A Possible Resolution of the Philosophical Problem of Sociopathic ‘Empathy’?

0.   Introduction

	How is it that the sociopath, et al, is often expertly able to read the minds of others in order both to anticipate their motives and manipulate the same, yet, for all this ‘empathy,’ appears unable to properly empathize with others? An ‘empathetic’ reading of other minds by the sociopath would appear to be a necessary prior condition for their being able to manipulate the behaviour of others, yet, this reading does not seem to be able to be read, by them, on an inter-personal level of true empathy? What does this observation tell us about this type of condition, and, can the following resolution throw some light upon the nature of this defect? To this extent does the model about to be proposed by myself adequately account for this failure to produce an empathetic empathy (and in the process illuminate the nature of the normal processes involved in our empathetic reception of others?)? (1)

1.   The Theoretical Background

	Every phenomenon can be read through an infinity of lenses. Medical conditions, apparent or non-apparent, real or illusory, psychiatrically oriented or non-psychiatrically oriented, can be read through a series of perspectives that may or may not be able to be successfully inter-translated in practical terms of reference in the light of current knowledge since all perspectives upon the ‘same phenomenon’ ‘when rooted in the phenomenological reality’ of the same person or set of persons should provide this semblance of a basic commensurability; e.g., a physiological reading versus an environmental-historical reading versus a genomic reading versus the enzymatic (with the expression of genes through enzymatic transcriptions) (versus transcriptions in other forms such as ribonomic transcriptions, proteinomic transcriptions, glyconomic transcriptions, liponomic transcriptions, etc.) and, neurological mechanisms and structures, etc., etc! The point I am making here is that a reading of a certain phenomenon or set of phenomena is going to be conducted through a pre-selected modeling, either simple or complex in nature, but, a modeling that can never be treated in an exclusively isolated, absolutistic reductive manner. The value of all forms of modeling, as a relatively systematic hermeneutic device utilized in a process of interpretation, can be measured in terms of the relative consistency of its apparent propriety of construction, the pragmatic utility of its apparent appropriateness in application, and, upon critical reflection, find a certain validity when such models are carefully self-appreciated and effectively evaluated in terms of their ensuing delivery of a certain degree of critical reflection. In the process we are presented with a double existential excess, i.e., both in terms of the value of its functioning as a process of modeling, and, in terms of the value of its ensuing level of ‘critical’ re-evaluation, i.e., in both valuative and evaluative terms of reference. Therefore, when a certain reading is proffered, this does not exclude other readings that may or may not currently be found to be commensurable with each other even though they may be rooted in the same phenomenon, and, therefore, should be inter-translatable theoretically given an adequate degree of accommodation wherein the appropriate degree of an invariant isomorphic transformational symmetry could be isolated and applied between those phenomenologically connected readings. Given the same phenomenon and an adequacy of theoretical accommodation we should be able to discriminatively isolate an invariant isomorphic symmetry that would allow us to travel from one reading to another dealing with the same phenomenon or set of phenomena when properly conducted given this common phenomenon and phenomenological commonality! Otherwise our current readings must be considered to be at present relatively non-commensurable for the moment even though they deal with the same phenomenon or set of phenomena, albeit from different phenomenological perspectives. (2)

	The value of a certain reading resides in the production/re-production of a certain degree of value realized in utilizing that particular phenomenological modeling to the extent that that investment is met by the dividend of an adequate existential excess of value. As noted this value, in the form of an existential excess, is both valuative in a relatively non-critical sense and evaluative in a relatively critical sense. The overall value of that enterprise qua value being comparative even if relatively non-commensurable at the time of that comparison. This comparative value being measured quantitatively and qualitatively; i.e., the relative overall intensity of these expressions of an existential excess being compared on this level as mere instances of an excess (and without recourse to other forms of inter-comparative appreciation other than this estimation of an overall existential excess); this overall process about to be subjected to an act of comparison being, perhaps, psychologically experienced with a certain intensity and quality of relief or resolution, etc., as realized in the contexts of those particular styles of modeling).  (3)

2.   Mirroring the Minds of Others?

	Recently, I read an article in a scientific journal that suggested autistic behaviour was the result of an inability to adequately simulate the behaviour of others, i.e., to virtually model both the apparent behaviour of others along with a speculative simulation of possible motives for the commission and/or omission of the same. Normally, not only do we perceive what others are doing or not doing, virtually simulating the same for ourselves, but we also attempt to speculate how those patterns of behaviour have been intentionally motivated in order to understand those patterns of behaviour and anticipate future patterns of behaviour, etc. In effect we try to read the minds of others. (4)

	Let me quote this article titled Autistic neurons from the New Scientist, 10 December 2005, p.22:

AUTISM may be caused in part by malfunctioning “mirror neurons” – brain cells that allow us to understand the actions and intentions of others.
	These cells, believed to be located in the pars opercularis, fire both when you perform a task and watch others do so.
	Since people with autism have a difficulty mimicking others, and communicating socially, Mirella Dapretto and her colleagues at the University of California, Los Angeles, wondered if faulty mirror neurons were to blame. They conducted brain scans on nine young autistic males and nine controls matched for age and IQ, while they imitated and observed 80 images of faces expression a variety of emotions.
	Both groups performed the task equally well, but the children with autism registered no extra activity in the pars opercularis while doing so. (Nature, Neuroscience, DOI: 10.1038/nn1611). (5)

	The negative findings of this group suggest that this process of actual and virtual mirroring was occurring normally for both groups but that for the autistic members this mirroring elsewhere was not being read or interpreted properly? (6)

3.   A Possible Model Proposed as a Resolution of this Philosophical Puzzle

	In reflection, it is my opinion that this inability of the autistic person to read what is being internally simulated could be perceived as the result of an inability to differentiate one relationship from another through a lack of an adequate degree of transcendental distance. In other words, through an excess degree of transcendental identification, the distinctive pattern of one relationship is not able to be discriminated from the occurrence of another pattern of activity either in the same moment or period of time or between different moments or periods of time. Consequently, the person is not able to discriminate between what pertains to their own sense of self and that which is not their own sense of self along with a consequent inability to also discriminate in the latter between other things and other persons. As a result, there is a vague amorphous identification with the world as a whole. Hence this lack of transcendental distance realizes an excessive state of transcendental identification. (7)

	What normally drives this ability to discriminate between the apparently distinctive boundaries of one phenomenological pattern of relationships and some other phenomenological pattern of relationships. How are the boundaries between these various patterns discriminated? In my opinion this process is meta-textually driven through the recognition of genres of identification. So consequently, the world is divided between what appears to pertain to one own sense of an embodied self and other things and other persons, etc. This is reflected in the categories adopted in that person’s language as a reflection of their resident culture, albeit subject to its own historical recurrences, re-interpretations and inter-cultural influences and their cultural re-interpretations, etc. (8)

	My model here is that through an inability to adopt the necessary degree of transcendental distance there is an excessive and defective process of transcendental identification, i.e., the perception of these meta-textually delineated boundaries between patterns of relational recognition is not adequately formed and/or breaks down. Hence this concept of an excessive degree of transcendental identification. (9)

	On the other hand, in comparison, I believe the sociopath suffers from too great a degree of transcendental distance and a consequent inability to identify, transcendentally, with the other person, and with their own sense/s of self, etc. Normally, a state of balance is prevalent between these poles of transcendental identification and transcendental detachment. Such a balance (and such a balanced-balance between the relative performance and the non-performance of an overall transcendental suspension) is achieved when we properly, appropriately and validly conduct an ongoing series of  overall transcendental suspensions. This concept has been discussed by myself elsewhere in numerous other papers! In this I have utilized concepts developed by the German transcendental phenomenologist Edmund Husserl but distinctly re-developed by myself. A transcendental suspension being, essentially, an ongoing balance between analytical processes of treatment and synthetical processes of treatment in the context of denominative processes of identification (these elements forming three moments in the ideal treatment of the hermeneutic circle). Basically, a sense of an ongoing balance is attempted in our phenomenological reading of a certain phenomenon or set of phenomena; a fundamental premise behind this critical pursuit being that a sense of reality is better appreciated through a non-extreme, non-decentered re-interpretation of its phenomenal simulation/re-simulation… in the process ‘bracketing’ or ‘putting out of action’ those ontological and epistemological commitments that would otherwise distort our critical phenomenological reading of that ‘phenomenon in question’ (despite the fact that all readings are conducted from a certain point of view or perspective, or, certain series of perspectives!)! This ‘balanced’ reading of the phenomenological process-content realized and recognized in the natural attitude, as an appearance, now being given a transcendental reading, i.e., as an ideal type of phenomenon or set of phenomena matching the phenomenon or set of phenomena under such critical review. Simply put there is a recognition of ‘type’ and this is achieved through this process of an overall transcendental suspension. Less simply put this overall transcendental suspension is the result of an ongoing balance between processes of transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental re-constitution (in the manner as argued by myself elsewhere). (10)
	
	It could be argued that an inability to perform an overall transcendental suspension results in a psychosis in some form or other in keeping with the nature of that defective application. Hence Organic Psychoses and Physiological Psychoses, Affective Psychoses, Cognitive Psychoses, and Judgmental Psychoses (depending on the nature of their epi-center in the epistemological organization of the psyche). (11)

	The point I would like to make with this comparative modeling is the following, namely, a person with a sociopathic-like condition is possibly the result of an inability to transcendentally identify with the other person or persons in contrast to the autistic person who cannot transcendentally discriminate between different patterns of relationships that may or may not entail other persons, etc? (12)

	In an ongoing, overall transcendental suspension there should be a balance between these poles of transcendental identification and transcendental detachment. With an over-emphasis upon the former we would get autistic-like behaviours and with an over-emphasis upon the latter we would get sociopathic-like behaviours? Processes involving defective degrees of transcendental suspension, etc., manifesting themselves in a corresponding type of psychosis(?).(13)

4.   Possible Treatment Programs?

	Various programs of treatment have been proposed for the treatment of sociopaths, often without much success. In passing I would like to note the following observations and possible forms of treatment in the light of this modeling. (14)

	The treatment of the sociopath (previously denominated as the psychopath) is notoriously difficult and may well be an impossible task overall. However, let me note the following observations:

1.	Instances of self-harming, etc., are more likely to occur in periods of relatively unresolved stress. Therefore, admissions to hospital do not occur for this type of patient when they are dealing adequately with their current perception of stress. This might imply the suitability of the teaching of relaxation techniques, etc., in order to help them to resolve such anxieties if that person is currently able to learn from and utilize such training.
2.	This type of patient often reports that the use of certain drugs, e.g., the benzodiazepines and the use of alcohol, appear in the short-term to assist them in their interactions with others. In the light of this observation, it might well be the case that a more closely tailored drug, or set of drugs, will come into existence that can reduce and overcome this apparent barrier between ‘merely understanding others’ and ‘being able to also profoundly empathize with them’? 
3.	Techniques might be found that allow the sociopathic person to re-identify with others around them through the relative de-transcendental detachment of their apparent over-emphasis being placed upon a sense of transcendental distance. 
4.	Have steps taken, by some means or other, to return these various aspects of detachment and identity, etc., to a balanced state of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension, etc., through those techniques found capable of restoring this sense of balance. (15)

5.   Conclusion

	Normally, the discernment of relational patterns is achieved through processes of transcendental distance and transcendental identification, etc., in the context of an ongoing process of an overall transcendental suspension. Serious imbalances in these processes should manifest themselves in a corresponding type of psychosis. In the light of this modeling I would argue that the sociopathic personality is the result of an inability to properly and appropriately discriminate (and validly appreciate) relational patterns through an over-emphasis upon a sense of transcendental distance at the expense of a process of transcendental identification, and, that this manifests as an inability to truly empathize with others. Hence their ability to read the minds of others yet without being able to closely identify with others as embodied persons standing-before-each-other in this one World-of-Life…. (16)

     Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6.1.06.