‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Part IV:
“Do Other Minds Get Known the Same Way We Get to Know Our Own?”
As Argued (And Qualified) by Vasubandhu in his Vimsatika*

0.   Introduction

	There is a comment by Vasubandhu in his Vimsatika that other minds are known the same way we know our own, however, according to him, this ‘knowledge’ is also ‘erroneous’. In this paper let me explore what Vasubandhu might mean by this observation and how his comments (and commentary on those comments) might help us to understand a resolution of the (so-called) Western philosophical ‘problem of other minds’. (1)

	Vasubandhu’s comment, and commentary, in question is:

How do we know the erroneous nature of other minds? 
In the same fashion we know the erroneous nature of our own mind.

And furthermore how do we know that (nature) is erroneous? 

Because of ignorance (non-knowledge), just as (the range of) the field (of understanding) for the Buddha (is to understand the existence of that ignorance as ‘ignorance’ which is knowledge). (2)

	It would appear that Vasubandhu’s realist opponent is unable to grasp the phenomenal nature of consciousness, mind, and is forever trying to re-cast Vasubandhu as an idealist. According to the introductory comments of this text the concept of vijnapti (perception/conception) is synonymous with the following expressions dealing with various aspects of consciousness and mind, namely, citta,(mind) manas (mental) and vijnana (consciousness). It follows, therefore, that the key expression vijnaptimatra is equivalent to cittamatra, manomatra and vijnanamatra. Now, although the compound cittamatra, e.g., could be translated as ‘sole Mind’ or ‘Mind-alone’, ‘one Mind’, only-Mind, mind only, etc., context should have us reading it merely as ‘mere mind’, or ‘mere consciousness’, i.e., as ‘phenomenal’ which means ‘merely phenomenal’! Such an expression should not be read through an idealistic lens (contra Tola and Dragonetti). (3)
* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
This transcendental manoeuvre on the part of Vasubandhu effectively deconstructs any pure notion/s of both the ontological and the epistemological. No pure ‘external worlds’ and no pure internality of an internal mind absolutely cut off from all others in this medium or dimension of the transcendental realm of the Life-World (to paraphrase this in Husserlian-like language). Now, the sense of the ‘phenomenal’ being used here straddles both an ontological sense through the articulation of an intentional object (and/or objective) and the transcendental fact that this intentional objectivity is constituted in the intentional consciousness of the person or persons entertaining this aspect of phenomenal existence. The true transcendental philosopher, through their thorough utilization of an overall transcendental suspension, cannot and does not deal with any isolated notion or notions of mind or similar pertaining merely to the purely conscious or purely mental. Moreover, for them, both the realistic treatment of the purely ontological and the idealistic treatment of the purely mental have together been thoroughly deconstructed (through the utilization of that overall transcendental suspension regardless of whether that manoeuvre is called or recognized to be an overall transcendental suspension)! By ‘phenomenal’ is meant, therefore, the mere form of that presentation/re-presentation; i.e., the manner and nature of its presentation/re-presentation (as experienced in phenomenal consciousness). Merely attending to the manner and nature of that under examination, without extrapolating from that type of investigation and imputing some form of existence beyond those phenomenological terms of reference, is to merely treat the same as a phenomenon or set of phenomena (as examined in those transcendental terms of reference). In this light a purification of the phenomenal content is an altogether different experience being no more nor no less than the sheer removal of all forms of imputation beyond those merely phenomenal terms of reference. Again, it is my belief that Vasubandhu is doing much the same sort of thing in his referral to all things as merely phenomenal (vijnaptimatra)! That, some translators still refer to this Yogacara philosopher and others in this Tradition as idealists, without the requisite evidence, simply beggars belief! (4)

	Vasubandhu also tells us:

There is a mutuality of restriction(s) upon the phenomenon of consciousness by virtue of the predominant conditioning factor(s) between one person with some other (and vice versa).  
	
	In other words: one stream of consciousness limits another stream of consciousness by virtue of their being able to mutually influence one another. I say something to someone and when they hear me and can understand what I am talking about then ideas form in their mind with some degree of hermeneutic correspondence to what was being uttered. And off course this works both ways. We do not inhabit some pure, idealistic realm of our own consciousness. Instead we are embodied in a world with others where we are engaged with others before-others. But ‘embodiment’ does not mean that we are merely embodied in some pure external realm of the ontological. Our use of ‘embodiment’ is meant in a phenomenological sense, i.e., we find ourselves as a phenomenon before others just as much as others are found to be an apparent phenomenon for us. The epistemological richness of our interaction with other subjects usually deems that interaction to be inter-subjective (in orientation). Normally when we talk to an object, as opposed to a subject, it does not speak back to us in reply (although in this day and age my microwave keeps telling me it is done what it was suppose to have done, and my telephone tells me it either has messages or no messages, etc; although we know that those types of ‘communication’ are indirectly set up and contrived by other subjects to be re-played on the presentation of appropriate cues for their electronic re-iteration). (5)

	Vasubandhu notes this difference between subjects and objects, i.e., subjective phenomena and objective phenomena through his acceptance of the classical Buddhist division between subject-like dharmas and object-like dharmas. This word dharma, in my opinion, is best understood through a (transcendental) phenomenological lens as a term that straddles the epistemological and the ontological realms or polarities of existence. Otherwise, we will be unable to make much sense of the texts. However, some confusion arises when we try to understand in what sense this term might have been used in a particular philosophical tradition since the nature and classifications of a dharmic philosophy itself were highly controversial and ever debated between various Buddhist factions. The expression itself needs to be contextually delineated since the word dharma in the singular normally meant, in a Buddhist frame of reference, the teachings of the Buddhist doctrine (in accordance with a particular tradition). However, in the plural, it is usually interpreted to imply a phenomenal-like context dealing with either mental or non-mental events or phenomena. However, the parameters of that treatment need to take into account, to begin with, whether that expression is being used as a pre-critical atomic-like irreducible or as a post-critical intentionally constituted relational element or factor. Then, we need to note its place in an organized scheme, a set of dharmas, as organized by a particular tradition (a list that, in effect, was politically formulated in time and space by a particular faction that may or may not be coincident with the lists of other factions in both name and/or definition). My expressions ‘pre-critical’ and ‘post-critical’ are not so much temporal attributes rather than whether a particular political faction recognized the critical consequences of the devastating critique of the likes of Nagarjuna et al. In a critique of atomic realism and the imputed irreducible nature of dharmas and shifting from an ontological orientation to an epistemological orientation, albeit in transcendental or transcendental-like terms of reference, dharmic analysis thereafter either recognized the advent and consequences of that revolution or turned its back on the same to some extent or other. Furthermore, under the influence of the Yogacara, a shift towards the epistemological orientation also took place but within the critical terms of reference as carved out by the likes of Nagarjuna. In this direction an increasingly intentional-like character was ascribed to dharmic analysis, albeit provisionally or conventionally. Needless to say our retrospective examination of the nature of a particular form of dharmic analysis is not without its hermeneutic and philosophical difficulties. In my investigations here I wish to essentially reconstruct the general nature of a Yogacara-like analysis albeit in and through a Husserlian or post-Husserlian type of terminological lens. (6)

	What are my intentions here? First, I would like to demonstrate the phenomenological nature of dharmas as I perceive the Yogacara to utilize this concept and practice. Second, I would like to demonstrate the transcendental nature of that style of analysis. Third, I would like to reconstruct the basic divisions of that analysis and examine its implications through the examination of an economy of non-absolute appropriation. Fourth, I would like to discuss what implications this has for our attempting to understand this comment by Vasubandhu that we can know other minds in the same way we know our own mind, albeit, erroneously. Fifth, we will then examine what might be meant by this expression ‘erroneous’? Sixth, we can then note the implication that an enlightened mind, should it exist, would or should be by nature non-erroneous. Lastly, we will need to examine how knowledge, for the Yogacara, could be both ‘erroneous’ and ‘knowledge’, and, what type of implications this type of phenomenology might have to offer for a resolution or dissolution of the Western problem of other minds. (7)

1.    The Phenomenal-Phenomenological Nature of Dharmas in the Yogacara

	The dharmic treatment of reality is a phenomenal type of treatment. Such treatment operates with both a distinctive presentation in mind and that that presentation occurs within certain categories as pre-delineated and pre-defined by that tradition conducting that form of analysis. In this regard, large lists of phenomena, varying in number, were tabulated by various schools of thought and added to or subtracted from overtime. The contents of these lists being regarded as vital material for meditation and the creation of a mindful insight into the nature of phenomena (as they were inferred to impact upon the course of our existence and our pursuit of salvation). In a comparison with strong parallels to Husserlian phenomenology we can note both the distinctive eidetic nature of phenomenal presentation and the nature of the distinctive relationships envisaged in the synthesis of a phenomenal context wherein various phenomenal types of presentations are conceived of as co-occurring. E.g., ‘saltiness’ has a distinctive eidetic presentation and ‘water’ has a distinctive presentation hence the distinctiveness of ‘salty-water’ as a complex phenomenal presentation. Or, the more complex phenomenon of a ‘beach’ is a complex interaction of sand, salty seawater, etc. Or, what might generally be entailed in ‘our walking along a beach’ is an even more complex phenomenon, etc. (8)

	Now, the philosophical treatment of that dharmic analysis by a particular Buddhist tradition, as noted, is either relatively critical in orientation or relatively non-critical. Into the latter category we can subsume an atomistic realism or other forms of realistic treatment (or the idealistic treatment of dharmas, etc., should that too have occurred). Furthermore, those dharmas, as already noted, are either subjective in perspective or non-subjective in perspective. Vasubandhu makes this latter point, to the same effect, in Verse no. 10. As the philosophical position of the Yogacara is basically transcendental the word ‘perspective’ might better translate the nature of the expressions vijnaptimatra and its feminine abstract vijnaptimatrata  (merely phenomenal/mere phenomenality). Tola and Dragonetti translate the later as ‘theory’ which, I believe, does not do full justice to the apparent intentions of Vasubandhu. For a start we are operating in meta-theoretical terms of reference since Vasubandhu is discussing how his perspective treats the realistic discourse under criticism. Similarly, the improper idealistic re-treatment of this same critique by the hypothetical realist is also subjected to the same meta-critical critique. Furthermore, by the very dialectical nature of perspectives not necessarily contradicting each other, as opposed to the (non-critical) treatment of theoretical positions (such as the realist versus the idealist or some other type of realist, etc.) there is the implication that the transcendental perspective does not rule out a non-transcendental perspective (i.e., a natural perspective, the realm of the conventional, the realm of samsara, etc.). Hence my distinction of inclusive ‘perspective/s’ versus non-inclusive ‘position/s’! In this light, although a perspective is theoretically formulated, it should be seen in a dialectical light as a certain attitude to be directed at a certain type of intentional content. On the other hand, a position normally assumes a certain degree of exclusivity. If you are a realist then you are not an idealist. On the other hand, a transcendental perspective demands a corresponding non-transcendental attitude (as the content of that transcendental perspective). Thus the word ‘theory’ does not do justice to these expressions incorporating the compound expression vijnaptimatra. How do we know Vasubandhu has adopted a transcendental perspective in his investigations? (9)

2.    Vasubandhu’s Transcendental Treatment of All Phenomena 

	Vasubandhu’s treatment of phenomena is transcendental in orientation or perspective. We are alerted to this fact by the nature of his investigations. E.g., by treating all phenomena as ‘like a dream’, or similar, in effect he has invoked (what I have defined as) an overall transcendental suspension. Metaphorical ‘like’ can be cashed out as ‘both like and not like’. This balance between ‘like’ and ‘not-like’, in effect, creates a transcendental suspension. On the other hand, if he were to say x is y (if we were to say, like a Gnostic or Manichean Dualist, that the world ‘is’ a dream or an illusion) then this definitive literal definition remains non-transcendentally constituted in orientation. By this skeptical-like approach through his treatment of all phenomena as the ‘mere appearance’ of the manner of its presentation, all forms of imputation are separated out from the mere form of that intentional constitution, i.e., the apparent nature of its presentation. Furthermore, this transcendental attitude removes all forms of privileging that constitute the terms of reference of a realist-idealist debate. E.g., by no longer privileging (or giving some form of priority to) the apparent objectivity of the intentional object (or intentional objective or intentional state) the phenomenologist can no longer be a realist (or naïve empiricist, etc.). Similarly, by no longer privileging (or giving some form of priority to) the act of intentionality the phenomenologist can no longer be an idealist (or dogmatic rationalist, etc.). Let me now examine the non-absolute appropriative nature of the dharmic economy. (10)

3.    The Non-Absolute Nature of Dharmic Appropriation and Division

	Intentional investigations (on either a phenomenal and/or trans-phenomenal-transcendental level of analysis) essentially replicate the general economy of the non-absolute appropriative nature of phenomena (dharmas). In order to understand a certain phenomenal context we appropriate the types and/or instances of phenomena that appear to constitute that context (in either its non-transcendental practicality and/or their transcendental ideality). But, such appropriation cannot be absolute in its execution (or its re-simulated re-simulation). E.g., if I am eating a delectable piece of chocolate and I have completely swallowed (and digested) the same I am no longer eating that piece of chocolate. Similarly, when completely digested it its no longer being digested, etc. Therefore, the act of appropriation cannot be absolutely complete in order to remain a current act of appropriation. As soon as that act of appropriation is completed it is no longer that act of appropriation. Hence our phenomenal investigations cannot be in progress if an absolute act of appropriation has already taken place (whether that be in non-transcendental, phenomenal, practical terms of reference and/or transcendental terms of reference through their simulation in their transcendental ideality)! Therefore, for there to be a current process of interaction, appropriation cannot be absolutely completed. Thence the non-absolute nature of dharmic appropriation and division (into and through a pre-configured classification of categories). The same conditions applying to the phenomenological nature of mental apperception (i.e., the self’s apperception of its own intentionally constituted existence as a subjectively endowed stream-of-life). (11)

4.    The Phenomenological Nature of Mental Apperception

	The two faced, reflexive nature of both intentional consciousness and intentional self-consciousness is already built into the same by virtue of its intentional constitution (as an intentional objective versus its dialectical relationship with its intentional field, and, the same versus its intentional appreciation in its meta-field of appreciation). We could imagine these two sets of axes, respectively, as horizontal and vertical. The intentional process involves both the simulated/re-simulate presentation of intentional content and its associated intentional act (on a ‘horizontal’ axis). Furthermore, the appreciation of the same is constituted in a similar manner (on a ‘vertical’ axis). Thus both consciousness and self-consciousness are intentionally constituted (as well as being dialectically interdependent). “I am conscious of an intentional object(ive) and I am also reflexively self-conscious of that same intentional process.” Thence the phenomenological nature of both mental perception and mental apperception; and for ‘mental’ we can read ‘intentional’. Now the expression ‘phenomenological’ refers to our treatment of phenomena as qua ‘phenomenal’, i.e., in the manner of its intentional presentation/re-presentation. Our phenomenological investigations taking a transcendental turn when those phenomenological investigations are conducted under the auspices of an overall transcendental suspension. The resultant effect of such a (series of) manoeuvres is to remove all processes of (non-phenomenological) imputation pre-associated and/or associated with those phenomena under examination. In this we are left merely with their transcendental ideality, i.e., their essential configurations as determined essentially, eidetically, etc. Simplistically, we could say that ‘perception’ is the dialectical result of the intentional interaction between the simulations/re-simulations of an intentional objective and its corresponding intentional field of context, and v.v., whereas, in contrast, we could say ‘apperception’ is the dialectical result of the intentional interaction between the simulations/re-simulations of an intentional ‘process of perception’ and its corresponding ‘intentional field of self-consciousness’, and v.v. Between these two levels or axes of intentionality, the ‘perceptive’ and the ‘apperceptive’ a sense of self is synthesized, perceived as an integrated descriptively-prescriptively treated flow-of-existence within certain unique spatio-temporal parameters that appear to constitute its cultural-intercultural history in this World-of-Life as shared by others with-us. Indeed, with each distinctive act of intentional perception there is an associated distinctive sense of intentional apperception, i.e., a corresponding sense of self. So, e.g., we have a visual seer, hearer, smeller, taster and toucher, and, collectively, an overall sense of a sense perceiver, and, a thinker, imaginer, speaker, etc., and, overall, a complex sense of person capable of doing (at least) most of the above. Thence the synthesis of a very complex sense of self in keeping with its appropriative abilities, faculties, and powers to act (in this one-Life-World-with-others before-others), etc. (12)

	Now, what is the ‘erroneous’ nature of imputational processes (when examined from the general, hypothetical, transcendental perspective of the Yogacara’s treatment of the phenomenal)? When those investigations have not been and/or are no longer being pursued in critical terms of reference! I.e., when exercised in a natural attitude wherein all phenomenal suppositions are cashed out in conventional terms of reference, i.e., when clothed/re-clothed in a mode of existence in a form beyond their mere transcendental ideality and, therein or thereafter, treated in those non-critical terms of reference. So, e.g., the perception of a tree has us naturally impute the real existence of a tree-substance when, however, the very concept of substance, cause and effect, a permanent sense of identity, etc., are only fit to be transcendentally deconstructed as impossible states of affairs; being impossible to either find ontologically and/or recognize epistemologically. Now, it is part of a tree phenomenon, admittedly, for it to be found in a substantial-like manner of presentation (even in the midst of a dream of a tree), but, we go well beyond the level of our abilities of transcendental deployment to impute a substantial nature to that tree in terms of a permanent substance and/or substrate; to impose upon it the possession of distinctive causes and effects; to insist that it maintains a fixed, permanent realistic material-like sense of identity, etc. Obviously a tree-phenomenon maintains a certain degree of identity through the possession of a considerable degree of a relatively invariant, isomorphic non-transformation in either the (theoretical and/or practical) simulation of its overall sense of a history and/or our re-simulation of its re-envisualization retrospective and/or prospectively. However, such non-critical concepts of ‘substance’, etc., are inherently self-contradictory and cannot be claimed as appropriate categories for a critically cogent and coherent treatment of phenomena except in highly provisional, conventional terms of reference (as exercised within the non-philosophical limits of everyday speech). However, in critical transcendental terms of reference we can speak of the apparent continuity of a tree-phenomenon without imputing these impossible concepts of substance (svabhava, etc.), cause and effect, etc. In their place we use a series of critical concepts such as, e.g., the recognition of conventional processes of imputation as imputative; the provisional treatment of the same as streams of existence (santana), or, as dharmic-like processes with the possession of certain (causal-like) conditions (as opposed to the classical and bankrupt definitions of causes and effects), etc. In other words operating within the terms of reference of a critical transcendental discourse (because for the critical philosopher there can be no other proper, appropriate and valid perspective in which to operate within!)! (13)
	That, in essence, this erroneous nature is none other that the non-critical, non-imputative meta-treatment of imputational processes! However, since this is my hermeneutic interpretation of the erroneous nature as being expressed in this type of philosophy, as understood by myself, let me now re-define and evaluate this more in the terms of the language as used by Vasubandhu in this particular text. (14)

5.     The Erroneous Nature of the Non-Enlightened Mind(?)

	What features of our existence are generally dis-valued in a philosophical sense by Vasubandhu according to this text of the Vimsatika. The very first thing he dis-values is the concept of extra-mental objects including (the ‘realistic’ treatment of) ‘objects’ in a so-called ‘external world’ that are correlatives of our perceptual experiences. But Vasubandhu tells us that all perception (which would include imaginative visualization, recollection, abstract thinking, etc.) is nothing but mere representations (vijnaptimatra) (and to be construed as mere phenomena from a transcendental perspective). As he states:

This is just phenomenal (vijnaptimatra) on account of the appearance of objects that are unreal. (15)

	Note, this does not mean that phenomena themselves, as intentionally constituted in consciousness, are unreal, only that our imputations beyond these phenomenal/phenomenological terms of reference are to be considered (and realized) as unreal. So, in the light of this reading, how are we to go about recognizing the unreality of such imputations? By seeking to clearly address this perspective on phenomena from a critical philosophical perspective, through engaging in appropriate forms of relevant meditation, through realizing and recognizing the direct discriminative experience of the ‘unreality of the unreal’ versus the ‘reality of the real’, etc? Unfortunately, how we could or should flesh out such a discriminative program is not the province of this paper. Suffice to say that the ‘truthfulness of this text’ is logically and experientially dependent upon the possibility and practice of certain procedures, that, if conducted correctly, then guarantee the form of insightfulness claimed as an entry into the transcendental dimension, or, its terminological equivalent as an entry (pravesa) into the selflessness of dharmas (nairatmya), etc. Clearly, the imputation of object-correlatives is to be treated as wrong, indeed, Vasubandhu et al would have us regard it as a practice that impedes our spiritual progress upon the path to enlightenment (nirvana). Much of this treatise, consequently, is designed to philosophically alert us as to how we should view phenomena, how we should make progress along this path, etc. What else does Vasubandhu dis-value? (16)

	In the same vein, conceptions and apperceptions of self (pudgala) are also to be subjected to a non-imputative or de-imputative treatment in our experience of their phenomenalization. Just as this advice also applies to the intentional constitution of all non-subjective phenomena (dharmas), as already noted. (17)

	Though its analogical comparison to our being asleep and dreaming and our current non-awakening to the false reality of our non-awakened state, the everyday state of conventional existence is also ever subjected to an oblique, or not so oblique, degree of criticism. In this there is a call that promotes the project of our coming into a state of conformity with reality as it is (yathabhutam) and therein and thereafter enjoy the spiritual consequences of such a re-alignment. (18)

	Similarly, the unenlightened mind is also subjected to this form of non-absolute deprecation or dis-valuation. (19)

	Thus, it would appear, that wherever and whenever imputation is recognized as going beyond its natural levels of mis-deployment then we are, in effect, making a transcendental mistake, committing a transcendental error (after Kant) and permitting our entry (as a descent or return) into the corresponding concomitant degree of transcendental confusion. By accepting these arguments for the erroneous (ayathabhutam, vitatha, ayathartha, etc.) nature of conventional knowledge can we, in the light of this phenomenological understanding, then find ourselves being able to envisage what might be meant by the ‘non-erroneous nature of the enlightened mind’? (20)

6.     The Non-Erroneous Nature of the Enlightened Mind(?)

	We are told quite clearly that the non-erroneous nature of the enlightened nature of the mind of the Buddhas is ineffable or indefinable (nirabhilapya/anabhilapya) and is the province of the Buddhas. On the other hand, this indescribability of the numinous, or, of the Divine (as I am going to argue in my next paper in this series albeit not along the lines of a classical deism), or, the real-as-it-is (yathabhutam), etc., etc., has never stopped a ‘negative theologian’ from attempting this ‘impossible’ task by means of the careful/careless use of metaphor or analogy; the use of a via negativa; by various indirect forms of pointing or demonstration (through the use, e.g. of strings of equivalent terms in the desire to create an existential surplus of meaning above and beyond the mere collective summation of the denominations and/or connotations, etc. used to semantically locate this type of divine or divine-like phenomenon/phenomena), co-defined as ultimately equivalent or co-referential, etc. (21)

	Now, the above can be treated as either mystical and/or non-mystical in extent, and/or, as theologically oriented and/or non-theologically oriented, and/or, just simply as a recognition that when we know the limits of our ignorance that is true knowledge… as had by an enlightened being? However, considerations and issues along these lines would be better examined in my next paper, the fifth in this series. (22)

7.     A Dissolution of the Problem of Other Minds

	Throughout this paper, a theory, or rather, a dialectical perspective on the epistemological nature of (human) subjectivity has been very briefly sketched (or in detail merely hinted at). In the light of this interpretation (and inevitable processes of re-interpretation) what insights can be developed to successfully deal with this Western philosophical genre of philosophical activity that concerns itself with this ‘problematic’ perception of ‘other minds’ (when, I might add, for myself, I basically see no problem whatsoever when we treat this apparent ‘problematic area of philosophical research’ through the critical lens of a transcendentally orientated perspective)?! (23)

First, let me simply re-state in more detail the problematic nature of this so-called problem of other minds. Second, let me attempt to show how the problematic nature of this problem is dissolved when ‘seen’ through a transcendental ‘lens’. Then, let me explore the ramifications of the relevant consequences that naturally appear to devolve from the adoption and adaptation of this transcendental perspective, especially those that appear to apply to the transcendental treatment of subjectivity. (24)

	There are a number of approaches one could adopt to outline the nature of this problem, and, better, simulate its apparent problematicity. But, first, part of the problematic is that we already know that other minds exist and, that, for us to think otherwise is to set up this problem as a problem. Then, given a number of cognitive manoeuvres we are then reasonably led, it seems, to conclude the opposite. Now, if we were truly convinced of the logic of this detour from the naivety of our previous mental landscape then that would be the end of it. But, no, in our mind of minds we are not really convinced at all. And, so, in our first years of philosophical investigation we seek a resolution of this puzzle: how do we really know other minds exist when they could be mere simulations of consciousness, but for all that or not we can never be privy to the mind of others in order to dispute that type of (a frivolous) claim? Why do we think one thing but believe something quite opposite? But, at least, we think we know that our intuitions are right, and, that this type of a philosophical problem can only be an artifact of our faulty logic and argumentation. So, by what sort of stratagems can we adopt and adapt to show this process of faulty argumentation and in the process resolve or dissolve the problematic nature of this apparent conundrum? (25)

	Various presuppositions could be carried over to, or dropped from, both sides of our psychological ledger of naïve imagination versus logically argued belief. For a start, why not just accept that all consciousness is only a simulation of consciousness and that there is no such thing as a real consciousness versus a non-real consciousness. Or, we could collapse the distinction between private experience and public experience. Or, we could deconstruct the realist nonsense about an external world versus an internal world or internal worlds. Or we could deconstruct the non-coherent idealistic nonsense that privileges the extent of my own sense of a world of consciousness at the expense of the same world experienced by an other, etc. Or, just simply deconstruct all of the above…! (26)

	No doubt the last has not be said when dealing with this type of problem. Suffice to say that, if left in the logical terms of its normal operation, time has amply shown that this problematic left to such devices cannot be resolved or dissolved! Therefore, let us expand the context of these terms of reference in order to expose those reef-like points beneath the surface of our logical sea that prevent us from realizing what we already know that we do, indeed, know other minds! Let me, therefore, adopt those wider terms of reference that would allow me to do this (feat on a logical level of explication)! Those new terms of reference being the exhibition of a transcendental dimension in which our problem can no longer be experienced as problematic! (27)

	The ‘intentional’ could be defined as ‘an intentional attitude towards a certain intentional objective, i.e., either as an intentional object or as an intentional state’. When we examine the nature of this constitution qua constitution we are already adopting a transcendental perspective, i.e., a trans-intentional perspective; i.e., a meta-intentional frame of reference wherein we can appreciate the object(ive)-intentional frame of reference in terms of its constitution. This type of investigation necessitates the development of certain tools and techniques for running these parallel types of inter-comparison. As noted, the transcendental dimension is entered into through the auspices of a proper, appropriate and valid exercise of overall transcendental suspension. By such means we are left with a transcendental purification of the content of our research program. By extracting the natural content, and their cognitive positions, from our phenomenological treatment of phenomena we are then left with a transcendental residue in a transcendental sense of perspective. Let me explicate some of the ramifications attendant upon this level of our investigations. (28)

	By transcendentally deconstructing various notions that philosophically obstruct our (purified) vision of the Life-World this type of problem, along with many others, should dissolve! For a start, although my experience can (provisionally) be called ‘my’ experience, my own experience, upon transcendental reflection, cannot be seen historically and concurrently as being merely put together in a purely subjective mode of experience. To think a sense of ‘myself’ I am already thinking of a contrasting sense of self that is ‘not mine’. Where did such a construction itself come from; how did it phenomenologically originate? Surely not just from me (and my own sense of self because then there would be no sense of contrast?)? But, then, in reflection we realize that we live-with-others and we were raised-by-others. Our very use of language and its concepts forever implies an accompanying inter-subjective dimension wherein we have learnt to use such expressions in our education in this-world-with-others. In other words, all language is simultaneously subjective and inter-subjective in its construction and emission, and, in its reception and re-construction (as a process of intentional re-constitution). Consequently, there can be no pure private sense of self (nor for that matter a pure sense of a public sense of self likewise). Consequently, there can be no pure private language, etc. (as per Wittgenstein). Now, in the same vein numerous other concepts can be deconstructed to reveal the interdependent, inseparable and transcendental nature of the Life-World. Yes, it is correct that I have a unique perspective (and sets of perspectives) upon the world which I can call my own, just, that orientation is not absolutely my own since it is also inter-subjectively constituted for me through my adoption and adaptation of language and its manipulation of its associated concepts, etc. Then, this uniqueness of perspective which I call ‘my own’ cannot be absolutely appropriated by myself, nor can anything else be absolutely appropriated! I am already locked out of (ever encountering and recognizing) such an impossible state of isolation. One may feel alone in this world, from time to time, but this loneliness in the world could only be felt if one’s basic position in this world is to be with-others in the first place! Loneliness, in this insight, is the result of our withdrawing from others or others withdrawing from us. Never being absolutely isolated from others at any time (since we are already bound in a world of language and culture with others throughout the formation of our history)! Moreover, in a recognition of the transcendental constitution of our phenomenal experience of our being in the world-with-others we can neither privilege the intentional objective, the intentional field, the intentional subject nor other intentional subjects (with whom we necessarily have shared and still share a transcendental sense of history!)! With a loss of such short-sighted privileging of these necessary interdependent aspects of the intentional process we can no longer profess, indeed, should no longer profess, to be either realists or idealists in our re-interpretation and re-perception of the natural world of everyday experience. Consequently, through our subsequent deconstruction of such (impossible states of absolute) privilege we can no longer, nor need to, impute extra-phenomenal entities, factors and forces in our coming to terms with what the world-with-others really means in its full existentiality and simulation of value. Our transcendental openness to this immediate source of value, as to its manner and its extent, letting us realize to what degree this existential excess of value that is already-there-for-us is allowed to enter our lives, as a life-as-lived-with-others-before-others! In effect, this determines the existential character of our spiritual being in this World-of-Life-with-others as lived in the transcendental sense of a ‘community’…. (29)
	
	What are the philosophical ramifications of this position, or, rather, (transcendental) perspective (when examined theoretically, practically and critically), especially w.r.t. our understanding of subjectivity? (30)

	It would appear that the boundaries between a sense of self and a sense of other cannot be absolutely distinctive, cannot be absolutely drawn. We are inescapably drawn together whether we like that fact or not! Nor is it possible to absolutely appropriate either the sense of one’s own self or the sense of the self of another or the sense of a community and all forms of sentience (be that from a non-divine point of view or from a Divine-like point of view). There, thus, can be neither a pure sense of the private nor a pure sense of the public (and this insight applies equally in a theological-like setting or a non-theological setting). That, although an historical depiction of existence of a distinctively constituted subject or object (or both when examining ‘embodiment’) can be nominated through the concept of a ‘stream of existence’, still, to apply non-transcendentally oriented concepts beyond their level of deployment is to engender a corresponding degree of transcendental confusion, etc. (31)

	Before concluding this section, let me deal with this question of how knowledge can be both ‘knowledge’ and ‘erroneous’ at the same time, and, briefly indicate, under what conditions non-erroneous knowledge might possibly be experienced (if at all)? (32)

	We may not be able to absolutely appropriate the world, in part or in whole, yet, at the same time, we cannot absolutely non-appropriate some small part or parts of the same! This allows us to be-in-this-World-of-Life and in this world with-others! Just as to be able to lie before-others means we must depict most of the world to others in a truthful manner in order then to dissimulate some small detail of it, in order to lie, so, too, in our non-absolute non-appropriation of the world we must, in part, be able to appropriate some of it in a truthful manner, more or less, in order to be able to be in-this-world and in this world with-others. So, as  consequence, we must possess some degree of knowledge about this world (through our inability to not appropriate some aspect/s of it in part). Furthermore, through the imputative treatment of this existential core of our being-in-the-world-with-others such knowledge must also be erroneous, albeit non-absolutely erroneous! Now, the implication follows, that to that extent the imputative overlay in our treatment of phenomena is removed then to that extent such knowledge becomes both ‘knowledge’ and relatively ‘non-erroneous’! Of course the question could then be asked: is it possible for knowledge to be absolutely non-erroneous either in effect or in full fact? However, to examine this possibility, or impossibility, and do it full justice to this topic, let me take up this issue, and others, in my next paper in this series. (33)

	Lastly, let me examine what might be the consequences if this type of critical phenomenological treatment as outlined by Vasubandhu is not adopted? Indeed, what are the existential ramifications of knowledge that is also erroneous, and, what part might this play in our perception/mis-perception of other minds? (34)

	To that extent our being is not coincident with reality then to that same extent we just are not in coincidence with the reality of that reality as it stands there-before-us! If this gulf between the relatively real and the relatively unreal is greater than usual then we have the conditions for the presence and exhibition of a psychosis (for example). Or, to some extent all erroneous knowledge is potentially psychotic or psychotic-like in nature by virtue of this discordance with the relatively real. Furthermore, for us to over invest an excessive ontological commitment and/or an excessive epistemological commitment into this erroneous formulation then, again, it follows that associated forms of psychotic or psychotic-like behaviour would naturally follow. Hence my concept of a pseudo-psychosis when a person over-commits themselves to some vision or version of reality (that, correctly, is discordant with the same). In this regard, e.g., any form of excessive political and/or religious affiliation could be regarded in a pseudo-psychotic light, and, should certainly be regarded as unhealthy to that degree that form of over-commitment is exercised!? Such attitudes then warping the nature of our relationships with others and in the process removing us further from the social reality of those relationships (which must in turn exacerbate that type and degree of psychosis)! Indeed, the appreciation of reality is a dialectical affair thence our need for an open-ended sense of perspective/s rather than the closure of a univocal position! (35)

8.   Conclusion

	There are numerous conclusions that could be noted in this paper – provisional conclusions concerning:

1.	The problem of other minds, 
2.	The nature of human subjectivity, 
3.	The nature of knowledge, 
4.	The erroneous aspects of knowledge (as discerned hermeneutically), 
5.	The nature of our existential interaction with others, 
6.	What is Vasabandhu’s position/perspective in these matters, etc., etc. (36)

In this regard, let me ask my reader, or audience, to supply what they think might be the relevant points they would like to make under these various headings just proffered (since, for my part as these concepts, such as, e.g., the nature of subjectivity, etc., remain a work in progress)? But, before I get you to do this task of finding what observations and comments you think might have been more relevant to yourselves, let me simply note that through a ‘transcendental lens’ (through the skilful utilization of an overall transcendental suspension) this problem of other minds, I believe, should cease to be problematic! It certainly seems that way for me, but, does it appear to fall, or have fallen, that way for you? And, one more last comment! (37)

	In order to deal with this question of the problematic nature of other minds in the light of this comment made by Vasubandhu, in his Vimsatika, I have had to create a disquisition on the nature of transcendental discourse in order to ‘illuminate’ what I think are the salient points being made by Vasubandhu in this regard. Consequently, limitations on the nature of a paper have prevented me from more closely arguing for the above in the light of other statements made by Vasubandhu in this text (and in other texts by this author and by other authors in this tradition of the Yogacara) although some additional comments have been relegated to the footnotes. It is my hope to repair this deficiency in a more technical paper at a later date. Of course I welcome all comments on this topic. (38)

           Noël Tointon, Sydney, 3.2.07.

A Preview of the Next Paper in this Series

	In the next and fifth paper, and possibly the last paper in this series, I will be looking at discerning the direct or indirect presence of a theological turn in this same text, Vimsatika, by Vasubandhu. Now, of course, I don’t desire to ‘see’ a classical exposition of a theistic position, but, instead, wish to argue that Buddhist Philosophy has been influenced, right from its outset, by what I would like to call a theological turn which, in turn, has carved out a religious territory for itself and that has re-constituted much of Buddhist Philosophy as a religious philosophy as well. Thence its dissemination in the world. If the relatively Divine is treated as that distinctive epistemological organization more advanced in the degree of its epistemological organization than that as possessed by us, then we have automatically a sense of the Divine should that greater degree of epistemological organization be thought instantiated in some form or other. Now, it is claimed that Buddhas, Bodhisattvas do possess a knowledge greatly in advance of that being held by us mere mortals then we have grounds for running this type of argument? Furthermore, if the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, etc., are treated as (like) a transcendental community or transcendental collective, in a state of relative harmony with itself, in a semblance of epistemological organization in advance of us mortals then we would have, again, in effect, a semblance or simulation of the Divine (in accordance with this neutral definition). Interaction with this source of the relatively Divine, whatever its form or forms of instantiation, would naturally be envisaged and/or experienced along numinous lines and accorded a varying compound of a corresponding degree of respect, deference, devotion, the focusing of prayer and/or a targeting of petitions for the success of spiritual and/or non-spiritual practices and ventures, etc. Furthermore, perceiving all things as empty, even the existence of the Divine, should it manifest itself in some form or other, then it implies that just as the functioning of the world is dependent upon its emptiness of being, that the Divine, should it exist, would then also be functioning in this World-of-Life by virtue of its emptiness of being (to utilize the same argument run by Nargajuna in his defense of emptiness). Then, as all things are empty, then one might infer that our being being the same too, then we too must possess this semblance of that sameness (samata), namely, a Buddha nature to that same degree we were able to exhibit and/or realize the same (albeit it in and through its non-essential emptiness and ‘purified’ of imputative material, etc.). However, let me examine the convolutions of this complex argument in parallel with a re-examination of this text of the Vimsatika in the light of this same argument in the next paper in this series ‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension, Part V. (39)