‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Part V:
Discerning the Influence of a Theological-like Turn at Work in 
The Exposition of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, etc.*

0.   Introduction

	Let me say right from the outset that by a theological turn or a theological-like turn I do not mean to suggest the formation and exposition of a classical theology in this text of the Vimsatika and other texts by this author and other contemporary or closely contemporary authors allied to the tradition of the Yogacara. On the other hand, in the light of previous work done in my Theology, Volume I and Volume II, I believe I can show that a theological-like influence is at work in the apparent religious intentions expressed in and through various elements of this text, etc., given its religious setting in a (traditional) Buddhist cultural context. (1)

	I have defined, in a neutral sense, this semblance of a theological-like influence as follows: whatever is regarded as possessing a degree of epistemological organization in considerable advance of the epistemological organization demonstrated through the humanity of our own being and institutions, that is to be treated, in effect, as relatively theological in orientation. The existence or non-existence of such an entity, as a ‘fact’ in ‘reality’, is irrelevant to its theological status in this regard. The invocation of the Buddha or Buddhas, along with a congregation of Bodhisattvas, fulfills this definition if we were to regard their treatment by the faithful as fulfilling these conditions. We are told that the range of understanding of a Buddha is far beyond that realized in non-enlightened human experience therefore we must assume that their epistemological organization is necessarily indicative of a degree of complexity and integration far in advance of our own as a consequence of this process of enlightenment (be that virtually simulated or non-virtually simulated from a conventional point of view).  (2)

	We are told quite clearly that the non-erroneous nature of the enlightened nature of the mind of the Buddhas is ineffable or indefinable (nirabhilapya/anabhilapya) and is the province of the Buddhas. This text, although polemical in aspiration, would have been prefixed with a dedication and does conclude, effectively, with an implicit supplication. It is expressed from within the religious context of a traditional Buddhist context that in my opinion took on a religious orientation through this influence of a theological-like turn almost from the beginning of its inception; most likely with the teachings of Gautama himself? This recognition of a ‘religious’ state of affairs that is more epistemologically advanced than that possessed by ourselves establishes this sense of a theological turn. Thereafter, its implicit and/or explicit vision of a theological or theological-like state is an intentional point of focus for theological or theological-like activity such as, e.g., as the dedicatee in religious texts, as a focus of devotion, as an object of meditation and emulation, as a focus or inspiration for the aspiration of salvation, etc., etc.  (3)
* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
	In the light of the above, first let me detail the nature of this sense of the numinous that appears to operate implicitly and/or explicitly in a ‘religious’ text. Second, let me note these ‘religious’ elements in this text of the Vimsatika. Third, let me explore these ramifications implicated in this text. Fourth, let me explore a particular type of comment to be found elsewhere in the works of Vasubandhu, namely, the apparent purity of ones’ original condition. Fifth, let me explore the three-natures (trisvabhavas) in the form as outlined by Vasubandhu in the text sometimes tilted Trisvabhavanirdesa, and, then, in comparison note later Yogacara variants that promoted either a more ‘vertical’ or more ‘horizontal’ interpretation. Sixth, let me explore a possible resolution of this tension between horizontal and vertical versions of these three natures. Last, in the form of a conclusion, let me re-argue this position that this text, and others closely related in this period of time in the Yogacara sphere of influence, are indeed influenced by a theological turn along with the religious and non-religious ramifications of the same! (4)

I.     Explication of a Sense of the Numinous?

Palpable, in its absence, is the loss of a traditional invocation at the beginning of this text, etc. Although most of this text is preserved in the Sanskrit along with most of its auto-commentary the first two verses of this text have been supplied by the editor, Sylvain Levi, from the Tibetan. Furthermore, the concluding verse looks like a summary and signature of the author that would have been more appropriately appended to the auto-commentary rather than the body of the text proper? Suffice to say we would expect this text to have had at least an invocation to some Bodhisattvic or Buddha-like figure! The ‘presence’ of such an element would normally alert us to the religious intentions of the author as they wrote (within their perception of) their tradition/s in that regard. (5)

	This text, in its transmission, has obviously lost its introductory section(s), i.e., dedication, titles, etc. This absence is noticeable! Moreover, its conclusion also seems to be truncated, or, perhaps summarized in a verse that might well have ended its auto commentary? The same applies to the Trimsika. There is a tradition (at least in China) that these two texts were coupled as a set which was titled Vijnaptima(ta)tratasiddi. When we look at other relatively more ‘intact’ texts by Vasubandhu we find them prefixed with an invocation, etc. What is the religious significance of that ‘absent’ invocation? (6)

	The type of text we are dealing with is primarily polemical! Although, more correctly, its final intentions are soteriological!! We are being instructed on how we should correctly see the world. When we correctly see the world as it is (yathabhutam) then we are in position to proceed from such intellectual knowledge to the intuitive apperceptive-like reception of the same and therein, and thereafter, join the ranks of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas by virtue of such knowledge or wisdom (prajna); at least according to theory. The polemical side of this type of text functioned with the intentions of reinforcing and redefining the faith of that tradition, and, most importantly, winning debates. Correctly winning the debate with one’s fellow religionists was important within that tradition in order to be seen as a successful representative within the same. But, successfully winning the debate with one’s opposing religionists was an even more important preoccupation since the outcome of such a contest often decided the direction of royal patronage, and patronage in general, vital to the survival and further promulgation of that tradition. Lose a debate and you might find yourself being expected to join the opposition that successfully debated you (unless some other member of your tradition was able to rebut that position and rebuild ‘your’ case for the defense). (7)

	In an open cataloguing of the world the religionist always finds a place for the ‘sense of the religious’ (in whatever form that might be defined or not defined). This sense of ‘the religious’ could be neutrally perceived in and through some ‘sense of the numinous (as the numinous qua Numinous, again, in whatever form that might be define or might not be defined). Now, this perception and/or apperception of the numinous can be treated or re-defined as a perception and/or apperception of the relatively Divine on the grounds, as noted elsewhere, that the perception and/or apperception of the relatively Divine would or should be received as numinous or numinous-like in nature by virtue of the fact that the relatively Divine is defined as that epistemological organization perceived/apperceived as relatively greater (by several orders) than that as possessed by human agency examined either individually or collectively. That, hypothetically, this difference in epistemological organization could well be treated as being experienced as numinous in nature by virtue of our current inability to properly, appropriately and validly  appropriate non-absolutely such a phenomenal state, object and/or subject in part or in whole. Thence the recognition and acceptance of the existence of the religious by the religious person or religious institution in its making of a place for this element of the religious, i.e., numinous. Into this (augmented) vision of the world, by the religious person, a theological or theological-like difference is positively asserted. Moreover, interaction with this source of the relatively Divine is treated as numinous or numinous-like in nature. The ‘presence’ (or palpable absence) of a religious-oriented invocation, in effect, is testimony to this acceptance of a place for the religious, i.e., the relatively Divine, within the world as perceived and conceived by the religious person concerned to live in the world in this regard (through a ‘recognition’ and acceptance of this sense of a theological or theological-like difference as just defined). That granted, how is the relatively numinous to be reviewed (by either the religious person or non-religious person or by the transcendental phenomenologist taking a neutral hypothetical position in regards to the same)? Ideally, of course, it would be nice to actually experience some semblance of this invoked numinous sense of the religious, still, how would we interpret the same? As an insider or as an outsider? In accordance with what tradition? Then, how might the same be experienced directly or indirectly and be ‘interpreted’ by the transcendental phenomenologist? Indirectly, we could catalogue the textual deposition of such a type of experience (either experienced directly and/or indirectly) and, therein, ‘phenomenologically’ comparatively catalogue these textual elements in accordance, no doubt, with an already prescribed genre or genres that deal with the same (through its appropriate adoption and adaptation). Over time such expressions might involve the re-adoption and re-adaptation of a variety of genres applicable for this type of task (either already operating within a certain base tradition and/or also operating outside the same). However, in our meta-examination of this type of text we might find ourselves in some form of an agreement with the apparently ‘numinous-like’ nature of the same as described (or prescribed) by those philosophers who have already examined the same, noting among other things, a tension between an attraction to this apparent source of the numinous and a simultaneously fearful repulsion to the same (of to the same degree). Such a tension being accompanied by a veritable pick of panorama of other associated phenomena, e.g., being textually described as experiences of ‘light’, ‘sound’, ‘smell’, ‘touch’, and ‘taste’, envisaged in modes of religious subjectivity/objectivity, etc., in a form or format (that is trans-literal-metaphorical, and) treated as ‘not of this world’ (in whatever manner that might lend itself to being interpreted, either directly and/or indirectly established in phenomenological experience, and therein textually deposited, since all forms of interpretation depend upon the prior formation of genres of activity pre-established and pre-associated with the interpretation of the same [and whose critical appreciation can only be had through the adequate imposition of an effective overall transcendental suspension]). Now, in the light of this exposition, we need to ask does Vasubandhu refer, directly or indirectly, to anything by nature in the spirit of the above, i.e., as numinous or numinous-like in nature? (7)

	In his Vimsatika we find Buddhas, in the plural, mentioned. Furthermore, we are told there that the type of experience they experience in nature is ineffable or indescribable (anabhilapya/nirlapya) and is only to had by this type of spiritual entity, and, by implication, when we too are in a position to experience the same we too can experience this spiritual state of affairs. Other (allied?) texts make a number of reference, such as, e.g.,  the Trimsatika’s comments on the alayavijnana or storehouse-consciousness and its privileging by virtue of its relative fundamentality (of its greater degree of epistemological organization) whilst simultaneously still being treated as empty [and non-substantial (in a constructed sense)]. Other possible indications of a numinousity could be cited. Suffice to say that this element of the numinous can be argued for through the presence/absence of these indicators concerned with such topics as Buddhahood; the career of the Bodhasattvas; the indescribable and ineffable nature of that experiential territory that is discerned as indescribable and ineffable by virtue of its relatively greater degree of epistemological organization (in its associated construction its intentional/trans-intentional entertainment), etc. (8) 

	How might we define this numinousity as being textually indicated in certain terms and passages of this type of text? That by noting, in textual statements dealing with the same, the explicit and/or implicit treatment that there exists this type of experience; that this experience is indescribable or ineffable; can only be referred to obliquely through a metaphorical/trans-literal-metaphorical treatment of conventional elements such as elements pertaining to a sense-field (like, e,g, ‘light’ as in the self-luminosity of the mind/citta) or semblance (or simulation or illusion) of subjectivity (of a relatively Divine-like nature); that we too can experience a taste of this enlightenment through following in the footsteps of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas…. (9)
	
	That, in the light of the above, we can note these conditions or pre-conditions indeed are being indicated by the utilization of genres involving this type of application already being brought to bear upon the same. E.g, when we are told that this (transcendental) knowledge is the domain or range of the Buddhas, i.e., the field of real knowledge as an understanding of things as they are (yathabhutum), we have already been ‘moved’ to this relatively less worldly domain albeit one heavily populated, apparently, by innumerable Buddhas et al living in some form of an overall harmonious transcendental community. (10)

	The element of the numinous includes this sense of numinosity that is both attractive and fearfully repelling, operating in non-conventional terms of reference assessed either transcendently or immanently. This ‘other-worldly’ aspect, whether implicit or explicit, therefore is a feature of this type of transcendental experience. Consequently, being gestated within the hermeneutic circle and its cycle of suspensions it follows that this feature of transcendental balance should both implicitly and explicitly be an essential-like feature of that type of phenomenon. Hence, although it might be approached and accessed, entered and realized in either an (internally oriented meditative-like) immanent mode or (externally oriented worshipful-like) transcendent mode, correctly, the transcendental basis of this type of experience cannot be de-centered in fact even if treated and interpreted through the use of such a bias. Therefore, one must assume, given this transcendental complexion that, properly, a feature that is reviewed under some explicit aspect should also be presented, and re-presented, in depth, with a greater degree of transcendental balance. Thus a theologian who takes a transcendent, worshipful-like approach should also be presenting an immanent approach in parallel, even if this were the case that this is done relatively less explicitly. Thence, our recognition of a text as explicitly noting a sense of the numinous should also do this through some form of a transcendental lens, i.e., in and through some form of suspension whether that be looked at/over-looked in either explicit and/or implicit terms of reference. (11)

	In the light of the above we now need to ask ourselves: does Vasubandhu conduct the exposition of his critical and polemical form of philosophy in a transcendental mode, i.e., in such a manner that references to the numinous, either explicitly noted or implicitly referred to, through such a lens? In previous papers I have indeed shown that to be the basic tenor of his approach by means of the utilization of an overall transcendental suspension (through a series of manoeuvres as discussed elsewhere in this series of essays). Thence his emphasis, e.g., upon his complex use of the analogy of dreams, his deconstruction of external/internal forms of privileging, his phenomenological concentration upon the mere phenomenality of phenomena (through the use of his concept of vijnaptimatra, etc.), etc. (12)

	To enquire, therefore, of a text and ask whether it has such a reference to the truly numinous, as here hypothetically defined as transcendental in orientation, then we need to be able to argue that some form of an overall transcendental suspension is in play in that section of that text. Moreover, in the light of my exposition, this element would also need to be treated as invoking or being invoked by some form of a theological or theological-like turn (without that orientation necessarily needing to invoke some form of classical deism, etc., nor for that matter even a thematized theology or theological format). Reference to a sense of the numinous should also appear to apply to a level of epistemological organization more advanced than that usually maintained by a human individual and this feature too should be looked for in our examination of this type of text (in order to ascertain whether this type of text is dealing with a numinous type of experience by definition). Lastly, numinous inclusions in a text, in a text with either an explicit or implicit numinous complexion (or at least a numinous orientation), one would expect to be hermeneutically encoded/coded in such a form that would alert the reader (or the reader cognizant with that type of text) as to the need to read them in that type of numinous light. The question, therefore, that we need to ask is how numinously-oriented textual material/readings are both written and read. This is not the place to be comprehensive in this aspect of our topic suffice to say that much of this territory has already been carved out between positive theologians and negative theologians (this theologically oriented textual territory being treated as inclusively as possible in the light of our definition/s of the ‘relative divine’). Allusions to this  range of techniques have already been briefly alluded to. However, we might say that a key to our understanding here is to be found resident in how metaphorical and rhetorical elements are treated in the light of a text with religious intentions, where by ‘religious’ is meant a reference to the relatively divine (in the broadest sense of our definition/s in that respect). What then is this key? A recognition of a trans-valuation of metaphor (as normally found in a conventional sense) and their transformation under the influence of those religious intentions. E.g., the ordinary non-religious expression of ‘light’ is then read through a spiritual lens to apply to some theological or theological entity, process and/or state, object and/or subject, etc. The same applying to whatever other metaphor are also subjected to this same or similar type of a trans-evaluative program. The reader then noting that the special metaphorical senses of these expressions are then meant to apply literally to the intentional object-states to which such ‘descriptions’ are defined as applying. Since metaphor under normal circumstances cannot be treated literally (except in situations where the equation of full identity is shown to apply) then it behooves the reader to suspend the resultant concept realized under the special conditions attendant upon such an ‘abnormal’ trans-evaluative program. To some extent this type of text is asking for some form of a ‘suspension of disbelief’ (as well as all other forms of suspension necessary in order to conduct the reception of this type of textual sense as translated through the entire hermeneutic circle [as interpreted by myself and discussed elsewhere]) in a manner valid, appropriate and proper to that type of research. (13)

II.   Vasubandhu’s References to the Relatively Theological?

	I.e., those references that are relatively ‘religious’ on the grounds that the sense of the ‘religious’ is defined in terms of an explicit theological complexion and/or an implicit theological-like complexion; in either instance there being a non de facto recognition of the numinous in some form or other (as broadly re-defined in the previous section of this essay). That accepted, not much more need be said here other than the fact that the intentions of Vasubandhu cannot be accepted as just polemical in nature despite the primary genre-identification of this type of text. This superficial treatment of relatively more apparent intentions would be a bit like saying a priest or a vicar or a minister held a service and gave a sermon because they were merely paid to do so. So, although this text is ostensively polemical, vis-à-vis both alternative Buddhist traditions and non-Buddhist forms of faith, let us simply ask what might motivate this polemical earnestness and drive for a philosophical consistency (beyond the sphere of mere philosophical interest)? Obviously, the motivation is religious and salvic in orientation. Indeed, Vasubandhu tells us:

(This text on) ‘the establishment of mere-phenomenality-ness’ having been written by me in accordance with my own abilities, but, in all ways, deals with that which is not thinkable… being (correctly) the province of the Buddhas.

	And why… 

because there is no obstacle for the Buddhas to an all-knowing knowledge in all its aspects… (14)

 	Furthermore, in another (closely related) text, the Trimsika, we are told as the conclusion of that text:

This trans-mundane (transcendental) knowledge is not conceivable by mind, is the turning around of the basis [of intentional existence], the overcoming of the two kinds of harm [i.e., of the afflictions and obstructions to knowledge]; it is the beneficial, sure reality of the non-outflowing [of the addictive desire for existence], the clear [or pure] body of liberation known as the Dharma(-kaya) of the Great Sage [the Buddha]. (15)

	Hence the religious nature of this text, namely, the recognition of (the need for) salvation and the trans-mundane nature of that state of experience therein proclaimed. The last quotation invoking a number of metaphors – turning around, overcoming, clarity or purification, the realization of the truly desirable, the use of the expression ‘body’ in a spiritual sense and not in a conventional sense, etc. Such forms of trans-valuation or trans-evaluation alerting us to their collective nature as numinous-like intrusions in a text with an intentional and consequently reinforced numinous complexion. Thence the religious nature of this text (in line with my broad definition of the religious as numinous oriented, etc.). (16)

III.  The Religious Ramifications of Vasubandhu’s Implicit ‘Theologicalization’.

	What are the religious ramifications, then, of this religious text the Vimsatika? The last quotation from the conclusion of the Trimsika, in many ways amplifying the conclusion of the Vimsatika. I.e., enlightenment is unthinkable in conventional terms of reference despite a set of metaphorical clues invoking clarity or purity, a turning around, overcoming, find a sure ‘foundation’ in reality (albeit one that is empty of substantial existence, and is ‘sure’ by virtue of the same), etc. (17)

	The ensuing consequence of a text with numinous inclusions/a numinous complexion is to set up the expectation of a sense of the other; a sense of the ‘holy other’ rather than a ‘wholly other sense of otherness’ despite the simultaneous invocation and induction of a psychic rift or chasm between the devotee and their object/s of devotion. We are meant to experience that sense of close-distance, or, distant-closeness. In experiencing the current imperfection of our own being in the world, this internalized experience of absence or loss is to be utilized in motivating us according to the directions outlined by that religious tradition in which this sense of ‘something missing in our lives’ is both to be broached and breached… approached and overcome. (18)

	Do we have textual evidence for this sense of a psychic rift or psychic chasm? Undoubtedly! From the beginning of this text to its very end we are taught to re-see the reality that is seen as being defective in some comparative sense to its true state of being when properly re-seen. So, when we dream we are merely dreaming and only on awakening from that dream do we realize the error of not seeing the dream-state for what it is, namely, as not real from the perspective of the awakened-state even though that process of dreaming is still real in the sense that it is only a dream experience. Hence an analogy for the hermeneutic doctrine of the two truths wherein truth is to be judged as being truthful in either transcendental, trans-mundane terms of reference or in conventional, empirical terms of reference. This type of point is noted by Vasubandhu in verse 8 where the intention of the Buddha (abhipraya) needs to be ascertained in our reading of a religious text in order to determine whether words used have a provisional meaning (neyartha) or a final definitive meaning (nitartha). In the former we have veiled meanings, the use of analogies, the use of strategies to introduce the religious student to religious truths of a non-concealed nature. They are like stepping stones being provisional measures that will lead the student to a definitive sense of truth. To some considerable extent one could view this text as an attempt (by Vasubandhu from the perspective of the Yogacara) to reconstruct the way we should re-see the world. That, from this re-vision of the world, as a process of revision, we should be led to lead a life in spiritual alignment with the same. This induction of this sense of a psychic rift further reinforcing this ‘spectre of the numinous.’ How is this re-alignment to be achieved (with this semblance of the numinous, etc.)? By the use of this transcendental phenomenological conceptual-practice of vijnaptimatrata, along with the use of other techniques more or less in harmony with practices developed within traditional Buddhist traditions. How does Vasubandhu review this process of revision or enlightenment? (19)

	Does Vasubandhu envisage some form of re-alignment with the real nature of reality as it is (yathabhutam)? A number of metaphors are utilized (in his extant oeuvre) to suggest a process of reversion (paravrtti), overcoming, entry into the trans-mundane (transcendental) dimension (pravesa), removal of obstructions (avighata), purification as a process of clarification (prasuddha), etc. Is there a common theme here? Without reducing all these metaphors to some basic ur-metaphor-like construction, let me note that Vasubandhu tells us the difference is between the construction of phenomena and then seeing and letting phenomena be merely themselves (in our appreciation of them, etc.) through the application of this concept-practice of vijnaptimatrata in much the same way the concept-practice of emptiness/sunyata is utilized in the Madhyamaka). Seeing things as they are, as merely empty, intrinsically pure, merely as phenomena… should free us from those conditioned responses that keep us attached to the things of this world... In this frame of mind we would then be able to directly engage thing-as-they-are! What seems to be entailed in this process of purification… this removal of the constructed as a proliferation of mental constructions imposed upon this ‘residue’ of the real? (20)

IV.  What Religious Role does the Concept of Purity Play in this (Type of) Text?

	So, what significance should we attach to this concept of purification? As a ‘phenomenon’, who is purified from what by doing what? Importantly, in what frame of reference is this act of purification to be seen as an ‘act of purification’ (if at all?)?  I.e., in transcendental terms of reference or natural, non-transcendental terms of reference? Furthermore, since this type of distinction can neither occur nor be recognized in pure terms of reference it follows that our terms of reference, correctly, are non-transcendental-transcendentally and/or transcendental-non-transcendentally oriented! Then, in order to maintain an ongoing semblance of an overall transcendental suspension our options are effectively whittled down to merely an ongoing balance between these two phenomenal-phenomenological directions or orientations? This understood, how are we then to interpret the phenomenological act of purification invoked in this type of philosophy, these specific acts of philosophicalization textually articulated by Vasubandhu in this text (and other allied texts)? (21)

	Purification originally, in the mists of times, was an archaic, primitive practice enacted ritually and through various positive injunctions and negative proscriptions. In the context of a very literate religious tradition it becomes transformed in terms of the ideology underpinning that particular philosophy promulgating this particular take on that type of practice. As noted, we would not be able to make much sense of the Yogacara perspective in this matter if we do not import this distinction between the relatively transcendental and the relatively non-transcendental, albeit, as defined by that tradition. Considerations of personal identity, e.g., are called into question. Ultimately there is no one who is purified, however, from an empirical, conventional point of view ‘the purified person’ does have a conventional existence. Furthermore, this ultimate point of view does not undercut the necessity for a moral perspective in the course of this path of purification when viewed from a non-absolute viewpoint. Similarly, the person, in their conventional existence, who is subject to this process of purification, has various factors that are subject to this process of conventional purification. Vasubandhu discusses at length various human defects under the heading of the samklesas. I am sure a number of metaphorical modalities are invoked in his expression of this complex concept of purification, e.g., stripping away the impure, transforming the impure to the pure, discovering and returning to the underlying purity of the basis (through an act of ‘turning around’), adding the pure to the existential condition of impurity, etc. Briefly, let me look more closely at this type of ‘spiritual exercise’ apparently called for through the recognition of the pure and its implication of a need for a process of purification. (22)

	In the Vimsatika Vasubandhu tells us that the attainment of a transcendental or transmundane knowledge (lokottara-nirvikalpa-jnana) is gained through ‘becoming awakened’ (prabuddha) wherein we free ourselves from the ‘sleep of the vasanas’. In this state of awakening we now treat objects, as constructed by the mind (parikalpita), to be non-existent. This becoming free of such discriminations acts as an antidote (pratipaksa) to such (conventional) discrimination. Thereafter, we realize a clear, or purified or clarified, worldly knowledge (visuddha-laukika-jnana). In the utilization of this metaphor of awakening from a dream what other metaphors are used in resonance with this primary metaphor in order to enrich this concept of purification? Freedom, use of an antidote (as something to oppose the proliferation of constructions constructed by the mind in its superimposition upon the dependent realm (paratantra) of causation and its nexus of dependent conditions). As a result a clarified vision of the world ensues. A vision of the world wherein we realize all constructed realities to be merely constructed, i.e., purely phenomenal and non-existent in the manner of their presentation! In other words, Vasubandhu is spelling out for us the manner and implications of his concept or doctrine of vijnaptimatra. In effect, his claim is this: when all forms of intentional experience are experienced as merely intentional, i.e., merely phenomenal, then we gain a transcendental insight into the intentional constitutional input of such experiences. Therein, and thereafter, all intentional objects and all intentional subjects are seen as mere phenomena (and superimpositions upon reality which, by nature, is empty of all such constructions). My simple commentary upon this is: that through the utilization of an overall transcendental suspension, by whatever means employed to this effect, all forms of phenomenal experience are treated as phenomena qua phenomena! Effectively, the primary type of metaphor is that of a re-seeing, a correct re-seeing of the relevant phenomena to hand. In order to understand this concept and method of vijnaptimatra let me briefly examine the text sometimes titled Trisvabhavanirdesa (or Trisvabhavakarika, etc.). (23)

V.    What Implicit Role does the Three Natures Play in the Vimsatika?

	It would appear that Vasubandhu’s exposition of the doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhava) is an attempt to give greater detail to this doctrine of the merely-phenomenal (vijnaptimatra, cittamatra, etc.). Although the expression ‘svabhava’ can be used in a negative sense to imply a misidentification of evanescent phenomenal existence as substantially self-existent, in this context this expression should be translated as ‘nature’ or kind or form of ‘existence’ or similar. Thence trisvabhava merely alerts us to ‘three natures’. Those three natures are the constructed (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra) and the purified or perfected (parinispanna). A key text to examine in order to understand how Vasubandhu treats these three kinds of existence, and the manner of their interrelations, is to be found in this text of the Trisvabhavanirdesa. In effect, as already noted, he is finely outlining, in detail, his concept of vijnaptimatra. We should also note that this exposition operates simultaneously in a number of parallel spheres, e.g., psychological, epistemological, ontological, trans-epistemological-ontological (or transcendental), meditational, polemical, salvic or spiritual, etc. (24)

	In the Trisvabhavanirdesa we are told that the aspect of paratrantra is effectively centered in causal conditions. From this baseline, so to speak, the mind constructs a reading of reality that is merely constructed, hence the parikalpita/kalpita aspect; thence the recognition of the constructed phenomenon as vijnaptimatra, i.e., merely phenomenal. From this misreading of reality arises afflictions (samklesas, etc.). On the other hand, in reverse, when the constructed nature is removed from the aspect of the paratantra what we are then left with is this aspect of parinispanna or perfected reality. It is tempting, in the context of this model, to privilege either the causal-like basis of the paratantric nature or the perfected reality of the parinispannic nature. In my opinion the former bias would open itself up to a more epistemological-like self-instigated enlightenment style of religious economy, whereas, in contrast, a bias towards the latter would open itself up to a more ontological-like vision of religious reality realized through some form of a recovery of the spiritually pure enacted through processes of self-purification more likely assisted through acts of salvation orchestrated by another or others of a greater spiritual standing. I am not arguing that these speculative tendencies cannot co-exist, only, that they represent ideal versions or visions of the religious economy sought by their proponents. (25)

		Now we need to ask a series of questions. Does Vasubandhu privilege any one of these three natures? Or, does he disvalue any one of them? Then, if does not privilege any one of them we should ask why? If Vasubandhu is indeed running a ‘transcendental economy’ then we would expect him to not relatively privilege any one of them in order to maintain an overall transcendental suspension. But, then, how could we argue in Vasubandhu’s language that these kinds of (transcendental phenomenological) preoccupations actually exist and are not merely being read into the text both retrospectively and anachronistically? (26)

	As noted, I would also like to argue that when one of these natures is privileged we arrive at a different kind of religious economy. Briefly, privilege the constructed nature of reality and you arrive at a tantric style of religiousity; privilege the dependent nature of the causal and you arrive at an immanent enlightenment style of religiousity; and, privilege the purified nature of reality and you arrive at a transcendent religious economy of salvation assisted in part or in full by spiritual agents of an already enlightened nature. Note, I am not arguing that these three ideal directions of religiousity need either be present or cannot co-exist. However, a certain tension between them must exist which would naturally pull certain religious people in different directions. E.g., we have the seemingly perplexing puzzle of some Buddhists arguing that “there is no intrinsic existence” (svabhava in the sense of independent self-existence) whilst others would appear to argue that “we all have a pure Buddha-nature”. But need these two ‘readings’ of ‘transcendental’ reality (from a hypothetical transcendental perspective) necessarily contradict each other? An issue at the basis of the present day controversy engendered in debates over the nature of a Critical Buddhism. (27)

	What does Vasubandhu tell us in this text of the Trisvabhavanirdesa? In the first verse he states that the wise recognize the profound reality of these three natures. Moreover he names them and uses the exclusive particle eva to imply that there are only three natures. However, as I would argue, at no point does Vasubandhu appear to privilege any one of these three natures (or suggest their relative disvaluation). At first I was surprised to discern this systematic lack of a definitive privileging. In the light of this observation, and the presence of forms of privilege apparently exercised in other texts, we would need to explain why Vasubandhu has adopted this neutral tack. To quickly answer this rhetorical question let me observe that this transcendental ‘neutrality’ should obviously follow on from his adoption of his doctrine of vijnaptimatra. Moreover, he adopts the doctrine of trisvabhava as one important route to flesh out the former. Then, his acceptance of the doctrine of the trikaya, three bodies of the Buddha/s, also appears to parallel the triple economy embedded in this doctrine of the trisvabhava. In order to stress the existence of all three bodies both privileging and/or disvaluation of any one or more of these parties would disestablish this doctrine of the trikaya. Hence to answer the question embedded in the title of this section we must accept the importance of this doctrine of the trisvabhava even if not directly alluded to in the Vimsatika? These two orientations of the conventional versus the ultimate (or transcendental) being centered on the nature of the paratantra. Thence his distinction between effable and the ineffable as noted in the Vimsatika; i.e., between the imagined nature (kalpita) and the ineffable (anabhilapya) aspects of reality. Let me now return to this consideration of a tension between the immanent epistemologically-oriented sense of enlightenment and transcendent ontologically-oriented sense of salvation. (28)

VI.   Is there a Resolution of this Tension between Enlightenment and Salvation? 
 
	This three fold model of existence or the nature of reality in one direction explains the source of afflictions and, by its reversal (paravrtti), an alleviation of the same. In a movement away from the parikalpita, the constructed, we head towards the nature of the parinispanna through a process of purification. As noted earlier in passing, a spiritual emphasis upon the nature of the constructed could be construed as a tantric-like approach to the nature of reality (and the nature of that reality that entails our bondage to this world of name and form ). Briefly, how might a spiritual approach to the constructed qua constructed be exercised (if at all?)? By its treatment as merely phenomenal, i.e., empty (sunya) of svabhava, i.e., as vijnaptimatra, etc. In other words, entertaining and ‘enjoying’ the world as a mere simulation (and therefore something that as such cannot be a real subject for attachment and addiction, etc.). However, if we move our center of attention away from the illusory nature of the constructed and its construction of dualities (between intentional objects/subjects) towards the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of those perceptual processes that entertain and enjoy such unreal-simulations what are the ramifications of such a re-direction of intentional emphasis? It is my suggestion we are entering into a more immanent epistemologically aware dimension of intentional causality and, therein, causal processes in general. That to favour this modality is to relatively privilege a deeper awareness of intentionality itself along with the causal implications of such processes. In this light I proffer my ‘horizontal’ reading of this theoretical doctrine of the three natures. I.e, in centering ourselves in the paratrantric nature of reality we have the choice of either compounding the constructed parikalpatic nature of our appreciation of ‘reality’ or subtracting the same and realizing a purified parinispannic vision of the truly ‘real’. In this type of religious economy we find an accompanying epistemological emphasis placed upon processes of an immanently realized enlightenment. On the other hand, to give a relative preference to the latter, the parinispannic nature, is to create what I would like to perceive as a transcendently-oriented, salvation-oriented religious economy; an economy centered on processes of purification in order to retrieve the inherently pure nature of this spiritual sense of reality. Of course, in a swift reply from Madhyamaka criticism of this ‘un-Buddhist’ concept of a ‘pure intrinsic nature’ this treatment of this ‘intrinsically pure realm’ would quickly need to be qualified, e.g., treated as either metaphorical, or as a mere heuristic device, or as an indirect vision of truth, or as a pragmatic process that needs to be deconstructed or disposed of in some fashion or other. Assuming Vasubandhu’s maintains an even keel in his treatment of these three natures, as noted, can we perceive elements of both of the above, i.e., the existence of an immanently-oriented enlightenment economy and a transcendently-oriented salvational economy with either a tension or without a tension between the same? A salvationally oriented economy implying the existence of a miscellany, to some degree or other, of divinity/divine aspects (operating in this sphere of the so-called spiritually purified and pure). (29)

	In my opinion this tension is eventually obviated by virtue of a process wherein all three natures are effected eliminated (from a transcendentally oriented perspective?)? Towards the end of this text Vasubandhu tells us: 

That by the means of the non-perception of duality the form of duality disappears,
From this disappearance, the nature of parinispanna is understood as the absence of duality.

	But the process continues…

That the non-perception of intentional objects (and subjects) should be known by means of the perception of mind-only (cittamatra),
That the non-perception of mind would be the case by means of the non-perception of duality.

	And… 

That there is the perception of the essential nature of reality (dharmadhatu) by means of the non-perception of duality,
That by the means of the perception of the essential nature of reality would follow the perception of sovereignty (vibhutva) [of a Boddhisatva {or a Buddha)]. 

	This expression vibhutva appears to imply a spiritual realm of power, omnipresence, omniscience, spiritual abundance, spiritual mastery of either a Bodhisattva or a Buddha, a sense of spiritual sovereignty, etc. Thence our return to a theological-like economy as expressed by the final verse:

And this sovereignty and/of perception having established the [spiritual] purpose of oneself and others (svapararthaprasiddhitah),
[Thence] the wise, ultimate enlightenment having been obtained, whose nature is threefold in body [/embodiment; i.e., the three-fold body of the Buddhas/Buddha-nature (kayatrayatmikam)]. (30)

	Throughout this text Vasubandhu, on the whole, maintains a threefold economy in sets of parallel terms and definitions. E.g., he tells us:

Given this entry simultaneously into the threefold characteristics (of existence/trisvabhava),
Wisdom (parijna), abandonment (prahinam) and obtainment (praptih) having been progressively realized.

	Now, these three expressions are defined in the next sloka:

The perception of wisdom there; the appearance/appearing (akhyanan) being treated as abandoned;
But obtainment (praptih) is realized as a perception that is causeless/signless (animittam) and as an activity that is directly perceived (saksatkriya).

	A traditional Buddhist would immediately recognize this threefold classification as denoting the three doors of the empty (sunya), signless (animitta) and wishless (apranihita). This being the case, then it follows that in effect our reversal of these three natures individually/collectively realizes our entry into the essential nature of reality through this appreciation of the empty, the signless/causeless and the wishless. (31)

	In the light of the above analysis, how do we search for a solution to this puzzle: why does Vasubandhu adopt what appears to be a thorough overall transcendental suspension in this text of the Trisvabhavanirdesa and in other texts like the Vimsatika? Then, what relevance does such an insight appear to proffer in an advancement of my thesis that a theological-like turn is operative in this type of philosophical exposition (of the Yogacara)? (32)

VII. Re-arguing this Over-looked Position of the Relatively Theological?
	
	By running a triple economy (between these three natures) Vasubandhu releases a degree of value he would not be able to release if he were to completely privilege or disvalue one of those parties. In the meta-textual headings supplied in verse 10 he takes great pains to show their mutual interaction with each other. This verse states:

The profoundness of these three natures is realized on account of their considerations of existence and non-existence (sadasattvat); duality and unity (dvayaikatvat); on the part of the afflictions and their alleviation (samklesavyavadanyoh); and from the (ultimate) non-difference of their characteristic natures (laksana-abheda). (33)

	In effect, Vasubandhu runs a dialectical operation wherein he notes the simultaneous existence of existence and non-existence; duality and unity; afflictions and their alleviation; and that these three natures are (conventionally and/or ultimately?) without distinction (abheda/abhinna), i.e. difference w.r.t. each other(?). By stressing this type of balance Vasubandhu has put into effect the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension. What are the implications, wittingly or unwittingly, released by this transcendentally neutral position (in effect as a ‘positionless-position’ to parallel Husserl)? (34)

	By preserving these three natures he is able to parallel them at the end of the text with the three bodies of the Buddha as cryptically noted in the last verse. In this we are to assume a parallel between the constructed and illusory nature of phenomena with the Buddha-body of appearance (nirmanakaya). Then, the causal sphere of the paratantra is paralleled with the Buddha-body of enjoyment (sambhogakaya). Lastly, the sphere of parinispanna is paralleled with the Buddha-body of dharma (dharmakaya) (and thence its equivalence with the dharmadhatu/essential realm of reality?). (35) 

	Could we run an argument that Vasubandhu argues to the effect that from an ultimate, non-conventional (transcendental) point of view there is no real difference between the afflicted nature (of parikalpita [and paratantra]) and the non-afflicted nature of parinispanna along the same or similar lines to Nagarjuna’s point that the very limit (koti) of nirvana is equally the very same limit of samsara? (36) 

	Tentatively, I would argue that one could see Vasubandhu’s use of the expressions abheda and abhinna to indicate this sense of an equivalence (from a transcendental point of view). Being without differentiation there can be no absolute differentiation from this sense of the ultimate and non-conventional. In the course of my examination of the concept of the theological I have also argued that there can be no transcendental appreciation of the transcendental only a transcendental appreciation of the relatively non-transcendental, i.e., the natural or phenomenal/phenomenological. Similarly, there can be no absolute phenomenal/phenomenological appreciation of the relatively phenomenal/phenomenological only a phenomenal/phenomenological regard for the relatively non-phenomenal/phenomenological, i.e., the transcendental. Of these four provisional points of view there can be no pure transcendental appreciation of the transcendental nor a pure phenomenal/phenomenological consideration of the phenomenal. To these two surviving perspectives we can add the existential, ongoing balance of both views entertained simultaneously in parallel as exercised in the performance of an overall transcendental suspension. I.e., running a non-conventional appreciation of the conventional versus the conventional appreciation of the non-conventional. Do we have textual grounds that would allow us to demonstrate that Vasubandhu is deliberately exercising this degree of an overall transcendental suspension? Would we be correct in reading his two ways of reading the doctrine of the trisvabhava, about this pivot point of the paratantra, as establishing just this point? I.e., by running kalpita versus parinispanna, etc? In the process also needing to argue that without paratrantra and parikalpita there could be no sense of the parinispanna, and v.v.? (37)

	As noted earlier, in my examination of this text of the Trisvabhavanirdesa (and the Vimsatika for that matter also) Vasubandhu takes great pains to preserve a sense of balance, a sense of transcendental-like neutrality through either a non-privileging or a non-disvaluing of any of one or more of these three natures in his exposition of the same. Furthermore, he tells us that in simultaneously entering all three they are progressively entered, and, by implication, left. We have here a heuristic device for explaining numerous themes and preoccupations of the Yogacara; e.g., the concept of vijnaptimatra or cittamatra; an explanation for the processes of affliction and also their alleviation; an exposition of what is entailed in the process of reversion (paravrtti), etc. It would appear, in my estimation, that this careful sense of balance is adopted and adapted in order to emphasize the course of our (hypothetical and practical) spiritual progress, as viewed by Vasubandhu through a relatively orthodox Buddhist lens, wherein the emphasis is upon a sense of ongoing process and not so much the sense of a final spiritual obtainment? That granted, what ramifications and implications does this have for a theological-like reading of this particular text and other allied texts? (38)

	In essence here we would be arguing for what observations could be made in our examination of this type of text that establishes a unique sense of spiritual value (distinctive, in this regard, to both Vasubandhu in particular and to his adopted tradition of the Yogacara in general). Of course a traditional Buddhist has ostensively no desire to re-define the nature of their tradition. The type of philosophy they would attempt is merely to define a traditional sense of a problematic and offer a traditional response towards the same. Thence an overt emphasis upon commentary. However, defining becomes an act of ‘re-defining’ and as a consequence both problems and solutions become distinctively re-defined! Our appreciation of this traditional differential then allows us to better appreciate the directions and re-directions adopted by that tradition and its philosophical representatives (as ‘philosophical’ representatives by virtue of their ongoing explorations and dissemination of this sense of an overall textual differential). The ongoing accumulation of small differences in textual analysis eventually contributing to considerable catastrophic-like or chaotic-like re-formulations of identity and self-identity and thence a relatively radical re-direction of those ensuing traditions! (39)

VIII.  Brief Conclusion in the Form of a Summary

	I would like to argue that Vasubandhu’s exposition of the trisvabhava in the Trisvabhavanirdesa, and elsewhere, more deeply defines his doctrine of vijnaptimatra as defended in the Vimsatika. In both texts (and elsewhere) he maintains the semblance of a transcendental neutrality through the ongoing exercise of what is, effectively, an overall transcendental suspension. (40)

	I have argued that the sense of the religious in this text of the Vimsatika, etc., is numinous in character and representative of a theological-like turn as defined in this essay; i.e., in effect, as a turning of the sense of self (and community) towards a sense of the relatively divine through the acceptance of a source of being whose epistemological status is greater by several orders than that (currently) possessed (overtly) by ourselves. That this sense of a difference is experienced through the simulation of a psychic rift as numinous in nature (by virtue of that differential of power). Moreover, such a belief is given a textual presentation by virtue of the formulation/re-formulation of a certain religious problematic and the formulation/re-formulation of its ongoing responsive resolution. That an analysis of relevant textual deposition should help us to appreciate something of the dynamics behind this type of process as it is textually represented. (41)

	Because Vasubandhu preserves his triple economy in his exposition(s) of this doctrine of trisvabhava in the Trisvabhavanirdesa I must conclude that his allusion to the trikaya doctrine of the three-bodies of the Buddha/s, noted in his final verse, is also being paralleled and preserved! Thence his ‘theological-like’ aspirations in this regard! His transcendental neutrality permitting strands of an immanent epistemologically oriented religious economy of enlightenment to co-exist and cohabitate with strands of a transcendent, ontologically oriented religious economy of salvation.   (42)

	Thus, we must conclude that this religious tradition of the Yogacara, as represented by Vasubandhu, is theologically-oriented in the manner as outlined by myself. Given my understanding that all religious forms of expression are oriented in the same manner, in accordance with their own problematics and responsive resolutions, we would find here in this type of topological similarity a conceptual isomorphism that would allow us to enter more fruitfully into forms of comparative analysis and investigation of other religious traditions with an accompanying realization of a better understanding of our own sense of religious identity (or non-religious identity) in that regard. (44)
	         					      	         Noël Tointon, Sydney, 29.4.07.