Iraq: To Leave Or Not To Leave – That is the Question?
The Viability of  Speculative History?*

0.   Introduction

	In this open forum let us workshop two parallel considerations. (1)

First, let us look at our understanding of the current dilemma for the American government and people as to whether American troops in Iraq should stay or start to withdraw and effectively leave this theatre of military operations. Of course, for “American troops” we can also read Australian forces also currently in operation there. (2) 

Second, let us look at what I would like to call the apparent viability of speculative history. By that I mean asking ourselves can we construct an adequate and effectively comprehensive historical appreciation of a certain type of situation over a certain period of time within the appropriate geographical constraints that, altogether, collectively define those ‘apparent’ historical processes under such consideration? That, essentially, this simulated arena of speculative investigation is either a mix of retrospective, relatively real-time and/or prospective considerations in orientation. The same being ‘speculative’ in nature by virtue of the fact that we are exploring probable historical possibilities in the hope of effectively establishing reasonably accurate historical actualities. A speculative process that takes a variety of facts and tries to hermeneutically account for their interrelationship in the form of a certain type of narration that is engineered in the hope of meeting a certain degree of consensus; either somewhat positively for or negatively against the ‘conclusions’ realized in that particular narration. The problematic nature of history arising from such philosophical considerations as to whether we can reasonably construct the past, effectively appreciate the present and successfully predict the future?! (3)

	In the course of this open forum let us ask and answer the following questions:

1.	Should the Coalition of the Willing stay in Iraq?
2.	Should the above set about leaving now? or,
3.	How should their exist strategy be put into effect?

and…

4.	How viable is ‘retrospective’ historical speculation?
5.	How viable is real-time speculative historical appreciation? and,
6.	How viable is prospective historical speculation?

and…

7.	Can we ever learn from the past in order not to commit the same ‘types’ of mistakes in the future? (4)

*	For the latest version of this paper refer to:
 www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html 

1.   Historical Background to the Second Gulf War and its Aftermath

	A first recent Gulf War, 2 August, 1990 - 28 February, 1991, was fought after Iraq invaded the oil rich state of Kuwait. A coalition of forces from thirty states invaded only Southern Iraq with a mandate from the UN. President Bush I has been reported to have said that they invaded with an exit strategy in mind, had the limited objective of returning sovereignty to Kuwait, military operations being conducted in as surgical fashion as possible in order to minimize the advent of a civil war between the main ethnic parties of the Shia, Sunni and Kurds. The dictator Saddam Hussein managed to maintain his controlled of the state of Iraq but only through the violent repression of the Shia in the south (relatively unseen by reporters) and unleashing (a televised) flood of fearful Kurdish refugees in the North. After this war Iraq was constrained by no-fly zones (wherein the remnants of his air-force would not be able to fly), the removal of radar stations (controlling missile sites) were repeatedly knocked out along with other military targets. Furthermore, only a certain amount of oil was allowed to be sold for food, medicines, etc. In addition, a large quantity of weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under UN supervision. (5)

	After the terrorism of ‘9/11’ a Second Recent Gulf War commenced once Afghanistan was successfully secured with the help of the Northern Alliance. In hindsight it appears obvious that the perceived need for a military response post 9/11 was manipulated by the White House to order to invade Iraq and topple the dictator Saddam Hussein. Motivation for this is complex but could be argued as getting even with their renegade henchman Hussein and to secure oil-supplies (given the probable eventuality of political instability in the non-democratic kingdom of Saudi Arabia)? Although general opinion believed Hussein to still possess considerable quantities of weapons of mass destruction it is most likely that most intelligence agencies were aware of the UN perception that most stocks were already destroyed at the end of the First Gulf War or thereafter? On 20 March, 2003, Iraq was invaded by a Coalition of the Willing comprising 40 states, however, without a UN mandate for the same. (6)

	On 1 May, 2003, President Bush II flew on to the decks of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln with the infamous banner reading ‘Mission Accomplished.’ Unfortunately, Iraq thereafter progressively unraveled till today we have, in effect, a civil war between Sunni and Shia, competing forces within the Shia camp (especially centered on the minor cleric Moqtada Sadr), an effectively independent state of Kurdistan (trying to wrestle back the oil rich region around Kirkuk) all helplessly watched by an increasingly ineffectual Iraqi government seemingly infiltrated by a number of Shia factions). Into this mix we have al-Qaeda often in the form of foreign mercenaries, various other Jihadist factions, political forms of interference from Iran, Syria, etc. (7)
	
	It would appear, from a retrospective historical speculations, that a number of mistakes were made by the Coalition of the Willing after militarily securing the country. I would suggest the lack of an adequate and comprehensive plan post invasion; the non-utilization of the Iraqi military to maintain law and order; the inability to prevent looting of historical, cultural and other important sites like hospitals, etc., by virtue of an inadequate number of troops in this Coalition of the Willing; non-securing of ammunition dumps, etc; the excessive de-Barthification of the elite in Iraq; the lack of an adequate awareness of ethnic divides, etc; the overall lack of an initial equitable political settlement of local government and the non-equitable division of resources, especially oil, were some of the notable causes why this post-invasion period appears to be doomed to a lengthy period of ongoing and increasing political instability. (8)

	From relatively indisputable facts and their relatively disputable narrative incorporation and relational evaluation a complex set of hermeneutic ‘summations’ are made that may or may not realize a certain degree of positive consensus. In order to understand the present we need, it would appear, to understand something of the recent past that realized that sense of the present. Then, what is the point of our speculating on current history if we have no desire to prospectively set out to learn from our speculative perception of past and current ‘mistakes’? Indeed, let us ask ourselves is it possible to derive a valid moral or set of morals from our ‘historical speculations’? (9)

	In all of this I am reminded of the paper read by Michael von Brasch at our last conference in 2006 when he informed us of the various military campaigns the British have conducted in Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Generally, they were wrongly motivated, poorly planned and incompetently exercised, and, ineptly exited often in a disastrous fashion. Today we have the same debate – in what manner should the Coalition of the Willing leave Iraq? (10)

	At some stage withdrawal is inevitable. The real questions are when and how? In this light I am reminded of a Republican tactic to label ‘leavers’ as ‘people who cut and run’ and ‘who loose such wars.’ In a release of cables between President Nixon and Kissinger, we have recently read the former as setting out to label the Democrats as such even though these political principals already thought the Vietnam War politically lost. Still, more US troops were allowed to pointless die in that theatre of combat. However, it could also be said, that he Americans had already effectively left South Vietnam quite a few months before it suddenly collapsed and became politically re-integrated by the Communist of government of North Vietnam. The memorable TV footage and photos of helicopters evacuating the US Embassy often being wrongly re-read as a defeat of the American military per se. I should also be noted that as an invader of Iraq this current Coalition of the Willing is beholden under international law to maintain the fabric of a civic society. Unfortunately, that fabric is being torn apart with a large number of people already displaced by the consequences of this developing ongoing ‘civil war’. Indeed, a figure of over two million people now exist as refugees outside the country, taking up a safer residence in Syria, Jordan and Iran and elsewhere. Then, also, there are the internally displaced as well! (11)

	So, let us start. Let us try to formulate a complex understanding of the complex situation in Iraq as it has arisen… as it is… to where it might be going? Is it possible to understand a geographical region of the world without being there? How many of us come from or have been to this part of the world? Recently? How does regular television coverage assist us in this type of task… or, how does it confuse the complexity of the situation through the perpetuation of rather inane simplifications; such machinations often reflecting the motivations of politicians to either over-gloss what they favour or gloss-over what they do not regard with great value… or, do not wish to see… or, see us see and accept…? (12)

2.   Discussion On Current Realities

	In the short term the American government has three options, namely,

1.	Immediate exit from Iraq,
2.	Planned withdrawal over a limited period of time,
3.	Indefinite stay at current troop-levels without a short-term exit in view.

In regards to the first option I would suggest it would lead to the immediate collapse or near immediate collapse of the current Iraqi government. With regard to the last option I would state that this option is not a viable prospect for the American government in view of the ongoing level of the high cost involved in its continued deployment. In essence, the only viable option is the second! (13)

	This second option of a planned withdrawal also has to be viewed against the overriding realities of the current political scene in the US. In my opinion both Republicans and Democrats are probably in agreement that the second option is the only viable one. However, what form that withdrawal would take is currently under contention. Permanent military bases in Iraq may have been contemplated initially, however, to remain with a sizeable military presence might invite a Vietnam-like scenario should the current or successive Iraqi government suddenly fail in the advent of an extremist Shia change of government, and, thereafter, and thereby, be forced to leave in some unseemly fashion regardless of the number of troops then present. Then, again, even if the current form of Iraqi government were to maintain its existence, and if it believed its strength adequate to governing the country, it would then call for American forces to leave for patriotic reasons. The type of exit to be contemplated and enacted, therefore, is only bedeviled in the detail, i.e., in the formulation of a timetable. The current administration in the Whitehouse is trusting that time and this so-called military option of a ‘Surge’ will see out a stabilization and strengthening of the current Iraqi government. However, there are a number of ‘political realities’ that will temper the extent and duration of this form of optimism. (14)

	The current administration is against a so-called ‘time-table’ despite a tacit understanding that that is effectively what is going to happen sometime soon in the short term. Inevitably, a time-table is going to be formulated in some form or other (even if un-published). Furthermore, with democratic control of both houses, and the prospect in 2008 of a Presidential campaign, and elections to both houses, and Republican too desiring to be clear of this Bush II inspired ‘Republican failure’ all parties (including the President) would then likely be hopeful that this situation could be effectively resolved before that November date. This could be wishful thinking, however, if adequate plans are not put in place for a resolution of this ongoing catastrophe of civil conflict before this change in American government. (15)

	More immediately, we have just had President Bush exercising a second veto of his presidency in order to kill a bill just recently passed in both houses and delivered on the fourth anniversary of his famously mis-named Mission Accomplished speech. That bill called for a time-table and linked its acceptance to certain benchmarks of performance to be accomplished by the Iraqi government along with a generous supply of money to continue funding the military involvement in Iraq. With the possibilities of a Democratically controlled government cutting off this supply of money the President is forced to negotiate with the same. (16)

	There are also a number of other political realities that need to be taken into account in this debate. A large number of parties actually stand to gain from the current degree of American involvement in this form of an over-extended entanglement (troop numbers being severely limited because of the current absence of a draft and inadequate levels of replacement). For a start, we have the current Iraqi government whose viability post-withdrawal is questionable. Then, the Sunni themselves are ambivalent about the untrammeled power of a Shia led government whatever form that were to take. Then, conservative Shia are not too keen on a government controlled by forces loyal to the likes of a radical such as Moqtada Sadr or his equivalent. Similarly, the Kurds are currently enjoying a de facto political independence that could be threatened by Turkey (despite its current degree of political instability). A level of independence that could also be threatened by a future radical Shia inspired form of government. Even al-Queda-oriented elements in all probability benefit by having American targets. A strong Shia government and military force would quickly spell the end of their presence in Sunni areas of the country. Externally, Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are not keen on an unchecked Shiite domination of Iraq. Then, having the USA mired down in Iraq also suits the purposes of countries like Iran and Syria who have various reasons to fear some form of a US-inspired military involvement in their own countries. To some extent Middle Eastern political circles might welcome, to a certain degree, that the current status quo be maintained for the short-term, however, the political scene in America is overwhelmingly against this continuing lack of a ‘change in course’. (17)

	Republicans in the Post-Vietnam era have brandished the mantra that Democrats are prone to ‘cutting and running’. Democrats are painfully aware of this dilemma – leave Iraq and be branded a defeatist! On the other hand, public consensus is that America should leave Iraq and as soon as possible! If this ‘war’ is already lost then why not cut your losses rather than continue on in this hopeless enterprise. Should America lose this war for a civil democratic Iraq, Republicans are forever going to blame Democrats for this failure despite a Republican government unwisely initiating this conflict and incompetently planning for and exercising this campaign. Inevitably, however, the political reality of a loss of will will coincide with the reality on the ground and American forces will be obliged to withdraw in some form or other. In the light of the above assessment, your own assessments of the same and other considerations, let us now examine this process of withdrawal and the parallel consequences it would have for the current deployment of Australian forces in this arena of combat, civil war, terrorism, the threat of an ever-widening dissemination of violence and other fatal complexities entailed in this phenomenon of human conflict and its unresolved escalation! Ideally, perhaps, we need to ask ourselves this question: what course of action might best shorten and lessen this ‘civil war’ presently dominating the frail fabric of life in this failed state of a contemporary Iraq? (18)
							      Noël Tointon, Sydney, 3.5.07.