‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Part I:
The Recognition and Exercise of the Overall Transcendental Suspension
And the Overlooking of this Dimension in Traditional (Mis)Interpretations
Of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika *

0.   Introduction

	In this paper I have three objectives. First, I would like to discuss how we ‘enter’ into the transcendental dimension and its implications for a critical philosopher. Second, I would like to show how we ‘enter’ into this transcendental dimension through the necessary placement of an overall transcendental suspension (OTS) and, in the process, show how this device can be exercised through the adoption of certain classical strategies. Then, I would like to introduce a key Buddhist Yogacara text, namely Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, in order to show how this type of transcendental-idealism/transcendental-phenomenology can be confused for a simple form of idealism and, thereby, ensure the radical misinterpretation of this (type of) text. (1)

In this series of papers, Part I-III, I will be examining how we should interpret Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika (as a prototypical text of the Buddhist Yogacara tradition) asking ourselves through which lens or lenses should this text be read? Should this text be read as idealistic in orientation or is it transcendentally idealistic in orientation? For practical purposes, when we suspect a transcendental position is in play we will need to demonstrate that an OTS is present in some form or other (because the imposition of the OTS establishes this transcendental transformation in philosophical style). That demonstrated, we would then be in a position to argue that this ‘positionless’ type of philosophy no longer plays the conventional polemical game of debate as practiced between realists and idealists et al and, therefore, that the nature of this philosophy should be read through a transcendental lens in order to appropriately interpret it! That without understanding the philosophical significance of a transcendental dimension this type of transcendental philosophy cannot be properly translated and/or interpreted! (2)

It is my hope that within the confines of this introductory paper I will be able to have you, the reader yourselves, see and ‘feel’ the immense interpretative distance between misinterpreting this text as a type of idealism and its more appropriate interpretation when conducted through the lens of a transcendental-idealism. Indeed, it is my hope that you will be able verify, as self-evident, that a transcendental type of philosophy is in play, that the OTS is necessarily present in order for this transformation in style to proceed, and, that the transcendental-phenomenological flavour of this text should not be confused as idealistic in tenor. (3)

* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
I.   ‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension

	Essentially, in accordance with my understanding, the OTS erects an ongoing balance between all opposing or contrasting facets of the psyche. I have argued elsewhere that this ongoing balance mirrors the nature of the hermeneutic circle in which all processes of intentional consciousness are processed and emerge as emotions, ideas, judgments, responses, etc. In the thorough imposition of the OTS all facets are balanced with their correlative contrasts. [This includes all bi-polar modalities (like epistemological versus ontological; process versus content; etc.) and all tri-polar modalities (like analytical versus synthetical versus identificational which parallels the intentional object-state versus intentional field versus the intentional ego; and in harmonic theory the same isomorphic set of transformations as denoted through the orientations of dissonance-consonance-resolution, etc.)]. (4)

	Style is the distinctive resolution of dissonance (competition, difference, that which is ‘felt’ and ‘perceived’ to be problematic). Therefore, philosophical style is the distinctive resolution of philosophical dissonance. Just what is the nature of a transcendental style as a distinctive approach in our dealing with the nature of philosophical problems and controversies? (5)

Transcendental style is realized as a consequence of the placement of a relatively central OTS. The consequences of this central emplacement of the OTS is the transformation of that text into one that exercises a predominantly transcendental-phenomenological attitude, etc. This type of text can also be described as transcendentally idealistic in complexion, but, great care should be exercised in the use of this appellation because this type of text should not be misconstrued as either idealistic or realistic in orientation (in the classical senses of those traditional descriptions)! (6)

	What is the nature of this transcendental transformation of a text from a naïve natural attitude through the imposition of an OTS? (7)

	In this type of text it should be stated, explicitly or implicitly, that all phenomena are treated as merely phenomenal, i.e., as appearances or presentations constituted in intentional consciousness. Such ‘appearances’ are not to be misconstrued as ‘surfacing’ or being the surfaces of things-in-themselves imputed as ‘real objects’ in the so-called ‘external world.’ Furthermore, just as all forms of realism are put to the side so too are all forms of idealism equally ruled out of court by virtue of the imposition of the OTS wherein all such theoretical positions are bracketed, neutralized, suspended, put out of action outside those brackets. (8)

	Let me now demonstrate how an OTS can be demonstrated in a text, and, how it can be exercised with our consequent ‘entry’ into the transcendental dimension. ‘Entry’ being our change of attitude from a natural, non-critical, conventional perspective to one of a critical transcendental complexion. Although, correctly, correlative orientations, the transition from the naïve to the relatively non-naïve is experienced as a distinctive transformation in our life and the manner or authenticity that ‘our’ life is to be lived-before-others.  This concept of the ‘transcendental’ in this light should not primarily be treated in a religious or mystical frame or reference (through the thorough imposition of the OTS) although such a religious transition cannot be ruled out when dealt with in a secondary fashion (in much the same way existential philosophies have naturally divided themselves between non-religious versions and religious versions by taking either a secular or non-secular turn in that respect). (9)

II.	Recognizing and Exercising the Overall Transcendental Suspension

This may sound a complicated procedure but is simplified by the fact that, correctly, the OTS is an intuitive process and can be easily ‘entered’ through the adoption of a variety of strategies such as, e.g., simulating a skeptical attitude; posing to oneself a question (without answering it); thinking metaphorically; playing devil’s advocate and considering an opposing point of view; adopting a deprecating attitude of ongoing disvaluation of phenomena (rather than their absolute devaluation or naïve evaluation); entertaining parallel readings of textual reports with respect to a textual translation of that under investigation; treating the phenomena to hand as mere presentations, mere simulations, i.e., as merely phenomenal; etc. (10)

	Technically, this suspended state of affairs can be achieved by noting what prominent textual features are under investigation and running parallel contrary texts to the same and leaving these parallel texts in a state of suspended balance. Effectively, the thorough OTS is realized when all aspects and facets of the psyche are dynamically balanced with respect to each other. (11)

	For the sake of simplicity I will note three classical methods for the instantiation of an OTS, namely: 

i.	the skeptical approach, 
ii.	the treatment of phenomenal (re)presentations as mere (re)presentations, and, 
iii.	the ongoing application of a key metaphor or a set of metaphors . (12)

	All three methods noted above essentially involve the running of parallel texts and the ‘putting out of action’ of all judgmental attitudes (such as essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual types of judgments, etc. This ‘effect’ is put into practice through the implicit and/or explicit use of parallel texts in some form or other). (13)

	Let me quickly define these three classical types of strategy (that engineer a transcendental transformation in philosophical style):

i. 	The skeptical attitude is an attitude that calls into question the imputed reality of that under investigation. In the process the thesis that S is p is called into question with a parallel state of affairs being entertained between “‘S is p’ & ‘S is –p’”. Into this rhetorical void the transcendental attitude is then being exercised to that extent this skeptical enquestioning is allowed to continue in parallel in a balanced fashion. 
ii.	A common practice is to just focus purely upon the mere appearance of that phenomenon or set of phenomena under investigation by noting the phenomenological nature of its essential, intentional constitution without imputing a judgmental attitude as to its factual nature, aesthetic qualities, ethical import, etc., etc.
iii.	Applying the ongoing prominent use of a metaphor/s without resolving the ‘parallel texts’ that hinge on the balanced nature of that involved in the exercise of ‘like’ wherein “‘S is both like p’ and ‘not like p’.” (14)

Briefly, let me now illustrate how we can adopt the above three strategies and therein recognize and/or instigate a transcendental transformation in the course of our (actively creative and/or passively interpretative) researches:

i.	Taking a skeptical attitude towards the world, e.g., calls it into question. Maintaining that attitude leaves us in the transcendental territory of only dealing with the ‘mere phenomenon of the world’ (without imputing either its idealistic and/or realistic existence in a so-called internal world and/or external world, etc.).
ii.	Similarly, just attending to the mere presentation of that to hand equally realizes this same metaphorical ‘entry’ into this transcendental dimension where we only attend to the constitutional form of our intentional re/presentations.
iii.	E.g., a classic manoeuvre is to treat the world like a dream and as long as we leave it under the sway of this metaphor, or some other, we maintain this transcendental attitude to all phenomena to hand. Treating phenomena to this type of attitude does not imply that we are insisting that the world ‘is just a dream’ (as in an absolutistic philosophy like many forms of early Gnostic Dualism, etc.) only that it ‘is like a dream’. (15)
	Our metaphorical and/or literal ‘entry’ into the transcendental dimension is realized through the auspices of the OTS. In this state of transition there is a transformation of our intentional processes and intentional content in such a manner that they are more in tune with the current nature of that reality to hand from an intentional perspective. We find ourselves more centered and balanced in outlook, such insight being better thematized through the relative enrichment and comparative purification of that intentional economy as a result of this process of ongoing deferment. What resolutions arrived at, as a result, are more resolved and more resolute in nature. We find our judgments are constructed with a greater sense of propriety, are more appropriate and those judgments possess a greater sense of (self-)evidential validity. When the OTS is adequately pre-informed and the OTS is sufficiently enacted then with our exit from this state we should find ourselves in a better position of having discerned the real, i.e., having better appreciate the essential-like nature of its intentional constitution without having to impute unobservable ‘realities’ such as ‘objects’ in a so-called ‘external world’ along with ‘thoughts’ in a so-called ‘internal world’, etc…. (16)

	As stated before, the transcendental perspective is claimed to be a transformation of position into a ‘positionless’ point of view. Through the loss of priority, preference, etc., through the imposition of the OTS, we no long indulge in the trivial pursuits obsessively followed by classical realists and idealists et al along with their interminable debates. Without a preference for the intentional object-state we no long promote the impossible separation and ‘priority’ of the so-called ‘real’! Equally, without a preference for the intentional field or intentional ego we no long promote the impossible separation and ‘priority’ of the so-called ‘ideal’ in the form of absolutistic ‘essences’, ‘egos’, ‘minds’, ‘facts’, etc! Indeed, the transcendental sense of ‘position’ is not beholden to this endless, pointless, non-resolvable type of puerile ‘philosophical’ game playing! (17)

	Although the transcendental is neutral in its overall perspective still within the brackets ‘life goes on as before’. Furthermore, through its critical simulation of the world, as directly engaged in this one-World-of-Life, we should find ourselves better able to appreciate both the complexities and the simplicities of this world-as-found-to-hand in a world-found-before-us! (18)

	In our commitment to ensuring the proper, appropriate and valid performance of the OTS we should find ourselves responding to the situations of this world with a greater sense of propriety, appropriateness and effective validity. In effect, we become more responsive to the ‘call’ of the world, and, our responses should be found to be relatively more existential in the aptness of their functioning…. (19)

III.  	Examination of the ‘Orthodox’ Interpretation of the Vimsatika as Idealistic?

	Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, with an auto-commentary by the same author, is a set of twenty-two verses with an interspersed commentary, and, is a key text for understanding the philosophical nature of this tradition. It was composed sometime around the end of the fifth century or the start of the sixth. It is my hope here that as we note key points of this text you will see, for yourselves, that this text cannot be properly translated through an idealistic lens but only through the transcendental-phenomenological lens of a transcendental-idealism. (20)

	I have decided to give my own translations of the following cited fragments of this text in order to establish my own readings of those segments in comparison to those other translators that will be comparatively examined. (21)

The Twenty Stanza (Vimsatika)

In the Mahayana (Buddhist Tradition) the three worlds have been established as mere(ly in) intentional consciousness (cittamatra). “The merely mental, O Son/s of the Jina (i.e., Bodhisattva/s), that is (the nature of) the threefold world” as stated in the (Dasabhumika) Sutra). ‘Mental’ (citta), ‘mind’ (manas), ‘consciousness’ (vijnana), ‘perceptual re/presentation’ (vijnapti) these are all synonyms. By ‘mind’ (etc.) is meant the mind and all psychological states associated with the same. By (the expression) ‘mere’ (matra) is meant the refutation (pratisedha) of objects (artha) (in the so-called external world, etc.). (22)

This introduction is followed by the first verse:

(All) this is indeed mere mental re/presentation (vijnaptimatra) because phenomenal appearances (avabhasana) are without objects (artha) (belonging to an external world, etc.).
Just as in the same manner a person suffering from an eye disease might see a non-existent net of hair (etc.). (23)

	Vasubandhu has immediately established his anti-realist vision of philosophy. This emphasis upon the merely mental has been misconstrued, in my opinion, by most of his translators to imply his position is automatically idealistic. Certainly it does have an idealistic flavour but not in any classical idealistic sense! (24)

	It is my simple contention that given the right lens this text would be properly translated! That lens is transcendentally idealistic in tenor, a transcendental ‘position’ that is phenomenologically(, hermeneutically and existentially) oriented. Obviously that lens is not realistic in aspiration, neither is it idealistic in a classical sense! Why? (25)

	Vasubandhu is focusing here on the ‘merely mental’. This expression ‘matra’ alerts us to the fact that his philosophy is intentionally and phenomenolgically oriented, i.e, is attending to the nature of the intentional constitution of that under investigation (and is meant to operate universally in general terms of reference) – hence its transcendental complexion. Already an OTS is being invoked (whether wittingly or unwittingly) through this focusing on the ‘merely phenomenal’ nature (of our intentional simulations) of the world. Hence, as noted, this philosophy is operating under transcendental terms of reference! These facts are reinforced by Vasubandhu’s insistence that we are not dealing with the natural attitude and its imputation of conventional objects (artha) (in an external world). To reinforce this transcendental fact (that we are not dealing with object imputations in a ‘real’ external world but only with phenomena) a metaphor is chosen to highlight this ‘fact’, namely, that some people with an eye disease see nets of hair that are actually non-existent (and treated as non-existent by those who perceive the same). Even though ‘seen’ these nets of hair are regarded by the sufferers of that eye disease as non-existent. The moral being that “‘if we can perceive things without them being there’ then is it not possible that the world as seen, etc., should be treated in the same manner?” More philosophically, we might put this in the following manner: In the economy of the Life-World why duplicate everything when our direct engagement with phenomena themselves is more than adequate whereas our ‘interaction’ with impossible objects like ‘objects’, in a so-called external world, is just impossible and should be refuted! (26)

	Why is it that this (type of) text might be (mis)construed as idealistic in tenor? For a start it is anti-realist. Opposing linguistic and non-linguistic habits to impute and populate conventional objects in a conventional world this type of text is taking a transcendental-phenomenological tack, a type of ‘unnatural’ manoeuvre that can be easily construed/misconstrued as idealistic by any person not conversant with this type of distinction between the transcendental and the non-transcendental. Then, certain idealistic-like characteristics are manifested in the phenomenologists’ desire to idealize the essential configuration of the intentional constitution of that to hand. However, despite this search for essentials (through eidetic forms of phenomenological reflection) those ‘essential’ themselves are also subject to the OTS with the implication that they cannot be cashed out, so to speak, in either pure ontological and/or pure epistemological terms of reference.  So, we must resist this understandable tendency to automatically label this highly technical form of philosophy as idealistic in complexion! (27)

	Certain historical influences can also be felt to operate in this ascription of ‘idealism’. In its transmission to China there was an idealistic interpretation applied to this type of text. Confusion of this distinction between a transcendental-idealism and some non-transcendentally oriented version of idealism is a mistake that can be easily made (witness the extent that this type of text is subjected to an unwarranted idealistic interpretation by most modern scholars). Then, Tibetan scholarship has an orthodox interpretation (from the Madhyamaka Prasanga point of view) that discounts these philosophical innovations as ‘idealistic’ and relatively retrogressive and such an input has had a considerable influence upon modern Western scholarship in this regard. Then, later Buddhist texts (both in this tradition and in the ‘tradition’ of the Tathagatagarbha) do take this transcendental form of idealism in a more idealistic direction (albeit in a valid manner as long as the OTS is overtly and/or covertly allowed to remain centrally emplaced and actively operating, i.e., with the implication that an idealistic-like ‘turn’ is still operating in transcendental terms of reference in a non-literal, metaphorical-like manner). (28)

	However, in reading this text we do not find any great emphasis upon a sense of Mind with a capital ‘M’. Equally, pluralities of Minds with a capital ‘M’ are not given any metaphysical degree of mention or emphasis. Those aspects of classical forms of idealism are just absent. Furthermore, scholars have been misled by their interpretations of the expression ‘matra’ and by the metaphorical comparisons Vasubandhu has set up to prove his anti-realistic stance and the transcendental nature of that orientation. Whereas, on the other hand, these same metaphorical examples are already being misconstrued by their misreading of this use of matra (in those compounds). How should we then read these expressions like citta-matra, e.g., etc? The end-component of the compound matra means ‘sole’, ‘only’ ‘alone’, ‘mere’, etc. Indeed matra is perhaps cognate with the same archaeological linguistic roots as found in our expression ‘mere’?  Its use should signal to us that we should be alert to the manner things in the world present themselves to us phenomenologically and transcendentally (through the essential nature of their intentional configuration in general terms of reference). Instead, interpreted as ‘mind-only’ or ‘sole mind’ or ‘mind alone’ and reified as ‘Mind-Only’, etc., the scholar is already wandering upon foreign terrain that has absolutely nothing to do with this type of text (and, in the process, must be hermeneutically hallucinating?)! No, this expression should be simply treated as ‘merely-the-intentional’; the phenomenon as it ‘merely presents itself’, etc! For what other reason does Vasubandhu tells us that this expression ‘mental’ is equivalent to ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘perceptual re/presentation’, etc?! Thence their connection with the final compounded component of matra should point us to the fact that Vasubandhu also intends a synonymous state between the ‘merely mental’, ‘mere mind’, ‘consciousness only’ and mere perceptual re/presentation, etc. So, with this interpretative lens of mine in place, let me cite two translations of this same passage and highlight in bold those sections of text that have taken an idealistic leaning in this regard. (29)

Anacker translates this segment without too many complications: 

In the Great Vehicle, the three realms of existence are determined as being perception-only. As it is said in the sutra, “The three realms of existence are citta-only.” Citta, manas, consciousness, and perception are synonyms. By the word “citta”, citta along with its associations is intended here. “Only” is said to rule out any (external) object of sense or understanding. 

All this is perception-only, because of the appearance of non-existent objects,
just as there may be the seeing of the non-existent nets of hair by someone afflicted with an optical disorder [1] (30)

On the other hand Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti obviously take an idealistic tack as evidenced by their interpolation of headings to that effect:

Section I: Thesis of the author: all is mere mental creations; only the mind exists
In the Mahayana the three worlds are established to be only consciousness (vijnapti), according to the sutra that affirms: “O sons of the Victorious, the three worlds are only mind (citta).” Citta, manas, vijnana and vijnapti are synonyms. There (i.e. in the quotation)(the word) citta (“mind”) is understood as (the mind) together with what is connected with it (samprayoga=caitta). (The word) matra (“only”) is (used) with the purpose of denying (the existence of external) objects.

1. (All) this is indeed only consciousness, 
because of the appearance (in it)
of non existing objects,
as the vision of the taimirika 
of an inexisting net of hairs, etc. (31)

	Comparing these two sets of translators we find the latter definitely heading in an idealistic direction. It is my argument that when an OTS is thoroughly imposed the text takes a transcendental turn through its object of interest being the intentional constitution of that to hand (in general or specific terms of reference). Confronting phenomena in a transcendental manner does not allow you to posit either a pure ontological and/or a pure epistemological reading of that presentation to hand. We can say, therefore, that Vasubandhu’s motivation is anti-realist in orientation, but, at the same time, this does not imply he is also taking a pro-idealistic orientation. (32)

	In the next segment of this text the realist argues that without an object, to underpin perception, his opponent, Vasubandhu et al, could not account for the following four conditions, namely, restrictions in time and space in the presentation of objects in our perception of objects, our being able to perceive the same ‘object’ by other sentient beings, and, the causal effectiveness of those perceptions. (33)

	Vasubandhu’s reply to these four realist objections does appear to take an idealistic tack but let us suspend such a characterization. If I am correct, from a transcendental perspective his reply cannot be idealistic per se. This debate, I would argue, is on a non-transcendental-transcendental axis and not a realist-idealist axis! To conclude this paper let me quickly look at his first reply. (34)

	The realist argues that perception could not be in the form it appears to take without empirical sense-objects to support the same. Objects appear in space and time. They are subject to the restrictions of those four dimensions. A certain object appears here and not over there, and, appears at this moment in time here and being finite in its temporal existence cannot appear at some other moment of time before or after its factual history, etc. It cannot be in two places at the same moment of time, etc., nor can it exist before it existed, etc., etc. How does Vasubandhu reply to this objection? (35)

	Just as in a dream (svapnavat). In a dream we find, upon awakening, that there are no objects supporting those objects as just perceived in that dream.  That being the case should we not also regard perception in the same manner when awake? If in dreams we can see objects restricted in space and time then what need have we for objects in a realist sense at any time whether asleep or awake? What are the implications of this comparison? How should we read this metaphor ‘just like as in a dream’? (36)

	For a start, Vasubandhu makes the anti-realist observation that dreams do not need the actual immediate presence of objects to support the perception in dreams of those objects. The moral to be drawn from this observation is the extrapolated inference that no perceptual-like state needs an objective basis in the form of extra-mental ‘reals’ to ground the same. That, if we were ‘awake’, i.e., enlightened, we would be in a position to appreciate this ‘fact’. All perceptual-like states entail phenomena that are constituted in intentional consciousness. We just are not acquainted with non-phenomenal ‘objects’ in any realistic sense! What we are acquainted with is merely phenomenal states as constituted in intentional consciousness. The non-intentional is not able to be appreciated in transcendental-intentional terms of reference! (37)

	So, without intentional access to ‘real objects’ how is it, the opponent asks, that more than one person can see the same object? This question is a cliff-hanger! You will need to read my second paper to see how Vasubandhu addresses this problem…. (38)

IV. Conclusion

	It is my contention that similar philosophical constructions should be able to be used as powerful commentaries on each other both with respect to their similarities and their dissimilarities. Furthermore, the covert territory (or blindspots in a Derridean sense) of one tradition can be more easily revealed through this form of a mutual comparative commentary of one tradition’s virtual comments upon the other, and v.v, in so far as the different configurations of one system can have similar facets in the other revealed in a more overt form of explication. Borrowing from the transcendental-phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, as (re-)interpreted by myself, I have classified this later work of Vasubandhu as ‘transcendental’ by virtue of the covert overall transcendental suspension being exercised by this attention to the mere intentional configuration to hand (as evident in the first segment of this text in his use of the expression matra). In such a positionless ‘position’ he cannot position himself as an idealist versus an realist, his critique, therefore, must be transcendental in flavour! Then, if this be true, how does Vasubandhu account for perceptual inter-subjectivity without having recourse to ‘objects’…?
	            						           Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.4.06.