1K. Deconstruction, Reconstruction, Suspension,
Philosophical Motivation, and the Existential Dimension:
An Extract from Extended-Essay 1A
Written as the Basis for a Presentation

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique:

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0. Preamble

The themes addressed in the title of this presentation were looked at in a number of recent essays, but, rather than trawl through these separate essays I have tried to direct a more linear approach, in the light of my current thinking, by extensively quoting from these papers and, hopefully, assemble my ideas in a more orderly fashion.[1] (0)

1. Extract:

I have argued that all trans-intentional judgment proceeds through the extensive suspension. Therefore, we should address how this is possible in the hope of applying such insights to the enaction of a critical philosophy. Indeed, even the economies that contribute to intentional directedness will do so through an economy of re(-)direction centered in this suspension. In the light of recent progress, in coming to understand the informative nature of the 'suspension', let me readdress this question of how we might better view this topic.[2] Let me sum up this shift in position as a moving towards the idea, or insight, **that the prime candidate for the suspension is the simulated representation of our relationships in their overtly or covertly spelt out relational situatedness.** As recently noted:

> In my 'comprehensive' re-interpretation of the Husserlian transcendental suspension one fundamental problem has never been satisfactorily resolved, namely, given the ensuing flatness of the relativistic-like terrain of the suspension how is it possible in and through the de-suspension to arrive at anything other than our prejudices brought to the suspension in the first place? My recent resolution[3] of this problem recognizes how the extensive suspension itself resolves such issues through a suspension of the representative simulation of our relationships wherein is instituted, upon the chaotic nature of this flattened landscape, ensuing processes of both re(-)organization and re(-)self-organization where the latter is able to radically re-direct behaviour in a novel direction whose ensuing trajectory can be more favourable to that relationship or overall relational-situation.[4] That through

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* For latest version of this text: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noels homepage5.html

1 Primarily in Essays III.1D to 1J. As cited in the footnotes.

2 What follows, effectively, is a linear commentary on the recent essay titled: 1J. *The Resolution of* (*the Problem of*) *the* (*Extensive*) *Suspensive*. 'Linear' in the sense of proffering a narration with a coherent set of sequential arguments, etc. (unlike that 'essay' which attempted a more systematic, comprehensive and summary style of exposition).

3 This recent resolution was first articulated in the series of six essays titled: *Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy that is Critical, Existential and Insightfully Productive*. (III.1D-I)

4 Please note that my convention '(-)' can be read to imply the dialectical application of three distinctive kinds of iteration contributing to the requisite economy, namely, hermeneutical reiteration, phe-

> the orchestrated redirection of incremental augmentation an enhancement of re-directed valuational formation can be more favourably arrived at in such a manner where, on balance, the relationship or overall relational situation in question, therein and thereafter, is more positively and progressively re(-)enriched.[5] [0] (1050)

As stated on a number of occasions my interpretation of the Husserlian suspension is a re-interpretation. Moreover, this complex topic comes in a number of formats and approaches as noted in the following summary:

> What I am working with here is my re-interpretation of the Husserlian suspension (and not its mere reinterpretation). Various approaches can all be taken up from treating the suspension in a local sense (of suspending what is to hand, etc.) to proposing a more global fashion (imagining, e.g., as if the entire world no longer existed and all that we are left with is its mere appearance, etc.), in a static balance of contra-intentional content (equally matching the configuration of our pre-judgments, etc.) to counter-processes (dynamically matching processes with anti-processes in the constitution of our pre-judgments, etc.). [2] (1051)

In re-interpreting Husserl, I argued some time back that the suspension and the reduction were somewhat conflated but in being disentangled we also needed to add a counterbalance to the analytical nature of the reduction by adding a third component of the synthesis or reconstitution of intentional experience.[6] I believe Husserl was heading in that direction by noting, e.g., a need for historical contextualization. Then, added to this mix, I have consistently made a distinction between the cognitive nature of our intentions divided up between perception and conception, and, acts of judgment concerning the former as occurring in trans-cognitive terms of reference as trans-intentional in orientation (taking a leaf from Kant's playbook). By such manoeuvres, I ended up with an economic account of the intentional and judgmental economies (further detailed through a six-fold imposition of an ordered analysis upon the former by suggesting that subtle forms of privileging or de-privileging could accounted for a comprehensive theory of e/valuational formation). But, once we note these miscellaneous forms of suspension, and intuitively assume they do similar things, then, as a strategy, we must ask 'what is the import of such a supposedly critical philosophical technique?' (1052)

In answering that question, I use the formula of 'passive, active and engaged forms' in describing the suspension. The first supplies a technique for phenomenal-phenomenological analysis (through acts of phenomenological reduction, etc.). The second, I would argue, gives us, through a process of deconstruction and the removal of non-viable materials, a process of 'purification' in which a static residue can be better revealed. As if one inhabited a natural world without forms of existential engagement (not

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nomenological iteration and non-systematic existential re-iteration (of a more chaotic complexion instituted through a resolution of the former).

5 III.1J.0. Note the following quotations occur from this same essay.

6 These three economic aspects of the reduction, reconstitution and suspension have since morphed into the subdisciplines, respectively, of the phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential (in both relatively non-systematic and systematic formats).

realizing that judgment appreciation, itself, would not be possible without an existential dimension of transcendental experience, i.e., trans-cognitive/trans-intentional appreciation). The third aspect of the 'engaged' being the suspension of the simulation of our relationships in their situatedness and their ability in and through the suspension to re-direct existentially oriented behaviour through chaotic forms of perturbation that, hopefully, are able and capable of positively 'engineering' an enrichment in valuational formation.[7] In effect, integrating the suspension within an existential account (given my claim that a truly 'critical philosophy' is also an 'existentially oriented philosophy'). (1053)

> A suspension can be approached from a variety of angles that are either non-economically constructed or economically constructed in part or in full, like, e.g., local or global suspensions, invoking bracketing or processes of disvaluation through reference to illusion, etc., *versus* running a rhetorical suspension or a metaphorical suspension in comparison to the applied formalism of the extensive suspension, etc. [41]) (1054)

But despite the complexity of the extensive suspension (as an overlapping amalgam of an inner economy of the overall transcendental suspension consisting of rhetorical, metaphorical and simulational suspensions, and the de-suspensional economy's embrace of the former and its incorporation with a conditional economy) such complexity is obviated (through the concepts of economic correlativity and an inductive holism):

> But complexity is obviated through economic correlativity since the adequate establishment of any aspect of the extensive suspension then ensures its realization through a process of holistic induction. [42] (1055)

Passive, active and engaged forms of the suspension being differentiated:

> A passive treatment of the suspension allows us to critically appreciate the phenomenal-phenomenological constitution of our pre-judgments (prejudices). [43]

> An active treatment of the suspension allows us, through critical forms of deconstruction, to view, from a less obstructed point of view, a remaining residue that is imputed to be more in an alignment with the representative simulation of our more important relationships as found in their overall relational situatedness. [44]

> An engaged treatment of the suspension, through the suspension of the representative simulation of our more important relationships as found in their overall relational situatedness, positively empowers those relationships through chaotic

[7] As noted elsewhere, I use the expression (e/)valuational formation to indicate that there re six kinds of value being referred to and that three forms of value each fall under the three categories of identify, function and value-formation (further complicated by relatively simple and complex forms of interaction between these six distinctive types of e/valuation.

> perturbation to oversee and impel ourselves as actors who existentially intervene on their behalf. [45] (1056)

These three forms of approach giving us, respectively, a phenomenological appreciation of the constitution of the spectrum of intentional objectives representing the essential features of such research, etc; the clarified, static, hermeneutic appreciation of the relational situation in question; and, a dynamic existential understanding of the existential dimension as it has constituted and could re(-)constitute the existential re(-)configuration of that relational situation being represented, or, rather, being re(-)presented (through a mix of phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, hermeneutical representation and non-systematic existential re-presentation [and where the continuation of the suspension then enacts a more systematic sense of the overall existential orientation]). (1057)

What would be the net impact of such approaches? In effect, we have a scheme for addressing various covert and/or overt way of addressing the 'transcendental suspension' (that I have renamed as the 'extensive suspension' for a variety of reasons already noted). Admittedly, this schematic approach is trying to make sense of the work I feel such a suspension is capable of achieving, indeed, as a critical tool that is able to function beyond merely performing in a passive mode where intentional constitution is focused upon in both atomic and molecular forms of phenomenological reduction and analysis. In attempting to see beyond this simplistic approach, in exploring just how the suspension is central to critical forms of research, I have invoked this heuristic device to illustrate how the suspension could well be operated in more active and proactive terms of reference. In this regard, let me introduce two sets of analogies to better illustrate how we could actually be enacting a much wider spectrum of possibilities between these economic possibilities of passivity, activity and engagement. In a first analogy, we could imagine looking through a window at the people and traffic passing along the street outside. Perhaps the window is veiled in a thin lace curtain that can be easily seen through but during the day gives a certain desired degree of privacy. But, in opening that same window, we could then lean out that window and say hello to people we know as they were passing by. Perhaps a friend might stop for a few minutes to chat. Too busy to come inside but at the same time want to quickly catch up with the latest gossip. Through the window an active two-way relationship can be entertained, but, to extend the analogy the person in that room now needs 'to climb out through that window' and, therein and thereafter, engage the world more on its own terms. In the same vein, another analogy springs to mind. I have been staying in a unit in the city and every morning at 8 am the doorbell religiously rings. At first, I thought it was someone wanting in who did not know which unit to buzz and so tried a combination of numbers. Then, I thought it must be children having fun with the intercom. But, on the third day realized there was another possibility. Maybe the doorbell is programmed to ring itself. These units are very new and that might have been the way they initially tested these doorbells. They did have some trouble with these intercoms to begin with. Unfortunately, they forgot to cancel this act of programming and have left it operating like an alarm clock each and every morning. So, now I have to engage with the system in order to deprogram this annoying alarm that would otherwise continue to ring the doorbell at 8 am. Here you first had a passive interpretation, namely, someone was pushing the buzzer; although it does more sound like a doorbell. Then, you

envisaged this doorbell was programmed like an alarm clock and would actively ring itself each and every morning. Then, to obviate this annoying act of programming, I had to engage and enact some form of intervention in order to return this doorbell to functioning purely as a 'doorbell'. That, similarly, the suspension has to be approached through a number of lenses in order to better understand what this heuristic device, in its range of practice, is capable of performing. That, seen this way, we would realize that the suspension is also the metaphorical 'gateway' to the existential dimension as we economically travel through all three modes and convert the so-called third moment of the non-systematic existential suspension into a form more systematically central to the full and fruitful operations of the psyche. A sense of the psychic that take on board a pro-relational attitude in and through the suspension of our representations of the simulated relationships in question:

> By such means progressively refining our essential appreciation of the distinctive nature of our relationships and through such positively re-directed trans-intentional-intentional directedness re-enrich the individual and collective expressions of such overall valuational formation. [46]) (1058)

Now, the implicit or explicit misreading of these features, resident in the extensive suspension, results in a co-associated form of philosophical confusion, and, together, in the wake of the former, there also follows forms of non-philosophical abuse (of a quantum that can be deadly given the ideologically inspired devastation ensuing from non-existentially oriented philosophies and religious forms of practice that would have been better deconstructed and rendered inoperative in the first place). E.g., in the inner economy of the extensive suspension, basically dealing with an interrogative economy consisting of rhetorical suspension, metaphorical first reply and a second reply in the possible form of an acceptable literalization of the metaphorical reply we note the following forms of abuse:

> An 'economy' is a 'process of circulation constituted between the polar orientations of its trimodal formulation. In the interrogative economy, i.e., in asking a question, such circulation should continue until resolution terminates that process or that process itself is displaced or discontinued, etc. However, to date, the systematic dialectics of this circulation could not be fully accounted for. But, the suspension of the third moment is now accounted for in the following idealized account. [31]

> In asking a question we invoke the rhetorical suspension of the 'either/or' (central to the meta-textual nature of textual experience, the hermeneutical subdiscipline, genres of behavior, narratives, etc.). [32]

> In a first reply, we invoke the metaphorical suspension of 'like' (central to textual deposition, the phenomenal-phenomenological subdiscipline, narrational facts, etc.). [33]

In a second reply, the possible formation of a definitive answer, we entertain a mode of non-textual simulation and a non-systematic doorway (of the third moment) to a more systematic sense of the existential (along with its influence on narrational critiques, etc.). [34]

This third moment can be treated as a distinctive suspension in its own right, like the first two moments, when treated as if it were a product of the former; instituting an apparitional suspension when the metaphorical is able to be literalized through the deconstruction of the metaphor/s in question. I.e. 'is it or is it not literally that as interpreted in its re/presentation?' [35]

This questioning (of a definite response) re-instituting the rhetorical suspension, etc., until one of these suspensions is no longer being engaged. [36]

Excessive treatment of the rhetorical gives us rhetorical abuse, i.e., excessive and unwarranted forms of skepticism, etc. Would you forever question your current desire for 'a cup of coffee' and then expect your engagement to end in the encounter of a specific cup of coffee? [37]

Excessive treatment of the metaphorical gives us metaphorical abuse, i.e., excessive and unwarranted forms of impossible metaphorical literalism, etc. If you don't believe the 'Moon is a blue cheese' then why see the world as 'external' or 'internal'? [38]

Excessive treatment of the simulated gives us apparitional abuse, i.e., excessive and unwarranted treatment of that identity in a permanent state of both unwarranted and impossible closure, etc. Just as, e.g., no apples are ever regarded as 'just apples'.[8] [39]

That, from deceptive forms of philosophical mistakenness arise the corresponding sense of philosophical confusion, and, along with both arises a co-associated sense of non-philosophical confusion (as noted elsewhere). [40] (1059)

Even the psychological ability of leaving or entering the (extensive) suspension can be seen to be highly problematic:

Or, more simply, we metaphorically escape (the psychotic nature of being trapped in the suspension) through the suspension of the suspension! Or, we can flee from being (neurotically[9]) trapped outside the suspension through a process of suspension *per se*. [11[(1060)

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[8] Those apples could be also a 'gift' or 'stolen' or 'both stolen and a gift', etc., etc. That even something as humble as an apple cannot be written off and subject to closure as a mere apple, as no more and no less! Treating identities as closed, and non-open to an existential richness of being and further insightful observation, is a form of simulational or apparition abuse. My nomenclature.

[9] I would redefine the term 'neurotic' to indicate an 'inability to learn simple modes of interpersonal interaction (on the principle that what has been learnt can be unlearnt)'. I would like to contrast it with psychotic behaviour and non-psychotic/non-neurotic behaviour in terms of our circadian rhythms where psy-

Seen in this light, we can see how deconstruction links a phenomenological appreciation in a passive suspension with existential insightfulness to be obtained in an engaged suspension. Moreover, such deconstruction cannot be viewed as merely destructive but also as re(-)constructive; as setting about, advertently and/or inadvertently, in a refineent of positionality that more reflects a first division in philosophical rectitude. I.e., through a removal of impossible and unwarranted forms of philosophical positioning. Leaving, hopefully, a residual core of attitudes that are viable and relatively non-defective, remain under the control of the (extensive) suspension and are productively able to instigate beneficial shifts in behavior both individually and collectively. Just how is this form of intervention possible? By what (metaphorically analogued) mechanism/s?

> …'Engaged' in the sense of volition and the decisive re-directing of judgmental appreciation. But, herein lies the source of this philosophical problem as to how suspension *per se* could re-direct behavior, hopefully, in a more beneficial manner in and through an alignment with the world to hand. I.e., through forms of alignment enacted through re(-)alignment that engineer relatively more positive forms of valuational formation? If the suspension produces a flattened terrain then we must seriously ask how a relativistic landscape could ever produce definitive responses that are suitably responsive and, hopefully, responsible, etc? [7]
>
> Or, if we bring to the suspension what is to hand then what could be taken away could be nothing other than our prejudices, as pre-judgments. So, other than seeing the intentional constitution of those prejudices we must ask how illuminating that could be beyond seeing those pre-judged prejudices as prejudicial pre-judgments? [8]
>
> Or, if we were to entertain in our imagination ourselves as if upon this perfectly balanced terrain, running contra-content against content and counter-processes against processes, then, perhaps, we should have first enquired as to how we might 'escape' from being possibly 'trapped' in the suspension if from such a place there were no escape? [9]
>
> But, an escape is ever to hand to the seemingly pre-suspended through a 'suspension of the suspension', and, a return to the suspension is also equally entertainable through 'the suspension of the suspension of the suspension', and so on. But, then a true return to the past is impossible. So, through the transformation of time, how is change possible other than as a mere iteration of what is already in place (retention)? Still, such iteration as mere reiteration becomes habituated (as genres) (and is foreseen through expectations as protention) Yet, when run together (as the consonant background *versus* the dissonance of the foreground), through an economic process of harmonization, a process of re-directed resolution can then be more immediately anticipated as a process of chaotic re(-)direction instituted through the bifurcation of that moment. [10]

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chotic rhythm is one day extended over one or two days, in terms of sleeping, eating, levels of alertness, etc., and, the inverse in terms of an apparent neurosis (with, say, two sleeps a day and six meals taken, etc.)

And looked at in more detail:

But metaphorical ‘salvation’ is also to hand if we were to understand that not only are simulated intentional objects, object-states, objectives, etc., materials for suspension, but, the most suitable material for suspension is the representative simulation of our relationships! Dynamically engaged, within the chaotic environment of the suspension, through harmonic processes of resolution, we are able to directly experience degrees of engagement as realized through chaotically re-directed harmonization. Thence our ability to experience passive, active and engaged forms of re-direction in the trajectory of our embodied relationship when chaotically instituted and actively self-re-directed. [12]

I.e., our simulated representations, suitably transcribed through forms of representation, are chaotically capable of inducing re-directed forms of behavior. [13]

Which, through embodiment, blend intentional and causal strands of re-directedness in and through the very midst of such suspensions. Giving us mechanisms for intentional re-directedness, proactive re-directedness of judgments, and, more engaged forms of participation in this world at large. [14]

That the more informed we are with relevant information for the thematization of our important relationships treated as intentional objectives to hand, and the more we suitably institute adequate acts of suspension, then the more able our simulated relationships, through processes of chaotic perturbation, can influence the course or trajectories of those relationships through our embodied acts of intervention enacted on the behalf of those same relationships. These simulated representations directly representing those relationships through the intermediation of our embodiment in this world at large. In an around about sense we could say that those relationships act on their behalf by getting us to act on their behalf to proceed with those patterns of enaction that appear to promote the relational richness and enrichment of our relationships in terms of both intersubjectively and subjectively sharing in the re-directing of such relational re-direction. [15]

In such a scheme, how do we account for behaviours that are either relatively existential in orientation or relatively non-existential in orientation? [16]

There can be neither a pure sense or expression of the existential nor an impure sense of the non-existential given that they are orientations born from the existentialization of the relative non-existential *versus* the de-existentialization of the relatively existential. That between these three economic poles of the relatively existential, the relatively non-existential and the process of the existential-non-existential interaction as a third orientation (and third dialectical moment) whatever promotes our receptivity to our relationships is relatively existential in tenor. Or, in effect, that whatever promotes our alignment with our relationships, through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment, to that same extent, is relatively existential.

[17]

That between our relationships the same type of process can be observed when and where we enter into communicative agreements with others, etc. [18]

Thence the basic outline of a resolution of this problem by invoking a representative simulation of our relationships as the material to hand in our suspensions subjected to chaotic perturbations that are expressed through forms of passive, active and engaged re-directedness, hopefully, provoking greater degrees of alignment with what would be the more positively trending trajectories of those same relationships. [19] (1062)

By such means linking an existential philosophy with the exercise of the extensive suspension:

That in existential attunement we progressively preference an ongoing process of relational re(-)alignment on the behalf of our individual relationships and their collective relational situatedness and through such an existential, pro-relational attitude, hopefully, we will engineer more beneficial trajectories on the behalf of our relationships. [25]

That through the ongoing harmonization of such ensuing communicative agreements we subjectively and intersubjectively promote our overall sense/s of freedom both collectively and individually. [26]

Thence the import of the extensive suspension in our passive, active and engaged forms of relational reflection intermediated through embodiment.[10] [27]

Hence the existential dimension and its metaphorical 'doorway' through the 'portal of the extensive suspension'. [28]

The existential distinctively presenting itself either directly through existential hallmarks or indirectly through existential indicators.[11] [29]

A fortunate few are ever aware of the existential, whilst many acquire an intimation of the same, but, for some, its significance will ever escape them..!! [30]
(1063)

Again, that the central 'mechanism' here is:

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[10] Using the term 'intermediated' to note the dialectical interplay going on between simulated subjectivity and intersubjectivity as centrally contextualized through embodiment, etc.

[11] Directly under the headings of the temporal (like spontaneity, the eternal sense of the ahistorical present, etc.), spatial (the trans-geographical, etc.), subjective (personal freedom, etc.) and intersubjective (collective freedoms, etc.).

> An engaged treatment of the suspension, through the suspension of the representative simulation of our more important relationships as found in their overall relational situatedness, positively empowers those relationships through chaotic perturbation to oversee and impel ourselves as actors who existentially intervene on their behalf. [45] (1064)

In the light of the above, we can now ask, almost as an apparent digression from this topic of the suspension, to what extent is deconstruction both reconstructive and central to this operation of an extensive suspension? (1065)

In a separate essay[12] I deal with this question by noting:

> … in the context of a first division, deconstruction is no longer just a destructive technique but, more importantly, a constructive method for re(-)building. In this essay, let me explore this more positive aspect of deconstruction. 'Deconstruction' being here defined as 'that critical approach that attempts to remove all forms of defective philosophical argumentation and ameliorate all ensuing co-associated philosophical and non-philosophical forms of abuse in accordance with either the perception and/or apperception of an existential-consequentialism'.[13] That the surviving residue of such critical treatment is a revised form of re(-)positioning that is treated as provisional, open, and, hopefully, productively fit for purpose. [0]
>
> That in constructive-deconstruction we can often salvage much from the wreckage of a second division as well as renovating less secure sections of a first division. As noted, the many tasks of a philosopher are ever ongoing; an introduction to an introduction; additional arguments to further augment and enhance our progress to date; ever working towards a sense of relative conclusiveness left rendered as 'provisional', but, for all that, to be regarded as an interim building that can be entered for purposes of edification, temporary refuge, as a place to look out upon a world at large and, therein and thereafter, with(-)others, be worked within in order to expedite the beneficial reconstruction of our world at large through existential transformation.[14] [1] (1066)

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12 III.1G.

13 The positive aspect of this tentative definition is entailed in an 'existential-consequentialism'. Basically, all forms of enaction have consequences. A first divisional philosopher aspires to overseeing the realization of positive consequences when exploring the specificity of the situatedness of a certain situation or set of situations. The expressions 'philosophical', 'critical' and 'existential' being treated as synonymous. That 'existential transformation' is arrived at through 'non-chaotically oriented re(-)organization and chaotically oriented re(-)self-organization (as instigated, on balance, by the relationship through its 'agents')'. As the existential dimension can be indirectly recognized through existential indicators hence the 'perception' of this dimension. In contrast, the existential dimension is directly experienced through its existential hallmarks and hence its trans-intentional 'apperception' through judgmental-discernment.

14 I.e., letting our relationships themselves re(-)construct themselves where, in effect, we act on the 'behalf of such relationships' as 'agents for such relationships'. Because there is an equivalence between 'critical' and 'existential', etc., it would follow that such 'transformations' would then be 'existentially oriented'. So, 'transformation through reconstruction (via deconstruction)', therefore, must be 'reconstruction through existential transformation'. Of course, we can do reconstructive philosophy without direct

Interestingly, such ideas feed back on to the question 'just what is philosophical motivation? and, 'how should it be enacted?' and, 'to what end or ends?' All such considerations having a crucial role to play in our working-understanding of 'just what is entailed in a critical-existential philosophy?' (1067)

Recently, in dealing with this question as to what might existentially motivate philosophers and other disciplinarians, etc., I proposed the following observation:

> In the context of our relationships, we can perceive motivation to be this recognizing of a relational differential between what we would like to aspire after and the current reality to hand, and, that this differential is experienced as a form of an anomalization which, in turn, will drive a corresponding sense of a narrative, be that something we either tell ourselves and/or tell others. An understanding as to how this differential can be reintegrated into the relative totality of the relationship in question naturally invokes a pragmatic dimension. Motivation being more inclined to move things, e-motionally, through the re(-)directed harnessing of the requisite emotions that might better promote the expedition of this aspirational diminishment in the perceived/apperceived intensity of that aspirational differential.[15] [14] (1068)

This topic as addressed in another essay[16] noted:

> Let me tentatively make the following provisional reflection, namely, 'that the philosopher demonstrates their care and concern for(-)others by applying themselves, to the best of their ability, to discerning the nature of lived-experience and living in accordance with such insight in the hope of enriching the nature of that lived-experience in terms of its valuational formation both for(-)others and for(-)themselves'. In the light of this intuitive assessment (that could equally apply to professionals and amateurs in many other disciplines) we must assume that a philosopher would have a preference for a placement in a first division and certainly would not wish to be relegated to a second division; that they would perceive some form of a critical philosophy to embrace both insight into the nature of lived-experience and the necessity to devise ways to be in some form of an alignment or accord with the same in order to advance the quality of our existences as lived-together in this overall world-of-life. That, in effect 'philosophical motivation' should encompass these aspirational features of 'being professional, critical, able to devise ways of finding such an accord with the life-world in order to seek an enrichment of 'our' lived-experiences through such insightfulness?' [22]

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recourse to the existential dimension, but, 'being critical' means an 'unavoidable confluence with the existential' and thence its explicit reference in the subtitle.

[15] Applying 'perception' to the intentional level of epistemological organization, and, 'apperception' to the trans-intentional, judgmental level of epistemological organization.

[16] III.1H.

Obviously, framed in this manner, the concept of motivation appears to take on an existential complexion, i.e., a 'pro-relational stance' that is concerned with the 'enrichment of our relationships through this enrichment in valuational formation'. Such motivation is quite different from the motivation that might be had, say, by a person whose only concern is the theoretical construction of philosophical systems, conjectural or speculative frames of reference, intellectual arguments, ideological narratives, academic critiques, and the like. Indeed, given this non-theoretical concern for others it would follow that the seriously professional philosopher, in line with this provisional assessment, must also have a practical bent, indeed, must have an interest in seriously engaging with the world at large, and other aspects like lived-experience, the overall life-world, life-worlds, the manner in which the political-economy is being re(-)constituted, the constitution of our relationships, and an array of topics like environmentalism, inequality, advancing political freedoms, and so on? [23]

In essence, suggesting that an aspirational differential drives motivation in general, but, that this 'care and concern' for others would drive a more existentially oriented form of motivation. The question then being 'how might such motivation be better or best arrived at?' [24] (1069)

In answering the last question, we can note:

Given that our relationships, when empowered, can express a progressive sense of alignment, through an ongoing process of re(-)alignment with our relationships, as they, themselves, find a sense of resolution among themselves, then such an understanding appears to illuminate this existential concept of 'responsibility'. Seen in this metaphorical light, just how might we re-view this all-pervasive plank in an existential philosophy that emphasizes authenticity, acting on the behalf of our relationships, acting in good faith, and so on? [28]

We might say, in an attempt to understand this existential phenomenon, that responsibility is better observed when we act with the requisite integrity that oversees being well-informed with the necessary, relevant information coming to hand; that we entertain the right motivation almost as a hermeneutic guide to what type of responsiveness is being searched for and sought after; that we correctly observe the impartiality of the (extensive) suspension; and, faithfully uphold the ensuing directedness realized through such suspended deliberations. I also suspect that this process is one in which an iteration of a similar sense of intentional directedness eventually reinforces which direction we will adopt and adapt as circumstances either shift before or stay relatively the same. Moreover, given that we can only make any form of substantial progress through forms of communicative agreement with others it would follow in the course of which we must subjectively and intersubjectively prioritize which aspirations will be[17] both individually and

[17] This working 'with(-)ourselves' and 'with(-)others', using this convention '(-)', to alert the reader that "the existential 'with-ourselves' and 'with-others' is arrived at through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential 'with ourselves' and 'with others'.

> collective optimized in our ensuing patterns of enaction delivered in the light of such ongoing agreements. That the net result of which is that an existentially enacted responsibility is the observance of those pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions that further promote the ongoing enrichment of those relationships we have both with(-)ourselves and with(-)others. [29] (1070)

That to sum up, the full implications of a critical-existential philosophy are to be found entailed in an integrated set of concepts like the suspension, responsibility, authenticity, and so on:

> 'Responsibility to our relationships' is a 'faithfulness to our relationships that is able to be enacted through the clarity of the suspension wherein our relationships are empowered to chaotically redirect the course of our responsiveness before(-)others'. [31]
>
> That, ideally, this would necessitate the observance of the following. [32]
>
> The correct post-condition/s being our responsibly enacting the ensuing deliberations discerned in and through that suitably enacted (extensive) suspension. [33]
>
> The correct conditions for the suspension are enacted when the necessary conditions for the correct supervision of the suspension itself are correctly enacted (by inducing an adequate, ongoing dynamic balance of the suspended materials that have adequately pre-informed that same suspension). [34]
>
> That the pre-conditions for this responsible enactment is to actively deconstruct all forms of psychic obstruction that would otherwise impede this ongoing clarification of behavioural re(-)directedness that is then to be arrived at in and through the conditional exercise of the suspension itself. [35]
>
> Hence this ongoing thematization and engaged exercise of our responsibility as the existential basis for 'authenticity, acting on the behalf of our relationships, acting in good faith, and so on'. [36] (1071)

That to conclude, we can envisage a critical-existential philosophy as being exercised through the auspices of an extensive suspension that, in practice, is induced through the adoption and adaptation of a suitable technique for simulating the suspension where…

> Philosophical motivation (and by extension disciplinary motivation), as an existential concept, has been defined as that which motivates the adoption and exercise of an existential-consequentialism. [39]
>
> That philosophical motivation, exercised through a suitable suspension, directs us towards acting responsibly in an existentially understood philosophical context.

(40)

> Appreciated in this light, we are drawn to the position that being philosophical is correctly doing 'philosophy' in a 'critical' and 'existential' manner, and, that these three terms are synonymous. [41]
>
> That acting responsibly in a philosophical discipline demands that we be well-informed, respectful towards our relationships, cultivate suspensions that can deliver the progressive thematization of our situatedness in the world as we find ourselves entering into agreements with(-)others, before(-)others... whilst remaining ever 'open' to this existential dimension at the center of lived-experience…. [42]
>
> (1072)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 14.4.21.

2. Provisional Conclusions

As the reader will surmise, these themes of deconstruction, reconstruction, suspension, philosophical motivation, and the existential dimension are all intimately linked. How might I succinctly summarize their relationships to each other?

a. Deconstruction is reconstructive when engineered within the (extensive) suspension; removes impossible and unwarranted forms of positionality; and, incrementally moves us closer to more positive and engaged forms of pro-relational, existential interaction.
b. That the suspension is induced and expressed through a dynamically balanced economy central to all acts of resolution in each and every moment.
c. That the suspension, therefore, is central to each and every economy, and the 'portal' to an existential transformation of lived-experience.
d. In the passive suspension we can do our phenomenological research.
e. In the active suspension we can do our hermeneutical research by engineering the construction and use of genres of behavior beneficial to our intentional objectives (despite our overlooking an existential dimension which is only rectified through 'engagement').
f. In an engaged suspension we can do our existential research, moving from the non-systematic to the systematic senses of the existential through forms of enaction found to promote our alignment with our relationships in their overall relational situatedness.
g. That a critical philosophy cannot overlook this engaged sense of the existential dimension.
h. That philosophical motivation should reflect our situatedness 'with(-)others' given this existential dimension is the inescapable basis for our freedom as experienced both individually and collectively. (1073)

N.T., Wentworth Falls, 15.4.21.