Negotiating Narratives:
After the successful Post-Modern critique of grand narratives how do we 
negotiate a complexity of narratives without succumbing to 
group-think, misunderstanding, confusion or relativism, etc?

0.    Introduction

	In recent papers (on ecological and economic topics, etc.) I have explored the concept of complexity. I have argued that complexity in human interaction is often pre-negotiated and that our understanding of these ‘understandings’ necessitates our examination of the meta-textual conventions for dealing with these apparent negotiations between different modes-of-life, or spheres-of-life, (e.g., the political, economical, social, personal, interpersonal, deontological, pragmatical, etc.). (1)

	With the collapse of grand narrative pretensions let us look into the complex role of narrative in everyday human interaction and communication. (2)

	Problems in the adoption and adaptation of a pre-negotiated complexity in interactive genre conventions would include, among others, group-think, misunderstanding, confusion, relativism, etc. I would like to define group-think as ‘a premature and extreme concurrence of consensus’ (either in a relative conformity or not in a relative conformity with reality whose objectivity is appreciated by-us in and through an adequate overall transcendental suspension given an adequate exercise of all relevant sequential processes with a minimization of mistakes of a de-sequential, mis-sequential, contra-sequential and dis-sequential nature). Misunderstanding is ‘a correct application of relevant genres but an inadequate exercise of those conventions’, whereas, on the other hand, confusion I would define as ‘an inappropriate application of relevant genres (and an inadequate exercise of those same conventions)’. Lastly, relativism is to be regarded as ‘the false belief that the adoption and adaptation of any set of meta-conventions and interactive genre conventions has (or must have) an equal weighting or overall value equivalent to that realized in any other reasonably applied, appropriately related and utilized set of conventions’. (3)

	The point of this paper is to attempt to demonstrate how a pre-negotiated  complexity of narratives in our everyday-lives constitutes the overall value of our complex, subjectively and inter-subjectively constituted vision of reality. (4)

Latest version of paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html 

1.   Complexity

 	In the invocation of the concept of complexity I invoke two key-concepts, namely, that complexity is usually pre-negotiated, and, the acceptance of an all-pervasive, dominant feature of the chaotic entering into the intentional constitution/re-constitution of all phenomenal-phenomenological constitution (be that receptive and/or responsive in intentional orientation). (5)

	Elsewhere I have noted that we do not normally experience an existential angst in the course of our lives in what ever sphere-of-life we focus upon. The interaction between different types of value is effectively pre-negotiated for-us and by-us. E.g., an artist paints a picture and offers it for sale. How should such a work be valued? By its aesthetic qualities? By how much we admire it? By the amount of work, experience and time that went into its production? By the value of its re-sale? By the commercial dissemination of its image through copyright, etc? However, all this is usually negotiated by being pre-negotiated for us. If the artist has been selling comparable works for x dollars then they would expect to be paid x dollars. If their works are in demand then price might be x plus y dollars (where x, y increases with time, the quantity of demand, scarcity, etc.). The artist might merely charge what they think they can get in that current art-market. In all of this there is an invocation of precedent/s, reasonable expectations, etc., and other factors such as whether the artist likes you, has an urgent need for money, etc. In some measure, a transaction is completed when the price agreed upon is satisfactory to the reasonable expectations of both parties (and the second party thinks they can afford that price, etc.). (6)

	Negotiations may be difficult to conduct for a variety of causes but they are never conducted in a negotiated vacuum! The complexity of inputs calculated by the artist or their agent and the complexity of considerations entered into by the purchaser are basically already mapped out by the relevant conventions of the art-world in this regard. A complex set of expectations are adopted and adapted by all the parties concerned upon a landscape of negotiations already essentially mapped out. An overall and full concurrence effectively establishes a sale (since an appropriate and proper price could be agreed upon without the full completion of that sale). (7)

	Therefore, this (meta-textual) phenomenon of complexity is best recognized and exercised in our negotiations; negotiations in part conducted both for-us and by-us to that extent such terrain is already mapped out for us and we chose to adopt and adapt the same! (8)

2.   The Post-Modern Critique of Grand Narratives

	Various grand-narratives were formulated or attempted in a variety of fields with varying degrees of universal encompassment. E.g., much effort was invested to formulate a universal theory of mathematics in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Such efforts, however constructed, were all doomed to fail! Indeed, this type of (systematic and reductive) project has now been shown to be an impossible objective to realize. Then, again, various philosophical, economical and psychological theories were variously proposed to completely encompass the entire social sphere of personal-interpersonal interaction have equally failed the test of a relatively complete universality be that in terms of truth value, coherence with a subjective-intersubjective vision of reality, utility, computability, openness, etc.  (9)

	Let me sketch a number of philosophical manoeuvres that quickly demonstrate that a complete universal encompassment in a simple or complex narrative is never able to function in that manner as intended. Let me list a series of objections that successfully de-construct such grand narrative constructions, namely, deconstruction, (the limited epistemic nature of) truth evaluation, potential non-computability (and non-decidability) of propositional statements in a system, (the non-linear nature of) chaotic organized complexes, the relatively arbitrary nature of presuppositional propositions (and axioms), the permanent necessity of (appreciative) framing, etc., etc. These elements as objections will be looked at in the course of this essay. (10)

	To begin with, Deconstruction can be meant in either a non-technical sense or in a more technical and philosophical sense. In the former, the discovery of inconsistencies can be used to de-construct the viability of such an enterprise when critically examined. By inconsistencies can mean inadequate assembly of relevant information, non-mediated contradictory information and processes, contradictory processes of construction, non-clarity and/or ambivalency of intent, etc. In a more technical and philosophical sense deconstruction (after Derrida, e.g.) can be seen as the recognition of the unwarranted absolutization and/or overlooked privileging of binary inputs involved in the enstructuralization of a certain narrative. Hence a grand narrative, in this light, can be seen to be more grand when it is intended to be more encompassing by fiat and reductive intent, and, more readily overlooks the privileging involved in the formulation of its structure (through hierarchical enstructuralization of its narrative system as noted). Let me give examples of these points. (11)

	I was listening to the radio a number of years ago in order to get the time to re-set my stopped watch and a radio shock-jockey was rabitting on about ‘how lazy New Zealanders were, never getting out of bed in the morning, etc.’, and, a few sentences later added that ‘they also pinched all the jobs Australians particularly want’. Now, unless lazy New Zealanders like to work not only from home but also bed, I fail to see how these two sets of propositions can be harmonized without some form of mediation or explanation that allows both to be concurrently true. Perhaps we should believe all New Zealanders are prostitutes or do only evening shifts or nightshifts, etc? Pointing out such (overlooked and/or inadequately accounted for) inconsistencies effectively deconstructs such a narrative in our non-technical (and non-philosophical) sense. (12)

	The same narrative as above also could be deconstructed on more technical, philosophical grounds by looking for the qualifying binaries present and noting their privileged aspects and their suppressed aspects through noting the emotional appeals and relatively non-rational arguments presupposed in erecting such hierarchies in the first place. ‘Relatively non-rational’ in the sense that we have to start somewhere rather than somewhere else and that we either accept current prejudice (pre-judgment as per Ricoeur) in this regard without rational scrutiny, or, decide to intervene in a manner that ultimately cannot be rationally defended on rational lines [by the nature of those ‘foundational’ choices]).  E.g., the binary between Australians and New Zealanders. The former are privileged, rightly or wrongly, by being citizens in Australia and the latter are de-privileged by being migrants (whether temporarily or permanently) even though legally allowed to work here just as much as Australians are allowed to work in New Zealand. So, in this instance on rational grounds we should privilege neither Australians nor New Zealanders. Then, in this example, New Zealanders are described as ‘lazy’ and by implication Australians are described as ‘non-lazy’ (but, obviously, not enterprising enough to stop New Zealanders from stealing their jobs). Such prejudice is ‘racist’ in tenor and only supported, if it could be called that, by erecting generalizations on possible instances through a stereotypical type-casting of a normal spectrum of behaviour. Who doesn’t want to sleep in rather than go to work? Who hasn’t slept in on some occasion or other? Then who hasn’t some form of ambivalence towards work in general and their particular job in particular? I have often heard people express such contradictory ideation: they want work, they don’t enjoy their current work to the extent they would wish, are looking for a better job, looking or not looking forward to retirement, etc., etc. No doubt such a fluctuating spectrum of attitudes can co-adhere to or with our labours, sense of vocation, work aspirations, etc. (13)

	Such attitudes, as exemplified above, constitute a narrative, or, more likely, a set of competing narratives. Furthermore, through the exigencies of existence and our social insertion into a world-of-others the existence of such relatively dissonant features are usually harmonized to some extent or other in a narrative for-oneself and its transformed expression as a narrative-before-others, and v.v. But such a narrative does not constitute a grand narrative. What exactly is a narrative and how might we define a grand narrative? Why do grand narratives fail when critically examined on their own ground, and, how is this failure to be understood in terms of types of successful critique and overall in a philosophical sense (of Post-Modernity?)? Just how is this type of critique to be exercised, and, what ramifications does it have for adherents of grand-narratives? Furthermore, how might we critique such manoeuvres and move from a Post-Modern philosophical environment to a Post-Post-Modern or Contemporary philosophical environment? (14)

	A narrative could be defined as ‘a specific language with meta-textual instructions as to how certain object-states/subjects can be either related to or not related to other object-states/subjects, etc.’ That a specific language is in effect a hermeneutic device for interpreting which object-states/subjects can be related to which other object-states/subjects and how such relations are to proceed. In this light a major narrative or grand narrative can be defined as narrative that subsumes political power over other topically related minor narratives with a grand narrative reductively denying all other narratives with similar pretensions. E.g., in Australia a democratic narrative is effectively a major narrative (without necessarily being a grand narrative). In the shadow of this major narrative all other political paradigms are automatically treated as sympathetic to or antagonistic to this paradigm (even if not completely sympathetic or antithetical to current versions or visions of the current democratic process). ‘Hermeneutic’ by virtue of its meta-textual invocation of genre-conventions for controlling the exercise and application of this narrative language. In effect, an ideal and/or comparative  story is told, be it with an emphasis upon myths and/or metaphors. (15)

	At this point I am tempted to illustrate this failure of modernism to erect an absolutely viable system by demonstrating a number of arguments used against mathematical absolutism, i.e., the impossibility of an absolute mathematical system (as a proxy in this regard for all absolutistic systems). I would like to do this under the limited headings of non-closure of truth evaluation, non-computability, natural selectivity of intent, etc. In effect, I hope to show how an absolutist vision or version of truth evaluation in mathematical theory must fail (whilst setting about to rescue an absolute vision or version of truth evaluation along critical transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential lines of application). In this set of manoeuvres my critique of an absolutist mathematical system is, by default, a proxy for all other types of absolutist systematization. (16)

	In mathematics, in the early 20th Century a barrage of objections were raised and shown to apply to absolutist mathematical systems, such as , e.g., Gödel’s incompleteness theorems; Tarski’s indefinability theorem; the parallel problems of consistency, the recursive nature of truth evaluation, non-computability, absolute closure, etc. Now, thankfully, I do not intend to reproduce such work in the context of this paper, but, rather sketch the essence of some of those arguments. (17)

	Imagine if you would a set of statements and our determination to establish the truth of those individual statements. The mere analysis of those statements cannot determine truth (other than analytical truth value). Assuming the statement is internally consistent, truth value must be conducted outside the mere object terms of reference, i.e., meta-textually. In tarskian notation we might say ‘P’ is true if and only if (iff) P, i.e., more or less, the statement ‘P’ is true (t) iff it can be found in the object-language description, namely, P. Or, we might say the same thing by noting that P’ in the meta-language is true if and only if P in the object-language is the case. 
		
P’ is t iff P { where [‘P’ is t iff P ]is seen as equivalent} (18)

	For the sake of an example let us say we have a fruit-bowl with one apple and one orange contained therein. The statement that there is a fruit bowl with one apple (A) and one orange (O) is true (t) iff in a list of facts about that bowl there is indeed one apple and one orange. 	
	
		(1 x A + 1 x O)’ is t iff (in our list of true facts ) 1 x A + 1 x O (19)

Put another way, we could say that in a transformation from the object-language to a meta-language (one degree higher than the object-language), and v.v.,  if there is an isomorphism of structure then truth is established or maintained. I.e:

1 x A + 1 x O and {1 x A + 1 x O}’ are isomorphic if t as per (19) (20)

	Truth is appreciated in meta-textual terms of reference, i.e., in extra-objective terms of reference (as applying to meta-language statements). Then, again, the truth of this truth is established in meta-meta-terms of reference, etc. How could we be absolutely be sure truth is established if we have to aspire to infinitely higher and higher meta-terms of reference? We cannot! Therefore, (non-analytical) truth determination must remain a provisional affair! 

P’ is t iff P  and (P’)’ is t iff P’, etc. (21)

	Other problems will also present themselves to the absolutist mathematician. E.g., questions of consistency, the ability to be in possession of all true statements in a set or system, problems of computability (e.g., deciding ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a certain question), etc. (22)

	A classic example of how a set with one proposition and its truth value contained within can contradict each other is to encapsulate the liars paradox with it truth value t. ‘This sentence is false.’ Is it true or is it false? If truth then it is false, and v.v. So by subsuming its truth value as a statement in the object language is only to reproduce this paradox and inconsistency. Basically it cannot be computed in terms of a logic of truth: ‘yes it is true’ or ‘no it is false’. Furthermore, there are some statements that just cannot be computed. E.g., what is the last digit of pi? No amount of computation (so far) has produced a final digit of pi. Such a proposition cannot be computed (given any degree of finite computational time). Then, if truth is merely determined in the meta-language it follows that the truth of that procedure must be merely determined in the meta-meta-language, etc. In such a recursive scheme there can be no final arbitration of truth value. So much for an absolutist vision and version of truth. There can be no creditable absolutist program, and, by extension, in philosophy there can be no absolutistic philosophical system that both argues for a set of propositions and their absolutistic verification in the same meta-terms of reference as exercised in the relative object-language (along with impossible demands for full consistency and full completeness, and, full computability, etc.). (23)

	Full extension of these ideas to philosophical systems can be conducted given their complete systematization or axiomatization. However, without mathematization in some form or other many of these principle cannot be fully transferred, e.g., the recursiveness of truth determination. One must wonder to what extent, also, a theory of everything could be constructed in Physics (although that does not argue against the integration of hitherto disparate fields of investigation (through a productive negotiation of narratives). (24)

	If an absolutistic system is constructed through a hierarchical preferencing of structural presuppositions then a process of formal deconstruction can equally undermine it! To this extent a grand narrative is not much more than a narrative constructed as a major narrative to control other narratives, namely minor narrative (or minor histories as per Deleuze). But, given a recursive truth evaluation, etc., no grand narrative, major narrative nor any form of narrative could ever be completely in control of its own formulation. On the other hand, this does not mean that a narrative can have no real value, or, that all narratives are equally valuable or valueless (in a relativist philosophy). How might we define a narrative (regardless of its status) and how should we regard a transcendental-phenomenological perspective on narrative in general (and in particular and specifically)? Putting such rhetorical questions aside, let me now look at the (epistemic or epistemological) limitations imposed upon the process of truth evaluation (despite whatever model of truth determination is being utilized). (25)

	As already noted, if we have ascertained by what ever means that P’ is true iff P, then it follows that the truth t’ of this ascertainment of truth determination is such that P’’ is t’ iff P’, etc. Hence the recursive nature of absolutistic truth determination. Put another way we might say, e.g., that appreciation is always conducted in extra-linguistic terms of reference. From the mountains we can better see the plains. That it follows, in turn, that an appreciation of appreciation is conducted in the same terms of reference, namely, higher by one meta-degree, etc. So, if truth can never be absolutely appreciated and determined how do we live with what must be none other than provisional truth? Without any real philosophical problems? By accepting the fact of our existence that we must negotiate our way through this world-of-life together. So, how do we escape a relativistic position in this regard, and, reclaim a transcendental phenomenology without resorting to the importation of new or old practises of an absolutistic flavour or odour? By conducting our transcendental phenomenology in and through the adequate exercise of a sufficiently informed overall transcendental suspension. Let me explain. (26)

	As already stated complexity is always pre-negotiated. Exercising this complex narrative territory is always productive of value. Therefore, even though an absolutistic position is not viable this does not mean the course of negotiations adopted and adapted is not productive of value. Moreover, different courses are productive of comparatively different degrees of value (both quantitatively and qualitatively) and it generally behoves us to advance in that direction that gives us the best value for the resources invested in that investigative engagement. An investment that is conducted in regards to the psychic energy invested, the time taken with that project, the successfulness of the same, and the extent intent is adequately compensated with respect to expectations entered into, and, this current pursuit is not seen as being too expensive vis-à-vis other possible projects that might be regarded as more pressing, etc. (27)

	Now the important question behoves us: how can a transcendental phenomenological program be seen as viable given the deconstruction, etc., of an absolutistic program? (28)

	In part this question is addressed by perceiving the preservation of value in our negotiation of narratives be that individually (on an individual narrative by narrative basis) or through complex interaction (between pre-negotiated narratives and our re-negotiation of the same). Then, by accepting the intentionally constituted nature of all projects through the application of the overall transcendental suspension we focus our attention only on that intentional formation itself (having suspended all relevant ontological and epistemological commitments). Furthermore, through a suspension of the suspension the weight of judgmental evidence is then allowed to direct or re-direct the ongoing course of our responses being engaged in our ongoing re-negotiated passage through this Life-World (as a World-of-Life wherein we can engage all transcendental possibilities of intentional formation). (29)

	To what extent can such mathematical insights apply to narratives and grand narratives attempting to explain and give meaning and value to our existence? Can or should mathematical insights extend to personal-interpersonal fields of experience? To that extent they invoke axioms, theorems, systemic organizational invocations of truth in some form or other, etc. However, I believe certain key-insights can be shared and extended to warn us as to how and to what extent we should limit our philosophical re-constructions of the apparent world-as-lived. Let me briefly mention some of these points (as important points for discussion in this regard). (30)

	That, as we live in the same one World-of-Life, and one Life-World only, therefore, all narrative frames of reference and all referred objectivity (and subjectivity) therein can be subject to processes of accommodation, transformation and, thereby, commensuration. However, such comparative examinations may or may not produce/re-produce an existential surplus of value commensurate with the value of that investment. That no closed system of thought can represent let alone re-present the complex nature of this Life-World, this World-of-Life. Consequently, a potential infinitude of hermeneutical perspectives exists to approach the topic to hand, that, as a result we should attempt to recognize those perspectives that adequately meet and adequately reward our current and reasonable expectations or intent in this regard. That, more often than not, a complexity of narratives needs to be negotiated and re-negotiated in accordance with the current task or tasks-to-hand. In doing so let us avoid relatively avoidable error through not subscribing to group-think, misunderstanding, confusion and/or mere relativism in part or in whole, and, through not subscribing to any form of an absolutist program. In effect, taking a middle path in this regard. (31)

	Moreover, let us reasonably clarify our intent, properly conduct our research, appropriately guide its application and determine to that extent possible where we might stand given such an investment of our psychic resources. Continuing our research when this investment appears to be making a return above and beyond that merely invested in its psychically. (32)

	In other words, what we cannot do (such as absolutizing our research programs) we cannot do, but, what we can do we can do better through an ongoing refinement of those research projects by critically re-negotiating the individual narratives entailed and by resolving through harmonization the manner of narrative complexity that may or may not also be involved (although correctly, through appreciation, no research project could be ever uni-modal and mono-narrational in its epistemic complexion). (33)

	Given this failure of an absolutistic project or program how do we go about re-negotiating a more productive passage through this World-of-Life? (34)

3.   Mistaken Forms of Negotiation

	I have arbitrarily listed four types of negotiated difficulty, namely, group-think, misunderstanding, confusion, relativism. At the beginning of this essay I individually defined them; we should also note a general increasing risk of error across this spectrum. Armed with such understandings let us learn to deploy those insights and methods that might help us to better overcome such epistemic obstacles. (35)

	Group-think was defined as ‘a premature and extreme concurrence of consensus (in regard to what is ‘real’ as subjectively-intersubjectively discerned)’. Relatively more powerful opinions can induce, manipulate or force a premature consensus with a faulty program of negotiation being put in play that misrepresents the nature of that reality-to-hand. Vested interests might then ensue the maintenance of that inadequate program with a consequential defective release of value. For group-think to be undone, a new form of consensus needs to be developed (beyond the influence of those vested interests). The debate is then whether that transition should be rapid or transitional (and is best left to the existential nature of those negotiations). (36)

	Mis-understanding is here defined in this open-paper as ‘the improper application of appropriate genre-conventions’. A clarification, and rectification in the light of that clarification, adequately conducted, should ensure a rectification of that misunderstanding of the appropriate meta-textual genre-conventions that should, instead, be invoked. Errors, here, being sequential in nature to the extent that certain steps are wrongly conducted and/or wrongly sequenced in those processes. (37)

	On the other hand, confusion is defined in this paper as ‘the relatively defective adoption and adaptation of genre-conventions in relation to the task currently to-hand’. It is a much deeper epistemic phenomenon and demands a greater degree of psychic investment in rectification. In essence, relatively non-appropriate genre conventions are adopted and adapted. The same need to be jettisoned and replaced by a better mix of genre-conventions in such a manner that better reflects the prior complexity of negotiations, the practical need for re-negotiations, and the realistic intent in expectations reasonably thought to be achievable. (38)

	Finally, it should be noted that an absolute-relativism is not able to be obtained, and, that a relative-relativism is just not entertained outside the transcendental-suspension (given the nature of the suspension, and, no values can be equivalent). (30)
	
	Generally, all negotiations could entail various aspects of the above. On the other hand, all processes of negotiations, or, rather, re-negotiation, need to observe logical requirements that attempt to observe adequate preparation of relevant information, appropriate invocation of apposite genre-conventions, proper pursuit of logical argument, and, the critically examined evaluations of validity (in both that being researched and in that process of research). That, in general, a well-maintained research project should be productive/re-productive of the required degree of value thought to be achieved in such a process. That, effectively, a well-conducted research project should elicit a richness of value in keeping with both the nature of that topic and goals intended to be achieved. (40)

4.   Negotiation of Complexity and Complexity of Negotiation: Conclusion

	The very nature of intentional production is complex. All negotiations-in-depth should naturally gravitate towards such complexity. However, complexity need not be too off-putting by virtue of the fact that we already have to-hand the makings of a pre-negotiated landscape to both start from and to move onward from in a process of relative resolution given that such opportunity must await us! (41)

	Imagine we are from some other planet in the nearby galaxy. How do go about interacting with our fellow citizens cum Earthlings? No doubt we need forms of translation that would link our culture with the cultures found on Earth. In essence, we would need to observe the presence of meta-textual genre conventions that accompany each and every endeavour entered into by the person in this Life-World, this shared World-of-Life. We would need to be very observant and impute the existence and nature of such conventions. Or, we might be informed about the same through some form of textual translation (as in books on etiquette, e.g.). In Sydney, generally, you put your rubbish bins out on the same one night of the week and bring them in on the morning of the next day. However, these days, such conventions are a bit more complex as we should also separate metals, plastics and paper and put them into different bins, etc. So far – so simple! Alas, in this day and age of the computer and Internet, we are obsessed with codes for practically allowing us to access almost anything. Forget these conventions and we may well be stuck! Trapped in the mere world of how things are currently to-hand and not much further! (42)

	We should also be cognizant of the fact that complex phenomena can act as chaotic phenomena (associated with self-organized/re-self-organized relationships and events) will also introduce an element of the unpredictable (a facet that establishes our fundamental humanity as expressed through our re-adaptive responses, etc.). (43)

	In this open-essay I have argued that any grand-narrative proposed by Modernity (and Neo-Modernity) is bound to fail! On the other hand, this does not project us into the realm of mere relativism. All engagements are productive of varying degrees of value, and, that such processes can be refined and made more productive though an adequate invocation of a re-centered transcendentally suspended re-positioning. In this, the general critique of Post-Modernity is valid, but, not valid if such criticism is improperly extended beyond its terms of reference through overlooking either a transcendental dimension or a phenomenological dimension in intentionally constituted simulation and imputation. In a viable critique of Post-Modernity we should find ourselves naturally moving on into a Contemporary sphere and era of textual production. Hopefully, such a transition will be a successful and productive one for us, and, that in this authenticity of transitioning we can prepare ourselves, fully, for its existential ramifications through the non-commission of a variety of avoidable sequential mistakes, and, the non-adoption of errors involving group-think, mis-understanding, confusion and/or the acceptance of an attitude of either relativism or absolutism (in all their controversial manifestations). (44)             Noel Tointon, Sydney, 26.12.08.
Some Reflections on Future Key-Points not Developed in this Text(?)

1.	An Answer to the Absolutist-Relativist Debate: Absolutism is deconstructed, etc., and relativism is bypassed through constructive narrative re-negotiation.

2.	Existential concept of re-positioning (between mere routinization of habit and irresponsible fickleness, etc; a movement of positioning that is responsibly-responsible).

3.	Exploration of the tension within and between the two key-concepts contained within complexity of the narrative predictability of complex narrative pre-negotiation and the potentially unpredictable nature of true ongoing negotiations themselves (in a bifurcation between passive reflection and active response, or, i.e., active-reflection).

4.	That the territory within an overall transcendental-suspension is the only domain for a relative-relativism (through ongoing balance of the suspension) (that an absolute-relativism, implying absolute change, is just as impossible as an absolute-absolutism with its inability to change whatsoever).

5.	A need to examine the claim (in para. no.4) as to how ongoing re-negotiation establishes the overall value of our… constituted vision of reality?

6.	How should we approach in practice a complex re-negotiation of an associated set of narratives?

7.	What else beside group-think, etc., leads us astray in our re-negotiations? Answer: excessive ontological commitments since an adequate re-positioning is necessary in an existential course of active-response and passive-responsibleness, and, similarly, excessive epistemological commitments along with excessive existential commitments (e.g., searching too much for an existential sense of love, openness, etc.). In effect, we must make an openly adaptive clear stand, be in good standing, accept the need to make a stand when and where necessary, etc? In essence… re-position, re-position, re-position..! On the other hand, and in contrast, a serious lack of commitment in any form is a current indication of a relativist position with no relevant sense and degree of committed positioning.

8.	Where are we heading in adopting and adapting this complex point of view? Is that mapped out for us? Does doing philosophy, being philosophical, having a philosophical-historical awareness… of help here? Does the ability to en-question (and its implicative en-answering) put us on the cutting edge here of a fully open sense of responsibility? Is it not the case that in moving beyond (the mere fact of) complex re-negotiations we are entering a more fleshed out vision of the existential dimension?
           (45)

          N, 27.12.08.