2G. A Proposal for an Economic Logic?

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique:

N.K.Tointon

2020 – 2021

2G. A Proposal for an Economic Logic?*

0. Preamble

The following is written in the form of an open letter and addresses a number of interrelated topics, namely, that bimodal logics are better translated into a series of tri-modal economic formats, questioning the relations between the analytic *versus* the synthetic, the *a priori versus* the *a posteriori*, and asking how the synthetic *a priori* might be interpreted or identified, etc?[1] (0)

1. An Open Letter

Dear Jakob,

The following is written in the form of an open letter that allows me, at the same time, to both marshal my thoughts and put their contents into the form of an essay (Presecience2G.doc) that I suspect will be longer than a mere page or two. Hopefully you will forgive this intent for such economy on my part but will also come to experience the potential excitement to be had through thinking through such ideas since I am wondering if I am rising along either the misty edges of a cliff or am traipsing through a murky swamp filled with quick sand on all sides… or both? As ever, hoping for the wisdom of your counsel in such matters. (1)

Recently, I brought together eighteen *ad hoc* guidelines, as protocols, for critically treating any philosophical discourse from a first-divisional perspective.[2] In the process, the first-divisional philosopher would proffer a series of amendments that if suitably taken up would render that discourse both rectified, as a process, and re(-)normalized, as a product or disquisition, from a first-divisional perspective.(2)

I perceive such protocols as '*ad hoc*' only in the sense of these ones being merely collected together when I am sure that there are other guidelines that could equally function in a similar viable manner. In contrast, to being gathered as an *ad hoc* collection, each of these protocols to my mind could be derived from experience if critically thought through. In other words, they derive their semblance of necessity from a critical appreciation of the very nature of thought itself. Of course, the history of philosophy is fraught with such claims and any serious observer of this discipline would wonder if such disciplined attention to such matters could ever settle such questions. However, the optimist that I am, believes that such an approach is possible once a few simple steps are followed through. (3)

---

* For the latest version of this text: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noels homepage5.html

1 These considerations are currently being worked out in my extended-essay (Prescience1A.doc) that introduces Volume III in *The Pursuit of the Philosophical Discipline*.

2 III.1A.1117. Such 'guidelines' or 'protocols' counselling against absolutistical identification, absolutistical non-identification, absolutistical indubitableness of truth determination, absolutistical non-indubitableness, rhetorical abuse, metaphorical abuse, apparitional abuse, etc.

E.g., if a relatively simple gestalt model were proposed, with a minimum of rules for its operation, we should quickly see that intentional significance is realized through a correlative tension between this metaphorical sense of a so-called 'foreground' and a so-called 'background', etc. By 'etc.' is meant the necessary co-presence of a sense of so-called 'transcendental subjectivity' in keeping with the nature of that relationship in question as being apparently entertained between that intentional semblance of a foreground and background. As for rules we could note:

i. That foreground can be neither as rich as nor richer than the qualitative richness of that background.

ii. That only through 'foreground focus can significance be observed and then articulated (through language, behavior, etc.).

iii. That 'inputs from focused attention exponentially enrich that background by virtue of the enlarged relationships being simultaneously entertained between such inputs registered within that background.

iv. That, importantly, focus cannot be completely focused upon, i.e., foregrounded absolutistically.

v. That neither the background, likewise, can be completely focused upon, i.e., backgrounded absolutistically.

vi. That the economic nature of a gestalt economy necessitates the appreciation of this relational tension between foreground focus and backgrounded background hence the meta-appreciation of this relational tension in the form of a co-associated sense or semblance of intentional subjectivity (which, in trans-intentional judgment is sometimes referred to as 'transcendental' subjectivity, i.e., 'trans-intentional/trans-cognitive' subjectivity.

vii. That these three polarities of foreground, background and co-associated subjectivity cannot be absolutistically arrived since all three dialectical orientations or moments are correlatively engendered together.

viii. Hence the archetypal nature of an economy has this trimodal disposition (that elsewhere has been abbreviated to 'Object, World and Ego'). (4)

However, for the moment, let us put such rulings aside and merely remember that, first, foreground focus cannot be just focused upon completely in and of itself (absolutistically), and, second, this dialectical relationship between foreground and background itself is dialectically appreciated in a similar manner along with its co-associated sense of subjectivity. So, e.g., in a visual field we have the relative orientations of a visual foreground, visual background and the co-associated sense of a visual perceiver, but, that

none of these three economic poles can be definitively arrived at in and of themselves (absolutistically)! (5)

Let me diagrammatically present this:

Subjectivity (Ego)
/
/
/
/
/
Foreground (Object)……*……Background (World) (6)

But if we treat these three orientations as dialectical, correlative co-equals it would better to re-represent this diagram as follows (with mutual reciprocity envisaged between all three parties as centered about the metaphorical center '*' of their trimodal economic interrelationship):

Subjectivity (Ego)

*

Foreground (Object) Background (World) (7)

With this metaphorical modeling of a gestalt field in mind, this then should persuade us to philosophically understand that no intentional object(ive) in its intentional objectivity can be completely arrived at in and of itself (absolutistically); be that as a matter of identification, truth determination, defining a function, in the form of a certain judgmental appreciation, etc. In essence all intentional productivity (and trans-intentional appreciation of judgments, etc.,) can only be treated as provisional even though on many, if not most occasions, we may have neither valid conventional need nor reason for re-e/valuating most of our conventional judgments as held to date. However, philosophically, and critically, such reservations should always be exercised from this relatively trans-conventional point of view. In holding such reservations, we critically exercise the beginnings of a trans-conventional, first-divisional style in philosophical appreciation. (8)

By means of this digression we have metaphorically visited the economic nature of a gestalt economy, and, by extension, the economic modeling that will allow us to bet-

ter understand both the conventional nature and limits of our thought processes along more trans-conventional lines. Such modeling, of course, could be just dismissed. However, seen as an investment, it should become quickly obvious that such an approach has more than enough interpretative value to well recommend itself for our taking this approach on a more permanent basis. But, in this regard, I would ask no more than such a trial be undertaken. (9)

However, in the provisional acceptance of this modeling, it is understandable why we could no longer accept a raft of outmoded philosophical ideas and their misguided styles of presentation if such second-divisional philosophers believe they can focus purely upon their chosen topics as things perfectly present in and of themselves (absolutistically) and over-indulge in styles of philosophical presentation (like misguided forms of unqualified realism, idealism, pragmatism, etc.) that merely short-circuit the very economic nature of our epistemological appreciation, and so on. (10)

But, I understand I could never expect instant agreement on such matters. On the other hand, if we accept, even if only upon provisional trust, that it's impossible for us to entertain all identities treated as purely and completely understood in and of themselves (absolutistically), then it would follow that we must treat such impossible entities, functions and all such claims, and their contradictory styles of presentation that promote such impossible prospects, as nothing more than 'empty nonsense'. As impossible verbal 'fabrications' that would automatically relegate such proponents to a second-division. (11)

With this position in mind, it would then be understandable that such proscriptions, treated either explicitly or implicitly, when applied to the formulations of such misguided second-divisional material, would be seen as valid and truthful, and, that such truth determination, being observed in and through our interpretative experience, would render such a 'truth' as 'synthetic', as something obviously had in experience through our critical reflections upon such patent nonsense. At the same time, through analysis, in the light of our economic understanding, such a 'truth' could also be declared to be 'analytically arrived at through such analysis and, therefore, as also *a priori*'. So, would we have here an instance of that elusive claim, as per Kant, for the existence of a truthful judgment that was 'synthetic *a priori*' and not merely 'synthetic *a posteriori*' nor 'analytic *a priori*? In effect, such a 'truth', through proscription, would rule out what was not true given such a claim was just not possible to entertain (economically) in the first place. Basically, a 'negative synthetic *a priori* truth' arrived at through mere exclusion. (12)

That interpretation accepted, albeit provisionally, could we envisage what might be entailed in the contrast of a 'positive synthetic *a priori* truth'? In this regard, we could ask just what might be left, as a residue, once a first-divisional critique renders all second-divisional materials, in that discourse, as candidates for emendation in an ensuing process of rectification that was instrumental in that overall process of re(-)normalization (of the now critically rendered discourse realized in and through such a hypothetical critical process?)? Revealing, joy of joy, not one type of synthetical *a priori* truth determination but two!? (13)

But, a more cautious attitude to such matters should have us quickly returned to the fold? Such stray sheep are problematic, and, taking a(nother) leaf from my own playbook, already noted in this letter, let me put such difficult considerations to the side by entertaining the dismissal of all bimodal formulations as short-sighted and only productive of endless controversies, confusions, as excessive philosophical nonsense. (14)

I have always been suspicious of these attempts to muster logical considerations and direct processes of truth determinations through bimodal gates of just 'either/or'. E.g., that a proposition is either analytical or synthetical in presentation. The basis for truth is either *a priori* or *a posteriori* in our engagement with experience. Even analytical propositions are engaged in experience… just by being entertained. Even an analytical tautology tells us something about the world namely that the world can be described, on occasions and places as both *x* and not *x*. 'It is either raining or not raining' implies we understand that the world has occasions and places when it is either raining or when is does not rain. Or, just take the simple use of an indexical 'this'. 'This is an apple'. Could be read as '"this is apple-like' and 'is an apple'", or something along similar lines. As an equation it has analytical import. 'This' equal 'that'. Its imputed analytical truth is then the basis for an affirmative synthetic claim that could not be made without this analytical basis or framework. That, in effect, all propositions, epistemologically, are basically ambivalent and have this dual reading. That even a tautology tells us something about the world. That propositional equations, in all possible forms, may or may not be reread in a synthetic light. That such bimodal ambivalence must ultimately infect our readings given that we should also understand that any pure sense of the analytical (mis)treated in and of itself (absolutistically) is just as (economically) impossible as any pure sense of the synthetical (mis)treated in and of itself (absolutistically)! (15)

Much safer, therefore, would be to bracket and discard all bimodal logic as 'infected', and only partially understood by virtue of its incorporation within an implicit trimodal economy. That one of the tasks of a first-divisional philosopher would be to explicate, in a suitable trimodal economic format, (a closer approximation to) the true constitution of such logical form (and realize in the process that such infection is perfectly understandable and can be treated as 'non-problematic' through such an economic translation). (16)

For consideration explore the following (as salutary reasons for why logical bimodalism should be absorbed within a logical trimodalism). (17)

'The astronomer predicted the next solar eclipse' and did so before it happened. The eclipse was envisaged before it was seen and might well not have been seen by this astronomer or, it might have been impossible for this astronomer to have seen the same under any conceivable circumstances. If correctly calculated, this possible fact becomes an actual fact (on the occurrence of that represented event). This proposition does not look like an analytical proposition (and it cannot be a statement before its actualization) and, yet, it is not something to be experienced until it occurs. Such a lack of clarity reinforces this point that no proposition could or should be read purely in and through the fo-

cus of an extreme and untenable uni-modalism (as to be found absolutistically defined in short-sighted bimodal terms of reference). (18)

Or, consider the following situation and how it might be better translated in trimodal terms of reference. Imagine a transparent globe filled with steam or dust particles or something similar, and, that projected upon such a space is a (computer generated) holistic projection of a body, say, in the shape of a human person. But what sort of body is this body? It is certainly not a body as might have been envisaged by, say, Descartes? This body has form, that then could be enlarged or shrunk by that process of projection, but, has no real sense of weight, or, neither the organized possession of such materials within its projected embrace. For an observer, this human-like 'body' is seen. But, that body is not a 'body' as normally understood. Our statements and propositions about such a phenomenon are going to oscillate between analytical definitions, as prescriptions, and synthetical correlations, as descriptions. If, into this mix, we were to insert first-divisional proscriptions that reread these prescriptions and descriptions through a critical lens that defused any and all forms of bimodally instituted logical uni-modalism then we would be presented with a set of economic correlations more in tune with the definitional ambivalence of such a projected reality, such projected realities..? (19)

Given such underlying logical ambivalence, all philosophical considerations of an imputed synthetic *a priori*, interpreted within such a fickle landscape, would more than likely be rendered even more problematic and prove to be not much more than an unprofitable diversion our time and efforts. (20)

So, let us work on formulating a trimodal logical format that would allow us to accept such overlooked ambivalencies and bypass other misplaced understandings (to that extent that is practicable). (21)

With this economic understanding in mind certain proscriptions would be introduced to the ensuing logical arena. Those proscriptions would be proscribing the roles exercised by analytical-like prescriptions and synthetical-like descriptions. Therein and thereafter, limiting how such factors were to operate, and in turn, defining proscriptions as ruling out what was impossible to entertain and should not be entertained. But, we must ask again what is left after such critical treatment (and retreatment as argued elsewhere)? (22)

In the form of a part-digression, I have argued elsewhere that all treatment is counter-mirrored by retreatment; and where the latter is exercised through the transcendental suspension and de-suspension entertained within the embrace of the 'extensive suspension'. I have argued that all forms of treatment produce a product of such appreciation that is elevated by one degree in its meta-status that is then returned to its original status through this counter process of retreatment. Suffice to say, here, that all treatment is counter-mirrored by retreatment in whose embrace the representative residue is able to reassert, through its surpluses of e/valuation, an emergent, non-reductive sense of 'presence' in and through a dialectical economy of passive, active and engaged forms of relational interaction. That, in the latter orientation, the apparent 'reality of the representa-

tion' is existentially able to re(-)express its 'representation of reality' through the ensuing re(-)configurations of such lived-experience. That, in effect, this overlooked aspect of a counter-mirrored process of retreatment gives to the economy in question the dynamic impetus to find relevant and co-associated forms of expressions; not just from passive and active forms of intervention but also to more existentially oriented forms of existentially oriented engagement enacted from a pro-relational, holistic perspective of the relevant relationship in question, albeit as found in its relational situatedness. (23)

With a carefully sculptured use of a trimodal language let me semantically divide this territory under these three headings of the descriptive, prescriptive and proscriptive. These three headings, as polarities, I believe, have already implicated phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented descriptions (of phenomenological modalities in line with past experience and their semantic mappings), hermeneutically oriented prescriptions (in the form of prescribed genres of behavior), and existentially oriented proscriptions (with, as I envisage it, a focus on causal effectiveness and intentional efficacy, especially realized through this mechanism of 'retreatment'). Using a trimodal language various 'technical' expressions will be assigned to only one of these three categories of the descriptive, etc. Rendering such language as technical through such selective usage. Under these three headings let me just list these precisely aligned expressions:

Descriptive	**Prescriptive**	**Proscriptive**
Synthetical	Analytical	Synthetic *a priori*??[3]
Past orientation	Future orientation	Present orientation
Encounter	Recognition	Engagement
Imputations	Expectations	Anticipations
Phenomenological	Hermeneutical	Existential
Modalities	Genres of behavior	Causal-efficacies
Propriety	Appropriateness	Appositeness
Foreground	Background	Subjectivity
Dissonant	Consonant	Harmonic resolution
'Consistence'	'Persistence'	'Insistence' (24)

How is such a trimodal logic to be exercised in order to be economically operated conventionally, and, trans-conventionally when suitable proscription is permitted to emend, rectify and re(-)normalize those representatively expressed proceedings in the form of a set of propositions and statements constituting the specific discourse in question? (25)

Economically, we must understand that all three poles must mutually reflect each other on a deeper level of explication and, therein, posses the same isomorphic relatively

[3] The first suggestion being that there is a synthetic *a priori*. Then I suggested there were two varieties that were negative and positive. Towards the end I make the suggestion that we have a causal synthetic *a priori* in efficacious conjunction with an analytical *a posteriori*. However, reframed in a trimodal logic the old bimodal/unimodal considerations can be conveniently shelved. 'Hic et nunc' (here and now) might also be used to indicate the anticipation of the 'immediacy' of an existential complexion?

invariant sense of symmetry (that would be relatively preserved in a process of treatment-retreatment). In a sense, preserving indexicals even though they are also articulated from within a certain context. Just as in a forest we have both individual 'trees' and their collection in the form of a 'forest', and, our use of either term is dependent upon the frame of reference in use, but, ultimately, must be somewhat independent of those realities being relatively invariant across multiple frames of reference that demonstrably exhibit significant pragmatic utility. So, e.g., a magical forest cannot be harvested for wood, but, a destroyed forest no longer has living trees within its embrace. (26)

In other words, the parties in a certain relationship must exhibit a certain sense of correlativity in matters of qualified (non-absolutistically treated) identification, functionality and value formation along with matters of truth determination appertaining to the former. Moreover, the truth determination determined for one party must equally pertain to the other two economic parties. So, with this understanding, let me demonstrate how this trimodal logic can operate. (27)

Let me take the simple statement 'this is an apple'. As a statement we must assume this proposition is true (by the definition of a 'statement' as a 'true proposition' in its representation of factual terms of reference). I.e., that we are dealing with a 'non-virtual apple'. (28)

Phenomenal-phenomenologically we can say that 'this' describes 'a locus of modalities that are accepted from 'our' past personal-social experience of apples to be present in the form of an apple and where this spectrum of modalities, in its density of modalities, is also present with each apparent modality also expressing the right range of intensity as well. E.g., 'this' looks like an apple, has a taste that is either bitter or sweet but not salty, etc. That in a non-virtual apple we make the imputation that this 'apple' is fully saturated with such modal imputations. Moreover, hermeneutically, we expect to engage the requisite type of genre recognitions one would expect to occur in our indirect and direct phenomenological encounter with an apple recognition. E.g., I am about to hold this apple in order to eat this same apple (in the organized confluence of these two genres just noted). Then, in eating this apple I find it has the capability, i.e., causal-efficacy, of assuaging my current levels of physiological hunger in the light of this desire for this required form of intentional efficaciousness. That if this phenomenological 'consistence' is coupled with hermeneutical 'persistence' (of genre involvement) then we arrive at this corresponding 'insistence' of causal efficacy and intentional efficaciousness. Further abbreviated we can state, correlatively, from their own perspectives, that possible consistence (c) equals possible persistence (p) which must also equal possible insistence (i), and v.v. Moreover, if c, p, or i are true (t) then all c, p and i must also be t with the provision that all 'logical' interactions are entertained within a certain suitable period of time. Furthermore, with any one of those possibilities truthfully determined the ensuing complexion must be entertained accordingly with the same manner of truth determination. Let me demonstrate this last observation. (29)

If I have tasted the apple in accordance with genre expectations of what is to be entailed in 'the satisfactory tasting of an apple' then this intention to taste that apple has

been successfully anticipated, i.e., accomplished (in this causally-efficacious cooperation with the requisite causal-effectiveness co-involved in the efficacious anticipation of this enacted tasting of that apple). If, then, I have eaten that apple in a satisfactory accordance with genre expectations of eating an apple then that apple must have been eaten in the anticipated moment of my direct interaction with that apple. Moreover, if 'consistence' is true then both 'persistence' is true and 'insistence' is true, and v.v. Just as if any one party or two parties are true then the third party must also be both true and actualized in accordance with the manner of its truth determination. So, e.g., if I am eating an apple that can be eaten, and that is true, then that apple must have successfully assuaged some or all of my feeling of physiological hunger (should they have been present). (30)

However, there is one valid objection to be made here. I could be tasting or eating an apple in a dream or in the reconstruction of a memory so the 'manner of the truth determination' being made also must be taken into account. So, how do we differentiate 'virtual truth determinations' from 'non-virtual truth determinations', and v.v? (31)

To overcome this valid philosophical objection, we have to take truth determination to a higher meta-level of expedition. In effect, we need to propose a concept of 'conformity', a 'conformal appreciation of individual truth determinations in a collective setting'. As I have argued elsewhere, we either have immediate 'confirmation' or retrospective 'verification' (along with a third prospective economic candidate of 'speculation'). 'Confirmation' in simplistic terms could be defined as 'either the confirmation or verification of a prior process of either confirmation or verification'. Implicit in these four types of operation is the word 'successful'. However, a more technical approach would be to argue that there is the experiential meeting and matching of a full complement of requisite phenomenological modalities as a 'saturation' or 'representative saturation'; also meeting and matching of a full complement of requisite hermeneutical genre expectations as a 'satisfaction' or 'representative satisfaction'; also meeting and matching of the effective requisite causal involvement with an efficacious realization of our intentions as a success(fulness) or representative success(fulness). Quite simply, virtual truth determinations must give way to non-virtual truth determinations when a representative saturation of modalities meets a representative satisfaction of normally implicated genres that together are successfully found to be in a conformal state with the process of conformation also in place between relevant causal aspects and intentional aspects. Or, we could abbreviate this as 'overall conformal truth determination is affirmed' when 'representative saturation meets representative satisfaction in a representative successfulness of causal-intentional conformation'. Or, more simply, when either confirmation or verification is able to either confirm or verify prior truth determinations (be they either negatively dis-affirmative or positively affirmative in character). (32)

In a confirmation or verification of a representative setting we can also claim a corresponding mutual correlativity. So, if I encountered a representative saturation of modalities then it would not be speculative to claim that I must have also meet a recognition of a representative satisfaction and engagement of a representative successfulness, and v.v. (33)

But, in such a scheme, how would we account for such previous intuitions like ‘analytical, synthetical, *a priori*, *a posteriori*’, and so on? (34)

Phenomenological modalities are retrospectively appreciated analytically (as predefined in our semantic mappings of the world at large as found in lived-experience). Hermeneutically oriented genres of behavior are prospectively synthetical in orientation. We could argue that the experiential conformity of causal and intentional aspects must be an emergent combination of the former. Tentatively, as an intellectual exercise, we might like to define the ‘causal orientation’ as ‘synthetic *a priori*’ and the ‘intentional aspect’ in conformity with the former as ‘analytic *a posteriori*’?? But, I am happy to leave the ascertainment of such definitions for others to debate. In the meantime, treating this representative ‘residue’ as a ‘conformal correlation between relevant and requisite causal aspects and intentional aspects’ (that would need to be validly declared as ‘effectively-efficacious’). (35)

Again, how do we demonstrate positive forms of truth determination of these particular economic parties? If ‘consistence’ has a consistency that is saturated, or regarded as effectively or representatively saturated, given we have no reasons to believe otherwise, and, the requisite ‘persistence’ was sufficiently and appropriately enacted satisfactorily, then, with no relevant reasons to the contrary, we may assume a successful process of truth determination for such ‘insistence’ can be assumed as having also been arrived at. E.g., this apple was ‘duly’ found to have an apple-like taste that was duly experienced in an act of tasting that implied that this apple was ‘duly’ tasted, or, rather, anticipated as being tasted (in that allotted period of time). Or, similarly, e.g., this apple was ‘duly’ found to have an apple-like eating that was ‘duly’ experienced in an act of eating that implied that this apple was ‘duly’ eaten, etc., or, rather, anticipated as being eaten (in that allotted period of time). That such experiences can be treated as non-virtual rather than a virtual would means, as noted, our now taking a more conformal approach and seeking a definitive determination of the conformal success to be ascertained between effective causal aspects and the efficacious realization of our intentional aspirations. (36)

Now, should this logic be found to break down we must assume either that apples representations cannot be tasted and eaten, e.g., which is contrary to ‘our’ phenomenological imputations and hermeneutical expectations of experience, or, that this representation was not an apple even if it were somewhat apple-like. Just as e.g., dreams apples cannot be suitably eaten either inside or outside the context of that dream, and, wax apples will not effectively assuage physiological feelings of hunger, and so on. That testing such arrangements would reinforce or suitably emend our semantic mappings of lived-experience, and, gives us adequate grounds, e.g., for the successful pursuit of scientific disciplines, etc. (37)

Given the critical insistence of proscriptions just what are we left with as a possible residue in lived-experience? An economy whose differentiation (through treatment) is relatively superficial and whose integration (through retreatment) must preserve a certain underlying isomorphic symmetry. Hence, e.g., our reception of a non-virtual apple in our direct experience is noted as duly possessing a certain saturated modal complexion in line

with past imputations whose functional appropriation is duly found to be in line with future expectations and is engaged, in the immediacy of anticipation, as a duly successful engagement in and through a successful meeting of both causal efficacy and intentional efficaciousness. Hence truth determination is observed through a paralleling of such alignments whose emendation, when called for, is to be engineered through successful patterns of 'closer' re(-)alignment. By 'closer' is more meant 'more integrated patterns of alignment through 'relevant' patterns of re(-)alignment'. Where 'relevant' is reflective of the fact that although 'all patterns of engagement deliver some form of an e/valuational surplus some surpluses are noticeably greater and more productive in the discharge of current intentions' and would obviously give their pragmatical imprimatur to those designs that parented such comparatively greater surpluses of e/valuational formation. (38)

Note by re(-)alignment, in a representative economy, we have three forms of iteration, namely, phenomenal-phenomenological 'presentation', that is different enough to be relatively experienced as 'sheer' dissonance; a hermeneutical sense of 'representation' being relatively arrived at through 'mere' consonance; and, an existential sense of resolution being relatively arrived at through a chaotically oriented process of re-direction or re-presentation (along with 'bare' instances of insistent rhetorical tropes reflecting the apparent truth status of that state of affairs). That this economy of representation consists of an ongoing mix and resolution of such harmonic aspects (through the interaction of these three kinds of iteration, namely iterative presentation, reiterative representation and re-iterative re-presentation). That in the historical persistence of a consistent relationship in lived-experience we should also note that this process of harmonic resolution must be ongoing and never definitively final despite whatever semblance of insistence is found to be co-present. There will be times that we may well think and feel that we are right in our truth determinations, but, in hindsight that we find we were proven to be wrong. Hence this critical philosophical call for treating/retreating all truth claims as provisional even if we were happily to call it otherwise as a non-philosopher (as we make our seemingly individual and collective passages together through this world-of-life). (39)

Truth determination being ascertained, in the light of the above, therefore, through these forms of parallelization and alignments, and, moreover, to find due emendation through correctly observed patterns of re(-)alignment. By such means helping us to find the requisite degree of alignment with the 'reality of our representations' through their carefully curated 'representation of reality'… as to be found in lived-experience and our critical treatment/retreatment of the same. This provisional modeling of lived-experience granted, what are the critical and existential ramifications of our conformance to the proscriptive requirements of such an approach? (40)

At this point I need to reintroduce my exposition of the 'extensive suspension' by noting our utilization of a suspended economy (and its retreatment) consists of passive suspensions, active suspensions and engaged suspensions. Let me briefly explore what is intended here in order to better answer this question entailed in asking and answering 'what are the philosophical, critical and existential ramifications of their exposition?' (41)

In a passive (Husserlian-like) suspension we merely observe, phenomenal-phenomenologically, the apparent constitution of that being found to hand (as the phenomenal aspect 'dictates' to us what its phenomenological constitution appears to be and as to how we dictate to ourselves our current interpretation of that constitution through the interactivity of this process entailing such 'co-mutual dictation'). Relatively speaking, on balance, such a process is passive in its overall tenor and complexion. (42)

In an active suspension we intend to suitably intervene through a deconstruction of conventional misinterpretations in order to envisage and successfully execute those hermeneutically oriented patterns of intervention as intended. Possibilities are engendered and enacted through the requisite sequential steps that would oversee either the commissions and/or omissions of such forms of enaction needed to sequentially expedite such intentions. (43)

However, through the further application of trans-conventional proscriptions we then trans-conventionally deconstruct such representative processes of constitutional construction, through such critically informed re(-)construction, in order to permit the relationship in question to become empowered that it may then empower us to act on its behalf for the progressive enrichment of that same relationship through either the creation of that relationship and/or overseeing the maintenance of its preservation and/or its expansive conservation. (44)

What is the net consequence of enacting this extensively suspended economy, either unwittingly and/or wittingly? Nothing less than the emergence of an existential orientation capable of overseeing the emendation, rectification and re(-)normalization of our relationships! (45)

In other words, through such careful and critical curation we set ourselves up to existentially act on the behalf of our relationships. As part of the pre-conditional requirements for this clarification of representative thought we need to approach matters of phenomenological identification, hermeneutical functionality and existential e/valuation through a logical apparatus that dialectically cuts through what needs to be excised and to accept the co-associated limitations also placed on such interactions. In effect, adopting and adapting whatever allows us to walk a middle path in such an endeavor, beholden, therein and thereafter, to no extremes, to no illusions and to no impossible conceptions whilst realizing that as imperfect as we are the potential perfection of our relationships, through suitable forms of ongoing resolution, is existentially ever to hand. How might we understand this potent possibility, as 'our' relational vocation, and, how might we avail ourselves of its potential promise? (46)

It is true 'that wholes are greater than the sum of their parts' since their relational identity, functionality and e/valuational formations cannot be reductively mistreated and still preserved as such. However, we should also understand, on the other hand, that the semblance of a relational excess or surplus in e/valuational formation is only to be experienced through the ongoing re(-)simulation of its ongoing harmonic integration. That through such re(-)simulation does a relationship have the power to chaotically re-direct

the course of its ensuing trajectory. This is to be entertained at the center of lived-experience. That, therein, through such critical, philosophical and existential processes of alignment, through such re(-)instituted processes of re(-)alignment are we then in a position to experience this excess of e/valuation at the very center of our relationships as 'authentically' re(-)lived in such a manner. The clarification of such functions being arrived at through the economy of suspension as previously outlined. Phenomenological clarification being arrived at through passive suspensions. Hermeneutical clarification being arrived at through active suspensions. Existential clarification being arrived at through engaged suspensions. Hence the import of this scheme and its incorporation of a trimodal logic in order to suitably deconstruct all relevant conventional and trans-conventional aspects that obstruct such oriented patterns of existential responsiveness and responsibility as we act on the informed behalf of our relationships as found in the specificity of their relational situatedness!! (47)

So, in summary, in the trimodal, economic logical format, as outlined, it could be said that a state of conformal truth assessment can be positively affirmed if a sufficiently encountered representative saturation (of a proper mix of phenomenal-phenomenological modalities) meets the recognition of a satisfaction (of appropriate hermeneutically oriented genres) that also meets an engagement with the requisite successfulness of an effective-causally aligned intentional-efficaciousness. Or, more simply, **that an affirmative conformal truth determination is realized when saturation plus satisfaction plus successfulness realizes the requisite, effective-causal, intentional-efficacy, and v.v!** In reflecting upon such successful deliveries of intent it becomes obvious that the effective-casual aspect is pre-conditional in orientation as mediated conditionally, and, that efficacious-intentionality is post-conditional in orientation whilst also being mediated conditionally.[4] That in such a format we can resurrect such notions of the analytic, synthetic, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, etc., albeit as economic correlatives where questions of exclusivity of identity, etc., can have (absolutistically) no place in such re-considerations, and, where, consequently and subsequently, certain dialectical ambivalences have to be accepted albeit if only, on balance, through subtle forms of preference, and so on.[5] (48)

Hence the intent of this letter to capture my current thinking on the nature of such logical considerations that appear to advance the existential ramifications of what I would re-define as 'our critical understanding of lived-experience'. (49)

Ever hopeful that you will forgive the complexity of such shifts in thinking inflicted upon yourself as you sought to follow this contorted and convoluted series of arguments. Wishing you the very best…

Your philosophical friend, Noël, Wentworth Falls, 6.6.21.[6] (50)

---

[4] I.e., translating bimodal causal concepts like 'cause and effect' in a trimodal economic scheme of pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional aspects.

[5] 'Subtle' being code for ordered forms of exposition. Where 'preference' is also code for retrospective 'priority', current 'privileging' and prospective 'promotion'.

[6] Please note that my convention of 're(-)' indicates an economy involving a mix of three different forms of iteration as noted in paragraph 39 (as abbreviated by the expressions 'mere, sheer and bare').