Philosophy of History (History of Philosophy): Part IX -
Doing History Through the Rectification of Error:
Conference Paper, Continental Philosophy Group, November 07*

0.   Introduction

How do we do history? What may or may not have happened might or might not have happened? How do we decide one way or the other when the past is no longer with us, has passed? What was the title of the last film you saw? To answer this question, I often have to stop to think. And the title of the film you saw before that one? Did you enjoy it? Once identified, I usually find that I answer that last question quickly enough. Could I reconstruct its narrative? Describe key scenes? If we witnessed a certain movie and later we have trouble accurately reconstructing its overall narrative what hope have we of reconstructing, in an historical narrative, the course of certain historical events that were not directly witnessed by ourselves…? (1)

	Doing history is a business, a whole industry, a mode-of-life (to use an expression after Gilles Deleuze). We could entabulate a set of rules for doing history, however, as a phenomenon ‘doing history’ is infinitely richer that the enunciation of a mere set of rules! We have historians, books on various historical themes, museums, archives, libraries, history conferences, particular days we commemorate certain historical events, etc., etc. Now none of these can be reduced to or merely derived from a set of rules. Still, history is done, and, I would like to promote the part-thesis that ‘doing history’ is realized through the ongoing rectification of historical error. (2)

	Recently, in working on this problematic nature of doing history and formulating a provisional philosophy of how history might be (better) conducted, I found myself proposing that this topic be understood under the headings of an Historical Analytics and an Historical Synthetics or Historical Aesthetics (with apologies to Immanuel Kant). In the former it would seem natural to divide our doing history into the gathering of facts, their interpretation, and, a criticism or critical evaluation of the former. I titled these three divisions a Factology, Hermeneutics and Stylistics. It seemed obvious that the collection and collation of facts is a different type of exercise to their interpretation, and, an appreciation of how we collect facts or interpret them is a stylistic question that examines ‘how’ we went about the same. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the manner of our fact-gathering expeditions must be linked to our interpretative schemes we employ in order to determine what we would ‘recognize’ as relevant to that particular enterprise, and v.v. Furthermore, how do we critically evaluate our hermeneutic ‘progress’ realized in a certain hermeneutic process if it were to be conducted on the same meta-level of that hermeneutic process itself. In other words, doing history, more correctly, is also an integrated affair, a mode-of-life, a way of being-in-the-world that has a unique life of its own along with its own distinctive, irreducible visions of value! (3)

	In this paper let me briefly look at error within these three analytical aspects of the factological, the hermeneutical and the stylistical. Then, let me examine the roles authenticity and inauthenticity play in the formation of error, and, finally how the integrated process of ‘doing history’ must forever remain a progressive and provisional process despite perceptions of success in our rectification of historical error…. (4)
*Latest version of paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
1.   Factological Errors

	 (In previous work) I noted that facts, in their overall totality, should be neither treated as absolutely wrong nor as absolutely right, and, can only be modified, in part, in our re-assessments of the same! Let me illustrate this simple point. If an historian proposed the ‘fact’ that “Hitler in the Second World War successfully invaded Britain,” I am sure, today, consensus would be that that historian was wrong. This assessment, generally, would be non-controversial. However, that accessible consensus might not be the case in 2,000 years from now. Today we all know that Hitler (in Operation Sea Lion) was never able to conduct, or seriously contemplate, an invasion of Britain. This so-called ‘fact’ (of Hitler’s invasion) otherwise, as presented above, is just wrong, and, therefore, is not a ‘fact’, i.e. a truly accepted fact! However, my argument is this, namely, that facts are never totally wrong/right and only become modified in their historical re-examination. Let me explain. In the above ‘fact’ it is true that there was a certain dictator called ‘Hitler’ who was also a major participant in this war called ‘The Second World War’, etc. However, historical consensus generally accepts ‘Hitler was not able to invade Britain.’ So, with that historian who asserted this wrong fact, my ability to successfully demonstrate to them, by whatever valid means, that this fact was, and is, wrong, would be a process wherein history is conducted through a rectification of error. I.e., through the modification of a factual-assembly and a modification of the truth-values therein assigned. (5)

 What is generally entailed here? The proposition of a certain fact, itself an implicit narration of a series of facts, i.e., to be as a factual-assembly. The demonstration, therein conducted, then showed through modification of this factual-assembly, if necessary, that our overall fact, as re-constituted, should then be re-considered as ‘true’ (albeit provisionally). Similarly, if we cannot show our factual-assembly to be false then, provisionally, we must also accept our current understanding of that overall factual-assembly as ‘true.’ So, on this level of our historical examination, with respect to our factual-assembly, the successful argument for the modification of its constitution and/or a determination of its truth-values re-establishes our historical ‘progress’ through this rectification of error (albeit non-absolutely, relatively or provisionally). Conversely, in the absence of this modification one can assume, albeit provisionally, that our current truth determinations stand, i.e., are and remain true. (6) 

	But, what if our narration of those facts in that factual-assembly were ‘wrong’? Or, rather, inappropriate, mis-guided, or, even deluded, etc? Our consideration of error or errors is now no longer merely factological in primary orientation. The manner of our historical investigations is now hermeneutical in complexion. How is history effected on this level of analysis? (7) 

	‘Facts’ are usually found to-hand, ready to wear, so to speak. We find them in cultural inventories (e.g., as books in libraries), as potted histories (e.g., as transmitted in schools), versions of history commemorated in certain festivals (e.g., Anzac Day), etc. Often, these assortments of facts, as factual-assemblies, are taken at face value. And, when critically treated, find their associated truth values subjected to forms of modification. Facts can also be linked to or de-linked from each other in accordance with our current interpretative frames of reference. Let me now look into this level of analysis wherein we attempt to discern relative errors of interpretation. (8)

2.   Hermeneutical Errors

	Let us say, for the sake of argument, our particular culture regards this historical figure of ‘Hitler’ as ‘a divine being’, or, as ‘a daemonic figure’; either perspective being ‘religious’ in orientation. Now, if a secular historian were to examine these so-called facts presented in either of these religious cultural frames of reference and disagreed with that perspective, or, thought that perspective inappropriate to utilize in a serious pursuit of ‘historical truth’, how might they re-conduct this process of assessment, or, rather, conduct this process of re-assessment? By re-examining the same ‘facts’ in that different perspective, a perspective now considered more appropriate to conducting a process of a secular-oriented historical evaluation. They might translate ‘Hitler as divine being’ to mean ‘Hitler was a person who facilitated acts of goodness’, or, ‘Hitler was daemonic person’ to mean ‘Hitler was a person who facilitated acts of evil’. Now, the evaluation of the appropriateness of these former and later hermeneutic frames of reference is not per se a hermeneutic process of evaluation. Rather, it is a meta-hermeneutic process wherein a hermeneutic process itself is under appreciative evaluation. So, in examining hermeneutic error, rather than stylistic questions of meta-hermeneutic error, let me first concentrate on the former. Just what sort of errors are hermeneutical errors? (9)

	Hermeneutic errors are meta-textual errors! A hermeneutic frame of reference tells us how to operate certain types of text/s in a certain distinctive manner or style. E.g., I’m going to write a letter. The form of a letter is a distinctive genre, a mode of activity. In writing a letter we adopt that meta-textual mode of activity and adapt that genre to the task to hand. All this is intentionally directed, and, all intentional behaviour is sequentially orchestrated. Errors, thus, are errors in sequencing; either on a textual level and/or a meta-textual level of intentional performance. As a consequence, errors have a predictable-like phenomenological nature. Let me illustrate this insight and show what predictable sorts of errors could be committed. (10)

	From experience, after a long nightshift and quite tired, what sorts of errors might I commit in the simple act of making a cup of tea? E.g., I might pour the hot water into the saucer having forgotten to put a cup there first, or, pour the hot water into the cup without putting a teabag into the same, or, I might put the tag into the cup instead and not the teabag and wonder why I find no tea in the cup when I jiggle the teabag and not the tag. All these errors just nominated are errors in sequencing within that genre of tea-making! They are either errors of mis-sequencing or errors of de-sequencing, i.e., errors wherein the sequential order is not properly complied with, or, mistakes are actually made within those acts of sequencing (whether mis-sequenced or not mis-sequenced). E.g., pouring hot water into the saucer or forgetting to put a teabag into the cup can be seen as errors of mis-sequencing (through their omission or their mis-sequenced commission). On the other hand, in contrast, jiggling the teabag as the tag/steeping the tag is an error of performance, a de-sequenced act to that extent its commission is incorrectly performed but correctly assigned in sequence. Now, what insights does this understanding of sequential error have for the historian? (11)

	As all forms of textual production are formed within genre-expectations, and read in the light of the expectations associated with that adoption and adaptation of genre, it follows that as those formations of text are sequenced that errors will arise as errors of sequencing in those processes of formation (that produce/re-produce those texts). In the same manner, thus, errors in our historical expositions and re-evaluations will be conducted with distinctive types of error associated with the sequences that constitute the formation and/or re-formation of those genres, i.e., in their (metaphorical) ‘writing’ and ‘reading’. (12)

Moreover, mistakes can also be committed in the wrongful or inadequate adoption and adaptation of relatively inappropriate genres (through their confusion). E.g., if I am making toast at the same time as I am making a cup of tea and I inadvertently put the teabag into the toaster I would be committing what I would call a contra-sequential mistake. I have mixed up my genres and thence commit an act that is contra the sequencing of the activity concerned. In this instance I have put the teabag into the toaster whereas I should have put it into the teacup or mug; by rights I should have put the toast into the toaster. Thankfully, most of the time, we get our genres and our sequences therein, operating as expected, without serious complications. (13)

	The serious point I would like to make here is this: that the assessment and re-assessment of truth values discerned in our historical investigations may or may not be definitively obtained, however, errors are definitive and predictable by nature once we have discerned the definitive nature involved in the sequencing of our genre-expectations! Demonstration and rectification of those errors, therefore, must establish a sense of progress in our historical investigations! (14)

	Let me illustrate this point in the following analogy. If I am writing a letter what general sorts of mistakes might I commit? E.g., I might forget to address a letter to a certain person intended to be the recipient of that letter, or, I might forget to write the contents in part or in whole within that letter, or, I might forget to sign it as my letter when I should have signed it. However, I cannot forget all three of these aspects involved in the writing a letter and still think of it as a ‘letter’. What could the Post Office do if I merely ‘posted’ an envelope with no address, no sender written on it and no letter within? I just would not be complying with the meta-textual rules that constitute the successful writing of a letter. In a similar fashion a defective history is still given a definitive form despite defective processes of sequentialization, etc.! (15)

	How do we evaluate the performance of an historically oriented text that, generally, is properly, appropriately and validly sequenced, i.e., is adequately formed? And what sorts of error might occur in this process of meta-hermeneutical or meta-meta-textual reflection? Just what value is there in treating the historical figure of ‘Hitler’ as ‘divine’ or ‘daemonic’, or, how do we assess the truth value of one version of history about ‘Hitler and the Second World War’, e.g? Consider the following: in Russia some political streams of thought have treated Stalin and his role in the Second World War as the saviour of his country and of the entire world. Then, again, in America, there are political streams of thought that have perceived the USA as the saviour of the world, the main actor in freeing the world from Hitler (and in freeing the free world from the clutches of communism). How might these competing historical claims be assessed and adequately evaluated? (16)

	Because these comparative forms of historical evaluation concern meta-hermeneutical levels of appreciation, therefore, in those hermeneutical terms of reference they cannot be appreciated! On the other hand, as meta-meta-textual processes of comparative evaluation, as evaluative acts of intentionally-directed comparison, it follows that errors on those levels of analysis must involve processes of meta-mis-sequencing, meta-de-sequencing and meta-contra-sequencing! Let me explore this definitive dimension of our historical investigations, albeit with errors in appreciative processes of truth value determination/re-determination. (17)

3.   Stylistic ‘Errors’

	No serious historian would want to treat Hitler as either ‘divine’ or ‘daemonic’. Such ascriptions, have no literal place in the performance of a serious historical examination and evaluation! But, just where do we draw the line? If we think Stalin was or was not the ‘saviour’ of his country is there any difference here from seeing Hitler as ‘divine’ or ‘daemonic’? Why should orthodox historical modes of historical exposition be given a relative preference over religious modes of exposition, or v.v? Or, why should economic reductions of historical analysis not be given a preferentialistic treatment in accordance with the dictates of a Marxist perspective? Or, giving up all forms of preferential treatment, should we just be relativists (or worse, absolute relativists)? Why not? How might this type of conundrum be diffused; allow us to perform various types of historical analyses, various types of reductionism, various type of (religious) synthesis, etc., at different times or at the same time, etc., etc?  (18)

	Here we need to investigate errors in evaluative appreciation. Just how do we appreciate a certain hermeneutical system and compare one system with another that might well be effectively incommensurable? (19)

	The adoption and adaptation of a certain pre-determined genre or set of genres realizes a hermeneutical system of appreciation. Every system of appreciation comes with its associated formation of value, a system of value. This value is a psychic residue realized through the integrated nature of that system and our not being able to reduce it to the mere value of its component functions. Our experience of all systems of value, therefore, is productive of this sense of an existential richness or an existential excess. This excess is experienced and judged in terms that are either essential and/or aesthetical and/or ethical (in a de-ontological sense) and/or pragmatical and/or hermeneutical (in a sense of perceived possibility) and/or factual (in terms of a perceived actuality). In a pragmatical light, e.g., one system of interpretation might be appreciated as having a greater sense of value or utility or usefulness or a greater degree of explanatory value (in line with or not in line with rules of evidence judged as applicable in those relevant types of situations). A determination of this sense of comparative value formation allows us to ‘perceive’ one system of interpretation as more value-forming, or as more valuable, than some other.  Hence this form of value formation is meta-hermeneutic in orientation. Thence errors in its formation, on demonstration, can also contribute to this perception of our making progress in our historical investigations, as well as letting us evaluate which systems have more value, and therein, a greater sense of (an explanatory) power! (20)
	How might or how should such a refined level of comparative evaluation be conducted? In this pursuit let me briefly examine questions of authenticity in this aspect of our topic dealing with the rectification of historical error. (21)

4.   Errors in Authenticity

	All forms of appreciation are forms of judgment! All forms of judgment, in my opinion as a transcendental-phenomenologist, have the same essential-like nature, namely, as transcendental acts of appreciation or judgment. Moreover, from this perspective, given enough information is already to hand to form a relatively valid judgment, I perceive all errors in appreciative judgment to primarily occur from improperly formed acts of transcendental suspension, i.e., inauthentic acts of appreciation! Let me elabourate. (22)

	A judgment answers a question. A question is one type of suspension, namely, a dis-conjunctive suspension, i.e., “is x this ‘or’ that?” On the other hand, an answer is primarily metaphorical. “x is ‘like’ this or is ‘like’ that” where ‘like’ logically is ‘both like and not like’, namely a conjunctive suspension. Giving both parties their proper due also involves the right balance between both of these senses of ‘dis-conjunctive suspensions and conjunctive suspensions’. That, as I have discussed in other papers, this in essence is an overall transcendental suspension (in and through the exercise an overall hermeneutic circle). Defective processes in the formation of this sense of an overall transcendental suspension realize defective processes of judgment. Briefly, in regard to historical judgment, what needs to be noted here? To answer this question, I would suggest the following: an adequate and proper pre-formation of factological content for judgment, an adequate and appropriate formation of interpretative systematization (through the adoption of a relevant approach to our investigations), and, an adequate and validly conducted process in the exercising of an overall transcendental suspension (that examines possible intentional consequences and related stylistic concerns). How is this complex process, in theory, to be conducted? (24)

	First, as noted, essential factological information relevant to our task needs to be gathered (from re-appropriated cultural inventories, etc.). ‘Non-essential information’ is that information that makes no difference either way to a particular act of judgment. Second, a relevant and appropriate interpretative scheme needs to be supplied. If we are doing history then let us do history in an historical format! Last, let us conduct the overall transcendental suspension involved in this overall process of (comparative) appreciation in a properly, appropriately and validly conducted manner. How is this to be performed? By invoking a proper balance between all factors involved in that act of judgment. And how is this to be done? Through running them in parallel with respect to themselves and in a balance among themselves (i.e., without over-concentrating on the factological at the expense of the hermeneutical, etc.). This is conducted by running all such factors in parallel within an overall balance of aspects therein focused upon. So ‘is this x or not x?’ is invoked in this dis-conjunctive sense. Similarly, all answers are treated as provisional, i.e., ‘as like x or like y’. Moreover, all forms of emphasis are balanced by processes of de-emphasis; thus we should not just concentrate on factological input at the expense of hermeneutical treatment or critical appreciation of the same, etc. Inauthenticity, therefore, is effectively permitted through inapposite forms of emphasis and/or de-emphasis (i.e., through their relative non-suspension) on all component functions within our acts of judgment. Now, given this authenticity of the balanced nature of the overall suspension, how might we escape from an implied sense of entrapment or paralysis within? By ‘suspending’ that very act of suspension itself!! Therein, and thereafter, in a non-symmetrical act of discharge, a process of resolution is realized that allows us to ‘escape’ what otherwise would have been an eternal impasse. Therein is realized a process of resolution, namely, a definitive act of judgment! Again, let us ask how errors might be committed within these transcendental terms of reference? (25)

	This transcendental dimension is defined in and through this sense of an overall transcendental suspension. Our investigations translated through this suspension create this sense of the transcendental. Furthermore, in my opinion, an openness to this dimension establishes a sense of the authentic. Conversely, an inauthentic non-openness establishes a sense of inauthenticity! Moreover, authenticity can be evaluatively measured by the ‘fruits’ (of the fruits) of our labour in this regard.  In this process, authenticity is a refinement of the authenticity already to-hand in this regard. Effectively a process of transcendental purification. A process wherein the non-transcendental is transcendentalized, and, through the suspension of the suspension the authentic re-establishes the relatively non-transcendental in a spirit of authenticity through an aptness of response, in a more full realization of responsibility! In all of this a greater degree of existential value is thereafter realized. In the process minimizing our obvious sense of error through a rectification of error. Openness to error establishes an ongoing overall rectification of the same! A process that delivers a sense or semblance of truth incrementally but never absolutely. But, for all that, a process that delivers a greater sense of historical conformity in the historically perceived reality of this history, of ‘our-story’, under investigation! Hence the possibility and actuality of the realization of our historical ambitions when conducted in and through the openness of the overall transcendental suspension, in this mode-of-life that establishes our historical sense of being in this World-of-Life with-others before-others. (26)

5.   Some Provisional Conclusions

Hence our transcendental access to the importance of a recognition and rectification of historical error in this pursuit of our finding an historical place in this lived-sense of the Life-World! A process that through the recognition and rectification of error can only be a provisional process. ‘Doing history’, therefore, can only be a ‘work in progress’. An eternal project of re-creation and re-constitution through a recognition and rectification of errors of commission and omission that implicate wrongly sequenced/re-sequenced intentional acts, i.e., acts of mis-sequencing, de-sequencing and/or contra-sequencing whether they be factological and/or hermeneutical and/or stylistical in orientation, whether conducted analytically and/or synthetically in our transcendental openness to this mode-of-life involved in this provisional process of ‘doing history’. Thence my part-thesis that ‘doing history’ is realized through a rectification of sequential errors!! (27) 
						               Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.8.07.