of theological value? To this end let us look into how a sense of phenomenal world might be focused upon and appreciated in an intentional perspective (along with the co-phenomenon of derived value engaged and reflectively discerned therein)? (1245)

	How is value experienced (practically, theoretically and critically)? Value emerges in our engagement with the corresponding phenomena in their intentional objectivity (be that intentional auto-subjectivity or intentional co-subjectivity, be that intentional focus on an object, state, objective, value, meta-text, non-textual experience, intentional process, intentional history, etc., etc.). By virtue of the directness of intentional engagement with the objective nature of that intentional objectivity through our direct intentional engagement with that intentional objective we come to experience the value of that ‘object’ by virtue of its objectivity as experienced intentionally. Now, all interaction as a process of interaction (qua interaction) arises in and through that process of interaction as a ‘relational state of affairs’. In other words, all processes of relational treatment are initially arrived at and realized on a relational level of interaction, i.e., on a higher meta-level to the nature of the objectivity qua objectivity (expressed in a relative object-language). As noted, all processes of treatment are either analytical and/or synthetical and/or identificational in orientation. ‘Orientation by virtue of the fact that an overt focus on analysis is conducted with a covert focus also on a background sense of synthesis, or v.v. That, in effect, analysis or synthesis are processes of treatment (or re-treatment) that are co-relative, i.e., correlatively conducted. Furthermore, both analysis and synthesis are dependent upon processes of identification co-occurring as well. Hence the correlativity (of processes and content) of analysis, synthesis and identification. Thence the realization of the phenomenon of value in and through the circulation of relational interaction wherein this sense of objectivity is found to be intentionally expressed in and through that process of interaction. That in effect, value is experience primarily on a relational level of interaction, i.e., on a meta-level higher by one degree than the relative objective-language utilized in the expression of the relatively pre-treated (pre-re-treated state of affairs). However, value per se cannot be experienced outside a process of intentional objectivity and thence its transformational treatment back to an object-level of intentional expression, i.e., through a process of re-treatment that transforms such relational interaction in that circulation of value back on to the initial object-level involved in its relational-process of treatment (or back towards some other object-level involved in that particular-type or specific instance of re-treatment). But neither the value of the relative intentional objectivity per se nor the relative intentional objectivity per se can be experienced without these co-processes of treatment and re-treatment! In all of this there is an intentional difference between intentional objectivity and its intentional value, and, that neither state can be experienced without the other (which stands to reason given the hermeneutic circle of comprehension, and, given that objectivity and the appreciation of its value are co-dependent upon each other)! Therefore, we cannot give any form of philosophical preference to either intentional objectivity or the value of its circulation, and, thus, it is truly represented to that extent entertained in and through a thorough and adequate overall transcendental suspension. The consequences of these various insights flowing through to practical, theoretical and critical spheres of application and operation. Moreover, theological consequences can also be observed given, effectively, that an intentional difference is neither more than nor less than a theological difference when examined from a natural theological point of view (whereby ‘view’ is meant ‘an intentional perspective’). And some theologians might want to extend this insight to include a non-difference between all forms of relational difference and a theological difference further conceived in either a mundane and/or trans-mundane format. Then, this granted, to some extent or other, that a theological difference is effectively a non-difference between the relatively natural, the relatively mundane and the relatively trans-mundane, etc. That, in effect, there can be no absolute theological difference in any form, and, that our very intentional existence in the world is co-immersed within the same given there can be no absolute theological difference! (1246)

	Let me re-state and re-derive these points arrived at in this previous paragraph. In a formula we could say: that the circulation of value is arrived at on a relational level higher by one meta-degree, and, moreover, is realized through the directness of our intentional engagement with the intentional objectivity of that under examination, and, is re-treated back on to the level of its intentional objectivity in such a manner that the difference between objectivity and value is experientially neutralized and is neutrally experienced in a de-distorted fashion when conducted through the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension implying that there can be no residual theological difference (in any form) (along with no form of fundamental epistemological, ontological and theological privileging) ! Let me explain in detail the logic, consequences and theological ramifications of this series of transcendental insights (i.e., insight into the transcendental nature of insight as a phenomenon in general). (1247)

	Where is the phenomenon of value to be found and phenomenologically centered? In our relational treatment of intentional objectivity (i.e., anything intentionally focused upon in practical and/or theoretical and/or critical terms of reference). (1248)

	Value, therefore, co-emerges from intentional objectivity (through ongoing treatment) , and, intentional objectivity co-emerges from processes of value formation (through ongoing re-treatment). (1249)

	Is there a divorce or an incommensurable meta-level gulf between objectivity and value? No, by virtue of ongoing re-treatment wherein value is transformed back on to an object level of intentional expression. Where, objectivity is already transformed on to a relational level higher by one meta-degree (through ongoing processes of relational treatment). (1250)

	Hence a co-incidence between objectivity and value given that there can be no real epistemological, ontological, existential and/or theological difference (in any of those terms of reference). Why? Objectivity is engaged. Value emerges in and through such engagement thence its co-emergence with objectivity, and v.v. (1251)

	Now, if objectivity and value, effectively, are co-emergent and co-incident it follows that there can be no ‘real’ difference between the same (in and through a thorough and adequate overall transcendental suspension). Hence value is directly engaged to the same extent intentional objectivity is adequately engaged. How is this proposition to be demonstrated? (1252)

	Because being in a relationship means we are in a relationship, i.e., directly in contact with that with which we are relating to in accordance with the nature of that relationship. So, e.g., a visual relationship is our direct relationship with visually perceived object-states as simulated in intentional consciousness. That there can be no pre-simulated state of affairs for-us as we stand in no relationship with the same nor could we be so related. But, in a counter-argument, could it not be said that in a dream we might think we are in a direct relationship with a visually perceived object-state when that object is non-existent? But there is no difference even here! We are still in a direct relationship with the ‘visually perceived dream object-state’ by virtue of the fact that that intentional state of affairs is still constructed for-oneself by our own sense of self (in keeping with that type of phenomenological state) in just the same manner that all intentional states are constructed by-oneself in cooperation with the-intentional-object-state-as-so-engaged. So, there is no difference? Yes, and, no. Phenomena are phenomenologically simulated through re-simulation. But a difference between different forms of modal engagement can be comparatively determined, given that possibility, through an examination of the relative modal richness of those different types of operations. This sense of difference is experienced in the comparative degree of (inter-modal and intra-modal) richness discerned between those different types of experience, and, this can be comparatively evaluated given the right circumstances for such a process of comparison (i.e., an adequate degree of gestalt intactness, the exercise of adequate overall transcendental suspensions, textual preservation of such comparative material through retention, etc.). By modal richness is meant the comparative richness in the number of (extra-modal) modes engaged and the richness entertained therein (inter-modally). Dream apples might be experienced in a vivid, visual-like manner they still cannot satisfy physiologically focused upon experiences of hunger, etc. In other words, our full experience of dream apples is not as rich as our full experience of non-dream-like apples. (1253)

	If value is experienced in and through a relationally oriented modality (higher by one meta-degree than its object-text based experiential basis) then how are we to construe a state of non-difference between the relational and its non-relational basis (in and through its object-textuality)? Surely there is a difference? Correctly, that is the case, however, through dependence and necessary re-treatment (though dependence/non-independence between the circulation of value and its engaged-basis-to-be-valued/evaluated) it follows that there can be no absolute (and transcendental) difference between ‘value’ and ‘that-to-be-evaluated’ (though dependence in the same manner that analysis, synthesis and identification cannot be absolutely differentiated by virtue of their covert correlativity). What are the ramifications of this emergence of value and its coincidence with that-to-be-evaluated? (1254)

	Admittedly there is a(n existential) difference between an economy of value and the constitutive members of that economy (and their individual value inputs). This difference is a phenomenal/phenomenological difference or a relational difference by virtue of the fact that a ‘whole’ is greater than the sum of parts (because it is phenomenological fact that through emergence the relational whole in its phenomenological significance cannot be reduced merely to its phenomenal inputs hence this apparent phenomenological residue). However, through dependence this difference cannot be absolute or transcendental, moreover, through re-treatment (a demonstration of this fact of non-independence) this economic difference in the circulation of value is re-invested back into its source or basis. Since all of this has a phenomenal-phenomenological translation through the simulation of the simulation (and never as an impossible simulation of a presupposed imputed pre-simulated state of affairs). Consequently, from a transcendental point of view there is no absolute difference between a relational difference and its relational basis in its simulation/re-simulation of its associated intentional objectivity. That the same situation must apply to any form of a theological difference by virtue of the fact that such value also emerges and is also re-invested in turn within the matrix of its economy (along lines of understanding that can be no different in this respect). What are the consequences and ramifications of this process of co-emergence of value in a differential state of affairs and its spontaneous and immediate re-investment in its basis or matrix of origination. Furthermore, how should our latest thinking on the nature of communication as a process of re-self-organization influence this understanding of intentional complexity (given the complex nature of chaotic re-self-organization and relational emergence/re-investment?)? (1255)

	Given that an overall transcendental suspension is realized through the de-privileging of all privilege then how is it possible through the breaking of the symmetry of a suspension to find the reinforcement of that same prejudice in privilege that existed prior to the imposition of that suspension, or, for that matter, to find an investment in some other form of privilege (since in our ordered analyses it was determined that through a distinctive privileging/de-privileging of the Ego, Object and/or World moments co-associated forms of value would emerge)? In other words, how does the suspension of prejudice preserve such prejudgment in the breaking of that same suspension? Through correlativity, consonance, dissonance and harmonization are all co-interdependent. Harmonization therefore, can only occur in the light of that distinctive formation and in keeping with the nature of that type of formation. One can only enter a suspension from the perspective of a prior positioning. A properly conducted process of an overall transcendental suspension, effectively, is a process of virtual re-simulation. On the other hand, an improperly conducted overall transcendental suspension is a defectively conducted process of virtual re-simulation. In effect, in a properly conducted suspension, the simulation is found through re-simulation, essentially, to correspond with its associated simulation. On the other hand, a defective suspension re-produces a defective state of affairs in keeping with the defective nature of its suspension. If you are looking at a mirage on the horizon of a desert and you think you are seeing water you will see water. But, if wary about mirage-like water phenomena then you will only suspect a mirage until disproved (when actual water is more closely observed). On this reading of the overall transcendental suspension, simulation is re-simulated in accordance with the relatively intrinsic nature of that suspension. Therefore, on this reading, an adequately conducted overall transcendental suspension is the relatively accurately reproduced re-simulation of the simulation. ‘Relatively’ by virtue of the fact that no process can be absolutely isomorphic and invariant, even a thoroughly conducted overall transcendental suspension. What are the implications of these two insights, namely, that there can be relative simulational-re-simulational isomorphic invariance, and, that there can be no absolute simulational-re-simulational isomorphic invariance? (1256)

	On one hand simulation is re-simulated. Under the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension the simulated state of affairs effectively is re-produced in a relatively accurate fashion and by such means allows us to address it as it is in phenomenal-phenomenological reality. On the other hand, given a non-adequately conducted overall transcendental suspension a defective post-overall transcendental suspension process of productivity is reproduced and thereby maintaining the original bias of that process of reproductive evaluation. Re-production cannot be absolutely maintained moment from moment but in an adequately conducted process of an overall transcendental suspension productivity is effectively re-produced and not defectively reproduced. The apposite use of the suspension ensures that we find ourselves seeing things as they are in phenomenal-phenomenological reality, whereas, on the other hand, improper bias in the conducting of our suspension ensures more the preservation of that biased suspension; phenomenal-phenomenological reality is then not correctly re-produced and only the bias of that defective suspension is more accurately re-reproduced. This is the case as understood from a relative point of view. From an absolute or transcendental perspective we must realize that there can be no absolutely accurate processes of re-production or re-simulation. That accepted, we find grounds, among other things, for finding additional value in re-performing the suspension (until such a time that additional value is perceived as not meriting that successive form of investment). Moreover, from a phenomenal orientation, we find that ongoing engagement in and through the overall transcendental suspension produces a differential pressure across that moment of suspension and, even more, across a certain period of moments in such a manner so as to introduce both a causal and a consequential differential. From the phenomenal orientation we find the introduction and maintenance of a causal dimension in our objective field whether under examination or not under direct examination. Then, from a phenomenological orientation we find a consequential dimension wherein decisions made by us have casual consequences stemming from the same. This consequential overlay recognizing intentional input into the otherwise relatively non-intentionally arranged causal sequencing (moment by moment). This accepted, we can now see why moments or periods of time on either side of our intentional engagement through successive overall transcendental suspensions to be relatively invariant unless radically re-configured by chaotic re-self-organization. Then, furthermore, how relatively distant moments and periods of time away from a certain moment or period of suspension produce a greater degree of non-invariance (through the lapse of time and the greater probability of further chaotic displacement of the same). Our relatively more accurate understanding of an intentionally examined area of focus being orchestrated through an adequate overall transcendental suspension, whereas, on the other hand, a less accurate understanding of an intentionally examined area of focus being orchestrated through an inadequate overall transcendental suspension, etc. To what extent, the above accepted, can we re-direct the course of our phenomenal-phenomenological productivity in and through processes of such intervention? To what extent can intentional re-self-organization intervene on a phenomeno-phenomenological basis? And apparent intervention obviously accepted, since we do seem to be able to intervene in the course of reality, to what extent can this process of intervention be conducted in an authentic manner (if that were possible)? (1257)

	A first position in answering this question on the possibility for and the possibility of the instantiation of authenticity let us note that when we are in conformity with phenomenal-phenomenological reality then we are acting authentically both passively and actively, i.e., in our being registered with and our registering/re-registering of that sense of a received and reconstructed reality. That conformity is arrived at in and through the adequate functioning of the overall transcendental suspension. More correctly, conformity is relative conformity and never absolute conformity. By the same token, inauthenticity is relative non-conformity but never absolute non-conformity. By implication some degree of authenticity must forever be present and that non-conformity can only be relative non-conformity in a peripheral sense. That existentialization is always a relative re-conforming of the relatively non-authentic, i.e., of the relatively non-conforming (implying that non-authenticity is a disconformity with a relatively more fundamental existential coursing of reality). That given relative reproductive conformity but never absolute reproductive conformity, a reproduced difference must arise, however minute, which can shift our sense of position  (and self-positioning) and therein move us towards a process of change (be that chaotically induced or non-chaotically induced). (1258)

	However, be that as it may, how does a distinctive form of value privileging (as noted in our ordered analyses) find itself being preserved in and through an adequate overall transcendental suspension? In what manner are ethical preoccupations authentically augmented or non-authentically non-augmented in practice? (1259)

	All intentionally directed activity is orchestrated by apposite meta-textual genres of activity (which are generally preserved and reinforced through utilization). Complexity in such matters usually being pre-negotiated (by virtue of the pre-existence of such genres) and thence generally re-negotiated in a similar fashion (whether by default or micro-engineering). The utilization of these applications, therefore, is generally maintained in and through and across the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension and all other suspensions concerned with the same type of phenomenological material. Furthermore the existential reality of such applications is preserved through ensuing re-simulation, albeit with micro-modifications, hrbridizations, re-qualifications, re-directions, etc. In all of this value is augmented or de-augmented but never merely destroyed or merely created\re-created. Hence the relative preservation of the application of a mix of distinctive orders in our engagement with the world and that the same equally applies to the utilization of complex patterns of interaction (with less emphasis upon one type of ordered value). In the hermeneutic circle of comprehension meta-textual considerations of genre, etc., are re-simulated and therein maintained in accordance with the adequacy or inadequacy of the ensuing overall transcendental suspension. Thus the prejudice of the prejudgment is relatively preserved despite the neutrality and neutralizing of the suspension. In this we can make a distinction between a (practical) non-virtual act of conformity and a (theoretical) virtual act of conformity. That the overall transcendental suspension is more concerned with the latter, although, on the breaking of the suspension, our concerns then switch to the former through the realization of a relative asymmetry within the productivity of that associated suspension. That, existentially, a non-virtual, asymmetrical response authentically exercised would then be in conformity with the existential nature of that relationship (in its existential contextualization with the rest of the world) through its practical projection (to the extent that its existential descriptors and relational axes are) in conformity with the directivedness of its relational nature (when examined from a critical historical perspective). We are now in a position to understand the transcendental value of an (intentionally directed) economy. (1260)

	Between the apparent value of an economy and its intentional objectivity (inserted into that same economy and re-constituted therein) we have noted a non-absolute difference. This is its relational difference – the degree to which value is realized above and beyond its mere materially oriented inputs. The surplus of value therein realized is then immediately re-invested back into its matrix of origination. So, that accepted, how is value to be appreciated given its full sublimation back into its context of origination? Because this residue leaves a residue (or meta-residue), namely, as a trace or, i.e., as a traced out trace. In other words, sublimation can not be complete (and absolutely isomorphic with this simultaneous emergence of value). In essence value, moment by moment, emerges and de-emerges, being submerged within its matrix of origination. Still, a differential between all of the same continues to super-emerge and colour the nature of that engagement. Hence a residual relational difference. This colour being relatively authentic or relatively non-authentic in orientation. Authenticity being realized when there is relative conformity to the existential coursing of that situational simulation. I.e., when there is a relative non-obstruction to its natural coursing. Can this theoretical understanding be given an adequate metaphorical instantiation (in order to put some flesh on this concept)? E.g., let us examine the following: how might an ethical process be put in play between a person with a large quantity of food reasonably close to a person with little or no access to food. How should its ethical course be existentially construed given this essential and adequate reading of that situation? The food-rich person discovers a person who is not adequately supplied with food. The first person’s discovery and observation of the food-poor individual puts these two people in a direct relationship with each other (regardless of the awareness or non-awareness of the second individual vis-à-vis as to the existence of the first party and/or their possession of food-resources). Now, an awareness by the first individual of the second establishes a direct sense of a relationship in keeping with the manner of that interaction being exercised. An authenticity of spirit would read that relationship as between a person with food and person with a relative paucity of the same. Authenticity of response would then ensure in such a manner that some of the food belonging to the first person is shared directly or indirectly with the second person. So a distribution of food ensures. This has the consequence of augmenting the nature of their relationship and preserving the greatest degree of value in this world between these two individuals (even if the second party is not aware of the first?). However, in a qualification of this a priori vision of the world of but one relationship we in truth find all our relationships embedded in the same Life-World in such a manner as to impinge upon each other, doing so in different ways and with different means and to varying degrees of relational intensity. There might be other hungry people in the vicinity of these two individuals and who should also be able to share or receive such a basic condition for life as the possession of food through an extension of this argument. Through empathy a process of redistribution should occur. In effect, the overall quality of this world is augmented (since the unnecessary death of an individual, and their resulting loss of input, could be read as loss in value in this same world, etc.). The point of this demonstration indicating that the preservation and augmentation of the existential richness found to be in conformity with the existential coursing of a relationship embedded in the Life-World should be considered as a process undergoing authentication.(1261)
	It would appear, therefore, that the value in a world is preserved through re-simulation across the ongoing overall transcendental suspension, moreover, a process of existentialization ensues when there is an augmentation in the value of that system under examination. By the same means, or similar, a theologian could treat a theological difference (as a residual theological difference) along the same lines as a relational difference (as a residual relational difference) by virtue of the fact that no difference on structural grounds can and should be discerned between the same. Let me demonstrate on hypothetical grounds how there can be difference between value and intentional objectivity, and, the defining sense of a theological difference (be that natural, mundane and/or trans-mundane). (1262)
	A theological difference has been defined as that difference proposed by a theologian between a vision of ‘a world with some semblance of a divine aspect’ and a vision of ‘a world with no semblance of a divine aspect’. This theological difference could be seen as that theological value that emerges beyond the mere value of its inputs (and by extension is not sublimated through non-theological re-investment). Similarly, relational difference is relatively isomorphic in this regard (and by extension is not sublimated through non-relational re-investment). Let me show this isomorphism through symbolic notation. Let the world be W and its sum of value be V. Hence a (residual) relational difference is V-W. Then, in parallel (as will be shown) let the world be W and sum of theological value be T. Thence a (residual) theological difference is T-W. As it stands, no structural differences assumed, then V-W : T-W from a structural point of view are isomorphic, i.e., therefore - V-W : T-W is isomorphic iff (V-W : T-W)’. (1263)
	All that need be shown now is that a natural theological difference, a mundane theological difference and a trans-mundane theological difference are all sructurally isomorphic with each other and with the existential structure of a relational difference. I.e., from a meta-textual/meta-level perspective the existential structure(s) of a relational difference are all relatively isomorphic with a theological difference despite its formulation (as a difference) and (the superposition/imposition of all forms of speculative imputation). However, that accepted, would not the emergence of value and its co-de-emergence and investment in its relational matrix/theological matrix imply that there could be no form of value as a differential in the first place. Or, should we ask to what extent and in what manner are a relational difference/theological difference (from a residual perspective) able both to exist and not to exist given co-emergence and co-dissolution of that emergence, and, to what extent a relational difference might be seen to intersect with a theological difference (be that in consideration natural, mundane or trans-mundane in complexion). (1264)
	Given the co-emergence of value from its contextualized contextual context and its simultaneous co-sublimation back into its relational context (both inter-relationally and intra-relationally) the question arises if this process of reciprocity is absolutely symmetrical and without a residue? And we have answered such a question by arguing for an adequate non-absolute process of re-reproduced conformity but qualified by the fact that there can be no absolute process of reproductive symmetry. Thence the incremental arising of a relational residue (as a residual relational difference). In effect, this residual relational difference becomes a relational difference by virtue of the fact that there can be no absolute form of a non-a-priori reproductive symmetry. This asymmetry expressing itself as an instantiated relational difference, albeit as a residual relational difference. Hence a micro-difference through non-absolute isomorphism, despite relative isomorphism, between co-relational expression and co-relational sublimation is effectively re-expressed as a residual relational difference. (1265)
	What evidence can be found for this concept(s) of the (re-)expression of a (residual) relational difference? (1266)
	In the (life-)world of physics we have the phenomena of fusion and fission. In the former we find that the fused synthesis of relatively light atoms releases a certain degree of energy by virtue of that synthesis. E.g., the hydrogen bomb. At the other end of the spectrum, relatively heavy elements when subject to an act of fission release energy. E.g., nuclear weapons based on the fission of uranium (U235) or plutonium (P239). (1267)
	In the above examples we can see that a relational difference can make quite a difference (however minute in quantitative or qualitative terms vis-à-vis its causal and/or consequential significance). How is it the case that we can appreciate this subtle input, this subtle sense of re-direction versus mere redirection? (1268)
	I would like to answer this rhetorical question by noting that somehow when we are dealing with the constitution of a simulation through a process of re-simulation we can discriminate relative inputs of a holistic orientation versus inputs of a relatively non-holistic orientation. When we see a crowd of people we see both ‘a’ crowd of people and a crowd of ‘people’ (with the latter in a plural sense of ‘persons’). We see both at the same time. It is almost as if our perception is simultaneously conducted both analytically and synthetically. And here relational difference is the emergent identity imputed above and beyond the merely analytically oriented inputs. Now, this is not problematic as in transformational (treatment-retreatment) philosophy three forms of treatment-type are presupposed simultaneously despite the current preference of treatment under focus. Those three types are synthetical, analytical and identificational (in orientation). Thus, when synthetic evaluation is the overt focus of our concern then analytical and identificational concerns are relatively covert and background in orientation. But, in truth, no type of examination could be conducted without overt (inputs of focus) and covert inputs (of contrast). In this pursuit, when we are dealing with processes of simulation through re-simulation all processes of synthesis, analysis and identification are co-produced. We see both ‘the’ crowd and crowding of ‘many’ people therein. Moreover, we can see the relational difference between these various expressions of the same state of affairs to the extent that we can impute a perceived will of the mass(es); as in, e.g., that crowd of angry people is coming this way. Best get out of the way. Or, this crowd is a military regiment on parade and will most likely peacefully pass us by as it is merely on parade. Not only can intent be ascribed to the totality of a state of affairs but also to individual aspects of the same. Within and across this spectrum of imputational possibility a relational difference would naturally be simulated through re-simulation. Then, moreover, our being in the same one World-of-Life would imply our direct engagement with the same and all imputations therein envisaged. Thus, all forms of relational difference, be they non-theological in orientation or theological in orientation would be directly engaged and envisaged. Furthermore, an essential understanding would be realized in our engagement with the same to the extent that this understanding is essentially holistic in nature, i.e., that not only an essential appreciation of the totality is to be perceived or apperceived but also all relatively significant non-totalistically oriented inputs would also be received to some extent or other (be that in conscious intentional awareness or in pre-intentional awareness). In other words, all forms of relational difference are engaged in and through our engagement with that under examination. However, a question must be posed as to the extent a holistic synthesis could be appreciated given that appreciation is both focused and apperceived from a higher meta-frame of reference (be that in the form of an associated  ‘horizontal’ background or an engaged ‘vertical’ sense of subjectivity)? (1269)
	The problem indicated here is that as intentional awareness is focalized upon an intentional object(ive)-state how could a sense of totality be apperceived? But as such states of affairs can be appreciated the question is not ‘if’ but ‘how’ this is to be achieved (in the context of our appreciation of intentional consciousness)? Then, by extension, localized objectivity can be appreciated (both covertly in its associated field of reception and subjectively) then how is the holistic unity of the world to be apperceived? Through an essential holism. The flavour of a synthetic state is appreciated albeit from a certain limited perspective of the agent as currently engaged. The ground beneath my feet is perceived as solid, that a certain distance of space is envisaged there between myself and this vision of a crowd of people heading in this direction. My engagement, however limited and curtailed, with this approaching phenomena also entails the intentionally directed appreciation of a certain essential flavour that I will impute as the nature of that phenomena as perceived from my current point of view (rightly or wrongly but never absolutely right nor absolutely wrong in apperception). In effect we can discern and discriminate between relatively emergent phenomena and relatively non-emergent phenomena arising in the same phenomenal-state-of-affairs. Thence all apposite senses of a relational difference must also be in play to that extent they can be focused upon in turn through an awareness of their basic essential configuration as constituted intentionally in our awareness of the same. What are the implications of this insight that an essential understanding of the associated sense of relational difference can also be appreciated, albeit through a focused token-awareness of their essential holism? (1270)
	Through an appreciation of limitation (as to where and how a certain relationship is located) along with a discernment of causal and consequential inputs all thematized forms of relational difference can be intuitively appreciated. Moreover, such an enriched act of appreciation must also be engaged in both passive and active registers by virtue of the fact that reception can neither be purely passive nor purely active in manifestation. Thus, all forms of relational difference, whether theologically oriented or non-theologically oriented, in effect, are and must be lived by virtue of the fact that no form of engagement can be purely passive in its manifestation! In this semblance of existential objectivity significance is appreciated, indeed, is also engaged, and, therein, lived! Such engagement ‘being truly lived’ to that extent there is an existential conformity with its fully effective and effected authenticity of enactment. (1271)
	In this scheme as noted, if granted, how is theological difference to be appreciated and engaged? (1272)
	Authenticity demands an existential conformity between means and ends, possibilities and actualities effected, a sense of the past and the sense of future (in a viable sense of the present), etc. In effect, as essentially mirrored or indicated (intimated or hinted at) through the suspension of the overall transcendental suspension. Given the imposition of this suspension then an existential surplus can be read as a transcendental phenomenon qua transcendental phenomenon. Moreover, given this emergence of existential value (and its identification with relational difference and its inclusion of a theological difference, and its sublimation back into its basis of origination, we need to ask to what extent this process cannot be perfectly mirrored? To what extent a relational (and theological) residue or trace could be released and expressed through such the act of an overall transcendental suspension? In a recent essay I noted: 
Finally, it should be noted that an absolute-relativism is not able to be obtained, and, that a relative-relativism is just not entertained outside the transcendental-suspension (given the nature of the suspension, and, no values can be equivalent). (30)
In this passage I argue that an absolutistic version or vision of relativism could be neither thought epistemologically nor recognized ontologically. Furthermore, that a relative-relativism and it reduction of all positions to a similar, if not equivalent, status was only entertainable within the confines of the overall transcendental suspension. That, in effect, no view is ever absolutely equivalent with any other view in terms of its value. So, how is the suspension balanced? By exactly negating, more or less, the values under suspension. Whereas, on the other hand, the value of a certain position cannot be absolutely equivalent to the value of some other position however psychically close to the position under comparative evaluation. That granted, in the suspension a form of relative-relativism is engaged through suspended balance and negation, this treatment being broken in the suspension of the suspension. Through an eruption of value an existential surplus of value is released as an emission through the breaking of all relevant currents within the context of a simulated system in question. However, I have noted that this eruption or emission of value is also sublimated back into its basis of origination. Now, I would like to note, that this process can never be perfectly symmetrical even though, effectively, expression and its sublimation may appear to be complete. Yet, given a non-absolute re-absorption it follows that a residual vestige or trace is also released and I would like to argue that it is this trace in the context of an associated bifurcation that can release an even greater degree of value given the complexity of that chaotically induced and triggered event moment. So, most moments of suspension do not radically self-engineer a moment of relatively radical re-direction, however, those moments that can are only in need of a trace-differential to ensure that peripheral change of state (since it is impossible for reality itself to radically change since only aspects of it can enter into a process of re-direction be that intentional in orientation and/or non-intentional in orientation). From within and across this gap how does this relational residue make itself evident to intentional consciousness and if that entracement were some form of theological difference (be it natural, mundane and/or trans-mundane in orientation) how would we both encounter and recognize it (as a part of/apart from its non-theologically oriented matrix of origination?)? Need we make such a distinction (between a relational, non-theologically oriented entracement and a relational, theologically oriented entracement)? Although no distinction could be observed from an absolute or transcendental point of view (between the non-theologically oriented and the theologically-oriented), given the right hermeneutic framework, might it be realized along the same grounds that intentionally can be observed in consequential behaviour versus merely causal processes? In a sense, imputing a semblance of theological intentionality to theological differences if and when observed as a theologically-oriented difference qua theologically-oriented difference. This model granted (speculatively), in what manner do we perceive intentional behaviour as intentional behaviour and not merely some form of a physiologically-environmentally oriented causal process (in contrast to an intentionally directed consequential behaviour)? Just how do we impute ‘intentionally directed behaviour’ (and by extension ‘theologically directed behaviour’?)? Through imputation (as duly noted) and by noting the associated comparatively enriched existential surplus of value accompanying this process of imputation. In other words, we assume consequential behaviour (rather than mere causal processes) when that type of imputation is at its most productive. Of course such a process assumes the existence of intent, i.e., the deliberate exercise of intentional resolution; which, in turn, presupposes an intentional problematic. Can such a modeling be analogically extended theologically be that in a natural theological setting (of a world unity) and/or in a mundane/trans-mundane theological setting? Even though, ultimately, there can be little or no real difference between the same? Indeed, from an absolute or transcendental perspective all imputation qua imputation is mere simulation (fixated through re-simulation). Basically, how could we tell the metaphorical hand of the Divine from the natural course of worldly events (or even the intentional intervention of a diabolical influence given that much world history is re-directed non-existentially!)?. (1273)
	Just how do we differentiate the imputed presence of transcendental subjectivity from non-transcendental subjectivity? Through the productive imputation of a transcendental subject! How is this type of project analytically reflected upon, synthetically ascertained in interpretative meta-textual terms of reference, and, creatively engaged existentially? How is such engagement read and to-be-read in theoretical, practical and critical terms of reference? Just how is personhood engaged? (1274)
	To begin with, let me suggest that this experience of extra-subjectivity is realized through a distinctive sense of relational power. We are co-opted by the other, and the other is co-opted by us. The nature of this power is understood. It co-opts us in terms we understand, and in turn, we co-opt others in terms that they understand or will come to understand. All this is pre-negotiated, conventionalized through apposite genres of expectation and interactive dissemination of personal power. And reflects its equivalent location epistemologically in a hierarchy of epistemological organization that is co-reflected upon ourselves as well. We are asked to do something, and, in turn, we can ask someone to do something for us. We are co-opted and we co-opt. Without this associated genre of expectation there could be no mutual recognition of a process of co-option. Can this model be extended to a reception of theological difference in such a manner that its relatively ‘more sophisticated’ epistemological organization could be both read and recognized as possessing some degree of imputed subjectivity? More precisely, need this model be extended towards all forms of theological difference be that natural, mundane and/or trans-mundane? Furthermore, how might relatively more sophisticated subjectivity be read given our relative lack of epistemological sophistication? (1275)
	If a theologian were to interpret a certain event as a form of theological co-option how might they go about this task of interpretation? Treating the relevant sense(s) of the Divine being invoked in this regard, just what forms of relationship are hypothetically available? As argued in a recent paper I would suggest two extreme forms of ‘interaction’ and a more moderate form of interaction distinctively different in between. Those two extremes are of a wholly-other sense of non-interaction bordering on alienation (for both parties) and a sense of absolute oppression (with a directly proportional loss of self for the oppressed party). In between, we have quite a different spectrum of interaction, namely, at its best, a catalytic and productive sense of interaction. Indeed, through the relative absence or presence of an organized criticality this style would oscillate between the relatively mundane with an ongoing sameness of redirection and an exciting existential sense of re-direction in a novelty of re-positioning. Could the theologian adopt and adapt this type of scenario? I believe they could, but, would still be left with a fundamental problem of how they would be able to ‘prove’ a theologically-oriented mental set or interpretative outlook in this regard. All that could be left to them would be the reasonableness of such an interpretative position, the comparative value of such an interpretative frame of reference and whatever forms of transcendental necessity (beyond a mundane theological position) they might be able to argue for. Is such a task a worthwhile venture? Such would be an important task for the ‘religious’ support of their congregations. By ‘religious’ is meant here the richness of value that can be existentially devolved in this direction of a theological interpretation of reality, especially everyday reality and the reality of our interactions with others! For a considerable number of people the world is a religious world they live in and it needs to be constructed in such a manner that is existentially supportive of such a lifestyle. Such a construction needs to assist the religious needs of the congregation but at the same time not support non-existential attitudes towards the world like various modern forms of extremism and fundamentalism nor, for that matter, certain disreputable practices from Pre-Reformational, Reformational, Counter-Reformation and post-Reformational period in Western cultural history. How might the theologian first guard against such culturally (and truly non-spiritual) forms of ideological extremism and immanent consequential adversity flowing in the wake of such disruptive attitudes? Let me outline an approach to this type of topic and then suggest what guidelines would be necessary for constructing an existentially oriented form of theology that could possibly be adapted along the lines of a more traditional approach? (1276)
	To commence this first task I would like to very briefly sketch out a theory of truth-determination and value-formation in which the concept of re-alignment can be seen to offer us some degree of protection from needing to adopt an extremist program (however impossible such a program is in experiential reality). Then, from a recognition of the impossibility of any form of extreme engagement (encountering and recognition) we then need to prepare the ground for a non-extremist position in which an ongoing process of existential re-alignment can be introduced and exercised. By discarding the impossible and dealing with the possible the theologian could then constructively adopt and adapt such an approach for purposes more in line with the vocational nature of their profession? (1277)
	In as recent book by Charles Seife, Decoding the Universe, I have learnt that quantum information is configured in such a way that it cannot be subjected to two impossible actions or processes, namely, such information cannot be perfectly replicated nor can it be absolutely deleted! All manipulation of information is somewhere in between. Now, translated through an iterative philosophical lens I would translate this to mean that ‘mere iteration’ is conventionally possible but absolutely impossible, and, ‘sheer iteration’ can never veer off in such a manner as to absolutely destroy all information. In some form of manner nothing is absolutely lost or can it be absolutely repeated in exactly the same manner. Furthermore, patterns of ‘bare iteration’ would be a mechanism that would act as a form of error correction. However, as noted, such a process cannot be a process of absolute iterative accuracy. Between these three polarities, impossible to obtain, we have the formation of the overall transcendental suspension and its parallel in the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension as discussed elsewhere on numerous occasions). Taking a gestalt approach we have achieved the same degree of understanding, namely, that focus and field, e.g., (along with associated senses of subjectivity/inter-subjectivity) can never take a non-interactive form. As noted, and forever should be stressed, value can only arise though relationships! Consequently, intentional production can only arise within thee natural constraints and hence such constraints on truth-determination and its correlative value-formation (be that in terms of sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness). Taking all of this into account means that any sense of position that is arrived at should not be treated in any absolute sense! Furthermore, through the very iterative nature of its formation it implies that we must continue to re-position ourselves in this regard! Hence this concept of re-alignment. (1278)
	What is implicated in such an approach? The ongoing exercise of the overall transcendental suspension! We need to continually re-practice this sense of suspension in order to be existentially realigned! And existential re-alignment demands the ongoing utilization of an existentially oriented overall transcendental suspension, and v.v. By such means we are no longer at the mercy of a priori attitudes of others and ourselves! By continually re-imposing the overall suspension we are continually neutralizing all sense of positioning along with the flow of ontological and epistemological commitments that rightfully and/or wrongly flow from the same. By being able to disconnect our commitments and finding a sense of existential re-affirmation in and through and beyond this sense of suspension we can find an existential sense of commitment in and through and beyond re-commitment! Hence this formula of commitment through re-commitment! As a consequence of such an attitude we should recognize that it is impossible to adhere to any form of extremism by virtue of the fact that extreme forms of reality cannot be engaged with, i.e., can be neither ontologically encountered nor epistemologically recognized! Hence, from such understanding, the rejection of such a position along with the full adoption of this sense of existential re-positioning through continual re-alignment. What are the existential benefits of such an attitude and practice? (1279)
	By being able to be ‘re-aligned’ we benefit from both ‘being aligned’ and ‘being re-aligned’. In the former we find ourselves standing in alignment with the way things are, and, in the later, we find ourselves standing in alignment with the way things have just become. Moreover, in the latter, in an openness to how things are and have become we become more flexible and in tune with reality as constructed by-us for-us. Furthermore, this ability to suspend opens us up to subtly of interaction, through ongoing thematization, that would otherwise escape us. (1280)
	Not all forms of fundamentalism need be variants of absolutist style philosophicalization. The mere getting back to fundamentals, with or without a set of ‘original texts’, need not be conducted in an absolutist type of format. How then does one discern and distinguish between a version or vision of philosophy that is absolutist or non-absolutist? The latter is amenable to being suspended. The latter is amenable to an inter-faith style of dialogue be that with other denominations, other faiths, and/or forms of secularism (be that atheism, agnosticism, humanism, secularist conventions, etc.). In the following section of this essay let me look more closely at this ‘test’ of suspension and (interfaith) dialogue. (1281)
	To conclude this section of my extended essay let me now look into what difference a theological difference makes or does not make? (1282)
	Does a theological difference make a difference? I would like to answer that with a “yes” and a “no”. Let me explain. Obviously, a person’s support for a theological difference is one way for them to declare their religious faith in some sense of the Divine. On the other hand, I have also argued that everyone must support some sense of a mundane theological difference by virtue of the fact that we all perceive the world as having some sense of a distinctive reality in its own right above and beyond its mere constituents. This sense of ‘a’ world as ‘the’ world gives it a sense of persistence and distinctive identity. That granted we find we then must find a profound basis for a dialogue be that with a religious person or a non-religious person, be that with a person with the same faith or a vastly different faith. Furthermore, as already noted, this ability to enter into a dialogue also marks out ‘our world of faith’ as one constituted in a non-absolutist sense of positioning and, therein, as one open to the ongoing authenticity of a more a-tuned sense of re-positioning and consequent re-alignment along with the positive consequential implications that stem from such a fundamentally authentic attitude to take with-others before-others. Let me now examine this level of interaction wherein through re-positioning we find ourselves open to others along a discovery of a deeper sense of personal and interpersonal commitment through re-commitment to be found in this sense of (a transcendentally responsive) re-positioning! (1283)