‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Part III:
The Mere-Unreality of the Realist’s Vision of ‘Reality’
As Argued for in Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika!*

0.   Introduction

	On superficial reflection, at first glance, the world could be seen to fall into two camps, namely, the ontological world of things as objects or states of affairs in the (so-called external) world and the world of ideas and all other things of an epistemological, psychological nature in some form or other. If one were to prepare a dictionary along these lines we would be left with lists of a non-psychological orientation and lists of a psychological orientation. I use the world ‘orientation’ because there would be some words that might well seem to belong to both worlds, and, that, on closer inspection, one might well be able to argue that all the things of the world as experienced objects or states must involve some form of an experiential dimension for all things-to-be-there-for-us. That, simply, this ‘fact’, that for something to be there for us it must be experientially simulated in some form or other, should be treated as an ‘observation’, or accurate inference, rather than as an imperative pronounced by some ideological idealist. (1)

	Now, the transcendental phenomenologist, through the imposition of a thorough (overall) transcendental suspension in effect dismisses both the purely ontological world of objects-states and the purely epistemological world of psychological states. They inhabit and recognize only this intermediate territory of the intentionally constituted wherein there are both ‘mental attitudes towards the world’ and ‘how our perceptions of the world and their appreciation appear to evoke certain responses of a psychological nature’. (2)

	In this paper I would like to demonstrate that Vasubandhu could be regarded, among many things, as a transcendental phenomenologist on the grounds that he dismisses both objects in the world (as mere imputations) as well as a pure realm of ideas and other psychological states (on the grounds that already we are in a direct relationship with the phenomenal content of experience, in all its forms, and, that such a relationship is not purely constituted by-us for-us but is also constituted for-us by-it as realized in our directly engaged interactions with that phenomenal state-of-affairs regardless of the nature of its intentional content). By demonstrating that Vasubandhu dismisses both the purely ontological and the purely epistemological I would have automatically shown, thus, that this great thinker cannot be mistreated and misinterpreted as an idealist in the classical sense. (3)

	To establish these overall objectives let me demonstrate, first, that Vasubandhu is not a realist. Then, let me establish that he is not an idealist either by his insistent dismissal of idealistic practices. Lastly, let me explore some of the ramifications that this ‘neutral’ position has both with respect to this style of Buddhist philosophy itself and with respect to Postmodern and Contemporary forms of philosophical practice today. (4)

* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
I.   Vasubandhu’s Dismissal of the Real

	At the beginning of the Vimsatika Vasubandhu tells us that the use of the expression matra is for the purpose of prohibiting (the conceptual use of) objects (artha) (as objects in the so-called external world). Effectively it treats all objectivity as merely an expression of intentional objectivity. Otherwise, as we are told, the intentional object would take on the capacity or nature of being like an object (in the so-called ‘external world’) (where it too would be subjected to the same type of objectifying process). (5)

	We are also told that the use of this compounded expression matra is not to be treated as a process of negation (apavada) in a denial of the phenomenon but only as recognition that the realistic evidence (laksana) of that phenomenon (as an object qua object [in the external world]) is not in evidence. (6)

	Atomic speculations that treat phenomena (dharmas) as partless or indivisible atoms are also ruled out as contradictory (in so far as atoms could congregate to form solid wholes, etc.[as a basis for {our perception of} the external ayatanas)]. However, if atoms were defined, instead, as minute particles with a spatial (and temporal) dimension would these objections of Vasubandhu be overcome? No! Vasubandhu tells us that our experience of phenomena (dharmas) is such that their nature is constructed/imagined/fabricated (kalpitatmana). In other words we are (directly) dealing with intentional constructions and not pre-intentional entities. Recognizing this fact of our intentional lives lets us realize that we are dealing only with intentional constructions hence the use of this expression matra alerts us to just this fact. As previously argued, in this series of papers, Vasubandhu is putting a very effective and thorough overall transcendental suspension in place. Hence the title given to this text, namely, vijnaptimatratasiddhi (“the establishment [or proof] of the merely-intentional nature [of all phenomena]). (7)

	Without doubt Vasubandhu could not be described as a realist. On the other hand that does not mean he could not be an empiricist (or that he must be an idealist). Vasubandhu’s prime argument for the denial of real objects (in the so-called external world) is to argue that we can vividly see things in dreams that obviously cannot be directly connected with the perception of real objects as the person experiencing such phenomena is asleep and has their eyes shut. The main implication to be drawn from this analogy, among a number of others, is to realize that real objects are not necessary for an act of perception, indeed, are completely absent since the intentional nature of perception is to operate with constructed or imagined phenomenon, i.e., with simulations of an intentional objectivity by-us for-us. However, a distinction can be made between acts of dreaming and acts of wakeful perception in terms of the greater quality of the phenomenal nature of the latter rather than the assumed presence and mistaken imputation of real objects. In being asked what is the difference between dreaming and wakefulness (in terms of a greater causal efficacy of the latter) in verse 18 he tells us: In a dream, mind is affected by torpor so there is a difference between these two psychological states. He then immediately adds, in his commentary: this is the reason, not the existence of an (external) object. In other words, this difference between dreaming and perceiving in a wakeful state is the greater clarity of consciousness realized in the latter, and, a realization upon ‘awakening’ that the imputed objects are just that, namely, the imputations of inexistent objects (just as when we wake up we find those dream-objects to be non-existent or inexistent). The fully awakened person, like the Buddhas, also recognizing the subtle, inexistence of all imputed intentional objectivity held to be existent in conventional frames of reference. (8)

	Let us now ask “does Vasubandhu’s use of the expression matra, in the concept and practice of the vijnaptimatra, etc.,  also invoke the complete overall transcendental suspension of all epistemological states, which, through their transcendental reduction, should become treated as no more than as intentional constructions (vijnaptimatra) without any overt or covert classical idealistic imputations or implications?” In other words, does Vasubandhu replace his dismissal of realist imputations with imputations of an idealistic tenor? (9)

II.   Vasubandhu’s Dismissal of the Ideal

	This question just posed, in effect, asks “although our intentional processes are constituted by-us for-us are they completely constituted for-us by-us-alone?” To answer that question we need to deal with such questions as how do we discern the real(ity of a certain phenomenal situation), and, how do we interact with and find ourselves coming to know the minds of others (as well as getting to know our own mind)?  All these issues, posed as challenges in this text by Vasubandhu’s composite vision of a realist, are met by Vasubandhu as a transcendental idealist (although I would prefer to use the expression transcendentalist as argued earlier) and not as an idealist (as classically formulated). We may only encounter ‘intentional objects’ but that does not mean for Vasubandhu that our experience of the world is entirely constituted by-us for-us alone. All phenomenal experience may be fabricated as the imagined or constructed, as English translations of the expression kalpita, that in no way implies that those phenomenal experiences qua phenomenal experiences are themselves merely fabricated by us alone, and, not had or experienced. As Vasubandhu states our correct understanding of phenomena is such when we recognize the inexistence of their intentional objectivity without also accepting, retrospectively, a negation of that phenomenal experience itself. Moreover, phenomenal experience is directly engaged, albeit from the points of view or perspectives of those elements involved in that engagement in the manner appropriate to their phenomenal natures. So, a person would engage another person as another person, and v.v., when those two individuals engage each other in and through an inter-subjective mode of engagement, etc. Or, a person would engage an object, say a chair, in such a manner that they see it as an object to sit upon, whereas, from the so-called ‘perception of the chair’ it would ‘perceive itself as being sat upon’ when something or someone were to sit upon it in the perceptive manner appropriate to the self-perception of a chair, i.e., the non-intentional/pre-intentional conjunction of two or more material-like states of affairs.  In this type of position, the person must find themselves in a richness of experience that is not just constituted by-them for-themselves-alone! In a mutual reciprocity the participants of that relationship reveal themselves to each other in such a manner as appropriate to their phenomenal natures from their respective points of view. So, the world of phenomenal experience may be phenomenologically constituted by us it is not just constituted by us and from our individual perspective/s alone! It is also constituted through our direct engagement with, and appreciation of, the natures and perspectives of that intentional objectivity being engaged (in the manner of that current engagement be it perception, imagination, recollection, etc.) within that overall intentional act. (10)

	Vasubandhu answers, hence, that there is a mutual interaction between different mental streams (of different people, each one being associated with the phenomenal presence of a person) and different segments of the same mental stream (associated with the phenomenal sense of self-presence experienced by a person in their own appreciation of their own sense of self). In this transcendental reduction to the merely intentional, vijnaptimatra, all theoretical constructions, as imputations, are ‘put our of action’ by this exercise of the transcendental suspension embedded in this practice of translating all phenomenal experiences through this lens of the merely intentional. Consequently, all imputations of an epistemological character are equally reduced to a transcendental appreciation of their mere intentional constitution. Thus, in no way could Vasubandhu’s anti-realist treatment of the phenomenal, and its interpretative, conventional imputation of the natural world, etc., be misconstrued as either idealistic in aspiration or practice or be misconstrued in any other manner other than as a transcendentalist which, as previously stressed, must not be construed as idealistic in any classical sense. To do otherwise, in my opinion, is to completely misunderstand the nature of the religious program that motivates Vasubandhu et al to adopt this type of philosophical platform. Although polemical, this text is envisaged as a tool in helping the reader to see reality as it really is in the hope that we be no longer ensnared in the apparent attractiveness of 'our' inexistent imputations. By showing those imputations to be inexistent, non-existent in the manner beyond their apparent presentation, is to automatically dissolve our attraction and addiction to such entities through a realization of their inexistence from the transcendental perspective… along with all the spiritual consequences that automatically flow in the wake of such a 'turning around'. (11)

	Let me now reinforce this observation that epistemological entities are also treated by Vasubandhu in the same manner as he treats ontologically oriented entities, namely, that they too are subject to this overall transcendental suspension entailed in this concept and practice of vijnaptimatra. E.g., he tells us that the constructed nature of intentional processes along with their intentional objectivity is bifurcated along the lines of the intentional object to be grasped (grahya) and the intentional subject committing such grasping as the apparent grasper (grahaka). Vasubandhu explicitly tells us that there is no absolute grasper just as much as there is no absolutely independent intentional object to be grasped (in any other mode other than in act of dependent intentional grasping). Thence the intentional inexistence of both the grasper and object grasped. Thus there can be no real absolute visual perceiver, etc… along with no real absolute mental apperceiver to be treated as apart from their associated intentional correlates of external objects in the visual field, etc., etc. Interestingly, Vasubandhu adds the expression adi, meaning ‘etc.’, to this compounded duality and we might like to cash out this ecetera to include the contrasting opposition of the duality between an intentional act of grasping (grahana) and the object to be grasped (grahya) in that act. It might also be cashed out to further include all future divisions based on these dual, artificial imputations of self-existent, absolutely independent entities of agents, objects, worlds, etc, as nothing but projected creations of the mind superimposed upon phenomenal reality (as ‘realized’ in our conventional appreciation of phenomenal reality). Whereas, in contrast, through the adoption of this transcendental perspective of the  vijnaptimatra our mis-interpretation of phenomenal reality is phenomenologically rectified in and through this translation of the merely intentional  E.g., Vasubandhu tells us: in our misguided treatment of the phenomenal the constructed nature (kalpitatmana) of phenomena is mistreated as absolutely self-existent/independent (svabhava) and based upon the absolutely divided duality of intentional processes being bifurcated into intentional agents/processes versus their intentional objectivity (grahyagrahakadi). Moreover, that the intentional correlates (laksana) of our intentional objectivity are just not existent there for us in intentional experience but that, at the same time, the experiences of those phenomenal imputations as processes of that perceived/apperceived state of affairs are not be negated in any way. Just as, I would suggest as an apposite parallel, a person who is hallucinating is imagining things to be in a manner that is just not the case, still, the very act of hallucinating must be considered to be just as ‘real’ as any other phenomenal experience; i.e., as a  phenomenal experience of phenomena (regardless of the inexistence of its phenomenal content and the relative reality/unreality of its interpretation of the world as lived)! (12)
III.   Some of the Ramifications of a Transcendental Phenomenology in General?

	What are the consequences, for Vasubandhu, of this type of transcendental philosophy? For a start, his pronouncement that the intentional object is ‘objectless’ would appear to be correct. Hence the inexistence of intentional objectivity, i.e., the non-existence of the intentional object other than in the intentional manner of its presentation. Thence the mere-unreality of the realist’s vision of ‘reality’. No where does anyone ever meet with a non-intentionally constructed, non-mediated object or state!! Whereas, on the other hand, the phenomenal reality of the mere-intentional reality of our phenomenological awareness of reality should be considered as proper, appropriate and valid to that degree an overall transcendental suspension has been put into effect, and, such revealed intentional constitution is critically re-valuated in the light of those intentional objectives for our research currently in play. For Vasubandhu this is realized through this re-interpretative lens of the merely-intentional (vijnaptimatra). (13)

	What then are the consequences of this revolution, this turning around of our understanding of the intentional nature that constitutes our experience of the world-as-lived (Life-World)? Too numerous to count! However, some of those consequences claimed are an insight into the way things are and a consequent re-alignment of how we should comport ourselves in this world-of-life before others (to paraphrase this in a Heidiggarian language). It is claimed that this ‘turning around’ and ‘purification’ of our appreciation of the world is spiritual and enlightening in its transformation of our being in this world with others. The ramification of this interpretative re-translation are claimed, more or less, to be valid, scientific, insightful, enlightening, spiritual, soteriological and salvic in aspiration and objective. Be that as it may, or may not be the case, a profound shift is promulgated in how we should re-see the nature of this phenomenal world, with, as a result, that a profound claim is made that promotes the need for a re-discovery of this phenomenal world in so far as the utilization of a central transcendental suspension provokes, it would seem, a more powerful prescriptive-description/descriptive-prescription on how we should inhabit and live in this one-world-of-life-that-we-share-with-others…. (14)

	Now, in order to interpret this transcendental style of philosophy we must first have the requisite lens or lenses in place in order to appreciate the nature of its terminology and the nature of the relationship between those terms. In other words, a reasonably accurate systematic appreciation of just how this type of philosophy functions. Only then can we appreciate its ramifications as a philosophical method (and when relevant, ascertain its indicated 'spiritual' consequences). To some extent I have found it annoying to have to spend so much time on laboriously demonstrating that, among many other things, Vasubandhu is a transcendentalist and not an idealist! Much more interesting and fruitful, I believe, would be to research the ramifications and consequences of this type of position, and, to compare this type of stance with much that has occurred in recent Postmodern and Contemporary philosophical thought. In many ways the philosophical practice of the Yogacara mirrors and virtually comments on much of what passes for the Postmodern and the Contemporary, and v.v. Indeed, as natural commentators upon each other, through their sharing of similar philosophical innovations, etc., what is relatively absent or defective or overlooked in one tradition can be illuminated by the other, and v.v. One such comparative feature that I find fascinating, and potentially fruitful, is the relative absence of a consistently developed ethical dimension in current philosophical thought versus its specialized development in the Yogacara (and all other streams of Buddhist thought). With the exceptions of Levinas and, perhaps by default, Foucault, the ethical dimension has been more seriously overlooked rather than developed or re-developed in the philosophical light of postmodernity. Then, alternatively, in the light of the work of Husserl, it would appear, at least superficially, that a transcendental philosophy could have been better articulated in the Yogacara. I say this with much reservation as I would also argue that Yogacara practice appears to be more sophisticated in the course of its practical expertise (and also in the exercise of a critical dimension). No doubt, in my opinion, a serious, in depth comparison between these two periods of philosophical rigour would produce a profound and mutual commentary of one upon the other. Suffice to say that we have here a potential dialogue that, when properly, appropriately and validly conducted, must have important ramification for postmodernity (along with our future study of the Yogacara and its later developments and other connections in the field of Buddhist thought such as Tantra, the Tathagatgarbha, later controversies over the nature of intentional objectivity, etc., etc.). (15)

IV. Conclusion (In the Form of Prospectus for Future Debate)

	In this paper, I believe, I have shown that Vasubandhu, and by proxy, much of the Yogacara tradition, not to be idealistic in its formulation and practice! Furthermore, by the use of this manner of practicing an (overall) transcendental suspension (via the treatment of intentional states as merely intentional, i.e., as vijnaptimatra) Vasubandhu could also be cast as a serious empiricist, albeit as a transcendental empiricist, i.e., as a philosopher who critically investigates, in an in depth manner, the process and nature of intentional constitution as it manifests itself (through re-iterations of its essential configuration, etc.). Moreover, I would add, through the virtual self-rectification of a closely observed noetic-noematic correlation, a critical element is introduced wherein evidence is realized through such intentional analysis rather than a searching for impossible pre-intentional states of evidential support (as often claimed in the course of scientific endeavours, etc.). Lastly, a closer interpretation of the generic structure of the Yogacara, and its evolution in time, should act as a powerful commentary on postmodernity, and v.v., especially in the field of the ethical (since Buddhist postmodern-like practices prioritize a vital need for this element of an existentially lived ethical dimension) - an aspect our current global civilization needs in the light of a proliferation of nuclear weaponry and other sophisticated devices for the delivery of death and destruction; in our accelerated dealings with other cultures, refugees and economic migrants; in the light of imminent global catastrophes like global warming, etc; and, in the very investment and re-organization of our social fabric along relatively more ethical lines through a re-emphasis upon spiritual growth and psychic maturity. Hence the value I have placed upon such research and its comparative commentary upon postmodernity, and v.v! (16)
	            						         Noël Tointon, Sydney, 26.5.06.