A Hypothetical Defense of the Theologian
And its Ramifications in the Form of a Theological Democracy

Conference Paper 2006 (The Continental Philosophy Group)

Brief Synopsis

A.	1.	Commensurability of  Intersecting Discourses (869-875)
	2.	Commensurability of All Discourses (872) 

B.	3.	Putting the Theologian on Trial (864-879, etc.)
4.	Parallels with Contemporary Physics (865)

C.	5.	Mere Phenomena versus Mere Phenomena-as-Constructed-By-Us (872)
6.	      Mere Theological-Phenomena-as-Constructed-By-Us (876, etc.)

D.	7.	The Analogy of the Ants and the Computer (882)
8.	      Some of the Ramifications of this Analogy (883-885)

E.	9.	Phenomenological Democracy (1043-1050)
	10.	Theological Democracy (1049-1050, Conclusion)

O.   Introduction

	In a first volume of papers I explored the neutral theological idea of the ‘Divine’ in order to examine whether such a concept is possible and meaningful. In a second volume, in the form of an extended essay, I have continued these hypothetical investigations to explore in what manner this concept of the ‘Divine’ could be defined (identity), might be seen to operate (work) and be valued (value) by theologists, i.e., people who accept and practice a theological mode-of-life. In this pursuit I am primarily interested in what minimal transcendental limits and conditions must be positively in place and negative non-transgressed against in order for this type of discourse to effectively operate (if at all?). Even if the Divine were not to exist (as a place-maker) and merely operated as mythological-like concept (as a place-marker) still the theological mode-of-life in general has a considerable intellectual and economic importance in the world, and, that neither the virtual and/or the non-virtual status of this concept should stop us from examining this inter-cultural aspect of our World-of-Life which we share with others in its ideality as the footprint that this type of discourse has upon our world is considerable and increas-ingly problematic in this age of globalization and increased inter-cultural exchange. (i)

	In this paper I will be briefly examining, through quotation, various sections of this extended essay in order to make a number of points: 

First, in Section A, paragraphs 869-875, I would like to show that phenomena can never be mere phenomena but are phenomena-in-frames-of-reference-constructed-by-us and that the same phenomenal referentcan be referred to through an infinity of frames of reference. E.g., I look at a farmer discussing the nature of his pasture with a geologist and finding two different but commensurable discourses concerning the landscape of this farm. In this regard, I  remembered a very recent trip I made to Mt Wilson and was astonished at how beautiful the volcanic soils there were compared to the thin, impoverished continental soils of the surrounding Blue Mts. I propose, through this example, that some discourses are commensurable, and, through argument that all discourses are commensurable by virtue of the fact that they are all constructed in and through the commonality of human intentionality. (ii)

	Second, in Section B, paragraphs 864, etc., I put the theologian on trial in order to examine if they have been obtaining a livelihood under false pretences? A parallel is drawn to the general discourse of Contemporary Physics and its current inability to coherently and extensively treat its own discipline as one integrated discourse (865). (iii)

	Third, in Section C, paragraphs 872, 876, etc., I broadly argue that theological phenomena must to some extent be hermeneutically pre-constructed by us in and through genres (of literary and practical activity) and frames of reference (through the adoption and adaptation of a variety of religious-theological perspectives). (iv)

	Fourth, in Section D, paragraphs 882-885, etc., I explore the comparative ramifications of an analogy between ‘a colony of ants living within the physical confines of a super-computer’ and that ‘we could well be living within the world in a similar fashion.’ The primary intention of this analogy being the mere establishment of the possibility of a process theological interpretation of our cosmos (the universe as revealed through the Hubble Telescope, e.g.). (v)

	Lastly, in Section E, paragraphs 1043-1050, I explore the ramification of this phenomenological understanding that we cannot interact with ‘mere phenomena’ but only with ‘phenomena as interpreted by us as intersecting through an infinity of frames of reference’. As a consequence I propose a theological democracy (1049) in parallel to this phenomenological democracy, wherein competing views of the Divine can co-occur, co-exist and co-inhabit within the same World-of-Life. That, indeed, religious traditions themselves, whether aware of this fact or not, possess a veritable variety of strands of interpretation of varying degrees of harmony/dis-harmony despite protestations that might be made otherwise. That, hopefully, an acceptance of this concept of a theological democracy might contribute to an inter-faith dialogue, both culturally and inter-culturally, and help create and promote an eventual climate of world peace. (vi)

1.   Extracts from Section 6 (864-887) in Volume II

B3	If the theologian were to be on trial, so to speak, how could they assemble enough evidence to support the viable nature of their profession? If they were to claim a Divine economy and could give no evidence for the existence of the same how should we perceive the nature of their profession? Could we say they were gainfully employed? On the other hand, we have the persistence of theological memes and should be able to argue, on those grounds, that what motivates their existence must have a well-established basis. How are we to account for this professional discrepancy between evidence and expectation? (864)

B4	To some extent I perceive the world of physics to be in a similar quandary. If matter as we know it only constitutes say seven percent of the universe (the rest being constituted by dark energy and dark matter) then how is the physicist able to say they are in control of their profession when they are unable to account for ninety-three percent of their topic. Moreover, the scandal is even deeper since the small amount of  territory they do seem to be in control of is itself riven by the apparently incommensurable divide situated between micro-cosmically oriented quantum based descriptions and macro-cosmically oriented description based on relativity theory. Is the theologian any worse in this regard? Well, if they have no direct evidence to hand of a Divine economy could they argue that there is sufficient evidence of an indirect nature to establish the grounds of their profession? How should such claims in that direction be processed and critically evaluated? Then, how would those claims, in turn, be critically re-evaluated? (865)

	Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a theologian is addressing his congregation in the middle of a storm and there is a sudden clap of thunder directly overhead. The theologian surmises out loud that that is the voice of God - “Hear the voice of God for he has spoken..!” However, this congregation is not a passive spectator of what the theologian does and says. One of the congregation shouts out: “But what does the voice of God say if that were to be the voice of God?” Another member of the congregation then adds: “He says nothing, he only makes a noise!” A person beside this last speaker adds: “This sound makes no sense, this God makes no sense!” Then another voice speaks out: “That is not the voice of God, that is only a bolt of lightening – nothing more and nothing less!” Then another voice cries out “There is no God, God does not exist!” Then a chorus of voices give voice to the thought: “That if God does not exist for-us then he may as well not exist for-us!” In the midst of all these observations and opinions the theologian feels he will be out of a job very soon at this rate. Thinking quickly, in a sonorous voice above the fray he proffers the following solution, hopefully, to calm their doubts…. (866)

	Now, if you were that theologian, what hypothetical solution might you proffer to account for the direct and/or indirect evidence of a Divine economy intersecting with our human economy (or at least account for the relative lack of direct evidence yet proffer a rational perspective in which to investigate indirect elements of Divine intervention and/or, at the very least, some minimal degree of Divine participation with or without the use of proxies?).  (867)

	Now, as a meta-theologian, or as a hypothetical theological-philosopher, it is not my job to indicate and prove the existence of the Divine along with the existence of a Divine economy. On the other hand, we could suggest some possibilities for the theologian to adopt in order to assist them in a validation of their own practice if that were at all possible. Do we have a hypothetical remedy, or, better, a set of options that would allow them to argue beyond some form of a puerile circularity of argument that might establish for them the existence of the Divine but would not inspire confidence in a neutral bystander? As an intellectual exercise how might you hypothetically extricate that theologian, any theologian for that matter, from the charge that their profession is ungainfully realized and, therein, obtained under false pretences? Or should we give our assent to the view that there is no way out for the theologian? That if the Divine cannot sensibly reveal itself to all and sundry then we must decry all such professions of faith as mere noise, no more nor no less, in sound, than that loud, simultaneous flash and clap of thunder that was to perplex that very vocal congregation with such a conflagration of reasonable doubts? (868)

	As noted in this extended essay, the religious economy is usually a complex mix of competing economies some of which are more dominant and others less dominant. So, e.g., a soteriological economy in a prominent religion/religious denomination might be philosophically constructed with associated devotional inputs, there might be ritualistic elements, sacrificial practices, moralistic prescriptions, meditational procedures, acts of mortification, etc., etc. Then, as the religious economy intersects with the economics of the world no absolute division of labour could be drawn between the same. We have to eat, we have to sleep, truly we are in the world even if we were to think we may not be off it! So, in a similar fashion to this non-absolute division between the complexities of a religious economy and non-religious economies is it not conceivable that the Divine economy, should it exist, might not be able to be absolutely separated from this mix of religious and non-religious economies as already found in the world? That, that granted, it then behooves the theologian, or the meta-theologian, to offer persuasive explanations that might be able to account for a religious basis in life (for those people naturally sympathetic to that type of life-project?)? In this task one would then need to parallel these parallel and intersecting economies in an interpretative framework that offers a considerably greater degree of explanatory power than that merely attendant upon a merely fabricated system regardless of the nature and manner of its synthetic constitution. In other words, in the narrations of the theologian what types of explanation might be considered acceptable and successful in the articulation of such a life-project? By what criteria other than these pragmatic aspirations should such a project be judged? By all those criteria that seem to support any hypothesis presented in the course of our existence through this World-of-Life! By utilizing all those means that are proper, appropriate and valid, and, are relatively consistent, internally, with that overall type of project! (868)

A1	So, we have these competing parallel economies intersecting with each other in various manners… let us ask to what extent parallel economies could intersect? To what extent is our metaphor of the parallel at odds with reality, or v.v? If these various simultaneous economies were truly parallel to each other they could not intersect. But we live in the openness of ‘one’-World-of-Life and nowhere do we find incommensurable universes of value! A landscape painter might view the land in a different manner to say a geologist or a farmer or a person looking for wild mushrooms, etc. Still, they each view the same landscape, albeit in their own manner in and through processes of mutual observation and discussion. By such means each person can then relate to how another might view that state of affairs in question. In this instance, they have the land in front of them to describe how they might see it from their particular set of perspectives. So, obviously, unlike some badly informed Postmodern philosophers, our metaphor of ‘parallel’ should not be taken too far! All these perspectives, all these ‘parallel’ economies could operate at the same time both semi-independently and collectively. Moreover, they can all be related to each other by various transformational rulings, etc. To do this various transformational rules are noted once processes of accommodation are adequately established. E.g., we could have two friends, one a geologist and the other a farmer. The geologist might say to their friend “that this upland region is volcanic in nature and, effectively, is a recent basalt poured over an ancient, eroded limestone region with very low soil nutrient properties, and, that from the weathering of this recent basaltic cap the soil here is high in prerequisite minerals and organic nutrients, and, that this explains why the vegetation and grass that grows here on this upland plateau is very green and luxurious.” So,” the dairy farmer might say in reply, “that is why my herd of cows on this farm here give such good quality milk.” The geologist nodding his head in assent. The province of the geologist is essentially below the surface of the land whereas the province of the diary farmer is the vegetation growing on the surface of their farm. Obviously, both disciplines can talk to each other in such a manner that is meaningful and can cross beyond the pure disciplines they each have professionally adopted! In comparison to eroded ancient continental soils the weathering of recent volcanic basalts produces a much better soil for farming! A theoretical connection is created that allows for a meaningful accommodation to be made between these two friends. (869)

	Can the theologian find a moral in this story? Should the theologian find a moral in this type of anecdote? Obviously, our two friends, the geologist and the farmer, can talk to each other. But does that imply all forms of discourse are commensurable? We have illustrated only that some discourse-types are commensurable! Furthermore, the description that some discourses can be accommodated does not imply that the injunction that ‘all discourses are commensurable to some degree or other’ necessarily follows! So, how could we universalize this type of observation and transform this into a universal observation with, consequently, a universalized moral for the theologian? (870)

A2	I believe our intuition ‘that all discourses are ultimately commensurable’ can be ‘grounded’ on intentional grounds and on the mutuality of an existentially shared Life-World. That these two grounds, effectively, exist back to back! Through the mutual interconnectivity of the Life-World ‘our’ individually experienced intentional life is also ‘our’ socially shared intentional life as members of a linguistic culture embedded in a world of linguistic culture/s. No thought is intentionally entertained without an inter-subjective meta-textual aspect. Equally, no meta-textual genre exists without its re-iteration in a world of culture within an overall World-of-Culture, i.e., the Life-World. As we must (transcendentally) think in the same fundamental intentional manner as all other thinkers (on transcendental grounds) and linguistic habit carves up the sense of our psychic universe it follows that all such linguistic artifacts can be ultimately accommodated by the mutuality of this linguistic expression of the Life-World as it is found there-for-‘us’! Of course the devil is in the detail. Some forms of accommodation may just not be worth the effort, producing little existential excess of value despite the systematic interconnections realized in their synthetic union. E.g., the game of chess is often compared to the art of warfare. Indeed, it may well have arisen out of a military context to the extent that various pieces might well have represented various elements of ancient warfare. We can still ‘see’ that in the names of the various pieces today. The game certainly seems to represent and simulate a political mode-of-life if not just a militaristic one! Now, these origins of chess granted, it could seem then quite natural to argue that the playing of this game could sharpen ones political and military instincts and that this observation could be validly argued for. On the other hand, what accommodations could be meaningfully drawn between the game of chess and a game more of mere chance where bets are made on the tossing of one or more coins despite that fact that both pursuits might be called ‘games’? (871)

	On this soil of the intentional and co-mutual nature of the Life-World we could state that all discourses can be accommodated, i.e., can be rendered commensurable! However, forming accommodations between some discourses (or ‘all’ discourses as a non-open-ended project of systematization) is just not a worthwhile exercise. A game of chess and a game of two-up or throwing a die may not have much in common other than the appellation of being a ‘game’. Still, as games, as a pastime, they do find a degree of accommodation, if only minimally. In this light, what further moral can the philosopher (and meta-theologian) draw as to the commensurability of competing economies be they theological, religious and/or non-religious in aspiration?! (872)

C5	Now, is it right to say that “a thunder bolt is no more nor no less than a bolt of lightening?” That “a scared tree is something more than a mere tree, or, that all trees are sacred?” That “The Divine economy is nothing more nor less than the Divine economy?” If something as seemingly simple as the landscape before us can be much greater than ten thousand things to each of ten thousand people, etc., then what hope have we to believe we could treat something, indeed anything, as something no more than its mere phenomenal presentation. No discourse can ever capture the full value, i.e., the full sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that phenomenon. We can recognize the apparent uniqueness of a phenomenon, as an instance of a certain type of phenomena, but we can never exhaust its value as that-phenomenon-as-it-presents-itself-to-us! So, in this light the theologian is right to say that thunder bolt is something more than a mere instance of weather. But, they should have good reasons for how and why they state as much. Then, what might count as evidence for such an implied or re-described ascription should be clearly spelt out! Similarly, to declare a tree, or all trees for that matter, as sacred objects is fine, but, to do so the value of such an exercise should deliver a dividend greatly in excess of that value initially invested, ontologically and/or epistemologically, in that particular type of enterprise. However, how should the nature of that particular type of dividend, as a process that discharges an existential excess, take form and in what manner? Given that religious memes are iconic-like cultural items that obviously find themselves, as innovations, developed within well-motivated economies then we should phenomenologically investigate the nature of their existence in order to determine why they so obviously seem to flourish in certain cultural niches and why some have even successfully transferred themselves between quite different cultures? (873)

	Truly, then, as a phenomenon, with respect to itself (to the extent it can be referred to non-absolutely), a bolt of lightening is no more nor no less than a bolt of lightening... However, all phenomena are experienced as phenomena-constituted by-us, and, as such, are always open-ended! The specific value of a specific phenomenon, therefore, cannot be pinned down and completely analyzed, perfectly represented, etc. The significance of a phenomenon for-us has infinite dimensions of possibility; but, not all modes of possibility are equal since some modes of possibility are found to be more productive of an existential excess of value than others (thence our recognition of a middle path between absolutism and anarchism). In this direct mutuality of engagement (between the center of the phenomenon as a phenomenal reference and all other reference-possibilities and the possibility of all participating agents) in this ‘natural’ evaluation of options we should find, with varying degrees of relevance and adequacy, we have a sedimentation of options-already-exercised through a habitualization of past responses (and in this we find the formation of the natural world when the same is non-critically examined, i.e., by non-transcendentally oriented means of appropriation as distributed in and through their associated economies of value-formation). It is through their pragmatic denomination that we feel we have a better understanding in our appropriation of that particular phenomenon-type or specific instance of that type of phenomena. Hence there, equally, can be no meaningful absolute open-endedness in our appropriation of phenomena! Thence there can be no practical philosophical utilization of an absolute relativism! Thus, in our direct or indirect dealings with the phenomenon/phenomena of the Divine, should it or they exist, there can be no definitive mode of approach and appropriation. Similarly, even in regards to the phenomenon/phenomena of the concept/s of the Divine equally there can be no definitive uni-vocal approach and appropriation of the same! In essence, a bolt of lightening is now no longer no more nor no less than a bolt of lightening!! Just how many philosophers and theologians are aware of this fact? Or, if they should have an intuitive awareness of this fact realize its important theological ramifications (whether regarded hypothetically and/or non-hypothetically)? (874)

C6	A bolt of lightening is engaged as an open-ended phenomenon in lived-reality in the same transcendental-phenomenological manner as all other phenomena, indeed, like all other phenomena including the imputed reality of the Divine and/or the concept/s of the same. All phenomena are experienced by-us as open-ended phenomena! In the open-ended transcendental economy of the Life-World the value of all economies can find a veritable choir of voices so to speak, a multitude of clearings in which to operate and be found productive of both apparent parallel and interactive phenomenologically distinctive forms of value in keeping with the nature of their associated economies…. (875)

	What are the important ramifications of this type of insight in a theological setting? For a start, traditional forms of a classical deism can no longer be seen to be allowed to operate since, in phenomenological reality, they could never do so in the first place. Such monolithic appearances are pure illusions, blinkered versions of an ideological reality that could have no real place in phenomenological reality, in life-as-lived! Second, and in equal importance, we should realize that this exciting open-endedness of phenomena is also not a recipe for a pure, unadulterated relativistic madness. We do not have a level playing field where all visions and versions of reality are equal. In a properly, appropriately and validly conducted phenomenological investigation we should find distinctive set of economies of varying degrees of value that are commensurable and potentially interactive to some extent but not equal in their production of value or in the value of their potential interactive frisson. Third, we must accept, therefore, in a Contemporary Theology, that all forms of philosophical appreciation must be in the form of an articulated version of a complex vista of semi-parallel and semi-interactive sets of visions that cannot be absolutely articulated and represented. Just as we have already noted a variety of competing economies in the formation of an individual overall religious economy in a similar fashion the presentation and/or representation of a Divine economy, or, more correctly, Divine economies, can be neither absolutely hegemonic nor absolutely anarchic! A task for the theologian, in this light, therefore, is to make better sense of this panorama of a world of living competition as it is found to already exist before-them! Thus, as a fourth point, we can note that the role of the Contemporary philosopher or theologian must be a creative one to the extent they can improvise techniques for discerning and appreciating the relative merits of these competing strands of systematization and produce/re-produce novel forms of accommodation, integration, synthesis, hybridization, conceptual emergence, etc. Surely, then, a bolt of lightening must become what you wish to make of it, but, this valorization must stand and fall on the relative merits of its semblance of finding a place in this world-as-lived before-others. Thence, as a fifth comment, we need to note that this sense of emplacement should be judged by its ‘fruits’ so to speak and hence, most importantly, our finding the acceptance of a need for our recognition of the vital import of creatively re-establishing an associated consequential philosophy along with it re-definition of an overall sense of morality, ethical concern, a desire to properly live-with-others in ‘our’ collective passage through this open-ended World of-Life! (876)

	Memes to some extent metaphorically picture the world. Formulated in our desire to understand the world they must in some measure reflect both the nature of this desire and the nature of their desired object or objective. We cannot expect these ‘reflections’ to be equal but we should expect to be able to discern them to some extent or other without insisting on either their absolute demarcation nor their absolute non-demarcation. In this light we could then ask to what manner and to what degree theological memes might reflect the world-as-lived and successful implicate particular senses of the Divine? In a list of theological attributes desired by a particular theologian how might they evaluate such a list and our selves, in turn, evaluate that same list (in the light of the theologian’s investigations’)? What non-theological parallels might we possess that would throw some light on this type of practice with its clarification of ‘definition’ and its ‘re-defined evaluation’? (877)

	One analogy might be the examination of the crime scene by the appropriate investigative professional. Or, the accountant at the end of the financial year assessing the profitability, etc., of a certain company. Or, the doctor examining their patient. In each of these three examples the distinctive coursing of reality is assumed to have left a textual trail which in the hands of the appropriate professional hermeneut is able, hopefully, to accurately re-constitute a version of the associated history that entered into the constitution of that specific trail of textual deposition.  In effect the professional in question, respectively, the investigator or detective, the accountant and the doctor, are able each to reconstitute a potted version of the history of their ‘subject’, and, to do this they must essentially narrate the outlines of the relevant story through whatever relevant lenses are brought to bear upon the same. Given such a narration, how do we know that it reasonably reflects the actual history of that process that realized that specific textual trail in the first place? And what relevance have these techniques to the evidential interpretation of the Divine as ‘they’ interact with those sections of the world-as-lived? (878)

	Basically, our investment in a theological vision of reality must find a degree of dividend whose interest is enough to continue those investigative reflections. In other words, the value released in a theological project should be greater, indeed, much greater, that the nature of your original investments. Interestingly, this value is re-realized in exactly the same economy that produced that value in the first place. I.e., value, re-evaluated, should equal the nature and degree of its original on-going re-valuation! Is this possible, and, if discrepancies are discovered between valuation and re-valuation what would be their import in this type of context? (879)

	Drawing together the various strands just explored what can we say about the presentation/re-presentation of a particular phenomenon-type/specific instance of a phenomenal event or situation? Do we have a potential conflict here, namely, if the phenomenon is always more than just a mere phenomenon then how, in accordance with a transcendental phenomenology, can we inspect the mere phenomenon itself as an appearance constituted by us, etc? Surely, without any extra difficulty by virtue of the fact that this existential excess itself is constituted in exactly the same manner as all phenomenal interaction should present itself to be assessed! Moreover, this existential open-endedness is already recognized in our acceptance of the phenomenological fact that all phenomena are presented in frames of reference whose horizons can never be exhausted through investigation, etc. Of course the situation may well be the case that further investigation of this horizon is not called for, would add little to our current research at that moment in time, etc. This element of the open-ended only being relevant to our investigations whenever and wherever its addition or subtraction should make an existential difference to the realization of those investigations and/or make a difference to any conclusions provisionally adopted therein. (880)

	It could be said, therefore, that in our interaction with a certain phenomenal event or situation our very interaction itself re-constitutes that phenomenon as that phenomenon-for-us. In essence, this additional existential overlay is realized and constituted through such interaction and is thus, consequently, an emergent feature of those investigations. As an emergent feature it should not be researched through the adoption and adaptation of a reductive mode of analysis! Correctly, its emergent value is constituted in a synthetic mode of examination and to investigate the same this same intentional direction must be brought to bear upon our topic. This intuitive observation has a primary role to play for the philosopher, the theologian and the philosophical theologian, etc. Let me demonstrate this type of point through the following analogy. (881)

D7	Imagine a huge mainframe computer, housed in its own building, has been in operation for a number of years. This electronic marvel has been used to model the weather, solve prime number combinations in order to crack codes, has been used to calculate tides for the next one hundred years around the coasts of various countries, has been used to monitor traffic in various cities, model the birth of the universe, mathematically model complex molecules and compounds in their interactions with each other, etc., etc. Sometimes these different sets of calculations are conducted at the same time. Now, unknown to the management and maintenance of such an institution a colony of ants is living within this machine. They forage for food outside this building and return through cracks in the floor. They happily co-exist with this machine. They have leant through experience that certain section of this machine are off-limits. They have noticed that venturing on to such sections has resulted in the death of those ants. So they no longer venture into these areas where the electricity would kill them and where panels are inserted into this mainframe from time to time. These ants can see in the semi-darkened confines of this machine and have its safe regions completely mapped. For them they see a universe of wires and slices of hardware occupying an enormous three dimensional space. They also know that it is connected to the outside world where they find their sustenance that allows them to live within its confines. But do they really see that computer as a ‘computer’? To the ants it is not much more than a sea of wires, segments of hardware, a lattice-work of supports, etc., that has become their home in the (life-)world (for ants). What is the metaphorical point of this analogy? (882)

D8	If the theologian were to accept the concept of a process theology and the fact that that type of investigation is better conducted along emergent lines of enquiry then, I believe, we have here a model for how that type of enquiry might be better engineered? Imagine if we were like those ants looking out into the world of the cosmos. What do we see? What have we discovered? A sea of swirling matter congregating in the form of nebulae, star-formations, galaxies, galactic clusters… often with swirling filaments of stars and dust interconnecting the same… in between vast voids where no one would want to travel except in their imaginations… and if they were to visualize such travel they would find there nothing except vast regions of emptiness. In this we are like the ants! Still, in the use of this vast computer a whole new world of virtual worlds is made to unfold for the technicians and researchers using this sophisticated instrument in their research projects. Extending the parallel we must now ask if this cosmos could be compared to a vast computer, indeed, something even greater than a mere computer, indeed, in hypothetical truth treated as a realm of possibility, might even be the Divine body itself; the very embodiment of the Divine in its emergence through the richness and complexity of the epistemological organization enfolded and engendered within? Now the phenomenon of the universe itself is then no longer a mere universe (just as the phenomenon of the universe, or any other phenomenon, could not be treated as a mere phenomenon-for-itself since all phenomena are constituted as phenomena-for-us!)! We, who are no more than mere worms, mere ant-like creatures, miniscule specs of animated dust in the vast spectre of the world currently unable to see these elevated dimensions of reality but perhaps able to imagine a Divine world emerging within the same? So, in a parallel analogy, with the use of this computer various virtual worlds are simulated which cannot be reduced just to the mere nuts and bolts of that device. In a similar fashion, this analogy asks us to ‘see’ the cosmos as something more than the mere assemblage of dust swirling through the empty immensity of space (without reifying any form of phenomenal expression in an impossible mode of self-existence). Of course, whether that existential difference is to be treated as theological in complexion is another matter to consider entirely. Just as, e.g., to extend this metaphorical comparison, the cultural domain of the Life-World itself (and its interactive envelopment of different cultural families, cultures and sub-cultures, etc.) cannot be reduced to mere atoms and molecules, mere artifacts and actors, etc., nor, for that matter, a mere list/s of historical facts…. (883) 

	Now, I am not arguing that this theological complexion of the Life-World is a self-proven fact that must be the case, only that this hypothetical possibility is conceivable and is not internally self-contradictory (in a non-absolute modality) (even though we should also note that we should never extrapolate metaphors too far by literally treating the same or subjecting them to a degree of extrapolation beyond which they cannot sensibly pass). Furthermore, that granted, if only provisionally, we have here a general model for constructing a hypothetical theology. Is this option open to the theologian, whether they be hypothetical or non-hypothetical in their stance? And, is such an enterprise constrained by critical rules of engagement, and if so, what? In other words, how could a critical philosopher evaluate the merits or otherwise of that type of enterprise and curb, as a result, a proliferation of fictitious nonsense masquerading as soteriological fact or similar? (884)

	Of course it should be no surprise that I will invoke once more the critical use of the overall transcendental suspension! By what manner should it be exercised, first, by the constructive or speculative theologian and, second, by the critical philosophical meta-theologian, or, the congregation of that theologian, etc? (885)

	Let us now examine the point of my analogy lest it be too quickly misinterpreted. Although the ants live inside the building housing this mainframe and forage for food in the outside world I am not making this type of division and creating a duality between the so-called internal and external worlds, or, the mental and the non-mental, or, worlds that are real or virtual in nature! The correctly intended reading is realized when you recognize that this complex metaphor has been set-up to be read in the following fashion: that all reality is embodied in a world of phenomena, but, that all experiences of reality are realized through a variety of reference frames in which various perspectives and degrees of epistemological organization conspire to configure that experience in the manner it was entered into. Hence a reductive reading will not truly appreciate the ‘reality’ that is directly engaged if the manner of its associated engagement is displaced or absented or removed in any attempt to re-read the same. Similarly, a re-reading that displaces the nature of this associated emplacement will equally misunderstand that topic apparently about to-be-examined. Then, these pre-conditions understood, we can then come to realize that other forms of emplacement will produce/re-produce additional readings despite the apparent insertion of the same core phenomenal-content into the open-ended nature of our phenomenal-phenomenological investigations. Even though those ants lived most of the time within the frame of that computer they could not appreciate the actual reality of the virtual realities able to be projected through its use as a computer. This dimension of its epistemological organization would completely escape them. They would only see wires and segments of hardware that could be seen to be occasionally extracted and re-inserted within the hardware of the computer itself from time to time. The analogy is drawn, that when we look into the depths of space we ‘see’ only long filaments of starry material connecting the miscellaneous content of galactic clusters and vast regions of relative emptiness. Although I shudder to (over) use the simile of a computer we could equally treat this appearance of the cosmos as a like the Internet or a body, etc. The ‘life’ of a computer, the Internet or a body cannot be reductively reduced to a mere seeing of its wiring so to speak. So, in this type of metaphor the theologian could argue that there is always more to what is to be seen in a world that is treated as open-ended and constituted in varying degrees of epistemological organization. Of course, what a theologian does with their metaphorical constructions is their business and the business of their congregations. In this we should concede the possibility and viability of this avenue of approach and this multi-valency of context, noting, therefore, the apparent adequacy and/or inadequacy of their speculative and/or non-speculative constructions on other grounds. And this type of investigation is conducted, as already noted, on the critical grounds of a well-conducted overall transcendental suspension that is properly, appropriately and validly formulated and examined on both its level/s of introduced explication and its (meta-)level/s of critical hermeneutic re-construction! (886)

	Having ruled out a reductive mode of analysis in our investigations should a non-reductive, synthetic mode be adopted in the formulation and critical examination of this type of project and its critical appreciation? I would contend that this type of approach is equally flawed. To adopt this direction alone would be an open invitation for the advent of speculative mayhem and madness! No! We must adopt the middle path of a critical, balanced, overall transcendental suspension in order to hopefully make some validly argued progress in this regard. So, thus through an appropriate and creative mixture of parallel reductive and synthetic modes of appropriation we should be able to make some progress in the critical course of that project under current investigation. Needless to say, we do not begin anywhere nor do we begin from nowhere, but, make a beginning from a critical transcendental suspension of that very  position in our understanding of the world as we find we have already pre-judged it. Thence, from the relatively known to the relatively unknown we then proceed through an expansion of those horizons. A creative and critically balanced dialectic between that already-known and that about-to-be-known allows us then to proceed in such a manner that sees us advancing into territory that will naturally help us to understand our about-to-be-understood understanding of the Life-World in that regard from that perspective, etc. (887)

2.   Extracts from Section 7 (1043-1050) in Volume II

	To this end let me look at three interconnected issues. First, let state and examine the phenomenal-phenomenological fact that all economic activity is a process of continual economic deferment. Second,. That there can be no absolute economic processes of appropriation. Third, that all forms of relative appropriation, as phenomenal-phenomenological content, are simulated. That authenticity in the light of the above is comparatively realized through the observation of a greater existential richness, a richness that engages more modalities in the light of expectations and those modalities are comparatively engaged in a richer and more productive manner. In effect, in the light of our hypothetical theological investigations, we can now resolve a series of problematic questions for all parties, namely, that the Divine cannot be conceived of as being able to be absolutely appropriated nor could it absolutely appropriate (the devotee, the world of the creation, the world, etc.), and, in the event that the Divine did not exist (like Father Xmas or Mickey Mouse) as a place-marker could still generate economic activity and ensure that economic activity concerning the same could still be treated as having a form of existence (that, ultimately, as a place-marker can be place-making, as a place-maker, in both virtual and non-virtual and formats). Let me exam these interrelated issues central to this complex problem effectively dealing with the authenticity of the so-call Divine economy. (1043)

	That all economic activity is a process of continual economic deferment! Should I find a meal waiting for me on a plate and be told that that food is for me I can do two things, quite simply eat it or defer my eating of the same either for the moment or absolutely, by refusing to partake. In the latter type of decision I defer my eating of the same. Should, then, I change my mind, I defer my deferment. However, should I desire to eat, I have essentially deferred by previous non-eating. In my opinion all of these processes of deferment, all these different types of deferment, are not a semantic quibble but a more accurate understanding of what is actually taking place phenomenally and phenomenologically, i.e., that economy is essentially driven by acts of deferment. Why? Because there can be no absolute processes of appropriation, i.e., no processes of absolute appropriation! Should the latter be remotely conceived of as possible then that particular economy, and its particular form of economic value, would immediately cease, and, as a result, there would be no sense, no meaning, no meaningfulness, nor, we must add, any form of an absolute act of appropriation (since appropriation must be exercised as an act or process within the appropriately associated economy). Furthermore, the absolute cessation of all forms of economic activity would be the absolute death of that individual as an economic participant in the economy of the Life-World. Economic activity can be subject to transformation, thereby migrating to some other form of economic activity. E.g., I see this plate of food and in an act of deferring from a state of non-eating, eat the same. The food has been relatively appropriated but not absolutely since that same food is now to be subjected to a digestive economy rather than a gustative economy. Equally, that food cannot be absolutely digested since to be completely digested it would then be part of an excretive economy and, now, something-no-longer-to-be-digested. Each economy transitioning into the next without any being absolutely realized since the absolute realization of the same realizes the end of that economic activity in that form, and, we cannot escape all forms of economic activity (except through death should death and death alone be absolute[ly non-virtual]). (1044)

	What are the (economic) consequences of this position that recognizes only processes of continual economic deferment (as non-absolute forms of appropriation)? That value is realized (in and through an appropriate hermeneutic circle) in such a manner that it can only be realized through ongoing engagement without impossible forms of absolute appropriation. A friendship, e.g., is only realized through processes of ongoing engagement. The value of that relationship can only be realized through acts of friendship. Such activity is then transmuted into the creation and preservation of a mutual attitude of friendship by those parties towards the other. In other word, when we are not actively being friends, the consequences of being a friend, when we were able to interact as friends, directly and/or indirectly, non-virtually and/or virtually, creates a disposition of friendship that is activated when we re-engage as friends. Such a disposition effectively carves out the requisite hermeneutic territory for our corresponding disposition/s towards that objective and/or subjective phenomenon or phenomena implicated in that disposition. Since the phenomenon or phenomena to-hand can only be regarded in the phenomenological light of their hermeneutic construction. So, e.g., that person-is-my-friend, that person-is-just-a-passer-by, that person-is-someone-I-know-by-sight-only, etc., etc. Never, merely the mere person x or person y or person z. (as if they could be known in some absolutistic intrinsic, self-existent sense of absolute appropriation). (1045)

	The second proposition to be examined was: that there can be no absolute economic processes of appropriation! As initially argued, such a process was inconceivable, i.e., impossible to conceive. Why? Because all value, in accordance with my understanding of the hermeneutic circle, is realized between three ideal dialectical points or moments, and, that to grasp or appropriate any one or more of them can only invite a collapse of that same value, making it impossible to realize this act of pure appropriation (since those moments or points are ideals that can never be absolutely grasped in their isolated containment). Or, put another way, as all meaning is realized in and through relationships it follows that to deconstruct that relational background is to equally collapse the value of our objective in that regard whatever its hermeneutic construction. Of course, it could be argued that in everyday life we can appropriate what ever we find to-hand. However, don’t let language mesmerize you to the fact that although relative appropriation is acceptable absolute appropriation is just impossible to realize (for the above reasons)! I.e., that value is realized in and through the requisite process for the realization of the same and never outside such a process or through its collapse! What then is the nature of that process that delivers this semblance of value? A process of deferment! Be that in ontologically oriented terms of reference or epistemologically oriented terms of reference or in a product of both (as best fits our understanding of the intentional nature of consciousness; as befits the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of our constitution of experience). (1046)

	In intentional terms of reference what does a process of ongoing deferment mean, and, what are the implications of this concept in regards to the simulation of the intentional object-state and its semblance of value attached to the same (by virtue of those processes of valuation, re-valuation, evaluation, re-evaluation, etc.)? (1047)

	The ongoing nature of deferment might be best demonstrated by the nature of dictionaries (to continually defer to other lexical entries in the mutual formation of their definitions). Let us enquire of the definition of an apple; let me propose the following definition: ‘a common, round edible fruit [of the genus malus] that might be red, green and/or yellow in colour, with pips in its core.’ If any of those words were unfamiliar to us we could further consult our dictionary hoping that they too would find a definition therein (or, for that matter, in some other English dictionary). Let us say we do not know what is meant by the word ‘pips’. Say we find the following: ‘pips’ ‘are the seeds of apples.’ Again, not being too sure of the word ‘seeds’ we consult our dictionary one more time. We find this definition: ‘seeds’ ‘like the pips of an apple.’ Each definition defers to some other, each circulating within the economy of that dictionary. If we had no direct knowledge of the world, the world of the dictionary would be not much more than a set of interlinked equations. Sense (of psychic location in our mapping of the Life-World), meaning, meaningfulness, i.e., all forms of value, are produced and reproduced in an economy of value corresponding to the phenomenal-phenomenological nature productive of that type of value. All economies being exercised in overlapping spheres of influence just as, e.g., edible fruits as agricultural items are also seen to inhabit the world of food, which, in turn, inhabits a physical world on par with our own physical sense of embodiment, which, in turn, inhabits the planetary world of Earth, etc., etc. Exhaust, diminish, deconstruct, destroy one frame of reference and you will expose another, thus, again, the impossibility of realizing an absolute act of appropriation since a relative act of appropriation is merely the absence or absenting of the sphere of influence that was in question and the realization of another now in keeping with the transformation in our intentional interest (just as food is eaten, then digested, then excreted, etc.). To think that appropriation is absolutely realized is to overlook the fact that absolute appropriation would demand the complete removal of all frames of reference involved in the current formation of that instance of value, with, as a result, the complete evacuation of value itself and thence the complete absence of all sense, meaning and meaningfulness. Surely, though, it might be argued, to achieve our intentional objectives it is to absolutely realize our intentional goals? Yes, but not through processes of absolute appropriation wherein all frames of reference are absolutely evacuated, deconstructed, etc. In this semantic point a critical observation is being made, namely, that, as value is still being presented it follows that a successful act of relative appropriation must be continuing and that this process of valuation, etc., cannot be realized in an absolute manner! (1048)

	Our third statement to explore was: that all forms of relative appropriation, as phenomenal-phenomenological content, are simulated! What exactly is meant by this statement? The word ‘simulation’ must be understood as being used in this definition here in a special sense, namely, as a ‘simulation of a simulation’ and never as a ‘simulation of that which is pre-simulated before that act of simulation or as something that exists beyond that act of simulation or beyond all acts of simulation, etc.’ Again, I must make a distinction between a relative simulation (of value in some form or other) and an impossible absolute simulation. But, surely, in a genuine economy for the collector a non-faked item is just that, an original, and not a fake, so, how then can we treat these genuine items as simulations, as being simulated? Quite simply by recognizing the possibility that they could have been faked and substituted – that, as a mere possibility, if it were to be the case that a fake could be presented in the place of an original, and that possibility is present with the presentation of all human artifacts then it follows that that presentation could be read as a ‘simulation’ even if the genuine original had not been substituted. Furthermore, our entertainment of an adequate overall transcendental suspension implies that all intentional items of any economy must be ‘simulations’ by virtue of their treatment in that transcendental light as mere simulations-in-their-associated-economies-of-presentation (but never as absolute simulations, as mere simulations of non-simulated states of affairs). Consequently, our intentional objectives cannot be treated as mere entities in their own right by virtue of their associated economies that cannot be isolated, etc! Moreover, we should also recognize the phenomenological fact that all intentional objectives (i.e., intentional object-states) can be viewed through an assembly of economies that are or could be directly co-associated or indirectly co-associated. Just as a farmer can talk to a soil geologist about the same landscape, and, that that same landscape can be seen through an infinitude of other frames of reference (with varying degrees of a possible, profitable commensurability, etc.). In other words, all phenomena for-us cannot be ‘mere phenomena’ but the presentation/re-presentation of simulations subjectively and inter-subjectively simulated in their co-associated frames of reference as ‘phenomena-for-us.’ All simulations, therefore, being co-constructed by-us in their associated, co-constructed phenomenal frames of reference, and, thence the simulated nature of their overall presentation/re-presentation as phenomena-for-us, i.e., as phenomenal simulations constructed/re-constructed in those fields of co-presentation. Of course, in the exercise of an adequate overall transcendental suspension these ‘phenomena-for-us’ would then be treated as ‘mere phenomena-for-us,’ and, never merely as ‘mere phenomena’ as argued above. Furthermore, our entertainment of an adequate overall transcendental suspension implies that all intentional items of any economy must be simulations by virtue of their treatment in that transcendental light as mere simulations-in-its-associated-economy-of-presentation (but never as absolute simulations, as mere simulation of simulated states of affairs). Consequently, our intentional objectives cannot be treated as mere entities in their own right by virtue of this associated economy, etc! Furthermore, as all (intersecting) referents (and no-intersecting economies) can be both viewed through an infinity of reference frames and the open general commensurability of all economic discourses, whether it be worth our while or not to enter into such processes of accommodation, it follows, as all phenomenological place-markers cannot be absolutely viewed as definitive place-markers, that all phenomena as interpretatively constructed by us can only be critically treated as simulated possibilities. Thus, all forms of phenomenological presentation, non-theological or theological in orientation, should be treated in this democratic spirit of non-exclusivity. Thus it follows, ipso facto, that all theological phenomena, in their associated theological economies, should also be viewed through the same open lens. In this democratic spirit, therefore, we should remain open to a variety of relatively intersecting and non-intersecting points of view be they religious or non-religious, be the former theological in orientation or non-theological in orientation. Thence, in an acceptance of these transcendental conditions on the nature of all forms of discourse it follows that all forms of discourses should be democratically treated as open and non-exclusive in regards to each other be they religious or non-religious in orientation, be they theological or non-theological in orientation! (1049)

E9	What are the ramifications of this concept of simulation (in this theoretical context of ongoing deferment, non-absolute appropriation, etc.)? Profound! For a start we must re-view the human subject, in their subjectivity and in their inter-subjectivity, as dialectical aspects of the overall hermeneutic circle that cannot be absolutely appropriated. In this light the subject is nominally treated as a place-marker, a place-marker or logical subject that cannot be treated in absolute isolation. Furthermore, the recognition of an inseparable sense of context implies that the phenomenon of self or any other intentional objective is always a phenomenon-treated-in-(a)-certain-frame/s-of-reference. Consequently, all transcendental phenomenological treatment (via transcendental reduction, synthesis, suspension) can never realize the ‘mere phenomenon’ or ‘mere set of phenomena’ in themself/themselves (in an apparent contradiction to the strict accordance with notable phenomenological formulae such as, e.g., “back to the things themselves,” etc.), but, that granted, however, transcendentally oriented forms of treatment are still possible to the extent that the associated frames of reference are also co-treated, etc. Hence this associated concept of a transcendental democracy (and its refined equivalent of a theological democracy) to the extent that phenomena are no longer ‘mere phenomena’ but ‘mere phenomena-in-their-associated-frame/s-of-reference’ within the transcendental ambit of one-Life-World! As a result all phenomena are place-markers that must remain open to the multi-dimensional intersection of other frames of reference when and where relevant to that simulation-to-hand in question. That, in our passages through this World-of-Life we can mediate or arbitrate modes of negotiated navigation without necessarily having to cancel any one frame of reference should other frames of reference be preferred, etc! So, e.g., when we look at ‘Father Xmas’ in a department store we can review that individual as both a substitute proxy for the place-marker ‘Father Xmas’ and as an ‘employee of that department store’, etc., without feeling any form of a contradiction between the two hats this person could be regarded as metaphorically wearing. Needless to say, this individual could be regarded as also wearing a number of other ‘hats’ should we attempt an existential description of this individual, yet, recognize, at the same time, that all these miscellaneous descriptions are shared, in this instance, by the same existential descriptor or place-marker (exercised in the denomination of the sense of that subjective identity, etc.). (1050)

3.   Conclusion

E10	We do not deal with ‘mere phenomena’ but with ‘mere phenomena as constructed by us in a variety of intersecting and non-intersecting frames of reference’. Furthermore, through the nature of simulation, as interpreted in its postmodern sense as a simulation of a simulation, we should be able to treat the Divine in their Divine economy, like any other component or participant in an economy, as a relative ‘place-marker’ and not as an absolute ‘place-maker’. Consequently, we need not put the theologian on trial when we all sit in the same boat so to speak. Moreover, just as the world can be seen through a variety of lenses so too all concepts of the Divine can be treated in a similar fashion. Hence this concept of phenomenological democracy can be equally extended to the realm of theological discourses and their treatment in the light of a theological democracy. Moreover, just as in each political era religious philosophy often reflects the ethos of its time, theological discourses can now better reflect the natural democratic spirit of our times without having to fall back on concepts wherein the Divine is just perceived as an absolute monarch, etc. Hopefully, as a consequence of this expanded degree of tolerance (and transcendental phenomenological discrimination) a greater degree of world peace and harmony can prevail both among and between religionists and non-religionist alike! (vii)

							        Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.11.06.