**12E-F-G. Background Notes for Producing a Series of Podcasts**
**Introducing *The Seventh Book*...**

# The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

## Volume III

## The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

## Beyond Criticism:

**How Should Philosophy**
**Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,**
**And,**
**Through Such Constructive Insight,**
**Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??**
**A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…**

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# 12E-F-G. Background Notes for Producing a Series of Podcasts Introducing *The Seventh Book...**[1]

## Foreword:

In these background notes, three podcasts are hypothetically envisaged as a way, first, of pre-introducing the economic method as a negative critique (as a form of pre-critical hermeneutic rectification); second, as introducing a positive critique (in the form of a critical process of phenomenological deconstruction); and, third, post-introducing ourselves to the world of the existential enrichment of our relationships (through an existential process of re(-)normalization). By such linear means, setting out to unlock a path to how we might start to understand the motivation behind the writing of this 'textbook' titled *The Seventh Book...*[2] (i)

## Structure Envisaged in the Organization of these Podcasts:

A. Suggested Questions that Could be Asked by a Moderator (in bold italics).
B. Suggested Responses in Reply (in ordinary text, certain points stressed in bold).
C. Sections Opened for Debate (preferably at the end of a presentation). (ii)

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* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

[1] These notes effectively, recognize an enacted difference between 'reading out aloud', 'silently reading to oneself', and 'the podcasting of a text more appropriate to the act of podcasting which, itself, could be either purely scripted, or in the form of a closed or open dialogue, or open some of the time or all of the time to some form of an ongoing group discussion.

[2] This 'textbook' can be found on my homepage site as cited above.

## 12E: First Podcast: Pre-Introduction to an 'Economic' Method (Commencing with Hermeneuetic Rectification[3])

**Q1:** ***Welcome to a first podcast in which Noël Tointon, the author of The Seventh Book…[4] is going to introduce this philosophical 'textbook' and discuss his use there of the 'economic method'. In a first podcast the negative power of this method will be introduced. In a second podcast the positive power of this same method will be explored. Finally, in a third podcast, the existential ramifications of a trans-economic repositioning will be approached. Can you tell us what this 'economic' method is?***

Thank you. In these three podcasts I hope, first, to pre-introduce this book by setting the stage for what is meant by 'adopting and adapting an economic method'. (0)

**But to begin, as a bold pronouncement, I am going to state, and argue, that a proverbial '95%' of the philosophical discipline, like all other disciplines I must add, borderlines on either the unsubstantiated or nonsense, where both misplaced 'contributions' are usually innocuous but, sometimes, may well be deleterious, and, that only '5%' is functioning effectively to some extent or other. Obviously, if this observation were to prove true, then we can do better, indeed, we have ample room for doing much, much better. Hence the primary intent, and import, of this 'textbook' titled *The Seventh Book*... is to reform both the constitution and functioning of our disciplines, especially the exercise of philosophical discourses.** (1)

But, back to this concept of an 'economic method', effectively, the *raison d'être* of this series of three podcast where I set out to demonstrate the philosophical (and disciplinary) value of this so-called 'economic method'. (2)

**The word 'economic' here simply means 'the creation or recognition of a field where we find a distinctive circulation of value** (where we can hermeneutically recognize, phenomenologically encounter, and existentially engage in the circulation of a distinctive form of e/valuational formation)'. Say, a conversation over a cup of coffee with a friend; or, the private reading of a book; or, the rules of the road in a specific country; a formal discipline such as the teaching of philosophy in a university or the practical performance of science in a laboratory, etc. This idea of the 'economic', as interpreted here, could be applied to a field of financial concerns (say, as found in a certain political-economy) but, is not to be construed as constrained by such financial considerations given that this set of ideas traverses the entire spectrum of human endeavour (given that all such activity is intentionally driven through various forms of intentional aspiration, etc.). In effect, such an approach argues that all such endeavour is enacted in a corresponding field in which the circulation of value is a reflection of that type of field being exercised.

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[3] In the dissemination of an eventual podcast everything in brackets is not to be mentioned (being quite rightly regarded as a 'technical distraction'), but, can be found in these accompanying notes as a clarification of such ideas (should the reader or podcast participant desire or need such further conceptual forms of refinement).

[4] The seventh book in the three-volume series titled: *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*.

So, e.g., a philosophical discussion is enacted in a philosophical field with a circulation of philosophical value (i.e., in a process of philosophical e/valuational formation). Or, similarly, an historical narrative is enacted in an historical field. (Furthermore, where we would view a 'philosophy of history' as a form of 'philosophy', and, that this would not be confused with a 'history of philosophy' which would be viewed as a form of 'history', etc.). (3)

For reasons that will soon be made clear, **all such fields are trimodally constructed. Must either overtly and/or covertly explicate, or implicate, at least three 'economic polarities', as 'economic correlativities', between which all significance in that field, therein, is both generated and circulated. That this should be viewed as a necessary pre-condition in the formation of any form of economic circulation.** That, effectively, this is the bare minimum requirement for any form of relational interaction. That this necessary trimodal requirement must be observed, either explicitly or implicitly. That by such means, between these three forms of relative polarization, we are then able to either recognize, encounter and/or engage that which is being generated and circulated in that current field of such focused concern. A state of affairs that is intentionally retained through the ongoing iteration of such intent, that, thereby, we may observe those phenomena being simulated through such reiteration. Indeed, only through the iteration of such intent, for the requisite period of time required, can such mental simulations come forward, through such promotion, to the awareness of our intentional consciousness. Such intentional imputations further co-finding forms of judgment through their trans-intentional appreciation. (4)

Simply put, without these three imputed 'poles' no intentional processes and their intentional content, along with their judgmental appreciation, could be envisaged as arising within the overall performance of our intentional consciousness. (5)

This also mean that such a 'hypothetical' pole, as well, both individually or collectively, can be neither reached nor appropriated, neither attained nor fully obtained in and of itself (in the semblance of a formula reminiscent of an impossible to envisage absolutistical philosophy).[5] Hence the negative power of this critique. (6)

**Q2:** ***Given the importance of 'the negative power of this critique' could you restate what is involved in the exercise of such a method***

**That, in any philosophical or disciplinary exposition without three such polarities forming the field under discussion in question there can be no such exposition. This immediately rules our all so-called 'unimodal' or 'bimodal' formulations. On the other hand, if any exposition is regarded as functioning, then three polarities**

[5] Because, to fully appropriate one pole, as a dialectical moment, would exempt ourselves from all the other poles or dialectical moments. Which, correctly, is here forbidden. That, because no one pole can be fully appropriated then all three, equally, cannot be appropriated. Moreover, in the suspension of all three poles or dialectical moments, through an act of dynamic balance, given the unstable nature of this balancing act we are also immediately de-suspended from the same (unless through an economy of ongoing re(-)iteration the overall suspension is left merely 'simulated', through such re(-)iterations, until such a time, inevitably, we soon move on to the next set of a newly functioning series of intentional simulations).

**must be present in at least an implicit format with the immediate consequence that such a philosophy cannot actually be either unimodal or bimodal in scope.** (7)

**Furthermore, because we cannot fully appropriate any one of these economic poles (as dialectical moments that are needed to co-constitute each other as economic correlativities), it follows that no absolute (absolutistical) philosophy can be countenanced nor, for that matter, could we live within the unstable suspension of such dialectical moments that, thereby and thereafter, must also render all forms of relativism as equally untenable! Hence the critical import entailed within the suitable application of this economic method!** (8)

E.g., without the implicit addition of God, Descartes so-called 'dualism' could not 'get off the ground' so to speak. (9)

E.g., a (naive) realism and its univocal focus on the apparent objectivity of things in the world, at the expense of both intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity, must also fail 'to fly'. Or, on the other hand, if such a short-sighted philosophy is thought to work it can only be because they are not actually subscribing to the univocal nature or bimodal nature of their articulated tenets. Either way, if truly amenable to reason, such misguided folks need to be remonstrated with by pointing out that, as prescribed, their philosophical approach cannot work, and, if it should seem to work, then they are not following the impossible prescription of their own dictates. Hence the negative power of this economic method. (10)

E.g., any philosophy conceived of as promoting impossible notions of 'pure being' or 'pure emptiness' must also be ruled as out of court on the double grounds of the untenability of an absolute (absolutistical) philosophy and the non-acceptance of an over-promoted unimodalism. (11)

E.g., the relativistic position that 'all points of view are equally tenable' should also be ruled out given our inability to live permanently within the process of the suspension where, inevitably, if not immediately, we will find an apparent resolution through dissolution. (12)

**Hence the power of this negative critique to rule out all forms of unimodlism, bimodalism, absolutism, and relativism. In effect, deconstructing all forms of either ideological over-commitment or ideological under-commitment![6]** (13)

**Q3:** ***But, if such misguided disciplinarians should insist on such impossible philosophies how should we view such intellectual intransigence?***

On the other hand, if not amenable to reason, let these folk self-relegate themselves to those nether regions where people falsely believe 'they can do what they say and can say what they do' when, in lived-reality, a vast river of unending nonsense

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6 'Relativism' being a form of under-commitment.

courses between such intent and their ensuing actions as enacted upon such a 'metaphorical' flood plain. (14)

**Q4:** ***Obviously, this declaration that each and every discipline is considerably riddled with either non-relevance or nonsense is going to annoy many disciplinarians. How, then, do you validly establish this controversial observation*****?**

By what authority can I claim that all disciplines, philosophy include, in proverbial terms, 'are incorporated with '95%' that is either non-relevant and/or nonsense, and, where only '5%' can function with some residual degree of effectiveness in that discipline in question?' Of course, I am being hyperbolical, and, not all disciplines are equally dysfunctional. (15)

Let me muster the following arguments under this set of headings, namely, the eternal rewriting and replacement of textbooks; interminable controversies and their rather unstable forms of somewhat imposed consensus; and, the application of economic methods along both negative and positive lines of critique, etc. (16)

In many disciplines, over time, their textbooks seem to ever-maintain a certain recognizable, over-proportioned size as voluminous tomes. To easily win this observation, of course with exceptions, which would you rather have dropped on your foot, if you had no choice in this matter other than to choose, say, between either a slim contemporary novel or a more hefty text-book? Assuming you are no masochist, the slim contemporary novel would be the most obvious answer as, more likely, no damage will ensue. (17)

I have noted this observation elsewhere,[7] that many nursing books written prior to the Second World War were just as massive as today's august editions. In one of these earlier editions, I noted pages and pages detailing a whole variety of baths as a therapeutic measure. E.g., hot baths, cold baths, hot and cold baths, sitz baths for various skin aliments, and so on. This could be perhaps forgiven given the then absence of antibiotics. If a patient was experiencing a fever giving them a cold bath would make some sense. Then, when a chilling rigor set in you would give them a hot bath. Or, alternate between 'hot' and 'cold' as the body temperature of the patient 'dictated' the need for such forms of bathing. Needless to say, you would only have one bath in place per *x* patients, that this room for bathing would not be in a dormitory, that very sick patients are not the best candidates for a rigorous routine of various prescribed bathings along with the fact that not all patients are equally ambulant, are able to get into and out of baths, etc. Showers, and showers with seating could be substituted, along with the use of extendable hoses in wet rooms, etc. Or, patients could be bathed in bed with hot flannels or icepacks, etc. At this point you are probably recognizing the relative untenability of the ideality of these various routines lovingly described in such excessive detail. Surely the rationale for a bathing regime could be written up on one page, not dozens of pages as noted in such an earnest, and somewhat over-zealous, textbook. I don't think I would like to be yanked off to a bath every few hours whilst in the midst of a fever although one could imagine the

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7 *Pursuit*, I.E.9-12.

temporary relief that might be experienced, hoping, of course, that the nurse delivered the right temperature that was appropriate at the moment in the coursing of your fever. (18)

Needless to say, all old-fashioned textbooks inevitably appear, in retrospect, to demand a bizarre set of rituals and routines, and, as well, being all too often excessively prolix in the advancement of their weird rules and regulations as if the worth of such textbooks were comparatively proportional to the number of pages entailed within these voluminous tomes. (19)

Now, over the course of such reflections, we also need to exercise the salutary thought that, today, all too often, we are not much better in the production and dissemination of such literary matters. Therefore, the question arises that as we ever see the interminable writing of such textbooks, with such seemingly disposable content, what does that say about so-called professionals in a certain discipline, indeed, in any discipline given that such institutionalized practices, like the proliferation of these types of texts, e.g., are practically everywhere? Moreover, what is 'in' or what is 'out' is all too often a matter of fashion. However, the persistence of seemingly 'unresolved' classic philosophical controversies also casts philosophy in a very poor light. (20)

Then, in every discipline, we find interminable controversies with fragile forms of compromise, or resolution, or, some might say temporary 'truces', and so on. Continually revisited, never satisfactorily resolved, or, merely eclipsed by a new set of controversies in the advent of a successful paradigm shift (which makes the same kind of point whilst also intimating the possibility of also having made some implicit form of 'progress' in such matters, albeit by merely changing the contextual parameters of what was 'problematic' in the first place?). (21)

Of course, the poster child for this all-pervasive observation is the discipline of Physics. A discipline that thinks it can only knowingly talk about 5% of the world at large; has no working idea of what so-called 'dark matter' and 'dark energy' are; is riven between a quantum world and the world of relativity that, to date, are totally disconnected; has trouble discerning and delineating the complex nature of singularities; and so on. On the other hand, to give it its proper due, this discipline of Physics has been very successful despite this much wider realm of itself as a topic with its very obvious theoretical disabilities. (22)

That the sphere of the philosophical is little different, and, arguably, much less productive in its engineering suitable forms of a mutual benefit for the diverse residents of a secular world. (23)

**Q5:** ***Why such a disconnect in the philosophical domain, and in the disciplinary world as a whole*****?**

As a simple answer, and whose misrepresented simplicity is recognized, I would contend that through more the ostensive absence of a properly constituted 'economic

method' we can, pragmatically, 'neither deconstruct the defective nor re(-)construct the effective'.[8] Let me elaborate. (24)

With this economic method, in theory, we should be able to negatively rule out all unimodal and bimodal formulations as impossible constructs that could be neither recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged as such. Then, as we cannot appropriate the economic purity of an absolutistically constructed world all such absolutistic constructions can also be ruled out along with the indefinite co-existence of a range of conflicting possibilities as could be entailed in co-entertaining some contrived instance of a pure form of an equally impossible relativism. (25)

Then, in taking a positive economic tack we could progressively re(-)construct[9] the relatively effective and further enrich its appreciation by means of positive economic tools[10] (like, e.g., economic complexification, economic simplification, transformational retreatment, an ordered analysis, a consequential analysis, etc.). But, let me deal with this positive side of the economic equation in the next podcast. (26)

**Q6:** ***You say that it is impossible to imagine that which is not economically constructed? Can you demonstrate this?***

Yes, to some extent, I can do this, E.g., I could propose the following challenge. Can we think non-economically, i.e., without this necessary presence of three polarities being prominently situated in the midst of the type of discourse in question either overtly or covertly? (27)

E.g., can we think of time without co-invoking a past, a present and a future; given that the very idea of the 'past' is 'both not present and not future', etc? (28)

Or, how do we describe a point in space without reference to three axes or their equivalent forms of expression? (29)

Or, in moving through a certain volume of space what other transformations are conceivable besides simple translation (moving forwards, backwards or sideways), reflection, or rotation, or, merely some complex combination of the former? (30)

Now, I would further argue that the necessity of this trimodal condition is present in all intentional field. E.g., say, if we were dealing with a field of (phenomenological) descriptions then either explicitly or implicitly we must also be dealing with, say, (hermeneutical) prescriptions (as to how such descriptions are conventionally operated through mets-textual rules) and (existential) proscriptions (dealing with how we should

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[8] Citing, negatively, the injunctions that are to be applied to the pragmatic philosopher or pragmatic disciplinarian. *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.11, etc.

[9] Note the nomenclature of '(-)' indicates an ongoing economic process is taking place (in this instance in an economy of construction, namely, in this instance, of 'reconstruction, construction, and reconstruction').

[10] That will be briefly looked at in the second podcast under the rubric of an *Introduction*.

deal with such forms of specificity[11]). E.g., this liquid being currently drunk is described as 'salty' implies exercising the genre that prescribes the 'imbibing of salty fluids' which, in this instance, is as would be entailed in the drinking of a relatively clear soup, which, also, simultaneously proscribes my falsely entertaining the (false) fact that, instead, 'I was actually drinking a sweet fruit juice'. (31)

But, why this trimodal condition or precondition in our experiencing of a certain intentional field? (32)

Because all intentional fields are only able to be constructed and experienced as fields of value formation arising and circulating between such economic polarities, acting as its necessary economic correlativities, as they distinctly constitute that same field in question. (33)

**Q7:** ***You also noted that the controversial nature of disciplines and the somewhat imposed nature of their forms of consensus as also indicative of the fact that disciplines possess an inordinate quantity of both non-relevant materials and nonsensical inputs that were either innocuous or, on occasions, could be deleterious to our well-being. Could you elaborate on this observation given, I am sure, that most disciplinarians would possess a rather high opinion of the worthiness of their own professions*****?**

We could contend that philosophers, on thematic grounds, are still arguing over the same controversies as heard in Athens and no doubt, elsewhere before the times of Plato and Aristotle. (34)

Now, it could be that either the logical form of a certain controversy has no reasonable resolution as it stands or with the lack of the correct application of a suitable economic method that we could wisely remove ourselves from the relatively unprofitable and direct ourselves, instead, both pragmatically and existentially, to a resolution of that which is within our powers that, in time, could be successfully resolved. By such means, positively recasting our notions of progress to the extent we could make progress by just addressing that which can be resolved, be that either in part or in whole. (35)

Unfortunately, from my perspective, the lack of a suitable economic method has considerably muddied the waters in this regard. (36)

'How many angels can dance on the head of a flat-topped pin?' is not something that, today, for most of us, is seen as that which could be settle by empirical means. If the answer were analytically defined as 'seven', then seven it is if you accepted the imposed validity of this answer. Of course, if it transpired that 'angels cannot dance' then the answer could not be 'seven'. Or, again, 'how many witches could ride the same broom?' would depend on the length and power of that broom to fly if in your world, you were to believe 'witches could fly on broomsticks and assumed the dimensions of a human form'. But, on the other hand, if you did not subscribe to such beliefs, such questions cannot be

[11] Including the entire gamut of ordered experiences from semantic distinctions, aesthetical states, deontological demands, pragmatical considerations, types of possibility to forms of factual conformation.

validly asked (other than in those metaphorical or mythical frames of reference). The logical form, then, for such questions is that there is no place in lived-reality for such impossible notions along with all controversies stemming from such unsubstantiated nonsense. Regrettably, a lack of clear and distinct philosophical thinking has meant all too many august disciplinarians are merely amusing themselves with the impossible and through such muddled thinking find themselves unable to differentiate 'the flesh and blood of this world' from 'the angel and witches' that simply populate only the metaphorical or mythical realms of childish make believe. How do we remedy this chronic defect that has so infected the disciplinary pretensions of the so-called 'civilized mind'? (37)

By differentiating the possible from the impossible, and, both pragmatically and existentially, 'deconstructing the defective and re(-)constructing the effective'.[12] (38)

Quite simply, this argument insists that we deal with a resolution of what is possible and leave the impossible to the side for those who know no better not to play with such endless nonsense. (38)

The fact that we are still bedeviled with interminable controversies obviously means that such forms of differentiation have either not been applied or have only been imperfectly applied. Thence the negative power of this economic method to remove us from at least those preoccupations that, correctly, would be wasteful and unworthy of both our time and energies. (39)

**Q8:** ***So, in your opinion as most philosophical research and dissemination, like all other disciplines, is basically a mix of either the irrelevant and/or the nonsensical, and if that were to be the case, then how could our professions function in such a manner that appears to make sense, and, hopefully, and optimistically too, I might add, actually enrich our passage through this secular world, this world at large given this all-pervasive handicap? Furthermore, in what ways could such misguided thinking also be 'deleterious' as you previously noted?***

It has been reported to me that in episodic redundancies conducted in a certain workplace that the workers are always surprised in this process of downsizing as to who is made redundant and who remains. That, all too often, it is the people who are seemingly already 'redundant' that remain and that some of their best workers are retired without rhyme or reason. The point I am making is that all institutions basically muddle along and it is only the work, more often than not, of a few individuals that actually ensures that that the 'business' of that institution is actually performed with some degree of professionalism. Dare I say it is a bit like bread making where only a small amount of yeast actually does the hard work of making a well-leavened loaf. (40)

Of course, that is an analogy. However, when we closely look at the textual production, say, of professional philosophers through an economic lens all too often I be-

[12] Citing the positive injunctions that are to be applied to the pragmatic philosopher or pragmatic disciplinarian, hopefully, expedited in a beneficial existential manner for all parties concerned in the primary relationships in question. *Pursuit,* III.VII.I.11, etc.

lieve that they cannot do what they say they are doing, and, cannot say what they might actually be doing. Run a ruler over such reams of verbiage and if they profess to be unimodal realists, empiricists, idealist, rationalists, materialists, and so on, or, bimodal corelationalists, dualists, and so forth, then we already know they cannot do what they say they are doing. On the other hand, if what they say and do does seem to make some small degree of sense it will also follow that they cannot be doing what they said they were doing. Period! (41)

Of course, most of these acts of professional labour are relatively harmless, merely ways and means, on the whole, for keeping people busy in the 'appearance of being industrious' but proffering little profit other than the purchasing of a pecuniary interest in an economic surplus, real or imagined, through some form of an entitlement that cultures inevitably divest in the hierarchical stratification of both elites and non-elites, that, too, I might add, are ever subject to the shifting fashions and power dynamics of the so-called 'marketplace'. (42)

Ok, perhaps this picture has been painted with too many dark colours? But this view of society 'muddling along' does remind me of the one occasion, in the course of my nursing, where I had to supervise an intellectually disabled workshop where electrical plugs were being assembled. The less able assembled the plugs and there was a fifty-fifty chance that they would correctly assemble those electrical fittings. The most able person there inspected these just assembled plugs and determined which were properly connected and those that were improperly assembled. The latter were then given to another 'assembly line' where they duly dis-assembled those defectively connected plugs. Eventually, all those plugs would be correctly connected and were then ready to be shipped on. Now, you may chuckle at hearing this, but, on reflection, are we any better? (43)

**Q9:** ***In what sense, then, can this 'muddling along' also be deleterious*****?**

All too often we are blinkered by the rigidity of a 'mental set', a 'certain fixed way of how to approach a certain topic'. The institutionalization of our 'authorities' is such that even in the face of these approaches being deemed to be defective, or less effective than some other approach, still, through the sheer inertia of a habit, people are conventionally instructed, even commanded to persevere despite the individual or individuals concerned knowing that there must a better way of tackling such tasks. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, e.g., we see on a daily basis this insanity of soldiers, especially Russians, being repetitively asked to do a form of battle manoeuvring that just has no chance of ever succeeding and where what progress is made is mere meters of territory occupied for thousands of lives lost. I cannot think of a better example of such institutionalized madness where more than 200,000 Russian troops have being rendered either as fatalities or severely wounded casualties along with the dead and injured on the Ukrainian side, albeit their fatalities and casualties have been inferred to be a much smaller proportion of the former. (44)

**Q10:** ***To end this first podcast can you give us a brief idea of what is entailed in a positive reading of this economic method, and, sum up for us the import of this negative reading*****?**

The central idea to this positive reading is that all intentional thinking can be modeled along similar gestalt lines to the extent that all intentional states, from individual thoughts to disciplines themselves, all possess a similar set of structural-function that can comparatively comment on each other in a profitable manner (as in the concept of 'economic complexification') and that through suspensions a process of de-suspension expresses some degree of resolution that can considerably simplify our understanding of the existential specificity of that which we might be dealing with (as per this concept of 'economic simplification'). Moreover, as just noted, entire disciplines possess a similarity in structural-functions that then allows us to explore, within reasonable bounds, forms of mutual commensuration that, otherwise, would not be available hence this further concept of 'philosophical complexification' or 'disciplinary complexification'. That, in essence, we have to hand a number of economic tools that can be used to profitably and mutually engineer more beneficial and existentially oriented patterns of intervention[13] as we make our passage through this world, both individually and collectively… (40)

As an invaluable negative rule, the suitable application of this economic method should rule out all impossible unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical, and relativistical approaches, and, with that which is possible to resolve, then set about to work in such manner so as to 'deconstruct the defective and re(-)construct the relatively effective (as the relatively less defective)…' (41)

Many thank for hosting this first podcast. It is my hope that your curiosity has been piqued and the beckoning charms and challenges of this economic approach will be thoroughly debated and not automatically dismissed merely through some form of miscomprehension. As ever, I seek neither your assent nor your approval for these ideas, but, I do welcome your understanding with the expectation that such ideas might then be better informed with your criticism. For, surely, what can stand the test of time will remain and what does not deserve to stay should be allowed to fall by the wayside,[14] or, perhaps, be simply filed and forgotten in that forlorn and hard to find library for no longer fashionable textbooks..!![15] (42)

(Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 28.3.23)

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[13] Arguing, elsewhere, that processes of intervention are inescapable, and, therefore, it behooves us to exercise those processes of interaction in an existential manner that is the most beneficial for all parties concerned, at least being expedited to the best of our abilities.

[14] Not an environmentally sound metaphor. I should also add that textbooks are also often written retrospectively to explain what is now no longer commonly understood conventions. E.g., various music textbooks looked backwards in time in their attempts to explain what was once the ruling conventions that then did not need to be stated. Or, similarly when the conventions of a painting from an earlier era need to be interpreted for us in order to help us to better understand how that same artwork might once have been seen and read.

[15] Effectively, entering into a process of error mitigation as we weed out those genres that are defective and focus on those genres that are less defective in order to better delineate the ensuing course of our arbitrated aspirations. I.e., by entering relational suspensions and observing patterns of pre-critical rectification, i.e., hermeneutic rectification.

## 12F: Second Podcast: Positive Introduction to an 'Economic' Method (Continuing with Phenomenological Deconstruction[16])

**Q1:** ***Welcome back to this second podcast in which Noël Tointon, the author of The Seventh Book…[17] is going to introduce this philosophical 'textbook' and discuss his use there of the 'economic method'. In a first podcast the negative power of this method was introduced. In a second podcast the positive power of this same method will be now explored. Finally, in a third podcast, the existential and potentially radical ramifications of a trans-economic approach will be outlined.***

Thanking you very much for this opportunity to discuss my ideas in this medium of the podcast. Today, we are going to look at the positive power of this economic method (as a way of critically approaching phenomenological deconstruction[18]). As intimated in the previous podcast I stated, more or less, that stamped on all forms of intentional experience was a very basic psychological sense and semblance of the gestalt. In this podcast let me explain (the economic ramifications of this observation). (0)

From gestalt psychology I have taken some very basic propositions. For a start that we cannot focus on something without the requisite experiential existence of a co-associated background field in which to operate, and v.v. I.e., without this semblance of focus, equally, we would be unaware of that co-associated background field, and v.v. That over time, through experience, this field is progressively enriched, exponentially, with inputs associated with that field. Indeed, the experiential richness to be found in that being focused upon cannot be greater, or even approach, the accumulative richness of that field as it has been enriched over time from such experiential inputs. (1)

Now, given this dialectical-like relationship between focus and field it also stands to reason that to purely focus on the point of focus is to observe nothing since the point of focus acquires its sense of significance from the nature of that background field, and v.v. Similarly, to merely background our awareness in a form completely coincidence with that background field, itself, is to also absent ourselves from experiencing any form of significance given that only through this relationship between focus and field can either orientation give a semblance of meaning to this relationship (and to each other as participants in this relationship). (2)

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[16] In the dissemination of an eventual podcast everything in brackets is not to be mentioned (being quite rightly regarded as a 'technical distraction'), but, can be found in these accompanying notes as a clarification of such ideas (should the reader or podcast participant desire or need such further conceptual forms of refinement).

[17] The seventh book in the three-volume series titled: *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*.

[18] 'Deconstruction' here entails 'the removal of the defective propositions (already started in a process of error mitigation) through processes of error correction as exercised through critical, conventional techniques considerably assisted by an array of economic tools'. Deconstruction' here can also entail a 'progressive de-hierarchicalization of cultural forms of undue or unnecessary preference, i.e., either present privilege, past prioritization, and/or future promotion (but also supplying forms of preference that are duly deserved)'.

To be also noted is the fact that in all intentional experience an accompanying sense of an intentional (or transcendental) subjectivity is also present, indeed, must also be present for how otherwise are we, as an intentional subject, going to appreciate the nature of this relationship being exercised between focus and field. In effect, giving an outline of this gestalt economy as that which is simulated between these correlativities of 'field', 'focus', and the 'framing' of this co-related sense of subjectivity (in keeping with the nature of that co-associated semblance of a field). Now, I would argue that this third aspect in the intentional economy is what 'frames' the nature of that experience. So, e.g., an intentional sense of 'I', (or 'Ego') 'sees' that which is being focused upon (as an intentional object or 'Object') by 'framing' our intent along those lines within the co-associated sense of a field (or 'World') (as that being currently focused upon). That, in essence, all three orientations must be in a process of interaction for that pattern of intent to be duly expedited. I say 'orientations' because none of these three aspects can be entertained completely and purely in their own right. Similarly, no two parties can be merely entertained as all three orientations must be co-opted together in order to exercise and differentiate the economy co-associated with the intentional nature of those series of focused upon interactions. (3)

A harmonic reading of this process can also be made by noting the consonant nature of the field (as a field conforming to one type of intentional preoccupation), and how the introduction of the sense of a focus also introduces an element of difference or dissonance, and, how the harmonic-like resolution of this relationship is experienced at the level of its subjective framing. Where this semblance of resolution also adds a sense of simplification (through the economic simplification that devolves from the automatic invocation of the de-suspension in the exercising of the requisite suspensions required in the 'interrogation' of that type of experience). Hence this linear conception of a harmonic progression consisting of:

Consonance (Focus) plus Dissonance (Field) finding Resolution (Framing)…[19] (4)

**Q2:** ***That economic portrayal granted, how does this economic perspective on a necessary circulation of value assist the philosopher or disciplinarian*****?**

In the overt or covert absence of such a perspective we can immediately rule out such an approach as just not economic, as just not possible.as that which just cannot be conceived! Hence the negative and critical power of this method. On the other hand, this approach can also positively supply a number of techniques to keep us from straying too far into the far less productive world of alternative realities. In other words, assist us to maintain our alignment through ongoing re(-)alignment with the world of lived-experience. (5)

To achieve this process of ongoing re(-)alignment we first need to practice forms of error mitigation by refining our use of those genres of behaviour regarded as appropriate to the tasks to hand. In effect, this is achieved through a use of this negative economic

[19] In music being referred to, e.g., as 'preparation, dissonance, and resolution'.

approach plus the adoption and adaptation of those approaches that in the past were observed to work for us. (6)

Then we enter a period of error correction (as a process of phenomenological deconstruction) where we again rule out those aspects that are seen to be logically defective and concentrate our efforts on those tasks deemed to be less defective and more effective. In essence, exercising a pragmatic approach that also attempts to remain 'open' to an existential reading of the situation to hand (that I would argue arises through a process of ongoing existential re(-)normalization which will be discussed in the final podcast). (7)

**Q3:** ***How then does this economic method positively assist this pragmatic approach*****?**

Let me sketch out some of the techniques that can be applied. For a start, if a certain approach is seen to work then we must assume that it is economically constituted, i.e., in trimodal terms of reference, and, therefore, we should be able to delineate just what polarities are being invoked between that which we are to simulate in the effective functioning of that subjected to such envisaged outcomes (as co-associated intentional objectives). So, e.g., if seek to phenomenologically 'describe' a certain type of phenomenon then I must also invoke certain co-associated hermeneutically oriented 'prescriptions' of behaviour that would facilitate the observation of those acts of description. Then, furthermore, I should also existentially anticipate the specificity of those focused upon experiences that would be quite correctly delineated under a list of 'proscriptions'. Say, over the course of this trite example, in my having a cup of coffee, let me put into propositions and statements the following. I can describe the smell and taste and temperature of that now tasted coffee. I am doing so within a certain set of prescribed forms of behaviour, namely, drinking from a cup, making sure I do not burn myself, drinking that coffee before it gets too cold, one small mouthful at a time, etc. Moreover, I anticipate, in the immediacy of that type of occurrence, the uniqueness of that experience, and in the light of previous experiences of this type I may well be able to form a judgment as to the quality of that experience that I can attach to this act of drinking that specific cup of coffee. By 'proscription' we note the rules that inform us what is not meant to happen – e.g., don't drink your hot coffee too soon, don't leave your coffee to get too cold, that we do not drink coffee as if it were soup, and so on. (8)

If in an aspirational economy, say, we have this desire to drink a cup of coffee we cannot do that in either a mono-dimensional realism, or, equally, in a mono-dimensional idealism, and so forth. Staring at a 'cup' and hoping it will 'become a cup of coffee' is not a successful strategy. Instead, this aspiration necessitates adhering to the preconditions and conditions that would enable us to meet this intentional objective. Indeed, we need to be one-part realistic, i.e., realistically realize we know where we are *vis-à-vis* the realization of this ambition, and, one-part be able to idealize the possibilities of obtaining this objective of getting a cup of coffee, and, one-part pragmatically work out how this objective can be practically realized in the here and now. Hence this necessity for this economic confluence of the 'where, why and how'. With the successful coming together of these three ingredients, we successfully obtain this desired 'cup of coffee'. (9)

**Q4:** ***Obviously, this approach as you have just outlined is very hands on, so to speak, but in a specific situation how do we discern these economic polarities*****? As you have stated, they must be there, but, how do we discern and approach such features****?**

We need to be pragmatic. Observe the essential nature of your current aspirations and discern in that form of focus just what polarities seem to stand out. By focusing on just one prominent facet, it would then follow that we should be able to perceive what is economically contrasting that particular feature. Just as, e.g., in focusing on (phenomenological) descriptions we would then look for (hermeneutical) 'prescriptions' and (non-systematic existential) 'proscriptions'. Or, if we were historians dealing with a certain aspect of the past it would automatically follow that we are also co-defining the present and future *vis-à-vis* the specific way we have focused on what is to count as 'past'. This is not too complicated. Then, in seizing on certain set of contrasting features we can be pragmatic. If the selection chosen does not seem to work, then try something else, and so on… (10)

**Q5:** ***How do we know we are focusing on these economic features and not something, say, more superficial or not economic*****?**

It is all economic, 'all the way up and all the way down'. But, when we focus on an 'economic polarity' we are focusing on an 'economic correlativity', i.e., an aspect that could be defined or economically 'located' in' apposition to the joint negation of the other two economic polarities'. So, e.g., the economic polarity of the 'past' could be mutually 'co-defined' as 'both not the way we see the present and not the way we would view the future', etc. As simple as that! (11)

Moreover, it should be recognized that although 'vertically' we seem to be placed above the gestalt nature of the very epistemological basis of the economic itself, horizontally, any particular economy is also enriched, at the same time, by a plethora of overlapping economies. Interestingly, I also argue that this overlap is possible by virtue of this gestalt-like structure along with its functions as already found present, and, that different economies, when relevant, can mutually 'both comment and commentate' upon each other in a manner that reinforces our economic understanding of what is currently being interacted with through such 'complementary comments' and 'supplementary commentary'. I.e., 'adding to an enrichment of our already arrived at insights (through a process of reiterated 'redirection')' and 'fostering an expansion of that same understanding in new and perhaps novel directions (through chaotic-like processes of 're-direction')'. (12)

E.g., in an interrogative economy, as invoked through the mere asking of a question, we find a confluence of rhetorical features, metaphorical features, and apparitional or existential features as we entertain a simulated literalization of the outcome of our rhetorically asking that question. 'Is that John over there?' We might answer: 'That person looks like John' as positive metaphorical-like reply. Then we see this person waving at us and we realize that this person, indeed, is 'John', i.e., it is as if this person is John, as if this person is John, as if this person is John, and so on. Under all circumstances we are not permitted to subscribe to the absolute assurance, or surety, of our judgments, still, in

engaging the irreducible nature of individuals, etc., as to be found in the world, on most, or many, occasions we can make a very safe bet that our current reading of a certain situation is basically correct, be that in part or in whole. So, we could imagine in the previous scenario that as we get closer to this person 'John' we could have mistaken them and that they, in turn, mistook us for somebody they know given our staring at them so intently; or, yes, this person we do know, but, that their actual name is 'Jack', and so on. Where these types of qualification at least bring home the point that 'understanding is a process' and that the termination of such a process, on some occasions, might need to be revisited, etc. (13)

**Q6:** ***This all sounds very technical, so do you have ways and means for simplifying these types of economic reflections*****? Then, at the end of such forms of economic scrutiny, what is to be gained through such hard labour?**

In many ways we are merely coming to a better understanding of what we already know, at least intuitively. We can also work in reverse and consult parallel dictionaries where we find on a horizontal axis various types of economies we come into contact with and the economic parties to be found in that particular type of economy, and, vertically, how the economic polarities in these economies can be found to co-align; and, where through such parallel forms of alignment automatically proffer such comments and commentaries as previously noted, albeit in a manner that may or may not be relevant in the explorations currently being undertaken. Let me demonstrate the use of this hypothetical dictionary, this semantic co-mapping of economic features that are to be found precisely entailed in particular economies. (14)

In the hermeneutic circle, e.g., we have 'parts' and 'wholes', and, to render this circle 'economic' we can also envisage a third moment of an emergent 'whole/s-and-parts'. Under 'parts' we note the coinciding invocation of 'analysis' or 'reduction'. Vertically we would see 'analysis' as 'retrospective' in a temporal economy, i.e., as an economic action that is 'past oriented', and so on. Already, we have to hand, a veritable juxtaposition or coincidence of various economic features that will further enrich our overall process of appreciation accordingly. Moreover, by relatively conforming to such criteria we will also be better aligning ourselves with the economic nature of those phenomena in question. Indeed, if we were to run both this trimodal hermeneutic circle in juxtaposition with the trimodally understood interrogative economy we would map the following forms of economic convergence:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Hermeneutic Circle:** | Whole | Parts | Whole/s-and-Parts |
| **Interrogative Economy:** | Rhetoric | Metaphor | Simulation/s[20] (15) |

[20] 'Apparitional moment' as the 'literal-like simulation of that which answers the rhetorical enquestioning should that answer be able to take some form of a literal simulation (or a non-literal simulation, say, in the use of abstract considerations, or the confirmation/verification, or the conformation, of a certain fact as presented within a certain narrative, etc.)'. The 'apparitional moment' being economically coincident, e.g., with the 'non-systematic existential moment' according to my vision of this economic scheme and its applied forms of economic complexification.

That the semblance of a ‘whole’ is represented ‘rhetorically’, the parts are presented ‘metaphorically’, and, the ensuing ‘resolution’ of the same is the ensuing significance of that act of reading where the re-presented significance of ‘whole/s-and-parts’, through emergent resolution, cannot be reduced merely to either those ‘whole/s’ and/or ‘parts’. (16)

Moreover, the perceptive person would also note that these parallel sequences, as just cited, are also harmonic progressions. So, e.g., the consonance of the ‘whole’ in meeting the introduction of a dissonant element as a ‘part’ would then, hopefully, proceed to some form of resolution as the significance of our ‘reading’ is realized through the economic emergence of this feature of ‘wholes-and-parts’ that, as I have stated, cannot be reduced merely to either this ‘whole’ and/or its ‘parts’. Indeed, this process of resolution mirrors a process of economic resolution wherein, as I would argue, the overall suspension in question is automatically de-suspended in a process of resolution, realized either in full or partial success, that usually somewhat simplifies the course of our progressively realized understanding. Hence my referring to this experience of resolution as a process of ‘economic simplification’. Yes, it does sound quite complicated, but, in lived-reality, this economic approach is quite elegant, if not more efficient, but, that this form of appreciation would need to be experienced by yourselves should you wish to venture further in the ‘economics’ of this philosophical direction. (17)

**Such an approach, I should also add, is very pragmatic and, when we take our relationships into account, in a pro-relational reading of the apparent situatedness in question, this will also provoke an existential reading of the same.** But, let me deal with this latter aspect in the third podcast. (18)

**Q7:** ***You mentioned in passing[21] that economic complexification can be extended to performing a type of philosophical complexification, or disciplinary complexification, as a way comparatively rendering different philosophies, or disciplines, in a more commensurable manner, as a method for conducting interdisciplinary forms of research. Could you outline what that might entail*****?**

Some years ago, I realized that each discipline has a different philosophical take on how to view the secular world given that between non-disciplinary secularists and the disciplinarians in question there would be ‘disciplinary difference’ between how they would view their vision of the overall life-world, this world at large. That granted, it would then be natural to ask what value this difference is imputed to have by those disciplinarians, and, by extension, just how does this difference relate to the both secular and the non-secular, etc. That given all disciplines ‘decide’ to structure the world they wish to see, through an ‘enshrining’ of that sense of difference from those who are just secularists, it follows that we could compare two or more systems by noting such differences and similarities in the manner of their structuralization, etc. Then we could invoke transformation rules in order to understand just how far apart or how close such systems of thinking may or may not be, etc. By such means entering into processes of interdiscipli-

[21] First podcast paragraph 40.

nary commensuration that may or may not be profitable in terms of the research where such concerns are being entertained. (19)

**Q8:** ***To sum up, how would you commend, and recommend, the use of this positive economic approach*****?**

Like the two rails of a railway track the negative and positive aspects of this economic method both keeps us from straying in unprofitable directions and can somewhat propel us in the direction or directions intended where we find a sense of representative conformity with the set of phenomena in question, but, not with the imputed substantial reality of the phenomenal situation *per se* given that this is done only through a harmonization of relevant report(ing)s in a process of alignment enacted through an economy of ongoing re(-)alignment. Let me explain, however, rather than using technical language (as I did on a first version of this discussion), I thought it more appropriate to just give the following three analogies as illustrative, respectively, of error mitigation, error correction, and relative alignment through re(-)alignment with the relatively non-erroneous (in the narrated form of an integration of relevant reports[22]). (20)

'Error mitigation', effectively, 'oversees both the relevance and refinement in our use of meta-textual genres of behaviour'. 'Meta-textual' as 'informing how texts should function'. E.g., very recently, on trying to put my shirt on in the darkness of the early morning I found I had one sleave that was 'inside out', to then realize I was actually putting my shirt on back to front. So, I had to take my arm out of the incorrectly entered sleave, and start again. As simple as that.[23] (21)

In 'error correction' we find the 'emendation of texts'. E.g., many years ago, before the digital era, I wanted to know the time in order to set my bedside alarm clock and in listening to the radio had the misfortune of having to hear a so-called 'shock jock' in the hope of them mentioning the time. On and on he went, in a rant about Kiwis (Aotearoa[n] New Zealanders) 'taking over Bondi', 'being lazy', and then a few minutes later, he also said, 'they also steal all the jobs of Australians'. Wow, would love to know how they could sleep in every morning or roll up to the beach and still get paid for all of that. Of course, this announcer was contradicting himself at almost every turn… and, so, it fell upon the critical listener to deconstruct such contradictory propositions, or, better, get their information from a respectable source. Of course, this very broad concept of 'deconstruction' covers a wide range of methods for the 'double deconstruction and ongoing re(-)construction of texts'. (22)

In 're(-)alignment with the relatively non-erroneous' we attempt to integrate a collection of reports that through metal extrapolation we paint a picture of the apparent reality to hand without actually subscribing to such imputations as other than non-textual

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[22] I am using the expression 'reportings' as 'propositions whose positive conformal truth determination then renders them as provisional statements, i.e., as reports'. This use was first explored in *Pursuit*, III.7Y.

[23] As an illustration also of my twin concept of 'insurance and assurance'. That we can always return to a stage in our behavioural sequences, and then start again. Hence rectification. That this can also apply to error correction as a process within context of deconstruction.

simulations'. E.g., from a selective harvesting of official statistics we could paint a more healthy picture of the current economy in Australia, but, in lived-reality another picture could be painted, namely, where inflation is more keenly suffered by those people inhabiting lower socio-economic demographics along with the fact that the relative purchasing power of wages has now relatively declined along with the statistical observation, e.g., that the cost of accommodation must now consume a larger proportion of such remuneration for the same units of labour expended. Which perspective better 'paints' a more accurate representation of the lived-situatedness of the Australian employee is depended upon the double understanding that each perspective needs to be suitably represented and that an infinite plurality of perspectives could be constructed and where each perspective cannot posses the same degree of topical relevance, and, where collectively, apposite frames of reference need to be deftly melded together in the context of an appropriate narrative properly constructed (in accordance with all relevant 'economic' means, etc.), etc. So, you may safely infer that such alignment through re(-)alignment with the relatively non-erroneous is very much a work in progress where the intensity and successfulness of our labour needs to find and also continue to find an adequate degree of compensation… (23)

So, when I mention rectification through error mitigation; deconstruction through error correction; and, alignment through re(-)normalization you will already have the beginnings of a working understanding of what I am up to in this regard. (24)

Working with these ideas we can also say that alignment within an economy of ongoing re(-)alignment also entails finding forms of alignment between representations, without the hyphen, a correction of mis-aligned forms of misrepresentation, and re-presentations, with a hyphen, where the latter are observed as chaotically re-directed and could potentially be experienced as relatively 'radical' in complexion, i.e., as innovative, provoking new and novel ways of seeing how things can economically cohere together, inducing us to experience what once would have been 'impossible thoughts', and so on. Introducing us, ironically, to so called 'final vocabularies', 'definitive histories', 'the definitive work of a disciplinarian', etc.[24] (25)

Let me demonstrate the sophisticated simplicity of these ideas. E.g., let me use something as mundane as the eating of an apple. I take the last apple from the fruit bowl. I get my trusty fruit knife, as used on so many occasions before, and find without much ado I am doing something that has been done many times before. Here I am merely reiterating a routine as performed on many occasions. However, I was under the impression that this apple was ripe and perfectly ready to eat. I now understand why it was the last apple left in the fruit bowl. On one side there is the beginnings of a worrisome patch of a dark discoloring. So, I have to disabuse myself of the notion that this apple was perfectly formed and ready to eat. However, this is not going to stop me. With my knife I cut out the malformed part of the apple and once I have peeled the rest of the apple and cut it into

[24] 'Final vocabularies' as discussed by Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Social Solidairy*. 'Definitive histories' or the 'definitive work of the disciplinarian' is an expression used by myself. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.VII.footnote 337; *Pursuit*, III.7Z.80/footnote 43.

chunk-size pieces I am pleasantly surprised to find that this apple is thoroughly delicious and continue on in my enjoyment found in my eating this wonderful piece of fruit. (26)

In this economy of alignment, as realized through a process of re(-)alignment, I merely reperformed (without a hyphen) as a conventional pattern of behaviour with this fruit knife; in discovering the bad patch on this apple I merely performed an excision; and, in re-performing (with a hyphen) the tasting of this apple was pleasantly surprised to find it was actually quite a mouth-watering experience…[25] (27)

**Q9:** ***You mentioned that you had a range of other economic tools with which to further this process of representatively simulating an alignment as realized through an ongoing process of re(-)alignment. Would you like to discuss some of these additional techniques*****?**

Of course, I would welcome this opportunity, but, am certain we would have to cancel the advent of our next meal if I were to get started on this topic. In passing, let me note that we have suspensions, and de-suspensions to consider;[26] certain ideas dealing with a philosophy of transformational retreatment;[27] a need to take into account forms of ordered analysis;[28] trans-ordered analysis;[29] consequential analysis; an existential interventionalism; economic induction of an extensive suspension;[30] technical processes of hermeneutically oriented rectification, phenomenological deconstruction, and a non-systematic existential re(-)normalization, the trans-economic and trans-relational appreciation of a systematic sense and semblance of the existential, besides having already mentioned economic correlativities, complexification, simplification, etc. All these technical methods are to be found in the pages of the Seventh Book… and are further discussed in essays in the six books that procced that 'textbook' (which are all contained in the three volumes of *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline* which are all linked on my homepage as cited at the start of these *Background Notes*). (28)

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25 This linear progression is also hermeneutically moving through recognition from the 'general' to the 'particular(ity of type)' through its phenomenological encountering, and thence to the relatively non-systematic existential 'specificity of the actual taste as realized in the eating of that apple.

26 Under the rubric of an 'extensive suspension' where we integrate an overall transcendental suspension modelled on the interrogative economy and it three differently contained forms of suspension, then the role played by the de-suspension, and, finally, alignments entered into with a causal interface connecting the relatively virtual with the relatively non-virtual.

27 Looking at an economic integration of pre-critical, critical and post-critical phases in a process of 'treatment' along with the role played by the de-suspension in the functioning of the post-critical, etc.

28 As a hexamodal form of treatment of the intentional (functions and content) and the trans-intentional (as six distinctive modes of judgment) realized through a distinctive pattern of economic preferential/de-preferential treatment of certain economic correlativities through respectively, processes of de-suspensions/suspensions.

29 Through forms of ordered reduplication where the six trans-cognitive/trans-intentional orders can then account for disciplines like metaphysics; psychology, etc., theology and existentially oriented forms of ethical discernment; the political-economy; science; and, history.

30 In an exploration of how suspensions can be intuitively induced through concentrating on a certain economic correlativity that can then through such economic correlation induce, either advertently and/or inadvertently, the totality of an extensive suspension

**Q10: To conclude this second podcast would you like to indicate what you intend to discuss in the next podcast?**

In Part III, I would like to introduce the idea of what I call 'the systematic existential', an expression I use to contrast a relatively non-systematic sense and semblance of the existential. That in realizing a process of alignment through ongoing re(-)alignment we move from an economy of the non-systematic existential to a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential, as it appears to existentially pervade those intervening patterns of behaviour in which we are more respectful of our relationships. Where, through a trans-relational approach we can more fully come to an understanding of just what is implied in a trans-economic understanding, amongst other things, of what is entailed in a fully functioning concept of freedom, where, as both individuals and communities, we can actually invoke and exercise an attitude *contra* a range of misguided concepts that constitute ruling paradigms, e.g., as found all too prevalent in major discourses, the neo-liberal marketplace and beyond, and so on… (29)

To explicate this 'post-introduction' to this trans-economic, trans-relational sense of world I intend to adopt and adapt, through by own brand of criticism, a non-standard, non-philosophical sense of positioning courtesy of the French philosopher François Laruelle. For myself, this is a very exciting phase in my philosophical development as I have found in the work of this philosopher a foil for developing my ideas on just what is involved in experiencing an existential orientation as originally developed, say, by the Jewish theologian Martin Buber, and others. So, hopefully, you will want to go on this journey, together, with all the twists and turns, with all the bends and bumps that will be experienced along this relatively untraveled road as yet still to be charted… (30)

Again, thanking you very much for this opportunity in being able to make this second podcast which, on this occasion, I would like to add, is actually demonstrating, more or less, a process of phenomenological deconstruction as noted in the subtitle of this exposition, i.e., by critically removing ourselves from defective patterns of thinking and behaviour in order to let us pragmatically concentrate our efforts on the less defective in the hope of rendering it as more effective, and, thereby, as a way of better assisting us in finding forms of alignment through ongoing re(-)alignment that we might be of better service to others through our work as an example of either a professional or amateur disciplinarian able 'to do some of the things they say they actually can do..!!' (31)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 29.3.23.

## 12G: Third Podcast: A Post-Introduction to an 'Economic' Method (Concluding with Existential Re(-)Normalization[31])

**Q1:** ***Welcome back to this third podcast in which Noël Tointon, the author of The Seventh Book…[32] is going to further introduce this philosophical 'textbook' and discuss his use there of the 'economic method'. In a first podcast the negative power of this method was introduced. In a second podcast the positive power of this same method was explored. Now, in a third podcast, the existential ramifications of a non-standard, trans-economic positioning will be approached using ideas refracted through a selective appropriation and critique of the work of François Laurelle.***

Thanking you for this opportunity. This third podcast will be preoccupied with the idea of the 'existential' in what I term to be its more 'systematic' sense. This expression merely contrasts it from its less systematic use where I team up this expression of the 'non-systematic existential' in a 'philosophical economy' comprising 'one-part hermeneutics, one-part-phenomenology, and 'one-part as the relatively non-systematic existential'. That to explore this systematic orientation of the existential I will be appropriating (some could well argue 'misappropriating') some of the key ideas of the French philosopher François Laruelle. To my mind upon his 'non-philosophical landscape', in his 'non-standard philosophy', I find myself in a better position to discuss and explore the trans-economic or trans-relational nature of this 'existential dimension', in it systematic sense, and, at the same time, its economic, or relational, deconstruction back into this more standard world of the philosophical despite my previously alluded misgivings about how all forms of disciplinary performance are more inclined to just 'muddle along'… That despite this subversion of the trans-relational, as the relatively trans-economic, by the relational and economic nature of this world at large, that between these cracks, these ruptures, and raptures, through such an experiential cleavage between the systematic existential and the non-systematic existential, with the latter inclusive as well of the relatively non-existential, we can still glimpse a profound philosophy of freedom expedited through what I will discuss as this 'promise' or 'gift' of an 'ongoing re(-)arbitration of experience and its continual reiteration of an inescapable experience of choice...' (0)

Why this division of labour (between the 'systematic' and the 'non-systematic')? In my reading of Martin Buber, e.g., it seems to me that there is a distinctive type of experience that can be deemed to be 'existential' and that this distinctive form of experience can be used by both religionists and secularists alike in their construction of a certain disciplinary outlook whilst still reflecting those different attitudes. (1)

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[31] In the dissemination of an eventual podcast everything in brackets is not to be mentioned (being quite rightly regarded as a 'technical distraction'), but, can be found in these accompanying notes as a clarification of such ideas (should the reader or podcast participant desire or need such further conceptual forms of refinement).

[32] The seventh book in the three-volume series titled: *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*.

But, as Buber, himself, points out the existentially addressed 'I-Thou' (or 'I-You') only arises through an 'existentialization of the I-It'. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential. (2)

Or, as I would put this, there is a relationship between 'the economy of the relatively systematic existential' *versus* 'the economy of the relatively non-systematic existential' with the latter also being inclusive of that deemed to be 'relatively non-existential in orientation'. (3)

Now, as the philosophical economy can be rebadged, in the light of current preferences as either a 'phenomenological economy' or as a 'hermeneutic economy' or as a 'non-systematic existential economy' it follows that to better appreciate the economy of the systematic existential we would need to invest in a 'trans-economic philosophy' or a 'meta-economic philosophy', or, indeed, in a 'non-economic philosophy' or. i.e., in a 'non-philosophy'. Hence my interest in the work of Laruelle and his attempts to delineate the parameters of a 'non-philosophy', a sense of positioning he later refers to as a 'non-standard philosophy'. (4)

As noted, my use of the word 'existential' has had to perform two tasks, namely, act as the third economic moment in the 'philosophical economy' which is conceived of by myself as 'one-part hermeneutics, one-part phenomenology, and one-part non-systematic existentialism', and, how the former (moment of the relatively non-systematic existential) acts in a relatively non-systematic existential economy where it can then come to the fore in a systematic existential economy[33] in order to account for this distinctive, all-pervasive difference between a systematic existential orientation and a relatively non-existential orientation. (5)

Quite simply, I arguing that the sense and semblance of the systematic existential is that distinctive type of experience that has a pronounced existential complexion, i.e., the paradoxical intimation of the ahistorical, the eternal moment, a transcendence of distance or geography, and so on, whilst also re-presenting itself with the concrete specificity to be found in the historical uniqueness of lived-experience. Where such an experience seems to be intensely vivid, relationally encompassing, proffers a sense of resolution, a psychic sense of at-onement and atonement, and so on, and so forth. I.e., as comprising a set of distinctive 'existential hallmarks' that stamp a specific experience in the currency of the moment, in the here and now (*hic et nunc*) with this semblance of the systematic existential (that, when reported in a text, could be delineated as 'existential indicators', and, when expressed in certain forms of future-oriented aspirations, could then be read as 'existential predictors'). (6)

**Q2:** ***From what you have just said about the systematic existential*** **versus** ***the non-systematic existential (and the relatively non-existential) it would seem that you are not invoking some form of an absolute (or, i.e., absolutistical) philosophy*****?**

[33] Through requisite processes of suspension, etc., along with all suitable pre-conditions such as e.g., being well-informed, being simulated and approached appropriately, properly, and appositely, etc.

Yes, that is very much the case, indeed, this experience of the systematic existential has nothing to do with so-called ‘systems’, ‘systematic ways of organizing a philosophy or ideology’, etc. Perhaps trying to be systematic in ‘method’ but not ‘ultimately’. (7)

That the stage is now set to selectively introduce some key ideas of François Laruelle. (8)

Admittedly, this is not an easy task since we have to re-position ourselves as if ‘before’ the advent of the philosophical (and the disciplined in any form whatsoever). Laruelle argues that every philosophy, or philosophy itself (and I would add along with the institution of all disciplines) has entered into the making of a momentous Philosophical Decision (Disciplinary Decision) upon which the rest of that philosophy (and the totality of all disciplines too) is helplessly cast and through which Authorities can then stamp their universally oriented will upon Individuals. Indeed, Laruelle argues that all irreducible Individuals are ‘ordinary’ until Authorities mark such Individuals out through various forms of approbation or non-approbation, in the process imposing various classifications, regulations, forms of constraint, forms of status, and so on. (9)

In the ‘background’, perhaps better nominated as ‘Background’, with a capital ‘B’, we have the One, somewhat reminiscent of the influence of a Neo-Platonic-like concept. Supposedly, we could argue that the world at large exists, an assumption that cannot be denied on par with intentional subjectivity (as per Descartes, e.g.). Then, that taken as granted, this pre-philosophical idea of the One acts, more or less, as a basis for a world of ordinary Individuals whose non-ordinariness will be dictated by Authorities, which we could read as ‘communities; relationships like families, e.g; organizations; institutions; nations; etc.’ That, only in the enactment of that Decision, in effect, how the world will be divided up in that philosophical ideology, can such Authorities then find the power to mark out these Individuals in accordance with their endless dictates. (10)

Laruelle argues that this Decision, as made by Philosophy (be that in an individual instance or in general) is something that is overlooked by most philosophers and all authoritarian institutions, but, which, to my mind, is actually something the philosopher is all too well-aware of. But, be that as it may or may not be the case, Authorities are now authorized to impose upon Individuals an endless succession of restraints, universally expressed limitations, and so on. Let me illustrate this in the following example. (11)

In the world of passports, as once dictated by past authorities, say, in Australia, a choice of gender consisted of only the two options ‘Male’ or ‘Female’. For most people this is non-problematic. However, for some people, a decision made in this regard is or has become problematic since the sex assigned at birth, rightly or wrongly, for whatever reasons now, may no longer be the one being adopted by the person concerned. In the UK, according to the 2021 Census, 0.5% of people do not identify with the sex they were assigned at birth. In more progressive countries authorities have now added the classification of ‘Other’. However, even this trimodal classification is complicated by the fact that a number of people may well prefer to self-identify themselves as ‘non-binary’ without definitively seeking a reclassification of their gender status on a more formal or legal

basis. Then, through a use of both phenomenological descriptions and self-descriptions we have various phenomena representing, e.g., the trans-gendered, or those aspiring after some degree of trans-gendering; the asexual; those people with various sexual aplasias and chromosomal anomalies, etc., who may or may not have been correctly assigned at birth; those who wish to identify informally as non-binary, and so on… (12)

Now the point of this current discussion is that seen through the lens of a non-philosophy we might surmise that Authorities have insisted in the past on a binary division and classification of the population on matters of gender without exceptions, but, that the imposition of this classification has now been amended through what might be termed this 'passport reform' that now recognizes this third category of 'Other'. (13)

What is the 'moral' or, better, what are the 'morals' to be derived from this current discussion? (14)

For a start Authorities do dictate a plurality of binary-like terms of engagement on Individuals (Communities, and so on). However, Individuals, as both irreducible and potentially irrepressible subjects, need not necessarily find themselves happily conforming to the classifications of such dictates. In the midst of this example, it is now necessary to commence a critique of Laruelle whilst considerably admiring and accepting much of his non-standard approach, albeit as qualified by myself along the following lines. (15)

Far from being 'ordinary', Individuals are 'extraordinary' in the uniqueness of their inherent dispositions even if such classifications will be cognitively arrived through an acceptance or rejection of universal standards as dictated by Authorities. (16)

By 'pre-marking' Individuals as 'non-ordinary', upon the following reflections, we could delineate three senses that could be deemed to be 'authentic' in orientation. First, an individual, in an awareness of their distinctive irreducibility, could discover and accept the nature of their non-ordinariness despite the one-size fits all imposition of such dictates imposed by Authorities. Second, the Individual, in their potential irrepressibility, could actively express their self-classifications contrary to the dictates of Authorities by seeking this form of an alignment between a 'covert non-expression of their non-ordinariness' and a considerable 'overt expression of that same non-ordinariness'. Third, in a spirit of mutual respectfulness towards these covert and overt expressions of non-ordinariness, Individual could enter into existentially oriented relationships with other Individuals in a celebration of such 'inclusive-diversity'/'diverse-inclusivity'. (17)

**Q3:** ***It would seem that this non-standard 'ontology' of 'One, Individuals, and Authorities' is being somewhat broken down*****?** ***Would I be correct in this reassessment*****?**

'Yes', and a highly qualified 'no'. I believe we can still entertain a non-philosophical stance in a trans-economic, trans-relational orientation, that this idea of the Decision holds, but, the logical priority of Individuals 'before' Authorities needs to be overhauled whilst still holding that Individuals possess a certain relative degree of actual irreducibility and potential irrepressibility. Moreover, that a mechanism for such irreduc-

ibility, etc., needs to be accounted for whilst also recognizing that Authorities, too, can be treated as if they exist as certain types of Individual, in their own right, albeit with a different or differing range of phenomenologies. Furthermore, as demonstrated by this discussion just had, it is possible for not only Individuals but also Authorities to undergo processes of reform, or progressive self-authentication, preferably, conducted with an existential, pro-relational tenor. Let me elaborate upon these points just noted. (18)

A great insight of Laruelle is that Individuals should be regarded as basically 'irreducible', etc., and not as mere economic participants or ciphers endlessly subjected to just economic forms of rearrangement. As a mechanism for this expression of an actual irreducibility and potential irrepressibility I would like to propose the non-reductive nature of 'economic emergence'. Similarly, this same mechanism can be extended to the apparent 'individuality' of Authorities themselves. In other words, individual-like identity emerges non-reductively from the economic matrix of our relationships, but, should also be reviewed through a trans-relational, trans-economic perspective wherein this imputed experience of the systematic existential can also be immediately entertained in existentially oriented experience. A distinctive type of experience that 'emerges' from the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, albeit through the auspices of the relatively non-systematic existential economy. Where the emergent advent of the systematic existential informs a systematic existential economy in its own right through exercising hermeneutical-like genres of behaviour such as e.g., compassion, love, empathy, sympathy, concern and care, etc., along with patterns of behaviour in full alignment with such existentially oriented aspirations… where, no doubt, this sense and semblance of the trans-relational and trans-economic 'living-experience' is also immediately and duly economized through the being brought back into the economics of lived-experience. (19)

**Q4:** ***If, as you have suggested, we are interminably bound by the dictates of such economics, besides the dictates of Authorities, along with other Individuals, in this vision of this world at large what freedom could this extraordinary human possess and possibly exercise, if at all*****?**

A very good question. The overall concept of the 'existential' is intimately bound by allied concepts of freedom. (20)

In the bulk of this 'textbook' I defined 'individual freedom' as that 'exercised through arbitration (with others)', i.e., in a compressed format, 'freedom through arbitration alone'. But, in the last two sections, or modules, as contained in *A First Digest*, I amended this to read 'freedom through (ongoing) re(-)arbitration alone'. Now, the nomenclature of a bracketed hyphen indicates an 'ongoing economy', in this case, of arbitration', i.e., 're(-)arbitration'. Let me explain. (21)

At one point Richard Rorty proposed two incommensurable, dichotomous-like realms of the 'private sphere' and the 'public sphere'. Now, obviously, such realms cannot be completely incommensurable given that we can communicate with others, and so on. So, in grappling with this impasse, I resolved this conundrum by arguing that such incommensurabilities were relative and not absolute (or absolutistical). Moreover, in pro-

posing an economy between these relatively incommensurable realms, which is an insightful observation to have been made by Rorty, I also proposed the mediation of a third sphere, namely, the overlooked 'domain of arbitration' where all (pragmatical) contracts and (deontological) compacts are formulated, exercised, and where forms of compliance could also be exercised, etc. (22)

Inevitably, here, I would bring out my anecdote of being able to buy a coffee for $3.50, or, now with inflation, perhaps somewhere closer to $5. This aspiration can be so easily realized by just going to a coffee shop and ordering a coffee, and then paying for the same. This 'getting a coffee' is not something we can just decide to do purely through our own efforts. For a start, coffee plants take between 5 and 8 years to produce beans, etc. In effect, so much financial planning has transpired over the years, so much labour has intervened, with a cast of thousands, that the $5 cost of a cup of coffee seems relatively cheap for what has been invested in the bringing that simple economic unit to the market. Now, if this simple decision of buying a cup of coffee is something that I, as an individual, cannot achieve, and, that this applies to most of the people on this planet Earth, and that this understanding practically applies to everything we do, then it follows that what economic freedom we do have is only arrived at through the auspices of others tirelessly working within this sphere of the arbitrated. I.e., that we only find a freedom through others, and v.v! (23)

**Q5:** ***Or should we perceive such freedom as only 'apparent' and not 'real' given our total dependence upon others, and v.v*****?**

No. If we were to treat it also as an emergent phenomenon then we could argue that freedom arises from economic behaviour, but, cannot be reduced to the same. That in effect, this difference or differential is the freedom we 'suffer' or 'enjoy' because of this irreducible process of emergence. However, we might wonder how an element of choice could also enter into this equation given that freedom without choice could not be a real freedom if there is no freedom to choose. I.e., that we are eternally bound by what freedoms are given to us, but, could not be claimed by us through the requisitely required form and degree of choice. (24)

**Q6:** ***Is your adoption (and adaption) of a non-standard philosophy able to resolve this dilemma*****? If the economy of the systematic existential emerges from the economy of the non-systematic existential, and, then, is immediately re-absorbed back into the world of economic activity could we propose a moment, an existential moment, when we are free so to speak*****?**

Yes, and not only in a single moment, but, through a series of moments! (25)

Just as the relatively non-systematic existential arises from the relatively non-existential through a process of existentialization then we might conjecture that the relatively systematic existential can arise from the relatively non-systematic existential, say, through a process of super-existentialization? Or, more simply, just through a process of existentialization if we see this type of process as basically 'more of the same'. (26)

**Q7:** ***What would more of the same actually entail*****?** ***Indeed, just how is this type of orientation entered into*****?**

Laruelle, it would seem, is reluctant to invoke suspensions, at least in the classic Husserlian sense. But, in resurrecting a certain form of 'indifference' to the decisive nature of the Decision, a psychic sense of returning to a non-philosophical stance, appears to mirror, to my mind, my vision of the 'extensive suspension' where the economic complexity of our representative thinking, etc., is held in abeyance or 'superposition'[34] (through paradoxical-like forms of contra-positioning of intentional content and counter-positioning of intentional functions, etc.[35]) to then be automatically resolved, and simplified, in the form of a de-suspension… all of which would seem to suggest the possible gestation of the systematic existential as outlined by myself. That, in essence, freedom of choice is arrived at through the continual re-iteration of the 'suspension' in whatever way this practice of the suspension is to be conceived and exercised? (27)

**Q8:** ***So, if 'freedom', as a 'freedom of choice', is to be exercised through the iteration of this 'economy of re(-)arbitration', just how does this choice manifest itself, and, how are such suspensions to be arrived at by ourselves as mere mortals*****?**

Through this inherent ability to re-iterate suspensions, this continual economy of a re(-)arbitration of our aspirations through others, and v.v., is to be mutually exercised. As intimated, it is almost as if we are bound, become momentarily unbound, and then re-bound economically, but, through this crack, this fissure, this crevasse between the relatively non-systematic existential and the relatively systematic existential we find also this freedom of choice wherein we can both choose and be chosen, decide to choose again, and so on… (28)

As for the exercise of the suspension, I would argue that our intentional lives are witness to this phenomenon of the suspension happening within and between each and every moment of our intentional lives. On a more intentional level of performance, it is how we change the drift of our current thinking, in interrogating a certain proposition, in exercising a metaphor, in perceiving a simulation of the literal in an apparitional mode as if it were real, as if it were real, as if it were real… unless, for whatever reason, we were to change our mind by calling such once obvious-obviousness now into question, and so on, and so forth. Indeed, a decisive and resolute sense of a unilateral re-direction of our intentional thinking is to be experienced through the de-suspension in keeping with an alignment with the causal arrow of time… for how else could we find our motivation moving us through this world at large?(29)

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34 Anthony Paul Smith; Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, Polity Press, 2016, p. 163-4.

35 To this I would also add a suspension of the trans-relational/trans-economic (when and where we are not longer at the mercy of the economic *per se* and no longer confront the extrapolation of all entities be they the One, Individual/s, and Authorities. However, to enter into this august level anti-representational mindfulness means we also have to suspend all forms of representation, presentation, and re-presentation where the joke is on us for even thinking they could be made to disappear and be replaced by some transcendent or immanent equivalent, etc.).

**Q9:** ***Therefore, you are arguing that because we can exercise all manner of suspensions, moment by moment, that, therein and thereby, we are granted this semblance of freedom. Is this correct*****?**

Yes, suspensions are the key, but, at the same time because our lives are lived one suspension at a time, moment by moment, this should not be something that is problematic. Moreover, as noted, de-suspensions, moment by moment, introduce us to a resolute sense of a unilateral re-directedness in apposition to the economic nature of circulation (as per Laruelle?) despite the immediate economic re-appropriation of such re-directed e/valuational formation. (30)

Of course, we then have to explain how do ensure this progression from the relatively non-existential to the relatively non-systematic existential, and, thence, to the relatively systematic existential can occur, be occasioned? (31)

None other than through a process of 'identification', albeit suspended, in which we shift our identification from our own embodied senses of self to coincide, representatively, with the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of our relationships in their situatedness and, from there, as to how all our relationships might or would find their coincidence in the transcendental unity of the overall life-world, or perhaps, with this sense and semblance of the One as articulated by Laruelle? But, I would like to quickly add that despite the theological-like overtones of such a proposition, the 'spiritual' nature of this pronouncement need be not be the sole province of either the religionist or the secularists. Furthermore, in taking a more humble sense of positioning, or non-positioning, we should also recognize that the hypothetical individuality of the One, Individuals, and Authorities, in each instance, is not only irreducible and irrepressible, but also inexpressible or ineluctable, indeed, as very much a *je ne sais quoi*… (32)

**Q10:** ***Thanking you for sharing this very complex vision of what is entailed in this concept of freedom. To conclude, how might you sum up this exposition to date*****?**

Thanking you very much for this opportunity that has allowed me to explore and share these thought that I confess are continually being re-worked. But that is life, very much a near-endless, repetitive parade of introductions, to be followed by yet more introductions… (33)

In some measure, more metaphorically meant than intended literally, it is as if we experience this freedom as if it were a 'promise' and a 'gift'… that should be both honoured and then re-gifted! That, furthermore, we are and can be irrepressibly free, and, that this fact of our nature should be suitably expressed, i.e., in a manner that is appropriate, proper and apposite to the unique nature of our current relational situatedness both passively with(-)others and actively before(-)others, and, that we can both 'suffer' and 'enjoy' this existential experience of freedom as that which is to be engaged vicariously through(-)others given that this fact of our being is ever-emmeshed in a continually recurring economy of re(-)arbitration.[36] (34)

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[36] Indirectly alluding to the eternal return of Nietzsche as voiced in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

**That this degree and form of freedom we appear to be able to both choose and experience such choice, to both witness in others and to be instigated by ourselves, is none other than that to be experienced through such re(-)arbitration alone. But, as paradoxical as it might seem, in and of ourselves alone, that we have no real semblance of freedom whatsoever..!!**[37] (35)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 30.3.23.

## Postscript A: Rectification, Deconstruction, and Re(-)Normalization

Covertly, these three podcasts were also conceived of as demonstrating, respectively, hermeneutic rectification, phenomenal-phenomenological[38] deconstruction, and non-systematic/systematic existential re(-)normalization. Let me explain. (36)

In technical language this 'economy of correction' was initially introduced in the second podcast in 'paragraph 21', as below, and alluded to elsewhere (e.g., in the subtitles). However, for obvious reasons, I thought this exposition would work better by merely introducing three analogies in order to illustrate error mitigation, etc:

> In envisaging an 'economy of alignment', arrived at through 'iterative processes of re(-)alignment', we could propose that this entails '(hermeneutically oriented) realignment, without a hyphen, in which we find, through error mitigation, a representative refinement and approbation, i.e., 'approval' in the use of the genres being adopted (and adapted within the exigences of those circumstances); then, through error correction we could find through (phenomenologically oriented deconstruction) processes of re-de-mis-alignment, conducted as an emendation of that critically presented presentation, that through such incremental orchestration of either additional inputs or subtractive outputs that this might then induce a movement towards a relatively radical process of innovative re-alignment, with the hyphen, in which we then find ourselves re-directed, with the hyphen, in a manner that finds ourselves more in alignment with our various report(ing)s (as found to be more relevant in our ongoing appreciation of that relational situation in question…)' That, as was stated, 'understanding is a process'[39] whose termination may or may not arrive at some semblance of the definitively understood (and whose apparent hallmark might then be regarded as somewhat 'non-calculative' in comparison… unless further called into question). '[21]' (37)

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[37] In interpreting this conundrum, we must take a middle path and perceive ourselves as neither impossibly beholden to a pure sense of self-agency nor impossibly beholden to a pure sense of other-agency.

[38] This expression 'phenomenal-phenomenological' is designed to alert the reader to the fact that even though the intentional (transcendental) subject constitutes their own phenomenological experience, still, such a matter is not just solely dictated by the intentional subject themselves. That in meeting the irreducible, somewhat incommensurable nature of both Individuals and Authorities we must accept the fact that they too must participate in this process of intentional constitution. Hence this acceptance of this co-authorship in this performance of intentional experience.

[39] This podcast, paragraph 13.

This economy, according to the nature of our current concerns, could also be referred to as either a ‘pre-critical economy of rectification’ or a ‘critical economy of deconstruction’ or a ‘post-critical economy of re(-)normalization’. The descriptions of ‘pre-critical’, etc., would alert the more knowledgeable reader that I am also mapping out an ‘economy of transformational retreatment’. (38)

The complexity attaching itself to this economy of correction or imputation, truth determination, etc., is very much a product of economic complexification where various insightful methods, held in parallel, are being collectively applied, However, despite that, the basic ideas underlying this economy are very easy to understand once understood with the additional implication that not too much mental effort need be applied. So, with this self-imposed ‘challenge’ let me attempt to prove myself not wrong on that score. (39)

Hypothetically, once a topic is proposed we would then note what relevant materials are already to hand. This phase begins in a pre-critical orientation, but, then, adopts and adapts suspensions of intentional functions, i.e., genres of behaviour in a hermeneutical orientation. Through a process of error mitigation relevant, meta-textual genres are chosen and refined in regard to the apparent tasks to hand (as preparatory for processes of critical deconstruction). In essence, we seek appropriate genres that would get either our own and/or some other person or persons’ approbation, i.e., approval. (40)

Hence the analogy of eating the apple and my using of a fruit knife as my way of resolving this task decided upon in this topic, namely, my eating an apple.[40] Hence taking up of a set of genres through mere conventional repetition, i.e., in effect, entertaining a process of mere realignment through such reiteration… and by such means commencing a narrative appropriate to the nature of that topic. (41)

In a critical process of deconstruction, we now take a phenomenal-phenomenological tack and enter into processes of error correction, i.e., re-de-mis-alignment. I.e., removing the defective, reconstructing the relatively effective as the relatively less defective. On one hand, removing or defusing contradictions, etc., and, on the other hand, strengthening our arguments, clarifying our facts, using those tools that critically clarify the presented form of this topic. This broad concept of ‘deconstruction’ does not rule out, but, also includes all relevant postmodern techniques such as, e.g., a de-hierarchicalization of binary forms of unequally imposed forms of preference, etc. I have chosen this appellation of ‘deconstruction’ in light of the relatively analytical or reductive nature of this overall approach as a form of ‘analysis (in contrast to the relatively synthetic nature of the prior pre-critical phase which, in technical language, I would deem to be more of an ‘investigation’ given its more generally oriented use of terminology, concepts, techniques, etc.). At this stage, suspensions are more focused on as a suspension of intentional content along phenomenological lines of treatment. (42)

In the last phase (paralleling transformational retreatment/posttreatment) we move towards processes of resolution wherein through such ‘examinations’ we are, now, more

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[40] Podcast II.23. (i.e., *Pursuit*, III.12F.23).

concerned with the concrete, historical specificity of our explorations. This aspect of our research involves, through such closer scrutiny, from time to time, an awareness of the relative radical as it is chaotically arrived at through critical forms of iterative addition or subtraction. Hence this co-associated idea of 're-interpretation' where we need to be also mindful of the innovative, the new and novel that might suddenly re-present itself in the midst of such 'examinations'. I have adopted this mathematical expression 'renormalization' and converted it into an 'economy of ongoing re(-)normalization' where we seek through trial and error to form a series of representative 'reportings' whose positive truth determinations then renders themselves as provisional 'reports'. 'Representative' in the sense that they are attempting to form or 'simulate' an overall picture of that intentional objectivity being 'represented' where these acts of representation deals only with the conformity or conformation of these 'reportings' which will be given a preferentially non-discounted review when more accepted as 'reports' (and, therein and thereby, transforming 'propositions' into 'provisional statements' [that, from an ordered perspective, as discussed in *The Seventh Book*… sees us traveling from the fifth trans-cognitive order of potentiality and possibility to a sixth trans-cognitive order of ontically determined factual forms of assessment, i.e. reports]).[41] In effect, exercising a process of 'trial and error' (through mitigation and correction) wherein we find a series of reports, in an anti-representational orientation, that appear to more closely mirror the apparent 'integrity' envisaged as applying to our re(-)reading of that set of textually presented/represented phenomena in question. Hence my invocation of the analogy of the tuning of my harpsichord where I am not seeking the absolute representation of a certain note, but, the coming together of the conformity of a set of readings that pragmatically give me a useful approximation of that note desired without its absolutely definitive instantiation ever being arrived at, or, for that matter, actually desired.[42] Where, pragmatically, all that we need to say is, "good enough is 'good enough'!" (43)

In this last phase, I also conceive it as the suspension of the trans-relational or trans-economic, i.e., the suspension of representations of our relationships in their relational situatedness, etc., in order for such examinations, in the scrutiny of these overall exploration informing our research, to take an existential turn… in a movement towards the relative thematization of the systematic existential.[43] (44)

That in a parallel to an imputational economy, this third stage is also conceived of as our removing ourselves from so-called 'extrapolations' of entities imputed to inhabit either so-called 'external world/s' and/or so-called 'internal world/s'… without, I might

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41 E.g., *The Seventh Book*… refer to modules 207, 302, 504, 601-606.

42 *Pursuit*, III.12D.26-33. *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.443.

43 *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.15. The ongoing thematization of the systematic existential could also be viewed as a form of 'self-authenticity' or 'self-authentication' by virtue of 'discerning the covert authentic nature of that relationship and then overtly re(-)expressing the same through the mutual harmonization of such re(-)understanding by appropriately exercising a certain intuitive 'skill in means' (invoking the Buddhist concept of *upaya*)'. Furthermore, where such (non-economic/trans-economic/trans-relational) re-positioning should be seen as an integrated mix of both the pragmatic (as the pragmatically expedient [in the fourth trans-cognitive order]) and the existential (as primarily being deontologically apposite [in the third trans-cognitive order {with the addition of the aesthetical, in a second trans-cognitive order, intimating a sense of style}] [and where the pragmatical and the aesthetical can be seen as secondary adjuncts of the existential primarily centered in the deontological]).

add, assuming the imputed destruction of a secular vision of this world at large. In effect, happily inhabiting a positive nihilism where the world works because we do not impose upon its engagement false notions perversely taken only at face value. By such means, breaking down forms of obstruction that prevent us from more suitably engaging existentially with(-)others, before(-)others, and, our mutually finding that true sense and semblance of freedom as that realized through(-)others given this parallel economy of ongoing re(-)arbitration..![44] (44)

Or, more succinctly, our engaging the world at large as 'forever a work in progress..!!' (45)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 31.3.23.

[44] Metaphorically as both a 'promise' and a 'gift'.