The Possibility of Dialogue both Extra-Faith and Inter-Faith*

0.    Introduction

	In this paper I would like to look at the possibility of an extra-faith dialogue between representatives of the secular and the representatives of the religious along with an inter-faith dialogue among and between representatives of the religious. Let me look at what possible grounds might exist for conducting this broad spectrum of exchange. In the process I will re-visit the concept of a theological difference and note possible secular implications for how we find ourselves living-in-this-same-world as a phenomenon of unity (along with the unity of engagement as we stand before-others with-others). On the possibilities for a spectrum of inter-faith dialogues I will re-visit the relatively neutral concept of the numinous and its implication of an open sense of the ‘spiritual’. Moreover, I will examine the hypothetical possibilities that might exit, among the religious, in a conversation between theists and non-theists on the grounds of enacted engagement, and, furthermore, I will make a distinction in conservative theological thinking between viable forms of fundamentalism and non-viable forms of fundamentalism (and their sometimes inauthentic co-option by the latter of an agendum of terrorism). To counter-balance conservative theological thinking I will also look into the possibility of forms of innovative liberal theological thinking to demonstrate similar principles that ideological privilege should never be exercised in an absolutist fashion. Indeed, to conclude, I will note, as a position of common sense, that through the auspices of ongoing, overall transcendental suspensions we find ourselves in a process of ongoing re-alignment with the world-at-large and that it is by such means that any form of a dialogue should be embedded be they secular or sacred in orientation or any form of an existentially open dialogue in between. Upon these grounds of re-alignment I would like to introduce an existential philosophy in general along with a parallel association of a hypothetical theology(/theologies). (0)

	Is there a need for dialogue? In a world riven with conflict, an inability to deal with diversity… parties of disparate views need to learn to accommodate each other and in the process through empathy, etc., find what has value in the lives of others and where applicable find themselves able to share in the same. Hopefully, in a world of suffering, it would be better for all of us to see to it in our own ways that we leave it a better place than how we have found it. This ambition is best collectively realized and, then, only through an understanding that is truly empathetic. Usually, and always to some degree, be the person non-psychotic or psychotic, each and every person has some realization of where they are in this world as they stand before-others with-others and such understanding needs both self-thematization and mutual comprehension by another if we are to collectively be of assistance to the other, and v.v. In such a task we must enter into a dialogue with the other in order to find this increased degree of self-thematization and comprehension by another. Through such a relationship we find this increased degree of mutual understanding and consequent re-alignment within the world, in a world where we find ourselves more insightfully embodied with-others, before-others. (1)

*Latest version: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage4.html 

1.    The Consequences of a Non-Absence of a Theological Difference?

	Elsewhere I have examined an interesting rhetorical concept of theological difference. The question is asked: is there a difference between ‘a world’ and ‘a world plus some form of a theological complexion or implication in some form or other’? In other words would you subscribe to the former or to the latter? However this issue is muddied by the consideration that we do not live in a mere world but in a unified world. Moreover, a world that arises through a certain degree of self-critically organized self-organization. The cosmos has a certain fractal symmetry about it that suggests the world cannot nor could never be a mere world but a unified sense of world. That in this world we are immersed in something more than a mere world of energy or molecules or dust or stars or even galaxies… that we are immersed in a relatively unified world of time and space and that the same flows over into a social dimension as we stand before-others with-others. The religious person might want to seize upon this residue (between a unified world minus a mere world) and give to it a fully fledged theological flavour or complexion. However, this semblance of a mere natural theology as it stands cannot be sympathetic to the wishes of a traditional theology. On the other hand, though, it does give both the secular person and the religious person the same grounds to initially stand upon and thereupon enter into the possibilities of a fruitful dialogue. Especially when our interest spills over into a human dimension and our recognition that this realm of the cultural and the inter-cultural cannot be reductively treated in an absolutist fashion. Despite different cultures we all live in the same Life-World and it is in our encounters with each other that we learn to progressively face each other and find an increasing awareness of the other and ‘our’ selves as we stand before-them and as they stand before-us! Philosophically, it is this (absolute or effective) absence of a viable non-theological(-like) difference that implies that both secularists and religionists must inhabit the same world and thence our common immersion in this emergent sense of a world (that cannot be subjected to an absolutistic reduction to a mere meaningless materialism!)! As a consequence, as noted, common grounds are presented upon which the non-religious and the religious can enter into the possibilities of a fruitful dialogue, a state of affairs generally in evidence in our Australian culture and its freedom of religious expression and its parallel freedom to be non-religious should one wish to be. (2)

	In this world, it would appear, more often than not, we have a tribe of idealists and a tribe of realists who both try to speak the same language but deprecate the privilegings of the other. Our common language is both idealistic and realistic in its tenor. A dialectic between generalities and particularities where certain people prefer to inhabit the former camp to some extent whilst others prefer to locate themselves in the other camp. Hence the endless controversies between global non-specificity and local detailed specificity. Between these two poles we have a polarized spectrum and although we might sometimes cross the psychic void in between on certain issues, normally, through natural preference and its consolidation through habit, we identify ourselves as either liberals or conservatives. Toss a coin and it comes down either heads or tails. Such a metaphor, however, should not be leant on too strongly since people can change their minds and do so. With a vast degree of qualification we might say that religious people are usually more idealistic than realistic, however, among the religious despite a prior history of philosophical innovation, theology can be and often is practiced in a conservative manner or style! Later in this essay I will look at conservative theologists and examine the viability or non-viability of certain styles of fundamentalism. In the same vein I will briefly examine the nature and viability or non-viability of certain strands or styles of liberal theological thought. Let me add at this point, that my examination at the end of this essay of a transcendental theologically oriented religious practices necessitates the imposition of a controlled, ongoing, dynamic balance between both conservative and theological trends and tendencies [and finding in the process a sense of re-alignment of our place in this world with others through such de-positioning… non-positioning… re-positioning… etc?]? (3)

	In effect, since the world cannot be engaged as a mere world, neither epistemologically recognized nor ontologically encountered, it could be claimed that a non-theological-like difference just could not exist. Moreover, how this semblance of a theological-like complexion might be construed or misconstrued is up to the secular or religious person themselves. However, in hypothetical terms of reference, let us proceed to examine this residual sense of a theological-like difference in our examination of differences between various styles of religious behaviour, thought and practice. On a spectrum of theologically oriented religiousity let me first examine an amorphous sense of the spiritual followed by conservative theological attitudes… liberal theological attitudes… Then, let me examine the possibility of a hypothetical transcendental attitude when a theological approach is coupled with the adequate exercise of an ongoing program of overall transcendental suspensions. In all of this I shall be building on this recognition of the non-absence of a theological difference given that the apparent unity of this world cannot be absolutely reduced to a material substrate (nor, equally for that matter, can any form of an approach, secular or religious in orientation, be absolutely non-reduced to some vision of a spiritual dimension reflecting the non-critically treated prejudices of any person or group of persons). (4)

	Let me re-state this ‘qualification of a simple idea’. There are some people who believe that the world is what we have and nothing else, that there can be no room for a theological aspect or complexion. On the other hand, a theologian or theologist (a person who holds the idea that divinity in some form or forms can be engaged within this world) would have to differ. A form of divinity that can not be engaged with, and v.v., can have no value for us in this world with-others. However, a complication arises as noted above. The unity of the world cannot be reduced to the mere matter of the world and so this aspect takes on a de facto theological-like complexion (which I have examined under the expression a natural theological difference). Unity of the world is in evidence through the fractal symmetry discerned by cosmologists. If the world experienced a period of rapid inflation after the so-called big bang that would be expected (along with the omnipresence of its residual cooling background radiation). Even if this field or any other were neutralized on a quantum level of observation it would still be in evidence and indicating the non-derivative nature of this field and any other (including the sense of totality experienced in our passage through this World-of-Life). Consequently there can be no ‘mere world’ and hence the ubiquitous nature of this natural theological difference. That granted we have now ‘material’ grounds for a dialogue between and among both the non-religionist and the religionist however tenuous it might be thought to be in that regard? Nevertheless, we are given grounds for such engagement (indeed, from a transcendental perspective, no dialogue could operate without this implicated sense of the transcendental unity of the Life-World). Hence this point that there can be non-absent theological difference in this minimal sense of a natural theological difference. Of course the religionist would like to go further and invest this non-absence of a theological difference with spiritual and/or theistic qualities along with a full repertoire of religious functions and practices, etc. In this direction, albeit in hypothetical terms of reference, I would like to introduce the neutral concept of the numinous, then, the non-neutral concept of a theistic version or vision in an interpretation of that implication of the numinous be that in personal and/or non-personal terms or in conservative and/or liberal styles of theological dissemination, etc. Continuing, in this same progressive direction, with the imposition of apposite and adequate overall transcendental suspensions and their implication of processes of re-alignment, re-interpretation, re-commitment, etc., the provisional proposal of a hypothetical transcendental theology could then be generally constructed in co-association with an existential philosophy of dialogical engagement, and v.v… at least being given a sound existential basis in theoretical terms of reference along with a sound appreciation of the necessary application of the transcendental rules of dialogical engagement, etc. (5) 

2.    Examining an Amorphous Sense of the Spiritual

	A large fraction of the population perceive themselves as ‘religious’ without serious commitment to an organized traditional form of religion. On a census form they might nominate themselves as members of a traditional religion or denomination but never attend or rarely attend. Again, a large number of the members of a traditional religion might regularly attend a denomination of that religion but still, upon reflection, might only commit themselves to the intuitive existence of an experiential sense of the Divine that need not conform to descriptions and prescriptions decreed by that traditional organization. How might grounds be found for these people to enter into a dialogue among themselves and with others that are either religious or non-religious in orientation? (6)

	At this point I would like to (re-)introduce the concept of the numinous. (7)

	The German theologian Rudolf Otto in his book (whose title translated into English sometimes reads as) The Idea of the Holy examined religious experience through the lens of a concept he called the numinous. As a neutral expression it neither states the existence of the Divine nor the non-existence of the Divine but categorizes a type of experience that is regularly self-perceived and interpreted, by oneself and/or others, as an experience of the Divine. Moreover, within this phenomenological type of experience, as imprinted on religious texts and/or as reported this theologian philosophically divided this type of experience as a mixture of either religious fascination and/or religious awe – often a wanting ‘to go forward through curiosity’ and a ‘fearful retreat backwards through fear of the unknown as it is found to present itself in all its apparent majesty’. This dialectic between fascination and fearfulness is considered a complex hallmark of numinous types of experience. In such a concept we have a neutral expression for dealing with an amorphous sense of the spiritual as expressed by a large section of the population who nominate themselves as religious without subscribing or fully subscribing to a more organized religious tradition and/or organization. Furthermore, it can give such subscribers dialogical grounds both among themselves and those of a more formal persuasion be that traditional and/or non-traditional in outlook whether conservative or liberal in aspiration. Upon this type of ground an understanding of how a sense of the religious is approached can be mutually formulated in such a manner that can be appreciated by either the religious or the non-religious. (8)

3.    Theistic Interpretations of the Numinous

	A theologist would wish to interpret numinousity in a theistic framework be that in non-personal terms of reference and/or personal terms of reference (to the extent this semblance of the numinous is perceived to be engaged in such terms of reference). It is true to say that experience experienced by a person is personal to some extent or other by virtue of the fact that a person is the subject of that experience. However we normally differentiate between an interaction with some other person or persons, or, an inanimate object or state of affairs. A theologian wishes to interpret some forms of numinous experience as being in someway an example of the former albeit of a special form hence this concept of enacted-engagement. In effect, the concept of inter-personal experience is treated metaphorically to the extent that the divine participation perceived in such a ‘relationship’ is treated as personable to some extent or other (obviously in some special sense). The concept of such ‘personal divinity’ is undoubtable a vexed and controversial issue. That is not at issue here other than the style that such a theological pursuit is conducted (i.e., conservative and/or non-conservative, i.e., liberal [adding that a hypothetical transcendental theology can also be approached through a parallel suspension of both conservative and liberal theological styles, etc. But this will have to be taken up in detail elsewhere and only briefly noted in section 6]). (9)

4.    Conservative Theological Thinking
	
	Conservative theological thinking is essentially fundamentalist in orientation by virtue of an emphasis upon what has been perceived and interpreted as going on before, i.e., retrospectively. There is an emphasis on past patterns of behaviour, thinking, performance, etc. Of course this reference to the past can only be conducted through their interpretation of texts relevant to this area of focus. Hence a backward gaze is essentially conducted through the lens of the present. Such a focus is often conducted in a search for essential features thought to be absolutely present in the source or sources of that tradition as perceived through a lens of presently constituted desires and aspirations, etc. In effect, that tradition finds itself reconstituted in the light of those desires and aspirations in their re-asserted adoption of such textual formulae, doctrines, symbols, texts regarded as relevant in this task of renewal in the light of this vision of the past. Hence the fundamentalist characteristics of this type of religious practice. (10)

	Now, in my opinion, fundamentalism comes in two flavours, namely, an orthodox non-extremist approach or a non-orthodox radical extremist approach. The former is often viable, as a religious philosophy, given its existential persistence through time. On the other hand, extremist versions of a fundamentalistic approach are often constructed in a non-viable form or format by virtue of their insistence on the literalistic interpretation of texts and their textual metaphors. Myths as powerful religious symbols along with textual metaphors are often ideologically mistreated through an absolutist stance where ideological literalness is heavily privileged at the expense of an existential openness towards the ‘mystery’ or ‘spiritual power’ of such textual devices. Moving completely from ideas to ideology is a process fraught with impossible manoeuvres. Upon such impossible contradictions a way of life, an existential way of living with others, cannot be realized in an authentic manner. Hence the erection of the spectres of an inhuman terrorism, subjugations of women and other minorities, an inability to deal properly with diversity, a general lack of humour and good sense, and, an overall inability to properly, appropriately and validly deal with others, etc! Into the banality of such inauthenticity true evil is unleashed from the ordinariness of such oppressive and oppressed existence! The often claimed ‘sacredness of life’ is not observed and thence the inevitable ‘irreligious nature’ of behaviour issuing from such protagonists despite being re-badged as ‘holy’ and unintended consequences being re-defined as ‘the misfortunate consequences of collateral action’ or some other similar formula for fudging the inhumanity of their actions! (11)

	The awful mechanism at work here is this absolutist tendency to rigidly treat the metaphorical nature of language to a process of absolutization! The metaphorical is an important strand of meaning embedded in all strings of language and intentional thought. The metaphorical operates along the lines that ‘like’ is essentially “both ‘like’ and ‘not-like’.” The statement that ‘the moon is like a round cheese’ does not mean that the moon is a round cheese, only, that it both like and not like a round cheese. There is one type of situation where the metaphorical can be treated literally but this exception essentially proves the rule since it is now no longer metaphorical in its overt orientation. We might say that ‘that person over there looks like John’, and, add a few moments later that ‘that person is John’. But the reference ‘John’ is not a metaphor and the claim ‘that is John’, when true, means that being referenced is not an overt metaphor. We could argue, covertly, that labels are metaphorical to the extent that in our world we attach this label to those items that are entailed in that class or set. However, that labelled is not to be treated as metaphorical per se by virtue of their definitive attributions. ‘That is John’ would be true sematically when the class that entails John and only John (being referred to) is true by virtue of this reference to this John as referred. And there is nothing metaphorical about that. You do not shake hands with a metaphor! Conversely, the metaphorical is not something that can be treated literally and referred to in a non-metaphorical modality when its core constitution is metaphorical in its construction. In other words, ideas and their metaphorical construction should not be treated ideologically as facts when such metaphorical aspects cannot be treated literally. This religious person, e.g., is like the Divine. ‘Being like the Divine’ does not mean that they are ‘Divine’! To do otherwise is to perform a form of linguistic idolatry. Or, in a reversed religious gear so to speak: ‘this person is a non-believer’ and non-believers are ‘evil’ and all forms of evil ‘should be extirpated’ therefore this evil person ‘should be killed’! Who are we to carry out such a logic when if they believed the Divine to be all judging and do not leave it to this vision of the Divine to enact its judgful nature in this regard! Can there be no doubt? What if we have been merely incited by non-religiously inspired forces? Without doubt, or, more correctly, with doubt, to question is our existential salvation in this regard! Whosoever, when and where appropriate, reduces the relational richness of this world is not acting existentially and authentically whether they be religious or secular in orientation! Similarly, whosoever, when and where appropriate, does not preserve the relational richness of this world is not acting existentially and authentically whether they be religious or secular in orientation! Similarly, whosoever, when and where appropriate, does not augment the relational richness of this world is not acting existentially and authentically whether they be religious or secular in orientation! Thence this commonality of existential grounds for all persons and organizations, establishments and institutions be they secular or religious in orientation! Hence an absolutist insistence on the ideological can only be conducted at the expense of the existential and authenticity itself, the very grounds for both secular and religious re-interpretation of how we should go about our passage together through this world before-others, with-others!! (12)

5.    Innovative Liberal Theological Thought

	The converse side to religious fundamentalism in all its forms is religious liberalism. E.g., a theology that attempts to transform social and personal conditions of engagement by proposing either not so radical innovations or radical innovations, introduced either individually or collectively. Noting, of course that the progressive input of a series of innovations can result in the emergence of chaotic points of transformation whose collective re-construction of the theological landscape can be out of all proportion to the intensity of their individual contributions. Just as with forms of conservative extremism an insistence upon forms of ideological purity must eventually deconstruct such impossibly re-constituted religious foundations. E.g., extreme apocalyptic tendencies. The urgency in a prospectively oriented metaphorical statement that ‘the end of the world (as we know it) is nigh’ could have positive religious implications (in a focusing of religious intent, e.g.), however, to treat such a claim literally can only existentially distort our existence in the world ‘now’ as we stand before-others with-others, i.e., both separated from others and not separated from others. Liberalism can be counter-conservative but need not be. Equally, all forms of extremism essentially defeat themselves by virtue of the fact that it can only be through contrast that the world can be known at all. To cut ourselves off from this world-of-contrast can only deliver us to stare at non-comprehension itself! Erecting existential patterns of behaviour, in our passage through this World-of-Life together, on inauthentic grounds of being, through the sheer impossibility of such privilege, can only progressively rob us of our existential authenticity in the Life-World itself! With our seeking a return towards the authentic being desired, by both the secular and the religious so existentially inclined, let us with one voice ask how is such authenticity to be orchestrated and augmented?! Through processes of re-alignment wherein we find a sense of commitment through continual re-commitment and not the mere imposition of a continuous commitment blindly preserved! Let me outline, provisionally, this type of existential outlook on our-being-in-the-world in the following tentative framework of a hypothetical existential philosophy and its co-associated theology/theologies. (13)

6.    Construction of a Hypothetical Existential Philosophy and Associated Theology

	How do we find a sense of re-alignment in this World-of-Life with-others before-others? As you might have guessed: through the adequate continual imposition of overall transcendental suspensions (apposite for such re-siting/re-sighting of our being in this World-of-Life). Hence, the construction of an existential philosophy, and its co-associated theology, when and where proposed, would necessitate just such an approach. I.e., the continual apposite imposition of adequate, overall transcendental suspensions along with the existential orchestration and augmentation of value when and where appropriate, proper and valid both internally and externally to the envisaged (phenomenal-phenomenological) limits of that relationship in question. (14)

	Such a process operates whether the person is inclined to be a secularist in orientation or a religionist in some form or other. We re-reality base our life in this world by just such means… through the careful use of doubt, through the careful use of the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension and its dialectic between the metaphorical, the rhetorical and the existential suspension of the former), through suspension, etc. By one method the world can be treated ‘as if an illusion’ to be re-instated through the suspension of that suspension itself, etc. Through intentional discrimination the sense of the relational is simulated and re-simulated… the ongoing re-iteration of the same as a simulation qua simulation, etc., can only re-express for-us and for-others the very value of our existence as re-constituted in that very moment of passive scrutiny and active-reflection. Therein and thereafter, through the continual suspension of the suspension, we find ourselves re-immersed back into this one-World-of-Life both before-other and with-others. By such means, whether as secularists or as religionists, we normally keep re-centering our passage through this World-of-Life as we stand both alone before-others and in their company stand together through our being with-others at the same time! (15)

	Engagement necessitates encountering and recognition, be that virtual or non-virtual in orientation. Furthermore, the transcendental rules for dialogical engagement necessitate, positively, common grounds for interaction, the realization and resolution of difference in a harmonic process of the emergence of an experienced co-associated process of identity-formation, and, negatively, the non-existence of the non-rules for non-engagement such as non-engagement, effective purity of fields (without differentiable possibilities), too much divergent difference, inadequate resolution of the former, disruptions of those relationships, etc. All in all, we basically parallel an existential philosophy wherein a relative authenticity of engagement is realized through an existential process of engagement. In understanding this we realize that such a relationship, whether virtual or non-virtual in orientation, is realized in and through and beyond the existential center of that relationship and is not authentically realized through the mere semblance of those actors per se. Thence the non-purity of a transcendent or immanent modality of being, and, an acceptance of the existential fact that reality and our experience of the same is only realized through the apposite and adequate ongoing overall transcendental suspensions of all prejudicial/pre-judged material (as points of re-commencement and thence our concomitant re-alignment, allied forms of re-commitment, etc.). However, this hypothetical vision of theological-like engagement will have to be re-visited elsewhere in order to detail the rules that might or might not allow such a perspective to find a fruitful place in our passage through the Life-World for those so religiously inclined. Religious influences deeply permeate the inter-personal expressions of culture we meet on a day to day basis. If a religious attitude is to be adopted and adapted then let those people who accept such an attitude ensure that it is primarily based on a sound existential basis and find therein and there from an existential authenticity in its co-associated formations of value both for such individuals and their associates whether they be non-religious or religious in a similar or dissimilar manner! In what has value let us find an orchestration and augmentation of the same be it engaged (encountered and recognized) in non-religious or religious frames of reference! (16)

7.    Conclusions?

1.	I have argued that we all stand before-others, with-others amid the relative unity of the Life-World; that this sense of the non-absence of a non-theological difference gives the person, whether secular and/or religious, dialogical grounds for existential engagement through epistemological recognition and ontological encountering. (17)

2.	That such engagement is realized existentially, an existential fact of our existence in this World-of-Life and this commonality offers further grounds for possible dialogues between both secularists and the religionists, and, among religionists themselves. (18)

3.	That this existential basis can offer a mutual ethical basis for both secularists and religionists, etc. (19)

4.	The concept of the numinous can offer an avenue for religionists to enter into a dialogue with each other (and a mode of understanding for secularists). (20)

5.	That the neutral concept of the numinous can proffer dialogical grounds for those who subscribe to a religious view of reality (regardless of tradition, lack of tradition, etc.). (21)

6.	Conservative theology should not ideologically treat textual material that is rightly metaphorical (or rhetorical) in complexion as literal, factual, etc. (22)

7.	That liberal theology equally should not ideologically treat textual material that is rightly metaphorical (or rhetorical) in complexion as literal, factual, etc. (23)

8.	That a transcendental philosophy, and its co-associated transcendental theology/theologies, can be hypothetically constructed by recognizing the existential need for a critically constituted continual succession of adequate overall transcendental suspensions in order to re-reality base our existence before-others, with-other… in a sense of commitment through re-commitment! (24)

9.	That a hypothetical transcendental theological proposal should positively be constructed on the transcendental rules of dialogical engagement (and negatively on the non-application of the non-transcendental rules of non-engagement). (25)

10. 	That such a theological landscape can be neither purely transcendent nor purely immanent with such proposed processes of engagement being centered in the relationships in question in such a manner so to emerge through such engagement, a process to be existentially orchestrated and augmented when and where possible! (26)

Noël Tointon, Sydney, 14.5.10.
Appendix A: Sketch of Key Arguments Used or Implied in this Working Paper

1.	Need for common grounds for a dialogue (alluded to as the transcendental rules of dialogical engagement {Refer to paragraphs 0, 5, 15, 16, 24-26}).

2.	Dialogue is very import in order to mutually thematize identity both for one’s own sense of self and the sense of the other as engaged. {1}

3.	That there is a serious need for an overall dialogue in this world (in order to collectively minimize suffering, etc.). {1}

4.	The non-absence of a natural theological difference is proposed, through the transcendental unity of the Life-World, is proposed as minimal (and adequate?) grounds for a dialogue between secularists and religionists. {2-5, 17} 

5.	The concept of the numinous (treatment of this non-absent natural theological difference) is proposed as common grounds for those religionists who propose and maintain an amorphous sense of spirituality. {6-8}

6.	The theological treatment of a numinous-like ground is one way of understanding how a theologist appears to approach the world. {9-16}

7.	That this approach of the theologist can be examined through the lens of either an impersonal theism and/or a personal theism (based on a metaphorical sense of enacted engagement) {0, 9, 15, 16, 25, 26}.

8.	This approach can also be conducted through the lens of either a conservatively oriented theology and/or a non-conservatively, liberally oriented theology. {9-13}

9.	It is argued that extreme forms of position are inauthentic and deconstructive of an authentic religious life. {11-13}

10.	Finally it is argued that we naturally center our passage through the world through ongoing overall transcendental suspensions that re-reality base us (in what ever frame of reference we might wish to adopt be that secularist or religionist in aspiration) and that a ‘parallel’ theology should be constructed along the same lines. {13-16}

11.	Hence an authenticity of commitment through existentially re-iterated re-commitment, an authenticity of alignment through existential re-alignment, etc! {13-16, 25, 26}

12.	Detailing, in effect, a Constructive Hypothetical Theology/Theologies (given the distinctive non-transcendental, interpretative treatments taken up in this open genre of an otherwise unified sense of the transcendental). {24-26} (27)		      N. 21.5.10.

Appendix B: A Re-Contextualized Overview 

The overall, interconnected narrative developed for dialogue in this paper is but one approach in preparation for this type of objective. We could have chosen to merely review how this enterprise is already being undertaken noting a diversity of cohabitation. Or, we could have invoked grounds of a common humanity; less theoretically proposing social mechanisms, e.g., where we conveniently overlook difference in opinion and merely allow processes to co-occur on a laissez-faire basis of quid pro quo. In Australia, in all three levels of government, we have a very tolerant attitude to diversity where e.g., we tolerate government finances supporting the building projects of different religious organizations. Extending the two steeples on the Catholic cathedral in Sydney comes to mind and I am sure other worthy projects of other denominations and religious traditions have been also supported. I am pleased that such projects do not find a level of contestation that might have been expected had they occurred in earlier periods of Australian history. I regard my small contribution to developing the grounds for a dialogue in this area of concern as one way of trying to develop a stronger theoretical and practical basis for such an approach to how we might better live-together-with-others, especially with others who appear to evoke a greater sense of diversity and difference. (28)

	Why theology? What if this talk of the Divine in reality were completely without a basis in reality, had no actual factual basis, or, at least, had no religious relevance for a ‘spiritual life’ how ever that might be defined? My answer here is we should make no absolute distinction between either a virtual theological dimension or a non-virtual, actual theological dimension! Because a large fraction of humanity is religious, rightly or wrongly, it still behoves us to accept such structures erected for how we and they might live our or their lives with others, however, it also behoves us to approach such structures in such a manner so as to existentially rectify what is patently non-existential about them to that extent such a task appears to befall us! Most of us do not support terrorism in what ever form it should manifest its ugly presence but that does not mean we should march off to Afghanistan or blockade a mosque or church that is seen to support it or do not condemn the same. Rather, we usually ask our political representatives or those persons more prominent in our society to better represent us in this matter. A transcendental phenomenologist is or should be quite agnostic in this process as to the existence or the non-existence of the Divine! Wearing such a hat they should divine the existential merit of that proposed for them or by them and only when they wear a religious hat, should they see themselves as religious, or of some other persuasion, should they then attempt to translate the existential nature of their program into a religious discourse or some other discourse, and v.v. Just as existentialism is historically divided between religious and non-religious exponents similarly an existentially based transcendental philosophy should be able to be adopted and adapted to different discourses, etc. Words do fail me as to how we might describe the subtle nature of this ‘neutral’ approach. It is neither purely pragmatic nor utilitarian. Doing theology might be seen as a heuristic device or a fruitful fiction or some other theoretical manoeuvre, but, again, this type of title does not seem to do justice to what should motivate such an approach and perhaps it is best left under the rubric of that which is transcendentally-existential or existentially conducive to how we can live together before-other, with-others. (29)

Appendix C: Re-Directing the Course of this Extended Essay
Finding a Place for the Idea of God, Volume II

	In this extended essay I will effectively expand the above essay for chapter-section k. 

	In a next section I will then detail these transcendental rules for dialogical engagement in order to indicate how they contribute to authentically oriented programs and inauthentically oriented programs in conducting collective-conversations ( within collective oriented genres of engagement). This will lay the foundations for a brief outline of a general constructive hypothetical theological program. 

	In a conclusion I will summarize key points examined in these two volumes.

	A third volume of hypothetical theology will then be conducted under the subtitle of a General Constructive Hypothetical Theological Program. (30)