‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Part II:
“Like a Dream” – Vasubandhu Answers His Realist Critics
And is an Idealistic Interpretation of His Vimsatika Appropriate?*

0.   Introduction

	In this series of papers I explore why I think the idealistic appellation applied to the Buddhist Yogacara philosopher Vasubandhu, as represented by his text Vimsatika (circa 500 CE) and by extension his other later texts, and in general, along with the entire early Buddhist Yogacara, is completely inappropriate! My argument is this: we should perceive this philosopher to be a transcendental idealist or ‘transcendentalist’ but, most certainly, not as an idealist! The key to understanding this difference is to more fully appreciate the nature and dynamics of a transcendental phenomenology; a philosophy as exemplified by a philosopher like Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), e.g. (1) 

	In Part I I left my readers on the edge, in the form of a cliff-hanger, by announcing that Vasubandhu’s first reply to his realist critics was to declare that in dreams ‘perceptions’ are had with images that are restricted by space and time without being paired up with so-call ‘real objects’ (artha) in an ‘external world’ (and without mentioning the rest of Vasubandhu’s reply to his critics). One moral to be drawn was the observation that if dreams were not accompanied by real objects (artha) then what need is there for the same in perceptual states that are non-dream oriented? In this paper let us look more closely at the totality of Vasubandhu’s reply to his critics (as expressed in their four part criticisms as formulated in verse 2). (2)

	In Part I certain principles and observations were announced, namely:

i.	That a text takes on a transcendental complexion when an embedded and active overall transcendental suspension (OTS) is centrally emplaced within that text. 

ii.	That we can demonstrate when a text is transcendentally oriented by demonstrating this necessary condition of an active, centrally emplaced overall transcendental suspension.

iii.	That the transcendental complexion of a text arises when our primary interest is in the intentional constitution per se of our experience of a phenomenon or set of phenomena under investigation. (3)

	An overall transcendental suspension (OTS) is defined as the ongoing balance of all aspects of the psyche; a process that mirrors the formation of value as derived in and through the operation of the overall hermeneutic circle as examined on many occasions elsewhere in other papers. (4)

* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
	In Part I three classical strategies were outlined as methods for the transformation of a non-transcendentally oriented text to one with a transcendental complexion, namely:

i.	the skeptical approach, 
ii.	the treatment of phenomenal (re)presentations as mere (re)presentations, and, 
iii.	the ongoing application of a key metaphor or a set of metaphors. (5)

In this paper we will also investigate the presence of the third of those strategies or manoeuvres, namely, the philosophical consequences that flow from the treatment of the phenomenal world to the metaphorical comparison of a dream, etc. (6)

I argued in the last paper that the use of the expression matra as the final segment of a compound, such as, e.g., cittamatra, should be read as indicating the adoption of the second strategy as noted, alerting the reader to the position that phenomenal experience is to be treated as merely intentional with a suspension of all other non-transcendental attitudes and the realization therein of a ‘positionless’ position, i.e., a transcendental sense of positionlessness wherein our interest is only with the essential phenomenological (hermeneutical and existential) configuration/s of the intentional constitution of that under investigation (whether that be in general terms of reference or applied to a particular type of intentional experience). (7)

I.   ‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension

	Essentially, in accordance with my understanding, the OTS erects an ongoing balance between all opposing or contrasting facets of the psyche. I have argued elsewhere that this ongoing balance mirrors the nature of the hermeneutic circle in which all facets of the psyche are dynamically balanced with respect to each other, e.g., transcendent structural content versus immanent process (of that to-be-enstructured), analysis versus synthesis (versus identify formation), etc., etc. When this transformation of orientation is arrived at through the realization of its necessary pre-conditions/conditions a text takes on a transcendental orientation, i.e., an emphasis is placed upon the intentional constitution of the type of phenomena under investigation whether that be in general terms of reference or applied to some specific type of phenomena. In the process there is a transmutation or transformation of the natural naïve attitude wherein the subject matter for investigation is introduced and articulated through the exhibition of its imputed status wherein our pre-critical emphasis is placed upon the realm of object-states imputed to exist in the so-called external world and/or so-called internal world/s. (8)

2.   Vasubandhu’s Reply to his Realist Critics

	In the last paper I noted the four objections posed by the realist, namely, there is an imputed need for objects because they impose restrictions both on place and time (in the presentation of an object or state), there can be no restriction on the number of agents (as streams of consciousness) that view a particular object, and, the causal effectiveness or efficiency of a certain state of affairs. (9)

A Reply to the First Two Objections

	In his reply to the first two objections, that you need objects to impose restrictions on the presentation of the world in order to be the stable target of visual perception, etc., in the verse he simply states: desakalaniyamah siddhah svapnavat – ‘restrictions on place and time are established just as in a dream.’ This expression svapnavat means simply ‘just as in dreams/just like in dreams’. (10)

	In his auto-commentary this explanation is unpacked in the following manner: ‘Even without an object in dreams, states like bees, gardens, women, men, etc., are seen in certain locations, and not everywhere… and seen only sometimes, and not all the time… therefore, restrictions are established in place and time’ (11)

	Vasubandhu is right. In a dream if a dream apple were to appear it would do so without an apple-object in the world since on awakening we would find no correlate. (12)

	What is the moral, or, rather, what are the morals, that should be drawn from this counter-argument being constructed here, namely, that we do not need an ‘object’ for an object-like presentation to manifest itself in its experiential reception? I believe the following four morals can be drawn. Let me list these four and then examine them in depth.

1.	If object-like presentations can be presented in space and time without an object then, by extension, what need have we for the imputation of ‘real objects’ in a so-called ‘external world’ as the basis for all forms of perception, etc.
2.	That to treat the world like a dream is to transcendentally transform our experience of the world (in such a manner that through this OTS we now focus on an appreciation of the intentional constitution of that experience).
3.	Supplies, in a theoretical form, a soteriological model of ‘awakening to the reality of things-as-they-are’ (that parallels the nature of the Buddha’s enlightenment and the enlightenment of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas).
4.	Implies, in practice, in the light of our third proposal, that this transcendental transformation is a step towards enlightenment as had by the Buddha, etc. (13)
1.	The first obvious moral to be drawn from this argument, in the form of an analogy, is that if dreams can be had without the need for the imputation of object correlates then, by extension, what need have we to do this in all forms of perceptual-like experience, etc. That the phenomenological experience of phenomena allows us to immediately and directly relate to the same through simulation without having to invoke a parallel economy of imputed objects. That, what is experienced, in non-transcendental, everyday experience, is our relation to phenomena constituted by-us for-us without having to explain that which cannot be had in experience that then, somehow, would enable us to experience what has been already experienced in intentional consciousness. Such a second, parallel economy is otiose, redundant and impossible to realize (since our verification of the same would impossibly entail our having to experience what cannot be experienced). Now, various additional arguments and qualifications will need to be noted to allow this argument to run properly, appropriately and validly. For a start, it could be objected that we could not dream about dream apples without having first had recourse to apple objects in the first place. (14)

But, this objection can be overruled and ruled out by noting that awake or asleep we are still dealing directly with phenomenal presentations, and, not with phenomenal presentations plus the parallel imputation from the same of real objects, etc. If we are already dealing with objects-like phenomenal presentations what need have we for so-called real object-correlates especially since the latter in their being cannot be directly experienced in intentional consciousness. The following qualification also needs to be noted, namely, that although intentional objects are constituted in transcendental experience that constitution is aspectival and non-exhaustive, i.e., open to the perspective/s under which it is specifically viewed and is not absolutely grasped in intentional consciousness. An ‘otherness’ in all phenomenal presentations implies that our intentional constitution of the same cannot absolutely and definitively be realized both in its totality and in the infinite totality of perspectives and frames of reference under which that type of phenomenon or set of phenomena are normally viewed. E.g., with respect to an apple presentation we perceive the same from a certain limited perspective (say in a northerly direction) in a certain set of reference frames (say ‘on an apple tree’ ‘in an orchard’ in a certain manner; as an ‘object’ ‘about to be picked’) – the totality of which cannot exhaust the reality of that phenomenal presentation from its own hypothetical absolute point of view. But the realist may counter-object – how can you differentiate dream apples from apples (without having to impute an apple object; i.e., directly with respect to an apple and indirectly with respect to a dream apple). (15)

That type of objection can be easily rebutted (by the transcendental phenomenologist) by noting that the modal richness, both quantitatively and qualitatively, decides this issue for us already as is practiced in our everyday (transcendental) appreciation of our intentional constitution. I.e., we can intuitively note the comparative richness of intentional modes being actively engaged between these two different types of intentional presentations, and, the comparative quality of that engagement (since in dreams, e.g., dream apples do not satisfy our physiologically-based sense of hunger, and, apple experiences are existentially richer forms of engagement than that experienced in dreams-states even if ‘vividly entertained’ there, etc.). (16)

2.	Second, by extension, we should treat all forms of experience ‘as if had in a dream’ and in the process transcendentally transform, and re-orient, the nature of our reception of experience. In effect an OTS has been put in place. By treating all experience ‘as if it were had in a dream’ then all re/presentations are treated as if ‘merely’ (no more nor no less than) intentional presentations. Furthermore, by applying this to all re/presentations this process is centralized and non-peripheral, and, then, being exercised in the form of a transformational process, where we are ‘merely’ refocusing on the intentional constitution of experience qua its intentional constitution, we can also aver that this process is being actively exercised. Hence these three conditions for the transcendental transformation of a philosophical discourse, namely, the presence of an OTS that is centralized and actively exercised. In this consequentially ensuing transcendental turn the philosopher now becomes a transcendental phenomenologist, etc. In the process their style of philosophy is now quite different from a non-critical, non-transcendental philosopher and should not be confused! This attention to intentional detail, etc., allows them to become critical in this special sense. That to confuse a pre-critical style with a critical style is to make a transcendental mistake, i.e., confuse a ‘non-critical’ phenomenal explication of phenomena with a ‘critical’ intentional explication (of the same) phenomena; in effect, the difference between a textual investigation and a trans-textual investigation. (17)

	Treating phenomenal experience ‘as’ if a dream, or, ‘like’ a dream, does not mean that phenomenal experience ‘is’ a dream, or, is to be treated as ‘just’ a dream. The philosophy that conducts this type of ‘turn’ is defined by me as an absolute philosophy, whereas, the literal treatment of this metaphor produces what I have defined as an absolutist philosophy. Two entirely different types of philosophical style ensue, namely, and respectively, a transcendental style of philosophy and a non-transcendental style of philosophy. (18)

	The ramifications that follow on from this turn towards a transcendentally oriented style of philosophy are profound. (In this philosophical change of state) no philosophical detail is left untouched. To start to understand this vast difference we need to address this transformation in value, both its creative formation and appreciative evaluation, across the board from the soteriological to metaphysical, etc; addressing all theoretical, practical and critical spheres of our investigations. Let me briefly address some of its soteriological implications and consequences. (19)

3.	Buddhist philosophy is not conducted for the mere sake of doing philosophy. No, its conduct is undertaken with serious soteriological implications and expectations, along with many other consequences not necessarily directly related to the former. This transcendental transformation of our way of seeing the world is meant to have existential consequences in the form of insight (into seeing things as they really are), a radical re-assessment of our position in the world is, therein, invoked along with the adaptation and adaptation of a modus operandi for doing and reinforcing the same (whether that be overtly religious or not). All of these changes need to be ‘viewed’ as dialectical: it can never be claimed that insight is a prior necessity since a change of attitude is also first necessary for that insight to be arrived at and, importantly, recognized, and v.v. But, what could be claimed internally by that tradition, or some other, or externally by people trying to report and comprehend the same, is the fact that a radical change in style appears to ensure when the preconditions are established for such a transformation; a transformation that ‘converts’ a certain style of philosophical approach into a radically critical philosophical process by virtue of this closer attention to intentional constitution and phenomenological process. Does my reading of this text bear out my understanding of these claims? Does this text have a theoretical agenda wherein such intentions, indeed, are spelt out? Let me quickly demonstrate this aspect (which I would like to attend to in greater detail in the second half of the next paper). (20)

	In the latter section of verse 17 Vasubandhu notes: ‘…not having awoken that person does not understand the non-existence of the object(s) as viewed in a dream.’ The following implication also being made that until we become as like the Buddha, etc., we are not awakened as to the way the world is constituted. This parallel is brought out in his auto-commentary where he states w.r.t. this verse: ‘Thus the world, not having awoken, is seeing non-existent objects as if in a dream through the sleep of the vasanas pervaded with false imagination; so, being not awakened they do not understand the nature of those non-existent objects. But, when awakened, through the obtainment of knowledge which is without fabrication (nirvikalpa) that is transcendental (lokottara) and opposed to this sleep (of the vasanas) (as an antitdote), then the non-existence of the correlative of the intentional object is duly understood on account of directly confronting this non-existence of ‘objects’ through a worldly knowledge that is purified and from whence there arises the acquisition of this (transcendental) ‘position’. Hence these two parallel positions between awakening and enlightenment [in this sense, to this extent] are equivalent.’ (21)

	This metaphor of the comparison to a dream extends, therefore, to theoretically underpin an implicit soteriological philosophy that is later explicated in this verse 17 and its auto-commentary. (22)

4.	Fourthly, this theoretical vision of enlightenment, whether implicitly or explicitly explicated, also envisages a program of transformation that is insightful for the person who ‘enters’ into this transcendental dimension. Indeed, the raison d’être of this religious text is to realize just this ‘end’, namely, enlightenment (nirvana)! (23)

	As Vasubandhu states: In the merely intentional (vijnaptimatra), in its profound depths where the determination of difference is endless… in all its subtlety it is not capable of being thought… this is the range/field of the Buddhas… who have no such impediment (to such transcendental knowledge). (24)

	That granted, we would then need to ask “how is this transcendental transformation of how we do philosophy and lead our lives to be practically realized?” (25)

	The quick reply would be to state that this transformation in style should achieve this for us. Simply put, this ‘new’ way of seeing things (as they really are) should, with diligence, assist us to enter into this transcendental dimension wherein insight itself should steer us in the proper, appropriate and valid direction. To adequately deal with this question I would need to look at a number of other texts in this tradition to ascertain the nature of those methods and the philosophy/philosophical transformations that are claimed to arise through their adoption and adaptation. (26)

A Reply to the Third Objection

	Let me now address the third objection, namely, how is it possible for more than one person to see a certain state of affairs if objects in the real world do not independently underpin such perceptions? (27)

	Vasubandhu answers in the latter sections of verse 3: ‘Like pretas (hungry ghosts), the non-restriction on the (number of) stream(s) of consciousness, in the seeing of rivers of pus, etc., by all of them.’ In effect, the hungry ghosts in their travels, all see the same pus-filled rivers, etc. Vasubandhu tells us in his auto-commentary to this verse by ‘etc.,’ is meant: ‘rivers full of urine and feces, etc., and the same guarded by men with sticks and swords.’ We are told that this is the result of a state of their karma ripening in the same manner equally (tulyakarmavipakavastha) even though this uniformity of perceptions is realized without those (pus-filled) objects existing (as pus-filled objects) (vijnaptinamasatyapyarthe).’ How is this counter-objection to be read and understood. (28)

	Pretas are hungry ghosts. They have been described as tear-shaped with distended bellies and very small, useless mouths and gullets. They travel about the landscape and in their progress see rivers (that mortals would see as rivers) as pus-filled rivers of purulent materials. The point of this counter-argument being that all of them see the same river as purulent even though that river is not a river filled with pus, etc. (29)

Now, the question must be asked is this a viable counter-objection? Does this argument hinge on the acceptance of the existence of pretas or is it still viable even if these entities are accepted only as hypothetical entities? Could this objection be translated into a more acceptable contemporary frame of reference? These questions, I believe, can be answered in the affirmative. Let me argue for this conclusion. (30)

	On a hypothetical level this argument could be tentatively accepted since it could be entertained in one’s imagination. One could imagine a troop of pretas coming to a river and all of them seeing it in the same fashion as a disgusting river filled with purulent pus, etc. But why should they so see it in the same fashion? Vasubandhu’s reasoning is that their karma is all maturing in the same fashion. Yet, how should we read that conformity of perceptual process without having to read back into it the necessity for a realist-type of object, namely, a real river, etc., to underpin those common perceptions, albeit misperceived? (31)

	Vasubandhu claims that we should see rivers, e.g., both in dreams and in non-dream states of wakefulness, etc., without the need for an imputed object-river. That granted, along with the fact that phenomenal perceptions are intentionally constituted in our relations with phenomena then we would only need to explain both why certain types of phenomena get mis-interpreted and some get mis-interpreted in the same collective fashion by a group of similar sentient entities, i.e., entities effectively with the same psychic backgrounds. Classically, there are a number of different distinctive types ) (on a possible spectrum) of mis-interpretation, e.g., hallucinations, delusions, sensory illusions (like bent sticks, mirages, etc.), mis-informed social conventions, mis-identifications, ill-informed co-authored scenarios, etc. Translators with latent or patent realist prejudices like to cast his comments as dealing with hallucinations, and, in this instance, with collective hallucinations. This, I believe, does an injustice to what Vasubandhu is trying to say and trying to achieve with his example. Let me look at this example through the lenses of the last three items on this spectrum as suggested above. (32)
	
	Under the heading of mis-informed social conventions we could run the following possible scenario. ‘Witches’ are an item in the medieval European world-view. People might have referred to the local midwife or herbalist as a ‘witch’, most likely as a ‘good witch’. A strange, psychotic neighbour might have been referred to as ‘possessed’ if not also as a ‘witch’, perhaps even a ‘bad witch’. If the consensus of gossip suggested that your cattle died because of a certain nasty neighbour, cum witch, then you might have felt that to have been the case. In your mind you might have entertained these notions with a certain degree of reservation. However, when the Inquisition comes knocking on the doors of your village what might have been ‘grey’ may well turn ‘black and white’. Along with other forms of social coercion and political pressure you might find yourself denouncing so-and-so before they denounce you, etc. In the process your testimony could well be amplified with what you now believe to be facts, namely, that ‘x’ and ‘y’ are ‘witches’, etc., and are ‘known’ to indulge in certain practices ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ as is the want of such infernal creatures. Of course in hindsight, few of us today believe in ‘witches’; certainly not in the manner as entertained in village life and religious politics of those cruel times (when certain forms of social difference were stigmatized as ‘witch-like behaviour,’ etc.). Albeit with or without doubts, ‘witches’ could well be seen as part of the local landscape with various nominated individuals being treated as possibly valid candidates to cast in such a role. Nowadays, most people will dismiss the classical form of a ‘witch’ as so much folklore. Some souls today might see themselves as ‘witches’, ‘white’ or ‘black’, and declare themselves to be the same, yet, we no longer treat such nominated or self-nominated persons to be anywhere near the classical definition of a ‘witch’ as defined in those manuals for their detection (with their fantastic depictions of Sabbaths with the devil or his proxies, etc.). Our world-view has moved on despite our possible re-valuation of what a witch might be or might not be today. The point I am trying to make is this, that in medieval times a certain person could be nominated as a ‘witch’ and seen as a ‘witch’, but, that through a contemporary lens even the category ‘witch’ itself is no longer viewed in the same manner with the implication that any nominated medieval ‘witch’ could never really have been a ‘true witch’ in the first place. All those people then, both peasants and non-peasants, thought there were ‘witches’ ready to play havoc with the spiritual fabric of society and that, therefore, there must exist certain individuals who truly were  ‘witches’, yet, we know, that none of those individuals could have been ‘real witches truly engaged in Sabbaths from time to time with the devil et al, etc.’ The cultural education of peasant and non-peasant alike predisposed certain individual to see other certain individuals as possible candidates for this type of role. Hence, for them, but not for us today, a classical form of witch-craft existed and that a certain person could be nominated as a ‘witch’ (until ‘proven’ or de-nominated otherwise?)? (33)

	Similarly, with inadvertent mistakes over identity. E.g., the streaker ran on to the bus through the front door wearing only a tie and a bowler hat whilst waving a cricket bat and then run quickly out the backdoor. On being interviewed some of the witnesses of this ‘moral outrage’ thought the streaker was actually a male when in this instance it happened to be a woman. ‘Ties’, ‘bowler hats’ and ‘cricket bats’ are usually seen as male paraphernalia and so in the ‘shock’ of the moment a number of ‘witnesses’ automatically assumed the person in question was a ‘male’. Here there is a collective process of mis-identification on the part of those passengers who incorrectly identified the sex of that streaker. (34)

	In the last category we have ill-informed co-authored scenarios. E.g., a hypnotist on a stage has a set of subjects in a hypnotic trance who have been made to believe the onion they are currently eating is actually a delicious apple. When individually asked “what colour is the ‘apple’ and how it tastes?” the replies of these entranced victims are met with mirth from the audience. Here the hypnotist and the trance subjects are collectively making a co-authored response. In this situation the phenomenon is collectively engaged. We have here a parallel to that suggested by Vasubandhu in his example of the pretas. Can we envisage a co-authored response without the presence of a hypnotist? (35)

	Imagine the following scenario. A hypnotist puts a number of people into a trance again on a stage in front of an audience. He nominates one of these entranced subjects to persuasively yell out, on the delivery of a certain cue, that the apples these other entranced subjects were eating were actually ‘onions’. Our ‘victims’ are each happily munching an apple when they are told that it is actually an onion. All of a sudden these hypnotized subjects declare their disgust at having been eating ‘onions’ when in fact they were truly eating apples. No longer does the hypnotist directly control these proceedings except through the use of an indirect cue. Now, all we need to do, to parallel Vasubandhu’s example is to envisage a situation where a group of subjects collectively co-authors a similar set of statements at variance to a normal, phenomenologically perceived phenomenal reality without a particular participant outside this mindset directly controlling the co-orchestrated flow of such co-authored utterances? (36)

	As in our examination of the imputed perception of medieval ‘witches’ through the application of mis-informed social conventions we could perceive the hunting and nomination of witches in a similar light as essentially co-authored, and certainly amplified in that manner. Now, I believe, we are in a better position to understand this common social ‘education’ as paralleling Vasubandh’s reply when he states that ‘apparent intersubjectivity’ is ‘the result of a state of individual karma ripening in the same manner equally’ (tulyakarmavipakavastha). E.g., young children ‘see’ a straight stick ‘bent’ in the water as a ‘bent’ stick. Then, with maturation of ‘education’ they come to know that straight sticks can appear bent and as a result might over-estimate the straightness of a slightly bent stick as seen partly in water and partly out of it? As we all know, people are individually and collectively privy to lots of weird and wonderful ‘knowledge’ about the world that is just plain wrong. As a result they collectively mis-translate the phenomenological nature of those types of phenomena subject to such mis-information. Hence this all-pervasive ability on our part to formulate, in principle, instances where, collectively, we are going to collectively misconstrue the phenomenal reality of a certain type of phenomenological engagement. Thence, there is no need on our part to interpret Vasubandhu as implying the collective hallucination of phenomena when through a commonality of educational gestation phenomenal reality will find itself translated and/or mistranslated in, either, the light of the maturity, or relative non-maturity, of that ‘education’. (37)

A Reply to the Fourth Objection

	The fourth objection demands that ‘real objects’ are also necessary for the causal efficiency or causal effectiveness of phenomena. Vasubandhu’s reply is to again invoke a comparison to dreams. He states in the first section of verse 4: ‘Causal effectiveness just as in nocturnal emissions in sleep.’ In his commentary he expands this to say: ‘…as evidenced in a dream in the emission of semen without the coming together of a couple.’ Apparently, this topic was of some concern to monks for a variety of reasons. Another example Vasubandhu might have availed himself of could have been ‘being chased in a dream and the resultant fear precipitating a heart attack.’ In either situation there were neither a ‘sexual coupling’ nor ‘someone or thing chasing you in a fearful and life threatening fashion.’ Extended to all phenomenal presentations, we are to perceive such phenomena as causally effective without having to invoke the impossible to experience real-objects so beloved by realists et al (even though these sorts of metaphors appear to find themselves treated literally in everyday life along with its subsequent, and consequent, inauthenticities of being). (38)

	Now, Vasubandhu, to clinch his counter-objection in four parts, now argues that: 
there is a situation where all four counter-objections co-occur. (39)

An Integrated Set of Counter-Objections

	In concluding verse 4 he states: ‘…furthermore, as in hell, all (of these counter-objections) can be met in the seeing of infernal guards, etc., and in the torture conducted by the same (etc.). (40)

	Vasubandhu’s detailed commentary on this point is worth translating here (particular sections that I would like to come to your attention I have put in a bold font):

For just as in the hells, on the part of hell denizens seeing infernal guards, etc., the restriction on place and time are established. By ‘etc.,’ is understood dogs, crows, mountains made of iron, etc., all coming and going being seen, and, by all and not by just one (of those hell denizens). And these denizens are being tortured by these infernal guards, etc., on account of the maturing of their own (individual) karma in the same fashion even though it is established that these (objects as) infernal guards, etc. are non-existent. Thus, also, in this additional example this fourfold set of objections is met and that this should be realized (by the realist, etc.).  Again, by what reason (should this be known) that these infernal guards and dogs and crows (etc.) cannot be referred to as beings (sattvas)? On account of the illogical (and impossible) existence of that which is ‘infernal’! For it is not the case that these ‘infernal guards (etc.)’ are applicable (and can exist) in this type of situation. Such being the case that they could not feel the suffering (of this burning and torture). If these infernal guards were to mutually torture these denizens of hell, and v.v., this infernal state would not be able to arise. On the part of these torturers, equal in size, strength and force, there would be a mutual torturing and fear would not arise. How could these guards be a torturing others if (both were) unable to suffer the burning pain from standing upon a molten ground made of iron? How could there exist those not experiencing the hellish state together with those who are? (41)

An objection is made:

Why not propose that animals (as infernal creatures) can be born in hell just as animals can be born in heaven? Thus there could arise in hells infernal guards as animals and pretas. (42)

A reply is made in verse form:

Just as (it is claimed) animals are born in heaven so too could pretas not be born in hell since they both should not experience the suffering that would arise there (if they did). Verse 5. (43)
For those animals born in heaven, by their karma, experience the pleasure that in that world is allotted there and so experience such pleasure. But that would not be the case with infernal guards, etc., as they would experience infernal suffering (too). Therefore this applies neither to animals nor pretas. Surely, for those in hells, as a consequence of their karma, there would be perceived special substances which would take on the form having a distinctive colour-shape, strength and force, recognized as infernal guards, etc. And, so, constantly transforming they are seen in miscellaneous forms , like, e.g., the raising of the hand (in order to instill fear, etc.)., and so too mountains coming and going in the form of sheep, and in the forest of iron cotton-silk trees with thorns rising-up and down-falling. It not being the case that these phenomena(l perceptions) don’t exist! (44)

Reply:

If, by their karma, these (special) elements arise there (in hell) (as infernal creatures) and this is recognized then why not recognize this transformation as being of consciousness. Verse 6. (45)

	A very complex example is given, of the situation in hell, in order to counter this set of four objections. But the situation in hell is ruled out as illogical by Vasubandhu. Not that these states of affairs don’t exist (in the minds of those [self-]condemned to hell). As phenomena, Vasubandhu argues, why not see them as constituted in consciousness rather than as both constituted in consciousness and paralleled in a realm of real object correlates when this second realm is ruled out as illogical in a realistic dimension (as well as impossible to experience as an object per se without it being constituted as an-object-for-us). (46)

	Now, various to-be-expected-criticisms could be brought to this example as were raised in our example of the pretas (as an illustration of a co-experiencing of phenomenal/phenomenological stability in the re/presentation of identity). And the same sorts of replies could be re-given. E.g., in our Contemporary era talk of hells can only be granted a hypothetical existence as few people now cognitively believe in such locations (although in non-cognitive forms they may still exist for the same people through [inauthentic] forms of religious education). But that is just Vasubandhu’s point! Hells are illogical creations that can only be suffered in the fevered guilt of minds indoctrinated with such nonsense. But if you were a believer and experienced infernal creatures about to torture you these states only have an existence for your perverted consciousness. And if there were more than one such person apparently condemned it is because these people all have the same level of spiritual maturity, or, rather, immaturity. Now, as such phenomena are manifested by mind, why not see all phenomena as constituted in mind by mind; as mere phenomena manifested purely by consciousness?! (47).

	Vasubandhu is not arguing for some kind of a collective hallucination, rather, a state of mis-interpretation of phenomena that are being read in and through the ‘perverted’ consciousness of a group of people all possessing a similar level of spiritual immaturity/maturity. Can we, again, parallel this type of phenomenal situation in something more acceptable for the Contemporary, relatively non-religious person of today? (48)

	Imagine the following scenario. In a certain unnamed country, a country ruled by a ruthless totalitarian regime, we have a cleaner and his wife who have just started working in their local psychiatric hospital. They are both simple, good, religious people. Now, after work, the husband discusses with his brother what their first week of cleaning was like for them. His brother works as a nurse in this hospital and is a person who is not so traditionally religious. The cleaner says to his brother, the nurse, “all three wards seemed to be the same. In A Ward there are lots of young people, they all look well and truly possessed by unclean spirits. In B Ward some of the people there look older but they too seem to be possessed by the same types of unclean spirits. In C Ward we have old and young people and after morning tea each day they too look like being possessed by the same hordes of unclean spirits. I didn’t know the Devil had such a large congregation here on Earth!” The brother replies, whispering quietly, I shouldn’t tell you this but as you are my brother I hope I can trust this information with you. In A Ward we have drug induced psychoses, usually young people who have been out partying all week and use, indeed, abuse too much crystal meth and the like. They are psychotic because of the drugs they take. In B Ward we have acutely psychotic people, both old and young, and with medication they eventually become less acutely psychotic. In C Ward we have, and he whispers it, political prisoners. Each night they are given medications, with their evening meal – sedation which lasts eight hours, a medication for psychotic side-effects and this last sixteen hours, and, a secret drug that makes them go psychotic, indeed psychotic all day if it were not for the anti-psychotic side-effect medication they also take. By nighttime they have learnt that they must take their medications otherwise they get no sleep, no rest from ‘the voices’ and the violent agitation caused by this secret drug. It is truly a dreadful sight to watch as they go from sane to insane like clockwork each morning around ten o’clock. So, you see drugs can make you mad, and, medication can overcome that madness be it caused by either drugs or a mental illness. There is no need to believe these people are possessed by unclean spirits. Don’t you agree?” The wife answers “they still look as if they were possessed, might it not be the case that the drugs actually let the spirits in, let them enter?” “Why have two explanations when one is enough,” said the nurse, “when certain drugs can be seen to both cause madness and others to cure the same!” The husband and wife think about this and tentatively nod in agreement. The wife and husband then, more or less, say together “what they are doing in C Ward is criminal!” “Yes” answers the nurse, “and a few of us are secretly documenting this in the hope that the ‘Great Leader’ will one day be taken before a United Nation’s tribunal in the Hague and be prosecuted as a criminal for committing crimes against humanity… and to let the world know what is happening in our once noble country… contrary to the sickening dissemination of the Party’s omnipresent propaganda…!” Saying this and looking around him in the hope they were not being overheard above the blaring radio…. (49)

	What is the point of this anecdote? The husband and wife both ‘saw’ psychotic behaviour as if it were the result of spirit possession. The nurse demonstrated that medication could both make them mad and/or help them overcome their apparent madness. In the light of this explanation, the parallel interpretation of spirit possession was seen to be both redundant and possessed of little explanatory power (without having to invest it with additional ad hoc premises like, e.g., that certain drugs could greatly set up the conditions for spirit possession, etc.). Whereas previously they both saw ‘spirit possession’, through the similar nature of their religious-cultural upbringing, now, through the overlay of a more scientific education, they no longer interpret psychotic behaviour in that former light (even though those poor souls still looked to them as if they were ‘possessed’ by a legion of devils). Thereafter, life for that husband and wife, in their jobs as cleaners, would take on an entirely new perspective, being seen with a different set of ethical parameters and injunctions, as they secretly assisted their brother-in-law. (50)

IV. Conclusion

	To conclude this essay I would like to introduce a number of observations. (51)

1.	With the active, central emplacement of an OTS a text takes on a transcendental complexion, namely, an appreciation, merely, of the intentional constitution of that phenomenon or phenomena under investigation. (52)

2.	Vasubandhu’s invocation of a comparison to a dream also invokes an OTS (through its invocation of our interest merely upon the intentional constitution of that as experienced) besides arguing that we also have no need for a parallel economy between a directly engage world of phenomena (as the Life-World) and a non-engaged, non-phenomenal realm of impossible to experience ‘objects’ as beloved by realist et al! (53)

3.	That, in the light of research on co-authored states, there is no need to read Vasubandhu’s examples along the lines of implying that a collective hallucination allows people to see the same things regardless of where they be, be they on Earth or in Hell or in Heaven. That there is a mutuality of interaction between the consciousness of sentient beings just as much, but albeit with some differences, as between sentient consciousnesses and phenomenal re/presentations regardless of whether the same are with or without the imputation of ‘objects’ (and/or ‘subjects’)! (54)

4.	That, therefore, we should not interpret this philosopher (and, by extension, this type of Buddhist Tradition) as idealistic in orientation! That a better position should be to read him as a transcendentalist, as a transcendental phenomenologist (and transcendental hermeneut/hermeneuticist, transcendental existentialist, etc.). Therein, dismissing all idealistic interpretations as totally inappropriate in regard to this particular text, this specific philosopher Vasubandhu, and, the (early) Yogacara Tradition in general!! (55)
	            						         Noël Tointon, Sydney, 22.4.06.