7.   The Value of Theological Value

	What is theological value, and, what is the value of theological value? In this segment of this extended essay let us look at this overall topic of theological value, i.e., the merit or worth of the work being done in a general, particular or specific theological setting. Again a hypothetical perspective will be maintained (by means of the adequate application of an overall transcendental suspension). (1008)

	We could argue that value is released in the relevant hermeneutic circle wherein the topic in question is simulated and/or re-simulated and through some form of adequate deconstruction an existential difference is experienced and/or re-experienced. In effect, the synthesis (of the relevant topic) minus its analysis produces and/or re-produces an existential difference equivalent to our experience and/or re-experience of that associated value therein expressed and/or re-expressed. Let me analogically represent this process. Imagine, if you would, a golden beach stretching for miles along a tropical sun-burnt coast, or, if you would rather imagine a particular beach you are familiar with that would do just as well. Now, pick up some sand and find a grain of sand to look closely at through the lens of a powerful magnifying glass. Do you see the beach there? Obviously not! So where is it? Through the coming together of millions of grains of sand a beach emerges. The ‘beach-ness’ of that ‘beach’, more or less, is that phenomenon phenomenologically experienced above and beyond the mere summation of its constituent sand grains. On one hand we have millions of sand grains and on the other a beach. Both are phenomena-constituted-by-us. Indeed, this existential difference is none other than those modalities that emerge for-us in our constitution of that phenomenon. So, from an accumulation of sand grains we have a place to walk, sunbathe, swim, meditate on the nature of the interaction between the world of the sea and the world of the land. In this constituted light a  beach can never be a mere beach nor a mere accumulation of sand grains! Rather, it is a place that has its own complex mode-of-life as expressed in our-going-to-the-beach and our-being-at-the-seaside, etc. Similarly, a theological mode-of-life is that existential space wherein a theologist perceives their existence to inhabit, namely, with some sense or senses of the Divine, a congregation of believers versus a multitude of non-believers within a world that, too, must bear some form of a relationship with this semblance/s of divinity. Rightly or wrongly, the value of that project would then be that existential difference between the emergent totality of these elements minus their mere enumeration. In theory, let us now ask could such a difference be experienced (in intentional consciousness)? Could this difference be experienced even if there were no trans-mundane component in this vision of a theological complexion? Or, can this dimension not be escaped by the believer by virtue of its projection and its implication and imputation in this world as constituted by the theologist and by their congregation of fellow theologists? To what extent, then, should we ask is the actuality or non-actuality of a phenomenal component manifest in our projected interactive simulation with the same? Would it be more correct to say that in all possible worlds our vision of the world-as-constituted has an existential role to play even if a key component of that interaction were to be absent in a more thorough existentially appreciated and assessed inventory of that world-as-lived? Even if a personified form of the Divine did not exist, in the vision of the world through the eyes of a theologist they would still see a world in which such a component is assumed to exist and, thereby, act accordingly, to some degree or other, as a consequence of such a committed belief. What are the consequences of such a projected vision of the world that is not based in reality, or, of a set of logical subjects formulated in a modality that is not self-consistently constituted by-us and/or projected into a modality that we, as human beings, cannot directly or indirectly engage with and therein experience? How might we ‘experience’, for whatever reasons, this phenomenon of Divine-absence should the logical subjectivity of the Divine be no more than our projections of our faith and induced needs simulated and re-simulated in that associated religious economy? Indeed, could this absence, for whatever reason, be experienced authentically and/or inauthentically? And if some degree of inauthenticity were to be present how might this element be discerned and differentiated from those elements that remain and preserve some degree of authenticity? (1009)

	In a classical deism the very contradictory impossibility of their concept of deity implies that a phenomenon of absence is already operating even though that whole process of inconsistent supposition could still ‘name’ or logically refer to a Divine subject or set of Divine subjects in some form or other. Again, a sense of the Divine set up as absolutely and wholly other (rather than as a holy other) would also invoke another sense of absence. In both instances through a mismatch of identity and function, etc., some element of experiential inauthenticity should be assumed. Equally, to invoke a logical subject as existent that is completely absent would also presuppose an element of experiential inauthenticity. If a psychotic person were to imagine that they had a wife when they didn’t or were to believe their wife was still alive when she was dead then the neutral observer may well believe they were indeed psychotic for whatever reason. For that person to act ‘as if they had a wife’ when they did not have a current wife we could rightly say they were not acting in conformity with reality and, therefore, must be apparently psychotic. Now, let us suppose another man who had married were to say “goodbye” to his wife one morning as she left their home to travel overseas. She takes a bus to the airport but, unfortunately, is involved in a fatal accident before getting to the airport. The bus is hit by a run-away petrol tanker and all are consumed in a fireball of intense heat. The victims are all completely incinerated along with all traces of their identity. Later that morning the husband is filling out some forms and identifies himself as ‘married’ even though now, unbeknownst to himself, he, correctly, is single again. This person is not acting inauthentically. He is certainly not psychotic even though he is acting in a manner that is not in conformity with reality. He has good reasons to believe he is still a married man. Might the theologist fall into the latter camp if their vision of the Divine, for whatever reason, did not exist? Or, should the theologist fall into that camp by virtue of the fact that they were in possession of no good reasons in the first place for truly believing in the existence of the Divine. So, how might the Divine be known (as present or absent)? Directly and/or indirectly! Directly through the direct entertainment of evidence that accurately supports that supposition. Or, indirectly through indirect evidence for that supposition, or, indirectly through testament in some form or other by some other person or persons that directly and/or indirectly attest that supposition. Now, theological traditions imbue theological modes-of-life with ‘reasons’ why their congregations should support that style of theological supposition. Whether those ‘reasons’ are individually and/or collectively sound or not is neither here nor there in the overall life of the theologist. The world is seen through a theological lens and, thereby, seen to possess a theological complexion. In doing so, for a non-theologist to call such a person “psychotic” is to misuse that expression’s normal range of denotation. So, the question remains, if a person were to emphatically assert the existence of a certain logical subject or set of logical subjects that were not to exist could they be said to be guilty of advertently or inadvertently committing an inauthentic act in part or in whole or at least to some recognizable extent? A religious person might doubt the existence of the Divine, but, still, commit themselves to such a belief without being manifestly inauthentic. Or, should we have reason to believe that assertions without adequate forms of direct and/or indirect evidence are maintained with some degree of inauthenticity? Just as, in contrast, assertions maintained in an over-committed fashion, rightly or wrongly, are done so in an ontological and/or epistemological psychosis by virtue of the psychotic or psychotic-like consequences of such degrees of over-commitment even though the reality of their intentional objective/s in this instance may well be confirmed. In which case a psychosis or psychotic-like state is in evidence even though there is a conformity with reality. Hence for a non-psychosis to be present we might suppose that there is a general conformity with reality and we act as if we are in conformity with that perception of reality. Whereas, for a psychosis to be present, in some form or other, there would need to be a general non-conformity with reality and/or the not acting in conformity with that general vision of reality. To this I would add ‘a general lack of overtly expressed insight into this conformity between ‘our vision of reality’ and ‘the reality of that vision’ along with a consistency of behaviour in the light of our apparent understanding’. So in the light of this provisional, more complex definition “a psychosis or psychotic-like state is present when there is a non-conformity with reality and/or our behaviour is not in conformity with those expressions of reality, and, our expressions of insight into the same are at variance with the former.” In this light a belief or non-belief in the Divine, regardless of whether they were actually right or wrong, cannot be sufficient grounds for stating such beliefs were psychotic or psychotic-like in nature. On the other hand, the same beliefs expressed in an over-committed manner and/or non-insightfully expressed could be evidence for a psychotic or psychotic-like state of affairs. Still, it is my intuition, that expressions of the asserted existence of a certain state of affairs that does not exist, or, the non-assertions of a certain, overlooked, relevant state of affairs that does exist must, one would believe, introduce a certain element of discontinuity and/or anxiety in some form or other? (1010)

	An example of an economy constructed ‘around’ a non-existent intentional object-state is seen in our belief or non-belief in Father Xmas. Now, a child could be said to genuinely and authentically believe in the existence of this said character. However, could they genuinely and authentically be said to believe in this said character if they were to be told that this overweight figure could come done narrow chimneys or visit homes without chimneys and whose doors were adequately locked? Should such contradictions introduce a degree of unease in the holding of such beliefs or is it the nature of belief that the strength of a mind-set is often such so as to force and reinforce such convictions despite anomalies being also present? All our convictions can be tinged by doubt but does this possibility alone introduce an inauthenticity in any act of belief? Would a belief be a belief if it could not be disbelieved? Does this example have any relevancy in our understanding the nature of theological belief in the life of the committed theologist? (1011)

	Despite the absolute non-existence of a ‘real’, non-virtual, non-mythological Father Xmas there is still an economy thriving around this state of absence. In a cultural, mythological setting we might say that this figure is ‘flush with existence’ but only in those defective terms of reference. Defective by their limitation of reality in all its possible plurality of modalities. Father Xmas ‘exists’ but only in a mythological setting (i.e., not in a non-mythological context of the world-as-lived in its complete entirety). Given this understanding, we could conclude that it is possible to conceive of a logical subject or set of logical subjects in an authentic manner despite their absolute non-existence in the Life-World as experienced in its full openness to all possible modalities of experience in conformity and conformation with all normally conceived expectations. So, a young child could authentically believe in Father Xmas, and, an informed adult could conceive Father Xmas to be only a cultural-mythological artifact or construct. (1012)

	In the light of these observations just made we might be able to transfer them to a theological setting in the following manner: yes, it is possible for a theologist to authentically entertain by some means or other a belief in the Divine, and, for a theologian or some other person to also entertain authentically a doubt in the existence of that type of logical subject. Obviously, given such a possible range of options between these possibilities, a theological economy could also thrive within those parameters despite the non-existence or in spite of the existence of this type of logical subjectivity. Now, can such observations be posted in a process theology if the latter is adequately constructed? (1013)

	Here, an interesting situation arises. Because we are part of the process in the very derivation of the Divine, in accordance with the construction of an open process theology, as the Divine emerges in and through our emergence, etc., it should follow, in these terms of reference, in at least mundane terms of reference, that we must also participate directly and/or indirectly in this sense of a mundane theological complexion! Given these analytical-like terms of reference it follows that we cannot inauthentically entertain such a concept of Divinity (if it were to be properly constructed, etc.). Of course no act can be absolutely inauthentic (or absolutely authentic), but, in the light of the above, a greater degree of authenticity could well be assumed! That, upon this augmentation of authenticity, a relatively more authentic attitude towards the world could be supported and realized in those theological terms of reference. Indeed, given our experience of this integrity of the world we could be forgiven in not not thinking otherwise! This apparent semblance of a ‘unity’ in all our experiences of the world transferring itself to a mundane theological appreciation of the same (sense of) world. (1014)

	Given such thinking we can now argue for the observation already held that theological formulations, reasonably presented, can be entertained authentically by the committed theologist. Of course, if a trans-mundane theological difference could be shown is another matter, and, correctly, that would be the domain of a theologian (in the first instance). On the other hand, as a qualification of this observation, all forms of over-commitment could equally be judged as inauthentically entertained despite the veracity or non-veracity of their intentional objective/s. Therefore, as you might have inferred, there is always the need, on all levels of judgment, for an adequately exercised overall transcendental suspension! Indeed, the latter then guaranteeing this presence of an overall authenticity despite the existence or non-existence in the conformity and confirmation of a (trans-mundane form of) theological subjectivity in some form or other. (1015)

	Still, would not the absence of a trans-mundane form of theological subjectivity/objectivity be entertained in a trans-mundane vision and version of a theology without some degree of inauthenticity? To what extent should such an absence disturb the Divine economy if the absence of a trans-mundane sense of the Divine were truly absent? How, if present, would or should such anomalous tremors be discerned? Or, are such economies often so powerful so as to not need the presence of this key ingredient, indeed, function well, if not better, by virtue of such an absence? As all economies are motivated and propelled by some sense of a deficit might it not be the case that it is this very perceived sense of a deficit that is essentially driving the same?! Therefore, how might one address these issues in an adequate manner? (1016)

	Or, put another way: in general and/or particular and/or specific terms of reference, what is the value of a Divine economy regardless of the presence or absence of the Divine itself (given its treatment through such continual deferment)? (1017)

	Given that certain anxieties create and are created in the formation of the Divine economy as in any form of religious economy, to what extent does the deferred absence of a sense or senses of the Divine add to the same? Indeed, driving a greater circulation of that economy despite the actual absence of a key ingredient pre-assumed to be driving the same. To what extent are initial anxieties merely preserved and preserve that same economy that fosters the same? Thus, given this kind of problematic, it would appear to be obvious that the value of a particular Divine economy and the validity of the same are two different and seemingly quite separate issues. So, without validating or invalidating a particular theological system in general, how are we to assess the value of that religious economy, and, in the process determine the apparent authenticity of the same (without attending to a thorough evidential assessment of the same if that were ever possible given this continual deferral and re-translated processes of anxiety, etc.)?  In order to ascertain this difference in value, attached to and generated by a particular theological system, it would appear that an experiential theological difference in some form or other needs to find itself being appreciated in the context of that system as enacted in daily life. Perhaps the following type of procedure might be found applicable in this regard. Imagine if you would what degree of value might be absent if the same person were to lead their life minus this imputation and implication of a theological dimension. To what extent, then, might one say that such a system positively augments the existence of that person if they were a believer? Are they a better person by entertaining that type of belief? Or are they worse people for entertaining such beliefs? Overall, what is the value of this hypothetical differential? Such an assessment also needing to suppress economic elements like over-commitment in order to ascertain to what degree this theological vision of reality positively and/or negatively adds/subtract from this hypothetical form of appreciation. Again the only path to such an assessment must be in and through the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! (1018)

	By what other means might we conduct this type of theoretical assessment? Through an assessment of the textual depositions deposited by such a tradition. In effect, assessing the value of the value apparently imbued by such artifacts. Thus taking into account the beauty, ethicality, pragmatics, etc., of the forms of value apparently realized from within such a system (for that particular believer in general). How should such an intuitive assessment into this overall intensity of feeling, should it be present, be conducted? By noting to what degree these different transcendental fields (of the beautiful, ethical, etc.) actually cohere and do not deconstruct each other! Such commensurability being argued for on deeper levels of epistemological judgment. E.g., Aztec-like sacrifices of living victims, however beautifully enacted ritually, would have, or should have, ethical re-considerations seriously deconstructing whatever aesthetic considerations and properties such rituals might appear to possess in that transcendental field of the aesthetic. On the other hand, noble sacrifices of one’s person, in a mythological-like setting, might be seen in the opposite light (and thereafter, as something that might need to be emulated should the occasion have to call for such behaviour?). Thence, through an overall coherence of transcendental value entertained from deeper levels of consideration/re-consideration we might find ourselves able to form a general consensus as to the religious value of that type of theologically inspired enterprise. The invocation of an adequate overall transcendental suspension allowing us to obviate any preferentialistic advantages/disadvantages of being an insider/outsider in regards to our standing in that particular type or specific instance of a religious situation subjected to such transcendental discernment. No doubt our appreciation of the quantity and quality of religious artifacts also associated with that particular type of religious tradition and/or specific instance of the same under normal circumstances augmenting this pattern of appreciation. The apparent integrity or lack of integrity stamped upon them reinforcing our appreciations in this regard? (1019)
	
	Obviously, the theological mode-of-life has its own sense of an economy; an economy that traditionally has demonstrated a considerable existential excess of value (despite an ongoing, continual deferral of evidential considerations concerning the imputed actuality of Divine subjectivity). (1020)

	Now, the perennial question could be raised: how objective can we be in the assessment of aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical considerations, etc? Are we ever in a position to judge the value of a system of values apparently held by another? For a start, I have expressed the point of view that an excess of ontological commitments results in a correspondingly ingrained ontological (or epistemological) psychosis. Then, on the opposite side of the fence, we could argue successfully, I believe, that a person who possessed no form of ethical integrity to that same extent is equally defective in that regard (and perhaps might be perceived as suffering from an apathetic condition or apathetic psychosis). By dis-valuing these two extremes of over-commitment and under-commitment might there be a neutral ground in between, in the very center, wherein some form of provisional objectivity is to be realized; the sort of ground that allows for degrees of consensus within a culture and between cultures and offering in the process a reasonably productive basis, e.g., for establishing the formulations of international law, or, the formulations of an international constitution or bill of rights, or similar, etc?)?  Obviously, in the light of what I have continually re-iterated, it is my belief that a certain degree of objectivity can be realized in and through the utilization of an adequately informed and adequately exercised overall transcendental suspension! As long as we are not too psychotic (in any or all senses of that complex concept) we should be able to reach some form of an objective-like consensus in regards to the individual types of value and overall value ‘intrinsically’ resident in certain distinctive types of traditionally recognized value-resident situations. That, an assessment can be neutrally intuited by reference to an adequately imposed overall transcendental suspension. How can we not be correct in our basis understanding of this phenomenal-phenomenological understanding of the average human condition as expressed through language, and translation, in and between all instances of a fully functioning culture? Surely, without this phenomenological basis there could be no formulation of religious law, no legal formulations in the light of the same or secular formulations outside the same, and, we would not be able to formulate trans-cultural rulings in the formation of an international rule of law as seems to be currently in an embryonic state of ongoing thematization, if not already adequately sketched out in essence!? That, in effect, a body of relatively ‘normal’ representative individuals chosen at random from specific cultures should be able to form a degree of consensus in addressing certain particular problems in general and the problematic features of specific issues; i.e., they should be able to apprehend the problematic nature of certain types of issues in an open fashion and formulate sets of principles along with their particular contexts of applications (as outlined through contextual illustrations and/or based on lists of precedents judged acceptable, etc.). The thematization of this general ground of consensus being evidence of this ability to concur with others in this regard (and without our having to [psychotically] claim any form of an absolute style in the derivation of a form of objectivity completely itemized and set in ‘literal’ concrete so to speak?)? Such formulations, in their finer points of detail and application, not necessarily being absolutely cast in the form of definitive rules, but, rather, through general guide-lines? However, such a process could be seen as thematizing certain objective-like centers in this regard through finding an alignment, more often than not, with traditional formulations of ethical principles. The only points of contention and controversy arising in how these principles are to be individually scoped with respect to each other, i.e., promoted and/or discounted in their intersections in particular types of ethical situations and specific instances of the same. A more dialectical, open, existential approach seeking those patterns of behaviour that promote the greatest degree of existential value within a specific ethical situation in conjunction with the least disruption in the formation of value in its intersection with other proximate relationships (in the light of interventions that might be expected both in economic terms of their quantity and quality). In other words, in this a maximization of harmony is sought both within that relationship and its immediate interfacing with other relationships! This harmony being treated as that excess in existential value realized when (overall) output is subtracted from (the sum of) input(s); such an evaluation taking a comparative and intuitive form of evaluation although, retrospectively, that general determination can be re-evaluated on consequential grounds through an inspection of emitted texts in the light of a subjective and/or inter-subjective consensus should the latter be formed in that regard. (1021)

	I would contend that in the same type of manner we might intuitively or non-intuitively evaluate the existential merit of a certain set of actions (in our simulations and/or retrospective re-simulations) that in the same type of manner we can evaluate the overall existential merit of any economy be that non-theological in circulation or theological in circulation. Now, as all forms of assessment are forms of appreciation it implies that contexts of assessment also have to be nominated and defined. Appreciation involves the meta-textual interpretation of textual material hence the need for its necessary contextualization (and this is both meta-textual and contextual). That, essentially, the appreciation of a theological system must involve the same type of dynamic. Meta-textually we appreciate this genre of activity (of the theological system as a mode-of-life) from that meta-textual perspective, and, textually demarcate its contextual situatedness from that inter-textual environment we find that text being co-situated within; the scope of our appreciation always being either relatively broad-spectrum or narrow in focus. Can we illustrate the general patterns of intentional behaviour that might entertain this type of evaluation? E.g., how might one evaluate the theological merit of a particular Buddhist tradition that utilizes devotional practices, or, the apparent theological economy attached to the worship of a particular tree as sacred by a certain society of individuals within a distinctive cultural setting, etc? Again, it should be noted that the invocation of an adequate degree of transcendental distance allows us to overcome the distinctive privilege between observing such a tradition or practice from within that social setting versus from without. Moreover, through re-simulation the overall existential merit of certain simulations can be appreciated and assessed as well as being critically re-assessed through re-simulations of its former processes of assessment. Putting some flesh upon these principles we might like to say in order to arrive at an existentially accurate approximation through simulation and/or re-simulation that all relevant aspects need to be taken into account. Then, all transcendental fields of value-determination, both individually and collectively, need to be adequately simulated and/or re-simulated and, therein, assessed. E.g., the overall Hindu religious tradition does seem to put a considerable store on the upholding of natural ethical values, so, how, we must ask, is it possible for prominent segments of that tradition to insist upon the death of the widow by immolation upon the funeral pyre of her husband so that her soul might accompany the soul of her recently deceased husband? Could he not wait until his wife died naturally? Surely the few years we have in this limited lifetime are only a minute fraction of the eons of time allotted to us in this vision of the hereafter? Or, is there a concern, held by society, that a widow might want to later re-marry or make herself available, or, worse, even prostitute herself in order to make ends meet so to speak? Obviously, the mechanics of this process have been positively re-evaluated through various writings, customs and sanctions, etc. ‘Assisting’ the widow to immolate herself is then not to be regarded as ‘suicide’ or ‘murder’. Still, underneath this socially expected pattern of behaviour there may have been the occasional wife who so loved her husband that she might have felt that she would have been better off sharing the same pyre. But should this metaphorical aspiration be allowed to be treated literally, and, thence, sanctioned and instituted as the norm in that culture? I don’t believe so! Remove those sanctions, etc., and would this practice continue? For a short time afterwards, perhaps, through the persisting power of tradition, but, I would suspect, not in the long term? Judged as non-existential, perhaps even as contra-existential, how should we critically judge, through the adequate exercise of an overall transcendental suspension, the relative lack of, or detraction from, an existential merit in such patterns of behaviour as situated in a particular type of situation or in a specific instance of the same? By evaluating whether a particular transcendental field of value determination appears to undermine some other field, or, appears to undermine the overall sense of a collective field of transcendental value determinations. Overall religious value being experienced in and through a collective sense of transcendental determination. A sense of collective value that is not nor can necessarily be absolutely centered in the psyche of an individual, society or culture. Hence this observation of a relative partial deconstruction of the totality, a process that would then need to be re-evaluated in relatively non-existential terms of reference, even if sanctioned and instituted as ‘religious’, in order to be taken up within that culture and preserved in cultural terms of reference. Then, through a process of relative non-partial deconstruction in our simulation of the relevant characteristics of those patterns of intentional behaviour we would then need to be able to assess to what extent an existential complexion is present in our current intentional processes (as representative of traditions, customs, cultural practices, etc.). That, for an overall sense of perspective, we would let the entire simulation as a re-simulation deconstruct itself so to speak through examining the presence of this existential excess realized through experiencing the degree an existential excess is comparatively able to manifest itself above and beyond the mere summation of its inputs. A pattern of intentional determination that occurs quite naturally in the formation of all forms of intentional integrity (be that in terms of relatively intact images, thematization of an intentional determination, consistency of action, in the resolution of anomalies, in and through our rapport with others, etc., etc.). Let me examine this process of a relative, non-partial deconstruction in closer detail. (1022)

By ‘relative’ is meant aspectival and non-absolute in orientation. By ‘non-partial’ is meant collectively and non-individually. By ‘deconstruction’ here is meant the intentional dissolution of that phenomenon to hand through the paralleled elements of the overall transcendental suspension being allowed to deconstruct each other but with the observance of the formation of an existential residue as an existential excess being allowed to speak for itself through the inability of deconstruction to deconstruct itself in such a manner as to leave no residue by virtue of the fact that in the formation of that intentional objective there cannot be a symmetry in the assembly of those paralleled factors. Just as thematization is usually productive in time so too does the ongoing integration of that objective increase in its modal quantity and modal quality in and through the augmentation of that existential richness realized through time in the very formation of that objective. Thus overall output minus the mere summation of its inputs, e.g., would always present an asymmetry in this regard, and, naturally, being in the favour of the former (i.e., later stages in the temporal sequencing of that objective, etc.). Furthermore, comparative existential merit could be ascertained through running in ‘parallel’ various version of that type of behavioural process wherein individual features, sets of individual features are run as present, absent or contrary to that overall process. The simulations/re-simulations of greater degrees of existential merit comparatively determining comparative authenticity in the light of the expenditure of similar degrees of economic energy and resources to achieve those mutations in intentional behaviour (when also judged to be in identical or closely similar contextual situations). (1023)

	Is it possible to demonstrate this deconstructive asymmetry and realization of a deconstructive residue (symptomatic of an ever-present existential excess?)? Let me invoke the following metaphor or analogy. When we bake a cake we start with various ingredients, e.g., flour, icing sugar, sugar, perhaps various fruits, yeast or baking powder, etc. They are mixed together in various sequences; the cake batter being poured into a mould or tin, the icing being applied after the cake is baked, the finished cake being exhibited on a platter or in an appropriate container, etc. The emergence of a cake minus its ingredients gives us the essential phenomenology of a cake. Most likely demonstrating a greater bulk than those mere ingredients, taking the form of a relatively solid object, namely, the cake, with an expectation of certain properties (i.e., e.g., that in this expanded form once baked the cake is chewable, can be tasted, is edible, etc.), etc. On the other hand, naturally, the cake cannot be divorced from the matrix of its origination, etc. However, obviously, this process has a certain asymmetry built into it that in a process of a suspension wherein these element were allowed to cancel each other out, despite this attempt to create a balance, will merely highlight that imbalance and therein invite an appreciation of its distinctive phenomenology, in this instance as the (trans)formation of a cake. Can we apply this example to an examination of, say, the sacrifice of victims in a ritual Aztec religious observance on the top of or before their pyramidal temples, or, the sacrifice of animals in Roman ritual (in the light of a later Pagan abhorrence of animal sacrifice and a promotion of vegetarianism)? In the former, for whatever reasons, sacrifice was seen as necessary. Perhaps the sun in the winter solstice needed urging to return; perhaps the sacrifice of enemies reinforced your power, etc., etc. Those victims might even have been told, or thought, that they were to go to a better plane of existence in the process, or, maybe, they thought they were now doomed to wander the underworld because they would not be intact through the lose various bodily organs, etc? Who, today, knows exactly the full reasoning behind this type of macabre ritual? Would those same Aztec ritualists also have fully comprehended their sacrificial logic too? No form of intentional behaviour is perfectly transparent to either that subject themselves or to other subjects. Still, in moments of non-detachment, would they not have felt a certain degree of sympathetic horror in what was being done in the name of religion? Surely, they would have entertained some doubts about the reasoning behind such practices, perhaps, even a certain anxiety that what was being committed might have been wrong? A certain anxiety in times of national stress that might have called for a veritable orgy of killing if the sacrifices to date were not coincident with a change in national fortune? Could that ‘need’ for more victims have extended to members of their own culture and as a consequence initiated a wave of revulsion against the priestly elites and their excessively re-iterated and grossly inhuman rituals? Now, in a partial contrast, in the example of Roman ritual, certain economic factors have been noted. Prestige was gained through the size of a sacrifice paid for by members of the upper classes. The sacrificial meat, although offered to the god or gods, would have been eaten afterwards by those privy to participating in such expected anticipations? Then, might not this ethos have extended to the games wherein even humans were made objects of sacrifice (thorough gladiatorial combat, execution of criminals and religious deviationalists?)? Still, over time, certain schools of thought did develop that would dis-value the literal nature of such a sacrifice, namely, the killing of life and all that that entailed in the name of religion. Since a trend for seeing ‘life as sacred’ developed, it was consistent within those developing trends to automatically dis-value such a process. However, economic interests and customs were so well entrenched that even Christian criticism of the games barely impeded their execution until very near the end of the Roman Empire. Often, it would seem that ritual processes that get dis-valued become symbolically represented as a resolution of this later anomaly paralleling such a re-direction and ideological overlay of public attitudes. E.g., the Christian Eucharist is a good example of this trend for symbolic substitution (perhaps one that could again be dropped or re-re-overlaid and re-valued in the light of an equal abhorrence of the very ‘idea, itself, of eating a fellow human being and drinking their blood’?). Similarly, the symbolic burial of people, animals, and grave goods in effigy, and no longer in fact, has occurred in many cultures, e.g., the Chinese (from the Chou onwards). Through the passage of time religious practices in society become transformed through processes of ongoing re-evaluation, sometimes indicative of profound shifts in religious motivation and aspiration. Similarly, cultural shifts can occur because of changes in attitude wherein previous practices are either abandoned or re-interpreted through forms of overlaid symbolic substitution, etc. (1024)

	Now, how do theologians, in general, deal with this phenomenon of the non-apparent presence of presentable evidence to support their thesis of Divine existence? No doubt by the adoption of a variety of strategies a number of which, in all likelihood, will be simultaneously chosen by the theologist. In essence, what may appear to be conducted in bad faith or in the relative absence of good faith, either to a fellow co-religionist (including themselves) or a non-religionist, is trans-valued in a positive light; a primary instance being, e.g., the re-iterated ‘demand’ for ‘faith’ (and other similar virtues). Let me examine this experience of this perception of an apparent anomaly in the light of this process of trans-valuation, etc. (1025)
		
	Now, for the committed theologist this apparent ‘lack of evidence’ for the existence Divine may be present or may be absent, such attitudes being held for a variety of reasons (be they intentionally appreciated or not). However, in their communications with others about their religious beliefs their concept of the Divine most likely will not be so (self-)evidentially demonstrable to others (be they co-religionists, religionists or non-religionists). Our concern here, primarily, is in examining this apparent absence of evidence as examined-by-others. (1026)

	I am arguing that this possibly defective component in the formation of a Divine economy, namely, the absence of a demonstrable sense of the Divine, can be trans-valued through the formation of either a positively regarded replacement factor or a positive transformation of this very sense of an absence itself. Accepting a pattern of continual referral (‘until such a time the Divine should wish to reveal itself to-us and/or have itself reveal by-us’) this experience of a gap or defect can either be filled in by some positive factor or be itself regarded in a positive light. E.g., faith could be seen to fall into either category. It could be said “we must have faith until the Divine is fully revealed,” or, our experience of a sense of absence in being experienced as an absence must, in truth, also be in some sense a sense of loss for how else would we recognize or experience this sense of an absence as an absence qua absence if were not already experienced as a ‘loss’ or ‘absence’? Needless to say, in a deeper analysis of the ‘Divine economy’ from the hypothetical perspective of a theological religionist, such an absence or apparent loss need be no more than projections induced in the very running of that economy since all economic motivation, whether religious or non-religious in orientation, proceeds through the experience/s of such virtual or non-virtual deficits in a perceived climate of need that can always be expressed in and through various forms involved in the adoption and adaptation of the practical realization of ideal manoeuvres as ideologically expressed in that associated system’s cognitive understanding of its own apparent economy. Either way there is a positive trans-valuation of this factor in the Divine economy as experienced from the perspective of human subjectivity. No doubt a number of other strategies might be adopted to overcome this sense of an apparent absence of a direct, demonstrable existence of Divine participation such as, e.g., processes of continual deferral, testimony from intermediating proxies, the promotion of processes of translation/re-translation indicating the active reality of this partnership, etc. However, let me examine this trans-valued factor given its prominence in theological practice. (1027)

	In effect, faith could be regarded as economically paralleled by belief. Where one finishes the other starts. To believe in the Divine, you must have faith (and you must have faith first before your belief in the Divine is realized, etc.) is one such formula. At the same time they might also be regarded as not in parallel, i.e., faith and belief are like chalk and cheese, i.e., that the phenomenon of faith is an entirely different phenomenon from acts of belief, etc. Or, a middle path might be adopted to the effect that faith must be faith in some belief just as belief is faith in something (namely that a certain a is b and that this state of affairs was, is or will be regarded as an integrated sixth order fact). In this regard both faith and belief can be regarded as intentionally structured, i.e., belief as belief in something, faith as faith in something. That ‘something’ acting as an intentional object-state or objective. In such a light a validity of belief or an appropriateness of faith might be considered as our being able, in theory, to find a full modal satisfaction in this intentional objective (as an object-state). E.g, a true belief would then be, in the light of our ordered analysis, our ability (if only hypothetically) of being able to go from a fifth order of possibility to a sixth order of simulation and/or re-simulation in a demonstration of a direct and/or indirect actualization/re-actualization of the same. E.g., yesterday I tasted a very delicious green apple. Today, from my current powers of memory (in and through my ability to cogently re-simulate for my own benefit a memory of this green apple) I am allowed to accept as fact that, “yes, yesterday I did indeed eat a delicious green apple.” Here we have, from my perspective a full satisfaction of all modalities necessary for this phenomenological type of act to be considered as valid (in those remembered terms of reference); i.e., all modalities of eating apples, memories of the same, confirmation of the same from recollection, (and other forms of testimony, inference, etc.) etc. (1028)

	Now, are we allowed to assume that the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of acts of faith, faithful dispositions, etc., to operate in a similar manner? To the extent that they can be validated, but, not to the extent where we must absolutely differentiate an act of faith from an act of belief, and, from acts of confirmation/dis-confirmation of the same, etc? That granted then let us accept this provisional attitude of a qualified accommodation towards and between these two types of intentional disposition and practice. Moreover, let us seek an acceptance of this fact, at least to the extent that they seem to intersect or must be regarded as having to intersect (by virtue of their common intentional constitution). In the light of this intersection what can we infer in regards to the simulation of a Divine economy in this regard? Surely, for a start, that there can be no act of faith without a belief component of ‘a certain faith in something or other’! Similarly, there can be no (properly simulated) act of belief without there being an element of faith in the propriety, appropriateness and validity of the same, i.e., the overall existential rectitude of this (hermeneutically interpreted) simulation/re-simulation (of phenomenal-phenomenological reality). That, effectively, this economic simulation, in this regard, is accepted as finding a full degree of modal satisfaction in its economic projection, imputation, confirmation, re-confirmation, etc! Thus, it behooves the theologist to duly recognize that there can be no pure act of faith without belief in some form or other, and, that there can be no pure act of belief without some form of faith (associated with this projection, imputation of Divine reality, etc.)! (1029)

	Let me now ask the question “how is it possible for there to be a Divine economy without the imputation of the Divine and without that imputation being valid (and sixth order in value)?” In other words – “how could there be a Divine economy without the participation in part or in full of the Divine itself?” I use this word ‘economy’ to indicate an appropriate hermeneutic circle dealing with the same. I certainly do not mean it in any Marxist sense or as a form of reductive materialism or, indeed, in any classical sense of a financial or monetary system concerned with the circulation of goods, services, capital and labour, etc. However, this association with a ‘circulation’ of value is a key point of comparison. Because the hermeneutic circle is divided between three moments it would be apposite to ask which moment might represent this ‘participation’ of the Divine? Focusing on an intentional object-state is a reductive- analytic type of process. However, since this economy is either simulated and/or re-simulated more correctly it is a place-marker that acts in that role. Moreover, in a hypothetical Divine economy implicating the valid imputation of the Divine that place-marker would be in a direct relationship with the same. Furthermore, from the perspective of the place-markers present (assuming a world of the Divine, non-Divine subjectivity, etc.) there would be the perspective of the Divine from the point of view of the Divine, the perspective of the non-Divine from the point of view of the Divine, the perspective of the non-Divine from the point of view of the non-Divine, and the perspective of the Divine from the perspective of the non-Divine. Then given an orientation that is either absolute transcendental or relative non-transcendental, i.e., absolute and trans-mundane versus the relative and mundane. We must also note that the co-concurrence of the same orientation has been previous forbidden. So there can be neither an absolute transcendental perspective of the Divine from an absolute transcendental Divine point of view nor a relative non-transcendental perspective of the non-Divine from a relative non-transcendental non-Divine point of view, etc. So, again, we must ask how can this economy circulate if the element of the Divine were truly absent. By virtue of its place-marker acting as a proxy for the same. Of course, the adequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension effectively cuts through this distinction between the representation and that ‘actually’ being represented. Indeed, in our acceptance of the economic as being simulated and/or re-simulated we do not need this distinction in any absolute sense. In its place we operate in the manner of degrees of modal satisfaction rather than a meta-economy improperly built upon the impossible metaphor of correspondence (where we have no way of  trans-empirically ‘seeing’ this correspondence). Thus, the element of the Divine need not meet a full participation in this economy of the ‘Divine’ by virtue of this place-marker acting as a proxy for the same. Hence the unproblematic acceptance of the possibility that the absence of the Divine as a valid imputation need not effect the circulation of a Divine economy from the point of view of the non-Divine (since the ‘Divine’ place-marker is able to do this to a certain extent through the exercise of its simulated proxy). Of course this is not without certain difficulties, indeed, the same difficulties more or less already incumbent upon a theological system from an ‘evidential point of view’ in so far as a theological system its seems must first manufacture, pre-interpret, re-interpret, defer, such modified information, etc., that the same might act as ‘evidence’ for the same. Although it is also possible for a place-marker simulating the Divine in a process of continual deferral to simulate a perfectly workable ‘Divine’ economy albeit without the actual direct imputation of the Divine as a participant in the same. Let me explore this possibility since in ascertaining the value of a theological system we need not deal with actual imputations of the Divine (contrary the intentions of the committed theologist in this regard). (1030)

	The Divine economy has three hypothetical perspectives, namely, this economy from the perspective of the Divine should that element exist beyond its existence as a mere place-marker, the Divine economy from the point of view of human subjectivity (be it from the perspectives of a co-religionist, a religionist and/or a non-religionist), and the nature of this relationship from the perspective of the relationship itself (regardless of whether Divine participation is actual or virtual [through some form of a place-marker in the latter instance]). The theologian would be interested in all three perspectives and their accompanying senses of a Divine-non-divine relationship. On the other hand, as stated, the primary interest of the religious philosopher (as a religious ‘economist’) would be the latter; i.e., the perspective of human subjectivity. In other words, what value could be ascertained and should be placed upon the religious economy in question (from either an insiders point of view and/or the point of view of an outsider, neutral or otherwise) (from general, particular and specific points of view)? (1031)

	From the perspective of human subjectivity (and inter-subjectivity) does a religious economy, on balance, possess an existential excess of value? By necessity, from the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of the definition of any system, as a system in circulation, it must automatically possess a surplus of existential value (from the fact that a whole psychically presents us in its intentional constitution/re-constitution with a greater degree of value than the mere sum of its constituent parts). So, the question to be more properly asked is does the Divine economy proffer a considerable degree of value in excess of its mere existential excess derived merely through the systematic nature of its mere presentation/representation? The historical persistence of this meme of the Divine, perhaps, more correctly, to be better treated as a super-meme given its trans-cultural distribution and historical persistence, must alert us to the fact that this must be case (without immediately examining the apparent authenticity, or otherwise, of this type of value). Therefore, the question would be better re-formulated, I believe, in the following format: to what extent and in what manner is the theological-religious type of economy productive of an excess authentic existential excess of value or not? Thus, let me now address this question by asking what is the value of such value (derived in and through a Divine economy whether treated in general, in particular or specifically)? Our emphasis being more upon a general hypothetical, philosophical appreciation of the same. (1032)

	Does this perspective-attitude of being an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ make a difference in our general examination of this question? No! Not if our investigations are conducted under the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension as argued previously! However, would it be correct to assume, though, that there is difference in how that relative excess of an excess in existential value is perceived and experienced by the insider versus the outsider? Indeed, that would be expected. But, as all texts (and textual reports of experiences, etc.) are mediated through human intentionality it follows that our examination of them can be mediated through the application of the overall transcendental suspension as must already be taking place through the mere machinery of intentional judgment (through the processes of judgmental intentionality)! Thus, as a critical philosopher it merely behooves us to existentially conduct that process from towards the psychic center of that relationship as already occurs in examinations of a relatively greater degree of authenticity (regardless of the fact as to whether that material was authentically or inauthentically realized in the first instance). How, then, are such investigation to be initially approached? Through the mediation of texts and the immediacy of their judgmental re-enactment when re-simulated in and through an adequately pre-informed and adequately conducted overall transcendental suspension! So, given a re-simulation of relevant texts in the framework of systematic presentation under examination how might a critical apparatus be realized that would allow us to better approach the same. By whatever means necessary for such a task. It being my suggestion, however, that an ordered appreciation of value be better avenues for such an endeavour. Let me demonstrate this application of an ordered philosophy. (1033)

	An ordered philosophy sees all forms of judgment as occurring between the three moments of the hermeneutic circle of synthesis, analysis and suspension (of the former) and that these moments are mirrored by our three archetypal moments of World, Object and Ego respectively. Moreover, through a relative promotion and/or suppression of these three dialectical poles we arrive at a distinctive set of six types of ordered value. From the perspective of a relative promotion of the Object-analytical pole we arrive at pre-essentially, non-integrated essential value such as, e.g., lexical entries, mathematical formulae, phenomenologically distinctive types of judgment, etc. Then, from the relative promotion of both the Object-analytical pole and the Ego-suspensional pole we arrive at essentially integrated aesthetical forms of value such as, e.g., judgments of aesthetic harmony, etc. From the relative promotion of the Ego-suspensional pole forms of deontological value are realized, such as, e.g., a sense of duty, etc., in contrast to the relative promotion of the Ego-suspensional pole and the World-synthetical pole in which pragmatical, utilitarian-like judgments are calculated. From the relative promotion of the World-synthetical  pole environmental, hermeneutical-like judgments are possibility made (of a meta-textually oriented nature). Lastly, from the relative promotion of both the World-synthetical pole and the Object-analytical pole fifth states of possibility are re-assessed as potentially actual-factual states of affairs. This linear-like process being treated as circular and realized between the moments of the hermeneutic circle (through the supposition of a relatively distinctive background connecting one order with the next and v.v.). The details may sound technical and complicated but the basic principles underlying the dynamics of this process of ordered judgment are very simple! (1034)

	Let me now quickly apply these insights to our critical treatment of a theological system (treated as a phenomenon to that extent it is able to be treated as a distinctive ‘entity’ in its own right). Theological concepts have the same gestation as any other, namely, in and through an appropriate hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension). So, theological identity, i.e., how the Divine is to be identified in that system is essentially a first order affair. Hence its preoccupation with definitions (such as, e.g., that the relatively Divine is several magnitudes of epistemological organization in advance of human subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, etc.). A system should possess a certain degree of aesthetic beauty, a theological system being no different in this regard. Indeed, the reverse, being relatively greater in its degree of epistemological organization it should follow that its aestheticality should be found to be commensurate with the same. Then, from an ethical point of view, Divine subjectivity should be treated as possessing a much greater degree of deontological discernment and practice; at least to that extent such an attribute is ideally determined as actually configuring that corresponding theological frame of reference. Pragmatical considerations treating concepts of providence and divine intervention, etc., as within that type of review. Hermeneutical considerations treating forms of possibility and meaning in that theological system. Lastly, sixth ordered considerations treating the role of factual, evidentially based process of discernment in its corresponding theological system under hypothetical and/or non-hypothetical considerations. However, despite the phenomenologically distinctive nature of our orders the thorough application of an overall transcendental suspension should deliver a form of value that overarches and encapsulates all of the above. Let me now re-examine this crucial point of my analysis in this regard and investigate, what is in effect, the value of value, and, in this type of situation, more exactly, the theological value of (that) theological value! (1035)

	Although ordered value is relatively distinctive phenomenologically it cannot be absolutely distinctive by virtue of that fact that all forms of value are intentionally constituted in and through the dialectical-like operations of the hermeneutic circle. That being granted then it is natural to ask would it not be the case that all forms of value, in their deep structures, should be actually identical, i.e., as a value synthesized within the boundaries of the hermeneutic circle, the same hermeneutic circle in which all forms of ordered value are realized and in which all forms of judgment are made? That being the case, how is this deeper level of value to be recognized and appreciated? Through the more thorough application of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! That, in effect, the value of theological value in its corresponding system would be determined on this level, at this depth of immanence, from this peak of transcendence in the constitution of value-formation. Recognizing that in the perfection of the overall transcendental suspension the same is realized through a dynamical balance also between these modes of transcendence and immanence (and thence a removal of the relatively superficial divisions of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ without nullifiying the original perspectives of input between different subjects, object-states, etc.). That an overall transcendental suspension could not be put into effect with out this degree of coordination and balance! How is such an integration in value formation instigated, exercised and appreciated? Through the imposition of an adequately informed overall transcendental suspension of the relevant complex theological-like materials to-be-investigated in this relative situation expressed through the harmonic resolution of those tensions discovered in that frame of reference. Primarily, our trained intuition in that regard assisting us in this process of instigation, etc. (1036)

	Now, I believe that this level of ascertainment being described (and prescribed) is neither mystical nor problematic in its exercise. It is an everyday occurrence, indeed, an occurrence that happens every moment of our waking, intentionally directed existences. All intentional processes are constituted between the three ideal poles of the hermeneutic circle and as a consequence are always realized to some extent in and through an overall suspension as a result. However, to shift from a natural practice to a critical, transcendentally oriented practice we need to re-center ourselves (within the coursing of our relationships) and in the process re-align ourselves within the relevant hermeneutic circle/s under simulation/re-simulation. Within. As long as we exercise an adequate, albeit thorough, overall transcendental suspension! Thereafter, a state of alignment is realized between the ‘nature of reality’ and the ‘reality of nature’ by virtue of this intentional link between the same. So, again, we must ask how such an all encompassing suspension and intentional re-alignment is put into effect, realized and allowed to produce consequences of an insightful and critical nature? Or is such a prospect not much more than a mere illusion, a mere dream or mere wish with no demonstrable value? (1037)

	When we are awake and alert we experience the world with the full directness of being brought to bear upon it by-us and it-upon-us. Furthermore, this sense of ‘us’ is a fact since an inter-subjective sense of subjectivity is there-for-us by virtue of the fact that the meta-textual aspect of the hermeneutic circle is forever with us! Now. I would like to add, conceivably, that if the theologist is correct in their belief that the Life-World has a theological complexion then the same should also be inescapably present in their intentional course of their lives as lived within the embrace of this World-of-Life. All that granted, if only hypothetically, so, if this question were to be asked,  again hypothetically, how might that ‘aspect of reality’ be recognized and be adequately addressed? Would it help if we were to re-construct the coursing of our intentional existences, or, to deconstruct the intentional fabric of our lives, or, indeed, set out to destroy the same by turning it inside out so to speak? In essence, by what measures could this imputed aspect be revealed without falling into a reductive pool of meaningless sludge and eternal darkness, or, constructing systematically a fabulist world of blinding light equally out of touch both with the world of lived experience and any semblance of a theological complexion postulated as possibly resident within the same? Then, if a middle path be thought applicable, could the invocation an overall transcendental suspension be productive of this sense of an ongoing balance? Would I be correct to believe that this so-called ‘adequate overall transcendental suspension’ both exists and is capable of realizing this semblance of a re-alignment, indeed, might be capable of taking us in that productive and critical direction sought in this regard? Furthermore, in this process of critical re-alignment, is able to exhibit those features hypothetically attendant upon any semblance of a theological complexion (be it merely mundane, if not trans-mundane in orientation and complexity)? But how could this act of theological recognition occur? Should we not ask in what sense the theological could be visited and/or re-visited if we had no notion of the same in the first place, and, thus, in what sense such a visit has to be pre-constructed before it could be recognized? The question then being asked – in what sense is the theological even able to be arrived at in an authenticity of manner (given this a priori-like pre-construction of this very concept itself)? (1038)

	Personally, in a non-hypothetical moment, it seems to me that the unity of the world along with the psycho-physical unity of subjects along with the teleologically driven-ness of process over processed content all seem to conspire to generally validate, in essence, a mundane theological-like reading of the Life-World. However, a non-theologist could merely reply to such an interpretation and rhetorically ask “so what?!” Indeed, just what difference (of a theological nature) could a mundane theology make in the life of an individual be they a non-theologist or a theologist? Or, do we have grounds here for building on a sense of theological difference that does, indeed, already make a difference in the life of the committed theologist. In this instance, e.g., perhaps more along the lines of a committed environmentalist et al, etc. This sort of argument being run here: that the world is a world of harmony, the world is a better place in which to live if it were to be lived in a greater state of harmony with this world since it is our ‘home’ (or our metaphorical ‘mother’, etc., etc.). That being the case then we should respect and identify with this sense of world-integration since its integrity is reflected in our integrity, and v.v. It thus following, that any augmentation of such an integrity automatically benefits those that attempt to live under such an umbrella of integrity/integration. Thence the ‘religious-like’ nature of environmentalism; or living with our neighbours in a spirit of cooperative harmony; or a seeking of the spiritual how ever that might be defined; etc., etc. Let me examine this type of argument, and, also see if a transition and transformation to a trans-mundane type of theology is both conceivable and able to be realized in practice (if only hypothetically)? (1039)

	Is this equation of the need for a re-alignment with the rectification of the overall transcendental suspension applicable and fruitful? When dealing with the artificial constraint of just one relationship, considered in isolation from all other relationships, we might be able to claim that a process of re-alignment is possible, if only metaphorically? But in the real world we are immersed in a flood of relationships, so, that being the case, how could we realize a state of alignment when our lives are intersected by this dis-conjunctive plethora of commitments. Yet, is it not also the case that we seem to be able to navigate, without too much difficulty, on the whole, an ethical path through this maze? A feat that often seems to defy all forms of computational logic and calculation? Truly, could well be considered to be an impossible task conducted even before we get up in the mornings and partake our breakfast. So, thus, if this semblance of integrity can be arrived at what then would be stopping us from re-perceiving this nexus of interaction as Divine in orientation? Indeed, why should the theologist, or any one else, re-consider its mundane dimensions as also possessing a theological-like aspect and/or imprint? (1040)

	The question to be posed is this: if our lives are lived in a veritable sea of relationships how then could a process of re-alignment and centering operate within each and between all of the same? Would we still have a process of re-alignment? However, if that were to be the case could we merely invoke a poly-dimensional sense of alignment? Just as our own epistemological organization is the hierarchical treatment of one level after another and is still accompanied by a sense of gestalt integration reflecting the resultant level of integration and integrity currently in play then surely we could re-adapt this same concept to understand how we might be able to better able to align ourselves within a number of disparate relationships simultaneously. Such a process also suggesting degrees of authenticity (without the need to invoke or disavow improper concepts of an absolute authenticity along with concepts of the complete absence of authenticity). If we were, then, to provisionally accept this model of a multi-modal, multi-dimensional sense of an overall interaction of ourselves-with-others in a poly-dimensional sense of a lived-space how might we better connect this concept of alignment-re-alignment with this sense of a poly-textual vision of reality, and, extend the same to indicate how an overall transcendental suspension is also implicated at the same time, in the light of this complex model. And, if that were not enough, also extract that residue or difference seemingly indicative of a theological imprint or dimension? (1041)

	Re-alignment, essentially, is our being able to understand the constitution of the phenomena-that-are-constituted-by-us for-us and recognizing and realixing this same alignment (with the additional existential transformations necessary in order to more fully meet our expectations in regard to the phenomenal-phenomenological natures of those states-of-affairs in question, etc.). To this end lets us look at this phenomenal-phenomenological content in order to better understand it is with-what that an adequate overall transcendental suspensions are conducted (in this desire to test and hopefully meet with our full phenomenal-phenomenological expectations). (1042)

	To this end let me look at three interconnected issues. First, let state and examine the phenomenal-phenomenological fact that all economic activity is a process of continual economic deferment. Second,. That there can be no absolute economic processes of appropriation. Third, that all forms of relative appropriation, as phenomenal-phenomenological content, are simulated. That authenticity in the light of the above is comparatively realized through the observation of a greater existential richness, a richness that engages more modalities in the light of expectations and those modalities are comparatively engaged in a richer and more productive manner. In effect, in the light of our hypothetical theological investigations, we can now resolve a series of problematic questions for all parties, namely, that the Divine cannot be conceived of as being able to be absolutely appropriated nor could it absolutely appropriate (the devotee, the world of the creation, the world, etc.), and, in the event that the Divine did not exist (like Father Xmas or Mickey Mouse) as a place-marker could still generate economic activity and ensure that economic activity concerning the same could still be treated as having a form of existence (that, ultimately, as a place-marker can be place-making, as a place-maker, in both virtual and non-virtual and formats). Let me exam these interrelated issues central to this complex problem effectively dealing with the authenticity of the so-call Divine economy. (1043)

	That all economic activity is a process of continual economic deferment! Should I find a meal waiting for me on a plate and be told that that food is for me I can do two things, quite simply eat it or defer my eating of the same either for the moment or absolutely, by refusing to partake. In the latter type of decision I defer my eating of the same. Should, then, I change my mind, I defer my deferment. However, should I desire to eat, I have essentially deferred by previous non-eating. In my opinion all of these processes of deferment, all these different types of deferment, are not a semantic quibble but a more accurate understanding of what is actually taking place phenomenally and phenomenologically, i.e., that economy is essentially driven by acts of deferment. Why? Because there can be no absolute processes of appropriation, i.e., no processes of absolute appropriation! Should the latter be remotely conceived of as possible then that particular economy, and its particular form of economic value, would immediately cease, and, as a result, there would be no sense, no meaning, no meaningfulness, nor, we must add, any form of an absolute act of appropriation (since appropriation must be exercised as an act or process within the appropriately associated economy). Furthermore, the absolute cessation of all forms of economic activity would be the absolute death of that individual as an economic participant in the economy of the Life-World. Economic activity can be subject to transformation, thereby migrating to some other form of economic activity. E.g., I see this plate of food and in an act of deferring from a state of non-eating, eat the same. The food has been relatively appropriated but not absolutely since that same food is now to be subjected to a digestive economy rather than a gustative economy. Equally, that food cannot be absolutely digested since to be completely digested it would then be part of an excretive economy and, now, something-no-longer-to-be-digested. Each economy transitioning into the next without any being absolutely realized since the absolute realization of the same realizes the end of that economic activity in that form, and, we cannot escape all forms of economic activity (except through death should death and death alone be absolute[ly non-virtual]). (1044)

	What are the (economic) consequences of this position that recognizes only processes of continual economic deferment (as non-absolute forms of appropriation)? That value is realized (in and through an appropriate hermeneutic circle) in such a manner that it can only be realized through ongoing engagement without impossible forms of absolute appropriation. A friendship, e.g., is only realized through processes of ongoing engagement. The value of that relationship can only be realized through acts of friendship. Such activity is then transmuted into the creation and preservation of a mutual attitude of friendship by those parties towards the other. In other word, when we are not actively being friends, the consequences of being a friend, when we were able to interact as friends, directly and/or indirectly, non-virtually and/or virtually, creates a disposition of friendship that is activated when we re-engage as friends. Such a disposition effectively carves out the requisite hermeneutic territory for our corresponding disposition/s towards that objective and/or subjective phenomenon or phenomena implicated in that disposition. Since the phenomenon or phenomena to-hand can only be regarded in the phenomenological light of their hermeneutic construction. So, e.g., that person-is-my-friend, that person-is-just-a-passer-by, that person-is-someone-I-know-by-sight-only, etc., etc. Never, merely the mere person x or person y or person z. (as if they could be known in some absolutistic intrinsic, self-existent sense of absolute appropriation). (1045)

	The second proposition to be examined was: that there can be no absolute economic processes of appropriation! As initially argued, such a process was inconceivable, i.e., impossible to conceive. Why? Because all value, in accordance with my understanding of the hermeneutic circle, is realized between three ideal dialectical points or moments, and, that to grasp or appropriate any one or more of them can only invite a collapse of that same value, making it impossible to realize this act of pure appropriation (since those moments or points are ideals that can never be absolutely grasped in their isolated containment). Or, put another way, as all meaning is realized in and through relationships it follows that to deconstruct that relational background is to equally collapse the value of our objective in that regard whatever its hermeneutic construction. Of course, it could be argued that in everyday life we can appropriate what ever we find to-hand. However, don’t let language mesmerize you to the fact that although relative appropriation is acceptable absolute appropriation is just impossible to realize (for the above reasons)! I.e., that value is realized in and through the requisite process for the realization of the same and never outside such a process or through its collapse! What then is the nature of that process that delivers this semblance of value? A process of deferment! Be that in ontologically oriented terms of reference or epistemologically oriented terms of reference or in a product of both (as best fits our understanding of the intentional nature of consciousness; as befits the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of our constitution of experience). (1046)

	In intentional terms of reference what does a process of ongoing deferment mean, and, what are the implications of this concept in regards to the simulation of the intentional object-state and its semblance of value attached to the same (by virtue of those processes of valuation, re-valuation, evaluation, re-evaluation, etc.)? (1047)

	The ongoing nature of deferment might be best demonstrated by the nature of dictionaries (to continually defer to other lexical entries in the mutual formation of their definitions). Let us enquire of the definition of an apple; let me propose the following definition: ‘a common, round edible fruit [of the genus malus] that might be red, green and/or yellow in colour, with pips in its core.’ If any of those words were unfamiliar to us we could further consult our dictionary hoping that they too would find a definition therein (or, for that matter, in some other English dictionary). Let us say we do not know what is meant by the word ‘pips’. Say we find the following: ‘pips’ ‘are the seeds of apples.’ Again, not being too sure of the word ‘seeds’ we consult our dictionary one more time. We find this definition: ‘seeds’ ‘like the pips of an apple.’ Each definition defers to some other, each circulating within the economy of that dictionary. If we had no direct knowledge of the world, the world of the dictionary would be not much more than a set of interlinked equations. Sense (of psychic location in our mapping of the Life-World), meaning, meaningfulness, i.e., all forms of value, are produced and reproduced in an economy of value corresponding to the phenomenal-phenomenological nature productive of that type of value. All economies being exercised in overlapping spheres of influence just as, e.g., edible fruits as agricultural items are also seen to inhabit the world of food, which, in turn, inhabits a physical world on par with our own physical sense of embodiment, which, in turn, inhabits the planetary world of Earth, etc., etc. Exhaust, diminish, deconstruct, destroy one frame of reference and you will expose another, thus, again, the impossibility of realizing an absolute act of appropriation since a relative act of appropriation is merely the absence or absenting of the sphere of influence that was in question and the realization of another now in keeping with the transformation in our intentional interest (just as food is eaten, then digested, then excreted, etc.). To think that appropriation is absolutely realized is to overlook the fact that absolute appropriation would demand the complete removal of all frames of reference involved in the current formation of that instance of value, with, as a result, the complete evacuation of value itself and thence the complete absence of all sense, meaning and meaningfulness. Surely, though, it might be argued, to achieve our intentional objectives it is to absolutely realize our intentional goals? Yes, but not through processes of absolute appropriation wherein all frames of reference are absolutely evacuated, deconstructed, etc. In this semantic point a critical observation is being made, namely, that, as value is still being presented it follows that a successful act of relative appropriation must be continuing and that this process of valuation, etc., cannot be realized in an absolute manner! (1048)

	Our third statement to explore was: that all forms of relative appropriation, as phenomenal-phenomenological content, are simulated! What exactly is meant by this statement? The word ‘simulation’ must be understood as being used in this definition here in a special sense, namely, as a ‘simulation of a simulation’ and never as a ‘simulation of that which is pre-simulated before that act of simulation or as something that exists beyond that act of simulation or beyond all acts of simulation, etc.’ Again, I must make a distinction between a relative simulation (of value in some form or other) and an impossible absolute simulation. But, surely, in a genuine economy for the collector a non-faked item is just that, an original, and not a fake, so, how then can we treat these genuine items as simulations, as being simulated? Quite simply by recognizing the possibility that they could have been faked and substituted – that, as a mere possibility, if it were to be the case that a fake could be presented in the place of an original, and that possibility is present with the presentation of all human artifacts then it follows that that presentation could be read as a ‘simulation’ even if the genuine original had not been substituted. Furthermore, our entertainment of an adequate overall transcendental suspension implies that all intentional items of any economy must be ‘simulations’ by virtue of their treatment in that transcendental light as mere simulations-in-their-associated-economies-of-presentation (but never as absolute simulations, as mere simulations of non-simulated states of affairs). Consequently, our intentional objectives cannot be treated as mere entities in their own right by virtue of their associated economies that cannot be isolated, etc! Moreover, we should also recognize the phenomenological fact that all intentional objectives (i.e., intentional object-states) can be viewed through an assembly of economies that are or could be directly co-associated or indirectly co-associated. Just as a farmer can talk to a soil geologist about the same landscape, and, that that same landscape can be seen through an infinitude of other frames of reference (with varying degrees of a possible, profitable commensurability, etc.). In other words, all phenomena for-us cannot be ‘mere phenomena’ but the presentation/re-presentation of simulations subjectively and inter-subjectively simulated in their co-associated frames of reference as ‘phenomena-for-us.’ All simulations, therefore, being co-constructed by-us in their associated, co-constructed phenomenal frames of reference, and, thence the simulated nature of their overall presentation/re-presentation as phenomena-for-us, i.e., as phenomenal simulations constructed/re-constructed in those fields of co-presentation. Of course, in the exercise of an adequate overall transcendental suspension these ‘phenomena-for-us’ would then be treated as ‘mere phenomena-for-us,’ and, never merely as ‘mere phenomena’ as argued above. Furthermore, our entertainment of an adequate overall transcendental suspension implies that all intentional items of any economy must be simulations by virtue of their treatment in that transcendental light as mere simulations-in-its-associated-economy-of-presentation (but never as absolute simulations, as mere simulation of simulated states of affairs). Consequently, our intentional objectives cannot be treated as mere entities in their own right by virtue of this associated economy, etc! Furthermore, as all (intersecting) referents (and no-intersecting economies) can be both viewed through an infinity of reference frames and the open general commensurability of all economic discourses, whether it be worth our while or not to enter into such processes of accommodation, it follows, as all phenomenological place-markers cannot be absolutely viewed as definitive place-markers, that all phenomena as interpretatively constructed by us can only be critically treated as simulated possibilities. Thus, all forms of phenomenological presentation, non-theological or theological in orientation, should be treated in this democratic spirit of non-exclusivity. Thus it follows, ipso facto, that all theological phenomena, in their associated theological economies, should also be viewed through the same open lens. In this democratic spirit, therefore, we should remain open to a variety of relatively intersecting and non-intersecting points of view be they religious or non-religious, be the former theological in orientation or non-theological in orientation. Thence, in an acceptance of these transcendental conditions on the nature of all forms of discourse it follows that all forms of discourses should be democratically treated as open and non-exclusive in regards to each other be they religious or non-religious in orientation, be they theological or non-theological in orientation! (1049)

	What are the ramifications of this concept of simulation (in this theoretical context of ongoing deferment, non-absolute appropriation, etc.)? Profound! For a start we must re-view the human subject, in their subjectivity and in their inter-subjectivity, as dialectical aspects of the overall hermeneutic circle that cannot be absolutely appropriated. In this light the subject is nominally treated as a place-marker, a place-marker or logical subject that cannot be treated in absolute isolation. Furthermore, the recognition of an inseparable sense of context implies that the phenomenon of self or any other intentional objective is always a phenomenon-treated-in-(a)-certain-frame/s-of-reference. Consequently, all transcendental phenomenological treatment (via transcendental reduction, synthesis, suspension) can never realize the ‘mere phenomenon’ or ‘mere set of phenomena’ in themself/themselves (in an apparent contradiction to the strict accordance with notable phenomenological formulae such as, e.g., “back to the things themselves,” etc.), but, that granted, however, transcendentally oriented forms of treatment are still possible to the extent that the associated frames of reference are also co-treated, etc. Hence this associated concept of a transcendental democracy (and its refined equivalent of a theological democracy) to the extent that phenomena are no longer ‘mere phenomena’ but ‘mere phenomena-in-their-associated-frame/s-of-reference’ within the transcendental ambit of one-Life-World! As a result all phenomena are place-markers that must remain open to the multi-dimensional intersection of other frames of reference when and where relevant to that simulation-to-hand in question. That, in our passages through this World-of-Life we can mediate or arbitrate modes of negotiated navigation without necessarily having to cancel any one frame of reference should other frames of reference be preferred, etc! So, e.g., when we look at ‘Father Xmas’ in a department store we can review that individual as both a substitute proxy for the place-marker ‘Father Xmas’ and as an ‘employee of that department store’, etc., without feeling any form of a contradiction between the two hats this person could be regarded as metaphorically wearing. Needless to say, this individual could be regarded as also wearing a number of other ‘hats’ should we attempt an existential description of this individual, yet, recognize, at the same time, that all these miscellaneous descriptions are shared, in this instance, by the same existential descriptor or place-marker (exercised in the denomination of the sense of that subjective identity, etc.). (1050)

	Now, I would like to investigate the possibility of a certain phenomenon wherein through the deployment of an economic surplus a place-marker effectively becomes an apparent place-maker in those same imputed economic terms of reference. To what extent, e.g., is Father Xmas instantiated in this non-mythological semblance of a world, or, e.g., to what extent is the sense of the Divine established with an apparent identity in this world of flesh and blood despite the possible non-instantiation of their putative being, etc., etc? In other words, to what extent is a simulation able to take on an apparent life of its own within those economic terms of reference? (1051)

	To begin I will need to draw a distinction between an absolute place-maker and a relative place-maker, perceiving the former as impossible to have realized or find recognized. As previously argued, because there can be no absolute act of appropriation it follows, therefore, that there can be no absolute appropriator! There just can be no absolute act of appropriation! Thence the non-existence of an absolute appropriator! In what sense, then, is a relative place-maker to be seen in distinction to a relative place-marker (since it also follows that an inability to absolutely appropriate rules out also an absolute place-maker [in either role of that absolutely appropriated or that absolutely appropriating])? If all phenomena are ‘real’ in what manner then is the ‘phenomenon of reality’ to be experienced? Through a meeting in such a manner that all or most of our expectations are generally met. A virtual, dream apple has a certain set of phenomenal-phenomenological modalities whilst a non-virtual, non-dream apple also has a certain set of  phenomenal-phenomenological modalities of which a certain number intersect with the former. In our normal, everyday expectations associated with our interaction with a non-virtual, non-dream apple we would find that those expectations associated with a non-virtual, non-dream apple on the whole as usually met. The experience of a dream apple involves an engagement with certain phenomenal-phenomenological modalities, but, if we should mistake it for a non-virtual, non-dream apple we will eventually find ourselves being disappointed (as this type of apple will not reduce our physiological sensations of hunger, e.g., etc.). In the light of this non-representationist explanation ‘reality’ is determined when there is a coincidence of our expectations with the phenomenal reality of that to-hand, i.e., a general meeting and matching of expected modalities with those modalities found to-hand and expected to be engaged in our engagement with that type of phenomenon. There can be no correspondence between an object-in-itself that could not be experienced and the nature of that being experienced. However, there can be a correspondence between ‘expectations-to-be-expected in a certain type of phenomenal engagement’ and ‘the actual discovery, overall, of those modalities generally associated with that type of phenomenon’ expected to be encountered in our engagement with that type of phenomenal presentation/re-presentation. Just as argued by certain philosophers, a dream apple, etc., could have no ideal representation in order to allow us to determine that the dream apple was a dream apple, etc. On the other hand, if an apple as a thing-in-itself could not be experienced then, equally, we have no ability to determine that such a correspondence could take place between our ‘representations’ and that of which our ‘representations are a so-called simulation of’. On the other hand, a correspondence between a set of modalities expected to occur with a certain type of phenomenon and the discovery of such a coincidental occurrence allows us to phenomenally determine the nature of our phenomenal representations, or, rather, presentations (and as re-presentations when re-iterated in consciousness after the event of such a presentation; the event, simulated or re-simulated, itself re-iterated through retention during that presentational event and hence ensuing the preservation of continuity and integrity of phenomenal presentations, etc.). Now, we can define to what extent a place-marker acts like a relative place-maker, albeit in keeping with the nature of that phenomenal presentational-type to that extent it can be nominalized and treated as a logical subject, etc. Furthermore, an adequate assessment of phenomenal type allows us to pre-determine to what extent we would expect a place-marker to act like a place-maker and in what general manner within a certain range of possibilities that presentation might be reviewed. E.g., a dream apple, despite its apparent perfection or otherwise, must eventually be found to disappoint us in comparison to the type of meeting we might have with a true exemplar of that type. In a dream we might find an apple growing on a tree and we may well endeavour to pluck this apple from that dream-tree and attempt to eat the same. We may well enjoy this experience but our enjoyment must be tempered by the eventual discovery that this simulation of an apple was merely the simulation of a dream apple and not the simulation associated with a non-virtual apple. At some stage we must discover that this simulation was less than adequate in comparison to that which would be associated with a non-virtual apple. The formation of non-virtual apple experiences acting as a phenomenal-phenomenological template for that type of determination. (1052)

	However, to what extent does our experience of a dream apple as a real apple falsely persuade us that it might be real, indeed, was nothing other than real? How could it be the case that a presentation could represent itself as other than what it was? Indeed, bringing us to ask ourselves how it might take on a life of its own and be falsely apprehended as true to type? To this end, in effect, we must ask ourselves how a presentation could take on a life of its own not properly in keeping with the manner in which that presentation is represented as? In other words, if I am not mistaken, where does a presentation get its energy of apparent continuity and integrity and set itself up to be misrepresented and, at the same time, we allow this process of misinterpretation to occur and continue until such a time it finds itself being exposed or, rather, perhaps, self-exposed? To that extent that a presentation finds itself integrated in intentional consciousness then to that same extent it can appear as possessing integrity, continuity and an active semblance of self-identity (through the collective retentional re-iteration of that associated set of modalities as engaged). So, if we misinterpret that process to ourselves and allow our mis-identification to pre-determine the nature of this sense of an overflow of identity then to that same extent that identity must present itself, and, hopefully, find an eventual exposure as to the more exact nature of its true constitution. And where does it get this ‘psychic energy’ that allows it to possess this semblance of a life of its own? From the overall generation and overflow of an existential excess in keeping with the nature of that type of presentation and the integrity of its presentation and/or re-presentation. A loosening of our critical acumen, associated with a relative loss of an overall gestalt integrity, however, unleashing a superficially vivid presentation that can only be deconstructed, so to speak, with a greater sense of phenomenological depth (i.e., through an increased sense of gestalt integrity). Thus the two primary psychic ingredients for this falsely read presentation would be an existential excess associated with the integrity of the presentation (and which directly reflects the degree of gestalt integrity currently present) and the extent that a proper sense of an existential perspective is currently absent (by degree). Decrease that degree of gestalt integrity and the integrity of its associated identity formation would also be lost. Or, by increasing the degree of perspective-depth necessary, as a direct reflection of the degree of gestalt integrity necessary to achieve this degree of determination, would then allow us to make that same type of determination in a more satisfactory, critical manner. Still, occupying this difference between the semblance of non-virtual integrity and its full determination as virtual should still present us with a presentation that on closer inspection should reveal the inadequacies of its intentional formation, i.e., it deviation, and degree of deviation, from trueness-to-type. However, such a model might explain how we can be both fooled and not fooled by dream imagery, does it explain simple cases of misidentification, or more complex instances of misinterpretation associated with false beliefs or even interpretations of a deluded form and format? I believe that such simplicity or complexity to be no barrier to using this general model albeit, when and where necessary, being supplied with a few additional refinements in order to successfully argue and demonstrate transcendental insights into that currently under review. E.g., simple acts of misidentification could well merely revolve around inadequate processes of recognition. Something appears like x and so it must be x-like. However, in truth, it may appear to be x-like it could well be, indeed, more y-like instead when re-discerned on closer examination (by testing that x-hypothesis and finding it to be inadequate, whereas, in contrast, more adequately explained through the invocation of a relatively more successful y-hypothesis, etc.). Or, in a psychotic or psychotic-like state gestalt integrity is disrupted in keeping with the nature of that disruption and thence a distortion of that intentional consciousness, as reflected through its parallel trails of intentional depositions, in that manner as might subsequently occur reflected in its intentional depositions, textual reports, phenomenological descriptions, etc. A distinctive distortion would produce a distinctive state of distortion. Hence setting up the conditions for a complex state of mis-identification. The degree of insight present and/or absent reflecting this state of distortion, be that simply induced through mis-recognition and/or complexly induced through complex processes of distortion of a more disruptive, psychotic nature. Identity being properly and adequately assessed (and critically re-assessed) through intentional processes that couple modal expectations and modal recognitions (whether adequately conducted or otherwise). That, overall, a sense of reality is experienced when our expectations seem to be actively met, and, that this correspondence remains invariant when the total process is subjected to a closer degree of discriminative scrutiny. (1053)

	In the light of the above, the inevitable ramifications of this position would seem to call for a deconstruction of the boundaries between a relative place-marker and a relative place-maker? As there can be no absolute place-maker (nor an absolute place-marker) can we or should we make a distinction between a relative place-marker and a relative place-maker. If we were to consider the subjectivity of a fully autonomous, non-virtual, intentional being as a ‘place-maker’ and only the virtual assemblage of anything else as a place-marker have we effectively established an absolute boundary between the same? Not on absolute grounds (which could be neither realized nor recognized) but perhaps on provisional grounds? Let me explain. With a human subject we expect to be able to converse with them. If we found ourselves conversing with a robot with a very good software program for the generation of artificial conversation, that might even fool an expert, should we consider such a concatenation of phenomenal factors to be a subjective entity in a place-maker sense? No! Because although we may converse with others we do a lot of other things besides that. Human subjectivity as an engaged phenomenon is multi-dimensional, an affair involving the intersection of a number of modalities, genres of activity and contextual reference frames. Possession of one or more of these modalities is not enough in itself establish to establish an identity with this phenomenon of subjective-identity (as normally understood or, rather, more often misunderstood). So, to this extent, when a full complement of expected modalities are not engaged in their full richness (quantitatively and qualitatively) then a place-marker is logically imputed rather than a full place-maker. Similarly, when a phenomenon is engaged in some virtual, no-actual modality of simulation again a relative place-marker is usually invoked rather than a relative place-maker. Thus this distinction can be maintained, but not absolutely. Since even place-markers are also place-makers in their own right to the extent they meet, through self-identity, with a full realization and recognition of modalities associated with their more limited place-making-ness. So, even though a dream apple can be treated as a place-marker experienced in the context of a dream, still, as a dreamed place-maker it can and does seem to have some metaphorical life of its own by virtue of its resident existential excess of value released through processes of intentional synthesis. In an explanation of this phenomenon of apparent place-maker-ness, on the part of both place-makers and place-markers, what needs to be said is that all processes of synthesis create/re-create a process of emergence wherein the psychic value of the same minus the psychic value of its components is always an excess (by virtue of that sense of a logical emergence on to a new, higher level of epistemological organization itself, etc.). A broom, e.g., is a useful tool and its utility in the world is in it having a handle attached to a boom-head that allows us to more effectively sweep. The broom-ness of the broom was not there in the world before its assembly and in its assembly this emergent difference is utilized in phenomenal-phenomenological acts of sweeping that hitherto could not have been realized, effectively, to that same extent. If you really wanted a courtyard wept you would not ask someone to use a toothbrush or even a hand-brush but, instead, offer them a broom as an instrument that better befits the nature of this desired work-to-hand! (1054) 

Now, let me take to task a Husserlian position that the (overall) transcendental suspension allows us to enter the world more fully, more critically, more perceptively in a more engaged manner by virtue of that simple suspension itself? The transcendental suspension, as noted elsewhere, more surely seems to be a recipe for psychotic entrapment and compete spiritual paralysis. The suspension of desires, motivation, processes of identification and enactment, etc., would seem to cut us off from being in the world, being more fully engaged with others… and this perception would be correct if not for the fact that an overall suspension in practice entails its own parallel deconstruction through an ongoing simultaneous suspension of that suspension itself, etc. In a sense we stand back in order to move forward! And we move forward in order to stand back! Therein perfecting the ongoing balance entailed in an adequately performed overall transcendental suspension. How else could we both ‘be engaged in the world’ and know we were engaged ‘in’ the world?! How else could we be both engaged with others and with our own sense of self if we could not both participate ‘in the world’ and also be able to simultaneously reflect ‘upon that same sense of world’?! What are the implications of this phenomenological sense of a re-alignment between critical reflections and a critically attuned sense of an existential response to ‘our being in the world with others’? (1055)

	For a start, the transcendental sense of ego is not an engaged sense of ego if it were merely reflective. On the other hand, our existential entry into the world of others is conducted through a fully engaged sense of ego. A sense of ego that represents our full compliment of being along with all our desires, motivations, ideas, perceptions, memories, judgments and aspirations, etc. A mere trans-cognitive, judgmental sense of self is not an engaged sense of self if that process of intentional judgment is not allowed to flow into the world and effect that semblance of an act of judgment through the effortless overcoming of the inherent duality of being both an act of judgment and the delivery of an actual judgment. As explained, metaphorically, only through an equal ongoing suspension of the suspension itself is there this semblance of the delivery of an existential, critically attuned sense of response. Then, only through the ongoing suspension of that suspension of a suspension can we return, simultaneously, and in parallel, to our critical deliberations without being merely lost in the world, forever lost, and lost in all senses of that expression! Thus in this manner should the concept of the Life-World be better understood, namely, as world-of-engagement-with-others’! Furthermore, it should be known as a world of direct engagement since it is only through relationships, and our being centered withinthe same, that we can encounter the other and be encountered by the other, and, encounter the ‘otherness of the other’ as own sense of self, as a place-maker too in the infinite world of all possible place-makers (and place-markers not able to be so fully engaged in this subjective sense of selfness in and through a meeting of this full otherness of our own sense/s of self as a ‘subject’). Moreover, as a consequence of this directness of engagement with all others and this sense of otherness there-for-us it follows that this Life-World can only be the one and same World-of-Life there for all others to that extent we can engage with them and there can be their engagement with us. Hence our theological rider that the full religious sense of the Divine can only be there-for-us by being-in-the-world and being in an ongoing process of interaction, directly or indirectly, with this uniformity of world-ness that entails all that there is there-for-us and its equally being-there-for-us (assuming that this overall sense of the Divine can be a relative place-maker and not merely a relative place-marker in this regard!)! Consequently, we can now spell out for the theologian just what needs to be entailed in their vision of the Divine for it to be an effective place-maker and not merely, through default, an effective place-marker, etc. (1056)

In order to run this argument we need to note the following axioms or phenomenological definitions: first, that the relatively Divine has been defined as several orders in magnitude more evolved in the level of its epistemological organization; second, that increased levels of epistemological organization realize an increased sense of subjectivity, i.e., the ability to reflect, to act, to be aware, to have and to maintain a unique sense of identity, etc., and, third, both of these conditions have to be co-present. In the light of these two conjoint conditions we could argue, as a partial test case or limited model that the very subjectivity of the human individual is an exemplar, albeit from the hypothetical perspective/s of the Divine that the same can only act as a limited instantiation of these principles (grounding our necessary relationship with the Divine, and v.v., in the so-called Divine economy). Some critics could then argue that humans have merely projected and extrapolated the phenomenological nature of their own nature, but, in reply, it should be added, in order to answer this critique, that through emergence a direct parallelism must break down. Higher levels of epistemological organization ensue a manner of emergence unique to those levels of organizational complexity and fruitfulness. Therefore, all metaphors must ultimately be inadequate and unable to more closely analogue the nature of the Divine if it were to exist as a place-maker and not a place-marker in that regard. Just as the virtual worlds simulated by the use of that computer, as alluded to earlier, could be neither comprehended nor entered into by that colony of ants living inside our super-computer, so, too, as human beings, we must be unable to fully comprehend the trans-mundane domain that is defined as accompanying, hypothetically, the associated sphere/s of that sense/those senses of the Divine under theoretical examination. Then, we would need to ask, to what extent are we open to this level of epistemological organization if we were unable to comprehend its realization and recognition? (1057)

	The sense of a person can be engaged directly and/or indirectly. Directly, we engage with them in and through their embodiment as it engages our embodiment, and v.v. Indirectly, we engage them through an interpretative encountering of their textual depositions, say, e.g., a book written by that person, the presentation of a photo, or, the narration of a person who has either directly and/or indirectly encountered the person in question, etc. Similarly, the theologian could argue that we could encounter the Divine, whether aware of that fact or not, through an encounter with their embodiment, albeit on a level of epistemological organization in keeping with the nature of our own epistemological organization, etc. Then, it would merely behoove the theologian to demonstrate why they think that type of encounter is an actual encounter with that sense or semblance of divinity in that regard. Could this type of argument actually work in favour of the theologian? Or, could it be run against them by stating that it offered no grounds in order to differentiate between what would be relatively non-divine and what would be regarded as relatively Divine? If the entire world could be regarded as a ‘Divine embodiment’ what then might constitute relatively non-Divine embodiment in contrast? If there could be no real contrast could there be a viable distinction in this regard? Under normal circumstances I believe this argument could well be fatal to the theoretical aspirations of the non-speculative theologian. However, no ‘either/or’ need be absolutely drawn in this instance! Just as a computer could be regarded by those ants, in our analogy, as merely the assemblage of wires and printed circuits, etc., so too, we need to note that this mere cataloguing of artifacts need not entail items of a higher degree of epistemological organization like software, the running of simulations, etc., along with the consequences flowing from these levels of greater epistemological sophistication. Of course whether the possibility of this approach is actually productive for the theologian is another matter?! More importantly, by what criteria, hypothetically, could we non-exclusively differentiate this special sense of embodiment from a non-special, natural level of embodiment? In effect, seeking to establish the transcendental rules by which this type of investigation is allowed to proceed (wherein the same nominal reference can be treated from a number of different, non-exclusively constituted intentional perspectives). (1058)

	First, let me indirectly re-write these questions through the lens of our ability to enter into commensurable forms of dialogue that would let us look into the nature of the relationship/s between, e.g., the perspective/s of a hypothetical Divine embodiment in an interactive state/s with non-hypothetical (forms of) human embodiment, etc. (since differently constituted intentional frames of reference could well be discovered to be found to realize different states of interaction with similar or different object-states found therein or there between). (1059)

	I have argued that all forms of discourse are commensurable, however, the value of realizing their inter-commensurability may not be worth our while in attempting such forms of dialogue. At this point in this essay I would like to look at the impossibility of establishing a pure discourse, and, that all forms of discourse are actually a medley of multiple discourses. Let me illustrate this phenomenological fact (about the naturally complex nature of discourse) in the following anecdote. (1060)

	In the Nineteenth Century, in Afghanistan, a despotic ruler by the name of Abdur Ramch decided to punish a married woman and a married man who had sought to commit adultery together. Because they had “consorted to be as one together” this despot then ordered the woman to be thrown into a vat of boiling water and rendered down to the consistency of a soup. He then force the married male adulterer to drink this soup before being hanged (which was probably a slow death through progressive strangulation?). The subtext here was this: that for the married man his eating of the human remains of his paramour denied him access to Paradise as the Moslem religion stated “that a cannibal cannot enter heaven”! (1061)

	Now, in this text we have a number of distinctive discursive strands operating with varying degrees of discursive intensity, e.g., historical treatment of texts; moral/ethical considerations; religious observations; dietary considerations (and dietary prohibitions); implication of certain legal-religious possibilities as to the status of the intentional freedom/non-freedom of the person subjected to coercive acts; relatively unrestrained prerogatives of absolute power; etc. We would not have this text if this particular variety of strands were not woven together in that manner as presented. Moreover, they are interwoven adequately to cohere in the form of an adequate text (that appears to be well-formed and able to be well-received both in regard to both the possible commission of these punishments and to their being reported in historically oriented texts [of which the above paraphrase is an example]). (1062)

The point of this anecdote is this: that there can be no pure univocal forms of discourse. All discourses are a woven series of multiple discourses in various states of inter-commensurability! That as commensurability is already pre-established in their collective dialogue it implies that all theologically oriented discourses are in a similar state (with all implicated non-theologically oriented forms of inter-associated discourse). Therefore, the theologian need only relatively isolate, examine and develop the processes of inter-commensurability already present between theologically and non-theologically oriented strands of discourse in order to develop practices and processes that further develop this form of inter-commensurability; no doubt to the mutual benefit of their own forms of discourse production and dissemination! To reinforce this argument let me first dispose of the impossible concept of a pure, artificial language, i.e., a pure, uncontaminated, uni-vocal discourse dealing with one and only one form of a discourse, and, then, argue for why this complex attitude should be adopted in our non-superficial treatment of discursive practice. (1063)

	Let us try to conceive of a pure discourse, or, even an artificially purified form of discourse merely consisting of one form of discourse through the removal of all others. Imagine, if you would, a series of nominatives labeled a, b, c… and a series of operations or actions that can be performed upon these elements, namely, x, y, z… For simplicity let us assume that all actions can be applied to all the elements (without restrictions and qualifications in that regard). Thus the simple intransitive sentences of our discourse are limited to the following sentences, namely, ax, ay, az, bx, by, bz, cx, cy, cz. Now, as it would appear that we can entertain our set of sentences as above how does one argue the opposite, i.e., that our discourse is not pure and multi-modal in its complexion? (1064)

For a start, we need a meta-language in order to define these terms of reference and that meta-language cannot be directly and completely treated in an object-language mode (in order to isolate our artificial language) without importing the need for a meta-meta-language mode in order to treat it then on a similar level of epistemological organization effectively in an object mode. Thus to treat the meta-mode as an object like the object level is to created a third modal import of the meta-meta-modality, etc. Furthermore, our differentiation of object-elements and actions has also bifurcated our so-called pure modality/modalities! Now, this process of bifurcation knows no end since to refer to the bifurcated product involves noting ax, ax’, a’, x’, ax”, ax”’ and so on, etc.! Furthermore, as all forms of manipulation are conducted by a natural language whence the complete purity of an artificial language? Consequently, its manipulation must remain in the province of a natural language. Thence our inescapability from the use of a natural language in order to operate an artificial language. (1065)
	
	Now, not only are all texts commensurable hypothetically but all texts internally are also a series of multiple, relatively commensurable discourses entertained in parallel (although this metaphor of the parallel need not be taken too literally as noted before). But, still, this is not a complete picture as our entertaining a discourse, albeit as an internally complex set of commensurable and semi-commensurable discourses, is also provocative, evocative, and invocative of other textual discourses, etc. As my general reading of the anecdote of the adulterers intimates a number of other discourse are also provocatively brought into virtual play such as, e.g., considerations on the religio-legal culpability of a person who was coerced against their will to act as a cannibal. Then, the salvic-religious status of that despot too could be called into question through their free commission of such barbaric acts of punishment? Moreover, as this book deals with the British presence in Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century we could no doubt draw unfavorable comparisons with their more recent forays into the same parts of the Islamic world today and draw the inevitable conclusions that recent adventures undoubtedly are more than likely embryonic disasters in the making too? Internally and externally, non-virtually and virtually, a swarm of texts of varying degrees of commensurability inhabit the textual space of a text and the meta-textual surrounds of that same text (almost as if a quantum field). What are the ramifications of this acceptance of the complex phenomenological nature of this textual landscape for the theologian? Profound, profuse and potentially perilous! Let me examine some of these possible ramifications. (1066)

	Moreover, textual reporting of intentionally directed objective-references must also account for the fact that the intentional object-state is engaged in accordance with the construction of that particular intentional mind-set. In other words, not only do we deal with a plurality of non-virtual and virtual discourses but also with an infinity of reference frames for dealing with intentional object-states. However, this plurality of options can be inter-linked and accommodated by means of transformational rulings that allow us to go from one reading to some other. So, e.g., the farmer who saw their green grass and the geologist who saw their rich volcanic soils were able to formulate a commensurable dialogue on the grounds that rich soils produce rich grass formations. Indeed, a series of inter-associated predictions could also be formulated, namely, rich grass produced great milk, and, better milk – better cheese, and, better farm products – usually means better income for the farmer, higher property values, etc. Now, we could say that our common sense of a world, as a world-there-for-us, arises only through the phenomenal-phenomenological fact that when we can go from one discourse to some other, via these transformational rules, this sense of a world-for-us indeed is actually realized! Context realizes a sense of space, through a sense of contextual field, however, common genres of activity establish a common sense of a world-there-for-us! Therefore, it would seem natural, whether it be for the non-theologian as for the theologian, to map these senses of interconnection in order to account for the interactive nature of their particular discourses. Undoubtedly, an appreciation of intentional objectives helps to carve out those domains, and, an appreciation of the nature of those domains can equally help us to spell out and define the nature of the intentionality needed to edify us in that regard. So, despite the bewildering array of non-virtual and virtual discourses along with intentional objectives both external to a text and also internal to the same, a sense of simplicity re-enters our world by virtue of its linkages already pre-formed for us in that regard through the exercise of relatively common modes of interconnected genre activity. Also, closely interlinked modes of activity congregate to form overlapping modes of life. E.g., the world of chess, the world of religion, the world of the theological, etc., all three of which overlap, and are interconnected, e.g., by the worlds of publishing and building construction, two genres among many others, etc. This sense of a common inter-linkage establishing this sense of a world-there-for-us, and, therein, a sense of home as ‘our place in the world’ (to that extent that we define ourselves in a dialectical contrast with the same; i.e., in our being perceived as both same and different)! (1067)

	In ancient time, theological discourses about divinities were often conducted through the form of an analogy or metaphor, in essence, a myth. Analyze any myth and you will find, when pushed, a series of internal discourse strands whose superficial contradictions in some form or other can only be found to cohere through the resolute abrogation of such discordant features in and through the integration and integrity of the overall objective of that text or series of texts. E.g., an overweight Father Xmas comes down narrow chimneys, etc., or, an uneducated carpenter is able to discourse upon scripture (Jesus), or, in Tantric Buddhism a celibate Buddha, who operates beyond or outside the sexual dichotomy of sexual lust, etc., is then imagined to be in an eternal sexual conjugation with his yogini, etc., or, the crucified Jesus never died, and similar, or, this wafer ‘is’ the body of Christ, etc., etc. In reality the only way to entertain such mythic contradictions is to imagine, to that extent possible, these contradictory-like states-of-affairs as just co-occurring! Yes, Santa Claus does go down chimneys, despite being overweight, he just manages to do it… and no doubt goes through walls or locked doors too when there are no chimneys to climb down into and climb up from! Of course when we are no longer children we no longer believe in Santa Claus. Then, instead, it would seem, we replace him, or similar, with a new assortment of impossibilia. Just how rational is any society when cultural myths are re-absorbed and re-lived and few if any of their scenarios are without contradictions, counter-textual elements, divergent readings, forced re-readings of historical facts, ideological re-interpretations of prior ideological interpretations, etc., etc. Of course, the dissemination of harmonized versions of various cultural myths try to regularize such divergences through their additional commentaries. In the same way much religious literature is forever trying to harmonize irregularities between potentially competing strains of text. Does this type of textual production have merit? And is it ever possible to escape from this type of textual regularization? In the light of this type of (meta-)questioning what value is realized in a theological context. Given that our sense of world is determined through such forms of textual complexity can we redefine our concept(s) of theological difference through this type of epistemological lens (by seeking to differentiate theologically oriented texts from non theologically oriented discourses?)? (1068)

	The emergent unity of the world granted we would then have a trivial form of a positive theological difference. However, a positive trans-mundane theological difference is of more concern to the theologian. Is it not conceivable in the light of the above, that a trans-mundane theological sense of world could be mapped by selecting those types of statement whose discursive nature deals with that type of topic in accordance, no doubt, with the general, prior theological commitments of that selecting theological philosopher or layperson? Just as a sense of world is realized through the transformation rules adopted and adapted between various discourse-strands or discursive-strains of text then it would follow that in articulating those specific rulings that account for that type of overall theological discourse they would then be in possession of their sense of world in that regard? I don’t see this as too problematic. However, how we treat this type of quest, and its evaluation, would, undoubtedly, be quite problematic. On the other hand, by such a method at least that enquirer has defined for themselves in what they expect to meet and engage in this sense of a theological difference as formulated-for-them. From a hypothetical point of view what rules might we propose in order to critically treat this type of pursuit without prejudging outcomes regarding the types of theological differences therein entailed? Moreover, how is the theological value of such transformational interconnections to be determined, and, to be critically evaluated? (1069)

	The consecration of food and drink is a practice common to many religious traditions. In this regard it is not the sole province of a Christian Tradition. However, in the Christian equivalent (and all its variants) we have the Eucharist, e.g. To a believer the wafers or bread are no longer wafers or bread but consecrated wafers or bread. In that sense they are seen to inhabit the world in a different manner. Moreover, the frame of reference in which they are to be reviewed by the believer is in a consecrated time and space, with a consecrated history that sets all other non-properly consecrated wafers and bread apart. In this, that particular frame of reference is now privileged in our treatment of those wafers or bread. Yes, they are still wafers or bread, but, they are treated as something special by virtue of their intersection with a sacred sense of time and space, and a sacred sense of history in terms of their consecration. Here we are given a practical demonstration of this sense of a theological difference, albeit on a small scale. However, in mapping this difference, as formulated and defined by the adherents of that tradition under examination, we have here presented to us a method for seeing how they define, in part, this sense of a theological difference. Moreover, I am sure, that this microcosmic attention to detail (in extrapolation) can also represent to some extent a more macrocosmic vision that would be entertained by that type of adherent (since the parts reflect the whole to some extent, and, the whole is reflected in the parts [but, of course, does not equal their mere non-emergent summation])? Furthermore, in examining what general existential difference this form of religious practice actually seems to make in the lives of those practicing individuals we might then be able to define the general form of the theological value being invoked; such invocation possibly representing the general form or forms of theological value expected to arise from the perspective of that tradition (as a theological genre of activity and its incorporation within a specific religious-theological mode of life). Then, given that our examination is conducted from the point of view of the overall transcendental suspension, our treatment of such reports is essentially and effectively critical to that extent we are able to map these phenomenal features (of those textual reports) and their phenomenological differences (as neutrally observed in the lives of those persons in question). So, in the example above, what might we discern that informs us as to how this theological difference is to be regarded by either that type of adherent or that type of critical observer (as a transcendental phenomenologist)? (1070)

	For a start we have a tension between a wafer as a mere wafer and a wafer that is consecrated, and, the consecrated wafer ‘seen’ as somehow participating in the body of Christ (who possessed or still possesses the dead body of Jesus reputedly crucified two thousand years ago), and, who exist in some form of a religious relationship with God the ‘Father’. So, ‘wafer’, ‘body of Christ’ and ‘God’ are all directly and/or indirectly represented by the consecrated wafer. Furthermore, the wafer is to be ingested in a certain ritual (and that it should be ingested by a person who is considered to be ritually pure for that task through the prior conditions of confession, etc.). An outsider might (re-)interpret this to imply that the immediacy of the consecrated wafer puts the adherent ‘in touch’ with the being of Christ who acts as a mediator with the Divine (defined as God with whom Christ is able to act as a mediator)? Hence encapsulated in the wafer is a microcosmic vision of the theological world disseminated by this type of religious practice. As a phenomenologist all we now need to do is to assess the existential impact such a ritual has positively and negatively upon a typical individual representative of that type of community, and, by extension, infer the consequences of such an attitude upon that type of community. Such research fleshing out, so to speak, the existential ramifications ideally and practically realized through that type of religious action. E.g., what general impact is realized through a denial and/or self-denial of that aspect of religious practice, what general impact is realized through the adoption (and adaptation) of that type of practice? It is not the place in this type of essay to go any further down this particular path of research other than to note various complex reactions can arise in response to an apparent simplicity of actions (like preparing for and the taking of this sacrament). Similarly, it would be worthwhile (from a sociological perspective) to also compare other processes of consecration both within that traditions and other traditions (from a general comparative point of view). Suffice to say, by such means a greater picture can emerge as to how a theological difference can be formulated and existentially engaged in a manner that can be examined by someone internal to that tradition and/or external to that tradition (in a manner that can be critically examined and critically re-examined in a relatively objective fashion, albeit in generalities and simplifications of the complexities ever resident in intentional dispositions and their flurry of ‘parallel’ non-virtual and virtual, internal and external, direct and indirect formations of textual discourses). (1071)

	How is theological value to be determined? For a start we need to recognize that no text can be purely uni-vocal in its discursiveness as already noted. Second, all value determination, as a judgmental act, is essentially conducted on a transcendental level, i.e., on a trans-conceptual level of psychic epistemological organization through an act of judgment wherein the cognitive simulation of the same is evaluated within the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension (and thence its transcendental flavour in that regard). Thus value is determined through a simulation of the text in question from a transcendental point of view realized in and through the application of an overall transcendental suspension. In this light we can see that value is authentically and accurately evaluated when all pre-conditions, conditions, post-conditions are adequately in play. Hence the need for an adequate re-presentation of that text, the adequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension and the necessary presence of an adequate hermeneutical background wherein (the genre of activity in question and) the consequences of our transcendentally treated simulations can be properly, appropriately and validly entertained, i.e., adequately appreciated! What are the implications and ramifications of this ‘close’ transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical treatment of the text? (1072)

	So far so good. Nothing mystical has been implied. By transcendental we merely the ability to conduct an examination of the overt intentional constitution of a text, i.e., by what means that text appears to be constituted in the manner of its phenomenal presentation. What is trans-intentional here is transcendentally oriented since this orientation is simulating, on one hand, the intentionality apparently to-hand, and, on the other, appreciating the same (from this non-absolutely separated trans-intentional point of view). (1073)

	Now this careful and critical  application of the overall transcendental suspension implies that we must adopt a constructive neutrality or a neutral constructivism. In the transcendental attitude all textual representations in their re-presentation, i.e. simulation, are treated equally, i.e., as mere textual depositions of intentional constructions. Without fear or favour all intentional constitution is re(-)viewed as merely that, namely, as intentional formations which, through re-simulation, are re-viewed by-us as no more than mere intentional formations. On the other hand, although all formations are treated equally, in a comparative re-evaluation with other similar formations we no longer perceive all things as equal! Now, we let things appear to speak for themselves by engaging the relative, apparent merit of the same. Although from a transcendental perspective we adopt a transcendental relativism from the non-transcendental perspective we also adopt a non-transcendental absolutism. All this is in play through the adoption of an overall transcendental suspension, and, critically in play when we adopt an adequate overall transcendental suspension. Without the utilization of an adequate overall transcendental suspension we are swayed in either the direction of the relativist or the absolutist. Not being able to escape some form of an overall transcendental suspension resident at the very center of a hermeneutic circle means we can neither be absolute relativists nor absolute absolutists! However, according to our realistic-idealistic predilections, without the adequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension we either head in the direction of the relativist or the absolutist, whereas, through the adequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension we re-balance those forces in the critical exercise of our transcendentally oriented powers of reflection and, therein, adopt and adapt a middle path in accordance with what is demanded in the overall nature of our enquiries. (1074)

	Relativism and absolutism in this view both stem from the inadequate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension! If we were to accept, more or less, a multi-vocal reading of the situation we become a relativists, whereas, in contrast, if we accept and insist upon a univocal reading of the text or texts in question then we become an absolutist. In either case we become either de facto or bone fide relativists (as realists?) or absolutists (as idealists?)! A de facto relativist or de facto absolutist arises when they do not see themselves as respectively relativists or absolutists but obviously operate in those respective manners. A bone fide relativist or bone fide absolutist arises when they insist that they take on those respective orientations in their dealings with those text or texts in question and claim, and are rightly seen to claim, respectively, a relativistic orientation or absolutistic orientation in their style of reading. However, would I be correct in seeing the relativist (as a realist?) as multi-vocal in their interpretations? Might they not be just as univocally oriented as the absolutist? Now, the relativist (as a realist?) adopts a relativist reading of the situation-to-hand. Alter that relativity or perspective and they would argue that our view of that situation-to-hand would change in an equally related manner. In this regard, subsuming a variety of reports within their overall interpretation of their situation-to-hand but not adopting a merely univocal report of the same. (1075)

	Obviously, the adoption of either a relativistic or an absolutistic point of view must imply the imperfect exercise of an adequately exercised overall transcendental suspension along with a diminished sense of authenticity equal proportionally to the degree they have absented themselves from utilizing a crucial, critical transcendental sense of perspective! Whereas, when our investigations are critically conducted from a transcendental perspective we have the best of both worlds! From the transcendental perspective all intentional constructions as ‘intentional constructions’ are treated equally. On the other hand, in the suspension of the suspension, no one construction can be equal with some other!  In our critically conducted comparative evaluations no presentations are equal! How then is this non-transcendental evaluation of comparative non-equality to be critically determined (given this disruption of the transcendental attitude?)? Because it is the disruption of a critically conducted process of transcendental appreciation in the first place. Retrospectively, how should one critically analyze this realized state of comparative inequality? Through the adoption of a critical ordered analysis either individually or collectively, although preferably in the critical light of the latter. E.g., we could adopt just a consequential analysis. Let us say we are comparing three religious styles of practice that may or may not be within the same hypothetical religious tradition. Let the first practice be a lottery conducted among the congregation as to whom will be chosen to be ritually consecrated, killed, cooked by boiling and later eaten by the rest of the congregation. Let the second practice be the kidnapping of a member of some other religious tradition who is then ritually consecrated killed, cooked by boiling and later eaten by the rest of the congregation. Let the third practice be a bread figure in the shape of person that is ritually consecrated, symbolically killed, boiled in water and then eaten by that congregation. Now, if you think you are a ‘postmodern person’ who perceives all practices as equal I ask you would you like to be a participant in the first congregation? Would you enjoy participating in a lottery in which you have the misfortune to win? Or, would you enjoy participating in the second congregation if you believed cannibalism to be wrong? Would we chose the third congregation if we had no other choice in this matter besides the more literal first and second variations on this theme of cannibalism? It is all very well to be a relativist philosophically but then to be a non-relativist in the enjoyment of your daily existence outside those philosophical professions of practice? Or, if one were to sensibly determine a better (more existential) reading of the world should one then absolutize it by claiming it were the best, etc? Comparative analysis cannot be absolutized except in an a priori fashion. As long as claims are left in the comparative form then with good reasons we can critically claim that some determinations are better than others. Let me now look at what standards we have for making these comparative preferences (even if transcendentally oriented in the manner of their performances). (1076)

	As noted we can do this by adopting individually oriented ordered forms of comparative judgment or, preferably, by adopting a collective form of ordered analysis (adapting it to the particular situation-to-hand). As already articulated, our circular ordered analysis from the first order to the sixth concerns, respectively, judgments concerning pre-essential features; integrated aesthetical forms of essentiality; deontological ethical considerations; pragmatical calculations, contextual-hermeneutic forms of treatment, and, actual-factual considerations as to the historicity of that type of claim. Through this lens let us re-visit our three earlier scenarios concerning the exercise of non-symbolic or symbolic cannibalism. (1077)

	To begin with we can make some simple observations in regards to the first two practices. If we were indulge in this ritual meal and we did this often then we must assume that this would seriously diminish either our congregation or those populations of relative non-believers sought for our disposal. Furthermore, w.r.t. forms of extra-congregational cannibalism, if those congregations were to ingest members from our own congregations, and we from theirs, then it would follow that they could quite easily consume all resources-to-hand if this practice was committed often enough! On pragmatic grounds, with other reasons as well in the same vein, on balance we should prefer the third option if these three options were the only ones available to us. Or, on aesthetic and deontological grounds one might say all three options were generally lacking in authenticity (on the grounds that the diminishment of possible relationships does not generally augment the overall quality of our collective existences, and, that even the simulation of this loss could be objected to on aesthetic grounds of integrity, etc.). What other grounds have we for determining the relative comparative merit of religious (and non-religious) practices? In this we could look at pre-essential trueness to type, hermeneutical conformity to genre expectations, and factual considerations through the examination of the apparent textual history of those existential descriptors in question. Let me now consider objections concerning the relative non-commensurability of different practices (as might be argued by the extreme postmodernist). (1078)

	A superficial postmodernist might argue that the lack of commensurability between various practices and processes in the world would imply that we cannot determine the comparative existential value of individual patterns of behaviour, etc. The validity of such an attitude must be vehemently denied! Because there are genre expectations involved in the intentional patterning of all forms of experience, then within those genres meaningful processes of comparison can be conducted (by reference to the ideality or exemplars of that type of genre). In Chinese furniture, e.g., with respect to the rare wood type of huang huali there is huang huali and ‘huang huali’! Indeed, not all light coloured woods defined as huang huali are even huang huali! Then, as far as the carving of the same is conducted, there is carving and there is ‘carving’! Then, we can go beyond one genre to some other if there are rules that allow us to connect both in some sense or other. The quality and style of carving on a piece of Chinese furniture might be favorably compared to that on a bamboo brushpot or a jade version of the same, etc., etc. The point of this example suggesting that commensurability is pre-established in and through the very presence of a commonality of genre, and, that as genres are mapped within our cultural-intercultural vision of the Life-World it follows that commensurability must always exist in some form or other even though the relative-absolute) value of the comparison of disparate objects may not be worth the effort (as noted previously)! (1079)

	The engaged person must make a stand in this world-with-others! A naïve, short-sighted interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology cannot escape the neutrality of the (overall) transcendental suspension. As I have argued, engagement with the world can only occur through a suspension of the suspension! Then, our engagement is rectified in time through the re-suspension of the same, etc., etc. So, by such means, we have one foot in this sense of the transcendental and one foot in this sense of the non-transcendental or the natural world as an engaged citizen of that world! How should the committed theologian make their stand in this phenomenal semblance of an engaged sense of world? In exactly the same type of manner as they should engage others-in-this-world when operating in a relatively non-theological manner (say as a husband or as a friend, as someone cooking a meal or as someone invited to share a meal cooked for them, etc.). Now, in getting a theologian to make a stand we would have there before us, I suspect, another way of looking at our (complex) concept of (a) theological difference? In making that stand, from a theological perspective, just how does the theologian (or any person of their congregation who shares that type of theology) make a stand in the world either collectively, i.e., in an overall fashion, or, on an individual basis vis-à-vis certain issues and practices of their being in the world (as perceived by themselves as members-of-a-theologically oriented-congregation). Or, should we ask ourselves again, does a theological difference make a (real) difference? Or, does the existentially engaged person in their engagement with the world, regardless of their theological or non-theological persuasion, find any real sense of a difference among themselves? Or, is there merely an existential difference by virtue of the fact that each individual in acting in good faith from their point of view in the world is going to react and respond in a different manner in the first place?! For the moment let me leave this type of rhetorical question as a general rhetorical question and instead let us examine what it might mean ‘to make a stand’? (1080)

	To make a stand in the world… is it not possible, regardless of the imputed authenticity of our being in this world, that we are forever making a stand in some form or other… at least until death? So, on reflection, we perhaps should ask this type of existential question by re-phrasing it as “how does one make an authentic stand in the world?” However, again, we critically overlook the fact that ‘being in the world’ already involves some form and degree of authenticity so, again, the question might more rightly be posed as “how do we become more existentially and authentically engaged in this world (with-others before-others)?” Then, we might question whether being relatively more authentic need involve any sense of an other person when, surely, it is that person themselves that is being relatively more authentic and not their necessary involvement with some other person in order for that first person to illicit a relatively more authentic act..? But, can we ever escape the other person, indirectly, when all acts are perceived through the meta-textual lens of genres of social activity and social interactivity. To my thirsty friend I bring a glass of water. After the intense heat of the day I water my pot plants on the balcony. After watering the rest of the garden I give myself a nice long cool drink from the fridge… Surely, the very act of giving a drink, regardless of the recipient, is already a social phenomenon even if practiced in the relative solitude and privacy of my own home? Even in front of an open window, perhaps before the sight of before others, other people, if present, (with the same or similar cultural background which, in this instance, could well entail most of humanity) would know that a glass of fluid raised to my lips probably meant I was about to drink it, that I was then, thereafter, would be seen to drink the same (whether I am aware of that other person or persons observing my actions in this regard)(and regardless of the fact even if I were to merely simulate an act of drinking; as actors might upon the stage). By being able to perform an intentionally directed activity implies my adoption and adaptation of a social convention already in the public arena so to speak, even if not witnessed by some other person. Even the (dissimulated) simulation of that act already implicates the adoption and adaptation of the corresponding social convention! Thence the permanent engagement with the sense of ‘the other’ even if only ‘present’, from time to time, in some indirect sense of involvement (through the mere adoption of these social conventions as genres of actvity). Still, in this light, the sense of the other, therefore, must be forever an inescapable fact of ‘our’ being in the world! So, perhaps we should wonder to what extent the individual is present in the performance of their own responses and actions? To that same extent they are already involved in an authenticity of being! By ‘being their own person’ they are then to that same extent ‘in the world with others’ and not merely as ‘another person in the world of the other’. So, ‘as we are already in the mere world with others’ ‘to what extent then does a theological perspective cast any light on the possibility of some form of a difference of being in this world with others?’ Re-written in this existential sense we are therefore asking ourselves “what difference does a theological difference make (if at all?)?” (1081)

	In beginning to answer this question, does a theological difference make any difference, now re-cast in this existential manner, I am led to intuitively believe that there would be no real overall difference in response between the authentic theologist and the authentic non-theologist even though for the religionist, they might well be able to argue that it does make a difference for them in the way they live their life and in the way their life is set up for them to-be-lived. Still, if the same sort of result overall is obtained, say in an existentially treated deontological frame of reference, then upon what grounds would the theologian be able to argue that a theological frame of reference does make a difference; except, perhaps, in the manner a theologist might arrive at the same existential point an existential humanist, e.g., might also arrive at? Of course, the theologian can still argue on different grounds that the skilful imposition of a theological frame of reference could constitute a difference in a soteriological frame of reference. Accept the Divine and be saved… On the other hand, by virtue of a different set of prejudices (as prejudgments in the manner as argued by Gadamer) the overall transcendental suspension would center that same person in a different fashion in their religious vision of the world! Now, such centering, although different, would not be incommensurable since both the theologist and the non-theologist must live side by side in this same world before-others, and, must live side by side in this world, in this same one-World-of-Life! So, perhaps there is a difference after all even if it cannot be ultimately expressed on an inter-social level of lived-experience from a community oriented inter-subjectively treated perspective? Or, do we again argue for some degree of an absolute-like uniqueness of an existential response and reaction that cannot be differentiated by the mere cataloguing of its pre-judgmental inputs (nor w.r.t. the existential nature of its deontological responses?)? (1082)

	So, where should we stand, and, how should we make that stand?! (1083)

	First, why should we make a stand (even if it were to be judged a non-propitious moment to be seen enacting an act of overt positioning)? Second, to what extent do pre-judged theological and/or non-theological prejudices possibly alter the manner of our being in this World-of-Life with-others? Third, does an adequate overall transcendental suspension minimize this existential sense of a theological difference? Fourth, even if the theologist and the non-theologist were to arrive at the same type of existential endpoint does the difference in their journeys make a difference? Fifth, by what means might the theologian have at their theoretical disposal, etc., for re-investing a sense of difference in their vision of a theological difference (viewed from both an existential-epistemological type of perspective and/or a soteriological-ontological type of ontology. (1084)

If a number of people were ‘to climb a mountain’, let us say a scared mountain in China, perhaps Tai Shan, and some went by bus and walked up the last few hundred feet, while others took a cable-car, or were carried in a sedan chair, or were actually able to walk all the way to the top… now that all of these people have arrived at the top of this very beautiful mountain, is there a difference to be found in the manner of their being on the top of that mountain? Or, is that difference a purely subjective difference, a personal affair? Would not each of these people possess a different sense of achievement, a different sense of being there? In my opinion a very subtle difference here could be dialectically argued for. ‘Dialectical’ by virtue of being commensurable with others yet distinctive in so far as it was constituted from their own point/s of view (in the same manner that all intentional constitution is both inter-subjectively commensurable and subjectively distinctive). If such a distinction could be made, then perhaps an existential sense of a theological difference could be formulated along the same sort of lines? (1085)

	Why should we make a stand? I am reminded of two sections of text in the Analects of Confucius where the Master tells us a certain high official ‘remonstrated with the emperor’/powers that be and ‘lost his head’ knowing he would more than likely be executed. However, in another verse, another high official does not ‘remonstrate with the emperor’/powers that be knowing that he would ‘lose his head’. The inter-textual point these two verses make, when compared, is that there are situations when you should make a stand knowing it will be fatal and other situations where you should not make a stand knowing it would be fatal. The truly wise person, we are led to assume, knows the ‘difference’, i.e., when to remonstrate and when not to remonstrate, or, when to make a stand and when to not make a stand (by making a stand that is ‘not making a public stand’). However, as mere mortals how are we to discern this subtle form of differentiation? Just how should our response to a certain situation be existentially informed? By the imposition of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! Through obtaining an essential and adequate understanding of the situation to hand and refining our response to the same through the thorough use of this suspension and letting the situation determine the manner of your response to the same through your attunement with that relationship as situated in the total nexus of relationships that constitutes your overall subjective perspective of your place within this transcendental sense of a world-there-for-us. But, such a theoretical exposition might be useful for a philosophical scholar, on the other hand, how should we translate such ‘insight’ into some form of ‘existential practice’?  Through the intuitive refinement of our transcendental powers of discernment… through an existential purification of existential practices already in play! Practices that must already be in existence, in part, in order for that relationship to have arisen in this World-of-Life! Because the relationship in question is in existence (or has been in existence) by virtue of this authenticity of being (realized through an ongoing resolution of both the relative consonance-dissonance in that relationship and the relative consonance-dissonance between that relationship and the totality-to-hand of the Life-World itself). (1086)

	What impels a person to want to make a stand, feel that they should adopt a certain attitude of good faith towards the world? The sense of the need for an existential integrity to be held and experienced by that individual as they stand before others. An existential desire to go in one direction, a desire to harmonize one’s efforts, a cherishing of authenticity and to be seen by other authentic people as also authentic (in whatever manner that matter might be found defined or not defined). As we walk along the street on one side of that street and in one direction only so too most people to some extent wish to be integrated in the execution of a set of objectives currently to hand. Now, this does not mean that we can be absolutely harmonized and fully integrated in this over-arching type of project. Life is the ongoing competition of various projects consisting of various objectives, desires, obligations, perceived causal and legal consequences, etc., all within a hierarchy of nested relationships with or without the implication of a committed theological perspective. Within these horizons the person operates as a person in the world with others. Generally the path trodden is not too complicated or too controversial – the way is mapped out for us and most of us follow those social instructions as conventional guidelines. Only when there are cultural paradigm shifts and competitive inter-cultural pressures for changing modes of interpretation do we usually find the way no longer so definitively mapped out for us. Or, again, only when we set ourselves parallel goals of a contradictory nature that cannot be conventionally resolved do we find a disconcerting frisson, to say the least, between competing projects. In this there is usually a balancing act between short-term goals and long-term objectives with various forms of deferral being put in play with respect to either end of this temporal continuum. However, some individuals with various forms of personality disorder may not be able or willing to enter into these conventionally arbitrated tradeoffs considered socially acceptable, and, by self-reflection, also considered personally self-acceptable. By disconnecting or not being connected with an appreciation of this short-term/long-term continuum they may well indulge in short-term motivated behaviour that is not integral and beneficial to their long-term prospects, or, often, to the long-term prospects of their communities in which they reside. So, overlooking such individuals let us assume that most people to some extent earnestly desire a morally integrated form of existence at least to that extent that they do not wish to appear before others as lacking in that attitude of public propriety and be seen indulging in a manner that does not take them towards those types of means and ends in society. With that simplification in mind we can now concentrate on this field of personal-interpersonal interaction on this short-term/long-term continuum in order to try to understand what might motivate people to make a stand in some form or other to some degree or other? In essence, we are seeking to determine the psycho-dynamics behind deontological forms of motivation. (1087)

	If it were possible that the most important and relevant features of our individual existence were to be formulated as a set of propositions, what part would be played, we should ask, by their collective interaction and integration? All individuals are integrated to some extent since only in that fashion could we intentionally chose to walk along a street on one side of it and only in a certain direction. There are advantages to the existence of such an adequate degree of self-integration. Surely what promotes the same would promote the very psychic tenor of our existence as a person-in-the-world. Conversely, what demotes that degree of integration would demote our own sense of self-integration. Now, neither extremes can be entertained. Without a certain degree of psycho-physical integration our embodied existence would be no more than a lifeless corpse. On the other hand, too much integration would surely imply a lack of flexibility and adaptation to our changing environment with the same sort of outcome? Death! A certain flexibility must be in play. A certain degree of choice must also be operative if we were to be presented with alternative options all equally weighted from a motivational perspective. The phenomenal appearance and presentation of an effective sense of freewill must also be necessary if only to remove ourselves from such motivational forms of impasse if we were to be merely ‘objective’ in our weighing of objective-oriented responses. We have to chose - so let us chose! By such means giving our consent to patterns of response part formulated culturally and part formulated personally (in the context of that situation and its relationship it might appear to have in general to all other contexts of involvement relevant to our-being-in-this-world-with-others). Into this milieu, choice is executed by virtue of the breaking of the overall suspension through the suspension of the suspension as already argued. Our existential atunement, or existential atonement/at-onement, being re-instigated through an ongoing re-imposition/re-breaking of the overall suspension, etc. Our motivation, it would seem, coursing from such patterns of exchange that establish those relationships amid the overall relationship that those relationships bear to each other collectively as represented to-us by-ourselves. Now, we need to ask if that ensuing sense of personal self-integrity is actually established since in what manner a relationship could exist as a relationship with all other relevant relationships since a relationship could only come into existence through processes of exchange?! What exchange mechanisms would be in play in a relationship between a set of relevant relationships in this regard? Even without having to involve any overarching unity of a theological sense of the Divine Being would we not be already invoking a sense of the impossible exchange – for how could relationships be in relationship with each other and their collective integrity without possessing processes of exchange themselves in order to establish that overall sense of an integrated self-relationship? This dilemma can be instantly defused by invoking reciprocal processes between all manner of relationships, and, limiting the degree of integrity that is put into effect between the same. So, given an adequate degree of intentional thematization then the nature of intentional directivity (to its intentional object-state or intentional objectivity) would naturally follow suit! Formulated in suspension, breaking the suspension through suspension would then ensue the emission of that intentional act. Then, those intentional actions that meet with our desired objectivities would naturally increase our sense of an ongoing self-satisfaction within those terms of reference. If those terms of reference then were to add to the overall harmonization of the psyche then some degree of self-satisfaction would consequently be enjoyed. Thence this imperative, the deontological motivation of an existential nature being allowed to follow its own path in the coursing of our existence through this World-of-Life with-others. Effectively, the discharge of ‘responsible’ action in a commensurate sense of self-satisfaction and self-harmonization. That, indeed, an enjoyed sense of self-integrity could well act as the true end of those existential acts of responsibility. Conversely, such harmonization effectively empowers us to move more ably, and often in a more successful manner, through this world with-others. (1088)

	Into this mix of responsibility and responsiveness to the same, along with all other forms of personal motivation, what difference does a theological frame of reference make with a non-theological religionist or with a non-theological non-religionist, i.e., an agnostic or atheist? Assuming that all people, with or without a religious background, can lead an existential existence let us enquire as to what differences a theological frame of reference might make if at all? (1089)

	For a start, ordinary social relationships in their minimal form can be seen as two partied, e.g. the other and myself. Whereas, a theological setting automatically casts that relationship in a three-partied form or format, namely, the other, myself and the implication of an imputed sense of the Divine able to interact in some form or other. Does this triadic complication make a difference? (1090)

	This difference can be deconstructed by noting that a meta-textual element of inter-subjectively determined genres of activity already frame the apparent isolation of a two-partied relationship. In the inter-subjective interrelationship of genres we have a meta-textual field also acting as a context for our hermeneutic appreciation of that apparent two-partied relationship. Let us, e.g., look at a relationship between a mother and her child. The mother perceives herself as a ‘mother’, her child as a ‘child’ dependent upon her for its upbringing, etc. Therefore this two-partied relationship would be better written as a ‘mother’ and ‘child’ in a ‘mother-child relationship’. The latter element being rooted in an inter-subjective cultural-intercultural medium (or media). Now some cultural phenomenologists (as sociologists, phenomenologists of religious practice, etc., etc.) could well argue that this inter-subjective dimension is isomorphic with the formulation of a dimension of Divine governance. I.e., the importation of a theological dimension of active participation, in some form or other, is equivalent to a sense of social-reflection entertained through the Sartrean ‘look’, etc. “I do not like to be seen committing an offense” is practically equivalent to “I do not like to commit an offense in the sight of the Divine.” Perhaps a public sense of oversight is not quite so all-pervasive as the all-seeing sense of the Divine although with a proliferation of cameras and other forms of monitoring that difference may well be now negligible. Certainly for our urbanized existences. However, this sense of surveillance is more self-imposed or self-internalized. Yes, we are being watched, but so what. We are observed by cameras but they hardly count as they are, more often than not, merely record what passes them by. However, this attitude of surveillance by others is internalized and in this there is little difference from the three-partied theological imputation! Although a minimal difference could be articulated by a theologian, more as a matter of style, effectiveness and thoroughness of application, overall there could be no real sense of difference in this regard because, more correctly, two-partied relationships should existentially be re-written in three-partied terms of reference. Moreover, as this inter-subjective social dimension cannot be non-artificially removed from all forms of discourse it follows that all relationships must operate with at least this tacit acceptance of a meta-textual dimension. Furthermore, this sense of a context along with all traces of an existential context (in and through the existential uniqueness of that under examination) it follows that no relationship could be treated in pure two-partied terms of reference. That, therefore, the implication of a Divine dimension in this regard, to this extent, in mere logical terms of reference, is little different from this necessary implication of a meta-textual dimension in the framing of a relationship to-be-investigated. Again, the ecology of relationships should also be taken into account in order to better comprehend the relational nature of that under investigation. Equally, in a deontological frame of reference, the ecology of that relationship should be considered in both internal and external terms of reference! A relationship as isolated in an intentionally directed discourse is both contextually related and contextually defined. Commensurable through relation and distinctive through its existential exemplification. All forms of identity occurring and being thematized through the utilization of this dialectics of commensuration. In this dialectical dance being both meta-textually related through type and defined distinctively through the uniqueness of its existential descriptors be they merely nominated and/or also defined in detail. Again, from an overall epistemological point of view, theological difference is finding itself being neutralized? Given this minimization of a difference between the ‘look of others’ (as passively embedded in genre and actively embedded in the observer) and the ‘active sight of the divine’ by what epistemological factors could the theologian make a case for a radical distinctiveness in this regard? (1092)

	We could come to the assistance of the theologian here by noting that as all intentionality is exercised through its intentional perspective that, therefore, a perspective that is theologically inclusive, and relevant to the topic to hand, would make a qualitative difference to that formation of intentionality exercised therein. Even if deontologically an existential theologist and an existential non-theologist were to arrive at the same existentially responsive course of dutiful action, still, their perceptions and interpretations of the same must differ! We would be forced, therefore, to consider a theological difference, more correctly, is the result of a theological or theological-like input or series of inputs. Non-dogmatically exercised, although dogmatically formulated prejudicially/pre-judgmentally, in this light we should perhaps view a theological difference more as an existential theological difference. Now the question remains to be asks – does such a difference make a real difference in the manner a person would course through this Life-World together be they theologists or non-theologists, religionist or non-religionists? Again, we would have to concur. Even if there were individual de-ontological coincidences in the manner of an existential response, still, in re-configuring their vision of the world as a theologically influenced panorama it would follow that the course of their existential receptivity to ‘the world’ must be different even if (occasionally coincident). However, in re-consideration of this ‘difference in position’ through a ‘difference in attitude’ should we not ask that if the world in truth just happened to be not actually constituted along theological lines, were not actually theologically constituted, at least in some trans-mundane sense, then would it not follow that this inauthentic view of reality would result in a de-centering of our existential responsiveness in this world-with-others? If as an adult, one were to still believe in Father Xmas, how might that distort one’s relationships with others especially around the time of Christmas if one were resident in a culture that celebrated that occasion? You would expect to be the recipient of Xmas gifts yet give no thought to being the donor of gifts to others in return. Along the same lines could one argue, hypothetically, that being a theologist in a world with no actual trans-mundane theological complexion should distort the patterns of response made therein despite their existential intentions should they be transcendentally balanced in their thematization? Or, as our ethical practices, etc., have been in the past formulated in cultures influenced by theological considerations might not there be much difference in this regard (since the ‘look of others’ could well function in a similar fashion to the ‘look of the Divine’?)? That conceded, the theologian would then need to formulate their theological perspective with a set of other imperatives in order to establish the necessary degree of differentiation? No doubt in this light certain soteriological claims could be presented in order to develop this degree of differentiation. This additional degree of differentiation then assisting in thematizing a different sense of a theological difference that need not be existentially centered in that regard. Still, operating along transcendental lines would, to some considerable extent then existentially rectify those inputs that, by themselves, might lead to non-existentially oriented modes of practice (as relatively inauthentic genres of activity). Would it not be the case that this non-existential de-centering of historical practices and their existential re-centering can account for much of the explanatory motivations behind our present interpretations of overall pattern of historical development. So, despite, and in spite of, relatively non-existential religious inputs, historical practices generally become rectified in time. Would we be right in this reading of historical trends? (1093)

	As asked earlier, to what extent do pre-judged theological and/or non-theological prejudices possibly alter the manner of our being in this World-of-Life with-others, and, does an adequate overall transcendental suspension minimize this existential sense of a theological difference? Even if the theologist and the non-theologist were to arrive at the same type of existential endpoint does the difference in their journeys make a difference? Because ‘the way we are in the world’ constitutes our experience it implies that our ‘journey’ to that point along with all relevant associated cultural baggage, etc., must colour the intentionally constituted perceptions and reflections therein entertained. Thence the existence of an existential theological difference even when all else might have minimized the same. Thus, even if the theologist and the non-theologist were to arrive at the same type of existential endpoint this difference in their journeys must make a difference! However, if the imputation of the Divine in trans-mundane terms of reference were not coincident with reality would this distorted treatment of reality then constitute and perpetuate an inauthenticity of response in the life of the theologist (w.r.t. the existential non-theological religionist or an existentialist non-theologists)? Let me explore this type of consideration first before moving on to some reflections on the importation, and imputation, of a sotereiological dimension or dimensions. (1094)

	Let it be said that all intentional processes are the resolution of competitive intentional forces and as a result must possess a certain core-authenticity in their formation. That, in this regard, we must consider inauthentic responses to be a corruption, in some form or other, of this process, albeit superficially. The corollary being that even the imputation of the Divine is based upon the authenticity of our being-in-the-world even if such a concept were to lack a substantial degree of coincidence with (the) reality (of the Life-World). Thus, even if that imputation were not actually coincident with reality still the centrality of our being is incorporated in an authenticity of being and to some extent must remain there. Let me explore this possible counter-example? If a certain person were a serial killer, let us ask what authenticity of being can be found within that type of action, within that type of person, on the grounds that as killing is destructive of relationships it, therefore, should be judged as quite inauthentic in orientation? Of course we cannot say “completely inauthentic” because the core of all intentional processes, all processes and all institutions must maintain a core authenticity of being otherwise they would immediately cease to exist as a person enjoying an intentional existence. So, how do we account for a core authenticity and a patent degree of inauthenticity? If wanton killing were absolutely inauthentic then in committing such an act that person would immediately die and cease to be a living person in the world. Moreover, as already noted, an absolute act of intentional inauthenticity could be neither thought nor recognized. Still, in what sense is a person’s authenticity diminished by such inauthentic acts as wanton killing, e.g? Obviously, the serial killer does not drop dead after their first commission of a murder since they could not be a serial killer if they were to have done so. An argument could then be run that for them to continue in their existence all those factors that need to be resolved in order to ensure ongoing survival of their embodiment must be in place and remain in place. Is not a core authenticity of being being preserved and conserved in this instance quite irrespective of the commission of non-existentially oriented acts? Without having to invoke a karmic law, the discovery of the person perpetrating such a series of murderous acts would then be met with certain consequences one of which, historically, could well be capital punishment. In all of this one would have to characterize intentional acts of behaviour as less central to the overall being of that person. Thus, less centralized forms of inauthenticity do not directly impede and act upon more centralized forms of intentional functioning. Still, all acts do have consequences in some form or other and improper acts constituted in a non-centralized forms of inauthenticity would eventually, in some measure or other, harvest the consequences of the same given a sufficiency of time and the emplacement of the necessary pre-conditions for that type of reactive enactment. Alas, such retributive justice is often never realized! An observation noted by both theologists and non-theologists alike (and to the greater consternation of the former when re-giving their assent to the imputation of a personified and/or non-personified form of Divine justice with, as a result, the experience of a theoretical need that demands some form of an explanation in order to guarantee some form of retribution in order to resolve this particular theological form of cognitive dissonance). (1095)

Now, with apologies to the theologist, let us ask if there is some parallel to the above. If one were to harbour an important idea in the overall constitution of one’s self-identity in this-world-with-others that was not coincident with reality in what manner might this discrepancy distort judgmental processes as a consequence? If that crucial point of reference were the imputation of a trans-mundane sense of the Divine, to what extent might such a discordance with reality impede and act upon more centralized forms of our identity formation as we stand before others? If it were not centrally disposed, it could not then be fatally disruptive. As a result would it make much difference if it were the case that this particular belief had absolutely no foundations in fact? How might we test this last hypothesis? (1096)

	We might investigate such a claim by evaluating the evidence for the same. Evidence of the Divine is notoriously lacking yet this rich religious mode-of-life has been richly spun about this silent absence. Then, again, we might test this hypothesis by noting to what extent people who are non-theological religionists and non-religious non-theologists suffer and/or prosper as a consequence? (1097)

	Now, I believe it could be argued that having altruistic genes and/or having religious proclivities actually enhance human existence and promote its existential fitness in the long term! Those practices that promote community, however circumscribed in extent of that support, also promote the continued quantity and quality of existence. So, might it be the case that that we win some and lose some, so to speak. Religious attitudes towards the world and others ‘existentially’ promote this greater quantity and quality of personal existence whilst discordant views of reality are usually counter-productive in direct proportion to the degree they impact upon this quantity and quality of existence, both individually and communally. That said, how are we to differentiate these positive and negative features associated with discordant and non-discordant beliefs, etc? Perhaps by noting their presence and absence in certain groups of people or communities and running an evidentially based consequential analysis in that regard. Still, with beliefs that are not obviously based upon evidential foundations, how might one discern this type of positive and/or negative contribution to the quantity and quality of existential existence associated with the same? (1098)

	As already noted, religious memes are a powerful contributing factor to the actual constitution of human cultures. It would appear, on the surface at least, that overall they must existentially promote the quantity and quality of human existence otherwise they would not have been institutionalized, etc., in the first place nor perpetuated thereafter! In this light we must be grateful for all forms of existential contribution in this regard. Obviously, I suspect, the more organized nature of religious institutions have better availed themselves on th behalf of both the individual and the community in which thy find themselves situated. Then, again, an existential, secular, humanist approach, whether individually based or communally oriented, in turn have contributed to the overall constitution of culture, etc. However, one must find, in comparison, that religious influences are more than likely to exert a greater positive influence in that regard (regardless of the evidential basis they may or may not possess). Moreover, as institutions, such memes and their institutionalizations can still be purified of, or from, relatively non-existential features, and, as a result, function more effectively…. (1099)

	Examined in this light, non-concordant features need not disrupt nor impede the existential quantity and quality of the lives of those people led within such institutions or cultures. Furthermore, the ongoing existentialization of such frames of reference and their associated practices can further augment the quantity and quality of the lives of those people subjected to such influences despite the possible existence of ontological and/or epistemological forms of discordance. But, then, as such discordant features can never be absolutely central perhaps it is only right, therefore, to overlook the possibility of such possibilities. As a result, theological difference is perhaps better re-written along existential lines as the ensuing quantity and quality of existence given that imputation of the Divine is currently accepted by that individual and/or community?! (1100)

	Just as the careful and circumspect serial killer can stay in business, if you will excuse my comparison, so too is there a plethora of ideas humans accept and act upon regardless of the nature of the extent of their associated evidential basis or, indeed, a lack or relative absence of an evidential basis. It would seem many ideas have a currency of their own regardless of their basis or non-basis in (the) reality (the Life-World as inter-subjectively thematized and culturally disseminated, etc.). As I have already argued, this proposal of a core-function and non-core-function might be able to account for the relative survival of identity-formations as long as non-existentially functioning non-core functions do not fatally impede, in the meantime, upon the course of core-functions. Another comparison might be made here: a corpse is no longer a living person whereas a person in a coma is still ‘living’ albeit marginally and through the intervention of forms of life-support. The point being made is this that intentionally conscious brain functions are neither sufficient nor necessary for the short-term survival of embodiment. Without basic functions of embodiment there could be no intentional life. Without intentionally conscious contributions to our existence a functioning sense of embodiment does not immediately cease to be. The fact that we normally go to sleep each day is proof of this simple point. Of course if we remained in a state of sleep or some form of a coma or similar no doubt our embodied existence would soon be called into question without some form of appropriate assistance in that regard. The moral being this – the moral and non-moral consequences of our ethical life may catch up with us, that need not necessarily be the case. Likewise, beliefs without adequate justification in fact need not necessarily impede the course of the individual nor necessarily impede the existential nature of their passage through this World-of-Life (at least in the short-term). Furthermore, in and off themselves, theological frames of reference overall could be shown, I believe, to assist in the existential existence of the individual and the community, etc. However, without the importation of other forms of imputation a theological difference, without a basis in evidential foundations, can only be written in the form of an existential theological difference (regardless of the long-term viability of the person or community, etc., that might subscribe to such a frame of reference). Let us now continue our investigation into the differences in the formulation of a theological difference by examining the imputations and consequences of soteriological contributions to this category of debate. (1101)

	I suspect that all relatively viable soteriological frames of reference see to it that some small instance of redemption and salvation is already meted out to the faithful in this world regardless of whether the overall tenor of that salvation is actually realizable or not realizable. Let me explain this observation. (1102)

	Part of the survival of religious memes dealing with the topic of salvation is that they create, more or less, a simultaneous sense of religious deficit and the religious means by which that deficit is to be overcome both in part and in whole. However, the means by which salvation is to be obtained in part is given an apparent exhibition whereas the exhibition of total salvation is never evidentially demonstrated (being only proclaimed, etc.). When a person claims to be ‘saved’ their claim is more along the lines, it would seem, as to ‘their feeling saved’. How do they know that salvation is now to hand? Through a resolution, in part, of this cognitively experienced sense of a religious deficit in their ‘previous existence’ (before the apparent advent of their salvation). Relief, any relief, in this sense of a religious deficit, would, quite naturally, be experienced as a form of religious relief, i.e., interpreted as some form of salvation (in part or in whole) (as it might be framed by that particular religious outlook). Indeed, soteriological philosophies both create this sense of a deficit and the supposed means by which the same deficit can be overcome. Once some sense of a deficit is taken on board, then any form of a lessening of that sense of a deficit would be experienced as some form of relief and interpreted, accordingly, in and through that same soteriological frame of reference as some semblance of salvation (whether realized in part or in whole). Now my argument here is this, regardless of whether salvation is actually realized in accordance with its formulation in that soteriological frame of reference, any form of a relief from this existential sense of a religious deficit would naturally be welcomed in those same terms of reference as some form and degree of salvation. What I would term here as salvation in part. An existential taste or foretaste of what is to come even though what is to come is never usually directly attested to and evidentially demonstrated. A person might claim to be ‘saved’, a claim seemingly uttered in good faith, still, they can never demonstrate that they have been ‘absolutely saved’ and ‘saved for all time’. By ‘saved’ we could substitute ‘enlightened’ or ‘blessed’ or ‘perfected’, etc., etc. Yet, a mere taste of that relief along with the repetition of such claims and their acceptance is often more than enough for some individuals to feel fully subscribed members of the religious fraternity into which they have psychically subscribed by self-simulating that semblance of a religious deficit and finding thereafter some small measure of relief from the same by such subscription of membership (to those also seemingly saved). I am not denying the importance and authenticity of such interpretations, but am merely pointing our that a neutral observer might be a better person to evaluate and test the apparent  ‘truth’ of such claims rather than the claimants themselves!? The claimant might claim some form of an existential difference in that regard. A claim, however, that is more analytic in its formulation and experience that synthetic a priori. Given that a cognitive deficit is induced, and, then, in turn, filled (in and by that same religious frame of reference) does not mean that that relief need necessarily conform to prescriptions and descriptions espoused by its associated religious philosophy in their fullest sense of salvation or similar! Am I being fair here? Surely the religious claimant knows what they are saying? Still, as simpler explanations are already to hand, why turn to one espoused by that same associated religious philosophy when a simpler psychological explanation could be offered in its place as suggested above? (1103)

	Although some might dismiss this semblance of a salvation in part, in truth we have here a powerful phenomenon – an assembly of motivations that can re-direct the life of both individuals and cultures. In my opinion much religious phenomena (along with the semblance of religious change) can be adequately explained and understood by reference to this type of a process of the induction of a religious form of existential deficit and its amelioration, in part, by methods and goals espoused by that same religious philosophy for overcoming that sense of a religious deficit. That instances wherein such psychic relief is realized is then, naturally, interpreted as a sign or indication of religious success upon that ‘path’ as prescribed by that associated religious philosophy. The total process (deficit induction and reduction of deficit, re-induction of a deficit, etc.) has the effect of reinforcing this ‘religious vision of reality’ as this ‘vision of religious reality’, etc. That much of the process of religious change, in all its forms, can be accounted for through an understanding of this basic mechanism. E.g., the process of religious conversion, the creation of religious innovation, the dissemination of religious ideas, etc. This understanding, I believe, now gives us access to an appreciation of this sense of an existential difference (whether that be as a theological existential difference and/or as a non-theological existential difference) along with an appreciation of the overall value of the same since all forms of values are essentially the difference in value between various states or modes as articulated within the epistemological level of expression as expressed within comparative modes of expression. All forms of value cannot occur in a psychic vacuum and, effectively, are the measure of a differentiation in value within some common inter-linking mode of activity. Let me examine this observation (on the nature of [religious] value as a differential within a common inter-linked genre of [religious] behaviour as a commonly associated mode of activity). (1104)

	If a person were to say to you “you are not saved, but I am saved” we have some idea what they are trying to say even if we do not believe them. Being not-saved/being saved occurs for-us in a common inter-linked genre of activity involving a non-absolute continuum in some form or other between ‘not-being-saved’-and-‘being-saved’. Thus the differential-value, value, being expressed by this continuum would, naturally, reflect the intentional nature of that continuum in question. In general terms of reference, what possibilities are archetypally open to us? For a start the continuum could be in the form of a continuity or discontinuity. Or, in the form of a poly-textual format, a bi-textual format or a relatively univocal format? In the latter we could treat reports of value as, by necessity, being in the form of a continuity; i.e., occupying mere degrees of gradation without any form of radical discontinuity (like degrees of temperature). Or, in a bi-textual format as either in a continuous parallel format or in a discontinuous non-parallel format (as in, say, the difference between a model dealing with water molecules per se and phase descriptions realized in various different states of water per se). Say, the sort of bi-textual difference experienced between the physical states of ice and running water, or, heated water about to boil and water in a gaseous form. Or, we might consider all these various physical states of water as a poly-textual format (and an open-ended one at that given an infinity of conditions?). Now, any account of value in a religious frame of reference will conform to the above in type in some form or other. Let us quickly examine various models of enlightenment in the Buddhist traditions in the regard. If enlightenment were proposed as merely more insight along a continuum of life in all its perfections and imperfections, as a Tantric exponent might argue, then we have adopted a uni-vocal, non-parallel type of text. However, more often Buddhist enlightenment (nirvana) is spoken of as entailing a radical dis-conjunction between a period of time before-enlightenment, and the moment of enlightenment itself along with an unending period of post-enlightenment; thence a non-paralleled bi-textual account is being implied in this type of scenario. But, some commentators would argue that the moment of enlightenment is more an illusion and that we are already forever enlightened but not, as yet, aware of this ‘existential fact’ of our being. This type of account being treated as a dis-conjunctive bi-textual text paralleled by a univocal text without any form of radical dis-conjunction as occurs in the first (which may or may not be treated equally with the former through the non-importation/importation of forms of privilege, etc.). Evaluation as to where a certain state is positioned within these coordinates establishing its relativity of value within that common inter-lined genre of activity. By such means the religious believer or some second party, etc., can evaluate the ascertainment of religious value being assumed or imparted to that person within that relevant scheme to hand (in accordance with various claims made, relevant observation that could be conducted in that regard, etc.). Hence, in a wider frame of reference we could merely nominate a specific variety of religious states as indicative of this type of common genre such as being non-baptized, baptized, re-baptized, or, being non-initiated, initiated, or, being condemned to the cycle of existence, a once-returner, a Buddha or bodhisattva, etc. Or, the implications of nominated processes of religious change might be spelt out through comparisons made between phenomenological-like prescriptions and descriptions as framed by that particular religious frame of reference. The important point being made here is that value is a differentiated phenomenon and is realized/re-realized through a differentiation/re-differentiation of the difference in value discerned in a nominated change of state as interpreted by that common inter-lined mode of activity (as formulated meta-textually through a denomination of a common genre of activity). (1105)

	Value is therefore differentiated, i.e., determined through some process of comparison whether that ascertainment is overtly recognized or covertly non-recognized! It should also be recognized, however, that that determination of value cannot be formulated in an absolute fashion as definitive with respect to that type of situation. Although people, religious specialist especially, might wish to impose absolute standards, here we should recognized the (analytical) absolutization of a non-absolute processes of intentional formulation in this regard! For example, a treasure chest filled with gold and jewels could be dug up on a beach. What is the value of the contents of that chest? There is no way to say that it has this value x and only that value x since it could be assayed in an infinity of evaluative frames of value determination. Thence this impossibility of an absolute determination since it can be determined in an infinity of frames of reference other than the one currently adopted (and mere adoption itself cannot establish absolutization of value). E.g., it could be seen as a source of woe as people steal it from each other and advertently or inadvertently injure and/or kill each other in the process. Or, the golden jewelry inside, being stolen and easily identifiable, can only be melted down to realize a value purely in terms of the weight and purity of the actual gold present, and, in a similar manner, gemstones might need to be de-mounted from their clasps and some of them also perhaps broken up. Or, the reward for the return of this treasure might be considered more valuable for an assortment of reasons. Or, it may well be the case that intrinsic beauty of this treasure might be such that a museum or collector might want to contribute a considerable premium to the same (beyond the intrinsic value of the mere gold, etc.). Or, we might be starving on that beach and consider its current value to be useless, unless, that is, we could trade some of this treasure for food and drink. If this point, that I am trying to make here, is not obvious then let me spell it out – value is never determined on an absolute, intrinsic basis but always in terms of the intentional frame of reference utilized for that type of determination; i.e., its determination is both meta-textually and contextually oriented! Alter that frame of determination and you will meet with a different sense of value! However, it should also be noted that as it is human intentionality that formulates the adopted and adapted evaluative frame/s of reference then transformation rules are open to us, at least theoretically if not practically, that would allow me to go from one frame of determination to some other, etc. Let me examine this possibility with respect to religious expressions of value. (1106)

	Let us say, for the sake of argument, two very open-minded, very religious individuals from difference religious traditions are exploring the possibility of a religious dialogue. How might they go about this possibility? Obviously, from my perspective (in accordance with my understanding), each religious person has already entered into a dialogue, if only with themselves, as to the merits of their adopted religious tradition versus the merits of a non-profession of faith and/or versus the perceived merit/demerit/relative lack of merit of other forms of faith (already to hand in some form or other). Their sense of commitment is already arrived at through this form of a self-dialogue! Hence this inter-linked genre of activity already exists between the adoption and adaptation of a certain faith versus the non-adoption of some other form of faith, etc. Thus a potential ‘space’ has already been made for this type of dialogue and it only behooves those entering into this process of possible dialogue to ‘enlarge’ it in a manner conducive to that type of engagement, i.e., from the transcendental perspective of that relationship itself in the best form deemed amenable to this type of close comparative analysis. Ideally, how might this be done, and, is it not conceivable that relatively incommensurable obstacles might prevent a process of dialogue from taking place in a satisfactory manner for one or both or all the parties concerned? By the ‘creation’ of processes of accommodation this process could then go forward. By ‘creation’ is meant here more the discovery of common modes of activity already engaged in by one or both or all of the parties concerned. Then, through this discovery, more as a process of uncovering, the extension of this type of common ground can be re-examined in the light of the adoption and adaptation of other elements of accommodation in order to facilitate these process of transformation that will occur as the parties ‘translate’ their respective positions in the light of their own positions and in the light of the apparent positions of the other parties interacting in that overall process of dialogue. Am I being too optimistic in this regard? Yes and no! As long as the whole process is centered in an overall transcendental suspension, by those parties concerned, then I have grounds for optimism. However, dialogue is never satisfactory when one or more of the parties indulges in egoistically driven acts of dogmatic, ideological absolutization. Other can learn from us and we can learn from others. Even if only to better thematize and develop our own sense of where we might stand or should stand. Then, again, the resultant value that emerges from that form of accommodation and transformation may well not merit the investment of value invested in that type of project. (1107)

	Let me now examine, theoretically, by what rules and insights a process of dialogue might be better examined and developed, and, thereafter, how it can be properly, appropriately and validly evaluated in and through our critical utilization of an overall transcendental suspension? (1108)

	To this end let me rehabilitate various rulings, etc., previously developed in my examinations of transformational treatment, ordered analysis, the examination of intentional types of structure and interaction, etc. Let me nominate these various elements as intentional frames of reference, logical subjects/states, specified intentional perspectives, operations (within a certain frame of intentional reference), accommodations (between intentional frames of reference), transformations (across intentional frame so reference), critical acts of appreciation, processes of treatment/re-treatment, determinations of difference in value within common inter-lined genres of activity, hypothetical and non-hypothetical modes of consequential analysis, etc. (1109)
	
	In the course of this extended essay much of the above has already been defined and dealt with directly or indirectly. Let me discuss the philosophy behind these terms in order to demonstrate the nature of my intentions in this regard. Quite simply if two or more parties are going to enter into a dialogue in some form or other then a common ground must be developed to do that. This accommodation then allows us to communicate with each other in that regard. Within our own area or field of context (as an intentional field of reference) certain elements are present in that field, i.e., logical subjects or logical states. Any alterations to the same is effectively conducted as an operation, or, we can re-present those logical subjects or logical states in another field, given this pre-formation of an accommodation, by virtue of a process of transformation. In doing so we carve out an inter-linked genre of activity (wherein this type of transformation is then allowed to be conducted). The result of this process can then be re-investigated from a consequential point of view (or in some other apposite ordered frame of reference, etc.). With this type of language we are now in a position to theoretically/practically/critically treat that under investigation in our current research program. E.g., if we were dealing with a specific type of religious phenomenon then we would need to specify the apparent essential nature of that phenomenon, the nature of the participants in that religious type of experience, etc. Furthermore, in dealing with transformations of perspective between frames of reference already accommodated in an inter-linked genre of activity, or an extension of the same, we are now in a position to conduct that process with a greater degree of critical clarity. Let me give an example in this regard in the hope it might put the above in a better or clearer light. (1110)

	Le us say for the sake of an example that a Buddhist devotee were to experience a religious like experience in which Quan Yin came to them in a dream and spoke to them. To a fellow religionist they relay the overall gist of this experience detailing the nature of this religious experience and also detailing how they reacted to the apparent religious import of this experience. Now, let us say a Christian friend overhears them discuss this religious-like experience and they in turn recount what to them seems to be a similar type of experience. However, in this case the Christian adherent claims the visitor in the dream was the Virgin Mary. Now, they are all friends and go about sharing their similar accounts of this common type of experiences in the process noting their similarities and differences. They note that this experience occurred in a vivid dream, that there each were visited by female divinity who spoke to them with religious words of advice. On the other hand the first party said it was Quan Yin whereas the third party said it was the Virgin Mary. Yes, they concur, both visitors were dressed in long flowing white robes, however, they agree to differ in their interpretations as to who this visitation was. Our second party  happily mediates and asks is it possible that perhaps Quan Yin is also the Virgin Mary, and vice versa? Then, noting that these experiences happened in dreams would go on to question whether these ‘visitations’ were real visitations and only images conjured up in their own minds and nothing else other than images created in their own minds? One of the parties noted that she felt somehow in control of this image to some extent. That when they earnestly wanted to get closer to the imagery as it appeared before them it would fade and by letting go of that aspiration it would come back again into a greater state of focus. The other party to whom there was a similar ‘visitation’ felt something similar was operating. The neutral second party then noting that the Buddhist interpreted this type of imagery as the Quan Yin whereas the Christian would interpret it as the Virgin Mary. What are (some of) the (transcendental) possibilities in this regard they asked out loud: that this type of dream imagery was real, in which case Quan Yin and the Virgin Mary were either separate entities or the same entity, or, if unreal, were mere fictions created by their own minds (with or without a real sense of religious involvement and trans-symbolic connection). What other options are there? Could it be Mara or the Devil in disguise? Happily discussing the hermeneutic nature of their response to a similar type of phenomenal presentation, namely, the apparent ‘visitation’ of a divinity in the course of a dream. What conclusions did they come to? Again they agreed to disagree but at the same time did partially admit to each other that this type of experience, although seemingly vivid, did occur in a dream, and, that dreams were notoriously fickle and often quite unfaithful to the reality of the world, yet, they could perhaps act as a medium for religious experience? To some extent a series of de facto or tacit transcendental suspensions were entered into in order for these three friends to discuss and compare the nature of their religious or religious-like experiences. This, effectively, allowed them to interrogate the particular phenomenon in question, textualized in the form of a report (either first-hand and/or second-hand) and examine some of those essential phenomenal properties apparently to hand in order to ascertain the transcendental ideality of that under such focus in its inter-subjectively apparent empirical reality. By such means we can come to some degree of a consensus as to the nature of the terrain we pass in our passage through this World-of-Life together with others. (1111)

	As critical philosophers what would we have made of this conversation between these three parties? As transcendental phenomenologists skilled in the proper and appropriate use of a terminological language of a type like that as sketched out above (e.g., in paragraph no. 1109) we might note a number of phenomenological properties and possibilities. For a start, even though two of the parties came from a difference religious frame of reference yet they were still able to converse with each other about their religious-like dream experiences. As a fourth party we could speculate that the Quan Yin image could be transformed very easily into the Virgin Mary image, and v.v. At the same time, treated as the simulation/re-simulation of a mere image, that acceptance of an image as an image did not force them to be either partisan nor non-partisan in that regard; i.e., to either propose that one of both of those images was either Quan Yin or the Virgin Mary, or, that image was both of these divinities, or, that there were no real divinities in that visitation, etc. Then, other observations could be made in regard to the apparent phenomenological nature of the those presentations, the nature of that type of presentation. Furthermore, the entertainment of such possibilities, despite such radical forms of criticism and deconstruction, could still be entertained as a legitimate channel for religious communication and insight-formation (about the nature-of-our-existence in this World-of-Life), etc. Although, the final conclusion that was reached was, that despite the apparent vividness of this type of dream imagery, it could only be tentatively identified, interpreted, etc. Hence, at least to some extent, the partial use of an overall transcendental suspension in their dialogical examination of this type of occurrence (and that the same was adopted by our phenomenological fourth party to the extent that they do not decide, one way or the other, as to their definite, definitive interpretations of the same! All research in this sense being forever provisional even if definitive findings, in a practical sense, are realized along the way. (1112)

	Now, how should any of these four parties determine the value of that type of occurrence (either directly or indirectly)? (1113)

	Obviously, already these four parties can talk to each other with varying degrees of successfulness. As critical philosophers it would be our task here to examine how that was possible and thematize procedures to refine this type of process (and therein improve upon these theoretical, practical and critical methods that assist this process of clarification). However, the dialectical nature of the hermeneutic circle implies that this task is contextually dependent and limited by the very nature of those constraints. But, then, we find that when current limits are approached the existential value of that task is seriously diminished and, therein, quite naturally circumscribed accordingly (until such a time a more fine-grained approach is found to be both possible and realizable). Still, the question does remain, what is the value for these four parties of their own first-hand reports and second-reports, etc? How is this localized form of value to be ascertained and realized? Let me proffer some observations in this regard. (1114)

	With a first-hand report a degree of self-evaluation is always associated with the same. The first party that spoke of the visitation of Quan Yin in the dream positively regarded such an experience as a religious experience and it was interpreted in that light. The second party when privy to the details of this experience, from a report made by the first party, also regarded it in the same light. Even the third party treated it as a religious experience and compared it with a similar religious experience entertained by them (with the possible imputation that perhaps the divinity in question was the Virgin Mary rather than Quan Yin; not that this possibility was insisted upon dogmatically). By being open to new interpretations and by being non-dogmatic in their judgments these first three parties regarded each other in a similar manner to that fourth party, effectively, as a neutral phenomenologists of a transcendental persuasion. No party in this three-way dialogue was going to absolutely insist that there interpretation was the definitive reading of the situation to hand. They all recognized that dreams were notoriously fickle, yet, also subscribed to an ancient belief that dreams could also act as a medium between the Divine and the non-divine. None of these three parties gave up their interpretations, yet, in a non-partisan spirit entertained the meaning and meaningfulness of other interpretations along with considerations that examined the hypothetical ramifications of certain alternative readings. To entertain parallel readings of the same phenomenal situation to hand is to enter into an open overall transcendental suspension, a position-less ‘position’ adopted and adapted by the fourth party. Without spelling out once more the fine detail of the practice of an overall transcendental suspension let me ask how parallel readings can be entertained and how this type of attitude can elicit for us the value of that under examination whether that be in a pre-critical, relatively non-transcendental light or in a critical, relatively transcendental light so to speak? (1115)

	To ask a question we obvious must be able to entertain in parallel the either /or central to the meaning and meaningfulness of that question. Indeed, the very pivot of the either/or is that point where the sense of that under examination is to be thematized. By ‘sense’ is meant that point in our psychic mapping of the Life-World currently in question. E.g., is the Earth flat (or round?) or not flat (or not round?)? If we were to believe that the Earth is flat then we believe the Earth is indeed flat. It certainly looks to be flat. Unfortunately, if we were to proceed in the same direction across the surface of this globe we end up where we began which must imply that the Earth cannot be flat, that flatness is only an illusion! Or, if we were to believe the Earth is round how are we to explain its apparent flatness? By recourse to the argument that the Earth is very large and a small section of its surface would look flat. But we do not see the Himalayas from the top of our mountains therefore the Earth must, indeed, be not-flat, i.e., round. Our belief that the Earth is either round or flat characterizes the way we have divided our world up in our psychic mapping of it. To focus on a small part of this Life-World is to localize ourselves within its psychic confines as mapped by us (courtesy of the culture/s we find ourselves within). If merely asking a question sets up the entertainment of parallel texts does this imply the overall transcendental suspension is merely realized through the entertainment of a question? No! The hermeneutic circle only allows us to dialectically engage the world through the ongoing relativity of an ‘other’ and in the process allows ourselves to entertain the possibilities of its otherness and non-otherness. After the question is posed, as a suspension, in the braking of that suspension (through the suspension of the suspension) we effectively end up privileging one particular text at the expense of some other by letting the relationship of that act of enquestioning itself effectively decide the issue so to speak when a process of resolution is able to be entered into. So, today, we know the world is round and thence not flat! In general the act of judgment is either done with an adequate degree of careful deliberation or without and adequate degree of careful deliberation. What allows us to arrive at a state of resolution reflecting this condition of a process of careful deliberation? Our ability to inspect both or all sides of our question, and, in our relationship with the same, discover which solution/s have more merit given our current state of contextual determination in the light of the propriety and appropriateness of the course of our meta-textual questions, etc. ‘Propriety’ in terms of the correctness of our internal formulations involved in the process of the question, and, ‘appropriateness’ in terms of the correctness of our external, i.e., contextual, formulations involved in the process of that same question. Then, given these two pre-conditions of the correct formulation of the question, namely its propriety and appropriateness, in the process of the questioning itself a lack of balance is realized when the suspension itself is metaphorically suspended. Thence the apparent resolution of our question! At least in those current terms of reference. If we were to ask a question and were unable to currently decide what was right and what was wrong then, obviously, we would not have been able to resolve this question in question. Indeed, the question then still remains a question by virtue of this inability to let it de-balance itself in an act of resolution. It is in this realization of a deliberative act that is unbalanced in the naturalness of its formulation that allows us to then move on. Or, our ability to not be able to move on then implies that we must move on to some other question (either related to the former or not related), a new question that hopefully can be resolved since, overall, the very nature of our existence in a world of culture and the survival of ourselves-in-that-world-of-culture, along with the survival of that world-of-culture, are all dependent upon our ability to make adequate judgments, as resolutions, about our place in this world-with-others! (1116)

	I am arguing that it is this natural realization of a state of imbalance that allows us to enjoy a resolution of the question. However, this imbalance must first be realized in a state of balance, i.e., in this ‘priority’ of the overall transcendental suspension. Moreover, this state of imbalance must be realized rather than imposed dogmatically. Given adequate pre-conditions and adequate conditions, and all relevant material is therefore to hand, we should assume, under normal circumstances, the realization of adequate post-conditions! Furthermore, normally, such deliberations should be able to be repeated and by such reiteration reinforce the relatively definitive nature of that resolution in question (or, rather, now no longer so much in question). Thence the basis for a consequential analysis/re-analysis along with other forms of ordered analysis/re-analysis. (1117)

	Now given this explanation how is value to be realized? Or, rather how is value recognized? (1118)

	Value is the collective result of the hermeneutic circle being the net result realized above and beyond its mere (phenomenological) sense, (hermeneutic) meaning and (existential) meaningfulness. How are we to extract these individual aspects from the collective result of this encircling of the question to hand in question, or, how are we to extract the collective result of this process of thematization wherein the value of that in question is realized? Again, subjectively, by means of genres of activity, and, inter-subjectively, by means of common inter-linked genres of activity. Still, how is value (overall and in all its forms and aspects) to be appreciated? By virtue of this ‘weight’ of its existential difference, its overbalance in the direction of its effectively and currently realized solution, i.e., resolution. Let me illustrate this ‘insight’. (1119)

	‘Insight’ is both the seeing into/in-seeing into a certain relationship in question and the seeing over/oversighting of the same relationship; a relationship defined by the simulator of that relationship, i.e., the person whose intentional formulations define the relationship in question and, in turn, are defined by that same question to hand. In this intentional frame of reference the relationship is defined as the relationship between the intentional field in question and the logical subject-state/s in question. The sense of ‘person’ involved in this judgmental act of questioning being both defined by the same and not defined by the same, being both immanent and transcendent to this vision of a relationship – constituting the intentional relationship in question from the points of view of that sense of person being constituted by the same (immanently), and, at the same time, as they are constituting this overall process (transcendently). Thus being neither absolutely in control nor being absolutely controlled by the same! That, effectively, the imbalance between the overall emergent nature of that relationship in question and the constituent components of that same relationship in question giving us this sense of a weighted-ness in our recognition  of the value of that value. In effect, this sense of an imbalance answers those critics that feel the (overall) transcendental suspension is a perfect recipe for the paralysis of psychosis or an unmotivated menu for those with no desire when, obviously, the relationship needs to be critically balanced first merely in order to be properly ascertained as a yet-to-be-answered-question (when the imbalance of that/those relationship/s is/are then appreciated) (otherwise questions would answer themselves before being asked). What are the consequences of this properly and appropriately ascertained sense of an imbalance? (1120)

	In our ‘research project’ an adequate overall transcendental suspension is called for! By ‘adequate’ is meant the simulation/re-simulation of a relationship in question (internally) in a proper manner, (externally) in an appropriate manner contextually, and, with a discovery of its unique existential sense of validity (through an ongoing balance, read ‘suspension’, of the former). Moreover, through this balance being allowed to operate by (deconstructing the overall suspension) we then are thrust or projected into the world in and through the utilization of that genre/s of activity associated with our framing of that relationship in question. Furthermore, through the application of a series of interrelated frames of intentional reference a richness of intent is thematized also above and beyond the mere summation of those facets present in each of those reference frames. Indeed, it is by such a richness of intentional formation that we can see objects in the round so to speak, that we can find an appreciation of the points of view of others and even entertain a simple question (through this process of a parallelization of texts, etc.). This richness of intent, above and beyond its mere summation of inputs, being discerned as the current value of that under examination in those investigations. So, with all these various inputs, and outputs, how is value discerned in the midst of such complexity? By this breaking of symmetry, this realization of an imbalance; value is discharged, and therein realized, through this self-deconstruction of the overall suspension (as held in parallel). Let me explore this concept of the realization of value through the breaking of symmetry first put in place through the utilization of the overall transcendental suspension. (1121)

	One puzzle that can now be explained is how the balanced nature of the overall transcendental suspension is able to produce a definitive form of judgment when and where ever a distinctive act of judgment is able then to be formed therein. This loss of symmetry is realized through this breaking of the symmetry of the overall transcendental suspension (and by an overall transcendental suspension is also meant the multi-dimensional treatment of the overall transcendental suspension; the overall transcendental suspensions involved in the formation of a complex intentional field of investigation). As a result a rich, complex multi-dimensional resolution is realized which through re-iteration re-establishes and reinforces the nature of that resolution arrived at in this process of symmetry breaking. It is by such means, e.g., that certain ethical questions find themselves more resolved in and through deontological terms of reference and other ethical questions find themselves more resolved in and through pragmatical terms of reference. Or, why aesthetic performances that are found to seriously involve themselves with ethical considerations, in a manner that is currently not found to be acceptable, are often found to be disruptive of their aesthetic for their audiences, or, find themselves being disrupted by their audiences or other parties who have voiced their disapproval in that regard. Even radically new forms of aesthetic practice can be found to be psychically disruptive/find themselves disrupted until that new style is better appreciated should that happen (or, otherwise, those new styles may be effectively ignored until such a time a general appreciation is able to be formed in which they can then be better judged one way or the other). Thus, we are forced to concede, that not only is value realized through this disruption of symmetry (inherent in its overall transcendental suspension) but that the necessary genres of activity and their adequate appreciation, must be in place befor a proper and appropriate appreciation of their value is able to be effectively thematized. That even the appreciation of value is genre-dependent! I.e., through the adoption and adaptation of the relevant genre or genres appropriate to its adequate appreciation. Now, what insights can we draw in regards to the appreciation of theological value (or religious value or any other form of value)? In an examination of the simulation of this type of value-formation in a first-hand report and its (re-)simulation in a second-hand report is there a difference? Is there, in effect, a discontinuity between this level of reporting that would imply that theological value could only be properly and appropriately (and validly) appreciated by none other than the first party themselves? (1122) 

	Although there is a sense in which the realization of value is a subjective experience it is also an inter-subjectively-oriented experience by virtue of the fact that all forms of experience are entertained in and through the relevant genres of activity. When the parties concerned share the same inter-linked genres of activity then they can find themselves in a position to appreciate those reports whether they be first-hand or second-hand, etc. Moreover, this appreciation can be qualitatively realized by the quality of those connections, however, once a definitive essential judgment is realized thereafter it is merely reinforced through its continual re-confirmation (until such a time there arises a need to radically revise that distinctive formation of opinion). Hence this implication of the above – that theological value should be able to be appreciated in either first-hand reports or second-hand reports, by theologist and non-theologist alike, to that extent inter-linked genres of activity are available for that level of mutual understanding. (1123)
	
	Habits become patterns of activity, and, patterns of activity become habits! Often, it would seem, judgments are made purely on the grounds of their correspondence with precedents already judged in that regard (by society). Hence our ethical lives are not normally lived in a state of moral agitation. Similarly, our lives lived in all other senses are more or less already shared with others in that same respect. So much so that just as objects in our utilization of the same, either intentionally formed or intentionally found, are already shared to a great extent, so, too, the same applies to our intentional frames of reference dealing with those object and their combination in the form of states and beyond in our re-combination of their concatenation, in the transcendental form of a ‘world’ whose possibility is established in the possibility-actuality of the Life-World. Although  I see the world from my point of view, still my point of view is not just my point of view alone! Your world is also my world, and v.v. Here we are presented with a considerable overlap – and one would expect the same to occur between theologists, and, theologists versus non-theologists. Still there is a difference, between all the parties, and that sense of a difference too could be referred to as a theological difference, or, more correctly, as an individualized existential theological difference (when cashed out in our examination of how those parties view this question of a theological or theological-like interpretation of the world since a mundane theological difference is almost guaranteed to some extent, however residual, by virtue of this transcendental need for a sense of world-unity, the semblance of a unified World-of-Life). In this regard we can note too that as all parties are going to have at least some minimal form of a subscription to a  mundane theological vision of the world, still, no party will have exactly the same degree and manner of theological ideation in this regard! Because all parties, therefore, are going to have and hold some form of a personalized vision and version of an individualized existential theological difference. Thus we need to account for this degree of difference (since it should be obvious that some people do not seriously entertain any form of a trans-mundane theological difference be they a religionist or a non-religionist whilst others are committed to some vision and version of this theological way of the seeing the world. That, in effect, for the latter, namely, theologists, the Life-World has a theological complexion, indeed, a trans-mundane theological complexion in some direct and/or indirect form or other. In our continuing investigations let us explore the innovations of this theological meme, the apparent value of such a religious innovation and the possible value of such a value (and even question the value of the value of this type of value, i.e., question the value of such a meta-value?)? (1124)

	Obviously, for some, the theological meme has a value since its persistence implies that it must have had a value for it to have been taken up and re-continued. What might the nature of that value be? Granted that this motivation is more than likely complex, let us examine important facets of that complexity. (1125)

	The easiest way of determining theological value might be to ask a practicing theologist what value the theological mode of life has for that person. Or, we could look at texts, with a theological implication, with this type of investigation to mind. Or, instead, let us interview a hypothetical theologian in the hope that we might be able to elicit the nature of this lived difference by creatively recreating what might well be featured prominently in the life of a real theologian. Essentially, we are looking for characteristic features in this regard and an open-ended eidetic reflection, in order to ascertain their contextual relevance and inherently distinctive range, might well help us to define and refine a series of possibilities in this quest. So let us ask our hypothetical theologian what difference their theological mode of life might make for them? (1126)

	I am sure one pronounced response would be “it’s a matter of salvation!” At this point let us divide responses of our hypothetical theologian along these lines of those concerned with salvation (in either the here and now or at some future point in time) and those not directly connected with salvation (at some [future] point in time). Let us also enquire at this point whether there are other prominent features of the theological landscape that might be focused upon by our hypothetical theologian besides dealing merely with matters directly related to issues of ‘salvation’. (1127)

	We could also conduct this type of search by referencing prominent metaphors utilized in a theological text or context. In the Christian Tradition we have the Divine as God compared to a father, shepherd, guide, creator, punisher (of crime/sin), bestower of boons, judge, hearer of prayers, guardian of the just, as an archetype for proper behaviour, etc., etc. In general terms of reference how might these type of metaphors inform us in this regard? Or, what work is done and what value is there in the performance of the same, or its simulation/re-simulation, by the devotee? (1128)

	Often myths have a ritual, performative aspect. They are meant to be emulated and re-lived. So, through such simulations/re-simulations the point or message of such a metaphor should be revealed and made relatively transparent? Again, in the Christian Tradition/s we can note that there are rituals (often adopted and adapted from pre-Christian pagan traditions) associated, e.g., with Christmas and Easter, and other points in the church calendar. Often, many of these rituals and performative acts are conducted in the hope of a sympathetic association with the Divine nature of that being simulated, or, rather through a simulation of (the event/advent of) that type of relationship desired (rather than the Divine per se); this association then leading to either consequences of a salvational nature or of a non-salvational nature, or, usually, as a complex mixture of both types of ‘consequences’. (1129)

	In other traditions we seem to have a mirroring of similar types of religious procedures, such as, e.g., rituals of benediction; the blessing of institutions, food, new structures, etc; the seeking of a divine communion in some direct/indirect form or other; processes of purification; practices for the expiration of guilt/sin; references to ritual implements, etc; processions and parades, etc., etc. Interestingly, we should note that many ritual procedures seem to echo each other across traditions although one should always be careful to note that a similarity of form does not necessarily imply a similarity of intentional motivation (since it is the meta-textual nature of the adopted genre that decides that type of issue), etc. What is a non-theologist to make of all this? Could they not accuse the theologist of merely weaving language to their own ends? Or, could a theologian reply that non-theologists are merely weaving language to their own ends and in all this they, too, are just as selective as to what they adopt and adapt for their own purposes?  (1130)

	Perhaps we should accept the possibility that in the advance of this type of meme inter-linked genres of religious activity have developed along with the development of such a transmission, and, as a consequence, that a theological understanding is generally understood (culturally and inter-culturally) whether that be entertained by a theologist or a non-theologists, whether that be entertained by a person who is naturally a religionists or a non-religionist. Let us invoke this common ground of understanding in order to explore, where possible, the apparent value of a theological mode of life? (1131)

	Moreover, I believe, we could also formulate a list of epithets concerning a set of abstract values that seem to be desired by the theologist. Most likely some, perhaps most, of these values would be shared by other theologists of different theological traditions. A closer scrutiny in this regard helping to determine in what manner and to what degree these values could be related to each other. Such an examination, hopefully, also being able to link these various values to create a certain theological philosophy as to why these values are desired and in what way they link salvational aspirations with non-salvational aspirations, and v.v. In this regard my intuition suggests that such epithets might well be best integrated around the concept of a personal relationship, i.e., a personalized relationship between some facet or aspect of the Divine and their devotee. Hence such qualities like love, communion, connection, compassion, caring, guidance, spiritual protection, etc., are relatively privileged by virtue of their status as positive relational terms expressing a sense of personal interrelationship (between the Divine and the religious adherent in some direct/indirect form or other). Often such epithets are equated with the theoretical nomination of the Divine, e.g., that God is love, that Divine is all powerful and all compassionate, etc. This technique of the invocation of a string of equated epithets often being indicative of an absolute philosophy (although their misuse would also portend a misguided version of an absolutist vision of the numinous). First, let us take one of these epithets and examine its intended meaning in the hope we can link non-salvational forms of religious value-seeking with forms of salvational value seeking. (1132)

	In this aspect of our research let me first ask if the non-current realization of salvation, and the fact that salvation never seems to be fully obtained in the midst of full life, how the complexity of such an attitude can assist us in our passage through this one-World-of-Life? To simplify this task let me chose one epithet, say love, and learn to look at how this aspect might thread disparate segments of one’s existence into a greater, more integrated ‘whole’. To this end let us hypothetically envisage how this epithet might be viewed by a religious theological devotee? (1133)

	What might the statement “God is love” mean, etc? For a start, as noted, most expressions of this form x is y are inviting the interpretation of a relationship, indeed, the projection of a(n intense) personal relationship with the Divine. Furthermore, this type of equation hints at our being able to surround the Divine but never being able to encounter its center, certainly not in a linguistic form. Yet, on the other hand, a relationship does suggest a certain proximity and intimacy too. Still, the defining of this value as a core value, yet only as a value that can be defined from around the site of the Divine in such a manner that the Divine, as an Absolute (in a non-absolutist mode), cannot be coincident with the same since it cannot be pinned down through the mere use of that value. Similarly, a string of such equations, characteristic of an absolute philosophy, would also suggest that the Divine in some inestimable measure cannot, ultimately, be expressed by such a vocabulary. Thence the use of a via negative, or, further chains of equations, or, obliquely referred to by means of metaphor and analogy, etc. But, then, what holds for relationships between the non-divine also seems to hold, in this regard, for the relationships between the Divine and the relatively non-divine. No one can absolutely appropriate the being of the other, interaction is that, namely, an ongoing process of interaction. For a process of absolute appropriation to be realized then we should also conclude that that relationship has effectively been terminated. Absolute appropriation, in any form, in all forms, being ruled our of court on the transcendental grounds that a process of interaction can never be completed only maintained in an ongoing act of engagement, never as an absolutely appropriated form of relationship. (1134)

	To examine this concept of theological value as the existential meaningfulness of value of the value realized in a general theological sense (through a hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension) (through a conjunction of sense, meaning and meaningfulness are discussed elsewhere on numerous occasions) I very quickly and briefly looked at a number of avenues in general terms of reference, e.g., we considered the ‘interviewing’ of a hypothetical theologian (1126), noted theological mattered usually divided between direct considerations of salvation and matters not directly related to considerations of salvation (1127), then I proposed that we could look at the use of theological metaphors in theological texts (1126), suggesting next that we could examine the attributed nature of deity (1128), and examine the nature of religious rituals (1129), look at the perceived nature of religious interactions with the Divine (1132), look at theological aspirations from the perspective of the devotee (1133) and explore the nature of Divine love (1134) (as one key concept for conceptual/metaphysical analyses, etc.), etc. However, I would like to now suggest another more central method that might be better used to integrate this quest for an understanding of theological value (as it might be found in a particular theological tradition or theological traditions in general). To this end I would like to propose the need for an examination of the concept of a theological turn. In those philosophies that invoke some semblance of a trans-mundane sense of the Divine let us ask what pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions are put in play in order for them to be able to make this kind of philosophical turn, and, importantly, ask what are the overall ramifications of this change of attitude? In the next section of this extended essay let me address this facet of our overall topic, namely, finding a place for the idea (or concept) of God (as the Divine) by examining the ramifications a theological turn appears to proffer the theologist, and, the different semblances of a theological difference that would be realized in and through a dialogue among or between theologists, religionists and non-religionists.  (1135)