5.   The Possible Religious Dimensions of a Theological Complexion?

	All processes of relational interaction are two-way, i.e., reciprocated. However, because there is always a differential of power between the participants of that relationship, these interactive, reciprocated pathways are non-symmetrical. Within this power differential or power spectrum one could then ask, in the hypothetical light of our topic, what is the nature of religious experience from the perspectives of the non-divine participants, from the perspectives of the Divine participants, and, what possible relational mutuality might exist between these two kinds of participants? Or, we could short-circuit this degree of elaboration by ‘merely’ asking just what is the experiential nature of the Divine-non-divine spectrum of interaction given the hypothetical presupposition of its relatively-actual existence (given that there can neither be the purely-potential existence of the relatively-divine nor the purely-actual existence of the relatively-divine as already argued elsewhere)? Taking a broader view, hypothetically, we could also envisage this type of question as taking place in either a conjunctive sense or in a non-conjunctive sense, i.e., there exists a state of affairs that is regarded as religious in its overall tenor that either involves the relationship with an element of the Divine or does not involved an element of the Divine despite what might be claimed by a participant of that type of experience in the light of their interpretation/s and/or interpretation/s co-authored by their religious community, etc. I.e., religious experiences are either the result of a conjunction in some form or other between these two kinds of disparate parties or no such conjunction exists between such participants. However, we are first presented with an immediate problem, namely, how do we go about analyzing the ‘apparent’ or presupposed phenomenological nature of such a ‘relationship’ grounded, ostensively, upon a spectrum of power that, effectively, is of such breath that one may well ask how could this relationship be actively entered into by any or all of those parties and be recognized by any or all of those participants despite their disparity in status? But, the same type of question could also be asked, e.g., about the nature of the relationship between a mother and her newly delivered baby! So, with this example first in mind, let me go about analyzing the same in order to demonstrate how we might possibly go about examining these types of relatively ‘incongruent’ relationship because, obviously, the love between a mother and her child is not a one-way affair despite their obvious initial disparity in epistemological status and its associated differentiated expressions of power! (674)

	For a relationship to be a relationship it must be a relationship between two or more parties or participants. When those parties are different types of entities or states and/or similar entities or states possessing a marked difference in their expression of power how is this process of relational interaction to be meaningfully entered into? Given that the nature of a relationship must possess a common nature in order to be that relationship it also follows that that nature must be both distinctive and unique since a relationship is the ongoing resultant of an ongoing process of resolution of the relative sense of dissonance in that relationship (and that the unique disposition of those parties and the distinctive nature of this process of resolution must contribute to this sense of unique distinctness of that relationship). Otherwise, e.g., in a relationship R between x and y, we would have x r1 y and y r2 x where r1 is not equal to r2. But in some measure the perspective on the relating does make a difference. A baby relates to its mother in a different fashion to the way a mother relates to her baby, but, for R to be that relationship we need to state that r1 and r2 have R in common, i.e., the intersecting nature of r1 and r2 is R. Furthermore the continuity of that relationship is maintained to that extent all relevant senses of relational difference are adequately accommodated in an ongoing fashion otherwise that sense of a relationship does not come into some form of an historical existence and/or ceases to remain in historical existence, etc. By ‘some form of an historical existence’ is meant the nature of its epistemological organization as would be determined in and through some ordered form of analysis of the nature of the intentional object-state in question (as a non-integrated pre-essential thought, as an integrated essential thought, as an idea with such content, as a perceptual translation of the former, and v.v., as a possible factual-like state of affairs and/or as an actually accepted factual-like state of affairs, etc., namely, as a corresponding orientation within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle, namely, in an essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and/or ontical [factual] modality or perspective). As implied, that common nature of the relationship in question is achieved in and through the manner of the harmonic resolution entered into as simulated/re-simulated by that intentional consciousness to itself. The intentionally differentiated phenomenality of that relationship being achieved through the simulated/re-simulated phenomenalization of that phenomenon or set of phenomena in question. Hence the ‘Life-World’ as the operating totality of the co-authored commonality of this phenomenalization of all discernable phenomena transcendentally available in this market place of the world whose complexion, in one aspect, has been determined to be theological (in some form or format as yet undetermined in its ability or non-ability to be experientially obtainable and entertainable). Now we must ask in a relationship between disparate entities or states how is that relationship between the same to be both obtainable and entertainable? Given that such disparate relationships exist (as in, e.g., that between a mother and her newborn child, and, a child and its doll, e.g., etc) we must now ask “how is this relational state of affairs realized in experiential reality?” (675)

	If we had a glass jar filled with marbles we might say that those marbles are in a relationship with each other by virtue of that glass jar and the fact that they all are marbles and that both the jar and these marbles are made of glass. To some extent set theory could be made to account for this state of affairs (such that there is a set S which entails all those marbles…). Let us alter that situation a little. Let us suppose that the jar is now made of a ceramic material and not glass. That container still acts as a container because of the solid nature of that container and its ability to contain a set of marbles, namely, those marbles currently contained within its confines. So, the container acts as a container not merely because it is a glass container but a solid container able to contain a certain set of marbles contained therein by virtue of their corresponding solidity and not their mere glass-ness, etc. Let us now envisage a set of interacting disparate entities. (676)

	Let us ask how a lock and its corresponding key might be able to interact when the latter is inserted into its corresponding lock and used by some person to open a door or box, etc? Surely, what allows this interaction of an ‘unlocking’ to take place is the isomorphic symmetry in existence between the key and the corresponding template of the lock! Let me use this analogy (of isomorphic symmetry between a key and its corresponding lock) in order to unpack this philosophical problem of a so-called relational disparity. (677)

	Now let us approach the philosophical puzzle can a child have a relationship with their doll. Obviously, when observing this type of phenomenon, we find children apparently having a relationship with their dolls. So, we may well ask what is the real problem here? The philosophical problem is this: how can a individual person have a personal relationship with an inanimate object in the form of a doll above and beyond that of a physical object in a relatively close proximity to that person? Certainly the doll as a physical object can be manipulated by the physical body, and, as a physical object can be found sitting on the floor in the same manner as its owner can also sit on the floor. How then, in what manner, is the relationship with that doll different from merely sitting on the floor, etc. For a start that physical object is perceived by the child as person-like, as personified with an apparent body that possesses an apparent child-like head, arms, legs, mouth, etc. So, in this important sense, it is different from a floor mat, tables and chairs, the cat, the dog or some other type of doll that is cat-like, dog-like, etc? In virtue of this isomorphic symmetry between a child and a child-like doll the child who has that doll can then treat that object as if like another person, namely, another child. Then, in this virtual space the doll can be utilized as if a child in the play of its owner. Here we are witness to the intentional simulation/re-simulation of a virtual transformational isomorphic symmetry in this intentionally treated state of affairs. In other words, in the virtual imagination of that child, the child-like doll is entertained as if it were a child in the play of that child and in this manner the child then enters into a relationship with that object, the nature of that relationship being virtual. However, in the relatively disparate relationship between a mother and her child this type of relationship cannot, of course, be virtual. So, under these different circumstances, how are we to philosophically read the nature of that type of relationship between a mother-and-her-child? (678)

	Assuming that a relationship is (obviously) present between a mother and her child then what is the nature of the (transformational) isomorphic symmetry that must necessarily be present between the same (in order to establish the non-virtual existence of that relationship)? For a start we can perceive that the body of the child is in proximity with the body of the mother, that the relationship is (centered in) an embodied relationship (in the same non-virtual manner that a child has with their doll to the extent both are physical objects). However, in this type of relationship the child is developing as a person in and through this relationship they have with their mother. To what extent does this colour the nature of this type of relationship? In other words, to what extent does the development of possibility or potentiality have to play in this type of relationship? (679)

	Transformational isomorphic symmetry is entertained when we find from the perspective of one of the parties in a relationship an aspect of that relationship that remains invariant in our transition to that point of view of that relationship itself or some other perspective of one of the other parties in that same relationship. E.g., in the consideration of a spatial configuration we find a 1:1 relationship between both the-mother-and-her-child and that child-and-its-mother. E.g., in the consideration of a temporal configuration we find an emerging relationship between both the-mother-and-her-child and that child-and-its-mother to the extent that the child becomes developed as another person in time with its associated degrees of freedom and restriction, appropriate expressions of power and attendant obligations, etc. So, the child normally develops in such manner as to more and more closely approximate the general characteristics of the mother, and other primary care-givers, in so far as it able to develop as the person it is able to become, etc. Hence  the nature of that relationship, its essential character, is reflected in and through the nature of its being in this World-of-Life; i.e., as in a relationship of child-caring. That granted, what are some of these isomorphic elements and how are they to be discerned? (680)

		So, from spatial, temporal and personal perspectives we have the symmetries of two living human bodies, along with the physical and mental development of the child (becoming more like it primary care givers) plus the personal development of both parties. Still, what reciprocity can there be in a relationship of extreme incongruency or disparity? Granted that a child responds to the ministrations of its mother could the same be said of the relationship between a child and their doll? As already argued, such a relationship in part is virtual and virtual tokens of reciprocity are imagined by the child as issuing from the assumed persona of the doll. So, the baby cries, appears to be hungry, may need to be changed, etc. On the other hand, these tokens of reciprocity are perceived in the interaction of the other with her child both by the mother internally to that relationship and by others externally to that relationship between mother-and-child. (681) 
	In our dealings with phenomenological descriptions we should always remember that no phenomenon can ever be directly accounted for in and through its representative descriptions since the phenomenon from any perspective (either internally and/or externally) is always re-presented and never represented. On the other hand, such limitations accepted, representation locates for us where a certain type of phenomenon is to be located in ‘our’ psychic mapping of the world; that such an affair can never arise from a purely individualistic point of view despite the perspective or perspectives currently being adopted and adapted in our investigations of the same! Therefore, all research, to some extent, is already an intersubjective affair and demands that some degree of an invariant isomorphic region is mutually shared by all parties able to interpretively able to deal with that phenomenon or set of phenomena in question. (682)

	With this qualification, that no phenomenon can be directly represented, let me set out to examine the overcoming of this power spectrum a mother shares with her infant charge. To some extent the mother as a person perceives another person embryonically embodied in her charge and takes a delight in discovering those signs that reinforce this belief and demonstrate to her the progress her child is making it its development. Now, with that in mind we could say that the mother is a person p in a relationship R with her baby b. Hence:

1.			 p R b
	
Now, from the perspective of the mother this relationship could be re-written:

2.			p rpb b

And, from the perspective of the baby the same relationship could be expressed:

3.			p rbp b

Now, let us combine these three formulae:

4. 			p R b  =  p rpb b :  p rbp b

Asking how the mother interacts with her charge, and v.v., we can surmise that p in 2 is perceived as pb and v,v. Hence:

5.			 pb R bp : bp R pb 

Expressed in intentional language we might say that idea the mother has of herself interacts with her idea of what the baby is through their embodiment and their common interaction as expressed in and on that level. Similarly, the baby’s evolving understanding of itself and its mother occurs in a similar fashion, albeit in much less developed, but developing, terms of reference. Hence:

6.			 pp rpb pb : bb rbp bp

Where the resultant interaction is established on this invariant territory of:

7.			 p R b

Because the idea of the mother interacts with her idea of the baby in terms of their individual and interacting embodiment. The same developing for the baby from its perspective. Hence their ability to interact by virtue of these interactions on both an embodied level and an intentional level, and the isomorphic region between these two correlative domains as re-expressed in the formula 7 (which equal 1). Hence all parties interact in terms of their intentional-embodied perceptions of their selves and relevant senses of otherness established in that relationship under examination:

8. 			[(pp: pb) : (bb :bp)]e/i 

Thus concluding that an apparent relationship is entered into when this isomorphic territory is co-incidentally established on both a relatively embodied level (e) and a relatively intentional level of explication (i) (treating the intentional level as effectively higher by one meta-degree in value). So the mother’s idea of herself interacts with her idea of her charge, and v.v. w.r.t. the baby’s developing ideas of itself and its mother; such ideas being clarified by the evolution of those ideas, etc. By these means, a relatively wide spectrum of power is effectively crossed by such processes of mutually simulated simulation on the same meta-levels of status, etc. Effectively, the mother interacts with her child in terms of her own embodiment and intentionality whilst the child does the same, with the embodiment of this interaction (through an overlapping of existential descriptors) ensuring some degree of interactive mutuality that is both already in existence and able to be refined through the interaction these two parties have with each other. This transformational isomorphic invariance  of  ‘p R b’ being established through the ability to travel between these various meta-levels, etc. Hence:

9.	(p rpb b)e/i <:> (p rbp b)e/i ; <:> iff E

Where E = an overlapping of existential descriptors in and through a process of interaction that is thematized intentionally and centered in an overall process of interactive embodiment. (683)

	Another way to envisage this process of mutual interaction, from all ‘the points of view’ within a certain overall process of interactive embodiment, let us return to the example of the lock and the key. We insert the key into a lock and if that is the appropriate key then when we turn that key we find the lock unlocking, or, the lock being made to lock. It is the isomorphism between the (textual) key and the imprinted template of the (contextual/meta-textual) lock that allows us to experience the existential excess of the lock unlocking or being made to lock. From the ‘perspective’ of the key it is able to move appropriately within the lock. From the ‘point of the view’ of the lock it finds the key able to move fully, as intended and expected, within the ambit of the lock. This freedom of movement is guaranteed by this isomorphic coincidence between this lock and its correctly associated key (or, by chance, some other key that can accomplish this same task). This freedom of movement of the key within the lock means that we can then experience the implications of that lock being unlocked and/or that lock being made to lock. These three moments, of lock, key and locking/unlocking, mirror our theoretical treatment of the hermeneutic circle. We might also add that this overall process of interaction is able to proceed to that extent that this degree of invariant isomorphism is shared between these parties and within these three ‘moments’. (684)

	Let me return now to our mother and child. This type of relationship will manifest itself to either parties within it, and for those external to that relationship, through various signs that appear to commonly be associated with that type of relationship. As already noted, no description, either relatively essential or otherwise can properly represent any phenomenon (from either the perspectives of description and/or prescription). But, be that as it may, when we view the mis-representation as a mis-representation then it no longer is a mis-representation to that manner to that same degree. In effect, the phenomenon has to be lived within its appropriate mode of  life or modes of live for us to become properly acquainted with it. Again, no long list of common features assumed to be found in a certain type of relationship is going to existentially define it for us unless we can, through simulation/re-simulation, live and re-live out that existential-type of meaning and meaningfulness contained therein; as associated within the same. So, rather than attempt an exhaustive phenomenological ‘description’ of this type of relationship let me, instead, deal with one important facet of it. Let my focus deal with one prominent feature in order to derive an understanding that would allow us to understand the relational dynamics between ostenisvely disparate relationships; relationships with a great disparity in power relations, in its spectrum of power. This feature of this mother-child relationship that I would like to analyze is the ‘smile’ they both share with each other. Let me briefly look into this feature. (685)

	A first thing I would like to say is that the smile is not a superficial phenomenon, indeed, that no phenomenon can be truly a superficial phenomenon (in anything other than a trivial sense)! A mother smiles at her baby and the baby smiles back in return. Or, the baby is seen to smile and the mother smiles back in return. Here, the smile is both an expression or transmission of happiness, etc., and a recognition of a state of happiness, and v.v. The mother or the child might be blind and still there could be both the expression and recognition of a smile. Or, the child might be half asleep with its eyes shut and when the mother says something to the child in a happy motherly tone the baby would still smile. Mother could even be in the another room. Now where does the mile come from? It is not the mere movement of the lips? There are many kinds of smile according to some research. As a spontaneous expression of happiness it is not just the mere movement of the lips. Surely, it must come from deep within the psyche of the person. Or, again, more correctly, it must come from deep within the relationship that provoked that smile in the first place whether that be in a relationship with some other person or situation or in and from the deepness of a relationship we are currently having with our own sense of self! Thus, the smile as a non-simulated expression, and recognition, of happiness, etc., cannot be a superficial phenomenon! Between the mother and her child, in the existential depths of that relationship, there is, when called forth, this simultaneous expression and recognition of this deeper state of relational intentionality; i.e., the intentional being of that relationship itself in and through this living of that relationship as a life-lived-before-others-with-others. (686)
	
	So, correctly perceived, the (non-simulated) smile is not a mere expression of the person who smiled but an in-depth expression of that very relationship it comes to represent. So, mother and child smiled together. So, we smile to ourselves when we find something amusing or pleasant, something that inspires a sense of happiness, a feeling of pleasant resolution, etc. Thus, by using the same logic, all other phenomenal aspects of a relationship, whether typical or atypical of that type of relationship, are in-depth expressions, and recognitions, centered in the very ‘depths’ of the relationship itself from whence there is this intentional transmission of those expressed and recognized phenomenal features centered in, through and from that co-responding relationship itself. The mutuality of such features being evidence of the presence of a mutual relationship to some degree or other despite the existence, or non-existence, of a superficial expectation of a great degree of relational disparity (in that associated spectrum of power). Now, the question remains (before we apply this model to a theological context of discussion) as to why, or rather how, such relational disparity can be overcome? With our example of the smile do we have a clue here as to how this relational disparity is actually overcome in the factual being of our lives before others? (687)

	In may ways a smile is the sign of a relatively successful process of resolution. As an expression of happiness, etc., it is not just the signal of a state of a happiness but, more, the expression of a coming into existence of an increased positive differential that recognizes this change of state from the relatively less pleasant to the pleasant or from the relatively pleasant to the more pleasant. This change in state expresses itself through an experience of ease, physiological relaxation indicative of a process of resolution in some form or other relevant to our contemporary state of being-in-the-world-before others. Despite a disparity in power between the mother and her child the smile, and other ‘similar’ phenomenal features through their expression and/or recognition indicate a co-mutuality between the parties of that relationship. How does this concept of resolution achieve these various tasks of expression, recognition, and, the creation of a mutual relationship between parties possessing such a disparity in power? (688)

	So what are the implications of this collective smile of the mother and child? Despite an obvious disparity in power the collective smile is indicative of a relationship being in place between these two relatively incongruent parties. The phenomenological fact that the smile should not be interpreted as a superficial phenomenon means that this relationship is able to overcome this disparity in power as witnessed by the ‘smile’ (along with other seemingly co-mutual phenomena). Thus, as the relationship is interpreted as obviously evident then it is up to the phenomenological philosopher to account for this phenomenon, and, for the theoretical or hypothetical theologian to draw what implications might be gathered and adapted as relevant in their interpretation of the parallel situation of the conjectured relationship between the Divine and the non-divine despite the intrinsic disparity in the magnitude of the extent of the power spectrum between both parties. Indeed, as the relatively Divine is, by definition, a dimension or two in advance of the epistemological organization of the human individual it is natural to ask by what mechanisms could this differential be overcome so that members of either party could experience the other, and, both parties, and their members, could mutually experience each other as being in a relationship with each other? Such explanations attempting to understand the existential possibilities of religious experience (as valid, non-virtual states of affairs in the life of the individual and their communities). So, let us model, by what ever possible means we can find at our disposal, how this relative discontinuity is overcome in theory and in practice in order to understand how this disparity in power between two or more relatively incongruent parties is resolved in general terms of reference. As the power inequality between a mother and her child is so obviously overcome let us keep that in mind as our primary model in this task. Given that this disparity in power (in the usual course of our relationships) is usually subjected to a process of successful resolution, and granted that all relationships are founded on an inequality of power, let us speculate through careful argument just what insights we might be able to gather on this topic that might assist and benefit theologians and their congregations in their coming to understanding that the phenomenal-phenomenological possibility of a Divine-non-divine relationship must demand a non-absolute wholly/holy otherness of the Divine? But, as already argued right from the beginning, such a relationship between the imputation of the Divine aspect and the non-divine is either in phenomenal-phenomenological existence or not, and, if the latter, then the theologian has neither a religious task to account for nor hope of a ‘religious’ relationship between such parties as entailed in their concept/s of the Divine and such parties like themselves, their congregations, and the rest of humanity! (689)

	The ‘smile’ is an indication that for both parties there is a relationship already in existence. In this instance this type of relational fact can be experienced internally as a relationship by those two parties of mother and child, and, externally by those other parties situated outside that particular relationship but in a position, directly or indirectly, to witness this ‘smile’ and all other signs that can also be interpreted as indicating a process of interaction; an in-depth relational basis. How is this process of interpretation to be approached by those parties situated either internally or externally to that relationship? As already noted the smile and all other phenomenal indications should not be treated as superficial but as in-depth expressions of this phenomenon of the relationship itself. That accepted, how is this information imparted by that relationship and received by those parties situated either internally or externally to that relationship? I have argued elsewhere that all information as information is prepared, transmitted, received and interpreted through the three moments of the hermeneutic circle as already explored on numerous occasion in these investigations and elsewhere. Simplified, we could say that just as dissonance is prepared in musical theory we could say that information is transmitted, etc., via these same three moments of (consonant background) preparation, (foreground) dissonance and (relational) resolution. Furthermore, all phenomenal features born in a relationship are constructed the same way. In this type of instance the ‘smile’ is indicative of just this process of harmonic resolution. The baby’s needs are being met and the baby smiles, the worries of the mother are alleviated, that, indeed, an in-depth expression of a relational rapport is being experienced simultaneously by both parties; that, in essence, both parties fell privy to an ongoing co-mutual, in-depth relationship of being-with-each-other… a relationship that is becoming considerably mutual from the perspective of both parties. In other words, a considerable degree of isomorphic invariance is being intentionally shared equally from the perspectives of both mother and child. How is this possible given this disparity in power between these two parties? Intentionality is not just a mental phenomenon but, truly, an embodied phenomenon! The baby is embodied in the world, the mother is embodied in the world, and, not to be overlooked or dismissed through some form of misguided reductionism, their relationship is also embodied in the world. The mother is a mother by virtue of her charge. Her baby is not just a mere baby by virtue of the fact this child is being looked after by this particular mother. This relationship is rooted in the world and has intentional priority to the extent the mother is a mother-with-child and this child-is-with-mother. This embodiment of the relationship is demonstrated by the phenomenal depths associated with certain distinctive phenomena found issuing from the same, such as the collective smile of both mother and child. Actively the mother addresses the child. Passively the child finds itself being addressed by the mother. Actively the child expresses some intention or desire. Passively the mother attempts to interpret and anticipate what that might be. A special language is always in evidence here along with characteristic modes of invoking the various names for this child, and names also for the mother when she addresses herself in this linguistic process that helps, in part, to constitute this overall relationship. A relationship that is allowed to come into existence through a process of concurrence between the relevant existential descriptors (associated with conception, delivery and/or the rearing of that child). A process of interaction that finds is own voice or set of voices. A relationship that is also embodied to that extent that this relationship is co-mutually allowed to come into existence and reductively cannot be taken out of the picture except to the extent there is the death of either party or the death of both parties (whilst that child is still a ‘child’). Symbolic of the relationship is the co-existence of reciprocity, co-existence of exchange, of which the ‘smile’ is a perfect example. The baby smiles and the mother follows suit, or the mother smiles at her baby and the baby smiles, or both parties just simultaneously smile at each other. A resolution of dissonance, difference, anxiety, stress, etc., being expressed through the ‘smile’ and the occurrence/co-occurrence of other phenomenal features born in the living midst of that relationship. Hence this list of features as found above in this type of incongruent relationship. To recapitulate let me list some of these distinctive features (which could be argued for as necessary transcendental features since their collective establishment establishes both relatively congruent and incongruent relationships [both as phenomenal-phenomenological idealities and as phenomenal-phenomenological realities] since, let it be recognized first, that all relationships are born in a differential of power, i.e., in and through an inequality of power!). Second, that there is a necessary embodiment both of all parties in some form/s or other and their mutual embodiment together as that relationship-as-existentially-embodied (through the presentation of an existential excess of value of that relationship and its associated existential descriptors that primarily describe the in-depth existence and nature of that relations such as the ‘smile’). Third, that there must be already in phenomenal-phenomenological existence a variety of exchange factors; e.g., such aspects as the ‘smile’, etc. Fourth, an invariant transformational isomorphism must be able to be accounted for when all relevant perspectives from all the relevant parties concerned, etc., are shared, etc. Fifth, that the effective ‘presence’ of a relationship is in evidence in and through the non-reductive reception of an existential excess; an excess that finds itself re-invested back into the relational ‘body’ of that relationship. Sixth, as a relationship comes into existence through the successful, ongoing resolution of relational difference or dissonance it follows that the relationship is in existence to that extent non-resolved processes of power are not able to disrupt the relational ‘body’ of that relationship as it enters into an existence within this World-of-Life. Hence these six provisional ‘transcendental insights’ of, namely, of the existence of a power-differential, relational embodiment, reciprocated indicators, trans-formational isomorphism, existential excess and relative non-destabilization. With these headings to hand let me now tentatively explore what relevance these features may or may not have within a process theology in general when setting out to exam this hypothetical disparity in power imputed between the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine (by theological philosophers, theologians, congregations [and miscellaneous other parties who may be only prepared to concede this point hypothetically]). (690)

	Already we have isolated some of the phenomenal-phenomenological features that should be attendant upon a Divine-non-divine relationship, albeit within a hypothetical frame of reference. E.g., that such a relationship should be in existence both phenomenally and phenomenologically (for it to be experiential in some form or other for the non-divine participant/s), that the Divine party should be more organized epistemologically as per definition, that for this relationship to be a relationship it should be two-way, i.e., reciprocated (whether the non-divine participant/s is/are aware of this), and, in the light of our six heading just noted, there should be an existential surplus of value issuing from the psychic center of that relationship, that some form of isomorphic invariance should be in existence (that allows these two different types of parties to interact with each from their own points of view but still within the ambit of a relationship-in-common, and that relationship should endure long enough for that relationship to nominated as that specific relationship (of that particular type in keeping with its general properties associated with that type of particularity). To this we should also add some form of relational embodiment not only of all the participants but also for that very relationship itself. As noted, the relationship itself cannot be reductively treated as without its own sense of an embodiment; without its own embodied sense of depth even if such a body cannot be pointed out in or on the same material reference plane of one or more of its participating parties. This psychic embodiment is witnessed though the appearance or simulated semblance of a mutual depth to that relationship as indicated through various indicators shared by the psychic mass of that relationship. This embodiment could be viewed as metaphorical but should not be reductively treated as just a metaphor (since metaphors only function through their insertion into the hermeneutic circle wherein we find ‘the simulation of the world’ through ‘the world of the simulation’…). Hence we must also posit in some form or other the embodiment of that relationship from the ‘metaphorical’ point of view of that relationship! Indeed, much of my analysis (on the nature of the possibilities of a Divine-non-divine relationship) will hinge on just this point. E.g., although religious language might say, in general terms of reference, that  the devotee is in the body of the Divine, correctly, we should say that the devotee is “in an embodied relationship with the Divine, and v.v.,” regardless of whether such a relationship for that non-divine party actually existed or not. Let me explore some of the implications of this concept of the relatively distinctive process formation of a Divine-non-divine form of relational embodiment. (691)

	This sense of relational embodiment, as a concept, opens us up to a number of interesting themes in variation, e.g., how do we differentiate between an operating relationship and a relatively non-operating relationship, a relationship that was operative but is now no longer operative in that past form (through the death or loss of participating members); and, what is it that activates a relationship; and how viable is the distinction between the internality of a relationship and its apparent or non-apparent externality; and, with respect to the last set of considerations, what role does entanglement play in the dynamics of an operating relationship that is relatively local or relatively non-local (and what constitutes locality?)? Under this theme of relational embodiment let me work my way through this list of questions. (692)

	No relationship can be absolutely distinctive, i.e., isolated from the open context of the world (as found within this one World-of-Life). So, can we distinguish the existence of a relationship as apart from this transcendentally necessary matrix of the Life-World, or, for that matter, one relationship from another? Therefore we must ask in what sense is a relationship ‘in existence’? The world may be uniformly ‘empty’ of substantial existence, still, the phenomenal-phenomenological world presents itself as anything but uniform in the apparent vivacity and veracity of its relationships and manner of the contents presented by the same. Different ‘things’ have different degrees of epistemological organization. E.g., I have some friends here in my current home town of Sydney, I have some friends in New Zealand, but, to the best of my knowledge, I don’t think I have any friends at the moment in England. What relationship do I bear to all the Peters, Pauls and Marys, for a start, in that far away land? Surely, such potential relationships are not being realized and in that sense are relatively non-operating. But, unbeknownst to me, a friend of my mine, by the name of Peter, is currently staying in London for a few days and will shortly give me a telephone call. This relationship is obviously operating despite the existence between him and myself. Should we not consider, therefore, the possibility of some form of exchange, at some point or period of time, as evidence of a relationship despite such geographical limitations imposed upon that relationship, etc. In this light we might like to say that the presence of the possibility of some form of exchange is indicative of an operating relationship regardless of whether that current relationship, at this moment of time, is indicating an actual process of exchange. That, in effect, the relationship is relatively activated when exchange mechanisms are evident, and, that this type of process effectively leaves a psychic ‘wake’ as a consequence (with the implication that a relationship remains open even after a process of exchange has taken place). Or, the presence and persistence of exchange processes, effectively reinforces the ‘presence and persistence’ of that relationship. Furthermore, we could argue that it is the (spatio-temporal) individuality of the exchange mechanisms that relatively individuates a relationship or non-individuates the same. E.g., it so happens that Peter is traveling with my friend Paul and I speak to both of them on the telephone and by this commonality of exchange processes the relationship I have with Peter and the relationship I have with Paul are brought together into a common relationship between Peter, Paul and myself. So, in the light of the above, we could say that relationships come into existence, are reinforces or non-reinforced through the process of sharing in exchange mechanisms and sometimes different relationships can combine and, at other times, sometimes separate, etc. The possibility and ‘presence’ of exchange factors relatively activating and reinforcing/de-reinforcing or dissolving these phenomenal-phenomenological appearances of relationships. This sense of relationship being experienced as some sort of a bond in whose wake we feel we have a relationship that is in existence as it is felt to wax and wane before us. What is the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of that bond? (693)
	
	The semblance of a bond between two or more people is experienced, I believe, as a field of obligations; a nebulous set of obligations of varying degrees of thematization within a matrix of genre expectations. This matrix of genre-expectations being situated within a culture of genre-expectation that, effectively, creates that sense of culture for its participants. These meta-textual perspectives on types of activity help define those relationships-for-us in our reflections upon the same and, in their re-definition, re-define the nature of those relationships. Only in a shift of paradigms (on the relative periphery of our psychic sense of world) are we cast into an ethical dilemma (not without, sometimes, a relatively radical re-experiencing of the world). Otherwise all other dilemmas are experienced through not conforming to those expectations for whatever reason, or, we find an equal weighting of conflicting patterns of obligations between which at some stage we are forced to chose. The relative weight or weighting of those obligations, that collective mass of obligations, giving us some indication of the strength of that relationship (relative to other relationships) (despite the fact that individual expressions of those obligations can be compromised or re-weighted by expectations incurred in our exercise of other relationships on an individual by individual basis). Hence we can say that our examination of these bonds is such that we experience them coming into existence, their waxing and waning, and their effective cessation when obligations are no longer experienced as obliging us to respond. (694)

	Thus, the operational status of a relationship is determined, more or less, through our experience of the status of these bonds should they exist (and/or their need to be expressed). Or, in more general terms of reference a relationship, effectively, is in existence when exchange factors are, have been or could be exercised. The relative  strength or non-strength of the collective mass of these exchange factors and the collective mass or wake of their consequences establishing the effective operational status of that putatively nominated relationship. So, I do have current relationship with persons in England by the names of Peter and Paul. But, no other relationships do I have with people by that name in that country until such a time that indications of exchange factors are in evidence (like letters, emails, or actually making my acquaintance with the same either here, there or elsewhere). Hence the operational status of a relationship is determined through the existence or non-existence of the status of possible factors of exchange, and v.v, associated with the same! Hence the equivalence between operational status and exchange status. (695)
	So, a relationship is in operation, i.e., in actual existence when there are indications of exchange factors. But, exchange factors exchanged between people do not occur either on a continuous basis or a continual basis. As noted before there is the phenomenon of a wake, an after effect that lasts for sometime after the exchange has been received and/or recognized and acknowledged and perhaps followed by a reciprocal process of exchange. How is this wake to be determined as in existence since, e.g., the merely sending of a letter does not imply that it will be received, acknowledged and/or replied to. Again, one must suppose that we either experience this wake directly as still in existence, or, discover its existence through interview and inference, or, surmise its existence from general genre expectations in the light of an adequate historical appreciation of that particular relationship; e.g., we see a flow of letters or the mere exchange of Xmas cards, etc. As a general understanding here, what is one allowed to assume constitutes and re-creates this semblance of a relational wake, the effective persistence of that relationship despite the vestigial continuity of exchange factors? From the historical acceptance of a relationship and its exchange factors one can then determine historically whether these processes of exchange are reciprocated; adequate in the complexion of their informational transfers; possess a frequency within the expected range as might be determined from an appropriate reading of genre expectations; these processes of exchange are found to constitute upon examination the realization of an adequate existential excess that finds itself psychically re-invested back into that relationship along with the continuation of the same. As examples and contra-examples of the same we might note: letters sent and either replied to or apparently not replied to; appropriate letter are sent and returned (whereas letters with no real information or those that are abusive in nature might be inclined to disrupt this form of relational continuation); letters not sent with an appropriate frequency, i.e., too few or too many (so lovers might write to each other on a daily basis but mere acquaintances would not normally be expected to do so); overall this process of exchange is found to either contribute an adequate existential gain or a non-adequate existential gain with the continuation of the relationship reflecting this state of affairs with a re-continuation of that relationship or its effective dis-continuation; etc. Now, these observations can be re-written in non-personalized terms of reference in looking at relationships between non-animate objects or states (as in particle physics, geological structures, astrophysical processes of interaction, etc.). What allows us to make this type of generalized transition? The acceptance that all forms of relationship ideally possess the same general phenomenal characteristics and that the same type of phenomenological appreciation of those characteristics applies. Should we not ask - what guarantees there might be in this regard that would allow us to assume a common phenomenal and phenomenological basis to the nature of relationships and their appreciation? In reply I would adopt the (transcendental-like) position that it is through the ubiquity and commonality of the hermeneutic circle that allows us to appreciate a relationship as qua a relationship, and, what does not exist for us does not exist for us hence only that which can be appreciated is able to be appreciated. Hence this uniformity of the relational dimension for us by virtue of this transcendental necessity of the hermeneutic circle of appreciation…. (696)
	
	Is such a position a form of idealism? Yes and no! A form of transcendental idealism but not a form of non-transcendental idealism. At the same time it invokes a form of transcendental empiricism to the extent that “what is not there for us is not there for us.” Correctly, this pointless, traditional tennis match between idealism versus empiricism is transcended by virtue of the fact that the existential operation of the hermeneutic circle is conducted through the auspices of an overall transcendental suspension in which such forms of privilege and prioritization are, negatively, automatically ruled out of court, and, positively, transcended through the transcendental synthesis of the hermeneutic circle itself. In essence, in the core-authenticity of the functioning of the hermeneutic circle, our ‘passing’ in and through an overall transcendental suspension ensures that there can be no effective or real privileging and prioritization of ideal orientations over empirical orientations and vice versa! The ideality of meta-textual generalizations has as much to play in the formation of intent and intentionality as the empirical particularizations of that being examined to hand. Text and meta-text must operate hand in glove so to speak, or, like a key and lock since to unlock the value of a textual context necessitates a ‘reading’ of their co-presence within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle. That granted, this commonality of all phenomena as relational (and v.v..) let me now examine the nature of relational space (and time), i.e., the nature of the relationship as it is to be experience either indirectly and externally and/or directly and internally. (697)

	What allows us to feel a relationship persists? In the wake of reciprocity there is the continuation of an expectation that between two or more participants perceived to be in a relationship that there exists an excess of value in that relationship above and beyond, more or less, the mere summation of the values brought to that relationship by those participants in that relationship, and, that this excess value in this relationship is neither disrupted at some point in time nor dissipated over a certain period of time. That this ‘intuition’ can be experienced internally and/or externally (just as, e.g., we can see friendships between friends without having to be friends with any of those parties in order to determine this internal state of affairs). What exactly is this division between the internality of a relationship and its externality in so far as our experience of a relationship is? This non-absolute sense of division is to some metaphorically arrived at through whether a potential participant is experiencing that relationship in and through the hermeneutic circle that constitutes its current, ongoing phenomenological appreciation (and/or its ontological equivalent in terms of interactive reciprocity) or whether that perspective is correctly external to that primary sense of an engaged hermeneutic circle. A relationship in general terms of reference is here viewed as being constituted through the interactivity of its participants, this interactivity constituting a hermeneutic-like circle of interaction wherein such participants both interact individually and collectively (and hence neither absolutely individually nor absolutely collectively). In this part-whole interaction we are effectively simulating the dynamics of a phenomenological hermeneutic circle hence our consideration of the same form either ontological and/or epistemological ‘orientations’. Moreover, our interaction, externally or internally, within or with that discriminated distinction of a relationship always implicates the enacted, activated potentiality of an epistemological-phenomenological sense of a(n appropriate and appropriated) hermeneutic circle. Indeed, the fact of perceiving this discriminated distinction of a relationship already implicates this phenomenological dimension in our appreciation of the phenomenal. A ‘distinction’ being validly discriminated as a relatively real relationship by virtue of our demonstration of an excess of existential value to be discovered in the virtual center of that simulation/re-simulation – the degree to which that relationship can be validly discerned being a direct, equal reflection of the degree of this excess value actually found discerned in its simulation/re-simulation. This semblance of an excess of value spilling over, so to speak, in its own received re-continuation. Hence the aesthetic of that relationship, the extent to which it possesses this greater sense of facticity, is a measure both of its valid discernment and its actual embodiment in the world, a world that is correctly a world of relationships and whose ‘intuition’, in turn, is found to be as an excess of value (and thence ‘open’ to be validly interpreted in a theological perspective?). Our experience of this excess of value resident in and/or from a discerned relationship establishing our discernment of its relative facticity, i.e. as a fact in the world above and beyond its mere material embodiment (where by ‘material’ we mean its object-status in an object language whose relational imprint upon the world establishes its meta-status above and beyond its mere material imprint through this semblance of a received excess of value). Mere material embodiment being a fiction since this excess of value is re-invested back into (the simulation/re-simulation of) its material imprint and v.v. Our discernment of a relationship through a hermeneutic circle of phenomenological appreciation both particularizing and collectivizing these relatively object-orientations and meta-orientations respectively in and through this dialectic of their co-mutual contrast with each other. Hence the mere relational expression of that relationship with material embodiment or set of material embodiments is equally a fiction since there can be no relationship without participants and v.v. Now, this dialectic accepted, what constitutes relational internality and relational externality, and, the relationship between the same? (698)
	
	As already indicated a relationship can be observed either externally and/or internally. In the latter, as a participant, we experience the reality of that relationship as a direct participant. The existential hallmarks of such an experience are quite distinctive from our experience of that relationship from an external perspective. Externally we experience time and space in an historical manner, i.e., space as three dimension and time as possessing a past, present and future through some form of an imputed historical persistence or endurance. In contrast, from an external perspective we experience no sense of the spatial and immediate sense of the historical and in its place we perceive the expanse of that relationship to be the same from any point within that relationship and a sense of time that is resolute, immediate, ongoing and spontaneous. Of course, our experience of a relationship more correctly is as a dynamic mixture of both perspectives (since our experience of ‘reality’ demands to some degree the balanced imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, a state of affairs realized through the dynamically engaged, mutual co-presence of the simulation/re-simulation of both perspectives to some extent or other). From the internal perspective a relationship is experienced through some form of a centered relational entanglement. Within this aspect we experience the resolution of relative relational dissonance that, as a consequence, realizes both the essential nature of that relationship and the effective resolve of that relationship. Because we experience the essential nature of that relationship and its sense of resolve as more or less the same (in our appreciation) anywhere in the relational space of that relationship it follows that, internally, we are experiencing the effective entanglement of that relationship with itself within its own internal sense of space and time. Our appreciation of this sense of a uniformity of essence establishes this sense of entanglement throughout the extent of that relationship as an imprint upon the fabric of the world. Moreover, experiencing this sense of resolutional intent also allows us to experience the unique, relatively ‘living’ spontaneity of that relationship, i.e., in that sense of where it is going to go as it finds itself being projected into the spatial-temporal imprint of that relationship from an external point of view. Externally, we perceive how a projection of that internal sense of resolution is manifested, albeit indirectly in and through the deposition of a text or a set of texts (which can be considered both from parallel and sequential points of view). Adopting an harmonic approach let me re-iterate these distinctions as noted above. (699)

	The particularity of a participant is experienced through simulation/re-simulation as relatively dissonant. Resolution of that sense of difference establishes a sense of the relationship between those dissonant participants. In this harmonic state of ongoing resolution we experience both the essential nature of that relationship and its sense of resoluteness, i.e., what it is and where it appears at that moment to be headed or not headed. As this type of experience is experienced throughout the ambit of that relationship in exactly the same manner (give or take merely the intensity of that eidetic-like realization) it follows that this type of experience is effective entangled within the ambit of that relationship. Within this hermeneutic circle-like environment the moment by moment resolution of the relationship is essentially chaotic in complexion hence its apparent spontaneity of direction/re-direction. Furthermore, I would argue, that this momentary-like nature is a consequence of the fact that limitations imposed upon perception (whether realized through sensory means or acquired instrumentally) imposes a momentary-like nature upon our experience of the same (or the nature of the ‘perception’ that is realized in non-phenomenological terms of reference, i.e., as entailed theoretically between non-intentionally constituted participants). Hence this internal sense of entanglement conceived of in both essential and chaotically directed/re-directed terms of reference. Externally, the internality of the relationship is phenomenally projected (rather than ‘phenomenologically’ injected) and hence its spatio-temporal configuration in those terms of reference. Thence its entry into history, an historical sense of time and space. (700)

	Previously I noted a number of insightful aspects or transcendental insights when investigating the nature of relationships, namely, a power-differential, relational embodiment, reciprocated indicators, trans-formational isomorphism, existential excess and relative non-destabilization. Let me look into these facets with some depth and then apply this collective understanding to the hypothetical field of a possible theological process that includes human agency in its interactive and emergent history. (701)

	As already noted there would be an obvious power differential between instances of human agency in a hypothetical process of divine emergence. It could be argued (along gestalt lines) that no power differential would not allow a relationship to arise through a lack of resolution, and, at the same time, too great a potential without adequate mediation would effectively disrupt that relationship through a dissonant destruction of that sense of ongoing resolution. In this light we can note that between any two potential participants in a possible relationship the power differential, first, is never equal and, second, never unchanging quantum in difference. In the hypothetical relationship of the Divine vis-à-vis the relatively non-divine, v.v., of course this differential can neither be equal nor of a similar quantum in intensity. That being the case one must then ask what form or forms of mediation would allow that relationship to form and persist with some degree of stability (as noted in our sixth transcendental insight). More appropriately this would be a task for the philosophical theologian to speculate upon and examine. However, since each relationship is productive of its own specific relational embodiment (as per our second transcendental insight) then it could be argued that such mediation necessary to initiate and maintain that relationship through resolution could be arranged within the ‘space’ of the relationship itself? More problematic would be the question “how do we discern the specific existence and nature of the reciprocated indicators of that relationship that would then allow us to determine the distinctive course of that relationship as it enters into the passage of historical time and space as a reflection of the unique embodiment of that relationship?” Let me examine this question in some detail. (702)

	As noted in our letter writing analogy exchange factors need not be exchanged either continuous or continually for the force of that relationship to remain in existence. Between friends some sense of obligation, desire, commitment to a relationship sees to it that that relationship persists despite obvious signs like exchange factors being evident. I would argue that this sense of obligation, etc., is an indications of the relational embodiment of that relationship in its own sense of time and space, i.e., in its own sense of an historical embodiment, an embodiment obviously felt to be in existence between these friends despite the absence of a sufficiency of signs external to that relationship. Between friends the exchange of letters creates a sense of obligation, an obligational inequality between these participants that from time to time is discharged in the form of new letters and further obligational displacements from one participant to the other overall. The exchange of letters can be seen in inter-subjective historical space. On the other hand, obligations are felt by those parties internal to that relationship and, on the other, only surmised by those external to that relationship. By envisaging the sense of an internal inter-subjective relational form of embodiment I am arguing that each and every relationship, with or without human and/or Divine agency, wittingly or unwittingly, forms its own distinctive sense of embodiment within the ambit of the Life-World. That symmetry breaks, reversal, disruptions, etc., are traced out for us in an external inter-subjective collective sense of an historical embodiment as we are found to stand-before-each-other in this one-World-of-Life. Hence this sense of the externality of the Life-World as opposed to the non-philosophical, naïve sense of the external world. The former sense of externality could be re-labeled as the non-internal externality of the Life-World. Now, what exactly is happening in these breaks in relational symmetry when, e.g., an obligation between friends to correspond by letter results in the creation of a new letter and upon its reception the additional imposition of a new obligation. Can we use this example as a model or metaphor of this sense of symmetry breaking when internal experience of an obligation, e,g.,  is converted into a letter written and emitted, and v.v., upon reception of that letter an additional obligation is created or simulated, etc. What is the essential nature of this phenomenon? In  sense it is the difference and non-difference between the intentional desire to write a letter to a friend and their caption of it as implying a certain obligation to respond over some expected time frame of reference. So just Xmas cards are swapped or a Xmas card with a short letter or a series of letters outside that festive season, etc. (703)

	What is the nature of this alternation between potentiality (as an obligation felt to write a letter, e.g.) and its actual discharge (in the form of a letter written), and v.v? Is it not the case that this difference is the very difference between the potentiality and the actuality? In many respects the same sort of difference between the experiential perception of absence and presence? Both presence and absence need to be registered implying an absence-of-something-or-someone-for-someone and a presence-of-something-or-someone-for-someone. Otherwise both presence and absence are not registered, and, in this respect, are similar. What else could be said about these two aspects of embodiment in a field? Change is not possible without something to change, hence presence in this relative, non-absolutist sense. At the same time absolute presence is ruled out as that would imply an inability to change and thence to exist in an embodied form in that relational field of embodiment. Hence their co-mutual cooperation and co-definition. Furthermore, rules of transformation must exist that allows these factors, or something/s that phenomenally mediate/s for the same, to be able to co-mutually interact. In other words that relational field must possess both modalities in some form of a co-mutual relationship. Then, it stands to reason that the collective field is greater in its summation that either modality – this threefold analysis suggesting a parallel with epistemological organization of the hermeneutic circle? If so what parallels might be drawn? (704)

	One could say that difference manifests itself as dissonance and as actuality. Conversely, the commonality of similarity establishes a background sense of field within which dissonance/actuality is realized and experienced, etc., through processes of resolution wherein the relationship is continually re-constituted (and expressed through the exchange of exchange factors). In essence the dissonance of x establishes the actuality of x through resolution. Without that sense of ongoing resolution there would be a disruption of x, etc., and the formation of a new state of actuality, e.g., y or a set of z’s, etc. In this scheme the sense of potentiality could be viewed as the difference between x and its background field B, namely, potentiality p = -(B-x) where actuality  a = x. Therefore, potentiality and actuality can be defined respectively as:    (B-x), (x). Furthermore, a change ^ in B and/or x establishing changes in both x and B. Transformation demanding some form of a transformational isomorphism in order to ensure the transformation of that object or state. Hence B:x : B’:x’ = TII  (transformational isomorphic invariance). Obviously, disruption in transformational isomorphic invariance implies the disruption of that relational field and the identities defined by the same. (705)

	With this theoretical understanding of the general phenomenal nature of transformational processes how should we understand this ‘symmetry breaking’ between potentiality and actuality? Obviously, when the conditions (as preconditions) are right this process can occur. Hence the ‘presence’ of potentiality and actuality need to be already co-present. Hence ^B-x = ^x, and v.v. TII also needs to be maintained. Effectively, non-disruptive change in that relationship R establishes a non-disruptive relational transition, etc. What light does this throw on this instantiation/oscillation of/between states of co-mutual potentiality and actuality? (706)

	Our fifth transcendental insight is that of an existential excess. In what manner is this manifested? In the perceived creation and maintenance of the relational field where/when is this sense of an ‘excess’ initiated and invested (because this aspect of our equations would surely result in some form of a contravention of the overall conservation of matter/energy, etc?)? So, e.g., between two separated friends, writing letters would be one active way to maintain this relational bond between them; this internally experienced sense of obligation, in this form, being discharged in acts and emissions of letter writing from time to time therein and thereby helping to create and maintain this internally experienced sense of ‘their’ relationship (an ‘epistemological fact’ greater than the mere sum of the participants, etc., in that relationship such as these two friends, piles of paper, pens, a postal system, etc). This existential residue being found to discharge itself into a sphere of embodiment above and beyond the mere materiality of that relationship that, in this sense, therefore, cannot be reductively reduced and dismissed. In what manner, then, is this internal sense of a relational field different from the mere sum of its ontologically oriented constituents? Or, is this sense of an existential residue merely an epistemological fiction projected from the interpreted/re-interpreted materiality of that relationship and without foundations other than as a simulated/re-simulated set/series of ‘illusions’ (and, therein and thereby, creating this overall sense of a transcendental illusion of two friends, acts of friendship, etc.)? (707)

	In many ways this existential difference is very much like that sense of difference experienced between two series of notes one of which manifests to our ear as a beautiful tune and the other as merely the noise of row of notes. In both instances we merely have a series of musical notes vibrating in our ears one of which appears as a coherent and beautiful tune and the other as merely a cacophony (even when it is the case the physical quantity of noise of the latter could very closely approximate the mere quantity of that tuneful series of notes. Of course, the psychic mass of the beautiful row of notes is experienced with a difference sense of a psychic intensity, and, this embodied difference is discharged in a relatively more inter-subjective domain as a tune conforming to musical genres and their expectations, etc; a state of affairs that cannot be entertained in a less [epistemologically organized] psychic dimension). How does this anecdote illuminate this concept of a relational sphere of embodiment wherein the more tuneful row of notes is heard manifested as a coherent and unique tune? (708)

	A tune is just that a tune, its perception as ‘a tune’ is performed in a time-and-space belonging to the musical and not just a dimension of being just dealing with the volume of sound and its discrete discernment through pitch, etc. Our psychic movement from a realm of hearing the sound of a row of notes to a dimension of the musical is achieved through this metaphor of a breaking of symmetry. Of course if we were to attend an orchestral concert and from our seat in the audience we see the conductor with their baton raised and ready to perform a famous symphony or a piece by a relatively unknown composer we find ourselves now sitting there silently waiting for the music to arrive. The break in symmetry is already upon us. However, let us say it is April 1st and the orchestra plan a surprise, a sort of musical happening where everyone in the orchestra just makes a noise and hopes eventually to make something musical in a spontaneous fashion. Our expectations are overthrown and we find a break, indeed, a violent disruption, in the current symmetry of our expectations. What do I mean by adapting this scientific concept for philosophical purposes? What I am suggesting is that a discernable change of state takes place where the spectrum of modalities exercised before and after are not symmetrical with each other in a collective sense. A row of notes is just a row of notes unless it is perceived as a tune or a relatively tuneful row of notes. Using harmonic theory I would describe this change of state as the resolution of one state of affairs and its realization in some other form. Although asymmetrical all processes of change are treated commutatively. A few wrong notes, a few instruments going out of tune, the orchestra loosing its cohesion and the music would start to sound strange. The conductor before the next movement allows the orchestra to retune and things go back to the way they were, i.e., musically. Although all processes are hypothetically treated as constituted by commutatively reversal processes, reversals of asymmetry may not be practically achievable (and this asymmetrical pressure in probability implicates [our perception] of the so-called ‘arrow of time’). An explosion is an explosion and to make it then implode is most unlikely if not improbable, yet, when we rewind a video in the play mode we can make the explosion appear to implode back into the bomb implicating its possibility despite its quantum improbability in this regard. On a quantum level this is not impossible only very highly improbable. Using harmonic theory: dissonance in a certain frame of reference is resolved in the formation of a new frame of reference. E.g., in the act of writing a letter we have a series of discontinuities in symmetry such as our initial finding we have no writing material immediately to hand, our finding writing material, the writing of the letter, the sending and delivery of that letter, its being read and responded to, etc. One sheet of paper, a pen, one envelope, a stamp and one potential writer of a letter does not constitute a letter. A letter has to be written, in effect, the letter emerges from these materials… the emergence of that letter constituting a new state of affairs with an asymmetry between prior modalities and posterior modalities hence this asymmetry and the breaking of the symmetry between these two collective states of affairs (between the mere letter writing materials and the emergent formation of a letter along with its inception/reception in a different meta-textual genre of activity in the light of the expectations associated with that type of textual interpretation). The gap or period between the prior state of affairs and the posterior state of affairs being realized through a resolution of the factors engineering this state of transformation Never an absolute state of transformation because some degree of transformational isomorphic invariance is preserved under that period of transition. E.g., in writing the letter the page is preserved albeit with the inscription of the letter, etc.  In effect, resolution is a relatively radical redirection of that economy; if the economy is an intentionally directed one then it is a relatively radical redirection of that intentional economy, etc. The economy occurring within an epistemological hermeneutic circle and/or its ontological equivalent (i.e., foreground field/background field and their interactions, etc.). With these concepts in mind (symmetry breaking, the transformational economy in circulation, etc.) let us examine what relevance this might have for the hypothetical construction of a potentially viable process theology and the limitations this type of approach would have on its construction? (709)

	Recently I argued that “what is valued, what is deemed valuable?” is not determined through some form of evaluation that determines ‘intrinsic worth’ but a determination of the nature of its circulation in a currency of valuation in an economy of desire(d intentional objectives holistically determined). Furthermore, as argued in this extended essay, all value is tri-modally divided up between sense (in our psychic mapping of the world), meaning and meaningfulness. That all of this can only occur in an intentional economy centered on a hermeneutic circle. Outside this economy there can be no economy-there-for-us! At the same time it should be recognized that an infinite number of economies could be theoretically brought to bear on similar point in this world-we-share-with-others. Fortunately, our intentional choices in economic appropriation are limited even if multi-dimensional. At the same time we should also be aware of the possibility of relationships without direct intentional knowledge, recognition, awareness, etc. The important implications for the religionist being twofold,, namely, no value can be entertained outside an appropriate economy of evaluation, and, forms of value could be realized both wittingly and unwittingly! So, theological value, e.g., cannot be searched for beyond our engagement with an appropriate theological economy, and, theological value might well be unwittingly engaged without out direct awareness? Let me examine these two consequences of this economic modeling of intentional awareness, in effect, the first prohibiting the path that tries to seek value beyond an economy of circulation, and, the second proposing the theological possibility that divine interaction could take place unwittingly in a multi-dimensional (re-)invagination of value of the site under investigation or some other (in such a manner that it might be possible to expose these possible undercurrents or overcurrents of direct theological engagement by some means or other, albeit usually not brought to full and adequate intentional experience and reflection). So, let us consider whether the first path is, indeed, forever blocked to us, and, let us also consider whether the second path is a viable option to entertain in some literal and/or metaphorical manner? (710)

	As one door closes another opens. As argued before, that phenomena which is not there for you is not there for you! There can be no transcendent and/or immanent value beyond that which can be experienced! Value must be circulated to have currency! What is beyond experience cannot be experienced (and can only remain speculative if at all able to be mentally envisaged!)! On the other hand, an infinitude of economies of value-formation can overlay the same point or points of intersection (such as a perceive object or state, a person, a particular group of people or institution, etc.). On the grounds of this latter theoretical observation, the religionist has the following hypothetical avenue, namely, that wittingly or unwittingly persons, institutions, communities, etc., could all participate in a complex set of relationships with various facets of the Divine. The possibility of this transcendental ideality leaves open for the theologian, etc., the type of situation where ‘religious experience’ is truly ‘an experience of the religious’ and not a mis-representation of what is in fact not a religiously grounded type of experience (even if experienced as religious in accordance with genres of activity judged in that manner culturally and/or inter-culturally). Of course, the real problem for the theologian, etc., lies in their ability to then discern and to determine the transcendental-empirical reality of that type of experience, i.e., does that type of religious experience truly intersect with the Divine in some form or other? Hypothetically, by what transcendental guide-lines would allow the critical philosopher, what ever their profession and whatever their (ontological, epistemological and religious) commitments, to critically and soundly navigate this transcendental possibility? And with what degree and manner of optimism? Since, hypothetically the impossibility of pure possibility implies the actuality of the possible in some form or other, to some degree or other? That granted, the questions that remain then are, first, is such a religious reside of the Divine, as experienced, experientially accompanied by a relevant degree, in a relevant manner, of religious resonance, and, second, does this apparent ‘reality of Divine experience’ truly coincides with the real ‘reality of the experience of the Divine qua Divine’?? In effect, what allows the religious phenomenologist, directly or indirectly, to investigate the reality of the experience of the Divine interpreted as the Divine and allow that type of experience to be classified as an experience of the Divine (in part or in whole, in some form or other)? The hypothetical reality of the Divine accepted, who are we to say whether experience of the Divine is or is not truly coincident with its imputed reality and the existential reality of that experience is truly religious, i.e., inspiring, able to generate a religious insightfulness, revelatory of the Divine, productive of a transformative nature able to re-constitute human existence with a deep existential sense of purpose along with an attendant sense of re-direction for that religious person, etc. In other words, the existential validity of a properly grounded religious experience should be able to declare its own propriety, validity, appropriateness and existential relevance as a religious experience qua religious experience? But, that ‘fact’ is often treated to be the case when it is also a ‘fact’ that no phenomenon should be treated merely at face value otherwise we would find ourselves believing that sticks are bent underwater, that the depths of every pond has its own moon, and that all deserts are flooded with a plenitude of water during the day that removes itself from our presence as soon as we try to walk towards it, etc.  (711)

	By what non-transcendental guidelines are these transcendental guidelines allowed to operate, i.e., by what transcendental rules do we find Divine value coinciding with the value of the Divine (and how can the same be appreciated in mundane non-transcendental terms of reference)? And by what rules are we allowed to verify the religious depth of religious-like experiences in a mundane frame of reference (since the ‘religious’ is experienced, even if only on reflection, in mundane terms of reference)? I would like to propose, at this point in time, the possibility of an ordered analysis being applicable in this regard; i.e., essential-pre-essential forms of evaluation, essential-aesthetical forms of evaluation, deontological-ethical forms of evaluation, pragmatical-utilitarian-forms of evaluation, contextual-hermeneutical forms of evaluation and/or ontical-factual forms of evaluation? Basically, these types of transcendental field must co-mutually overlap in the formation of their deep structure (through being forms of a qualified and distinctive privileging of the intentional object-state and/or intentional ego and/or intentional field) and prepare each other for their co-mutual constitution and deployment, especially when all six orders can be entered and left (in transformative and transformational processes of value formation and evaluation) (when examined on a less deep level of epistemological analysis). Let us examine the possible merits of this process of critical discrimination and the possible merits of such processes of insight-formation albeit as re-treated onto a mundane level of cultural/inter-cultural experience as experiences-as-lived, even if only seemingly lived and experienced in and through critical processes of reflection!? But, since acts of reflection must be acts of reflection upon something it follows from this fact of intentional-objectivity that we cannot dismiss such artifacts as mere reflections and retrospective simulations or, as a consequence, as non-existentially lived-out  ‘fictions’. (712)
	
	As a phenomenologist we will deal with types of experience, i.e., types of experience that have the same essential constitution, i.e., the same type of distinctive constitution. (in other words their existential descriptors are bound within certain limits as determined by the epistemological organization of that type of situation). To this end, the religious phenomenologist might like to form a list of religious types of experience utilizing, in the process, a thorough transcendental suspension; thereby not allowing their ontological, epistemological and other critical commitments to seriously write/re-write their interpretations/re-interpretations of the phenomenon or phenomena under investigative re-constitution (such being enabled through acts of intentional simulation and comparative re-simulation within those critical parameters). E.g., seeing ‘divine-like imagery’ is always constituted in the light of one’s own culture or intercultural appropriations, so if it were the case that one were to see a radiant figure of a mother and child in a Western culture that might be interpreted as the ‘Virgin Mary’ whereas in a Chinese culture that might well be interpreted as ‘Kwan Yin’, etc. In bracketing such a type of experience it is enough to note that the religious interpretation was of ‘imagery entailing a radiant figure of a mother and child’ and that that image was interpreted by that person as ‘of x’. By these transcendental phenomenological procedures we are neutrally attempting to clarify and classify such distinctively different types of religious treated phenomena (even though each phenomenon should also be perceived as a unique occurrence). Phenomena that appear to possess the same essential configuration being assumed to be of the same class and to possess the same manner of constitution until such a time good reasons are found to prevail upon us to re-interpret otherwise our modes of classification (and the manner of their ‘interaction’ in our psychic mapping of the sense of the Life-World). (713)

	Now, we must ask ourselves why an ordered analysis, in part or in whole, could establish the transcendental credentials of both religious-types of experience and religious experiences that invoke a relationship with the Divine in some form or other. At face value, a religious-like experience of the Divine is obviously interpreted by the person having that experience as possessing that type of content or at least possibly possessing that interpretation. Such an interpretation would be valid if there were a one to one correspondence between the content of that interpretation and the reality of that interpretation, i.e., that there were a correspondence between the ‘reality of that interpretation’ and that ‘interpretation of reality’. However, without invoking a correspondence theory of reality how is that to be achieved? Why this aversion to a correspondence theory of reality. Traditional empiricists, as empiricist, by invoking this type of metaphorical modeling of reality were asking us and themselves to do the impossible! If one’s ideas in the mind are formed empirically then we must ask how can such ideas be found to truly represent the objects in the world that can only be seen through the body and mind as representations or copies? If those objects of which our ideas are copies are copies how do we know they are indeed copies if we cannot directly see the originals so to speak except as copies (in the mind)? To do that is to ask the impossible for the limited empiricist whose only means of seeing reality is in and through imputed ‘copies’. To see that those ‘copies’ correctly mirror ‘that which they are imputed to be copies of’ is to invoke some form of a trans-empirical perception or apperception which the empiricist has rules out by their decision to be mere empiricists, no more and no less. This metaphor may appear to work in ordinary non-critical language in the arena of a critical philosophy this metaphor cannot be treated literally! On the other hand, forms of correspondence between similar types of intentional constituted intentionalities is possible. E.g., that person appears to be Jack and is Jack, indeed, that person is called Jack. Here we have correspondences invoked between perceptions, names and interpretations of perceptions treated as validly conducted. All such manoeuvres here being conducted intentionally and through process of transformation treatment/re-treatment wherein validity is assured on the grounds of the preservation of an invariant isomorphic symmetry on this level or in this medium of the intentional alone. Here, correspondences naturally figure. The invocation of an ordered analysis operating on the same model, namely, that there is maintained the necessary degree of preservation of a core invariant transformational isomorphic symmetry between the various intentional states so reviewed as linked and found to so correspond with each other. Here, processes of treatment/re-treatment are not so much representative as being basically re-presentative, i.e., re-presented through various processes of intentional re-iteration, transformation, confirmation, etc. (714)

	Why is an ordered analysis of our intentional constitution the key to determining the possible propriety, appropriateness and validity of our transcendental determination of forms of religious experience (and non-religious experience) that appear to implicate an actual relationship with some facet or other of the Divine if that were to be the case? In our hypothetical investigations we have defined the Divine as that whose epistemological organization is considerably in advance of that of relatively non-divine, human intentionality. Now, if that were to be the case then it follows that the relatively superior degree of organization should be imprinted on any relationship actively formed/informed with the same, by the same. This advanced degree of organization should be found to be self-evident in all forms of ordered analysis conducted order by order or collectively. So, on these grounds, one must assume that a religious experience that truly entailed a valid religious relationship with some form of religious, advanced epistemological organization that that organization should be imprinted to some degree or other upon that intentionally formed relationship with the same and all traces formed therein. Is that a valid assumption to make? E.g., a child in their coming to understand the world does so with many mistakes. From a feeble understanding of the world they learn to see this same world better, in greater depth and in greater detail and with a greater appreciation of its modalities and verities, etc. So, the world looks flat until it is explained to them that it is in fact round, etc. Is it not possible, hypothetically, that the valid thematization of religious realities must also proceed in the same manner, i.e., through processes of a corrective re-definitional thematization, etc? On the other hand, well-formed interpretative processes of religious perception/apperception should manifest themselves with this superior degree of epistemological organization. Therefore, we must assume that when processes of religious insight, revelation, etc., do happen that on attentive repetition this degree of gestalt intactness should shine through? Of course assuming that our own degree of gestalt intact is able to perform this degree of recognition and appreciation of this greater degree of epistemological organization? Therefore, assuming that people do have religious types of experience, assuming that some of them actually entail a relationship with forms of religious reality and assuming that our gestalt intactness is capable of interpreting the superior constitution of those religious realities then we must assume that such a course of interpretation is open albeit hypothetically!? That, our exercise of an ordered analysis is conducted so as to ascertain that this possibility of a superior epistemological organization is met in some forms of experience (whether consciously/non-consciously treated as religious or non-religious in orientation). Now, how is this ordered analysis conducted and appreciated with this type of objective in mind? (715)

	In ordered analysis we are dealing with the transcendental appreciation of all possible forms of judgment, i.e., pre-essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and ontical in orientation. These types of value occur through the privileging/de-privileging of the intentional object-state and/or the intentional ego and/or the intentional field. These six states also concern the following, namely, the pre-integrated content of thoughts, the integrated content of thoughts, the ideation process, the perceptive process, the possible-factual consideration of non-integrated content of simulated perceptive states and the actual-factual consideration of integrated content of simulated perceptive states. All this is achieved, respectively, through the relative privileging of the intentional object-state, privileging both the intentional object-state and the intentional ego, privileging the intentional ego, privileging both the intentional ego and the intentional field, privileging the intentional field, and, privileging both the intentional field and the intentional object. All this may well sound complicated but the underlying principles are not! Complications arise more through the multi-mapping of different grids used in the interpretation of the same; such as looking at the distinction between the content of a process and the process per se; the interactions of relative privileging/relative de-privileging (e.g., privileging the intentional object simultaneously de-privileges the intentional ego and the intentional field, and v.v., etc.); taking a gestalt approach to the general nature of fields; the general nature of these fields as essential (in its dealing with the pre-essential components of essential field), aesthetical, etc., etc. However, be that as it may, let us now look more closely at this hypothetical problem that questions our ability of actually being able to interpret the imputed superiority of a religious reality as actually possessing this relatively advanced superiority of epistemological organization? (716)

	We must ask ourselves what is possibly religious about aesthetical experience, de-ontological experience, our appreciation of pragmatic utility, etc? The transcendental verification of experience involves being able to correctly ascertain the correct transcendental status of that under critical examination and appreciation. In essence, transcendental reality is essentially simple in its presentation/re-presentation, aesthetically harmonized, ethically good, pragmatically effective, meaningfully ascertained and ontically determined as to the status of its current reality is, i.e., is it a true fact or it a fact that its truth is only as a possible state of affairs (and a modal complexion of a particular order such as a thought, an idea or perception, as a fact). In this light we cannot but imagine the transcendental nature of reality to be other than as so ordered, indeed, that the imputed superior epistemological organization of the relatively divine must directly and/or indirectly impress upon us as nothing other than the possession of this superior degree of transcendental constitution… hence the Divine would present itself/ re-present itself with this superiority of transcendental constitution both in quantity or magnitude and in quality or integrated-complexity. Thence, in this type of intuition, both the classical mind and the mediaeval mind would be theologically correct to assume, through extrapolation, that the Divine manifested as the One, the Beautiful, the Good, etc. Of course, if we were to insist on a process theology, a non-reification of universals, the emptiness of substance, a non-absoluteness of identity, etc., we cannot judge the efforts of our ancestors, in this regard, to be valid unless taken only in a metaphorical light! So, how does this critical-transcendental-rewriting of the theological discipline set us up to re-view the possible, hypothetical nature of the relatively Divine? (717)

	The (relatively more) real could be seen as ‘real’ in two senses, namely, in magnitude and in its integrated-complexity. By magnitude is meant its existential impact by virtue of its implicated number of exercised modalities. By integrated-complexity is meant the degree of its epistemological organization, whereas, the former deals more with the manner of its epistemological organization. We truly can invoke ‘degrees of reality’ when we perceive existence through the lens of invoked phenomenal-phenomenological modalities. It is all very well to say that something either exists or does not exist and that it neither exists more or less than it is as it is. This table and chair before me either exists or it does not exist, it cannot be more of a table or less of a table, more of a chair or less of a chair. That would be true of a factual state of affairs treated in a sixth order of actuality, however, even our appreciation of that factual state of affairs can be experienced and appreciated in a relatively apodictic manner or a relatively less apodictic manner. No. what is at stake here is an awareness of the modal ordering of existence as phenomenally and phenomenologically entertained. I.e., as conceived of in reality and as found to be experienced. Of course the chair I sit on either exists or does not exist and to say it half exists or exists twice over is a nonsense. On the other hand, our experiences of chair-like phenomena are had in a variety of manners or modalities. We could see a picture of a chair, watch  a movie of a chair, see a photo of a chair, make a drawing of a chair, imagine a chair, experience the hallucination of a chair, dream about a chair, entertain the memory of a certain chair, etc., etc. The phenomenal world is not populated purely by physical things, i.e., our phenomenological experience of chairs normally involves overlapping hierarchies of chair-like phenomena. When we see a chair we are not just seeing the perception of a chair. The chair is being actively constituted/re-constituted from a number of perspectives in order for us to imagine its three dimensional nature. Otherwise, how could we recognize it as something to sit on. We have memories of it, can imagine it, recognize it in a photo, find ourselves having lost it when taken to another room unknown by us [and therein discover both a sense of its phenomen(ologic)al absence as well as a sense of its phenomen(ologic)al presence], etc. Thence, in recognizing the reality of a certain state of affairs entails that we correctly ascertain the relative magnitude of modalities entailed as well as the manner of their entertainment. In other words, in our reconstitution of the simulation/re-simulation of a certain state of affairs we experience both the complexity and the integrated simplicity or relative-integrity apparently involved in the epistemological organization of that phenomenon or set of phenomena. An ‘integrity’ experienced/re-experienced through simulation/re-simulation. In a dream state we could be experiencing the relative integrity of that dream-chair but we could only sit upon it with a dreamed up sense of identity. So, of course, the dream chair exists because it was entertained in that particular dream-state. But, you cannot sit on it in a physically awake sense of self-identity because the chair-like phenomenon was only a dream-chair and not a relatively more real chair in a ‘normal’ non-dream-state as would be involved in our everyday experience of the everyday! So, what is at stake here (and what is at stake from a theological-like point of view?)? (718)

	Experience, in its intentional constitution, is multi-layered and multi-aspectival! Hence the ordered manner of its constitution! Our very concept of a chair is derived from our acquaintance with the reality of our experience of real chairs. Then, for us to believe we are being confronted by an instance of a real chair, in reverse order, we first must invoke its possibility in order to then confirm if that be a fact (in a sixth order of actual-factuality). Actuality informs potentiality, and, potentiality informs actuality. Overall, we can privilege neither factual modality (and this is reflected in the necessary constitution of the overall transcendental suspension otherwise we would be impressed by the latest appearance and disconcerted by the contradictions implicated between the manifestations of different appearances of the same phenomenon). However, in the confirmation of the reality of a chair phenomenon, the constitution of the possibility of a chair as the phenomenal content for its modal ascertainment of its transformation being able to make a sixth order determination of actual existence. So, in this light we have the necessary priority with the potentiality of a chair first in order to establish its positive determination as a real factual chair. Hence the multi-layered nature of intentional constitution (for that is how it is appreciated through the simulated/re-simulated ‘evolvement’ of its epistemological organization). Now, can we also argue that our experience of reality is also a multi-aspectival affair? Surely, if we are looking at an object from the perspective of one point of view we are only perceiving it under that aspect and that aspect alone. Superficially, that would appear to be correct, but let us consider the following. How do I know what aspect to perceive a real chair under. Genres of activity pre-determine identity, and v.v. These genres of activity are hierarchically constructed in our overall psychic mapping of our sense of world. So a chair is an object that is man-made object intended to be sat upon. The ideal chair has a number of legs from 1 to x, where, usually, x = 1-4. Already a normal, everyday sense of chair involves an overlapping hierarchy of discriminative intentional motives, etc! I.e., as an intentionally constructed physical object in the world, conforming to the pattern universally recognized as a chair; that even a relatively simple determination of a chair involves a complexity of sub-determinations invoking the genres of man-made, for sitting upon, for other purposes like an investment if the chair is to be sought after as an antique of the future if not already treated that way in the present, etc? The correct determination of genre involves a threading of our way through this hierarchical construction and recognition of genre. But, this threading of our way through the world also can involve no absolute rejection of any form of either modal-contrast or aspectival-contrast in order for this world to remain mapped out for us! In the determination of a chair nothing is absolutely rejected. To see it as a chair involves our seeing it also as not a table. Yet, too, we could sit on the floor and eat off the seat of that same chair and turn it into a table. What ever contrast is there in the determination of its identity must remain in  a state of contrast otherwise that contrast could not be maintained, would collapse and cease to be. So, a chair is a man-made object and this ongoing contrast is with all ‘other’ non-man-made objects, etc. For that identity to be maintained in its re-simulation implies that it cannot be absolutely severed from that matrix of identity. The ‘other’ and the identity that is ‘non-other’ cannot be severed from each other except through superficial forms of overlooking, etc. What is this living matrix being lived that must include both the discriminated identity of the non-other and all other relative senses of otherness is nothing other than the World-of-Life in its entirety. Hence in the determination of the reality of a certain phenomenon we determine the magnitude of its modal mix and, therein, its degree of epistemological organization. At the same time, it ‘simplicity of integrity’ is a reflection of our experience of its phenomenological integration into our experience of this World-of-Life. With some truth it could be re-stated that “the whole world is seen in each and every spec or moment of experience…” just as “each grain of sand mirrors the entire world…” (if we could but profoundly see it mirrored therein….). (719)

	Hypothetically, what would be the theological ramifications of this insight into the hierarchical and multi-aspectival phenomenological nature of the perception/apperception of phenomena? (720)

	Earlier I noted that as one door shuts another would open for the theologian. Theological value cannot be looked for beyond a phenomenological-phenomenal economy of evaluation. Such value must be entertained as currency; that which is currently there-for-us. At the same time, however, because each and every psychic point in our cosmic world, this World-of-Life, is multi-aspectival in its potentiality, this left open the possibility of the supposition of the super-imposition of a viable theological point of view, or points-of-view, being present either wittingly and/or unwittingly, and, capable, hopefully, of being found in a thematizable form that would allow us to ascertain both the magnitude and integrated-complexity of such an interpreted occurrence! Everything in the world, what ever its mix of modalities, could be viewed through a hypothetical theologically-oriented lens given the apparent unity of this one-World-of-Life. This viewing being considered from the hypothetical point/s of view of the non-Divine, from the hypothetical point/s of view of the Divine, and, from any hypothetical, imputed, viable relationship from point/s of view as entailed within this hypothetical relationship between ‘the relatively non-Divine and the Divine’ (the same being treated either relatively experientially and/or relatively non-experientially in and through its occupation of the simulation/re-simulation of an overall intentional perspective as understood in its general sense). Then, as the relatively Divine is with superior epistemological organization we should find, in time, all being well, that this simplicity of integrity should find itself (being seen as) stamped as a print, or theological imprint, on that circumscribed location of scrutiny!? But, let us ask the critical theologian how they might achieve this type of determination in its interpretative frame-work (given the possibility of its re-iteration through simulation and/or re-simulation)? (721)

	As I have claimed, covertly if not overtly, that all possible aspects or perspectives of intentional experience are already embedded in each and every determination of any point or moment of phenomenal-phenomenological reality, what ever its mix of modalities, etc., it follows that if there exists any theological-like point of view then that same type of view, given the right phenomenological strategy and ability, should be thematizable; if only theoretically, i.e., hypothetically? What are the theological ramifications and consequences of this simulation of an absolute, non-absolutist vision that one would expected to find in this type of holoism? (722)

	First, let me overtly argue for this type of position (that the transcendence of the Divine should be mirrored immanently, and v.v.). Second, let me extract its experiential ramifications in general (and, therein, note the possible phenomenal-phenomenological range of the ‘religious dimension’ of such experience). Third, let me extract its hypothetical theological ramifications and the implications it has for the nature and reality of religious experience, i.e, investigating, hypothetically, the possible theological work that might be done in and through the possibility and possible consequences of such ‘experiences’ and our reflections upon the same. (723)

	A theological reading of reality is conceivable and, therefore, actualized in some form or other. However, to determine the nature of this actualization (and thence its religious merit) is another thing entirely. As just noted every object or state, or set of thereof, can be given a theological reading superimposed upon the same (along with anti-theological readings and contra-religious readings, etc.). Let us explore, hypothetically, what might be entailed here and what limitations would need to be overcome by the interpretative theologian. To begin with, as the relatively Divine has been defined as that considerably in advance of the epistemological organization of a human individual and their institutions it would follow that the relatively Divine, hypothetically, would more easily be discovered in that possessing greater degrees of epistemological organization. So, e.g., between the immensity of the cosmos and a simple rock the former shows a greater degree of epistemological organization since the former includes the latter in its organizational nexus. Similarly between a human person and a domesticated dog one should find the imprint of the relatively Divine more in the former than the latter, and, if that were to be the case this imprint should be found more in those modes of life that demonstrate a greater degree of epistemological organization just as the intentional deposition of the same is to be found imprinted on their intentional depositions in the physical world. So, books, e.g., are not just a pile of cellulose but the organization of intentional actions and their depositions from the mode of life of reading-and-writing. Once that perspective is realized and re-realized a book can then be read as a book even if, currently, we are not privy to its language as found therein written. Similarly, therefore a divine perspective must be realized and re-realized in order to read ‘relatively Divine imprints’ as qua ‘imprints’ of the relative Divine. Now, what morals are we to derive from this analogy? For a start, the relatively Divine is not to be approached from a reductive point of view. Looking at mere objects and states in the world, from a physical perspective, is just the wrong direction to look. Not absolutely wrong, only relatively wrong! Better would be our looking at the organization, and implicit epistemological organization therein, of the cosmos, e.g. Or, looking at the transcendental unity of the person or institution (or the unity of a less epistemologically organized object or state like a rock crystal or the fractal patterns demonstrated by a storm front or congregation of passing clouds, etc.). Indeed, the theologian might relish this potentially insightful orientation assisted by the fact that all appearances of phenomenon through their mutual relativity are empty of substantial being and are only informed through the epistemological organization present in that being examined (from that point of view). Whether such a point of view can offer a relatively abundant existential excess of religious value remains to be seen. What would be entailed in this transcendental insight (and what transcendental limitations might circumscribe its value and restrict its religious value and any sense of  theological ‘work’ to be found therein?)? (724)

	If one were to look at a clock as a mere collection of mere parts would we understand a clock qua clock? An object would still be seen, namely, the mere collection of bits and pieces that constitute that clock whether it works or not such as the dial, its hands, etc. To understand the clockness of the clock one needs to enter into the world of clocks, namely, the time-telling mode of life. There the profound connection of clocks with the rhythms of the universe is to be found; there we also find the industries and trades of clock-making, clock-selling and clock-collecting; a world of physics dealing with the dimension of time and its intimate connections with the three dimensional world of the spatial, etc., etc. Such knowledge allows us to use a working clock; get a clock to work if is in working condition; re-set a clock with some other, etc. Now, in the light of such understandings, it would then be difficult to look at a clock and only see it merely as a physical-like object that might or might not have been intentionally deposited upon the face of this Earth. Confronted by a new clock-like object for a few moments we would inspect the same in an overall transcendental suspension and quickly ask ourselves “is this a clock?”, or, rhetorically, “is this not a clock?” (meaning, transcendentally, “is this or is this not a clock?”). Moreover, this superimposition of value realized in our reading of the clock as a ‘clock’ is experienced as an existential excess above and beyond what would have been gained if we were not able to perceive that clock as a clock and only able to perceive it as a mere physical object or state. The richness of this reading, once read, and realized as apparently valid, just cannot be reduced to its physical basis whilst maintaining this level and manner of existential richness. On the other hand, the reading of it as a clock may not be absolutely valid since it might so happen that that clock is actually also an explosive device, a bomb that is working and set to explode in the next few minutes. You look at it, see it connected to a few sticks of gelignite or a wad of plastic explosives and wisely get out of harms way as quickly as possible. On the other hand, as a trained bomb expert you realize the relative simplicity of this contraption and merely pull the wires from the clock and dismantle the rest of this now no longer dangerous device. How should that object just discussed have been viewed, or, in what frame of reference do we find a maximum degree of existential value? As a ‘pile of bits and pieces’, as a ‘clock’ or as a ‘bomb with a timing device ready to explode’? Obviously, if we were to just view it as a clock as long as we were in its vicinity that reading would not beneficial to our continued existence if it were to explode in front of us! The theologian, I am sure, would want to take a moral from this story and inform us that by subscribing to their particular theological reading of reality we might lessen the danger to a spiritual sense of our being… But, let us not be merely charitable here and say that that theological vision of the world has some degree of an additional existential value, rather, insist that this theologian must also cogently argue that this is truly the case above and beyond that merely attendant upon telling us an interesting story. Then, we can ask ourselves “does this vision possess a degree of merit both beyond and well beyond that merely had in telling us a story that systematizes and enriches our vision of the world, and, if it has this amplitude of magnitude in value, what are its overt (and possible covert) consequences for the coursing of our existence as we make our passage through this world?” (725)
	
	Let me view this analogy through the lens of our (non-exhaustive list of) transcendental insights, namely, in the light of a power-differential, relational embodiment, reciprocated indicators, trans-formational isomorphism, existential excess and relative non-destabilization. Our clock-cum-bomb in terms of explosive power is greater than ourselves. Human beings are not usually in the habit of exploding. Bomb quite often do. Our relationship with that clock-like device is realized through our embodiment with it as it with us (especially when it explodes)? What reciprocated indicators are there? Is there an exchange vector? If this bomb were to explode no doubt it would quickly turn us into a ‘vector’. On the other hand, realizing it were possibly a bomb we disrupt our relationship to it in space and time and leave its vicinity as rapidly as possible, or, disrupt that device as a bomb. Either way, our realization of this device as a bomb and not just a clock creates a considerable symmetry break. We may walk casually up to that bomb thinking it to be a clock, but, when we realize it to be otherwise, a considerable break in the symmetry of that relationship is now put into effect once it is now appropriately realized to be a bomb! Our relationship to it has considerably altered, and, more or less, permanently altered. This reading and its re-reading are relative… this object on the ground is a clock… till we realize… this object is a bomb and not just a clock! Still, there is a preservation of some degree of isomorphism despite the transformation of our insight (in the realization of it as a bomb operated by a clock). The appearance of a clock remains, the fact that the existential history of that device has it maintaining its appearance at a certain place over a certain period of time. Of course if it were to explode then at most what might remain would only be the relative substance of that clock-bomb (and few bits and pieces like clock hands, etc). Either way it maintains a certain degree of phenomenal stability in our phenomenological interactions with it. As an unexploded clock-bomb device… as an exploded clock-bomb. Similarly, our phenomenological appreciation remains relatively stable until such a time there is a disruption in the previous symmetry and a new reading is broached with the potential to offer more value! But never at the expense of a complete loss of an invariant core transformational isomorphism maintained across the boundaries of this (metaphorical) breaking of symmetry! Then the newer reading remain relatively stable until such a time it is revised in a similar fashion or is left neglected and forgotten about (from the perspective of its original perceivers/conceivers). What was first perceived as a clock was then perceived as a clock-bomb. Once the bomb expert dismantled it we now see it as a disarmed or dismantled clock-bomb, etc. The existential excess, and success, of our readings standing to reason (when treated as apparently self-evident). Just seeing a pretty clock was not a wise career move if we thought we should add it to our clock collection. On the other hand, seeing it, correctly or incorrectly, as a possible bomb is a wise career move if we can either quickly distance ourselves from it or safely defuse it. Now, what moral would I like to draw from this analogy or anecdote? (726)

	A first point is this: although the Divine is to be looked for more in the direction of a reading of an epistemological organization, yet, what ever reading is realized, validly or invalidly, must be in reference to our current embodiment in this World-of-Life. That clock-bomb once read as a bomb, as a reading in terms of our possibly endangered physical embodiment, we then entered a process that appropriately allowed us to discharge ourselves from that bomb qua bomb, either though our physical removal from its presence or through safely defusing that device by ourselves or having someone else do that for us. The theologian, therefore, apparently, has this difficult two-edged task to perform, namely, both to explain in what mode of life their vision of the theological is best explained (though their pursuit of an informative epistemological organizational reading [that needs to be judged as proper, appropriate and valid in its construction/re-construction]), and, in what manner the relationship the imputation of the relatively Divine best bears to us in and through the manner of our embodied existence in the World-of-Life [through an examination of the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of ‘that subjected to this level of epistemological organization’, i.e., our ‘embodiment’ in this World-of-Life]! The Divine might be constituted, rightly or wrongly, as incorporeal (through its bias towards the epistemological in and through its relatively superior degree of imputed epistemological organization), yet, on the other hand, we are fully embodied and our relationship with the relatively Divine must take that too into account (through some form of a simulated reversal of this epistemological bias). In this regard, can the theologian both have their cake and eat it so to speak? Addressing them we would need to demand that they can account both for their invocation of a ‘spiritual dimension’ and how the same must relate to the ‘very material being of our embodiment in this world’? (727)

	All relationships are realized in a ‘living space’ between its organization and that which is organized; never, however, purely in either its ‘organization’ or ‘that which is organized’. These orientations when (attempted to be) treated in an extreme manner have no existence; being neither experienced (epistemologically) nor recognized (ontologically)! The work of the theologian is no different than that of the non-theologian in this regard. In dealing with the nature of a relationship, whatever the nature of its participants, relatively Divine or otherwise, there is dialectical contestation between its epistemological organization and that (semblance of ‘substance’) subjected to the same, and v.v. In this regard all relationships are embodied in the world, have their existence in and through the very nature of the Life-World without exception! There, the theologian in giving value to their topic, must operate within these same parameters like all other philosophers and non-philosophers. Rhetorically, we must now ask what does ‘embodiment’ mean if it cannot be absolutely embodied, and, what implications this have for a viable theology whether regarded hypothetically or non-hypothetically? (728)

	Embodiment is ‘the unique confluence of transcendent-oriented processes with immanent-oriented processes and the realization of a resultant process possessing a distinctive period of non-symmetrical breaking on this level of identity formation.’ Let me explain. All identity is an identity that endures, for a distinctive period of time in keeping with the nature of that identity. So, the human person once born lives a few hours or a handful of decades, whilst a dog might live for a decade and the pi meson an expected fragment or minute moment of a time… hence the distinctive phenomenon of the endurance of identity in keeping with the nature of that phenomenon… between the symmetry break of its relative origination and the symmetry break of its relative cessation, the relativity of its identity formation in between being preserved or conserved through processes of ongoing re-constitution (with or without periods of minor non-disruptive symmetry change). Now, transcendent-oriented processes are structural aspects of the epistemological organization centered in that embodied form of identity, immanent-oriented processes being that ‘matter’ subjected to such a distinctive pattern of organization. The intersection of these two process orientations ensure the distinctive and unique formation of identity, an identity that can be described, in part, by the existential description symbolized or identified as its overall existential descriptor. All identity, therefore, is embodied… being the confluence of these two orientations that must mutually co-define each other; the ensuing identity being phenomenally unique and phenomenologically distinctive. Hence the non-absolute ground for a transcendental phenomenology (along with a transcendental hermeneutics and a transcendental existentialism completing this picture centered upon the formation of value in and through the hermeneutic circle of comprehension). A transcendental phenomenology being able to supply a certain transformational invariance in the re-iteration of its prescriptions-descriptions by virtue of the simulation/re-simulation of this dialectic between the transcendently oriented and the immanently oriented. It is by virtue of this dialectic that there can be a preservation of phenomenal-phenomenological identity to that degree that identity, and the value of such identity, can be both simulated and re-simulated. By these means, and on these transcendental grounds, that identity is phenomenally formed and experienced phenomenologically. Otherwise there could be no identity in any form there-for-us, etc. This dialectical strategy overcoming the ‘spatial’ ‘dichotomy’ between the one-and-the-many or a-part-versus-the-whole distinction and the ‘temporal’ ‘dichotomy’ of change-versus-non-change in the formation, reception and appreciation of identity (as classical problematized philosophically by Plato et al). (729)

	Now, let us re-examine the minimal democratic-like nature of the dissemination of power and the implications that this must have for a critical theology regardless of the theological construction/re-construction adopted and adapted by a theologian. (730)

	Theological edifices, in varying degrees, usually reflect the cultural nature of their cultural gestation, and, often merely reflect the current vision of the political dimension. So, in the age of absolute monarchies the Divine is cast as an absolute monarch above all terrestrial monarchs themselves hierarchically arrayed before each other. Do we not, therefore, in this age of the current wave of democratic revolutions, also expect to find a democratic vision of the theological arrayed in a similar fashion? Surely, perceiving the Divine as an absolute monarch is out of sympathy with the democratic spirit of our times? As in heaven so too on earth… As on earth so too in heaven..? Can an up-to-date theological construction be given a democratic-like make-over, or, are those who are faithful to this type of religious philosophy out of step in their secular existence with expectations pre-committed to a sense of the Divine firmly rooted in an already archaic political philosophy now more or less discredited? Let me explore the ramifications of this theological anomaly, namely, that the traditional vision of the Divine is hopelessly out of step with secular thinking in this regard? (731)

	In recent papers on this topic dealing with democratic concepts, etc., I have argued for a basic democratic-like nature that grounds the dissemination of power. The dissemination of power through others must involve the active and/or passive consent of those political points in that nexus involved in that transmission since to not actively re-constitute an interpretation of that power that desires to be disseminated and/or its passive obstruction would constitute a non-transmission of power via that particular channel. Furthermore, if all channels were to non-reconstruct/obstruct that passage of power there would be no dissemination of that power whatsoever! Hence this transcendentally necessary democratic-like sub-structure must be involved in the dissemination of power since to be without it there could be no dissemination in the first place! This democratic ground is often overlooked. Indeed, it is often subverted by custom and other forms of convention along with other coercive devices in order to ensure a compliance in this dissemination from a relatively central point or relatively central set of points whose organization allow it to act in concert with each other. What theological and spiritual ramifications does this insight have for the theological vista? (732)

 	Despite the fact that all relationships are unequal in their power relations, still, in the transmission of power some form of consent, subverted or non-subverted, coerced or non-coerced, must be involved. All that accepted, in the theological dissemination of power from the Divine to the non-divine, or v.v., we must accept that some minimal democratic-like substructure must be self-evidently present. In this light, how should the traditional or non-traditional theologian face this fact that without our consent there could be no theological dissemination of power!? If a theologian proposes some form of theological dissemination then it necessary follows that some form of consent must be give, actively and/or passively, tacitly or explicitly, for this type of scheme to operate? That granted, then we must welcome the theologian to this current age of politically democratic! (733)

	No longer could the Divine then autocratically command, literally or metaphorically, and we, on such knowledge, automatically obey or disobey! Rather, we must be present to give our consent, whether it be informed or not informed. So, we must now rhetorically ask the theologian, in such a scheme, how, hypothetically, could the Divine ‘command’ seeking our consent, and, how could we ‘give consent’ be it informed or not informed, be it well-informed or not-well-informed?! Indeed, as embodied subjects in this World-of-Life how should we envisage some form of a meaningful encounter with the Divine? Could such an encounter be meaningful, possess value for-us, we who be no more than embodied subjects in the mundane here-and-now as ordinary persons-before-each-other in this one World-of-Life? (734)

	However, let us face the following objection first, namely, that the Divine has no need for the dissemination of power and that their command is automatically put into effect in and through the very extension of their own powers (almost as if the metaphorically potential can be translated into the literally actual). So, e.g., a king could dictate a letter (in a dissemination of power) or they could write that same letter themselves. But, does this analogy break down for ‘to send the letter’ would involve a dissemination of power to that effect. Otherwise, the king would need to personally deliver that letter and then ensure that it gets read in some form or other. Then, on presenting that letter the recipient may refuse to accept it… so the king feels free to open it and recite its contents in person to that intended recipient. So, in an another example, the king is cold and wants the fire lit. He finds the servants are absent and noticing some firewood beside the fireplace decides to light this fire by himself. Unfortunately, the wood needs chopping into smaller pieces to fit the hearth and the king finding the axe beside the fireplace duly chops this wood and lights the fire. Obviously no great king if he has to do such chores by himself. Thus, theoretically, power could be extended by the Divine in through the very nature of their being if the powers of the Divine were capable of such an extension. (735)

However, such self-sufficiency itself is still a philosophical problem for the theologian. No theologian would argue for an absolute divorce between the Divine and the non-Divine since the self-sufficiency of the Divine in this regard is not an essential factor in this type of relationship (unless unleashed in a coercive role or in a role of punishment, etc., as beloved by religious myths from the distant past?)? No, if the Divine is going to enter into a relationship with the race of human persons, and v.v., then such self-sufficiency is rendered powerless and inapposite by virtue of the fact that a relationship should entail an act of relating, i.e., the dissemination of power (despite the disparity in power relations). Furthermore, such a relationship should also entail a two-way process of dissemination with a magnitude of reciprocity that establishes that relationship as one that is truly a cognitive affair for the less powerful party, namely, the person who has entered into this relationship (wittingly and/or unwittingly). Therefore, it follows, that a meaningful ‘personal’ relationship with the Divine, and v.v., must entail the dissemination of power and not be reliant on the self-sufficiency of the Divine to merely extend their ‘presence’ and/or ‘absence’ by acts of fiat. Therefore, it behooves the theologian to take into account at least a minimal democratic basis in this type of Divine-non-Divine relationship as, indeed, we find being signaled throughout much traditional theological writings (and as indirectly indicated through various expressions such as guilt, duty, responsibility, devotion, etc., given a theological re-interpretation in their particular respective theologies). So, the point I would like to make here is this, that a viable and meaningful theology that ‘works’ would naturally entail some form of a recognition of this minimal democratic-like basis, and, that this feature should also be already present in a traditional theology for that theology to account for the meaningful nature of the overall relationship/ that might be envisaged between both the Divine and a particular individual non-Divine person and the Divine and the collective assembly of non-Divine persons in general. Thus, in this light, the theologian must take into consideration some form of an account that considers (and/or re-considers) a minimal democratic-like basis in the very nature of the constitution of this hypothetical relationship between the Divine and both ‘the person in particular’ and ‘the person in general’, and, considered both ‘individually’ and collectively! In a nutshell, the theologian must account for the theological dissemination of power on a minimal democratic-like basis in some form or other, and, recognize and be committed to that very same fact in the hypothetical constitution of such a relationship and their construction/re-construction of such a project as a viable proposition to be disseminated and entertained by their congregations!! (736)

How can the theologian argue for viable personal/inter-personal relationship between the Divine and the non-Divine in terms of the relative limitations placed upon the nature of our embodiment in this world in the here-and-now given this excessive inequality of power relations? (737)

	As we are operating within the hypothetical context of a process theology, and automatic assume that the Divine is just as embodied as any other form of identity, then it follows that this relationship between the relatively Divine and the relatively human non-divine can be effected in terms of this necessary embodiment especially given the containment, by definition, of the latter in the former. Now, it only behooves the theologian to metaphorically articulate what mechanisms could be ‘seen’ to be in play in order to cross and positively engage this relatively enlarged power spectrum between these two types of epistemological organization. Naturally, our focus can begin with those metaphorical modes of dissemination of power that we find in the course of our passage through the world that engage a considerable degree of difference in power and yet find themselves being negotiated.. In this we can also fall back on to traditional metaphors already attached to this type of philosophy, as mechanisms that attempt to negotiate this difference in power, such as ‘seeing’ the Divine as some form of a monarch, represented through a mediator or mediators, e.g., etc., etc. What is essentially entailed here, and, what problems might present themselves given the non-absolute substantiality, i.e., emptiness, of all forms of identity be they Divine or non-divine in orientation? (738)

	As previously defined, embodiment is the confluence of transcendent forces and immanent forces in the formation of an identity that preserves a certain degree of identity for a certain period of time from a non-radical breaking of its own symmetry. What constitutes ‘time’ and ‘space’, ‘identity’ and ‘relative non-identity’ is configured in terms of the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of that under examination. So, e.g., a person born on Earth has an identity that is constituted, preserved and disrupted in earth-time, i.e., in years, months, days, hours, minutes and/or seconds, etc. All senses of space being constituted in relationship to this Earth. So, e.g., plum blossoms and plums are constituted in seasonal terms of reference, etc. However, should we not ask “are all forms of embodied identity contradicted in a point-of-view that perceives only their non-substantial materiality, or rather, immateriality, i.e., their emptiness (of the super-impositions of identity imposed such non-material materiality. Or, do we just have a sheer contradiction whose intersection can only be the death of such a seemingly contradictory philosophy? (739)

	However, a proponent of emptiness would argue the exact opposite, namely, that without this absolute emptiness of identity there could be no relativity of identity in a phenomenal-phenomenological perspective. The so-called substantial or material, taken in an absolutist mode, is nothing other than a failed metaphor (i.e., a metaphor that is either improperly constructed and/or improperly literalized). On the other hand, substance treated merely as the phenomenally and/or phenomenologically constituted/re-constituted material that gives identity the semblance of being a preserved identity is not to be taken literally, i.e., absolutistically. Seeing, instead, identity as the ongoing resultant dialectically engendered between all relevant interacting forces allows us to treat that identity in a relative frame of reference as materially embodied in its associated phenomenal-phenomenological form/s and yet from an absolute point of view as being non-substantially embodied in any absolutistic sense. The dialectical nature of that interaction giving the phenomenal appearance of identity and at the same time allowing this pattern of phenomenal-phenomenological performance to be in play in the very formation and relative stability of that discriminated process of identification. (740)

	Now we must ask, does this type of dialectical mechanism allow for the dissemination of power between discriminated forms of identity whose power spectrum is radically unequal. Obviously, the answer must be “yes!” All relationships must entail an inequality in their spectrum of power (and, that, indeed, it is a resolution of this inequality that establishes both the existence and the persistence of that relationship through the ensuing ongoing process of resolution (itself, by such means, being the very basis for a process theology). That being the case, we must ask ourselves how this semblance of difference is traversed in those situations where this interaction is obviously taking place, and, how might excessively diverse power spectra be traversed given the pre-existence of such a mechanism in the normal course of our passage through this World-of-Life. Hopefully find, by extrapolation, a type or set of mechanisms that might allow this form of negotiation to both exist and to be found realizing an existential profit for all participating parties in this ‘mutual’ process of interaction. The central value of a theological system residing in a thematization of this necessary co-mutual ‘mutuality’ (otherwise, without some degree of a mutual interdependence of value-formation for all parties, the semblance of the Divine is just not-there-for-us, and v.v!). (741)

	It is as if the world and all therein could not know itself except through the dialectics of relationships. Through such thematization identity is progressively realized and not otherwise! So-called concepts like ‘substance’ treated in an absolutistic mode just could not be thought (epistemologically), just could not be recognized (ontologically). Consequently, with the dialectics of relational interaction no phenomenological identity could be thematized and recognized and no phenomenal identity could be thematized and recognized. But that already stands to reason! All identity-there-for-us is thematized and thematized in and through its phenomenological constitution as that-experienced-by-us. By definition we cannot experience that which cannot be experienced! To take from phenomenologically-constituted experience the simulation of phenomena qua simulations is one thing, but, to extrapolate from such phenomenological interpretations, reify these extractions and then to super-impose such speculative non-experiential entities back upon this world of phenomenologically engaged phenomena is bizarre from a critical philosophical point of view. Indeed, this distorted literalization of the metaphorical is just not philosophically thought through at all! What is impossible is just that impossible (whereas what is possible must be actualizable in some form or other; to some degree or other in some manner or other, to some extent or other, as argued in both volumes). Through such an unnecessary process of reduplication we create the fabrication of the so-called ‘external world’ when it is nothing more than a projection of a misguided mind (as habitually sedimented in everyday, non-critical discourse/s). We are already immersed in this World-of-Life and directly engaged therein with whatever we are directly engaged with relationally as found being thematized in our intentional consciousnesses. Of course we are actively involved in this process of ongoing re-constitution through our intentional thematization of ‘that being experienced’ but, at the same time, we are also passively beholden to the world of others (meta-textually through the adoption and adaptation of genres of activity within modes of life, etc.) and the otherness of all phenomena (including our own sense/s of self) (by virtue of a contextual world of experience wherein we can intentionally thematize distinctive senses of identity that will allow us to focus on that currently to hand in that current overall perspective to hand). So, just as intentional identity is thematized through the dialectical interaction of foreground/background fields along with an appreciation of the same it follows that without no absolute distinction between the Ontological and the Epistemological that what follows for one must also follow for the other, i.e., this concept of non-absolute demarcation wherein all identity is doubly realized through a contrast with a contrasting field along with an appreciation of this relationship in a (meta-contrasting) field, a field with a higher meta-status by one degree (as also argued in the concept of appreciation on many occasions both inside and outside these two volumes of theological essays). So, just as tables and chairs are meta-textually discerned as different types of intentional objects with different intentionally pre-configured senses of utility-in-design in a specific cultural world we also perceive them as meant to accompany each other in the mode of life of eating (when and where eating is conducted from a chair at a table, etc.). The distinctive perception/conception of ‘chairs’ from ‘tables’ also being appreciated in a meta-context as associated items of eating furniture, etc.). This (transcendentally necessary) dialectical coupling of distinctions with accommodations, and v.v., (in order to be able to intentionally thematize any particular topic) also has theological ramifications (to the extent that this topic or any other can be intentionally thematized, i.e., find value) both hypothetically and non-hypothetically! Let me now address some of these implicit issues. (742)

	First, emptiness of identity is the automatic consequence of the dialectics of this concept of the inter-dependence of the simulation of phenomenal-phenomenological identity (wherein identity is thematized and recognized both epistemologically and ontologically), and, that this must apply in the same manner to any construction of a theological nature! Hence the emptiness of all phenomena, thence the emptiness of all phenomenon dealing with a sense or senses of self. Whence we must include all theological phenomena likewise (being empty both as a phenomenon and as an epistemological expression of egological complexity equivalent to a sense of self albeit to a degree considerably in advance of that which pertains to human subjectivity [as per definition of the relatively Divine]). (743)

	On this topic of the emptiness of phenomena, relatively non-egological or egological in orientation, let us think through the ramifications this concept has for relatively non-radical processes of change, relatively radical processes of change in identity, the endurance or relative stability of identity, the relative interaction or non-interaction of identities, etc., etc. To do this let me propose the fictitious device of Relative and Absolute points of view. Aligning a natural, everyday perspective with the former and a transcendental perspective with the latter, albeit as if from some hypothetical divine-like perspective to be imagined by the reader. So, the material is seen as matter from a relative perspective, a sense of substance defined by various aspects like extension, resistance to penetration, limitation by boundaries, sense of identificational persistence, stuff or fabric woven with a sense of history and the expectation of a causal future to some extent or other even if only for a few more moments in time, etc. In other words a perspective as would be expected in a natural everyday world as lived before-others. The same type of basis being applies to egological identities albeit also with a sense of personal history. On the other hand, from an Absolute perspective the use of the concept of emptiness tells us that there is no absolute substance upon which either non-egological phenomena or egological phenomena can be based. That, in other words, relative identities ‘interpreted’ from an Absolute perspective are now ‘seen’ as completely empty of all traces of identity in an absolute sense. Beneath the relatively material there is no unchanging substance upon which identity can be affixed, etc! That, from such a perspective, there can be no identity whatsoever! Now, effectively, to run this sort of transformation from the Relative to the Absolute, and v.v., what we really have is the Relative treated from an Absolute sense of perspective, and, the so-called Absolute perspective treated from a Relative point of view with the implication that there can be neither a pure Absolute point of view nor a pure Relative point of view since the Transcendental informs the Relative, and v.v. with the implication that there can be no pure reading either way without it being read through, against or from its co-relative contrast. In this Scheme even the relatively Divine could not perceive the world from an Absolutely Divine point of view, such a perspective being a fiction, hopefully of a fruitful kind and, also, of a nature that should not be allowed to distort our own appreciation of the world (in the formations of pseudo-psychoses, etc., through an over-excessive commitment of an ontological and/or epistemological variety). Thus what we are left with is a Relative treatment of an Absolute perspective and an Absolute treatment of a Relative perspective. Hence a transcendental reading of the relative and a non-transcendental reading of the transcendental. How are these double readings to be put into effect? By the invocation of an overall transcendental suspension. E.g., if we were to be dealing with a reading of some pattern of activity in another culture in order to make some sense of it we would be interpreting that pattern of activity in terms of our own cultural and intercultural being in the world but at the same time questioning it, i.e., putting it through some form of a suspension. E.g., how would we first understand the knotted strings used in the Inca empire to transfer information to and from the capital city, etc? Does this repeated pattern of activity, which seems to bear some comparison to the writing of a letter, actually be meaningfully read through our own cultural lens of ‘writing a letter’? In understanding the apparent phenomenological nature involved in the re-iterated phenomenon of ‘letter-writing’ it would seem upon careful comparison that this use of knotted strings is a similar phenomenon albeit appearing strange and puzzling when first viewed. Indeed, we could write a letter translating the apparently intended sense of a bundle of strings if we were privy to the encodings of both practices. Our ability to translate one to the other, and v.v., reinforcing the apparent validity of our interpreting this bundle of knotted strings through this qualified lens of a ‘written letter’! (744)

	With our double readings, or twice-doubled readings, how is the basic phenomenon of identity to be understood? How are the processes of non-radical change to be understood and how are the processes of radical change to be understood? Identity can be defined as those distinctive forces both relatively immanent and relatively transcendent that through their confluence form a unique state with a certain value of identity. That value being read through a sense of sense, i.e., its place in our cosmic mapping of the universe as lived-by-us (as an experience of typology, eidetic reflection, etc.); a sense of meaning as interpreted in and through various meta-textual genres of activity within various modes of life, etc; and, a sense of meaningfulness that is derived through an appreciation of the existential richness that devolves from the exercise of that pattern of explication, etc. In other words, these three styles of reading are in fact merely facets involved in the three dialectical modes of the hermeneutic circle. That, when we concentrate upon phenomenological content then we are taking a more relative point of view, whereas, an emphasis upon process induces us to take a more critical, transcendentally-oriented point of view. A ‘calling’ of content and/or process into contention giving us a more transcendentally oriented perspective that can only be critically enacted to that extent a proper, appropriate and valid semblance of a transcendentally-oriented perspective is effectively realized. So, e.g., when we are looking at a painting that truly is a wonderful work of art, although we might immediately fall in love with its semblance of beauty, still, we must ask ourselves through a transcendental suspension “is this work of art truly a wonderful work of art?” In other words, even though the content of our experience is the semblance of an aesthetic work of art, in a process of reflection we skeptically call that into question to find ourselves, eventually, merely re-instating that same opinion upon such deliberate reflection. A carefully balanced reading of that phenomenon-to-hand, namely the aesthetic qualities of a certain world of art, we are pleasantly surprised in this situation to find our immediate opinion re-confirmed and reinforced in the process. In and through this carefully conducted transcendental reading of the phenomenon currently to hand, we find our initial appreciated merely reconfirmed and reinforced. In this we experience a certain stability in the identity of that phenomenon; we first looked at it as a so-called work of art and finally find ourselves agreeing with our initial understandings that, indeed, we are actually looking at a wonderful work of art, etc. Now, I am going to ‘ontologize’ this sense of a transcendental reading to a more practical domain… how are we going to understand identity as the confluence of the relatively immanent and transcendent forces let loose in this World-of-Life?! (745) 

	What is the difference between a relatively radical patterns of activity and a pattern of less-radical  change. E.g, the ice cube melts in a glass of water. For a period of time it maintains this identity as an ice cube. Then, with it’s melting, the ice ceases to be water in a solid form and melts into the glass of water. I would argue that radical changes in identity occur when this balance of immanent and/or transcendental forces are not in a relatively stable pattern of mutual cooperation. On the other hand, all immanent forces and all transcendent forces, and their mutual inter-cooperation, not ever being absolutely equal, implies a fluctuation in the formation involved in the re-continuing re-constitution of that phenomenon must institute patterns of change! So, when the net effect of all relevant forces impinge upon the formation of a certain phenomenon are effectively beyond the bounds of an overall transcendental suspension, or its ontological-like equivalent, then a radical process of change ensues, i.e., a symmetry break in the continuity of that overall sense of identity. On the other hand, when all relevant forces are effectively in a state of balance only a non-radical process of change ensues! Hence the relativity of this distinction between relatively radical and relatively non-radical processes of change (this qualification of ‘relatively’ alluding to the frame/s of reference being used to address that phenomenon or set of phenomena). As an example we could invoke a reading of the process of death: minor fluctuations in immanent and transcendent forces relevant to the ongoing constitution of personal embodiment ensure an ongoing process of change without radical breaks in the formation of identity, whereas, on the other hand, major fluctuations that cannot be balanced disrupt the integrity of that form of personal embodiment and death ensues. In the light of this model, we can find death from external transcendent factors like being killed by a knife or gun, or, from internal factors like sickness or the consequences of injuries (such as infections, e.g., etc.). The prime point being made here is this: that in a loss of an ‘overall transcendental-like balance’ there results the disruption of identity in a process of radical re-identification, whereas, the preservation of this semblance of ‘balance’ ensures an overall process of change within the limits of the phenomenal nature of that identity. (746)

	After having re-visited these concepts of emptiness and the radical and non-radical expressions of change let us now ask how identity itself is possible given this emptiness of identity from a so-called ‘Absolute point of view’? (747)

	From an Absolute point of view no identity could be seen through emptiness. On the other hand, no one could see from the ideality of an Absolute point of view therefore identity is ‘seen’. It is ‘seen’ either through its presence or absence, and, through radical and/or non-radical processes of change. In a spatial-temporal frame of reference identity is also limited by radical discontinuities in its spatial-temporal expression. So, identity x continues in time for a period of time t (say as a living person till their time of their death), and, the extent of that identity x (as a human body) is within certain internal and external parameters pi/e such as, respectively, the size and shape of its current embodiment x (as a human body) and restrictions upon the range that identity could possibly traverse within periods of time t’(say the surface of the Earth). That identity x, therefore, being relatively self-defined and limited by these boundaries of discontinuity. (748)

	Fluctuations in these boundaries of identity re-defining that identity subject to such transformations. Now, despite such fluctuations in expression/re-expression  identity is still able to be identified and re-identified. Identity is able to be distinctively identified, and re-identified, by virtue of these discontinuities and the fact that there can be no absolute process of discontinuity. Even when matter collides with anti-matter the re-expression of that collision is never purely energy, or mere energy without some mass-effect. New particles are formed or virtual particles like photons that still exhibit the effects of gravitation (as when the path of star-light is bent by the gravitational mass of a nearby stellar object, like the sun, e.g.). Therefore, because change can never be absolutely radical, the discontinuity of identity can never be absolutely radical likewise. Hence the preservation of an invariant region of transformational isomorphism. E.g., the baby x grows and becomes a child and then becomes an adult, yet, despite such changes, we are still dealing with that same person x. Thus change is always a change of something that is relatively not changing. But, is this a contradiction? Yes, but only if we assume a literalization of the metaphorical process of identification that superimposes itself upon this semblance of identity a sense of the material that, currently, is distinctively isolated, self-existent, absolutely unique and unchanging. But, as has been just shown, the emptiness of identity does not demand such an impossible process of unnecessary reduplification wherein the semblance of an identity is superimposed upon the semblance of itself, etc.  This doubling of our economy only arising through processes of misguided privileging wherein in and through a relatively non-balanced overall transcendental suspension the semblance of an identity is superimposed upon itself as the apparent substrate for its own expression. However, the wise person should realize that current identity to hand is the resolution of the net result of the relevant forces under focus as a congregation of immanent and transcendent influences within the perception of a certain frame of reference. Given this emptiness of identity, as a non-permanent, unchanging material substrate (and context), how is identity actually engaged and (validly) experienced? In and through the interactive consequences of that identity in and through our relationship with it. If material were absolutely unchanging it could not be there-for-us! Conversely, if material were in a state of absolute change, there could be no semblance of something changing. The Relative and the Absolute are both impossible idealities ‘in-themselves’. On the other hand, the interactions between the same realize phenomena, and, our interactions with the same realizes a phenomenological treatment of the same. Through imposing an overall suspension of that found to hand in a distinctive manner allows us to experience the distinctive identity of that to hand. In this process we thematize the double readings of the relatively non-transcendental and the relatively transcendental. Then, dialectically, we realize a relatively transcendental orientation and a relatively non-transcendental orientation (once we completely dismiss these illusions of the Absolute or Transcendental [from an Absolute point of view] and the Relative or Non-Transcendental [from a Relative point of view]). With these two orientations to hand we should also realize their effective open-ended collapse when subjected to a thorough and properly conducted, appropriately exercised and validly re-constructed overall transcendental suspension! This even-mindedness of attention effectively manifests itself as a sense of the spiritual to that extent there is this sense of a transcendental-non-transcendental balance or suspension, and, should be perceived as the only valid mode of perception since all validity stems from our treatment of the phenomenal in and through the transcendental balance of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension! Still, without ‘substance’ how is identity engaged? Through ‘the simulation of the phenomenon’ and ‘the phenomenon of the simulation’! Let me explain….(749)

	The Absolute from the so-called Absolute point of view would perceive no identity through emptiness (and the emptiness of emptiness). Equally, the Relative from the Relative point of view is completely meaningless. On the other hand, from a Relative point of view the Absolute can be viewed as a rectification of the relatively non-transcendental through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, and, the Relative can be viewed through an existentialization of an Absolute-Transcendental reading of the phenomenon or set of phenomena to hand. As suggested, a ‘spiritual reading’ arises when a Transcendental reading is paralleled with its Non-Transcendental reading, i.e., through the thorough imposition of an overall transcendental suspension. Now, through this mix of readings, all of which ‘naturally’ inhabit the realm of our intentional existence, privileging in all its forms distorts our appreciation of this World-of-Life unless run back-to-back so to speak through the performance of an overall transcendental suspension conducted in a critical tenor. In this critical process of suspension, etc., there is both a rectification of distortions and an existentialization of practice. In rectification both the boundaries and the non-boundaries of phenomena under examination are better realized. In existentialization our response to that phenomenon or set of phenomena is found to be more relationally oriented and in tune with the nature of that relationship under focus; reflecting the nature of the ongoing resolution being realized in our appreciation of the simulation/re-simulation of that relationship. Our participation in that relationship, on balance, adding the overall existential value of that relationship under focus as it is experienced by-us in this World-of-Life. All relationships being directly experienced through a simulation of their content to that extent such a simulation is available for-us and is found to be obtainable in intentional experience [as being ‘experienced’ within that relationship qua relationship itself to that extent its epistemological organization allows this process of reflection to be self-reflected upon itself in either the simulation and/or re-simulation of that same relationship]. A transcendental reading of the relatively non-transcendental produces the ‘phenomenon of the simulation’, whilst a non-transcendental reading of the transcendental produces the ‘simulation of the phenomenon’. In the ‘simulation of the phenomenon’ the phenomenon in question is realized as a phenomenon qua phenomenon, i.e., as the experience of the phenomenal-phenomenological content of that phenomenon or set of phenomena being engaged. In contrast, the ‘phenomenon of the simulation’ the simulation in question is realized as a simulation qua simulation, i.e., as the intentional exercise of consciousness that is intentional in the process-formation of its content. Another way to view this contrast is to compare the ‘illusion of reality’ and the ‘reality of the illusion’ – the former being a non-transcendental reading of the transcendental (reality of the phenomenal-phenomenological) whilst the latter is the transcendental reading of the non-transcendental-illusion of reality (as simulated for-us by-us). This contrast is vividly experienced in the theatre or cinema when we are absorbed in the reality of the spectacle, whereas, in contrast, in the opposite type of reading we are absorbed in the illusory quality of that spectacle. A balance operating between these ‘idealities’ that allows us to effectively run both readings at the same time in and though the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension as orchestrated within the hermeneutic circle. The difference between ‘empathetically feeling the suffering of Julius Caesar as he is stabbed and dies on the stage’, and, knowing the whole thing is ‘only simulated within the context of a play’. Or, put another way the difference between the non-transcendental reading of the ‘illusion of reality’ as the ‘simulation of the phenomenon’, and, the ‘reality of the illusion’ as the ‘phenomenon of the simulation’! Both reading effectively cooperating together in order to allow us to privilege one or the other.. so one moment we experience the horror of the drama unfolding before us and in another moment we remind ourselves again that it is only an illusion being dramatically enacted for our ‘enjoyment’. Our ‘existential’ enjoyment being fully engaged when we maintain a balance between these two orientations of the Transcendental or Absolute and the Non-Transcendental or Relative. This existential attitude of a ‘dynamic balance’ carrying over from the ‘life of the drama’ into the ‘living drama of life’ as we operate by the same rules when charting our course through this World-of-Life (and learn to not discriminate in an exclusive fashion between these reading that need to be conducted in parallel before we are able to privilege any one of these readings and therein and thereby allow them to be promoted and/or demoted)! (750)

	Now, in working though this philosophy of identity, let us focus on the presuppositions that would be (transcendentally) necessary in order to run an effective understanding of relational interaction. The phenomenon of identity, and both its recognition and engagement, necessitate a dialectic that both differentiates and accommodates the relative isolation of identifiable phenomena as prefigured through symmetry breaks, temporal-spatial breaks in symmetry, continuity of phenomenal context, etc., etc. In other words, given this qualified discontinuity in the phenomenal formation of distinctive semblances of identity how is the overall process of interaction to be understood in both phenomenal and phenomenological levels of explication? Let us look at a tree, any type of tree, say an oak tree. We can point it out and say this tree is here and not over there. That it was planted from an acorn so many years ago, and, that it persists as an oak tree and does not become a willow or pine or any other type of tree. These aspects of identity have already been worked through. On the other hand, a tree arises, as like all other phenomena, i.e., in its appropriate context of origination. In this instance, the soil that beds that tree in this time and place for a period of time equivalent to its period of existence as a living tree. As a living tree it exhibits a certain degree of epistemological organization. Furthermore, its external context of origination, the land beneath that tree, also exhibits a certain degree or range of epistemological organization. Similarly, the internal, immanent processes that establish that tree as a living tree are also epistemologically organized. The net result of these levels of relatively transcendent, hyper-epistemological organization and relatively immanent, hypo-epistemological organization is the realization of a living tree through the net resolution of all these interacting forces/levels of epistemological organization. Then, in our engagement with this tree this resolutional flavour is to some extent re-experienced through our simulation/re-simulation of that phenomenon (through its direct phenomenological engagement and the simulation ‘therein’ of the forces that effect and continue the constitution of that phenomenon or set of phenomena both phenomenally and phenomenologically). With this understanding of the interaction between the hyper-epistemological economy and the hypo-epistemological economy we are find ourselves simulating/re-simulating to some extent the ‘actual’ or ‘apparent’ epistemological economy as currently realized (in both senses of this word realization, i.e., ontologically and epistemologically). The dialectics of interaction can now be better appreciated. (751)

	Identity is maintained through the relative non-instantiation of symmetry breaks. Interaction is realized when the economy can accommodate breaks in symmetry in a context that can accommodate such discontinuities, interaction being realized through the transmission of exchange factors. So, e.g., a certain tree grows in the soil beneath it in a forest of other trees that include that same species and other species along with other plants and an assortment of animal. This is the total epistemological economy of that forest. In our scientific research and general understanding this total epistemological economy should overtly be taken into account from time to time. Hence the realization of a broad ecological understanding of that tree in its environment of that forest, etc. (752)

	Let me demonstrate what is involved here. Imagine a forest fire, a fire started by a bolt of lightening. One tree is burning. We have a symmetry break that is viable as long as the ingredients necessary for the continuation of that fire are present, namely, fuel, a process of combustion, oxygen and no particular factors that might impede the development and spread of this fire such as rain, etc. A tree is burning, the heat catalyzing the ongoing combustion of that fire. The tree burns like the wick of a candle that, in turn, from sparks, lights the other trees around it, and so on. We have a forest fire which continues to burn until one or more of these factors involved in the realization of that fire are found absent or insufficiently present. A living tree involved in this fire either survives or does not survive. In this particular Australian forest the heat was so intense that most of the oak trees and most of the pine trees growing on the edge of that bush were killed whereas the eucalypts and other native species were merely singed (although juvenile specimens are also often killed). The fire continued as long as exchange factors were in effect, i.e., sparks, and all the necessary conditions remained in place. Those trees that survived in effect continued without major breaks in symmetry although native trees that were non-fatally burnt very quickly developed a distinctively different dense profusion of leafage to overcome the loss of leaves during that fire-storm. As a rule, as noted, non-native trees (like pinus radiate, e.g.) were killed whereas native trees have adapted to this landscape of regular bush-fires. Dead trees operating within a different and diminished epistemological economy. Living trees persisting in their usual economies of interaction. (753)

	The preservation of an overall economy is realized when there are no breaks in symmetry or such breaks, when they occur are eventually over-written by process of re-instatement. The nature of those various relationships being expressed through the nature of those exchange factors; symmetry breaks in the same effectively representing symmetry break in those relationships. So, dead trees no longer absorb various nutrients from the soil, and, forest fires die out when the necessary conditions for a fire are no present, etc. All these ‘processes of change’ and ‘change of processes’ being registered in the overall economy of that forest. (754)

	In the light of this modeling of the Australian bush, and a regularity of bush-fire therein, how is the process of relational interaction to be seen being simulated? Just how do trees interact with the soil, with each other, suffer a bush-fire, etc? In their interaction with the soil trees exchange certain factors, so, e.g., water is taken up into the tree, nutrients are absorbed, various gases are absorbed by the leaves and sunlight is used through processes of photosynthesis in the leaves, etc. In return, leaf litter and dead trees re-establish the nature and quality of that soil, water is emitted by the leaves along with various gasses, etc. And how do trees interact with each other? By the formation of a micro-climate, the possible exchange of gaseous hormones (that establish the ripening of fruit, etc.), by the exchange of pollens, etc. And how does fire interact in a forest? From spreading from one tree to the next until the process is unable to continue through the non-presence of those factors necessary for its re-continuation and the presence of those factors that would successfully disrupt that process of burning such as rain, e.g.…. (755)

	The active exchange of exchange factors signals the presence of a distinctive economy and the presence of a distinctive sense of identity to be found therein! By extension, our modeling is also able to be applied to the Divine economy hypothetically (albeit with a different and more advanced epistemological complexion)! This Divine economy being dependant upon the existence of exchange factors that define/re-define that relationship as theological in tenor. Hence the theologian would need to be able to evidentially demonstrate the presence of such exchange factors that pertain to our relationship with the Divine, and v.v., in the context of the articulation of various exchange mechanism possibilities in order to make sense of the imputed nature of this process of interaction (whether regarded in pre-conscious terms of reference [e.g., as ‘valid’ religious intuitions] and/or conscious terms of reference [e.g., as ‘valid’ religious experiences] and/or post-conscious terms of reference [e.g., as ‘valid’ religious consequences such as existential responses, appropriate actions, viable religious aspirations, etc.]). (756)

	Now, let us examine the transition from one identity state to some other in a relatively radical process of change involving a break in overall symmetry. A break in symmetry involves a process of non-absolute chaotic bifurcation. ‘Non-absolute’ in the sense that there can be no absolute process of change; all processes of change occurring in certain immanent/transcendent contexts that are maintained and not disrupted. E.g., a pot is made from clay, or, an intact pot breaks when dropped on to the ground… in either example the material substance of the pot does not radically change; even in the firing of clay, despite chemical changes that result in a stoneware or porcellaneous body, the elements that constitute that clay are not fundamentally changed. The implication being that breaks in symmetry occur in defined contexts and not absolutely, i.e., is specific locations in the epistemological organization of that object or state in its associated context. Or, put another way, change does not completely disrupt the economy that entails that object or state in its associated context. Hence the transcendental concept of a necessary degree of an environmental stability in order for processes of change to occur in some facet or facets of the epistemological organization of that under examination. Now, the nature of intentional appropriation is such that it is naturally discrete, apparently momentary in nature by virtue of the minimum extent an intentional state can be re-constituted. Constitution as a process is as a process in time, therefore, through retention, processes of re-constitution cannot be realized intentionally beneath a certain limit; a limit placed upon its intentional reception. So, e.g., in perception a light that flashes on for one second might be seen but a light that flashes on only once for one hundredth of a second per minute might not be seen (or might only be just registered subliminally). Therefore, natural limits limit the intentional perception/apperception of a process of conscious intentional formation and thereby impose a momentary-like nature to the same. Imagine if you would a vast tank of die that suddenly changes colour with an increase in temperature. Just how quickly does this tank change colour? As a self-organized chaotic phenomenon an actual time of transition is not definitively computable. It is as if in the blink of an eye this transition is realized between moments and not within a temporal-spatial dimensions of the moment itself or over a series of moments. Theoretically, if the Pacific Ocean were mixed with this die and the temperature was slowly and evenly raised across its vast expanse the transition from one colour to the next is still going to occur within the confines of that moment, or rather, between the confines of that moment. Therefore, information is not spread at the speed of light, rather, a change of state takes place about or between a moment of bifurcation that involves the holistic entirety of that interactive space/relationship. How is this possible? Because the ongoing relationship is the result of a process of ongoing resolution, and, it is the flavour of this resolution along with all changes therein that are holistically manifested in and through the metaphorical ‘body’ of that relationship. Without a doubt, for the process-theologian, such concepts can find an invaluable place in the context of a process theology. (757)

	Let us now attend to a deeper phenomenal-phenomenological understanding of the nature of a break in symmetry and how different intentional objects/states/relationships are able to interact with each other (given the emptiness of identity from an Absolute point of view?)? (758)

	The point of a break is conducted chaotically. But the transition is always contained within a frame of reference where there is no transformation (other than that symmetry break). Although inter-momentary and effectively instantaneous because conditions for the break in symmetry may not be smoothly spread across the extent of that relational space it implies that transitions are haphazard, patchy, potentially reversible or obstructed and/or incremental.  E.g., a caterpillar becomes a pupa and thence a butterfly – none of those transitions are spontaneous. Similarly, when it is about to rain you get a few warning drops of rain first. On the other hand, the radioactive decay is completely random although conforming to characteristic decay patterns (w.r.t. half-lives, etc.). Reality operates between these two poles on a spectrum of chaotic transitions in symmetry. Now, it follows that during these transitions and between periods of non-transition distinctive identity formations will interact with the exchange of distinctive exchange factors. But, as noted elsewhere, exchange need not be a continuous affair as long as the causal consequences of the exchange operate in a set of dimensions one of which re-continues the wake of that process of exchange. People can never write letters to each other on an absolutely continuous basis. People cannot telephone each other on a continuous basis either (as we have to sleep, e.g.). Interpersonal relationships are never predicated on a continuous, uninterrupted process of exchange. How do we account for this phenomenon of the exchange’s after-life or existential wake? As previously noted, the field of obligation is one of the mechanisms that ensures a continuation of the relationship as signaled by the re-iteration of exchange events. Transferring this model or metaphor to the nuclear world and all other worlds of interaction how should we adopt and adapt this type of image? Just how does a relationship ‘remember’ past exchange phenomena? (759)

	The very nature of the relationship is an expression of the process of resolution that, at the very heart of that relationship establishes its embodied presence in this World-of-Life. So, an interpersonal relationship is realized through the resolution of interpersonal dissonance, difference, competition, etc. What exchange mechanisms take place characterize the nature of that relationship in accordance with genre expectations as situated in various relevant modes of life. So chess players make chess moves in accordance with certain rules and other conventions – in effect, they exchange chess moves. On the other hand, between lovers, other forms of exchange take place of a more intimate nature. Throughout all interpersonal relationships there is a certain existential excess of value operating as surpluses in their respective economies. This value is never static in quantity or quality, and, its current value, intuitively determined through conventional (and non-conventional) means, in effect, is a manifestation of the ‘memory’ of that relationship as its existential descriptor moves through the ongoing present, etc. This phenomenon being re-constituted in the re-constitution of that phenomenon regardless of the presence or absence of an intentional ego performing this process of phenomenal-phenomenological re-constitution. Of course, once that phenomenon or set of phenomena is there-for-us then in our re-constitution of that phenomenon or set of phenomena that relationship must include the intentional presence of an intentional ego even though, normally, the intentional contribution to that relationship is often psychically extracted from the same (although, again, on the grounds of the necessary possibility of an intentionally-oriented engagement this intentional contribution cannot be absolutely extracted and discounted!). What are the implication of this perspective and what theological ramifications flow from its apparently ‘transcendental-idealistic’ take on our being in this world-together-with-each-other? (760)

	Engagement can never be realized through the ‘pure’ privileging of any idealistic-like form. Hermeneutic comprehension in and through the hermeneutic circle of comprehension can only proceed through parallel readings of either an overt and/or covert nature. Admittedly this philosophy being constructed here has a role for the transcendental-idealistic-like treatment of phenomenal situations or events. On the other hand, to balance the same we need to also propose the parallel reading of a transcendentally realistic complexion in and through the simulation of an intentional object or state! Moreover, the critical tenor of our examinations and investigations is realized through a balance of such readings in and through the proper exercise of an overall transcendental suspension! The very necessity of the overall transcendental suspension in order to execute the hermeneutic economy of the hermeneutic circle guarantees that all forms of privilege are ultimately ‘neutralized’ through the same. Hence all talk that the transcendental phenomenologist, hermeneuticist/hermeneut and existentialist privilege this or that perspective must be dismissed even though their very disciplines are conducted aspectivally! Ultimately, all such forms of privileging are for apparent pragmatic purposes only and are never conducted in a univocal form without also balancing the same through the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension resident at the very center of the hermeneutic circle (in the form as examined and articulated in the course of this extended essay, e.g.). And because the transcendental phenomenologist, etc., balances all idealistically-oriented practices with all  realistically-oriented practices, ultimately, and effectively, they are not a party to any form of privileging despite the definitive ends or determinations that can be realized in and through such critical processes of simulation/re-simulation! Indeed, such determinations ultimately reflect symmetry changes effected by critically conducted processes of simulation/re-simulation wherein forms of relational resolution are simulated/re-simulated (and can be found to take the same re-simulated form or some similar equivalent form or mode of resolution equally judged as proper, appropriate and valid!)! (761)

	But, if everything is in constant, continuous change how could continuity of identity be expressed (ontologically) and experienced (epistemologically)? (762)

	Because there can be no absolute identity from the Absolute point of view then it follows that there is absolutely nothing that actually changes. On the other hand, from a phenomenal, relative point of view, there is the ongoing constitution of that phenomenon-to-hand in its phenomenal-context-to-hand as realized in its context-of-origination, etc. I.e., a continuous-continual resolution of dissonance, difference, differentials, etc., on and in all levels of epistemological organization. It is as if the phenomenon-to-hand, whether consciously experienced or non-experienced, is the ongoing net sum of the resolution of all influences relevant to its current constitutional expression. In this we need to note the role of symmetry changes between the various dimensions that constitute that particular phenomenon capable of being differentially identified. Let us return to this metaphor/model of the acts of letter writing between two parties. Obviously a letter as a letter has to be written. The phenomenon of the letter is already complex in a dimensional sense, i.e., we have the phenomenon of ‘the writing of letters’, the phenomenon of ‘their emission’ and the phenomenon of ‘their reception’ along with the phenomenon of ‘their consequential implications’. Imagine a so-called friend writes an abusive letter. For some reason they are abusive. The person who receives that letter, that was directed to them, writes back to ask ‘why was the original letter writer being abusive?’ A second abusive letter follows, and a third. At that point in time, the reader in receipt of this stream of abusive letters decides that enough is a enough and that they will no longer ever write to that person again. As a consequence this process of reciprocated letter-writing ceases. Still, a few more letters arrive but they are disposed of in the bin without being read. Here the continuity of this relationship of a process of reciprocated letter-writing has ceased. In effect the four dimensions of ‘the writing of a letter’, etc., are disrupted in such a manner that this process of reciprocated letter writing comes to an end. Now, all future letters perceived as coming from this abusive writer of letters to yourself are no longer subjected to the usual process of reception. Left unopened, they are just binned. It is almost as if there is now a dis-conjunction between the dimension of the actualization of the intentional and the dimension of the potentialization of the intentional. E.g., I have the intention of writing a letter. A letter is duly actualized. There is a symmetry break, in this instance, between the potential and the actual modalities. Or, I have no intention of writing a letter in reply to a series of  abusive letters and no letter is duly written with, as a result, no symmetry break when taken from this intentional point of view (because from the point of view of these two dimensions of the intentional-potentialization and the intentional-actualization there is actually no difference in the overall  intentional economy in the latter type of negative instance). I intend to write no letter and no letter consequently is written. On the other hand, if I were to change my mind and write a final letter, whether abusive or not abusive in nature, (in order to signal my non-future obligation to continue to participate in a process of [abusive] letter writing with the same) in reply a letter is realized that is different from its intentional state of existence (to the extent that it is actualized beyond a mere intentional economy although meant to be read within the presence of one). In other words, in the actualization of the next letter, albeit as a final letter, there is that change in our overall economy between the net sum of the intentionally-potential and the intentionally-actualized (even though one could also argue that my not writing a letter is also the actualization of this intent ‘not to write a letter’, however, from an economic point of view the overall economic equation has not changed, i.e., nothing in addition to the mere intention is realized). With this model in mind, we must now ask how is it possible to go from the writing of a letter to the emission of that letter, and, from the reception of a letter to the writing of a new letter as a response to that newly received letter? Indeed, what allows one dimension to intentionally and/or consequentially migrate into another, indeed, create a process and period of re-disseminated re-iteration, etc? (763)

	The solution to this puzzle is both a complex and simple one. For a start, there is no absolute distinction that can be drawn between one distinction and any other distinction by virtue of the fact that a distinction is drawn in the first place in and through a dialectical interaction with an appropriate contextual field, and, all this demarcation occurs in and through the integrity of the Life-world. Consequently, all distinctions in some sense or series of sense are co-existing to some extent in some form or series of forms, etc., with each other either directly and/or indirectly. Secondly, distinctions are realized through their simultaneous relative promotion in conjunction with their relative suppression of whatever would effectively disestablish their non-promotion. Just as in the hermeneutic circle we are able to focus on some aspect of value, i.e., analytically, or, synthetically, or, existentially as a distinctive sense of identity (or, through some ordered combination of the same) and this process of ‘focus’ is arrived at through the appropriate type of suspension in conjunction with a simultaneously effective suppression of all other types of suspension, it follows that the same dialectical-type of process must be in effect when we find ourselves able to migrate from one modal orientation to some other, e.g., from the intention of writing a letter to the actual writing of that letter, etc. The transcendental necessity of this type of dialectical machinery arising from the fact that all forms of value arise in and through their appropriate hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Therefore, should we infer that through both the suspension of that under focus and the suspension of the suspension of all else relevant to its potential dis-establishment and/or non-establishment realizes the actualization of the possibility of our heading to that intentional objective as currently desired? Therefore, why not consider this modeling of the process of symmetry breaking along similar lines to the modeling of the hermeneutic circle in this regard? To this end let us see what might be involved? (764)

	In a certain light we could see all phenomena being realized as if in a marriage – that because there can be found no impediment to the marriage and the marriage is freely desired it then is allowed to proceed. The ‘marriage’ being symbolic of the resolution of all the relevant positive and negative forces that respectively would establish or disestablish that particular phenomenon. This ‘marriage’ then unites all those parties within the metaphorical ‘body’ of that relationship. That relationship can then be perceived to have its own relatively unique existential description/descriptor and this existential fact is then self-imposed upon the participants of that relationship; each from their own unique points of view within that relationship. Now, all we need to note is that apparently radical shifts in the topography of that relationship and in the existential descriptions of its participants is the result of radical shifts in symmetry due to chaotic re-alignments/dis-alignments in the existential complexion of that relationship as reflected in that relationship (from the relatively of its own point of view) and in the complexion of its participants (from the relativity of their own points of view). These relatively radical/non-radical re-alignments, etc., resulting from the net effect or resultant of interactions that constitute/re-constitute the constitution of that relationship and the constitution of its participants. It then behooves us to ask what exactly, in ideal/idealized terms of reference, are those re-alignments, etc., that effected the expression/re-expression/non-expression of that relationship under examination; in the process invoking those contributions nominated to have a relevant input on the alignment/re-alignment/non-alignment in the ongoing expression and/or disruption of that relationship. To this end, let me re-examine this aspect of the phenomenal-phenomenological in this light of the reciprocated process of letter-writing and its disruption (with advent of a disruptive effect introduced by a series of the abusive letters). (765)

	Each act of letter writing involves a complexity of dimensions. For a start there is that under focus in a context of focus itself within a field of origination. So the letter writer, etc., e.g., is acting within the inter-subjective genre of activity, namely, letter-writing, within the mode of life of communications, e.g. Then, there is the intentional potential of the desired-intention to write a letter, its actualization, emission, reception and interpretation, and its consequential implications. And so the cycle of letter reciprocation is born and maintained. Then, the exchange factor in this relationship of the letter imparts, as a process, upon reception and interpretation, etc., a transmission of its apparently intended content along with the setting in play of an obligational wake, etc. Now, I am sure the complexity already denominated is only a fraction of the surface complexity of this phenomenon, itself a phenomenon in the wider context of a communicational mode of life, etc. Effectively, only in an idealized form are we going to be able to denominate certain relevant characteristics of a particular phenomenon. But, in this restricted economy, we usually find we have all we need to know, on a need-to-know basis, in order to adequately understand what is at stake in that relationship, i.e., what is essentially relevant to our effective understanding of the same. So, e.g., we receive a letter from someone we don’t know addressed to someone we equally don’t know. Under those circumstances we assume the letter was not meant to be received by us and return it to the post-office. And, most likely, that was all we needed to know or assume. On the other hand, if an erstwhile friend is now writing abusive letters we find ourselves wondering if we need to change tack with the same. Do we assume that they are upset for some reason or other and that such a reason has no real basis in the reality of that relationship? Do we assume that they are rightly ‘pissed off’ and that we need to make amends? Or, we might assume that the letter writer has an illness or some other character defect that has turned them into an abusive letter writer; our judgment in this matter determining the nature of our response, and, importantly, a sparking a possible re-interpretation of the nature of our experience of a field of obligations we had previously shared with this fellow letter writer. If in turn we now become ‘pissed off’ what will be the consequences for the continuation of this relationship? Without some form of a resolution, if the abusive tenor is maintained or is of a strength that is felt to be disruptive in its consequences, then, we find, before too long, the cessation of that relationship along with all the consequences that flow from that re-alignment and/or non-alignment. Previously, the everyday ‘act’ of relative inertia, i.e., an effective act of non-letter-writing itself, through a prioritizing of competing demands upon our life, etc., would often stop us from writing a letter sooner than the one we were to actually to write and arrange to be sent. With our motivation paralyzed or weakened through some form of an introduced/re-introduced ambivalence on our part, etc., our effective ‘ability’ to write another letter may suffer. In response to an abusive letter writing situation that inertia is promoted if we don’t feel the immediate need to write a reply that might seek for some sort of an explanation as to why the previous letter or letters were written in what appeared to be an  abusiveness manner, or, feel the need to offer an apology in the self-perceived light of our own wrong-doing, and/or, our being abusive in turn. It is possible we might just ignore that letter and act as if we had not received it. However, the repeated reception of abusive letters must be harder to ignore and eventually, of not sooner, would lead us to actively/passively to put in place a disruption or non-expression of the previously reciprocated process of letter-writing. So, we have here the non-resolution of dissonance which would effectively lead, without some form of adequate resolution, to the dis-establishment of that relationship between these two letter writers. Hence the implication of this dialectic of the relative promotion of certain positive factors and the relative de-motion of other negative factors in arriving at the expression of a certain course of action whether that results in the maintaining of this course of letter writing, its transformation into some other form of letter-writing, or, its final dis-establishment. (766)

	To what extent can we refer to these positive factors of promotion and negative factors of demotion as ‘suspensions’? (767)

	Say, for the sake of a simplicity, we write an abusive letter in return. The letter is written and sits on the desk beside the door waiting for us to post it. We have written the text but have not fully emitted it. What symmetry changes would be involved to change the status of that letter from ‘written, but not emitted’ to ‘emitted’? I am having second thoughts about sending it and so defer my decision to send it. I will re-think what I am going to do tomorrow. Unfortunately, or fortunately, another person in my household sees the letter and posts it for me assuming that would have been my intention to send it for what other reasons would it have been left sitting beside the door? So the letter gets sent. In these two types of situation I either directly post it myself or it is posted on my behalf. However, in both types of situations an intention is formed of posting the letter by the agent performing this act of emission. This symmetry change, from non-emitted to emitted, is therefore put into effect through the formation of this additional intention, albeit one already embedded, ostensively, in the genre and act of writing the letter in the first place. The discharge of that additional intention puts in play the emission of that letter (whose delivery, in properly being discharged depends, in turn, on another series of intentions and their interpretation in accordance with this genre of activity, etc., by the delivers of that item of mail). The enactment of its emission, therefore, is dependent upon the actualization of an intention to that effect, in a series of intentions, discharged to that end by one or more actors operating in accordance with this genre of the letter, its formation, delivery and reception. As would be argued, in the light of the hermeneutic circle as currently envisaged, the discharge of an intention (in a series of intentions to that effect) is realized through a ‘suspension’ of the ‘mere intention to act accordingly’. In other words, the ‘mere intention to send the letter’ is actualized by suspending its mere potentiality… in the process the act of emission is realized and so the letter is taken to the post-office, etc., duly stamped and placed in the right box for posting, etc. “Should this letter be sent or should it not be sent?”  This question is asked by the emitter of that letter. Here we have a suspension, a suspension that itself becomes suspended would realize the emission of that letter. In notation we might express this along the following lines:

	[(“Should this letter be sent or should it not be sent?”) yea or nay?]? (768)

	A question, as previously discussed elsewhere, is a dis-conjunctive suspension of the either/or. In this type of situation we effectively have a double suspension as noted/notated above. If we were to answer “yes” the letter is sent, if “nay” the letter is not sent. To break this outer suspension needs the suspension of that second suspension. An answer in effect being a metaphorical suspension of a conjunctive variety as response to the dis-conjunctive question/s. It arises in such a fashion that ‘looks like that “yes”’ is ‘my answer’ in response to this question-complex. This literalization of the metaphor then being allowed to occur on the sole grounds that x not only ‘looks like y’ but is ‘n’, i.e., in this situation, ‘yes, the letter should be sent’ is apparently intended by ‘the letter sitting on the desk beside the door’, and, ‘yes, the letter is being sent’ by ‘its actually being taken to the post-office, etc.’ In answering this ‘enquestioning of the question’ a resolution is definitively realized when there is suppression of one of those possible parties, i.e., “yes, the letter has been sent,” or, “no, the letter has not been sent.” In this type of instance is “yes” or “no” best described as a ‘suspension’, or, ‘the breaking of a suspension’? Because the question is intentionally coupled with some form of an implicit answer in order to make sense as a ‘question’ it follows that the realization of a definitive response to the question must be delivered through a ‘suspension of the suspension’ in order to escape its equal weighting between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ otherwise there could be no resolution of this question. How are we to free ourselves from the ostensive paralysis of ‘the dis-conjunctive suspension’ and ‘the suspension of the question in the light of its conjunctive suspension in the form of a reply’ – by virtue of ‘the suspension of the suspension of the suspension (etc.)’  – in effect a mini-hermeneutic circle. The dialectical machinery of the same arises through ‘successive suspensions of suspensions of suspensions, etc.’ How else could we escape the  ‘being trapped in the suspension itself, the suspension of the suspension,’ etc?’ The process of suspension, what ever its variety, being broken through a disruptive suspension of the suspension itself, i.e., a weighting of one or more parties and, therein, the simultaneous promotion and demotion of the requisite factors that allow the emission of a definitive response to the act of enquestioning in the first place! So a ‘suspension is formed’ and a ‘suspension is disrupted’ within the ambit of the same transcendental machinery, namely, the hermeneutic circle and its active exercise! The emission of intentionally formed value arising through the sheer necessity of this type of process wherein different types of suspension collectively thematize a process of intentionality that ceases to remain purely intentional, as an intentional process qua intentional process. By such a process of simulation/re-simulation we are allowed to interact directly both actively and/or passively, with the ‘phenomenon being simulated’ through the ‘simulation of that phenomenon’ and the suspension of the same (in effect the ‘collapse of the transcendental with the non-transcendentally mundane’). (769)

	In order for the relatively intentional to have some form of significance, and value, it must also exist in a state of psychic contrast with that which is relatively non-intentional. In this sense our phenomenology cannot be just intentional or merely intentional! What contrast, therefore, is there that would allow the relatively-intentional per se to take its place upon the stage of human endeavour? Given this transcendental condition it follows that our intentional lives in and through the Life-World cannot be lived-out merely in intentional terms of reference. Furthermore, no perspective upon the open constitution of the world could be either uni-vocal or bi-vocal in (its absolutist) orientation. With these restrictions in mind let me enumerate a number of potentially co-existent contrasting possibilities in this regard. E.g., in our temporal division of the process into the Pre-conditional, Conditional and the Post-conditional we can note a variety of contrast along the following lines respectively, namely, the pre-intentional, the trans-intentionally judgmental and the post-intentionally consequential; while the latter would include responses as subjective (non-cognitive) reactions and (cognitive) replies and/or inter-subjective (non-cognitive) reactions and (cognitive) replies, etc. These various forms of response finding themselves translated into actions, non-actions, reactions, non-reactions, etc., in and through various forms of non-dissemination and/or dissemination. E.g., in anger I hit the other person; or, I recognize my anger but decide not to hit the other person; or, without realizing it in anger I suddenly lash out and hit the other person and in the process become aware of the nature of that intention as it was formed from perhaps this habit to be too aggressive in response to that type of situation; or, without fully realizing it, from a reinforced habit of not expressing myself aggressively, I now automatically desist from hitting the person as much as I find that intentional type of response to be attractive in cognitive reflection in the present circumstances. In a similar fashion, all other forms of value need to find their significance through an informative and defining sense of contrast! E.g., as discovered through an appreciation of a simulation of highly likely possible causal consequences; an appreciation of the role and consequences of emotional states of mind; an appreciation of the role of political influences in the coursing of a political state of affairs, etc., etc. Hence the variety of contrasting influences that allow a transcendental-phenomenological philosophy to at least start to compete in the polemical race of the public philosopher, whereas, I am sure, in critical reflection, many philosophical positions would automatically be ruled out as untenable (on the grounds that their constructions are inherently unstable and not properly able to be entertained in their current forms either epistemologically and/or ontologically by virtue of their inherent contradictions, inadequate resolutions of the same, transgressing the limits of their deployment, etc!)! (770)

	So our intentional(ly oriented constitution of our transcendental) philosophy cannot be merely intentional despite our overt orientation towards the same. In this situation of the intentional we are now allowed to engage with the relatively non-intention, albeit through its intentional-phenomenological translation. Thence ‘the simulation of the intention’ and ‘the intention of the simulation’ must correlatively co-define each other, etc. By such means giving us more than just an absolutely-intentional uni-modal access to the world, thence our access to the World-of-Life as the Life-World is not merely intentional in its simulation because no mere idealistic fabrication on our part is going to create/re-create this Earth upon which we live nor the heavens within which our corner of the world is allowed to sail through… No! This type of philosophy cannot be some version of an idealism constructed in some form of a philosophical contrast to some form of a realism, and v.v; whether those terms of reference be in general, in particular or specifically denoted. On the other hand, if one were careful, we could nominate this type of non-exclusive transcendental phenomenology, etc., as a form of transcendental-idealism as long as one were to recognize the importance of the overall transcendental suspension and the consequent non-prioritization of the realistic, idealistic, or any other form of an ‘ism’, etc! Continuing in this same vein, eliciting the implications and consequences of a qualified transcendental-idealism, what needs to be said on the contentious postulate of an external world versus an internal world/series of internal worlds of a subjective orientation? That in and through the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension there can be no privileging of either a so-called ‘external world’ and its contrasting so-called ‘internal worlds’, nor, ‘the ideal nature of the intentional process’ versus ‘the realistic nature of the intentional object’. Indeed, in a critical philosophical frame of reference such concepts, formed through processes of intentional privilege, are complete fabrications, impossibilia, impossible metaphorical literalizations, etc. We are immersed in the Life-World full-stop! In a metaphorical mode we may think of the world as outside the limits of our current embodiment, that we are trapped inside our bodies and, worse, absolutely trapped in our minds as solipsistic agents, but, the inter-subjective coursing of natural experience must rule out such philosophical short-sightedness and our consequent self-entrapment in this self-created ‘philosophical’ cul de sac! We live ‘our’ life with others and it is only from a metaphorical dis-engagement with the Life-World that we think we can imagine inhabiting the realm of our own minds and only our own minds. Such conceit! Our very ability to think ‘that we can think’ this genre of philosophical reflection is already inter-subjectively pre-established for us. The very defining of our sense/s of self has/have arisen through our coursing with others and their coursing with us. Climb a mountain, hide in a cave and reflect upon the constitution of the world and the overall world of discourse moves in with you! Immersed in a World-of-Life we cannot escape the same… so should we not ask “how could this open-concept of the Life-World have significance for us if there is no form of a meaningful contrast (between what is the Life-World and what is not the Life-World)?” (as was argued in the fact that our transcendental phenomenology could not be structured upon a pure intentional philosophy wherein there could not exist anything whatsoever that was not simply intentional?). In reply, let me argue that the Life-World gains its significance in and through its transcendental contrast with the natural world, i.e., the intentional, phenomenal, non-critically formulated prejudice, etc. So, as for one so for the other. As the intentional is not exclusive, indeed, depends upon the non-intentional (through the pre-intentional, trans-intentional, post-intentional actions, reactions, etc.,) so too does it follow that our transcendental concept of the Life-World cannot be exclusively formulated apart from the natural world. Instead, our orientation is contra-natural, i.e., transcendental; recognizing that all phenomena are constituted by-us for-us without implying that the intentional object is not the object-as-intended (in all its essential modal richness or lack thereof!)! That furthermore, it is only through a suspension of both the transcendental and the non-transcendentally phenomenal that a fully effective overall transcendental suspension can come into its own state of relative perfection (as a critical procedure to illuminate our place-in-this-World-of-Life-with-others-before-others!)! (771)

	Given this critical, non-exclusive constitution of our Transcendental-Phenomenology, etc., how does this sense of the ‘transcendental’ constrain the often over-exuberant hand of the theologian hypothetically? (772)

	However, first, let me ask how does the relationship remember the exchange of exchange factors given that no process of exchange itself can be continuous let alone continual and absolutely non-intermittent? As suggested previously we have invoked a multi-dimensional appreciation of that relational affair in such a manner that the discharge of exchange is preserved in one or more of those additional dimensions. We could, for instance, invoke a non-mysterious sense of a relative and non-absolute implicate order. E.g., in order to illustrate the possibility of this concept, let me relate the following experiment as a metaphor of this type of a relative process-basis for the reading of certain phenomenal features. In a rotating vat of glycerin a drop of an intensely concentrated die is dropped. The die spreads throughout the vat at ‘random’ until it has apparently spread equally throughout. However, let us now rotate that vat of glycerin in the opposite direction and an amazing phenomenon presents itself to us. Gradually, we see reversed the dispersal of that drop of die until it finds itself perfectly reassembled at that point it was dropped in the vat (and to then be re-disperse in the ‘opposite direction’ – being de-reversed when that vat of glycerin is reversed once again, etc., etc.). What can we note from this experiment, and, of these inferences what exactly are we allowed to infer? For a start, we should note that chaotic phenomena are structured! They may be subjected to bifurcations, ongoing or dis-continuous, however, in an implicate order this type of information, apparently, is not lost. Just as in the determination of weather, precise details of the initial starting conditions are necessary since in chaotic periods these initial conditions distinctively characterize final conditions. Indeed, small differences in initial conditions and widely divergent final conditions are an indication of the degree of chaos present in that system (since non-chaotic conditions normally produce a linear, determined final complexion that is generally the same for all points of commencement; a complexion that if subjected to some form of transformation is relatively smooth in its computed enplotment). This postulation of an implicate order being seen to allow processes of exchange to be registered on a long-term basis, and, the chaotic consequences of initial conditions to be, in effect, ‘remembered’. This postulation of an implicate order implicating, in my opinion, a higher frame of reference with a higher degree of epistemological order and need not be treated as something mysterious. In other words, the phenomenon is situated in an appropriate phenomenal sense of space-time (be that non-virtual and/or virtual). In turn, this phenomenon is then situated in the locality of its own sense of a relational space-time from the relative unique of its own relational sense of existence (as measured in and through the production of a semblance of an existential excess along with the investment of the same in the ‘locality’ of that relational space-time). Then, in turn, that semblance of a relatively unique relational space-time is then nested in a more encompassing sense of a trans-relational space-time which acts or simulates as the relatively implicate order of that relational locality. Each plane or dimension being constituted in and through the ongoing resolution of its own definition of the relatively dissonant. Indeed, the very semblance of that dimension being the direct result of that sense of resolution which must distinctively characterize the same. No doubt the theologian could salvage something of this type of universe to support their various claims for the pre-eminence of a sense of the Divine or a variety of senses of the Divine. However, let us continue in these explorations of the nature of the relational, etc., before arbitrating what types and/or experiences of theological possibilities might be acceptable or not acceptable, etc. (773)

	Both the phenomenologist, etc., and the theologian must not confuse this expression of the ‘transcendental’ with the term ‘transcendent’. On the other hand, these expressions are related. Let me critically re-define the dialectical space between these two closely related expressions and in the process also defuse their non-critical superimposition in the mind of the non-critical philosopher. (774)

	Without wasting time, coming straight to the point (and acting as mutual co-definitions of each other), the semblance of the transcendental arises through the suspension of both the relatively transcendent (nature of ‘structure’ and ‘process’) and the relatively immanent (nature of that ‘being-structured’ and that being relatively subjected to a process, i.e., content). Through mutual interdependence and correlativity (in the formation of all processes of identity either epistemologically oriented or ontologically oriented) there can be no absolute sense of either the transcendental or the non-transcendental, nor, the transcendent or the immanent! Hence the non-absolute relativity of the transcendental, etc., by virtue of the existential fact that the transcendental (attitude) defines and is defined by the ‘relatively non-transcendental’, i.e., the phenomenal as entertained in and through the natural attitude, etc. An ‘existential fact’ by virtue of the necessary existence of this ongoing balance between the transcendent and the immanent, the relatively transcendental and the relatively non-transcendental, etc., in order for the overall transcendental suspension to produce/re-produce all forms of value (collectively at the level of the overall transcendental suspension in general terms of reference, particularly in ordered terms of reference through the privileging and/or de-privileging of the moments of the overall hermeneutic circle, and, specifically in individually applied terms of reference on a case by case basis). Our integrated philosophy of value exhibiting an integrated relatively systematic philosophy in this regard (as long as such systematization is not treated in a non-suspended absolutistic mode of exhibition, i.e., is both not closed by such fiat and is left open to the emergence of novel forms of value, novel perspectives for the interpretative evaluation of the same, novel modes of engagement, etc.). (775)

	Concepts like transcendent and immanent cannot be treated absolutely by virtue of their mutual correlativity of their epistemological gestation. Indeed, no concepts could be entertained in an absolutistic mode by virtue of the fact that all are entertained in and through the same ‘transcendental machinery’! I.e., in and through gestalt fields, the same hermeneutic circle, etc., wherein that demarcated cannot be neither absolutely demarcated nor absolutely non-demarcated from that which that under ‘focus’ gains its sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., its value. And the same epistemological mechanics, in general terms of reference, applies to all forms of epistemological thematization (along with the intentional recognition of the ontological objectivity directly dealt with appropriate to the nature of the simulation/re-simulation entertained therein). Put another way, one could say that all value is context dependent and never be absolutely de-contextualized. Hence the co-existence of a context/meta-text in the presentation/re-presentation of value and hence the re-presentational nature of the same, etc. (through the invocation of the same mechanics/dynamics). A directness of engagement being realized through the existential simulation of the non-textual;  the not-textual itself being realized as a dynamic balance of the textual versus its meta-textual context; thence the not-textual in and through the overall transcendental suspension along with all semblances of an existential surplus and the comparative existential merit of the same…! (776)

	In this dialectical dance value is thematized through the relationship of that under focus with that background against which, metaphorically, its receives the merit of its existential thematization. All this is as a process of systematization, however, the merit of such endeavours is directly dependent upon the existential richness of that background, the method of its contrasted application, the ability of the overall process to both resolve acts of enquestioning with a metaphorical modeling of reply/replies in and through acts of simulation that adequately and satisfactorily supply degrees of value apposite to such endeavours. Quite simple really! What works works, what doesn’t work for us doesn’t answer for us! (777)
 
	Having co-mutually defined the transcendental in and through its contrast with the phenomenal as presented in the natural attitude as subjected to an overall transcendental suspension let me now ‘define’ what must be entailed in these two separate but related expressions of the transcendent and immanent. Having dismissed an absolutisitic reading of the expression transcendent it follows that we cannot define this expression in regard to some misguided absolutitistic envisualization of the Divine. Instead, let us re-define the relatively transcendent as that structure that has structured its relatively immanent content, and, that such a reading necessitates a dynamic process reading of that type of process. Hence the redirection of our focus upon an enstructuralization of the relative immanent. Therein, the relativity of structure both enstructures and is enstructured on all levels of epistemological hierarchicalization. Thence what applies to the relatively Divine must equally apply in the same general manner to the relatively non-Divine in this regard! From these roots it follows that the relatively immanent is defined as that relativity of content processed in the enstructuralization of a process or set of processes that defined that living-structure under the process of thematization involved in those acts of epistemological focus. In other words the relative content of a process (since from the absolute emptiness of all existence, including the Divine, there can be no unchanging correlate around which, upon which and through which acts of superimpositions of value can be meaningfully imposed, etc., in such absolutistic terms of reference!)! Consequently, content can only be dealt with in relative terms of reference to the same extent that processes must equally be contextualized, etc. Only through a mutual correlativity can structure be enstucturing and content can be processed, etc. That granted, let me now turn our hypothetical gaze upon the rhetoric of divine intelligence and intelligent design in light of the above preamble. (778)

	In a nutshell of essential compression let me state that the concept, or more often as a dogma, intelligent design must be turned on its head! In the light of a critical dialectical process theology if we are to envisage the world as designed by some intelligent being, i.e., the relatively Divine, then we must equally envisage the world as designing that same intelligent being! As for one - so too with the other! In a process philosophy what enstructures is in turn enstructured… and what is processed also equally processes! Such an conclusion is inescapable in a process philosophy based upon the mutual interdependence of identity-formation. To that extent, identity is (in/)formed but never absolutely! Furthermore, identity can never be absolutely reduced! Consequently, identity is also synthetically synthesized. Otherwise, how else would the world of value have emerged from the relative emptiness of the microcosmic world into the relative emptiness of the macrocosmic world, and v.v! Thence the Life-World as a World-of-Life! Whence the implication that “what goes for one goes for the other, v.v!” So if the world were to be considered to be designed then all semblance of a designer must equally be designed by that same world, and v.v. There can be no meaningful invocation and superimposition of privilege or priority upon one or the other. So, if a theologian must insist on some sense of an intelligent design/designer then let us reply that “what is good for the goose is good for the gander” so to speak! That, in essence, the world must also design that same intelligence! At the same time, let us dismiss all forms of unbalanced reductionism! Let us remain open to the dialectical richness that is our World-of-Life in the hope that if a theological complexion could be ascribed to the same that it could equally be phenomenally-phenomenologically described, etc! Hypothetically, in the dialectical light of this equality of opportunity, what might be entailed in such an open concept? (779)

	In this light of a process of emergence we could now re-interpret the concept of evolution along the same lines, i.e., not as a process of evolution but rather as a process of mutual emergence. What would be entailed in such a transformation of this concept of evolution into a concept of mutual emergence, and, what role might the possible formation of such empathetic resonances have for the broad concept of divine experience (in subjective, objective forms, etc.)? (780)

	These considerations are hypothetical in stance (and covered by an overall transcendental suspension in the process), however, they touch on matters of the very nature of subjectivity and self-agency which need not be construed, eventually, as hypothetical. But, then, such a field of endeavour, being in its infancy, we should stress that word ‘eventually’. In the meantime, in the same hypothetical manner as we should conduct our phenomenal-phenomenological research in general, let us continue in this particular field of the egological to see what light could be cast upon these questions of intelligent design, the exercise of will, the dissemination of the power from apparent centers of agency, the nature of experience itself, the consequences of responsibility, etc., etc. (781)

	First, let us assume, until we know better or know no better, that the phenomenon of self is just as much a phenomenon in this world as any other phenomenon. Between the experience of self and the self of experience there is the ‘phenomenon of world’ and, or as, the ‘world of phenomena’. Into this mix all we need add is a dash of embodiment, the semblance of the other and before we know it we encounter a living world as the World-of-Life along with the transcendental possibility of all forms of value. Between these parameters a world of significance is existentially simulated, and re-simulated… all within the confines of a hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Within this theoretical universe just what exactly is this phenomenon of self, the phenomenon of our engagement with others and do we ever find verifiable evidence that this World-of-Life as one-Life-World even remotely possesses a theological complexion. Indeed, within these terms of reference is the concept of the Divine, along with divine-experience (in all or any of its hypothetical possibilities), conceivable. In my First Volume of theological essays I answered that in the affirmative. Through the possible formation of a superiority of epistemological organization the formation of the relative Divine would naturally arise in a process-theology. Now it behooves us to ask what evidence might support that reasonable conclusion. Or, more to the point, hypothetically, how would we recognize and experience some form of phenomenal engagement with that to be regarded as relatively Divine, i.e., of a superiority of epistemological organization. As a child we were in the company of those of superior epistemological organization, namely, our parents and their friends, our teachers and elders in general. So that possibility, of encountering an active superiority of epistemological organization, is already established, rather, what is at stake here is in the detail, i.e., how might be recognized a superiority in epistemological organization a dimension or two, or more, removed from that possessed currently by ourselves? As agents in this World-of-Life standing before others, with-others, is the world a perfectly rational, reasonable plane of existence, or, are their moments or passages in the coursing of our existence that leave us speechless and without an effective language so to speak to discuss the same (in their formation and/or interpretation). And, in this light, are all reports of religious-like phenomena mere fantasies on our part and co-authored ones at that?! Fractured, mis-formed, il-formed, uninformed, misinformed, malformed, yet-to-be-formed, yet-to-be-informed formations in a process of inadequate thematization construed, misconstrued, etc., through the lenses of social expectations of a pre-determined religious-like nature or merely through an absence of the necessary linguistic-concept formations that would allow us to properly evaluate the same through non-defective, re-iterable forms of sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., through repeatable proper, appropriate and valid forms of value-formation? Then, into this sea of anxious questions what role does a sense of self play along with its open miscellany of various senses of self… or, is any religious sense of self a mere adoption and adaptation of inter-subjective, publicly accessible religious pre-conceptions of the relatively Divine? In this direction of our hypothetical explorations I feel I need to clarify what is entailed in the phenomenology of self, in the form of a transcendental egology, in order to clarify what might possibly be meant by sense/s of self, possible Divine sense/s of self, and, the necessary interaction between the same in order to establish the full possibility of this ‘Divine experience’ what ever that might entail or might not entail. (782)

	An overall sense of self is apparently synthesized from a variety of senses of self, and v.v. (assuming that there is a dialectic between an overall sense of self and a variety of senses of self that can be discerned within the same, and v.v.). Now, in our intentional philosophy to date we could define a sense of self as that which distinctively opposes and contrasts an overall sense of an intentional-object-state and an overall sense of an intentional-field. That sense of distinctiveness arising through the nature of that field, etc. So, a visual perceiver is a sense of self that perceives the visual object-states within the visual field, etc. (itself a summation of a number of sub-visual fields like colour, focus, linear acuity, motion, distance, three dimensionality, etc.). Moreover, a sense of self could be defined in relatively advanced epistemologically organized terms of reference in so far as the intentional or intentional-like appreciation of a field assumes and presumes a more epistemologically organized field of appreciation. All that granted, what I would like to do now is to re-define the semblance of a sense of self in neutral terms of reference in order to subsume all forms of integration (from an epistemological perspective). So, a flower blooms on a stem of a plant and a fly lands upon the same (and eats a grain of pollen). Both possess a sense of integrity that allows us to refer to them as ‘living things’. In order to capture this sense of ‘integrity’ let me define the distinctive integration of a phenomenal object-state, as a phenomenon perceived in its own right in the following fashion:

i.	As having distinctive boundaries in space and time pertaining to a certain field,
ii.	As able to exert, in a certain overall manner, an influence or sense of ‘presence’ in that field beyond those boundaries, and,
iii.	Being constituted also by the nature of its interaction within that overall field (as a set of fields). (783)

In this light a sense of self is manifested when this integrity is present, presents itself beyond a certain well-defined sense of boundary, and is dialectically permeable to the degree that that sense of self is within that field also constituted and re-constituted by that field, this integrity being allowed to persist through such an overall process of re-constitution. So, we could say that subjectivity is defined by inter-subjectivity, and v.v! No inter-subjectivity – no subjectivity, etc! That, the distinctive nature of this interaction defines what is to be focused upon as subjective, etc. This boundary being a permeable or semi-permeable-like membrane so to speak (metaphorically). Particular aspects of that ‘subjective’ identity arising through the same type of arrangement to the extent that process-features have some degree of autonomy within the phenomenally apparent integrity of  that ‘subjective complex’. This permeability implies, therefore, that the nature of this interaction is always two-way and dialectical (to the extent that they mutually co-define each other). Thus all investigations of subjectivity, in the agency of a person, must therefore also take into account the nature of this two-way permeability between or across those apparent boundaries. That embodiment, in this light, is a transcendental necessity in the formation of all forms of identity be they human or non-human, or, non-divine or divine in orientation, etc. Indeed, that the whole question of subjectivity versus inter-subjectivity as taking place cannot be problematic; that only the process-nature of the mechanisms for this two-way transfer of information need be considered as problematic or needing determination. (784)

	Now, we could argue, I believe, that the distinctive nature of an apparent phenomenal entity could be appreciated through the asymmetry expressed across this embodied boundary from the relatively subjective perspective in comparison to the relatively inter-subjective perspective (without treating this expression of ‘subjective’ in terms of human agency unless that particular asymmetry under investigation is actually that of human-agency-as-expressed-in-the-world). So, e.g., a fly needs to partake of certain kinds of sustenance such as pollen grains, e.g., imbibe liquids containing water from time to time and intake oxygen, etc. In the opposite direction a fly excretes waste products, flaps its wings, mates with other flies, of which some lay eggs and re-arranges the environment external to it, albeit in a manner proportional to its size and numerical extent. This asymmetry effectively defines the nature of a fly. (785)

	In the context of asymmetry we can see that human subjectivity is going to be defined by the bi-directional nature of its interaction with other human subjects, either individually, grouped and/or collectively organized, and, with respect to those aspects of the world humans find themselves currently situated within. In this our previous analyses of power must figure prominently since asymmetries in the same will define that individual, etc. E.g.,  a person could either chop a tree down or they could ask someone who is both able to chop a tree and is ‘willing’ to do the same. In a dissemination of power  the second individual could arrange for this to occur through a third, etc. (that might or might not entail directly an organization of individuals, i.e., say through the hiring of an individual belonging to a company whose area of operation includes tree-felling, e.g.). The felling of a fully grown tree also usually entailing the use of a tool or set of tools for the execution of the same. Acting through our bodies and/or the use of tools allows us to operate in the world in a manner that is peculiar to the spectrum of activity that can be expressed by human agency. (786)

	Now in the light of the above, it behooves the theologian to be able to reasonably demonstrate the nature of this interaction between the imputation of a relatively divine centre of agency and the human individual either treated individually and/or organized in a group. The distinctive nature of this type of imputed relationship/s being discerned through its imputed asymmetry! An additional imputation being that the imputation of divine agency must also entail a model of subjectivity-inter-subjectivity already argued for in the expression of a distinctive identity (as it interacts in its ‘experience’ of its own sense of world). The implications being, namely, that a sense of divine agency must be embodied, operate with a system of processes some of which operate across those embodied boundaries, and, that asymmetries with respect to the same will distinctively define the nature of its operation/s within its sense of a world (that in turn must be epistemologically more organized through its mere inclusion within that extra-subjective environment, i.e., beyond its current boundaries of embodiment)…. (787)

	Of course we have the spectacle of classical expressions of deism all arguing therein that their visions of the Divine are logically tenably despite being impossibly defined in terms that are absolutely non-embodied, demand an infinitude of power and an assortment of other faculties whose powers must ultimately contradict each other, etc. Can a rational theologian take this type of ‘impossible’ position? (788)

	To the extent that the ‘totality of totality’ is ineluctable and ineffable then to that extent this open-endedness could be granted as the ground for the formation and operation of divinity, but, never as a definition/s for an expression/s of the same! In this the theologian cannot have their cake and eat it! Either they leave open, as infinitely open-ended, the grounds of divinity or they define divinity in rational terms (through a harmonizing of dialectical expressions of dissonance) in which case they can no longer maintain this usual impossible stance of a classical deism. For divinity to express itself in the world, therefore, it too must be ‘embodied’, participate in processes, be able to express its presence in the world in an asymmetrical form that distinctive characterizes its phenomenality as a phenomenon in the world, etc! (789)

	Having noted that the asymmetry across this ‘permeable membrane’ or boundary defines the nature of that identity let us now ask what defines those limits of its current embodiment (since, dialectically, the presence of its identity does extend beyond such a limit through a dissemination of its effective power). Re-phrased we can ask this in the following fashion: “what limits the limit?” My answer to this question must be “that it is the overall resolution of the overall dialectical differences that identity has with its phenomenal field of context that establishes the same,” and, that the effective differential of this relationship (considered either in real time-and-space, or in its ideality) that thereafter, and therebefore, establishes the evolving history of the same. Let me explain what seems to be entailed in this vision of identificational resolution and the non-reductively treated manifestation of its associated semblance of identity (by virtue of the all-embracing ‘circumference’ of that boundary/boundary condition). (790)

	Do these transcendental conditions attached to identity transfer to relatively more ideal forms of identity (and identity of a relatively abstract nature in a more nominal field?)? My answer to this question is “yes”. Identity of a relatively more ideal or nominal form carves out its associated territory in the same manner as nominated identities in its (denominated) spatio-temporal frame of reference. So the phenomenon of love or hate (and a non-attractive, non-antipathy with respect to both) define themselves (phenomenologically in either critical and/or non –critical forms) in a linguistic division of the Life-World with respect to each other (even though their demarcations may be blurred or mediated by neutral territory). In this ideal frame of reference can we then say they are fully encapsulated within those boundaries? Again I must answer “yes”. All phenomena find themselves (both linguistically and non-linguistically) essentially centered in this semantically mapped out vision of the Life-World. Hence the natural enfolding of those boundaries by that sense of a semi-permeable-like membrane or boundary even if a sense of definition invokes a multidimensional sense of center or centers of identity. E.g., imagine a sweet drink has some salt added to it and perhaps a dash of something acidic as well. The resulting taste if ably and properly determined would invoke all three essential centers (along with any others that might correctly locate it in this multidimensional sense of taste determination. By such means if and when we can detect the presence of salt in that sweet drink we can still characterize its more fundamental sweetness as ‘apple-like’ or ‘raspberry-like’ or of some other fruit or fruits individually (to some degree or other) to that extent we are able to differentiate this multidimensional dimension to taste. It could well be argued that taste more often than not has a multidimensional sense of flavour which allows us to account for the veritable variety of flavours that, normally, can be discerned. But, can this psychic sense of encapsulation still apply to a multidimensionally complex set of sensations like taste, etc? Yes, because the phenomenon is psychically centered in our psychic mapping of the Life-World and limits will naturally limit the extent that type of nomination can still essentially operate beyond these naturally and phenomenonally imposed set of phenomenological apperceived limits. Hence this transcendental requisite that demands all phenomena, to be phenomenologically phenomenal, must be centered, limited, and fully encapsulated by certain essentially distinctive restrictions that are both imposed upon identity in its nominal formation and define that identity at the same time. (791)

	What are the consequences of this vision of identity in so far as all forms of identity are correctly emergent? Through resolution a sense of the relational is realized. In this process of realization (whether treated from an ontological aspect/s or an epistemological aspect/s), in its appropriate field, resolution realizes both the uniqueness of that instance of identity formation and its essential typology. Hence the distinctiveness of identity. At the same time, because of its relational interaction in a field of thematization (both from an ontological perspective/s and an epistemological perspective/s) there is also a dialectical sense of interaction between the identity (in its formation of identity) and its associated field of thematization (which in turn is subject to a mutual process of thematization to that extent found relevant). Hence the relative ‘permeability’ of all forms of identity (in their associated field of identity formation, and, their interaction in a field or set of fields that allow us to identity those fields in their own relevant sense of identity-formation, etc.). (792)

	In effect we have theoretically defined the phenomenal nature, and relative grounds, of a transcendental-phenomenological philosophy. Whereas before we have appealed to experience, and its distinctive essentialization, as realized eidetically, we can now proceed on more theoretical grounds in this regard. However, theory and practice are best conducted with due deference to each other (even though various tensions must manifest themselves between these two types of disciplines by virtue of their dissimilar mode/s of operation. Similarly, the addition of our critical endeavours can only be relatively harmonized and never absolutely with these other two fields of the theoretical and practical, and v.v., etc! (793)

	At this juncture I would like to re-think through some of these various ideas concerning the critical formation of a transcendental-phenomenology of identity (before unleashing them in a theological sphere of discourse). For a start, what is the nature of the boundary between that which is relatively internal to a relationship and that which is, then, by default, relatively external to the same? It could well be the case that this boundary could be defined as the differential change between the internal communication of information within the relationship and the dissemination of information externally from the same. As already noted, it is assumed that this boundary effectively encloses the internality of that relationship under examination (perhaps in a self-organized manner?). This limit being defined by this differential change in the nature of communication flows (because of the dialectical nature of that ‘metaphorical’ membrane). However, in a relationship between say two people, e.g., a marriage, in what ever manner it might or should be defined in this Contemporary era, we must ask what is this boundary or literal/metaphorical ‘membrane’ in this type of relationship? As noted with the implication and invocation of an obligational sphere of interaction certain things are promoted and certain things are proscribed by the nature of that specific marriage and the particular nature of marriage in general. This differential effectively forms one of the dimensions of this differentiation (between the relatively internal and the relatively external). That being the case, then let us now look into the nature of the communication that might possibly defined this polarity of internal versus external. My current thinking in this regard is to perceive those informational flows as being essentially of the nature of a current within the boundaries of that relationship and thence as emissions beyond those boundaries. The relationship can be treated as a system in this regard. Now systems essentially operate in terms of three or more constituents while currents involve the reciprocity of only two parties whilst emissions, realized through the breakdown of a current, operate in a ‘relationship’ of one term (namely as identical to themselves in wider/less wide terms of reference wherein they exist in different terms of reference with respect to some other systematic relationship). What is involved here? For a start, information would then flow within a relationship as a two-way process of reciprocity, but, between relationships, as emissions in those more expansive terms of reference. Essentially, the two parties in a current are entangled. Break that entanglement and you realize a process of emission external to that entangled relationship (i.e., the two parties within its associated system in order for that entanglement to be a proper relationship as it is internally to that relationship in question). The process of emission, therefore, defines the boundaries of that relationship (literally and/or metaphorically) (and to the same extent the process of absorption of an emission from some other system in the form of the creation/re-creation of a current). In a physical context how are we to understand the physical dynamics of entanglement? Say two entangled photons or electrons are speeding away from each other and after four light years apart we would like to know the spin polarity or some other feature of one of those two parties (although currents can be collectively organized in so far as a particular current could involve more than two parties in the same state of entanglement). We interrupt that current and that electron then takes on for us what those features were/are to be discerned. The other party taking on the contrary features as discerned in our disruptive exploration of the first party. How could we envisage this apparent feat that seems to defy certain dictates of Einstein (about the speed of light, etc.)? I believe the way around this is to envisage the fact that the resolutional nature of a relationship is continuously being realized about the psychic center of a relationship. That the essential nature of a relationship, as a system, permeates holistically, by virtue of these resolutional processes at the center of that relationship, the entire internal space of that relationship and therein defines that essentially internal space of that relationship. Moreover, this must imply that the psychic center of a relationship permeates the entire internal space of that relationship equally and, therefore, in any disruption of an entangled current (such entanglement being the definition of a current) we will find that disruption consequently will permeate the entirety of that relationship with exactly the same result wherever and whenever we were to investigate the internality of that current. Thus, the interface between a current and its disruptive emission effectively defines the boundaries of that relationship. But, it should be noted, that although an emission is defined in terms of one term or party there is still a relationship in play by virtue of the fact that an emission is always directed directly into a sphere of operation that is relatively less organized epistemologically. There, that party is in a relation with its emissional space(-time) by virtue of itself, its field of emissional entry and reception, and the party or parties that ensure its interaction in that field of emission. Might emission also be into a field of higher epistemological organizational status? Yes, but then only in the form of currents created/re-created therein (and thereby re-defining the internality of that relationship which permitted that emission)! So, it must be, then, that no emission could ever be completely independent since its emission is into a new field of operation; therein introduced/re-introduced as an emitted current realized through absorption, whereas, in contrast, its apparent emission was the result of a disruption of a current in that prior field, etc. Therefore, descent (of information, etc.) from a higher state of epistemological organization is as an emission, and, its entry into a higher order of epistemological organization is always as a current. That, the interface between these two states differentially defines this boundary between the relative internality and the relative externality of a specific relationship (and the phenomenal particularity of relationships in general). That this transformation of currents, and thereby their associated systems, through processes of emission-absorption is the result of re-organization of those economies overall. Hence the overall relational economy and the particular economy of an identity in its interactions with that which define the same through contrast, etc. Now, what light does this understanding of the transcendental-phenomenological appreciation of identity throw on the nature of the essential (and thereby earmarking it for transcendental-phenomenological research whether it be in philosophical and/or non-philosophical terms of reference)? (794)

As already intimated the nature of the essential is realized through the ongoing resolution nature of the relationship. I.e., ‘fields’ of consonant similarity and points of dissonant difference are interactively engaged in and through this dialectical space wherein the relationship is engendered as a consequence of such ongoing resolution of this relational difference between the parties within that field of operation. Points of identity are perhaps best seen in an ontologically oriented light, whilst, conversely, fields can be seen as epistemologically oriented. Interaction between the same realizes the resolutional/resolved/resolute constitution of that relationship, and, the nature of such a feature is expressed in accordance with the nature of that relationship. How is this process of expression ideally realized? Through the emission of currents within and between systems. The interdependency of all these features mutually defining each other dialectically as previously noted. That granted, we must then ask how are relationships to be envisaged between states of differing epistemological organizational status? E.g., as between a mother and newborn child? This disparity between different levels of epistemological organization might well be broached by a (transcendental-)phenomenological examination of just this type of state between mother and child, e.g., and by these means explore what must be transcendentally entailed in order that a relatively more divine level of epistemological organization could be ensilaged as interacting with a relatively less divine level of epistemological organization, and v.v.? In other words, just how could the theologian envisage this process of interaction in order for theology to enter a practical, experiential sphere of operation and, therein and thereby, perform various programs of theological work, etc. (795)

	A common denominator between mother and child is their respective embodiment in the form of a human body. Furthermore, as just previously discussed, by implication this relationship too is temporally-spatially embodied within certain relational boundaries (although not left entirely to a temporal-spatial frame of reference through the influences of obligations, meta-textual genre conventions, etc., etc.). Next we would investigate what exchange factors signal the evidence of that relationship along with the nature of that relationship, albeit indirectly. So the mother gives the child her own milk to suckle. Food is eventually added to the diet and the child thereby is progressively weaned. Mother looks at the child, the child learns to look at the mother. Mother and child discover the ‘being of the smile’ and the ‘meaning of the frown’, etc. Language is developed and the child eventually becomes another citizen in this world with others. Therein entering other relationships. In this process of maturation the child finds it have various duties to perform in keeping with is current status within that family and beyond. Does such a sketch adequately account for the nature and evolution of such a relationship, and, can we extrapolate from the same in order to understand the general nature of all relationships including the theological should the same be found to exist in some form or other? (796)

	E.g., in the maternal economy a baby is suckled. Using her own milk the mother emits the same for the benefit of the child. That milk in her breasts is as a current in that economy of milk-production. The milk is emitted and immediately becomes part of the child’s economy wherein it circulates as a current within its body. Therein, enzymes, etc., operate upon the same. In this regard let us define operations as relatively internal transformations, and, transformations as those processes of emission between systems. (797)

	Similarly, we might view the emission of language and all forms of intentional deposition, fully intended or not so fully intended (in that sense of the expression intended). E.g., I bump into a friend on the street and say “hello”. This utterance is emitted and circulates in the air as a current… that current being absorbed and comprehended through a re-creation of its intentional sense (in this primary sense of the term of intentional, i.e., as having a certain object/objective, namely, to say “hello”, recognize the other)… (798)

	Obviously, in the light of this discussion to date, for the theologian to formulate a creditable theology they must (transcendentally) establish the terms of reference of a (‘limited’)divine economy, and, how the circulations of the same can be experienced within the limitations of a human economy! But first, first, let us continue to investigate what might be transcendentally implicated in the formation of the economy of identity in general, and, more specifically, the economy of personal identity. In this regard let us ask just what circulates and allows the formation of the same, be it personal or non-personal in orientation? The key being here, I believe, in our understanding of this use of the term of ‘orientation’ since personal identity must involve a contrasting element of the non-personal (and with terminological qualification when investigated in the converse direction). The expression ‘orientation’ also recognizing that there can be no absolute identity in an absolutely independent sense (and hence the relative emptiness of identity to invoke this Buddhist term). (799)

	What, indeed, allows us to nominate a certain identified economy as either a personal economy or as a non-personal economy? Obviously, the degree of implicated epistemological order allows to ascertain the same. But, then, how is this type of ascertainment to be performed? Is this type of nomination merely the acting out of conventional prejudice in this regard – this is a person that is not a person. Should we believe that there is an absolute boundary here? Turing test should have definitively demarcated this type of division but what with the sophistication of computer programs today that distinction must now be considered to be fundamentally arbitrary. Still, under normal circumstances we can usually arbitrate successfully this classificational bifurcation. How is this type of task achieved? (800)

	Obviously, our classification of emissions allows us to perform this task under normal circumstances (i.e., without the intervention of screened sophisticated computer software to simulate human identity and/or realistic robots that could either contain human beings or sophisticated computer software to simulate human identity). Personal identity being found to conform to meta-textual genre conventions that allow us to ascribe human identity or human-like identity. So, e.g., a living conscious human-like body potentially able to interact with us is seen as ‘human’ and the human-like features of a pet animal are seen as personifications, whereas, in complete contrast, a non-human identity, e.g., a dead body (perceived as a mere corpse) or a rock is seen as no longer human or as non-human. Therefore, for the ascription of human identity human-like emissions must be emitted that conform to meta-textual genres that allow us to scribe humanity, etc., to the emitter of those emissions (such as language, looking at us, acting in a human-like fashion, etc., etc.). (801)

	Extended analogically to a divine economy, in its hypothetical understood, transcendentally necessary interaction with a human economy, we can therefore note both the necessary presence of emitted tokens that signify a divine economy and the uptake of the same as imparted from a divine economy whether that uptake is recognized as being from and within a divine economy or not. Now the question must be posed – how do we recognize ‘tokens’ emitted from a relatively divine economy? Of course this is a task for the committed theologian. However, in general, transcendental terms of reference this still remains the task of the theoretical transcendental-phenomenologist. Moreover, in our recognizing a recognition of divine emissions our initial avenue can only be in a utilization of those conventional genres already to hand that might allow us to conduct this type of appreciation (either as those genres stand or through their transformation and/or transformed hybridization, etc.). But if we were to exercise certain conventional expectations and find those expectations met to some degree or other how can we avoid the objection that a vicious circularity does not ensure that our recognition has a truly synthetic and evidential basis. If x type of emission were considered to be indicative of the Divine, and, and the Divine is defined directly and/or indirectly through the presence of x type of type of emission, how, given this apparent circularity, is the theologian to escape the claim that their vision of the divine is only a imagined fabrication or artificial construction or mere definition without any basis in reality (of the existential-and-experiential reality of the Life-World)? How is such an objection to be circumvented? (802)

	Analogously, I expect, in the same manner we discern intentionally deposited artifacts versus non-intentionally formed non-artifacts. I.e., e.g., this is an intentional deposit by virtue of the degree of epistemological organization that was necessary, directly or indirectly, for its formation and emission. E.g., I find a poem. Only a person could write a poem. Indirectly, a compute could do this using some software package designed for the same (but then human agency is indirectly involved in the creation of that software package, the computer or computers used to run it, the printer or screen used to emit the same, etc. Again this is the result of genre expectations and apparent conformations with respect to the same. So, e.g., this is a poem and it seems to be a thoughtfully written poem that implicates human intelligence and human agency. Whereas, e.g., this pebble on the beach was merely formed by the action of waves upon a piece of rock material, etc. (803)

	This division between the humanly intentional and the non-humanly intentional is, of course, complicated by the presence of the intentional-like consciousness of animals. But that accepted, the practicing theologian must now argued for a classification that is not merely divided between designated emissions as divided, more or less, between intentionally formed emissions by humans and non-intentionally formed emissions. In other words, they must clearly articulate a genre or a set of genres that directly or indirectly implicate a Divine order of emission. From a transcendental perspective what must be entailed in this regard hypothetically (for this classification of Divine emissions to succeed)? (804)

	To develop solutions to these types of questions we now need to ask if it is possible for a field, or relative ground, to emit? Without an encapsulated and limited sense of identity, without an ongoing sense of harmonically realized sense of identity is it possible for a field, or relative ground, to emit in its own right in the same fashion as an identity? So far my argumentation has leant in the direction that only a limited, fully encapsulated identity could enter into an economy of the breaking of a current and its discharge as an emission with its uptake as current and, therein, simulating an exchange mechanism, i.e., actually establish a non-virtual economy of interaction. One solution is to propose the possibility that relatively non-encapsulated fields can only emit virtually and then in such a manner that this manner of activity is cancelled, more or less, simultaneously (certainly within the limits set by a Plank moment). Given this differential distinction and ‘definition’ of the virtual we could then propose that the actual processes of interaction can only take place between and/or within encapsulated identities. That granted, it would imply that for the theologian to propose a process of theological exchange they would need to define/re-define their sense of the divine along the lines of a fully encapsulated, non-independent identity, i.e., as limited agent/s, albeit as an agent/s constituted, in magnitude, in such a fashion to be of several orders of complexity greater than that exhibited in the epistemological organization of the relatively non-divine participants in that inter-Divine-non-divine economy. Otherwise, we might appear or not appear to participate only in the fabricated illusion of a process of reciprocity that is ultimately premised on the impossibility of the impossible exchange! In other words, the Divine ground cannot actually and non-virtually enter into an exchange with the relatively non-divine since such an economy can only be based on a process of actualized non-virtual reciprocity. What then is the relationship between the relatively Divine and the Divine ground (as a concept in the form of an infinite Godhead) given that the non-independent dependence of this ‘limited’ sense of Divine agency? Would not the very dependence of some form of divinity upon the same establish a sense of interaction and therefore imply that this Ground too must be structured in a similar fashion to our understanding of Divine agency as currently envisaged? No form of identity can be either independent or self-dependent, therefore, its interaction with ground must too take place in such a manner that this ground is also structured in a similar fashion, albeit in more and more complex terms of reference than the relative epistemological organization of that relatively Divine form of agency under consideration. Hence the exception in this instance must prove the same point! So, in the light of the above we have two issues that need to be examined and definitively addressed, namely, is it possible for a field to enter into a process of non-virtually emission, and, what would be the hypothetical nature of the relationship between the relatively divine and its emplacement in an open-ended field that acts as its relative ground? (805)
	
	Is it possible that a field, e.g., a field of gravitation, to interact with itself in order to propagate its propagation once propagated from its material sources? In other words, the propagation once initiated is re-propagated through this (intentional-like retentional) process of re-iteration on this virtual level of emission? This virtuality immediately being constituted/re-constituted in non-virtual terms of reference when it engages a limited, encapsulated sense of identity. Of course these distinction cannot be absolutely absolute. In other words, virtuality is never just the merely virtual, etc. Transferred to intentional terms of reference we might say, in parallel, that the intentional can never be just the merely intentional (and hence the non-virtual actuality of processes of intentional simulation likewise, i.e., being constituted in such a form that they cannot be merely virtual and hence their actual simulation of the actual to some degree or other as qualified within that dialectical-type of reference frame). (806)
	
	Could we transcendentally envisage an infinitely open-ended universe? Would not such a state of affairs realize an instant blackhole with the collapse of the same within and beyond the confines of an infinitely dense singularity. That because we (think we) can contemplate such a question this must surely imply that this infinitely open state of affairs cannot be the case, therefore, the universe as we have come to know it must be limited (like all other forms of identity) albeit within hyper-universal frames of reference that too, in turn, are limited and circumscribed and fully encapsulated in a similar manner, and so on and so forth, etc. That the continuation of a field must be the result of this process of virtual emission/de-emission (wherein the emission is immediately canceled within the extent of a Planck moment in order to not violate laws of conservation, etc.). This relative infinitely recurrent relative ground-relative identity relationship, wherein no one identity can be absolutely independent/non-dependent/self-dependent, must also imply that the sheer open-ended complexity of the same cannot but ensure a theologicalization of the Life-World although not necessarily in any form that might invoke a necessarily religiously oriented frame of reference(?). Or, could a religious dimension, in a religiously oriented economy, also be transcendentally deduced? That such an economy should occur cannot be circumvented through the sheer non-independence of the same. Hence we must concur that given this transcendentally necessary thelogicalization of the Life-World, and, its necessary interaction it must follow that some form of a religious economy cannot be escaped in some form or other to some degree or other! These last two qualifications (of manner and degree) leaving open, therefore, whether a religious economy is religious enough to satisfy a fully committed traditional and/or contemporaneous theologists (whether as theoretical theologians, practical theologically-oriented congregations and critical theological philosophers)? (806)

Let me now re-articulate the steps in this complex argument that argues for the limited theological identity of the relatively Divine, a relationship with Divine-ground by virtue of its similar hyper-constitution, the necessity for a theologicalization of the Life-World, and, its religious treatment to some extent (as yet undefined and open to whether religiously viable or not?) through the sheer necessity for a divine economy vis-à-vis the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine, and, between the Divine ground and the relatively Divine (instantiation as demarcated and believed to have been discerned in experience in some form or other). (807)

1.	A universe is constituted through an interaction of limited identities (because only limited, fully encapsulated identities can interact [through current-emission-current uptake]).
2.	Thence the epistemological organization of that universe (because that universe must entail a hierarchicalization of structure).
3.	Hence the limitations upon that universe itself (because an infinitely extended universe would create an infinitely dense singularity which is forbidden).
4.	Hence the necessarily theologicalization of the Life-World (because sufficiently advanced degrees of epistemological organization automatically creates the simulation of divinity, Divinity, etc.).
5.	Through limitation relative forms of Divinity can be neither unique nor comparably similar in epistemological status).
6.	Limitation of divine identity in general/specific identities in particular implies the necessity of a relative divine ground.
7.	Interaction with the same by forms of divinity imply that it too is structured in a similar limited manner, albeit in a relatively more epistemologically organized manner, etc.
8.	Necessary interaction (though dependence) between the relatively non-divine and the Divine, and, between the Divine and the Divine ground implies the necessity of a religious economy in some form or other.
9.	However, the religious viability of such a necessary state of affairs would need to be determined through a critical examination of religious-like and non religious-like states of experiential consciousness along with a determination whether such forms of interaction possess the necessary degree of theological encounter in order to ascertain the religious viability of this transcendentally necessary implication of a Divine order upon the world as experienced in and through the transcendental sense of  the Life-World?
10.	That effectively this complex process of argumentation establishes the transcendental necessity for a theologicalization of the Life-World but not its necessary transcendental theological viability (as a religious force in the world) despite the necessary existence of such interaction/s).
11.	Hence the possibility of religious-like experience can be transcendentally deduced (but not its actuality or the manner of its possible actuality, etc.)!
12.	Thence the existence of the Divine regardless of a viability or non-viability of a mutual religious dimension of interaction (between the relatively non-divine and the relatively-Divine, etc.). (808)

	In line with our current research into the possibility and possible configuration/s of a religious(ly viable) dimension (i.e., theological work) and the possible viability of such a dimension (to that extent such work actually works in a theological frame of reference) at this point in time we can only say that such a dimension exists through the necessity of interaction, but, that to what extent this might be operative must be explored. With what additional tools is such a task to be undertaken if it could be undertaken, and, if that were to be the case in what form would such work be found to operate (given the transcendental necessity that interaction in some form or other to some extent or other is necessary, etc.)? (809)

	At this point in time let me summarize my key finding to date on this aspects of our topic. (810)

	Theological identity must be fully encapsulated, albeit non-absolutely, within its field of operation, and, act as an internal field of identity in a dialectical relationship with its field of operation (beyond its own sense of self). The power relations involved ensuring a sense of agency, indeed, a certain degree of hyper-agency. The only viable option being in the form of a process theology would also imply that the relatively non-divine must be subsumed within the fabric of the same albeit in a less complex manner and degree of epistemological organization. This subsuming of relatively non-divine identity must also imply some manner and degree of interaction with the same, hence the possibility for a religious dimension through this form of relatively-Divine/relatively-non-divine interaction. However, as already stressed, this does not imply that this dimension is a viable religious dimension conforming to all or some of the demands of a more traditional theology, etc. Furthermore, such relative complexity of epistemological constitution implies a corresponding sophisticated sense of agency, i.e., Divine agency. (811)

	Theological identity must dialectically also be able to act beyond its encapsulation of identity, and v.v. Hence its interaction within its field of operation as Divine ground (which itself, in turn, must be encapsulated and take on a form of identity that may or may not be of a form recognizable to all or part of the elements subsumed by that hyper-encapsulated sense of identity, etc.). Because it must be able to act beyond its encapsulated terms of reference, ensures that Divine identity can range beyond its own confines, i.e., within the immediate territory of that field of operation. (812)

	Lastly, some form of interaction is mutually demanded between the sense of the Divine and the space created by the same wherein non-divine forms of agency are found to operate. Granted these possibilities and restrictions what might we expect, what could we hope for, and, are we ever in a position to determine the theological viability of the Divine, on and from our own level of being. In attempting to determine the viability of this religious dimension the theologically oriented person, however, should find themselves heartened to the extent that a Divine economy must be present in some form or other. In the light of this transcendental necessity of interaction the theological philosophy would need to ask in what exchange mechanisms might this economy be founded and to what extent they might be open to both interpretative recognition and evidential ascertainment. Essentially, this comes down to an awareness of how trans-intentional states might be formed, experienced in intentional terms of reference and recognized in evidential terms of reference as religious and theological in orientation. Is such a hermeneutic-existential enterprise possible? (813)

	Already a good degree of groundwork has been laid to start to answer this type of question. The analysis of the interaction between a mother and her child is one direction that has been adopted in order to understand the nature of this interaction between different degrees of actualized epistemological complexity. Similarly, an analysis that attempts to determine the difference between intentionally deposited artifacts and non-intentionally formed states of affairs should be of assistance in order to determine this type of difference to the extent that tokens deposited from or within the Divine economy/economies must possess a hyper-intentional-like constitution and disposition (through involving the orderly ordering/re-ordering of intentional/non-intentional states of affairs). Moreover, all appropriate genres of activity have to be, in effect, adequately pre-established in order to search for the same or similar, and, to appropriate the same or similar with the necessary degree of comprehension of their derivation. As already suggested, the theologian fortunately does not have to start from scratch in formulating in what manner the Divine, in some form or other, might, directly and/or indirectly, interact with the relatively non-divine. Religious economies have been formulated and thematized in detail in all manner of hypothetical interactive styles. To pursue this type of task the theologian, etc., would have to ensure the transcendental viability of those tentatively entertained particular options. Next, they would have to ascertain what would evidentially support a determination that this type of economy was, is or will be operating. Penultimately, they would have to ascertain to what degree and in what manner such option are evidentially supported through various forms of testament, etc. Lastly, they will have to determine the consequential ramifications of such options in the light of such evidence, transcendental necessity, accuracy of genre determination, etc., etc. Undoubtedly, a profound degree of transformation of the nature of how we might live in this World-of-Life would arise given the reputed existence of the Divine along with the possibilities for salvation be those insights and methods relevant or not relevant to how we might live in this One-World-of-Life with-others before the possible sense and probable semblance of the Divine. But, then, equally, such a profound transformation of our understanding in this regard will also profoundly transform our vision of the Divine and the associated forms of religious viability that we come to think should or should not be associated with such a vision, and v.v., etc. In continuing this extended essay let me now investigate this topic of the determination of religious viability, i.e., attempting to determine to what extent traditional and/or non-traditional contemporaneous forms of theological-religious genres are found to be religiously viable, etc. In effect, determining what theological work a particular vision of the Divine is capable of doing or not doing in hypothetical and transcendental terms of reference? (814)