The Re(-)Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical
Along with the Re(-)Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas
Through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena
Within the Instantiations of their Systematic Social Organization

BOOK 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark…
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts…
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness….

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12V. The Re(-)Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical Along with the Re(-)Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas Through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena Within the Instantiations of their Systematic Social Organization*[1]

The semantics of semantics is a non-semantics, or a meta-semantics;
And this possibility proffers a relative narrow definition of the metaphysical…

The philosophical appreciation of the philosophical is metaphysical;
And is not philosophical being both meta-philosophical and non-philosophical...

The appreciation of the inter-ordered world of disciplines has to be situated
Within the systematic world of organizations within the overall political-economy...

0. Preface

In *Book* 9, I hope to explore and flesh out a number of themes already sketched out in *The Seventh Book*..., namely, a mapping of ordered and inter-ordered phenomena, etc., from which a complex vision of the metaphysical will be re(-)constituted and rendered as newly fit for purpose. Along the way I will also be exploring the ramifications of this innovative and relatively systematic mapping of the disciplinary world... (0)

Given the intricacies of this complex topic of inter-ordered phenomena (and its creation of a complex space for a resuscitation of the topic of metaphysics) let me divide this book into, first, *A Statement of Aspirations*, and, second, into *Part* I: *Negotiating the Difficulties of an Ascent*, and, *Part* II: *Navigating the Obstacles of a Descent*. The latter forming a short 'final report'.[2] To set the context for these two sections I have also presented the following: 12V. *An Introductory Presentation*: *The Discipline of Metaphysics as Entailed within a Complex Approach to Certain Types of Inter-Ordered Phenomena.*[3] (1)

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1 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

2 A 'final report' being issued in the same vein as the dissemination of a 'final vocabulary' as per Richard Rorty, I.e., as ironically meant in the form of 'a working text being presented in its currently definitive format and form whilst understood as being set in an open pragmatic attitude to the topic in question whilst awaiting further forms of both critical and radical re-contextualization'.

3 The resuscitation of a positive metaphysics is possible given that has never died and persists through the enduring competence of a positive nihilism, and, therefore, cannot be the resurrection of a 'negative' or 'zombie metaphysics' that has never lived given the conjured up misrepresented impossibilities of a negative nihilism. In this regard this 'ghost' or 'specter' cannot be reanimated being forever without a 'body'. Therefore, in this regard, the resuscitation of a positive metaphysics cannot be the resurrection of this type of endeavour since the emergent 'spirit', *esprit de corps*, of the existential has never left the stage of the communal world of the relational, and, therefore. has not died. Whereas a resurrection of a traditional negative metaphysics is impossible given that the reanimation of its corpse cannot occur since it had no metaphorical 'body' to begin with.

**An Introductory Presentation: The Discipline of Metaphysics
As Entailed within a Complex Approach to
Certain Types of Inter-Ordered Phenomenon
Within the Instantiations of their Systematic Social Organization**[4]

As noted, inter-ordered phenomena are 'phenomena' that can be phenomenal-phenomenologically analyzed, etc. (2)

An 'order' is a 'distinctive mode of intentional behaviour operating within a certain aspect of the psyche'. In each aspect of the psyche, I perceive the existence of six distinctive, but 'economically' interrelated, orders. So, e.g., in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect dealing with trans-intentional forms of judgment' I perceive the existence of six distinctive types of judgment, namely:

1. A first ordered phenomenologically oriented approach to the linguistic mapping of semantic categories (as atomic propositions);
2. A second ordered aesthetically oriented integration of atomic propositions (in the form of molecular propositions);
3. A third ordered existentially and deontologically oriented forms of evaluation (without reference to any impossible invocation of so-called First Principles, etc.);
4. A fourth ordered pragmatically oriented evaluation (dealing with, e.g., considerations of expediency, effectiveness, efficaciousness, economic parsimony, etc.);
5. A fifth ordered hermeneutical considerations of potentiality (e.g., as either possibility, probability, and/or potency, etc.);
6. A sixth ordered approach to ontical, i.e., factual, considerations (where propositions provisionally become statements of either perceived or interpreted fact). (3)

As a simplified formula these judgmental orders, from the first order, respectively, are phenomenological(ly semantic); aesthetical; (existentially-) deontological; pragmatical; hermeneutical(ly-potential), and ontical(ly-factual). (4)

These orders are ordered because we can propose transformational rules that take us from one order to any another given their underlying basis is economic. E.g., following semantic rules for the molecular integration of atomic propositions we can say that 'this glass of water is salty' (regardless of whether this is true or false, because it is stated, in this instance, that that 'water' tastes as 'saline'; that water can be salty in taste; and, water in the form of a 'liquid' can be 'contained within a glass'). On the other hand, 'table-tops' can be 'round' or 'square' in shape, etc., but, cannot be both perfectly 'round' and perfectly 'square' at the same time. Therefore, there could be no 'green or red table-tops that are both perfectly round and square at the same' time because such a molecular proposition cannot be obtained by the simple application of those conventional semantic rules as already understood (as could be evidently demonstrated through invoking both cultural and intercultural levels of explication). (5)

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[4] This Presentation was written to be read at The Continental Philosophy Group, 8 October 2013.

Under the rubric of 'inter-ordered' I include orders, both focused and globalized; inter-ordered reduplications that are either symmetrical or asymmetrical in their interactive multiplication; and even more complex forms of interaction falling more specifically under the category of hyper-ordered phenomena. (6)

So, e.g., the localized focus on phenomenologically articulated categories, e.g., saltiness, colour, form, etc., obviously sees us dealing with semantic issues and their cultural and inter-cultural forms of linguistic articulation in and through corresponding cultural and intercultural forms of mapping (as to how these relatively atomic forms of judgment, as propositions, are related to each other. So, e.g., 'saltiness' is perceived as a 'distinctive type of taste (and, therefore, 'not sweet')', and, 'pink' is perceived as a 'certain type of colour with some proximity to the colour red' (and, therefore, not so closely related to the colour 'blue'), etc., and, 'liquids' can be both 'salty' or 'pink', etc. (7)

'Philosophy', as a special case, is perceived as 'globalized' given its definition as 'one-part phenomenologically oriented, one-part hermeneutically oriented, and, one one-part (non-systematic[5]) existentially oriented'. In effect, 'philosophy' is treated as a 'philosophy of economic phenomena' hence its reflections on the trimodal nature of an archetypal economics, etc. Where by 'etc.' we can include each order considered in local terms of reference, hence the philosophical sub-disciplines of phenomenology/semantics; aesthetics; a deontologically oriented existentialism (as a central influence in an existential-pragmatism, etc.), pragmatics (in its non-existential sense of functions of expediency, etc.); hermeneutics, and ontics or factology (in proto-historical inventories of facts that can be accessed by historians in the formulation of their historical narratives etc.). (8)

'Reduplication' or 'multiplicative interaction' takes two forms, either conducted in a symmetrical fashion or conducted in an asymmetrical fashion. E.g., 'the philosophy of philosophy' or 'the semantics of semantics', etc., *versus* 'the history of philosophy' (as a certain direction taken for historical research) or 'the philosophy of history' (as a certain direction taken for philosophical research).[6] (9)

As history will be later defined as that which arises through the reduplication of 'sixth ordered facts of facts' it can be deemed to be an inter-ordered phenomena in its own right. (10)

But, as philosophy, here, is already being treated as a global phenomenon entering into a multiplicative interaction with history, then that type of 'inter-ordered phenomenon' has already taken on a specifically delineated status, through such increased complexity, as an instance of a 'hyper-ordered phenomenon'. Let me depict this in the form of a representative matrix: I.e. ('philosophy' as 'one-part first ordered phenomenology,

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5 'Non-systematic is a way of signaling that we are dealing with the so-called third moment of resolution (Ego) and not a more fully developed theoretical sense and experiential semblance of the existential orientation *per se*.

6 Note that asymmetrical (re)duplication through multiplicative interaction is also non-commutative. I.e., the 'history of philosophy' as 'history' is not the same as 'the philosophy of history' as 'philosophy'.

one-part fifth ordered hermeneutics, and one-part third ordered non-systematic existential') x ('history' as 'the six ordered facts x six ordered facts'). Or, in a simplified notation:

$(1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0) \times (6^0 \times 6^0)$ = (the philosophy of history) (11)

Now, the simple question could be asked, does it make sense to discuss, say, 'the philosophy of philosophy', or, 'the semantics of semantics (as the phenomenology of phenomenology)', etc? (12)

Why not! If we can point to texts deemed to be on the (inter-ordered) topic of a 'history of philosophy' (as an example of historical research) or a 'philosophy of history (as a distinctive discipline that is philosophically looking at the nature of historical research)', then we should be able to approach this inter-ordered topic of a 'philosophical appreciation of its own discipline', etc. (13)

But, in the adoption and adaptation of an inter-ordered approach, just what might be entailed? (14)

In a philosophy of transformational (re)treatment, 'appreciation' is regarded as 'taking a position of inspection whose meta-status is elevated by one meta-degree'. (15)

Just as, e.g., truth is applied to the sentence that depicts a certain integrated semantic mapping of elements (M), be they either participants or parts, etc. So, a certain semantic mapping (M) of a certain situation is considered to be 'true' (T) if(f) that as mapped, m, correctly maps that being mapped:

I.e., M is T iff m. (16)

But, appreciation also brings to our attention the fact that the appreciation of that being appreciated is not that which is being appreciated! Just as 'the heat of heat' is 'neither hot nor cold' being the conceptual notion of 'temperature'. (17)

This reduplicated state of affairs, as a symmetrical form of multiplicative interaction, can be expressed by the formula:

The *x* of *x* is not-*x*, and can be treated as either meta-*x* and/or non-*x*. (18)

Here, we can introduce the idea of the 'metaphysical', in a broad sense, as 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical', i.e., 'the philosophy of philosophy as meta-philosophy or non-philosophy'. (19)

I.e., an appreciation of how certain philosophical concerns, as themes, are framed in the context of their philosophical treatment (and subsequent retreatment through process of regularization, depiction of their ramifications, the contrast of what is not considered to be primarily philosophical, etc.). (20)

Or, in a much more narrow sense as a form of categorical metaphysics (dealing with the semantic mapping of phenomena in general terms of reference) by arguing that the semantics of semantics (as phenomenologically exercised) results in an inter-ordered phenomenon, or product, that is not-semantic, being either a meta-semantics and/or a non-semantics, i.e., as a 'categorical metaphysics'. (21)

I.e., a categorical metaphysical sub-discipline dealing with the apparent objectivity of (embodied) participants and parts, the interobjectivity of time and space, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and other notions falling within or between these categories, etc. (22)

Now, I must confess, that these two definitions of the metaphysical, as just noted, hide a 'scandalous' background. After years of avoiding this topic of the metaphysical, given eons of well-deserved philosophical criticism of this type of topic, I had recently approached this subject and, separately, ended up as formulating two definitions. But, shock horror, I discovered that these two definitions, ostensively, were quite different. So, how do I harmonize this apparent anomaly? (23)

Looked at closely, we can immediately see that both definitions are forms of symmetrical reduplication. Namely, a 'phenomenological-semantics of a phenomenological-semantics' *versus* a 'philosophy of philosophy' (as a 'philosophical appreciation of the philosophical'). Furthermore, given my global interpretation of the philosophical as one-part phenomenological, etc., then it follows that a 'phenomenological-semantics of a phenomenological-semantic' can be non-problematically viewed as an intersection to be explicated within the philosophical field as a subset in which we focus more on a categorical orientation (as to how these semantic categories are linguistically indicated and explicated within the context of how they are being mapped *vis-à-vis* each other, etc.). (24)

So, in this manner, effectively, this problem is diffused. However, as an observation, 'when one door closes a number of other doors can open', or, as a more brutal observation, one solution can soon mutate to become 'a veritable can of worms'. Let me explain why these observations are being noted... (25)

Why persist with two definitions when proffering a third is now one more definition to have to deal with when, surely, 'the more the merrier'? In wishing to carve out an 'existential metaphysics', the metaphysical landscape upon which we can discern and differentiate the relatively existential from the relatively non-existential, whilst recognizing their interrelationship to the extent that 'the relatively existential is the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential', I set about thinking how philosophical appreciation could possibly take on board an 'existential turn' metaphysically speaking. But, more about that shortly... (26)

Now, this narrow definition of the metaphysical, as a form of categorically oriented metaphysics, could be treated as somewhat 'passive' in outlook, whereas, in contrast, we might like to perceive a process of philosophical appreciation as potentially able to contribute to a more active approach as to how we might deal with philosophical issues,

the manner of their resolution, what ramifications such patterns of resolution might proffer a possibly more profitable re-direction in how we might be able to re-direct the course of our lived-experience, as enacted both individually and collectively, etc. Hence, we might like to think of this more broad definition of the metaphysical, realized through carefully performed processes of philosophical appreciation, as a more 'active' approach to a resolution of what is found to be philosophically problematic over the course of our philosophical reflections. Now, I am not immediately suggesting such problems are necessarily addressed and fully redressed by such an approach, still, the ability to clearly formulate a problematic issue might at least lead us in the direction to eventually oversee either its effective resolution or our seeing that no effective resolution could ever exist for that type of problem. Being optimist in this regard, I would envisage that forms of resolution could be articulated in either conventional terms of reference; critical philosophical terms of implementation; and/or possibly radical forms of resolution involving new and novel so-called 'final vocabularies', the ironic formation of definitive histories (in which 'what cannot be historically said' is duly deconstructed and circumscribed, etc.), the innovative reform of old disciplines and/or the formulation of new disciplines through interdisciplinary hybridization, and so on and so forth. (27)

This distinction of the critical *versus* the radical, and v.v., will soon be looked at in the non-economic context of a non-philosophy... (28)

Now, I would like to think of an 'existential metaphysics' as 'an existential-appreciation of an existential-appreciation' as very much an 'engaged metaphysics' (rather than as either a passive or active metaphysically oriented form of philosophical practice). I.e., as forming both a critical and radical component in how we engage with this world at large given that the realization of our personal ambitions and social aspirations can only be conducted through ongoing forms of arbitration, hopefully of an existential complexion, in which our enactions (of either actions, non-actions, and/or inactions [with the latter concerning either the temporary postponement of our making decisions or their permanent deferral]) are conducted for the general enrichment of our relationships (be that through either their creation, preservation, and/or conservational expansion of their overall e/valuational formations). (29)

My use of the expression 'e/valuational formation'[7] technically implies that the value generated in the second order of the aesthetical, the third order of the deontological, and the fourth order of the pragmatical (in terms of functional utility) is not to be confused with the 'value' of the other three orders, and, that in trans-intentional evaluation, as a process of judgment, we find the formation and delivery of intentional forms of valuation (some of which are value oriented, as pertaining to the second, third and fourth trans-cognitive orders, and, where other forms of valuation are not so directly value oriented in terms of such 'values'). (30)

Now, I also intimated that we might have 'a veritable can of worms' on 'our doorstep', so to speak. If the reduplication of the first order gives us a categorical metaphys-

[7] Which can be read (out loud) as either' evaluational formation' or 'evaluational and valuational (in) formation'

ics, then why do we need to stop there?! Surely the reduplication of the second order, e.g., in the form of an aesthetic-like integration of events and facts, etc., as transcribed in molecular propositions already treated as in the public domain would merely compound this seemingly fractious form of a metaphysics where we now have nine styles of meta-physical practice, namely, the six ordered variants, when viewed as relatively passive in tenor, as relatively active, and, as the relatively engaged in orientation (when its promised definition is duly discussed and defined, etc.). (31)

Should this bountiful harvest of meta-physical styles in textual discourse be an embarrassment of riches? No, I do not think that type of thought is applicable. As I have already pointed out, so far, at least, they all fall within an inter-ordered pattern of reduplication centered within the apparent confines of the sole embrace of the philosophical discipline. (32)

Now, at the current center of this edifice is this concept of an 'order'. I claim that in trans-cognitive terms of reference, as judgments *qua* judgment, when duly catalogued, they signal that there are six distinctive types of judgment, namely, the phenomenologically-semantic, aesthetical, etc. How might I account for this state of affairs without resorting to an inventory of judgmental types and demonstrating, phenomenologically, that there are just six types of judgment and six types alone within these ordered terms of reference? I believe that this question can be effectively resolved on economic grounds. Let me explain. (33)

These so-called 'orders' can be generated on economic grounds, and, by such means we arrive at the requisitely ordered six-fold economy in question. So, e.g., in forms of semantic exploration and scrutiny we are more directly focusing on intentional objectivity to the extent we attempt to re(-)experience certain relatively atomic-like types of experience in order to clearly map the same *vis-à-vis* their essential-like phenomenal-phenomenological[8] presentation and the conventional manner of their semantic conjugation in seemingly viable molecular propositions. So, e.g., table-tops come with both a variety of (non-contradictory) shapes and colours, but, idea cannot be so depicted (except metaphorically or poetically). (34)

In other words, orders presuppose an archetypal economy in which we can envisage processes focusing on either intentional objectivity (in the form of a phenomenal-phenomenological focus on certain phenomenological presentations distinctively present-

[8] The formula 'phenomenal-phenomenological presentation' is adopted in order to indicate that the manufacturing of their mapped identity is a two-way process. Just as we might wish to drink our cup of tea, but, being too hot at this moment in time, we are consequently prevented by that tea itself from doing so (and in the process destroying the over-blown idea of the subjective-idealist that the mind totally constitutes the entirety of experience from its own point of view without reference to an imputed objective reality of objects, object-states, objectives, from their 'points of view', etc., given no definitive internal-external distinction/s, and, that there necessarily exists the intersubjectivity arising through forms of communication with others, which could not be otherwise, within both our cultures and between cultures. Honestly, the very idea of a solipsistic philosophy can only be envisaged non-solipsistically, and, thereby, deconstructing the very possibility of any absolutistical form of both such an impossible idea and world. In the same vein, ideologically defective forms of a unimodal, bimodal nature, etc., in not being able to be thought economically can have no existence, neither extra-economically nor intra-economically!).

ed in and through certain pre-defined types of textually oriented experience as phenomenologically mapped), and/or, a meta-textual shifting of our awareness (to the hermeneutically oriented performance of certain genres of behaviour), and/or, a non-textual, non-systematic existential-like simulation of experiences (dealing with harmonic resolution, etc., as we grapple with the concrete specificity of lived historical experience, etc.). Or, more simply, in the formation of a textual economy (of textual depositions, meta-textual genres, and non-textually oriented simulations) we learn to juggle the intersection of a foreground textual analysis, a background textual synthesis, and the subjectivity of a plethora of intentional-types of subjective experience concerned with nomination, self-nomination, and other-nomination) (all within the economic confines of an overall economically constituted economy[9]). (35)

Archetypally, an economy is trimodally constituted around these three archetypal moments of Object, Ego, and World (respectively mirroring foreground focus, background field, and their interaction in the form of a co-associated sense of subjectivity in keeping with the nature of that current relationship being focused upon). (36)

That upon this trimodal basis a six-fold ordered economy can be erected through the imputation of a subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of these economic correlatives as 'correlativities'. E.g., in subtly preferencing the Object moment we simultaneously de-preference the moments of both Ego and World with a highlighting of an interest on a first ordered articulation of phenomenal-phenomenological forms of semantics expression. Or, to shift to a second ordered concern, we now concentrate on an integrated-aesthetics as we now subtly preference both Object and Ego moments in conjunction with the oppositional de-preferencing of the World moment in this ordered scheme. Similarly, a third order of (the non-systematic existential orientation of) the de-ontological is arrived at by preferencing just the Ego moment in an oppositional de-preferencing of both the World and Object moments.[10] That by such a series of preferential/de-preferential manoeuvres we can successfully account for all six orders, as six permutations, as based in this manner on this archetypal sense of the economic. (37)

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[9] I.e., that the overall economy of the economic, is constituted economically, non-economically, and hyper-economically. But this level of exposition will be explored very soon and its relevance to formulating and defining of an 'engaged existential metaphysics' will be accordingly educed.

[10] For your convenience, the table noted in Part II, in paragraph 22, is reproduced for generating these six distinctive orders. The distinctive pattern of preferencing (+), de-preferencing (-), equaling (=) the specific order in question:

+O/-E/-W	=	1^0	Semantical/Phenomenological
+O/+E/-W	=	2^0	Aesthetical
-O/+E/-W	=	3^0	Deontological
-O/+E/+W	=	4^0	Pragmatical
-O/-E/+W	=	5^0	Hermeneutical
+O/-E/+W	=	6^0	Ontical [22]

But, that granted, how should we understand what is involved in these counter-balancing processes of uni-modal and bi-modal forms of preferencing and de-preferencing? (38)

To answer that question, the following solution eventually introduced itself and evolved over time, namely, that forms of a subtle de-preferencing involved forms of suspension whilst subtle forms of preferencing arose through the automatic de-suspension of those subtle forms of suspension. 'Subtle' being defined as 'maintaining an overall suspension, but, by delicately disturbing the balance between these archetypal moments the situation is set up to create, or re(-)create, a distinctive type of experiential behaviour with its correspondingly ordered complexion'. (39)

The invocation of an automatic de-suspension with each and every momentary act of a suspension also solved another problem in the (philosophical) field of transformational retreatment (as my formulation of this approach also evolved over the last forty years). (40)

In transformational treatment (as exercised only under the following three forms of treatment, namely, analysis, synthesis, and nomination[11]) I proposed the universal rule 'that all forms of treatment (of the pretreated product) realize a treatment product elevated in meta-status by one degree'. However, such a rule, as it stands, must also imply an ongoing process of hyper-metafication since each new process of treatment would endlessly promote the ensuing product by one more meta-degree in meta-status.[12] So, to resolve this anomaly, I simply proposed the following *ad hoc* rule, namely, that each process of treatment could return to its original meta-level of pre-treatment through its de-elevation in meta-status by one meta-degree. Problem solved, if only on paper. Eventually, however, this *ad hoc* rule was rendered considerably less *ad hoc* through the invocation of the force of the de-suspension which automatically accompanies the imputation of each and every act of suspension envisaged over the course of that process of ongoing suspension. Thankfully, through this expression of the de-suspension we cannot be eternally trapped within the confines of the suspension (although in processes of either psychosis, pseudo-psychosis, and a qualified possibility of neurosis there may be problems in regards to these mechanisms as to how we either 'enter' and/or 'escape' the relativistic world of the suspension[13]). (41)

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11 As also paralleling, respectively, predications, relations, and nominations.

12 We don't normally live entirely within our heads so to speak. I am reminded, here, of my moving into my current residence in Wentworth Falls. Before moving in, I spent a considerable amount of time working out how to organize my furniture, etc. I amazed the furniture movers by fitting a large table in between two bookshelves in a very small room with less than millimeter to spare. To be honest, I was even more amazed because I did not place a complete confidence in my own calculations given this very small margin of error.

13 With partially incomplete suspensions we get the dogmatic presentation of a pseudo-psychosis. With a non-partially incomplete suspension we get the problematic territory of a psychosis, regardless of whether it is is organic or drug induced, cognitive oriented in schizophrenia, or judgmentally orient in a a sociopathology or a psychopathology, etc. In the imputation of a neurosis I envisage a halving of circadian rhythms, in a being metaphorically 'locked out' of a suspension through the prevalence of certain anxieties, disrupted patterns of emotional education, etc? By 'suspension' is meant my use of an 'extensive suspension' as a more nuanced reading of a 'transcendental suspension'. Refer to *Pursui*t, III.12N.

Now, having sketched out the economic nature of ordered phenomena (as falling under one distinctive pattern of either intentional or trans-intentional (judgmental) behaviour) let me now explore the disciplinary implications of this scheme before moving on, in turn, to the explication of inter-ordered phenomena and their distinctively co-associated disciplines. (42)

Let me list these six orders in an ascending order and note their co-associated discipline or disciplines:

Order	**Trans-Cognitive Order**	**Co-Associated Discipline/s**
6^0	Ontical	Factologist[14]
5^0	Hermeneutical Possibility	Hermeneuticist/Hermeneut[15]
4^0	Pragmatical	Pragmaticist[16]
3^0	Deontological	Deontologist/Existentialist
2^0	Aesthetical	Aesthetician/Artist
1^0	Phenomenological	Phenomenologist/Semanticist

(43)

Now, as a 'philosopher' is defined as a 'globalist', being 'one-part phenomenologist, etc.', it follows that 'the philosophical appreciation of *x*', as an inter-ordered phenomenon, could entail either the subtle preferencing of its phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of *x* and/or it hermeneutical appreciation of *x* and/or its non-systematic existential appreciation of *x* along with any ensuing ordered complexion co-associated with the preferencing/de-preferencing of those three same 'philosophical orientations'. Thence the philosophical complexities and possible ordered options for philosophical appreciation. Hence, in this regard, we can account for some of the philosophical sub-disciplines within the overall discipline of philosophy such as, e.g., the phenomenologist, hermeneuticist, aesthetician, ethicist, etc., etc. (44)

Moreover, we can also take any specific order and subject it to either symmetrical reduplication or asymmetrical duplication or multiplicative interaction. (45)

E.g., with the symmetrical reduplication of the phenomenologically-semantic we get a categorical metaphysics as as already noted. (46)

E.g., with a non-symmetrical duplication of the fifth order of hermeneutical possibility with the sixth order of ontically treated factual assessment we can ascertain, at leasst hypothetically, to what extent certain facts are either possibly true or false, or probably true or false, or even potently true or false (in a relatively more apodictic-like sense,

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[14] A proto-historian interested in formulating and testing the evidential basis of an inventory of facts.

[15] A 'hermeneuticist' is a hermeneut more interested in theoretical-philosophical problems of interpretation, whereas, in contrast, a 'hermeneut' is 'concerned with specific problems in interpretation'.

[16] In distinction to (my distinction of) an existentially oriented pragmatist. A specialist whose interest is in delineating utilitarian forms of expediency, functioning effectiveness, efficaciousness, etc.

such as, e.g., in assessing the foundational fact of the later Roman Empire that Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, etc.), etc. In non-symmetrical forms of multiplicative interaction we should also note their non-commutative, associative status. Just as a 'history of philosophy' as a 'history' is 'not directly an exercise in philosophy'. (47)

With the symmetrical reduplication of the six trans-cognitive (judgmental) orders we can creatively envisage arriving at the following disciplines:

Order	**Trans-Cognitive Reduplication**	**Co-Associated Discipline/s**
6^0	Ontical	Historian
5^0	Hermeneutical Possibility	Scientist
4^0	Pragmatical	Political-Economist
3^0	Deontological	Deontological-Existentialist
2^0	Aesthetical	Psychologist/Sociologist, etc.
1^0	Phenomenological	Categorical Metaphysician[17]

(48)

As suggested, we can arrive at these disciplines above through some degree of creative imagination. (49)

E.g., the facts of facts could be read as forming a history (along with its narration where those imputed interrelationships between those facts being used to support or deconstruct various co-associated historical interpretations of those imputed events, the ramification of those events, etc.). (50)

E.g., the possibilities of possibilities could well be used to carve out the overall discipline of science where its various sub-disciplines would reflect which types of possibilities were being referred to in that specific form of research. So, e.g., in regard to chemicals, along with their interactions and reactions, we would have the discipline of chemistry, and so on. (51)

E.g., in a pragmatics of pragmatics we could well envision the formation of a political-economics and allied disciplines occurring with the same, such as, e.g., politicians, civil servants, social critics, accountants, executives (both political and business related), etc. (52)

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[17] As noted earlier, the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order gave us a categorical metaphysics, and, that these other symmetrically reduplicated ordered products can also be re-perceived to possess their co-associated sense of metaphysical significance. So, e.g., the metaphysical ramifications of the historical discipline could be extended to imply, say, that the metaphysical nature of enaction, as entailed in an engaged metaphysics, and an active metaphysics, can only do so within the limitations of an historical appreciation of identity, etc. All in all, supplying a potentially immense richness to this resuscitated topic of an overall, positive metaphysics (through this additional sourcing of passive contributions, active and engaged contributions within the overall compass of this specific topic that we can note is situated interdependently within the philosophical discipline given its potential ability to both critically and radically emend philosophical research, and v.v.).

E.g., in the symmetrical reduplication of an existential-deontology we might well find the engaged space for an existentially oriented interventionalism as would be practised by existential-pragmatists/pragmatic-existentialists, etc. (53)

E.g., in the reduplication of aesthetically-oriented patterns of integration, I would envisage a cultural space for professionals, and amateurs, dealing with the distinctive type of experience that would fall under the headings of a psychology or a variety of psychologies (whose reduplication/s, in turn, could well be perceived as a form of sociology/sociologies), etc.[18] (54)

E.g., as already noted, the symmetrical reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order reproducing a categorical metaphysics in which the (transcendental limitations imposed on our understanding of time and space, identity, subjectivity, etc., become explored and descriptively outlined when and where this is possible to explicate. (55)

But, why stop there! With the inter-ordered complexities, say, of either the philosophy of philosophy; or the history of science; or the philosophy of science or the ethical consideration of deontological, pragmatical and aesthetic inputs, we now enter the territory of hyper-ordered phenomena.... along with the possibility discovering their practising professionals and amateurs. (56)

Interestingly, in this overall, complex vision of inter-ordered phenomena, along with their co-associated disciplines, we have, more or less, an integrated way of viewing the world of disciplines along with the manner of their intersections with the secular world. As well, it would appear, that we are also presented, with a complex space for the less controversial resuscitation of the discipline of a positive metaphysics along with its co-associated disciplinarians.[19] **Indeed, just what ramifications are there for both metaphysical and non-metaphysical disciplines that might be presented to us through this mapping of inter-ordered phenomena?** (57)

As already noted in this presentation:

The *x* of *x* is not-*x*, and can be treated as either meta-*x* and/or non-*x*. [18] (58)

By such means we can find an introduction to a non-economic philosophy in which virtual patterns of intentional thematization can be understood to take on a non-virtual complexion with the causal implications attendant upon this transformational-transition (from the virtual, non-systematic existential form of input/output being thematized and its progressive realization as a non-virtual, non-systematic existential form of

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[18] By 'etc.' I am implying that this process could continue, say, with the symmetrical reduplication of sociology forming a political space for politicians, etc.

[19] A 'less controversial resuscitation of the discipline of (a positive) metaphysics' as long as we follow the abbreviated dictum (establishing an anti-representational existential-pragmatics) 'deconstruct the negative and re(-)construct the positive' as outlined in the previous book, *Book* 8. Indeed, we could argue that the metaphysical discipline, as both a critical and radical appreciation of the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential discernments of value, form, functions, and limitations of the philosophical discipline, has as much legitimacy as any other inter-ordered discipline, say, history or science, etc!

input/output coincident with the archetypal moment of resolution centered on the Ego polarity). Hence the non-economic ramifications of a non-economic philosophy (and metaphysics given its primary reading as 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical'). (59)

Let me explore the following in order to refine these various parallel forms of understanding, namely, a history of science; a history of history; a philosophy of history; and, a philosophy of philosophy. (60)

Previously, I have argued that we need to invoke this aspect of the non-economic in order to remove ourselves, ever so temporarily or momentarily, from, otherwise, the impossible tyranny of an endless world of mere, inescapable economic circulation. Thence the causal necessity for this role of the non-economic and its formations of unilateral re-directednesses of ensuing moments that would not be there for us if we were to be eternally trapped within the effective suspension of economic circulation! Thankfully, with every suspension we find the automatic invocation of an opposite process of de-suspension to ever rescue us in this same regard. Hence the role of the non-economic is not merely the result of some mere passive form of inter-order appreciation. Of course, the next problem is how to engineer an effective existentialization of this irruption of the non-economic in its first incarnation as the 'non-virtual, non-systematic existential moment' as initially expressed non-economically. The resolution of this philosophical problem, I believe, is quite simple - transmute the non-virtual, non-systematic existential moment into a non-virtual, systematic existential moment through arranging an 'ongoing' dynamic balance or suspension of the overall economy of the economic, non-economic and the hyper-economic. The additional invocation of the latter sub-economy of the hyper-economic being necessitated in order for the relatively-radical to be successfully accommodated through its imputed, incrementally appropriated, hyper-economic re(-)contextualization. Recognizing that the radically-radical just could not be appropriately re(-)contextualized if such innovative transmutations could not be suitably supervised through their re-contextually and re-self-organized modes of re(-)appropriation. That, in the light of this observation, it stands to reason that either critical and/or radical innovations can only be appreciated increment by increment (and, that in the same fashion, the delivery of innovations, themselves, are interactively recognized, encountered, and engaged along the same lines). Thence the necessity for the overall, working imputation of an overall economy of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic. (61)

In the history (H) of science (S) we see 'science' being treated through an historical lens (i.e., S>H) given that the H of S is presenting a 'history' (H) and 'not a science' (-S).

I.e., H/S = H/(S>H) = H/H(-S).[20] (62)

Moreover, given 'the *x*/*x* is -*x*' it follows that the history of history (H) of scientific history (H (-S) must take the non-economic form of -H.

[20] Reading '/' as 'of', as in the *x*/*x* as the *x* 'of' *x*, etc.

I.e., H/H(-S) = -H. (63)

Indirectly, we understand the 'science-history' involved through appreciating the ramifications of the relevant scientific innovations that took place, etc. Still, all this is re-presented more as a 'history' = as an historical narrative (whose motivation, ostensively, is to resolve various overt and/or covert narrational anomalies. But, as 'we are more in love with our narratives', rather 'than overseeing their dissolution through the finality of definitive resolutions' it follows that their effective resolution is more likely to be ever postponed or permanently deferred). (64)

Therefore, we can argue that in the disciplinary form of research involved, say, in the history of science, we will observe that that topic inevitably takes on the form of a history (and not the mere exposition of a scientific theme or observation, etc.). (65)

Therefore, in 'a history of history' we have already recognized its taking on board a non-economic complexion as a meta-history or as a non-economic, non-history:

I.e., the H/H is -H. (66)

Furthermore, we will need to read -H as not just inter-ordered, but, now as hyper-ordered in its overall complexion.

I.e., $(6^0/6^0)$ = H, and, -H is = $(6^0/6^0)/(6^0/6^0)$

...and now, obviously, hyper-ordered.[21] (67)

Then, in focusing on a philosophy of history we can now note the following:

P/H = P/H>P = -P...

Namely, that a philosophy of history has that history now taking on the form of a philosophy, and, where through reduplication that history then takes on the form of non-philosophy (-P). (68)

Then, in the light of previous comments about the nature of transformational treatment taking on an elevation in meta-status by one meta-degree we can also take on board the fact of an automatic process of transformational retreatment, through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension, where the non-philosophical retakes on a philosophical orientation in meta-status (as if on the relative level of the initial object language). (69)

That, as well, a similar phenomenon of transformational retreatment can be applied to truth determinations to the extent that although it is true to perceive the truth of

[21] We could use the following notation to say that $(6^0/6^0)/(6^0/6^0)$ could be notated as $(6^0)^4$, and anything greater than the second power must be hyper-ordered.

statements as applying to their statements and not the (objectively demonstrated) contents of those statements, still, in common parlance we can now retreat those contents as either true or false in status as long as we observe this relatively non-philosophical approach to declarations of truth determination. However, return to the suspension, etc., and we must re-state that all truth declarations, be they either true or false, or undecided, etc., should be re-applied to their attending statements. (70)

Now, in dealing with the metaphysical ramifications of 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' it follows that in a similar fashion we are dealing with a non-economic form of inter-ordered (if not hyper-ordered) productivity, etc. (71)

Just what implications does this portend for this resuscitated discipline of the metaphysical (in our transformational retreatment of the positivity of the metaphysical domain?)? (72)

To complicate this issue I could point out that the process of transformational retreatment observes the progression of the rectification of the hermeneutical processes of pre-treatment; the broad phenomenal-phenomenological deconstruction of the processes of treatment; and, the ensuing ongoing existential re(-)normalization of retreatment (and the posttreatment of initial forms of pretreatment, etc., in the qualified 'completion' of this economy of transformational retreatment). (73)

Or, more directly, that in the pursuit of an anti-representational existential-pragmatics we will need to observe the progressive deconstruction of all impossible forms of a negative nihilism (centered on defective ideological mistreatments that are unimodally, bimodally, absolutistically, and/or relativistically mis-formulated), and, the promotion of all residual forms of an obviously working positive nihilism given that this is 'how things can only be found' in suitably appreciated forms of lived-experience. (74)

So, in attempting to simplify matters, to that extent this is practically possible, in the light of these observations (from transformational retreatment and the necessity for a positive nihilism in our viable interpretations of lived-experience) what ramifications for the pursuit of a viable metaphysical discipline might we draw, i.e., be allowed to be definitively educed? (75)

That a relatively non-controversial metaphysical approach can be demonstrated as long as we adhere to the correct adoption and adaptation of those philosophical guidelines already established as both viable and productive (as noted above and which can be expressed through the abbreviated dictum of 'deconstructing the negative and re(-)constructing the positive). (76)

Let me explore these ramifications of a relatively non-controversial metaphysics and propose the necessity for the presentation of some form of metaphysical motivation to be realized through the necessary co-option (of the requisite intensity and expression of the apposite sense and semblance of) an apparent set of existential sentiments capable of expediting this ensuing process of a 'metaphysically oriented form of focus'. I.e., pro-

ducing a sense of focus on of what is aptly relevant to the metaphysical appreciation of the relational situatedness in question both in existentially oriented terms of reference and in non-existentially oriented terms of reference. As both these orientations are in a dialectical dance with each other it would be neglectful of ourselves to focus entirely on one aspect at the expense of the other party. (77)

Why do this metaphysical form of focus? Just what motivates this progression from these types of economic; non-philosophically, non-economic; and hyper-economically oriented forms of focus? None other than those forms of motivation that seek to existentially comprehend and intervene in the affairs of this world at large! Let me explore this pro-relational sense of perspective that implicates the necessity for our suitably attuned awareness of an existential orientation... (78)

Am I allowed to equate this 'philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' as a 'metaphysical awareness of our relationships' and that such an awareness must also take into account 'the pro-relational nature of the existential'? (79)

As 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' implicates a non-economic, non-philosophical approach, along with its implication of our appreciation of a causal dimension underlying our intentional appreciation of the situatedness in question, all that we now need to establish is an existential dimension be co-established with these same forms of appreciation already to hand. Or, given the existence of a relational form of situational appreciation how could an existential dimension not be co-established in such forms of appreciation?! Let me detail and inter-link the individual arguments within this relatively complex argument... (80)

Philosophical appreciation of the philosophical has been deemed to be both meta-philosophical and non-philosophical (in orientation).[22] (81)

This form of meta-philosophical and non-philosophical focus has been nominated as one definition of the metaphysical (namely as an active definition, as inclusive of a passive set of definitions concerning the categorical metaphysical through the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenological-semantic,[23] and, by extension, the reduplication of the other orders and their equally implicated presentations, respectively, of the categorical presentation of a psychology/psychologies, etc.; of a categorical presentation of a deontological-existentialism (with aesthetic and pragmatic adjuncts); a categorical presentation of a political-economics; a categorical presentation of the scientific; and, a categorical presentation of the historical. And, also, as awaiting an existentially defined theoretical sense and experiential semblance of an 'engaged metaphysics'). (82)

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22 As per paragraphs 18, etc.

23 As per paragraph 46, etc.

That a non-philosophical appreciation implicates a causal dimension through the non-economic moment in the unilateral re-directedness of ensuing moments (both relatively existential and non-existential in tenor).[24] (83)

That the appreciation of the non-economic implicates the necessity for the imputation of a hyper-economic dimension (within the orbit of an overall economy of the economic).[25] (84)

So, now, the underlying questions to be resolved are, "how does the non-virtual, non-systematic existential input/output of the non-economic take on an additional existential complexion given its relatively non-existential complexion?" and, "why should we believe that a pro-relational attitude covertly reveals and overtly expresses the sense and semblance of a systematic version (or vision) of the existential?" (85)

This second question is resolved once we understand that 'a relational appreciation of the relational is not-relational *per se* but existential in tenor (being emergently 'non-relational' in complexion and not able to be reduced to the merely relational *per se*)'! (86)

The first question is resolved should that moment arise when we immediately come to understand that 'through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential a process of existentialization is automatically set in play (be that left either relatively obstructed or relatively non-obstructed by the party or parties in a position to experience some degree and form of its non-obstruction). (87)

Now given the relational *qua* relational is not relational *per se*, being both meta-relational and non-relational, and, being metaphysical (by definition) it would follow that the metaphysical must be accordingly constituted. That, in effect, in an appreciation of the relational this pro-relational stance would and should reveal, admittedly through careful scrutiny, this non-relational, trans-relational complexion of our current situatedness in the context of that relationship. That this non-reducible, emergent aspect is none other than this apparent semblance of the existential in which we become attuned to this existential excess or surplus in e/valuational formation arising in the situational uniqueness of that situation in question. (88)

Moreover, this excess or surplus, I would like to contend, also has the power of initiating and re-directing patterns of enaction that could be considered to be either non-existential in tenor and/or existential in complexion. If this initiation of enactive behaviour (through either the ensuing action, non-action, and/or the inaction of either postponement or deferral) be granted then it follows that at least non-existentially oriented behaviours are being initiated. But, there can be no pure non-existentially oriented behaviours because such orientations are that, namely 'orientations', and so it merely behooves us to understand how non-existentially oriented behaviour can be existentialized for us to understand how the relatively non-existential can be transmuted into existentially orien-

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[24] As per paragraph 26.

[25] As per paragraph 61

tated patterns of behaviour. In this latter regard, I would like to contend that in an 'ongoing' dynamic balance of the economic moments in the overall economy of the economic that this process of existentialization would be duly observed (as when duly attested in the expression of patterns of behaviour deemed to be existential in tenor through the confirmed or verified identification of validated existential hallmarks, indicators and predictors, or, in finding an affirmational approbation when generally expressed as the persistence of positive consequences when we find the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion in the progressive richness and enrichment of relational experience). That this force for the ensuing existentialization of experience can be found through the well-informed and well-exercised (and maintained extensive) suspension along with the unilateral re-directedness of the non-economic as entailed in the imputation of the automatic expression of the de-suspension itself! (89)

How might we succinctly summarize this complex argument (for the existentialization of the relatively non-virtual, non-systematic existential, non-economic moment in the overall economy of the economic as it pertains to its dynamically balanced interrelations of its economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic moments)? (90)

That the imputation of an overall dynamic suspension of the economic moments of the economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic should automatically existentialize the relatively non-systematic, non-existential orientation of the initial unilaterally re-directed moment of the non-economic and, therein and thereafter, for a certain period of time, ensure its relatively systematic existential import and subsequent imprint upon those ensuing patterns of behaviour through the imputation of the automatic invocation of a de-suspension initiated within the orbit of that sense and semblance of the overall economy of the economic. Or, in other words, the overall economy of the economic, in the same manner as its economic incorporation, should be able to unleash a de-suspension, on its own terms, at the level of the overall economic able to impart this more systematic sense of the existential. (91)

Now, given this possibility for an all too easy confusion of the 'merely economic' with the 'overall economic' let me clarify this distinction as one between the 'sub-economic' and the 'overall economic'. Now, admittedly, it would be tempting to merely rename the latter as the 'hyper-economic', but, in further research into the economics of the hyper-economic it would be better to disentangle and not conflate these three sub-economics of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic (even though any one of these three economies could be used, albeit with some degree of care, to re-name this 'overall economy of the economic'). (92)

Given these arguments that have now re-defined, by implication, the 'metaphysical domain' as an arena for 'an existential metaphysics of engagement' just how should we, therefore, philosophically view the ensuing resuscitation of this discipline? Namely, as a metaphysical realm of endeavour, when suitably exercised, for the expedition of our existential involvement and intervention in this world at large, this overall world-of-life! (93)

That granted, if only hypothetically, let me now explore the ramifications of this re-defined form of identification between the 'metaphysical' and the 'existential'. To do this, I will briefly summarize these ramifications, each as serious points of discussion, under the following five headings: **pragmatic re(-)positioning; anti-representationalism; inter-ordered recognition; intuitive appreciation; and,** (the development of our) **existential motivation**. Namely, our need to work only within a truly pragmatic philosophy; through observing an anti-representationalism from promoting a positive nihilism; as exercising a pro-relational, trans-relational openness to the situation to hand centered in an embrace of a deontological non-exclusiveness; in which we need to recognize the inter-ordered complexities of the economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic, etc., intuitively appreciate the unfolding of the richness and enrichment that can be unleashed from processes of apposite existential engagement, all expedited through the co-development of both our existential intuition and motivation. (95)

With my tongue in my cheek, I have declared the resuscitation of this discipline of the metaphysical to be 'relatively non-controversial'...[26] **provided we do not stray beyond the suitable observance of a pragmatic philosophy as has been re-defined over the course of the unfolding of my more recent research as entailed within *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*. In brief, doing what is allowed and not doing what is not allowed, be the latter impossible, possible, unproductive, or forbidden. That in this exposition a space has been cleared for the pursuit of the metaphysical as a realm in which the existential sphere of influence is to be both duly recognized and engaged...** (96)

Furthermore, how is a pragmatic philosophy to be suitably exercised? Through correctly observing an anti-representationalism. How is this specific frame of mind to be duly performed? Through the utilization of a well-informed and well-exercised performance of extensive suspensions in which we deconstruct all ideologically defective forms of a negative nihilism as expressed through the excessive adherence to impossible forms of extreme unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism and relativism, and, through promoting the residue of all viable forms of a positive nihilism that remain through the continued use of such extensive suspensions... (97)

To assist us in understanding that there is a place for the metaphysical, despite well-deserved forms of historical criticism, we need to entertain an awareness of inter-ordered phenomena (as briefly sketched out in this introductory presentation). Thence this disquisition on ordered phenomena along with inter-ordered and hyper-ordered phenomena. Moreover, in an understanding of the reiterated 'economics' of the overall economy of the economic we are presented with a deeper understanding as to how the relatively virtual nature of intentional phenomena can be enacted as relatively non-virtual in orientation, and where the non-systematic existential expressions of the non-economic can be transmuted within the sphere of the hyper-economic through a relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existen-

[26] Paragraph 76. Of course, it can be re-rendered controversial by either disputing or misinterpreting these provisional philosophical guidelines as are being developed within this *Book* 9.

tial obtained through the exercising of an ongoing dynamic suspension of the overall economy of the economic... (98)

That all this depends upon the development of our existential intuition. In a recognition that there is this domain of existential richness and enrichment that can be discerned through a pro-relational, trans-relational appreciation of our relationships as they are found situated in a world of relational experience. Through an observance of existential hallmarks, indicators and predictors... as met in our reflections upon our coursing through this world at large... as we hone our abilities to recognize this much overlooked dimension in our making our passages, both individually and collectively, through this overall world-of-life. All in all, as arrived at in and through our contemplating our passive existence with(-)other, how we actively stand before(-)others, and engage our freedoms-to-be-realized through(-)others as exercised in and through an arbitration of our social aspirations and personal ambitions... all prioritized, over time, through acts of navigation (around others) and negotiation (with others)... (99)

Where the motivation for an existential attitude is fostered through the positive, and harmonic development of our existential sentiments. No intentions can be discharged without the apposite form of motivation. Hence the need for the necessary degree of an alignment between our affective emotions, cognitive directions, and the resolve of our existential sentiments. Where the requisite degree of existential intensity needs to be felt in order to suitably intervene in this world at large on the behalf of our relationships, both individually and collectively. Now, whether existential sentiments are all too numerous to identify[27] **or are merely mirrored refractions of but one judgmental formation is neither here nor there in this required existential intensification of experience in order to perform what is deontologically expected of us in terms of our primary relationships, albeit as dialectically situated and interpreted in this overall world of the relational. Hopefully, without a doubt, we can now safely find a place for this metaphysical discipline - a considerable mansion in its own right with many rooms, albeit as firmly entailed and enmeshed within the disciplinary community of this philosophical township or city, as a conclave of philosophers, metaphysicians, other disciplinarians, secularist... all, hopefully, working together within the realm of the politically-economic in the universal hope of overseeing a better expedition of our freedom-to-be in this world-of-life, as to-be-realized both individually and collectively... despite all our limitations involved in the very being of our being in this world-of-life, this life-world perhaps best reviewed as a metaphysical sense of place where our emplacement is not much more than 'a trace traced out upon a trace'... in a realm with neither feet nor footprints... as potentially as joyful as the bursting of bubbles... as we await the existential richness and enrichment of each and every moment despite, and in spite of, the state of our current lot in life..!!**[28] (100) Noël Tointon, Penrith, 2.9.23.

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[27] E.g., optimism, honesty, integrity, authenticity, faithfulness, truthfulness, heart-felt affection, etc.

[28] We are all constrained by our emplacement, displacement and de-displacement; by our embodiment, embeddedness, and embankment within this world at large. Unfortunately, some people are more

A Simplified Approach to this Topic: An Introductory Presentation…

1. The advertised blurb on Facebook read:

An Introductory Presentation to Book 9.

This essay is titled:

12V. The Re(-)Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical
Along with the Re(-)Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas
Through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena

This Introductory Presentation introduces the idea of inter-ordered phenomena in order to find a complex sense of space for the relatively non-controversial resurrection of the metaphysical discipline. By 'inter-ordered' is simply meant the reduplication of forms of e/valuation to produce different fields of endeavour. E.g., 'the history of science', 'the philosophy of science', 'the history of history' - as a certain type of discipline, etc. Tentatively defining 'metaphysics' as 'the philosophical appreciation of the sphere of the philosophical discipline' (as a form of either meta-philosophy and/or non-philosophy). In the process exploring both inter-ordered phenomena and how the discipline of metaphysics can be re-purposed in terms of the former.

First, in order to introduce an important point of clarification, let me note that I should not have used the word 'resurrection' in regard to this topic of metaphysics. Rather, the word should have been 'resuscitation'. In dividing the overall field of metaphysics into a 'negative metaphysics' and a 'positive metaphysics' I wish only to resuscitate the latter. This metaphysics, as a metaphysics of existential experience, is never absent from our experience of the world of the relational even if overlooked, sadly, more often than not. On the other hand, a negative metaphysics, based on a negative nihilism, being impossible, never possessed a metaphorical 'body' in the first place. Being only conjured up as a 'ghost', as a' zombie' or 'specter', we could never re-animate that 'corpse' because it cannot possess one. In contrast, a positive metaphysics, based on the pragmatics of a positive nihilism is in no need of resurrection. Hence, furthermore, an oblique reference to the abbreviated motto explored in the *Book* 8: 'deconstruct the negative and re(-)construct the positive (referring to these two kinds of nihilism.[29] (101)

2. By 'order' is meant:

One of six distinctive types of e/valuational formation (value) of which three are deemed to be more correctly 'value/s' in orientation, namely, second ordered aes-

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constrained than others, less free, as a reflection of the type of political-economy within which they must endure, suffer, and survive...

[29] Refer to footnote 2. The nomenclature of '(-)' expresses an ongoing trimodal economy which, in this instance is between construction, reconstruction and re-construction.

thetical value, third ordered deontological value, and fourth ordered pragmatical value. The remaining three orders are first ordered phenomenological or semantical e/valuation; fifth ordered hermeneutical e/valuation of potentiality or possibility, and sixth ordered factual or ontical e/valuational formation.[30] Hence these six trans-cognitive types of ordered judgment:

1^0 Phenomenological (semantical) evaluation
2^0 Aesthetical evaluation
3^0 Deontological evaluation
4^0 Pragmatical evaluation
5^0 Hermeneutical (potential) evaluation
6^0 Ontical (factual) evaluation. (102)

3. Now, these orders give us the following disciplines when pursued as a topic of expertise:

1. Phenomenologist/semanticist
2. Aesthetician/ artists
3. Deontologists/pragmatic-existentialists
4 Pragmaticists (and not pragmatists)[31]
5 Hermeneuticists/hermeneuts[32]
6 Factologists (proto-historians) (103)

4. 'Orders' as heuristic devices:

As a heuristic device these orders have work to do. E.g., defusing category mistakes, supplying a basis for transformational rules that allow us to go from one order to another, etc. The overall merit of such techniques needs to be critically explored before being dismissed (rather than being merely dismissed through their non-comprehension). One of these additional uses for this device is to supply a theoretical basis for inter-ordered phenomena. (104)

5. Inter-ordered phenomena

By 'inter-ordered' is meant 'the entirety of this ordered approach' including either their symmetrical reduplication e.g., the facts of facts as forming a (basis for the understanding of) history [6^0 x 6^0],

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30 The expression 'e/valuational formation' notes that trans-cognitive, trans-intentional judgmental processes deliver intentional judgments as the cognitive content of those acts. As judgmental acts we are dealing primarily with trans-intentional orders of the phenomenological (semantic), aesthetical, deontological, pragmatical, hermeneutical, and ontical types of ordered e/valuation; where evaluations produce the corresponding cognitive forms of valuation. However, cognitive valuations have a different ordering to trans-cognitive evaluations (and are not dealt with in this essay).

31 'Pragmaticists' are seen as 'specialists dealing with expediency, effectiveness, efficaciousness, etc.

32 'Hermeneuticists' as 'theoretical hermeneuts', whereas, 'hermeneutics' set out to resolve specific problems in interpretation.

versus,

asymmetrical duplication e.g., the phenomenological treatment of aesthetical experiences $[1^0 \times 2^0]$. (105)

Therefore, in this scheme, history can be viewed as an inter-ordered phenomenon $[6^0 \times 6^0]$ whereas, more correctly, semantics might be viewed as an ordered phenomenon (but for convenience all such phenomena can be viewed as 'inter-ordered' including the hyper-ordered). (106)

Furthermore, philosophy has been defined (by myself) as one-part first ordered phenomenological-semantics, one-part fifth ordered hermeneutics, and, one-part third ordered (non-systematic) existentialism, i.e., $[1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0]$. (107)

With one definition of a positive metaphysics being 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' this, as an ordered matrix, can be represented as:

$[1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0] \times [1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0]$ (108)

Then, with a positive categorical metaphysics being defined as:

$[1^0 \times 1^0]$ (109)

…we can note its potential intersection of entailment (U), in an ordered matrix representing the positive philosophical appreciation of the philosophical as the metaphysical (represented above):

$[1^0 \times 1^0] \cup [1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0] \times [1^0 + 5^0 + 3^0]$ (110)

6. The 'hyper-ordered' as 'neither ordered nor strictly inter-ordered in status'

Now as history as a symmetrical product of the sixth order is $[6^0 \times 6^0]$ and science is $[5^0 \times 5^0]$ then their (non-commutative) asymmetrical product represented as $[6^0 \times 6^0] \times [5^0 \times 5^0]$ must be hyper-ordered (by definition). (111)

7. That the disciplinary world can be represented in an ordered format

Ideally, in forms of a specific ordering (with examples as above) in which the complex topic of a positive metaphysics can be seen to occupy a number of overlapping ordered positions. Furthermore, that disciplines can be creatively represented by an ordered format. Where from simple ideas, through the possibility of reduplication and duplication, an innovative complexity can progressively emerge…. (112)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 7.10.23.

Postscript

Immediately between this presentation and the writing of my first conference paper for 2023 I had come to the radical understanding that inter-ordered phenomena cannot be suitably appreciated without being inserted into the conventional recognition of some form of a systematic situatedness that notes both its contextualization and its systematization within what I term to be the 'openness' of the Political-Economy. As it stands, this current presentation is a detailed introduction to inter-ordered phenomena. Inter-ordered phenomena form the enduring stability of what I now term to be the 'topic', say, history or science, in which the 'exposition' takes on a more specific stance as to how that topic is to be textually unraveled, hopefully, in an informed fashion able to achieve the objectives of either that text, or series and/or set/s of texts, i.e., its 'textual situation'. Inescapable is the fact that all textual production occurs within its co-associated systematic emplacement. So, e.g., the topic of history is written in regard to either the formal *de jure* situatedness of actually being in academia, or, in a relatively less *de facto* set of situated influences that are equivalent to the former, say, as a member in various historical societies, a readership for history in non-academic settings, friends with whom one could discuss your research or reflections, etc. Hence these three levels of textual explication, namely, the inter-ordered topic, the transformational evolution of the exposition; and, its systematic contextualization (both in terms of its spatio-temporal and cultural situatedness, and, its systematic cultural emplacement). Now, although this might sound far too complex and impractical to take up in a useful manner the truth of the matter is quite the opposite. Indeed, the stability of the topic immediately puts the pursuit of research on a relatively firm footing (in phenomenological and economic terms of reference). Similarly, the hyper-economic dimension of the systematic is basically an expression of conventional forms of hermeneutic formulations (that set the stage for what is to be considered as problematic and what could count as a resolution of such problematicity). That leaves the course of the exposition as being arrived at through non-economic forms of intervention (that, hopefully, will also take on an existential complexion). Therefore, as a second introduction to this *Book* 9, given these radical shifts in my thinking, the next essay aims to be more comprehensive by unfolding upon a much wider stage in order to better account for these various aspects of topics, expositions, and their systematic emplacements within the 'open' embrace of the Political-Economy… (113) N.T., 27.10.23.

12W. The Disciplining of Disciplines:
The Systematic Circumscription of Inter-Ordered Disciplines
Within the Open Boundaries of the Political-Economy:
A First Conference Paper for 2023
Dealing with the Evolving Motivation behind the Formation of Book 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12W. The Disciplining of Disciplines: The Systematic Circumscription of Inter-Ordered Disciplines Within the Open Boundaries of the Political-Economy: A First Conference Paper for 2023 Dealing with the Evolving Motivation behind the Formation of *Book* 9*[33]

0. Preamble

In my recently completed *The Seventh Book*… I sketched out an overview of this topic titled 'inter-ordered phenomena' and it was my hope in this current book to merely detail what had already been briefly mapped out. The only complication was my discovery that in two different essays I had inadvertently supplied two different definitions of the 'metaphysical'. However, as both these definitions were variants on a concept called 'reduplication' I had, more or less, merely restated the same ideas but from two different levels in generality and that all I then had to do was to demonstrate this isomorphism being entertained alike by both definitions. But, then, to these same proceedings I also wanted to bring a concept of 'metaphysical engagement' that lays out an epistemological basis for understanding the nature and expression of the concept of 'existential engagement'. Completing this book by proffering a defense of the 'metaphysical' as needing not much more than a dynamic approach and appreciation of our relationships, albeit as seen from the overlooked dimension of an existential perspective. Genuinely believing that this short book, if it could be called that, would be completed well before my arriving at, say, fifty pages or so. But what insight do I have? I am merely the author hunched over a computer trying to make sense of these few ideas I have been given to work with? (1)

For a start, one of my philosophical friends merely uttered a very simple observation that, again, caught me totally off guard. Given we are in an era of cultural and technological innovations then it stands to reason that society, in all probability, will have a new set of problematic issues to have to deal with in conjunction with those it has also inherited. It also stands to reason that we cannot assume we already have to hand a set of precedents with which to successfully address and redress such issues. Therefore, it must follow that a responsive and responsible appropriation of such issues will most likely not be a state of affairs that can be immediately accomplished and will need time for us to both suitably respond to the same and be in a position to suitably appreciate the potential merits, or otherwise, of such responses. Indeed, that in order to achieve this successful level of responsible re(-)positioning implies that we cannot merely exercise a superficial

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[33] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html The initial emphasis of this *Book* 9 was to map out in more detail the nature of inter-ordered phenomena (including ordered, inter-ordered, and hyper-ordered phenomena) as first sketched out in T*he Seventh Book*... But, as noted, the center of gravity has shifted to the political-economic embedding of semi-autonomous systems and their cultivation of inter-ordered disciplines along with transformational possibilities of communication between the same. That the development of this infrastructure was necessary in order to provide the groundwork for the more effective resolution of social anomalies both Traditional and Contemporary (where the novelty of the latter could only have arisen through recent cultural and technological transformations of the marketplace, etc., and which, obviously, need our non-superficial awareness as to how we might be better able to deal with whatever is found to be problematic there, and so on.

appreciation and to this end we need an in-depth, suitably detailed appreciation of the social structures and functions in order to sufficiently understand the very contours of our responses and by what mechanism such responses could possibly resolve those issues and do so in a responsible manner… (2)

In other words, in a response to social and technological innovations a superficial appreciation of the social dimension will in all probability not help us in that regard! (3)

Armed with that simple understanding, that 'deep problems demand deep solutions', I almost immediately stumbled upon the work of the German sociologist Niklaus Luhmann (1927-1998) often placed in a contrasting juxtaposition with the philosopher Jûrgen Habemas (born 1929). (4)

Luhmann notes that the complexity of society is constituted through a set of semi-autonomous, auto-poetic systems operating in an environment that is richer than any one systematic-like structure. As a simple observation, we can see about us a number of such systems (within what I call 'the Political-Economy', albeit when capitalized I am referring to this 'systematic-background' and not the discipline of 'political-economics' *per se*), and, without being exhaustive in a listing of these apparent systems, we would find, e.g., Academia; the Legal Fraternity; the World of Business; Political Establishments; Sports and Recreational Venues; the Restaurant Trade; and so on. I would like to nominate the Political-Economy as this much richer, complex background environment within which these systems are situated, where they are semi-independent, auto-poetically self-constituting, whilst also reacting with and communicating between each other, etc. (5)

So, e.g., to more fully appreciate a topic like 'history', say, 'the writing of a biography' or 'exploring the evolution of the Russo-Ukrainian War', we need to appreciate its systematic situatedness, to some extent, be that either *de jure* or *de facto,* as being primarily sited within the system of 'Academia' (with such systems will be capitalized). So, let us imagine a certain professor of history in a well-known university is writing a certain biography. Or, in a contrast, we could imagine a certain journalist writing a history of this war as was just cited. The latter, in doing their research, will probably find themselves continually alluding to certain prominent news aggregators involved in this business of assembling and assessing daily news items concerning this war in a pursuit I have discussed under the rubric of 'doing histories of the present'[34]. Now, a point stressed in my discussion on these histories of the past, present and, future is that no researcher is ever alone, and that this observation is more formally attested to by Luhmann in his observation that (all) disciplines function within the embrace of such systems. Such an observation. I should quickly add, is 'observational' and has nothing to do whatsoever with misguided notions about so-called 'absolute philosophies' or the totalizing notion of a 'systematic philosophy', or similar.[35] (6)

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[34] The reader can refer to apposite essays on this topic in *Book* 6.

[35] Working somewhat towards such an impossible goal could be relatively' successful as long as we are insightful enough to realize the current limitations that are in place or to what extent innovative advancements can only replace and re-qualify the former extent of those limitations. Basically, the same attitude that is to be entertained towards economic correlativities, i.e., can be 'moved towards' but never attained, neither obtained nor appropriated.

As for their 'emplacement within a rich, inter-systematic environment', I would merely like to nominate the 'Political-Economy' for this role, noting, that conveniently to hand, in Book 4, I have already a 3 x 3 matrix depicting the political economy.[36] Furthermore, this 3 x 3 matrix used to intuitively represent the political-economy, can now be put on a much stronger theoretical basis in which these nine segments, divided between the three poles of economic correlativity, reflect a new way of viewing the overall economy of the economic, namely, as that being divided between the hyper-economic hermeneutics of habit; the economics of a phenomenology involved in a semantic mapping of our cultural world/s as lived; and the potential existentialism of a non-economically directed involvement and intervention within 'this world as lived', within 'this world at large' or 'overall world-of-life'. (7)

A profound shift in direction has been undergone. As much as it is tempting to think along *a priori* lines and assume we can discover everything we need to know about an inter-ordered phenomenon like, e.g., history, and our inter-ordered treatment of it as merely the symmetrical reduplication of sixth ordered 'facts' without such systematic emplacements no disciplines and their topics could even be significantly thought through to begin with! Ask yourself the following questions. Merely thinking about the topic of philosophy could we have ever imagined the scenario where 'natural philosophy eventually divided, historically, into science, psychology, and the discipline of philosophy as it is currently understood, more or less, in (various cultural representations of) Academia? Or, similarly, could we imagine the necessity for amalgamating both politics and economics within some form of 'the political-economy', as a discipline, indeed, as some systematic form of a representation of the Political-Economy (designated with capitals) in order to better understand the adverse dynamics and ramifications of the Neo-Liberal paradigm since this cultural phenomenon can never be sufficiently understood by merely persisting with it in either pure, political terms of reference or in just economic terms (given, e.g., the role played by various political alterations in legislation or the unintended political consequences of such policies in deconstructing democratic institutions, etc?[37])? (8)

In effect, it is my aspiration to theoretically integrate a bottom-up approach (dealing with inter-ordered phenomena) with a top-down scheme (dealing with a systematic representation of its political-economics) along with the formation of a horizontal strand dealing with the relevant exposition in question, be those objectives dealing primarily with either theoretical (or hermeneutical concerns), practical (or phenomenological concerns) ,and/or critical/radical terms of orientation (in dealing with both non-existential and existential concerns). (9)

What is meant by my expression 'inter-ordered phenomena'? I argue on (archetypal) economic grounds that we deal with six basic forms of judgment, namely, phenomenological semantics; aesthetical forms of integration; existentially oriented deontological e/valuational formation; pragmatical forms of e/valuational formation; hermeneu-

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36 The reader can refer to apposite essays on this topic in *Book* 4.

37 As discussed in my Three Critiques of Neo-Liberalism.

tic considerations of possibility; and, factual concerns dealing ontically with positive forms of truth determination. 'Inter-ordered' merely refers to the fact that these basic types of judgment can be reduplicated symmetrically or find forms of duplication that are non-asymmetrically oriented. E.g., the facts of facts, through reduplication, gives us the topic of 'history', whereas, in a similar symmetrical fashion, the possibility of possibilities gives us the topic of a science. In contrast, the non-symmetrical duplication, say, of a 'history of science' is not to be confused with, say, a 'science of history' given that these operations are not commutative. (10)

Now, let us go for a quick guided tour of this triple scheme that attempts to both represent and explicate the political-economics of disciplines, within an 'open' Political-Economy, in and through their utilization within their various systematic forms of cultural situatedness. E.g., the discipline of history as situated either within Academia or situated outside Academia but facing inwards or towards it so to speak (in a non-*de jure* sense). (11)

At the bottom, we have the economics of the **topic** as they fall under the rubric of inter-ordered phenomena. (12)

The topic sets the **exposition** which will hopefully be subjected to fruitful processes of transformational retreatment. (13)

All expositions are **situated** both contextually and systematically. The topic could be history. The exposition could be in the form of a biography about a certain person P. The situation is contextual to the extent that the cultural world of that individual P is being historically explicated. Systematically, the exposition is also seen to be situated within some form of reference to Academia even if that relationship is either formally constituted *de jure*, as an academic dissemination, or, established with more independence through some form of a *de facto* stance *vis-à-vis* the simulation of some form of an academic-like background in which that history is being both formed and informed through such interactions among those relevant like-minded individuals that share that same milieu. (14)

Then, from a more systematic point of view, we can argue that the hermeneutical nature of hyper-economic productivity is more conventionally oriented and seeks, primarily, to merely ascertain those relevant of genres of behaviour deemed to be either relatively viable or potentially viable. In this regard we delineate the systematic **segment** in which this exposition appears to be primarily located. Noting any migration from one Political-Economic sector to some other Political-Economic sector as a process of **segmental progression** (and in which we invoke the suitable application of transformational rules that would allow us to do those types of cultural manoeuvre). (15)

Now, at a first glance, all this might sound far too complex to understand let alone take up from a more practical point of view? However, we can also run the argument that we have two degrees of simplification with which to render the evolution of such an exposition, namely, the fact that the topic is basically invariant topologically once its nomi-

nation is adequately delineated. Similarly, the hermeneutical pre-occupations of the overall economy of the economic (as it entails the hyper-economic, the economics of the topical content) can be relatively overlooked in a similar manner to the conventional nature of the former. That, through economic correlativity, the relative suspensions of the hyper-economic and the economic should, then, be able to allow us to promote productive forms of textual formation and complete the formation of the exposition within the confines of a more orthodox regime. Where the formation of the exposition then acts as a discourse with co-associated discursive ramifications. In each and every economy, I have repeatedly argued that through economic correlativity each and every moment is equivalent to the joint negation of the other two moment. So, in the relative fixing or freezing, or suspension, of both the hyper-economic and the economic we should find ourselves in a position to pursue the transformations of the non-economic text as it propels the effective narration of its involved involvement in the formation of this exposition as currently being reviewed to hand. Hopefully, seeing the formation of an exposition, as a one more discourse that throws light on whatever we are finding, currently, to be either problematic or potentially problematic (and which responses are more or less suitable). (16).

Let me diagrammatically represent these three levels of explication (in their increasing level of epistemological organization and complexity starting with the Topic):

Systematization (semi-systematic contextualization) – Hyper-Economic

Exposition (narrational transformation as discourse) – Non-Economic

Topic (Inter-ordered stability defining discipline) – Economic (17)

This time, let me travel in the opposite direction, starting from systematic segments or sectors and ending with the relatively invariant nature of the topic plus, hopefully, the formation of an exposition in keeping with the aspirational objectives as already voiced? In effect juggling these levels in ascending levels of intentional focus starting with the systematic-context or situatedness; moving on to the economics of the discipline; and, thence, to its execution of a topic as the exposition which, through narration, then takes on a certain range of discursive functions as a certain type of discourse by virtue of its systematic situatedness both historically context-wise and system-wise). (18)

Imagine our history professor has written his biography of a certain notable or interesting person P, and, now, they wish to publish this book. Publishing is a business and is not directly the business of Academia even though many universities also have publishing houses associated with their institutions. Quite rightly, these publishing ‘businesses’ will be run as ‘businesses’ and not as ‘faculty departments’. In others words, I am making a rather mundane observation. This academic has to metaphorically remove their academic cap, so to speak, and put on a business hat instead. In effect, performing a segmental progression, as a migration or translation in their location within the formal constitution of the Political-Economy as currently understood in institutional terms of refer-

ence (and not here as a discipline for academic study called 'political-economics' also with the hyphen). To illustrate this progression let me map the formal Political-Economy whilst understanding that, informally, it cannot be closed and must remain open to its immanent depths and transcendent structures hitherto beyond current levels of cultural comprehension by definition). In this simplified mapping I shall re-organize this scheme in terms of its apparent relativity of power structures with the hyper-economic, as both hermeneutical and theoretical in orientation, on the bottom rung; with the economic as both phenomenological (semantical) and practical in orientation on the middle rung; and, a more powerful level of interventional dynamics on the top rung representing the non-economic manipulation of causal processes taking on either a critical and/or radical orientation correspondingly that, in my estimation, is a mix of both non-existentially and existentially oriented phenomena. For convenience, these sectors or segments are numbered. Academia, along with the legislative functions of politicians, etc., in sector 1. In order to publish this biography, metaphorically, this author 'travels' to sector 5, namely, the world of business activities, i.e., the World of Business.

Schematic Representation of the 'Open' Political-Economy

	Hyper-Economic	**Economic**	**Non-Economic**
Non-Economic	7	8	9
Economic	4	5	6
Hyper-Economic	1	2	3 (19)

Exemplifying these Political-Economic Segments or 'Sectors'

	Hyper-Economic	**Economic**	**Non-Economic**
Non-Economic	Committees of Enq.	Police Compliance Officers	Political Execs Execs/Judges
Economic	Civil Service	Business Political Parties	Managers
Hyper-Economic	Legislators Academia	Policy Planning	Medias Social-Media

(20)

Disciplines and Professions in their Primary Sectors

Segment 1:

Political legislators, representatives.
Academics
Policy planning (on a theoretical level)

Segment 2

Policy planning on a more practical level
Economist (operating outside their discipline)

Segment 3

Social critics and cultural commentators
Media and Social Media.

Segment 4

Civil Service.

Segment 5

The world of business,
The business of political parties.
Legal business

Segment 6

Management (on a day-by-day basis).

Segment 7

Committees of enquiry, political or otherwise.

Segment 8

Compliance officers
Police

Segment 9

Presidents and Prime Ministers, the head of ministries, politicians on afront bench,
Business executives
Judges (21)

Interestingly, in order to demonstrate the inequality of power relations across this formalization of the Political-Economy we can use the following *ad hoc* illustration as follows. Let us, on an *ad hoc* basis, merely ascribe one unit of power to the level of the hyper-economic, two units of power to the level of the economic, and three units of power to the level of the non-economic, and, supplying the same distribution of power units to the vertical columns in a similar manner. The ensuing intersections, through multiplication, then gives us the following *ad hoc* map of relative power relations:

	Hyper-Economic	**Economic**	**Non-Economic**
Non-Economic	3	8	9
Economic	2	4	6
Hyper-Economic	1	2	3 (22)

I note this simple, admittedly contrived, illustration in order to point out, e.g., that politicians, as legislators, in this *ad hoc* scheme, get one unit of power, whereas, civil servants receive two units of power which might explain why they seem to be paid a lot more than ordinary political representatives. Obviously, those who exercise the most power in society find themselves paid, to some extent, proportionally. Hence the pay of prime ministers and presidents, judges, etc., compared to humble representatives and legislators. Although the exorbitant pay of certain CEOs would seem to suggest a certain power imbalance with respect to those who are a natural member of this ninth segment or sector? (23)

Using this same scheme let me exemplify its schematization of disciplines:

A Simplified Representation of the Political-Economy

	Hyper-Economic	Economic	Non-Economic
Non-Economic	**Enquiries**	**Police**	**Executives**
Economic	**Civil Service**	**Business**	**Managers**
Hyper-Economic	**Legislators/Academia**	**Policy planning**	**Media** (24)

Returning to our history professor and the publishing of this biography of person P. As noted, they travel from sector 1 to sector 5, namely, the world of business. The interesting content of their soon to be published book is the 'exposition'. Their 'topic' is history, and in particular, takes a biographical approach, and, it is surprising that over the ages this topic of 'history' is as recognizable today as it would have been in the time of Herodotus and other historians. Of course, in how this exposition finds itself resolved naturally takes into account various recent stylistic developments concerning our appreciation of this topic of the historical (as also explored by myself in various essays when dealing, say, with histories of the past, present, and future, etc.). (25)

In the same vein we can also note the relative inter-ordered stability of the topic of philosophy despite its recent historical spin-offs into science and psychology. Again, I put this down to the relative stability of its inter-ordered constitution. An observation that is just as prominent in our ability to naturally differentiate, say, 'science' from 'history', and the 'history of philosophy' from 'philosophy' *per se*. Also it will form one aspect in my defense of a resuscitated, and radically reconstituted, metaphysics as the phenomenologically distinctive 'philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' (which cannot be reductively dismissed as being merely philosophical in tenor, tone and temperament even though through transformational retreatment the overall topic of philosophy can reappropriate the sub-topic of metaphysics as a sub-discipline within the overall world of philosophy *per se*, hopefully, of course, without confusing the discipline with its sub-discipline in that inter-ordered regard!). (26)

As you can well see, I have my work cut out for me in patiently orchestrating the coherent formation of this *Book* 9. Even after writing a few sentences, I have had to travel in new directions. Indeed, it is already quite an adventure. (27)

But, let me rhetorically ask, is such 'travel' necessary? Would it be better to just jettison this intellectual baggage and merely procced on the way of common sense given, at least, the recognition of our social problems is a start, the first few steps already being undertaken, that will inevitably lead to their eventual resolution? (28)

I certainly do not wish to dismiss common sense. But, an appreciation of the complexities of the Political-Economy along with its plethora of social problems cannot be so easily dispensed with. Despite performing a series of executive decisions as to how these various levels in textual formation are constructed and performed at the end of the metaphorical day, in a clearing of light, I find all this preparation actually makes life a lot simpler given this schematic clarity being brought to bear upon the nature of the overall economy of the hyper-economic, economic and the non-economic. Let me briefly illustrate an exemplification of this observation. (29)

Systematic contextualization of the hyper-economic conventionalization of political-economic functions is basically a hermeneutical type of process. I.e., the rules of prescription for dealing with how these systems run their own epistemologies and ontolo-

gies, pursue their own practices and priorities, ply their own forms of intentionally directed investment and seek forms of co-associated profitableness. Often, simple conventions that are clearly understood and exercised by its membership. (30)

Similarly, topical stability is observed through historical forms of inter-ordering that distinctively and distinctly establish the phenomenological-semantic rules for the formation of such topics. When an academic, say, is doing history, they are 'doing history', and, when they are doing science, they are 'doing science', and, usually, all of this is non-problematic. (31)

Of course, the important aspect of a text is its 'exposition', 'just how should we read what that text appears to be saying?' Here the philosopher needs to point out that the rules that should not be broken should not be broken, and, the rules that need to be applied need to be applied. Along economic lines, we have to rule out all forms of intended or unintended uni-modalism, bi-modalism, absolutism, and relativism…in which the collective force of argument itself is seriously undermined. At the same time, let us observe those short-cuts that safely take us to the relatively conclusive-conclusions set up by such expositions, be they either formal or informal in orientation. Availing ourselves of transformational retreatment, various economic methods for economic simplification… (32)

This brief conference paper has outlined the four key components that have come together in the evolving motivation behind the formation of *Book* 9. To list them we note:

1. Inter-Ordered Phenomena (expressed as the topic)
2. The Repurposing of Metaphysics as an Example of the Former
3. The Political-Economic Embedding of Disciplines with Semi-Autonomous Systems
4. The Non-Superficial Resolution of Traditional and Non-Traditional Social Issues. (33)

The 'disciplining of disciplines' is just a polite expression for acknowledging the fact that 'disciplines have a place', and, 'that they should know their place', namely, that they are embedded and bound, to varying degrees, within these semi-autonomous systems as located within and intermediated between different segments of an open-ended Political-Economy that effectively constitutes for-(-)us this overall world-of-life, this world at large - no more, and no less! (34)

Concern was expressed with all new genres of behaviour, along with their cultural and technological innovations, that it stands to reason, as with all such two-edged swords, that we will be faced with a succession of novel situations that will need to be both suitably addressed and successfully redressed. That confrontation with Contemporaneity accepted, and understood, how might we more appositely go about such processes of cultural resolution? 35)

As a metaphor, I would like to suggest that the more we come to better appreciate the nature of the 'cultural terrain' the better position we should find ourselves in in attempting to resolve those discovered anomalies that come to be defined by that 'landscape' and come to be experienced in and through such complex systematic terms of ref-

erence. Complex issues deserve to be resolved as complex issues, but, where forms of simplification can be equally applied to both context and topic then it behooves us to adopt and adapt such strategies. What we must avoid at all cost, however, are those superficial, cultural modes of simplification that cannot but fail despite our susceptibility to their facile promises as the expected path to be trodden when needing to resolve such issues. In other words, novel modes of resolution will need to be exercised that can demonstrate their philosophical utility and ensuing productivity! Part of our agility in such matters is being cognizant of the landscape upon which we have to traverse in order to proffer workable solutions that can defuse that range of ensuing issues to some degree or other. Put more simply, without some understanding of the social systems of thought that constitute the general trajectory of our cultural world as lived we simply stand to inevitably misconstrue all such anomalies should such issues become problematic for us. So, that granted, just what social systems are there and how do they individually and collectively frame these topics of research? But, let me explore such issues in this book itself… (36)

Hence the primary points and preoccupations of this Book 9, that, ultimately, seek to better understand this world at large in the hope that we can existentially augment and enhance the quality of our relationships and, therein and thereby, help ourselves to enjoy a better and more meaningful standard of life… in our being in this inescapable world with(-)others, before(-)others, and, as well, find a greater expression of an overall freedom through(-)others..!! (37)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 27.10.23.

Postscript

I cannot stress enough how the expansion of these four themes are intensely interrelated. From an inter-ordered perspective, we observe the topical stability of disciplines. From a systematic perspective we observe their emplacement within and embracement of the Political-Economy along with their auto-poetic stability historical-wise. In our appreciation of the unfolding of expositions, as narrated forms of discourse within these various systems of enfoldment, we are, in effect, taking a positive metaphysical stance in our appreciation of these inter-ordered phenomena as they are to be found in the uniqueness of their historical specifications. Then, with an eye on their potential existential enrichment, we should also find ourselves in a better position to deal with the flood of cultural and technological innovations which, I believe, to date is a fraction of what is about to be unleashed.[38] That, collectively, these ideas are my small contribution to what is needed in order to survive such political and economic dislocations about to be seen in the wake of such innovations. **That in preparing for such changes we at least put ourselves in a better position to deal with the inevitable reconstitution of our world and where our voice is better to be heard lest in not being heard these changes will be imposed upon us by others rather than being self-imposed through the collective reflections of our communities in which those who are deemed to be responsible need to existentially accept such responsibilities in all seriousness on our behalf..!!** (38)

N.T., 3.11.23.

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[38] Refer to the essay: *Pursuit*, III.7X: *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruption*.

12X. The Re(-)Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical
Along with the Re(-)Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas
Through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena
Within the Instantiations of their Systematic Social Organization

BOOK 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

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12X. The Re(-)Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical Along with the Re(-)Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas Through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena Within the Instantiations of their Systematic Social Organization

Part I & Part II*[39]

The semantics of semantics is a non-semantics, or a meta-semantics;
And this possibility proffers a relative narrow definition of the metaphysical…

The philosophical appreciation of the philosophical is metaphysical;
And is not philosophical being both meta-philosophical and non-philosophical...

The appreciation of the inter-ordered world of disciplines has to be situated
Within the systematic world of organizations within the overall Political-Economy...

0. Preface

In *Book* 9, I hope to explore and flesh out a number of themes already sketched out in *The Seventh Book...*, namely, a mapping of ordered and inter-ordered phenomena, etc., from which a complex vision of the metaphysical will be re(-)constituted and rendered as newly fit for purpose. Along the way I will also be exploring the ramifications of this innovative and relatively systematic mapping of the disciplinary world... (i)

Given the intricacies of this complex topic of inter-ordered phenomena (and its creation of a complex space for a resuscitation of the topic of metaphysics) let me divide this book into, first, *A Statement of Aspirations*, and, second, into *Part* I: *Negotiating the Difficulties of an Ascent*, and, *Part* II: *Navigating the Obstacles of a Descent*. The latter forming a short 'final report'.[40] To set the context for these two sections I have also presented the following: 12V. *An Introductory Presentation*: *The Discipline of Metaphysics as Entailed within a Complex Approach to Certain Types of Inter-Ordered Phenomena.*[41] (ii)

Where, hopefully, we can suitably address the ensuing problematicity of an expected avalanche of innovations arising in both cultural and technological terms of refer-

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39 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

40 A 'final report' being issued in the same vein as the dissemination of a 'final vocabulary' as per Richard Rorty, I.e., as ironically meant in the form of 'a working text being presented in its currently definitive format and form whilst understood as being set in an open pragmatic attitude to the topic in question whilst awaiting further forms of both critical and radical re-contextualization'.

41 The resuscitation of a positive metaphysics is possible given that has never died and persists through the enduring competence of a positive nihilism, and, therefore, cannot be the resurrection of a 'negative' or 'zombie metaphysics' that has never lived given the conjured up misrepresented impossibilities of a negative nihilism. In this regard this 'ghost' or 'specter' cannot be reanimated being forever without a 'body'. Therefore, in this regard, the resuscitation of a positive metaphysics cannot be the resurrection of this type of endeavour since the emergent 'spirit', *esprit de corps*, of the existential has never left the stage of the communal world of the relational, and, therefore. has not died. Whereas a resurrection of a traditional negative metaphysics is impossible given that the reanimation of its corpse cannot occur since it had no metaphorical 'body' to begin with.

ence… through suitable, metaphysically oriented forms philosophical appreciation (in the light of both topical and systematic forms of conventionalized stability and an understanding how narrated expositions, as discourses, can both reflect and express the arising of innovative non-continuities within the systematic representations…). (iii)

To these ends, as intentional objectives, let me note the four motivations currently propelling the exposition of this discourse dealing with such innovative non-continuities:

1. A more detailed exploration of inter-ordered phenomena.
2. The resuscitation of metaphysics as a complex inter-ordered phenomenon.
3. The re-siting of disciplines in their systematic contexts.
4. Utilizing such insights in order to suitably address contemporary anomalies.

(iv)

By ‘non-continuities’ is understood ‘the incremental arising of forms of innovation that cannot be reduced to mere historical reiterations’. Concomitant with such innovations in both culture and technology will be the experience of certain anomalies in social performance that will need to be both suitably addressed and redressed. I am optimistic that such deep problems demand deeper form of appreciation, and, that we must trust that responsible people, on balance, will arise to deal with such potentially disruptive phenomena. To this end we may well be able to lean on a positive metaphysics, suitably based in a pragmatic-existentialism or, equally, as an existential-pragmatism, to help us meet such expected challenges. Thence the primary or overall motivation of this book is that we need to rapidly acquire apposite spectacles to be created in order to properly and appropriately see such anomalies and seek their ongoing resolution in such a manner that incrementally augments and existentially enhances an array of responsible responses that would defuse such problematic forms of expectation whose anticipation is already upon us. Thence this aspiration of mine to both delineate such problems and proffer processes of adaptation that can responsibly address such issues… by exploring inter-ordered phenomena in their systematic situatedness from a metaphysical perspective wherein forms of philosophical appreciation may well devolve to assist us in urgently resolving such anticipated issues…[42] (v)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth falls, 4.11.23.

[42] Where ‘anticipated’ is defined as ‘the immediate recognition, encountering and engagement of phenomena, problematic situations, and their co-associated issues as already to be found to hand.

A Statement of Aspirations

The initial impetus for this *Book* 9 was sketched out in *The Seventh Book...* along with the fact that in that book a complex sense of space was already being thematized for the resuscitation and rehabilitation of the discipline of metaphysics. Albeit as a metaphysics that is both critically and radically conducted in accordance with the repurposing of its evolving re(-)constituted post-metaphysical inter-ordered format and in somewhat of a 'weak' form with its emphasis now being preferentially placed upon the trans-relational and pro-relational orientations of a pragmatic-existentialism as 'subjectively' exercised in and through a viable form of an existential-pragmatism. However, despite the optimistic inter-ordered promise of a complete mapping of the entirety of the disciplinary world this static approach has to be inserted within a more dynamic, reality-based mapping of social systems in order to account for the genesis of the same. Thence this necessity for taking into account how various systems support the development and continuation of such disciplines. E.g., how Academia supports such disciplines like history and science, etc., but will also discourage other disciplines like astrology and sympathetic magic, etc. Such cultural contexts, in their autopoietic[43] institutional systematization, giving historical descriptions and explanations, say, for the agglutination of politics and economics (in the form of a political-economics with the hyphen, as a distinctive discipline in its own right[44]), and the de-agglutination of natural philosophy into science, psychology, and philosophical subdisciplines (as currently recognized and practised). In the context of the above, let me note a number of highly interrelated aspirations. First, I wish to detail, in depth, the contours of an inter-ordered philosophy. Second, I would like to carve out a space for this advertised resuscitation and rehabilitation of a complex, post-metaphysical metaphysics and note both the existential configurations and ramifications of such a broad topic. Third, in the same vein, I would like to explore the consequences this has for a revitalization of the topic of philosophy in general. Fourth, I would like to contextualize the disciplines of the disciplinary world within a more systematically oriented appreciation of their cultural-intercultural emplacements. Fifth, then explore how a static bottom-up, inter-ordered orientation and a dynamic top-down inter-systematic orientation could fruitfully meet in order to productively form an engaged, in-depth appreciation of the 'inter-ordered systematization of disciplinary phenomena'. Sixth, in the context of this research, it is then my desire to outline a series of approaches as to how the engaged individual, through cooperation with others, might be able to existentialize such a landscape in order to set the pre-conditions for the arising of better outcomes for the inhabitants of the secular world as a whole. What had been my previous hope for the compact writing of a short book, in the light of the above, has now obviously evaporated. But, to map the more prominent landmarks upon this enlarged terrain I have felt it necessary to at least formulate at the outset my list of aspirations in this same regard. Hoping my reader, or audience, will understand just where I intend to be (be)headed in realizing an overall completion of this grand ambition... (0)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 11.10.23.

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[43] A continuing process of self-(re)constitution through its ongoing, chaotic re-self-organization. In using this expression, I am also implying a reference to the work of Niklas Luhmann. Hence my use of "inter-ordered phenomena (that exist) within the instantiations of their 'systematical social organization'."

[44] Along with the separate notion of the 'Political-Economy' as the 'environment for all systems.

Part I: Negotiating the Difficulties of the Ascent

A. Pre-Introduction

Many recent philosophical iterations of the metaphysical enterprise have been quite rightly treated in a skeptical vein historically re-continuing a long, critical tradition where the ever-present re-presentation of metaphysical notions have been deemed to be worthy targets of such deconstructions, as so aptly exemplified, e.g., by Richard Rorty, and many others.[45] However, despite a long history of such seemingly successful demolitions, it would appear that the need for such patterns of behaviour might also perhaps deserve to be better explored and appreciated. In the following extended essay, among a number of other topics, I wish to re(-)purpose[46] the concept of the metaphysical by finding a place for its *raison d'être* by arguing that a 'home' for such a notional need is possible within the contours and configurations of an anti-representational, positively nihilistic, pragmatic-existentialism or existential-pragmatism. I will do this by exploring how the 'reduplications of ordered phenomena' can proffer that sense of a place along with a philosophical exploration of the ensuing ramifications devolving from such a novel field of inter-disciplinary research. In effect, by asking 'what are the phenomenological-semantics of phenomenological-semantics' we arrive at a position that legitimately undertakes to scrutinize such non-phenomenological-semantics, i.e., defining 'metaphysics in a narrow sense' by attempting to understand how categories of phenomenological experience, etc., are received, interpreted (both culturally and inter-culturally), acted upon, become re-modelled, and, therein and thereby, re-purposed, and so on. (1)

Recently, *quelle horreur*, I had also quite inadvertently supplied a second definition of the metaphysical in an essay on that topic where I defined this sense, more broadly, this semblance of a second definition along the following lines, namely, 'philosophical appreciation (of the philosophical [discipline]) is primarily metaphysical, etc.'[47] I.e., where 'philosophical appreciation' is 'not philosophical *per se*' but now 'non-philosophical' or 'meta-philosophical', or, i.e., 'metaphysical' (given that the 'philosophy of philosophy' is 'not philosophy and philosophical' [unless suitably subjected to apposite forms of transformational retreatment that reverse the consequences of that initial philosophical treatment of the philosophical[48]]). Therefore, over the course of this essay it behooves me to harmonize these two interpretations. It is also my intention, at the same time, to flesh out work merely mapped out in *The Seventh Book…* dealing with inter-ordered phenomena (albeit as situated within auto-poietic systems within the Political-Economy). (2)

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45 Recently, I discovered that I had been using two re-purposed definitions of the metaphysical which I have had to quickly rebadge as either broad or narrow in scope. I will be arguing that a metaphysical notion, and discipline, arrived at through the symmetrical reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic supplies a relatively more narrow definition.

46 The nomenclature of '(-)' indicates a 'trimodal economy operating as a continual work in progress'.

47 *Pursuit*, III.2M.2: *Imagining the Possible versus Reimagining the Impossible*: *A Series of Essays Inviting a Radical Re(-)Thinking of the Political-Economy, etc*: *Part* V: *A Radical Re-Thinking of the Nature of Metaphysics and its Existential Re(-)Integration in Lived-Experience*.

48 As would be explained within the exercise of a philosophy of 'transformational retreatment' as already explicated elsewhere, e.g., in relevant sections of *The Seventh Book*...

Now, these first definitions can be seen as both relatively passive and relatively active approaches to this resuscitated discipline of the metaphysical. In the creating of a viable metaphysical economy we can also propose the joint negation of the former in the invocation a more existentially engaged vision of the metaphysical. In effect, an engaged metaphysics more capable of dealing with an appreciation of the philosophical, the philosophies resident in the pursuit of all manner of disciplines and in the philosophies exercised from a more secular point of view. That in this vista we can also more closely scrutinize all disciplinary forms of interpretation and application on the grounds that we are dealing with either ordered or inter-ordered phenomena as already extensively sketched out in *The Seventh Book*… (3)

For convenience, let me use the expression 'inter-ordered phenomena' to cover both 'ordered an inter-ordered phenomena'. Under this heading just what is entailed? Over many years I have explored a classification of seemingly basic forms of e/valuational formation, as types of judgment, under six headings of a first ordered phenomenologically oriented semantics; a second ordered classification of aesthetical discernments; a third ordered classification of deontological discernments; a fourth ordered classification of pragmatical discernments; a fifth ordered classification of hermeneutical differentiations of possibility; and, a sixth ordered classification of ontical determinations of factual actuality (with provisionally treated historical inventories of facts considered as having occurred). Now judgments have a dual sense in so far as we have trans-cognitively oriented judgmental processes and the delivery of cognitively oriented judgments. 'Orientations' is understood as I am proposing the epistemological fact that we cannot completely sever the trans-intentional act of judgment from the intentional delivery of that same judgment (and where the expressions 'cognitive' and 'intentional' are treated as synonymous to the extent that in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect in epistemological organization, that aspect dealing with judgment, we have trans-cognitive/trans-intentional processes delivering cognitive/intentional judgmental content/s'. Moreover, channeling Kant, given judgments are of conceptual material (as either concepts *per se* or conceptual translations of perceptual content) it follows that judgmental acts must have a greater degree of epistemological organization and hierarchical stratification given that such 'judgments' must be both 'trans-intentional' and 'trans-conceptual' in orientation given this 'judgmental appreciation of the intentional forms of such conceptual materials', etc. Where the concept of 'appreciation' implies 'the meta-treatment of that content being appreciated' and, therein and thereafter, potentially subject to 'all relevant and ensuing forms of transformational retreatment' consistent with such judgmental processes of appreciation, etc. Or, more succinctly, given that judgments can only be of concepts (as the only type of phenomena that can be directly appreciated in a process of judgment) it follows that 'judgments', primarily, must be 'trans-conceptual' and both 'trans-intentional' and 'trans-cognitive' in orientation. Now, these six distinctive forms of trans-cognitive judgment, as proposed, also have a set of six ordered cognitive correlates, namely, a first cognitively order classification of atomic thoughts; then molecular thoughts; conceptual ideas; perceptual 'images' or 'perceptuals'; possible fact(ual)s and actual fact(ual)s (where the latter have been given this provisional ascription through cultural-intercultural forms of historical ascertainment). (4)

Now, such ordered complexities are being briefly introduced here in order to articulate what is meant by the expression/s 'inter-ordered' (and 'hyper-ordered'), etc. E.g., a person exploring the trans-cognitive first order of phenomenologically oriented semantics, in effect, becomes a disciplinarian concerned with a phenomenological-semantics, being in effect either a phenomenologist or a semanticist (or, in fact, a phenomenological-semanticist/semantic-phenomenologist). That, as already indicated, in a 'semantics of semantics' or a 'phenomenology of a phenomenologically oriented modes of appreciation' we arrive at a meta-phenomenological or non-phenomenological form of disciplinary activity, i.e., effectively, we arrive out my previous definition of a 'narrow categorical metaphysics' implying that such a disciplinarian, in this instance, is a 'categorical metaphysician', albeit as a disciplinarian operating within the narrow confines of this categorically oriented metaphysics, and where they would be concerned, primarily, with the mapping of cognitive categories like, e.g., space, time, subjectivity, different types of taste, like, e.g., saltiness, etc., and all other manner of other phenomenologically discerned phenomena (in part, reflecting how our human psyche is organized in its interactions with this overall world-of-life, this life-world as found in this world at large, etc. (5)

So, by envisaging a 'reduplication of the semantic orientation', in a 'semantics of semantics', we arrive at a new region of disciplinary activity, namely, this narrow form of a 'categorically oriented metaphysics'. Illustrating, therefore, this concept of 'reduplication'. E.g., where a reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order of (hermeneutic) possibility, effectively, would give us the discipline of science in whose generality such disciplinarians would find themselves exploring and scrutinizing possible forms of possibility, in effect, as working within the general field of 'science'. Or, e.g., similarly, 'the fact/s of facts' (whose field of factual conformation would be appreciated by a 'factologist'[49]) now forms the working field of an historian concerned more with the facts of facts, or, how those facts find their historical importance, confirmation, interpretations, in the context of a certain history, etc. Hence, in regards to these two last examples of the scientist and the historian, it is obvious we are dealing with the 'symmetrical inter-ordered reduplication of orders'. In a distinctive contrast we could note that the disciplinarian dealing with the history of science, as an historian of the scientific discipline, effectively, would be dealing with the asymmetrical reduplication of inter-ordered phenomena that as a matrix operation could be represented as follows, namely, (the facts of facts) x (the possibility of possibilities). Or let us say, in terms of a simplified notation of the trans-cognitive level of epistemological ordering, 6^2 x 5^2 ...which must also count for a form of hyper-ordered inter-ordering. (6)

Interestingly, having elsewhere defined 'the philosophical economy' as 'one-part hermeneutical sub-economy, one-part phenomenal-phenomenological sub-economy, and, one-part non-systematic existential[50] economy', it would appear, framed in this manner,

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[49] 'Factology' as 'the documenting of a certain person's life'. I have taken this expression and have implicitly redefined it to mean 'the documentary evidence for a set/s of a selected series of facts relevant to the existential description of a certain situatedness be that of a person, a relational group of individuals, or a certain designated situation, say, an organization, institution, discipline, or country, etc.' In effect, 'the relatively truthful compilation of a set of facts, and all that that might entail'.

[50] 'Non-systematic' as, more or less, pertaining to the so-called 'third economic moment' (given that our counting of moments could occur in any order. Indeed, taken in that order as expressed, I am invoking,

that this economy is more of a 'global economy', i.e., as an expansive economy that is predicated on the interactions of the fifth, first, and third trans-cognitive orders respectively, or, rather, collectively. (7)

An important observation to make here is that of the non-commutative nature of asymmetrical reduplications. E.g., the 'philosophy of history', as a philosophy, and, the 'history of philosophy', as a history, are not equivalent as inter-ordered phenomena (and that the matrix order of the operations is important to note as differentiating these different forms of inter-ordered productivity. (8)

That it could be said, as a humorous paraphrase, "that it is the economy, stupid!" 'All just a matter of economics', but, meant, of course, as 'significant expressions of e/valuational formation realized through trimodal forms of judgment, etc...' where through processes of truth determination the serious philosopher, or a some other patient ally, in line with the disciplinary difference of the philosopher as a person who primarily deals with perceiving and interpreting the world as seen, etc.[51] But, as shown in both The Seventh Book... and Book 8, and elsewhere, e/valuational formation, e.g., etc., cannot be contemplated entirely in economic terms of reference but must also envisage a widening of such a frame through an invocation of the overall economy entailing economic, non-economic and hyper-economic moments of orientation. That, a systematic sense and semblance of the existential can be envisaged through a dynamic balance of such economic facets hence the dynamic balance of the philosophical economy along with its appreciation overall terms of reference of the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic, then heads us in the direction of an 'existential metaphysics'. (9)

These various philosophies of the economic, transformational retreatment, ordered phenomena, etc., for myself, have had a long history along with considerable degrees of 'reinterpretation' with a vast assortment of arguments being mustered to support such evolving re-interpretations. I cannot expect my reader or audience to immediately understand what is being expressed, but, I am sure, given time, and an apposite succession of incremental arguments, that reasonable degrees of understanding should eventually be arrived at without the reader or audience needing to necessarily accept the conformal[52] validity of such arguments. That, over the course of this essay, in this *Book* 9, I will attempt to layout some of those subsidiary arguments for why I feel the need to take this (overall) economic stance, etc. (10)

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in this instance, a' harmonic economy' given the dialectical progression, in linear terms, of 'the hermeneutical background of relative consonance, the relatively dissonant foreground field of the phenomenological, and the relative moment of resolution not to be confused with a definitive moment of resolution which would immediately oversee the metaphorical 'death' of the relationship in question. In contrast, a systematic sense and semblance of the existential is arrived at through a dynamic balancing of all three economic moments (be that economically, or in an (overall) economy of the overall economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic. In this latter sense we can refer to an 'existential metaphysics' when is economic, non-economic and hyper-economic inputs and outputs are in a relative state of dynamic equilibrium.

51 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12T, 12 U, etc.

52 I use my expression of 'conformal' to mean either the re-confirmation of either a positive or negative truth determination in real time and/or the re-verification of either the same positive or negative truth determination in non-real time of a certain factual assessment giving such statements a sixth ordered status.

However, restricting ourselves to just a realm of the economic cannot explain how we enter into causal forms of non-virtual intervention in this world at large. Hence the invocation of the non-economic, and its inevitable hyper-economic re(-)contextualization given our need to appreciate the relatively-radical through its incremental appropriation, and, where the radically-radical could never find any degree of suitable comprehension. Just as in eating we need to be mindful of taking reasonable bite-sized mouthfuls of food lest we spend all day continually eating, or worse, choke on what we had been trying to eat should we have stuffed out mouths with far too much food... (11)

At this point in this Pre-Introduction the reader or audience can move on to the last two paragraphs of this section should they not wish to read an abbreviated version of the history behind the formation of this ordered philosophy which soon will be explicated without our needing to be referred to this history. Although the final version might be referred to as a 'definitive product' such assurance is meant in an ironic sense (like, e.g., definitive histories,[53] final vocabularies,[54] etc.). (12)

This idea of an 'order' was originally proposed to understand how the verb to be functions in a variety of propositions – from non-integrated thoughts (as the intentional content of an ideational process) to the integration of the same… from possible facts to actual facts treated as valid statements (even if regarded as provisional). E.g., in a linear format for cognitive functions we could divide the field between ideation and perception by means of a dialectical-like resonance. Then we could extract from such existent processes their subsistent content in both non-integrated and integrated formats. Hence, in a linear format we could ascend from the first cognitive order of atomic propositions to a second order of integrated molecular propositions, thence to a ideational processes of a conceptual character in a third order… crossing this resonance of injectively oriented intentional formations *versus* projectively oriented intentional formations with a fourth order of perceptual-like or imaginative-like processes… then, we can extract factual-like subsistent content in a non-historically integrated fashion where possibility is accounted for to then move on to the historical integration of statements as a recounting of actual facts in a sixth cognitive order (albeit attached with a provisional truth determination as a qualification). Let me depict these six orders in a vertical ascending format:

Order	**Type of Proposition**	**Characterization**
6^0	Actual Facts/Statements	(Proto-)Histories
5^0	Possible Facts/Possible Propositions	Possibilities
4^0	Imagined Perceptions	Perceptions
3^0	Conceptual Ideation	Conceptions
2^0	Molecular Propositions	Essentials
1^0	Atomic Propositions	Pre-Essentials (13)

Now, the first *raison d'être* of this scheme is to see how far certain propositional sentences could travel through this scheme ending in the form of statements depicting

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53 As per myself.

54 As per Richard Rorty.

historical events considered as either validly confirmed (in real time) or verified (retrospectively). So, e.g., although we can have atomic propositions concerning, e.g., squareness and roundness, in a second order the proposition of a square circle painted, say green, cannot be allowed through a lack of semantic integration. Integration can be indicated through the use, e.g., of hyphens. So, the propositional content representing the following integrated thought of 'a green table top that was round' is able to find a second ordered status. Being integrated it can be experienced in ideational processes as 'a-green-table-top-that-is-round'. Although abstract ideational content cannot be directly imagined or perceived in this instance we could see or imagine 'a-green-table-top-that-is-round'. Hence this third ordered product could also find a fourth ordered formation. Then, indeed, from such an integrated perceptual-like state we could imagine the possibility of such an object either seen or imagined. Hence its fifth ordered status as a possible state of affairs. Then, if a specific table is being referenced then we could this factual state of affairs to be true iff this specific table, as specified, is both round and green. Of course, along the way certain propositions may well not be allowed to proceed any further and hence such propositions would assume that ordered status as would therein apply. (14)

So, e.g., we could imagine 'having a cup of tea with the current King of France who is bald' but know that that is impossible given that there is no current King of France. That this proposition cannot be a statement of fact and therefore has only a fifth ordered status. On the other hand, we must accept the fact that Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, signaling the start of a civil war; which gives this statement a sixth ordered status. (15)

All rather uncomplicated except for the fact that I initially ran two somewhat parallel versions of this type of a sequence that were eventually differentiated as Cognitive (as just recounted) and Trans-Cognitive or as a Judgmental Form of Evaluation. (16)

In the latter version, the first two orders and the last two orders, effectively, were identical. In between, the third order was deemed to be deontological in status whilst the fourth order was deemed to be pragmatical in orientation. Then, atomic propositions in a first cognitive order were treated as phenomenological and semantically oriented propositions. Integrated propositional thoughts were then treated as aesthetical forms of evaluation. A fifth order state of possibility was read through a hermeneutical lens, whilst sixth ordered facts were seen as ontical facts, the material a respectable historian could incorporate within their historical narratives, etc. Let me depict this Trans-Cognitive Linear Format concerned with delineating six distinctive types of e/valuational formations, namely, either essential and/or pre-essential phenomenologically oriented forms of semantic mapping; essential integration in aesthetic forms of experience as aesthetical judgments; deontological judgments; pragmatical judgments; hermeneutical judgments of possibility' and/or ontical judgment of actual truth determinations (albeit as that which should also be treated as potentially valid, etc., in provisional terms of reference even if currently treated and accepted as conformally valid.). Depicted in an ascending, linear format The Trans-Cognitive Orders can be viewed as paralleling the Cognitive Orders as here reiterated:

Order	Trans-Cognitive Order	Cognitive Order
6^0	Ontical	Ontical
5^0	Hermeneutical Possibility	Possible Facts
4^0	Pragmatical	Perceptions
3^0	Deontological	Conceptions
2^0	Aesthetical	Essentials
1^0	Phenomenological	Pre-Essentials (17)

By making this distinction between the Cognitive Aspect and the Trans-Cognitive (Judgmental) Aspect in epistemological organization) these two versions could be disentangled. In the latter instance, these six types of judgment meant we should not mistake, say, a deontological form of ethical judgment from a pragmatical form of ethical judgment, and so on. (18)

Parallel to this process of a practical refinement of this heuristic device I saw how we could center such a scheme in an economic format. Given that the first, third, and fifth trans-cognitive orders were concerned, respectively, with phenomenological, existential and hermeneutic pre-occupations meant that we could superimpose such a scheme on a tripolar economic basis. Hence, now invoking a circular format we could depict this economic super-imposition as follows:

3^0
Existential
(Deontological)

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Phenomenological
(Semantic)
1^0

Hermeneutical
(Possibility)
5^0 (19)

Supplying the three archetypal economic moments or polarities or correlativities of World, Object and Ego we get the following:

3^0
Existential
(Deontological)
EGO

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OBJECT
Phenomenological
(Semantic)
1^0

WORLD
Hermeneutical
(Possibility)
5^0 (20)

Filling in the three remaining orders then gives us the following:

3^0
Existential
(Deontological)

2^0 Aesthetical 4^0 Pragmatical

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Phenomenological
(Semantic)
1^0

Hermeneutical
(Possibility)
5^0

Ontical
6^0 (21)

Later, a rule was adopted for how this ordering occurred, namely, through subtle forms of preferencing (+)/de-preferencing (-) the following six orders could be accounted for. E.g., in preferencing the first order implies the simultaneous de-preferencing of the third and fifth orders with the realization of the phenomenologically oriented semantics. On the other hand, a subtle de-preferencing of first order (Object) meant a preferencing of both the other two correlativities of World and Ego, and in between we can posit the pragmatical fourth order. Hence, through subtle preferences and opposed de-preferences we can generate all six orders as follows:

+O/-E/-W	=	1^0	Semantical/Phenomenological
+O/+E/-W	=	2^0	Aesthetical
-O/+E/-W	=	3^0	Deontological
-O/+E/+W	=	4^0	Pragmatical
-O/-E/+W	=	5^0	Hermeneutical
+O/-E/+W	=	6^0	Ontical (22)

After making this series of ‘executive decisions’, sometime later, in resolving a problem in my co-developing of a philosophy of transformational retreatment (namely, that all treatment realizes an elevation in meta-status by one degree except the necessary ruling that states retreatment is arrived at through a de-elevation in meta-status by one degree) I realized that this subtle preferencing could be supplied through the automatic invocation of a de-suspension, and, where de-preferencing was arrived at through some form of a balanced suspension of the party or pair of parties involved. That, by this economy of the de-suspension, within the extensive suspension (in my complex reading of a transcendental suspension) I could much better account for these ordered dynamics, and so on. (23)

However, in the writing of *The Seventh Book*… the further prospect of inter-ordered phenomena was more systematically explicated. Just as 'the semantics of semantics' could be read as indicating a 'categorical metaphysics'. So too, the consideration of 'the possibilities of possibilities' opens up a scientific 'space', and, the consideration of 'the facts of facts' opens up an historical 'space', and so on. In these three instances we would be invoking symmetrical forms of inter-ordered reduplication. Whereas, in contrast, a 'history ($6^0/6^0$) of science' ($5^0/5^0$) would be an asymmetrical form of a hyper-ordered phenomenon. Without a doubt, by such creative means in an entertaining of various inter-ordered forms of interrelation, etc., the entire world of disciplines could well be delineated and mapped accordingly. (24)

Hence, from this proposal of a basic rule of invoking subtle forms of preference/de-preference I could hypothetically account for a progression from one order to the next, etc. I.e., namely, through invoking the subtle preferential treatment of one economic correlativity or a pair of two economic correlativities in an archetypal economy *versus*, respectively, the corresponding de-preferential treatment of an opposite pair of economic correlativities or an individual economic correlativity. Then, as noted, more recently, I was able to propose a mechanism for this basic rule, namely, that either a subtle preference could be supplied to an economic correlativity through the balanced suspension of an opposite pair of economic correlativities with the automatic invocation of a de-suspension promoting that form of subtle preference, or, where a subtle preference could be supplied to a pair of economic correlativity through the balanced suspension of an opposite economic correlativities with the automatic invocation of a de-suspension promoting that subtle form of preference. But this invocation of the subtle preferential force of an ensuing de-suspension, underlying the expression of an ordered form of e/valuational, will be explored in greater depth later in this essay.[55] (25)

This idea that the preferentially oriented de-suspension can also be superimposed upon the so-called third moment of the economy in question as a moment of harmonic resolution where, hypothetically, we can envisage the intentional engineering of a move from the relatively virtual to the relatively non-virtual. I.e., imparting a causal dimension to this idea of the de-suspension, albeit only in and through this third moment of the non-systematic existential taking effect also as a moment of harmonic resolution. Read in this manner, effectively, allows us to causally connect the idea of the non-economic with this harmonically oriented third moment of the non-systematic existential taking on a non-virtual complexion. Indeed, we have here a mechanism for taking us, albeit momentarily, outside the confines of the eternally economic and its otherwise endless recycling of circulated e/valuational formation/s. In the subsequent discharge of this instance of the unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment the economic is now expanded non-economically into this sphere of causal intervention. However, as indicted, the radically-radical cannot be re-appropriated into wider terms of economic reference, i.e., the hyper-economic through a process of re(-)contextualization with the implication that the incremental nature of the relatively-radical is being called for instead. That, by such theoretical means, the non-economic is able to be re(-)incorporated back into those wider economic terms of reference, albeit with this causal ability to now intervene in this world at

[55] Refer to paragraph 165-167.

large. Implying also a way of re-defining a more systematic intellectual sense and experiential semblance of the relatively systematic existential as explicated by certain existentialists who insist upon a difference between non-existential experience and existential experience (in terms of our experience of time, space, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, etc.). I.e., as arrived at through a dynamic balance within the overall economic economy between these economic, non-economic and hyper-economic inputs and outputs. (26)

Therefore, in also articulating economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic levels of scrutiny (within this 'overall economic economy') we are now in a position to both radically and critically address those topics that are of more interest to us regardless of whether we are acting as either philosophers, disciplinarians, and/or secularists. In this hope, I trust that a certain level of intellectual satisfaction be derived in these explanations as they continually set out to seek a relatively evolving format whose qualified, mutual systematization might render such a philosophy as more competent in the many fields of expertise that fall within ether the philosophical discipline or elsewhere, indeed, within the very irreducibility of the secular world itself as... that which cannot be manufactured within any one form and expression of either a disciplinary reduction or synthesis (or mere nomination)..![56] (27)

That the main ambition of this essay is to explore the philosophical ramifications of the inter-ordered phenomena and within this schematic mapping of its co-associated disciplines find the space for a complex sense of the metaphysical that would allow the resuscitation of this sub-discipline as seriously fit for purpose, despite historical criticism, within the ambit of the philosophical discipline. (28)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 26.9.23.

[56] As the three modes of (re)treatment, namely, synthesis, analysis and nomination.

B. Index and Introduction

Let me now sketch out how I intend to complete this task, organize this *Book* 9, *Part* I, namely, the expedition of a deeper understanding of both ordered, inter-ordered, and hyper-ordered phenomena (as falling with the general rubric of 'inter-ordered phenomena') along with the ramification of the same including an in-depth exploration of its metaphysical implications whilst extending such content through the functional lens of a more systematic appreciation of their emplacement in certain historical institutions (as situated in regard to the current state of the political-economy in question):

Part II: Negotiating the Difficulties of the Ascent

1. Overview
2. Definitions
3. The Archetypal Economy
4. Gestalt Reading of the Archetypal Economy
5. An Interrogative Exemplification of the Economic
6. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part I:
7. An Economic Philosophy:
8. Re-Introduction of the Non-Economic:
9. Introducing the Hyper-Economic:
10. Ordered Phenomena:
11. Inter-Ordered Phenomena:
12. Symmetrical Inter-Order Phenomena
13. Asymmetrical Inter-Order Phenomena
14. Complex Inter-Ordering
15. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part II:
16. General Ramifications
17. Metaphysical Ramifications
18. Anticipatory-Expectations?
19. The Presentation of a Radical Philosophy
20. A De-Radicalized Philosophy through Hyper-Economization
21. Introduction of a Top-Down Approach from a Systematic Environment
22. The Distinctive Nature of 'Systems'
23. Systematic 'Migration'
24. Intra-Ordered Systems and Extra-ordered Systems in Communication
25. A Hyper-Economic Appreciation of the Political-Economic Environment
26. What is the Topical Basis of the Legal System, etc?
27. Systems within Their Environment of the Political-Economy
28. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part III.
29. Ramifications of a Systematic Approach for Instituting Social Change
30. The Institution of Positive Pre-Conditions for Existential Re-Self-Organization
31. The Systematic Embracement and Envelopment of Philosophy
32. The Metaphysical Ramifications of Philosophical Reduplication, etc. (29)

Part II: A Navigation of Obstacles Discerned on the Descent

Foreword
Re-Introduction
Exposition/s

C: Five Postscripts

1. Overview

As a challenge it could be asked does the reduplication, say, of 'the philosophy of philosophy' actually make sense? Or, similarly, are we allowed to say that 'the phenomenology of phenomenology' or, i.e., 'the semantics of semantics', is a form of 'meta-phenomenology' or 'meta-semantics', as a form of 'non-phenomenology' or 'non-semantics', and, by implication, effectively supplying a form of a 'categorical metaphysics'? (30)

Elsewhere, I have defined 'philosophy' as 'one-part phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one-part non-systematic existentialism'.[57] We could think of this as a global form of ordering rather than a local ordering which concentrates on one of six orders in a certain epistemological aspect or the relationships envisaged between a certain set of orders within a certain epistemological aspect.[58] Then, superimposed upon the archetypal trimodal economy we have its corresponding ordering. In the Cognitive and Trans-Cognitive Aspects this is as depicted in paragraph 17. Now, in the light of these orders in both the Cognitive and Trans-Cognitive Aspects we find in their first orders disciplinary professionals or amateurs concerned with semantic configurations of phenomenal-phenomenological experience; in their second order we aestheticians and artists; in their fifth orders we find hermeneuticists and hermeneuts; and, in their sixth orders we find factologists (or proto-historians concerned with the inventorying and evidence of certain historical facts). In the Cognitive Aspect we find the third order concerns specialists concerned with the conceptual construction of structural-functions as could be explicated both logically and dialectically; and, in the fourth order we find specialists concerned with acts of perception. Whereas, in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, the third order is concerned with deontological forms of e/valuation that can take on an existential complexion when widened to also include its neighbouring adjuncts of a fourth order pragmatics and a second order aesthetics, and, a fourth order that is concerned with various forms of pragmatical expediency (that may or may not also be influenced by deontological-like imperatives[59]). Obviously, in ordered terms of reference, and in localize or focused terms, we already have a number disciplines being represented along with their disciplinary representatives, e.g., phenomenologically oriented semanticists, hermeneuts,

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[57] By 'non-systematic' is meant the so-called 'third moment of an economy paralleling the archetypal moment of harmonic resolution'. By 'systematic-existential is meant 'a more overt sense of the existential presented through an overall economic suspension of the economy in question'. However, in light of an overall economy of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic a better definition of the overt theoretical sense and experiential semblance of the 'systematic existential' arises through ' the ongoing dynamic suspension of the overall economy itself', i.e., a 'the ongoing entertainment of a dynamic balance between the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic moments'. This global definition was entered into given a need to do philosophy in terms of reference that are wider than say just the phenomenal-phenomenological, etc. Moreover, economic considerations demand wider economic terms of reference, especially in any attempt to understand the nature of existentially oriented experience, etc.

[58] By 'aspect' is meant a certain level in epistemological organization, e.g., the Pre-Cognitive /Affective Aspect, the Cognitive Aspect (entailing the presentation of forms of intentional objectivity, motivation, and subjectivity); the Trans-Intentional; (and the putative Post-Cognitive Aspect of events, facts, consequences, ramifications, etc?).

[59] The desire to be economical, parsimonious, thrifty, etc., all seems to respond to the imperative not to waste your resources

deontologists and pragmaticists, and so on. In global terms we have philosophers as one-part phenomenologists, etc., The desire to somewhat systematically incorporate all distinctive forms of disciplinary profession and behaviour within a provisionally formulated scheme is already underway if we were to open up this ordered field, in both localized and globalized formats, to forms of reduplication, etc. Here we might define reduplication, in tis broadest sense, to include both overt and convert forms of reduplication. In an overt format we have, e.g., 'the semantics of semantics' (as a form of 'meta-semantics' or 'non-semantics') in its envisaged production of a 'narrow categorical sense and semblance of the metaphysical' is a case in point. But, as all ordered categories are economic, say, within a Cognitive Aspect or Trans-Cognitive Aspect, and economic within the entirety of the epistemological hierarchy of the psyche we could argue that even asymmetrical forms of reduplication are covert forms of reduplication given their basis in the economy in question and where no one economic correlative or pairs of economic correlatives can be isolated from any other economic correlative, especially within its own economy of presentation. So, e.g., the sixth ordered 'reduplication' of the fifth order can still be treated as 'a form of reduplication' given that this form of 'asymmetrical multiplication' is dealing with economic correlatives that cannot be absolutistically isolated form their economic basis. I would also like to retain this expression 'reduplication' since in my philosophy of transformational treatment what is conducted on one meta-level in status is automatically duplicated in higher meta-terms of reference by one degree. Let me depict this as follows (in the envisaged building of a house):

Meta-Level (0 + 1): Meta-Bricks ....(via synthesis).....Meta-House
/ \
Object-Meta-Level (()): Bricks Object-Level House

...where from bricks we go to meta-bricks, then put together, via virtual/non-virtual synthesis, to form the envisaged meta-house, but, as we don't live in meta-houses, so the rule of metafication (that all treatment takes us to a higher meta-status by one meta-degree) is reversed by invoking a rule of a 'reversed metafication (as a process of de-metafication)', namely, that for all transformations a return, at some point in time, to the original meta-status is usually required (but, in dialectical terms, as simultaneous) .[60] So, for convenience, read 'reduplication' to refer to 'symmetrical reduplication', and, 'duplication' to refer to 'asymmetrical multiplication of distinctively articulated orders in either localized or globalized formats'. (31)

Having commenced this process of supplying definitions, let me proceed... (32)

[60] As intimated, this reversed metafication is usually supplied, in experience, through the hypothetically envisaged processes of a de-suspension (be that in an alignment with the archetypal moment of resolution or otherwise).

2. Definitions

An ‘order’ is a six-fold division of an economy experientially realized through the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of archetypal economic correlativities (as dialectical moments or poles or polarities or correlatives, etc.). (33)

Where ‘preferencing’ can be defined as ‘the opposite of a process of de-preferencing’, and, where ‘de-preferencing’ is defined as ‘a dynamically balanced suspension of two poles or the self-suspension of one pole... all in conjunction with the relative de-suspension of the same acting as an opposing point of subsequent emphasis through the focus of that de-suspension’. E.g., the suspension of the Object and Ego moments would produce/reproduce and/or re-produce, i.e, re(-)produce[61] a de-suspensional preferencing on the moment of World, i.e., the hermeneutic along with its focus on generality (versus particularity of the Object focus and specificity of the Ego moment), the meta-textual nature of genres, potentiality and possibility, etc. E.g., the suspension of the Object moment alone would induce a de-suspensional focus on the opposing pair of moments of Ego and World with an ensuing emphasis upon the fourth order which in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect coincides with pragmatical e/valuational formation (not to be confused with pragmatic e/valuation centered in the deontological third order with adjuncts in the aesthetical second order and the pragmatical fourth order and inclined to take an existential complexion).[62] (34)

The definition of these orders can be seen to take two forms, namely, internal to an order by cataloguing characteristic features, and, externally, in terms of their economic promotion through the relative force of the imputation of the de-suspensional focus (as per the table noted in paragraph. Where, we can assume, that the de-suspensional emphasis when exerted in the third order, coincident with the archetypal moment of resolution (Ego), induces a non-economic shift from the virtual to the non-virtual sense and semblance of the non-systematic existential which then takes on a mix of both relatively existential and relatively non-existential aspects within its overall complexion. That this then needs us to ask and answer the question how is an overt systematic existential complexion arrived at? Basically, through an overall suspension of the overall economy of the economic that then more promotes a systematic existential orientation. (35)

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[61] I.e., in its acting as an economy of re(-)production through an ‘ongoing mix of either production, reproduction and/or chaotic re-production’. Where ‘ongoing’ is to be subtly re-defined as ‘the current momentum initiated in and through either an event or series and/or set/s of events arising through the unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moments directed by the current momentum that same eventful situation’. This subtle definition is set up to more clearly differentiate the relatively non-existential arising of the unilateral re-directedness of the last moment and its mere reiteration *versus* the relative existential arising of the unilateral re-directedness of the first (or next) moment through the initiated momentum of the sheer semblance of a relative process of ‘ongoing re-direction’. In effect, through a qualified existentialization of the relatively non-existential.

[62] The fourth order of the pragmatical can be viewed as expedient in some form or other, say, by being either effective or efficacious, either economical or expeditious, etc. In effect, insulating a pragmatic philosophy, as a pragmatic-existentialism, etc., from charges of mere expediency that could be levelled at our being merely pragmatical (in a fourth ordered approach, but, where certain situations might well call for that relatively non-existential type of intervention should that be appropriate. Say, when asking for a coffee in a café and duly paying for it as contracted.).

3. The Archetypal Economy

An archetypal economy is a basic pre-condition for the subtle imposition of the archetypal nature of an ordered economy (but not taking into direct account the overall economy of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic). (36)

That it is an inescapable artefact of our thinking that we think, either explicitly or implicitly, is entertained in and through a trimodal format. Of course, the process of intentionality, etc., is multi-layered, but, that each of these level or layers is also economically constituted along archetypal line, namely, with a foregrounded objective orientation, with a backgrounded sense of field, and, the co-associated subjective appreciation of the former. (37)

This epistemological simplicity of structural-functions can also be viewed through a harmonic lens by 'sequencing' first the consonance of field *versus* the dissonance of focus, and, then, all subjectively framed in a manner in keeping with the phenomenal-phenomenological and hermeneutical natures of the former that is productive of a process of resolution to some extent or other. Claiming, of course that there can be neither pure consonance nor pure dissonance nor a pure form of resolution. That, equally, there can be neither too much nor too little consonance, dissonance and/or resolution. Furthermore, it must be accepted that these economic correlatives mutually co-define each other through their joint negations. (38)

That our experience of relational facticity is a direct function of these processes of relational resolution, i.e., the extent identity experientially emerges above and beyond the mere sum of its relational participants. (39)

That the imputation of an archetypal economy is as a fruitful fiction in order to better comprehend the basic economic nature of all economies without exceptions. Moreover, the modeling of such a translation also allows us to invoke the parallelization of economic complexification. I.e., where we can more richly read economies through other relevant economies in order to mutually enrich our overall understandings as they evolve, are utilized, critiqued, etc. (40)

So, e.g., we impute backgrounds, foregrounds, and higher-order forms of appreciation of the former. Hence World (field), Object (focus), and Ego (framing). (41)

Setting ourselves up to appreciate the conceptual resonance between, say, analysis, and retrospectivity, the phenomenological and critical processes like deconstruction, etc., etc. (42)

4. Gestalt Reading of the Archetypal Economy

In a gestalt philosophy we invoke backgrounds, foregrounds, and the co-associated subjective appreciation of the former. (43)

Hence, the dialectical moments of 'World, Object, and Ego' as intended to parallel or 'mirror' the above. (44)

Hence, e.g., three readings of the intentional as refracted through these dialectical lenses of the Object, etc. Therefore, 'intentional objectivity in the first sense' as 'the portending towards an object or object-state or objective'. E.g., intentional referencing of a distinctively perceived perceptual object (like one musician playing a piece of music) or a certain state of affairs as an object-state (like, e.g., an orchestra collectively playing a piece of music) or more abstract ideas concerning the practice of music, etc. A 'second sense' that notes 'the motivation consonant with the field in question'. E.g., the hunger motivating (in the second sense) the eating of an apple (in the first sense). In a 'third sense' we note 'the 'value' of the performance under the headings of either the second order of the aesthetic, the third order of the existentially deontological, and/or the fourth order of the pragmatical… to the extent they reflect upon the subjective nature of the intentionality and self-agency as experienced. I.e., in and through forms of non-economically directed patterns of intervention, etc., perceived in non-existential terms of reference and apperceived in existential terms of reference. Just as we need food to live (in a non-existential sense) and where the gift of food (in an existential sense) may well be experienced as an existential duty that is needed to be performed by the person who is perhaps less hungry on the behalf of the person who is hungry. (45)

Now the commonality of existentially oriented behaviours has the same basis for the observed commonality of non-existentially oriented experience. (46)

Under the contention or conjecture that all economies are but versions of this trimodal constitution of 'field-focus-frame'. Consequently, and subsequently, all economies have the same isomorphic sense and semblance of this tripartite symmetry. Hence the concepts of a trimodal economic correlativity and a parallel economic process of representation arrived at through an economy of re(-)presentation in which economic complexification, induction, simplification can be applied, etc., in order to enrich either the topic or exposition, and, by default, the systematic sense and semblance of appreciation needed to closely delineate the impact of the situatedness in question (under the double headings of its contextual situatedness and its systematic situatedness. (47)

Many economies can be articulated to better present a wide range of philosophical issues along with their co-associated methods of resolution. The benefits of their economic translation (or, rather, their re-translation given that this is how we think and that we cannot excise ourselves from this economic constitution of the intentional, etc.) should over time reveal itself. As an example of such economic re-translation let me proffer my exploration of the interrogative economy, the simple asking a of a question at the center of all philosophical thinking, etc., indeed, at the very center of all disciplines, etc. (48)

5. An Interrogative Exemplification of the Economic

In asking a question, in economic terms, I perceive the rhetorical question is followed by two replies, namely, a metaphorical first reply, and a second more literal reply. Each of these three moments in the dialectics of asking a question are a type of suspension in their own right, and, where collectively, they form what I term to be an 'overall transcendental suspension' when run in a state of dynamic balance. This overall transcendental suspension becomes, in my reading of this complex phenomenon an 'extended suspension' when read into the same and economy of suspension and de-suspension. That when the force of the de-suspension is coupled to a causal economy, we finally arrive at what I term to be 'the extensive suspension' (which, is my complex reading of the Husserlian 'transcendental suspension', is also a critique of Husserl to the extent that I claim that he overlooks both the role of the de-suspension and proffers no mechanism for causally oriented forms of intervention which I believe are intimately co-associated with the suspension in general[63]). (49)

However, let concentrate on just the overall transcendental suspension as composed of rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional economic correlativities. (50)

A question is a dis-conjunctive suspension centered on the either/or. E.g., is X a person to be trusted or a person not to be trusted? Is X called John or is X not called John? (51)

I suggest that a first reply is expressed metaphorically. X is like a trusted person, or X looks like John. Now, a metaphor is a conjunctive suspension, namely, based on the dual aspects of 'like' when logically analyzed as 'both like and not like'. (52)

But in a breaking of the symmetry or symmetrical balance of the metaphorical 'both like and not like' we find ourselves with either a positive or negative literal reading. E.g., X is John, but, John is not a person to be trusted. The suspension at work here could be rendered as the as-if, as-if, as-if… (given the non-absolutisitical, non-indubitable nature of judgment. Or, instead, we might want to refer to the three operations of Boolean algebra and simply equate the apparitional or literal moment with the operation of negation, but, read as a double negation of an assertion. It is not-not true that John is trustworthy, and, this person X is not-not John, i.e., is John (or, rather, as-if John, as-if John, as-if John, etc.). Reading this process of the 'as-if …' or the 'double negation' as the double suspension of 'both the dis-conjunctive suspension and the conjunctive suspension'.[64] Interestingly, these three suspensions can also be seen to parallel an economy consisting, respectively, of 'synthesis' (or reconstitution), 'analysis' (or reduction) and a balanced suspension of the former treated along the lines of a 'nominative'. That, in parallel to this reading we can also invoke a trimodal reading of the hermeneutic circle (of comprehension) dealing, respectively, with 'whole, parts, and whole-and-parts'. Hence a demonstration of my concept of 'economic complexification' (by running such parallels). (53)

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63 The extensive suspension is initially explored in *Pursui*t, Volume II.

64 In effect, giving us three ways of 'reading' third third suspension in the overall transcendental suspension and where the latter is arrived at through a dynamic balance of all three suspensions.

6. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part I:[65]

'Economic complexification' argues that we 'can enrich an economic reding by running relevant economies in parallel'. Establishing parallels in reference to an archetypal reading of the economies about to be juxtaposed through a coinciding of their archetypal constitutions. E.g., by paralleling 'analysis' in an economy of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension with the 'retrospective' or 'past' in a temporal economy, etc. Or, similarly, noting that 'analysis' economically parallels, in archetypal terms of reference, say, the 'metaphorical moment' in the interrogative economy, and, where the other moments in any one economy will archetypally mirror their corresponding economic moments in archetypal terms of reference, and so on. (54)

Now let segue to the economy of transformational retreatment. (55)

'Retreatment' takes the inferred observation that 'in treatment we elevate the content of the relative object-language by one meta-degree in status'. When we are talking about something we are referring to its conceptual treatment which is elevated in meta-status by one degree (in a process of 'metafication'). In some languages, like Sanskrit, e.g., this elevation is syntactically expressed. In English we sometimes get the addition of a '-ness', or '-like', or '-wise', etc. E.g., 'happiness', or 'elegant-like', or 'health-wise', etc. But, as we do see a continual rise in meta-status, all the way to infinity, we must also assume that a reversed process of metafication must also be eventually operating, i.e., de-metafication, because we do not live in imaginary houses, e.g., but in non-imaginary homes, etc. The original rule was simply posted in an *ad hoc* manner 'that transformational treatment is followed by transformational retreatment' where everyone and everything is returned to the relative object-language. However, eventually this *ad hoc* rule was deemed to be non-*ad hoc* by virtue of the role played by the de-suspension in returning the process of retreatment back to the relative object-language. Hence this equation of 'de-suspension' and 'de-metafication'. (56)

With the explication of 'the overall economy of the economic', consisting of the hyper-economic, etc., I am now in a position to better under understand 'retreatment' thrugh the sub-economic lenses of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic, as respectively mirroring the moments of the pre-conditional pretreatment (viewed along hermeneutical lines), the moment of conditional treatment (viewed through a phenomenal-phenomenological lens), and the moment of post-conditional retreatment (viewed through a non-systematic existential lens); and where the last moment here can be also viewed as posttreatment to the extent that it rewrites the first moment of the pre-critical pretreatment in a continuation of this economy (as it continually re-writes its economic content till such a point in time is reached when, for the moment at least, no further relevant re-writing is being found to occur). In effect, these three moments of pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment can now be viewed as functioning, respectively, within these sub-economies of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic. Hence their ability to develop processes of rectification, etc. (57)

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[65] Given this section is a continuation of work done in *The Seventh Book*… we might like to renumber it as Part III.

7. An Economic Philosophy:

An economic philosophy attempts to take into account the full breath of economic phenomena given this concept of economic complexification. (58)

E.g., in the economy of transformational retreatment I perceive these three sub-economies as supporting critical processes, respectively, of rectification (pretreatment), deconstruction (treatment), and ongoing re(-)normalization (retreatment/posttreatment) that potentially can chaotically instigate the formation of relatively radical outputs. (59)

The formation of chaotic outputs occurs non-economically. However, I would argue that if outputs are too radical, they just could not be comprehended. Hence the necessity for radical outputs to take the form of small incremental progressions whose innovative differences needed to be suitably comprehended by what I envisage as the hyper-economic. The persistence of that economy that effectively appropriates through continual re(-)appropriation those small increments that hitherto have not formally registered prior to their initial reception. That only in small increments can they be 'observed', i.e., recognized (hermeneutically), encountered (phenomenologically), and engaged (existentially). Hence the necessary addition of the hyper-economic economy to take on board the digestion of the relatively radical (and not the non-relatively radical or the radically-radical). (60)

One way of appreciating the roles played by the hyper-economic is to perceive it as a sort of storehouse for wayward perceptions and apperceptions that once comprehended can be laid down through that process of re(-)appropriation. Another way of seeing the hyper-economy's tendency to re(-)appropriate non-economic emissions, irruptions, etc., is to accept its hermeneutic role in re-programming functioning genres of behaviour and their productivity. E.g., is we encounter a person who seems to operate in an existential-like manner, say, through being honest and trustworthy then we might note that such sentiments collectively register a person who is perceived to be both honest and trustworthy, etc. In other words, the hyper-economic accounts for the integrated registration of such inputs be they either non-radical and non-critical, critical and/or relatively radical in complexion, etc. (61)

Hence the tripartite nature of the overall economy of the economic perceived to be a dynamic composite that is one-part hermeneutically hyper-economic in orientation one part phenomenologically economic in orientation, and one-part non-economic non-systematically existential in orientation… and where the existentialization of the overall economy of the economic then rendered the resulting productivity with a relatively existential complexion. How such relative systematic existentialization is to be put into effect is an important topic to be dealt with elsewhere. (62)

But, now let me re-explore the crucial role to be played by the relatively non-economic (as a concept appropriated from the work of François Laruelle[66]). (63)

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[66] It would be tempting to use the expression 'mined' rather than 'appropriated' (or 'misappropriated'). That the same appropriative attitude is also at work in my adopting and adapting ideas from Luhmann.

8. Re-Introduction of the Non-Economic:

Confronting a number of the ideas of François Laruelle initiated a re-evaluation of my interpretation of the role of the economic *per se*. I would also confess to saying 'initiated a re-evaluation' is quite an understatement! Pointedly, something like 'the unilateral re-directedness of the last instance' shatters the endless re-circulation of the economic as was previously understood. The implication of a causal dimension apparently has change heading off in definitely unilateral directions without endless recycling. Admittedly, the so-called 'third moment' of 'resolution' was charged with this type of mission of 'settling things' and heading them in either a redirected or (chaotically inspired) re-directed direction when and where necessary, but, at the same time proffered no realistic mechanism or model for doing just that. On the other hand, invoking a 'non-economy' with 'the irruption of unilateral processes of re(-)direction' paralleled my own attempts to more broadly conceive of the 'transcendental suspension' as also having a casual role by virtue of the force of the de-suspension. Both features, I will add effectively overlooked by Husserl in his evolving formulation of the transcendental suspension. Hence my necessitated addition of a non-economic dimension in the evolution of my concept of the economic as it also needs to parallel the extensive suspension, and v.v. (64)

We could argue that 'the economics of economics is non-economics (or meta-economics, etc.[67])'. Hence this implicated dimension of the non-economic. In effect, the locus of power, the enactment of our intentionally organized short-term projects and long-term programs, the discharge of an irruption of relatively resolute intent as we find the unfolding of the course of our interventions in this world at large, hopefully, patterns of enactment that take on a suitable existential complexion. But 'beware the binaries (just as much as we should avoid pure forms of unimodalism or unilateralism)!' Given the seemingly radical nature of the non-economic just how is such chaotic unfoldment to be registered? I.e., hermeneutically recognized, phenomenologically encountered, and non-systematic existentially engaged?[68] In essence, the problem of escaping the economic necessitates this idea of the non-economic, but, in turn, the problem of the potentially radical nature of the non-economic now necessitates a need to envisage the dimension of the hyper-economic where the relatively-radical is appropriated, and in turn becomes conventionally registered as no longer in such a radical sense. Basically, defusing the radical nature of the non-economic by a process of incremental re(-)appropriations that, therein and thereafter, renders it in a more critical fashion and as less radical in tenor. Hence the addition of the hyper-economic dimension in this expanded overall economy of the economic. (65)

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[67] The 'etc.' hinting at a metaphysical dimension given its primary definition as the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation.

[68] In treating the third moment of engagement as existential in orientation necessitates leaving open a more global sense of the existential in the form of the systematic existential when patterns of behaviour take on a more overt sense of the existential (in this relatively more systematic sense and semblance of the existential). Context should determine which sense is being referred to (but often both aspects are implicated given that the metaphorical 'door' and 'exit' from the pro-relational and trans-relational orientation of the existential is through this third moment of the non-systematic existential (once a more dynamic balance between all three economic moments is engendered).

9. Introducing the Hyper-Economic:

The hyper-economic, as noted, is envisaged as that economic domain that progressively re(-)appropriates the relatively-radical given the envisaged non-registering of the radically-radical as impossibly-impossible inputs from the non-economic domain. This conjectured is somewhat harmonized with the observation that the radically-radical is just not appreciated, as it stands, in cultural consciousness. That, only increment by increment can we eventually come to understand what is relatively-radical. Just as in history, e.g., the (non-)controversy of the Earth revolving around the Sun needs to be taken on board before science could conceive of the successful launching of satellites, etc. Indeed, the once radical idea that the Earth revolved around the Sun was conventionally resisted, but, now, in holding the major discourse, it has become the critical position *de rigeur* (even though we see and still interpret the Sun as 'rising' in the morning and 'setting' in the evening, etc.). (66)

The hyper-economic dimension in the overall economy of the economic, in my understanding, also has the role of 'establishing' and 'storing' the critical treatment of what was once relatively-radical, etc. In effect, continue to 'legislate' the cultural prominence of major discourses whilst, perhaps reluctantly, also registering relatively minor discourse as they once were either major discourses dethroned or as controversial disputants of current major discourses, etc. I have also referred to the role of the hyper-economic as a place where people find affirmed or disconfirmed both their non-existential status and existential status through the matter of 'reputations'. Say, this person has this type of social status in their culture, and, through the iteration or non-iteration of certain existential sentiments either establishes a reputation as an existentially oriented person or as a person who does not demonstrate such personal characteristics, etc. (67)

Moreover, this dimension in the overall economy of the economic (in a similar manner to how the economic was philosophically apportioned) can be reviewed as relatively hermeneutical in orientation. I.e., as more concerned with the prescriptive nature of meta-textually oriented genres of behaviour (as divided between their so-called 'writing' and 'reading'). Effectively, channeling the systematic side of how disciplines are enveloped in semi-independent, relatively autonomous, autopoietic systems in the concrete history of such disciplines can find their representative and explicative expositions (and their narrated dissemination in the form of discourses tracing the play of power intra-systematically and extra-systematically). (68)

I will also argue that the conventional nature of genres, as hermeneutically appreciated, considerably constitute the domain of arbitration in which people have to operate over the course of their navigation and negotiations with other in setting out to successfully implement a prioritization of their intentional aspirations, etc. Furthermore, we can argue, from a conventional perspective, only marginally altered through a 'rectification' of such meta-textual rules a relative stability of such processes paralleling the relative stability of the topic pre-established on inter-ordered grounds (which will now be further explored before then exploring the role of systems within the Political-Economy). (69)

10. Ordered Phenomena:

It is my contention that thought is both to be appreciated and already appreciates itself through trimodal forms of economically constituted comprehension. Hence the ensuing disapprobation of the unimodal and bimodal schemes that do not recognize their economic encapsulation in the first place. Now, an ordered scheme is hexa-modally constituted within the trimodal nature of the economy in question. How do we migrate from a trimodal scheme to this hex-modal reconfiguration of the same? Given the dynamic balance necessary to express an extensive suspension we introduce the subtle preferencing and/or de-preferencing of these economic correlativities in order to expose an ordered overlay reflecting such subtle reconfiguration that take on a relatively distinctive sixfold set of differentiations whilst remaining integrated with the overall economy (of the economic). That in the archetypal economy, composed of World, Object, and Ego,[69] such subtle preferencings/de-preferencings give us the following sixfold divisions or 'orders':

+O/-E/-W	=	1^0	Semantical/Phenomenological
+O/+E/-W	=	2^0	Aesthetical
-O/+E/-W	=	3^0	Deontological
-O/+E/+W	=	4^0	Pragmatical
-O/-E/+W	=	5^0	Hermeneutical
+O/-E/+W	=	6^0	Ontical [22][70] (70)

How this subtle prefererncing, etc., is to be interpreted has undergone an evolution over time. Within the context of the extensive suspension (and the inner extended suspension) taking on board a role for the de-suspension such an approach has considerably illuminated a set of mechanisms for understanding just what is meant by the subtlety such 'subtle' operations. In effect, the force of the ensuing de-suspension from the envisages suspension or suspensions of other economic correlativities oversees this form of subtle preferencing. E.g., in the scheme above we not that in a suspension of both /World and Ego poles we would 'observe' an ensuing preference on the Object moment, i.e., a differentiated interest in the phenomenal-phenomenological identification of semantic elements as culturally-interculturally already mapped in language, etc. (71)

An expansion of the overall economy of the economic, through its incorporation of the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic, now further enlarges just how this mechanism of the 'suspension', and its definitive delivery of a forceful 'de-suspension' of a specifically ordered type of phenomenon, can be effectively engineered. I.e., where and when these relatively autonomous sub-economies of the economic, etc., can be put into either a state of relatively balanced suspension or non-suspension by virtue of their relative autonomy. Thence the basic for an exploration of inter-ordered phenomena. (72)

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[69] The sequence of World, Object, and Ego is to also read as a harmonic sequencing, treating Ego as the moment of resolution, etc.

[70] As previously noted in paragraph 22.

11. Inter-Ordered Phenomena:

By inter-ordered phenomena is meant the entire spectrum of ordered phenomena, inter-ordered phenomena, hyper-ordered phenomena, etc. A state of affairs where inter-ordered complexity is to be observed through either the symmetrical 'reduplication' of orders, etc., or their asymmetrical 'duplication'. (73)

E.g., the sixth ordered reduplication of the sixth order is perceived as enabling the formation of the historical topic. This could be expressed as either $6^0.6^0$ or 6^2. The sixth order being seen to ontically focus on facts (i.e., as oriented factually on statements treated as 'statements' and not as just proposition of possibility (as would be presented in the fifth order), etc. (74)

Now, let me outline my current consensus on the serial symmetrical reduplication of these six orders as follows:

	Trans-Cognitive Order		**Reduplicated Topic**
1^0	Phenomenological/Semantic	1^2	Categorical Metaphysics
2^0	Aesthetical	2^2	Psychological, etc.[71]
3^0	Deontological/Existential	3^2	Political
4^0	Pragmatical	4^2	Business
5^0	Hermeneutic Possibility	5^2	Science
6^0	Ontical/Factual (Evidential)	6^2	History (75)

Let me explain why I think such reduplications results in a categorical metaphysics, etc. (76)

The reduplication of the phenomenological in semantic mappings of the world of both 'atomic' and 'molecular' experience realizes a mapping of such mappings which can be viewed as a 'categorical metaphysics'. E.g., tastes have sweet and salty aspects, etc. A 'sweet(ly tasting) liquid' effectively, in its semantic representation, is a molecular proposition by virtue of 'liquids', in their phenomenal-phenomenological 'liquidity', being able to be designated as either 'sweet' or 'salty', etc. In other words, form experience we have found that we can think, i.e., simulate, the taste of 'sweet or salty liquids', but, except metaphorically, we cannot have sweet or salty sounds or colours, and so on. Hence the cultural creation of such semantic rules which, on the basic commonality of the human constitution, can be hermeneutically demonstrated to be considerably translatable between both cultures and eras in historical time. These semantic rules exercising how these atomic propositions can be integrated or not integrated into propositions[72] that remain

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[71] Psychology reduplicated becomes sociology, etc.

[72] Where such orders are also to be viewed as sequentially necessary (in both linear and circular forms of depiction). E.g., to actively think the thought (through experiential simulation) that table tops can be either square or round, etc., and can possess colour descriptions it is necessary for such thoughts to be integrated propositions (which moves us into the second order of the integral nature of the aesthetic). So, in this light, a table top that is both round and square simultaneously can possess no colour because of its

significant and not merely syntactically sensible but relatively impossible to simulate in our imaginations or recognize in lived-experience, etc.[73] (77)

Through aesthetic-like integration thoughts can take on both a second ordered status and a third ordered (cognitive) status as ideas (able to be entertained through some further form of simulation).[74] (78)

The third order sees the deontological orientation (in moral judgment) (which can be assisted through second ordered harmonization and/or fourth ordered pragmatical forms of supplementation.[75]However, given in transformational retreatment that the existential moment is also a moment of resolution, etc., we observe (through effectively a non-economic lens) that this position is enactive, specifying, as well as possessing potential existential enhancement (in the comparative and qualitative e/valuational formation of our relationships). Hence this necessary broadening of the deontological in order to take into account these additional roles of enactment, etc. Tentatively arguing that the reduplication of this third order could possibly contribute to an existentialization of process (to be understood as the effective center of political/non-political enactment). (79)

The reduplication of the pragmatical is now conceived of establishing both the economics of the business world and the politicking of the political world (and where a further synthesis or conjunction establishes the sense and semblance of the topic of political-economics when mutually duplicated with third order reduplication). (80)

Where the possibility of possibilities is viewed as the territory of science in all its many scientific fields. (81)

That the 'facts of facts' can be read, in turn, as the non-factual *per se* taking the form of the historical topic despite its many genres of explication. (82)

The above can be treated as the localized symmetrical reduplication of orders. In a contrast, we can refer to the topic of 'philosophy' as a 'global phenomenon' being defined as 'one-part phenomenological, one-part hermeneutical, and one-part non-systematic existential'. (83)

That as defined, the symmetrical reduplication of the philosophical produces a more comprehensive version of the metaphysical than the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of judgment, namely, the semantic appreciation of the phenomenological. Here the philosophy of philosophy is non-philosophy or meta-philosophy, or, i.e., a form of metaphysics that covers the appreciation of all philosophical topics. (84)

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ordered impossibility. Because such a thought cannot be entertained as third order cognitive 'idea' (with a semantically integrated conceptual structure).

73 By 'etc.' is merely meant interacted with, i.e., recognized, encountered, and engaged.

74 Making a distinction between cognitive orders and trans-cognitive orders. E.g., second ordered cognitive integration versus second ordered trans-cognitive judgments of an aesthetical orientation.

75 Defining the pragmatical in terms of some pre-defined sense of expediency, say, as effective or efficacious, etc., whereas, in a contrast, the 'pragmatic' is existentially open to 'both deontological and pragmatical inputs along with aesthetic like contributions when and where applicable.

12. Symmetrical Inter-Order Phenomena

It could be argued that both reduplication and duplication are not much more than a more concrete form of economic interaction to be entertained along the lines of economic complexification, where interactions definitively reflect such interactions(?) through being observed as such. (85)

In ‘economic complexification’ we note that ‘distinctive economic poles, in an archetypal alignment, can effectively comment on each other and enrich the nature of the ensuing discourse’. So, e.g., in the temporal economy we note the coincidence of the ‘past’ with the ‘metaphorical moment’ in the interrogative economy and the reductive or analytical moment of ‘parts’ in the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. (86)

That as a shortcut to this type of commentary and its corresponding mutual enrichment of the exposition we can also consult a dictionary designed with just this purpose in mind.[76] (87)

In the reduplication of the philosophical topic, we get the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical, i.e., the non-philosophical, meta-philosophical, or metaphysical, i.e., as understood in a broad sense and semblance of the metaphysical incorporating the categorical metaphysical, etc. Here, by ‘etc.’ is meant the implication that if we can include the phenomenological appreciation of the phenomenological, then, we should be a able to also include the hermeneutical appreciation of the hermeneutical, i.e., science, and, the non-systematic existential appreciation of the non-systematic existential, i.e., as presenting a form of the relatively systematic existential? Or, by extension considering as well the same reduplications of the second, fourth and sixth orders. (88)

Just what is entailed in this broad concept of a resuscitated vision of the metaphysical and just what is not entailed in this same complex topic? (89)

The articulation of a positive metaphysical ‘philosophy’ and a negative metaphysical ‘philosophy’, namely, the promotion of those processes that involve rectification, deconstruction (in a broad sense) and ongoing re(-)normalization along with our evidential attention to non-alternative facts, our ability to integrate the distinctly differentiated, and the ability to both critically and radically reconstitute our working frames of reference in the pursuit of an anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism, and, the complete rejection of all unqualified unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical and relativistical forms of philosophical ‘reductionism’ or ‘extremism’. (90)

Then, through careful transformational retreatment this critical and radical metaphysical philosophical approach can be regularized as contributing to the overall form of philosophical discipline whose positive and non-negative ideality can once again represent a metaphysical philosophy in a productively useful light given that this broad metaphysics is the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical realized and arrived at through symmetrical reduplication! (91)

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[76] E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A(ppendix A).

13. Asymmetrical Inter-Order Phenomena

There is an important difference to be observed between symmetrical reduplication and asymmetrical duplication, namely, that the operations of the latter are not commutative! (92)

E.g., the philosophy ($1^0/3^0/5^0 = P$) of history (6^2) as a topic is 'philosophy', and, the history of philosophy as a topic is 'history', etc. (93)

In effect, an asymmetrical operation does not produce a transformation of topic. On the other hand, a symmetrical operation does produce a higher ordered form of topical productivity. So, e.g., a history of science is still history, whereas, the psychology of psychology has been reviewed as a sociology, and, where a sociology of sociology is some form of politics (as the political organization of societies in general terms, etc.). (94)

We can also entertain the conjecture that all disciplines can be conceptually based through some form of inter-ordering plus or minus forms of systematic specification in certain situations that, therein and thereafter, can redefine such topicality. E.g., the science of astronomy could be translated, rightly or wrongly (where the effective pragmatic value of this discipline is not the point of this example) through, say, an astrological lens. Thence the hypothetical genesis of this specific discipline of astrology (given that some astrologers can find themselves being paid for their astrological advice). Similarly, the vast spectrum of disciplines can be accounted for (even though, more correctly, disciplines will come to our notice through their historical presence within a co-associated form of systematic envelopment). By the same type of mechanism, e.g., we can account for the range of psychologies advocate by a variety of psychologists, and so on and so forth. However, even though the conjecture can be laid out that all disciplines can be treated as topics the topicality of disciplines is more correctly discerned *in situ* so to speak. I.e., through the systematic specification of a discipline or a topic can then be phenomenologically, hermeneutically, and non-systematic existentially discerned… and then discerned in terms of its theoretical topicality. As an observation we can also note the relative stability of the topic even though, e.g., some disciplines agglutinate with others and, on other occasions, some disciplines bifurcate. At the same time, we must also recognize the potential emergence of a relatively novel topic, e.g., political-economics which can be reduced to neither politics nor economics alone. On the other hand, it could also be argued that political-economics continues to be the same symmetrical inter-ordered topic, i.e., which can be depicted as 4^2, along with politics and economics (and I must also add 'stylistics'[77]). What other observations could be conjectured? Then, by what intentional-trans-intentional mechanism/s could we propose in order to better understand how one topic, based on some ordered or inter-ordered specific configuration, can operate on another set of ordered or inter-ordered topic. Presently, I view this conjugation arises through the subjected topic being treated as the intentional object in the relevant field? (95)

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[77] Where 'political-economics' is seen as 'the emergent conjunction of the disciplines of politics and economics and the overlooked discipline of stylistics dealing with criticism, executive functions, distinctive patterns of resolution of dissonance, etc.)'.

14. Complex Inter-Ordering

Theoretically, there is a potential infinitude of symmetrical and asymmetrical combinations. On the other hand, from an historical perspective, it would appear that most combinations are simply ignored and that those that are relatively less complex are more likely to find some form of applicable systemic envelopment and development therein. Furthermore, we must recognize that how a discipline finds its historical unfolding through the specificities of its systematic envelopment cannot be envisage on *a priori* grounds. However, even though we can claim forms of topical stability in a certain discipline over time, still, the precise description of its social functions is highly dependent upon its systematic socialization in a certain period of time. Hence, e.g., variety of psychologies; different ways of doing history; the vast variety of scientific fields (even though the various methodologies in the domain of science may well collectively form, through consensus and practice, the distinctive individuation and relative unity of the scientific life-world whose types of performance distinctively differentiate it from, say, pseudo-sciences and other more respectable disciplinary topics). (96)

As a possible conjecture, can we envisage the equal respectability of all intern-ordered phenomena reviewed from a disciplinary perspective. Realistically, we could also argue that as all things cannot be equal (except through forms of equivalence engineered through *a priori* forms of treatment) that all potential candidates for topics, and their disciplinary involvement, cannot claim equal degrees of topical viability. But, that granted, instead, could we envisage a modified conjecture that only claims some degree of co-associated viability for a discipline given a recognizable form of inter-ordered phenomenology. E.g., we can conceive of a 'philosophy of science' as a respectable form of philosophy when it is suitably conducted in accordance with best philosophical practice. On the other hand, can we equally, more or less, envisage a 'science of philosophy', albeit as a form of 'science', should it likewise be suitably conducted (as proposed, e.g., by the non-standard philosopher François Laruelle?)? Let me explore this modified conjecture and the specificity of this particular issue. (97)

A number of philosophers have claimed that their discipline should be treated as a science, e.g., Edmund Husserl, and others. Given my definition of philosophy as one-part phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one-part non-systematic existentialism would it be possible to render some or all of these sub-philosophical disciplines on a scientific-like basis? The inter-ordered constitution of science is conceived of as dealing with the possibilities of possibilities as the symmetrical reduplication of the fifth order (5^2) where the fifth trans-cognitive order (and the cognitive order) deals with hermeneutic possibility. If science is developed to appreciate such possible-possibilities, and the theoretical apparatus set us to interpret, predict, measure, etc., such contentions then we could also envisage it sharing this aspect with philosophy but in its more metaphysically oriented form as an appreciation of both the philosophical (as defined with hermeneutic functions) and the hermeneutic (in its considerations of genre rules and their transformations pertaining to this discipline or the discipline in question when viewed from a hermeneutic perspective) then we could well accept that in this regard philosophy can (metaphysically) intersect with this perceived constitution of the scientific discipline. (98)

15. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part II:

As for the viability of all asymmetrically reduplicated disciplines we would need to leave this question as open and certainly not treat it as closed. Now, another potential technique for conducting this type of exploration is entailed in transformational retreatment but as further expanded to operate within the systematic complexion of the Political-Economy, albeit as refracted through this overall economy of the economic and its incorporation of the sub-disciplines of the hyper-economic, the economic and the non-economic. Let me explain. (99)

The philosophy of transformational retreatment is not something that can be avoided philosophically given that all intentional formation and all trans-intentional judgment involves its inescapable performance. Merely to think about something is to invoke its application. Thinking about something involves its metafiction, and, all metafication then automatically involves its de-suspended de-metafication. (100)

Therefore, the topical operation of one topic upon another demands suitable forms of transformational retreatment, and, that this applies to one discipline treating another discipline as its topic to operate upon in the formation of its co-associated inter-ordered phenomena. (101)

Finally, although more probably to be understood retrospectively in an ironic fashion, all topics and co-associated disciplines can be considered to be arrived at through transformational retreatment. However, this process of treatment must now be refracted through an economy of the economic as apparently situated primarily within the Political-Economy in accordance with its perceived segment or sector of most prominent origination and in the light of the system or systems that envelop its historical formation. E.g., the topic of history treated as a discipline within Academia be that in either a relative *de jure* role or in a relative *de facto*/non-*de jure* role. Later, I will be able to give such a segment or sector an overall economic address in the hypothetical light of its intersection in a 3 x 3 matrix written in terms of these sub-economies within the overall economy of the economic.[78] (102)

That in a similar manner to the constitution of the topic, as an inter-ordered phenomenon, we can also ideally envisage the systematic configuration of systems within this open-ended vision of the Political-Economy along similar lines, albeit as living systems configured through the economic coincidence of economic correlativities (which in respect to the Political-Economy involve theses sub-economies of the hyper-economic, etc. (103)

Given the conventionalized nature of the hyper-economic, as relatively hermeneutic in orientation, it follows that it too must observe a certain degree of discursive stability. Leaving the exposition, primarily, as being non-economically constituted, as that which can experience either the relatively non-critical and non-radical, the relatively critical and/or the relatively radical. What are the ramifications of such positioning? (104)

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78 Refer to paragraph xxx, etc.

16. General Ramifications

On one hand we need to note the inter-ordering of the topic, and, on the other hand, we need to note the proposed economic defining of segments or sectors in the systematic situatedness of both intra-systematic and extra-systematic forms of cultural-intercultural communication. (105)

In between (in one form of metaphorical modeling of the overall economy of the economic), we have the non-economic resolution of the exposition which, in its social contextualization, takes on the dynamics of a 'discourse'. (106)

In another form of modeling, we could argue that only in the relative suspension of the topic and the situational-context can we then arrive at the effective emergence of an exposition, be it either in a mix of non-critical and non-radical reiterations of previously iterated discursive content, etc., the critical treatment and reorganization of content, etc., and/or, the relatively radical treatment and re(-)organization of content, etc. (107)

As an observation we note the relative stability of the topic given either the preservation of the topic in asymmetrical duplication, and/or, the definitive emergence of an expected, initially novel topic through symmetrical reduplication. (108)

Similarly, through hermeneutic rectification we find a stability of genres of behaviour in a systematic context despite their inevitable transformational migration over time (and, therein and thereafter, being seen to exhibit some conformance with the *zeitgeist* of those times). (109)

Therefore, we can conjecture that the future re-exposition of the topic is potentially unstable given the possibility of its relatively-critical reorganization and/or its relatively-radical re(-)organization. (110)

Thence the relative stability of the balanced suspension of both the topic and the economic representation of its situated-context *versus* the potential instability of the exposition (and its disseminated manifestation taking the form of a discourse). (111)

That the potentially disruptive nature of the exposition can be productive of insight given its distinctively induced shifts in interpretation, etc. (112)

That such a role, in insight formation, can be discerned as 'metaphysical' in orientation. (113)

Given that 'the appreciation of appreciation' cannot be dismissed as 'mere appreciation', taking the form of meta-appreciation, non-appreciation, etc. (114)

On the assumption that a pragmatic approach is correctly undertaken, that it is not ideologically distorted, and is open to non-existential and existential forms of enrichment, etc., and is not invalidly subjected to philosophical transformation retreatment. (115)

17. Metaphysical Ramifications

Why resuscitate this concept of the ‘metaphysical’? (116)

Because we are not resurrecting that which has died a deserved death, but, instead, bringing to the fore that which has remained with us, albeit sadly overlooked and left effectively moribund and neglected. (117)

‘The philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation’ is ‘not philosophical appreciation *per se*’. This I re-term ‘metaphysical’ because that is what we are dealing with once the traditional metaphysical stables are properly, appropriately and appositely cleaned out, i.e., suitably cleansed, purified, purged… of all misbegotten metaphysical notions that have so weighed down the pragmatic pursuit of the philosophical! (118)

Just in what way is a traditional misconstruing of the metaphysical to be remedied? Through the continual application of ongoing extensive suspensions, awaiting their de-suspensions, pursuing forms of consequential analysis, engaging in existentially oriented patterns of intervention on the behalf of our relationships… where all things are to be treated as ‘fruitful fiction’ despite the abundant fruitfulness of such de-distorted processes of engagement. (119)

Where all such insightfulness is ‘progressive’ to the extent that it is able to remain self-deconstructing through the lived-passages of time… (120)

Erasing the relatively non-aligned to reveal the relatively more aligned, and so on and so forth… without accepting a fully definite sense of positioning that can then be mistreated and misconstrued as ‘indubitable’, etc. (121)

But, the continual application of the extensive suspension will remedy this tendency to otherwise prematurely retire, and, therein and thereafter, merely enjoy the previous fruits of all labours undergone… (122)

Where ‘the illusion of an illusion become a relatively non-illusion’ as long as the ‘illusory world of experience’ is experienced as a ‘world of illusion’, and v.v. (123)

Turning around what needs to be turned around, and, not turning around what does not need to be turned around. (124)

Where by ‘turning round’ we undo through extensive suspensions ‘the apparent fact that we live in a world with others that is altogether extrapolated, not suspended, suspended and not extrapolated… in and through an ongoing suspension of all of the same. (125)

Directly engaging lived-experience as living-experience that is being more fully lived… through such existential openness to the unfolding exposition of our relationships… (126)

18. Anticipatory-Expectations?

But, through the ‘openness’ such re(-)positioning what can we expect? (127)

The continual recognition, encountering and engaging with the relatively non-critical and the non-radical, along with the consequences of critical reorganization, and the surprising irruptions of the relative-radical. (128)

Welcome to the smoothness of a journey that could also be very bumpy. (129)

Incremental inputs will always reach inevitable points of chaotic irruption. (130)

The chaotic irruption being in variable intensity of difference, and, is either the result of bifurcation, emergence or a phase change. (131)

More deeply, some philosophers might well perceive all three to be but similar manifestations of the same chaotic phenomenon of irruption. I.e., where a phase change in the overall relational state can be seen as both bifurcating and emergent depending on the perspective adopted to review such chaotic outputs. (132)

Hence the dialectical economy of chaotic irruption. (133)

Where the sense and semblance of the radical is more a matter of the apparent-ly perceive intensity. (134)

Where every moment in the formation of our intentional forms of appreciation are effectively chaotic, but, not registered as such. (135)

However, with the advent of critical deconstruction, conceived in a broad sense of ruling out what does not logically work and ruling in all tentative forms of logical construction that do seem to work we prepare the advent of the radical. (136)

Such ‘preparation’ being ‘the preparing of the ‘ground’ for such insight for-mation’ and ‘preparing the ‘grounds’ for our recognition, encountering and engage-ment with the same’. (137)

Since, the insightful nature of the radical is wasted on us if we can interact with such relatively radical insight-formation. (138)

Thence the need for the necessary preparation since the radical cannot be ap-preciated as relatively-radical *qua* relatively-radical if we are in no position to experi-ence and interpret the same (as relatively-radical, etc.). (139)

The world traces itself out but just as we might just see the crime scene of a murder as a possible murder, hopefully, the detective will see what is radically present to determine what exactly occurred through encountering-engaged-recognitions. (140)

19. The Presentation of a Radical Philosophy

Obviously the relatively-radical needs to be recognized, etc.[79] (141)

An understanding of our experience of the 'radical' necessitates an 'economy of the relatively non-critical and non-radical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical as to when and how it should manifest itself. (142)

The 'relatively-radical' could be defined as 'the transformation of interpretation that turns around previous interpretations in part but never in whole'. Which is why radically-radical interpretative shifts could not be registered because such transformations need to be partial. I start to sip this coffee but suddenly realize that it is far too hot to imbibe for the present moment. I am still left in a state about to drink my coffee but must wait. Hence the relatively-radical turning around is the reversal of those features that need to be re-qualified. (143)

But, the registering the relatively-radical can go far beyond the mere reversals of re(-)presented interpretations to also include a reversal of central-like features in our current frames of reference themselves. That, in being either critically re-organized and/or radically re-self-organized novel things can then be 'seen' not hitherto registered before. The metaphor of 'being seen' and 'not having been seen before' is obviously not just a metaphor. Then, again, it must not be treated in too literal a stance because insight-formation is not the province of the merely 'seen' or 'perceived in some other sense modality', but, rather, as the 'apperceived'. Since, we can be insightful with our eyes closed, etc. Who has sat down with a cup of tea, or had a relaxing bath, or just stopped for a few moments and suddenly realized that they had promised to do *x*, or should be somewhere else, or need to do some other thing besides just having a cup of tea, etc. That type of experience arises as a re-appreciation of our current situatedness. For philosophers, metaphysician, other disciplinarians, or secularists… that type of experience is to be worked for on a more continual basis. Hence the concept of an exploratory ongoing process of re(-)normalization wherein through moments of insightful re-configuration we find ourselves interacting with the arising of novel interpretations, final vocabularies, definitive histories, more respectable philosophies, and so on… step by step, incremental input by incremental input until some form of chaotic irruption reverses our previous understandings, albeit in part and never in whole. (144)

But, how is the relatively-radical to be processed and treated as the relatively-radical? Hence the necessary supposition of the hyper-economic dimension as the hermeneutical and systematic representative of the overall economy of the economic. (145)

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[79] I.e., encountering-recognized-engagements, encountering-engaged-recognitions, recognizing-engaged-encounterings, etc. Where the philosophical aspect of such appreciation is the taking on board of phenomenal-phenomenological encounterings, hermeneutical recognitions, and both non-systematic and systematic existential engagements.

20. A De-Radicalized Philosophy through Hyper-Economization

The radically-radical is like ‘medication that is poisonous’! Whereas, the relatively-radical can be incrementally appropriated in small units that can find themselves being usefully comprehended. That comprehension is hyper-economic in orientation. (146)

In this regard, even though insight is effectively peripheral in orientation (and never central) still the radical consequences of such reversals and novelties can be thoroughly profound. (147)

We could say, as an analogy, that the advent of sliced bread was too convenient to ignore and it would eclipse traditional bakeries. But, sliced bread, on a factory scale, demands being wrapped along with all that that would entail. That even the more recent return of so-called more traditional forms of bread-making they, too, will often also be wrapped (especially if recreated in a factory setting). (148)

Now, the point of that analogy is this – bread-making found a new and novel form of production, but, still remained bread (just as topics, too, have the topical stability, through their inter-ordered constitutions, to remain ‘on topic’ so to speak. (149)

Similarly, the contextual representation of the systematically-situated also possesses its own conventional form of stability… with the implication that the relatively-radical can only be expressed non-economically through the exposition. (150)

But, be that as it may, the relatively-radical can radically re-write both the topic and the historical specificity of its current situatedness. Thence he power of discourse, be they either major or minor in their relative political empowerment or their relative political dis-empowerment. (151)

Our interpretations of the world at large are reconstructed, bit by bit, through registering the relatively-radical through a hyper-economic sense of lens. (152)

However, no *a priori*-like contemplation of the topic will establish its systematic embracement within the openness of the Political-Economy. (153)

Likewise, the relatively-instituted conventional stability of systems and their disciplines, topics, and expositions, along with their dissemination as discourses, also cannot be conjured up on a priori-like processes of creative construction. (154)

On the other hand, through the persistence of hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical, the same, in turn, can be conventionally registered in critical ad non-critical terms of reference (given that we do scrutinize everything but only that which is experienced as an apparent anomaly, and, even then not often forthrightly. (155)

How, then should we proceed in our re(-)presentations of lived-experience? (156)

21. Introduction of a Top-Down Approach from a Systematic Environment

As much as the dream of mapping the disciplinary world (within the secular world) through inter-ordering might be thought possible (at least in retrospect?) the fact of the matter is that we are accounting for historical phenomena already delineated within our intercultural-cultural sense of an overall openness of horizon (entailing sets and series of such contexts) and as already pre-mapped out in terms of its phenomenological-semantic categorizations, the hermeneutics of its meta-textual genres of behaviour, the existential specifics of forms of engagement relevant to our appreciation of co-associated senses and semblances of e/valuational formations, etc. Or, in other words, no amount of *a priori*-like thinking will ever get us to an informed understanding of the current historical specifics of those disciplines already to be found to hand. To comprehend their current historical delineations, in histories of the present, etc., we need to look at how they are currently organized within various semi-autonomous systems such as, e.g., as a non-exhaustive list, Academia; the world of Business and Advertising; the domain of the Police, Legal Fraternities, and other forms of Compliance; Media and Social Media; the realm of Politics and its executive, legislature, policy formations, commissions of enquiry; Infra-Structure including transport, distribution of power, and other resources; Entertainment; Agriculture and Food Industries, etc. Building and Repair; etc. (157)

E.g., the discipline of history is exercised either within the halls of academia and/or through individual or community efforts in the documenting of histories, autobiographies, biographies, and so on. However, despite this array of professionals, semi-professionals, and amateurs the primary identity of the historical discipline is refracted through an academic lens. Without the support of an academic world a lot less history would be done, certainly along more formal lines despite, e.g., the phenomenon of news aggregators compiling histories of the present as discussed elsewhere.[80] Without taking the history of the discipline of history as primarily organized within academia (both nationally and internationally) into account we would be at a loss as to how to define such a 'disciplinary tradition'. Similarly, we need to account for the world of science as primarily occurring over time within academia. Yes, scientific research can be conducted within the realm of business, still, its dissemination is better facilitated through academic forms of discourse or its effective equivalent in the world of Social-Media. But, regardless, of whether we have independent scholars and non-academic forms of research, the traditional 'mass' of the academic system imprints itself on behavioural expectations and patterns of performance in such a manner that we should regard all professionals and amateurs alike as having some degree of 'standing' within such a system to some degree or other. Hence the following proposal that if such semi-autonomous systems are to be viewed as occupying a certain cultural 'space' within the political-economy, in some form or other, given both their dependence on economic means (through that form of a redistribution of an assumed economic surplus) and either formal or informal forms of

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[80] E.g., 7Y. *The Hermeneutics of the 'Virtual' Re*(-)*Presentation of the War in the Ukraine*. 7Z. *A Pragmatic History*? *Part* I & II: *A History of Histories*: *Discerning Methodological Symmetries and Asymmetries between Histories of the Past, Present, and Future*; etc.

political permission to perform certain types of behaviours (given the inevitable institutionalization of such politically sanctioned behaviours), then we might surmise that this broad concept of the political-economy subsumes this world of such semi-autonomous systems, like Academia;, Media and Social Media; Business and Advertising, etc. (158)

For convenience, let us assume, through various forms of economic necessity along with the absence of political anarchy, that the political-economy subsumes all forms of systematic institutionalization where either formal and/or informal forms of co-operation are enlisted in the effective formation of relatively semi-autonomous enclaves in which a variety of disciplines will find their primary, culturally-interculturally situated sense of center. So, e.g., the general discipline of both history and science will find their locus in the systems of Academia which, acting as a metaphorical center of gravity, will have expressions of that discipline reflecting to some degree or other. In a contrast, we would find businesses and commercial forms of advertising falling within the system of Business and Advertising, albeit with varying degree of legal identification conducted in those terms of reference. So, an auction house would be seen as a business; your use of an auction platform would be treated accordingly; whereas, two friends selling objects or services between themselves could be treated as an informal reflection of such practices. Now, in the light of the above, the political-economy is assumed to have some degree of hegemony over such disciplinary pursuits be that either in a formal manner or enacted in a less formal manner. I.e., that the political-economy is omnipresent but experienced to some degree, i.e., as never entirely present nor as entirely absent. So, e.g., an academic might informally suggest to a certain student that they may well profit from reading a certain author or authors in addition to those texts that were prescribed, whereas, in contrast, in the informal recounting of an oral history the recipient of that history might want to check certain details along more formal lines. The point being made here is that such hegemony is neither absolutistically present nor absent. That, to some extent, either individually or collectively, we can elect to remove ourselves from the embrace of a certain system in question, or the political-economy in general, but, that either our identification or non-identification with the same must be understood as qualified. E.g., an independent scholar is no longer formally attached to a certain academic institution but continues to do their line of research as if they were still formally bound. E.g., an aggregator of current news might wish to act as if a professional historian (of the present) in such matters and seriously endeavour to maintain their professional-like reputation in the dissemination of their work.[81] In effect, we could argue that a relatively qualified withdrawal from a certain system is basically a withdrawal from the political-economy in that same regard, but, that in absenting ourselves, to some degree, from its formalities we cannot hope to completely escape from this overall sense of its systematic embrace. (159)

The self-perception (and other-perception) of oneself as a participant, conceived of either actively and/or through some form of a dispositional affinity, then has that person identifying more strongly with that system, and its institutions, organizations, com-

[81] Which I would ascribe to a hyper-economic sphere of concern. I.e., that the re-iterations of existentially oriented forms of behaviour, through the requisite expressions of existential sentiments, become recognized and, therein and thereby, take on a hyper-economic sense of recognition. Similarly, the phenomenon of ‘goodwill’, deserved or not so deserved, should be treated accordingly.

munities, etc., in question. So, an academic historian, e.g., quite naturally perceives themselves to be an 'historian'. Just what type of subjectivity is being invoked in this type of situation? On par with existential sentiments, we must suppose that our experience of such subjectivity must be derived through the types of relationships involved and, therefore, must be 'trans-relational' in orientation.[82] Moreover, given the persistence of such an identification it could also incline us to believe that, like considerations of reputation, this subjective phenomenon will also have a hyper-economic locus, or basis, along with all co-associated senses of expression. (160)

Treating, e.g., the topic of history as an inter-ordered symmetrical reduplication of sixth ordered ontically oriented statements we find being presented a bottom-up type of classification. Now, taking a top-down perspective, we could note, given the political-economy that entails the academic world, that we could define the same as the academic world, within the political-economy referred to entails the discipline of history, as a matter of observation, in which the individual/s or institutions in question is in conformity with the same. (161)

So, such optimistic ambitions granted, if only hypothetically, what can we hope for in terms of a clarity in our understanding of functional form as pertaining to the current historical instantiations of such institutions like Academia, Media and Social-Media, Legal Fraternities, Political Systems, and the like? To what degree are we permitted to be creative in forming this connection top-down with bottom-up, and, will the twain meet in the middle in any productive sense of an insightfully formed form of comprehension? Or, more bluntly, can we be pragmatic on such issues and just ask do such forms of modeling assist us in better understanding the inter-ordered basis and historical expression of such institutional phenomena? Where does this lead, and, is such a direction undertaken pragmatically useful? No doubt time will tell, but, given the economic nature of phenomenological interaction I am sure the necessary effort to be expended in the formation of the fine tuning of this overall philosophical prospect, etc., should prove its worth... (162)

As a head's up, just which insightful ideas am I bringing to this form of 'fine-tuning?' First, a return to the triple economic modeling of the political economy (in the form of a matrix 3 x3[83]) given my recent division of the political economy into the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic (as a more formal account of this matrix 3 x 3).[84] Second, a more in-depth, informative modeling of the subtle forms of 'preferencing' and 'de-preferencing' previously argued for under the vague rubric, respectively

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[82] As argued in *Book* 8, existential sentiments, in their relative existential presence or relative existential absence, are primarily experienced trans-relationally and not merely in either a subjective or inter-subjective orientation. That accepting this locus, or basis, for, e.g., optimism or courage, etc., might seem surprising, however, in terms of disciplinary behaviours that form of identification may well seem to be less surprising? That the acceptance of trans-personal, trans-relational forms of self-identification could be guaranteed on the basis that phenomenologically, we cannot coherently conceive of so-called 'internal worlds' *versus* so-called (relatively unknowable) 'external worlds'.

[83] As explored in *Book* IV very early in the commencement of Volume III in this *Pursuit*.

[84] Again, we have a process of resuscitation rather than resurrection. In effect, I could argue that this triple configuration of the political economy is about to have its day in the sun given the co-association of this previous 3 x 3 matrix to this recent innovation of the triple economy of the hyper-economic, etc.

of ‘de-suspensions’ and ‘suspensions’ of the ‘economic’, albeit as now refracted through the overall economy of the economic and its inclusion of the hyper-economic, etc. Third, a recognition of the extent that the political-economy defines both the commonality of a localized cultural world and our interactions of a relatively inter-cultural formation, and, that our relationship to this all-pervasive sense of the political-economy, whilst inescapable, can be redefined in terms of our personal standing in regard to the same to that extent we have a range of freedoms wherein we can potentially exempt ourselves from its non-resisted hegemony to some degree or other. Fourth, that although we can locate certain facets of certain institutional systems within the segments of the triple matrix of the political-economy, still, the powers exerted by those systems also needs to be observed as pervading the entirety of that modeling. Fifth, that because those same professional facets of a certain, semi-autonomous system are relatively independent of other systematic forms of cultural expression, still, they need to be professionally place in siloes *vis-à-vis* each other in order to preserve their effective professional autonomy and the professional responsibilities pertaining to the relative independence of their institutions despite sharing similar economic segments within the orbit of this overall sense and semblance of a political-economy.[85] Then, sixth, we also have to delineate when and where transparency is to operate and be operated both within and between systems.[86] Hence some of the presuppositions that will inform the following delineation of this topic (where all systematic forms of expression will find a ‘home’ within the relatively non-inescapable embrace of the political-economy to some degree or other). (163)

In earlier forms of the triple configuration of the political-economy (within the confines of a 3 x 3 matrix) those polarities or economic moments were originally defined as ‘theoretical, practical, and critical’. Now, refracted through the triple economy of the

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[85] The professional silo-ing of decision makers among themselves given also the general reluctance to sanction either non-diagonal or non-linear forms of interactive movement in one or two steps as a general rule against indirect processes of re-direction along with the professional prohibition of relatively unfettered communications between different types of executives belonging to different semi-autonomous systems within the same political-economic segment in this triple political-economy. Meaning, judges, as executives within the Legal Fraternity, e.g., should neither directly nor secretly communicate with either political executives or business executives, etc.

[86] So, e.g., the members of the political executive should have transparent dealings with each other within the confines of their institutional cabinet, but, generally, not with their legislature, and certainly not with their electorates. On the other hand, the legislature should be transparent in all forms of lobbying, deliberations over policy formations, and the enactment of legislation. Simultaneously, the executives of the business world should not be having secret negotiations with political executives, but, should be openly directed to engage members of the legislature, and, thence mediated and directed by the latter to be channeled through their civil service in order to expedite those more finalized policy directives within the spheres of the business world. That, as the political dimension can be found in all nine segments of the political-economy then there can be no objection to the pervasion of other systematic expressions to find institutional agents operating in such segments. That, although empowered political decision makers, business executives (in contrast to their day-to-day managers), judges, the boards of all institutions, etc., might meet within the embrace of the most powerful segment of the political-economy, still, from a professional point of view a certain degree of separation should be duly observed between various professional agents perceived as operating within the distinctive scope of that same segment! That in an a*d hoc* determination of the potential and differential power this segment is treated as the most powerful given its role in the enactive economy, i.e., the economy of re-directed behaviours that are meta-textually available to be taken up, causally, as possible forms of enaction within the range of a certain systematic-institution.

overall economic we can make the following equations on the economic grounds of an economic correlativity (as previously argued for from economic complexification[87]):

Theoretical	Hyper-Economic	Hermeneutical
Practical	Economic	Phenomenological
Critical (& Radical)	Non-Economic	(Non-Systematic) Existential (164)

Now, in reconstructing this 3 x 3 matrix of the triple configuration of the political-economy let me now, in a vertical orientation, invoke a harmonic reading (in an ascension from the relatively consonance to dissonance to resolution) in parallel with the general treatment of transformational retreatment (in an equivalent ascension from pretreatment to treatment to retreatment/posttreatment) as depicted diagrammatically as paralleling , in turn, an ascension on the vertical axis from (the rectification of) the hermeneutical; to (the deconstruction of) the phenomenal-phenomenological; to the non-systematic existential (and its ongoing processes of re(-)normalization). In continuing to use the first-letter the abbreviations of the Theoretical (also formerly read as political, etc.), Practical, and the Critical as T, P, and C. We can re-orientate this triple political-economic matrix accordingly:

	Theoretical/**t**	Practical/**p**	Critical/c
Non-Economic/**C**:	C.t	C.p	C.c
Economic/**P**:	P.t	P.p	P.c
Hyper-Economic/**T**:	T.t	T.p	T.c (165)

Now, let me slot in various institutions within this framework whilst recognizing that each system must also pervade the entirety of the political-economic matrix.

	Theoretical/**t**	Practical/**p**	Critical/**c**
C	Commissions[88]	Accountants/Police[89]	Executives[90]
P	Civil Service	Businesses/Political Parties	Managers
T	Legislature/Academics	Economists	Critics/Media (166)

[87] I.e., the argument from an archetypal economy stating that similar moments of economic correlativity will be co-associated to a greater extent with certain distinctive polarities or moments. E.g., the co-association of 'analysis' with 'reduction', with 'retrospectivity', 'the phenomenological orientation', etc.

[88] Commissions of Enquiry, Royal Commissions, Senate Enquiries, Congressional Commissions, etc.

[89] Along with other forms of required compliance, etc.

[90] Political executives, ministers, members on the Front Bench, etc. Business executives doing more than just operating a business on a day-to-day basis like 'managers'. Judges, etc.

Now, I would like to argue that in terms of enactive power, forms of decisions making able to re(-)construct society and head it in new directions through re-direction, along with culture/s and inter-cultural/inter-national relations, we could ascribe the most power to executives, be they, e.g., political, business, legal, etc. In an *ad hoc* form let me ascribe to each segment a product where C/c is 3 in value, P/p is 2, and T/t are 1. Treated as multiplied product this would give the equivalent matrix to the that above as:

	Theoretical/**t**	Practical/**p**	Critical/c
C	3	6	9
P	2	4	6
T	1	2	3 (167)

Admittedly, this is an *ad hoc* reading[91] of the potential intensity of power-relations that could be exercised, ideally, within and between these nine segments along with a recognition of traditional forms of preference that would also be exercised within and between these same segments. In such a scheme, it is obvious that maximum social power is ascribed to executives, be they political, business, or legal, etc. Similarly, it would appear that civil servants have more power than members of the legislatures, that academics figure also in such lowly terms (except for economist?[92]). (168)

Does this triple schematization of the overall economic economy (including the hyper-economic, etc.) put this triple schematization of the political economy on a better footing? I believe so, for a number of reasons. This intuitive triplication can now be analogued with this metaphorically 'vertical' assembly of the hyper-economic, surmounted by the economic and, thence, the non-economic (as enabling forms of causal intervention). Furthermore, the intuitive re-reading of subtle preferences and de-preferences in the formation of ordered phenomena can now be much better accounted for by envisaging three semi-autonomous economies within the overall economic economy operating in either suspended or non-suspended modes. Previously, there was an ambiguity in what would be meant by imposing a form of suspension on one or more moments that would either de-preference an archetypal economic moment (in the generation of the first, third or fifth orders) or the relationship between two archetypal economic moments (in the generation of the second, fourth, and sixth orders). Treating the hyper-economy as semi-autonomous allows us to read it as either suspended, i.e., as de-preferencing one or two moments, or, non-suspended, i.e., preferencing one or two moments, and, therein and thereby, being able to deliver a form of de-suspension capable of preferencing the ensu-

[91] Illustrative purposes only.

[92] Or, should economists be seen merely as academics with that segment T.p being only for people like business planners, policy formers, and information gatherers, etc?

ing order accordingly. Diagrammatically this understanding can now be depicted along the following lines:

Existential[93] Non-Eco/C:	Suspended (-) or Non-Suspended (+)
Phenomenological-Eco/P:	Suspended (-) or Non-Suspended (+)
Hermeneutical Hyper-Eco/T:	Suspended (-) or Non-Suspended (+)

…using the abbreviation of C, P, and T, in the trans-Cognitive Aspect we get:

		T	P	C
1^0	Semantic-Phenomenological:	-	+	-
2^0	Aesthetical:	-	+	+
3^0	Deontological-Existential:	-	-	+
4^0	Pragmatical:	+	-	-
5^0	Hermeneutical (Possibility):	+	-	+
6^0	Ontical (Factual):	+	+	-

…now, we can also depict the same in a vertical format, so, e.g., the semantic-phenomenological first order can be represented as... the suspension of hyper-economic and the non-economic.:

C	-
P	+
T	-

…and the exact opposite configuration of the sixth ontical order can be vertically represented as... where only the economic economy as suspended:

C	+
P	-
T	+ (169)

Where the other four orders can be envisaged as demonstrating the other four permutations as members of the only six combinations available. That, a full extensive suspension can be envisaged as the suspension of all three sub-economies. Hence, by these analogical means, we can now visualize how the suspension of two moments can preferentially treat the other remaining moment to a subtle form of privileging through the automatic invocation of the corresponding directedness of the de-suspension, and,

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93 Non-systematic existential orientation as the so-called ‘third moment’.

where the privileging of the other two moments arises through the suspension of one sub-economy. (170)

We can now invoke an inter-ordered economic reading of the political economy as a system where its nine segments of systematic influence can, in turn be read as ordered phenomena, albeit on a systematic level of representation. Let me demonstrate the confluence of such bifurcated readings. (171)

History, e.g., as an instituted academic topic in the segment T.t can be now be read T.t $\{6^0 \times 6^0)$, i.e., as 'the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order within the political economy primarily in the segment T.t.' (172)

Are we now in a position to fully schematize the disciplinary world accordingly? First, we would need to more fully map disciplines within an inter-ordered scheme. Second, we would need to map the historical and cultural location, and influence, of such systems within this theoretical domain of the political-economy in its triple formulation. Last, we would need to better integrate both schemes. However, it is my current intuition, or suspicion, that the same mechanisms at work in the ordering of phenomena that can also account for their historical systematizations. Let me explore the following possibilities. (173)

Given, a suspension of one or two of these sub-economies within the overall economic is capable, at least theoretically, of establishing these orders, then we could surmise that in a state of mono-economic suspension we could individually nominate these nine segments and perhaps denominate the same as well?)? E.g., the segment that intersects T.t could well be nominated through the suspension of the other two economies of the practical/phenomenological and the critical/non-systematic existential with a non-suspended emphasis place upon the hermeneutical moment of t. Hence, in a diagrammatic form:

C -
P -
T +t (174)

Such a re-directed form of a dynamic could also be theoretically marshalled to account for possible enaction, active enaction, and existentially engaged patterns of enaction by supposing, in the existential/non-economic sub-economy, that we have forms of emphasis placed respectively on t, p. and c. Therein and thereby accounting for the existentialization of activity initiated in the non-economic orientation. Or, respectively, in diagrammatic form (from left to right):

Non-Economic:	+t	+p	+c
Economic:	-	-	-
Hyper-Economic:	-	-	- (175)

Then, a succession of re-directions could transformationally or translationally re-direct the psychic center of our attention in this regard? Or, we might be able to invoke an extension of our more detailed ordering in terms of the overall economy of the economic by invoking bi-non-suspended states. Let me explore this further option? (176)

Say, the non-economic sub-economy is effectively suspended (through a dynamic balance of all three of its moments) then we would be presented with how many permutations or combinations if we were to consider the remaining matrix of the economic and the hyper-economic in the form of a 3 x 3 set of interactions? Taking the priority of the hyper-economic economy in this vertical economy first this would give us the following combinations, namely:

t.t, t.p, t.c; p.t, p.p, p.c; c.t, c.p, c.c (177)

That this set of relations is isomorphic (or, rather homomorphic[94]) with the hypothetical configuration being spelt out in regard to these nine systematic segments. But, to complicate this issue is the fact that we can also invoke a total of three states of bi-non-suspension. But, to amelioration these worries, we would still be presented with the same isomorphic-like configurations that spell out these nine systematic segments within the overall political-economy. That such possibilities for duplication could also spell out a dynamic way of moving the psychic center of our attention from one systematic segment or sector to some other? Say, by invoking a certain tension between, say, T.t., and, say, C.c, etc? (178)

What other benefits, or disabilities, might be viewed through the complexification of this schematic formatting of this triple political-economy? (179)

Among other things, a genetic specification of a specific system *in situ*, etc. (180)

Where ‘systems’ as semi-autonomous, autopoietic, self-replicating, socially distinctive differentiations of type of behaviour have taken on an institutional-like presentation even if not completely contained or confined in a more overt traditional form of institution *per se*. So, e.g., we have Academia, on one hand, but the specific institution of a certain university as a self-governing body or legal entity, on the other hand. In this example Academia is ‘systematic’ and a specific university is an ‘institution’ within Academia. (181)

Participants in a system ‘can wear many different hats’. E.g., in a parliamentary form of governance members of the so-called Front Bench are both legislators and where these members are also executives (to varying degrees).[95] Or, just as an historian wishing to publish their latest book or essays, research papers heads to the Business World. (182)

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[94] Considering the mapping of this set on to the hypothetical systematization does not imply that we can reverse this isomorphism in the opposite direction?

[95] I.e., occupying the first sector and the ninth sector respectively in my mapping of the Political-Economy along the lines of an overall economy of the economic.

22. The Distinctive Nature of 'Systems'

Luhmann insisted that 'systems' are based on 'distinctive distinctions' and neither objects nor subjects (neither institutions nor communities?). (183)

These 'distinctions' could be called 'the distinctive use of 'binary codes'. E.g., in the Legal System (or Legal Fraternity) we have the use of a legal distinction that asks the question 'is the textual representation of certain acts of behaviour legal or not legal? Therefore, such a question is not directly 'ethical' unless a set of ethical judgments are closely codified in a legal text as being either 'legal' or 'not legal'. So, similarly, in the business world we might ask, instead, 'is a certain project or program, a certain set of actions 'profitable' or not 'profitable'?' (184)

But, similar to using a switch to turn the electric lights on or off we must not review this approach as a form of extreme bimodalism since it must be argued that for the switch to function as intended the switch, itself, must be first switched on in a functioning electrical circuit. (185)

Based on the distinctive use of such a code the implicated use of a program then takes on the necessary information to operate this code. So, e.g., in a murder trial we need the observation or inference of a dead body whose life was terminated through an act of killing that then will be legally determined to have been 'murder' or 'not murder', say, 'manslaughter' or 'death incurred through legitimate self-defense' or an 'accident' or 'suicide' or by 'natural causes', etc. (186)

Hence Luhmann's insistence on 'normative closure' but 'cognitive openness' (to the background environment as 'Environment', which I have equated to my open concept of the 'Political-Economy' [not to be confused with the topic of political-economics]). Luhmann arguing that the coded operations of a system are not 'environmental') (187)

By insisting on 'normative closure' we must note the equal insistence of the system in question to only insist on the use of its distinctive code and not some other code or to travel beyond the use of that code (even in the expansion or contraction of that system in its confrontation with novel situation-types not hitherto dealt with, etc.). (188)

But, by insisting on the normative closure of a system we have the problem of how do we deal with sub-systems, with their own horizons of normative closure that might also have a role to play in decision formation within that overall system? (189)

To my mind, in being 'dialectical' as a positional preference, instead of insisting on a 'logical exclusivism' that must have natural limits in the first place, we would register systems as 'semi-autonomous' and 'not completely autonomous'. I.e., somewhat 'permeable' and 'not rigidly self-contained' despite the effective appearance of an operating normative closure. Let me proffer the following theoretical approach as one way to square the intractable nature of this apparent circle of an exclusive normative closure

(despite the lived-fact that operate within-the-world and never 'outside' it or 'apart' from it). (190)

In entertaining the overall economy of the economic[96] we could theorize the following in how to re-configure the primary operations of the Legal System: in the hyper-economic we could ask if this type of textual representation of either certain activities and/or non-activities is 'appropriate' for some form of legal scrutiny. Then, if the answer is positive, we could then move to the economic sub-economy to ask 'what are the factual circumstances that appear to be relevant in this instance of legal scrutiny in order to establish whether we can 'properly' entertain a decision that could well fall into being 'legal' or 'not legal' or 'as currently undecided and should be either deferred or permanently postponed'. Last, by then heading into the non-economic sub-economy a unilateral decision could be definitively cast in some measure reflecting, or qualifying, the economic parsing of that legal-like situation. Here we would require the cooperation of sub-economies with the analogical implication that sub-systems can also both cooperate among themselves and within the embrace of their overriding system. (191)

To reinforce this same hypothetical observation, I would also like to invoke an argument from transformational retreatment that ideally must also invoke the sub-economies of the hermeneutical in pretreatment, the phenomenological in treatment, and the retreatment in non-systematic existential forms of explication, etc. Where posttreatment then re-writes the initial hermeneutic input of pretreatment, etc. (192)

A similar problem to the transformational retreatment of the semi-autonomous nature of metaphysical appreciation of the philosophical that, then, is able to re-absorbed within the overall discipline of philosophy as an important sub-discipline within the overall discipline of philosophy (along with its many other sub-economies of the logical, dialectical, ontological, epistemological, semantics, aesthetics, deontology/existentialism, pragmatical-pragmatism, hermeneutics, ontics, pragmatism, inter-ordered phenomenology, etc., systematic phenomenology, etc., etc. (193)

I also have another argument suggestive of systematic permeability (re the re-insistence of a 'qualified normative closure'). (194)

In inter-ordered forms symmetrical reduplication and asymmetrical duplication, we can also add a third category of bi-ordered/bi-inter-ordered forms of inter-topic/inter-disciplinary comparison/s. Or, if there are more than two parties entering into some hopefully productive form of inter-topical comparison, we might refer to the same, more generally, as 'poly-inter-ordered considerations'. E.g., a chemist might consult a physicist to enquire if a set of quantum mechanical descriptions of a certain chemical reaction could throw light on the deeper nature of that type of reaction, and v.v. Or, e.g., an economist researching the adverse consequences of excessive neo-liberal policy settings would ob-

[96] Where the overall economy of the economic is seen to comprise the sub-economies of the hyper-economic, economic, and the non-economic. My example acts as a sort of case study as to how to deal with sub-economies or sub-systems as being able to operate within a more comprehensive sense of an economy or system.

viously have to travel beyond the domain of the economic *per se* to the political domain *per se* in order to better explore the ramification of such policy re-settings, etc. In other words, if only hypothetically, and not necessarily in pragmatical terms of expediency, transformational rules must exist in order to allow us to travel from one economy to another, form one systematic domain to some other, and so on. Or, in more simple terms, how would it be possible for people, otherwise, to generally comprehend the overall Political-Economy, even if its totalization is not possible, and, in order to also understand 'migration' between various Systems where people keep changing their hats so to speak (if those 'hats' are being worn there in the first place). (195)

As an additional critique we could also note that even in the acceptance of a qualified normative closure the ever-present irruption of the relatively-radical could, still, quite radically re-write the pre-conditional reasons for the observance of certain sections of that coded-domain by a certain System. E.g., in the dreadful days of slavery, a slave was the property of their master or mistress, but, no legal system today, seeking national and international respectability would now ever entertain, let alone uphold, such a previously pre-decided issue of the previously assumed legality of slave ownership. So, qualified normative closure is itself not immune to relatively-radical re-writing of what counts in a certain System as relevant to that system in its coded deliberations. (196)

In regard to the above, we should perhaps treat Luhmann's normative closure as a working proposal, but, as a work in progress, will also be amended from time to time as required. But, then again, just as we observe topical stability and hermeneutic stability in systematic functions, we may well surmise that a certain expositional stability will also be observed at the level of expositions and their ensuing dissemination as discourses (as reflecting that co-associated form of distinctive closure). (197)

Furthermore, we can now ask a series of co-associated question, e.g., how is it possible to migrate from one System to another; what rules might allow this or disallow this in professional terms; what commonality do Systems possess given this ability for subjects to migrate; just how do Systems have consequences across the entirety of the Political-System, and just what can we say about this environment of the so-called 'Political-Economy'; and so on? (198)

It should be pointed out that there are other ways of observing and conceiving of the hypothetical constitution of Systems. E.g., through the concept of 'normative closure' we could surmise that Systems have a sense and semblance of self-referentiality *versus* that which is relatively external to them, but, obviously relevant in their coded-deliberations, albeit as translated into an appropriate Systematic format. Or, in their cognitive openness we might surmise that 'consciousness', 'intentionality', 'trans-intentional judgments', along with 'existential forms of appreciation', and similar, are all vital ingredients in the functional operating of Systems (and also present in their Extra-Systematic interactions despite a narrowness in their coding). (199)

23. Systematic 'Migration'

Just as we can talk about 'the lengthy halls of Academia' let us sojourn for a short period of time within the edifice of the Political-Economy in order to explore the apparent configuration of its confines. (200)

That, despite topical stability of our inter-ordered phenomenology, the conventionalized institutional hermeneutic stability of Systems, along with their relative stability in coded expositions (hopefully with an existential complexion), still, we are confronted by the revolutionary nature of the relative-radical and its potential for a re-configuration of ensuing pragmatic consequences! (201)

Thence we must accept the relatively radical historical re-configuration of the Political-Economy from time to time (as would be better represented in our histories of the past, the present, and the future). (202)

Let me commence with a series of hypothetical observations and a long series of questions pursing such positionings. (203)

In my previous reflections on the Political-Economy, as previously conceived of near the start of *Volume* III of this *Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*, I eventually came to qualify my blanket prescription of a need for complete transparency in our democratic systems by noting a need for cabinet secrecy, otherwise, no minister or executive member in a ministry or government would be game to say anything remotely controversial, etc. With that insight to hand I then needed to separate the Front Bench or political executive from the Legislative Assembly be that the English House of Commons or the House of Lords, be that the presidency from the US Congress or Senate, etc. Perhaps arrived at by historical default the Westminster separation of the Executive, the Legislature, and Judiciary, or its political equivalent in other democratically oriented political systems would seem to suggest that these three institutions, or Systems, could well be seen to professionally operate within the Political-Economy along the same lines. (204)

In other words, fire-walls should exist around these three Systems in order to prevent improper and non-professional behaviour among members of these three political institutions as semi-autonomous Systems in their own right. As noted already, we can perceive the central location of the Judiciary, regarded as a legal business, as in the business of legal determinations, as primarily occupying the World of Business despite the Legislature establishing laws (when not directly appealing to the precedence of customs), and, Judges assuming an executive role. (205)

Let me diagrammatically depict these systematic-locations within my schematization of the Political-Economy (in the form of this specific 3 x 3 matrix):

	Hyper-Economic	Economic	Non-Economic
Non-Economic	Committees of Enq.	Police Compliance Officers	<u>Political Execs</u> Execs/Judges
Economic	Civil Service	Business Political Parties <u>Judiciary</u>	Managers
Hyper-Economic	<u>Legislators</u> Academia	Policy Planning	Medias Social-Media [20][97] (206)

Here I have underlined these three primary locations of the Legislature, Judiciary, and Executive. We can see that they occupy a diagonal relationship to each other. In earlier expositions of the Political-Economy I proposed an *ad hoc* rule that professional relations within the Political-Economy need to observe an additional level of propriety, professionalism, when the envisaged interactions were diagonal or not directly arrived at in one direction. On the other hand, vertical and horizontal relationships could be professionally observed within the normal bounds of professional propriety, etc. (207)

In the same vein, I noted that both the legislature and the political executive office should not have any direct dealings with the Business World, and, that the *raison d'être* of the Civil Service (or Managers) was to translate political policies into a realized form through the auspices of the Business World. But, in solving or observing a resolution of one problem we are not immune from a number of others arising through the promotion of that solution. In this instance we have, e.g., business executives occupying this ninth sector and one must wonder how they operate their businesses? Of course, the same type of solution needs to be supplied, namely business executives dealing directly with either their managers and/or their compliance officers. So, that next problem solved. But, again, should political executive have direct dealings with business executives given that they already occupy the same segment or sector of the Political-Economy? Our philosophical intuition should at least expect that there should be some form of a fire-wall between the same and that direct relations are to be exercised both transparently and with full traditional propriety. So, presidents (like, e.g., President Trump) who think they can or could, indeed, should intervene in the World of Business are, in fact, contravening one more institutional custom or practice, be it either explicitly stated or implicitly followed in a conventional and traditional form of observance. (208)

Or, e.g., if a member of the Legislature in a certain Political System of a democratic country were to observe this rule that primary members of the first sector are not to have diagonal dealings with the business world, as a parallel, where does this leave our academic historian wishing to publish their latest research through the auspices of the

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97 *Pursuit*, III.12W.20.

Business world? I suspect here that their university might wish to have first rights in such forms of publishing, although, in this age of the Internet and self-publish we might assume instead that the person in question can wear two hats in that instance, i.e., as an academic and as a private person wishing to publish their own research (with direct permission or *de facto* permission to publish?). Or, instead, the publishing house attached to that university might present an agent to conduct such negotiations, or, such an agent might be obtained by the academic instead? (209)

What other expectations or surprises might lurk within the covert passageways and overt alleyways of the Political-Economy? Consider, e.g., the correctly assigned functioning status of a political party (that is to raise moneys, say, through donations, for political propaganda and advertising that should not be directly conducted by members of the either political legislature or the executive)? I.e., the business of the party-machine is to be exercised as a business in the Business World and, therefore, should not be beholden directly to either the Political Legislature or the Political Executive. Indeed, it should b left to rise or fall as business in the expanse of the Business World. (210)

Or, let us return to the concept or doctrine of 'the separation of powers' as usually exemplified in political emulations of the Westminster System. Given all three institutions of the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary occur on the diagonal as depicted in paragraph 200, just how could these three sections of government be allowed to directly communicate with each other? Well, the short answer is they don/t and shouldn't communicate with each other. On the other hand, given a Front bench wears two hat such communication between the Legislature and the Executive is tacitly understood in that type of a political structure. Or, in the US system we might surmise that on important political occasions there is a call for the President to lobby in person or by telephone members of either Congress or the Senate. Or, that granted we could argue that proxies for the President in either the House of Congress or the Senate could be coopted to that end. Or, members of other fraternities could so lobby, or, that specific agents charged with such a professional task could do this in place of the former… and hence, one more reason, for a world of lobbying (that I would believe would have its primary location in the realm of Media, etc.). Of course, these issues can be addressed by observation, i.e., by what sighting/citing/siting mechanisms of communications issuing in one segment are entrusted with that professional form of interaction in some other segment, and v.v? (211)

Or, in returning to the Legal Fraternity, we could note that to a certain extent the Legislature passes laws that the business world of the Legal Fraternity then applies whenever and wherever it is thought to be systematically appropriate for its legal coding to be brought to bear on the pursuit of activities that could occur in some other System anywhere in this Political-Economy. E.g., policy planners (in the first two segment of this Scheme) could ask for legal opinions on the legal propriety of a certain type of practice envisaged by those policy planers. Or, instead, Compliance Officers might need to get an opinion on whether a certain act is or is not in compliance with current legislation or other forms of regulation, and so on. (212)

Now, how should we regard or better interpret this *ad hoc* rule that states that members of Systems should not be allowed to professionally interact, or interact with a minimal observance of current political propriety, should their interactions be diagonally charted or not directed discharged in a linear manner (be that either vertically or horizontally) within this environment of the Political-Economy? As a first observation, we might surmise that interactions can occur when they have something economically in common, i.e., some form of overlap in either hyper-economic, or economic, or non-economic terms of reference. So, e.g., members of the Legislature have a hyper-economic overlap with members of the Civil Service, who, in turn, have an economic overlap with members of the Business World. Therefore, Civil Servants, or Consultants charged with that form of political-economic performance, can professionally act as intermediaries between members of the legislature and the members of the Business World able to realize the policy planning enshrined in Legislature, or Executive orders, etc. (213)

Now with this *ad hoc* rule now put on a better theoretical, less *ad hoc* footing what are the implications of its recognition across the entailed environment of this Scheme of the Political-Economy? (214)

Referring to the previous diagram we can note that the following relationships are automatically referred to as professionally ‘inappropriate’, and can only be resolved when the appropriate intermediaries are appropriately utilized. So, the Business World should have no directly dealings with either the Political Legislature or the Political Executive, with operation of Political Committees of Enquiry and with Media in general. Of course, member of the Business World can make submissions or be asked to make submissions to a Committees of Enquiry, and, the Business World should not directly embed itself in the World of Media except through the employment of agencies to operate on their behalf in this regard (and conducted by either Business Policy Planners and/or Political Policy Planners. (215)

The same prescriptive operation should be seen functioning for Political Parties also operating from within the World of Business. By using, say advertising agencies in order to create political advertisements, etc. Moreover, to the same ends, Business Executives should not have direct dealings with Policy Planning who can independently create submissions to viewed and conveyed by the necessary intermediaries (say Managers directly dealing with the Business World who in turn deal with Policy Planners operating in the Second Segment or Second Sector. Of course, in this same Scheme of the Political Economy, members of the public should be allowed to have forms of interaction with any Segment or Sector as long as they are duly observant of all expected conventional standards of propriety in such matters, etc. (216)

Therefore, in a summary on this matter of professional interactions between members of Systems within this Scheme we can make this speculative observation that members of Systems are better interacting directly only in virtue of what economic basis they might share in common, i.e., professionally avoiding all diagonal interactions and those interactions that involve a mix of both horizontal and vertical axes. (217)

24. Intra-Ordered Systems and Extra-ordered Systems of Communication

On one hand, we have apparent or qualified normative closure, and, on the other hand, we have cognitive openness, non-closure, wherein members of both Systems and the General Public (as living with in the Political-Economy without a primary location) can interact (as coupled) within such an environment as this Scheme. I.e., that in effect, there is no 'outside' the Political-Economy and neither an 'inside' as well as long as this Scheme is treated as non-Systematic in orientation, is not itself systematically treated. Can this positioning be coherently argued for? (218)

Now, we could argue that membership within a certain System encloses that individual operating as a member of that system (through metaphorically 'wearing that type of hat'). At the same time, it is not impossible for members to 'wear a variety of such hats', i.e., also be members in other Systems simultaneously. However, would it be safe to say that operating as a member in one System also simultaneously excludes your operating in some other System at the same time, but, not when the person with joint memberships is concurrently operating in different Systems at different times?! I believe such an observation to be reasonable and in concordance with systematic evidence. So, e.g., an Academic could be a member of the Legislature and still operate in both Systematic Spheres of Operation but non-concurrently. (219)

Now, how is communication to be exercised within a certain System, and, how is communication to be put into practice when emitted outside or beyond the range of a certain System? (220)

Internal communication within a System would be internal communications, by whatever relevant means, preferably in an alignment with policy-setting as pre-arbitrated in that same domain. On the other hand, expositions communicated outside a System would, through dissemination, take the form of discourses. Can we, in the light of this interpretation of extra-Systematic communications infer internal expositions as also being able to be referred to as 'internal discourses', albeit preferably maintaining some form of an alignment with current policy setting? Or, should we infer that external discourses perhaps should also observe policy-setting when officially disseminated likewise? In all probability we may well assume such symmetries and asymmetries, although not without questing inevitable divergences between such trajectories given the perception of different audiences of receiving such 'differently targeted' discourses? (221)

But, then, at the end of the metaphorical day, given the expected advent of the irruption of relatively-radical expositions, from time to time, just how should such variant forms of communication be comprehended within the extent of the Political-Economy (as possibly reviewed under a passive ambit, active remit and engaged composite?)? (222)

25. A Hyper-Economic Appreciation of the Political-Economic Environment

Even though I have made the observation of the relative phenomenological stability of the topic, the relative hermeneutic stability in the operations of a System, along with its relative (non-existentially and existentially characterized) stability in its binary-coded expositional formulations, still, the Political-Economy is not immune from also experiencing the advent of the chaotic irruption of non-economically oriented relatively-radical inputs as expressed in and through the formation of such expositions and their near-automatic disseminations within and between Systems, and within the extent of the Political-Economy itself. Just how does this Scheme deal with such evidently presented chaotic anomalies? (223)

Just what examples of chaotic anomalies could be presented as evidence for this non-economically oriented irruption of the relatively-radical? (224)

Systems have no all-pervasive control over how so-called ‘programs’ will find themselves being executed, if that were currently possible, in the advent of situational anomalies. A bit like Stock Market collapses where the very mechanism that would normally guarantee some degree of price stability being in the short-term, i.e., as realized through an excessive resistance to price increases or price decreases, themselves, become part of the now no longer properly responding market able to process such incoming bets for sale or purchase through either an imbalance in selling orders or buying orders, etc. We could argue from chaos theory that incremental additions or subtractions will always eventually reach points of either chaotic bifurcation, emergence, (and/)or phase changes. Under those extreme conditions, inducing chaotic responses, such systems could well fail, or, at the very least, produce anomalously regarded forms of systemic ‘judgment’. As a case in point what exactly happens in a legal system, e.g., that operates under the legal regime that says ‘slave ownership is legal’, and, on the next morning says it is now no longer legal (through, say, a political act of legislation, or, an overwhelming revolt in public opinion and, when and where, such dramatic shifts in attitudes are publicly and clearly broadcast to the Legal Fraternity. Under such a ‘transition in programs’ should former slave owners be compensated or bear the full weight of their apparent financial losses, or, be fined or regulated by other means should they continue to use such labour even if now re-badged as freely proffered without constraints, and so on? The point being made here is that anomalous readings of binary code will occur when chaotically re-contextually treated, and, that such transitions are more than likely to be quite messy with various differently qualified or hybrid readings being made along the way until such a time that System has been re-stabilized? (225)

So, extremes in inputs or outputs, or, re-contextually treated programs, and other forms of altered subsidiary inputs, like conflicts in evidence, etc., could well expose a System to chaotically interpreted phenomena inviting novel forms of a responsive approach to such re(-)interpretation… (226)

As already noted, the hyper-economic sub-economy in the overall economy of the economic is a necessity given a need to re-read problematic or anomalous or chaotic situ-

ations. In effect, conducting the relatively-radical through, as a succession of small increment through a critical process of conventional re(-)appropriation by whatever strategy best observes that process of ongoing re(-)normalization (be it by trial and error or by proffering a more pragmatically useful form of interpretation, etc?). Then, once conventionally re(-)appropriated that type of situation can then be no longer treated as anomalous. As we might surmise eventually occurred in the 'political' acceptance of a heliocentric view of the now 'solar system'. (227)

This, incremental understanding of the potentially radical nature of novel memes or themes, etc., should be relatively non-controversial? I am reluctant to use the (all too often misused) expression of 'quantum', but the appropriation of incremental units in a process of (hyper-economically) integrating differentiated meaning units into the re-fashioning of an overall semantic mapping of the landscape in question is on par with how the quantization of information is to be approached? I.e., through small discrete shifts in meaning-significance. Seemingly in a dialectical process of both differentiation and integration (that I will later sketch out in my re-visiting, yet again, the nature of transformational retreatment as processes of treatment that involve the granular detail of a taking up evidential units of information [that should not act as alternative facts] that, in that form, then have to pass the deconstructive scrutiny of being passed through a first ordered 'atomic' differentiation, that then need to pass through a second ordered process of an aesthetic-like 'molecular' integration before being existentially specified in the third order in a form that takes up and presents its concrete historicity in both deontological-existential and non-deontological non-existential forms of re(-)presentative expression[98]).[99] Basically, we can only handle small units of information, increment by increment, in a sequential manner, where, on occasions, small additional units of information can then induce quite radical changes from a more integrated sense of perspective. (228)

As a case in point, but speculatively constructed, whereas only a few individuals in 'civilized society' had once voiced qualms over the institution of slavery, say, in the US, at some point in time a critical number of relatively elite voices came together to both politically and economically 'deconstruct' that 'institution'.[100] That this moral revolution would then find its way into legal practice (and v.v.). (229)

Therefore, these questions have to be asked, namely, to what extent are members of the Legal Fraternity bound by the moral horizons of their resident cultures, and just what is the topical basis of the Legal System, and how does it relate to such ethical considerations if at all??? (230)

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98 Refer to section x, paragraphs y-z.

99 The reader might like to refer to my essay titled: *A Philosophy of Innovation*: *Outlining a Phenomenological Approach to this Topic as well as Exploring Trends in a Futuristic Contex*t, 23.4.18.

100 I would argue that secular society eats, drinks, and dances the course of its current customs through the reiteration of the same, but, that only elites can 'radically' re-direct and shift those trajectories.

26. What is the Topical Basis of the Legal System, etc?

In the topic (and discipline) of History I have argued it is the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (of judgmental determination) of ontical or factual determinations (6^2). Similarly, my inter-ordered approach to the topic (and discipline) of science is to treat it as the symmetrical reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutic possibility (5^2). Now, given every topic (and discipline) has the inherent stability of a distinctive topical basis, and, every System is a also reflection of such an approach, be that individually formed or collectively aggregated,[101] then let us ask the pertinent question, just what is the topical basis of the Legal System (that then allows it to utilize the binary-code of 'what is legal *versus* what is not legal?'). (231)

Luhmann was insistent that the very nebulous nature of morality or ethics does not form a Moral System or an Ethical system, and, in that regard, the Legal system was not a member of such an impossible or absent System. I have much sympathy for this positioning on its face value. However, my example of the radical shift from seeing 'slavery as a form of property law' to its 'total abrogation' as such, and this radical shift in public opinion being reflected in the Legal System, would seem to suggest otherwise. To seek some clarity on this controversial question, first, let me ask just what is the topical basis of the Legal System? (232)

Giving this question some thought I have come to the current conclusion that it is a bi-ordered hybrid that is one-part pragmatical in orientation and one-part deontological in orientation (that does considerably reflect the dialectics of moral or ethical decision making). However, the binary-code, I believe to be in play at the center of the Legal System, is not conducted between two equally weighted alternatives, i.e., 'being legal' and 'not being legal' are not mirror images or counter-positions with respect to each other. Let me demonstrate this asymmetry. (233)

We could define both positive and negative aspects to the complexities of the binary-code that I perceive to be utilized in this System. In 'positive terms' it could be considered 'to be legal to do *x*' when it is the case 'if it is both legal to do *x* and/or *x* does not coincide with any legal considerations that are relevant to the conduct of its performance'. On the other hand, 'it is not legal to do *y*' when it is the case that 'if it is both not legal to do *y* or by doing *y*' the performers of *y*' can successfully skirt such proscriptions or prohibitions associated with *y* alone', etc. (234)

In a simplified form we could restate this distinction between positive and negative aspects of this binary-code as follows: 'it is legal when it is either legal or not illegal'

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[101] E.g., Academia is a collection of such 'Sub-Systems, say, of History, Science, Literature, Legal Philosophy, Philosophy, Languages, etc. etc. Science, e.g., although in Academia, can be treated as a System in its own right, like all the other Disciplines collectively included in various Academic lists. In the light of this belief of the centrality of a binary-code at the center of each and every system we could well ask in what form does the binary-code for Academia take (be it constructed on some definitive test or the *a priori*-like treatment of its listing of which Disciplines are to be considered to be as currently enfolded within this System of the Academic in accordance with the geographical location of the Academic representative in question).

versus ‘it is illegal when it is proscribed as illegal and no amendments in envisaged behaviour can circumvent the force of such a proscription or prohibition’. Or, in effect, the positive aspect of this binary-coded distinction is ‘pragmatical’ in orientation whereas, the negative aspect of this text is deontological in orientation. Hence the force of my observation that we have an asymmetrical binary-division in this instance. Or, i.e., a hybrid that, essentially, is a topical conjunction of the positivity of a fourth trans-cognitive order and the negativity of a third trans-cognitive order. On reflection, the expression ‘hybrid’ does not seem to do full justice to this mutually bonded state of affairs where the different natures of the positive and negative aspects do not seem to be in conflict but (as supplements or complements to each other?)? (235)

This state of affairs, I believe, fully reflects the ethical or moral nature of such decision-making already in force across our communities, cultures, societies, and so on. I.e., some ethical decisions need to be pragmatically exercised, and, other decisions need to be exercised in a deontological mode (and that we can run a ‘pragmatic test’ by considering what decisions if made would more likely be value-enhancing by doing so[102]). Then, on other occasions we need to take both ethical aspects into consideration and that generally cultures, etc., already have rules of arbitration for dealing with such potential conflicts of interest that by virtue of such mediation or intermediation do not arise to this level of an actual overt conflict of interest. In this regard we could almost argue for a third dimension in ethical performance and compliance with cultural understandings, namely, second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetic harmonization of these pragmatical and deontological spheres of ethical or moral interest. To illustrate this point, yet again, I could invoke my classical example of the bridge architect who has to design a bridge both pragmatically within budget and, deontologically, erect an edifice that does not fall down and/or injure people in the process. If I am allowed to stretch this metaphorically, that between pragmatical and deontological judgments society has ‘bridging mechanisms’ already in place in the form of rules of arbitration for dealing with such potential conflicts that, otherwise, could well rise to the level of overt conflicts of interest. (236)

But, for the philosopher, it often remains a mystery, as a fact, ‘that people do not have existential crises every moment of the day’. But, in truth, embedded in both secular ‘lore’ and legal ‘law’ forms of arbitration come into play when the consequential nature of pragmatical judgments overlap deontological judgments, and v.v., to then, more often than not, successfully defuse such potential conflicts, anomalies, legal *aporia*s, etc. (237)

That, in the light of this mutually bonded, pre-arbitrated bi-ordered, asymmetrical weighted topical code at the center of the Legal System, devolving around both pragmatically positive prescriptions and deontologically negative proscriptions we might well surmise that, *contra* Luhmann, an Ethical or Moral System has at least a *de facto* or covert existence in civilized society, if not fully in ‘law’, then certainly in ‘lore’!? Witness

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[102] Please note I am making my usual distinction between the expediency of the ‘pragmatical’ (in our considering non-existentially oriented judgments) *versus* the ‘pragmatic’ enrichment of judgments that consider all apposite possibilities of either existentially oriented deontological judgments, pragmatical judgment and/o the harmonization of the former when it is necessary and relevant for that interrelationship to be also considered

the recent advent of ethicists, as ethical philosophers, in hospitals who are required to rule in or rule out the apparent propriety involved in the formulation of certain medial trials, etc., as conforming to the required degree of ethical rigour needed for their permission to proceed, and so on. Perhaps we should encourage these same specialists to intervene when and where necessary in both our politics and in our economics… given the slowness of public opinion to respond to such ethical or moral considerations that should more quickly demand a more profound degree of proactive prospectivity... (238)

In this section, three questions were being explored, namely:

> …to what extent are members of the Legal Fraternity bound by the moral horizons of their resident cultures, and just what is the topical basis of the Legal System, and how does it relate to such ethical considerations if at all??? [230] (239)

Obviously, in the light of my example involving 'the eventual abrogation of slavery' we must conjecture that members of the Legal Fraternity will eventually have to 'pay their dues to society' (that ultimately pays their wages as a business in the World of Business). That said, we cannot assume an automatic proportional reflection of current opinions being immediately reflected in legal circles even if certain member might already assent to an array of such progressive notions that conceivably, in all probability, through an extrapolation of society's apparent understandings of itself, will eventually be taken on board in apposite forms of legal codification. As it stands in the current Political-Economy, shifts in law (that could somewhat reflect current lore as entertain in the evolving consensus of public attitudes) are more often than not instituted primarily through political legislation, and, only secondarily, through the institution of innovative forms of legal precedence. (240)

As I see it, the binary nature of legal-coding, run within a set of 'legal programs', replete with adequate representative textual instantiations of the relevant situatedness of the events in question, in the light of what is to be counted as evidence, along with demonstrations of apparent intent plus the observed consequences of certain actions, non-actions, or inactions, and so on, all fed into the 'sausage making' of legal determination. In this regard, we can perhaps surmise, hopefully, that Legal System in democratic countries will eventually reflect, albeit 'partially', current ethical and moral attitudes held by societies as reflected through both politicians and judges if and when they should decide to be more proactive in such matters. (241)

From a topic perspective we might consider the binary-code at the center of Legal Systems to be a mutually bonded, inter-ordered mix or hybrid of positive pragmatical considerations in conjunction with negative deontological proscriptions with or without some degree of inter-order harmonization along aesthetical lines… to a great extent reflect current forms of arbitrational practice. (242)

That, *contra* Luhmann, societies operate within the shadows of an evolving, slowly thematizing Ethical or Moral semblance of a System, albeit as realized through the 'presence' of a possibly more engaged world to be found in the public domain!? (243)

27. Systems within Their Environment of the Political-Economy

For Luhmann, this binary code that distinguishes one autonomous System from another system cannot be extended as such beyond the (programmatic) boundaries of that System (although those boundaries could either expand or contract). At face value, it would be easy to just agree with this sociologist on this point. However, Systems are messy, people are continually migrating between them, the consequences, say, of legal decisions enacted by a judge, go far beyond the confines of a mere System. We could quip that people are not locked up in Systems but in jails.[103] Furthermore, the autonomy of a System will more than likely have to be shared with a number of Sub-Systems, and, in turn, any one System could be enveloped in a Super-System, most certainly, within the systematic-like environment of the Political-Economy itself. This is *contra* Luhmann who has insisted on just normative closure but admits cognitive non-closure or openness (for how, otherwise, could a court case, say, be run if we had no access to the historical information of that legal case in question through its adequate documentation?). (244)

Still, a legal decision, in a legal act of intentional discernment, is not an ethical decision even though, as shown in the previous section, it can very much reflect the ethical-like System of Society by virtue of its mirroring both the positively pragmatical (say, both descriptively and prescriptively to the extent this act *a* or situation *s* describes something that is not-illegal and/or could be prescribed as not-illegal) whereas, in contrast, a negative legal judgment appears to co-opt a deontological (and potentially existential dimension) through proscription. All of which, it would appear could well reflect, to some extent, the current state of 'lore' rather than being fully enshrined in 'law'. And, therefore, does reflect the imputed ethical state and current status of that inferred Social System[104] (and its tentative identification with the Political-Economy, as socially understood, to the extent its current ethical determinations are reflected in that problematic and programmatical textulization of 'lore' as 'law'. (245)

People can migrate between Systems, in all probability changing their metaphorical hats when moving from one to some other, but, can only wear two hats, or more, simultaneously when entering into a state of inter-disciplinary interaction, be that either hypothetically simulated or non-hypothetically engaged as such. Hence the type of position that might describe the type of dialogue going on between, say, a physicist and a chemist when referring to their different descriptions, etc., of the same type of phenomena. Then,

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103 A person is sent to jail and is not imprisoned in the System (although Kafka might disagree).

104 That granted then we might surmise that this imputation of a Social System could well be seen as in an alignment with much of the Political-Economy (although never in an state of absolutistical alignment on the grounds that the Social System, like all Systems, being at least semi-autonomous, will exclude, to some degree, all other Systems as per Luhmann? So, e.g., a society's attitudes towards the System of Science, be that world within Academia or the World of Business (or, more likely, in both Worlds in some form of arbitrated hybridization), may well be different from the more positive perceptions of scientists, an others, and so to that extent the relationship between the Social System and the plethora of others Systems might not be in a state of simple alignment or mere envelopment. The implication being that even the imputation of a socially inherent Social System cannot be in a relational state with the environment of the Political-Economy in the form of a simple equivalence, etc.

Systems, too, have offshoots of their primary influence just as the Legal System has Legislation, Courts of Judgment, Police as officers for enforcement, etc. (246)

A System is better approached through an apposite trimodal economy, hence my suggestion of hyper-economic, economic, and non-economic inputs, throughputs, and outputs. The imputed binary code of a System initially operates hyper-economically but is then operated economically with a unilateral re-directedness of decisions being decisively exerted non-economically (through a suspension of both the hyper-economic and the economic) in and through a process of retreatment that is transformational. (247)
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In my opinion, the best way to view the nature of the relationship between Systems within the environment of the Political-Economy is to explore the same under the heading of communication, structural coupling, and the position that advocated a non-ideological principle of (Social) Holism (reflecting the Political-Economy as currently understood). Let me tentatively explore these interlinked headings. (248)

The reason why, say, in the Legal System lore can be eventually enfolded, in part, within a set of laws is that Systems can communicate in their own way, and, through structural coupling can absorb, albeit through their own lenses, an appropriation of materials that originally belonged to an initial System. This idea is similarly entailed in the idea that one topic or discipline can appropriate some other through asymmetrical duplication (where the dominance of the coupling System *versus* the coupled System needs to be clearly denominated given that this this type of relationship has already been delineated as theoretically non-communicative). (249)

Furthermore, although a System can be provisionally treated as normatively closed, albeit cognitively open, we might also conjecture that the use of a common natural language will demand that the information and decisions of one system can be broadcast by some other, if only hypothetically. Say, e.g., the Media reporting on the legal determinations arrived. Moreover, the imputed commonality of the same environment of the Political-Economy should also take a holistic turn once reviewed either trans-relationally and/or pro-relationally. That is evident in the Legal System reflecting the very ethical nature of an imputed Social System of Society through the same bifocal lens of the pragmatical, the deontological and the tacit aesthetical harmonization entered into in order to construct a working world of arbitration. (250)

In light of the above, communication is also necessary in order to give ‘substance’ or ‘material’ to the overall economy of the economic through certain focused upon inputs, invoking conditionally connected throughputs, and thence interconnected outputs. A holistic principle can also be invoked to connect the co-associated economies of the Sub-System/s within a similar sense of System, and, by a similar set of mechanisms, then invoke the envelopment of this process within a relatively more encompassing economy up to and including the Political-Economy, albeit as each is indirectly refracted from its own point of view. A process of systematic alignment that can be assisted and promoted should that type of limited effort be viewed as relatively fruitful in comparative terms of reference? (251)

In addition, we also need to recognize that the output of a Legal System can change over time. Witness the abolition of slavery, or the more recent process of ongoing re(-)normalization of gay marriage as being enfolded into the System of Marriage through this form of a re-defined application of that type of binary code. However, as an observation, it would probably be more true to say that Systems do not suffer much internal change except through relevant processes of regularization when incoherent or conflicting forms of code are regularized through processes of rectification. That in this regard, codes are hyper-economically oriented patterns of hermeneutically oriented behaviour which are best subjected to qualification through rectification when those genres of behaviour are progressively reformed, re-qualified, harmonized, rendered more appropriate, etc. On the other hand, the formation of the exposition is subjected to ongoing non-economic re(-)normalization through the relevant forms of qualification be they either relatively non-existential and/or existential in scope, and, in contrast, the economic is further refined through the broad application of a concept of 'deconstruction' in which economic deliberations are rendered more coherent, less incoherent, more integrated, etc. Yet, despite the imposed stability of the System investing in such forms of working regularization and the eventual clarification of outputs, still, no System is immune from chaotic forms of re(-)regularization issuing from such definitive forms of unilateral redirection of intent, the emergence of non-continuities, and so on. (252)

Then, again, to re-state the same point, Systems have the habit of holistically reflecting each other within the embrace of an all-pervasive Political-Economy, and, in that regard do give us a direct account of that same Political-Economy by virtue of the fact that all relationships are directly engendered and directly engaged to some degree, to some extent. (253)

That, to insist on the absolutistical internality of Systems is to advance an ideological thesis that effectively argues for the unknowability of the environment *per se* which should quite rightly be dismissed as ludicrous and impossible. (254)

Then, there is obvious appreciation of a holistic-like intersection of binary lenses, their simulations of distinctly differentiated content, and the suspensions of the same, through ensuing de-suspensions we are not only permitted to live in this world at large, this overall world-of-life, but are virtually propelled to find our habitation throughout the encompassment of its living-extent. (255)

Where both the trans-relational and the pro-relational turn all things upside down, inside out, and back-to-front... where, through effective mechanisms of simplification, the overall economy of the economic can progressively engage these 'simulations of reality' through 'the reality of these same simulations' *qua* simulations. (256)

So, through retreatment, all divisions can be integrated and all integrations can be analyzed, and, along the way all things can be semantically mapped and named. (257)

28. A Philosophy of Transformational Retreatment: Part III.

A philosophy of retreatment has been progressively refined. (258)

A long time ago I was also to entertain the simultaneous paralleling of both linear ordering with circular re-formulations of the same; later from preferential treatment to invoking the role of the de-suspension and implicating a causal dimension; more recently invoking an economy of the economic to embracing a systematic re(-)positioning... now, we explore the economics of a fifth trans-cognitively ordered pretreatment, a first ordered treatment, and a third ordered orientation in retreatment through the supplementation of a progression through all six orders themselves on an economic level of explication. (259)

Traditionally, we start with pretreatment through the fifth ordered hermeneutical explication of what is already to be 'found to hand'. (260)

To be able to travel to the first order of phenomenal-phenomenological treatment we must pass through the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical with the implication that we should attend to a factual dimension and not to so-called 'alternative facts'. (261)

Let me diagrammatically depict these transformational-transitions being envisaged between the trans-cognitive orders of the fifth, first, and third:

3^0
Retreatment
Existential
(Deontological)

2^0 Aesthetical 4^0 Pragmatical

Treatment * **Pretreatment**
Phenomenological Hermeneutical
(Semantic) (Possibility)
1^0 **5^0**

Ontical
6^0 (262)

Now, referring to the diagram we can see that in order to get from the fifth order to the first order (by the shortest distance) we need to travel through the sixth order of the ontical or factual determination. The inescapable implication to draw from this is that even though we take 'what is to be found to hand' in the fifth order of pretreatment, still, we then proceed to the first order of treatment via this order of factual determination (where a proposition can be treated as provisional statement). In other words, we must attend to the apparent facts of the situation in question and avoid so-called 'alternative facts'. We could call this process 'factualization'… just becoming better informed. (263)

Arriving at the first trans-cognitive order we encounter a phenomenological-semantics, i.e., how we map the world of atomically treated phenomenologically analyzed experiences (albeit in conventional terms). Such 'treatment' is overseen through positive and negative forms of deconstruction, i.e., removing what is functioning incoherently or in a factually contradictory or self-contradictory presentation, etc., whilst leaving a working residue that, as a remainder, is to be regarded as relatively positive in tenor through this process of deconstructed-reconstructed phenomenal-phenomenological differentiation associated with the phenomenological appreciation of that review. (264)

Then, moving on to the third order, we now pass through the second order of the aesthetical. In effect, we now entertain the integration of atomic propositions as potential statements, etc. Hence this in-between-stage can be considered to be one of relative integrations to be arrived at through apposite forms of harmonization. (265)

In arriving at the third order we passed from the generality of the hermeneutical fifth order to the phenomenological particularity of the first order to then now experience the concrete specificity of the non-systematic existential as both an instantiated form of the historically re(-)presented and in its deontologically oriented forms of e/valuational formation (a division of labour that could be accounted for through simultaneously invoking both the third cognitive and the trans-cognitive orders respectively). (266)

From the third order with its potential for the resolution and harmonization of Systematic experience we find a process of transformational retreatment (through both metafication being automatically followed by de-metafication). (267)

Next, we pass through the fourth order of the pragmatical returning to where we started, albeit, where pretreatment is now rewritten as posttreatment with which we now re-start the same cycle over again, albeit re-writing the pre-critical pretreatment now through a process of relative critical, if not relatively radical 'posttreatment'. (268)

Hence the cycle of transformational retreatment, on an economic level, can now be summarized as: pre-critical pretreatment through rectification; factualization; differential deconstruction in treatment (with metafication); integration; critical/radical retreatment (with both non-existential and existential aspects through de-metafication); post-treatment re-writing the initial pre-critical state of affairs. (269)

Obviously, this scrutiny presents a number of considerations that need to be suitably applied. E.g., our attention to facts and our avoidance of alternative facts of 'factoids' (should we wish to better appreciate the 'apparent' nature of that being explored). (270)

Or, from a coded perspective, the hermeneutical state of pre-treatment allows us to appreciate within which System we are operating; the code being operated in economic terms, but, finding a trail performance in economic retreatment from whose portals, in non-economic terms, we might be able to better instigate more insightfully directed forms of social change through an appreciation of systematic embracement... (271)

29. Ramifications of a Systematic Approach for Instituting Social Change

Only a totally misguided relativist would think the world is completely 'flat', so we should behave accordingly (by attempting to adopt a more insightful approach which could well include taking an assortment of in-depth systematic perspectives). (272)

I.e., we need to better understand the systematic topography of the world of lived-experience in order to insightfully discern how both distortions in and non-alignments between Systems, concerning overlapping states, can be instrumental in adversely expressed phenomena. Let me explain. (273)

In order to understand social problems arising from innovations in the relationship both within and between technology and culture, and v.v., an in-depth appreciation of the relevant System or Systems in question is called for. (274)

In this regard, let me deal, first, with what is now a relatively traditional problem in the form of a current Obesity Epidemic in order to possibly use it as a template for the resolution of relatively more Contemporary issues. (275)

Recently, in a science magazine, I read an article that proposed that we have a mechanism for detecting the amount of protein in our food and directing our appetite accordingly. Unfortunately, in the eating of modern, processed and highly refined foods that have a diminish protein content the body is insistent that we eat more in order to realize the amount of protein it decides we need. On realizing the apparent phenomenology of this type of situation it becomes quite obvious that we have here an important piece in this puzzle as to why we now have an epidemic in obesity. (276)

In support of this contention, I have found the following posting confirming this type of conclusion (with the following title and subtitle):

Like human locusts, humans can be tricked into overeating

> Our bodies crave more food if we haven't had enough protein, and this can lead to a vicious cycle - especially if we're reaching for ultraprocessed instead of high-fiber whole foods.[105] (277)

As a knowledgeable baker might say, 'the quality of the bread is in the quality of the flour used'. With a protein content below 6%, bread has difficulty becoming leavened. A lot of white breads have a protein content of about 8-10%. Loaves using better grades of flour, seeds, longer periods of fermentation or proving can be around 12-14%. In the light of the above, we might conjecture that we would need to almost eat twice the amount of a low protein grade bread in comparison with a bread that has a much higher level of protein. That granted, the immediate implication that can be drawn is that in order to satiate our requirement for an adequate level of protein intake if we were to just eat

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[105] Article is by Tim Vernimmen, 05.01.223; Do low-protein diets and ultraprocessed foods cause overeating? Published in the *knowable Magazine*.

a bread with a much lower level of protein we would, all things equal, need to also consume twice the level of calories in order to meet our protein requirements. Undoubtedly, in eating everyday more calories than are actually needed, even if only as a small percentage of our total requirement, then over time we will inevitably put on weight should these extra calories be incrementally converted to fat and those reserves not be metabolized in periods of time when the body experiences an insufficiency in caloric intake. In my opinion, this is the essence of the problem when described in simplified physiological terms of reference (if we were not to take into account other relevant considerations like, e.g., overall diet, exercise, lifestyle, genetics, etc.). (278)

Now, just looking at the obesity epidemic from, say, the perspective of diet alone, would be what I would term a rather unproductive 'flat perspective'. Instead, let us attempt a 'systematic reading' by first asking just what Systems appear to intersect in this problem, and what Systems might intersect in some form of an in-depth resolution? (279)

Obviously, at the center of this social problem we have the Business World that we could assume is making a greater profit through lowering protein content (given there is some degree of a direct correlation between the level of protein and its cost of production), and, then finding their target population also needing to eat more of the same product or similar in order to meet their minimum protein requirements. (280)

Obviously, we also have The World of Agriculture (or Food Production if the food in question is produced through precision fermentation in a factory-like setting[106]). Then, we might also include the Health World given considerable current concerns already being expressed about this epidemic. (281)

As for possible Systems that might be co-opted in an ongoing resolution of this crisis, we might provisionally include Education, Media, and the World of Politics. (282)

Without a doubt the binary code at the center of the Business World could well be written in the following form: 'if it is profitable proceed, if it is not profitable do not proceed, and, if it can be even more profitable proceed accordingly...' (283)

We might surmise that in the World of Health Services their binary code, in a proactive attitude, might take the form: 'be healthy by doing what is healthy, do not be unhealthy by doing what is detrimental to your health...' or, something similar along those lines. (284)

Assuming a structural coupling between the World of Business and the World of Agriculture (and The World of Food Production if implicated) where the Business World fully co-opts the latter, through its distribution of the former, to it own ends, namely, profit, then we can safely assume a serious disconnect between the dissemination of healthy food, on one hand, and, the dissemination of cheaper, but highly profitable food products, on the other. Therefore, in this regard, we have good reason to believe a non-

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[106] Refer to the following essay where this revolution in food technology is now upon us. *Pursuit*, III.7X: *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruption* (12.1.23).

alignment of intentional objectives disseminated between these two worlds is one way, from a a systematic perspective, to describe the pre-conditions and condition of this increasing evident anomaly taking the form of an epidemic of obesity... (285)

So, from a systematic understanding of this problem, how might we proffer a raft of solutions that might collectively contribute to an eventual resolution? (286)

Here, I invite the reader, themselves, to formulate a set of solutions. On my list, I would like to start from the individual and through a process of social education inform people as to the predominant reasons why they might be unduly putting on far too much weight. In effect, co-opting the Systems of both Education and the Media. In contrast, from a political point of view, in co-opting the Political System, a creatively constructed set of policy re-directions could well be used in conjunction with the previous use of both the Systems of Education and the Media (be that traditional Media or Social-Media). In regard to bread production, breads with lower levels of protein might be mandated with a higher cost, whereas, more expensive breads might be subsidized. Then businesses might be required, by law, to clearly advertise both the percentage of protein present and the total protein content present in certain products, especially those that are ultrarefined, low in fiber, replete with additional sugars, use excessive levels of salt, and other forms of relatively unhealthy ingredients when their consumption is excessively reiterated. (287)

Interestingly, at the end of the day, a more integrated approach might prove to be far more beneficial where profit, which is inherently neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ in itself, is actually harnessed to ends that are both profitable and health-oriented in what we might term to a ‘mutual alignment of disparate means and ends’. (288)

Of course, in expediting such ends, be they relatively mutual or non-mutual, it would be preferable to find an economical use of inputs *versus* a surplus of outputs, but, I would suspect in a rectification of the pre-conditions and conditions implicated in the formation of this crisis under focus much work will need to be done in a range of Systems. Still, we should take heart from the fact that a number of adverse social trends have been reversed. E.g., the percentage of people smoking. Then, other campaigns in educating the public have also been relatively successful. E.g., In New South Wales, a more ethical approach to egg production has the abolition of the caged-chickens on the horizon and its replacement with a mandated free-range form of farming. In a recent shortage of eggs, I noted that the last eggs to be left were the cheaper caged variety. So, on that positive note, I should also add that quite recently some very effective weight-loss drugs have come on to the market... suggesting that this trend that produced this obesity crisis may well be able to be reversed with a raft of suitable evidence-based policy measures? (289)

Now, let me find a more recent problematic issue to see if this type of systematic template can be applied to problems of a more Contemporary outlook? (290)

Arising from the advent of computers, smart phones, the Internet, and so on, there has been a profound fracturing and diminishing in Traditional-Media that has been somewhat replaced by Social-Media, but, not in any directly equivalent sense. Now, if an

earnest democrat is of the belief, certainly once very strongly held, that one of the purposes of the so-called 'Fourth Estate' was to hold the body politic accountable and, therein and thereby, render a service to ensuring the metaphorical 'health' of our democratic institutions in this age of an ongoing, virtual deconstruction of much of Traditional-Media we must ask, 'is there some way that we can either preserve Traditional-Media in the hope that it can still serve this function or invest in Social-Media in such a manner that this role might be continued, albeit re-purposed instead from this different perspective of Social-Media? (291)

From a systematic perspective we could ask in the World of Media, in this shift from Traditional-Media to Social-Media can we or should we politically, say, subsidize, certain segments of Traditional-Media in this hope that this now much reduced form of Media could still perform this role of making the Political World and other worlds, say, the Business World or the World of Heath, etc., accountable through the influence of its readership. Therein, of course lies a first problem, if people have now turned towards alternative forms of information, etc., and have completely fallen out of the habit of reading newspapers there may well be little point in keeping the barely alive on some form of subsidized life-support. Alternatively, could or should certain sectors of our Political World subsidize instead seemingly viable forms of Social-Media, or Traditional Media that, perhaps, have already successfully migrated to Social-Media, to perform a similar type of function to their Traditional counterparts? Maybe an alternative to what is known as Facebook, a sort of public or community notice board where members of the public could post news items, essays, notices about public meetings, letters to the editor, and so on. Or, slightly more formally, produce a virtual e-newspaper with minimal staff, say, an editor, an Internet specialist, and a part-time member of the Legal Fraternity to screen input and prevent from dissemination items that would be classed as defamatory, indecent, abusive, promote hate speech, and so on? Such a venture, whose 'political' independence was guaranteed, should not be too expensive given its dissemination by Internet without the expense of a print-run and its costs of distribution. (292)

Interestingly Luhmann has described Media as a varied mixture of 'news, advertising, and entertainment', and, in this regard, it would be necessary in the formation of an eventually 'viable' e-newspaper to delineate just how it would be funded and which of these aspects of media will be promoted or not promoted, and, to what degree they might be segregated or not segregated given that most, if not all forms of Media, are a contested and disconcerting mix of all of the above. (293)

Seriously, although this example is more of a thought experiment, we are on the cusp of a period of quite radical change in which more traditional features of our Social World are about to be disrupted in no uncertain terms. In this regard, our politicians need to be proactive and prepare for such disruptions as climate change; a superfluidity in power creation and consumption; autonomous vehicles (and a probable diminished desire to actually own such vehicles); the disappearance of the fossil fuel industries; rapid development of factory farming already upon us should we pay attention to such products already in our supermarkets; new forms of vocation, but, with the possibly greater loss of traditional forms of employment that to date had manage to resist blue-collar and white-

collar forms of replacements and displacements; etc. Without a doubt this means for a start our politicians need to be prominently proactive now... which is not something we see as one side is immersed in culture wars and the other side is trying to catch up after a series of adverse situations like Covid, inflation, disruptions in supply chains, etc. (294)

Now is not the time to ignore such issues, such potentially compounding problems! Our politicians need to be informed that they will need to be proactive in dealing with this avalanche of such impending disconformities and non-continuities in social practice. Truly, an urgency will be soon required in order to rise to these challenges some of which are already upon us. Need I mention chaotically expressed forms of climate change given an acceleration in rising temperatures! (295)

To hopefully minimize the problematic impact of such impeding adversities, in what manner, and to what extent, could this systematic reading of the Social World assist us in recognizing the advent and nature of such negatively presented phenomena, and, how might we be able to successfully address and redress the same? Let me proffer some ideas in this regard. (296)

In order to successfully conduct a series of systematic reading of anomalous social situations and expedite forms of productive systematic alignment it is my opinion that we need 'strong narratives' that are clearly formed as to what reasonable objectives are necessary in order to arrive at in the timely resolution of such issues. Let me elaborate. (297)

One trimodal economic approach towards an understanding of the transformational formation of strong narratives could be as follows: first, narrational facts; second, narratives *per se*; and, third, the recognition of the necessity of a need to resolve narrational anomalies as the drivers of such communicative phenomena. In regard to the latter, we would need a clear formation of the goals or objectives desired through the exercise of such narrations (in contrast with most narratives where we desire to qualify such processes of resolution in order to maintain these modes of dissemination given our attachments to these same non-terminated forms of narrated relationships). (298)

Taking a direct lesson from transformational retreatment as enacted within an economic sphere we would need to observe the following, namely, first, our articulating those hermeneutic genres found to hand that would at least appear to proffer a start in this quest for definitive forms of resolution. Second, totally defer to and marshal non-alternative facts whilst avoiding all forms of alternative factoids. Third, exercise a broad deconstructive differentiation of the narrated landscape (subjected to metafication). Fourth, then seek an integrated formation. Fifth, subject the same to a process of de-suspensional retreatment (when subjected to an ensuing course of de-metafication). Sixth, through pragmatical posttreatment we then initiate a process of re-writing wherein the pretreatment is emended accordingly. Then, in addition, through an extensive suspension, the relational situation itself is also seemingly empowered to intervene in an existential realization of those same objectives that contribute to a resolution of such clearly nominated and articulated anomalies… (299)

30. Institution of Positive Pre-Conditions for Existential Re-Self-Organization

From the perspective of a successful gardener our relationships are very similar to plants. If planted appropriately, in good soil with the necessary degree of sunlight required, then all plants only need to be merely 'watered and weeded'. I.e., more broadly, plants are given what they need, and, what they do not need, those factors then need to be removed. In truth the gardener grows nothing just as the baker does not bake the bread when that task is for the oven! Once the hard work of preparation is done, they then act as a supervisor, watching over whatever it is that they are charged to supervise... (300)

In a similar manner, the existential 'life' of our relationships is something where it is those relationships that 'live', having a metaphorical 'life of their own'. All we can do is act like a gardener or farmer, behave like a baker or barista, and so on. Pre-organizing the pre-conditions for a successful outcome where the process in play, through positive forms of chaotic re-self-organization, hopefully, then does the work for us... (301)

A similar existential-like state of affairs is present in our apparent intervening within the course of our relationships. For a start, we must realize that we cannot but intervene be that through either actions or non-actions or even through forms of deferral, be that through indecision or postponement perhaps being given a necessary prioritization of other intentional ambitions and aspirations.[107] But, if truth be told, it is almost as if our intervention is not required given that it is our relationships, themselves, that chaotically more chart the course of their trajectories through processes of re-self-organization. But, then, on the other hand, at the end of the day it is us, ourselves, who is also empowered by whatever positive forms of e/valuational formation arise, are found to emerge from such more humble origins... in this metaphorical 'transmutation of lead into gold', in the 'flight of the butterfly', in the miraculous transformation of an unleavened bread into a leavened loaf replete with a perfect crust and a divine aroma that could almost wake the dead... (302)

In talking about the existential orientation, we need to linguistically 'tread carefully' as ordinary language needs to be' turned on its head, turned inside out, upside down, and back to front...' (303)

By 'pro-relational' is meant 'taking a perspective that attempts to simulate the hypothetical point of view of the primary relationship itself, albeit as it, in turn, is relationally situated in an open-ended world of relationships'. By 'trans-relational' is meant

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[107] A dialectical state where we cannot but intervene since even a deferral of action or non-action already means we are already intervening through such acts of intervention or non-intervention. Then, on the other hand, it is almost as if were redundant as the course of our relationships is more set by our relationships themselves, as they act and interact with each other through chaotic moments of re-direction and similar. So, how do we square this circle? By engaging our relationships; through our best representative understandings of them, then through a suspension of the same along with an awareness of the automatically ensuing de-suspension; through an ongoing enrichment of our relationships; by attempting to be both responsive and responsible; through duly observing how our relationships seek to resolve relational anomalies through either deontological or pragmatical forms of response, or through a working harmonization of the same, and so on and so forth.

‘the sub-instantiation of ‘our’ apparent points of view that are both subjective and inter-subjective within the expression of an emergent relationship that, effectively, transcends those former perspectives’. (304)

The ramifications of this pro-relational emergence of the trans-relational is that, among many things, transcendental sentiments, in a contrast to affective emotions, etc., are directly not the province of either subjectivity or intersubjectivity *per se*. Moreover, in the instantiation of an existential transformation of the relatively non-existential such a transition is not and cannot be purely engineered in either personal or interpersonal terms of reference, being, effectively, re-self-organized by those relationships themselves. That all we can do, like the baker and the gardener, is to ensure that the pre-conditions are in play for such a transformational-transition to spontaneously self-instantiate its more suitable, if not most suitable, processes and periods of transformational-transitioning, more or less, on ‘our’ behalf... (305)

Thence this qualification that, correctly, we do not do existentially oriented patterns of transformational-transitioning, but, the existential does us should we ‘permit’ such transformational-transitions by ‘investing’ in these necessary pre-conditions. (306)

Can we list such pre-conditions? I.e., through observation, etc., can we discern the character of those pre-conditions that appear to be more conducive to overseeing such ensuing patterns of e/valuational enrichment? (307)

For a start we can list the expression and required refinement of those existential sentiments that are conducive to such existentially oriented patterns of transformation by noting the holistic nature of such experiences, and, where the instantiation of any one sentiment, in effect, can potentially establish the realization of any other such sentiment, or sentiments, seemingly apposite in the context of that situatedness in question. I.e., where such sentiments are both reflective of that more existentially desired state of affairs and more inclined to actually induce that form of simulation; where in simulating the simulation we have simulated the relatively non-simulated, i.e., a lived-reality that becomes something more than its mere simulation! A state of affairs on par with the implication of causally directed phenomena through motivated simulation, etc.[108] Again, something that can be induced through extensive suspensions and their automatically ensuing de-suspensions, etc. Indeed, something that I believe can be intuitively learnt through finessing the recognition, encountering and engagement with this type of phenomenological experience... (308)

Where through simulating the simulation, the non-simulation can relatively non-simulate itself... given the suitable pre-conditions for the relative transformational-transitioning of the existential orientation which, if truth be told, is never absent, perhaps, more tacit or covert, or then more established through default where the pre-conditions lay the groundwork for its inevitable phenomenal-phenomenological amplification and overt expression, and so on. But, then, the existential moment has a ‘life of its own... as its own master or mistress...’ (309)

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[108] Like (my thought experiment of) staring at an apple and then deciding to eat it, etc.

But, if one way to induce a positive existential orientation is to simulate an existential sentiment, or a set of such sentiments, what might this tell us? (310)

E.g., if the situation called for it, then thinking about 'being brave, having courage, being courageous', as a simulation, may well spill over into that person finding courage to be courageous. Of course, this is accounted for in my complex concept of the 'extensive suspension' where the simulation of a certain course intentionally directed behaviour becomes that same course, more or less, through the power of the de-suspension to evoke a causal response along the same lines of the well-motivated simulation. Where by well-motivated I mean 'investing in emotionally affective energy, having an intentional set of relevant and obtainable objectives, and promoting those existential sentiments in harmony with their intuitively appreciated existential re-directedness as dictated both pro-relationally and trans-relationally'. 'Pro-relationally' as 'being brought to an existential understanding of the interventional situation in its relation situatedness', and, 'trans-relationally' as having been brought to such an appreciation finding, therein and thereby, what is trans-relationally required to be in harmony with such pro-relationally discerned objectives'. (311)

That from this perspective of the trans-relational we may well surmise that there is no difference, form the perspective of the trans-relational, between one existential sentiment and a set of such relevant sentiments, or, indeed, the entire set of all possible sentiments, given that there can be no arising of an irrelevant sentiment and where every situation, in its existential difference, would, in all probability, induce the suitable range of sentiments needed to promote the ensuing enrichment of that relationship in question. Or, where the existential nature of the sentiment or sentiments being evoked and expressed cannot but assist in such pro-relational forms of overall relational enrichment (through admittedly, seemingly promoting the best of all possible worlds with the important qualifications that 'just as a mountain might be climbed by many routes' we should not infer that the same routes would or should be adopted and adapted by each and every individual as well as noting that the finiteness of all individuals in a world of chaotic phenomena can never guarantee that the best plans of puny man need necessarily be advanced in spite of the best of intent to do just that...). (312)

In this regard, we should be mindful that all intentional behaviours can be undermined by poorly envisaged pathways as mis-intended patterns of intentional behaviour, through unintended consequences, or the advent of non-intended consequences…. (313)

On the other hand, from a relational perspective, given our freedom is only guaranteed, to some extent, through others, and only through others, on balance this better of all possible worlds is somewhat belatedly arrived at... and that it behooves us to more act on the behalf of others in the hope that others will also work on our behalf... for how else can we promote the realization of our own projects and programs inside a prospect that does not take this into a more full account. Thence the necessity for promoting an existential complexion in our relational undertakings... and, for the insightful philosopher to understand this relational fact of life..! (314)

31. The Systematic Embracement and Envelopment of Philosophy

Now, let us attend to the obvious point that the topic and discipline/s of philosophy also need to be systematically embraced and where we take into a more full account the ramifications of the systematic envelopment of this 'necessary observation' (that all topics and their disciplines are systematically embraced historically). (315)

In interpreting philosophy as a globally constituted inter-ordered phenomenon, mirroring to a great extent the manoeuvres of a philosophy of a transformational retreatment, where the three core sub-disciplines of the phenomenological, the hermeneutical, and the non-systematic existential economically co-define each other, and where in moving from one sub-discipline to another we must also pass those three other intervening orders (of the ontical, the pragmatical and the aesthetical) it follows that in perceiving the philosophical topic as complex both in the light of the above and the observation that the overall topic of philosophy contains a near impossible number of sub-disciplines to simply count, like, e.g., logics, dialectics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, mereolgy, metaphysics, etc., we may well wonder as to how Luhmann's insistence on normative closure can operate in respect to such a bewildering array of additional codes needed to run this plethora of sub-disciplines, each as a 'system in its own right', within this super-discipline of philosophy itself? (316)

But, this philosophical problem is easily resolved once we realize that all things, be they systems, environments, codes, programs; inputs, throughputs, outputs; subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, objectivity, inter-objectivity; trans-intentional judgments, intentional content, pre-intentional emotions, etc., etc., both are and need to be understood as economically refracted through an overlapping miscellany of relevant super-economies, economies, and sub-economies. That, in this instance the recognition of a relevant code is primarily hyper-economical and hermeneutically oriented, whereas, the operation of a code is economically situated, and, that the distinctive output of a super-system, system or sub-system is a non-economically situated in the overall economy of the economic as it is found to progressively reveal itself to us through such economically oriented forms of interaction. (317)

So, those various problematic concerns re Luhmann's strict approach to systems can all be refracted through these trans-economic terms of reference[109] as just noted. (318)

Such as the problems of relative sub-systems contributing inputs, etc., to a relative super-system; the inability to account for how codes also can holistically reflect the social construction of societies and both their relatively critical and radical changes that historically occur in the 'rewoven fabric' of those same societies; that systems themselves must reconstitute their immediate environments, and v.v., along with the overall Political-Economy itself, and so on. (319)

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[109] I.e., the overall economy of the economic.

That, reconstructed in the light of the above we find semi-poietic, semi-autonomous systems as permeable structures within the Political-Economy. Given that we still live in one world at large even though we migrate between Systems and that systems have offshoots or interconnected branches in other sectors of the Political-Economy other than their primary sense and semblance of location. Just as businesses operate in the World of Business, but, are managed by managers in another sector titled 'Management', whilst, in turn, being managed by their executives in yet another segment of the Political-Economy concerned with the 'Execution of Directives', or, rather, the' Execution of Re-Directives'. (320)

So, now, assuming a systematic philosophical point of view, how does this more subtle approach to these questions as cited contribute to a systematic understanding of the topic of philosophy (as a discipline containing a plethora of sub-disciplines)? (321)

As noted, I define 'philosophy' as 'one-part phenomenology, etc.', and qualify that definition by noting 'everything else in between in terms of an ordered philosophy as refracted through the perspective of transformational retreatment'. Hence, in that more comprehensive light, the topic of philosophy, as a global inter-ordered phenomenon, already includes approaches that are phenomenologically semantic; aesthetical; deontologically existential; pragmatical; hermeneutically scientific; and, factologically oriented, and, by extension, through inter-ordered forms of reduplication and duplication everything else that flows from such an abundance of riches, albeit from the imputation of a 'philosophical perspective'. So, from a systematic point of view how then does the philosophical topic *per se* operate as a philosophical perspective *qua* philosophical perspective? (322)

First, let me note that the imputation of 'codes' are first approached in pretreatment from a hermeneutical and hyper-economic perspective, but, as noted, those codes themselves are semantically operated in phenomenological-like terms of reference through processes of treatment centered on positive and negative forms of deconstruction (as broadly defined by myself). I.e., ruling in what is relevant once we can rule out what is not relevant or is contradictory or incoherent, etc. Then, from such throughput, non-economic forms of deliberation, as definitive outputs, are discharged as 'expositions', and, either disseminated or not disseminated as 'discourses'. But, let me look more closely at these interconnected processes also enacted from this perspective of disciplinary differences, etc.[110] (323)

These ideas of 'disciplinary differences' were initially modeled on what apparently differentiated the work of the theologian, say, from a philosopher (and, then, these same ideas were applied to the philosophical discipline, and, thence, to all other disciplines). In comparison to a simplistically defined secularist, the theologian adds their vision of the Divine to what otherwise could well be a secular vision of the world no different from that held by the secularist themselves. In effect, if we were to hypothetically subtract this common secularist vision of the world, also entertained by the theologian,

[110] As explored, e.g., in *The Seventh Book...* and elsewhere. In effect, re-defining these disciplinary differences or differentials from the perspective of the overall economy of the economic, and v.v.

then that difference, this element of the numinous treated as Divine, would present itself as a 'theological difference'. We can theoretically view this imputed 'theological difference' as phenomenologically oriented and in 'coded terms of reference' when and where it it is semantically operated, etc., i.e., pre-deliberating on a probable response of either affirmation, non-affirmation and/or inaction through either temporary deferral or permanent postponement. (324)

Then, in asking, 'what is the value of this theological distinction?' the theologian, in effect, invokes a 'theological meta-distinction' where from a hermeneutic perspective we entertain just what genres of behaviour are imputed to be co-associated with such a perspective. This perspective having a hermeneutic orientation along with its hyper-economic background. (325)

A third question then needs to be asked, namely, 'just how does this theological difference and theological meta-difference apply to people living in a secular vision of the world, whereby, through such interrogation, they are being asked, and asking themselves, for what, in effect, is none other than a 'non-theological difference'. I.e., just how does this theological vision of the overall-life-world make something more than just a hypothetical difference in secular terms of reference? Or, in overall economic terms of reference, we are asking just how in non-economic and existential terms of reference, does this theological vision of the world at large actually interact in this secular world of the everyday? Given that a theology needs to operate within the world at large, otherwise what is not there for us, cannot not be there for us (and *contra* the theologian, we, then, need not be there for it!)! (326)

Now, this hypothetical treatment of the theological discipline, as just outlined, is meant as an analogy that can be applied to all disciplines including the complexities of the philosophical discipline. (327)

Therefore, let me take up this claim and demonstrate, in effect, the hypothetically imputed 'coding' at the center of the philosophical topic by paralleling these three differences of the theological difference, theological meta-difference, and the theological non-difference, respectively, with the imputed phenomenological orientation of the philosophical difference, the hermeneutical orientation of the philosophical meta-difference, and the non-systematic existential difference of the philosophical non-difference. (328)

After much reflection, and as unfashionable as this claim may well be seen and received, it is my current understand, held now for some time, that this coding is centered around the concept of 'truth', which I must immediately add, has nothing to do whatsoever with absolutistical ideas of so-called 'Truth' with a capital 'T'. Instead, we would be better to review this practical concept of 'truth determination' as a reiterative process in which we seek to ascertain to what extent a set of propositions are in an alignment with another set of propositions that collectively can be ascribed the working status of 'statements', albeit as reviewed in and through the permanent light of a provisional attitude when and where additional information could well modify or reverse that ascription of a qualified positive or negative truth determination as previously determined in the light of

what then was available for the exercise of that important type of discrimination as was then suitably conducted. (329)

So, let me illustrate this provisionally treated, working concept of 'truth determination' and its transformation of propositions into 'apparent statements'. (330)

We approach the world of experience already holding an array of assumptions, beliefs, perceptions, interpretations, ideas about the nature of causal processes, and so on. By such means we normally find ourselves in a position to discriminate between 'mere propositions' and 'attested statements' that we believe are either somewhat evident or self-evident to some degree or other, or, we as something that we just either affirm or deny in order to non-disturb the living-edifice of the rest of our world of ideation lest we demolish all ideas of understanding itself. Under the light of various topics we affirm that Julius Caesar must have historically crossed the Rubicon; that recent science deals with both waves and particles without running an exclusive economy between the same; that such and such a movie was found to be very enjoyable by a certain person who told me about their opinion on this matter; that I am staring at three ripe apples in a row and have decided that the middle one looks more edible, more delicious and enjoyable to eat, than the other two; and so on and so forth. In effect, presenting propositions as statements in some form or other, be that as historical fact (in historical interpretation); as a theoretical scientific construct; as an opinion I believe was honestly relayed to myself; as a perceptual state of affairs, etc. (331)

Without a working notion of truth, without being able to ascertain what is either 'true' or 'false' (or currently 'undecided' and 'deferred') in a well-exercised process of truth determination, we would be totally lost both non-philosophically and philosophically! (332)

Traditionally, truth has been determined with reference to some 'cannon' be that either direct sense evidence, indirect testimony, and/or through some form of valid inference, etc. However, at root, let us simply apply a Tarskian perspective and submit, by whatever means are treated and reviewed as valid, that what is true has itself as a statement the evidence of its meta-proposition. I.e., P.s' is true iff S.s (i.e., the meta-proposition P about 's' is true if and only if it is 'evident' that there is 's' guaranteeing that the proposition P.s is more correctly, the statement, S.s., and tht S.s can be affirmed, or, i.e., 'E.s' is such 'that there exists 's' as 's' exists' (i.e., is evident in accordance with some accepted or acceptable canon of truth determination) hence the simple proposition P.s is more correctly a statement S.s. (should 's' exist in the manner claimed). (333)

Rather than say, however, P' is t iff p let us note its propositional equivalent, namely, P.s''is t iff S.s. I.e., that in this performance of truth determination there has been demonstrated that there is an alignment between P.ss', P.s and S.s, namely, any propositional-statement that merely states 's'. (334)

That, through this tortuous argument, I just want to point out that, even more correctly, there is an alignment between propositions (and statements when truth determina-

tion is either affirmative or its negation is affirmed in the opposite instance). That we have to deal with grammatical sentences because the economic cannot be presented through the isolation of an economic correlate, as ‘s’, e.g., be that either individually or collectively (because economic correlativity does not and cannot countenance such a short-sighted impossible isolationist approach). Or, in effect, the imputed presentation of, say, ‘s’ is a dangerous fiction with improper philosophical consequences if allowed to stand in anything other than in a provisional stance. Where propositions are the presented medium, i.e., as the medium of presentation, and not mere intentional objectives regardless of whether they be constituted in either objective, inter-objective, subjective and/or inter-subjective terms of reference, etc. (335)

In other words, we can simplistically define a ‘positive truth determination’ as the ‘isomorphic preservation of either intentional intent, sense, semblance, and/or significance, etc., as a proposition, is preserved within the ensuing resultant form of a statement. E.g., the statement that ‘there are three edible apples in front of me at this moment in time’ is true because the meta-proposition with the same meta-form has, in evidence, namely, in the form of the statement able to be affirmed. (336)

Now, if the ‘central code’ of the philosophical position is this process of truth determination how does philosophy, as a general topic, deal with, say, the apparent particularity of an aesthetic judgment as a sub-philosophical economy (assuming such a tentative judgment can be rendered even if only through the correlation of patterns of well-pre-informed consensus, etc.[111])? Quite simply by noting, e.g., that the proposition X in either dealing with a positive aesthetical determination A or a negative aesthetical determination –A to be considered to be true then we must merely consider X to be a statement, etc. I.e., X(+A) is t iff +A or X(-A) is t iff –A. (337)

Similarly, in the philosophical discipline any other sub-philosophical economy has truth determinations structured in an isomorphic fashion. So, e.g., ‘Y is ethically good’ because there exists the statement ‘Y is good’ (where, through the presentation of the statement. we are short-circuiting the Tarskian perspective by noting the statement to be considered as a true proposition by virtue of the fact that P’ is p, the meta-proposition is true because there exists the proposition p. and, therefore, the proposition can be correctly treated as a statement (regardless, in this instance, as to whether other people might affirm or disconfirm this specific process of truth determination since the determination needs to be done by someone (or computerized to that same effect) and the person in question has arrived at their results of their deliberations by regarding the proposition in question as a statement). (338)

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[111] I.e., for the sake of this hypothetical argument we need to assume that esthetical judgments are possible, etc. More formally, we could note that on the grounds of the aesthetic formula of ‘preparation, (consonance), dissonance (through difference with the background field of consonance), and resolution of the ensuing tension between the former we could parallel the same by noting what is relatively consonant, dissonant, and resolved, etc.

That the point of this demonstration is to merely note that in the philosophical super-discipline[112] (super-topic) the application of the code, here in the form of truth determination, can be equally applied to all sub-disciplines that fall within this super-discipline. That, moreover, this same observation of practice can be envisaged as applying to all other super-disciplines or disciplines possessing viable sub-disciplines, etc. I.e., that the central code of a discipline can be applied (effectively in a process of 'duplication' and, therein and thereby, defining that instance of duplication being invoked). (339)

Hence in the Legal System we might presume that the central code is applied to the sub-codes pertaining to viable sub-disciplines embraced within that system, such as, e.g., contract law, criminal law, international law, taxation law, torts, etc. (340)

In effect, demonstrating that the central code of a discipline can be applied to the individual codes of those sub-disciplines embraced by that same discipline or super-discipline. Illustrating this possibility that in a System the central code can be applied to relative Sub-Systems evidently embraced, through the observations of such cultural practice, by that System in question. Illustrating, at the same time, how this process of duplication is able to be exercised, say, in 'the history of philosophy' or 'the philosophy of history', and, where it becomes obvious why such processes are to be regarded as non-commutative… (341)

In reverse, let me argue 'that what is good for the goose is good for the gander', namely, if systems through forms of duplication can absorb functions of a sub-systematic code, then, we could through extrapolation, expect super-systems through duplication to absorb the central code of any system. Then, let me also argue that when a system is enveloped within a super-system this reasoning applies, and, that all system are not not enveloped within some form of super-systematization. I.e., all systems are enveloped in super-systems that embrace the former, etc. Hence, through such expansive succession, co-extensive with the Political-Economy, albeit in an open sense, effectively, through this form of reasoning we are brought to the position where this iterated state of affairs must occur, but, in such a manner where, first there are no theoretical limits, and, second, experiential limits must form when our abilities to interact with the same can no longer be put into effect, albeit through some form of either successful recognition, encountering, and/or engagement. So, in regard to the dictum by Lehmann 'that a legal judgment is not a moral or ethical judgment' we can affirm this restriction only through the qualification that it applies to the apparent Legal System *per se*, but, does not apply to any possible systematic absorption of the Legal System itself regardless of whether that envelopment is covert, embryonic, inchoate, progressively finding itself self-thematized but not to that extent that a recognizable discipline or set of disciplines is coming into some form of a full evident or self-evident existence. Therefore, in the light of these qualifications, I would like to surmise that it is because of some form of super-systematic inclusion that legal code is able to evolve in some form of an eventual alignment with the imputation of an evolving Social System that, more or less, comes to reflect the critical and radical changes taking place in society itself from perspectives that are individually cultural and

[112] Needless to say, the reader will probably already have inferred that I believe philosophy to be a 'super-discipline'/'super-topic'.

collectively inter-cultural in orientation/s. Rhetorically, we could ask, how otherwise are we to explain how something that is illegal in one decade in another later decade could be quite the opposite, and v.v? (342)

That Lehmann is quite right to question whether some sense and semblance of a Social System is in existence on par with, say, the Legal System, yet, how else are we to explain the evolution of a specific system without its duplicated inclusion in some form of a super-system? (343)

So, by such a systematic mechanism we might be able to explain both the inclusion of sub-systems through the central code of a system absorbing the code of a sub-system through some form of duplication, and, in reverse, where some explicit or inchoate form of a super-system is effectively able to rewrite the central code of its envelopment of the embraced system in question. I would like to speculate that an in-depth sociological study of evolving legal codes, e.g., might be able to settle the further question as to whether the primary origins of such change is either (super-systematically) external and/or (systematically or sub-systematically) internal in orientation/s? (344)

However, it should also be pointed out that all forms of iteration, through a particular range of reiteration, will eventually arrive at chaotic forms of either bifurcation, emergences and/or phase changes... to the extent that either relatively critical and/or relatively radical change is forever inherent in any form of a systematic state of organization although forms of systematic reflection of the imputation of a Social System that appear to be in line with shifts in current ethical or moral thinking, say, in the Legal System or some other System, would be more suggestive of some form of a super-systematic re-writing of the relatively systematic code in question. (345)

That granted, how should we view the Philosophical System, as a systematic part of Academia, in terms of these disciplinary differences or differentials as just previously outlined? (346)

Hermeneutically, and hyper-economically, let me argue that the Philosophical System in terms of its philosophical meta-difference would suggest that, either advertently or inadvertently, it applies a process of truth determination, as its central code, to either those issues and/or sub-systems it currently finds to hand. (347)

That phenomenologically, and economically, a process of truth determination is more closely applied to the relevant textual situation in question in both negative and positive terms of reference, as noted elsewhere, in order to clarify an eventual non-economically oriented form of response that, hopefully, is existentially found to be both responsible and productive of suitable forms of relational enrichment in e/valuational formation (when viewed from both pro-relationally and trans-relationally oriented sense/s of stance). (348)

From a non-economic point of view, a philosophical non-difference is manifested both deontologically and existentially should a pro-relational stance, and its trans-

relational expression, be suitably realized in lived-experience (through the inescapable textualization of its co-associated 'living-experience'[113]). (349)

But, without the overall economy of the economic, hermeneutically, there could be no hyper-economic genre of coding in the first place, then, obviously, neither its economic operation nor its non-economically expressed forms of determination. (350)

So, we must surmise, in the context of such prior arguments, if sufficiently validated, that no philosophical issues will escape an eventual alignment with general cultural-intercultural forms of consensus (just as, by similar mechanisms, the Legal System is also eventually re-written in a similar manner). On the other hand, this does not mean that all systems will be reflecting to the same degree an equal uptake in the same set of cultural innovation, etc., although, on the other hand, given the holistic nature of relational experience, we might also surmise that a general concordance in uptake could also be relatively self-evident to some degree or other? (351)

Where forms of consensus find themselves reflected, to varying degrees, in the re-writing of codes, or, at the very least, in the apparent manner as to how such codes are to be programmatically applied to certain topics, and v.v., etc. Just as, e.g., not too long ago, a person with a hat might touch or doff that same article of apparel in meeting someone known to them, whereas, in having lost that custom through an absence of hat-wearing, when people now wear hats they no longer perform this same custom... where we can argue that just as once through custom people would touch or doff their hat through a new form of consensus that now no longer happens. Thence the nature of consensus as something that can be rewritten, hopefully, in a more existentially oriented sense of re-directedness should that be pro-relationally required. (352)

Hence, furthermore, our philosophical appreciation of such differences, differentials, shifts in consensus, and so on. (353)

However, be that as it may, the philosophical appreciation of some form of philosophical appreciation per se is not and cannot be philosophical by definition, but, instead, meta-philosophical or non-philosophical, or, in effect, 'metaphysical' in scope. Let me explore this point and propose a re-purposing of this concept of the 'metaphysical' that correctly can escape the successful application of its more traditional forms of critique whilst also arguing that through transformational retreatment can also figure, when correctly conducted, as a philosophical sub-discipline in its own right. (354)

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[113] I.e., we directly experience' living-experience', because that is the nature of relationships, but, in their inescapable textualization, within the application of a textual economy, etc., it then take the form of 'lived-experience' through the iteration of either retrospective, introspective and/or prospective forms of textual treatment and retreatment. I.e., in thinking about something it immediately takes the form of lived-experience, etc.

32. The Metaphysical Ramifications of Philosophical Reduplication, etc.

As noted earlier, I inadvertently arrived at two definitions of the metaphysical. But, as both were forms of reduplication and one enveloped the other the potential conflict between the same was completely obviated. (355)

Before the inter-ordered concepts of 'reduplication' and 'duplication' were even thematized I had defined the philosophical discipline as a 'philosophical economy that entailed, as one-part, the phenomenological sub-discipline, as a second-part, the hermeneutical sub-discipline, and, as a third-part, the non-systematic existential sub-discipline'. In inter-ordered terminology I referred to this as a 'global expression' in comparison to a 'local expression' that involved a non-composite ordered expression that may or may not have involved some form of reduplication or duplication, etc. (356)

Now, a definition of 'the overall sense and semblance of the metaphysical' was defined as 'the reduplication of the global expression of the philosophical', in other words, as 'the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation'. (357)

Enveloped within this definition was the reduplication of the local expression of the first order of the phenomenological also viewed as a semantics. Hence 'the reduplication of a semantic-phenomenology/phenomenological-semantics' as a 'categorical metaphysics' concerned with the hyper-mapping or meta-mapping of the apparent phenomenological categorization of semantic categories. All in all, something reminiscent of a Kantian transcendental aesthetic but not set up to act as an equivalent in that regard. Merely, our noting the iteration of apparent categories being used in our cultural-interculturally based phenomenologies.[114] (358)

The common element being the reduplication of either global expressions containing a set of orders or the local expression of individual orders. (359)

Now, that granted, we could well ask why not extend that instance of a local reduplication to also include the other five orders as giving rise, through a similar process of local reduplication their own ensuing form of metaphysical treatment, albeit as enveloped within the overall sense of the metaphysical (being treated, therein, as a 'metaphysical economy containing six metaphysical sub-disciplines'?)? (360)

I.e., through the reduplication of the orders we are presented with the following (as approximately noted in *The Seventh Book*...):

1. Phenomenological-Semantics^2 = Categorical Metaphysics
2. Aesthetical^2 = Psychologies, etc.
3. Deontological^2 = Existential
4. Pragmatical^2 = Business, Political, thence the Political-Economics (topic)
5. Hermeneutical (Possibility)^2 = Science
6. Ontical (Factology)^2 = History. (361)

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114 On one hand, based on physiological factors, and on the other, on cultural influences, etc.

Very briefly, let me argue for the reasons why these reduplications are currently ascribed with the form as given. (362)

In an appreciation of the semantic we are merely attending to a mapping of these pre-culturally/interculturally mapped categories as presented linguistically. Hence our preoccupation with notions like, e.g., time, space, identity, subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, objectivity, inter-objectivity, process, translations, transformations, transitions, etc. (363)

Given the integrated nature of (the second cognitive order, and its concern with molecular propositions, and the aesthetic nature of the second trans-cognitive order, we could surmise the integrated mapping of the psychologies apparently in operation from a linguistic perspective or from a more theoretical-psychological point of view. Where, the reduplication of the aesthetic seems to give us an ensuing 'psychology' (where various types of experience are both epistemologically integrated and categorized in psychologic like terms of reference. Noting, that this reduplicative process in continuing then produces 'sociologies', as 'the psychological appreciation of psychologies', which, in turn, then give us a potential variety of 'political possibilities' (with possible links to reduplications of the pragmatical?). (364)

The reduplication of the deontological, as 'the deontological appreciation of the deontological', could well be treated as 'existential' in scope given that this form of appreciation should then be open to non-deontologically oriented forms of e/valuational input (along with aesthetical inputs?) in their collective accumulation as an existentially open sense of discrimination that is not just deontological in both flavour and execution? Hence my designation as 'existential' by virtue of this openness to the non-deontologically contributions to be registered at the same time. (365)

The reduplication of possibility, in effect, 'the potential appreciation of the possibilities of possibilities', in effect, carves out the world of science (which, as a System, then become the 'Scientific World' or the 'World of Science', etc.). (366)

Then, invoking similar lines of thinking, we might surmise that the factual appreciation of actual facts (i.e., as having been successfully subjected to varying degrees of confirmation or verification, etc.) creates the veritable space for the topic and discipline of history. (367)

Thence these six metaphysical sub-disciplines of the 'categorical', etc. But, we should also argue, that this metaphysical designation as a 'sub-discipline' can only apply to these topics in their reduplicated first state given that in transformational retreatment, e.g., history is not exercised as a metaphysical-like sub-discipline but as 'history' *qua* 'the performance of historical research, etc.' I.e., in its ground state, with a meta-status coincident with the relative object language, we have historical research, but, effectively, in its first state we are doing 'a history of history', paralleling an appreciation of the facts

of facts',[115] which we could well surmise may well have some possible form of meta-physical input? Let me put this another way... (368)

It would seem, with respect to codes (primarily introduced in hyper-economic, hermeneutic terms in a meta-textual articulation of those relevant genres of behaviour as those genres of behaviour that engineer the type of scrutinization in question) that 'duplication' is 'the coded dominance of one code over the textual use of some other code', whereas, in contrast, 'reduplication' is the effective metafication of the code in question. E.g., in regard to the sixth order of the ontical, history can be seen to be 'the factual-like appreciation of factual appreciation', or, in other words, the meta-factual appreciation of the positively factological (ontical). Or, similarly, the history of history would be the meta-historical appreciation of the historical, and so on. Arguing, then, as if through association, that metafication, in effect, is a 'metaphysical turn' or 'metaphysical-like turn'. That, de-metafication, as exercised in a process of transformational retreatment (in the phase of 'retreatment') could then be seen as 'anti-metaphysical' or '*contra*-metaphysical' or 'de-metaphysical', and so on. (369)

Therefore, in the light of these explorations, we can define 'duplication' as 'the domination of one hermeneutic code over the textual formation of a topic that uses another hermeneutic code', and, 'reduplication' as 'the metafication of the hermeneutic code being currently utilized'. (370)

So, this brings us to ask if the overall sense of the metaphysical (economy) is merely the metafication of the philosophical economy (whilst remaining in this state elevated by one meta-degree in relative status)? To which, as things stand, we must answer in the affirmative. (371)

Therefore, can this 'dominant sense of the metaphysical' be also defined as 'the appreciation of the exercise of the philosophical code over the exercise of the philosophical code (in practice)', or, in summary, no more and no less than, 'the truth determination of truth determination (as basically conducted from a Tarskian perspective)'? Again, as things currently stand, we must answer in the affirmative. Therefore, that being the case, what are the metaphysical ramification of this form of transformational treatment? (372)

To better address these issues let me explore this topic of the overall metaphysical as a topic that is characterized by this conformal approach wherein the appreciation of truth determination, itself, is subjected to a higher order of confirmation or verification. Where, by 'confirmation' is meant 'establishing a form of truth determination in real time', whereas, in a contrast, 'verification' has been defined as 'establishing a form of truth determination that is not conducted in real time'. I.e., e.g., 'the seeing of an apple now' versus 'being told about another apple that had been eaten (and where the remaining apple core now provisionally confirms the verification of this now 'conformal' account). Where 'conformal' is defined as 'the confirmation or verification of a separate act of co-associated confirmation or verification'. I.e., basically, checking the imputed trajec-

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[115] Equally,' the factological appreciation of the factological (in its apparent treatment of facts)'.

tories of our narratives in order to better assess their asserted truth claims, etc., to that extent such observations, testimony, inferences, etc. will allow us. (373)

Such conformation granted, at least hypothetically, to what extent might these six sub-metaphysical disciplines of the categorical, etc., contribute to a possible process of conformation? (374)

If we were going to assess our reading of a certain relational situation one would hope that we could do this in as thorough a manner as possible. Here, these six-metaphysical 'sub-disciplines' would be of an inestimable service since, e.g., knowing what we were dealing with would be a good start, thence, accordingly, the value of a categorical mapping of such intentional content. Moreover, its 'aesthetic' integration would then guarantee the qualified integrity of such research, and, where, under a reduplication of both the deontological and its co-existentially oriented specification of the apparent concrete historicity under review, we should then find a more detailed understanding of the unique form of this current process of interaction, but, also, a better appreciation of its co-associated e/valuational formation further enriched through, taking up next, its co-existing pragmatical implications. In a reduplication of the fifth order, we would then find ourselves better discerning the scientific-like probabilities of such discerned occurrences which would then be further reinforced through the historical panorama afforded to us through a reduplication of the sixth order. All in all, we could envisage the cooperation of these six sub-metaphysical disciplines in order to better flesh out the broad semantic nature, etc., that seemingly characterizes the apparent constitution of our review of the situatedness in question. (375)

Recast in this manner, what purpose could the metaphysical serve from a philosophical perspective? (376)

For a start, it would be wrong to dismiss this idea of the 'metaphysical' as just the reduplication of the code seeking truth determination because the consequences of this conformal approach go far beyond the mere conformation of such determinations! Let me explore the ramifications of this wider perspective from the implications of this consequential orientation. (377)

If a conformal metaphysics were to co-opt the work of its sub-disciplines, then the ensuing judgments entered in, despite being perpetually treated as provisional works in progress, would and should take on a more assured sense of a 'footing' in our being more 'firmly situated' in this world at large. In using a legal metaphor, we could say we have 'standing' in such a situation that from both pragmatic and existential points of view would re-confirm, i.e., affirm such worked for conformance, concede that we had a more aligned approach[116] in such matters despite an inability to completely exhaust any one

[116] Where by 'alignment' is not meant 'parallel positions entered into from any impossible realistic or idealistic positionings, etc.', but, rather what is more meant is 'the relevantly entailed parallels entertained between either propositions, statements, etc and/or other economic parallels entertained either textually, meta-textually, and/or non-textually be all of the above simply entertained comparatively or through forms of economic complexification'. In other words, such conformance is between epistemological entracements as textually established in some 'relevant' form or other. Where by 'relevant' is implied 'much more pro-

perspective and our inability to exhaust the infinite range of perspectives let alone those that would proffer a more relevant prospect for the delineation of the specific form of that situatedness under review. To further this line of argument let me take into account the following observations and comments. (378)

In light of the 3 x 3 matrix of the Political-Economy, as the primary environment for Systems, as envisaged by myself, and, the tripolar notion that the political-economy, as a topic and discipline, is a conjunction of three sub-disciplines, we should note that the execution of political power in this environment would more rightly lie in the stylistic sub-discipline and not in either the political sub-discipline or in the sub-discipline of business. In other words, political power is executed through the executive functions of any form of government and not from the legislature *per se*. Minor inputs from the legislature or the civil service or mangers or consultants or academic advisors, etc., might well be taken on board, but, final decisions are to be left with those who execute political power (in accordance with the nature of the political system in question). By extension, when we review these six metaphysical sub-disciplines, we must come to the conclusion that political power is primarily exercised through the appreciative reduplication of the third order. That, basically, this form of reduplication cannot be just deontological in orientation, nor can it be just existential in orientation, but, must also be the locus for the executed exercise of political power regardless of whether that specific political exercise in the ensuing dissemination of power is deontologically oriented or non-deontologically oriented, regardless of whether it be existential or non-existential in complexion, but, must be at the end of the day be none other than forms of instantiated intervention within a certain situation that must also be unable to escape certain degrees of both deontological and non-deontological influences, and also be unable to escape influences that are both existential and non-existential in complexion. The primary implication of this section of exposition must be that the metaphysical-like appreciation of the third transcognitive order of the deontological, as the central locus for the execution of political power, must have potent ramifications far beyond the mere truth determination of such truth determination in this particular regard. Indeed, that the overall sense and semblance of the metaphysical, in this instance, must take into account a more involved, hopefully, a more existentially engaged form of appreciation, as to the specific manner being undertaken in political forms of intervention that quite rightly must fall under its purview (and, by extension, through the throughput of de-suspensional, de-metafictional retreatment being firmly returned to the sphere of the philosophical). The additional implication being that the metaphysician (and by extension the philosopher too) needs to accept that the metaphysician (and the philosopher) cannot be just observers, or enter into endless processes of speculative conjectures, but must also accept that that they are also either direct or indirect participants in the exercise of political power be their overall role seen and treated as either passive, active and/or existentially engaged. That, it then follows that either the apparent or substantially instantiated ‘authenticity’ of the metaphysician (and philosopher) cannot escape the twists and turns of political intervention along with the ramifications that devolve from such inescapable involvement (even if such ‘involve-

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ductive forms of research than that that which would issue from mere happenstance. Hence the ensuing pragmatic and existential enrichment in consequent and subsequent co-associated patterns of positive e/valuational formation (in both non-existential and existential terms of reference).

ment' were to be vehemently denied or rebadged as 'neutral' or 'non-involved' or 'absent', etc.).[117] (379)

Similarly, when the other five metaphysical sub-disciplines are more closely inspected the same type of picture is presented, namely, ramifications that extend far beyond the mere appellation of 'working to determine the truth determination of a previous pattern of truth determination…' (380)

In the sub-discipline of a categorical metaphysics undoubtedly cultural and intercultural contradictions will be exposed that will inevitably deserve forms of resolution (most likely needing to be re-entertained each generation by generation although, no doubt, such concerns will present either themselves in a fashionable mode or, on other occasions, in and through some form of an hysterical-like presentation that immediately demands we accept either reinstate past conventions or that we need to adopt and adapt new ones more than likely under the aegis of an intercultural set of influences where such memes and themes, for whatever reasons, are being preferentially admired, etc., and whose absence in the resident culture are perhaps being intensely experienced). (381)

Just as the dissemination of power is judged to occur under the sub-discipline of stylistics, primarily with its locus in the third order, we might argue that aesthetic contributions assist in the delivery of the trajectories of such dialectical demands and counter-demands.[118] Or, the 'aesthetics of style' can be defined as 'the distinctive manner of resolution entered into'. I.e., how the relative dissonance in the presented-representation of a certain situation is perceived and engenders distinctive forms of resolution. Therein, also, implicating a sense of an apparent deficiency in such resolution hen the desired level of resolution is not effectively realized (be that resolution enacted either non-existentially and/or existentially oriented). (382)

Returning to the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order (and my implication its cognitive counterpart of the 'conceptual') we must ask in what sense its appreciation can deliver some apposite form of existential understanding of what is required in that situation under review in terms of both the deontological and the pragmatical, in terms that take into account both the existential in orientation and the non-existential in

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117 Where by 'authenticity' we could negatively define it as not accepting full responsibility for their behaviours in the context of a certain situation, and, positively, by realistically assuming a maximum alignment between intentions and actions, etc. (effectively, as a worked for alignment being entertained between perceived histories of the past, present and future?).

118 Assuming a democratic core to the dissemination of power where both demands and counter-demands must be in some form of an alignment even though all power relations are never equal in any one moment of time. I.e., a minimal compactual sense of agreement must be in place for the ensuing dissemination in power through agents of relative less power? Otherwise, such agents must be, more or less, as powerful or more powerful, or, instead, are happy to give their assent to such transmissions although, it should be added, such permissions granted does not means, advertently or inadvertently, that distortions will not occur over the course of such transmissions. That such misinterpretations can only be partially rectified as an ongoing process of economic reinterpretation, de-mis-interpretation and re(-)interpretation, etc.

orientation (without the deprecation of the latter expression given that we should stress 'we do not live by bread' alone so to speak[119]). (383)

As noted elsewhere, the metaphorical 'door' and 'exit' to and from the systematic existential dimension is through the so-called 'third moment' of the relatively non-systematic existential co-relative orientation. That this also happens to be the same primary locus for the execution of the dissemination of 'political' power. How do we 'make square' our apparent intermingling of these two ostensively quite different types of enaction? I.e., just how do we transmute and transform the relatively non-existential into the existential? Or, i.e., just how is a process of existentialization to be successfully engendered? Then, again, from the perspective of the reduplication of the third order(s) just how is a process of existentialization to be entered into? (384)

Earlier, the suggestion was put forward that in the visualization of an apposite existential sentiment it could well be instrumental in moving from the virtually non-causal orientation to the relatively non-virtual causal orientation. Other, much older suggestions have been proposed along the lines that in a well-pre-informed and well-exercised extensive suspension this same permeable barrier between the virtual and the non-virtual can be effectively crossed (especially when well-motivated affectively, where cognitive designs are not contradictory or incoherent, etc., and where the intentional objectives of such designs are suitably engineered, and where the apposite existential sentiments, if needed, can further reinforce the intensity of the aspiration to cross this divide between the relatively possible and the relatively actualized). That, in effect, the suspension, if well-implemented, then automatically ensures the existential status of such enaction without claiming the resolution adopted is necessarily better than some other mode of resolution, etc., or indeed, for that matter was actually apposite when read retrospectively. Given such possible mishaps, one might further surmise that to enter into a self-perceived state of enacted existentialization one would need to exercise a certain degree of faith, in good faith, that that course of enaction being entered into, indeed, was suitably apposite, etc., trusting that perhaps common sense, an appreciation of probabilities and the course of the historical would hopefully support you in your delivery of those ensuing forms of responsive and responsible existential determination being entered into… Hence a recognition of the extensive role to be played by the collective input of these metaphysical disciplines. E.g., where pragmatically, forms of expediency are entered into that do undermine existential (re-)directives, and v.v. E.g., where a scientific-like reading of the situation under review allows us to more accurately determine the necessary probabilities co-associated with such decision making. Similarly, e.g., where an in-depth historical reading of the situation, in turn, also assists sin the making of such existentially oriented decisions. (385)

That granted, in what sense, then, does the metaphysical discipline directly contribute to the attempt to correctly observe an immediate or sequential process of existential deliberations? (386)

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[119] I.e., positive roles should be found for both existential and non-existential forms of e/valuational formation whilst, hopefully, discounting relatively negative forms of non-existential e/valuation.

That to answer this ‘crucial’ question we need to fully understand that although the central role of the metaphysical discipline is to appreciate conformal truth determinations the ramification of such well-exercised deliberations will travel far beyond such limited preoccupations. Indeed, by ‘crucial’ is meant that such deliberations, when suitably enacted, will automatically invoke an ‘existential turn’. How might we explain this ‘turning around’ of the relatively non-existential in a process of existentialization that, through intervention, either creates, preserves, and/or conserves positive forms of e/valuational enrichment of the relationship or relationships placed under such ‘insightful’ review? (387)

Obviously, an existentially oriented pattern of intervention would need to be well-informed so that in processes of intervention an enrichment of the e/valuational formation of that relational situation was enhanced, or, at least not de-enhanced. E.g., in order to persuasively present this point, let me use this analogy. If a person presented to a doctor with some form of an infection and were given an antibiotic and that patient finds themselves to be allergic to that type of medication, and those allergic symptoms were misunderstood by that doctor as merely symptoms of that infection, and this patient was told to persist with the use of that same medication it could be the case, in continuing to follow such misguided instructions, that it could well prove to be fatal for that patient. In this situation, the doctor needs to re-intervene and stop that patient from using that type of antibiotic and instigate another medicational treatment plan should medication be required. The point being, that in intervention if the overall e/valuational formation pertaining to that primary relationship were to be de-enhanced as a direct result of such intervention one would naturally question whether such intervention was ‘existential’ in orientation, indeed, one would more likely assume that such intervention was not existentially delivered. The only positive qualification of this reading that could be made would be the situation where there was already a progressive decline in the positive quality of the co-associated e/valuational formation and that that intervention actually de-accelerated or was about to reverse that same decline in valuation. So, if it would be the case that intervention were directly instrumental in a diminishment of e/valuational formation then it would most likely have been the case that non-intervention, in that instance, would have been the better option to have pursued. (388)

In the logical light of this anecdote, it follows that the potential existential enhance in e/valuational formation should follow from a well-pre-informed positioning in regard to a suitable representation of that relational situation in question should a suitable form of intervention be found able to be exercised therein. That, from the perspective of the process of intervention, a correctly conducted conformal appreciation would be a prerequisite for existentially oriented patterns of involvement. ‘Patterns’ in the sense that the claim is not made that there must be one and only one responsive pathway for that response to assume maximum responsibility in that ensuing act of intervention. Different people, in the same type of situation, might perceive different ‘patterns of response’ that all equally and adequately deliver the preservation of relational richness or promote the enhancement of a re-enrichment required by an existential discernment of the relational imperatives to be associated with a well-pre-informed representative appreciation of that same relational situation in question. Then, again, it could be obvious that a resolution of

the existentially problematic nature of a certain situation could well 'demand' the adoption of just one solution. E.g., if you were alone in a burning building and you were standing near a non-locked doorway that gave you a safe exit to the outside of that building then the only solution in that instance would be to quickly exit by that same doorway. The point, here, being that we should not demand single solutions but in some situations recognize that as all solutions are never precisely equal in value that some solutions could well be better to adopt and exercise. (389)

As defined, philosophical appreciation is a 'globally ordered phenomenon', i.e., as 'entailing a collective overlapping of fifth ordered hermeneutical, first ordered phenomenological, and third ordered existential inputs (and, by implication, the intervening orders of the second, fourth and sixth orders collectively organized in pursuing suitable processes of transformational retreatment)'. In contrast, perhaps without the sense of a contrast, a metaphysical perspective is an inter-order reduplication of a 'global' treatment of philosophical appreciation. Which, from a coded perspective is conducted through a conformal lens. This understanding granted, in what regard does an existential orientation bear with respect to a metaphysical perspective? Given that a well-pre-informed representation of the situation in question is a necessary requirement for the potentially successful performance of existentially oriented patterns of intervention then we may surmise that a correctly conducted conformal appreciation of that same situatedness is also required. In effect, prompting the question, is the exercise of the existential attitude an inter-ordered phenomenon that is co-extensive in its exercise with the conformal nature of metaphysically oriented experience as here defined? To some extent, that would appear to be the case. Furthermore, given the sub-metaphysical discipline of a reduplicated third ordered deontological appreciation might we conjecture that this aspect could be instrumental in at least initiating this process of existentialization, i.e., entertaining this 'existential turn' (besides also accepting the necessity of operating under the required auspices of a suitably well-informed and well-conducted extensive suspension, etc., as expected in the suitably enacted performance of any form of judgmental appreciation)? Therefore, let me further explore this sub-metaphysical discipline in order to see if this could possibly be the case, namely, an existentially oriented metaphysical attitude might well be organized through the operation of this type of input or, rather, throughput? (390)

The third trans-cognitive order is viewed as exercising a deontological (moral or ethical) perspective (and in cognitive terms of reference as informing a sense of the 'conceptual' *versus* a fourth cognitively ordered sense of the 'perceptual'). Now, in reduplication we would surmise that an appreciation of the deontological style of judgment should be able to discern between the relatively deontological and the relatively non-deontological. Treating the 'relatively deontological' as 'existential' (at least in its non-systematic introductory sense) we could then treat the 'non-deontological aspects' of that type of judgmental appreciation as 'relatively non-existential in tenor'. That in regard to the latter, we can then further distinguish between its positive and relatively useful pragmatic functions, on one hand, and, on the other hand, either its relatively non-useful functions, or, indeed, those functions that are detrimental and are quite unproductive or counter-productive when considered from the perspective the overall e/valuational formation of that primary relationship under review. So, theoretically, a correctly conducted process

of an appreciation of deontological forms of appreciation should be able to discern between potentially positively existential contributions and both the potentially positive and negative forms of the non-existential where potentially detrimental counter-contributions may well need to be excised or rendered as inoperative should that be needed. (391)

Therefore, we can surmise, that a reduplication of deontological appreciation should be able to discern both the potentially positive and negative imports of both the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential forms of input, or throughput, and, set about obtaining a relative preference for positive forms of output over negative forms of output. Implying, as a consequence of this understanding of a reduplication of deontologically oriented experience, that a preferential discrimination for positive forms of existential and non-existential e/valuational formation should, in all likelihood, be the preferred course to undertake. That, by doing so, through the well-informed exercise of conformal patterns of appreciation, we should then automatically be taking on board the suitable expression of an existential attitude as, therein and thereafter, we correspondingly contemplate apposite form of enacted existential intervention (be that through forms of either action, non-action, and/or inaction[120]). (392)

But, be that as it may, if we are to also argue that political power is primarily exerted through this pole of Ego, by virtue of its ability to proffer resolved patterns of possible enaction, along with its coincidence with the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, then we must also ask why is it not the case, as an obvious observation, that the delivery and dissemination of political power is all too often not existential in orientation? Whereas, if were to be the case that the converse is the default mode then that would be truly demonstrated in our experience of this world at large as being the very best of all possible worlds, which, either fortunately or unfortunately, does not appear to be the case, then, according to your philosophical point of view, given that we have the limited freedom to individually operate otherwise, it would appear all too often enough that we do not necessarily operate on the behalf of our relationships given the unnecessary forms of strive individuals and communities will continue to inflict upon one another. So, given this relatively overall negative observation whilst persisting with a relatively optimist expectation that the world in its core functions must operate existentially to some degree or other, and that given some form of harmonic resolution must be in place if only for the persistence of our relationships, then we need to further ask just how does this minimal degree of an existential observance be performed in a world where power is all too often enacted in and through relatively non-existential forms of delivery and dissemination?[121] So, why is the case that the political-like exercise of power, all too often, does not appear to be more widely refracted through deontological modes of consideration given this perceived alignment with the deontological mode of e/valuational formation and our ability to enact responses in our ensuing behaviours, be they relatively existential or relatively non-existential in tenor, be they relatively authentic or relatively non-authentic in temperament? (393)

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120 As a definition of an ‘enacted response’.

121 The mere delivery of power is not enough for that power to be disseminated. Only through dissemination is power more correctly delivered. Therefore, the successful exercise of power is also only enacted in the world through those people who enable its transmission.

In any act of judgment, we can usually determine if we wish to extend that judgment into some form of a response be that response either responsible or not responsible in its perceived, or apperceived, moral or ethical complexion. In other words, we have the freedom, to some extent, to either permit the performance of a certain course of action or not permit the performance of that same course of action. Therefore, it follows, that we do not necessarily reflect our refraction through this pole of Ego in a manner that is necessarily deontological and existential in expression. On the other hand, this relative freedom in this performance of individual acts of permission does not imply that we can be completely unbound in the non-existential nature of our behaviour since, ultimately, freedom is only to be arrived at through an arbitration of our prioritized aspirational interactions with others. Therefore, we behave somewhere in the midst of this spectrum between the willful exercise of this permission to enact a certain course of behaviour and the blind obedience of ourselves to act in the complete accordance, and concordance, with the apparent dictates that would seemingly be demanded if we were to be involved in our acting on the full behalf of our relationships. So, in the light of our being seemingly situated in the very midst of this subtle dialectic, why is the case that we appear to have the freedom to choose to be either willful or obedient to the existential demands issuing from our representative readings of the imputed existential nature of our relationships? Or, would it be a better interpretation to infer that we lean either one way or the other rather than completely ignore, all the time, these demands on the correctly expected expression of our behaviour before the company of others? That, given then such social pressures to conform to either relatively existentially oriented patterns of expected behavoiur or relatively non-existential oriented patterns of expected behaviour that the choice then more falls on the shoulders of others even if sanctioned by the extension of our own permission to conform to such expectations regardless of whether they be relatively existential or relatively non-existential in orientation? Such an observation at least partially explaining why, in certain circumstances, people knowingly act not in accordance with their understanding of what would be proper or legal or ethical or moral, etc., but, rather following the dictates of those who have more apparent power over ourselves and will corrupt our ensuing patterns of enaction? An observation understood, that increment by increment, people can be induced to behave immorally despite their clear cognizance that they should be acting otherwise. Thence the imputed banality of evil to the extent that we can act neither in the best interests of others nor in the best interests of own ourselves, but, rather, sadly behave like puppets manipulated through the unwholesome demands of others in power over us. Just as, e.g., the dictates of an army that can insist on soldiers fighting for an unworthy cause knowing their death is inevitable and duly do so when if all such agents were to say "no" then that same army could not direct such a pointless waste of human life (especially in the light of religious people who profess to believe in the sanctity of life, but, who act totally in a non-accordance with such professions of faith by continuing to bless the madness of such pointless sacrifices of either life or limb). (394)

How vexed is this comprehension of human behaviour! (395)

So, we have this ability to either permit or not permit the performance of certain patterns of behaviour, and, sometimes the ability to consequentially ascertain the existen-

tial ramifications of such permitted or non-permitted performances, still, willfully or otherwise, we have also this ability to override or ignore our working on the behalf of our relationships in the pursuit of other objectives, which I well suspect, all of us, from time to time, have demonstrated both to others and to ourselves. Therefore, at the very least before the court of public opinion we must all stand in this regard as equally 'guilty', although, without a doubt, some of us will stand more guilty in this respect and be more condemned as such than others. Therefore, the question still remains 'how is it the case that refracted through the Ego pole coincident with deontological judgment people can ignore the existential implications of their behaviour with respect to the relationships they have with(-)others? (396)

To resolve this conundrum, we might conjecture that people are privy to emotional forces and intentional drives, be they for survival or the obtainment of desired objectives or the avoidance of those things not desired, knowingly or unknowingly, will act in their own interests instead of 'standing back' and also taking into account the mutual or non-mutual interests of others. Herein lies, I believe, a clue, that not 'in standing back' and, instead, more consciously permitting an apposite form of transcendental suspension we would then, more as a matter of course, be more likely to align the exercise of such political or non-political power with its existential refraction through such reflections on the nature of our relationships from the pro-relational perspective of our relationships. That through such identification we would then operate more from a 'trans-personal sense of identity' rather than from either, rightly or wrongly, the predilections of our own sense/s of personal identity and/or the quite possibly imposed predilections of others. Thence a possible resolution of this conundrum to the effect that in an alignment with a pro-relational orientation with respect to our relationships, arrived at through a suspension of a well-pre-informed representative understanding of those relationships, we would then trans-relationally act on their imputed behalf, whereas, without this degree and manner of suspension, through such ensuing non-alignment, we would be more at the mercy of either our own inclinations and/or the dictates of others. (397)

I would like to surmise, then, as a conjecture in the form of a broad summary, that this conundrum of 'the observation of the relatively non-existential delivery and dissemination of power', political or otherwise, could be perceived to fall under one heading of 'misalignment', and, two sub-headings, namely, 'absences' and 'distortions'. (398)

We could conjecture that in a state of alignment between, say, the deontological, existential, metaphysical conformal treatment, deliberations of enactment, etc., that in alignment between the same, under the auspices of a suitable suspension, we would observe an existential orientation would be automatically expressed (via impetus of the de-suspension). (399)

However, under the presence of relevant absences and distortions such an alignment, in existential terms, is not able to be adequately realized. 'Absences' would include an inattention to the imposition of an adequate extensive suspension; the overlooking of a pro-relational attitude; the non-awareness of the role to be played by a trans-relational appreciation of our relationships from the pro-relational perspective of those relationships

themselves. Under ‘distortions’ we would find over-commitments of either an epistemological or ontological orientation; the over-prioritization of either person or inter-personal objectives; the under-prioritization of aspirational objectives that proffer forms of relational benefit to implicated relationships *per se*; inadequate states of factual representation and other forms of conformal deficiency; ideological forms of extremism under the rubic of unimodalism, etc., etc. (400)

Whereas, with the removal of such absences and the de-distortion of such distortions it is my conjecture that we would then find a more automatically oriented instantiation of the existential delivery and dissemination of power, be that power political, as conventionally defined, or relatively non-political in orientation as is to be found in our more personal relationships, our daily dealings with communities, institutions, etc.(although others could also argue that, ultimately, there is no difference given all power relationships are unequal over the course of their operations). (401)

Hence, given these somewhat subtle nuances in relational understanding, we have now cleared a path to accepting that a correctly enacted act of metaphysical appreciation, either theoretically or hypothetically, should be also existentially instrumental in better informing those courses of enaction to be taken up, both personally and collectively, by the relational participants in those relationships. That, in effect, the consequences of a correctly enacted metaphysically oriented attitude travel far beyond, at face value, the mere performance of a conformal act of truth determination. That furthermore, such receptivity to others should also be instrumental in better observing patterns of productive consensus by the participants in both their relationships and their communities.[122] (402)

Furthermore, in the metaphorical ‘light’ of this existential line of argument, what else might we expect as we travel along this relatively mutual path of mutual obligations to be conscientiously navigated, negotiated, and arbitrated (passively) with(-)others, (actively) before(-)others, and in an existentially engaged attitude through(-)others? (403)

The adoption and adaptation of an approach that is respectful of our relationships, through the instantiation of a well-performed and well-pre-informed representative understanding of our relationships, via the suitable use of an extensive suspension, etc., without a doubt pursues a critical sense of process. That from the rectification and deconstructive treatment of this working understanding of our relationships we should arrive at the ongoing re(-)normalization of our provisional understandings, somewhat through processes of trial and error, that will then inevitably meet moments of radical re-self-organization of those same understandings hitherto attained, albeit as now to be re-understood understandings. Indeed, I would like to argue that this tentative, ongoing process of re(-)normalization must inevitably meet various instantiations of the ‘radical’ and that a working through of such potentially difficult forms of appreciation is called for whose arrival, either expectedly or unexpectedly, forms a higher order critique of such ‘research’ if and only if it was and is suitably conducted under the auspices of an extensive suspension. (404)

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122 As has been promoted by Richard Rorty.

As I have argued earlier, the reception of the radical can only be arrived at through small increments. I.e., ‘bite-sized’ units of information rather that huge ‘mouthfuls of indigestible material’. Hence the concept of the ‘relatively-radical’ rather than the impossible to appreciate ‘radically-radical’. That the ongoing appropriation of the relatively-radical is primarily a hyper-economic affair that has the task to progressive conventionalized and render in a more critically understood fashion the apparent ‘insights’ incrementally presented through a relatively non-economic sense of resolution. That over the course of such innovations we will inevitably find the formation of ironically so-called ‘final vocabularies’, or ‘definitive histories’, or completely comprehended non-continuities… as emergent artifacts of a systematic embracement of our topics whose exposition through ongoing critique will inevitably crack, rupture, and re-present themselves in a new light as an ‘impossible thought not hitherto thought before’. (405)

I am hoping, and ever hopeful, that my reader, or listener, will now better understand the philosophical nature of this topic of the metaphysical as not some speculative envisioning of a world beyond the senses or the machinations of intellect but, rather, as ‘the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation as conducted through a conformal lens’. (406)

What are the epistemological and ontological ramifications of this type of constructive re(-)positioning (entered into through ongoing re(-)normalization, etc.)? (407)

Jokingly, we have the comment made that ‘as we construct the stars seen’, no doubt through some form of a controlled hallucination or similar form of metaphorical modeling, ‘that those same stars are created by us’. No doubt then treating ourselves as on par with the imputed existence of a Divine creator. Of course, such a position cannot be seriously contemplated since my ability to also de-create those same stars seems to be ever defeated even though I also know, from the discipline of physics, that all stars have an origin and dissolution ‘like all compounded things’. That even though there is forever change, still, no change is ever absolutely realized, and, that all processes must also possess a certain sense and semblance of that which must endure to some extent, from moment to moment, etc. But, all that granted, as conventionally understood, to what extent does this metaphysics, as envisaged by myself, insist on the observance of certain epistemological and ontological presuppositions like any other previously constructed ‘metaphysics’? (408)

Here, I must take an exception to the proposal of such insistence! Other than a reduplication of a Tarskian perspective and an awareness that the provisional nature of our knowledge is arrived at through the desired harmonization of our interpretations having a relative source in either our direct observations, the communicated reception of testimonies, and/or the inferences that can be intersubjectively conducted, I am simply presenting a conformal approach to truth determination that is not dependent on any form of a previously mis-constructed or mal-constructed concatenation of metaphysical speculations that have well-surpassed the inherent limitations naturally imposed upon their articulation and dissemination regardless of whether they were constructed in an impossible

manner or in a somewhat conceivably possible manner. Let me immediately clear up such misconceptions.[123] (409)

As I have stressed on a number of occasions in *The Seventh Book…* and elsewhere, we should have no truck with any philosophical positionings based on an excessive uptake of a 'unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, or relativism'. Reasons have been outlined as to why these types of impossible positioning should not be adopted and promoted, etc. Namely, being unable to economical propose such positions (on the epistemological grounds that such metaphorically based positionings cannot be literally entertained in those exclusive terms of reference) (or that the positioning of a hypothetical relativist could only be entertained in the moment of suspension and nowhere else). (410)

But, if such impossible terms of reference are rightly dismissed, then what positioning might be overtly or covertly being presented, either advertently or inadvertently, through the dissemination of these ideas concerning the imputed 'economic' nature of our interpretation of intentionally constituted phenomena, etc., these heuristic ideas concerning inter-ordered phenomena, their systematic embracement, their hyper-economic and non-economic qualifications, etc? (411)

In a reply to this enquiry as to the basis of such imputed positioning I would merely like to answer that the somewhat 'position-less position' is being entertained in an attempt to proffer merely a 'pragmatic-existentialism' as an 'existential-pragmatism, and v.v., albeit through the use of a series of interrelated heuristic devices being proposed, along the way, in order to better illustrate such ideas. Where, e.g., an anti-representationalism is operative given that my use of relative forms of representation are conducted in economic terms of reference, and where such correlative expressions can have no ultimate representation; without reference to both internal and external worlds, with the implication that the imputed relational participants in an imputed relationship can only be directly perceived in our entertainment of such representative-like experiences without the necessity to invoke impossible forms of positioning be that conceived of in short-sighted forms of realism or idealism, etc., or through dualistic forms of equally impossible pairing of terms without any economic forms of contextualization, etc., where such impossible '-isms' are impossibly legislated into existence in forms that could not be experienced, or, where through a lack of reasonable forms of commitment, all positions are deemed to be either equally valid or invalid, etc… (412)

On the other hand, the rhetorical use of metaphors, etc., is not denied given, e.g., that the interrogative economy, involved in the simple asking of a question, cannot be operated without such economic correlativities being engaged in this process that should consist of carefully conducted, logically supervised forms of ascertainment whilst also recognizing that such correlativities cannot be found any ultimate form of philosophical or 'metaphysical' explication. On the other hand, such carefully constructed constructs have a worth that can only be pragmatically demonstrated through forms of functional utility, preferably conducted through a conformal lens whilst cognizant of economic lim-

[123] Here I would like to add… such misconceptions 'as entertained by all you naughty people' (but thought it better to relegate such comic levity to the footnotes).

its, the potentially chaotic nature of such conditions, that the logical nature of definitions cannot be non-dialectically entertained, that relationships demand direct forms of interaction where phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential forms of epistemological cooperation attempt to make provisional sense of such re(-)interpreted forms of relational interaction… (413)

Where such an ontology is 'essentially', by its very experiential nature, substanceless, etc. Where imputations are treated as imputation *qua* imputations, and, where there can be no definitive equality among such imputations rendering some heuristic approaches as either more or less pragmatically useful than others heuristically inspired approaches, etc. Where provisional forms of 'representative appreciation' are to be evaluated in terms of their ability 'to work for us', 'to be found reasonably to hand', and, 'be productively maintained under the auspices of ongoing extensive suspensions…' (414)

Now, such a 'position-less position', in ultimate terms of reference, does not mean we cannot develop and maintain relatively entertain conventional forms of positioning that are found to be productively-useful for the purposes they are philosophically designed to illuminate, etc. That, as qualified constructions, their constructiveness is not denied whilst their representative capacities are to be used as 'fruitful fictions', as 'useful constructs', as 'picture-tools' that cannot escape also depicting the world in a variety of useful ways that we need not be beholden to other than in adopting pragmatic forms of positioning with pragmatic forms of commitment, preferably arrived at through conformally derived forms of working-consensus. And so on and so forth… (415)

As an additional point we need to note that given our metaphysics is reduplicated[124] through the entailed metafication of such transformational treatment then, in a process of de-metafication retreatment, such envisaged forms of conformal consensus can then retake a full membership within the philosophical fraternity (as systematically embraced within academia regardless of whether that envelopment is relatively *de jure* or *de facto* within the environmental confines of the Political-Economy). That through the potential influence of such existential 'power' arising through such de-suspended demetafication the adoption and adaptation of all pragmatically oriented processes can have a crucial role to play in the pursuit of a carefully conducted philosophical research project or program. Alerting us, therein and thereby, to the either the timely or untimely emergence of the relatively-radical and insisting on the fact that no philosopher (or metaphysician, etc.,) who is not prepared to be as equally radical can claim to be a 'philosopher' (etc.). Let me explain. (416)

Given that 'duplication' is 'the manipulation of a sub-dominant code by the dominating code (which can be viewed as a hermeneutically oriented process concerning the expression of disciplinary meta-differences)' in contrast 'reduplication' is a process of reiteration involving metafication with the implication of invoking an automatic process of de-metafication de-suspension along with the consequential ramifications following on in the wake of such inescapable forms of consequential intervention. In the context of

[124] That these same considerations also apply to duplication as also being an exercise in transformational retreatment.

the discipline of philosophy as systematically set in the system of Academia, we may suppose that if a conformal metaphysics, suitably conducted, i.e., properly, appropriately and appositely, that the consequences of its de-suspended retreatment is to conformally re-invigorate the discipline of philosophy itself as systematically exercised, be that either *de jure* or *de facto* in regard to that system of Academia. That a conformal metaphysics leads to a conformal philosophy, i.e., as a discipline that takes conformal truth determination both seriously and professionally! That, therefore, a well-exercised conformal metaphysics acts as a form of error correction in the pursuit of the philosophical, and, by extension, the philosophical duplication of some other disciplinary field will act in a similar manner when such treatment-retreatment is suitably discharged. (417)

That this overall conformal approach, via this philosophy of transformational retreatment, etc., proffers an attitudinal expectation that can suitably recognize (hermeneutically), encounter (phenomenologically), and engage (existentially) with the advent of radical phenomena, albeit in the digestible form of the relatively-radical and not the radically-radical. That processes of resolution enacted and realized through non-economic phenomena cannot escape either the timely or untimely advent of the relatively-radical which, through hyper-economic means of re-conventionalization is eventually able to appropriate such innovative shifts in creative re-direction can be usefully and pragmatically re(-)appropriated, albeit in and through a sequential set of appropriations that attempt to make better sense of such forms of non-continuity. That, obviously, such an approach is primarily conducted as a form of 'histories of the present' be that more individually conducted or communally enacted (even though, more correctly, all such processes are effectively formulated and disseminated intersubjectively where all processes of dissemination cannot escape such forms of co-authored phenomenalization[125]). (418)

That when a discipline is conformally supervised there is an inevitable augmentation and enhancement of overall human freedom through the better facilitation of processes of arbitration given that we are dealing with an ontical perspective on our relationships and not one given to the barely useful and non-pragmatical application of so-called 'alternative facts', fake histories, false narratives emitted through bad faith, etc. (419)

How then does the philosopher or metaphysician *et al* deal with the relatively-radical? Through incremental forms of re(-)appropriation realized through a building upon precedents, albeit subjected to processes of transformational retreatment in the light of a relatively radical re-interpretation of such apparently anomalous non-continuities, etc. Ideally, this would be done to such an extent that the necessary innovations in question are suitably re-framed in perspective, are unpacked in terms of their ensuing ramifications through the re-doing the relevant history/histories of the past, appreciating current implications that need to be anticipated, and confronting the lived-reality of future consequences that would be normally expected from such envisaged shifts in and through an acceptance of such speculative re-interpretations, etc. E.g., if one were to duly recognize the apparent consequences of the excessive implementation of the neo-liberal paradigm one would expect that historians dealing with the political-economic would need to suitably re-appraise, indeed, should re-appraise, the adverse impact of such shifts in the uptake

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125 As explored in the set of essays titled:

of such policy formations along with those impacts that were relatively non-adverse or positively beneficial. In other words, in dealing with the ramifications of the relative-radical, and, indeed, the critical and non-critical enaction of any form of intervention, we need to not only note both the present implications of such processes of either re-direction, direction, and/or mere conventional redirection and the future consequences of such implemented intervention/s but also how such shifts in perspectival appreciation are also going to re-write co-associated histories of the past, etc. Obviously, a relatively critical approach should be instrumental in both the instantiation and re-interpretation of such relatively anomalous phenomena, although, it would also be true to say that the relatively-radical could find an advent at any time. However, in order to better appreciate the potential ramifications of such phenomena one would need to be in a pre-prepared position in order to successfully relate to the same, i.e., recognize, encounter and engage such events. That effectively, the innovative philosopher or disciplinarian must be more than just a critical disciplinarian… (420)

Now, given a need for conformally supervised processes of representative treatment of the situations under such review it would be reasonable to ask in what sense an anti-representative stance could actually make sense without any form of a contradiction in such matters? Or, just how does the conformal metaphysician avoid the mistakes made by more traditional metaphysicians in this same regard? (421)

By accepting that representations are to not be treated as anything more than 'simulations' whilst also recognizing that 'all simulations are not equal in their simulated status when both suitably formed and explored'. Just as the phenomenologist immediately replies to the impossible criticisms of either an ardent empiricist or correspondence theorist that a phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of the semantic constitution of such imputed representations should reveal the natural differences, say, between a dream apple, a remembered apple experience, and imagined apple, and our confronting the lived-reality of a ripe apple from a state of hunger, etc. Indeed, if people could not phenomenologically determine the former types of phenomena apart from each other then they would be in no position to survive in this world at large, and, having obviously survived thus far it must stand to reason that they do know how to successfully determine such differences despite all pseudo-philosophical protestations to the contrary. (422)

Moreover, if we are to considerably enhance the richness and the relative ongoing enrichment of our relationships, beyond mere processes of sequential augmentation, then it further stands to reason that such forms of discrimination are called for both in their modal formations and in the ensuing intensity such modes are found to be expressed in experiential terms, and so on.[126] In other words, through chaotic means the element of the existential is also called for in better understanding processes involved in the positive enrichment of e/valuational formation from the perspective of pro-relational forms of

[126] Hence the formula of density (in the spectrum of apparent modalities invoked), intensity (of those more prominent individual modalities as noted), propensity (in the re-iteration of distinctive utilization through resolution of the same tropes, memes, themes, etc.); along with salience, consilience and propinquity (or standing) as discussed elsewhere.

treatment. How might such an ‘existential turn’ or ‘turning around’ be both expedited and understood? (423)

As a first answer, I would need to note the requisite pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions stemming from the well-pre-informed and well-exercised utilization of extensive suspensions which are suitably conducted from within a conformally validated sense of perspective, be that either inadvertently or advertently engineered and expedited. (424)

As a second answer, I might reply, as a form of qualification, that we need to experience the non-economic delivery of such an existential stance and, therein and thereby, see patterns of intervention enacted accordingly. (425)

Where a first reply assumes an external-like approach to the relational dimension, whereas, in contrast, the second reply invokes a pro-relational stance that must be experienced trans-relationally, be that in a mix of either passive, active and/or engaged terms of reference (although, more correctly, an economy of both the relatively non-existential and the existential, through the existentialization of the former, are both required and where these functions of the passive, etc., are, therein, also all required[127]). (426)

That, given this transition from the relatively virtual to the relatively non-virtual is non-economically expedited through the utilization of an extensive suspension, and all that that entails, it follows that a process of existential intervention is initiated primarily in overall economic terms of reference, ie., from the interactive perspective of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic. In effect, primarily through an extensive suspension of this overall economy of the economic. That the suitable expedition of the same demands all requisite contributions, as inputs, be pre-conditionally delivered, etc. I.e., the well-pre-informed and well-exercised extensive suspension of this economy of the overall economic. That this is something everyone must be able to do at least inadvertently although through the advertent supervision of the same the quality of this process of ongoing existentialization (and its ongoing re(-)normalization) should further enhance such incremental augmentation (that gets us to those chaotic point of such positive, relatively-radical enhancement and those non-chaotic critical forms of orchestrated augmentation). Or, in effect, through invoking those means that we find can deliver a progressive state of a positive productive process of existentialization, i.e., through suspensions, metaphorical analogies, disvaluations, rhetorical processes of productive questioning, permitting a creative free-flowing of ideas and their co-associated patterns of potentially innovative resolutions, etc., etc. I.e., by whatever means are found to proffer such relational states of either richness, enrichment, and/or re-enrichment in the e/valuational formation of such existentially oriented states involved in such re(-)e/valuations. That the correctly assessed conformal treatment of the above can be either self-ascertained or oth-

[127] On the grounds of either non-existential passivity and/or activity along with an engaged process of existentialization must be co-present in order to delineate and differentiate relatively non-existential and relatively existential contributions under the conformal evaluation of either positive and/or negative forms of valuation.

er-ascertained through the textual pointing out of such past observations, indicators and predictions that positively support that form of identification. (427)

That, at this stage, I am now in a position to point out just 'what a radical, conformal metaphysics both is and is not?'! The metaphysical, as envisaged by myself, is an attempt to improve upon the iterative fitness of our simulated representations, albeit treated as hermeneutically oriented functions ever in need of rectification; subjected as well to both economic deconstruction and re(-)construction; etc; along with the ongoing re(-)normalization enacted through the re-specification of intentional judgment and content, and, where all processes are evidentially based both non-speculative and speculative forms of interpretatively appreciated perception (of the configuration of intentional content) and apperception (of the trans-intentional judgment). An overall function that effectively acts in the evidentially shared formation of a process of communally based forms of conformal consensus as individually initiated through the discursive dissemination of it relevantly apposite, co-associated discourses! Or, where individual insights eventually promote apposite forms of social consensus along with the existential pattern of relational enrichment and re-enrichment that flow from such critically induced radical innovation, etc. Not that all patterns of insightfulness need to be relatively-radically in their inauguration since even both the critical and non-critical, suitably understood, can also present themselves in an insightful light. That this heuristic device of 'the overall economy of the economic' along with other heuristic tools can collectively and mutually foster forms of conformally based social consensus (as articulated through the expressed aspirations of the philosopher Richard Rorty, other pragmatists, and like-minded disciplinarians). (428)

What a conformal metaphysics is not is in an agreement with the types of criticism supplied by Richard Rorty *et al* of classical forms of metaphysical (mis)treatment. E.g., by consistently treating 'simulations' as 'interpreted in the one world of this world at large, this open world of the overall life-world. Eschewing, therefore, all absolutistical notions concerning objective substance, inter-objective space, the totally isolated subjective uniqueness of the person, intersubjective souls, disembodied minds, etc., along with both external worlds and internal worlds, all impossible artifacts that are pseudo-constructed in either unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical, and/or relativistical lines of exposition that would appear to invite nothing more than impossible beliefs despite their proponents believing 'that such impossibilities could be believably entertained, etc.' On the other hand, in a categorical metaphysics (through the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order and as a duplication by a conformal metaphysics along with its philosophical retreatment) we are only dealing with a clarification of the apparent typologies involved in the utilization of semantic categories and not their imputative projection as non-simulated states of affairs, etc., from the impossible perspectives of a so-called 'realists' or 'idealists', and all other misguided ideologues along with their extremist positions that cannot be entertained in a conformal metaphysics (and its conformal retreatment of the relative 'super-discipline' of the philosophical as sited within the system of Academia, etc.). I.e., anyone who professes, in effect, forms of either over-commitment and/or under-commitment has no functioning idea of what is being articulated through the discursive expositions, etc., of a conformal metaphysics, etc. On the other hand, we cannot ignore and divorce ourselves from the conventions of the social world since it is through

their suspended mediation that we can then intermediate between imputations and both their suspensions and non-suspensions, and, both their extrapolations and non-extrapolations, that then allows us to make conformal progress in our critically conducted research projects and programs, lending to us a prospect where conformal progress in such matters can be extended to ourselves as ordinary persons, and, where existentially enacted patterns of intervention can also render ourselves as extraordinary in that same sense and semblance of process that must inevitably take on a relatively-radical sense and semblance of persona. (429)

As listed, this Book 9 seeks to address the nature of inter-ordered phenomena (as the apparent nature of the topic in question); the nature and ramifications of metaphysics as a process of conformal treatment and transformational retreatment (of the philosophical topic in the system of Academia); the re-siting of disciplines within their respective Systems as situated in the Political-Economy; and, using these heuristic tools in a better understanding of both traditional and contemporary disciplinary problems by better appreciating the different economic roles played by topics, systems, and expositions, and so on. Furthermore, and more often than not with more importance, it is the comparative intermediation of these aspects of the overall economy of the economic that can proffer forms of extended insightfulness. E.g., the narrow definition of a 'system' as 'proffering the production of a certain type of text denominated as only relevant with those systematic terms of reference' needs to be substantially modified in order to better understand how its internal Sub-Systems, other Systems, and their internal Sub-Systems as well can either subtly or non-subtly influence the functioning of those internal codes pertaining to a specific system or sub-system. E.g., on its own, the imposed rigidity of the legal system would not have removed slavery from the realms of property law, etc. Indeed, how could we account for the legislation of the law through political processes of the Political System, in the first place, if the current legal code and its computation through its emission of expositions and thence as discourses, could not be written, or rewritten, or progressively re(-)written, through such an external process to that system of the Legal Fraternity itself? Yes, the systematic process of a legal question and its possibilities for reply is not a moral or ethical process per se, yet, no system is immune from internal forms of communication with its Sub-Systems or between apparent communications entertained externally between Systems and their Sub-Systems, and so on. That, all in all, systems, composed of topics and sub-topics, cannot avoid being subjected to forms of either reduplication and/or duplication (although the non-communicative function of the latter implies a dominating code will hermeneutically and hyper-textually remain within the terms of its apparent ambit, etc.).[128] (430)

What insights might we envisage from the relative pairing of System with Topic, and v.v., System with Exposition, and v.v., and, Exposition with Topic, and v.v? (431)

Systems are the historical site for both the envelopment of both traditional and non-traditional topics, be that through either agglutination or de-agglutination, or being historically rendered as relatively obsolete, or chaotically re(-)developed through bifurca-

[128] I.e., within the apparent terms of either its passive(ly conceived) 'ambit', active 'remit', and/or engaged 'composite'.

tions, emergences and/or through phases changes as realized in distinctive changes of state. That no *a priori* understandings could never spell out the historical formations of any one topical-discipline outside the specific institutionalization of that disciplinary topic within its embrace and envelopment by that system in question. That such an arrangement is beneficial for both parties (and their joint emission of expositions, etc.). (432)

We could say, before a lengthy process of qualification complicates matters, 'that systems are designed to produce expositions that, when disseminated, act as discourses which then may or may not spill over into the social domain in either a positive and/or a negative light (as varying forms of intervention that might be or might not be overtly existential in orientation)'. That even though systems are relatively independent, and autopoietic, their expositions are quite the opposite once transformed into processes of dissemination. (433)

As for the nature of the interaction between expositions and their topics, and v.v., we could say that it is through the evolution of such expositions that such topics find our ongoing appreciation, and v.v. That, being well-pre-informed is one role expositions need to exercise in order to ensure that all ensuing interventions are suitably apposite, i.e., existentially oriented, etc. (434)

Now, before concluding this Part I, first, I would like to explore the possible location of the topic of the 'political', and, second, explore how our hierarchical modeling of the overall economy of the economic might affect our understanding of the nature of the relationships being collectively entertained between specificity of the system/s, topic/s and exposition/s currently being placed under critical forms of review. (435)

I confess that the topic of the 'political' has incontinently migrated erratically between reduplications of the second, third, and fourth trans-cognitive orders and for that I apologize. Rather than textually emend these tentative acts of location scattered through this Book 9 let me explore the reasons why I have been relatively indecisive on this point till recently. (436)

Years ago, in a first explorations of the topic of psychology, I simply reasoned that a 'psychology of a psychology; would or should be productive of a 'sociology' (or anthropology) in these first glimmerings of this practice of reduplication. Then, in a similar act of reduplication, that a 'sociology of a sociology' would or should be productive of a 'politics', at least to the extent the social organization of that society could be depicted through more extensive terms of reference. Now, as I have reconceived the integrated nature of a psychology, and its discernment of distinctly integrated states as constituting that psychology, as arising from the reduplication of the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical it would be natural for me to then to suppose that the political topic had its hyper-ordered location as sited accordingly. (437)

In a different line of speculative thought, I treated the expedient nature of political decisions, in being centered on practical matters of expedited power, therefore, as located in a reduplication of the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical. However, then,

we could possibly have the problem of differentiating political expedience from expediency exercised in the world off business (although that might not be too difficult given various forms of the pragmatical already delineated under the miscellany of headings such as, e.g., the effective, expeditious, the efficacious, the expedient, and so on. (438)

However, at the end of the day, although not disputing the prior logic of such forms of positionings, I reasoned, on a stronger balance of probabilities, that the non-virtual transformation of the virtual could only procced through the resolution needed to make such a non-economic transition and, therefore, political power must primarily be located through the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological and its then taking on a political role (preferably through the instantiation of an existential orientation). Hence the deliberations exercised in paragraph 79, e.g., in which I then had to account for the problem of how do we differentiate the deontological, existential and political exercise of forms of intervention that could be characterized as either non-existential in orientation and/or existential in orientation (whilst further acknowledging that the existential economy cannot be conducted apart from the non-existential economy and its contributions arising through existentialization, etc.). That, effectively, a political role could only be enacted through the third moment of Ego and all forms of economic complexification that might be needed to be utilized in order to proffer the significant glossing of the dialectical nature of this non-economically oriented moment of resolution, etc. Hence my siting of this topic of the 'political' through the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological along with its potential for political existentialization. At the same time, I am also reluctant to merely dismiss my previous arguments for either a second ordered form of hyper-ordered reduplication of a fourth ordered form of reduplication by making the following reservation or qualification of this stance that now promotes a third ordered pattern of reduplication. First, it seems quite tenable and acceptable to describe political organization through a reduplication of the sociological because, in that regard, we are not directly focusing on the expedition of political power but, rather, describing differences between political systems (albeit within the System of the Political). Second, we could argue that political power is and must be indirectly exercised through economic means within the World of Business (which, in turn, is differently predicated on the coded imperative of the necessity to make a profit). So, yes, political power must invoke forms of expediency, but, however, through indirect means (and in the process preserving the maxim 'that politics is not in the business of business but rather in the business of governing' that should not reduce the role of government as an institution purely predicated on the production of a profit!)! (439)

Interestingly, the agglutination of the topics of the 'political' and the 'economic' sphere of business as the hybrid topic of the 'political-economic' was necessitated for a better understanding of the ramifications of the excessive implementation of neo-liberal policy setting for reasons as previously discussed. That, given a third ordered reduplication of the political topic within the Political System and a fourth ordered reduplication of the topic off the financially economic within the World of Business we can also see, underlying that interaction, the dialectical processes that need to be exercised between the relatively existential and the merely expedient, between the compactual dimension and the different dimension of contractual practice, and between the need to maintain a sense

of social conscience whilst also pursing the business imperative of the requisite need to also make some form of an adequate profit (in order to ensure the survivability of those business enterprises, etc., and, similarly, where governments cannot and should not be too profligate in their budgetary expenditures [although, not at the same time, conflating domestic budgets with governmental budgets]). (440)

Now, as a second confession, I have also been guilty of conflating different hierarchical models of the overall economy of the economic although that would be dialectically acceptable on metaphorical grounds that could prove to be endlessly confusing. E.g., by seeing Expositions as being sandwiched between an upper imposition of the specific System in question and the Topic in particular we see the former as arising from the interaction of the latter orientations. However for consistency, and in an alignment with my treatment of the system of the Political-Economy as a 3 x 3 matrix, it would have been more consistent of me to have insisted, instead, on the 'lower' relative organization of the System (in its correlation with the hermeneutic nature of the hyper-economic), then imposing the Topic upon the former (along with its phenomenological nature of the economic), and, finally, super-imposing the Exposition upon the collective 'weight' of the former (where the emission of the Topic is non-economically expressed from a non-systematic existential perspective along with the possibilities for its future existentialization arising from the introduction of a relatively pro-relational, systematic perspective). Thence my preferred form of hierarchical arrangement, although, as well, we could also approach these same configurations as constituted in either linear and/or circular formats. Moreover, in this arrangement we can also perceive the emission of the Exposition as arising the joint suspension of both the System and the Topic (and by such means assuming a parallel with the so-called economic 'third moment'[129]). (441)

Thus, we have now reached the summit of this exposition and it is time to 'descend' metaphorically. No doubt, in re-visiting the variously introduced elements of this discourse, like e.g., System, Topic, and Exposition, like e.g., orders, reduplication, duplication, etc., no doubt their further exploration will either subtly or non-subtly processes of ongoing re(-)interpret for which I will have to make no apologies. The process of 'representation', by its very nature, is ever given to processes of mis-representation and, thence, the eternal need for the de-mis-representation of the same, and so on. That by such means we become privy to the relatively-radical and that that type of experience should be ever welcomed, although not without the exercise of some degree of cautious vigilance. That, in exercising this descent let me formulate in the ironic form of a 'final report' my latest thoughts on these interconnected topics of the hyper-ordered; a conformal metaphysics; the necessity to historically appreciate topics in their Systematic settings; and, apply these insightful developments to the 'progressive' unravelling of both traditional and contemporary social problems through the improvement of all forms of social consensus issuing from both our critical and radical reflections upon the discerned relevance of such evolving discourses..!! (442)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 29.11.23

[129] Because the arbitrary nature of where we start implies that any one economic moment could be denominated as either 'first', 'second', or 'third'.

Part II: A Navigation of Obstacles Discerned on the Descent

Foreword

This *Descent* is envisaged as one-part final report, one-part commentary on the Ascent, one-part the continuing details of an ongoing exploration, and so on... The overall appreciation of each paragraph itself should meta-textually reveal just what my apparent intentions are in that section of text.... (443)

Re-Introduction

In Tibet the attitude is traditionally held ‘that you ascend the mountain on the back of a horse’, if you were lucky enough to possess such means of transport, ‘but, on the way down you would dismount…’ and, no doubt, hope your descent was easier than your ascent. Trusting, in a similar vein, that this ‘concluding’ section of our travels is less onerous. (444)

In this section let me proffer a series of reflections that might collectively paint an overall picture of what is being put forward in this book, namely, that both topical and systematic stability generally underlies the formation and disseminations of expositions within the relative openness of the political-economy. Furthermore, that such an understanding should also attempt to observe the dialectical-like interactions within the overall economy of the economic as expressed through its sub-economies of the hermeneutically oriented hyper-economic, the phenomenological orientation of the economic, and the existential orientation and its potential being given a possible semblance of ‘voice’ through the expositions delivered and disseminated within its experiential confines. (445)

Furthermore, the outline of this inter-ordered and inter-systematic configuration of these expositions has philosophical ramifications across the entire philosophical spectrum from the hermeneutic to the phenomenological to the existential, and, where the collective appreciation of the same cannot but take on a metaphysical complexion, albeit as both critically and radically re(-)constituted through an ensuing pragmatic-existentialism that is also equally an existential-pragmatism. (446)

In the first section of this explication to date much complexity has been on display. Now is the time, hopefully, to show how it all fits together, has a simpler and surprising sense of form that undercuts vast swarths of theoretical speculations from which my work, as well, is not immune. Where, what is continually re(-)presented, is not as some form of a finished product, but, rather, as a permanent work in progress that I would happily place on the shoulders of other. Perhaps these ideas might instill a similar sense of intrigue and mystery, insightfulness along with those painful moments of deconstruction of ideas unknowingly once undeservedly cherished but now needing to be sacrificed along the way… (447)

First, let me examine the interconnectedness between the inter-ordered nature of the topic and its inter-systematic enfoldment of its situatedness and how the formation of expositions are ‘propelled’ through the midst of their interactions. Then, let me wander about this edifice of the Political-Economy and discern to what extent its edification can and cannot bring to our insightful understanding of this world at large… (448)

So, let us now make our descent… (449)

Exposition/s

Without a doubt the exposition is, or should be, the most creative aspect of textual formation given the pre-assumed stability of both the topic and its institutional situatedness.[130] The topic can be reconstituted in the light of an inter-ordered philosophy. Similarly, the segmental location of a system and its co-associated disciplines, somewhat reflecting topical stability, also find their own form of an institutional stability that likewise can be written in term of its hyper-economic configuration/s (as already used to outline the natural divisions or the nine segments or sectors of the Political-Economy). Furthermore, given the economic nature of the overall economy a certain degree of economic correlativity can be postulated between these sub-economic divisions of the hyper-economic, the economic and the non-economic. As correlativities we must assume, in this regard, that the 'negation' of the hyper-economic and the 'negation' of the economic are implicated in the resolutional formation of the exposition, and v.v. Interestingly, how are we to interpret this open or ill-defined concept of this 'negation'? As a balanced suspension, as a form of suppression, the pre-conditions for the setting up of an integrated forceful expression of the de-suspension, some or all of the above, or, along some other lines? Let me explore the implications of such overall economic correlativity. (450)

In a vertical 3 x 3 matrix of the Political-Economy we can labeling the 'lower level' of the hyper-economic (hermeneutical institution of systems both intra-systematically and extra-systematically) as 'H' on its level of explication and as 'h' for its vertical orientation. Similar 'E' and 'e' for the economic axes, and 'N' and 'n' for its non-economic axes. Hence:

	h	**e**	**n**
N	Nh	Ne	Nn
E	Eh	Ee	En
H	Hh	He	Hn (451)

By such nomenclature we can indicate the non-segmental and segmental forms of progression from within a sector or to another sector (echoing the nomenclature for inter-ordered phenomena) as either, say, 'Hh^2'or, say, 'Ee (Hh)' or Ee.Hh' should, say, an historian (as an non-*de facto*/*de jure* academic, either operates within their sector or, say, decides to enter the world of business in order to publish a certain exposition (be that as a paper or essay, or book, etc.) in this world of business. (452)

Now, as just noted in the overall economy of the economic we can define, through economic correlativity, any member of that economy through a joint negation of the other two correlative parties then its follows that if (-H) + (-E) = N then the joint negation of

130 Implicitly observing a self-explanatory distinction between 'institutional' and 'institutionalized'.

the systematic situatedness and the topic should present us with the exposition (along with its narrated presentation, etc.). Interesting, in further defining the nature of the systematic situatedness in terms of the uniqueness of its historical contextualization this could be done from two perspectives, namely, noting all contexts, subjects, objects along with their transformations, or, somewhat more simply, merely itemizing the more relevant relationships in question, etc. Now, granted we generally possess both topic stability and systematic stability (excluding contextual stability given the presence of certain chaotic transformations of circumstances, etc.) it follows that in the delineation of the narrated exposition all such features can be 'translated' in mass to the level of the exposition. That, thereafter, the exposition takes on its unique representations in the light of such relevant relationships and their depicted transformations. Furthermore, through extensive suspensions, the narrator can unfold their discourse/s[131] in the light of the co-associated perception of resolutions perceived by that narrator, rightly or wrongly, that they believe pertain to the evolution of that textual situation.[132] In other words, by such means that they have to hand, the narrator can not only delineate the course of their exposition, but can also intervene in any co-connected form of behaviour co-associated with such an exposition (without necessary subscribing to the philosophical argument that that they are fully in control of the trajectory of that discourse or completely in lack of some form an ability to intervene at the same time.)[133] (453)

In other words, by translating the relational context of the system we can start to understand the nature of the topic as an 'exposition' *qua* 'exposition' (and not merely as an 'inter-ordered topic' *qua* 'topic'). (454)

Furthermore, we also have some interesting ramifications following on in the wake of this novel sense and semblance of re-positioning that now focuses more of our attention on the evolution of the exposition, preferably from a relational point of view as an entrance to its existential re-appreciation. Namely, e.g., the fact that a disciplinarian, of whatever discipline, can only appreciate the nature of their disciplinary discourse from

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131 Implicitly, that because resolution is ongoing and imperfect, in that sense, it follows that the maintenance of a single narrative is impossible even if attested as such. Furthermore, in seeking a contrast with the narrative to hand being entered into then its contrasted delineation demands the simultaneous entertainment of a series of at least a contrasting narrative within in a set of possible narratives. Just as a person who is lying must also entertain a set of parallel narratives lest they believe their own deceptions. However, in being good faith such narrational reconciliations can be conducted more overtly and with less psychic effort. Then, in the overall economy of the economic we can also conjecture that we have three relatively individual streams of input and collectively arrived at output/s, just as, in our dealings with others we have to entertain both in parallel and sequentially the functions of navigation (around), negotiation (with) and arbitration (through the meta-textual environment as inescapably presented both culturally and interculturally since we can no longer live in just a cave or the confines of a single village).

132 'Textual situation' is a simplifying code for 'text, texts, series and/or set/s of texts'.

133 This position of mine is in a stark contrast to the relatively passive use of transcendental suspensions as exercised by Husserl. Here I am arguing that through the suspension, or, rather the de-suspension, there is also an intervening causal role to be played by such a complex process. Hence the broad nature of the exposition from a narration to a non-verbalized form of intervention, and everything else in between, etc. This is both an observation and criticism of the Husserlian notion/s of the suspension, etc. My concept of the 'extensive suspension' being the 'extended suspension plus its causal role for intervention' through the role of the de-suspension [within the extended suspension}, etc., as discussed in *Pursuit*, Volume II).

a trans-disciplinary perspective, i.e., through the workings, effectively, of what is none other than a metaphysical perspective! (455)

So, the historian, e.g., whose topic is the symmetrical inter-ordered reduplication of the sixth order (i.e., notated as $6^0.6^0$ or 6^2) can only appreciate their discipline from the philosophical appreciation of the same, i.e., meta-philosophically, or, more precisely non-economically, by virtue of their ability to actively intervene in the evolution of both their exposition and its behavioural offspring. So, in this regard an historian might passively recount a certain history of (predominantly) either the past, present, and/or future and in so doing not only disseminate a certain textual situation but also whatever behaviours that might also flow from the same, say, as disciplinary imperatives that observe the necessity for changes in behavioural responses be they intra-disciplinary and/or extra-disciplinary in orientation (in a communication between systems). Moreover, by such means as well-informed extensive suspension, etc., we should be able to take on an existential complexion in the formation of that overall pattern of discourse (in and through the dissemination of the exposition once released for dissemination). (456)

In a commentary on my stated intentions, we note two lists of four headings[134] and six headings respectively.[135] (457)

The four set of four headings could be abbreviated as explorations concerning **inter-ordered phenomena**; (the resuscitation of) **metaphysics** (as an example of the former); **systems** (giving the enveloped historical specificity of the discipline/s in question); and, (the resolution of **Contemporary problems** (along with traditional problems in and through the light of the preceding headings). (458)

Under those six headings we could find the following abbreviations where the first two of **inter-ordered phenomena** and **metaphysics** are identical with the first list. Third, **philosophical ramifications (**of this in-depth approach need to be explored); **systematic envelopment** (of disciplines); (a 'top-down meets a bottom-up approach' lets us proffer an) **integration** (of inter-ordered topics with their co-associated systematic contexts); (and, finally, an **existentialization** (of this approach then needs to be suitably articulated). (459)

Interestingly, this topical 'bottom-up' meeting a systematic 'top-down' orientation highlights a point made in the *Ascent* re the use of different hierarchical model being articulated along with the potential confusion that could also be incurred.[136] In effect, suggesting through allusion to the making of a sandwich where the filling is to be judged as more interesting than either differently constituted 'upper and lower pieces of bread' being used. Now, I am not suggesting that such differing forms of modeling are wrong, just, that we should chose more profitable forms of modeling as well as noting just which forms of modeling are being invoked and when this approach is transformed by the adoption and adaptation of a new form of modeling, and so forth. However, in a shift towards

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134 Paragraph iv.

135 Paragraph 0.

136 E.g., refer to 435, 441

a greater degree of consistency in such modeling, in an alignment also with the modeling invoked for a schematic depiction of the Political-Economy, we start at the 'bottom' with the hermeneutical generality of a systems approach, move on to the phenomenological particularity of the economic, and then, proceed to the existential specificity of the concretely historical as to be discerned, through ongoing resolution, in and through the emission of the exposition. So, ideally, choosing one model over another on the grounds of either for their comparative utility or for the sake of consistency in the dominant use of one possible model over all other models. (460)

The third heading of the first set of four heading is more or less identical to the fourth heading of the second set of six headings. In the last heading of the set of six headings we find an emphasis upon the existential dimension which is tacitly or covertly implicated in the fourth heading of the first set in its application to a resolution of Contemporary problems (without overlooking a need to resolve more Traditional problems especially those of a seemingly intractable nature). (461)

Although the so-called 'obesity epidemic' has been around for some time, at least for the last sixty to seventy years, given its expanding currency we could also quite easily refer to it as a very pressing Contemporary problem. Taking a systems approach in the light of the best evidence to hand it was suggested that there is a contemporary incongruity between the objectives of an imputed Health System versus the Business World in terms of the Food Industry (itself as enveloped within the embracement of this World of Business). Business is out to make a profit (if not a hyper-conservation of an exponential profit) whereas, hopefully, the Health System is interested in 'both proactively promoting better pre-conditions for healthy choices, and, reactively treating the consequences of such poor choices along with the remediation of disease, declining health, the adverse processes of aging, etc.' That from a policy perspective, politicians, disciplinarians, philosophers, *et al*, need to 'square this circle' so to speak. I.e., through suitable forms of evidence-based policy re-directives 'encourage' businesses to produce and market healthier foods, identify the percentage of protein in their products, co-opt a profit motive in the development of such healthier products;[137] politicians need to legislate when and where relevant (say, through the removal of trans-fat from food products), perhaps by either subsidizing healthier food options and/or by placing a reasonable levy or tax on relatively less healthy food options; educate the public as to how they can exercise better choices in foods to be consumed, etc.; and, where, as well, the public needs to take responsibility for their eating habits in the light of the former re-directives (as issued as policy guidelines along with their various modes of implementation, etc., the dissemination of information that supports such evidence-based recommendations, etc.). (462)

That, if we were to entertain the relevant information required and an anatomical-like dissection of the apparent systems overlapping in our appreciation of a certain type of situation, it is my contention that we should find ourselves in a better situation to either definitively resolve the discernment of such resident anomalies as found, or, at the very least, effectively minimize them to some noticeable extent (preferably through initiating

[137] E.g., by capitalizing on the healthier nature of the product; having it certified as meeting recommended nutritional standards; as being, say, higher in protein, etc.

those trends that ameliorate the relatively adverse concatenation of pre-conditions and conditions primarily instrumental in such negative phenomenologies rather than a more superficial treatment of its symptomology should such a deeper approach be able to be both and successfully enacted). (463)

In this regard we can also note the apparent presence or absence of either relatively defective forms of modeling or, preferably, their relatively non-defective forms of qualified representation (where by 'representation' is meant 'the well-pre-informed and the well-conducted re-presenting of texts by the collation and integration of other texts found to be relevant in our attempts to better appreciate that type of textual situation under review'. So, e.g., in regard to the obesity epidemic, to date, either scientific models have failed us and/or our interpretations of the science has been poorly misunderstood and disseminated. Besides a plethora of diets, or the hegemony of the caloric model (in an endless counting of calories), often in association with the reduction in fat model (that insists on a removal of a large proportion of the fat that would have otherwise consumed) it is obvious that such measures for most people have been a total failure. Witness a non-reversal of the stats associated with the long-term charting of this cultural-intercultural phenomenon. Of course, although it is often true that 'complex problems may well have complex causes', still, this more recent evidence-based model arguing 'that deficient protein intake can promote, as a consequence, a regular uptake of an excessive caloric intake with a subsequent incremental process of weight gain in its wake', it would appear that such an adverse world-wide phenomenon might at last be properly addressed. That, in this instance and others, a successful *redressement* is better supervised through the careful application of a systems approach where we note the defective 'communication' between systems in order to find forms of harmonization that more deeply redress such cultural and/or intercultural anomalies between such systematic forms of aspirational non-alignment. In this regard, in not finding definitive forms of resolution, we need to be mindful that we do not live in a perfect world and be more accepting of those solutions that proffer acceptable degrees of re(-)normalization. E.g., it would be nice, from an impartial perspective that sought the best health possible for all the members of a certain community or nation, if no one were to smoked, yet, if all those tobacco products were be completely banned, in the light of the failure of previous forms of prohibition, that policy would most likely prove to be a complete failure. Rather, we should take comfort in the fact that a decline in such consumption should be seen as a success and continue with those policy re-directives that have assisted in establishing this same positive trend (whilst also being mindful of the fact that such an industry, in the poor light past record in such matters, might attempt other counter-measures to reverse its loss in markets, market share, etc., through the creation of new products of addiction[138]). (464)

As an example of a Contemporary problem, in light of the ongoing loss of traditional Media, and its non-coincidental replacement by Social-Media, I suggested the role of the so-called Fourth Estate (and its advantageous history of calling out all forms of improper political behaviour) might be successfully preserved through the governmental establishment of independent national and community news-services. Besides the wages

[138] With an obvious reference to e-cigarettes, etc. An issue, in not being seriously addressed, that stands in need of clarification for all parties concerned.

to be paid of a small number of staff involved in this independent dissemination of such news, etc., along with the e-costs of running such sites given that contribution in various formats and forms could be sought from the public, that the costs of dissemination were virtually negligible (if print runs, and their physical distribution, are not envisaged, etc.) then once again governments could be called to account, and so on. That, as much as politicians might not like such scrutiny, over the long-term it is in the best interests of our democratic institutions in order to both maintain the expected levels of propriety and their being observed to be followed accordingly. (465)

Of course, my attention and my presentation of possible modes of resolution to these two sets of problematic issues does deserve to be properly debated, but, the important point I am trying to make stands, namely, a systematic approach would proffer a more successful roadmap to how we might more effectively resolve such issues. Indeed, it should almost be mandatory that such social considerations be first call into question a pragmatic mapping of their systematic forms of embracement (within a dominant system), mediation and intermediation (between more prominent systems of overlapping relevance), along with their envelopment (of social sub-systems within their fold). So, e.g., in dealing with the obesity crisis we would need to note, hopefully, the political will to instigate and institute an academic approach within the System of Academia from, say, the discipline/s of health and medicine along with submissions and assistance from philosophers, interested parties, etc; noting the overlap between the Health System and the Business World; and, also noting the inclusion of the Food Industry within this World of Business, and so on. That once mapped out, in conjunction with a pragmatic delineation of the problematic issues, only then should we think we can correctly commence a process of appreciation as to how we might better resolve such complex issues. (466)

In the light of the above we would also need to note to what extent these various Systems appear to exert a certain level of political-economic power by virtue of their segmented standing within this open environment of the Political-Economy,[139] and, to some extent, produce a working suspension of such power relations lest invested Systems, vested interested, and other over-interested or under-interested parties could improperly affect the overall performance of more beneficial outcomes etc., whilst also recognizing that 'politics ever remains within the sphere of the art of the politically possible...'[140] (467)

The expressions symmetrical 'reduplication' and asymmetrical 'duplication' were (eventually) more closely defined through a systems approach, which, respectively, we can now re-define as 'the metafication of an ordered complex (and its automatic invocation of its transformational retreatment through de-suspensional de-metafication)', and, 'the dominance of a system's code over the sub-dominant code pertaining to the sub-system's ordered complex'. So, e.g., according to this ordered-systematic philosophy, the

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139 Refer to paragraph 167, etc.

140 Where the requisite political will need to be appositely mustered in order to more positively re-arrange such influences, say, through finding forms of cooperation from mutual forms of alignment (where, e.g., the Food Industry could profit from healthier food production and dissemination, etc.) or enforce forms of legislation that promote a so-called 'more level playing field', etc.

philosophical appreciation of a certain topic is metaphysically invested, and where that investment is retreated in philosophical terms of reference in the light of critical outcomes and potentially radical outcomes, etc., that would then need to be de-radicalized hyper-economically. So, e.g., in the legal treatment of an adverse work-related incident the law would need, first, to legally retreat the coded significance of that work related incident before, second, delivering a legal judgment, or similar, etc. (468)

With what does a system work with, and, how is communication within and between systems realized? (469)

An exposition textually represents a relationship, as a relational situation, either recognized as such or not recognized as such, through the use of representative elements such as nominatives (through a transcendent balance of analysis and synthesis), predicates (through analysis) and relations (through synthesis) as pertaining to the perspectival delineation of objects, subjects, inter-objective spaces and inter-subjective spaces all subjected to various semantically applicable transitions (within a distinction) or transformations (between distinctions) as further qualified through ordered analysis; and, an appreciation of modal density (as a spectrum of phenomenological modalities), modal intensity, iterative modal propensity (for the reoccurrence of rhetorical tropes, themes, memes, etc.), and, salience, consilience, and propinquity (or standing). Within such markings representative identities meet distinctions, transitions, transformations, accommodations, etc. Where an economy of re(-)presentations is co-simulated through a correlation of texts in a textual economy between, e.g., the dialectical moments of the textual, metatextual and the simulation of the non-textual (all further enriched through either covert and/or overt forms of economic complexification [in the mutually productive parallelization of relevant economies]). (470)

Where ‘representation’ is ‘economically simulated textually, and where there can be no mere text outside its economy of presentation and where there can be interaction with that which is not represented within that textual economy other than that which is treated as either non-economically or hyper-economically in orientation or both non-economically and hyper-economically in orientation without any form of a divorce from the relatively textual’. Where, in other words, representation is conducted and enacted between texts and never purely within a text nor purely outside a text! (471)

Within such an economic frame of reference the overall economy of the exposition is dialectically realized as a textualized interaction that is one-part ongoing expositional re(-)presentation (with a relatively specific non-systematic existential orientation), one-part inter-ordered topical presentation (with a relatively particular phenomenological orientation), and, one-part systematic representation (with a relatively general hermeneutical orientation). Hence the economy of the exposition and its ongoing re(-)presentation which, furthermore, can take on a more overt existential complexion when treated through a pro-relational lens from a trans-relational sense of perspective as expedited through the suitable use of extensive suspensions. I.e., through the simulated identification with our relationships from a perspective that is pro-relational in orientation to the extent that relational emergence is recognized, encountered and engaged, and, where

trans-relational subjectivity is both subjective and intersubjective, and, is neither subjective nor inter-subjective (as expedited through the extensive suspension, and, given that the relational dimension in experience cannot be reduced to its relational elements as just previously articulated). (472)

But, even though the representative dimension is simulated in and through the open-ended complexities of these relational elements, etc., still, 'the simulation of a simulation cannot be a pure simulation *per se* being a meta-simulation or a non-simulation', etc., and, where through transformational retreatment, we are returned from whence we came, albeit, hopefully, a little wiser... (473)

Where, e.g., the metaphysical becomes philosophical once more... (474)

Where all pre-intentional, intentional, and trans-intentional inputs continually enrich the furtherance of all ensuing forms of experiential patterns of appreciation. (475)

Against such a complex background, we can now approach these questions of communication with and between systems. (476)

On theoretical grounds we cannot accept the absolutistical isolation of one system *vis-à-vis* any other system because we all must live in one world (of life) in order to communicate with one another (be that recognized through paraphrases conducted within a language or as translations between languages); moreover, as human agents in this world at large we travel between overlapping systems; furthermore, the coded performance of one system is often legislated by some other system and, over time, can be rendered more amenable to changes and shifts in public consensus, etc.[141] But, this qualification granted, we can accept the semi-autopoietic, apparent self-generating, and the relative self-replicating nature of these systems. That, in this regard, 'a legal question remains a legal question and is not a moral or ethical question' even though the ideas of 'justice', 'fairness', 'equality before the law', and so on, in turn, cannot be purely legal in either their philosophical origination or judged as a legal consideration given that the conservative formulation and utilization of the law often reflects vested interests and the differences in their power relations, and so forth. That, the disparity of these differences between the compactual dimension and the contractual dimension is forever to be seen, still, through an existentialization of discourses processes of harmonization will also forever attempt to reverse such natural forms of inequity, inequality, inconsistencies in the application of the more inherently 'lawful' (as a general notion that seeks 'alignment' through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment[142] between its historical and conceptual formulizations, etc.), etc. (477)

We could consider communication to be expositional, and, then, discursive through the dissemination of such ensuing discourses. (478)

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141 E.g., the Political System legislating the laws of the Legal System.

142 As articulated in paragraph 479.

As noted, the economic emission of an exposition is relatively non-economic, potentially radical and disruptive, and can only be comprehended hyper-economically by whatever hermeneutic strategies can achieve that satisfactory degree of conventionally oriented appropriation as realized through that process of ongoing re(-)appropriation. Where such overall comprehension can be realized through reiterative recognition of an alignment through iterative realignment; deconstructive de-re-mis-alignment, and chaotically instigated non-economic non-alignment, re-alignment, etc. Where it is the overall harmonization of such inputs that 'progressively' realized that conceptual sense and experiential semblance of an overall economy of economic re(-)alignment. (479)

That communication within a system, e.g., as put into effect within a certain discipline, is realized through transformational retreatment as enacted though hermeneutic pretreatment of the hyper-economic, the phenomenological treatment of the economic, and the non-systematic existential retreatment/posttreatment of the non-economic (emission of an exposition). Thence, by such imputed means, albeit as heuristically presented, we may (barely) think we can understand (a reasonable fraction of) the genesis of the intentional, etc. (480)

Indeed, we can attempt to think such dialectical processes in either sequential terms, circular terms, or as relatively simultaneous despite transformational processes continually re(-)defining all economic correlativities over the course of that dialectically constituted process of transformation (which, admittedly, must occur over a passage of time beyond the space of a bare moment?). So, that understood, the limits of all forms of modeling must be both understood and accepted… (481)

From either a sequential or circular perspective we can attempt to understand how inter-ordered topics and their respective systematic locations operate. E.g., from a hyper-economic point of view, we find the system in question discerns the relevance or irrelevance of the type of text/s that can be mediated within that system or possibly intermediated between systems (be that either within or external to the primary or dominant system[143]). By 'mediated' is meant 'the text under review treated through a form of interrogation in keeping with that system in question. E.g., imaging a person wishing to build a house and do so in conformity with all required permissions, such as, e.g., obtaining the legally effective ownership of the land where this building is to be erected, where contracts are properly formulated, etc., etc. In this instance the legal code is asking, first, hyper-economically, is this required for approval, and, second, economically, can this approval be applied or should it be denied or deferred, etc? Then, when all required permissions are in place we can then proceed, non-economically, with the emission and dissemination of an exposition that proffers the requisite permission to proceed with this building project. By 'intermediation' is meant 'the refraction of a text through the double encoding of the system and either some other system or a sub-system within the system in question'. E.g., in the System of Academia, we could ask within the philosophical discipline, as the topic, does this piece of music M have aesthetic potential in terms, say, of generally complying with its genre, is particularly playable, and, is specifically found to be memorable, and so on? Or, in a determination of the truth value, in our reception in

[143] Intermediation being between both systems and sub-systems (within the dominant system).

this instance of M, is it the case or is it not the case that M is 'aesthetically viable' or 'a good piece of music' or 'is that which is well-appreciated by either the public and/or music scholars', and so forth? Where, in this example, the code attached to philosophical discernment is then applied to the relative sub-dominant code in use for discerning musical merit, or similar. Or, in an intermediation between systems we might imagine the following example, namely, a philosophical appreciation of the Russo-Ukrainian 'Special Operation' as instigated by Russia or the more recent so-called Israeli 'War' with Hamas. In either case we might first evaluate the political background behind these conflagrations, and, then, philosophically proceed to appreciate the moral merit or otherwise behind the parties concerned continuing or discontinuing such offensive-defensive forms of belligerence, etc? Now, I am not interested here in making and arguing for such forms of judgment but to point out that the philosophical appreciation of the political backgrounds to such conflicts, in these two instances, is an intermediated affair… (482)

On the other hand, if we were to take a more dialectical sense of perspective, we might well argue that intermediation, through duplication, is more permanently the operative mechanism given the fact that systems are not isolated in experience, and, at the same time, continual forms of appreciation also demand the permanent exercise of reduplication. Thence the inter-ordered nature of the psychic landscape, i.e., as permanently undergoing continual duplication and reduplication from moment to moment. That, somewhat similarly, we can envisage the systematic environment to have a primary location whilst also having secondary forms of systematic intermediation as witnessed by the Political System having aspects of its collective functioning throughout the Political-Economy. So, the legislature is to be found Sector One whilst the Political Executive separately occupies Sector Nine; and, where the organization of political parties, conducted along business lines, is primarily centered in Sector Five; where the necessity of a Civil Service, or its functioning equivalent, effectively, is in either Sector Four or Six, or, more likely, in both Sectors.[144] Such considerations complicate the determination of a primary location for various disciplines within the Political-Economy, on the other hand, specificities of function can more easily set us up to conclude where those types of functions more obviously will have their primary basis. As for the Political System, we might well surmise that as the political executive have a much greater sense and semblance of political power that the political system is primarily located in Sector Nine. On the other hand, the perception of the legal Fraternity as primarily a 'business' would locate it in Sector Five (the World of Business).[145] (483)

Systems can communicate but to do so they must translate their import between each other. Because the power dynamics of any relationship cannot be perfectly balanced

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144 Say, Sector Four working for the Political Legislature in Sector One, and, Sector Six working for the Political Executive in Sector Nine. Then, we have Special Committees, like royal commissions, etc., in Sector Seven; Policy Planning in Sector Two; and Media, Social-Media, or 'propaganda' in Sector Three. Then, to complete this political infiltration throughout the environment of the Political-Economy we might surmise how politicians set the rules for how various forms of compliance are to be accomplished, when spelt out, in Sector Eight. Similarly, we could note in the Legal Fraternity that laws are established through the Political Legislature, where the practice of law as a business is conducted in Sector Five within the Business World, and where judges independently operate within Sector Nine.

145 Refer to the mapping of the Political-Economy in paragraphs 166, 167.

it would imply asymmetrical forms of asymmetrical duplication where a certain degree of non-commutativity needs to be overcome through such co-inter-systematic forms of translation. This interdisciplinary approach is possible for a number of reasons. For a start the hyper-economic dimension is shared in the meta-textual, hermeneutically oriented intersubjectivity of cultural and intercultural 'spaces' where the generality of performances is immediately recognized and comprehended accordingly. Just as, e.g., when people simultaneously laugh in stand-up theater, they also recognize that others have understood the comic point of the humour just demonstrated (where it is much easier to believe that most people who laughed understood that same comic turn rather than each person apperceiving a different humorous event). Moreover, through the use of a similar palette of rhetorical tropes, meme, themes, culturally shared metaphorical images, etc., people in general can analogically comprehend the distinctive nature and functions of the various systems that semi-autopoietically and self-evidently present themselves almost as if a mere matter of common observation as they differentially shaping our interactions and conversations about the same accordingly. Furthermore, people need to pass from one sector to another, just as, e.g., the academic who wishes to publish needs to directly travel to the publishing domain within the world of business or find an intermediary person or organization that would complete that same mission on their behalf… (484)

Interestingly, this phenomenon of either acting as a middle agent or lobbying occurs across the entire environment of the Political-Economy especially, I am inclined to believe, when the need for communication is diagonally represented in this mapping of the Political-Economy or when a direct vertical or horizontal path is not present (metaphorically). Let me explore this apparent phenomenon of 'intermediation'. (485)

Consider the following political situation. If the political executive (in Sector 9) wishes to get legislation through, say, their parliament or congress (as a house of representatives in Sector One) given the 'diagonal' nature of this (political-economic) interaction and that, theoretically, direct, non-transparent interaction is technically and professionally 'prohibited' how might such directives be intermediated? In a parliament, the Front bench wears two hats, namely, as participants in the executive and as member in that same parliament. In effect, they act as their own intermediating agents. Furthermore, we might also suppose that the election or appointment of 'whips', in each of the major parties, could also achieve the same outcome, namely, the obtainment of the necessary number of required votes in order to pass that same legislation currently under such review. Or, the executive could transparently lobby or appoint envoys to promote the same legislation required by the executive… Of course, in a one-party system or authoritarian dictatorship we return to something like a monarchical-like type of political process, yet, even here there is often the appearance of a desire to find the expedition of their authority reinforced publicly through some form of rubber stamping by a body of statespersons to confer that aura of respectability on such unilateral forms of decision making. (486)

Or, consider the process of political lobbying that intermediates the Business World and the World of Politics (in all the manifestations across the Political-Economy). In effect, we meet with a parallel, non-official, but often required to be regulated, 'Civil Service' or 'Domain of Consultants' charged with the same types of tasks to complete,

i.e., the intermediation of the Political and Business Worlds (from different, and relatively disparate sectors or segment of this Political-Economy). Unfortunately, all too often fueled by excessive donations the ensuing communications between these two disparate systems, through such intermediation, cannot but distort the overall political process. E.g., by polarizing the overall political spectrum and then internally polarizing parties in turn. However, as seen through this systems approach as constructed by myself, namely, this 3 x 3 matrix of the Political-Economy, it would appear that, indeed, there is a serious need for such intermediation and that its suitable regulation (minus corporate donations, etc.) might prove to be the better path to adopt for the maintenance of our political democracies (whilst also insulating and repairing them from excessive forms of a democratically corrosive neo-liberalism, etc.). (487)

As noted, intermediation is a prominent phenomenon that is much in demand across the entirety of the Political-Economy given this need for Systems to communicate to each other by such relatively indirect means. On the other hand, some system will communicate more directly by a process we could refer to as 'mediation'. E.g., the direct dealings of a civil servant, or appointed consultant, to deal with legislators, on one hand, and, the business world on the other. Or, a need for legislators to deal with involved forms of policy formation as being developed by policy planners in the Second Sector. Or, where political executives directly engage business executives within the Ninth Sector (hopefully, without the emollient of promised donations, or similar), or, where business executive directly engage managers in the Sixth Sector in order to transmit instructions and receive the requite forms of information needed for the running of their businesses. (488)

Whether by intermediation or mediation working definitions of requisite 'professionalism' need to be adhered to (or amended when appropriate). Basically, first, by observing current expectations and standards already in place conventionally, and, second, by pursuing a clarification and intensification of such standards. (489)

In general terms we can surmise that communications between Systems occurs *vis-à-vis* Systems *per se* through reduplication and duplication, and, on a more fragmentary basis through mediation and intermediation. That with reduplication we will find either its practical treatment or critical retreatment, preferably of a conformal nature. That with duplication we will either find its asymmetrical non-communicative domination of the sub-dominant party, or, the relatively mutual co-thematization of an interdisciplinary approach through various forms of working compromise. Let me explore these (theoretically speculative) observations. (490)

In the conformal appreciation of the 'metaphysical' as the 'philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' I have noted its critical and potentially radical retreatment back into the body of philosophy as a Discipline within the System of Academia (be that in either a *de jure* and/or *de facto* role). In a contrast, we might surmise that 'history' defined as 'the inter-ordered symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (6^2)' maintains its treated status as a distinctive Discipline in its own right without retreatment back to its basis in the sixth trans-cognitive order. That, in interdisci-

plinary forms of communication and research we may surmise the parallel holding of non-communicative patterns of asymmetrical duplication back-to-back in either a balanced format or in a format that recognizes forms of an inequality in power relations. So, e.g., a hypothetical conference between philosophers and historians could be entertained where submissions either observed forms of duplicated inequality or attempted to observe forms of disciplinary neutrality by running those types of discourses back-to-back or in parallel. So, e.g., with respect to the latter we could imagine historical processes being interpreted from a productively relevant philosophical perspective, and v.v., without giving an undue preference to either discipline. So, e.g., in the English Civil War/s we could argue that there was also a philosophical clash over the nature of political governance, etc. (especially in light of the economic fact that members in the House of Commons were, on average, far more wealthy that the average wealth of the members of the House of Lords). (491)

Communicative interactions should also be explored in diachronic, non-synchronic terms of reference. E.g., the example already posted that slavery in one period of time could be deemed both 'legal' and socially 'normal', and, in a later period of time, be deemed to be both 'illegal' and 'non-normal', implies that the evolutional thematization of a System of Social Consensus can effectively dominate both the Legal System and the Political System given that the laws of a nation, today, are legislated within the Political Sphere and will reflect to varying degrees this pragmatic notion of a generally understood 'social consensus'.[146] (492)

Therefore, *contra* Luhmann, I propose that systems are 'semi-autopoietic' and 'not just autopoietic in the self-reiterative continuation of both their systematic place and role in society'. Which stands to reason given their ability both to internally and externally conduct processes of duplication, and, in turn, through duplication be dominated by more dominant systems, and so on. (493)

On the other hand, as an important point of qualification, it is economically[147] impossible to simultaneously exercise two different codes within the same topic. That, only over a period of time can the exercise of two codes enter into some form of an apparent, equally weighted interdisciplinary interaction and research project or program should the intention be to subvert the dominance of a certain discipline over the other, or v.v. Hence, we must also correctly recognize the sheer absence of a non-autopoietic sense and semblance of a system. (494)

Now, having spent some time exploring inter-ordered phenomena (as the Topic), and the systematic nature of their contextualization (as the System within the environment of the Political-Economic) along with their interactive-resolution (in the formation of the Exposition) let me now focus our attention on both the Discipline of the Metaphys-

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146 In effect, tacitly attempting to develop a mechanism or set of mechanisms (when notions of arbitration, etc., are also included) as to how this process of 'social consensus', as noted by Richard Rorty, might come into existence from a philosophical perspective.

147 In the two economic sense of the overall economic treatment and in terms of the deconstructive application of economic treatment.

ical, as here radically re-defined along conformal lines, and the insightful virtues of taking a systems approach to a resolution of the problematic under the headings of the 'Traditional', and, especially, the 'Contemporary' given that the latter have had less time to find suitable forms of successfully realized hyper-economic re(-)appropriation. (495)

'The philosophical appreciation of the philosophical' has here been defined as 'metaphysical'. Thence this re-defining of the 'metaphysical'. Assuming that such meta-philosophical appreciation can be conducted and is conducted correctly, i.e., critically, then we can assume that such metaphysical appreciation, when correctly conducted, is critically conducted accordingly. That granted, hypothetically, a next question to ask would be 'does this approach have a disciplinary point or purpose to make in being critically enacted?' In the affirmative, I would state that it is my well-reflected upon conclusion that this critical exercise of the 'meta-philosophical', or 'non-philosophical', is our metaphorical 'doorway' to the inevitable entry of the potentially radical, albeit as comprehended incrementally as the relatively-radical, for reasons already noted. Furthermore, through the adoption and adaptation of an apposite pro-relational approach that we will also meet the metaphorical 'entrance' to (and 'exit' from) the experience of the existential in its more systematic aspect as would need to be experienced from a trans-relational sense of personal-interpersonal subjectivity.[148] This context understood, let us now ask just what value this form of symmetrical reduplication can afford, and, in its asymmetrical duplication of these individual trans-cognitive orders just what additional value might be realized through the focused application of this form of critical scrutiny? (496)

As a form of reduplicated philosophical appreciation, we are asking, in effect, for a clarification and conformation of the truth determinations either already to hand or that being brought to hand both when and where this degree and form of thematization is found possible to realize. In an informative contrast, it could be argued that duplication, individually or collectively, presents us with a 'characteristic' explication of the life-world to hand be that in either general, particular, and/or specific terms of reference, i.e., in either hermeneutical, phenomenological, and/or existential terms of reference respectively. By 'characteristic' is meant the individual or collective focusing on or more ordered form of judgment. So, e.g., the meta-philosophical appreciation of semantic e/valuation would focus our attention on the semantic, and so on and so forth. (497)

Now a series of questions to ask, in this regard, is as follows. It would appear that anything could be made the subject of philosophical appreciation. E.g., the philosophy or philosophical appreciation of the historical (through the auspices of the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order) would appear to be possible in experience (given the existence of textual discourses on that type of complex topic). That philosophical appreciation is one thing, but, is there a need for its metaphysical equivalent through reduplication? Now, in notation the philosophical (as it can be defined as one-part hermeneutical appreciation, one-part phenomenological, and one-part non-systematic existential appreciation could be notated as '$5^0/1^0/3^0$', but, given the ordered passage from one orientation must also pass also through the sixth order, the second order, and the fourth orders we

[148] The trans-relational sense of perspective, being trans-relational cannot be limited to being just personally subjective, etc. Hence its interpersonal inter-subjectivity, even if just simulated.

could merely redefine 'philosophy' as the sum of the orders one to six then we could re-notate the same as merely Z^0 or E^0,[149] as 'the sum of the six orders in those proportions of involvement that reflect the character of the reflections involved') . This notation understood, we can now ask is meta-philosophical appreciation necessary and qualitatively different when philosophical appreciation appears to be doing the same work? Or, should we be conservative and insist that Z^{0} is quite different form the conformally oriented Z^{02}? I.e., that there is a metaphysical difference between say $Z^{02}.1^2$ and $Z^{0}.1^{2}$? However, to main my consistency here let me assume that philosophical appreciation of *x* is different from the conformal metaphysical appreciation of that same *x*. That, that accepted, let me now explore the meta-philosophical/non-philosophical configurations of our conformal treatment of ordered, inter-ordered and hyper-ordered products. (498)

To begin with, let me argue that there is not a great degree of difference between symmetrical 'reduplication' and asymmetrical 'duplication' on the grounds that both are manifestations of economic interactions imputed between economic correlativities where it is only the ratio of subtle preferencing/de-preferencing that accounts for any specific manifestation of any apparent presentation of a certain form of correlativity. Furthermore, through economic complexification Through forms of economic parallelization of economic corelativities), simplification (through non-economic resolution), hyper-economic re(-)appropriation, induction (of extensive suspensions through the correlative basis of the overall economy of the economic), etc., such interactions between the ordered, etc., are already pre-prepared. Moreover, in philosophical appreciation or in conformal metaphysical (metaphysical) appreciation of an ordered or inter-ordered phenomenon we already have within the former an expression of the latter. If we can treat philosophical economy as the sum of all trans-cognitive orders (as the judgment of cognitive orders, and their emergent forms of trans-cognitive differentiation (in the third and fourth orders [where from the conceptual we emergently realize the deontological and, therein and thereby, political power, and, where from the perceptual we emergently realize the pragmatical]) then, say, in the conformal treatment of a categorical sense of the metaphysical we are merely aligning 12 in metaphysical field with 10 as the object of such productivity. Let me diagrammatically represent this symmetrical form of an alignment in what, ostensively, is manifestly asymmetrical:

1^2 ……. 1^2 (categorical metaphysical)
2^2
3^2
4^2
5^2
6^2

…hence $Z^2.1^2$ although ostensive asymmetrical is in this instance also entails a symmetrical form of alignment… (499)

[149] Basically channelling the sign indicating mathematical integration.

Where effectively, the archetypal economic nature of all economies, including the overall economy of the economic, along with the ordered nature of its inter-ordered interactions, paves the way for the topical complexity of disciplines, etc. (500)

Now, in defining the code of the philosophical attitude as' a preoccupation with truth determination in its non-absolutistical sense', we need to further define it in terms of its appreciation of a philosophically treated sense and semblance of a situation found to be amenable to such treatment. If this definition were to just stand without this qualification of 'the necessity of the addition of its application to a philosophically oriented sense and semblance of that type of situatedness' then should a person declare that 'this person 'A is truly ugly' that by itself would not constitute a philosophical proposition despite its utterance of a certain truth determination (admittedly self-declared to be also true), here treated as 'valid' regardless of its truth in 'the courts of social consensus?' (501)

Ostensively, mere declarations of truth value are not and cannot be 'philosophical' as things stand without this additional aspect of its philosophical-like situatedness. Here we can supply either an ordered, inter-ordered, or hyper-ordered complement. E.g., 'what is the truth determination of this object X being viewed through a second trans-cognitively ordered form of aesthetic appreciation?' Through supplying this complement we now can stake a claim both for philosophical appreciation and in a reduplication of philosophical appreciation of the same as a form of conformal metaphysical appreciation. So, e.g., I can metaphorically 'stand back' in order to appreciate the parallel semantics of a certain type of phenomenological experience, say, in the tasting of a saline solution, and, where, in addition we can also contemplate the reduplications of either that philosophical appreciation, as a form of metaphysical appreciation, or the semantic sub-field currently being held as a form of categorical metaphysics (in which semantic categories themselves are being reviewed). (502)

Theoretically, 'disciplinarians' are 'those people, acting either individually or collectively, who, over the course of their interactions, intervene through their attempting to be of service to others'. 'Telling the truth', without 'an eye on its consequential ramifications, or similar, is a two-edged sword, either promoting the philosophical orientation or shredding it'. On the other hand, supplying either a sub-dominantly ordered, inter-ordered, or hyper-ordered field (along with their codes), is instrumental in this progressive path towards being either philosophical or metaphysical (as here being re-defined). Moreover, the philosophical attention to truth determination also demands the overt or covert implementation of the extensive suspension (for how else are we to economically proceed?). Furthermore, in the disciplinarian desiring either a state of 'felicitation' or 'de-non-felicitation' in both non-existential and existential orientations we must suppose the accompaniment of this additional and final set of qualifications. Let me explain. (503)

No discipline, no topic, no intentional form of ideation, no pattern of activity, etc., can commence without the implementation of an appositive form of suspension (in order to then proceed through the immediately ensuing 'force' of the de-suspension). So, e.g., the asking of a question, philosophical or otherwise, demands the utilization of a disconjunctive, rhetorical suspension, etc., and, where its first reply is in terms of the meta-

phorical, itself in the form of a conjunctive suspension, and so on then through the literal-like treatment of the apparitional suspension).[150] (504)

As for the last set of qualifications let me explain their raison d'être. (505)

'Discerning the truth' is a core preoccupation of the philosopher, but, also applies to all other serious disciplines and their use as topics in apposition with systems in the formation of expositions able to be disseminated. (506)

But, more specifically, philosophical appreciation, as both a pre-condition and condition for informed existentially oriented intervention necessitates either the positive incremental, non-chaotic augmentation or the positive non-incremental, chaotic enhancement of felicitation (i.e., happiness in general)[151] as well as the de-non-felicitation (i.e., effectively, in the form of an 'alleviation of suffering, etc.'[152]). But, the ostensively 'neutral' nature of the relatively non-existential also needs to be taken into account... Many actions or non-action, or inactions, through enaction do not find themselves interpreted as possessing, to any great extent, either existentially oriented or non-existentially oriented forms of e/valuational treatment. Just as, in the Biblical reference, we do not and cannot live by 'bread' alone.[153] "Bread' here is symbolic of the 'non-existential', i.e., those material pre-conditions and conditions that contribute to the well-being of our relational participation in the world as relational participants (rather than, existentially, as pro-relationally oriented trans-relational participants, etc., operating in an alignment with our ostensive relational 'objectives' viewed as 'beneficial trajectories'). (507)

Now, the necessity of these qualifications, as complements, is automatically accounted for through the philosophical or metaphysical treatment of these sub-dominantly ordered, inter-ordered or hyper-ordered forms of focus that must co-occur in either philosophical or metaphysical forms of appreciation. Ideally, we should recognize their total, collective, automatic co-presentation, although, in more practical terms, we will focus on

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150 Refer to paragraph 53. The three correlatives as imputed to be present in the interrogative economy.

151 Where the positive, non-incremental, chaotic enhancement is predicated on the apposite orchestration of the incremental.

152 Taken from a remark made by a friend who noted the apocryphal anecdote that in the time of British Raj in India where a Hindu holy man, sadhu, was arrested and interrogated by a judge who asked of him 'what was his purpose or function in life?' where this judge, no doubt, from cultural ignorance, assumed that he was merely 'an itinerant and potential rabble rouser'. The sadhu replied, 'I alleviate human suffering'.

153 The word 'neutral' here is meant in the sense 'that value, in either an existential sense or a non-existential sense, is not being directly applied to these material conditions and pre-conditions'. E.g., the act of eating, as it stands without an existential context, is neither existentially nor non-existentially referred to. On the other hand, either the direct or indirect withholding of disposable food from a hungry person, under normal circumstances, is a relatively non-existential act. Thence we could categorize such behaviours as either existentially or non-existentially adverse, indifferent or beneficial. The 'indifferent' being treated here as relatively 'neutral'. On the other hand, this is also controversial since we can also argue that the relatively existential is even present in the very midst of non-existentially oriented acts because without this core domain of the existential there could be no non-existential functionality. Just as the dissemination of the relatively non-democratic demands some form of democratic choice by each and every person in order for them to choose to be such an enabler, be that from either co-operation and/or co-option.

one or two of these inter-ordered phenomena. Of course, in dialectical terms, in the formation of the ordered, etc., we cannot escape from the entirety of an economic basis underlying the extensive suspension, etc., on account of the correlativity of all economic phenomena. (508)

That the recognition of the philosophical need for the awareness for either the promotion of the relatively existential orientation of felicitation and/or the de-promotion of the relatively non-existential orientation of de-non-felicitation, implies the automatic necessity for the co-association of such sub-dominantly presented concerns. That, in effect, the philosophical attitude is predicated on either the truth determination or the conformal truth determination of inter-ordered phenomena within the philosophical situatedness under such review. (509)

That, ideally, a philosophical attitude is predicated on truth determination that is either conformal or pre-conformal in status; is well-pre-informed and entails well-conducted extensive suspensions; along with the recognition for the human need for felicitation and de-non-felicitation, etc. (510)

That we can then draw the implication that philosophical appreciation or metaphysical appreciation must at least implicitly entail the focusing on a sub-dominant inter-ordered field and the creation, therein and thereby, of a philosophical sense of the situatedness in question (that then would characterize that type of philosophy under review, e.g., as perhaps aesthetical (2^0), historical (6^2), or social and political$2^3/3^2$)? (511)

In other words, we could claim that a sense and semblance of the philosophical, or at least the pre-philosophical, must already be in play in order to appreciate any type of order productivity. That, by implication, the conformal pretensions of the metaphysical, as the meta-philosophical or non-philosophical (or non-standard philosophical) must be brought to the party in order to establish a more critical sense of the critical, and, thence, prepare the ground for the inevitable recognition, encountering and engagement with the possible advent of the relatively-radical (although we could also counter-argue that the relatively-radical re-occurs in each and every instant by virtue of its chaotically oriented non-economic genesis). (512)

So, e.g., we could not review the aesthetic productivity of a second trans-cognitively ordered form of aesthetic experience (or, similarly, the semantic integration experienced in the second cognitively ordered form of molecularization of propositions). That, at the very least, there is an embryonic form of pre-philosophical appreciation already present in order to deal with the appreciation of inter-ordered phenomena (even before we need to, through epistemological necessity, re(-)present their apparent systematic ‘embracement’ within a System [itself embraced within the developing ‘encompassment’ within the environment of the Political-Economy] and envelopment of sub-dominant field therein, etc., such as, e.g., the aesthetical). (513)

As a further consideration, we need to note that the sense and semblance of the pre-philosophical is also foundered and developed upon an arbitrated experience of world

in which, first, we find our freedom through others, that, second, that seems to allows us to develop this apparent illusion that we are then individually free to go our own way, etc. So, how do such small insights into the imputation of a philosophical attitude collectively manifest in a more fully formed and informed sense of the philosophical, and, thence, its reduplication in the form of a conformally corrected process of re(-)appreciation deemed as 'metaphysical' as re(-)defined in this repurposed sense of the 'metaphysical' (that through de-suspensional retreatment transforms the philosophical discipline, either overtly and/or covertly, along more conformal lines in its progressively simulated re(-)alignment with the world of lived-experiences and its more productively discerned interpretations, and so on and so forth. (514)

Or, if such ideas are 'turned around', we might accept the experiential fact that the philosophical effectively defines itself in and through a parallel set of processes of ongoing re(-)presentation that, therein and thereby, re(-)defines itself from an evidentially oriented sense of conformance. (515)

In this regard, we might say that even the most monstrous of conspiracy theories still reflect the lived-nature of the world, in order to appear intelligible, but, that it would also be true to say that their expedited negation says even more about the world, this world at large. (516)

If your world entails such entities as witches and warlocks, goblins and nature deities, and so on, then your world entails such 'witches and warlocks, goblins and nature deities, and so forth'. Of course, if your version of science finds no such entities then such 'entities' in that presented sense and semblance of a world must be 'fictions' and representation of such a world must also be deemed to be somewhat 'fictitious'. Still, let us neither be impolite nor impolitely criticize such a world-farer... when such criticism is neither sought nor worth the while to be expended over the course of its dissemination. I like to think everyone has their problems and that we should not add to them. That, metaphorically, it is as if everyone has a sack of rice or grain on their back, in variable sizes, that can only be rendered more of a burden when 'rained' upon. (517)

Through this implicit manipulation of such sub-dominant fields entailing the ordered, the inter-ordered or hyper-ordered, a sense and semblance of a secular world is progressively thematized both culturally and inter-culturally. That, for some people, indeed, many people, the apparent integrity of such an overall life-world is both pre-interpreted and (re-)interpreted in and through some form of a religious filter. This understood, implies a fifth archetypal orientation after the objective, the inter-objective (nature of space and time, etc.), the subjective, and the intersubjective (nature of communities, organization, institutions, nations, etc.), namely, some sense and semblance of the 'trans-inter-objective-inter-subjective' which we may identify with through whatever nominative we might wish to name it. That the very necessary integrity of the world as 'a' world, namely, 'this' world, is an apparent transcendental pre-condition for our communication with others... although it is also the case, perhaps, that not much more than this could then be argued for. Still, such apparent necessity would allow us to speak of it as the 'One', the World at Large, or Life-World, or similar... and sees its sense and semblance

of place as that which can be not reduced through either analysis (or reduction), synthesis (or reconstitution), or nomination (as arrived at through a dynamic suspension of the former correlatives, etc.[154]). (518)

That, just as the environment of the Political-Economy is regarded as infinitely open-ended, so, too, should we view and review the overall life-world, *et a*l, in a similar manner. Who are we to make such pre-philosophical decisions, one way or the other, and, by what right or what form of reason do we have to decide either way? Although, qualifying this through the form of a transcendental-like counter-argument, based on the economic nature of gestalt fields, we could also argue that what seems to be possible in thought must also be potentially possible in fact, given that no pure concept of either possibility or actuality (or of the purely virtual or the purely non-virtual) could be thought exclusively in and of themselves through themselves (either in their absolutistical unimodal individuality or as an absolutistical bimodal duality), it must follow that the possible cannot be thought to be either completely impossible in fact or merely exist as a pure possibility only, and, therefore, must have some form and degree of actuality be that either known or unknown, ever reside as something that we might never know, or, indeed, be something that is even worth knowing... And, that these limitations that apply to the concept of possibility must also apply to the concept of actuality. That, it is on the balance of coherence, non-contradiction, integrity of argumentation, evidential ascertainment, authority of testimony, pragmatic utility, and so on, that in practical terms we can decide to preference, in our narratives, one perspective over another, or v.v., or preference one set of inventoried items in such a perspective over some other, and v.v. (519)

In a similar vein, we cannot nor should not propose theories of either pure transcendence or pure immanence. Such extremist impossibilities cannot be thought, neither unimodally nor bimodally, and should not be promulgated as such. On the other hand, should you wish to invoke a metaphor along such lines by all means declare your prejudice, your preferences in this regard, just do not reify and hypostatize them in a form that is impossible to altogether recognize, encounter and engage! (520)

There is a place for such correctives, especially in an ideological climate that has gone too far in the opposite direction. In a world, say, besotted with divine transcendence, then philosophically contrast it with a world of immanence... but, cautiously qualify such a metaphorical-function lest you commit the same type of mistake you complained about in the first instance. (521)

The modeling of the inter-ordered constitution of the topical, the systematic embracement of the discipline in question, and the evolving exposition in question along with the manner of its dissemination has taken a number of forms as already explored. E.g., in a vertical sense where the exposition is sandwiched between the topic and system, or, in another vertical sense where the topic is superimposed upon system and where the exposition is then is superimposed upon the former (and is also arrived at through a creative suspension of the former). But, just as orders can be diagrammatically depicted in

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[154] The ‘etc.’ is referring to the triple suspension of all three economic correlatives after the dynamically balance double suspension of the reduction and the reconstitution.

either a linear and/or vertical sense, and, in a circular sense (where it is just the accepted convention to begin with the first order (with various reasons as to why we should start there, etc.), but, for any variety of other reasons, where we could begin with any order and then head in either direction), so, too, in the same manner, we can treat this overall economy of the economic, i.e., visualize this economy as circular whilst understanding and not overlooking the deeper, dialectical nature of the economic will inevitably also defy all forms of metaphorical modeling, especially when approached too closely, with a granular perspective, and whose performance is conducted without the expected recognition of such inherent limitations! (522)

In general terms, what does this necessary involvement of this sense and semblance of the imputed pre-philosophical have in our appreciation of the ordered, inter-ordered, and hyper-ordered phenomena? That in lived-reality, none other than its taking on the role of an organized basis for our appreciation of both the philosophical and the non-philosophical[155] along with their conformal metaphysical re(-)appreciation when that level of discern is invoked? Indeed, in effect, as the sketching out of a 'world of life' in which we can recognize, encounter, and engage in the apparently objective, inter-objective, subjective, inter-subjective (and the trans-inter-objective-inter-subjective)! That, therein, find a 'home' within this world at large... a home that can be constructed along either philosophical lines or along more secular lines albeit as continually redefined through a plethora of disciplines within the embracement of their co-associated systems... as they give a voice, a shape, a sense of presence (through non-reductive emergence) to the apparent furniture of this world... and so on and so forth.... (523)

That, in effect, even if we would like to argue that the philosophical orientation, more or less, defines itself, through the very nature of theoretical, practical and critical or radical experience, still, we might find it more appropriate to articulate its centrality in truth determination, its objectives as augmenting and enhancing both collective and individual forms of freedom, as productively manipulating inter-ordered phenomena as found in their systematic embracement in order to formulate and disseminate an expositional situation that assists us in our passage through this world at large both collectively and individually. Effectively setting itself up for forms of philosophically oriented confirmation and/or verification through duplication, and, thence, preparing the ground for its conformal treatment from a metaphysical perspective arrived at through reduplication. (524)

In what sense is the overall life-world, as this imputed overall world of life, already pre-sketched out through pre-philosophical, philosophical, and meta-philosophical or metaphysical forms of transformation treatment establish these appreciated forms of duplication? (525)

Here, I am arguing that the range of inter-ordered phenomena effectively maps out the basic architecture of our world both culturally and inter-culturally and allows us to translate within both our cultural worlds and between such worlds in an inter-cultural sense given that there can be no such thing as a 'pure world of culture' (just as there can

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[155] 'Non-philosophical' in both its senses of the 'non-economic' and that which is not philosophically oriented.

be ‘no pure world of race’, or ‘genetic identity’ likewise![156]). As we move about our overlapping worlds of culture, we see both things that have been engineered through intentional directives and the things engineered through such intentional transformations. Then, such artifacts of culture and non-culture are structured semantically and hermeneutically encoded within certain predefined patterns of behaviour through whose lenses we see such patterns as meaningful, as possessing both meaning and meaningfulness. Starting with ordered phenomena, in a sequential manner, we observe both phenomenologically distinctive states, by virtue of our physiology and its cultural forms of focus and the manner of their semantic molecularization along with its potential for aesthetic experience; our ability to both conceive, experience the deontological, and either formulate and/or disseminate acts of political enaction; our ability to perceive through a variety of cultural lenses the world at large and, therein, adopt and adapt pragmatically conceived expediently oriented courses of action; our abilities to both discern and determine possibility, probability, potency, etc; and, through various means of conformal treatment determine and articulate the facts of our various narrative. Then, through reduplication, these same sequences give us a metaphysical-like formats that allows us to deal with a categorical metaphysics; a metaphysical-like appreciation of the psychological (etc.); the aesthetical; the deontological, the political, and the relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existential (arrived at both pro-relationally and trans-relationally); the pragmatical (through the observation of various forms of expedience, such as the effective, efficacious, the economical, and so on); the scientific-like nature of the world that then can become treated as scientific in orientation; and, the historical-like nature of the world that can then become treated as an historical world of narrated facts as presented through a variety of histories of past, present, and future. But, then through further forms of reduplication we note how psychologies become sociologies or similar, and thence, an accounting of possible forms of political organization, etc. That, e.g., the contractual world of the pragmatical and the compactual world of the deontological join hands to form the topic of the political-economics… as systems all encompassed within the open-ended environment of the Political-Economy, or whatever else one might wish to call its…[157] (526)

Therefore, our sense and semblance of a world of ourselves and others is already carved out for us from this topical perspective. As a series of ‘revelation’ realized through a lifetime of interactive recognitions, encounterings, and engagements. Retrospectively, from observations and their interpretations, we find ‘what is there for us’ to again re(-)begin with in such a manner so as to further refine our understandings. Just as systems can be delineated through a recognition, etc., of their apparent sense and semblance of a distinctive set of differentiations where no one confuses, e.g., legal considerations with philosophical reflections, and so on, even though their interactions and communications can also be productively entered into. Hence their (inter-ordered hybridiza-

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156 Implicit in such an understanding is my critique of multi-culturalism (but not so much the respectable objectives entailed in such a philosophy as promulgated by its exponents. That, in time, a strict multicultural will prove and has proven to be untenable to varying degrees. Refer to my essay *Polyvalency*(?) 26.6.12 in the volume of essay titled: *Transformation through Re-Self-Organization*? *The Beneficial Engineering of Social Change*.

157 I.e., sequentially progressing through the orders, the inter-ordered orders, and, then, the hyper-ordered orders.

tion) in a 'philosophy of law' and the so-called 'laws of philosophy', and so forth. But, are such incrementally received 'revelations' of innovative ways of re-seeing things forms of knowledge that go beyond the merely pragmatic, in a regression to claims of knowing Reality as if in and of itself, through itself, and so on? In an obvious moment of philosophical carelessness let me say both 'yes' and 'non' but quickly caution the reader or the audience to such a confession that they will need to pay more attention to the qualifications about to be extended... (527)

For a start, innovations *qua* innovations cannot be merely reduced to the basis from which they emerge with the emphasis here on the concept of 'emergence'. On the other hand, novelties cannot be radically-radical but only relatively-radical and hence they cannot be completely divorced from the non-novel aspects of their pre-transformational basis as a necessary pre-condition to their successful origination as an innovation. Just as 'sliced bread' is still 'bread', albeit sliced (and through necessity then having to be packaged, etc.). Or, where accommodation can be found through the use of an app(lication) on a smart phone is still accommodation, albeit now accessed online through that specific app. Now, through the mere use of pragmatic means alone such innovation will be neither recognized, encountered, nor engaged. But this observation does not mean that we have dispensed with the 'pragmatic' and that we are now no longer 'pragmatic philosophers'. If anything, we are more pragmatic by recognizing that we must be open to such innovations before they then become part of the conventional furniture of the world (through hyper-economic re(-)appropriations). But the persistent stance that should be in place and that should remain is that of a 'positive nihilism'. I.e., the taking to heart of that which is to be found to hand, in and through the hard-worked for light of a lifetime where we can make judgments as to whether something now to hand is either conventionally appreciated or is received as relatively novel and requires the requisite forms of appreciation in order to more fully ascertain just what it is that is now to hand in that same regard. Moving beyond the merely pragmatic without transgressing into that which is not to be pragmatically treated. Indeed, the topical nature of experience is inter-ordered because, economically, we cannot focus on any one ordered aspect in and of itself or through itself or invoked through some other formula mistakenly chanted by either the non-insightful absolutist or insightless relativist (where their only difference, respectively, is a serious over-commitment *versus* a serious under-commitment through the lack of an adequate degree of suspended positioning along with the existential ramifications that consequentially flow from this necessary ability to just 'stand back' whilst also 'standing within' the simulated-simulation of the relational situatedness in question whilst also 'making a stand' with the requisite degree of a non-extremist comportment in commitment…[158]). (528)

So, 'yes', in so far that all pragmatic boundaries need to be crossed but not transgressed, and, 'no', in so far as an emergent novelty can never be radically-radical and not

[158] Which must sound all too complicated in order to contemplate how to put all such nuanced complexity into effect. However, my concepts of 'economic simplification' through 'economic induction' comes to our philosophical rescue by virtue of the fact 'that resolution is simplifying through an integration of its differential inputs', and, 'that the detailed development of any one aspect of an economy through holographic resonance, given economic correlativity, ensures that the sense and semblance of that economic totality is then automatically or 'intuitively' expressed'.

there for us, but, only relatively-radical in order to be there for us (to be eventually arrived at more fully through re(-)appropriations conducted in hyper-economic terms of reference). (529)

But, I can hear the murmurings of objections, like all reasonably formulated concerns, that do deserve to be heard. Is this philosophy of a systematic embracement of inter-ordered topics no different from a search for the Real, the One, the Reality behind appearances, Truth, along with an inevitable association with an entire zoo of other ideological creatures once successfully dispelled and dissolved by critical (and radical) pragmatists? (530)

Yes, I do admit the supposition of the' One', or an equivalent nominative, on the transcendental grounds of its necessity for communication between individual persons within 'the apparent (transcendental) unity of a world at large', but, what that is is not for me to say... other than to invoke such transcendental-like arguments... which we should be quite happy to dissolve or emend after the philosophical work that needs to be done for the benefit of others is successfully completed or at least sufficiently realized.[159] (531)

The environment of the Political-Economy (with capitals and not as a system conjoining economics and politics), Systems, Topics, emerging Expositions, and the dissemination of the latter as Discourses, etc., are all employed as heuristic devices in their co-associated economies. Should they be found to work for you, you are welcome to adopt and adapt the same. Should you feel the need to emend such heuristic devices, please do so. Should you find something better, then I insist that you head in that direction. What is being proposed by myself is entirely pragmatic in this regard, where what works should be harnessed to work for you, and, what does not work for you, can just as well be discarded. Albeit, with one small qualification... (532)

Intuitively, I would also like to contend that our tools in a direct fashion, but in a back to front sense, must also 'mirror the world' in which we find their utility. A spade, e.g., is used to dig the world, say, a garden for the growing of vegetables, and its use tells us something about the world (of that garden), namely, that it can be dug, can be used to weed between the vegetables, can be used to lift those vegetables when ready to be harvested, but, as well, an instrument that cannot be used on solid rock, an instrument we will happily put aside the very moment when we no longer need to use such an implement. I daresay, we build up a profound knowledge of the world through the use of such

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[159] I am defending philosophers like Laruelle, Plotinus, even Plato... as long as such exponents of an 'absolute philosophy' continually utilize an extensive suspension, otherwise, such efforts are wasted and such adherence descends merely into forms of abolutistical nonsense through misbegotten adoptions of an extremist unimodalism, bimodalism, etc. But, to confute such notions, this charge requires a separate charge sheet to the claim that I am not a pragmatist, cannot be a pragmatist, by virtue of this proliferation of absolutistical-like entities like orders, etc. My succinct reply to the latter charge is that "these entities are only heuristic in scope. If they have no use for you, avoid the use of such devices. On the other hand, if you find they work, then use them, and, if something better comes along, please head in that direction instead. I will also argue that this proliferation of such apparent absolutistical entities is more the product of 'pre-interpreted-observations', etc., albeit treated as provisional heuristic devices, etc. Our accepting the eventual disposal of such devices will render such nominated terms as 'heuristic' in both their apperceived tenor and complexion (i.e., in their intentional functions and structures).

devices, be they heuristic or otherwise. It gives us the very meaning and meaningfulness of that which is to be treated as 'that which is to hand'. In this sense, orders, topics, expositions, discourses, systems, etc., I will argue are 'all to hand'.[160] As observations already pre-interpreted that can be re-appropriated once again in order to add something to our knowledge of this world as lived. A world at large, there for us, with a vocabulary of those things that are now currently to hand, and, where through forms of emergence, new things can be innovatively realized as the now 'newly to be found to hand'. The simulation of a world that is exposed, revealed, increment by increment, a world that is metaphorically 'dug up', 'dug over', 'over-dug', 'dug in', 're-dug', and so on... revealing a lived-world to hand that can be dug in a variety of ways.... (533)

In this regard such 'picture-tools', tools that reveal both their isomorphic features of relative transformational invariance and the relative transformational isomorphic invariance that establishes both the lived-duration of this world-as-lived and the being of that which is found, therein, to be to hand, and so on. But where such picture-tools cannot be merely reviewed as pictures apart from their 'tooling' and where these tools, in turn, cannot be viewed apart from their vision of the world that we give to them through their being used as tools... It could well be that if we were to come across an implement of unknown origin and unknown function, we might want to understand its possible being there for. Already we understand that it appears to be an 'implement', a 'tool' of some description. From memory we might be able to work it out, or from being told we might come to understand its use. Or, then again, we might never completely understand the intentions mustered behinds its initial fabrication... not that any one tool need have only one type of function just as a simple 'hammer' could also be either the 'murder weapon' and/or that 'found to hand that was used by a certain person to defend themselves through the fatal disarming of the assailant'... that it could be said that 'words', as 'tools', also have this connection with the world in which we use them. A 'world' that a pragmatic philosopher has no need to view as 'some form of a Reality masquerading behind appearances', as divided up 'between so-called internal worlds and external worlds, and so on and so forth! (534)

On the other hand, can the proliferation of this topical world of inter-ordered phenomena[161] be seen as a now 'pre-interpreted world of observations to hand' even if 'as heuristic devices inserted within a heuristic sense of a systematic perspective (where Systems are also to be seen, through such differential observations, as heuristic devices also to hand likewise?)'? Let me argue why this complex situation could be treated as if 'to hand', and not just as 'discourses' or 'texts' merely thought of to hand, but, more as 'tools' with which to further explore this world at large and come to various useful understandings that once we would have not been able to think about let alone think as possible, as able to be recognized, encountered, and engaged, etc. Where, through such novel vocabularies, definitive histories, existentially unexpected innovations, and so on, we can

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160 As 'pre-interpreted observations' (along with the 'just-interpreted-observations', and the 'soon-to-be-interpreted-observations'.

161 Inter-ordered both in the sense that all forms of ordered formation can be present under the umbrella of this rubric, but, also as 'inter-ordered' in the sense 'that no ordered formation can be economically appreciation on its own terms extra-economically' as noted in paragraph 498-500, etc. Just as, in turn, no ordered-formations can be viewed as apart from their systematic embracement, and v.v., etc.

entertain an appreciation of our world as a work forever in progress… as we trace our passage along this no-person's land between the impossible relativism of the non-indubitable nature of the non-existent and the impossible absolutism of the indubitably existent… finding only the necessary overlapping of the apparent existentialization of the non-existential and the counter de-existentialization of the relatively existential in this economy of the existential-and-non-existential.[162] (535)

Interestingly, it should be noted, that the primary value of such heuristic elements is the possible range of interactions that they can enter into and not just some lexical set of possible meanings, and so on. I.e., e.g., that it is the interactions between (the simultaneous and equal suspensions of both) the Topic and the relevant System in question that an Exposition can be formed and formulated, and thence disseminated as a discursive discourse in and through some form of textual dissemination. Or, where a similar process of suspended suppression of the Exposition and the System, (say, in its phenomenological structural-functions), better reveals the imputed, particular nature of the Topic in question, or where the suspended suppression of the Exposition and Topic (say, in its hermeneutical functional-structures), in turn, is more able to reveal the general nature of the specific System in question. Implicit in such forms of focused entertainment is the existentialization of these interactions between System, Topic, and Exposition when and where we entertain a dynamic balance of all economic aspects… in a full, free-flowing interactiveness open both to 'the expectations of the unexpected' and 'the non-expectations of the expected' in which we find progressive forms of ongoing alignment through processes of re(-)alignment. (536)

On in other words, a kaleidoscope of significant meanings can emerge from who knows where… from through these simulations where the value of such states is more to be realized through the mutual quality of their interactions and where they take us in terms of our interventions in this overall world of life. But, that it should also be known, that through the mutually realized authenticity of our being in this world can we then recognize, encounter, engage, an authenticity in others, to that extent it is present, and in the lived-nature of their productivity, as mutually shared, on the 'stage' of this world at large… (537)

Now, let me argue why these heuristic devices, like orders, systems, etc., can also be treated as pre-interpreted-observations' and that they, therefore, can also take on the status as the 'ready to hand' once understood. (538)

Inter-ordered phenomena are interpreted in a 'topical space', i.e., as 'that 'space' potential disciplines can take up such inter-ordered forms of distinctly differentiated coding. So, e.g., the semantic nature of phenomenological inputs is one type of thing, or judgment, and, an understanding of the hermeneutic genres of behaviour wherein forms

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[162] That in the last phrase we could translate it as follows, respectively, as 'the qualified absolutization of the relative *versus* the qualified relativization of the absolute (with neither recognition, encountering, nor engagement with any sense and semblance of an impossible 'Relative' or 'Absolute' state of affair).

of possibility have their intersubjective ability to be expressed is another thing, or judgment. (539)

Fifty years ago, I came to the observational-conclusion that there were six near-fundamentally different types of judgment. Originally, I believed, I came to see a set of five, but, divided the category of 'ethical judgment' up between a third trans-cognitive order of deontological judgments and a fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical judgments. The former could be seen in a compactual light (as forms of obligation, duties, promises, etc.) *versus* the latter, as forms of expedience, etc., as often being exercised in a contractual orientation. But, an in-depth appreciation of the necessary relations between these two categories would also note that as differentially distinctive as they superficially appear we must also take into account a transformational progression from one to the other, and so on. Just as a compactually inequitable contract will more than likely fail on a contractual level. Or, as in my classical example of the architect whose brief is to build a massive bridge must honour both compactual and contractual obligations, i.e., build a structure that does not injure people, does not fall down, and all within a reasonable budget, etc.[163] Hence the world of arbitration must already have in place those hermeneutically oriented meta-textual rules and meta-rules for dealing with such 'negotiations' given their status as that which has already been negotiated and, thence, is already, so to speak, 'ready to hand'. (540)

Indeed, the very expression 'order' entails this transformational ability for us to progress from one order to another and realize, through such strategies, a factual sense and semblance of world that can pragmatically work for us and as a work in progress should be treated as ever amenable to forms of ongoing deconstruction and reconstruction, and so on. That, in this regard, through the edification of such a schematic device, usually reflecting considerable degrees of social consensus, that a hierarchy of certainties and an inverse hierarchy of uncertainties implies that not all facts are not equally factual', and, that we need to behave accordingly. I.e., trusting some parts of our construction of an overall life-world enough to make qualified forms of commitment accordingly. So, e.g., what historian, worth their metaphorical 'salt', would dismiss the 'pre-interpreted-fact' of the event and its ramifications of 'Caesar crossing the Rubicon' when so much of later Roman history is dependent upon a pre-acceptance of its positive truth determination. Not, of course that we should set such a pre-interpreted historical observation in metaphorical 'concrete', etc. That, while we must accept its forever provisional status, still, we can safely act otherwise in this instance. That such qualifications and dialectical treatment is necessary lest we treat the mere possibility of fifth ordered 'factoids' (so beloved by short-sighted proponents of relatively unsubstantiated conspiracies) for the relative confirmation of sixth order 'facts' (upon which pre-informed patterns of existentially oriented intervention so necessarily require)![164] (541)

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163 I would also like to add to this list second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical requirements as well. In this regard we might also hope that the solutions arrived at by this bridge architect, through processes of resolution, will by virtue of such forms of resolution will also take on an aesthetic-like tenor and complexion. In this, one can only hope that such processes of resolution will come together in a manner that will be (eventually) perceived as 'aesthetic'.

164 An interesting comparison can be drawn with the Republicans in the House of Congress, in 2023, wanting to set up an impeachment enquiry of President Biden and when, currently, there is no evidence of

In effect, this phenomenological-like categorization of six distinctly perceived types of judgment, along with their deeper interconnectedness through their being able to all be sequentially integrated within this heuristic device dealing with ordered phenomena, to my mind, acts as a pre-interpreted-observational set of philosophical-like instructions as to how to deal with the confronted specificity of such phenomena, albeit as a heuristic device, albeit in the form of a very complex systematization of observation phenomena under the rubric of this overall heuristic scheme. That, at the end of the metaphorical 'day', should you find this scheme works for you the go ahead and both adopt and adapt it to your own research projects and programs. On the other hand, should it be found to proffer little value then put it to the side and look for something better. Of course, for the seriously non-philosophically motivated, the challenges of this complex scheme would most likely be better overlooked entirely. However, the pragmatic utility of such a scheme, especially in its systematic embracement, is to proffer a series of techniques for the resolution of both Traditional and Contemporary problems. Indeed, the intractable nature of many Traditional problems implies the need for a re-visiting of such social anomalies in the hope of either recognizing that such problems have no solutions, or, much more likely, drastically need deeper, reality-based determinations in order to defuse their inherent problematicity along the lines already suggested, i.e., from a systems approach that is heuristically based on a well-pre-informed, inter-ordered topical basis. That, our accounting for the differentiated distinctiveness of Systems in the environment of the Political-Economy must also be viewed as a series of pre-interpreted-observations. Let me explore this 'observation'. (542)

Just as orders were differentiated as relatively distinct, both in terms of their apparent objectives and their use of meta-textual coding that would allow them to perform a distinctive clarification of such objectives, so, too, as with these orders we can through mutual social consensus delineate just what systems there are to be found in this world at large, and just which disciplines naturally fall within their socially organized confines (be that as either institutions or customs, etc.). It takes little powers of observation to note that various institutions, as Systems, do indeed constitute the commons, i.e., that territory to which we can venture or by various means find that it can impinge upon us, and, whereas subjects, as citizens, we find our social world, through this distinctively overlapping of such Systems, to be instituted accordingly. So, e.g., the historian is a member of an academic institution in the System of Academia, who, in wishing to publish their latest book, ventures, in some form or other, into the World of Publishing within the World of Business in order to see out this arbitrated aspiration. Or, e.g., the Political World, through the World of Taxation, may send out to us a demand that we pay or have paid a certain calculated amount. Or, e.g., we might see ourselves as concerned citizens and

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financial irregularities, or any other irregularities, upon which such an impeachment should proceed which so favourably contrasts with the two 'unsuccessful' impeachments of President Trump where a factual basis for such proceedings was all too obviously present in such abundance. In effect, the former proceedings are built upon a factoid, the mere hope such an enquiry might find irregularities of some form or other, whereas, the latter proceedings were argued on the grounds of demonstrable facts. To my mind, such a pointless strategy is a waste of time for serious governance, when such governance is well-called for, and could well be seen as such by more reasonable thinking sections of the US public eligible to vote and who will do so?

reflect such concerns in how we might vote in the next series of elections, and so on. That, upon reflection, it does not seem controversial to state that the public world is divided up by a large number of distinctly overlapping Systems such the Political world, the World of Business, Academia, the Legal Fraternity, and so on. That, as argued by Niklas Luhmann, these Systems acquire their distinctive functions through the distinctive nature of both their coding and computation (where such coding is enacted). However, *contra* Luhmann, I have also argued that the overall economy of the economy oversees the environmental observation that no System is an island unto its self through being both operated upon by Super-Systematic Fields, and, in turn, will operate on Sub-Systematic Fields. Otherwise, how can we explain the Political System's reconstitution of the Legal System with respect to the institution of slavery, as an institution that no longer can be treated as an item in property law, etc., and deserve to be completely deconstructed, and, that computational-coding must apply to sub-fields in computational coding just as the Legal Fraternity might see Property Law as falling under the Law of Contracts (and Torts), or v.v., etc? Just as the functioning of the Philosophical Field would be vacuous and without significance-formation if the philosophical was not the philosophical appreciation of something (being treated in a philosophical light of some form or other through the application of the requisite coding, sub-coding, etc.). (543)

Hence my further arguing for the hyper-economic status of the System, the economic status of the Topic, and, the non-economic status of the Exposition (and its discursive dissemination, textually, as a Discourse in the public arena). (544)

Thus, in metaphorically looking around, we are inundated by a flood of heuristic devices, as pre-interpreted-observations, be they promoted by others and, as noted here, being promoted by myself on the 'pragmatical grounds of a pragmatist' (across the entire field of inter-ordered phenomena as systematic embraced) (and not merely on the non-existentially oriented grounds of expediency in the calculative domain of the merely 'pragmatical' as pertains only to a fourth trans-cognitive order). (545)

At this point in our explorations we could tentatively proffer an integration of the four objectives, as headings, referred to at the beginning of this book; that, in the form of a summary, we could say **that the topical reading of the systematic from a conformal perspective can be instrumental in a resolution of social problems.**[165] Of course, to better understand these ideas and how they are being arrived at would need an in-depth commentary, hence the primary intent of this book to unravel such complexities, relevant arguments, and integrated conclusions, albeit all unfolded as working proposals. (546)

That in the *Descent*, this section is attempting to spell out more clearly the purport of this abbreviation of intent as just noted. To this end let me continue these reflections as I ponder these interconnections through a format that might well be able to assist in this amelioration of social anomalies such as e.g., the obesity crisis; neo-liberal distortions, etc. of marketplaces that could well be less able to proffer traditional forms of work that are equitably compensated, rewarding, identity enhancing, and recognize both skills and enterprise being brought to the contract undertaken by the contracted parties; profound

[165] Refer, e.g., to paragraph iv, etc.

disruptions envisaged in the food industry, energy field, transport, education (where skills taught can be out of date before graduation if not before); etc.[166] An ongoing concatenation of crises, both current and future, that are already having political consequences pace populist politicians, political polarization, bizarre political performances, paralysis, various forms of political disruption where various rights, obligations and freedoms, etc., are being overridden by 'politically correct' ideologues of all dubious persuasions, etc. A circus arena crying out for sensible, rational, well-spoken, compassionate philosophers able to conformally appreciate the existential dimension concomitant with our world of the relational… at least to the best of their abilities, rather than exhibiting a gladiatorial form of linguistic combat conducted to the egotistical 'death', so to speak. Not that philosophers are the paragon of all virtues and insights when the philosophical nature of all disciplines could equally see any disciplinarian with integrity be brought to perform a similar role of the peacemaker, the menders of dreams, the righter of wrongs, as a person who gets us to both see the error of our ways and who proffers a positive path forward the noisy rabble unable to point to any viable sense of a future… (547)

Resonant with the ideas above is the observation that a global philosophical appreciation of that being more locally focused through metafication, deconstruction, treatment, etc., parallels the hyper-economic dimension of the hermeneutic, the historical, conventional, pretreatment, etc., and, that the product of such a union of the global with the local is the emission or potential disruption of the non-economic as its lays out the specificities in question as pertaining to that process of transformational retreatment. That her we would witness, in all probability, a diverse mixture of the non-critical, the critical, and the advent of the relatively-radical (given that the radically radical is just not able to be comprehended as such). That even a small incremental shift in re-directed attention in the right context could set off a chain reaction of events that by no stretch of the imagination could be either deduced from or reduced to the contextual matrix of its pretreated and treated situatedness. (548)

That, in the same vein, we might surmise that the economic moment (in the overall economy of the economic) as it parallels (through economic complexification the moment of the) treatment together could be viewed as that territory being manipulated by the primary code in question. Thence this economic treatment of the potentially radical through paralleling a transformational reading of the situation in question. The implication being that there can be no isolated form of pure philosophical treatment *per se* given the economic need for the hyper-economic to work with the economic in order to then work with the ensuing non-economic productivity resulting from such processes of transformational retreatment. (549)

The entailed enrichment of this reading (arrived at through economic complexification exercised through the paralleling of relevant economies) appears to support this contention that the global form of philosophical or philosophical-like appreciation is practically aligned with the hyper-economic dimension further implying alignments between, first, the duplicated field under deconstructive reduction with treatment, and, sec-

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166 Refer to the essay *Pursuit*, III.12X. *The Great Transformation aka The great disruption*.

ond, the non-economic process of resolution with retreatment (preferably being exercised with an existential tenor and complexion). (550)

Now, in moving to a systematic approach we might note that specific Systems, as interpreted-observations, are discerned through the intuitive appreciation of radical differences in performative coding, indeed, in radically different uses of coding, etc. This type of appreciation being hype-economically oriented is primarily pretreatment in orientation and (globally) philosophical in general terms of reference. So, e.g., with a certain set of propositions to hand we, more often than not, having pre-decided the issue, know which specific system will primarily be utilized in order to run judgments appropriate to that system in question, and v.v. (551)

That beneficially engineered forms of resolution through intervention from a conformal perspective should find forms of alignment that are more existentially productive in the realization of such suitable forms of e/valuational terms of reference. (552)

Hence a need to explore what constitutes the pre-conditions, etc., of existentially apposite responses (which, by their inescapable nature, are exercised through forms of intervention, be that either advertent or inadvertent, or, more usually, a mix of the same). Furthermore, there is also a need to understand both internal and external forms of systematic communication. Then, a methodology for how problematic issues that arise either intra-systematically and/or extra-systematically can be articulated, i.e., outlining the development of general strategies about how this might be achieved in general terms. (553)

What might constitute a useful list in this latter regard? Let me supply the following as a tentative set of proposals that might profitably be taken up? As a mnemonic device let me title these twelve approaches under the following headings: **Location**, **Objectives**, **Education**, **Assessment, Reassessment**, **Political**, **Compromise**, **Substitution**, **Exploration**, **Alignment**, **Ascertainment**, and **Consequences**. (554)

1. A defining of the location of the apparent and probable ‘points’ of contestment, clash, or tension taking place either intra-systematically and/or extra-systematically.
2. Along with the location/s of such intersecting fault-lines we also need to progressively re(-)define our aspirational objectives in order to clarify and direct our appreciation of both Systems and Topics being directly referred to in the eventual hope of realizing a relatively successful resolution of such anomalies through the ensuing re(-)direction of our expositions, etc.
3. A(n ongoing) re-defining of the possible roles that could be productively performed by the focused education of individuals, families, friends, associates and work colleagues, communities, organisations, institutions, political leaders, international forums, etc.
4. Seek and assess solutions found presented within the relevant Systems themselves that could ostensively proffer working solutions based upon a conventionalization of procedures either already operating to that effect or could be positively re-directed in those directions required for realizing such processes of eventual resolution.

5. In addition seek and re-assess solutions found presented by interested parties not directly associated with the Systems, disciplines and industries, etc., that are more directly implicated in the problematicity of such concerns.
6. Institute political forms of supervision, through either apposite co-option and/or co-operation, over the instigation of the required shifts in behaviour that are needed to accomplish the objectives spelt out in a resolution of the problematic in question as will be enacted through the prioritization of the itemization of the positive and negative forms of intervention required.
7. As well, there should be the seeking of relevant forms of 'compromise, without being compromised' in order to ensure that most parties are on board and either have a positive stake in such proceedings and/or are duly compensated.
8. Promote the substitution of those radical measures, as they arise, that would seemingly ameliorate the current or anticipated problematicity under such review. E.g., factory farming would alleviate many of the perceived problems associated with intensive land-based forms of mono-agriculture, along with those that arise from both animal husbandry and aqua-culture, etc., as presently practised. Just as, e.g., we must assume cheaper solar power, wind power, and batteries will economically displace the more expensive fossil-fuel industries (and their unnecessary subsidies if also co-present).[167]
9. An exploration of the social ramifications of what might be incurred through the adoption and adaptation of the relatively-radical shifts in policy directions required for the anticipated instantiation of such non-economic measures, etc. I.e., the exercising of a critical appreciation of its hyper-economic preconditions/post-conditions, the critical appreciation of its economic cultivation in the pre-preparation of its conditions, and an awareness of the non-economic nature of its potentially radical re-shaping of the problematic cultural-intercultural landscape in question.
10. What role existentially-oriented forms of alignment need to be explicated and duly enacted in order to profitably direct or more profitably re-direct such current non-financially oriented patterns of observable behaviour when their cost-benefits analyses are more broadly accounted for in this regard.
11. Then, with the above duly performed, just how should we measure the realized successfulness of these strategies? Perhaps though an ascertainment and measurement of either a de-acceleration, breaking, and/or reversal of adverse trends, and, the promotion, instigation, and acceleration of positive trends?
12. An appreciation of possibly expected unintended consequences is also needed, etc., given that a hypothetical 'window of opportunity' can only stay open for a limited period of time when either dealing with non-radical and/or relatively-radical shifts in collective behaviours, etc…[168] (555)

Given the global-like role of the philosophical background, what role might we surmise is in operation in the formation, exercise, and critical appreciation of any reputable discipline? That the ensuing topical nature of that discipline arises through the philosophical-like scrutiny being brought to bear on a subdominant topical field that, then, in turn typifies the type of code being brought to bear in those distinctively enacted enquiries. So, e.g., in regard to historical research by an historian, we might surmise that hyper-

167 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7X.
168 The classical example here is found in the time-limited utility of anti-biotics, etc.

economic philosophical appreciation in a globalized form is focused through a sense of intentional objectivity whose objectivity is realized through a reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order. Whereas, in a contrast, an aesthetically oriented enquiry would conduct a local focus on the second trans-cognitive order, but, a scientific enquiry, instead, would need to focus on a reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order of the ontical, and so on. (556)

Now, just what role is played by a conformal metaphysics, and, how is metaphysical retreatment re(-)normalized in philosophical terms of reference (on the understanding that the reduplication or duplication of treatment is automatically reversed in a process of de-metafication, i.e., transformational retreatment, de-suspension, non-economic specification, etc?). (557)

Then, such questions will also touch upon the roles that are to be played by deconstruction through treatment, and rectification through pretreatment, both orientations being needed to economically support this transformational process of retreatment (and its entailed, ongoing processes of re(-)normalization)? (558)

Moreover, and most importantly, just what is exactly meant by a process of 'existentially oriented re(-)alignment?' Where the answering of this series of questions should be suitably framed through a parallel set off lenses that are, say, pragmatic, anti-representational, positively nihilistic, and exercised through an economy of imputational cognitions subjected to extrapolations, non-extrapolations, non-suspensions and suspensions, etc. (559)

'Alignment', as argued elsewhere, is 'realized through a process of re-alignment'.[169] But the crucial question that needs to be asked must be, 'an alignment between what?' What this alignment is not is 'that as impossibly conceived and entertained as the matching between a simulation or perception and that which that simulation or perception is a simulated copy of (in an absolutistically mistreated process of (mis)representation)'. **Quite simply, we entertain an alignment between simulations reviewed in the terms of apposite economic correlativities and where such insightful-observations are suitably translated in propositional forms reflecting such economic modalities and specificities involved in the constitution of their fields of identity as realized through imputations, extrapolation, non-extrapolation, non-suspensions, and suspensions, etc., as designated through an itemization of relation participants and parties as categorized either objectively, inter-objectively, subjectively, and/or inter-subjectively, etc.** (560)

E.g., if I were to look at 'my left hand' and then look at 'my right hand' I would observe a certain set of symmetries and characteristics that constitute that field of observation. Because I could move my left, and then move my right hand, I naturally impute that these two hands are mine. But, the alignment here is not being realized between these simulations and that imputed to not be simulated, but, rather, between sets of simulations regardless of whether they are being subjected to either extrapolations, non-

169 Involving an economic mix of realignment, re-de-mis-alignment, and chaotic/radical re-alignment.

extrapolations, suspensions or non-suspensions. The effective medium of simulation being propositional, albeit as economically delineated in and through such interpreted experiences. Those interpreted experiences being further enriched through economic complexification, economic simplification (through forms of economic resolution), economic induction along with virtual extrapolations, non-virtual de-extrapolations, suspensions, de-suspensions, and so on. (561)

Such suppositions being either further reinforced or deconstructed through the interactive operations of a topical-systematic-expositional approach to such research. E.g., the former 'comparison of my left hand with my right hand' can be considered to take place, say, in the Secular System of the Everyday (as a kind of null -System[170]) dealing with the requisite perceptual field reviewed as the fourth cognitive order, and, where this alignment is experienced through the specificity of these events as they are found to devolve from such processes of perceptual appreciation. Ideally, through extrapolation, simulating the objectivities of my two hands, in the inter-objective visual space as seen by myself, as subjectively understood as myself perceiving my two hands, and further refracted through a language that would be intersubjective comprehended. Thence this miscellany of propositional alignments being entertained in these topical, systematic, and expositional terms of reference, and, transformationally appreciated through parallel processes of retreatment as understood through a set of an alignments refracted through hyper-economic inputs (of a philosophical-like orientation), dealing deconstructively with topical considerations of a fourth cognitively ordered set of identified materials or elements, that is then non-economically appreciated in forms that are a mix of non-critical, critical, and radical outputs. That the 'non-critical' can be further reviewed as inconsistent with both critical and radical inputs and in need of further rectification through processes of transformational retreatment/posttreatment to that extent such information remains in a continuing attentive state of discernment and appreciation, and so on. (562)

The perspicacious might also appreciate that, perhaps, it is the apparent non-alignments between the theoretical, the (critically-)practical, and the (radically-)critical that could well be more informative (and thence deserving deconstructive forms of treatment, etc., in the hope of also finding amenable forms of re(-)normalization and rectification, etc.).[171] (563)

On this topic of alignment (through 're(-)alignment as 'the economy of ongoing processes of re-alignment as enacted in and through 'an economy of reiterative hermeneutical realignment, phenomenological re-de-mis-alignment, and non-systematic existential re-alignment') we can run parallel forms of treatment from hermeneutical, phenomenological and existential perspectives, and, as well, also run an in-depth sequentialization within and between orders (as implied in the term 'orders'. As there is no shortage of forms of economic alignment to profitably consider why bother at all with bankrupt

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170 That the Secular is as if a System in its own right, as if by default being the System that is left when all other Systems are subtracted from this hypothetical world of Systems?

171 Where the example of the simple comparison of 'the left hand and the right hand' seems to demand the interpreted-observation of the System of the Everyday, a Secular System or Null-System (when all other Systems are subtracted from the 'overall life-world' as the 'world at large', and v.v., etc.) in order to run this topical-systematic-expositional economy in the first place?

and impossible to enact simulated forms of alignment that are non-anti-representational in tenor! (564)

At this point[172] I definitely feel the need to articulate how my use of Husserlian terminology does not have me operating within a Husserlian-like frame of reference, i.e., with respect to his strongly asserted epistemological and ontological commitments concomitant with his sense and semblance of his philosophical standing as strongly asserted by himself (when it is my belief much of that territory had to be rescinded towards the end of his life as evidenced in shifts entered into in the Crisis[173] Or, if not rescinded by Husserl himself most certainly something that needed to be done by Husserlians and other philosophers). For a start, in line with the use of a transcendental suspension, the psychic adherence to either internal worlds versus external worlds (as entertained, say, by an idealist or rationalist, etc.) or external worlds *versus* internal worlds (as entertained by, say, by a realist or empiricist, etc.) is just not philosophically tenable. Both orientations have their 'fatal problems' (is as polite as I can say it). 'Untenable' on at least three counts, if not on more grounds when more widely explored, namely, as something that just cannot be 'entertained' when a suspension' is being suitably conducted; where both preferences, as 'prioritizations' have proven to be historically problematic in relatively superficial terms of critical exploration; and, where they cannot be correctly envisaged in intentional terms of reference since noematic intentional objectivity and intentional subjectivity along with noetic intentional motivation have to economically co-arise together and, as correlativities that, both individually and collectively, just cannot be absolutistically thematized; and so on. (565)

A distinction between 'indubitable-like' and 'indubitable' has to be clearly drawn and where the latter is to be entirely dispensed with. It is true we do have experiences that

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172 More correctly, something I should have stressed form the outset. However, in happily inhabiting my radically re-interpreted understanding of Husserlian ideas, terminology, methods, etc.

173 I am sure Husserl was aware of the fatal criticisms incurred in continuing to re-affirm the type of 'mathematical' stance he had asserted and had, to that point in time, re-asserted. Admittedly, this is an intuitive position I have not followed up. Basically, a shift to the historicity of the life-world (or 'Life-World' when defined from a transcendentally oriented perspective) takes on a more Hegelian and Heideggerian tenor and complexion when the unique specificity of the world is taken into account and which cannot be derived through any form of *a priori* positioning, etc. The same type of shift in thinking as engaged by myself when I found I was 'forced' to take into account the role played by Systems in the historical development of the topical dimension/s of disciplines invoking a distinctive sense of place or 'embracement' within the same as 'enveloped', and developed, by such institutions (here to be understood in the broadest sense possible. Witness the institutionally nebulous nature of the Secular System of the Everyday that needs to be enlisted in order to run this topical-systematic-expositional economy, etc. Almost as a counter-argument to Luhmann who insisted that a System of Morality had no observable dimensions or 'place' unlike the Legal System, the World of Business, Academia, etc. Given transformations of the Political System and the Legal System in a progressive alignment with 'Public Opinion', even if delayed, we might well surmise that this secular dimension, however inchoate its distinctively observable, organized presence, does have a shadowy sense of presence in appellations like 'Society', 'Culture', the 'Secular World', and, other expressions like 'zeitgeist', 'ethos', and so on. We might also surmise, that granted, that in political societies heavily invested in internal surveillance and political control that this sense and semblance of a distinctive 'Systematic Cultural Expression' could well be delayed in the formation of its institutionalization to the expense of the cultural development of those same coercively disciplined political worlds?).

seem to be ‘indubitable-like’, but, as both critical and radical philosophers, we should know better, if only to the extent, first, that we can be wrong and that we do not have perfect access to knowledge or the evidence to absolutistically confirm or disconfirm things one way or the other, and, second, we have no need for such ‘nonsense’. Indeed, freed from such an unnecessary straightjacket we can get on to do what is more important, namely, ‘be of existential service to others’ in a world that does not run of any form of perfection and as muddling and as annoying the messy nature of human interactions are, on the whole, we have a pretty good idea of what we are doing and the possible consequences of such patterns of enaction, and that we would find a better standing in this world if we were to work more co-operatively and less coercively with each other, and so on. (566)

Now, as for a ‘science of philosophy’ I would prefer to sit on the sidelines for the immediate future whilst also admitting some degree of admiration for this idea as being pursued, e.g., by Laruelle even if I will dispute his prioritization or preferentialization of of science over philosophy? From my perspective, every discipline is uniquely distinctive but it would be wrong to prioritize one discipline over another on those grounds alone. Obviously, in a legal situation a Legal System should be in charge so to speak (even if such ideas can also be philosophically appreciated in a philosophical orientation, etc.). That conversely, we should not prioritize philosophy over science given that as topics they have different fields of enquiry, i.e., a different topicality, have a different sense and semblance of objectivity, have different vocabularies, different methods, different forms of e/valuation of their different styles of truth determinations, and so on. On the other hand, just as a ‘philosophy of science’ is a respectable field of philosophical enquiry we might well surmise that there is no obvious reason why a ‘science of philosophy’ could not also be as equally tenable as a field of enquiry with the qualification that it be conducted ‘correctly’, i.e., with the due observance of all entailed limitations, that such a hybrid, inter-ordered discipline could be explored and acted upon as long as it maintained the requisite degree of professionalism required in order to expedite a realization of its reasonably formulated objectives if such objectives could be formulated along scientific lines? (567)

Furthermore, my vision of the ‘transcendental suspension’, as viewed through my lens of an ‘extensive suspension’ notes the centrality of suspensions in the performance of judgments; the overlooked role of the de-suspension; and, the causal implications of suspensions in the non-virtual delivery of intentional acts (that otherwise would remain as both merely virtual and non-causally implicated). Given this centrality in acts of judgment it behooves the philosopher, and the disciplinarian, etc., to duly observe that such suspensions are both individually and collectively performed in the manner most conducive to the critical discharge of those intentional objectives.[174] Now the covert assumption being made here is that ‘given suspensions are central to judgmental deliberations

[174] That an ‘overall transcendental suspension’, at the center of an extensive suspension, is defined as a ‘product of a rhetorical dis-conjunctive suspension, a metaphorical conjunctive suspension, and an apparitional suspension that is the balanced suspension of the former’. The automatic advent of the de-suspension then envelops the former in a de-suspensional economy which, in turn, is enveloped in an extensive suspension with direct causal implications. Refer to this discussion as it evolves in *Pursuit,* II, (Book 2)

then should those deliberations be suitably and sufficiently well-performed then we might hope to conduct processes of truth determination in an alignment with our interpreted experience of the world of lived-experience (where such 'alignments' are propositional, and, hopefully, between statements, etc.)'. Forms of alignment being further reinforced through the parallel readings of the hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential (both non-systematic and systematic in orientation) on the grounds of an inescapable economic correlativity between such economic moments. An observation that would reinforce this co-association, as just noted, is that there can be no pure processes of description, neither phenomenological nor otherwise, since descriptions must operate within the meta-textual configuration of their hermeneutical prescriptions that supervise this distinctive genre of descriptive behaviours. That such an economy of descriptions must also co-opt prescriptions along with proscriptions (and where the latter is the primary orientation for the determination of existentially oriented patterns of enaction, etc.). 568)

That, given this quite radical re-framing of the Husserlian enterprise, although Husserlian methods are prominently both re-adopted and re-adapted, the underlying problematic has evolved in considerably different directions. As I have pointed out on a number of occasions, basically, I am not in the business of interpreting the Husserlian project nor am I out to creatively reinterpret the same (along the same lines), but, rather, I have set out right from the very beginning to critically, and sometimes quite radically, 're-interpret' that entire type of a philosophical prospect (along what first took an 'economic turn', and, more recently, has now taken also 'non-economic and hyper-economic turns' in the light of a need to affirm the role systems play in the topical historicity of such disciplines, and so on. (569)

Hence this equation: **'hyper-economic System/s, economic disciplinary Topic/s, and non-economic formation of a discursive Exposition/s...' as the equivalent of 'System plus Topic plus an evolving Exposition' (which can be modeled in either linear and/or circular and/or dialectical-like formats).** (570)

Now, as the extensive suspension is to be ever in play, along with out forever being de-suspended from within the same simultaneously, and, given this non-consideration of either so-called 'internal worlds' and so-called 'external worlds' along with the understanding that interactions must be relationally direct, otherwise there can be no interactive relationship taking place, it now seems obvious that an anti-representational orientation is being duly observed. Unfortunately, for those disciplinarians that cannot contemplate this radical re-orientation within the world of lived-experience they will no doubt proffer criticisms to the effect, e.g., that in such a non-man's land we would be unable to that to differentiate the non-virtual form the virtual and v.v., and so on. But, this type of criticism must ever fall flat on account of the fact that in various intentional attitudes their ensuing modal complexions will be observed quite differently. Otherwise, how could we safely and surely differentiate 'perceiving' from 'dreaming', and 'remembering' from 'imagining', and so on. (571)

Indeed, in is in the modal light of such different attitudes and their differences in ensuing productivity that allows us to conduct a categorical metaphysics both within such

distinctive attitudes and between such distinctive attitudes. Hence the delineation in a natural language between objectively projected space and time and the same considerations reconsidered from a subjective (and intersubjective) perspective/s. But, at the same time, the persistence of an extensive suspension means we cannot reify, hypostatize, absolutistically extrapolate, or interpolate, such categorical artifacts of our economies, and so on. Let me explore such metaphysical implications without resorting to a non-anti-representational metaphysics based on impossible forms of representation and other philosophical *impossibilia*. (572)

Recently, I discussed categories of philosophers as to whether they had the requisite 'standing' that would avail them of a first divisional form of seating, or a second divisional form of seating, or a third divisional form of seating. Paralleling such degrees of 'standing' as to whether the first division practices both suspensions and forms of non-extrapolation, whether the second division practices suspensions but maintained forms of extrapolation (into a so-called 'external world'), and whether the third division practises neither suspensions (of a so-called 'internal world') nor forms of non-extrapolation (into a so-called 'external world'). But, amusingly, the joke is on us who discriminates in such a manner since the economy of suspensions and non-extrapolations is just as dependent upon that economy also entailing non-suspensions and extrapolation. That the ultimate point that needs to be made here is that we need to suspend everything in order to be returned to entirety of this world of lived-experience through the living-reality of 'living-experience' itself (given the suspension automatically de-suspends itself)! (573)

That to productively continue in the performance of our metaphysical research, be it categorical or otherwise, we now need to recognize that processes of reduplication and duplication must both be operative in processes of transformational retreatment (as one method for the better understanding of expositional processes, etc.). Let me explore this 'observation' (that devolves around the necessary interactions of Systems, Topics, and Exposition, etc.). (574)

As noted, transformational retreatment is viewed through the trimodal lens of pretreatment, treatment and retreatment. In treatment we have both reduplicated metafication (of pretreatment) and duplicated patterns of positive and negatively enacted deconstruction (in determinations of coherence, non-contradiction, etc.). In the dialectical non-economic phase of retreatment, we have de-metafication and the resulting duplicational reconstruction of the initial form of the pretreatment through a process of posttreatment. In duplication we have one coded system conducting an orderly sequential-like treatment of the intentionally coded sub-systematic configurations being subjected to such critical forms of re-e/valuation. E.g., hyper-economically and hermeneutically we could ask are the processes of questioning about to be conducted appropriate, say, for a legal frame of reference in general terms of reference? If this is held in the affirmative then legal considerations manipulate those texts, in their textual simulation, about to be reviewed in such a deconstructive manner. Through such duplication those textual simulations are reconstructed in a phenomenological manner, hopefully, in an overall alignment with the particularity of the relational situatedness as currently understood and finding itself being re(-)understood. Then, through an ensuing de-suspended process of de-reduplication we

move on to meet the specificity of that being re(-)simulated. This linear sequential reading, as here selected, can then be reread in and through some other sequential rereading or through a circular format, or, through a more dialectical and simultaneous form of re(-)reading that then permits an existential reading to more affirm itself. That, just as with our divisional treatment of philosophers and other disciplinarians, at the end of the day we also need to recognize that what is being read is being read through the entirety of the lived-interactions as entertained in a linear direction, a circular direction, and through the dialectical-like suspension of the former in what might be better described as (taking on a systematic existential expression through taking on the appearance of being) spontaneous, simultaneous, synchronous, as trans-geographical and trans-intersubjective, both pro-relational and trans-relational, and so on. (575)

In an exploration of an ideal situation let me demonstrate the co-occurrence of reduplication (through suspensional metafication), de-reduplication (through de-suspensional de-metafication), and duplication (through positive and negative forms of deconstruction in the phase of treatment, rectificational reconstruction arrived at through posttreatment, and relatively radical re-construction through re(-)normalization constituting retreatment). (576)

Suffice to say, upon reflection, it would be intentionally impossible to imaginatively re(-)construct a textual simulation as it stands without elevating it first in meta-status by one degree through suspended metafication, i.e., treatment. As a simulated non-textual image we would need to imagine its reduplication first in order to then alter the same through a process of a mixture of both duplication and its automatically ensuing de-reduplication where through the latter we then have the choice to either leave it as it is in virtual terms of reference or proceed with its sequentially enacted non-virtual reconstruction in causal terms of reference. The non-textual reduplication of the image taking a meta-status elevated by one degree being a reduplication of that which is being reduplicated. The expression ‘non-textual’ is being used to merely indicate that moment of the textual economy where we have a non-textual simulation of the textual process that obviously cannot be reduced to the mere text (in the form of words) or the mere meta-textual instructions informing that meta-textually instantiated genre of textual behaviour. But, emergent from the suspended product of the former we arrive at the simulation of that textual situation being engendered by intentional means. For how else could we ‘read’ a novel and be moved by its simulated landscape upon which we experience the relational drama of its interacting actors, etc. As if we were there in an apparitional sense and semblance? Forgetting that we are engaging a text in an act of simulation through reiterzted forms of re(-)simulation[175] just as we engage alignment through re(-)alignment.[176] (577)

My classical example here is ‘the building of a brick house from a pile of bricks, etc.’ However, in the light of the necessary insertion of the topic of inter-ordered phe-

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[175] Noting my use of the nomenclature of ‘(-)’ as indicating an ongoing trimodal economy invoking the continuing re(-)iteration of the correlativities that constitute that economy.

[176] I.e., in an economy of ongoing re(-)simulation through hermeneutically oriented resimulation, phenomenological re-de-mis-simulation (in a process resembling error correction), and the ensuing specification of ongoing re-simulation in this overall economy of re(-)simulation.

nomena within the bounds of its systematic envelopment we need to expand our terms of treatment to include a systematic context as introduced hyper-economically, hermeneutically, and in the phase of transformational pretreatment. In its pre-introduction pretreatment notes pre-conditions, etc., through the lens of the systematic context in question. In this instance we are within the (Business) World of Building (Houses)[177] within the World of Business whose codes are immediately exercised hyper-economically, etc., in this dialectical phase of pretreatment. (578)

Now, once the primary code of the System in question is being exercised, i.e., deployed,[178] we can then redirect our attention to the process of treatment in which we find employed, through reduplicated-duplication, the exercise of control over or by subdominant systems on a meta-level of disquisition that is elevated by one degree. Under such deconstruction, ideally, the overall text in question is now rendered non-contradictory, coherent, and integrated to that extent it can re-deployed in a simulated non-textual mode of entertainment, i.e., as arrived at through transformational retreatment with or without causal implications. But, as it is the overall aspirational intention to build a brick house then its relevant casual considerations are taken up in overseeing the sequences of behaviour necessary to realize that brick house (on the same meta-level as experienced in our initial reception of those bricks). That, it could also be argued, that this de-metafication through de-suspensional re-direction of behaviour could be seen to 'guide' the sequential behaviours needed to implement the realization of this project? That through a reiteration of such de-suspensions, collectively, the erection of that brick house is realized over that period of time. So, even though a non-involved observer sees merely 'a pile of bricks transformed into a brick house' we know that such constructive deliberations demand a process of transformational retreatment involving the ongoing re(-)iterations of different meta-levels of explication in order to achieve that final realization of such overall intent. (579)

That within our idealized explorations of this classical example we find the conjoined integration of both reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication. Whereas, in the outlining of a topical philosophy we could individually articulate these economic functions as 'aspects' of the overall transformational process it was also realized that that within an overall economy of the economic that we also needed to take on board a systematic approach by noting the hyper-economic introduction of primary and secondary codes entailed under the influence of the systematic, etc. (580)

Basically, we could say that the purpose of the 'means' of disciplinary behaviours is to successfully realize systematic 'ends'. But, more correctly, that those 'ends' are realized through the discursive transformations of such expositional disquisitions. (581)

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177 In a command economy we could imagine this World of Building as being within either the Political Sphere; or, as tended out to the Business World; or, located purely within this World of Business.

178 No doubt necessitating the adequate completion of all the paper work by taking into account all relevant regulations, the signing of all contractual agreements, etc., needed to commence this building project, and so on.

Now, transferred to a metaphysical arena, as here being re(-)purposed (in an on-going economy of re-purposing) we can now note that processes of reduplication cannot escape automatic de-reduplication, and, that an such an economy must also constructively employ processes of duplication, i.e., in order to enter into deconstructive processes of treatment, etc., and, furthermore, that such overall processes can also involve processes of causal implication along with the ramifications of such processes of enaction. (582)

Therefore, in the same light, we must assume that this re-purposing of the meta-physical must invoke, likewise, the critical, and potentially radical, reconstruction of philosophical appreciation (through de-reduplication), the deconstructive reconstruction of our topic, etc., and, take on a causal complexion, hopefully, of an existential tenor (sense) and complexion (semblance). (583)

Where, by logical extension, we must put all ideas of just a purely passive, non-involved metaphysics well and truly behind us! (584)

With such reconsiderations taken to heart, let me now proceed to explore this idea of a re-purposed metaphysics and, furthermore, seek to understand how it can also direct a direct instantiation of an existential dimension through the pragmatic auspices of its holistic engagement. (585)

At the beginning of this exploratory disquisition the idea of the ‘metaphyical’, in its global sense, was introduced as ‘the global reduplication of the process of philosophical appreciation’ where the implication could be drawn (but was not directly explicated) that philosophical appreciation was ‘metaphysical’ my nature (as defined through reduplicational metafication) given the need for higher meta-terms of reference for this process of ‘appreciation’ to proceed. But, rather than complicate such matters, metaphysical appreciation was more or less defined as ‘the metaphysical appreciation of philosophical appreciation’. In parallel, so to speak, the idea was also broached of the reduplication of trans-cognitive (and cognitive) orders forming, e.g., a categorical metaphysics in the semantic-phenomenological appreciation of semantic-phenomenological processes, etc., through a reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order as would realize a ‘categorical metaphysics’ (interested in the conceptual formation of concepts like ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘identity’, ‘personhood’, ‘community’, ‘contributions’ in the form of e/valuational formations, ‘relational interactions’, ‘relationships’, ‘pro-relational existential orientations’, etc., etc.). That, by extension, the same metaphysical treatment could be also applied to the other orders through proffering a similar process of reduplication. That, by connecting a process of duplicational manipulation of a sub-dominant order we could also extend such metaphysical treatment to the orders both trans-cognitive and cognitive (as well as the imputed pre-cognitive and the consequentially post-cognitive [noted for the sake of a categorical completeness]). (586)

Hence the initial display of a complicated and complex set of metaphysical categories, much like a philosophical jigsaw, of a series of tentative metaphysically oriented facets seemingly inviting some form of philosophical integration and explication. Hope-

fully, this can now be achieved, or at least outlined, in a continuance of these provisional explorations? (587)

As noted, we can use a reinvested form of transformational retreatment to proffer this form of tentative integration, namely, the inter-co-operative utilization of these mechanisms of reduplication, duplication and de-reduplication, etc., as paralleling, respectively, pre-treatment, treatment, and retreatment, etc. (588)

That, given this theoretical integration, as an economic field where such process-orientations of reduplication, etc., must all be co-present implies that we can now consider metaphysically oriented operations as concerning one field, namely, an economy of the overall economic, as systematically incorporated within the purview of Academia, despite these sub-dominant fields of focal consideration such as, e.g., the categorical domain of metaphysics arrived at through reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order, etc. But, that granted, we must still determine how the conformal nature of metaphysical appreciation of philosophical appreciation can take on an existential tenor and complexion? That given automatic de-suspensional de-reduplication it follows that philosophical appreciation must take on a conformal status through the transformational nature of metaphysical retreatment. That, furthermore, if such conformal processes were to take on an existential orientation, then that too would re-characterize the ensuing course of those co-associated forms of philosophical research 'leavened', so to speak by such metaphysical retreatment. (589)

Now, we could argue that metafication arises through the suspension involved in the enaction of a process with a reduplicated orientation. Furthermore, through the dynamically balanced suspension of all co-occurring processes of reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication we might well suspect the formation of an overall suspension, in an alignment with an extensive suspension that through economic induction could then more fully take on the specific mantle of that extensive suspension. I.e., the well-pre-informed and well-executed extensive suspension would then be instrumental in the formation of a more relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existential (rather than that merely supplied, or intimated, through the so-called third moment of the relatively non-systematic existential). (590)

The immediate implication being that through a suitably enacted extensive suspension an existential orientation can arise beyond the simulated detailization of this so-called 'third moment of the non-systematic existential. That granted, what might we learn about this induced instantiation of the systematic existential along with the relevant history of such induction given preparation in the immediately preceding historical past and the consequential ramification to be possibly expected immediately after its formation, and thereafter? That, therefore, to do justice to such a transformational-situation, histories of the past, present, and future would need to be elicited when and where relevant. (591)

What would be the primary characteristics of an existential transformation enacted from the perspective of a conformal metaphysics? (592)

None other than a pro-relational stance as experienced in and through a trans-relational sense and semblance of perspective. Let me explore and unpack the apparent and possible import of this imputed observation? (593)

That required sense of self must be 'trans-relational in orientation', i.e., 'an epistemological orientation wherein one is able to consciously discern pro-relational content through the corresponding sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity required to appreciate such trans-relational content'. I.e., among other things, the ability to discern what has previously been referred to as trans-cognitive 'sentiments' (or 'transcendental emotions' not to be confused with affective, pre-cognitive emotions), etc. (594)

Now, I first need to explore the ramifications of a 'conformal metaphysics' given that a conformal orientation re(-)produces an augmented and enhanced degree of alignment with our relationships in focalized relational terms, which, in effect, establishes a pro-relational orientation, which, in turn, promotes an existential orientation along with an increased sense and semblance of trans-relational subjective awareness, i.e., existential awareness as 'centered' in that ongoing pro-relational identification with the primary relationship under review, albeit as it is also emplaced in an overall world of the relational. Let me unpack what I believe is entailed, therefore, in my concept of a 'conformal metaphysics'. (595)

The initial definition of 'conformal' was 'the confirmation in real time or the retrospective verification of a prior positive instance of either confirmation or verification as the basis for a re(-)iterated alignment in truth determination/s (as neutral structured in a Tarskian frame of reference on the assumption of the necessary evidence to positively support such truth contentions until such a truth determination should reveal otherwise or critically or radically re-qualify the same in a partial sense[179]). However, the much wider ramifications of this initial definition will now be explored. (596)

Basically, we start with the idea that through a re(-)iteration of the process of truth determination we put ourselves on a firmer basis in regard to such determinations. But also implicit behind my intentions for this type of definition is the emergence of a counter-positioning should it occur, the envisaged widening of the evidential basis for such ascertainment, the incorporation of other relevant frames of references, the continuing emergence of a more holistic approach to such truth determination itself with ramifications that go far beyond mere reiteration. (597)

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[179] More correctly, we find a partial re-qualification just as we cannot abolutistically lie given that we must be truthful to a considerable extent in order to then untruthfully modify some important element or elements of that distorted narration. On the other hand, the apparent integrity of the truthfulness being asserted could well be undermined by new evidence or a more effective interpretation of the evidence already to hand, etc. Thence the built-in provisional attitude to such determinations even if the forcefulness of current truth determinations seems to be currently unassailable. In all of this ascertainment we should also recognize that all truth determinations are not equal and will be hierarchically enstructured (just as the fact 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' has a different degree of truth-supportedness, or status, to the presumed 'fact' that he would have eaten, say, 'gruel for breakfast along with fresh bread and olive oil, etc.'

It is this element of emergence that saves this definition from also being a definition of insanity. E.g., ‘this paper straw that I see in this glass of water looks bent’ when I look at this glass of water brought out for me by my host. I look again, and again see this bent straw in this glass of water. I look once more, and the straw still looks bent, therefore ,I must assume, once again, that that straw is bent. Then, I drink that water and find to my naive amazement that that straw was actually a straight straw after all. That the simple point of this anecdote being that the mere reiteration of truth determinations does not necessarily give us a conformally accurate determination, but, on the other hand, the utilization of other approaches to that same process of truth determination could well give us either strengthened grounds for believing such attributions to date so a radical-like disconfirmation of the same. That the mere reiteration of such ascertainment is only the beginning of such a process and not its end unless one were insane enough to believe in the apparent truth of everything merely seen must be taken at face value. Thankfully, most people are not taken in my visible illusions. Unfortunately, verbal dissembling is all too often taken up at face value, witness the successful monetization of conspiratorial narratives disseminated on the Internet. (598)

So, this conformal orientation, through a reiteration of either confirmation and/or verification, is to be seen as just a beginning. Let me explore this point of departure. A phenomenological perspective observes that, say, in the wandering around of a mountainous peak or circling of the stationary presence of a person, we find a series of visual images that, through their collective adumbration, then give to us a more three-dimensional sense of perspective. Imagine in the latter instance, being behind a certain person whom we think is a friend of ours who is called John. As we start to see the face of this person we then realize that this person is not John. Indeed, the type of mistake made by every person at some time or other. As a possible sequence of thoughts entertained along the following lines: ‘yes, looks like John’, ‘still looks like John’, no, does not look like John at all!’ My mistaken ‘recognition’ now re-recognized and duly rectified... in effect, given a conformal re(-)reading where the thought ‘this is not John after all’ is given a much stronger status than the initial thoughts that ‘this person looked like John’. That a conformal reading also recognizes that truth determination is both a process and a process that is hierarchically organized to the extent certain facets of this process of truth determination will be more ‘central’ in our appreciative alignment with the ensuing ‘representative appreciation’ of the phenomenon or phenomena in question. Again, not to be mistaken as asserting a representational philosophy, from an anti-representational perspective this alignment is not between a simulation and a non-simulation (of what the simulation is supposedly a simulation of) but between simulations as textually presented in an ongoing economy of re(-)presentation of such textual reports... where the utilization of a conformal reading either continues to support the rewriting of such reports or counter-re-writes the same, albeit in some significant but non-centrally oriented feature or features of the same. Just as in seeing this person first as ‘John’ that report was finally counter-reported upon when I realized this person ‘was not John’ even though that person remained as a ‘person’, as my seeing that person as a ‘person’, and, in this instance as a ‘male person’. (599)

Now, just as a conformal reading, initially, is to be exercised within a certain frame of reference, or perspective, albeit possibly through the collective adumbration of a series of shifts in that overall perspective or frame of reference, truth determinations can be either reinforced or undermined when we seek to appreciate the overlapping of a certain number of perspectives. In these regards we should note that we can never exhaust any one perspective, and, that an infinite number of perspectives could be brought to bare on any one intentional objective, and where, however, the apparent relevance of those perspectives can never be equal in their supporting or non-supporting of a progressively arrived at output of a 'final truth determination' that has incorporated a well-argued cross referencing of such inputs, which, through the lens of a philosophical or some other disciplinary appreciation must forever also be treated as 'provisional' (despite the experiential fact that we might well have the confidence to safely bet on such positively determined truth outputs). (600)

To clarify these ideas of perspectives as frames of reference we could refer to them as either adumbrated perspectives within an overall perspectival frame of reference or as overlapping set of perspectives focusing on a common referent or set of referents. Interesting, in regard to the latter we could pose a question with relation to a certain referent and find arguments for multiple readings that necessitated different perspectives on how to read that exactly same referent. Recently, on YouTube came across a video that asked the question 'how many corners has a semi-circle', in a figure resulting from the slicing of a circle into half where the surface resembles, e.g., a demilune table. The following possible answers were given, namely, zero, two, three, an infinite number, and all of the above. The most correct answer, if it could be described as such, was the last answer, i.e., all of the above. The explanations given were as follows. That if a 'corner' is defined as 'the intersection of two straight lines' then the answer is zero. On the other hand, common sense would tell us that this figure has two sharp corners on either side (like a demilune table). Then, again, in graphic design, this figure could be described as being generated from two fixed corners on either side and a third corner in the middle generating this arc. Hence, in this perspective, we get the answer of 'three'. Finally, we could argue that a circle, or a semi-circle, can be generated from an infinite number of corners giving us this last solution. That, if we were to assume all frames of reference to be equally valid then all of the above would imply that from the same referent, this semi-circular figure, we can generate four different answers from the application of those four different perspectives, which, in being charitable, we can ascribe an equal weight to in so far as answering this specific question. In a conformal reading, when not so dialectically constituted, the reverse is normally contemplated, i.e., an overlapping of perspectives that either augment, if not emergently enhance, the conformal reading of its truth determination.[180] That, in a conformal process of re(-)reading the suggestion is being made, as an implication, that in some circumstances re(-)iteration supplies an emergent reinforcement of the ensuing reading/s and not the 'non-impact' of the mere reiteration of those same acts of truth determination. (601)

[180] In my use of technical language 'augment' is used as 'the incremental addition or subtraction of inputs that contribute a non-chaotically enriched reading of the situation in question', and, where 'enhanced' is used to indicate 'the non-incremental chaotic positive enrichment of our reading of the referent in question, etc.'

Also implied is the fact that when we psychically move from a relational perspective, in the mere acceptance of relational participants and parties, to a pro-relational orientation, one in which we witness the emergent and holistic nature of a relationship in and through its own re(-)presentative simulations, a conformal approach comes more into its own. In effect taking on both non-existentially oriented truth determinations and existentially oriented truth determinations, and those ensuing truth determinations that take on the holistic nature between an integration of the former that then come to constitute 'the overall truth determination of that relationship' as simulated within the simulated relationship of those perspectives when and where those perspectives are judged to be relevant over the course of such intuitively ascertained proceedings. 'Intuitive' in the sense of being arrived at 'through processes of resolution delivered through the de-suspension of the de-reduplication should such proceeding be suitably pre-informed and suitably enacted through the requisite aspects of the extensive suspension such as conforming to the overall transcendental suspension, maintaining a relatively unobstructed delivery of the de-suspension, and, taking on board a consequential appreciation of the causal ramifications of such forms of intervention as were subsequently entered into'. Needless to say, such 'relational alignment' is viewed as a potential course of validation realizing a relatively more conformal set of readings able to be utilized as flowing from our interactions with that relational situation as reviewed, albeit as also to be entertained within its relational emplacement'.[181] (602)

Now, given this ability for a conformal determination to emerge beyond the mere reiteration of simple acts of truth determination we now must attend to what is constituted by the concept of a 'conformal metaphysics' and how the same can be invested in an existential reading in and through a parallel re-writing and re-reading of our behaviours within that relationship, albeit as to be further determined both pro-relationally and trans-relationally. (603)

By 'pro-relational' is meant a 'psychic identification with the simulation of the primary relationship as found in its relational context'. (604)

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[181] This latter qualification is important, because it is implied that we cannot just run, say, an ethical judgment, purely in terms of its immediate relational sphere of influence. That all relationships have a relational context and it might be relevant to also include the immediacy of that context in such deliberations. The classical example that illustrates this point is in the ramifications an adulterous relationship might or might not have on the parties surrounding those two primary participants. Or, put another way, pragmatically speaking, in determining the apparent deontological consequences of certain actions in a primary relationship on the relatively secondary relationships, should they be present, may well also need to be taken into account when attempting to determine an ethical appreciation of that situation in its contextual emplacement (as viewed through an appreciation of either relevant embodiments, embeddednesses, and/or embankments, and so on). Of course, other considerations may well also need to be in play, such as, e.g., the contrasting of passive perspectives with either active and/or engaged senses of perspective, and v.v; transformational considerations; semantic-phenomenological considerations *versus* hermeneutical considerations *versus* non-systematic existential considerations; the introduction of seemingly relevant perspectives; our own reports, the testimony of others, inferences; the results of 'textual interrogation' and other economic techniques, like economic complexification, etc.

By ‘trans-relational’ is meant a ‘trans-relational subjective identification with a trans-relational perspective as entailed in and through a pro-relationally oriented sense of identification’. (605)

A pro-relational identification has been analogically compared to the taking of ‘an upside down, back to front, and inside out sense of perspective’. The direct implication being that we cannot comprehend the pro-relational attitude through an attitude that merely recognizes the existence of both relational participants and parties as treated in untranslated relational terms of reference as merely referenced under the non-pro-relational headings of ‘the objective, inter-objective, subjective, and inter-subjective (etc.)’. (606)

A pro-relational reading is holistic in orientation and needs to be understood in such terms of reference (if anything through an erasure but not the non-destruction of such forms of treatment as expedited under such non-pro-relational headings as noted, etc.). (607)

Hence the logical necessity for a dialectical reading of such considerations as assisted through the effective deconstruction of such categorization needs to be comprehended despite transformational transformations that can be conducted between non-pro-relational and pro-relational readings. In order to illustrate this relatively connected-discontinuity/dis-connected-continuity between these two types of readings. An anecdote I have previously noted can give us some idea of this ‘turning around’ of the natural attitude in order to attempt to begin to imagine the sense of a pro-relational holism, the apparent overlapping centrality of the relational, its essential dispersion of information throughout the orbit of a relational ‘space’ (at the levels of its passive ‘ambit’, active ‘remit’, and engaged ‘composite’), etc. (608)

In my pocket I have two gold dollar coins. I can give you one coin and you will now possess a gold coin like myself. Now, we could refer to each other as friends. We could both say that we have a friend in each other, that we have this friendship as just nominated. But, it would be incorrect to say that we ‘have’ a friendship in the same manner as we ‘have’ a gold one dollar coin in our pocket. For a start, we might say we ‘share’ a relationship of our being friends with respect to each other. However, we should go even further to note that given a relational whole is greater than the sum of its parts, through relational emergence, that it would be much more correct to say that the relationship in question ‘shares us’ within the compass of its orbit. That, from a pro-relational perspective, the emergent integrity of the primary relationship, we should see ourselves as deferring to the relationship itself whilst also noting that, in turn, the primary relationship is also embraced within the entirety of the world of the relational. That, this turning around recognizes the existential surplus of the emergence of the relational, where information is essentially holistic in its relational dispersion, that relationships possess a sense and semblance of a psychic ‘center’ that is not geographical but more trans-geographical in it experiential reception. Moreover, the relational sense of time is also different from non-relational types of time reception. Hence the pro-relationally oriented experience of the temporal takes ahistorical and trans-historical forms of reception along with moments

of synchronicity, simultaneity, spontaneity, and so on. Moreover, there is also an ability to discern the integrity, trajectories and commonalities of both our subjective and inter-subjective experiences, etc., that cannot be reduced to their non-pro-relational counterparts (if much leeway is to be given to such comparisons given that existential orientation cannot be simply reduced to a non-existential orientation despite the former emerging through a process of'existentialization in which the 'relatively existential emerges from the existenitalization of the relatively non-existential and not the relatively existential'. All in all, upon reflection upon such experience deemed to be 'existential in both tenor and complexion', that it is my understanding that this semblance of existential experience is equally to understood under these same pro-relational forms of spatial, temporal, subjective and inter-subjective treatment as experienced within and from the 'existential attitude'. Furthermore, we can add that given its genesis in and through the extensive suspension that it proffers more aligned forms of judgment in terms of their relational emplacement, the relative de-distortion of the de-suspended process of de-reduplication, along with the causal possibilities of enacting patterns of interaction that appear to primarily benefit the apparent relationship *per se* given this causal implication in processes of transformation initiated by the empowerment of the relationship as it is apparently devolved from the processing of emergence surpluses, metaphorically 'spilling over' into the 'material body' of the relationship so to speak...[182] (609)

Admittedly, this use of analogical language has its limits. But, suffice to say, that the existential orientation is both different and connected to non-existential experience and that its emergence in experience is not something that can be reduced to non-existential experience *per se*. At the same time, this does not imply any disvaluation[183] or disparagement of the relatively non-existential since it is in the existentialization of the same that the existential orientation can emerge and not otherwise. On the other hand, what should be disparaged and deserves to be seriously disvalued is the non-existential attitude that is characterized as egotistical, limited purely to material forms of exposition, has a marked counter-relational 'weight' upon what otherwise would be the mutually beneficial enrichment of our relationships, manifests as an obstruction to existentialization, can be conventionally referred to as 'evil', 'wicked', 'horrible', 'horrendous', 'inhumane', and so on. Hence, rather than refer to it as a species of the non-existential let me rebadge it, rather, as the 'counter-existential'. As it has been said 'we do not live by bread alone', but, on the other hand, 'we do not live without bread', and, so, a happy relationship needs to be forged between these two seemingly correlative parties given, as just stated, 'that the existential comes into being through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential!' In addition, through an identification of the 'relational orientation' with the 'existential orientation', and v.v., it becomes obvious their mutual existence, as correlatives, is entirely dependent upon the co-existence of each other... for without one there could be no other, no relationships, no identity, no significance, no meaning, and no meaningfulness, no personal identity, no community, and so on and so forth. (610)

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[182] A re-directedness of existentially oriented phenomena assisted by the fact that processes of economic resolution can be uni-focal or uni-directional in their patterns of discharge (but, not necessarily so).

[183] A term introduced in my Thesis, Versions I (1990) & II (1991) to proffer a contrast with the non-process orientation of the expression 'devaluation'.

As a position, I would like to state that from a 'transcendental' perspective, i.e., from a trans-intentional perspective of judgment(al processes), the existential is co-equivalent to those judgments that are existentially delivered, when both suitably pre-informed and well-conducted through the auspices of the extensive suspension. That, in the light of this equation, that the suitable performance of a conformal metaphysics is practically equivalent in existential terms of origination. Let me attempt to philosophically prove this contention of what hitherto to date might be more reported as not much more than 'the making of a mere assertion'. (611)

Can I justify this assertion 'that a conformal metaphysics, correctly enacted, is equivalent, more or less, to the successful expedition of a suitably responsive and responsible existential attitude, etc., and v.v!'[184] (612)

The key connection here, among other avenues, can be found in my concept of 'textual alignment'. Let me explore this connection. (613)

First, as an observation, we need to be in an alignment with the relational situation under review in order to find ourselves in a better position to more successfully intervene therein. Otherwise, successful patterns of intervention would be more matter of chance or luck (with the latter, I am sure, the pragmatist would unofficially welcome since even they can get things wrong, but, as a matter of professional preference would rather rely on a better understanding of the situation in order to put into effect processes that would would more directly oversee or indirectly promote the ensuing enrichment of that same relationship). An existential orientation, on balance, is more receptive to inducing patterns of intervention that are more inclined to directly oversee or indirectly promote a suitably progressive enrichment of that relationship that is proper, appropriate, and apposite. Given that such 'enrichment' is a key aspect that is characteristic of an existential relationship then we must assume that a better pre-informed understanding of a relationship stands us in better stead than if we were less well-informed. Therefore, with the surprising advent of existentially arising exceptions granted, we should infer, on a more probable basis, that a conformally oriented process of metaphysical appreciation is more likely to parallel and existential orientation and be instrumental in overseeing or promoting the ensuing richness of that relationship. In this regard, 'enrichment' is representative of either the creation of a relationship and/or the preservation of a relationship and/or its conservational expansion in terms of the positive, mutual enrichment of that e/valuational formation. That granted, it now merely falls to myself to indicate how a conformal metaphysics is also instrumental in these forms of positive and mutual transformational enrichment and, thereby and therein, is equivalent, no more and no less, to an existential orientation *per se*, and v.v. (614)

In these explorations to date it has been noted that reduplication of philosophical appreciation (P) directly informs a metaphysical appreciation (M). I.e., in notation that:

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[184] The 'etc.' here alerts the reader to the fact that 'this grand equivalence between the existential and a conformal metaphysics suitably conducted

$P.P \text{ (or } P^2) = M$ (615)

Now, I could also argue that the pre-conformal truth determination (t) or the conformal truth determination T of philosophical appreciation through the reiterative nature of reduplication establishes, the advent of critical or radical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, in the conformal truth determination of metaphysical appreciation given the reduplication of the truth determination of philosophical appreciation already being truthfully established. I.e., quite simply through this process of transformational reduplication:

P.t/T ....> M.T (616)

That given this coincidence between positively established conformal truth determinations between philosophical appreciation and metaphysical appreciation we might surmise that a positively conformal metaphysics is equivalent to a positively produced existential orientation reflecting the current currency of the lived-reality of that primary relationship in question. Moreover, if we can further argue that an existential orientation is representative of a relationship able to initiate its own patterns of intervention in the furtherance of that relationship then we could directly equate the same. I.e., a positively conformal metaphysics can possess none other than an existential orientation empowered through the emergence of an existential surplus or excess to take on a causal role in the continuing projection of our relationships in such a manner, more often than not, that would both augment and enhance the lived-quality of that same relationship. That it be an existential feature of our relationships that they have the power, through such emergent empowerment, to either instigate productive patterns of relational enrichment and/or the ability to co-opt relational participants to act on the behalf of that same relationships. More correctly one should insist that there can be no clear-cut dichotomy here between the enactive behaviour of a relationship and its relational participants acting on its behalf. That, in this regard, there can be no absolutistical distinctions drawn between the relationship, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the relational participants and parties on the other. That, effectively, through forms of induced co-operation or co-option individual participant or a working collection of participants can apparently, either wittingly and/or unwittingly, ostensively act on the behalf of that same relationship in such a manner so as to either create, preserve and/or conserve the richness and enrichment of its e/valuational formation/s. (617)

In other words, we can assume a working equivalence between a positively conformal metaphysics and productive existential orientation when and where these two approaches both overlap and coincide. (618)

That, then, primarily through an ensuing de-suspended de-reduplication the philosophical discipline, or some other discipline, open to a positively conformal orientation becomes ‘positively charged’ through such ongoing re-invagination and existential leavening. That the more specific re(-)directions undertaken by this process of an existentially orientated transformation are more likely a reflection of the other economic forces resident in this existentially informed economy, namely, reduplication and duplication. So, e.g., a concern with the deontological orientation of the third trans-cognitive order,

through either duplication and/or reduplication, could well be instrumental in overseeing and/or promoting this sense and semblance of an existential tenor and complexion to be directly experience in and through the very simulation of our relationships, as aligned through re(-)alignment, and rendered as 'open to' and 'inviting of' such existentially patterns of interventions, etc. So, e.g., similarly, a concern with the pragmatical orientation of the fourth trans-cognitive order, through either reduplication and/or duplication could well be instrumental in overseeing and/or promoting a non-existential interest in suitably relevant forms of expediency able to also supplement the paralleling of existentially oriented deontological preoccupations. That, even though we must recognize the distinctiveness of all ordered and inter-ordered phenomena, still, on a less superficial level, the living-integrity of the relational dimension will not be sacrificed on the altar of such distinctions (given the non-absolutistical transcendence and non-absolutistical immanence of the existential dimension, given its inescapable roots in the non-existential domain, and v.v.)[185] (619)

That, given this role of a positively conformal metaphysics to 'leaven' the discipline of philosophical appreciation, through de-suspended reduplication, etc., it stands to reason that a conformal metaphysic has a crucial role to play in the productive regulation of the philosophical discipline or any other discipline so 'charged'![186] (620)

Now, if given this insight that a positive conformal metaphysics, suitably preinformed and enacted (through the requisite use of extensive suspensions) is able to successfully re(-)direct existentially informed patterns of existential intervention it seems appropriate to ask if such processes of intervention could also occur in the resolution of both Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems? (621)

That, in an immediate reply to this question, we need merely note the role to be played by 'resolution', as the so-called 'third moment of the archetypal economy, to realize that the very nature of relational involvement is either overseen and/or promoted by the harnessing of such means as long as we duly exercise a conformity to best practice in this same regard. (622)

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185 As a reflection of the observational-interpretation/interpreted-observation that existentialization is arrived at through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, 'de-existentialization is arrived at through the de-existentialization of the relatively existential'. That given such dialectically constituted constraints all talk about the purely transcendent (the existential) and/or the purely immanent (the non-existential) can only be metaphorical (that as metaphor *qua* metaphor cannot be and should not be literalized either way!). On the other hand, we can discuss either 'transcendent orientations' and/or 'immanent orientations', but, then, such a discussion is already about 'orientations' that cannot be perfectly realized in terms that would need to be either hyper-economic, economic, and/or non-economic in tenor and complexion.

186 Here the 'etc.' is indicative of the observation that the metaphysical discipline/sub-discipline, like any other discipline, cannot be beholden to a single economic 'force', but, must utilize a trimodal economy of such economically correlative 'forces'. That it is the metaphorical role of both reduplication and duplication to 'fine-tune' the manner as to how the metaphysical dimension is to distinctively alter the philosophical landscape through such ensuing de-reduplication/s.

With some degree of necessary detail, let me unpack what is implied by this imputed observational-interpretation that processes of resolution are an inescapable feature of the economic in all its manifestations. (623)

From a perspective of existential empowerment, through the self-utilization of a chaotically re-directed existential excess or surplus in e/valuational formation, we could quite easily envisage how processes of harmonic resolution are able to re-direct such ensuing processes of resolution along with the expected relational enrichment of that relationship as a result of such semi-autonomous relational cultivation. That along with this core concept of relational autonomy, etc., we can also note the co-occurrence of a series of an assortment of co-associated concepts such as, e.g., 'freedom'; 'relational affection' or 'love'; 'relational facticity'; relational augmentation and enhancement; existential indicators, hallmarks, predictors; rectification, deconstruction (in its broadest sense), and re(-)normalization, and so on. Let me explain (the interconnected import of these headings). (624)

The extent we can envisage a relationship as having a relational existence above and beyond the mere summation of its relational participants and parties to that same extent it is deemed by me to be its relational 'facticity'. That from a 'transcendental perspective', i.e., as defined as its 'trans-cognitive' and 'judgmental point of view' this 'differential', namely, its 'facticity', is equivalent to its 'existential intensity' or its degree of 'interactive affection' or 'love' and, more or less, equivalent 'to the degree of an overall freedom being equitably shared' or 'interactively co-experienced', etc. In other words, from this trans-cognitive sense of judgmental perspective we have this imputed grand equation between various identified forms of productivity issuing from this epistemological level of experience that is also equivalent to the extent the form of experience in question also appears to have taken on a systematic sense and semblance of the existential. So, first, the important question here is to ask on what grounds can this grand equation be argued for, and, second, what relevance has this insight, should it be valid, for determining the validity of our truth determinations in processes of transformational retreatment be that viewed, either critically and/or radically, in either philosophical, metaphysical and/or other disciplinary terms of reference? (625)

Admittedly, such a claim appears to be, at the very least, surprising. However, from the trans-relational role of judgment and an understanding that it arises through harmonically oriented processes of ongoing economic resolution this claim should not be viewed as far-fetched. Given that the relational orientation, realized through ongoing resolution, is holistic implies that at each metaphorical 'point' within the orbit of that relationship that it essentially reflects each and every other point, albeit from its own sense of perspective. In other words, in a holistic frame of reference it could be argued that the intensity of the experience could well be equivalent, or rather proportional, to its facticity (as the difference between its emergent totality minus the mere summation of the relational input of its relational participant and parties). Then, in the application of various overlapping perspectives the perception of that intersected referent or set of referents could well take on a set of different readings in accordance with the nature of those perspectives while, at the same time, supplying a certain intensity to those reading of an

equivalent degree or proportion to this economic intensity of its ongoing relational resolution (which to remind you is proportionally interposable with its facticity, etc.). To analogically illustrate something of this same type of idea let us imagine two lovers, two friends, and two family members where all the parties noted have had a long time to mutually foster an intense bond of affection with the other party. Now, it would not be impossible to imagine that these three pairs of relationships, in their own manner, experience an intensity of mutual affection of a similar degree if it were possible to measure the strength of such a bond. In the first relationship, that bond is of romantic love; in the second relationship, that bond is of friendship; and, in the third relationship, that bond is of a familial interconnectedness. Now, represented in this fashion it would not be impossible to imagine the hypothetical intensity of such interactions to take an approximate equivalence despite the relational differences between these different types of relationship. That in a similar manner, within the parameters or 'orbit' of the same relationship we could also imagine the expressiveness of that relationship, when viewed through different perspectives, to present different aspects of that same relationship, albeit with the same degree of a psychic or relational intensity should those perspectives be attended to with the same intentional intensity of review? In this imaginative thought experiment, I am not suggesting that we would on all occasions review this array of perspectives with the same intensity, but, that if we did, we might well find this grand equivalence as previously noted. That underlying this relational commonality of experience is the idea that through ongoing economic resolution we find the continuity of relational experience with an intensity proportional to the intensity of its resolution. Now, whether this positional stance is to be accepted or non-accepted, or is to persist with a definitive judgment being merely deferred, is not so important as the understanding that from this imputed positioning we can formulate the following conjecture, namely, that the imputed degree and form of freedom of that relationship is proportion to the degree of the ongoing resolution instrumental in the relational formation of that same relationship. That, similarly, other aspects of that relationship will also be expressed in a similar manner with the same proportional sense and semblance of relational intensity as co-experienced by the participants in that same relationship (when those members are directly participating in that relationship, be their membership full-time or part-time?). (626)

The purpose of this conjecture being to indicate that the imputed freedom to be experience within a relationship is reflective of that relationship and would be experienced with an intensity proportional to its ongoing sense and semblance of its apparent relational resolution. Such a conjecture does not, however, describe in what form such freedoms would be experienced. To illustrate what is meant by my expression the 'freedom of the relationship' (or system) let me note the following analogy. Imagine raking the autumn leaves in a rather large concrete backyard. The leaves need to be gathered up lest they block the drains that drain this yard should it rain as the weather is suggesting is imminent. You use a rake and you make some progress with this implement. Unfortunately, halfway through this task, the head of this tool falls off from the staff which, having split in half, you are left to finish this raking up of leaves with only the useful end of this implement. Your progress is now much slower and is felt as a proportional loss of freedom. In a similar idea, our non-coercive relationships proffer a certain degree of freedom that sometimes is better appreciated when that same freedom is either restricted or

completely lost. Again, much like the absence of a friend who goes overseas or has died, the existential freedom once enjoyed in that relationship is now something that cannot be enjoyed. Or, again, much like the orchardist who has a crop to pick and only has half the workers necessary to bring in their harvest, compared, say, to a neighbouring orchardist who has the full number of workers needed to collect that fruit. Or, the freedom that is then to be felt should another orchardist lend, in that period of time, some of their surplus workers to that first orchardist (given that different types of fruit will ripen at different times). Where we could say, as a somewhat crude approximation, "that 'freedom' is 'the effort needed to perform a certain task divided by the time such effort needs to be expended'… where other parameters can either contribute to the saving of time or the lengthening of the time required, or, the rendering of that task in a manner that is either more difficult or with less difficulty, etc." (627)

As noted, in our appreciation of the relational we need to be somewhat 'creative' in how we go about forming a holistically oriented understanding of what might be involved. A pro-relational stance needs to envisage, almost through analogies, just what is to be understood, just how far it differs from the conventional understanding we have of causal phenomena. On the other hand, reflections upon experiences that are seemingly existential in both tenor and complexion do proffer an avenue into this 'upside down world' of the relational. Let me explore this approach as to how we might better understand what is involved in a pro-relational stance through the invocation of existentially oriented experience. (628)

From interpreting texts that apparently seem to be discussing existentially oriented experience,[187] and from reflections upon personal experience, it appears that the apparent differences between non-existential experience and existential experience can be explored and scrutinized under the headings of the temporal, spatial, personal, and interpersonal (although those of a religious persuasion might wish to add a fifth category of the imputed semblance of the noumenal or numinous that evades falling under these first four categories[188]). (629)

E.g., in regard to the temporal dimension, we could note differences in time experiences such as the presence or absence of 'simultaneity', 'synchronicity', or 'spontaneity'. Or, the description of temporal experience as if were to fall under 'ahistorical' or 'trans-historical categories', etc., or masquerades as a 'flow' or 'flowing'. Or, with a sense and semblance of 'duration' that is distinctively different from an ordinary, everyday sense of time, and so on. (630)

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187 An important text here, I believe, is the work of Martin Buber, e.g., *I and Thou* (1923, first English translation, 1937). However, any number of religious or secular texts cold be used to the same end. E.g., in the choice of a certain novel we could do an existential reading of the same in order to articulate to what extent that same text appears or does not appear to invoke such a dimension, etc.

188 Such a fifth category is proposed for the sake of a schematic completeness (in order to neutrally account for religious claims whether accepted or not accepted). It could well be that the collective impact of these first four categories, from an existential perspective, in effect, correctly or incorrectly, simulates this fifth category (and, therefore, that this fifth heading could then be deconstructed and duly dispensed with?).

E.g., in regard to a spatial dimension, we could note language or descriptions that implicate a trans-spatial sense of space, a trans-geographical sense of interaction (as when, e.g., two people are on the telephone and 'suddenly' feel as if they were in the same room). (631)

E.g., in regard to the personal dimension we might feel as if 'disembodied'; or, as if 'someone else' whilst being entertained without feelings of alienation or psychic disruption; or, feeling 'timeless' or 'absent' or as 'someone somewhere else' or 'everywhere else'; or, as if feeling 'integrated', as if possessing a 'great clarity', as 'possessing a sense of purpose', and so on? (632)

E.g., in regard to the interpersonal dimension we might feel as if we were 'working together', or felt a 'great empathy for the other person or persons', along with jointly entertained existentially oriented-like experiences from the other three categories as just noted, and so on. (633)

These differential experiences, as just enumerated, albeit as examples, are to be understood as occurring in the immediacy of the present moment. From a study of texts and reports such experiences in the historical past when identified as 'existential' in orientation can be treated as 'indicators' (rather than as 'hallmarks' when viewed as occurring in a current or contemporary sense of time). When such identified existential experiences are viewed in a prospective future sense of time they can then be referred to as existential 'predictors'. Therefore, in the reading of a text or report we might find that we can identify forms of language that are suggestive of an existential orientation. Thence our ability to proffer an existential reading should our appreciation of a certain situation benefit from developing this type of exposition, or, on the contrary through the noticing of its absence when in the description of relationships between people we would expect such an aspect or dimension to be present…[189] (634)

Now, the freedom just explored, say, with the appropriate use of certain tools, is very much a relative sense of freedom, a freedom that is either augmented, through the use of such tools, or, obstructed through their absence or being defective in some manner

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189 A certain person might claim they acted with the requisite degree of authenticity that they felt would have been demanded of them in their perception or apperception of what they thought society world demand of them in that regard. But, should it be shown that the required co-presence of such existential language was to be relatively absent in our reading of textual reports on such matters then we might argue that a close reading of that textual situation in question would then appear to contradict such a claim, or, at the very least, not affirm it, so much so that we would then need to review the entirety of that claim accordingly. Interestingly, in my 'existential' reading of the great novel by Marcel Proust; *Remembrance of Things Past*/*In Search of Lost time* (*Å la recherche du temps perdu*) I would like to contend that it is the complete absence of relational authenticity that seriously marks out every character in this novel as someone you would not like to identify with despite some of those characters being extremely wealthy or as possessing an easier lifestyle to the unending hard work endured by most of the French population in this period of time. Page after page, Marcel, the narrator, equally tarnished in this same respect, reveals to us how we should not be in this world with others even when we encounter people who view the world in a similar transactional manner. Rather than engaging with a book seemingly operating on such a superficial level the subtlety and sophistication of his approach can be quite breathtaking and at other time quite hilarious especially during the long segments devoted to conversation and wonderful repartee.

or other. But, another type of freedom is also indicated in this anecdote of the raking of Autumn leaves, namely, when we find to hand a tool that allows us to do something that would not be able to done by the mere embodiment of ourselves alone. Yes, we could pick up individual leaves or painfully sweep leaves us with our hands, when on our hands and knees, but, neither of these actions is as effortlessly performed when we get the rake or broom out to do either our raking or sweeping. The phenomenon of raking, or sweeping, emerges from the functioning of that type of tool to hand and most certainly cannot be reduced to the functioning of either the handle or the head of the rake, or the handle and head of the broom. I.e., an emergent sense of freedom... which now sets me up to segue towards an existential understanding of this general phenomenon of freedom. As much as everyone might think of themselves as a rugged individualist more than capable of metaphorically 'standing on their own feet' when properly scrutinized this conventional understanding, much beloved of people so obviously over-committed to the Neo-Liberal paradigm, is so patently false. We very much depend upon other people. As an instance of this point, the way things are in this world, imagine how it would be possible to get a university education if we set out to achieve this aspiration without the help of others, indeed, without their help throughout the course of our lives. Of course, we could imagine giving ourselves an honorary doctorate, but, then, what could we do with it? We inhabit a non-virtual world and cannot live just in a virtual world alone. (635)

Now, it is this form of freedom that I believe is to be found equated with the existential surplus of our relationships. That, in effect, the more our relationships take on an existential orientation, the more we can experience the freedom that devolves from such an existential transformation. Therefore, it is in our mutual interests to pursue this existential attitude to life in the hope that we can participate in this existential augmentation and enhancement of our existences and, therein and thereby, pursue the relational enrichment of our passages through this world at large as expedited through the efforts of others. (636)

The relational dimension is either overlooked or totally misunderstood (because of it being viewed and refracted through a perspective that just notes the discrete identification of relational participants (subjects, etc.) and parties (objects, etc.). Instead, from a holistic perspective we should entertain the metaphorical 'space between the cracks'. Think about it, it is the open-ended near infinite sets of relations between neurons in the brain, etc., that transforms 'brain' into 'mind'. Their interactive organization in an economy of re(-)organization through re-self-organization, etc., accounting for the non-determinate nature of human freedom, its manifestation through the sense and semblance of freewill, and so on. That, it is the existential-like intensity of economic resolution that fosters a proportional tenor and complexion of freedom through the expedition of our relationships. That it is through others that we must thank for the ultimate expression of this more refined vision of freedom as it specifically flows through the realization of our aspirational-objectives made possible by others, and v.v. That it is through this existentially oriented world of arbitration that we can appear to be both navigating and negotiating small perturbations in these co-operative flows of mutual enaction in order to eventually oversee the fulfillment of some of our more prioritized projects and programs in a prospect that must mutually attend to both social and personal ambitions. Moreover, we

should also note that all relationships overlap in an ocean of relationships, or, rather, interrelationships, from which alone we find our both freedom and identity to be realized through(-)others, through the good graces of this world of the relational, this world at large, this overall life-world as a world-of-life there for(-)us, and so on and so forth... that, before the apparent simplicity of such transcendental integrity of 'a' world that, in humbleness and humility, we can only contemplate with little more than with our eyes shut and an open mouth.!? (637)

As suggested, a positive(ly) conformal metaphysics plays an important role in the promotion of philosophical discourses that, hitherto, has been seriously overlooked, certainly in so-called 'Western Philosophy'.[190] In a repurposing of the concept of the 'metaphysical' we travel on an arc from 'philosophical appreciation of truth determination' to a 'conformal metaphysical appreciation of truth determination' to an ensuing transformation of the philosophical discipline through the retreatment of this conformal metaphysical position back into the very discipline of philosophy itself. Viewed through a process of transformational retreatment the stages of this transformational process, as just noted, are, respectively, philosophical pretreatment, metaphysical treatment, and philosophical retreatment now realized as occupying a more conformal sense of perspective in terms of its lived-reality, its ability to persuade, promote the required degree of social consensus… when argued have cooled down and time does not seem to want to undo the work already performed to hand... (638)

When the soil is prepared, and the conditions are right the seeds germinate. The process of conformal assurance sometimes is like the bursting of a seed into a state of germination or the dropping of a piece of ripe fruit at the first expression of a gentle breeze. On other occasions, it slowly matures like that piece of fruit on the tree… as something that is obvious to everyone who takes a moment of time to just look. When we look again, we see that same piece of fruit slowly maturing. Truth determination sometimes has an indubitable-like aura, the spontaneity of a judgment that is no longer acting in a calculative manner. In such an event we may well be either pleasantly surprised or outrightly annoyed that we had not seen what now is so blindingly obvious. Especially in light of the fact that innovations are received in small increments but where such small outputs can have consequences that rang far beyond their apparent micro-shifts in the manufacture of their import. In whatever form such conformal assurance is recognized we find, for the time being, basically the same answers to our questions although this form of reiterated conformity is not so much assessed through reiteration but through the emergence of an existential surplus in e/valuational formation that appears to consolidate

190 'Positive' in the sense that conformation needs to be realized, i.e., through the emergence of a form of truth determination that is self-asserted, and not self-deconstructed, proffers forms of innovative creativity that demonstrates that our textual 'ducks are seemingly aligned in a row' and not impossibly aligned with some fantastic revelation of so-called 'real ducks in a row'. That the circular nature of transformational retreatment is not some vicious circle but a productive encircling around the phenomenon to hand that currently continues to correctly map is relations to the world at large. On the other hand, when such retreatment stops producing the expected existential surplus required then we quite naturally move on to some other expositional item on our agendum.

such an understanding, has the power to not only persuade us, ourselves, but also others… as if we were set-up to find this degree of conformance with other, and so on. (639)

This harmonic dialectic, this conformal process of appreciation arrived at through transformational retreatment is to be understood in sequential terms, then linked in a circular manner, ideally begins with pretreatment. Hermeneutic pretreatment is of that found to hand; which, primarily through reduplication, then arrives at phenomenological treatment in which processes of duplication can orchestrate processes of both positive and negative forms of deconstruction; that, then, through de-reduplication takes us to a process of non-systematic existential retreatment, wherein, through posttreatment, can now enact processes of rectification of the initial pretreatment. Or, as indirectly indicated, when refracted through an overall economy of the economic we find it metaphorically 'mirrors' the hyper-economic sub-economy, the economic sub-economy, and the non-economic sub-economy respectively. To draw your attention to these parallels let me represent the same diagrammatically (where we move from 1. to 2. to 3. and thence, through posttreatment, to a rectification of our initial state of pretreatment):[191]

2. Treatment
Phenomenological
Duplication
Economic Sub-Economy
Deconstruction

1. Pretreatment
Hermeneutical
Reduplication/Metafication
Hyper-Economic Sud-Economy
Rectification

3. Retreatment/Posttreatment
Existential
De-Reduplication/De-Metafiction
Non-Economic Sub-Economy
Re(-)Normalization (640)

Following the harmonic sequence 1.(consonance) to 2. (dissonance) to 3. (resolution) (and back to 1. through posttreatment) we effectively parallel the same arc of transformational retreatment as noted elsewhere. (641)

This diagram, maps, among other things, these three philosophical tools of rectification, deconstruction, and re(-)normalization and that through this diagrammatically depicted form of economic complexification how they comment on and can, in turn, be

[191] The dialectical nature of any economy is such that it cannot be either linear or circular in lived-reality, be that in either direction, but, that which is had spontaneously whilst still also evolving, and where important moments take on an ostensive chaotic form taking the appearance of a relatively radical process of re-direction or change in its causal trajectory.

commented upon, respectively, by reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication. Let me explore the significance of this parallelism in order to better appreciate the nature of these imputed processes of reduplication, duplication, and de-duplication and how they collectively cooperate in an economy of inter-ordered formation (and where even the formation of ordered phenomena cannot escape forms of co-associated reduplication, etc.[192]). (642)

An argument can be run along the following lines (and then re-qualified on a more ordered basis?). Because reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication are all economic phenomena, like the economic reception of all phenomenal experience, it follows that there can be no completely economically isolated process of reduplication, etc. Therefore, despite a preferential promotion of any one economic operation, say, in order to establish an effective outcome of reduplication, etc., it follows that to be effective it must be the resultant of a process of economic cooperation. In other words, no reduplication without duplication and de-reduplication. However, to qualify these processes on a more ordered orientation of a dialectically oriented level of organization it would follow that we would need to introduce six different functions, and their counter functions, in order to model circular behaviour in both directions and along with the fact, as well, where those functions would also need to reflect their preferentially-de-preferentially oriented constitution that established their ordered behaviours in the first place. That in a finely tuned account of this process of reduplication, etc., we would need to proffer an account of these two levels of explication and have transformational rules that would allow us to 'economically' transition or migrate between both levels of exposition. To this end let me explore what this would entail. (643)

Briefly, aligned with these orders we have a threefold mapping (aligned with transformational-retreatment, namely, 5-1-3 in bold and underlined), then, a sixfold mapping (aligned with the orders 1-2-3-4-5-6(-1), etc.), and, last, the ability to inter-map between these two epistemological levels of psychic/psychological organization:

3

2 4

1 **5**

6 (644)

[192] A retrospective reason for also designating 'ordered, inter-ordered, and hyper-ordered phenomena' as 'inter-ordered'.

Although a complex account, to move from the fifth order to the third order via the first, it is relatively simple in comparison with a sixfold account to be coherently constructed in order to encompass the entire cycle. Basically, from the fifth order, there is the hermeneutical taking up 'what is to hand' and subjecting it to metafication, i.e., reduplication in order to arrive at the phenomenological first order charged with treatment through duplication which can be broadly referred to as negative and positive forms of deconstruction preparatory for either the overt or covert existentialization of the historically concrete as preparation for its de-reduplication through de-metafication back to the hermeneutically oriented fifth order, albeit now subjected to rectification through posttreatment. That such an explanation is already indicating an anticipation of a sixfold ordered account (through the addition of posttreatment re-directed forms of rectification of the initial hermeneutic pretreatment; the double nature of deconstruction being explicated along both negative and positive lines that is concerned with the ruling out of the defective and the taking in of the non-defective, i.e., basically, taking the form of a process of deconstruction and reconstruction). (645)

But, as things stand, given that orders have a preferential/de-preferential construction based on the archetypal economy it is obvious that metafictional reduplication is not the contrary of de-metafictional de-reduplication. How might this anomaly in our mapping be resolved? Putting aside such expression of reduplication let me concentrate on these ordered functions from an ordered perspective. (646)

E.g., in moving from the third order to the fourth we might refer to this putative function as a process of 'pragmatization', or, more correctly, as re-pragmatization (given that pragmatization of the relatively deontological has already economically pre-occurred within the body of this hermeneutic circle of comprehension). That, then, in reverse, we might just call this reversal of that particular type of function a process of 'de-re-pragmatization', or, just 'de-pragmatization' (as a mediated mirror of re-pragmatiztion) or, in effect, existentialization[193] (although not necessarily to a degree that would treat the relatively non-systematic existential in necessarily an overt light of a relatively systematic form of existential contribution [as an significant excess over a non-systematic level of existential input]). Using this as a model for our nomenclature of a sixfold mapping we could note the following functions (with a quadrupling of names between the ordered node of each ordered transition):

1 – 2 – 1: re-integration (aesthetication)/de-integration
2 – 3 – 2: re-ontologicalization/de-ontologicalization
3 – 4 – 3: re-pragmatization/de-pragmatization

[193] Where it would be better to avoid this potentially confusing refinement of definitions of the process of 'existentialization' (best left with an emphasis on its systematic sense for the explication of an existential philosophy where the non-systematic sense, in turn, has had to be transcended in order to arrive at this more overt sense of significance).

4 – 5 – 4: re-potentialization/de-potentialization
5 – 6 – 5: re-actualization/de-actualization
6 – 1 – 6: re-articulation/de-articulation (647)

Now, these twelve names nominate these processes between these orders (be it considered on an ordered basis or an inter-ordered basis). The problem now is to map the functions of reduplication, etc., on to this hypothetically ordered scheme in the hope we can make better sense of these economic processes in ordered terms of reference (rather than just economic terms of reference be that either archetypally or as refracted through the overall economy of the economic). (648)

As, e.g., 'duplication' is conceived of as occurring in a process of 'deconstruction centered in 'phenomenologically oriented treatment' we could re-conceive the concept of 'deconstruction' or 're-deconstruction' as occurring over the ordered transitions of '6 – 1 – 2' (and 'de-deconstruction' as occurring in the transitions '2 – 1 – 6'). Hence the following schematic nominations and their reversals as using in this regard using this example as a template:

6 – 1 – 2/2 – 1 –6: re-duplication/de-duplication
2 – 3 – 4/4 – 3 – 2: re-de-reduplication/de-de-reduplication
5 – 6 – 1/1 – 6 – 5:re-reduplication/de-reduplication…

…but, as de-reduplication would end up with two definitions let me rebadge the above as follows… by substituting 're' with 'pro', and, an initial 'de' with 'contra' (left non-italicized as would be my usual custom in languages other than English). Hence:

6 – 1 – 2/2 – 1 –6: pro-duplication/contra-duplication
2 – 3 – 4/4 – 3 – 2: pro-de-reduplication/contra-de-reduplication
4 – 5 – 6/6 – 5 – 4: pro-reduplication/contra-reduplication…

…in a diagrammatic representation we get this representation:

3
de-reduplication
pro-de-reduplication/contra-de-reduplication

1
duplication
pro-duplication/contra-duplication

5
reduplication
pro-reduplication/contra-reduplication (649)

With these names now to hand, we could go on and phenomenologically define (analogically) the types of functions associated with the same.[194] But, here, as this process of micro-defining these inter-ordered processes is already complicated enough, I would prefer to leave it to conduct elsewhere at some other time. The purpose of this exercise being merely to point out how we would need to redefine these broad processes of reduplication, duplication and de-duplication in terms of these micro-definitions (that would be able to satisfy an ordered analysis in terms of its hypothetical or archetypal preferential/de-preferential construction, etc.). So, processes of de-reduplication centered on the third order would need to be de-preferentially treated in terms of processes centered on the sixth order as noted above, namely, re-actualization/de-actualization.[195] (650)

Why bother with this level of complexity (given that the dialectical nature of the ultimacy of lived-reality is ultimately dialectical, and, therefore, cannot be anything other than ineffably incomprehensible?)? Because (before we get to an ultimately incomprehensible level of pointless subtlety) from an ordered perspective, given a reading through the lens of transformational retreatment, de-reduplication is not the contrary of reduplication, and v.v., but, only its reversal, and v.v., and, that to proffer a fine-tuned conformal reading of truth determination it is my intuition that we would need to invoke this level of scrutiny in order to more closely detail the role reduplication, etc., plays in metaphysical forms of appreciation along with its imputed revitalization of the philosophical perspective through the ensuing retreatment of this metaphysical perspective already arrived at through this putative process of the reduplication of the philosophical economy in the first place. Central to this heuristic of transformational retreatment is the sequentially arrived at progressive process of positive truth determination from the first order to the sixth order when viewed in linear terms. However, both the linear and circular format need to be read in both directions whilst also acknowledging the more dialectical position that assumes the simultaneous development of ordered phenomena, albeit as reviewed retrospectively to some extent (at least to the extent all processes are observed to occur within a period of time or at least are pre-conditionally prepared with their necessary sense of history/histories, etc.[196]). Interestingly, positively determined ontical-truth determination (of an imputed conformal fact) is arrived at through the subtle, preferential treatment of the sixth order organized by the de-suspension of the third and first moments, and put into effect through suspensions, respectively, of the non-economic and the economic sub-economies, whereas, in contrast, and existential orientation relatively demands the global suspension of the entire economy of the economic, through an overall

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194 At least the language required to delineate these complex contributions to a positive conform process of truth determination has been spelt out as a point to begin with. Then we have an array of philosophical tools to approach this task, namely, transformational retreatment, inter-ordered analyses, etc.

195 Where ‘re-actualization’ could be viewed as ‘the reconstitution of a positive sixth order status as a statement or stated situation (rather than its mere propositional representation)’. Where de-actualization could be viewed as its localized suspension (from an economic perspective of the overall economy given that the semi-autonomy of this overall economy of the economic is able to conduct suspensions at either one, two, or all three poles of this ‘vertical’ economy)’.

196 Or put another way, even though the chaotic moment of re-direction has the appearance of spontaneity, etc., still, it is arrived at through pre-conditional processes of either incremental augmentation or de-augmentation (as analogue by, respectively, the boiling of water and the freezing of water).

dynamic suspension of the hyper-economic, the economic and non-economic sub-economies. (651)

Furthermore, given a general increased concern about mis-information, dis-information and mal-information flooding the info-sphere (now dominated by Social Media) and its further polarization and contamination of cultural and inter-cultural relations it behooves the perspicacious philosopher, metaphysician, or disciplinarian to propose successful strategies for dealing with the adverse consequences of such advertent and inadvertent duplicity, dissimulation, alternative facts, inauthenticity, and so on. A problem with which I wish to closely address given the repetitive voicing of such concerns and, hopefully, proffer some solutions to this important Contemporary issue. (652)

To my mind, without a doubt, a systematically inclusive approach is necessary for the resolution of both Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems.[197] How might we go about successfully explicating this point? Moreover, if philosophy is the philosophical appreciation of a certain topic and can be conducted along positive conformal lines what need do we have for any form of conformal metaphysics? Let me answer these questions in the following sections of this *Descent*. (653)

As a case in point, it could be argued that 'reduplication' is basically 'a form of appreciation initiated by a suspension that is a productive of a state of metafication as preparation for stage one in a process of transformational retreatment.' Moreover, it could also be argued that 'duplication' is 'a process that involves the selective uptake of systematic coding relevant to that type of enquiry'. Given the hermeneutic and hyper-economic basis as having a systematic orientation we might also surmise, therefore, that pre-treatment is constructed or replicated through the relevant applicating of such coding. In this regard we could call this the 'initial or primary coding or encoding' (with its emphasis on the general, the hermeneutical and hyper-economic). In the same vein, deconstruction can be reviewed as the application of 'secondary coding or encoding' (with an orientation on the phenomenological and semantic along with an emphasis on particulars but not specifics). Then, the re(-)specification of the either the relatively-critical and/or the relatively-radical forms of apparently 'insightful edification' through positively constructive processes of re(-)formation entails a 'tertiary coding or encoding' (constructively arrived at through such retreatment, hopefully with a systematic existential tenor and complexion). That a process of retreatment will also oversee a rectification of the initial pretreatment via posttreatment which then can be seen to entail a process of 'quaternary coding or encoding' (and, as such, more dealing with a 'final treatment' or a 'final reading' with an emphasis upon the specific aspects of pretreatment, and, hopefully, the productive recognition of a pro-existential orientation as translated into forms of existentially informed processes of intervention). Now, given these equations between 'reduplication and suspension', and, 'duplication and the insertion of systematic forms of coding', it could well be surmised that both Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems are inextricably connected to a disentangling of systematic considerations be the apparent anomalies in question either intra-systematic and/or inter-systematic in origination. (654)

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197 Capitalized as headings.

Now, in the light of the above, what is meant by a 'positive' conformal process of truth determination? (655)

Now, a conformal philosophy is inescapably metaphysical by virtue of reduplication through suspension, and v.v. That a provisionally approached, 'positive conformal process of re(-)positioning' means being relatively aligned through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment, and all that that entails, and, following the required rules, namely, a thorough suspension of all relevant forms of ideological positioning; a well-pre-informed, well-conducted, openness to the potentially radical via the critical, and so on…[198] (656)

In effect, a 'positively conformal philosophy' is arrived at through courtesy of a 'positively conformal metaphysics' (given the automatic retreatment of the latter back to the co-associated formation, format, and form of the former)! (657)

Therefore, the conjecture that a conformal metaphysics is central to a conformal philosophy must be seriously considered! (658)

What are the ramifications of this equation? That philosophy is given a radical makeover once a radical metaphysics, as here repurposed, is given any degree or modicum of a tentative acceptance. So, on this probationary basis let this *Descent* work towards the articulation, among a number of objectives, of a working protocol for overseeing this general resolution of both Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems, as being able to demonstrate the inescapable relevance of a positive conformal metaphysics to the critical and radical functioning of the philosophical discipline, as being able to clearly articulate a working existential philosophy, and, as integrating these three technical approaches towards the ongoing working 'unification' of the topical, the systematical, and expositional, and so on and so forth.[199] (659)

So, these objectives laid out, how might a working protocol for the resolution of problematic social issues be progressively worked towards given a provisional acceptance of this putative supposition of an inescapable positive conformal metaphysical reconstruction of the philosophical discipline when all relevant conformal considerations are duly followed to the best of our critical abilities? (660)

In a preparatory state note the following and whatever else is thought to be possibly relevant. (661)

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198 Given the critical is approached through the suspension (i.e., extensive suspension) we must conclude that the radical is approached, first, through the exercise of a critical attitude in order to incrementally arrive at such a point of insightful appreciation, and second, the implication of the critical is needed in order to recognize, etc., the sense and semblance of the radical otherwise the radical would escape be interacted with.

199 As an analogical concept we could equate 'unification', as used in this sentence, with 'ignition'. Most certainly in the sense that a productive existential excess, as a surplus of e/valuational formation, is the primary philosophical aspiration to be entertained in the hope of enacting critical, radical and existential forms of transformational retreatment able to resolve anomalous and highly problematic narratives, etc.

First, present a potted version of the anomalous type of situation in question in the form of a succinct narrative (to which, if useful, can be appended previous attempts of resolution that proved to be relatively unsuccessful). (662)

Second, rewrite that narrative in the form of a systematic account noting the types of coding that would normally be involved in that type of exposition. (663)

Third, assemble and articulate all relevant information and, as well, the note topical, systematic, and expositional contributions in terms of such information whilst also noting the overlapping of such terminology (given the various encoded roles that processes of duplication have in such general hermeneutical investigations, particular phenomenal-phenomenological analyses, and specific existential examinations as will also mirror hyper-economic, economic and non-economic considerations). (664)

Fourth, under the adoption and adaptation of a suitable format for the expedition of a process of creative exploration, carefully scrutinize these prepared elements for consideration under the auspices of an ongoing working suspension noting, when and where relevant, interrogative features that issue from an overall transcendental suspension, then note de-suspensional elements (as forms of de-reduplicational retreatment), and, finally, explore the causal ramifications of such critical, and possible radical, forms of emendation that appear to arise from such proceedings. (665)

At the same time, if possible, observe all relevant considerations of topical, systematical, and expositional features that either seem to alter the course of our ensuing understandings or, for the time being, do not seem to alter such pre-formed understandings. Questioning whether such alterations are relatively-critical in stance or relatively radical in their ensuing re-positioning. (666)

Fifth, an attempt to conduct a retrospective process of either self-debated and/or other-debated deliberations is undergone in order to ascertain and summarize the potential ramifications of these prior proceedings from the retreated perspective of a de-reduplicated de-suspension, basically, in the form of an impact statement or its equivalent. (667)

Sixth, under the headings of noting important pre-conditional considerations, current implications, and future consequential consequences attempt to determine the overall impact such proceedings have had in terms of either the pre-critical, the critical and/or the radical import of these proceedings. Importantly, isolate the critical lessons to be learnt or re-learnt and even more importantly, when relevant, note the potentially radical or obviously radical import of such explorations. (668)

Seventh, and for the time being, propose a provisional ‘final reading’ of these proceedings in the light of formulating a working project or program for instantiating patterns of involvement that preferably take an existential orientation (as intuitively assessed from exploring all relevant forms of conjectured hypotheticals and counterfactuals

in the hope that such processes can clarify a de-anomalization of narratives, be that either int terms of their topical, systematical, and/or expositional inputs and outputs. (669)

Eighth, propose a working proposal for the de-anomalization of the issue or issues being reviewed, highlighting the relevant mechanisms that are considered to resolve, in part or in full, the problematic nature of those types of situatedness. (670)

In the form of a mnemonic, an abbreviation of these proceedings can be formulated under the following eight headings: **Essential Presentation, Systematic Translation, Reduplicated Pretreatment, Duplicated Treatment, De-Reduplicated Retreatment, Impact Statement, Final Report, and Working Proposal/s.** (671)

E.g., in the context of my classical traditional and contemporary problem of the obesity 'epidemic' we might propose the following using this format as a working template:

1. A long-term trend in general weight gain for a certain population where counting calories and the suggested reduction in the regular over-consumption of either sugars and/or fats, along with many other dietary suggestions, has supplied no working or practical solution of this problem.

2. The Systems directly implicated (and clashing) in this 'crisis' are the Food Industries as entailed in the Business World, along with concerns raised by the Health System (as well as implicating Political and Regulatory Bodies, etc.).

3. Hence the assembly of relevant information along with the possible fact that a relative protein deficiency could be instrumental in the re-direction of dietary behaviours towards 'overeating'. Such information assembled for suspension, i.e., reduplication.

4. It appears obvious that if we were to assume a relative protein deficiency in daily intake has a considerable role to play in the etiology of this 'epidemic' then this should shape our review of this problematic issue. That to explore such considerations we need to take a suspended ideological stance in a suspended reduplication and deconstructive duplication of such matters that contribute an essential shaping of the ensuing discourses.

5. That from a seemingly successful process of transformational retreatment we might surmise that a process of ongoing re(-)normalization should resolve such issues, i.e., by adopting and adopting the working proposals about to be formulated.

6. An impact statement could be proposed that notes the observation that foods with diminished protein levels are a considerable factor in the persistence of this crisis and an inability to correctly redress the same to date.

7. A final report' would note what changes need to be observed and proposed as a provisional instrument in the communal resolution of this social issue.

8. That, in the light of the 'final' report, as issued to date, a series of measures would need to be adopted from the suitable education of individuals, taking what communal steps would be necessary as initiated by communities, organizations, institutions, the relevant systems, local and federal levels of government, international considerations if relevant, and so on. (672)

Now, with this template to hand, how might we go about approaching a resolution of the vexed problem of misinformation, dis-information, and mal-information being so disseminated, especially in the context of Social-Media? (673)

'Misinformation' could be defined as 'the inadvertent dissemination of information that is either poorly aligned or not aligned with the careful scrutiny of either socially lived reality/realities and/or personally lived-reality/realities. (674)

'Disinformation' is 'the deliberate dissemination of apparent information that is not truthfully delineated and/or is disseminated with rewritten points of emphasis designed to have a possible adverse impact'. (675)

'Mal-information' is 'the deliberate dissemination of either misinformation or disinformation designed to have a considerable adverse impact on reception'. (676)

The above definitions are only working proposals in this direction and the reader is welcome to supply their own. Hinging on intended consequences, either advertent and/or inadvertent, the nature of their impact, the role played by unintended and misintended consequences, etc., it is obvious that these distorted forms of dissemination could well have quite adverse consequences regardless of their initial intent for dissemination. Into such a mix we should also add affective contributions along with an absence of existential sentiments given also that the use of Social-Media, e.g., is often used as medium for bullying, intimidation, silencing critics, doxing, and all other manner of non-existentially oriented patterns of behaviour. To illustrate some idea why such a protocol is necessary let me note the following two instances of this contemporary 'corruption' of Social-Media in order to illustrate the immensity of this type of social problem. Without a doubt this problem could not be resolved overnight and let it be understood that I am the first to recognize any solutions and protocols proposed can only be a few more 'first small steps for humankind' in this regard. (677)

(According to Wikipedia) on the 21st December 2023, at the main Faculty of Arts building of the Charles University, at Jan Palach Square in central Prague, Czech Republic, 15 people were killing in a mass shooting by a postgraduate history student at the school. Another 25 were injured. The 24-year-old perpetrator killed himself. Before the attack, his father was found dead at his house. The perpetrator was considered to be one of several suspects in in a double murder case that took place six days earlier, but the lead investigator stated that the police did not manage to act in time to prevent the attack. This perpetrator was identified by a police officer with Interpol Prague as a Czech national who had graduated with a bachelor's degree in History and European Studies from the faculty of Arts. Police said the perpetrator had no prior criminal record and legally had a

gun permit and owned eight weapons. Now, a considerable process of disinformation came to overlay the overall reporting of this situation given that a Telegram account attributed to this perpetrator contained writings in fluent Russian that praised two other school shooters from Russia, and described suicidal ideation. This information was shared by Czech media but was not officially confirmed by police. According to some reports, the Telegram account is likely fake, as one post was edited after the shooter's death and the posts were probably written by a native Russian speaker. These distorted accounts were soon further remodeled by Russian affiliated propaganda Telegram channels spreading fake reports that the perpetrator of these shootings was an immigrant from Ukraine as reported by the Center Countering Disinformation (CCD) (as a working body of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine established in 2021[200]). Needless to say, such fake reporting can very quickly contaminate the international reporting of such incident, and where we must assume that these hijacking of such accounts are useful candidates, for whatever reason or reasons, to be re-disseminated as deliberate instances of disinformation and where other people will then further inadvertently disseminate such 'disinformation' as 'misinformation'. (678)

As a second instance of a possibly 'contaminated' report disseminated in the Media, and easily re-disseminated by Social-Media, is the following account, namely, the article by Michael Pascoe in the *New Daily* titled: *The IPA is taking Gina Rinehart for a ride down the garden path*, dated 22 December 2023, updated 23 December 2023.[201] Now, I do not wish to weigh in on either the veracity or non-veracity of this account as my only purpose is to propose a possible instance where misinformation, if not actual disinformation, is posted to intentionally muddy the waters of future social debate and commentary based on the misrepresentations of either factual information and/or its interpretations that is disseminated in either the Media and/or Social-Media. In other words, treated as a hypothetical situation we need to ask ourselves how do we deal with the deliberate dissemination of either factually incorrect information and/or the deliberate misinterpretations of the same that are ideological driven to convey a certain narrative that is set up to either advertently and/or inadvertently distort our understanding of that situation in question and upon which, as a result, we cannot, in the light of those distortions, be able to enter into any form of an apposite understand and, therein and thereafter, responsibly promote any form of a suitable response as a direct consequence of the possibly intended (mis-)appropriation of such supplied misinformation, disinformation, or mal-information, etc. (679)

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200 Not without creating its own instances of controversy. By highlighting authors critical of the Ukraine, those peddling disinformation campaigns, etc., it has also come under criticism for perhaps going too far in this direction and 'silencing' democratically oriented forms of dissent, forms of international debate, etc. Then, again, by blacklisting such authors it might well prove to contribute to such debates by pointing out such forms of dissent that would also need to be differentiated from such more organized forms of dis-information, etc. In this regard we would need to ask ourselves is such an inventory a positive step to take in countering forms of misinformation, disinformation and mal-information, etc?

201 IPA, the Institute of Public Affair, is a conservative non-profit free market public policy think tank based in Melbourne, Australia. Besides advocating for free markets, privatization, deregulation of state-owned enterprises, abolition of the minimum wage, is a critic of socialism, and also rejects large parts of climate science (no doubt for reasons of its own decision-making, albeit, in all high probability, influenced by its donors). It has been claimed that this right-wing think tank has been very influential in writing policies adopted by the Coalition.

The central purport of this article is that this institute has promoted a campaign of disinformation for various questionable reasons? I do not wish to cite the entire article, a link below has been supplied.[202] But, let me quote a small proportion of this article highlight this idea of deliberate disinformation, or possibly, perhaps, inadvertent misinformation arrived at through misinterpreted, and possibly misreported, facts. (680)

> It looks like Gina Rinehart is getting very poor value for the millions of dollars she has paid the Institute of Public Affairs. Or maybe not. It would depend on whether she wants the right-wing "think tank" to produce credible research or misleading rubbish.
>
> The Australian public faces no such quandary – we are being ripped off by the tax-deductible status afforded the IPS's culture warriors and political campaigns.
>
> The IPA, something of a finishing school for Liberal Party candidates, enjoys "deductible gift recipient status as an "Approved Research Institute" on the grounds that it engages in "scientific research which is, or may prove to be, of value for Australia".
>
> On the basis of the latest codswallop it calls a "research paper". The alleged research is neither scientific or of any value.
>
> Worse, than that, it is of negative value, spreading misinformation, potentially alarming simple souls, retarding our transition to renewable energy.
>
> **Trolling for fun and tax breaks**
>
> In my opinion, that must be the point of the exercise.
>
> The institute has been promoting its "Analysis of Land Use By Variable Renewable Energy Production By 2050"…
>
> My immediate wonder was whether the IPA had thrown the switch to vaudeville, was just trolling for the hell of it, was following the advice of Trump strategist Steve Bannon to "flood the zone with s***"…
>
> It's tempting to dismiss the claim by Ms Rinehart and her IPA out of hand, but a couple of Australian Institute economists had a quick look at the "research" –
> It only took a quick look – and found it had all the credibility of, well, the IPA.
>
> **Scare tactics**

[202] https://www.thenewdaily.com.au//finance/2023/12/23/michael-pascoe-gina-rinehart-is-being-ripped-off-by-the-ipa

Matt Sauders and Mark Ogge are struck by the heroic assumptions the IPA used to reach its scary headline.

Just for openers, there's one that wouldn't pass a Year 7 science exam, let along being worthy of tax deductibility: The IPA assumes renewables need to replace the total primary energy form fossil fuel use instead of the actual delivered energy – the stuff that counts, what we get to use.

"Most of the energy from fossil fuels is lost as heat," explain Messrs Sauders and Ogge. "For instance, for coal at least 60 per cent of the primary energy from coal in coal power is last as heat, and 40 per cent for gas.

"Renewables do not have to replace the waste heat form fossil fuels, just the delivered energy, which is significantly less half of the primary energy figure which includes waste heat.

"This is a very basic error," they conclude – with considerable understatement.

But, that is just the start of the holes you could drive a supertanker through…

"No one would consider the BAU forecast plausible," says Saunders and Ogge.

And then there's the kindergarten-level folly:

"Just because they estimate renewables need 119 million hectares doesn't mean that is 119 million hectares of prime agricultural land. Nowhere do they ever attempt to work out how much agricultural land will be needed. Importantly, wind farming is dual use land with other farming.

Sheep love solar

I'd add there are growing examples of agriculture and grazing continuing under solar farms anyway, but, hey, don't let inconvenient examples get in the way of a climate scepticism spray…

Yet the rubbish circulates and finds supporters among those who want to believe it. It is reliably and uncritically regurgitated by denialists, turning up in comics like the Spectator and spread in the echo chambers of the deluded or self-interested.

And it is tax deductible, costing the rest of us money.

Merry Christmas. (681)

In the article above it was pointed out that certain facts were basically misreported and misappropriated essentially as 'fuel' for ideologically driving the affirmation of a

certain narrative that just is not supported by the misinformation supplied. That we may deduce, as a place to start, that in order to distort a certain narrative a number of potentially dishonest, if not outrightly fraudulent, strategies can be presented, namely, the misinterpretation of correct information; the supplying of false information; the deliberate dissemination of either acknowledged or non-acknowledged distortions of a narrative structure with the intent to either affirm or disconfirm a certain narrative with the intent to deceive either the actual disseminator of that narration and/or the recipient of such a narration. One has to at least accept the notion that self-deception could possibly have a role to play here in such deceptive forms of dissemination, or, at least, the asking of ourselves to what extent the disseminator actually understands that they are perpetuating a form of narration that does not accord with either social consensus, informed opinion, expert understanding, the historical records as generally known, reasonable forms of interpretation, the overall logic of the argument or arguments being broadcast, and so on and so forth? (682)

These two instances of disseminated 'information' are meant to illustrate the nature and extend to this somewhat contemporary problem although such distorted transmissions have been with us as long as humanity has walked upon the surface of the Earth and has talked about events happening in ways that do not align with those events themselves, be that in the minds of such dis-disseminators or in the minds of those to whom such disseminations are treated, mistakenly, as truthful reports. We could say, however, that even though deception and dissimulation have been forever with us that the problem to day goes far beyond the bounds of simple distortions of mispresented representations of a lived-reality to almost inevitably de-construct, through such willfulness, the quality of the existences our lives regardless of whether we live under the mutual benefits of a democratic way of life or the grudging support given to a population trapped under the rule of a dictatorship in some form or other. Everyone stands to lose, because the economy of the world, wherever we are, whoever we are, is dependent upon a reasonable standard in persistent forms of honest truth-telling in order for existentially oriented decision to be made that mutually benefit others and not just the self-interested exercisers of such choices supposedly enacted on our behalf… Now, admittedly, deception comes in many forms, and, we have all been 'guilty' of such a charge at some time or other. Be it a so-called 'white lie' or just being nice to someone and not wishing to hurt their feelings when perhaps speaking the truth in such a situation might be of benefit to all parties in the eventual scheme of thing. Be it through commission or omission, there is no one who should throw stones when we all live in 'glasses houses'. Now, to trivialize this type fo situation, to make the following point, it is a bit like exposing children, either in front of television set, a computer monitor, or their smart phones, say, to one thousand advertisements per year for icecream and unwisely expecting them not to like 'icecream'. A few lies here and there could well have little consequence or impact, but, the continual, incremental distortion of the truth by large numbers of people can only end badly for all people concerned. With only a reputed six degree of an interconnected separation between everyone it would not take too many people to poison the overall quality of our interactions with others. Hence the urgency that should be felt for addressing this issue whose magnitude is only being exponentially enlarged through the ubiquity of a Social-Media constructed without the safeguard of those mechanism that might call out or si-

lence those claims that do not deserve to be even registered. Much like the filters on our mobile phones that regularly sideline scams and other fraudulent communications to folders that only deserve to be less attended to. In the same vein it seems our access to Social-Media needs to similarly scrutinized but not completely censored since we can inspect these same folders when we are less busy. To somewhat of a similar end, perhaps it is possible to construct a series of protocols that might perform this same form of a positive discrimination to at the very least quickly identify claims, arguments, communications that, seemingly, are less deserving of our unwise affirmation and a misplaced redisseminated approval and admiration. Unless we were strongly disapproving of a certain negative label, for good and honest reasons, that had been incorrectly appended to a certain dispatch on Social-Media would we be happy to lend our name to such a communication that had been earmarked as potentially fraudulent or as too fantastical to believe? Or, is there no help for those who have a yearning for either simplistic simplifications or conspiratorial complexifications and who refuse to exercise reason when reason is well-called for, or, when it is far too late to reason with such over-committed folk?[203] Therefore, without further stressing the gravity of this continuing to expand social problem, being over-amplified by Social-Media, let me begin the formulation of a protocol (or series of protocols) that might assist in defusing the problematicity of this specific cultural-intercultural phenomenon by proffering strategies for countermanding its seemingly unchecked forms of proliferation? An important journey that necessitates the commencement of a few simple steps at least started and to be seen being seen to be heading in the right direction… (683)

Ideally, I would like to adopt, and adapt the eight heading just earlier formulated under the mnemonic: **Essential Presentation, Systematic Translation, Reduplicated Pretreatment, Duplicated Treatment, De-Reduplicated Retreatment, Impact Statement, Final Report, and Working Proposal/s.**[204] (684)

Furthermore, let me formulate the problematic nature of the type of situation under review, under the two headings of ‘Essential Presentation’ and ‘Systematic Translation’ using the headings as noted under the earlier mnemonic: **Location**, **Objectives**, **Education**, **Assessment, Reassessment**, **Political**, **Compromise**, **Substitution**, **Exploration**, **Alignment**, **Ascertainment**, and **Consequences**.[205] So, in the hopeful light of the above, let me explore this problematic issue through these various interpretative lenses and, when and where relevant, seek the suitable applicable of philosophical tools already developed to successfully assist us in the pursuit of such beneficial research. (685)

A Working Protocol for Dealing with Misinformation, etc., on Social-Media, etc.

1. **Essential Presentation**: The unchecked freedom to disseminate information in all degrees of an alignment or mis-alignment with lived-reality has serious ramifications across the entire cultural-intercultural spectrum of lived-experience. The **Objective** in formulat-

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203 Where the latter exhibit what I term a pseudo-psychosis (with psychotic-like features being expressed when questioned too closely about these contentious areas of over-misplaced concern).

204 As cited in paragraph 671.*

205 As cited in paragraph 554.*

ing such a protocol is to counter the prevalence of the ensuing adversity emanating from the type of issues as just articulated in the Essential Presentation of the type of problematicity being reviewed. (686)

2. **Systematic Translation**: In systematic terms of reference, the **Location** of this problematic issue appears to be concentrated, primarily, in Social-Media, and, sometimes as also originating in Media, especially if the latter is questionable content that is then redisseminated and amplified on Social-Media. The adverse ramification of such misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, etc., then has ramifications that spread far beyond all forms of Media *per se*. E.g., undermining democratic institutions and co-associated forms of political governance, as disrupting international relations; negatively rewriting vocations and employment, promoting the acceptance of distorting and defectively reconceived social norms, practices, expectations, and so on. (687)

Hence **Objectives** entail the eventual minimization of misinformation, etc., in the hope that the landscape of Social-Media more reflects conventions already in place in the realm of Media, and, where they together might make even more progress in this same regard (without imposing direct forms of censorship, without serious restrictions impinging upon freedoms already being currently observed in those countries that demonstrate better examples of democratic governance, etc.). (688)

In terms of **Education**, it would be natural to propose the dissemination of methods for recognizing and dealing with misinformation, etc., on Social-Media, Media, and elsewhere, say, in schools, universities, institutions, workplaces, etc. It should also behoove the concerned individual to self-educate themselves on such matters and disseminate such concerns to their peers, work colleagues, etc. (689)

In a process of **Assessment**, we could note and ascertain concerns already expressed and partially addressed by Social-Media itself. E.g., in exploring content warning, successful and unsuccessful forms of redress, say, in the relative use or absence of restrictions on misinformation, etc., as imposed or not sufficiently imposed or just avoided by various platforms in these spaces of Social-Media, etc. Perhaps looking to regulations already in place relating to the regulation of Media, etc. (690)

In a process of **Reassessment**, we can note the concerns of people and institutions not directly involved in the regulation or non-regulation, or similar, of Social-Media in the hope that apposite innovations in this field could be taken up, explored, and possibly adopted. (691)

Under the heading of the **Political**, the role for political forms of intervention that might be needed can be explored and evaluated. To what extent do governments, individually and collectively, need to be proactive, rather than merely being reactive to such issues (where such problematic concerns could well be further compounded with the unchecked utilization of AI applications that have already entered the marketplace). (692)

Under the idea of **Compromise**, we can note to what extent both 'the good with the bad' has to be accepted in the advent and development of cultural innovations, emergent patterns of memetic behaviour, etc. (693)

Substitution notes that the advent of radical solutions in other areas of cultural expression that may well have non-adverse, positive consequences in these areas of current concern. In this regard, it could well be, say, demands for political transparency (in political legislation, policy formation, lobbying, etc., but not with respect to the deliberations of the executive conducted in camera) could also be adopted and adapted by Social-Media? (694)

Exploration, as a heading, suggests an urgent need to anticipate the expected consequences arising from the uptake of relatively-radical innovations and, appositely, adapt policy settings accordingly. (695)

Alignment concerns 'the role existentially-oriented forms of alignment need to be explicated and duly enacted in order to profitably direct or more profitably re-direct such current non-financially oriented patterns of observable behaviour when their cost-benefits analyses are more broadly accounted for in this regard'.[206] Without a doubt, non-financial considerations should also be taken into account… (696)

In a process of **Ascertainment**, solutions either proposed or being adopted need to be closely explored in terms of social impact, legality, augmentation and enhancement of the social freedoms, etc. (697)

Consequences, as a heading, is somewhat self-explanatory and demands a suitable form and degree of accounting for through the exercise of proper, appropriate, and apposite forms of consequential analysis, etc.[207] (698)

3. **Reduplicated Pretreatment**:

All discourses can be regarded as 'distorted' but not necessarily defective since we need to be somewhere, metaphorically, in order to emit any form of exposition in the first place. I.e., they have an ideological-like origination that can be better appreciated through the suspension of such ideological-like positioning. Just as a process of misrepresentation is no longer as 'misrepresentative' once we understand in what manner it is being misrepresentative. E.g., I see this stick in the water is bent, but, I know it is a stick that is not bent and so what is seen is an 'illusion' that no longer is seen as just an illusion given I know the stick not to be bent and cannot be bent by merely being immersed in the water. In other words, the image of the bent stick is rectified through this form of re-

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206 Paragraph section 555.

207 Elsewhere, I have defined 'suitable' as the exercise of phenomenologically proper forms of analysis, hermeneutically appropriate forms of investigation, and existentially apposite forms of examination. In this context, consequential analysis might be better terms consequential explorations or scrutiny (given that an appreciation of consequential 'ramifications' involves the recall of past considerations, the anticipation of present implications, and the expectation of possible future consequences… all of which involves the co-explication of histories of the past, present and future as introduced in the *Pursuit*, III, Book 6.).

treatment given my re(-)normalization of this type of phenomenal situation (of the illusion of the bent stick when clearly seen simultaneously through both water and air). (699)

The point of my anecdote is to note that all texts have an ideological-like basis but that basis once exposed through the imposition of a suspension (i.e., more comprehensively as an extensive suspension) that ideological-like perspective is also seen and can be compensated for to some extent. The moral of this understanding is to also realize that no text could be completely purged of its perspective or perspectives that are instrumental in both its emission and reception, and, that comprehension of this text's import is arrived at the very moment there is an effective alignment between the virtual reconstruction of its perspectival frame of reference and the non-virtual utilization of practically that same perspectival frame of reference as seemingly guaranteed by a sufficient degree of an existential excess in significance generation prompted by such an apparently successful process of reconstruction of that textual economy. Much like the fitting of a piece of a jigsaw in which the shape of the piece fits without having to be pushed and where the image on the jigsaw piece also apparently matches the overall image superimposed on the jigsaw itself. In all of this we seek the comparatively greater emergence of a surplus of significance that appears to align with where we seem to be and where we seem to be going with such an evolution of understanding. Such 'representations' simply occur in a representational economy, say, trimodally constituted between the polarities of presentation, representation and re-presentation, all understood from an anti-representational perspective to the extent that there can be no isolated presentations in themselves, etc., nor can there be any form of representation being conducted between the representation and that not being represented since all alignment in the representative economy is only between dialectically entertained economic facets in this economy and the emission of texts that appear to support such a process of alignment. Yes, the 'presentation' is interpreted and extrapolated as 'representing the stick seen', but, the fact and feat of our being able to re-see the bent stick as 'straight' is a simple witness to the fact that such presentations, representations, and re-presentations are all epistemological constructions directly engaged as facets of their textual economy in which processes of transformational retreatment continually modify such processes of comprehension until such a time this process of significance creation, through alignment, is no longer being so significant generated at which point we then 'move on' and entertain some other series of epistemological processes, etc., be it a new process of perception or a novel process of attempting to understand the former, perhaps a process of memory or the free-play of the imagination, and so on. (700)

But, then, the question perennially arises, 'how could we tell the difference between perceptions and conceptions, between memories or the free-pay of the imagination, say, in the context of a dream?' Quite simply, different epistemological processes have quite different modal complexions just as we find a non-virtual apple can be eaten and as satisfying and satiating our physiological experience of hunger where no virtual dream apple could ever do this, since, after a few moments of reflection, be that either as experienced in the dream or after the dream has been experienced, lived-reality will inevitably tell us otherwise as to whether wea re still hungry or not, and so on and so forth. (701)

Now, this digression has been entered into in order to demonstrate that through suspension, i.e., reduplication, our appreciation of the constitution of that which has been reduplicated has put us in a better position to appreciate the phenomenological nature of the constitution of that being focused upon in this critical manner. That prior to this process of a reduplicational-suspension the hermeneutics of the situation are invoked in order to set us up as to what type of appreciation we are about to enter into, i.e., as reflective of just what system/s, and its disciplines and subdisciplines, we are dealing with in terms of the types of codes about to be applied in the next phase of the duplicated process of treatment. A philosophical form of appreciation, for instance, is to be understood as occurring in the light or shade, the searing brightness or shadow of the System of Academia as it has imprinted itself upon our cultural-intercultural understandings of this world at large. By such means differentiating, e.g., a literary reading from a legal reading where the latter would pertain to the Legal Fraternity and the former would pertain to a literary discipline as currently situated within the halls of Academia regardless of whether such a reading was disseminated by either a non-independent scholar or an independent scholar or, alternatively, by an independent amateur. (702)

Now, given our current location is in the World of Media, focusing on Social-Media, and concentrating on the apparently growing problem of misinformation, etc., what can we say about this specific system that is relevant to this enquiry? Luhmann has noted that we have to entertain some form of balance between three competing forces, namely, the ostensive dissemination of information, the apparent need to be entertaining, and the financing the operations of the platforms and infra-structure of such a system. Commercial pressures, it would seem, have place a relatively newer re-emphasis upon being entertaining in order, say, through clicks and other financial mechanism, improve the finances of such platforms, etc. Hence the relative impossibility of finding a platform that is in the 'business' of just disseminating news, e.g., given that it is in 'the business of disseminating news, etc.' On one hand, it is impossible to find a platform that would entirely concentrate on this dissemination of the news other than if it were patronized by a certain business and charged to do that, or, if it were to be financed by government and independently left to its own 'resources' thereafter. But, even here, if it ceased to be 'entertaining', and no one, or only a few people, were to occasionally avail themselves of this service one could be sure questions would be asked as to whether if such a service were desirable given it did not seem to be desired in the first place. The moral of this story being that a pure news service, e.g., is impractical as an aspiration, that all forms of media need to be both entertaining and financially viable, and, although it would be great if such a service were to assume obvious, working boundaries between 'news', 'entertainment', and 'financial imperatives in the form of advertisements, e.g., etc.', the reality of the matter is that all three forces, as distinct imperatives, need to be co-accommodated in functioning-structure, or platform, that can duly discharge those three different types of imperative in a sustainable historically demonstrated ratio that supports the overall viability of that specific platform. (703)

However, be that as it may, these imperatives are not shared by all forms of Media. Into this space we also have to recognize the introduction of players that are not concerned about the accurate dissemination of information, about being entertaining enough

to sustain the life of their transmitted broadcasts, nor concerned about financial concerns given that their raison d'être could well be certain relatively nefarious ends like running influencing campaigns, producing propaganda, inducing forms of radicalism in certain populations, and so on. Although we find misinformation, etc., rampant in Media, especially in Social-Media, here, misinformation is quite often the least of their potential range in adverse impacts. To some extent we find 'negative forms of Media' whose mix of imperatives do not seem to involve the accurate dissemination of news, the desire to be entertaining, and have little in the way of financial needs, being financially patronized by their all too often covert masters and their sometimes even more covert master-minds. In a turning around of Luhmann's observations, we find these 'negative imperatives' or 'non-imperatives' at work, namely, no desire to accurately disseminate the so-called 'news', the absence of a need to be entertaining, along with the absence of a need for financial security, or similar. Without a doubt the type of platform that could easily head in disreputable directions if were not already set up to operate along such adverse lines of operation. So, these parallel platforms granted, and given both can or will exercise patterns of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, etc., just what can be done, both privately and publicly, in order to minimize the cultural and intercultural damage that can be so advertently or inadvertently disseminated? (704)

In a first, few steps we might divide the World of Media, in the light or darkness of the above, into 'overt Media' and 'overt Social-Media' along with their parallels in 'covert Media' and 'convert Social-Media', given that the various remedies that could be applied would in all probability be quite different in their application according to which of these four categories were to be focused upon, not that there could also be some areas of considerable overlap given the fact that these various phenomena of misinformation, etc., are the same regardless of the nature of the intent being exercise behind their dissemination? As a good place to start we might consider itemizing conventions already in place in the more open world of overt Media as template to begin with recognizing that in covert forms of media there will be the general absence of such checks and balances, various forms of regulation that both confer and restrict certain practices, obligations, responsibilities, and so on. On the other hand, in terms of both a public and private reception of media, in general, it can be shown that certain restrictions are already being placed on just who is able to have a relatively fettered or unfettered access to all forms of media. Surprising, and yet not surprising, those countries with very restrictive forms of non-democratically oriented governance have been the first to censor such hitherto open access to media (although, at the same time, ways and means have been created to circumvent such restricted forms of access, e.g., VPNs, and similar). (705)

Now, from a personal point of view, given forms of education that can assist us to more safely navigate the Internet, a set of protocols could be drawn up to guide us, philosophically, as to how we might differentiate, say, between misinformation and disinformation, and, how to distinguish disinformation from mal-information, and so on. Obviously, this ability to initiate a suspension, i.e., in and through a process of reduplication could well be where we should start in this regard. By asking, say, 'what is the Social-Media of Social-Media?' we should be well along the road to answering sch questions and actively differentiating between misinformation, disinformation, and mal-

information, etc. As already noted, misinformation is either inadvertently created and/or disseminated. On the other hand, disinformation and mal-information are not inadvertent but have a difference only as to the intent of the damage desired to be inflicted on the receiving party, among other things. (706)

That in this differentiating the metaphorical 'wheat from the chaff' this is best left to negative forms of deconstruction operating in the next phase of transformational re-treatment, namely, duplicated treatment. (707)

4. **Duplicated Treatment**:

In this next stage of transformational retreatment, once the 'suspension; is in place, we can utilize processes of duplicated functions in order to delineate, with such codes, whether that approach is productive of non-relationally oriented enrichment and whether that approach is also productive of an existential, relationally oriented process of enrichment. The first approach being seen as utilizing a negative form of deconstruction in order to remove or put out of action those scattered ideas that are not connected with our overall embodiment, such as, e.g., discarding contradictions, incoherent formations, paradoxical features, and all other anomalies, paradoxes, conundrums, aporias, etc. In a contrast, positive forms of deconstruction seek the reconstruction of the relatively non-defective (where, hopefully, the relatively defective has already been removed or harmonically reconstructed, rendered as more fit for purpose, and so on.?). (708)

Through the use of duplicated codes, wherein either disciplines or sub-disciplines are manipulating texts, there is overseen the removal of contradictory forms of misinformation, etc., and the re-working, hypothetically, of the remaining residue in a form more fit for purpose. All in all, critically removing the defective and reconstructing the non-defective… in preparation for the possible advent of relatively-radical innovations being recognized, encountered, and engaged in a process of transformational retreatment enacted through de-reduplication, etc. (709)

5. **De-Reduplicated Retreatment**:

Increment by increment, we move closer to the advent, potentially, of the relatively chaotic as the relatively-radical. That, more likely, the relatively-radical is promoted through the establishment of the relatively-critical. That, hypothetically, upon this basis of the relatively-critical are we more likely to interact with the relatively-radical in the sequential evolution of a series of micro-innovations that, from time to time, will have an impact, as an effective output, considerably greater that the quanta of input that chaotically initiated that specific sense and semblance of an innovative process of re-direction. Moreover, it is through channeling a similar step by step process that such innovations will able to be both culturally and interculturally digested. (710)

Our ability to critically appreciate such relatively-radical innovation is achieved hyper-economically. Here the apparent 'shock' of the relatively new is to be absorbed and where such innovations become progressively re(-)appropriated, i.e., in terms of their

relatively novel hermeneutical genres of behaviour able to both contain and retain such innovations in performative behaviours. The first time we see a bent stick half in and half out of the water we might be puzzled, but, soon we take on the illusion of this apparent, visual anomaly and just accept it as an illusion that, then, just needs to be rectified and understood as a mere illusion, that, in effect, the stick only appears to be bent and is not bent *per se* (when we inspect this same stick when pulled from the water[208]). (711)

Through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension, we are immediate thrust back into this world as lived. I.e., through the process of de-reduplication, we are returned, metaphorically, from whence we came, hopefully, a little wiser. (712)

In the context of the World of Media, through the use of both negative and positive forms of deconstruction we should find ourselves in a better place as to how we might judge the 'authenticity' of those instances of the media being simulated. I.e., through such metaphorical 'weeding and watering' we should find ourselves working with a more accurate representation of the events being represented, not because we have access to the events themselves, but a direct access instead to their more closely reiterated formations as textually represented simulations for us in which the relatively-radical can better expose the non-radically relative, i.e., that we will find more viable residue that is appears to be left *in situ* along with those innovations and more positively fruitful forms of reframing that proffer a greater clarity of inspection, augmented functional utility, consequential impacts, more persuasive patterns of consensus, a richer degree of e/valuational formation, and so on and so forth! (713)

Or, in effect, the product of our research, should it be relatively successful, is to witness the more positive nature of its impact upon the course of our daily lives… as we appear to better recognize, encounter, and engage the lived-reality of our interactions with both relational participants and relational parties (where the latter are not subjectively interactive) along with the non-reductive nature of our emergent relationships as they are continually refined through their critically embraced forms of re(-)iterative simulations. That, from time to time, this can take on a relatively-radical 'turn' in the consequential appreciation of novel significance involved in the 'turning-around' of what had hitherto been thought to be ideologically stable, and, where old ideas are overthrown, and new ideas are taken on board, innovative increment by innovative increment… (714)

6. **Impact Statement**:

Thence the idea of an impact statement given these inevitable revolutions in our thinking since the existential richness of the world that awaits us is forever greater than all the mere jottings of all writers and philosophers. That, in this regard, living-reality is forever richer than lived-reality as hitherto experienced, and, therein and thereafter, slowly digested through our all-ongoing forms of conventional appropriation. Therefore, be ready to be surprised, but, course, hopefully, not alarmed, or, at the very least, not too alarmed. (715)

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[208] Where the text 'this stick looks bent' is overridden by the statement that 'the stick is not bent but just appears bent when half-placed in water).

In terms of our dealing with various forms of media, in these four categories that constitute this overall World of Media, we should be able, in time, to better appreciate the radical differences in our experience and appreciation of their modal constitutions, their apparent and less apparent intentions, the apparent authenticity or non-authenticity of their discursive disseminations, their potential consequences, and the existential ramifications for both cultural and intercultural forms of expression, and so on. (716)

7. **Final Report**:

What can we say for the writing up of a so-called 'final' report? That, as the intentional nature of our behaviour is forever faithfully stamped upon the productive consequences of all our interventions in this world at large it behooves the attentive person, to the best of their ability, to carefully discern the apparent authenticity or non-authenticity of our interactions with others, and that in the dissemination and reception of all manner of discourses this state of affairs is no different. In other words, through the application of an apposite degree of deconstructive strategizing we should eventually be able to discern acts of relatively good faith from acts of relatively bad faith given these differences to be found in our close interpretations of their different types of phenomenological constitution. In the meantime, however, perhaps more trusting intuition in such matters, we need to be mindful that such differences do exist, that misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, etc., do exist and that we should be alert to all too prevalent instantiations in this virulent world of Media and where false information, sadly, has a greater propensity to travel faster through the World of Media that more accurate forms of information that are less misrepresentative of this world as lived…(717)

8. **Working Proposal/s**:

In the light of such observations, interpretations, commentary, communicative and media theory, and so on, just what working proposals might we put forward for due consideration? I.e., just what measures could be put in place, on a more public level, to effectively minimize, and somewhat neutralize, the adverse consequences of misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, etc., that are all too prevalent in this open World of Media? (718)

A first suggestion, that was mooted, was to take the restrictions and freedoms already in traditional Media and discern to what extent, as a template, they could also be carried over to Social-Media, covert Media, and covert Social-Media? (719)

Interestingly, in this regard, the legal ramifications of unrestricted and adversely impactful forms of speech on Social-Media are being tested in various courts of law in so far as apparent forms of defamation, liability, the non-acting as a responsible citizen, the dissemination of untruthful statements, etc. are being tested and where the parameters of what should be permitted or should not be permitted are being progressively refined and where such novel precedents are finding their place on a body of law, on a country by country basis. That, in a similar manner, the potentially adverse impacts of AI applica-

tions are also being both politically and legally explored, although it would be true to say, politician today are neither very proactive nor seemingly equipped to successfully respond to such an onslaught of challenges reconstituting the very nature of Contemporary society? (720)

Another legal consideration is to ask, 'just who is responsible for the adverse consequences emanating from the misuse of these novel forms of technology and cultural-intercultural innovations?' To some extent, as a Contemporary citizen, we all need to share to some degree in this collective form of culpability. We need politicians, etc., to stand up and take a lead in such matter, but, if we are not electing those capable of such well-informed, proactive reconstitution of the requisite forms of behavioural adaptation then we, ourselves, are somewhat to blame. Unfortunately, on a number of fronts we are heading for the proverbial 'car crash' and where our politicians, etc., instead, will have to reactively stand up and take a lead in such matter… and where, optimistically, our confidence that that will successfully occur is not currently seen as a realistic option? Happily, I would be glad to be proven wrong, that this form of apprehensiveness was misplaced and that we will rise to the challenges so clearly looming ever larger before us… (721)

Taking a much wider systematic perspective, it is also obvious that the World of Media, itself, is never going to fully take a responsible charter in this regard given the prevalence of bad actors operating in all forms of media. That, as intimated, politicians, legal experts, policy planners, economists, technologists, and so on, will all need to play a role in dealing with the adverse cultural-intercultural consequences of misinformation, etc. Should we be worried about such a phenomenon? Indeed, yes! It could be quite reasonably argued that the very 'health' of our democracies is under attack from the accumulative effects of such incremental forms of bad faith collectively poisoning all manner of social discourse in the realm of the public sphere. A domain that is disenfranchising and disempower all citizens given the collective power of organizations to colonize this space that should be more reserved for public discourse and not the contractual imperatives of large corporations. Moreover, through the corrosive nature of political donations, mindsets besotted with a rampant and inhuman Neo-Liberalism, increasing degrees of inequality, along with citizens seemingly mesmerized with their ubiquitous mobiles and other technological forms of cultural tranquilization, polarization, a reversion to the stereotypical profiling of different minorities, the advancement of an individualism that loses its compassion for the plight of others… just what hope have we to successfully adapt to the challenges facing us on a number of fronts, that, quite correctly, cannot be dealt with on a simple situational by situational basis, but, will need to be approached more collectively, more politically, indeed both culturally and interculturally. (722)

On the imperative of this form of a response, I am actually more optimistic, because if we fail, we all fail and, I am sure, this will, at last, focus the minds of those who truly care for the sustainability of this wonderful world at large, something far too precious to just simply lose. Indeed, it is on this level of a collective responsibility that an inter-systematic approach will need to be mustered in order to more successfully respond to these many challenges of which the prevalence of misinformation, etc., might more be seen as a 'symptom' rather than the cause of such a worldly malaise… Yes, misinfor-

mation and its more adverse cousins of disinformation and mal-information, can eventually be destructive of our democracies, but, the world operates on a level of goodwill that cannot be so easily dismissed, downplayed, and destroyed. That a harmonization of the informational space of the pubic domain, as a small piece of this puzzle, in the revitalization of a world capable of overcoming its impending disasters overhanging public discourse, I am sure, over time, will be suitably dealt with by understanding that ultimately all problems need forms of successful amelioration through intra-systematic and inter-systematic forms of resolution (i.e., through the rectification, deconstruction, and ongoing re(-)normalization of social discourse/s).So, to this end, it is obvious that Media, the Legal fraternity, the Political Domains, Education, the World of Business and Health, and so on and so forth, will all need to get together to proffer collective solutions that will stand us in better stead over the course of time… along with the hard work entailed in managing such disruptive shifts in both public and private forms of behaviour..!! (723)

As possible points of discussion, let me proffer the following list of ideas as to how we might better deal with these problems of misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, etc., that I would contend are collectively more problematic than their mere individual instantiations as exercises in either inadvertent and/or advertent forms of 'misrepresentation':

1. The use of AI to screen out very objectionable forms of language and ideas, misinformation, etc., hate speech, etc.

2. The human supervision of the application/s utilized above created to monitor these adverse insertions into the world of both Media and Socia-Media.

3. Education in schools, universities, workplaces, etc., to give a broad philosophical context to this problem, and its social ramifications, along with the tools for the recognition of misinformation, etc.[209]

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[209] Certain observations, principles, instructive forms of guidance, etc., could be put forward to assist people to form their own judgments in this regard rather than having certain 'instances' being merely pointed out and pre-described in a manner that fits that type of counter-narrative. To this end, we can highlight the observation concerning the necessity of discerning by what apparent 'authority' a certain report is being disseminated. E.g., in my researches on how people are doing histories of the present, in regard to the Russo-Ukrainian War, discerning the historically acquired reputation of the collator and re-disseminator of such information is vital in order to construct a better, more informed opinion about what is being actually 'represented' and disseminated. From my experience of the reception of such reporting it would appear there is a great chasm between the presentation of sometimes quite fanciful information that is basically not much more than propaganda for either side *versus* assiduous attempts to get it right often with apologies when reports have been pointed out as incorrect, misleading, and so on (as if the reputation of such commentators is one of their best attributes in their quest to gather an audience that will often quickly react to click-bait headlines in a very negative and vocal manner through their posting of comments, threats to de-subscribe, etc.). That if we are not in a position to appreciate the 'authenticity' of the reporter in this regard then we should be more cautious in our treatment of that report, and, attempt to discern to what extent the overall arguments of the text are non-self-contradictory, non-incoherent, probable, could be tested (through relevant forms of further research should such means be available), finds forms of corroboration from sources that could be trusted, ascertaining the intent behind both the narrative and analysis being disseminated, etc. In effect, taking on the role of a serious, honest and earnest hermeneut seeking to better re-represent what has been disseminated and not re-disseminating that which does not deserve to be dissemi-

4. The use of consumers themselves to alert monitors to such blatant forms of impropriety, etc., and, the issuing warnings, insisting on emendations of texts, and ensuring that people and organizations, etc., with a metaphorical 'ax to grind' are not misusing such systems of surveillance to further their own nefarious ends.

5. The use of fact checkers but also, more importantly, the use of 'narration checkers' able 'to point out fraudulent propositional constructions that are clearly antithetical to the pursuit of democratically-based forms of consensus-building, etc., and which are called out as such.

6. The disabling of a process of enabling b disconnecting such monitoring form commercial imperatives, etc., perhaps by relocating such responsibilities to other platforms charged with this form of regulated supervision (which is not to be represented and taken up as forms of 'censorship' given how these rules are to be democratically constructed by panels charged with such a task, and how the rules are to be clearly applied without fear and favour).

7. Using rules and regulations, etc., already present in the World of Media and repurposed for the World of Social-Media.

8. The institutional blocking of those platforms or sites on the Internet deemed to be either irresponsible or shown to be operating with nefarious intensions.

9. A doctrine of complete transparency of Internet authorship (unless the agent in question is operating from a relatively non-democratic country with severe restrictions on the freedom of public speech, etc.). On other hand, also advancing a doctrine of complete non-transparency of Internet viewership so that those who review any platform or site within the overt World of Social-Media can remain anonymous in that regard. In other words, proffering unlimited access to the Internet and, thereby, ensure this universal freedom of access (even if only able to viewed through the use of VPNs, etc., in those countries that restrict such unfettered access).

10. The extension of reasonable laws of defamation, liability, etc., on a countrywide basis so that should such privileges and obligations be abused a price could be paid for the commission of such infringement of the rights of others via this type of medium.

11. Re-regulation of the corporatization of this media space in order to re-democratize it as a public space for public discourse, i.e.

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nated in the form of its original presentation, and so on… No doubt, people professionally qualified in this task of educating people on a safer usage of the Internet and Social-Media, and similar, will be better able to supply a long list of strategies more conducive to the realization of this seemingly neglected area of public education in our schools, universities, etc.

12. Governments taking up the responsibility of offering free platforms and sites for its citizen and, therein and thereby, proffering alternatives to the dearth of community newspapers, supplying alternative forums to corporations like Facebook or Meta, etc.

13. The institution of a national body in each nation, as a platform, for vetting all speeches delivered by political officials in terms of a fact checking, a checking of narrational structures, with clear summaries also supplied to ensure that political discourses are not obstructed by nonsensical construction, obfuscation, contradictory statements, incoherencies, misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, hate speech, forms of discrimination, misinterpretation of public data, etc., etc.

14. International agreements between democratically-oriented nations to observe free speech, and the right to internally and externally regulate adverse forms of discourse in light of such agreement where details on what is to be supervised is clearly spelt out.

15. That in the re-dissemination of a text, your co-associated authorship is also to be published along with the same.

16. The state sponsored creation of open forums where adverse forms of text are to be respectfully discussed and acted upon in the light of an evolving public consensus as long as such adverse texts clearly fall within such parameters that mark out such texts as deserving social discussion, etc. On the other hand, the respectful discussion of such texts should not be proscribed, along with all relevant quotations, given their role as supervising such suspect and adverse forms of discursive dissemination.

17. The official state recognition of those platforms and sites that demonstrate responsible leadership in this field; to be recognized, e.g., by financial grants that can be used to further support the operation of such platforms and sites.

18. The political facilitation of those intra-systematic bodies capable of regulating such matters internal to that type of System in question.

19. The political introduction of those additional mechanisms that can support the inter-systematically oriented interactions capable of developing inter-systematic procedures, etc., that support the pre-conditions conducive to a more constructive use of the Internet, etc.

20. Other ideas (insert here) that support the constructive and productive use of Media and Social-Media, and, can assist or supplement those forms of practice that can diminish the prevalence of misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, etc. (724)

At the end of the day, we need to observe the fact that it also our responsibility to be good netizens and users of both Media and Social-Media! (725)

Now, behind this overall discussion on how we might minimize, and potentially neutralize, the adverse prevalence of misinformation, etc., is this re-purposing of the met-

aphysical discipline as reconstructed under the rubric of a process of ‘transformational retreatment’ using these inter-ordered concepts like ‘reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication’ in a systematic context given this understanding that much of Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems may well be driven by anomalous patterns of intra-systematic and inter-systematic processes of interaction, and so on and so forth. To further explore this re-purposing of the metaphysical sub-discipline within the philosophical discipline let me unpack just what might be entailed in this subtle and complex form of re(-)positioning. (726)

If the import of this process of repurposing does seem to present the degree of value, I have claimed for it, then without a doubt this anti-representational metaphysics is central to both the critical and radical performance of the philosophical discipline itself. Therefore, to support this potentially controversial claim, let me proffer a set of arguments as to why I have had this dramatic change of heart. (727)

From the outset, in the development of this critique titled The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline, I have steered clear from traditional forms of metaphysical speculation, but, in the course of these exploration have had to change tack and explore the ramification of the repurposing of a non-traditional, anti-representational metaphysics that is both positively nihilistic and pragmatic in scope. Therefore, over the course of this defense and promotion of a re-purposed metaphysics let me clearly state and argue why a traditional metaphysics is not being channeled, whereas, some of the intentions behind a traditional metaphysics are being re-appropriated in a form that I hope will be seen as definitely ‘mis-appropriated’, but, also in a form that is non-contradictory, coherent, persuasive, pragmatic, as a productive instrument capable of re-vitalizing the very discipline of philosophy itself… (728)

To begin, let me reintroduce this inter-ordered concept of ‘reduplication’. (729)

Now, it seems quite reasonable to insist, e.g., that ‘the philosophy of history’ is an exercise in ‘philosophy’, and, e.g., the ‘history of philosophy’ is an exercise in ‘history’. This non-commutative process I would term to be a process of ‘duplication; (between different disciplines or ordered functions or logical procedures, etc.). (730)

Now, if we can perform the disciplinary exercise of x over y, then, why not ask what might be involved in a process where, through ‘reduplication’, we look instead at a process of *x* of *x*, or *y* of *y*, etc? (731)

But such reduplication was given a cursory exploration in the *Twelfth Essay* in Volume I of my *Pursuit* (and somewhat summarized in *Appendix E* in this same Volume of essays). However, this operation was productive of the insight behind the formulation/s of a ‘non-philosophy’ given that I argue there that ‘the *x* of *x* is non-*x* or not-*x* or meta-*x*, etc.’ The perfect example in this regard is that of heat. That ‘the heat of heat is neither hot nor cold being temperature’. (732)

Now, admittedly I can be a bit slow at 'putting 1 and 1 together to make two, and then adding 2 plus 2 to make 4'. It eventually dawned on me that this process of 'reduplication' is none other than a 'suspension' (as better channeled through my complex concept of the 'extensive suspension' as developed and extensively explored in Volume II of the *Pursuit*). Moreover, I eventually also came to an earlier understanding that with every suspension also comes the automatic process of a de-suspension (lest we become eternally trapped within the confines of the transcendental suspension). So, in the light of such reasoning it would be natural to then equate the process of 'de-reduplication' as a process that also parallels the delivery of a 'de-suspension' (with each and every suspension at the performative center of each and every economy. Indeed, as central to each and every judgment, in the simple asking of question, and also in the very answering of that same question, etc.[210]). (733)

By such strategies we can also insert these processes of 'reduplication, duplication, and de-reduplication' within my exposition of a process of 'transformational retreatment' under the headings, respectively, of 'pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment'. In a procedure where, e.g., any process of treatment advances the status of the propositions in question by one meta-degree, and, where through retreatment the same process is reversed courtesy of the de-suspension. (734)

Later, in another eventual dawning of insight, I found the inescapable need to take on a systematic approach to how disciplines are historically enmeshed within the fabric of the Political-Economy where the latter is to be understood as the open-ended environment for the system of the Political-Economy itself, and where all Systems are to be found resident in such an overall environment. Systems such as the World of Business, Academia, the Legal Fraternity, Political Institutions, the Health System, the Worlds of Entertainment, Education, Transport, and so on. In this regard, I took on some of Niklas Luhmann's insights whilst also tempering the exclusivity of a system on the understanding that Disciplines can contain Sub-Systems, and where the System itself will be entailed and enveloped in a more comprehensive Super-System, and so on. The implication being that systems are not absolutistical islands unto themselves *contra* Luhmann. (735)

That central to such Systems is the use of a 'code' to manipulate the material of Sub-Systems, etc., and, where such processes can be treated as types of 'duplication'. Linking 'distinctive codes' with 'distinctive disciplines' and, more often than not, supplying an inter-ordered basis for a discipline through processes of reduplication (to be further developed through processes of duplication, etc.). Let me here re-introduce and re-articulate the ensuing complexities of an inter-ordered philosophy dealing with ordered phenomena, inter-ordered phenomena, and on occasions also taking on board, hyper-ordered phenomena. (736)

'Orders' are conceived of as 'the relatively subtle privileging/de-privileging of the tripolar nature of the archetypal economy', where the 'archetypal economy', itself, is conceived, through a gestalt lens, as 'composed of the economic correlatives of the representation of a hermeneutically oriented background, the presentation of a phenomenolog-

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210 As explored in my understanding of the interrogative economy. Refer to The Seventh Book…, etc.

ically oriented foreground, and the harmonic re-presentation through resolution of a non-systematic existential orientation (first arrived at as the relationship between the former and as re-presenting as a distinctive type of subjective experience reflecting the specific economy in question under focus) in an ongoing overall economy of continual processes of re(-)presentation conceived on in an anti-representational frame of reference where the re-presentation of simulations (through a 'simulation of simulation' and not as a simulation of that which is not being simulated) are directly entertained given the deconstruction of impossible so-called 'external worlds' and 'internal worlds'. The subtle preferencing, etc. of these three economic correlatives or poles or dialectical moments gives us six possibilities which are interpreted as 'order' in keeping with the aspect and level of epistemological organization in question, e.g., in either affective, cognitive and trans-cognitive terms of reference. Moreover, they are distinctively 'ordered' in the sense that they can be reviewed through transformation rules as sequentially able to be re-focused upon in either a linear or circular manner or in the simultaneity of a more dialectically oriented reading. In the dynamic balance of all economic moments and orders we arrive at an overall transcendental suspension (as entailed within the more complex understanding of the extensive suspension that also takes on board the concepts of the de-suspension and the induction of causally re-directed behaviours). That this overall transcendental suspension, arrived at through the dynamic, ongoing balance of all economic correlatives, etc., is also equivalent to 'the trimodally interpreted hermeneutic circle' re-defined as 'the hermeneutic circle of comprehension'. It is also against this backdrop that a 'philosophical economy' is defined as 'one-part hermeneutical, one-part phenomenological, and one-part (non-systematic) existential' (and, by extension, as entailing the entirety of all ordered-functions). Furthermore, 'reduplication' is defined as 'the replication of a specific order, hyper-order, or ordered complex on the analogical model that 'the *x* of *x* is not-*x*, is non-*x*, or is meta-*x*, etc.' That in the reference frame of a philosophy of 'transformational retreatment' it is co-defined as a process of 'metafication' in which 'processes of treatment will operate in relational terms elevated by one degree in meta-status'. Those 'processes of treatment' can be defined as 'invoking forms of duplication in which hermeneutic codes are applied to the material to hand'. That as 'metafication' is also defined as a 'process of suspension', and every 'suspension' invokes the epistemological reaction of an automatic 'de-suspension' we must also co-invoke, therefore, an equation between 'de-metafication' as being also a process of both 'de-reduplication' and 'de-suspension'. By such means linking an economic philosophy, an ordered philosophy, and inter-ordered philosophy (through reduplication, etc.), a philosophy of transformational re-treatment, a philosophy of disciplines as preparation for their being linked in with a systematic philosophy (in its sociological sense). The net consequence of which is to expound a re-purposing of the metaphysical sub-discipline as central and crucial to the 're-vitalization' of this discipline of philosophy through this complex re-purposing of philosophy (along pragmatic, anti-representational line, etc.).[211] (737)

[211] Admittedly, this condensed paragraph is very complex. However, I am unable to apologise for this complexity since to better understand the role of my re-purposing of the sub-discipline of metaphysics has to the discipline of philosophy we need to attend to its various equations, etc. However, in the next few passages let me spell out these connections in a less sudden manner and in a way that makes sense of the trajectories being explored in this specific book and the central role it plays in its incorporation within the *Pursuit*.

Rather than this metaphysical revitalization of philosophy being just understood as if along scholastic lines alone the more serious intent of this trajectory is to supply both critical and radical approaches, among other things, to the resolution of seemingly intractable social problems of both a traditional and contemporary historical orientation and genesis. We all have 'work' to do within this world at large, and both the philosopher and metaphysician, along with all respectable disciplinarians also have their respective forms of work to perform as well. (738)

How, then, do I arrive at this 're-purposing of the metaphysical sub-discipline' within the discipline of 'philosophy' as reconceived of as being 'reconstituted along pragmatic, anti-representational lines, etc.'? (739)

The 'philosophical economy', in part,[212] has been redefined by myself as 'one-part hermeneutical, one-part phenomenological, and one-part (non-systematic) existential', etc. In effect, as the incorporation of these three sub-disciplines with in this discipline of philosophy. Moreover, on the basis that all disciplines have distinctive disciplinary meta-differences, differences, and non-differences it would be natural to ask just how the philosophical discipline could be (re)defined in and through such terms? (740)

I answer that question quite simply by articulating the unfashionable observation 'that philosophy is intimately concerned with truth determination', and, 'that philosophical appreciation' is 'an appreciation of the type and style of truth determination currently in question'. By extension we could also argue that all disciplines also adopt and adapt a similar perspective, albeit as refracted through the distinctive nature of their sense and semblance of a disciplinary difference, etc. (741)

E.g., a theologian would be concerned with the distinctive codes of their discipline, supplied hermeneutically or hyper-economically or through their understanding of a theological meta-difference where by exercising a theological difference they conceive of their disciplinary vision of the world as the secular understanding of this world at large plus the addition a theological aspect be that defined in an open or closed sense as either numinous, or mono-theological, or poly-theological, and/or monistic, etc. Therefore, their vision of a 'theological difference (T)' is 'their re-envisioning of the secular world (S) with a religious component (R) minus this secular contribution (S)':

I.e., $T = (S + R) – (S)$. (742)

That in determining the meta-theological difference we ask, 'what is the value, i.e., function of a theological difference (in those genres of behaviour conceived of as contributing 'value (MT)' to the theological project or program)?' Or, in effect, what 'work' is done by the theological project or program in order for it to be discerned as theological work' as a 'function' or 'value' as situated in this distinctive type of a disciplinary frame of reference?

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[212] In 'part' because we can also add an ordered component along with the range and ramifications of all other philosophical tools and schemes as explored, e.g., in these three volumes of this *Pursuit*.

I.e., if T then MT. (743)

Last, we ask what is the non-theological difference (NT) given that there can be no final relational difference between T and MT since what is not there for us is not there for us, and, we need not be there for it (which is something, I am sure, that a theologian would not wish to contemplate!):

I.e., T – MT = NT = 0. (744)

Now, what is meant by truth determination? Let me define this under the following four headings, namely, a Tarskian frame of reference, an evidential input, a consequential output, all suitably conducted within a pragmatic, anti-representational perspective. (745)

In a Tarskian frame of reference what must count as truth, in a process of truth determination, complies with the relatively neutral definition of truth (t), namely, that a meta-proposition P' is true if and only if (iff) *p*:

I.e., P' is t iff *p*. (746)

In other words, the positive determination of truth is appended to a proposition if the meta-proposition *p*' entailing a 'description about *p*' can demonstrate the existence of *p* in such a manner that satisfies what would count for this determination to be positively asserted. Now, this definition attempts to be 'neutral' to the extent that it does not state how that evidential demonstration of *p* can be demonstrated. Importantly, my fourth heading here circumscribes this 'demonstration; as being both 'pragmatic' and 'anti-representational' in both its sense (in it is overall 'tenor') and semblance (as the specifics of the entailed complexity of its presenting 'complexion'). Effectively, by 'neutral' is meant that 'no ideological modelling of how truth determination is conducted is allowed other than to note that the condition that "P' is t iff *p*" must be propositionally complied with. (747)

Under rules of evidence, or how evidence is to be ascertained, we set out to observe in that specific frame of reference how the 'description about *p*' in the meta-proposition P' is either met or is not met, etc. If not met, then P' is 'not true', and, if met then this meta-proposition P' is to be treated as 'true' (according to that evidential frame of reference, etc.). (748)

All quite simple and very elegant. Unfortunately, what is 'messy' is how we might go about determining the rules of evidence, or similar. Still, in a large part this is already predefined in hermeneutical terms of reference plus the coupling of the phenomenological modes of treatment being brought to bear upon the same. E.g., I see and apple. Is this sight of a non-virtual apple something that can be substantiated? Here I stand in front of an apple tree bearing fruit, and I am looking at one apple specifically. Yes, this a correct description of this state of affairs as I am indeed looking at this apple, this apple here (as I point to it). Then, in a state of conformation, as a confirmation of this confirma-

tion, you, too, can say that both yourself and ourselves together are looking at this specific apple as being currently pointed to by myself. Hermeneutically we have the genre of 'looking at a tree that is a fruit tree and expecting it to produce fruit of the type as determined by that tree itself should the preconditions and conditions for bearing fruit are also complied with, etc.' Phenomenologically, we know when we are looking at a piece of fruit called an 'apple' despite its wide range in colors, sizes and some potential irregularities in shape. Put the hermeneutical contributions and the phenomenological contributions together and we get the existential specifics of the situation in its specificity. I.e., in this instance 'this specific apple' (and none other). So, given the specificity of this apple *a* then the proposition about a, namely, A' is true iff *a*:

A' is t iff *a*. (749)

That our joint confirmation of this state of affairs allows me to treat that process of truth determination, through such re-confirmation, as relatively 'conformal' in orientation (and where this 'process of conformation' is such 'that it cannot be reduced to one individual act of either confirmation in real time or one act of verification in non-real-time, and, where it is assumed that this provisional form of truth determination, for the time being, emerges in line with its indicated pattern of current conformation). (750)

Truth determination in a philosophical setting either stands as it is presented in general philosophical terms of reference, or, as it is applied through a sub-disciplinary modality. So, e.g., my reception of this play is that it was most enjoyable for me and was well-received by others. Or, that this specific painting is more interesting aesthetically than some other painting entertained as a form of comparison. Or, that the actions of intervention entered in by X were something I would regard as morally 'good' given 'that no person was killed or harmed, that no animal was killed and harmed, person X seems to have done the right thing with respect to persons, say, A and B, etc.' Of course, if we were to radically reconstruct what counts as evidence in a certain frame of reference then the ensuing results of our processes of truth determination could be altered accordingly, etc. That what stops such an ascription of truth e/valuation taking on an *a priori*-like format is the fact that we are dependent upon the evidential nature of that evidence to hand as pre-determined by how we define just what is to be considered as 'evidential', etc. Yes, we could re-define the same thing as either evidentially true or evidentially false, but, that is not the point, rather, it is simply letting the evidence definitively demonstrate either 'what is to hand' or 'what is not to hand' (or, what is neither relevantly to hand or relevantly not to hand). By such means, demonstrating the apparent truth, or otherwise, of a certain situation within the parameters of either 'what is to count' or what does not count in that type of situation'. (751)

In accordance with our heading of a 'consequential output; we note the consequences follow in accordance with how our rules of evidence are define in that process of truth determination in question. So, if I am eating apple then the immediately anticipated and expected future consequences that follow in eating a apply must apply. E.g., yes, 'it tastes delicious' and 'I expect to find this apple as more than ample before my next meal which will be in two hours from now', etc. (752)

How do I indicate that I am not impossibly talking about some form of absolutistical Truth (with a capital 'T'), or, the mere relativity of truth (with a non-capital 't') as being only relatively true as if such truth determination can only be had by the mere presentation of a pre-defined definition, and so on? Indeed, how could we provisionally have to hand a world of 'facts' if what were factual were merely defined as true or false by the sheer presentation of a mere definition one way or the other? Or, how could we have an impossible absolutistically declared truth determination if we have no access to 'things in themselves', 'things for themselves', 'things to be found through themselves', or 'things to be encountered through some other impossibly contorted sense of interaction'? I.e., how does one demonstrate an anti-representational frame of reference is in play and not merely declared to be present without any evidence to substantiate that type of declaration? (753)

Positively, by demonstrating a Tarskian vision of truth determination as only applying to meta-propositions by virtue of an alignment between propositions, meta-propositions, etc. Negatively, by demonstrating processes of truth determination as being conducted despite the entire absence of anything other than our working with proposition, meta-propositions, etc., and, our noting relevant alignments or non-alignments between the same. (754)

Is such an anti-representationally oriented truth determination possible? (755)

Note the subtle introduction of my use of the expression 'orientation' here. Because we live in a world that has the habit of extrapolating truth determinations beyond their suitable level of practically realized epistemological employment then we have to make this dialectical distinction between this old metaphysical use of 'representation' and my re-purposed use of the metaphysical notion of 'the anti-representational treatment of the economy of representation' (which in terms of the trimodal nature of that economy of 'representation' could just as well be termed or nominated as an 'economy of presentation' or 're-presentation', or, indeed, 'anti-representational representation' [or for that matter as 'pragmatic' or 'positively nihilistic', or depending on its current status, as either 'relatively-critical' or 'relatively-radical' in both tenor and complexion, etc.]). As philosophers, or metaphysicians or disciplinarians, we are forced to recognize conventional customs in these matters, but, that understood, we seek to conduct ourselves in the requisite manner by merely noting this restricted economy of propositions, meta-propositions, evidential frames of reference, evidential elements, processes of truth determination as the ascertainment of alignments or non-alignments between propositions, meta-propositions, the demonstration of both positive and negative statements, and all other relevant inputs and outputs, etc. E.g., 'I am eating this delicious apple *a*' in its truth determination simply means, more correctly, in its definitive explication, that 'the meta-meta-proposition 'I am eating a delicious apple *a*' is true' iff 'the meta-proposition that I am eating a delicious apple a is (already) treated as true':

I.e., P" is t iff P'. (756)

I.e., by doing away with the impossible to separate contents of a proposition from its propositional presentation we merely elevate our process of truth determination by one extra degree in meta-status. Or, in transformational terms, if there is a positive relationship of alignment in isomorphic terms of reference between meta-meta-propositions and their meta-propositions then a positive truth determination will flow accordingly. Indeed, this isomorphic element in the example just cited is '*a*' but because we cannot recognize, encounter, and engage '*a*' apart from its propositional presentation (or representation, or re-presentation, and its anti-representational-representation) therefore we must discount 'a' outside any propositional context of presentation, etc., which further reinforces this anti-representational account as here just outlined. (757)

That, all in all, conforming to this type of anti-representational re(-)positioning, as contained within these four headings of the Tarskian frame of reference, etc., it now allows me to qualify the distinctive disciplinary difference of the philosophical discipline as being distinctly defined by 'processes of conformal truth determination as entailed within an anti-representational perspective (as re-defined in those Tarskian terms of reference as just noted)'. (758)

But, we live in this lived-world at large and we must also note that we do not eat propositions (about apples), and neither do we eat what we talk about despite the occasional fruitfulness of such chatter (and, hopefully, therefore, we can forgive this pun)! So, where do we stand in such conformal re(-)positioning? (759)

In the midst of living-experience, we are directly confronted both 'by' and 'with' 'lived-judgments' (given that they are re(-)constituted both by-us and 'with-us by-them'[213]).. The seemingly radical, non-economic products of 'our' deliberations (in a sense and semblance of a world where there can be no absolute boundaries between objects and subjects, and subject and other subjects... given that there can exist no so-called 'internal worlds' and so-called 'external worlds', and, where all interactions must be direct![214]). In other words, the definitive-like delineated products of our non-economically produced judgments issued in the last instance and existentially portrayed as immediately figuring in the next instance (the latter being how we avail ourselves of such pro-relational and trans-relational intuitions as to why we should or should not intervene in this world at large even though, more correctly, our 'not intervening' in the world is not a real option that can be pursued). Hence our non-isolated confrontation 'by' and 'with' lived-judgments which in a conventional sense the world extrapolates, and wherein both critical and radical non-conventional philosophical, metaphysical, secular and disciplinary forms of appreciation should also be suspended and non-extrapolated. Where despite relegation to second-class seating or third-class benches we must re-perceive the fact that from a non-conventional, pro-relational, and trans-relational perspective there cannot be the sheer ideality of a mere first-class! That, to it bluntly, there would be no philosophies and philosophers if the latter did not eat! (760)

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213 Where 'them' is a mix of objective, inter-objective, other subjects and the inter-subjective nature, say, of culture/s, etc.

214 Both by definition and by default. A process of interactions means just that, namely, a process of directly interacting, being related to, standing in relationship to that which we are interacting with, etc.

How do we ‘escape’ such an eternal conundrum presented through the recycling of the appearance-reality distinction? By understanding the tenacity of its sway and by doing away with both so-called ‘appearances’ and their ‘realities’! Pragmatically, and through an anti-representationalism that neither privileges analyses nor narratives. To proffer an analysis we must do so through the exposition of a narration, and, to appreciate a narrative we must analyze it and will inevitably compare it with the syntheses provided through other narratives. Thence a balance is called for... as well as the standing back through a process of suspension... as preparation for forms of deconstruction... and then further processes of re-construction, and so on... where, through the de-suspension, we will immediately be continually returned to a world ever so slightly different from the one we seemed to have left that same moment before[215]... inviting an evolving process of ongoing re(-)interpretation that, hopefully, is forever open to innovations, new vocabularies, new concepts, the ironic destiny of definitive histories, and so forth... (761)

Thence the re(-)formation of a lived-economy, wherein the relatively-radical nature of the non-economic, delivered (re-)directly in both the last and next instants, is hyper-economically re-appropriated and economically re-treated, etc., ideally, without any form of preferential or non-preferential treatment for whether the judgmental nature of lived-reality of lived-experience is either extrapolated, non-suspended, suspended, and/or non-extrapolated… given that the suspension is forever of the conventional. Where a thorough anti-representationalism must rise above the fray and neither favour nor disfavour the conformal nature of such productive forms of experience… given, too, that we must live in one and only ‘one’ overall world-of-life… for how else could we communicate the shared nature of our lived-experiences!? (762)

Finding, though a matching of metaphorical images and rhetorical functions an evolving appreciation of the conformally valid where the apperception of this apparition[216] of the ‘true’ is neither perfectly true nor perfectly false, where the fine line between a deconstructive falsity and a re-constructed truthful-likenes, where our interwoven re(-)interpretations of living-experience supply an incremental re(-)appreciation of ‘our’ lived-reality that evolves on a need-to-know basis. Where the accumulative work of our histories of the past, present, and future can continually re-fashion both how we can stand in this world and in what manner we could or should also make a stand... (763)

Where in such matters, we also need to redress a natural phenomenological bias, namely, the preference to treat intentional experience as ‘just an intending towards the intentional objective’ since in the full exercise of a(n extensive) suspension we must also realize a reversal of the emphasis on this preference for the shifting of our psychic interest from the noetic to the noematic in an intending ‘towards’ and also realize an intending ‘into’ from the opposite ‘direction’ of the noematic to the noetic as well as also ‘finding room’ for the dynamically balanced suspension of the simultaneous deconstruction and

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[215] When, on some occasions, the world will partially take on a relatively-radical reconfiguration through the re-self-organization of chaotic phenomena.

[216] Invoking here the elements of an interrogative economy (as must be present even in the simple asking of a question, etc.)

re(-)construction of this relationship responsible for its co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity. Indeed, the synthetically oriented tenor (sense) and the analytical complexion (semblance) must be co-present in our economic appreciation along with their non-economic 'turning everything around' and the immediately ensuing hyper-economic incremental 'return' to the world of the conventional… (764)

Thence it is in the context of 'this living-world (of the whirled)' that we directly recognize, encounter, and engage the immediacy of living-experience, albeit as refracted through it re(-)appropriation as lived-experience. Hence this confrontation 'with' and 'by' the world within this overall world-of-life since this is where we are since we can be nowhere else! In and through the relativity of representations whose only foundations, as (non-economically experienced) non-foundations cannot be other than anti-representational in scope since to be otherwise there could be no economy of the presented, represented, and the re-presented (given, moreover, that economic correlatives could neither be isolated within the sphere of economic nor be isolated outside the sphere of the economy of the overall economy [of the hyper-economic the economic and the non-economic]). Thence the 'definitively' delineated nature of experience as re-directed through both the last and next instances to the extent we avail ourselves of both a non-existential orientation and an existential orientation in the enactive delivery of our inescapable interventions in this world at large. (765)

Thence our living-confrontation within a world that equally confront us through lived-experience..! (766)

Where no form of inter-ordered productivity in the systematic nature of its historical settings should ever find its current exposition being privileged through some short-sighted exercise in over-commitment,[217] but, rather, 'taken to hand' when found useful, albeit as refracted through a 'pragmatic' sense and not the narrowness of a pragmatical focusing on some expedient form of a derivative utilitarian calculus that overlooks the ever-surprising breadth of our humanity... (767)

Should this complexity and working-definition of a process of conformal truth determination have been accepted, at least hypothetically, I am now in a position to define the 'metaphysical forms of conformal appreciation' as the 'reduplication of philosophical forms of conformal appreciation'. By 'conformal appreciation' is meant 'an appreciation of conformal truth determination along with the philosophical ramifications, etc., of such re(-)positioning'. (768)

In the broad field of inter-ordered phenomena (as entailing ordered phenomena, inter-ordered phenomena, hyper-order-phenomena, etc.) as I have defined the philosophical economy as 'one-part hermeneutic, one-part phenomenology, and one-part existential, (etc.)' we can treat this economy as a global economy entailing an entire economy (con-

[217] A partial critique of Rorty who at times has favoured poetry and history over, say, mathematics and philosophy, etc. E.g., Richard Rorty, *Philosophy as Poetry* (*Page-Babour Lectures*, 2004); University of Virginia Press, 2016. E.g., p. 58, etc.

sisting of background, foreground, co-associated forms of subjectivity, etc.) rather than as a local(ly) ordered phenomenon, say, as a first trans-cognitively ordered semantical product; or as a second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical product, or as a third trans-cognitively ordered deontological product, or as a fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical product, or as a fifth trans-cognitively ordered hermeneutical product, or as a sixth trans-cognitively ordered ontical (or factual) product. (769)

Now, through reduplication, say, of the fifth trans-cognitively ordered hermeneutical category entailing possibility we arrive at the hyper-ordered discipline of 'science' (given that it distinctively deals with possibilities, probabilities, potentialities, etc.), or, in the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitively ordered category of ontical (or factual) considerations we find ourselves dealing with the hyper-ordered discipline of history (given that this discipline distinctively deals with the fact of facts, their interpretation, etc.). Similarly, in a reduplication of the philosophical discipline I claim we arrive at a metaphysical level of theoretical deployment, albeit as re-purposed by myself (albeit within the parameters of this process of hyper-ordered schematization). (770)

Through reduplication of (a globally defined inter-ordered constitution of) philosophical appreciation we arrive at a non-philosophical appreciation or meta-philosophical appreciation, i.e., 'metaphysical appreciation' (as here defined through reduplication), preferably with a conformal tenor and complexion. The primary coding of the metaphysical is 'conform', and its secondary operations of its manipulation of its coding conducted through the utilization of sub-disciplines can be defined as either ordered, inter-ordered and hyper-ordered. So, e.g., in focusing on the semantic-phenomenologically oriented first trans-cognitive order such appreciation would be focused on the distinctive categories found in our cultural-intercultural mapping of phenomenological experience. Or, e.g., if such appreciation were to be focused on the reduplication of this first trans-cognitive order our focus would shift to the basic categories being found and delineated over the course of human experience (as refracted through the historicity of metaphysical-categorically oriented experience as encapsulated in such discursive language). Or, again, a focus on the second trans-cognitive order would see our emphasis shifting to the archetypal dimension of the aesthetic as refracted through forms of language appropriate to the discussion and appreciation of such a topic. Or, again, a focus on the reduplication of the second trans-cognitive order would see our focus shifting towards an archetypal psychology as we note and attempt to interrelated different forms of psychological experience. Then, again, focusing on the third trans-cognitive order would see our focusing on the deontological nature of the 'good'. Albeit, hopefully, as refracted through a positive nihilism that does not get diverted and lost in impossible concept like Platonic-style forms, or other miscellaneous impossibilia, etc. In continuing in this same vein, let me chart these forms of metaphysically oriented manipulation of these sub-disciplines, both non-reduplicated and reduplicated, along with their distinctive forms of coding:

Re-Purposed Metaphysical Treatment:

Non-Reduplicated Trans-Cognitive Orders *vs* Reduplicated Trans-Cognitive Orders

10	Semantic Categories (identity)	Categorical Metaphysics[218]
20	Aesthetic Reception (beauty)	Archetypal Psychology
30	Deontological (goodness)[219]	Pro-Relational Existential[220]
40	Functional (utility/useful)[221]	Expedience[222]
50	Potentiality (possible)[223]	Archetypal Science
60	Existing (actual/factual)[224]	Archetypal History

…where suitably supervised, collective manipulation of all codes (including hyper-ordered when applicable) gives us the definitive expression of the 'pragmatic'… (771)

All coding can be understood as imperatives seeking to establish the topical sense of the discipline in question. So, e.g., philosophical coding is primarily conformal in orientation, whereas, e.g., second trans-cognitively ordered coding is concerned with aesthetic considerations (in the manner the aesthetic becomes defined in experiential terms as refracted philosophically, etc.). (772)

Now, the perceptive reader, in reviewing this table above, will see why I have kept the expression 'metaphysics' in this expression 're(-)purposed metaphysics' (more correctly, being experienced as a work in progress, the indication of an 'ongoing economy' is indicated by the nomenclature of '(-)' in this expression of 're(-)purposed'). (773)

Moreover, given the implicit reading of a pragmatic disposition, within the context of a positive nihilism, etc., the even more perceptive reader will note that such metaphysical resonances are not being speculatively articulated through an impossible, old-style of a non-anti-representationally constructed metaphysics but only in this highly qualified form of understanding where we are dealing with the conformal treatment of ordered, inter-ordered, and hyper-ordered epistemological constructs that pretend to be nothing more than heuristic devices for approaching the 'definitive' delineation of experience in either in a format, formation, or form as non-economically emitted in either the first and/or last instances as already noted.[225] (774)

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218 Equated with my shorter expression 'semanticism'.

219 More correct equated with an 'existentialism' that cannot be reduced to just deontological considerations, etc.

220 Equated with 'political empowerment both non-existential and existential in orientation'.

221 Equated with the pragmatical (and as not equivalent toth pragmatic).

222 Equated with 'economics'.

223 'Hermeneutics'.

224 Equated with the 'ontical' or 'fctual' (with the discipline being called 'factology' to distinguish it from 'history/histories'.

225 Moreover, more correctly, this 'existential choice' between the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential is more a matter of preferential treatment since the existential economy is dependent upon the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, where this implication lands, is also quite irrelevant to the fact that we cannot be truly divorced from either orientation in lived-experience. The idea

So, a qualified return to the 'metaphysical world' of the 'one, good, and true' (*unnam, bonum, verum*) and the beautiful (and where the aesthetical aspect needs to be carefully re-defined from both pro-relational and trans-relational viewpoints, etc.).[226] Or, put another way, how was it the case that old-styled metaphysicians intuitively headed in this type of direction despite getting lost along the way in their mis-constructed constructions of their own misguided devising? (775)

Let me immediately argue for these types of 'existential sentiments' (as 'transcendental sentiments', i.e., 'trans-intentionally oriented constructs') lest I be wrongly branded as a "'metaphysician' merely out to restore the old order 'lock, stock and barrel'." (776)

I do not think that we can dispute the conventional use of such expressions like, e.g., 'integrity', 'goodness', 'truth', 'beauty', and so on. That philosophers or metaphysicians should also be able to use such expressions in their conventional usage preferably defined or re(-)defined in such a manner that clarifies their purposes or intentional objectives as long as the disciplinarian in question neither absolutized nor relativizes such expression in an impossible manner that just cannot be thought. I.e., such ideas can be approached, say, phenomenal-phenomenologically, or hermeneutically, or existentially, etc. That said, should we also recognize that if we were to run an inter-ordered economy noting phenomena that were either ordered, inter-ordered, or hyper-ordered, then the overall topical nature of such an economy would incline one to believe that as a background to experience an inter-ordered set of themes would naturally arise or surface over the course of experience in general. Or, argued more strongly, without such themes we could not experience an integration of thought reflecting these various conventional experiences that primarily devolve form such notional observations of 'integrity', 'goodness', 'truth', 'beauty', and so on. How otherwise could we talk about identity, moral behaviour, the conformal nature of lived-experience, the harmonic nature of experience when logically non-contradictory, not incoherent, as being suitably observed from a thematic perspective (as reflective of the generally 'well-ordered' nature of experience?)? (777)

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of the 'next instance' being what existentially portends as that which should be done (whether it be enacted or otherwise).

[226] Kant notes in his *First Critique* that Scholastic Philosophy had the dictum; *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum* (every being is one, true, good). To some extent, I am resurrecting this intuitive sentiment but not the non-anti-representational, representative philosophy being impossibly entertained behind its formal historically formulated explication/s! Other disciplinarians have added the expression 'beautiful' to this type of list. From my philosophical perspective, given that all economic experience must also reflect its inter-ordered topical constitution then it would follow, epistemologically, that the generally conformal nature of lived-experience must also proffer intimations of the entire spectrum of inter-ordered experience, hence these intimations of these somewhat inescapable features such as the apparent integrity of identity, a central goodness persisting in moral experience, a conformal truth-likeness that can be neither absolutistically confirmed nor denied, a harmonic aspect of the beautiful arising through the necessary ongoing resolution of experience in order to non-economically delineate decision making in the last and next instance… all to varying degrees reflective of to what extent the existential orientation is being self-preferenced, etc., etc.

That given our conventional understanding of such expressions, without their being either absolutized or relativized, along with an ordered appreciation of such relatively circumscribed, distinctively thematized forms of categorical experience why dispense with such notions even if past iterations of such metaphysically oriented motivation have given such a well-deserved, bad press to these distinctive corners of linguistic experience. Substituting other expressions with a similar purport seems a much tougher 'row to hoe' so to speak when it would make more sense to merely refine and qualify just how we might wish to use such expressive forms of refinement. (778)

An integrity of experience makes perfect sense when dealing with the explication of identity, but, insisting on some perfect, perfected form of identification defeats the purpose of the fact that to make progress we need 'to deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the relatively non-defective', etc. Without change, there could be no progress whatsoever! (779)

Similarly, some degree of an ethical integrity is demanded within the moral configurations of our relationships. Otherwise, through an ensuing loss of trust, respect, relational optimism, and so on, we would not be able to find much time for the pursuit of any form of reflections, productive or otherwise. So, in being able to read this very sentence, or hear it pronounced as a member of an audience, in itself, is an outright guarantee that the requisite forms of moral integrity are already in place in order to provision you with the required time that would allow you to pursue these extracurricular activities that could not have been undertaken if we were bound to a state where we had to attend only to the bare necessities of life itself which even then, without the veneer of civilization, would, surely, be slated for an inevitable failure. Dispute this speculative observation if you must, but the fact of the matter is that we obtain the majority of our freedom through others, and, without others working on our behalf, and v.v., there could be no progress in any form! (780)

Our very ability to envisage the form of our virtual intentions and, therein, transmute our virtual intentions into a non-virtual format is the profoundest form of testimony there is to this notion that without forms of resolution there could be no intentional deliberation in the first place, neither of the last instance nor of the next instance. That such processes of resolution, whether we are aware of this fact or not, are harmonically operating in the very midst of our experience. That at the very core of our being in this world at large is this experience of the aesthetic that cannot be escaped since its very absence would be the death of this relational world… in the blinking flash of an eye. (781)

So, these qualities of experience have a conventional expression able to be communicated to others, hopefully, in a manner that does not oversee either their impossible absolutistic existence or their equally impossible relativistic non-existence… and, therefore, must be able to account for everything else in between. (782)

That, it is with these notions of the everyday, a metaphysician can point out what is so obvious, what could not be thought and experienced otherwise… (783)

Therefore, it behooves the disciplinarian to observe such existential notions, refine their use and not mistreat them either ideologically or through the very denial of their existence! (784)

Now, such necessary features of of relational existence and experience are recognized, encountered and engaged through what I have termed ‘existential sentiments’, i.e., ‘transcendental emotions’, i.e., ‘trans-cognitive, trans-intentional, judgments preferably entertained with a pronounced pro-relational existential tenor and complexion. That the reception of such interpreted judgments is conducted through a pro-relational attitude and trans-relational orientation given that such forms of deliberations and appreciation necessitate these co-associated expressions of a trans-relationally delineated sense and semblance of subjectivity able to simulate this pro-relational orientation… (785)

Hence this observation that we cautiously need to recognize the apparent integrity of identification; phenomenologically accept the need for the minimum requisite degree of moral propriety in mutual supervision of our relationships; ensue the observance of the conformally valid even if treated as provisional and necessitating periodic moments of reconformation; along an acceptance of the harmonically resolute as threading the definite delineation of our decision-making as we make our passages through this world at large both individually and collectively. Furthermore, by accurately ascertaining the formation of such trans-relational subjectivity we should also find ourselves in a better position to find a relational attunement in the skillful re-directing of the progression of our relational trajectories in such a manner so as to benefit the both richness and enrichment of our more important relationships to the best of our abilities. (786)

The historical specificity of our being in this world through(-)others, etc., granted, then a well-pre-informed and well-conducted pro-relational understanding of relational intervention implies the co-operative need for an appreciation of the systematic dimension over the course of our interactions? Furthermore, given that an inter-ordered topical basis will also need to be accepted, if only hypothetically, the question then to be asked is, ‘in an economy of duplication, along with reduplication and de-reduplication, how do such putative codes function, reflecting, as they must, that their systematic envelopment needs to be seen operating in such an economic setting of duplication, etc? Or, more simply, just how does duplication operate through the imputed functioning of such systematic codes? (787)

Quite simply such ‘codes’ can be compared to ‘imperatives’ acting as ‘operators’ instigated to oversee the objectives of those systems in question should their directed requirements be able to be met in practical terms of reference. So, e.g., in the legal system we have the imperative of generating legal decisions in situations hyper-economically deemed to as both ‘fit and ‘ripe’ for such legal ascertainment. Or, e.g., in the philosophical discipline we need to form an exposition that is deemed to be in need of philosophically oriented treatment, primarily, of a conformal nature, and, secondarily, in a sub-disciplinary field requiring such a less general, more refined appreciation of either the particularity and/or specificity of the topic in question as characterized by its inter-ordered focus and the application to the apparent uniqueness of its situational specificity

should those latter considerations also be present. As a case in point, we might be philosophically reviewing both the non-existential and existential character of a certain series of ethical interactions in a certain relational situation in the hope of ascertaining to what extent, say, that the subject or subjects in that situation were acting responsibly or otherwise, were either successfully or unsuccessfully responsive to the situation to hand being scrutinized under that process of review. Given that disciplines have systematic-like objectives, as operating within the confines of systems acting, in turn, as if they were super-disciplines, then we need to ask how such operations, on all levels of their practical employment, can function like 'imperatives'? (788)

A first requirement is reduplication, through metafication, since it is only in or on relational terms of reference that functions can virtually operate (prior to their non-virtual transmutation should that form of de-reduplicational de-suspension, through de-metafication, take on an effective causal tenor and complexion). This is in accordance with the philosophy of transformational retreatment where economic functions operate on a relational level elevated in status by one meta-degree (or more). (789)

Then the imperative-like nature of duplicated codes can operate in a deconstructive manner either eliminating the defective and/or re(-)constructing the relatively effective. Thence the operation of such processes in accordance with the transformational rules pertaining to this phase of transformational (re)treatment. (790)

As a legal example, should the Supreme Court of America decide to hear the case as to 'whether ex-President Trump can legally have his name on the presidential ballot of 2024?' to the layperson, and no doubt many people of a legal training or disposition, the decision seems to be already self-evident. Certain courts have already decided Trump was an 'insurrectionist through acts of both commission and omission', and, as the presidency can be considered to be the highest office of the land then according to the Thirteenth Amendment, Section C of the American Constitution, the Supreme Court can only rule one way, namely, against Trump being able to put his name on the ballot in all states across the US. Now, most admittedly, we are not the Supreme Court of the US nor should we presume to predict how this Court might react to the arguments it would need to first hear before delivering and arguing for the resulting finality of its overall decision along with the counter-arguments of those who dissent with the delivery of the verdict from the majority of these Justices should that decision prove not be unanimous. However, that understood, in its simplest formulation we have here three or four propositions that need to be either ruled in or out, and where the ruling in of all three or four of these propositions would then see Trump disqualified. So, if held in the affirmative, namely, Trump was an insurrectionist (and did not honour his oath whilst in office), that Section C can be applied to Trump as an insurrectionist (as a matter of fact and not needing a prior conviction on that type of count)… then he would be automatically disqualified.[227] But, as ever

[227] Now, as a series of possibilities, the Supreme Court could decide not to adjudicate this case and refer it (back) to a lower court; review this case and merely issue its findings, say, in one sentence, or, proffer arguments for the determination issued along with counter arguments from the minority opinions should that ruling be non-unanimous. Without a doubt, and more importantly, how the Supreme Court 'behaves' in this instance will decide to what extent its authority, on balance, will be publicly augmented or diminished over both the short-term and the medium-term?

the Devil is to be found in the detail… and who knows what mitigating considerations could well be applied should this decision be found to fall either way? (791)

In a close reading of this type of legal situation, we can note the following. First, relevant facts need to be ascertained. Then, such ascertainment needs to be hyper-economically addressed in order to see if the factually described situation in question is actually a report where the forming of a legal decision, one way or the other, deserves to be suitably treated as a legal imperative, i.e., as suitable in that type of textual situation[228])? Then, the legally reviewed situation, hopefully, can then reach a definitive resolution, or declare that that situation as now no longer warranting some form of legal ascertainment, or by declaring that current legal situation to be null and void for whatever reason or reasons. Of course, we are all human, and it is true some people are more human in this regard and prone to make mistakes over the course of exercising their vocation. Hence those occasions when decisions cannot be effectively and definitively decided upon or when that process of deliberation is declared to be either a mistrial, or as defectively determined, or as possibly deserving to be reversed on appeal, etc., etc. (792)

Thence this progression from ascertaining the relevant facts, to the determination that a certain system applies, to the entertaining of arguments and counter-arguments; to then proffering either a valid interpretation or a better interpretation that then allows us to rule one way or the other, or, not at all to the extent that this type of decision-making has been rued to be either deficient, defective, indecisively arrived at, detrimental to the operating of that system, or just not deserving of some form of judgment of that kind being passed upon it… (793)

On a deeper level of scrutiny, we can conjecture that there is a need for reduplication to take place in order for the applicable imperatives, as coded functions, to operate on that relational level elevated in meta-status by one degree (or more). Where, such imperatives must rule in all relevant appropriate formulations and rule out all defective formulation deemed to be either contradictory, incoherent, non-applicable, and/or not relevant, etc. Then, de-reduplication re(-)normalizes the situation and directs forms of rectification if needed and, as well, co-ops a causal dimension when required, hopefully, whose intervention is exercised with an apposite existential tenor and complexion. (794)

Now let us explore systematic interactions with the topical and how the former can historically alter the functions of the latter? (795)

As already noted, in the Business of the Legal Fraternity, e.g., they have access to a body of law as promulgated in a democratic world through the Legislation of the Political System. That in resonance with the somewhat inchoate World of Public Opinion conservatively oriented forces eventually re-write such rulings, etc. Creating new areas of

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228 With the implication of my definition of ‘suitable’ being applied, namely, the ‘reinforced confluence of that which is either phenomenologically proper, hermeneutically appropriate, and/or existentially apposite’. My concept of an ‘economic holism’ further implying that all relevant economic correlatives (and ordered subtleties, etc.) also need to be applied in the proportion of their perceived or apperceived contribution to the formation of their overall consequential impact, etc. Refer to paragraphs 800-802* re the introduction of this concept of an ‘economic holism’.

focus, discarding some older forms of focus, etc. That in the application of the law, either through the input of a solicitor or advice of a barrister, or in an actual court of law through cases won and lost, the inevitable extension of precedents, etc. Summarizing this form of historical re(-)writing we could draw the conclusion that such transformations or 'mutations' can be fostered when a Super-System re-writes the coding of a System, and, when a System rewrites or qualifies its own coding through ongoing processes of re-adoption and re-adaptation, etc., as exercised in and through its manipulations of Sub-Systems. (796)

That granted, just how complex is the topical machinations of a system? E.g., how might we envisage, in general terms, the inter-ordered nature of the Business World? Ostensively, the World of Business is in the business of making a profit in order to guarantee the continuing survival of that business (unless it is funded from a source that is not so business oriented, say, from forms of governmental intervention via either the necessary use of the Civil Service and/or the services of a requisite set of necessary Consultants, etc.]). That understood, how is this imperative for business survival translated through an inter-ordered lens? The fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical immediately comes to mind with which we could also add its potential reduplication (where the pragmatic nature of the pragmatical could well re-form notions of effectiveness, efficiency, being economical, etc. So, in returning to the business of the Legal Fraternity we might conjecture that its Super-System runs on the profit motivation of the Business World, its Systematic coding is the advantageous reading of law, and where Sub-Systems are concerned with both the focusing on relevant Sub-Systems in question (as in the relevant branches of law) and the specification of events in the form of reports able to be used by the Overall Functions of that Legal System in the pursuit of its business opportunities. (797)

Interestingly, in the genesis of distinctive relational situations, i.e., relationships, we note their creation, preservation, conservational expansion (and, on occasions, their super-conservation in terms of making a super-profit, etc., where by 'profit' we can cite 'psychic richness and supplementary processes of either incrementally augmented and/or enhanced enrichment through positive forms of chaotic instantiation'). To some extent, as a rule of thumb, augmented enrichment would be, more often than not, relatively non-existential in orientation, and, enhancement would be relatively existential in orientation. Furthermore, in the pursuit of our individual objectives such aspirations need to be arbitrated through the World of Arbitration (as it 'sits' between the Private and the Public Spheres). In a similar manner, but on a grander scale, Systems pursue the apparent imperatives of their objectives, in harmony with their topical distinctiveness, in a similar manner of arbitration (with the facilitation of the same often bearing some form of a direct connection to the degree of effective power able to be exerted by such Systems vis-à-vis each other and the overall world of the 'Apparent Political-Economy', in an overt-covert style of relationship with the apparent expression of 'Public Opinion' all situated within the open world of the 'Political-Economic Environment'. (798)

That the creation say, of business relationships and entities, must also involve the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical, where, furthermore, the thematization and

utilization of Systematic Objectives will also be re(-)formulated through the auspices of such requisite forms of resolution required for creation, etc. (799)

In the same vein, we can also note how an appreciation of the World of Inter-Systematic Relations, within the overall confines of the Political-Economic Environment, could also be approached through emergent terms of reference and not so much through reductive strategies. However, it should also be pointed out (as a form of 'economic holism') that no economy can solely preference any one economic correlativity or any one pair of economic correlativities at the expense of the total trimodal constitution of each and every economy, etc. That by applying a suitable suite of approaches the *zeitgeist* of the times, the tenor and complexion of the World of Inter-Systematic Relations could possibly be characterized, albeit in part, but, at the same time, with a general intimation of the totality of such an *ethos* as it meets an ensuing thematizing through the innovative production of culturally distinctive products and services that typify the cultural impetus of that specific era, etc. Here we might also note how utilization of histories of the past, the present and the future could assist us in delineating such cultural-inter-cultural epochs through the noting of non-continuities that distinctively characterize forms of cultural novelties that set in 'historical concrete' our migration from one era to another. (800)

At a deeper level, in the use of topical mechanisms in the formation of reports, their incorporation in systematic terms of reference that develop our expositions prior to their dissemination in both cultural-intercultural and causal terms of reference we should note the role played by a 'doctrine of economic holism' where 'all economic corelativities, all forms of economic complexification and simplification, etc., must be perceived as co-existing in and through both the actualization of possibilities and the potentiation of actualities and where through forms of preferential treatment[229] certain themes, memes, tropes, and systematic, disciplinary, and intentional objectives, etc., can all be thematized, aspired after, and where some of these notions can then be brought to some form and degree of fruition through suitable forms of arbitration, and so on'. Then the next question to ask is to enquire 'how, economic holism granted, we can focus on certain objectively formed ambitions to oversee their aspirational and arbitrational processes of instantiated realization?' I.e., by echoing certain relevant background forms of resonance, focusing on the thematization of such objectives, and then subjectively overseeing their instantiation through requisite forms of arbitration, navigation, and negotiation, etc. That through the granting of various forms of permission, both intersubjectively and subjectively pre-organized, by harnessing the required forms of chaotically oriented re-self-

[229] My concept of 'preferential' treatment notes 'past forms of prioritization, present forms of privileging, and future forms of promotion'. Subtle forms of preferential treatment are also orchestrated in an inter-ordered setting through the impetus of an automatically discharged process of the de-suspension as a result of the balanced suspension of one or other economic polarities or moments. In the conception of an overall economy of the economic the sub-economies of the hyper-economic, economic and the non-economic can all play their part in these subtle machinations through the autonomous nature of their envisaged functionings. So, e.g., in de-suspensional focusing on the moment of the Object (in the archetypal economy), as realized through the promotion of the suspension of the Ego and World moments the economic economy is correspondingly privileged in a moment of treatment along with its ensuing overt emphasis on a phenomenal-phenomenological orientation of the semantic, intentional objectivity, perceptual scrutiny, close(r) readings of texts, etc.

organization we can, if relatively successful, thematize, in and through such economic holism, the realization of our personal ambitions and social aspirations. That such complexity will also be approached, no doubt, through its 'modularization' just as once we have learnt to ride a bike our minds can then attend to other things, e.g., like safely riding that same bike along the street, and deciding where to head and for what intentions or reasons, etc. (801)

This concept of an obligatory economic holism, as underlying all intentional formation, trans-intentional judgment, and pre-intentional affective motivation, etc., along with its post-intentional consequences, etc., also strongly suggests that just as no inter-ordered phenomenon is an island unto itself, likewise, no individual system is an island unto itself. That Systems can overlap despite the apparent rigidity of coded forms of operational duplication, etc. So, e.g., in the World of Business we can find both the Legal Fraternity and the World of Health, and so on and so forth. Importantly, this allows us to understand that innovation in one system can also be quickly taken up in another system by virtue of such overlapping, innovative imitation, economic holism, etc. (802)

Such 'insights' can now be brought back to help us further re-explore the centrality of a conformal metaphysical discipline within the conformal pursuit and the articulated re(-)configuration of a putative philosophical super-discipline… (803)

For 'good reasons', I had avoided until recently, any dealings with a metaphysically oriented project or program given my seeing no place whatsoever for its operations within the philosophical prospect (as systematically exercised within the overall world-of-life). Those 'reasons' are admirably spelt out by Richard Rorty in his 'negative' formulation of what an anti-representationalism is not. On the 'positive' side of this philosophical ledger the same philosopher has emphasized the need for a democratically oriented polis as more conducive to pragmatically overseeing a more beneficial environment and climate for the citizenry of this world. That through the promotion of considerate, non-extremist, innovative forms of 'social consensus' we all stand to live in the makings of a better world where we can both individually and collectively realize the ensuing arbitration of our private ambitions and public aspirations… (804)

However, from the theoretical force of my current researches I am 'forced', in turn, to admit the relevance, indeed, the centrality of a conformal metaphysics to the very operation of a well-orchestrated and well-conducted philosophical discipline.[230] But, lest I quickly lose some philosophical friends at the advent of such an announcement, let me quickly note that this is not at the expense of a pragmatic anti-representationalism, or a positive nihilism, at the recognition of the innovative need for a philosophical radicalism, and so on! (805)

So, let me spell out just what is involved in this turning around of my previous neglect and avoidance of the metaphysical discipline, and why I now believe that it has a crucial contribution to make to the very operation of the philosophical discipline itself. How it can contribute both a critical and radical re-envisioning of the philosophical disci-

[230] Hence its ensuing status as a 'super-discipline'.

pline, and, where, through a resuscitation and re(-)purposing of a conformal metaphysical discipline, it will reinforce and revitalize the suitable performance of philosophical practice fit for this Contemporary era (and its inevitable ensuing supersession of the Postmodern)… (806)

To this end, let me explore what I intend through my use of these six key expression, namely, 'conformal', 'metaphysics', a 're(-)presentational economy' and 'anti-representationalism', 'nihilism', and the ensuing reside of a 'pragmatic philosophy' fit for purpose and devoid of both impossible nonsense and ideological extremism... (807)

As a first definition of this concept of the 'conformal' I introduced the idea of the checking of either 'the confirmation of the truth determinations of the co-occurring of a certain sequence of events in a certain relational situation conducted in a period of time coinciding or overlapping with those events in question and/or the verification of the truth determinations of the co-occurring of a certain sequence of events in a certain relational situation not conducted in a period of time coinciding or overlapping with those events in question in such a manner that this process is repeated till such a time a conformance of results reinforces the perceived accuracy of such determinations. Albeit as forever treated as provisional even if, quite sensibly, such treatment is not acted upon given this reinforcement of such assured conformance'. Or, more succinctly, 'a process of conformance is arrived at through the confirmation and/or verification of a process of confirmation and/or verification'. Now, it is quite conceivable that verification could be cast as a credible prediction should that future prediction being either confirmed and/or verified after either its perceived and/or apperceived phenomenal-phenomenological instantiation in time. At the end of the day this form of positioning, or rather orchestrated as a process of re(-)positioning demands some form of valid evidential assessment in some suitable form or other be that arrived at through either the credible reporting of either perceptions, testimonies, and/or inferences. (808)

As a second definition, we note the additional supplementation of further information and validation arrived at through an appreciative expansion of our understanding of its relational situatedness preferably arrived at through an existentially conducted, open-ended process of further re(-)positioning… (809)

Both definitional aspects imply a mutual reinforcement based upon correctly conducted, well-pre-informed, re-iterated forms of re(-)assessment in which ensuing validation is reinforced through appositely received forms of an aligned existential assurance and insurance, i.e., the positive confluence of the apparent fact that we are in a suitable position to form such ascertainments in truth determination along with the additional ability to positively rewrite those ascertainments if proven to be wrongly interpreted as well as being further reinforced along with incidental and coincidental forms of conformance that accompany the expansion of all forms of relational appreciation of the relational situatedness in question. Let me demonstrate what is meant by this complex definition of the conformal. (810)

I am locking a front-door with two locking mechanisms. I dead-lock the first lock. I have turned the key in the first lock, and it will now turn no further. I check to see if it is firmly locked. It is firmly locked in place. I snib the second lock on the handle, leave, and then shut this door. I try the door handle, and find it will not let me enter as the door is 'conformally' locked (by virtue of this addition fact of confirmation). I also know that the door was also properly dead-locked. Later that day, I return and find the door is still locked (and not broken down and trust it would be impossible to pick two locks at the same time?) and knowing no one else has a key to this door assume it has remained locked. I unlock the door, find nothing disturbed, observe that my fine Royal Doulton cups and saucers with the hand-painted periwinkles are still there in the cabinet and assume nothing has been stolen… and that no one has been here while I was absent… (811)

In the richness of life, we meet with and are met by a plethora of details that usually reinforce, in a positive manner, the narratives we both tell ourselves and each other as we make our passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively, given the relatively non-anomalous nature of such mutually perceived conformity… Of course, on some occasions, being human, we do get things wrong, but never completely wrong just as we should not expect to get everything perfectly right, and, that when we do find that we are wrong, in some small aspect or other, it is because we either perceive or apperceive how to successfully re-write such partial misunderstandings through an ongoing process of rectification (along with deconstruction and re(-)normalization as discussed elsewhere[231]). (812)

To a great extent we are also 'set-up' to recognize, encounter, and engage the truth of our relational situatedness. As an analogy this is very much like reading an Agatha Christie murder mystery (or seeing a well-produced film version of one of those novels). If we can see the red-herrings as 'red-herrings' meant to distract us, and, can see the innocuously related clues as relevant 'clues', and, successfully collate the relevant information then we should find ourselves set-up to know who the murderer or murderers were, if an act of murder had actually occurred, and, say not either an accident or a suicide. Then, off course, when we get to the dramatic denouement, we are finally told what exactly happened. Now given the fallacy of the over-extended analogy or the misapplication of a defectively used metaphor am I allowed to both make this comparison and is such a comparison informatively useful? (813)

All judgments, as explored elsewhere, involve the use of an interrogative economy (along with the types of suspension entailed in each and every economy). We ask relevant questions to our enquiries and appropriately answer the same. If I asked you, 'did you like the fish that was cooked for the evening meal', and you answered, 'the flesh was a perfect shade of white' it would be obvious that you were not appropriately answering that question. Or, If I were to ask you, 'did you enjoy the play we had just seen together', and you answered, 'the lighting and costumes were superb', I might well deduce, as an allusion to a famous piece of apocryphal criticism, that the play was not quite as good as its 'lighting and costumes', indeed, fell well short of the expectations of its dramatic promise... (814)

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231 As explored under the rubric of a 'philosophy of transformational retreatment'.

In a similar manner, through the very being of a question, we set ourselves up for an answer to be arrived at in keeping with that intended formulation. All rhetorical devices acting in a similar manner with analogies being no exception. In other words, even though we conduct some form of an enquiry the very form of that enquiry is set up as a 'set-up' that narrowly defines what type of answer is appropriate, and either appropriately corrector or appropriately not correct, or needs to be appropriately deferred in the meantime for whatever reason or reasons. (815)

Thence this observation that conformation is universally present and expected even though there are also disreputable people who will capitalize on this type of a blanket expectation in order to parasitically advance their own objectives at the general expense of others. But, then even here, such an exception proves this basic thesis that we normally expect others, under normal circumstances, to be truth-tellers, as reinforces of a conformal approach to truth determination and the dissemination of such forms of ascertainment (whilst being well-aware that not all people are honest and reputable, and, being human, that we can also get in wrong, at least in part, but, of course, never being totally or entirely wrong). (816)

I am also suggesting here that from an existential perspective this phenomenon of conformance contributes further experiences of conformity more often than not. Let me explain this type of observation. In an act of transformational retreatment, the process of reduplication advances the pretreatment report through metafication to a state of treatment where we can entertain the three forms of (archetypal economic) treatment, namely, synthesis, analysis, and nomination. So, e.g., in coming across the need for a broom (for the first time) we might note its similarities to a hand-held brush but also in what way it differs from the latter. Or, e.g., analyzing the contents filling a bought sandwich you might find the presence of corn which you know you just do not like (and then go about removing it). Or, e.g., in the distance you see someone that looks vaguely familiar and then you realize it is a friend of yours called 'John'. In each of these three situations you have discerned additional information that leads to better understanding of the specific nature of that relational situation in which you already have some conformal degree of appreciation. That, in effect, a good working understanding of a certain situation, through iterative re-ascertainment, should further advance the conformity of such discernment unless we find we need to 'radically' reconstruct our phenomenological understand of that relational situation, albeit in relative, incremental terms of reference. (817)

But it would be very short-sighted to reduce such insightfulness to merely these three individually isolated phases of the harmonic process because, together, synthesis is experienced as a consonant background, analysis introduces itself as a dissonant foreground through focus, and, together, an ensuing process of harmonic resolution both powers and empowers a sense of subjectivity more in tune, more attuned with the evolving nature of those presented proceedings. Furthermore, collectively, such processes of resolution will produce, and reproduce, chaotic moments of clarification, through re-self-organization, that should not be treated merely as nominative in orientation, as if something were being merely found a name... Indeed, as moments provocatively capable of

both asking and answering those very same questions being posed by ourselves, be they addressed advertently or inadvertently, be they formulated in part or in whole and, therein and thereby, set up to proffer a process of redress that implicates and impels a causal dimension, through the de-suspension, that either redirects us in a critical fashion or radically re-directs in a manner that, hitherto, might well have been thought to have been totally impossible… (818)

That in and through the existential richness of experience, experienced as an ongoing surplus of e/valuational formation, more often than not, we will continue to meet with such situational integrity arising through this experience of conformal continuity… as will be advanced and qualified through processes of harmonic resolution… (819)

Such apparent 'integrity', as arising through harmonic resolution, also has a metaphysical resonance to the extent that this type of experience, as a broadly based requisite to the very obtainment of appreciation itself, is a 'transcendental necessity' to the extent we can both appreciate an overall continuation of integrity despite occasional, partial forms of non-conformance therein. However, this imputation of conformal continuity does not mean we should non-pragmatically provide some other set of extrapolated or interpolated mechanism or mechanisms in order to explain such a phenomenon, and all other related phenomena, when it is the very nature of phenomenal experience and its appreciation to be nothing else other than being in conformity with the very nature to be entailed in such phenomenological experience, etc., and, that the requisite forms of epistemological appreciation are already in place in order to entertain such simulated suppositions, etc., such as, e.g., truth determination, conformance, our abilities to entertain imputations, along with our capacities to recognize, encounter, and engage processes of transformation by virtue of their virtually engendered transformational retreatment, and so on, and so forth. (820)

Why invoke this expression 'metaphysics' when traditional forms of metaphysical speculation have been so thoroughly deconstructed and dismissed as no more than ideological baggage and extremist nonsense? (821)

I would like to contend that, despite the fact that a considerable proportion of the motivation between a traditional metaphysics is patent nonsense, still, some aspects, cautiously re-translated, should survive more thorough forms of scrutiny. Moreover, central to the conformal appreciation of a philosophical sense of perspective we should find certain processes exist that deal with metaphysical-like notions and experiences that need to be viewed through a resuscitated and reformed version of metaphysics that needs to be finally rendered as fit for purpose in this Contemporary era. So, why seek a new appellation of 'metaphysics' for this discipline of metaphysics when the reconstruction of this field of enquiry is being reformed as a form of metaphysics *qua* metaphysics, albeit, hopefully without the ideological nonsense and the extremist baggage… (822)

To argue this case let me do so under the following twelve *ad hoc* headings, namely, **integrity, functional similarities, mutations, anti-representationalism, a positive nihilism, methodological reclamation, philosophical revitalization, economic**

holism, existential re(-)writing, discursive dissemination, causal implications, and a consequential analysis. (823)

The relatively integrated nature of phenomenological experience, realized through forms of economic-non-economic-hyper-economic resolution, manifests as forms of integrity, e.g., subjectivity, objectivity, and so on.[232] Or, running this transcendental-like argument in reverse,[233] without such relative integration of process, i.e., integrity, there could be no personal integrity, no objective integrity, and so on, with the result there could be no exposition, no discourse, and no causal processes of re(-)direction, etc.[234] Without consequences there could be neither perception nor apperception of a world a large, and so forth. Disciplinarians, philosophers, and metaphysicians deal with this transcendentally necessary type of observation, each in their own way.[235] E.g., by assuming the relatively stable integrity of their respective discourses; through a non-denial of integrated-continuity; and, through an advertent or inadvertent conformal understanding of the ramification of transformation retreatment as conducted within the overall economy of the economic, or its equivalent, etc.[236] (824)

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232 I.e., the relatively distinctive domains of intentional objectivity, intentional subjectivity, intentional inter-objectivity (of space and time), intentional inter-subjectivity (as constituting the divisions of the private sphere, the public sphere, and the sphere of arbitration). Then, those of a religious or theological persuasion may well wish to also argue for a fifth category, namely, the relative integrity of the transcendental-like unity of the overall life-world/world-of-life, world at large, etc. However, from a re(-)formed metaphysical-like point of view the relative-integrity imputed in the necessary continuity of experience would subsume all relatively 'distinctive domains' in line with the dialectical ramifications of an economic holism, etc.

233 Integrity of experience allows us to talk about a relational-situation encompassing certain facets of the same. In reverse, a relational-situatedness then allows us to talk about the forms of identity being discerned therein. Ideally, no form of absolutistical precedence can be arrived at from intentionally dividing up and 'isolating' intentional objectivity, intentional subjectivity along with the impetus for intentional motivation since all facets of epistemological experience in general are co-founded as economic correlativities in their respective economies that, likewise, cannot be isolated within the possible-actualities-/-actualized-possibilities to be discerned within this 'encompassment' of the overall world-of-life. Such considerations fall somewhat within a 'categorical metaphysics' that remains a re(-)formed metaphysics as long as it does not impute forms of representation (in a misguided representationalism) and positively maintains an anti-representationalism (through the absence of such unnecessary and impossible forms of representative imputation).

234 The argument here is that from form forms of resolution we get expositions, from the dissemination of the same we get discourses, and through discourses we get the (further) causal manipulation of phenomena both individually and collectively orchestrated. That the formation of an exposition and the dissemination of a discourse are already forms of causal manipulation, namely, intentional and discursive in orientation.

235 Please note that my use of this word 'transcendental' here has a more Kantian flavour and, thus, in this usage. is not being defined as 'trans-intentional, trans-cognitive, trans-perceptual, trans-conceptual', etc.

236 Economic complexification plus different aspects within a perspective and different perspectives in general permit the running of the inter-translation of seemingly parallel 'autonomous' language games as well as those that are seemingly incommensurable in more immediate terms of reference when both translators and translations are not currently available. That through various forms of semantic mapping within a hierarchy of meta-textual genres even seemingly autonomous language games can be both internally paraphrased and externally translated although the existential dividend of such forms of accommodation may well be, in all likelihood, practically minimal in terms of their e/valuational formation. Now, it may be argued that the games, say, of cricket and soccer are autonomously incommensurate, in some sympathy with Luhmann, however both involve the use of a ball, and say, in comparison with chess, they still invoke

Next, the experience of functional similarities, allows us to impute, either rightly or wrongly, various forms of relational connection, connectedness and inter-connectedness (between different relational situations). Such 'similarities recognizing, etc., non-absolutistical forms of relational integration and integrity (as long as such imputations are maintained in anti-representational terms of reference). (825)

The concept of 'mutations' recognizes 'that transformational alterations in the psychic integration of the epistemological hierarchy are dialectically reflected through apposite forms of language that note relative changes in its representative expressions, but, not absolute changes in the overall basis for the dissemination of our discourses, etc. Such conformal appreciation, therefore, needs to note such mutations as represented within the epistemological hierarchy, as reflected in language, etc., but not the alteration of the epistemological 'empire' itself through economic holism, etc. In effect, we have to recognize an increasing reluctance on our part to have to question relatively more basic presuppositional notions since to do so can have drastic, if not devasting, consequences for further acts of reporting in that disciplinary field being placed under such seriously reconstituted review. That we can be critical, and should be forever critical, but, we cannot be radically-radical, only relatively-radical as exercised through suitable forms of incremental hyper-economic re(-)appropriation. To illustrate this holistic observation we can note that historians may question what Julius Caesar had to eat on the morning of the day he crossed the Rubicon, but, not whether he did cross the Rubicon in anything other than the most cursory form of a hypothetical consideration that, in all likelihood, would not be that profitable for an historian's research in this field of Roman History (since such events did define this historical actor and continue to redefine that same historical actor today. That, even if it should be proven that he did not cross the Rubicon and ferment a civil war, still, historical reality on an even deeper level would be ever more resistant to more fundamental forms of (historical) mutation. Such mutational possibilities are not ruled out, only noted as more and more resistant to being able to be radically altered the deeper their presuppositional locations, but, if such relatively deeper mutations could be successfully explicated then the ramifications of such mutations in our understanding are just as radically profound, if not more so. From a re(-)formed metaphysical point of view this type of observation is to be duly noted. (826)

It cannot be stressed enough that it can only be in an anti-representationally oriented format that a re(-)formed metaphysics should be permitted to operate! Because a metaphysics based on the impossible literalization of metaphors is self-defeating, and, this can be demonstrated when this is suitably pointed out through argument! Moreover, a non-literal mode implies the persistence of the suspension, but, without the abrogation of the literal such a metaphysics will remain hobbled by the omission of that oversight. That the conventional use of all expressions in a conventional setting are permitted when per-

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a concept of 'winning and losing', and so on and so forth. Just as all codes are enveloped by super-codes, and, in turn, embrace sub-codes, etc., within the historical architecture of specific Political-Economies within the Political-Economic Environment. To state that the functions, say, of the Legal Fraternity are different from the Political System within a specific Political-Economy is state the obvious, however, we should also remember that the latter legislates the coding, and alterations in such coding, for the former!

mitted and not permitted when not permitted, but, cannot and should not be employed in the critical use of a discipline seeking the necessary possibility of relatively-radical outcomes in the existential service of others, etc. Thence the cultural-intercultural importance of an anti-representational ethics, an anti-representational science, an anti-representational history, and anti-representational metaphysics, etc., etc.[237] (827)

That a 'positive nihilism' automatically follows from any form of anti-representational 'presentationalism'. The epistemological world works when it is non-substantially oriented and non-negatively nihilistic in both tenor and complexion.[238] By 'presentationalism' is economically meant both an anti-representational representationalism and an anti-representational-re-presentationalism within the confine of the economy of an anti-representaitonal re(-)presentationalism… where conventional notions of economic representation are permitted, but, are not permitted in non-conventional, non-economic terms of reference given the impossible 'reality', in lived-reality, of all forms of 'ideological extremism'! The re(-)formed metaphysician having to walk a fine line between conventional substantialism and conventional non-substantialism whilst completely rejecting all talk and speculation about the non-conventional misuse of either substantial or non-substantial metaphors, etc! (828)

In 'methodological reclamation' we find a 'resuscitation in philosophical, metaphysical, and disciplinary use of method in order to achieve outcomes that have either critical import and/or radical import'. Basically, operating as permitted in conventional terms of reference without transgressing those limitations by not incurring misguided forms of impossible ideological baggage. Hence the need for the critical exercise of conventional forms of treatment in order to profit from the induced occurrence of either relatively-critical and/or relative-radical ramifications manifested with both a positive tenor and complexion as to be discerned in the pursuit of the formation of both positive forms of non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented processes of re(-)e/valuational formation. (829)

As already intimated, suitably exercised processes of a conformal metaphysical-like metafication through reduplication, along with pragmatic process of duplication, are automatically de-suspended through de-reduplicated de-metafication along with the subsequent revitalization of the philosophical discipline. **Thence the crucial, central importance of a well-conducted, well-pre-informed conformal metaphysics in the ongoing revitalization of both a relatively-critical and a relatively-radical conformal philosophy!** (830)

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237 'Etc.' including an 'anti-representational philosophy' courtesy of its revitalization through the retreatment of an anti-representational metaphysics (as argued for under the heading of 'philosophical revitalization').

238 A 'negative nihilism' being 'fraudulently based on the impossible non-conventional treatment of the non-substantial'. In contrast, a 'positive nihilism' is 'non-fraudulently based on the non-literal, economically qualified conventional treatment of both substantial and non-substantial metaphors without overstepping the conventional boundaries of such conventional usage'. Moreover, the re-positioning of a positive nihilism also actively permits the creative, innovative, responsible responses to existential arise in situations found through experience to be relatively anomalous for whatever reason or reasons. Thence its positive connotations.

Central to the critical operation of such metaphysical-philosophical ideas is the need to understand both the relatively immanent and relatively transcendental role to be played by the functional concept of an 'economic holism'. Let me explain. The nominative process of identification, e.g., etc., is realized through the extensive suspension from the dynamic balance of both immanent and transcendental orientations. Something relatively immanent is identified and its identification is then articulated from a relatively transcendent orientation. We cannot have one orientation without the other, and v.v. E.g., here is a tree, a product of tree-ness and the woody material that makes the tree be this tree and not that tree over there. Now, in a forest one tree is both this tree and one tree in that forest. Given that we do not absolutistically separate 'this tree' from its being 'this tree in that forest' why should we, similarly, invoke some 'absolutistical (form of) tree-ness' as 'absolutistically separate from its woody materiality'? Pragmatically, we have the form of a tree without needing to invoke some Platonic Form. Conversely, we have the woody material of the tree without have to invoke some (mysterious) substantial nature to account for something that is already being accounted for. That, in a similar vein, we should immediately dismiss all so-called 'immanent philosophies' and all so-called 'transcendent philosophies' unless such appellations are being used in a metaphorical sense that is not being impossibly mistreated in a literal vein. On the other hand, should a literal mode be invoked then such invocation must stand or fall in exactly those literal terms of reference. So, e.g., this woody material of this trees that has fallen can be utilized as 'wood', but, most certainly cannot be substituted for some misguide metaphysical notion of the 'substantial'. Quite plainly to see it is the 'wood' that 'burns in a fire or can be sawn and assembled in the form of a piece of furniture' because water, which too can be treated as conventionally 'substantial' does not burn in a fire, indeed, will put the fire out and, therefore, acts quite differently to 'wood' despite being just as 'substantial' from a conventional perspective. And a non-conventional language makes no sense. Or put another way, (entertain the notion of) a 'non-conventional language' makes as much sense as (entertaining the notion of) a 'private language'… (831)

'Economic holism', is a concept, that from a dialectical, economic perspective, metaphysically notes 'the co-existence of all economic possibilities and apparent actualities to some degree whilst also recognizing that all such dialectical forces can never be equal at any one moment in time, and, where an equality of forces can only be non-experientially envisaged between moments (and where all ascribed forms of equality must be analytically arbitrary in their designation, be that form of misrepresentation be theoretical, practical or critical-radical in scope). A number of important ramifications follow in the wake of this understanding. Hence, e.g., in conventional terms we can discern conventional process of misrepresentation in a conformal frame by noting apparent or envisaged discrepancy between phenomenal-phenomenological descriptions, etc. Or, e.g., that envisaged economic correlativities in a certain economy must all co-exists despite the subtle or non-subtle forms of preferencing that either rightly or wrongly can be appreciated as such within a conformally conducted process of appreciation. Because, for a start, misrepresentation can only be conceived of in an anti-representational philosophy, etc. Absolutistical representation, say, in a misguided substantialistic metaphysics, cannot even be entertained, and, therefore, 'misrepresentation' in such terms of reference only

compounds the nonsense if insisted upon. An economic holism also guarantees that all things are possible to the extent such possibilities are not only possible but actualizable, albeit to philosophical-metaphysical extent that we do no insist on an absolute separation between these correlative concepts of relative-possibility and relative-actuality, or any other forms of economic correlativity, say, 'cause' and 'effect', etc., which collectively demands a more conditional-economic approach, etc.[239] (832)

Now, recognition of the need for an extensive suspension at the center of all forms of judgment, etc., also implies that certain existential ramifications must also follow on in the wake of the philosophy of transformational retreatment, etc. That all forms of re-writing will have existential ramifications just as an awareness of the existential dimension will foresee it demands for the suitable rewriting of all forms of intervention. Unfortunately, such a dimension, more often than not, is seriously overlooked along with the imposition of a short-sighted transactionalism. That a pragmatic philosophy cannot be reduced the mere expediency of a pragmatical attitude because a pragmatic philosophy is open to the valid expression of all forms of inter-ordered phenomena as sited in their respective systematic frames of reference, and v.v. Where rom their interactive confluence, we find through resolution the formulation of our expositions, etc., and, from an existential appreciation of their interconnectedness we find through resolution the existential re-writing of those same expositions, etc. The expedition of which is better facilitated through the quality of our extensive suspensions. Thence the implication of a pro-relational attitude and its trans-relational sense and semblance of an ongoing process of a co-associated subjective re-orientation. (833)

From the formation of expositions, through the interaction of economic topics with hyper-economic systems, is non-economically disseminated their discursively formed disseminations along with their causal implications stemming from their consequential ramifications. Discursive textual formation is not productive of just passively 'read' texts but all manner of 're-writing'… from the relatively non-existential to the relatively existential, from the non-critical to the relatively-critical to the relatively-radical and, thence, its return to the conventional world through the auspices of the hyper-economic nature of that sub-economic domain, etc. (834)

As argued, from discursive formation we can entertain causal formations, courtesy of the extensive suspension, de-suspensions, etc.[240] From paralleling writing, we get reading, from reading we get re-writing, form re-writing we get re-reading, and so on, which can be nothing other than the approximate paralleling of the virtual and the non-virtual, i.e., our causal engagement in this world at large. That through the extensive suspension we can also more overtly encourage the working-refinement of an existential re-reading and re-writing of this same world at large. (835)

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239 The 'etc.' referencing here the need also for an expansion in terms, e.g., of the overall economy of the economic, etc.

240 The de-suspension occurs in the (sub-economy of the) 'extended suspension' that then allows us to operate, through physiological approximations, in a causal dimension that is entailed within the 'extensive suspension' as discussed at length in *Pursuit,* Volume II.

From our obvious implication and involvement in a non-virtual world of causation the metaphysical ramifications of a consequential analysis automatically follows, albeit as construed through the ensuing re(-)formation of this metaphysics as fit for this Contemporary era. But, let us look more closely at this subject through the lens of a fully fledge pragmatic philosophy (as it will be soon further outlined). (836)

Now, in regard to these *ad hoc* reasons for postulating a re(-)formed metaphysical discipline fit for purpose I am not asking for either their unquestioned acceptance or their equally unprofessional rejection, merely their hypothetical comprehension as a precondition for their relatively-critical and relatively-radical appreciation as possible working proposals in the formation of a positively nihilistic, anti-representational, existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism. In this regard, the reader, or audience, are also invited, indeed, encouraged to formulate their own list of characteristics that would successfully mark out the terrain for such a working-pragmatism… (837)

Now having explored these notions of the 'conformal' and 'metaphysics', let me now continue to re-explore these following four concepts of a 're(-)presentational economy', an 'anti-representationalism', 'nihilism', and the ensuing reside of an innovatively creative 'pragmatic philosophy'.[241] (838)

An anti-representational philosophy (and metaphysics, etc.) cannot be formulated without reference to the working formation of conventional processes of a functioning representationalism since the former would be rendered invisible, as without a trace of significance in any form whatsoever. Equally, all impossible formulations of a traditional representationalism would be as just as useless in this same regard. So, how does a working, conventional form of representationalism operate that allows us to then formulate the prioritization of an anti-representationalism to successfully permeate all forms of disciplinary endeavour? The statement I see my cat sitting on my rug beside the fire is something that can be both understood both conceptually and perceptually. Indeed, we could run an argument that this statement (S) is a true (t) proposition (P) by virtue of the fact that through an alignment between the relevant element of the conceptual proposition [Z e^1, e^2, etc.]'and the perceptual statement (Z e^1, e^2, etc.) this meta-alignment is true iff and only if this alignment holds:

I.e., S' is t iff P, namely [Z e^1, e^2, etc.]' iff (Z e^1, e^2, etc.). (839)

For a process of representation to be entertained we need to be able to relate the structures of S and P in terms of their relatively invariant isomorphic correspondences, and, for a positive conformal state of truth determination to follow we need to note the full or saturated corresponding alignments to be observed (or, at least, as symbolically being observed). From my perspective this is non-controversial. If we were to see an apple we are seeing an apple regardless of whether it is non-virtual apple or a virtual apple, say, a dream apple. However, to produce a positively conformal report we need to be able to note in what sense an apple representation matches or does not match the ideality of a phenomenologically experienced non-virtual apple, or some other type of discerned phe-

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241 Referencing the intent set out in paragraph 807.

nomenal manifestation, in general terms of reference in terms of its modal complexion in order to be able to determine the type of truth relations that conformally follow… all I might add without to impute the non-necessary addition of metaphysical notions like substance, the Divine, preestablished harmony, and so on. (840)

Similarly, the explication of certain attributes to an apple presentation, say, colour, smell, taste, etc., equally stand in no need of unnecessary forms of a traditional metaphysical supplementation. So, a 'red apple' is a red apple, and a 'delicious apple' was a delicious apple, and so on. Again, we have no need for unnecessary and misguided forms of a traditional-stye of metaphysical supplementation. On the other hand, whether we are conformally correct or incorrect in the attribution of such appellations is another matter, merely calling into question evidential modes of assessment that only need to operate in the evidential frames of treatment as suitably conducted within a Tarskian frame of reference. No more, and, no less! Indeed, in this, we can only work with what is to be treated as that 'which is to hand'. (841)

So, a conventional reading of representation, through propositional forms of alignment, in a Tarskian frame of reference, albeit from an evidential perspective, is all that is needed. (842)

That, granted, then how do we define an anti-representationalism asking ourselves at the same time if such re(-)positioning is actually needed? (843)

An anti-representationalism recognizes that beyond the conventional that 'there is no being beyond the conventional', that in trying to go beyond the conventional *qua* conventional we can only make fools out of ourselves the very instant we were to believe in the existence of such ideological nonsense! Unfortunately, most people are mesmerized by such impossible thoughts. (844)

When we look into a mirror and see 'our own face looking back at us' we do not usually impute the substantial existence of the 'reflection' as if there existed two people who looked like ourselves. Otherwise, how could we look at such a reflection and view it as merely 'a reflection of our own face, no more, and, no less..!' (845)

Thence the need for a nihilistic re-positioning that is positive in orientation, i.e., as not ruling out a conventional basis for all manner of e/valuational formations. Whereas a negative reading is pessimism writ large, as anti-creative, inhuman, as devoid of the innovative possibilities for apposite, existentially oriented forms of transformation, relational richness and enrichment, etc. (846)

Now, in removing the impossible baggage of misguided forms of traditional metaphysics, and in establishing the workings of a re(-)formed metaphysical-philosophy fit for Contemporary metaphysical practice, etc., just what would we be left with? We would be left with a fully functioning pragmatic philosophy, no more, and, no less! Let me explore the functions and ramifications of such re(-)positioning. (847)

My definition of a 'pragmatically oriented re(-)positioning', in the light of the above, is as a 'positively nihilistic, anti-representational existentialism'. Therefore, the following contrast is set up, namely, that a 'pragmatic philosophy' is 'not a negatively nihilistic, representationalistic anti-existentialism'. (848)

Or, we could take a parallel tack and from the perspective of a re(-)formed metaphysics explore the nature of a pragmatic philosophy, say, under the twelve *ad hoc* heading as just explored. In this regard, let me now further focus of what is entailed in an 'anti-representationalism' by exploring how various traditional disciplines could be seriously re-constituted through this necessary aspect of a pragmatic perspective.[242] (849)

With the six trans-cognitive orders we have six distinctive disciplines, namely, beginning with the first order, a semantic-phenomenology, an aesthetics, (non-systematic and systematic forms of) a deontologically oriented ethics or existentialism, pragmatics,[243] hermeneutics, and an ontics or factology.[244] Then, through reduplication, beginning with the first order, we arrive at, respectively, a categorical or semantic metaphysics, (metaphysical-like considerations of a) psychology (and then, through further reduplication, a sociology, etc.), (metaphysical-like considerations of) politics (and the enaction of political power), (metaphysical-like considerations of the) business world under the rubric of 'economics', (metaphysical-like considerations of a) science, (metaphysical-like considerations of a) history. (850)

For convenience, let me simply list them as **phenomenology, aesthetics, existentialism, pragmatics, hermeneutics, factology; categorical metaphysics (semanticism), psychology, politics, economics, science, and history**. To this list let also add (the business of) **law** and (the business of Media and Social-Media as) **communications**. Now with these fourteen headings[245] let my explore how each one of these disciplines can apply an anti-representational philosophical-metaphysical perspective in order to oversee the detailed re(-)constitution of these disciplines as 'radically' refracted through this type of a pragmatic lens. Although 'more detailed' this pragmatic transformation, as a disciplinary makeover or process of conversion, should be regarded as only the beginnings of this type of project, or over time, as a program that, no doubt, will ever remain as a 'work in progress'. (851)

Some quick comments on my methodology for conducting this anti-representational conversion. The discipline in question needs to be treated first in its con-

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242 'Necessary' by virtue of the definitions supplied in the two preceding paragraphs.

243 'Pragmatics' here is not to be confused with a 'pragmatic philosophy' given the emphasis of the former on a functional or transactional expediency, effectiveness, efficaciousness, economical or parsimonious behaviours, etc., etc.

244 The articulation of a discipline concerned with the discernment, thematization, clarification, and collation of fact through the exercise of suitable conformal forms of evidential treatment.

245 Although both a conformal philosophy (P) and a conformal metaphysics (M) have been given a brief introductory exploration we can also add these two additional anti-representational headings to our list of fourteen. An archetypal, conformal anti-representational theology (T) will also be considered. In relation to P and M I am currently of two minds as to how to define T through forms of reduplication, namely, P^3 or M^2 or a combination of both forms of reduplication?

ventional orientation *qua* conventional orientation. To oversee this phenomenlogicalization of the discipline we need to orchestrate a suitably exercised suspension (in the same manner that this is already a necessary prerequisite in the suitable exercise of a 'transcendental phenomenology'). Then we need to both exercise a negative process of deconstruction in order to remove the ideologically defective, and, a positive process of deconstruction in order to reconstruct the non-ideologically non-defective. Then, in a process of ongoing re(-)normalization, we introduce a creative use of analogical language in order to then set the metaphorical 'stage' for the creative productivity of forms of economic modeling conducive to either a relatively-critical and/or relatively-radical expansion of our experiential horizons within the distinctive compass of that discipline in question. (852)

Even before we introduce and begin this process of conversion, we already have two poster-like examples of what is hoped to be achieved by such a transformational conversion, namely, the disciplines of a 'transcendental phenomenology' and 'quantum physics'. In the first, as noted, we begin with a transcendental suspension, albeit as exercised through what I have explored as an 'extensive suspension'. In the second, we find quantum physics, at least in the dominant 'modeling' of the Copenhagen Interpretation, expresses a profound reluctance to analogically model its construction as little more than the 'prescriptive application of measurements', etc.[246] As will be later expressed, I believe the absence of this feature of analogical modeling to seriously act as a missing feature, as somewhat of a puzzle, in the coursing of this sub-discipline (within the super-discipline of science) and its 'lack' has spawned a creative plethora of models where, currently, the jury is not yet ready to retire to in order to commence its comparative deliberations over the enhanced utility of these tentatively presented models, etc. For some anti-representationalists this absence of modelling could well be viewed as a theoretical plus. However, in my opinion, the qualified utilization of modelling is a necessity if the discipline is going to be able to creatively expand and potentially overlap, in a profitable inter-disciplinary manner, other scientific sub-disciplines, e.g., the macro-cosmic dimensions of relativity and its entailed calculations, etc.[247] However, this qualified introduction of the analogical (use, e.g., of picture-tools, etc.) must be conducted within both the conventional sphere and the suspension of the same (without the literal mistreatment of analogical language misdirected in a mistaken representationalistic direction). Hence this manoeuvre must be viewed as the 'qualified introduction of analogical modeling' along with the 'non-transgression of its creative explorations within the limitations of the epistemological boundaries of the discipline in question...' (853)

Before setting about this process of conversion (translating non-anti-representational presentations, etc., to an anti-repesentational format, formation, and form) let first discuss in what senses an anti-representationalism can be contemplated from an economic perspective, etc., and, second, let me present a scheme under seven heading for how this process might proceed in a more consistent fashion. (854)

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246 Crudely put this could be expressed as 'just shut up, and calculate!', etc.

247 An anomalous chasm that has riven the theoretical enterprise of physics (in the super-discipline of science). Needless to say, in the world of science there are a number of other anomalies that are also perceived as a cause for concern. On the other hand, we might surmise that at the non-center of every discipline we will find such anomalies perhaps more as a consequence of the dialectical-like artifacts economically encountering the natural limits placed upon our theoretical constructs?

In my opinion an anti-representationalism inescapably depends upon a philosophy of representation and that we should not shy away from this dialectical fact that gives us the definitively desired contrast required for the articulation of the former. But, in this manoeuvre, in setting up this meaningful contrast, we need to qualify a form of representationalism that, first, can operate as a significant construct, but, second, at the same time, ultimately defers to the requisite re(-)positioning demanded by a fully functioning anti-representationalism. This requirement I perceive as being met in an economic viewing of the 'representational economy' that could just as equally be referred to as a 'presentational economy' or a 're-presentational economy' if the trimodal formulation of that economy is correlatively shared in that same manner. Now, as an economy we should already understand that no economic correlative can be either attained or obtained, i.e., fully appropriated in and of itself. They only function in an economic relationship to each other. Therefore, a *de facto* anti-representationalism is already in place by virtue of the fact that no economic correaltivity can be either absolutistically presented, represented and/or re-presented in an isolated form purely in or of themselves! Another way of approaching this anti-representationalismis to ubstitue the so-called third moment of re-presentation with the equated moment of 'anti-representation(alism)'. Given that all economic moments are the joint suspension of the other two moments it follows, in this version of the representational economy that the so-called 'third moment' of an 'anti-representational moment' is equivalent to 'the joint negation of the remaining two moments, namely, the presentational moment and the representational moment…' and, therein, establishing this same point that an anti-representationalism is neither the moments of presentation nor representational. But, then, a balanced trimodal economy then gives us this overall economy of the anti-representation. That, in effect, and economic review (further reinforced through both a hyper-economic and non-economic reviewing) would establish the same superior sense of re(-)positioning, namely, that because no economic correlative can be absolutistically isolated from its co-associated economy of origination it follows that we are left with the relative superiority of the default position which should be none other than an anti-representationalism! (855)

Now, for the sake of being economical and for the sake of a relative simplicity let me tentative propose the following provisional scheme as a working methodology for the conversion of a report entailing a set of non-representational propositions, etc., into a set of anti-representational propositions. Let me do this under this mnemonic of seven headings, namely, **Exhibition**, **Suspension/s**, **Negative & Positive Deconstructions**, **Re-Specification**, **Completion** (of Conversion), (Existential) **Appreciation**. Let me briefly explain what is entailed. (856)

1. **Exhibition** entails the symbolically represented set of conventional propositions (descriptions, prescriptions, proscriptions; perceptual reports, testimony, inferences; possible states of affairs, facts, opinions, beliefs, etc.) of the report about to be converted to its anti-representational translation. This can be considered as the relevant material to hand. Moreover, all processes of (an extensive) suspension necessitate such propositional materials to hand… (857)

2. **Suspensions** entail treating the propositional nature of the report (without necessarily overtly exhibiting each and every proposition of that report) to the triple status of propositions treated as imputations, as non-extrapolated and as suspended.[248] (858)

3. **Negative Deconstruction**, as a form of treatment, follows the suspension, where we rule out the defective, e.g., the irrelevant, self-contradictions, incoherencies, fallacious arguments, impossible economic states of affairs, impossible or non-applicable conclusions and consequences, etc. (859)

4. **Positive Deconstruction** continue where a negative process of deconstruction has finished by (the ongoing economic of) re(-)constructing the relatively non-defective. It is further reinforced by the ensuing de-suspension overseeing processes of existential re-specification.[249] (860)

5. **Re(-)Specification** is a process of existentially oriented re(-)modeling that innovatively occurs either as a matter of course and/or through the adoption and adaptation of the creatively qualified introduction of models that expand the horizons of that report, that hopefully, are capable of augmenting and enhancing existential enrichment, the formation of new vocabularies, the creation of novel and more relevant forms of social consensus, and/or definitive histories, etc., etc. (861)

6. **Completion** oversees the completing of this process of translation in which the report in question is fully rendered in an anti-representational format, etc. (862)

7. **Appreciation** attempts to discern to what extent that an existential difference has been created in the formation of the report and to what extent it was acted upon and successfully enacted. Similarly, a non-existential difference should also be observed to the extent it also can be seen to augment and enhance the non-existential richness of that relationship or set of relationships represented by that report. That, collectively, by taking both existential and non-existential differences into account it then assists us in our discerning a consequential difference in our e/valuation of a co-associated consequential analysis in the hope that we also acted in a reasonable conformance with the apparent imperatives entailed in the demands entailed in that report? (863)

However, this scheme is designed to be applied in circumstances that are more specifically focused. In general terms let me introduce the broader ramifications of this

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248 As a related digression we can define a first-class disciplinarian as a person who operates from a position with a triple status through maintaining a putative, suspended and non-extrapolated set of orientation. Where a second-class disciplinarian operated with the double status of imputations that are suspended but by remaining as not non-extrapolated. That a third-class disciplinarian operates with imputations. but where they are neither suspended nor non-extrapolated. That the disciplinary economy, consisting of first second, and third-class disciplinarians., is such where there can be no first class, no second class, and no third-class disciplinarians operating purely in those exclusively defined terms of reference because they mutually define each other through economic correlativity, and, where no economic correlative can be isolated as being a 'part' apart from their economy of origination.

249 We can introduce here novel forms of modelling in the hope of find innovative forms of ensuing re(-)specification.

process of conversion. To set the stage for this turning around of conventional understandings let note the following reverse engineering of my definition of a pragmatic philosophy, that is not intended to be reduced to a simple exercise in mere expediency, by demonstrating the connections between a positive nihilism, an anti-representationalism, and an existentialism (defined in its systematic sense and not just as the archetypal third moment of the archetypal economy). The equation reads that the re(-)positioning in question here is to be viewed as a 'positively nihilistic,[250] anti-representational existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism'. From a pragmatic perspective we can say this form of 'pragmatism' is 'existential, anti-representational, and positively nihilistic'. Moreover, from a pro-relational, holistic point of view we can also mutually equate these defining facets of this definition. That being 'positively nihilistic' is being both 'anti-representational' and 'pro-relationally existential'. To argue for this type of a 'grand equation' it is my opinion, as an inferential observation, that from the 'transcendental' perspective defined as the broad equivalence to be entertained between the 'trans-cognitive', 'trans-intentional', 'trans-conceptual', 'trans-perceptual', 'judgmental', 'pro-relational', existential', etc., set of perspectives. Moreover, this equivalence can be extended when we realize the 'pro-relational' can also be equated with both a 'positive nihilism' and an 'anti-representationalism'. But, this set of equations granted, hypothetically at least, how then do we account for their equivalence with a 'pragmatic philosophy' merely arrived at through the mere dictates of this definition alone? To answer this question, equivalent to a serious objection, let me outline my perception, or, rather, apperception, of this concept of the 'pragmatic' as here being articulated by myself (in an attempt to flesh out how a working pragmatic philosophy can be constructed in a fully functioning manner capable of non-ideologically replacing ideological forms of positioning that are unsuitable for uptake by serious disciplinarians being formulated in either an improper, inappropriate, and/or inapposite manner of theoretical deployment, etc.[251]). [252] (864)

My idea of the pragmatic is primarily deontological in orientation but not excluding both aesthetical and pragmatical inputs. I.e., being a composite of these three forms of 'value' contributing to an overall expression of an e/valuational process of value formation. I.e., as centered in the third trans-cognitive order but not located there exclusively. It is on these grounds that I can insist that the pragmatic (in a fully functioning pragmatic philosophy) is not and cannot be reduced to mere expediency of the pragmatic fourth order (but, at the same time, not excluding non-existentially oriented forms of pragmatical evaluation [which, we should also note, is not divorced from also entailing certain deontological imperatives just as, e.g., being 'parsimonious' is 'conforming to the dictate to be economical', etc.]). Now the third trans-cognitive order' corresponds, coincidently, with the 'third archetypal moment of the archetypal economy', namely, 'Ego'. This third order is primarily deontological in the distinctive type of its e/valuational formation. As a 'discipline' we could call such 'broad ethical considerations' primarily 'deontological in scope' with the disciplinarian being somewhat of an 'ethicist', 'deontolo-

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250 From an existential point of view, we can arrange a similar set of equations.

251 Referencing the formula: theoretical deployment, practical employment and critical/radical redeployment.

252 Referencing the formula where 'suitable' is equivalent to 'phenomenological propriety, hermeneutical appropriateness, and (both non-systematic and existential) existential appositeness'.

gist' or preferably, and 'existentialist'. Now, through reduplication, because the locus of causal enaction is centered in this moment of Ego, in and through its co-associated sense of its current mix of subjectivities, i.e., in and through an overall sense and semblance of subjective expression, we should see that 'disciplinarian', generally, as a 'politician', and particularly, as a 'moral person' whose actual 'morality', specifically, is a direct reflection of their existential and pragmatic uptake of a suitably expressed responsibility in keeping with the pro-relational requirements of the situatedness of that person or persons in question as defined through their current relational terms of reference. By 'politician' it is left open as to whether they individually or collectively are taking up the full gamut of responsibilities to be found 'called for' in responding responsibly to the specific nature of the lived-reality of their current situatedness. The interventions of the politician taking on an existential orientation when the e/valuational appreciation of that situation oversees the overall creation, preservation and conservations of the relational richness and enrichment of those relationships in question. That in this scheme a fully-fledged pragmatist, therefore, is an existentialist who primarily adopts and adapts a deontological appreciation of the situation to hand without either reducing their ethical interactions to a matter of mere pragmatical expediency or to a response that is equally devoid of all non-existentially oriented forms of valid input. I can make this same point of qualification by re-paraphrasing an allusion to a Biblical quotation to the effect that 'we do not live by bread alone nor should we live without bread as well!'[253] (865)

Therefore, once we understand this equation between the 'pragmatic' and the 'existential', and, that the nature of the existential is pro-relational in orientation, i.e., without a preferential over-commitment to the so-called 'realism', etc., (or 'idealism', etc.) of the material elements of the objective orientation (as presented through an intentional objectivity) , the mere presentation of the subjectivity, intersubjectivity, inter-objectivity, etc., then we are already entertaining a positive nihilistically treated anti-representationalism. That what we are left with are imputations treated in a conventional sense and semblance as conventional in sense and semblance only. I.e., as suspended and non-extrapolated. Thence this pragmatic re(-)positioning, therefore, is the acceptance of conventional imputations that are both suspended and non-extrapolated beyond the suitable limits of a representative philosophy. That a representative philosophy is perfectly acceptable in an economic setting that does not transgress the economic limitations of such a setting. Hence, the conformal settings of a representational philosophy can only be positively nihilistic and anti-representational in scope.[254] (866)

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253 Matthew 4: 1-4. Here I make the reversed allusion to 'bread' being the 'existential in orientation', and 'food other than bread' being 'the relatively non-existential as pragmatically derived'. Or, in effect, the supplementation of that which is 'not bread', i.e., the 'non-deontologically oriented non-existential' can be discriminatively discerned either as negative, neutral, or positive in orientation, and, where our preference in non-existential considerations should fall on the latter two options of either the relatively neutral or the relatively positive. I.e., that the relatively non-existential should not be just dismissed in negative terms of reference… because 'we cannot live by bead alone'.

254 A 'negative nihilism' could be equated with a 'pessimistic relativism'. But, we should be more aware that even though that an ideal and perfect understanding of the world would entail an indubitable appreciation of every perspective in an infinity of perspectives, still, in an appreciation of the merely relevant we do not need such impossible feats of epistemological resourcefulness because our limited interrogations to a greater extent seem to answer themselves allowing us to enjoy the fruits of our labours and a hopeless squandering of our limited resources. Furthermore, through the emergence of an existential en-

Thence this definition of a pragmatic philosophy (and similarly an existential philosophy) is also an equation between a 'positive nihilism' and an 'anti-representationalism', and an 'existentialism'. (867)

1. An Anti-Representational Phenomenology

As just noted, the exercise of a (transcendental) phenomenology under the auspices of a transcendental suspension renders this discipline very must in the category of a poster exhibit, at least as an example of how we should commence, etc.[255] By 'transcendental' is meant the inspection of the intentional constitution *qua* intentional constitution of the apparent constitution of the intentional objective under review (in phenomenological terms of reference). However, I re(-)interpret the expression 'transcendental' in this type of phenomenal-phenomenological use as 'trans-intentional', 'trans-cognitive', 'trans-conceptual', 'trans-perceptual', etc. That the (extensive) suspension exposes, among many things, the apparent intentional constitution under review given its economic constitution and where the economic lends itself to various forms of hyper-economic pretreatment and posttreatment forms of rectification, etc; economic treatment through deconstruction, etc; non-economic retreatment through re(-)normalization, etc. (868)

The import of a thorough suspension (as supplied through my practical-concept of the 'extensive suspension' viewed as a more consistent and broader interpretation of a transcendental suspension through its implications of the de-suspension and the ensuing causal consequences incurred through this process of the de-suspension that are entirely absent in the exposition of the Husserlian interpretation) provides for a more dynamic appreciation of judgment that also finds a place for interrogation, forms of representation, the innovative room for patterns of re-direction, etc? I.e., the very asking of a question, central to philosophy, like any respectable discipline, involves a series of suspensions as explored in my exposition of the interrogative economy. Similarly, in that exposition we have parallels with a representational economy where rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional moments in the interrogative economy parallel the representational, presentation, and re-presentational moments in the representational economy. However, this representational economy, like all economies, implies through economic correlativity that no moment can be either attained or obtained in and of itself, i.e., fully appropriated, which is in complete harmony with both a positive nihilism and an anti-representationalism. Furthermore, this existentially oriented moment of re-presentation through chaotically induced re-direction also supplies this element of innovative re-specification as argued for in this in-depth appreciation of an anti-representational translation of representative experience (as contained within a representative economy through economic correlativity, etc.). (869)

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richment we find our careful investments can harvest a harvest greater than that merely invested in the same!

[255] Ensuring, at the same time, we do not make the same types of mistakes committed by Edmund Husserl, e.g., by insisting on the search for the absolutistically indubitable, by not taking on board a respect for the historical nature of systems, etc. (although I am still sympathetic to the cautious treatment of 'philosophy' as a 'science', as possibly exemplified by Laruelle, without at the same time seeking any form of an impossible to obtain so-called 'First Philosophy', or a prioritization of the ethical, or similar, etc.).

A phenomenological approach also backets ideological considerations and where further scrutiny, through a well-conducted suspension, should reveal either their economically impossible formulation or their inappropriately qualified formulation, or, where we should also add, their appropriately qualified specification through apposite forms of re-specification as recovered or remodeled through the force of the automatically ensuing de-suspension. By 'recovered' is meant 'the relatively intact restoration of the initial state of the pretreatment subjected to the suspension', and by 're-modeled' is meant the innovatively remodeled approach arrived at through creative forms of situational re-writing that prove to be instrumental in the ensuing overall process of existential enrichment arising from the impact of its re-directed understanding along with its re-directed consequential import, etc.' Arguing, in effect, for an ongoing process of re(-)normalization where existential events increasingly parallel and approximate their non-economic moments of relational resolution. However, unlike the imaginative exploration of virtual states of affair, the ensuing phenomenological articulation of the non-virtual is a process that must occur over a certain period of time and not, e.g., spontaneously, which needs to be recognized as being a hallmark of existentially oriented experience rather than as a consequential fact of such existential involvement. (870)

2. An Anti-Representational Aesthetics

How might we report such reports concerning aesthetic experience, arrived at through ongoing processes of resolution, when converted and translated through an anti-representational perspective? (871)

My immediate response to this question is to note that there could be no aesthetic response to either artistic artworks or the sublime nature of reality if an anti-representationalism were not already evident in the enaction of this type of an aesthetic review. In other words, elements naturally falling into the relativity of foregrounds and backgrounds along with our perception and apperception of human predicaments, and subjectivities entailed, ensure, I am sure, the formation of processes of ongoing resolution that contribute to this appreciation of the relatively aesthetic (when subtly engendered between Object and Ego moments along with the relative suppression of the World moment). That without such relational involvement and its resolution there would be no relationships let along a relational appreciation of their aesthetic potential, etc. (872)

In other words, at the expense of this simplicity of an exposition, without relational interaction through a relative downplaying of both relational participant (subjects) and parties (objects) in a pro-relational process of relational simulation, there could neither relationships nor their aesthetic appreciation, etc. Hence the necessity of an anti-representational conversion of representative elements as presented in and through the relational origination of both our relationships and in the simulations of their pro-relational situatedness. (873)

3. An (Ethical) Anti-Representational Existentialism[256]

That what applies to the formation of aesthetical experience also applies to the value formation of ethical considerations, albeit as divided between the deontological and the pragmatical (with an existential preference for the former). (874)

Furthermore, from a pro-relational perspective, relational interactions are automatically preferenced over relational participants and parties in the light of emergent creation of existential surpluses as excesses in e/valuational formation over that value originally invested in the same. (875)

Thence the obvious conclusion, that existentially oriented relationships oversee a relative proliferation in e/valuational formation (value) over that being invested in the same. Hence without a pro-relational exhibition of an anti-representational perspective there could not emerge such notions as the 'ethical', an 'anti-representative existentialism', the 'pragmatic', 'political power', along with supplemental processes of the aesthetical, pragmatical, etc. That without this basis in the pro-relational nature of the existential there could not exist the discipline of the existentialist and its reduplication in the form of the politician or politicist[257] regardless of whether their interventions in this world at large are either existentially oriented and/or non-existentially oriented. (876)

Where the pro-relational orientation oversees the de-preferential treatment of both relational participants (subjects) and relational parties (objects) by neither prioritizing, nor privileging, nor promoting the relatively non-relational over the relatively relational, whereas, through emergence, the relatively relational deserves to be preferenced to the same degree it expresses its relational facticity above and beyond the mere summation of its relatively non-relational inputs.[258] (877)

4. An Anti-Representational Pragmatics

Similarly, without an anti-representational perspective there could be no ascertainment of the effective, efficacious, expeditious, economical, etc. (878)

Because pragmatical e/valuation can only arise through the resolution of such practical considerations viewed in and through practical terms of reference. That without a pro-relational aspect this calculation and form of discrimination, re the effective, etc., just could not arise in non-relational terms of reference. (879)

Thankfully, the existential transcends the purely calculative nature of pragmatical considerations without severing itself from the value of such supplementation. (880)

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256 An 'anti-representational existentialism' can also be viewed as an 'existential anti-representational ethics'.

257 The 'politicist' being 'a person who enters into patterns of intervention that could be described as either political and/or non-political in orientation (with respect to the conventional use of that expression 'political')

258 I.e., relational output is always greater than its relatively non-relational input hence this concept of 'relational facticity' proportional to that excess in e/valuational formation.

5. An Anti-Representational Hermeneutics

The hermeneutical dimension (of the hyper-economic) exerts its influence through meta-textual instructions imprinted on the functioning form of textual formation. Hence e.g., the literary form of letters *versus* essays, and, business letters *versus* love letters, etc. Confuse such genres, etc., and we risk becoming incomprehensible. These genres of behaviour all have two faces, namely, writing and reading, although more correctly the joint sub-economy of both re(-)writing-and-re(-)reading (acting as the third hermeneutic sub-economic moment in the economy of the hyper-economic on par with the trimodal hermeneutic circle of comprehension divided between the economic correlatives of the hermeneutic 'whole', the phenomenological 'part', and the existential 'whole-and-parts'. This comparison being, argued through economic complexification, as active re(-)writing, passive re(-)reading, and our engagement of re(-)writing-and-re(-)reading. Furthermore, we should note a hierarchicalization in the semantic mapping of genres of behaviour as is implied where letters and essays fall within the relatively super-genre of literary texts, and, business letters and love letters fall under the relative super-genre of letters, etc. Or just as the many ways of eating a piece of fruit fall under the many ways of eating considered more generally. (881)

Now, such relations could not be observed in a non-relational frame of reference, or, similarly, if radically-radical relations were attempted to be understood within the conventional categorizations of various hermeneutic forms of mapping. The *raison d'être* of the hyper-economic economy, in its contributing to the overall economy of the economic, is to successfully re(-)appropriate the relatively-radical as it incrementally departs from a standard mapping of genres of behaviour through the relatively-incremental re-adoption and re-adaptation of pre-existing genres through processes of rectification as applied through post-relevant forms of suitable transformational retreatment. Just as, e.g., slicing a loaf of bread needs to be wrapped in some manner or other for the convenience of its purchase, and, by branding the wrapping of that loaf of sliced bread a process of practically costless advertising is also conveniently disseminated by doing so, etc. Or, as I have argued, displaying the applicable range in protein content of that loaf of bread could also add additional value to that product if it were to represent a more protein enriched loaf (as one practical piece in the resolution of the obesity 'epidemic'). (882)

Without these co-semantic interconnections in the hierarchical mapping of genres we would end up with a bewildering array of behavioural responses that we would not be able to make much sense of. As an illustration of this point, we can note the taxonomy of medical expressions where organs have a technical name and how they are either described or have prescribed patterns of treatment applied to them so, e.g., phlebitis, and, phlebotomy, i.e., respectively, an inflammation (through irritation, injury or infection) of the vein/s, and, the puncturing of a vein, say, for purposes of blood-letting (for whatever reason), etc. Implicit in such terminology is this mapping as a convenient way to compress the degree of complexity that would be present if everything were to be given a discrete, unrelated name without such cross-connections. (883)

Hence an anti-representational hermeneutics is the full functioning of a hierarchical mapping of an array of meta-textual gernes of behaviour that assists in our recognition of what is being focused upon by its proximity to closely related genres and when necessary, in what manner they have been incrementally adjusted to form a newly adapted genre or a new hybrid genre functioning somewhere between two or more genres already well-understood. In effect, an anti-representational approach is instrumental in establishing the pre-condition of a Goldilocks region in which hermeneutic appropriation operates between that which is either too complex or that which is too simplistic. In effect, proffering a holistic-like space with, more or less, the least effort for the maximum return that could not function if such representation were impractically conducted on a one for one basis[259] or on an impossible basis of many to one.[260] (884)

Such representation being anti-representational (and positively nihilistic) because this economic correlative of 'representation' in a 'representational economy' (that equally could be called a 'presentational economy' or a 're-presentational economy') can be neither attained nor obtained given that it cannot be absolutistically appropriated. (885)

6. **An Anti-Representational Factology**

Again, similar considerations apply. The 'factologist', as a 'collator of evidentially ascertained facts' could not collate a set of facts if these facts were discrete and unrelatable or, equally, if all these facts were to merge anonymously within the total embrace of one non-analyzable collation. Where, furthermore, our ability to sort and re-sort such epistemological artifacts demands an economic setting, and where the correlative constitution of that economy cannot be referred to in any form of discrete non-interconnectedness whatsoever! Thence the necessity for an anti-representational contextualization in the sorting and re-sorting of such relatively interconnected, evidentially ascertained data. Such contextualization acting as a limit or limitation beyond which it makes no sense to transgress since to transgress would mean the radical diminution of such sense-forming in that economy of sense-formation. (886)

7. An Anti-Representational Sematicism (Categorical Metaphysics)

Through reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order, we find ourselves presented with either an intended or unintended categorical metaphysics concerning the articulation of the categories replicated in the ongoing, progressively realized cross-fertilization of our semantic mapping of such phenomenological presentations, representations and re-presentations, along with their parallel co-hermeneutic collations, etc. In this interconnected correlation of phenomenological content with hermeneutic functions, and v.v., we could not proceed if such interconnections were to be transcendently projected in a transgression of such economic limits or were to be immanently mistreated in an immanent orientation that also transgressed such economic limits. That our ability to

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259 Needing a resident memory equivalent to a doubling of the number of elements to be memorized.

260 Needing a resident memory equivalent to one unit that could not possibly connect all the elements to be memorized. On the other hand, one map (or one atlas of maps) proffers a certain degree of simplification of such complexity through such ensuing compression of information.

deal competently with such abstract(ed) notions, e.g., of time and space, identity, subjectivity, transformation, etc., implies a suitably functioning economy of representation that does not transgress its anti-representational limitations, namely, where representations cannot be impossibly imputed and extrapolated beyond either their current economic terms of reference or their suitable forms of economic complexification (through the hyper-economic territory of all possible forms of inter-economically entertained forms of comparative treatment entertained through viable forms of re(-)appropriation). (887)

Just as, dialectically, it would be impossible to talk about categories, and in those categories, we could not conceive of viable candidates besides relevant null hypotheses which, by default, proves this same point since we then know what does not fall within those categories and where our sense and semblance of a world, equally, cannot be an endless array of categories marked out as only an array of null hypotheses. Where categorical content must possess a reasonable degree of relative isomorphic invariance whilst also necessarily presenting as non-equivalent units of identified information unless analytically overruled in that same regard. That in those categories with enough 'space' for more than one candidate we also need to imagine what else can fall with their embrace and where such virtual or non-virtual exemplification is achieved through an eidetic-like form of replication. That at the end of the day, for a categorical world to make sense we must be able to economically entertain such candidates, and, at the same time, not transgress its anti-representational limits by either proposing absolutistical forms of identification or relativistically dismissing all forms of identificational differentiation. Where the relative differentiation of all relative forms of integration needs to be conversely entertained, back-to-back, with the relative integration of all relative forms of differentiation… all within the suitable confines of a functioning epistemological economy. (888)

The non-economic economy might be though to challenge such an interactive interconnectedness of the systematic envelopment (of 'systems' with their diverse array) of distinctive, inter-ordered disciplines (with their professional treatment of such 'topics'), but, (the nature of 'expositions') through the unilateral re-direction of either the last (or first) instances or next instances is dispelled by the dialectical 'sleight of hand' where the non-economical is immediately re-appropriated hyper-economically.[261] However, as already noted, such re-appropriation must be micro-incremental proportioned in a form that is relatively-radical and not radically-radical. That, by such means, expositions can be formed in preparation for their dissemination. That the metaphysical manipulation of this sub-discipline of categorical treatment is no different in this regard. (889)

Where the limits of the economically representative (etc.) has exactly the same limits of the anti-representative.[262] Or, if you were to transgress your presentation of the

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[261] Where the last or first instance of unilateral re-directedness is reiterative and relatively non-existential in orientation in contrast to where the next instance, if enacted, is an existentially oriented processes of chaotically re-iterated behaviour, hopefully, of a positively productive character.

[262] In an allusion to Nagarjuna famous dictum, here paraphrased, that the limits (*koti*) of samsara are the limits of nirvana, and v.v. Mulamadhyamakakarika, 25: 20 – The limits of nirvana are the limits of samsara. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference (from the translation by Kenneth K. Inada; Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika; Sri Satguru Publications, 1993, p. 158).

representation in question you would automatically transgress these limits that are imposed anti-representatively! (890)

Of course, we have a profound paradox here. Since the non-economic profitably transgresses the limits of the economic as long we do so in relatively-radical incremental terms of reference and not in an impossible to re-appropriate radically-radical form, and, where such imputed 'transgression' is then immediately re(-)appropriated in and through a hyper-economically oriented format, etc, (891)

8. An Anti-Representational Psychology (and Hyper-Ordered Sociology, etc.)

I have suggested that through reduplication the aesthetical integration of semantic input is to be re-registered in psychological terms. I.e., that the 'aesthetics of aesthetics' is 'psychological' in an 'integrity of distinctive types of experience in both tenor and complexion'. Moreover, that the 'psychology of psychology' is then re-registered as a 'sociology' through the hyper-ordered reduplication of the inter-order reduplication of the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical.[263] Furthermore, that the classification of political organization would then be realized through the additional reduplication of the sociological. However, as far as political and non-political forms of enaction occur that would be coincident with the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order under the next heading of the 'political' (as 'an anti-representational politics'). (892)

A classical psychology attempts to describe distinctive psychological states, integrate them to that extent that this is found to be both possible and profitable, then note pathologies in such a scheme, and, on that basis formulate patterns of treatment, hopefully, subjecting the same to suitable forms of comparative evidential ascertainment. (893)

An anti-representational psychology does all of the above but 'framed' by a dynamic anti-representational perspective that invokes suspensions, etc., whilst understanding that only on an anti-representational 'basis' can any form of psychological appreciation actually function. That, in the light of this observation, suitable modes of treatment, when and where necessary, are similarly framed and existentially executed on a mutual basis of cooperation rather than through co-option to the extent the latter can be practically avoided. (894)

As part of this methodology, it is to be noted that forms of psychological insightfulness and error correction can be both entertained by running in parallel phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential forms of co-associated description, prescription and proscription. At the same time recognizing that all imputations, simulations, treatment

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263 This type of intuition was already entertained by myself in the 1980s when working on my unfinished twelve volume series titled *The Reanalysis.on the Nature of Things* and abridged in various versions of the *Summation* whose finalized form took *The Reanalysis.on the Nature of Things in Summary Form* (*Being a Condensation in 500 Propositions*. E.g., proposition 291. Decades later it has taken a formalized form through, e.g., reduplication, metafication, transformational retreatment (the latter itself as a methodological concept that arose in this same period of time. Basically, attempting to answer the type of question 'what is a thought of a thought, the idea of thought of a perception, etc? Where 'retreatment' provided a vast simplification of that type of quest).

programs, etc., can only fully function through the application of a positive nihilistic attitude in which all forms of reference are to be viewed in economic, hyper-economic, and non-economic terms of reference, as viewed through the lens of the overall economy of the economic, or whatever else is suitably to hand, whilst, at the same time, equally recognizing that forms of representation are to be converted into an anti-repesentationally oriented existential format where the understood limits of representation are equally the same limits of the anti-representative. (895)

That, in more practical terms, approaches that have an apparent pragmatic function are to be further re-adopted and re-adapted as long as they are simultaneously, in principle, ascertained in comparative evidential terms of reference. (896)

At all times eliciting the mutual cooperation of both patient and practitioner whilst recognizing that 'simulations of simulations' are manifested as either 'non-simulations' and/or 'meta-simulations', etc., and where all lived-realities are to be lived within the mutual confines of this overall world-of-life through mutually working for a progressively harmonized world of interactions. Where living-experience is textualized as 'reports' in both secular and disciplinary formats, and, where reporting the perception and apperception of relatively engendered lived-realities is enacted and conducted as a mix of experiences that, in relative terms, are either non-mutually recognized and encountered and/or mutually engaged, and so on. (897)

An anti-representationalism also insists that processes of transformational retreatment involving rectification, deconstruction and re(-)normalization, etc., can only be effective through working on what is to hand and accepting that the metaphorical 'core' of such processes are already functioning through healthy processes of resolution and that it behooves both patient and practitioner to mutually build on that central island of functional-integrity… (898)

An anti-representational psychology also understands that all attitudes, all reports, etc., are perspectival and that no one aspect can be completely exhausted, i.e., fully represented. Just as, furthermore, living-reality cannot be exhausted through the application of a plethora of perspectives other than to note, through a doctrine of non-equality, an economy of purpose dictates that all frames of reference in having different degrees of either relevance or irrelevance that it is more worth our while to focus on those frames of reference that are more relevant to ourselves as we find ourselves 'sighted/sited/cited' in the uniqueness of our current relational situatedness. Thence the preferential focus on the existential but not at the expense of the relatively non-existential. That, ultimately, every situation has the seeds of its own reconstitution through processes of harmonic resolution… whereas a misrepresented 'representative psychology' must fail to see and take advantage of such 'resolute forms of relational insightfulness…' (899)

That in the insightful appreciation of the sociological panorama the inescapable centrality of systems needs to be better understood. That the resolution of the socially problematic will almost inevitably require either a critical and/or radical re-appraisal of intra-systematic and inter-systematic forms of resolution relating to the resolution of such

resident forms of problematicity. That no solutions could be profitably applied without either an overt and/or covert anti-representational perspective given that a functional support and extension of a working core demands a certain fluidity in the identification and articulation of restorative strategies, etc. That the skillful sociologist has to work with what is already to hand and set the pre-conditions and conditions for processes of resolution that better 'represent' the interests of those relationships in question... (900)

9. An Anti-Representational Politics

Some points of clarification: The fourth trans-cognitive order is (primarily) deontological in orientation. The discipline associated with this type of e/valuational formation is as a 'deontologist', and more broadly as an 'ethicist' (also taking into account a pragmatic component that, itself, is also not immune from a deontological reading of pragmatical forms of efficiency, economical parsimony, effective functionality, etc.), and all, thereafter, subsumed under the appellation of an 'existentialist'. Through reduplication we arrive at the 'politician' or 'politicist', i.e., a person, respectively, who exerts either political or non-political power through inescapable forms of intervention as enacted in and through the overlapping relational world of our relationships. That when treated from a pro-relational perspective, in a recognition of the non-reducible emergence of our relationships, we automatically adopt, either covertly and/or overtly, an anti-representational perspective since we could not function otherwise in our passages through this world both individually and collectively (through requisite forms of navigation, negotiation and arbitration). (901)

Thence the implicit hope that the enaction of political power will progressively take on board an existentialization of process since whatever works, works in and through an anti-representational perspective, whether either advertently and/or inadvertently acknowledged as such… That without this overlapping of political identification and representation there could be no political praxis… (902)

10. An Anti-Representational Economics

Similarly, the economics of the Business World could not function if all forms of economic representation were thought representatively fixed in practice. Just as 'the tree in a forest is both a tree and a tree in a forest', etc. (903)

This is also recognized in the ability of this system, the Business World, to manipulate a code of profitability, etc., and form that sense of a psychic center exercising coded forms of operation over a plethora of financial features like, e.g., Sub-Systems concerning finance, requisitioning of resources, accounting, product development/extension of services, the transportation and dissemination of products, etc., advertising, forms of quality control and research into product re-development, etc. (904)

That this fluidity is also recognized in the inter-ordered hybridization of both the political and economics (and stylistics) in the formation of the Political-Economic Sys-

tem that also lends its name to the Political-Economic Environment (and is not to be confused with either the latter or the disciplinary topic of 'political-economics'). (905)

11. An Anti-Representational Science

In amazement I have witnessed the ardent misplaced faith of realists, *et al*, to takeover an official appreciation of the World of Science, as the major discourse, that just could not possibly function in the manner they so insistently declare they believe to be so self-evidently self-evident. (906)

Nothing could be so far from the truth as entailed in this matter… (907)

Intentional objectivity cannot and should not be definitively 'prioritized' (in either theoretical or experiential time[264]) because without the intentional economy there could be no intentional objectivity in the first place. Thence the necessary co-recognition of intentional motivation (noetic considerations) and co-associated intentional subjectivity beside those concerns with the inseparable nature of apparent intentional objectivity (noematic considerations). Furthermore, given an intentional correlativity between the noematic and the noetic, and its economic extension to their collective, co-associated sense/s of subjectivity, and, that no economic corelative can be experienced in and of itself or through itself, etc., it follows that processes, say, of phenomenological presentation, hermeneutical representation, and (non-systematic) existential re-presentation, in an evolving economy of re(-)presentation, just cannot be isolated as if evidentially self-presented, in that metaphorically dictated 'sleight of hand', and so on. Prioritization of just the intentionally objective is both an economic impossibility and an economic form of nonsense… just as much as the chopping the end of a stick off can neither produce nor reproduce a one-ended stick! That realists could even think that they could defy lived-reality in this regard and not appreciate the impossibility of their misplaced mode/s of representation, totally beggars such belief. That they still think that they can imagine such an impossibly state-of-affairs is an indication of the power of thought do delude themselves, and therein and thereafter, contaminate their impossible to conduct projects and programs. That, what partial success they might inadvertently enjoy can be none other than through the overlooking of such impossible attitudes… (908)

That those areas of science that are found to work must work by virtue of their being construed along an anti-representational perspective, be that either advertently looked at and/or inadvertently overlooked. (909)

12. An Anti-Representational History

The formation of history, by either a professional or amateur, organized either individually or collectively, likewise must be anti-representational in scope in order to be successfully enacted. Without such inherent flexibility the historian would be unable to

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[264] The partial exceptions to this observation being the immediate re-appropriation of the non-economic by the hyper-economic, and, the subtle forms of focus exercised in the very formation of ordered phenomena, etc.

emend their texts to better reflect both forms of historical alignment and appreciate the critical or radical differences in arguments between different historians, etc. But, as such debates with ourselves and others is par for the course we must assume, at the very least, forms of anti-representational acceptance must already be in place (for consensus, itself, to occur). (910)

That, again, through careful observation, we must accept the hypothesis of historical research extending to the formation of histories of the past, present and future which could only operate and cooperate if an anti-representational stance was not already in place, be that ensuing format established in either a *de facto* or *de jure* manner of deployment, etc. (911)

Similarly, such a form of recognition allows us to observe discontinuities of the historical past, non-continuities of the historical present, and continuities of the speculative histories of future (assuming that the overall constitution of the person will relatively remain in force for the foreseeable future).[265] Furthermore, through this dialectical flux between the world dictating itself to us through perception, resistance, etc., and our interpretations of it follows that none of this 'edification' could be arrived out without such a dialectical constituted mutual interactivity predicated on the establishment of such a positively productive nihilism. (912)

Thence the intended irony of the fact that all 'definitive histories' can be neither so definitively formulated nor disseminated… (913)

13. An Anti-Representational Philosophy of the Law

Here, too, there is this paradox, that the World of Law can only operate on the 'presentation of a representation' or the 'representation of a presentation'.[266] Let me explain. Legal adjudication depends on that being legally examined to be adjudicated through the medium of a presented-representation. Without both the textualization of the events in question and their relatively indisputable documentation over time where all relative forms of interconnection are also duly documented between these relevant events then no legal case could technically proceed. (914)

So, from the perspective of a non-anti-representational frame of reference just what is being represented, presented, etc? Is it the legal bones of the case (if presented in court) or the representation of the events in legal question, then neither a representative-presentation nor a presented-representation could be prepared on just representative grounds alone given the events themselves are not in court, etc., nor are the arguments to be (re-)experienced in the world so to speak. Where, in effect, the virtual is treated as the non-virtual, and, the non-virtual is treated as the virtual, etc. In other words, in effect, the representation is adjudicated, and, the adjudication is then to be represented where both the 'presentation of a representation' and the ensuing 'representation of a presentation'

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265 Refer to *Pursuit*, III. Book 6.

266 I.e., the fully prepared documentation of all relevant agents, events, sequences, imputed behaviours and intentions, etc. versus the documentation of those legal proceedings themselves, etc.

must mock all philosophical notions of a dichotomous world between ‘representation’ and ‘the imputed subject matter of that being documented before its being representative documentation’ and its ‘documented presentation’, and v.v., etc. Because, as well, all adjudication is of that which is documented only, and, where adjudication itself is represented in a double act of representation. Where the legal events in potential dispute are documented, and, then, where their legal review is documented in turn, and, where, furthermore, this reiterated process of document representation can continue through the re-representation of appeals, and so on. (915)

How could the simple-minded representationalist cope with such representative complexities (given that where the events in legal question are not documented then those non-represented facets of the case in question are legally irrelevant!)? (916)

14. An Anti-Representational Study of Communications (Media)

Now a similar ‘paradox of double representation’ occurs in the dissemination of personal communications or intersubjective communications facilitated by either Traditional-Media and/or Social-Media. (917)

A certain situation is to be reviewed. There is a collation of apparent facts, courtesy of factologists, from which a presentation is to be formed as a representation of the events in question. Then, this representation is presented through its presented-representation. In a reception of its dissemination that presentation is then construed as a representation of the events in question along with the relative presence or absence of interpretive or pre-interpreted commentary, and so on. Just as titles, and subediting, is inherently misrepresentative (but where such misinterpretation is somewhat defused when successfully de-misrepresented) then representation might be better viewed as processes of endless misrepresentation forever in need of endless processes of de-misrepresentation, and so on. (918)

Again, the simple-minded representationalist could make no sense of such proceedings if they were to persist with their fraudulent position of being just a non-anti-representationalist! A situation further complexified, indeed muddied, given the imperatives behind intersubjective forms of media, when duly recognized, are a necessary mix of ‘news along with a need to both entertain and find financial recompense for such a service’. At the end of the day, just what is being ‘represented’ or ‘not represented’, and so on and so forth? (919)

In the light of the above we can now further refine the necessary anti-representationalism of both the conformal philosopher and the conformal metaphysician (and which, by reduplicated extension, also find a disciplinary basis, at least in theory, for the conformal theologian or religionist?). (920)

To date the argument has been made that economically inescapable processes of representation operate under hyper-economic, economic, and non-economic forms of transformation, but, where ‘representation’ as an ‘economic correlative’, cannot be mean-

ingfully and significantly isolated at all from its origination in and through such relational terms of reference. That this inability to be isolated implies the necessary inescapable limitation in the form of an anti-representationalism for without such a non-fraudulent positioning even fraudulent positionings could not be presented without defectively mis-representing such a necessary anti-representational pre-positioning. (921)

That the working basis for a conformal positioning begins and ends in such ant-representationalism, be that either overtly and/or covertly recognized, be that either advertently and/or inadvertently understood. (922)

That this economic recognition of the limits co-associated with all forms of economic correlativity implies, furthermore, that all excessive preferencing of unimodal and bimodal presentations, along with either their over-commitment and/or under-commitment, should also be equally dismissed as the misguided fabrication of disciplinary nonsense, be it philosophical or metaphysical in orientation, be it scientific or historical in its intended scope, or representative of any other respectable discipline or even in any portrayal of the secular world itself. (923)

Similarly, the absolutistical positing of any form of representative activity along with the relativistical negation of all forms of representative responsibility should also be equally denied, to be dismissed as non-creditable. Taken as an 'indubitable' fact, at least metaphorically, that there can be neither indubitable representations nor indubitably (mis)treated non-indubitable representations! Thankfully, we can happily live on this no-man's land situated in between such incredible nonsense, which, through complete self-deconstruction leaves this remaining terrain as completely coincident with this world at large, this overall world-of-life; extending to this domain whatever appellation we might wish to sensibly append to its relatively represented sense of 'presence' whose equal 'absence' is also guaranteed from an anti-representational perspective..? (924)

That, controversial as it may seem at first, a relational philosophy of 'presence' is perfectly acceptable if qualified on the grounds of a non-reducible emergence of e/valuational formation that, equally, must also be understood as that which cannot be absolutistically represented. That this 'existential difference', as 'presence', is something that can be experienced, but, the very relational nature of experience implies that this experiential surplus can neither be absolutistically represented nor relativistically de-represented nor absolutistically absented, etc. (925)

That this phenomenon of a qualified sense and semblance of 'presence', and 'absence' when absent, is an everyday phenomenon that cannot be dismissed through disciplinary prohibitions enacted as mere acts of fiat. (926)

This granted, and its co-associated qualifications duly noted, then the grounds are prepared for conformal philosophers, conformal metaphysicians, conformal theologians or religionists, indeed, all manner of conformal disciplinarians and secularists, can all talk about the non-reducible nature of 'events' correctly represented as 'existentially emergent situations' in which are gathered 'surpluses as excesses of e/valuational formation that

can be discerned, experienced and, in all probability, shared should we be able to recognize, encounter, and engage such reservoirs of existential significance and meaningfulness. (927)

Now, it will no doubt be asked, why introduce this apology for this qualified form of 'presence', and its correlative of 'absence'? For the very reason that a conformal philosophy, etc., needs to understand the existence of the existential dimension and how our appreciation of 'events', in an 'existentialization of lived-phenomena', will also need to recognize, encounter, and engage this type of experience. That the very tenor and complexion of existential experience cannot escape the insistent emergence of this phenomenon as a type of phenomenal experience to be experienced in and through this emergence of a process of re(-)e/valuational formation that cannot be experienced other than as a surplus of meaning and significance, and, on some occasions, as an excessive surplus of meaning and significance. That, just as a deconstruction of the over-stated concept of an absolutistically misrepresented 'representation' was and is duly called for, still, as an economic concept, an economically qualified 'representation' cannot and should not be immediately and completely dismissed. So, too, a range of other relegated forms of language also stand in possible need for sensible forms of re-appraisal. That as a point of re-exploration, the expressions 'presence' and 'absence' both stand in need of their qualified dialectical rehabilitation, when, all too often, such ideas have been tarred and painted by the same tatty type of brush, although to be honest, former disciplinarians have blotted their copy books through excessively misplaced forms of admiration so inexpertly expressed that requisite forms of opprobrium were well-called for. Therefore, with this qualified intent, I believe it is time that concepts like 'presence' and 'absence' both stand in need of once again being rendered respectable in the halls of Academia, and elsewhere. That, if the phenomenology of the 'event', e.g., is to be rendered fully respectable, indeed, indispensable, then just such processes of rehabilitation must proceed whilst not undoing the necessary work of pragmatic deconstructionists who have valiantly cleared the way and now can allow others to pave a path for these difficult processes of conceptual re(-)normalization. I.e., a returning to the reasonable re-signification of those expressions in need of such rehabilitation whilst not letting the pendulum of history swing too far and too quickly in the opposite direction since what must be sought is more the preference for a working middle path through these thickets of such confused terminological denotations and connotations, where both the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly have been indiscriminately relegated to the netherworld of darkness, at the expense of an impoverishment of language in this land of the living, and so on and so forth. (928)

'Presence' is experienced in the simulation of a relationship, and, in comparative terms, is an 'indication as to what extent that relationship manifests, i.e., emerges, with an existential tenor (integrity) and complexion (richness of expression)'. As an existential hallmark its emergent existential richness, is indicative of its apparent 'facticity', i.e., 'the extent that a delineated relationship distinctively emerges above and beyond the mere summation of its relational participants (as subjects in the world of the inter-subjective) and its (objective) parties (treated as its material displacements observed in the inter-objective world of time and space) and to what extent it is able to participate in the world of a unilaterally expressed causal re-directedness in enacted responses, etc.' The apparent

intensity of ‘presence’ is also indicative of the ‘currently enduring existential orientation of that relationship’ as also expressed through the ‘similarly apportioned experience of other existential sentiments (as transcendental-like emotions)’. (929)

Now, in some circumstances ‘presence’ could also be read as the ‘apparent *joie de vivre* being experienced in that relationship’, as an indication of its ‘ongoing semblance of relational resolution, its successfulness in being resolute, in the economic harmonization of the involved facets of its relational world, and so on’, whereas, its unexpected ‘absence’ of this looked for *joie de vivre* or other existential hallmarks, of their ‘not being manifested over time in our expectations or in the immediacy of our anticipations could well be experienced as an ‘absence’.’ But, in this regard, the existence of this ‘absence’ should not be regarded as some ‘thing’. For a start, it cannot be pointed out, or, only ‘pointed out’ metaphorically. (930)

In a similar manner, we should also understand that ‘presence’ is not something that can be pointed out, except metaphorically. It, equally, does not represent some ‘thing’, ‘something’ being represented, say, ‘spirit’, or ‘soul’, or some other misplace metaphysical notion (unless, of course such ideas are existentially rehabilitated). (931)

That the existential ‘hallmarks’ of a relationship, as experienced in the anticipated currency of the present, or, as inferred as ‘indicators’ in the past, e.g., as might be read in a well-written novel, or as ‘predictors’ in the future, say, as expected portends of relational success, etc., are time-stamped expressions of the holistic nature of relationships and our relational experience of the same. Being holistic expressions of our relational experiences, they cannot represent anything other than, indirectly, in a metaphorical sense, the ‘existential status’ of that relationship, and, then, only in comparative terms of reference despite the uniqueness of each and every relationship. Let me demonstrate the sense of this inferred-observation. A friend of mine recently traveled from Australia to work in London for a short period of time. Traveling by the Middle East should we refer to our friendship as located over the Indian Ocean. Or, when they travelled to work in New York, did our friendship then hover over the Pacific Ocean. But, then, as no sensible person these days could be a flat-earther, does our relationship reside in the center of the Earth among the compressed stirring of a molten iron core. Of course not. Such talk is silly, and the mis-representation of relational attributes is similarly misplaced! (932)

That this concept of ‘presence’ is not to be read as some form of representation, as representing, say, the so-called immanent or transcendent reality of that being presented, revealed through cracks in this superficial world of appearances. The use of such metaphors is fine if you were a poet and writing as a poet. They even have a place in the articulation of religious experience as long as they are qualified and deconstructed at the metaphorical ‘end of the day’.[267] However, as philosophers, as metaphysicians or disciplinar-

[267] As a method for inducing suspensions by disvaluing phenomenal experience. E.g., by comparing the world, say, to a shadow, or a bubble, or a mirage, and so on. Such an approach induces a phenomenological approach to the subject matter being placed under such close exploration. On the other hand, the relentless referring of the world to an illusion is quite counter-productive in my opinion and distracts the philosopher or theologian, or whosoever, from progressing through more productive regions of experience.

ians, such seemingly rational talk becomes ‘seen’ exactly nonsense the moment we critically scrutinize such impossible notions. (933)

In a nutshell, our experience of ‘presence’ is to be perceived, or, rather, apperceived, as a comparative indication of the extent a certain relationship has taken on, emerges with, an existential orientation in the ‘sense’ or ‘tenor’ of its overall integrity of its ‘presence’ and in ‘semblance’ of the relative richness of its overall ‘complexion’ as a result of ongoing processes of relational resolution… (934)

Now, I would like to draw the following comparative connection, namely, that an anti-representational approach to this experience of ‘presence’, and all other ‘existential sentiments’, is a more productive way to recognize, encounter and engage relational experience *qua* relational experience, i.e., as suitably informed from an identification with the holistic nature of the relationship in question. That by doing so, in effect, we avail ourselves of an existential appreciation of that relationship being focused upon over the course of our existential reflections. Furthermore, the subjectivity to be experience in such reflections will also take on a trans-relational identification (since it is a phenomenological fact that the economic nature of our reflections also has the intentional subject (or the ‘transcendental’/trans-intentional subject) taking on both the tenor and complexion of those ‘reflections’ be they perceptual or otherwise, be they experienced within a dream state or in an act of memory, and so on and so forth). That through such judgmental forms of appreciation, the subject inevitably and inescapably takes on the tenor and complexion of those same forms of appreciation. As highlighted by the difference, e.g., between a ‘person passively reviewing evil acts of a non-existential orientation’ or being a ‘person actually contemplating the commission of such atrocities’. (935)

So, in taking on an existential orientation our subjectivity takes on this trans-relational sense of subjectivity likewise… and this apparent transformation in subjective experience is to apperceived through these trans-relationally oriented experiences of presence, or the relative non-absence of this semblance of presence, and all other manner of existential hallmarks like spontaneity, simultaneity, and synchronous types of temporal experiences, a trans-geographical experience of our relationships (that cannot and should not be geographically confused, etc.), etc. That, as suggested, a relational re-orientation, effectively, is the taking on of an anti-representational attitude. A nihilistic-like state of affairs where we no longer refer to objective parties in an inter-objective domain of time and space viewed in a material sense, and, subjective participants occupying an inter-subjective domain (where the intersection of private and public spheres is re-expressed through a sphere of arbitration as explored elsewhere). Of course, although standing in a contrast to the non-relational nature of a materially embodied world, still, this relational dimension of the existential is not experienced in any disembodied sense since as has been stated on a number of occasions, the existential arises through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v. That, therefore, like the two sides of a coin, neither aspect can be viewed as independent of the other. That to do so is to entertain the impossibilities of an absolutistically treated bimodalism, or dualism, that, quite correctly, has no place in an existential philosophy… or any respectable philosophy, etc. (936)

Now, my motivation for introducing this qualified concept of 'presence' has a number of 'legs' (in order to run my overall argument). First, as an indication of the existential orientation, and, where this type of experience is not to be misconstrued as representing anything other than this experience of an 'emergent existential difference to be accounted for in our distinctive entertainment of a relational orientation'. Second, as a comparative indication of the extent a relationship has been existentialized by the subject entertaining, i.e., simulating, that relational state of affairs *qua* that relational state of affairs, i.e., in and through the simulation of both its holistic and monadic emergence, albeit both from its own unique relational point of view and from our own sense and semblance of a personal perspective. Third, as indicative of the adoption and adaptation of an anti-representationally perspective in which the nihilistic-like nature of relational experience is able to be experienced by virtue of this nihilistic-like nature since in absolutistical terms it could not be experienced (through a transformation of simulated experience) and relativistically it likewise could not be experienced (as there would be nothing there to experience in the first place). Fourth, that the production of an anti-representational orientation is mutually conducive to the formation of an existential re-orientation in experience, and v.v. Therefore, my previous introduction of the seven stages in the 'conversion' of representative experience to an anti-representative orientation will also have this co-associated outcome, namely, the induction of a relative existential emergence, i.e., this 'turning around' incurred in and through this transformation of an existential orientation. Fifth, by such means I would like to put this much over-looked phenomenon of existentialization on a firmer footing be that within the exercise of a conformal philosophy, a conformal metaphysics, or any other conformal discipline (including the discipline of a theologian or any person of a religionist persuasion, whether exercised in either a non-critical/non-radical orientation, in a critical orientation, or in a radical orientation). (937)

With reference to this fifth and last point, I am alerting the reader, or audience, to a return to those seven stages in the 'conversion' of a representative attitude to an anti-representational stance.[268] However, first, before I return to such considerations, let me make the following hypothetical argument for determining a reasonable topical location for a theological discipline or the discipline of a fellow religionist (as a non-theist). (938)

Although not overstressed, from a topical perspective, I would like to argue that all respectable disciplines can be found a place, a psychic 'home', in this inter-ordered philosophy (although the historical specificities of all disciplines are to be discerned in their respective systematic settings[269]). So, e.g., the topic of 'aesthetics' coincides with the second trans-cognitive order of the 'aesthetical'. Where the topic of 'history' can be pointed out as arising through the 'reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (of the ontical through the evidential collation of facts organized by a factologist)'. That the location of philosophy, quite differently, cannot be found in a local sense but through the globalization of the six trans-cognitive orders themselves (given that philosophy was already defined as 'one-part phenomenological, one-part hermeneutical, and one-part exis-

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[268] More correctly, this process of 'conversion' is a misnomer since from an existential perspective I will also be arguing that there is no difference whatsoever between the 'representative orientation' and the 'anti-representative orientation'.

[269] I.e., therefore, not on *a priori* grounds.

tential, etc.[270]). Then, we can also introduce inter-ordered forms of hybridization, say, in the political-economy as a discipline in its own right (that cannot be reduced to the components of a reduplicated third order of 'politics' and the reduplicated fourth order of 'economics'). Again, the topic of 'sociology' is perceived as the emergent product of the 'psychology of psychology', and, where 'metaphysics' is reviewed as the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' (and, where the reduplication of a conformal philosophy results in a conformal metaphysics whose retreatment is further reviewed as a revitalization of the philosophical discipline through such an input) So, in the context of this desire, this aspirational imperative, to locate the discipline of the theologian, or religious equivalent, within this inter-ordered scheme, this ambition can be viewed more as a challenge rather than the 'legitimization' of this discipline as both a topically located profession and topically informed type of pursuit. In other words, if I am to hold this notion that all disciplines can be found a topical location, and theology is no different from any other discipline *qua* discipline (given it can be ascribed with a disciplinary difference, etc., like any other discipline[271]) then it behooves me to demonstrate in what manner this discipline can be topically located (in order to continue to hold this notion that all disciplines have a topical location in some suitable form or other). (939)

So, let me rise to this challenge of my own making and seek, if I can, an inter-ordered location for this apparent discipline as professionally exercised and pursued by a theologian, etc? (940)

Now, admittedly, the requirement of some degree of creativity is being called for in order to maintain this topical thesis 'that all disciplines can be accounted for through the assignment of some form of an inter-ordered location'. To this end, in an attempt to locate the topic of a theology, or similar, let me propose the following series of conjectures. As the reduplication of philosophy (P) results in the conjecture of a metaphysics (M) then we can invoke the notation $M = P^2$. Now, through further processes of reduplication we could invoke the conjectures of the hyper-ordered possibilities of P^3 and M^2. (where P^3 is not equal to M^2). But, could we assign either of these possibilities as the location for a working theology?[272] But, just as we have a philosophical economy (of the phenomenological, etc.) that establishes the discipline of the philosophical (as a set of methods primarily focused on conformal truth determination) perhaps we could envisage a theological economy as possibly constituted in the following format? Say, by invoking three these economic correlativities of M, P^3, and M^2? Now, as would be required, each correlative would be different but also be co-defined through reference to P, i.e., as M,


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[270] Where 'etc.' represents our also taking on board a philosophical approach to the six trans-cognitive orders, as well as both logics and dialectics, non-fallacious arguments, etc., the assumption of a conformal orientation, etc.

[271] As first explored in my *Theological Investigations*, Volume II. Those three disciplinary differences, or differentials, being (in their respective disciplinary economy) as a 'theological difference' (in phenomenological terms of reference), as a 'theological meta-difference' (in hermeneutical terms of reference that point out how theological value is to be functionally engendered in behavioural terms through the adoption and adaptation of certain genres), and a 'non-theological difference' (in existential terms of reference given 'what is not there for us, is not there for us, and we need not be there for it' [as the antithesis of theologically oriented experience]).

[272] Without considering whether such a theology is Traditional or Contemporary, or, as either non-critical/nonradical, critical and/or radical in orientation, etc?

P^3, and M^2 equivalent to, respectively, P^2, P^3, and P^4. That to further support this tentative contention let me assign the theological differentials of a theological difference, a theological meta-difference, and a theological non-difference to these possible candidates, say, in the following order of explication. I.e., that a theological meta-difference can be found in the apparent hermeneutic integrity of the metaphysical discipline expressed as M = P2; that a theological difference of a phenomenological complexion or orientation could be ascribed to P3, and, a theological non-difference with an existential complexion or orientation could be ascribed to P4 (M2). As a background assumption, in the context of a process of transformational retreatment, I am relying on the metafication of the hermeneutical in order to form the basis for phenomenological treatment, where positive deconstructive treatment would also need to observe the re-metafication of the same, and, where the de-de-metafication, or the double de-metafication, of the theological non-difference is automatically observed in such ensuing super-retreatment back to the philosophical domain and thence to the secular world itself (given that the role of a theological non-difference is to relate the secular with the numinous, etc., and v.v.). Diagrammatically the overall relationship of this series of conjectures could be illustrated in the sketch below:



Now, regardless of our opinion on the viability of theology as a discipline, the observation of its existence as a profession does not deserve to be disputed. Moreover, given this contention that all disciplines have a topical location, the following series of

conjectures does establish the possibility of a complex sense of hyper-ordered location for this topical discipline of theology (and its co-related forms of religious expression in their putative relationship to either notions of the Divine, the Numinous and/or the Spiritual, or similar). Therefore, this tentative location/s of the topic of theology, etc., as either P2, P3 and/or P4, etc. (942)

Now, the question could be asked, in pursuit of a more dynamic vision of a discipline could philosophy adopt and adapt a similar set of strategies (as adopted above in order to locate the discipline of theology)? Say, the secular world as the pre-philosophical (P^0), that through metafication, in order to observe a negative form of deconstruction, becomes the topic of philosophy (P^1), that through positive deconstruction then becomes, through a further process of metafication, none other than the metaphysical (P^2) which through de-de-construction existentially announces itself through the super-treatment of its findings (entertained through the emergent transformations entailed in such ensuing suspensions) as the philosophical re-vitalization of our perceptions and apperceptions of the secular world (through this return to either P^0 and/or P^1), albeit as viewed through such 'philosophical' re-configurations entailed in this progression through the philosophical economy. Again, I merely answering this question as noted above, but, at the same time here, there has been no questioning the 'philosophical' viability of such strategic manoeuvres, etc. In this same regard, we could come up any number of other creative heuristic devices whose pragmatic utility would have to be comparatively assessed in relation to their demonstrated utility should such facilitation of our thinking about the world be found to be both noticeably augmented and enhanced by the adoption and adaptation of such strategies or similar?). (943)

Almost as an entertainment, or a game, we could continue to locate any other number of professions, as topical disciplines that currently do not seem to be ascribed some form of an inter-ordered location (i.e., in terms of an ordering, inter-ordering, hyper-ordering, hybrid-ordering, globalized ordering (e.g., as has been applied to the philosophical discipline, etc.), etc.[273] (944)

E.g., how might we account for the practitioners of the legal profession within the System of the Legal Fraternity, or, those within an industry concerned with communications, i.e., as entailed in Traditional-Media or Social-Media, etc? (945)

Now, just as the political profession is divided up between Legislators and Executives (on a front bench or participating in a ministry, or similar) we might suppose that the theoretical orientation of legislators would portend a hermeneutically oriented disposition coincident with the fifth trans-cognitive order, Whereas, in a considerable contrast, the political executives exert a more direct form of political power and, therefore, could well be viewed as occupying the political-like complexion of the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order (hopefully, on balance, assuming an existential orientation over the course of the exercising of such political power and related forms of empowerment, etc.). In the same vein we could render the formulation of the different sub-disciplines of the Legal Domain as falling under different topical locations whilst still

[273] Hopefully, without having to add too many 'epi-cycles'.

assigning a Business World classification as its primary form of encoding, the encoded manipulation of co-associated types of information, etc., in keeping with the nature of such judgments as framed by that super-discipline discipline, and/or sub-discipline. (946)

On the other hand, the formulation of law is a product of the political legislation. Whereas, the power exerted by a judge would put them in the reduplicated third trans-cognitive category of the political executive. Otherwise, in the main as a business pursuit it would be given a reduplicated pragmatical entry. (947)

Similarly, work in the field of communications, i.e., either as a participant in Traditional-Media and/or in Social-Media, treated as a business would see a reduplication of the fourth trans-cognitive order. On the other hand, when business aspects are minimized or effectively dropped, we might surmise a more critical-theoretical/theoretical-critical intersection in the third Sector or the Political-Economic Scheme as articulated earlier (more concerned with the dissemination of information)?[274] (948)

In the same vein, where should we locate the Medical World (other than when it is primarily functioning as a business?)? For a start, we could surmise that even if the functioning of the Medical World, as the performance of a Health System, were not directly predicated on a profit motive, still, both incarnations of the Medical World could be assigned a primary pragmatical fourth ordered location whose coding seeks to 'observe the desired utility to be gained through the pursuit of certain practical functions'. However, when the Medical World is predicated on a profit motive then that type of disciplinary performance would then also fall more specifically under the reduplication of the fourth order in a manner that is more concerned with the business of pursuing a profit for reasons of obtaining its continued funding and for purposes of organizational survival, etc. In Australia we can observe the functioning of both models in health care with certain degrees of overlap that, in some instances, I think should be seriously questioned (as, e.g., in the mandated apportioning of a fraction of a person's tax (Medicare Levy Surcharge MSL of 2%) being misdirected into the world of insurance that each year demonstratively demonstrates 'less value for the money' when diverted into that type of scheme?[275]). (949)

At this point I would like to clarify the multi-dimensional concept of 'location' in a relatively non-representative, anti-representational set of senses. 'Relatively' as an 'orientation' by virtue of the fact an anti-representational perspective cannot be defined apart from a representative aspect whilst understanding that neither aspect can be viewed isolated within their own imagined terms of reference. In regard to following viewpoints, to hold either, both, or, indeed, neither, is to entirely defeat the purpose of an anti-

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274 Refer to the diagram, e.g., in paragraph. 166*

275 As initiated under the leadership of the Prime Minister John Howard in July 1997. Initially at a rate of 1%. To my mind, this money would be better directed if it were directly 'invested' in the sphere of public health. Having worked in the sphere of public health, and like all Australian citizens have had dealing from time to time with this credible set of institutions, not without the need for well thought-out reforms, etc., it still strikes me as disconcerting that 'certain people (invested in this industry) should profit on the suffering of others'. Then, again, having the competition of two parallel systems could stand both parties, at least theoretically, in better stead?

representational philosophy. **With this understanding in mind, we can delineate 'location' in the following senses, namely, topical, systematic (both conventional and organizational), expositional (in both non-existential and existential forms of apparitional specification), and as a primary point of focus within the Political-Economy along with its secondary reiterations or segmented footprints and co-associations). These four headings can be viewed, respectively, as economic, hyper-economic, non-economic, and as entailed within the overall economy of the economic.** (950)

Finding the location of a discipline as a 'topic' within this inter-ordered scheme is established on the prior acceptance of the conjecture 'that all disciplines have topical a complexion'. So, e.g., the discipline of 'history', with its expositions disseminated by historians, has been viewed as 'the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical or factual' (and where the latter has itself treated as the discipline of the factological where 'factologists' can be viewed as 'collators of supposed examples of evidentially ascertained facts' that historian, in turn, would also need to review). (951)

'Topical ascertainment', in general, can be viewed as 'economic', primarily in terms of forms of treatment conducted under the headings of a Negative Deconstruction and a Positive Deconstruction. (952)

The determination of a systematic location is hyper-economically oriented and would be conducted under the double headings of the Conventional and the Organizational. (953)

A conventional aspect is expressed through a meta-textual paralleling of the textual formation of an exposition through the invocation of genres of behaviour through which the broadly parallel functioning of both 'writing' and 'reading' are conducted in such terms accordingly. That, in this regard, we need to find an appropriate alignment of genres of behaviour with their co-associated modes of experiential reception. So, e.g., in the eating of an apple we expect to either bite it or cut it up into pieces for eating, or, witness the cooking of that apple in some form of a recipe. Then, co-associated with this process involved in the eating of an apple we expect to chew what is being eaten, to taste a certain range of flavours, etc. (954)

The organizational aspect notes in which historical System (or Systems) the discipline in question has been and is currently organized in social terms of reference. So, e.g., the discipline of philosophy remains primarily centered in Academia regardless of whether its exponents are professionally dependent or independent of such an institution and/or act as non-professional amateurs. In such political and historical terms of reference we can also note how the topical complexion of a certain discipline is transformed both non-chaotically and chaotically as it either bifurcates, emerges (through either merging and/or emerging), and/or entertains qualitative phase changes in its overall state and status.[276] (955)

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[276] More correctly, in a chaotic economy the non-economic irrupts through a dialectical mix of bifurcation/s, emergence/s, and phase change/s of state. Albeit with an orientational preference for one or other.

Under the heading of the expositional, location is expressed in both non-existential and existential orientations with either a critical and/or radical emphasis usually being more placed on the latter given the implicated cultural 'weight' of its being historically overlooked, alas, more often than not, and, as well as being expressed through the experiential fact that expositions are primarily non-economic in nature as a product primarily of economic resolution being non-economically expressed in and through causal terms of reference (otherwise an exposition would not be able to be disseminated as a non-virtual discursive 'discourse', etc.). (956)

Under the expositional influence of the non-economic we find a process of historically concrete re-specification (in both non-existential and existential orientations [given their definitional dependence upon each other[277]]). 'Re-specification' of the specificities already in place will take the form of either innovations supplied by the creativity of the recipient or recipients as expressed through ensuing processes of the de-suspension and/or through the de-suspensional revelations of the existential impetus itself as it similarly comes to the awareness of that recipient or those recipients. (957)

Then, from the combined effects of this multi-dimensional sense of the overall economic we experience a re-iterated conformation of just where in the Political-Economy that which we are dealing with is being expressed in political-economic terms as it finds the current cultural-intercultural sense of its lived-expression. As heuristic devices 'topicality', 'systematization', and 'expositional expression' are all to be viewed as inseparable artifacts of the overall economy of the economic as expressed in and through lived-experience as refracted through its cultural-intercultural forms of phenomenal expression. Thence this important conjecture 'that topics, systems, and expositions must be understood as mutually co-defining each other' be that in relatively non-critical/non-radical terms of reference, relatively critical terms of reference, and/or relatively radical terms of reference (when, more correctly our 'progress' is a 'progression through the permanent presence of all three styles and degrees of interactive conformation'). (958)

Furthermore, the Political-Economy as articulated as a System (and not just as an inter-ordered hybrid topic of 'politics' and 'economics') within the open, non-confinement of the Political-Economic Environment should also be viewed in economic terms as the emergence of an economy topically consisting of the Political Sub-Discipline, the Economic Sub-Discipline, and the Stylistic Sub-Discipline (and hence our ability to use the subheadings, respectively, of the theoretical/hermeneutical/political, practical/phenomenal-phenomenological/economic, and the equally important sphere of the critical-radical/existential/stylistic (as mapped, e.g., in the matrix of nine segmented or sectors as noted earlier in this extended-essay[278]). Where these sub-disciplines can also be defined, respectively as hyper-economic (and conventional in orientation), economic, and non-economic in orientation. (959)

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[277] That 'the existential orientation arises through the pro-relational existentialization of the relatively non-pro-relational non-existential, and v.v.'

[278] E.g., as found diagrammatically represented in paragraphs 164and 165, etc.

Now, let me return more specifically to this tentatively outlined process of 'conversion' in which representative propositions, etc., are given a potentially 'radical' anti-representational re-interpretation, etc., along with the existential and non-existential ramifications that I believe are attendant upon this form of re-identification. (960)

As introduced this mnemonic for conversion from the representative to the anti-representative was noted as: **Exhibition**, **Suspension/s**, **Negative & Positive Deconstructions**, **Re-Specification**, **Completion** (of Conversion), (Existential) **Appreciation**.[279] Let me now explore this *ad hoc* scheme in detail. (961)

As already argued, relevant propositions are prepared in **Exhibition** as the material for processes of suspension. Suspensions are of materials already to hand. Now, it has been argued elsewhere that the subject matter of judgments are concepts (and not percepts). Because concepts act like vectors and can, therefore, be compared in vectorial-like states. Unlike percepts (as perceptions) because in perceptual focus we can only focus on one point of focus at any one time. Then, citing Kant, that judgments are meta-conceptual and not conceptual *per se*, even though the act of judgment, post-judgment, can then be delivered in a conceptual format. That granted, we can propose propositions, as representing a string of concepts presenting putative states of representation, etc., along with all our prejudices, prejudgments, epistemological biases, ontological commitments, ove-commitments and under-commitments, etc. (962)

For the sake of an example, let me assume I am looking at a bowl of apples freshly bought from the fruit market. (963)

The state of **Suspension** can be arrived at through a number of strategies (which, as a matter of experiential fact, merely reinforces the situation that in every intentional moment suspensions must already be present for us to be able to trans-intentionally appreciate, through acts of trans-intentional judgment, what is being representatively approached in the first place. Indeed, these strategies can even be practised and internalized as philosophical habits. In the form of an open list these strategies could include being skeptical; questioning the propositional form of these phenomenal experiences in terms of contra-contents (this is not a bowl of apples, they could be pieces of wax fruit, etc.) or counter-processes (I am not seeing this bowl of apples, I am not thinking about eating one of these apples, etc.); counter-balancing textual reports on the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of these current experiences with their hermeneutically oriented meta-textual genres informing the form of such propositional reception in order to induce the apparitional-like manifestation of non-textual simulations (retrospective reviewed in the form of perceptions); intensely experiencing the phenomenological experience through an aesthetical lens in order to experience, where possible, the processes of resolution being entered into in order to produce and reproduce this semblance of representations being directly engaged; closely inspecting the imagery in terms of the language being used to match these simulations with propositional parallels; by noting rhetorical tropes, metaphorical analogies, and apparitional forms that can be treated in a more literal sense (because of their apparent fulfilment of their expected modal density (as a spectrum

[279] Paragraph 856*.

of modalities), intensity (of those individual modalities), and propensity (in the reoccurrence of modal combinations) that we would expect to be present in the reception of a conformally valid, non-virtual state of affairs corresponding to the reception, say, of a bowl of apples; and so on. With practice we should be able to parallel textual reports, hermeneutical meta-texts (as co-associated genres of behaviour) along with existential specificities in the form of non-textual simulations (where we forget we are dealing with texts, propositions, perceptual experiences, representative patterns of interpretation, etc., and find ourselves both actively enjoined and passively conjoined with the existential-like hallmarks (or indicators or predictors) of such existentially oriented patterns of appreciation, etc. (964)

Under the heading of a **Negative Deconstruction**, we seek to remove the apparently defective by excluding all unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical and relativistical modes of thinking. By such means, we can no longer subscribe, e.g., either to realist metaphors and language, etc. or idealist metaphors and language, and so on. Next, we attempt to regularize all logical anomalies, incoherencies, self-contradictions, factual irregularities, narrational anomalies, incorrectly applied conclusions, misinterpretations, defectively understood ironies, forms of inappropriately undue or overdue emphasis, etc., etc. (965)

Then, in a **Positive Deconstruction** we either attend to what remains in terms of its apparent representativeness (as will be delineated through the forcefulness of the de-suspension; empowered, furthermore, through the encompassed existential surplus of e/valuational formation that are being realized though processes of non-economic resolution, etc.) or when imaginatively reconfigured through novel or expected re-interpretations enacted in a more creative mode of analogical transformation (in order to see what either metaphorically 'flies or does not fly'). Thence this automatic process of an existential re-direction to processes of re-specification of the specificities being experienced (be they either passively engendered and/or actively re(-)engendered). (966)

So, in a process of ongoing engagement, we note the perceptual representation that is being simulated and how the richness of this experience controls its apparent dictation. These apples look perfect, but, when we look more closely, we find ourselves noting subtle blemishes, slight differences in colour and patterning on the surfaces of these apples, the minute differences in their ideal sense of shape, settling on some of these apples as more representative of the type of apple we might like to eat, and so on. Indeed, in this type of situation, the more we look the more we see until the time is felt right for us to move on to the next set of phenomenological concerns. (967)

Finding ourselves automatically reviewing an ongoing re-specification of these specificities being representatively experienced through the imputed force of the de-suspension. Hence this dialectical stage of **Re-Specification**.[280] This process reaching very soon an inevitable point of stasis that either needs to be re-visited or terminated in an

[280] Dialectical by virtue of the epistemological fact that the trans-intentional appreciation of our apparent intentions is an indeterminate mix (mixture) of linear, reversed linear, circular, and spontaneous and synchronous patterns of apparent thinking and being thought, etc,

intentional act of visiting the next set of intentional themes, memes, tropes, conjectures, questions, responses, determinations of comparative responsibility,[281] etc. (968)

In a process of **Conversion**, we attempt to take the idealized position that what is being seen is nothing other than a constructed set of imputations, that in being re-suspended, is to be non-extrapolated because to do otherwise is totally unnecessary given our direct engagement with such patterns of representation that, because they can be neither attained nor obtained, i.e., cannot be fully appropriated, must be also viewed as anti-representationally presented given that there is no difference between representative-representations and their anti-representative-presentation… as viewed hyper-economically as conventional expressions that can only be viewed as conventional expressions, as economically unobtainable, unattainable, and not able to be appropriated (given the inability to completely exhaust any one perspective let alone all relevant perspectives besides all possible perspectives…), and how, non-economically we are existentially taken back by discovering a richness of detail not hitherto observed, and so on, and so forth. Such 'conversion' is also an act of 'completion' (as the required degree of preparation needed for pursuing its comprehensive existential appreciation). (969)

In the stage of **Appreciation**, we attempt to recollect the existential ramifications of our current period of reflections (on our current reflections to date). We do this by intuitively noting what is relevant, responsive, responsible, as apparent resolutions entered into, the richness of detail and the enrichment realized in and through this process of 'reflected-reflections', etc. 'Reflective-reflections' since we are reflecting upon our reflection through processes of continual re-iteration that will, from time to time, recognize, encounter, and engage moments of re-direction of either a relatively-critical or relatively radical tenor and complexion. 'Relatively-critical' when we find ourselves being corrected. E.g., this apple, at first, looked perfect, but, on closer inspection I now perceive its blemishes, indeed, as being partially rotten, and so on. 'Relatively-radical' when we find ourselves suddenly heading off in a new direction in our reflections, etc. Increment by increment, and, where the radically-radical cannot be comprehended (unless realized through a series of increments provoked over the course of such attentive reflections that are further reflected upon in an apparently profitable manner). (970)

Becoming aware that what is being reviewed are the wanderings of our mind, but, without too much concern because the world dictates to us even more than how we dictate to it… through what we might want, might desire, have both personal ambitions and social aspirations for in the context of needing to continually arbitrate with others to achieve both entwined strands in the richly evolving fabric of our lives… as we find ourselves actively recognizing before(-)others, passively encountering with(-)others, and where our individual and collective freedoms are only realized through-others through engagement… as we make our passage through this world both individually and collectively. Suffice to say:

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[281] E.g., should I eat one of these apples if they do not belong to me, or being too near the time of a major meal, or because of more pressing engagements, etc.

That the limits of our representations are anti-representative,
That the limits of our anti-representations are representative,
With not a jot of difference, not an iota of differentiation…

Or:

What is conventional is conventionally understood,
What 'moves beyond' the conventional is nonsense,
Nothing more, and nothing less..! (971)

Therefore, it behooves the serious, conformal philosopher, metaphysician, disciplinarian, or secularist to conform to what is to hand and not to stray too far, all pragmatic innovations being well excepted, and hopefully, well accepted should they prove to be useful in the pursuit of a reasonable, responsible process of consensus formation… (972)

Now the final heading in this apparent process of conversion, is 'Appreciation', meaning taking on board its existential ramifications. So, what is entailed? (973)

For a start we need to realize that there can be no process of conversion since what is being more meant is the removal from our representative habits all thoughts that a traditionally understood process of representation is the *modus operandi* of our being in this world together. But, in lived reality we continually run suspensions in order to appreciate whatever we might be thinking, etc. Moreover, accepting that the conventional, conducted just in conventional terms of reference, is more than enough for us to find the requisite degree of conformation in our being in this world-of-life, without having to apply all manner of adventitious thinking that is not necessary, only confounds us if not properly assessed as nonsensical in the first place, and so on. Hence the co-existence of the non-existential and the existential which needs to be duly understood…[282] (974)

That, although the imposition of suspensions has been insisted upon (and are claimed as both the theoretical 'doorway' to and 'exit' from the existential dimension), and the dimensional imprint of the existential and its continual re-specification of experience has been needed to be introduced and preferentially treated, whilst all along the impossibility of representation finding any form of absolutistical representative instantiation has been barely pointed out, etc., the truth of the matter is that every moment of our intentional lives, and their trans-intentional appreciation, cannot be lived without the continual functioning of such inescapable aspects of our being in this world at large. 'Conversion', therefore, is more a matter of an illusion since 'nothing', no aspect of our being in this overall world-of-life, is actually being 'converted' *per se*! On the other hand, a shift in attitudes is being called for, namely, the understanding that suspensions are in each and every moment of intentionally organized consciousness and can be somewhat co-opted accordingly, that the conventional already works well for us to that extent it is not disrupted by ideological forms of preferential extremism, and, furthermore, a pro-

[282] Given these two correlatives are needed co-define each other, and, where, economically, we can invoke a so-called 'third moment' through the covert existence of 'the-existential-and-the-non-existential' (on par with my treatment of the trimodal economy of 'the hermeneutical circle of comprehension').

relational dimension already exists in our being with others and is inescapably present whether we recognize this existential fact of our being or not. That, basically, the dialectical matrix of our finding both our existence and freedom through-others needs to be both recognized and re(-)organized accordingly. (975)

Hence these metaphorical 'calls' for the 'turning around of experience' and its 'existential transformation' or 'conversion' as something to be also witnessed as upside-down, and back-to-front, and so on… in regard to our re-e/valuation of so-called 'natural experience'. (976)

Needless to say, in effect, what is being said is not much more than **'work with what is already to hand', and (creatively) 'just get on with it..!'** [283] (977)

That the attuned and balanced preferencing of the existential is much like 'adding yeast to leaven a loaf of bread', rendering it as a three-dimensional loaf rather than as a flat disc barely able to rise above the floor of the fiery oven or the heated surface of the girdle. (978)

Similarly, we need to recognize that the conventional works quite well by itself, under most circumstances, thank you very much, and has no need for impossible non-anti-representative notions like the importation of a so-called 'realist perspective' or 'that all products of the mind are reductively just nothing more than the idealistic constructions of our own solipsistic sovereignty' when it is obvious that the world of subjects and objects more dictates the intentional flows of our own thinking and that the briefest of momentary reflections should re-establish this dependent fact of our apparent interdependence in this world at large! (979)

That, basically, this process of 'conversion' is a 'transformation of attitudes' in which we dispense with the nonsensical and, instead, focus on continuing the refinement of what abilities and assets we already have as we make our passages through this overall world-of-life both individually and collectively! (980)

In the pursuit of this 'descent', what points are worth re-highlighting and perhaps further re-exploring? (981)

As noted, this extended-essay had four ambitions as well as working towards a progressive interrelation of these same themes. This latter aspect will be briefly taken up, e.g., in a working concept of 'alignment' as providing a suitable method as capable of working with both a non-representative and an anti-representative basis in practice in order to advance a better understanding of my concept of the 'conformal' (in relation to truth-determination at the center of the philosophical discipline, and, by extension, to the successful expedition of all reputable and respectable disciplines). (982)

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[283] Somewhat echoing both the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics and my conceptual practice of 're-specification' that can also be creatively engendered (through positive forms of deconstruction, etc., and also acts as a partial criticism of the former).

Those four themes were announced as:

1. A more detailed exploration of inter-ordered phenomena.
2. The resuscitation of metaphysics as a complex inter-ordered phenomenon.
3. The re-siting of disciplines in their systematic contexts.
4. Utilizing such insights in order to suitably address contemporary anomalies.[284]

[iv] (893)

Over the course of this disquisition, I also argued that inter-ordered phenomena informed a Topic which in interaction with the historicity of a System allowed us to form a working Exposition that, in dissemination, then became the Discourse in question (hopefully. all conformally supervised through suitable processes transformational re-treatment, be they exercised inadvertently and intuitively, or, advertently and on a more formal footing). That these three dialectical aspects, respectively, of the economic, the hyper-economic, and the non-economic mirrored the workings of the overall economy of the economic.[285] A number of arguments being advanced why this overall economy of the economic was worthy of our consideration.[286] (984)

The concept of an 'order' was put forward for consideration as one variation of six distinctive types of judgment, namely, phenomenological (and semantic), aesthetical, deontological (and when more comprehensively appreciated as existential in orientation), pragmatical (as types of expediency that are not to be confused with the broader philosophical concept of the 'pragmatic'), hermeneutical(as the appreciation of possibility, etc.), and the ontical (as the appreciation of that which can be provisionally regarded as evidentially factual). The argument was made that in a hexamodal interpretation of the trimodal nature of the archetypal economy (of World, Object, and Ego) through forms of subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of these three economic correlativies (of World, Object, and Ego) these six orders could be duly accounted for. Linked in with a philosophy of transformational retreatment, I further argued that 'subtle forms of preferential treatment' were expressed through a process of 'de-suspension' (as an aspect of the [extensive] suspension generally overlooked in previous philosophical attempts to proffer a deeper form of phenomenological scrutiny, etc.). (985)

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[284] Paragraph iv. As well as being extended to a resolution of more traditional problems, especially those of a relatively intractable disposition. The point being made here is more in reference to contemporary social anomalies to the extent that new insights and methods for resolution will also need to be developed given the advent of non-continuities as will be noted and should be articulated in the formulation of histories of the present (and also as will inevitably occur in histories of the future should that type of historian be prescient enough to anticipate the delineation of such expectations).

[285] Note that the expression 'inter-ordered phenomena' includes 'all ordered, inter-order, hyper-ordered, globalize, localized and hybrid from of ordering'.

[286] In order to account for, e.g., the hyper-economic sub-economy's critical exercise of both the conventional and the conventional re(-)appropriation of the relative radical; the economic forms of treatment exercised through processes of negative and positive deconstruction; and, the need to co-opt a non-economic model for observing non-virtual forms of causal intervention, etc. Where the well-balanced functioning of all three orientations would be seen as inducing a process of relative existentialization contributing both to the enrichment of our relationships and our freedom as realized through the auspices of others.

Against this background, it was argued that inter-ordered states could be arrived at through ‘harmonic’ processes of reduplication, and metafication; that forms of treatment could be exercised through duplication; and, processes of de-suspensional resolution in non-economic terms could be advanced through de-metafication de-suspension. That such processes of de-suspension could also be viewed as re-specifying the concrete historical specificity of living-experience as textually interpreted and translated through lived-experience. Moreover, as also supplying an existential basis to patterns of intervention rightly regarded as inescapable regardless of whether we employ either forms of action, non-action and/or the deferral of inaction. (986)

From a systems perspective,’ duplication’, etc., is to be viewed as ‘forms of treatment conducted by the codes of Sub-Systems’, whereas ‘reduplication’ and its converse of de-reduplication’ observed the functioning of the central code/s pertaining to that system (which in turn will be superseded by the codes of a Super-System should that be found relevant to the nature of our current enquiries). As examples of reduplications we have, e.g., the inter-ordered topic of ‘science’ (in general) as the ‘reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order of possibility, etc.’, and, where we have, e.g., the inter-ordered topic of ‘history’ (in general) as the ‘reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order of factual assessment (in provisional forms of ontical appreciation by a factologist), etc.’. In duplication it was noted that such patterns of treatment were further exercised by the codes of sub-dominant sub-disciplines, e.g., the history of science or the history of philosophy versus the controversial topics of the science of history or the science of philosophy. It was noted also that duplication is also non-commutative in its coded functions. So, e.g., ‘the history or science’ is not ‘the science of history’, etc.[287] (987)

‘Philosophy’ being previously defined as one-part hermeneutics, and on-part phenomenology, one-part existentialization’, could be considered as a ‘globalized form of ordered phenomenon with its central function being to supervise conformal forms of truth determination (either in general terms of reference with to respect to itself as a formal discipline, or through codes entailed in the duplication of sub-disciplines, etc.)’. By, extension all forms of inter-ordered formation could also be taken up within the sphere of philosophical practice, and hence the wide range of sub-disciplines falling under the topic of the philosophical, e.g., semantics, aesthetics, deontology, pragmatical considerations, hermeneutics, ontics, etc., along with logic/s, dialectics, narratology, etc. (988)

One sub-topic to fall within the topic of philosophy was the surprising discovery of the placement of a general metaphysics through the reduplication of the conformal appreciation of the philosophical, namely, as ‘the conformal philosophical appreciation of a conformal philosophical appreciation’. Where through similar patterns of reduplication we could then observe, i.e., consider, the metaphysical manipulation of inter-ordered

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[287] I am sure most people would regard a ‘history of science’, as a topic, to be non-problematic (other than how it might be organized and exercised, which is another matter). On the other hand, a ‘science of history’ is potentially problematic (and hence the intensified contrast to highlight this observation of non-commutativity). Still, some people might consider a ‘science of history’ to be just as credible as, say, a ‘science of philosophy’ as argued for, e.g., by Laurelle,

phenomena through this form of a metaphysical lens, i.e., as treated through either a meta-philosophical and/or non-philosophical perspective… (989)

That this surprising discovery found a respectable place for a critical-radical metaphysics at the center of the philosophical discipline that through retreatment, through de-suspensions (and de-reduplication), could proffer the re-vitalization of this discipline through its meta-appreciation/non-appreciation of conformally treated philosophical phenomena (as in the ensuing narration/s of such discourses along with the ensuing critical and radical emendations of the same, etc.). (990)

Of course, such a metaphysics has no truck with a traditional metaphysics whatsoever to the extent that the latter remains wedded to impossible notions of representation, etc! (991)

However, a topical philosophy and a systematic philosophy (in its recognition of the necessary historicity of social systems) were married with the hope that expositional progeny would take, preserve and conserve the maintenance, and extension, of a conformal status! (992)

Now, over the course of this extended-essay, the idea of the 'conformal', on numerous occasions, was linked, often in passing, with the important concept of 'alignment'. Having just articulated something of the complexity behind a 'philosophy of location', I am now in a better position to formulate an account of this concept which, by extension, also offers a method for conformal practice. It is my contention that the observance of conformally exercised patterns of truth determination should be at the heart of all disciplinary practice. However, to better understand what this conceptual-practice entails its exhibition is best left to its philosophical explication, preferably, as re-vitalized by a conformal process of metaphysical retreatment. That the resuscitation of a conformal metaphysics along the lines of an anti-representationalism is also very much the resuscitation of a conformal philosophy where our disciplinary attention is profitably re-diverted back to a pursuit of what actually works pragmatically through the complete foregoing of all forms of ideological extremism. I.e., all undesirable and non-necessary, unhealthy and unprofitable predilections predicated on either a misplaced over-commitment to unimodalism, bimodalism, and all other forms of absolutistical nonsense and/or an equally misplaced under-commitment stemming from of all forms of relativistical mistreatment that also leads to the serious misinterpretation of lived-experience with various deleterious consequences.[288] Importantly, it should be known that this version of a conformal philosophy of truth determination has no reference whatsoever to impossible notions of mistreated forms of extrapolation passing as 'representations'. That, quite rightly, representative forms subjected to an extrapolation beyond their conventional terms of reference should be viewed as both unnecessary and impossible, and, where the non-insightful addiction to such modes of misthinking have given to the traditional pursuits of both philosophy and metaphysics a not undeserved semblance of a 'bad reputation'. Indeed, reputations of such ill-repute, which, through the weight of bad historical habits, sadly, still

[288] A very lengthy book could be compiled on this topic alone. It is left to the imaginations of the reader, etc., to understand the implicit gravity entailed in an appreciation of this single proposition.

remain in need of reiterated forms of deconstruction in order to progressively weaken the accumulative impact of this noisy, insistent, persistent, and fraudulent form of a traditional thought and practice that definitely deserves to be neither seen nor heard. Against this complex, deconstructive background, a positively nihilistic, anti-representational (non-)perspective is being promulgated in the firm hope that philosophical practice needs to strictly adhere to critical and radical forms of treatment and not pay an unprofitable allegiance to some imputed conformity to an impossible 'vision' of the so-called 'Truth'. A questionable 'Truth', its proponents stridently proclaim as able to be seen and known if only we had the 'eyes' to see this imposter posing as a specter philosophically haunting the dark and dank halls of Academia… where in a timeless mantra, monotonously chanted, 'if only we had the philosophical eyes to see this self-lit region beyond this besmeared realm of worldly shadows…' 'If only we could see beyond the obscuration of appearances and encounter… this 'shibboleth' of a 'reality' claimed to be forever hiding in the shadows cast by such obstructions. But little do such adherents know and realize 'that appearance already have a depth of formation' that needs no 'scratching of the surface', neither the parting nor the departing of an all-pervasive veil of illusion, for how else could we more closely attend to such textual surfaces in order to observe their meta-textual formations and their non-textual simulations as engaged in lived-experience, as able to be thought about, disseminated, discussed, continually emended through conversations upon which is fabricated these enduring, and endearing, yet well-contested processes of consensus building. 'Fabricated' somewhat, since to tell the truth, we have to lie to some extent, just as when we lie, we first have to tell the truth, but, where in the former, through an authenticity of intent, through ongoing processes of de-misrepresentation, we eventually fashion a more conformally aligned version of an evolving development that can be progressively designated as a process of conformal truth-telling that will also meet and engage in increasing forms of social consensus. Where such truth-telling is the necessary bedrock for a democratic way of life, and v.v. So, putting such polemics aside, just what is meant by this practical, working concept of 'alignment'? (993)

I would like to argue that 'alignments' are to be entertained between 'the integration of various propositional strands in relevantly related propositional locations'. That such processes, by their very nature, when correctly located, do not transgress their own conventional (boundaries and functional) limitations, and, at the same time, will also supply both an augmentation and enhancement of non-existential and existential pattens of relational enrichment to be better fostered in our more important relationships. (994)

Indeed, such alignments are crucial in connecting inter-ordered topics with their historical formations as distinctively expressed through systems. Such linkages[289] then promote the formation of an ongoing improvement of our expositions along with the dis-

[289] These relevantly productive 'linkages', or 'putative forms of alignment', can be creatively found within and between many different types of locations and deserve to be assessed in pragmatic terms, etc. E.g., as can be deployed in interviews where there is an exploring of apparent isomorphic invariances or 'resonances' between phenomenal-phenomenological styles of an interview, and hermeneutical styles of interview, and which can be extended to also include a paralleling of an existential appreciation of specifics, values in e/valuational formation, the apparent presence of existential sentiments, etc.

semination of their discursive discourses and where these alignments between the co-associated hyper-economic, economic, and the non-economic sub-disciplines, etc., will further amplify the cultural-intercultural ramifications of this broadcasting of an overall economy of the economic. (995)

Importantly, this practical concept of promoting forms of relative alignment and de-promoting forms of relatively non-alignment can also be re(-)appropriated in the context of our attempting to resolve a seemingly intractable array of both Traditional and Contemporary Social Problems from invoking a more systematic sense of perspective. Just as explored in the outline of a tentative resolution of the so-called 'obesity epidemic' it was found that a profound non-alignment was being culturally instigated and widened, on one hand, between the proactive and reactive institutions of the Health System, and, on the other hand, with the Food Industry with the latter operating in accordance with the usual imperatives entailed in the relatively single-minded pursuit of profit as the primary motive for doing business, acting as set of incentives that so obviously characterize, and distort, the distinctive nature and predictable behaviours of the Business World. That somehow, on various social levels, from the individual to the political organization of that super-system of the Political-Economy in question, successful forms of compromise will need to be engineered in order to promote healthier forms of dietary behaviours especially in terms of increasing the overall level of protein consumption that needs to be instituted in a wider range of food products; through promoting relevant forms of education and self-awareness, attending to the difficult task of getting politicians to be proactive rather than acting in a reactive manner all too often delayed by vested interests, etc. Of course, complex problems are not often resolved by the adoption and adaptation of simplistic solutions, and, undoubtedly, a wide range of other measures will also need to be taken up in order to provide a more comprehensive sense and semblance of a resolution of this particular type of problem. That various social anomalies are more than likely better viewed through either intra-systematic and/or inter-systematic forms of appreciation along with a recognition that the uniqueness of each problem demands their own distinctive patterns in problem solving. Where it is to be hoped that philosophers, and other relevantly involved disciplinarians, whether professional or amateur in status, can both collectively and skillfully proffer suitable forms of resolution that are evidentially found to be relevant to the successful resolution of such problems, be such problems more traditional in orientation or more markedly contemporary in their disruptive manifestation. That, with the relentless advent of both cultural and technological non-continuities, contemporary problems will more than likely need contemporary forms of both address and redress. That these urgently needed forms of *redressement*. I am sure, will be better facilitated through seeking these forms of conventional alignment within and between inter-ordered topics, the complexity of systematic organizations, and the evolving expositions forming discourses that will be set up to progressively seek both relatively-critical and relatively-radical forms of resolution in such problem-solving given this more detailed process of a de-promotion of forms of relative non-alignment and the promotion of better forms of relative alignment… (996)

Now, our metaphorical 'descent; has been completed and, hopefully, we might be a little wiser than when we first ventured forth..? (997)

Perhaps it is now apposite to ask, ‘what might we have learnt if anything?’ (998)

Now, I have no desire to answer for my reader, or audience, but, for myself, it seems to me that, given a recognition of the limits of our conventional thinking, we need to witness their anti-representative containment that, at the end of the day there is not the thinnest ‘sliver of daylight’ between the anti-representational and conventional treatment of our modes of representative thoughts and practices, minus, of course, the complete absence of those patterns of conventional mistreatment through the incorporation of unnecessary and totally non-required forms of ideologically contaminated patterns of extrapolation, etc. That again, this is no different from recognizing these natural limitations of an anti-representative stance. That, quite simply, in economic terms, no economic correlative in any economy can be extrapolated either individually or collectively from their economic origination within that sense and semblance of an economy. That all forms of unimodal, bimodal, or any other imputed instances of absolutistical or relativistical mispractice and malpractice should not be contemplated, indeed, just cannot be contemplated. That pure points of focus just cannot be seen, that backgrounds alone proffer no sense of intentional focus, and the fiction of an experience of pure subjectivity is just nowhere to be found. Only the through the imputed relationships between economic correlativities can a non-anti-representative world be conjured up and simulated, and, therefore, be found devoid of any semblance of an impossible instance of a so-called ‘internal world/s’ and an equally impossible instance of a so-called ‘external world/s’. That through the directness of relational interaction, otherwise there would be no relationship through non-interaction, we cannot but recognize, encounter and engage directly with what is seemingly recognized, encountered and engaged. Thence our inescapable participation and intervention in this world at large, this overall world-of-life. A sense of involvement from a pro-relational and trans-relational perspective that opens us up to the distinctive overlapping of both non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation. Where, theoretically, processes of suspension can metaphorically be referred to as both the ‘door into’ and the ‘exit from; this world of the existential. But, where, in experiential terms, as every moment is engineered through chaotic processes of transformational re-self-organization this sense and semblance of the suspension is ever-present and, therefore, never absent. That through the immediacy of an existential creativity, incremental step by incremental step, we can both critically and radically practice a working-philosophy that is a positively nihilistic, anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism… that is just as equally an existential-pragmatism… proffering the ongoing expansion of a process of social consensus and profiting from its conformal inclusion of the practice of promoting an individual insightfulness… (999)

Working tirelessly to deconstruct the relatively defective,
and to re(-)construct the relatively effective…
and all that that entails both non-existentially and existentially..!! (1000)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 10.1.24.

Five Postscripts

Book 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

Five Postscripts*[290]

C: Postscript A: An Explication of the Concept 'Locations' and their 'Linkages'

The basic premise of this working-concept of 'location/s' is 'that through propositional forms of linkage a richly cross-related, conformally valid presentation can take on the formation of apparent 'representations' within an anti-representational stance along with both co-associated non-existentially and existentially oriented forms of e/valuational formation.[291] In this Postscript A, let me proffer a more detailed exposition on both the intent and ramifications of this 'pragmatic' positioning. (1001)

Previously, I noted (in this central text 12X):

> **I would like to argue that 'alignments' are to be entertained between 'the integration of various propositional strands in relevantly related propositional locations'. That such processes, by their very nature, when correctly located, do not transgress their own conventional (boundaries and functional) limitations, and, at the same time, will also supply both an augmentation and enhancement of non-existential and existential pattens of relational enrichment to be better fostered in our more important relationships.** [994]

Indeed, such alignments are crucial in connecting inter-ordered topics with their historical formations as distinctively expressed through systems. Such linkages[292] then promote the formation of an ongoing improvement of our expositions

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290 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

291 With this expression "apparent 'representations'" we should also be able to answer, if asked, just what are these apparent 'representations' apparent representations of what?' As propositions they present what is basically non-propositional in orientation, but, as, found within the relevant economic setting/s in question, e.g., in a 'textual economy' as viewed through the lens of its constructed constitution as construed, say, through an economic circulation envisaged as enacted between 'textual presentations representing objectively oriented textual intentions, meta-textual genres of behaviour, and the simulations of the textual economy with a relatively non-textual import' all arrived at through processes of economic resolution viewed from a relatively non-economic point of view, etc., as re(-)appropriated through the machinations of the hyper-economic, etc.' Objective' in a 'first sense of the intentional' as 'an intending towards the focus on an intentional objective' (that cannot be isolated from its textual origination). The other two intentional senses being 'motivational' (as expressed through meta-textual genres of behaviour) and 'subjective' in the sense of matching its intentional objectivity (so, e.g., the intentional act of being a visual perceiver is immediately co-associated with its corresponding intentional subjectivity of a visual perceiver without isolating such subjectivity in and through the impossibility of terms of reference that not 'economic'). However, a more convenient and less technical reply, in answering this type of question, might be to merely state, intentionally, that we are focusing on types of intentional experience, genres of behaviour, and the simulations engendered by the textual depositions of that economy, and, in being read, engender the re-simulation of similar patterns of intent, and v.v., and, with absolutely no reference to traditional candidates treated as extra-representationally situated, etc.

292 These relevantly productive 'linkages', or 'putative forms of alignment', can be creatively found within and between many different types of locations and deserve to be assessed in pragmatic terms, etc. E.g., as can be deployed in interviews where there is an exploring of apparent isomorphic invariances or 'resonances' between phenomenal-phenomenological styles of an interview and hermeneutical styles of interview, and which can be extended to also include a paralleling of an existential appreciation of specifics, values in e/valuational formation, the apparent (co-)presence of existential sentiments, etc.

> along with the dissemination of their discursive discourses and where these alignments between the co-associated hyper-economic, economic, and the non-economic sub-disciplines, etc., will further amplify the cultural-intercultural ramifications of this broadcasting of an overall economy of the economic. [995] (1002)

So, the question to now ask is, "just where are these 'propositional locations' that would give us, as a cross-related propositional complex acting as a 'presentation' originating in a 'presentational economy' (that could equally be called an 'economy of representation' or an 'economy of re-presentation')', that in presenting as if like 'representations' whilst not undermining the required 'pragmatic' stance of an anti-representationalism (given that traditional 'representational philosophies' are usually constructed in a form that is either impossible to contemplate and/or in an inconsistent manner that is fatally incoherent"[293]). (1003)

Without becoming sidetracked in a critique of misguided forms of representationalism let me enumerate some of these propositional locations. (1004)

Various schemes are clearly noted or covertly implied. E.g., where propositional alignments can be entertained within and between the sub-economies of the overall economy of the economic. I.e., within and between either the hermeneutic orientation of the hyper-economic, the phenomenological orientation of the economic, and/or the existential orientation of the non-economic. As the trimodal correlativities that constitute the 'overall economy of the economic' we are to assume, first, that all correlatitivies must co-occur, and, second, that relatively isomorphic forms of invariance will be observed in the distinctive variety of transformations able to be performed by that very economy, and, third, that no one economic correlativity, etc., can be isolated and impossibly referred to in discrete terms of reference. Let me attempt to demonstrate this both anecdotally and formally. (1005)

A number of phenomenologically inspired psychologists and psychiatrists have noted that phenomenologically oriented interviews can also be conducted from a herme-

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[293] More basically, I am arguing that, superficially, these traditional representational arguments do appear as if they could be reasonably entertained, but, which, on closer attention, would first appear as if they were somewhat inconsistent and, then, perhaps fatally incoherent, but, then, through further non-superficial inspection, in an overall form of such manifested self-contradictions that they just could not be entertained, economically, through the very impossibility of their being able to be actually contemplated. That the root of such ideological 'sleights of hand' resides in making covert rhetorical and metaphorical shifts that are both totally illegal and not able to be economically contemplated. E.g., the nonsensical positioning of the 'realist' or 'empiricist' who ideologically preferences the interpretation of sense experiences through their impossible temporal prioritization, conducted completely at the expense of the necessary co-associated associations of both intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity. The analogy I like to draw here is the comparison to 'the chopping of a stick in half in the seeking of the impossible hope of arriving at a smaller stick with only one end'. It should also be pointed out that an 'idealist' or 'rationalist' is attempting to do a similar impossible thing, albeit in reverse, by prioritizing ideational experience over perceptual experience. In technical language I define 'preferential positioning' as 'the relatively or non-relatively focusing an emphasis upon either past prioritizations, current forms of privileging, and/or future promotions'. The sense implicated in this critique is not on some form of a 'relative privileging' that could be entertained, but, on an ''absolutistical, non-relative sense and semblance of prioritization, etc.'

neutic sense of perspective, and v.v., and, where their apparent cross-relational intersections can provide a certain degree of mutual confirmation and verification of the narrational content that can be discerned in those narratives elicited under these styles of scrutiny exercised in conducting these types of interviews, say, of a psychological tenor and complexion. In supporting their working hypothesis, in this regard, I have noted how economies can be interpreted through these sub-economies of the phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential. Indeed, by extension, I have previously argued that we can also run this form of parallelism by also invoking phenomenological-existential parallels and hermeneutical-existential parallels along with a triple set of cross-relations when conducted between all three economies of the phenomenal-phenomenological,[294] hermeneutical and existential. In the following more formal explication, I will briefly exemplify how this parallel set of triple correlations (alignments) can be conducted. (1006)

E.g., I could phenomenal-phenomenologically report that 'I am seeing a fruit bowl filled with apples that I know were bought from the fruit market yesterday'. That 'these apple-like phenomena, when handled, look like 'apples' and smell like 'apples', and, indeed, taste like 'apples', when I bite into this apple, in line with my current anticipations aligning with my expectations as derived from the recollections of past experiences of having eating apples on numerous occasion'.[295] (1007)

E.g., I could hermeneutically report that by invoking the meta-textual genre of 'seeing' and the genre of 'seeing a fruit bowl', that 'I am now seeing a fruit bowl filled with apples' that I also know 'were bought from the fruit market yesterday'. That in invoking the genre of 'looking at apples', 'handling apples', and 'eating apples', I know, through such alignments, that 'these apple-like textual reports (of apple phenomena), when handled, look like apples and smell like apples, and, indeed, taste like apples, when I bite into this apple, in line with my current anticipations aligning with my expectations as derived from my recollections of past experiences of having eating apples on numerous occasion'. That my very ability to form such a report is dependent upon the invocation of this coherent set of meta-textual gernes of behaviour in both the (re-)writing and (re-)reading of such overall behaviour. The recognition of these mutual acts of continual 're-writing/re-reading' further reinforcing the integrity of this hermeneutically oriented report(ing). (1008)

E.g., I could existentially report that 'I am distinctly seeing the specificity of a fruit bowl filled with apples that I also historically know were bought from the fruit market yesterday'. That 'these apple-like specificities, when handled, distinctly look like apples and specifically smell like apples, and, indeed, very much taste like apples, despite

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294 'Phenomenal-phenomenological' as a technical expression, explicitly notes both an implicit suspension and de-suspension of ' what psychic direction is the constitution of the phenomenological experience being more constructed within, namely, through the impact of the presenting phenomenon 'itself' (or phenomena 'themselves') or more thorough the exertions of our own sense/s of agency (as in comparison with an apparent act of sense involvement, etc., *versus* an act, say, of memory or the (re)viewing of an apparent dream sequence, etc.).

295 That these propositional reports noting alignments in both our expectations and the immediacy of our anticipation between, the 'looks', 'smells'; and 'tastes', specifically associated with these 'apples' will also further this process of making an informed, representative integration of that propositional report, etc.

the unique flavours being experienced when I bite into this apple, exactly in line with my current anticipations aligning with my expectations as derived from the range of past experience, as recollections, as incurred through having eaten apples on numerous occasion'. (1009)

Technically, in a phenomenological orientation we are dealing with particularities, whereas, hermeneutically we deal with the generalities of meta-textual genres of behaviour, and, existentially, we deal with the presented immediacy of the concrete, historical specificities of that recorded set of experiences. Hence such alignments between these three levels of propositional generality-particularity-specificity. Then, within such reports we would note the subject matter of our attention, namely, in this instance, being 'a fruit bowl filled with apples' (along with our reports on the viewing and handling of the same, etc.). Within these modes of intentional orientation, we note objective and subjective elements in an inter-objective time and space being reviewed subjectively (and quite possibly also being conducted in intersubjective terms of reference at the same time). Moreover, in the hermeneutic orientation we note the parallel alignments that are necessarily being engendered between the necessarily co-associated acts of re-reading and re-writing that cannot meaningfully be divided into the isolation of pure acts of either (re-)writing and/or (re-)reading. That, furthermore, the reiteration of such intentional states (and their trans-intentional appreciation) also gives us further material for conducting these forms of propositional alignment, etc. That, similarly, say, in the existential experiencing of the specificities of that apple we note how each mouthful is experienced as a very subtle set of variations on the overall taste and flavour of that apple being eaten. Where, through iterations, we find the progressive integration and apparent integrity of that overall experience involved in looking at these apples in the fruit-bowl and in the very eating of one of these pieces of fruit'. (1010)

Indeed, in this instance, we witness, either passively and/or actively, a rich nexus of cross-related propositional mini-reports all able to be generalized, more 'more' than 'less', under the aegis of an overall report. That at no time in this act of collation or synthesis do we need to note the extrapolated, extra-textual, extra-propositional status of those same reports in whatever presented degree of cross-related detail they find themselves being given an exposition (and potentially disseminated either to the reviewer[296] and/or by the self-reviewer to themselves, etc.). (1011)

But, in experience, this enrichment of cross-references is open-ended to the extent that there is a plethora of other forms of alignment available for use, be such recognitions entertained either advertently and/or inadvertently. E.g., the relations between topics and disciplines along with their integrated patterns of conventional expression, etc. E.g., the relations between topics and their historically situated envelopment within their co-associated systems, along with their secondary forms of extension conducted within the Political-Economy itself as situated within the embrace of the Political-Economic Environment. E.g., the relations involved in the genesis of the sets of disseminated discourses instigated between the relations between systems, topics, and expositions. E.g., through economic forms of correlative interactions introduced on grounds of relevance, pragmatic

[296] I.e., if there were a person or persons conducting the interview.

utility, as introduced for either reinforcing conformal assurance or overseeing the deconstructing of the same, and so on… (1012)

Now, this explication hypothetically granted, what philosophical ramifications and pragmatic impacts are afforded through this appreciation of the reiterated alignments entailed in this linkage of propositional locations supporting this contention that traditional forms of representation are both economically impossible and economically unnecessary since we already have to hand all that we need to run a valid conformal instantiation of an anti-representational process of re(-)positioning. 'Re(-)positioning' in the sense 'that positioning should always be arrived at through valid forms of ongoing, circumscribed, conformal re(-)iteration'.[297] (1013)

On a number of grounds, traditional forms of philosophical repesentationalism just cannot operate, as claimed, basically through economic impossibilities, such as, e.g., the ontological impossibilities involved in either the isolation and/or the extrapolation of economic correlativities; on epistemological grounds that the reception involved in either the isolation and/or extrapolation of economic correlativities are equally impossible; that ideas of absolutistical representation are also impossible to contemplate both within and outside the operating of both ontological and epistemological forms of economic simulation, etc. (1014)

That 'such misrepresented claims can appear so credible to those who are not non-intelligent' is itself a philosophical puzzle and problem, but, the resolution of this observation can be given a partial explanation in the form of noting how they abuse, e.g., the interrogative economy involved in the asking and answering of questions, etc., through conflating fallacious forms of rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional modes of treatment that should have been conformally observed in the validly performed sequencing of their propositional report(ing)s, etc. Even if mesmerized by their preference for certain metaphors, etc., does not give them a license to promote, say, the literal treatment of such imagery. Just as children in hearing a nursery rhyme referring to the 'Moon' as 'a big blue (or green) cheese' does not have them believing that for one moment, whereas, in an obvious contrast, we have learned disciplinarians endlessly obsessing over the prioritization of either the apparently 'realistic' or 'idealistic' and clearly mistaking such simulated notions as if simulating that which cannot be simulated. Why do we need to deal with such misguided folks who so persistently self-relegate themselves off the stage of serious discussion and debate? Because, unfortunately, they have occupied the central courts of Academia… when they should have been politely pensioned off… at the intellectual dawn of time itself… (1015)

The ramifications of this conformal re(-)positioning are many. Putting paid to misguided forms of representationalism! Being able to philosophically move on and deal with problems that are truly pressing and better deserve our attention as we attempt to act

[297] 'Circumscribed' in a number of senses, e.g., circumscribed by time; circumscribed by the observation that these ongoing processes of cross-referencing of correlated locations do not usually need to be excessively reiterated; circumscribed by the limited but adequate nature of intentional processes themselves, etc.

for the betterment of others. E.g., by observing how the overlapping of systems can have deleterious consequences in both cultural and intercultural terms of reference, etc. (1016)

But, in economically running economies of 'presentation, representation and re-presentation', etc., would we be not be as guilty of the same philosophical sins here ascribed to others. Not necessarily. I am not claiming perfected and perfect forms of argumentation, but, at the same time, I am making a case for the suitable delivery of adequate arguments that at no point need to fall back on these misguided notions of a non-simulated or pre-simulated 'vision' of 'that-being-represented'. Arguments that equally do not need to fall back on misguided notions that 'all perception' is 'just apperception' and nothing else other than this self-constituted and lonely vision of that which is solely self-apperceived. Or, to continue to indulge in our drowning in regurgitated myths that have us think 'we live in a world of shadows, and that one day, with perseverance and impossible skill, we will encounter through reason a well-lit world of 'Reality' whose 'Truth' will make us free…' when such addiction and enslavement to such bankrupt modes of ideation have had us trapped in unprofitable forms of endless and pointless chatter when our attention would have been better spent being better informed, in truly working with others, in attempting to resolve traditional and contemporary social problems, and so on… (1017)

As for the impact of such a pragmatic approach, what can I say other than 'it should be allowed to speak for itself'? At least attempt to understand how we need to enter into viable forms of an evolving social consensus in the hope that we can set up both the political and non-political pre-conditions that promote the pursuit of more profitable forms of freedom better expedited through the auspices of others… (1018)

As for the moral of this postscript – an anti-representational philosophy cannot entirely dismiss notions of representation because such a pragmatic positioning would lose all sense. Neither can an absolutistically portrayed representationalism be permitted to talk about things that are patently impossible especially when these representationalists insist that we have to listen to their endless dissemination of such nonsense. That, in taking a middle path, we should also be aware that as we can never exhaust any one perspective nor co-opt the enlistment of all perspectives, be they relevant or otherwise… that, as a consequence, we need to be humble in the face of the fact that we will misrepresent the lived-reality of our passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively, but, that through processes of de-mis-representation, and other forms of error correction, and so on, we can pragmatically arrive at forms of social consensus that better suit the needs of those around us. Indeed, learn to ascertain both the distinctiveness and accommodation that needs to be observed between 'the relatively non-existential' and 'the relatively existential.!!' (1019)

That, as ever, I do not seek your assent, along with your approval, but, rather your understanding, and, when and where possible, that you share in those forms of criticism that will mutually strengthen our careful, ongoing re(-)consideration of all such matters…. (1020)

N.T., Wentworth Falls, 12.1.24.

Postscript B: Conformal Assurance *versus* Conformal De-Assurance

As a point of departure, the concept of the 'conformal' has been initially defined as 'either the confirmation and/or the verification of either a prior confirmation (in real time) and/or a verification (in non-real time) where the concept of truth determination is evidentially framed in Tarskian terms of reference'. Of course, how 'evidence' is to be adjudicated is here not outlined. Basically, it is implicitly viewed as it might be more commonly understood, i.e., as the necessary forms of propositional alignments required in the way of expectations considered relevant all conducted within a suitable framework that is not inconsistently formulated.[298] Or, we might wish to frame this exercise in conformalism as the reiteration of a narrative based on the best advancement of the narrational facts in a form that appears to reiterate the truth determinations already arrived at (in the light of the objectives of that narrative in question).,, but also meeting, hopefully, in a timely fashion, the overall qualification of the same through partial forms of conformal de-assurance along with those ensuing responses that suitably ameliorate such anomalies met long the way...[299] (1021)

In other words, from a process of reiterative truth determination we move from either confirmation and/or verification to a process treated as 'conformal' assuming such assurance has not in the interim been deconstructed through some form of conformal de-assurance. E.g., when we find so-called facts were incorrectly recorded or inappropriately interpreted, etc. Or, we came to the conclusion that our arguments were fallaciously constructed at some point in their sequencing. Or, in pragmatic terms, where the immediate anticipation of our expectations did not occur and, therefore, were not realized in a manner even close to that as predicted, etc. Where a 'positive process of reiterated conformance', i.e., positive 'assurance' can be seen to occur when 'that 'narration is treated as conformally valid', albeit as 'qualified in provisional terms of reference'. In contrast, 'conformal de-assurance' is 'when and where a process of reiteration meets a point in time that then disrupts that prior process of assurance'. (1022)

Assurance is also tied to my twin concept of 'insurance'. I.e., 'with the discovery of conformal de-assurance, given that we can never be completely wrong, it behooves us to retrace our metaphorical steps in our sequence to meet a point where assurance can once again be taken up, albeit on a provisional basis, at least hypothetically. (1023)

'Assurance is also used in the sense of an 'emergent appreciation'... that 'arising from many micro-instances of conformal reiteration where conformal assurance is non-reductively arrived at that is only disrupted through partial conformal de-assurance, etc.' Hence a positive conformal process cannot be merely equated with its initial definition (as if merely conducted through reiterative patterns of processes that just involve the checking of truth determinations). (1024)

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[298] Where the expression 'suitable' is used by myself in a technical sense, namely, 'the phenomenologically proper, hermeneutically appropriate, and existentially apposite use of information to hand, etc.'

[299] E.g., through processes of hermeneutical rectification of pretreatment, phenomenal-phenomenological deconstruction of treatment, and non-systematic and systematic existential patterns of retreatment through ongoing re(-)normalization, etc.

Furthermore, through philosophical reiteration, as ‘the process of a conformal philosophical appreciation of conformal philosophical appreciation, i.e., ‘conformal metaphysical appreciation’, defined as per this definition just supplied, we also have this overlay of processes of treatment that actively deconstruct the relatively defective and institute the relatively engaged re(-)construction of the relatively non-defective. Where, through the automatic invocation of a process of the de-suspension, we then come to experience the results of such processes of treatment through the transformational retreatment of de-reduplication. Those results being instrumental in either reinforcing this sense and semblance of a conformal re(-)assurance, or, the introduction of a period of conformal de-assurance until suitable forms of assurance more effectively re-establishes the ensuing truth determination in question, i.e., as either re-affirming the previous positive interpretation, or more permanently establishing the negative interpretation, and/or then either de-establishing that negative interpretation or entering the recognition of a more indecisive territory, etc. (1025)

Where, the concepts of both the absolutistically indubitable and the absolutistically nob-indubitable have no place whatsoever in a non-extremist philosophy that accepts processes of relatively qualified conformal appreciation given that we work our way through such deliberations to the extent they seem to mutually support such progress in these processes of truth determination. (1026)

Furthermore, the indubitable could not be understood for without the possibility of de-assurance it would make no sense to be so self-defined (as not needing either conformal assurance and/or conformal de-assurance). Otherwise, it would be like setting an examination where the ‘right’ answers have already been analytically pre-determined, regardless of whether that process be rightly or wrongly pre-determined. (1027)

Moreover, the nature of the non-economic expressions of the causal is such that the world as lived is not relativistically ‘flat’ as envisaged in a mere process of suspension. We know ‘that we can walk across the surface of the land without dangerously levitating’ even though this possibility can be imagined, and, ‘that walking on the surface of the Moon in our birthday suit is impossible’ even if we were able to be transported to the surface of the Moon, despite being able to do so through the virtual nature of our imagination. (1028)

That the radical and critical ‘evidence’ of the non-economic is such that truth determinations do not usually have an equality of possible outcomes. Thence, these biases more easily set the stage for a world of mutually shared determinations furthering the lived basis for the formation of social consensus and ensuing patterns of relatively mutual arbitration, and so on. (1029)

On the other hand, an economy of synthetic truth determinations cannot be constructed without their analytical pre-constructions through definitions, distinctive identities, transformations, accommodations, etc. Therefore, an in-depth conformal appreciation of truth determination cannot escape a suspension of both analytical and synthetical

contributions in a process that borders on the virtually synthetic *a priori* as it is manifested in this phenomenal-phenomenological experience of a qualified assurance as seemingly arrived at through an appreciation of an open conformal process of truth determination.[300] But, call it what you may, assurance cannot be equated with the impossibility of the absolutistically indubitable. Where a conformal philosophy is re-vitalized by a conformal metaphysics, as defined, but, equally circumscribed through processes of inter-ordered reduplication, transformational retreatment, and so on. (1030)

To sum up, as a work in progress, a process of conformal re(-)assurance, in either a positive, negative or neutral outcome, is strengthened through re(-)iteration, narrational reinforcement, insurance, emergence, and forms of metaphysical retreatment in which outcomes in conformal truth determination can be rendered relatively resistance to reduction, analysis, counter-evidential demonstration, albeit in provisional terms of reference, until such a point in time is reached when conformal de-assurance both produces and, through forms of reiteration, re(-)produces a different process of assurance through the format, form, and formation[301] of the persisting consistency and integrity of those subsequent outcomes (that could also take on, somewhat, the virtual semblance of the synthetic *a priori* rather than its non-virtual reality?). Where, basically, assurance in truth determination emerges well beyond mere processes of re-iterative checking, or similar, but, furthermore, in a format that has no truck whatsoever with any one misguided instance of a non-anti-representationalism. (1031)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 17.1.24.

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300 A similar state of affairs arises in fact-value distinctions, the naturalistic fallacy, etc. Where given an economy of 'the descriptive, the prescriptive and the proscriptive' a process of an in-depth exploration should reveal the qualified collapse of such distinctions if permitted to remain in just superficial terms of reference.

301 I.e., in an economy of assurance (hermeneutically oriented, hyper-economic format; phenomenological economic form, and existential formation).

Postscript C: The Topical Intersection of Disciplines and Systems

As noted, more in passing, the intersection between the topical nature of disciplines and their historical instantiation in social systems is inferred as being present in the operation of the codes imputed for the distinctive functioning of those systems. So, legal codes deal with legal matters and not directly with ethical concerns as pointed out by Luhmann. However, thankfully, today, slavery no longer falls under property law, or similar. For ethical concerns to become embedded in legal codes, legislation in the Overall Political System usually needs to be established through noting alterations in the formation and codification of laws where the conservative worlds of both politics and law eventually catch up with the consolidation of current social thinking in areas that once might have been thought to have been too controversial for less unreasonable opinions to aspire after and perhaps find some form of either an acceptable compromise and/or an unacceptable non-compromise. Those laws are then taken up in the overall Legal World by its varied representatives, e.g., judges, barristers, solicitors, conveyancers, various academics working in this type of field, etc., with the general community eventually finding some form of social awareness of their very existence, i.e., where the general consensus of their views finds an actual codification in law and where this fact of modern life is also, over time, becomes generally recognized...[302] (1032)

As a general rule we can suppose that a super-system envelops a relevant system, that in turn, envelops, a sub-system, and, all this finds reflection in the relative dominance of their respective disciplines. So, e.g., if we are to run with the observation that The Legal Fraternity operates primarily as a business then we might surmise that the code/s of The Business World envelop The Legal World which, in turn, envelop various codes pertaining to the formation of sub-disciplinary fields focusing on more specific branches in law, e.g., the formation of statements or depositions, rules of evidence, etc., paralleling various disciplines charged with the performance of such specific tasks. (1033)

Hence this understanding that the ahistorical topicality of disciplines and the historical nature of social systems intersect in this plethora of coded operations that characterize the distinctive nature of such systems along with their entailed disciplines. Therefore, it behooves the disciplinarian in question to discern just how those codes are constituted, and, how their phenomenal-phenomenological descriptions, hermeneutical prescriptions, and existential proscriptions intersect in the expressed form of non-economically oriented patterns of codified behaviour.[303] Differentiating codes in the hope of rectifying, deconstructing, and pursuing healthier forms of re(-)normalization in the overall resolution of intra-systematic and inter-systematic anomalies. (1034)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 19.1.24.

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302 The inference to be drawn is that the Legal Fraternity seems to have a number of prominent locations in the Political-Economy, namely, judges as executives; political legislators creating and amplifying a body of law, and solicitors, etc., operating in the midst of The Business World (and that the latter forms, in my opinion, the primary location for this discipline). Of course, the argument, 'ignorance of the law is not a defence' is also a nonsense given the inevitable conflict within a non-fully coherent body of law.

303 Where the use of current forms of AI might be able to better delineate these operations and how they might more productively intersect, resolve systemic forms of anomalization, find innovations, etc.

Postscript D: Nomenclature: Anti-Representationalism *versus* Anti-Realism, etc.

I have read that Richard Rorty, himself, has said he prefers the expression 'anti-representationalism' rather than use this term 'anti-realism' (or, by extension, 'non-realism'). Here are some reasons why I am in agreement here (without reconsidering his reasons for this preference in terminology). (1035)

I believe that once realism, as a form of ideological extremism, is understood to be both untenable and unnecessary then it would be more productive just not to engage such philosophical nonsense. Indeed, have no truck with any form of realism whatsoever, including so-called empiricists, *et al*, be it in either disputing 'impossible realist fantasies' or by articulating what you have meant by either an 'anti-realism' or a 'non-realism', etc. I am sure time would be better spent in formulating both the functioning and advantages of your non-extremist re(-)positioning, and, that this work could well be more impressive than just a polemic when the better audience to captivate with your forms of innovative reasoning would be those that have already demonstrated that they have no such forms of over-commitment. Admittedly, others through time have already brilliantly performed this deconstructive labour for us, and it is, for us, to outline how a nihilistic philosophy can be both positive and pragmatic, both a productive pursuit and a profitable way to make our passages through this world at large both individually and collectively. (1036)

In this vein, to this end, I would also like to note, as a tentative observation, an existential approach can also be executed in the dialectical movement of one step only rather than the two steps of deconstruction, first, and then reconstruction, second. I.e., by taking a pro-relational perspective and operating more from the perceived, or rather ap-perceived, perspective of the primary relationship itself, we allow ourselves to enter into modes of engagement by directly dealing with the specificities of the situation itself. Seeking consensus, working with what is to hand, seeing innovative ways of re-approaching the problematic, seeking for solutions already embedded in our current un-derstanding of just what is anomalous, being open to those measure that seem to promise an enrichment of our relationships, and so on and so forth. (1037)

I also have another reason for not wishing to directly confront realists as I per-ceive their problematic style of positioning to be very similar to that perpetrated by ideal-ists, and rationalists, *et al*. Both types of intellectual misfits take seductive metaphors and then allow themselves to be so inadvertently seduced by the same. In this regard, an anti-realism has little or nothing to say to the rampant idealist, and, yet, in confronting either misguided party, a similar set of manoeuvres should be adopted, albeit with a subtle set of differences in strategies and polemical objectives, if the latter need to be observed. Although, again, time is probably better spent dealing with the non-over-committed... and, here, the form and value of your approach needs to be deftly crafted for an audience that does not prove itself to be deaf to the innovative unfolding of the crafting of your pragmatic approaches as you set out to attempt a series of probable resolutions of real problems, i.e., those with a social dimension and can potentially reduce the suffering in this world and might even add to the pleasures that could also be shared with others... that an anti-representationalist has a broader canvass to work with and a much wider set of

objectives that deserve to be accomplished (and non-obstructed by unprofitable forms of either digression or diversion). (1038)

Where the anti-representationalist also needs to work with ideas of 'representation' that are not impossibly forged and fabricated by noisy realists, *et al*, who, forever, will insist upon the literalization of their misshapen analogies and arguments. In working within economically viable readings of an economy of ongoing re(-)presentation (treated as a heuristic device constructed along with its co-associated economic correlatives, say, of 'representation', 'presentation', and 're-presentation') we have already through this economic translation adopted a nihilistic sense of positioning by virtue of the fact that no economic correlative, or anything else for that matter, is able to be absolutistically extracted from its economic setting and be self-presented in its own right (the infamous conjuring trick, nonsensically chanted, as the so-called 'in itself', or 'of itself' or 'through itself'). Just as intentional objectives (in a first economic sense of the intentional) cannot be severed from their intentional motivation (in a second economic sense of the intentional) along with the self-observation of its co-associated sense and semblance of subjective-like experience (as a third economic sense of the intentional). Where pure subjectivity is an impossible state of affairs like 'the chopping in half of a stick and hoping to get two sticks each possessing only one end'. Or, similarly, attempt to imagine a state of so-called 'pure subjectivity' when all subjective experience appears to reflect our current intentional preoccupations (along with their pre-intentional inputs of physiological, motor-sensory, and emotional or affective processes and contents, and, trans-intentional outputs in the form of judgments, patterns of causal intervention, etc.).[304] Since our intentional appreciation of our subjectivity is always coloured by such 'preoccupations' then how could we talk about 'pure subjectivity', or 'pure anything else' for that matter, since we cannot experience it in a form that is not economically oriented. Additional reasons, therefore, why we should not go down this type of an impossible rabbit hole and, instead, develop those models of innovative understanding, such heuristic devices, and similar, that rhetorically and metaphorically are suggestive of new ways to proceed rather than tripping over where others have gone so unwisely, be that either foolishly and unproductively, or, with much wisdom but without our merely wishing to echo and just proclaim a long list of their many achievements alone without our creatively focusing on what contributions we could make, regardless of whether they are to be found to pragmatically succeed or fail... (1039)

There are those people who love to listen to music so much that they inevitably set out to perform it as well...[305] (1040)

Here, I have outlined an overlapping set of reasons why I believe it is better to positively outline the pragmatic advantages of a non-negative nihilist philosophy that would be better presented and qualified as an 'anti-representationalism' rather than termed and defined more narrowly as an 'anti-realism' (or 'non-realism'). (1041)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 17.1.24.

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304 Implying both an overall sense of self and an infinitude of various co-associated senses of self.

305 E.g., a form of motivation that also inspires sportspersons, etc.

Postscript E: Summary of Book 9 Conducted in a Reversed Order to its Exposition

In introducing the trajectory of this Book 9, a summary of its ideas conducted in the reversed order of its exposition would proffer a more approachable method for its comprehension (given the relative topical complexity of inter-ordered phenomena *vis-à-vis* our daily observations and interactions with the visible functioning of the social organization of systems like e.g., The World of Business, Academia, The Political Establishment, The Legal Fraternity, etc.).[306] (1042)

The motivation behind this book was formed under four distinctive headings, but, more importantly, how these themes are to be inter-linked is a more basic motivation for their formulation. These four headings were:

1. Inter-Ordered Phenomena (expressed as the Topic),
2. The Repurposing of Metaphysics as an Example of the Former,
3. The Political-Economic Embedding of Disciplines within Semi-Autonomous Systems,
4. The Non-Superficial Resolution of Traditional and Non-Traditional Social Issues.[307]

(1043)

In a distillation of this primary motivation, I noted:

Economy of 'the Topic (of the Discipline) + Systems + Expositions = Discourses'

...translated, this formulation notes that all disciplines have an inter-ordered topicality plus their embedding in a world of systems whose interactions give us the expression of expositions, which, as textual depositions, then find forms of dissemination with the implication of a co-associated causal dimension.[308] (1044)

E.g., I could write and send a business email to Business A requesting they send Product X, which, when having paid for the cost of Product X and the costs of shipping, should the latter be incurred, hopefully, they will do so as contracted. Basically, this communication is a' letter', but, not just the mere writing and receiving of a letter, in the 'passive' form of an email, given its causal implications as noted. (1045)

But, rather than immediately cashing out a long list of complicated concepts like 'orders', 'reduplication', 'duplication', 'transformational retreatment', 'inter-ordered phenomena', the 'topical basis of disciplines', let me start, in reverse, with a discussion on the nature of discourses and systems. (1046)

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306 Note that historically specific 'Systems' are capitalized. Their specificity being expressed by which types of texts their distinctive codes will operate upon. So, e.g., The Legal Fraternity deals with legal texts along with those texts that have some form of demonstrable legal relevance, like, e.g., statements, depositions, documents of ownership, the citing of legal precedents, the delivery of judgments, etc.

307 *Pursuit*, III.12W.33.

308 I.e., 'Expositions' are 'virtual in orientation', and, 'Discourses' are 'non-virtual in orientation'. 'Orientation' in the sense we cannot make an absolutistical distinction between the same.

A 'discourse', as intimated, is 'the finalization of an exposition[309] given the textually deposited nature of its emission and dissemination as a discursive communication with the potential for co-associated causal ramifications, i.e., present implications and future consequences. Yes, e.g., we could just passively read a letter and, at the same time, ignore all its injunctions, but, then, we do so, actively, through choosing not to act upon those same injunctions. (1047)

Abbreviated, we could say 'discourses' are 'disseminated communications that might have consequential ramifications that could also elicit further responses, etc., and so on'. (1048)

Now, the secular world could be envisaged as an arena where people experience the inputs from a plethora of disciplines, as discursively engendered by their disciplinarians. Moreover, I would like to argue two conjectures, namely, first, 'that all disciplines must have a topical basic in inter-ordered phenomena' (which will be shortly explored), and, second, 'that all disciplines must be historically resident in a primary system, either in a *de jure* role or in a *de facto* role'.[310] E.g., the topic of history is primarily situated in the system of Academia, but, most scholars either in Academia or outside Academia, usually operate with a view to the norms disseminated by Academia, e.g., as expressed through the establishment of universities, being exposed to a university education, reading books explaining how 'orthodox' historical research should be conducted and presented, etc. I.e., where 'scholars', as 'historians', acting either as professionals or amateurs, either dependent upon a university or acting as independent scholars, contribute to the ongoing, overall world of conversations surrounding this disciplinary topic of the 'historical' broad enough to also subsume, to varying degrees, heretical ideas of what might also be thought to be entailed in notions of the 'historical' (that I believe, and have argued, should also note delineations and interactions between a pluralized vision of histories of the past, present, and future). (1049).

My interest in Systems is to understand the historicity of disciplines (as necessarily embedded within systems) and to better understand how many traditional and contemporary social problems could be approached and progressively de-problematized through a better understanding of their interactions, be those interactions either relatively disruptive and/or relatively constructive in orientation. (1050)

The key example of this operating at cross purposes to the detriment of the well-being of society in general, explored in this Book 9, is the so-called Obesity Epidemic' arising from the demonstrated tendency for The Food Industry, operating with The World of Business, as an imperative, to maximize profits, unfortunately, also at the expense of the health of its customers. In other words, we find a clash between objectives expressed by professionals in The Health World (and Industry) and The World of Business in which the excessive attention to the maximization of profits has led to a non-negligible decrease in the percentage of protein in our basic food intake. As a result, our bodily protein sen-

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309 Through economic resolution expressed 'non-economically'.

310 I am influenced here by the work of Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), the German sociologist and philosopher.

sors ‘tell’ us to eat more with the consequence that to get an adequate level of protein we end up ingesting more calories than are actually required. Consequently, these elevated levels of caloric intake get deposited as body fat and, where, on an incremental basis, the population, as a trend, continues to increase in the size of its average body mass. That to address this phenomenon of an overweight population it is obvious that counting calories, special diets, increased exercise regimes, etc., have not proven to be successful (as this crisis still continues to unfold) That, only in a deeper exploration, in this instance, on a systematic basis, can we explain what we really need to do to more effectively address and efficaciously redress such issues, and, as well, understand why past remedies have proven to be so totally ineffective. That, in this type of example, only in an understanding of the clash of objectives between these competing and intersecting systems can we turn potentially effective, but often failing, measures dealing more with symptoms into more efficacious forms of treatment by more directly dealing with the root causes of such hitherto misdirected patterns of either inadvertent and/or advertent social behaviour. (1051)

Hence this additional conjecture, ‘that given the impending disruption of our social world in the near future, from the confluence of technologies along with innovative non-continuities in cultural practice, we will also need to develop contemporary solutions for contemporary problems centered in a resolution of either intra-systematic and/or inter-systematic forms of anomalization arising from a discordance between the ideality of social objectives and their observed reality where competing projects and programs either re-direct, distort and/or disrupt such forms of requisite resolution required to resolve such problematic issues’. (1052)

To the casual observer, we see a wide variety of social systems such as The Business World, The Health World, The Political Establishment, The Legal Fraternity, Academia, and so on. Also discussed in this *Book* 9 is how these systems find a primary sense of place in a segmented dissection of the Political-Economy as situated in the open context of the Political-Economic Environment along with the outline of how these different sectors of society should either directly or indirectly communicate with each other in a professionally understood manner. Just as, e.g., it would be improper for a politician to interact directly, and in a potentially non-transparent manner, with The World of Business (in order to avoid either the perception or the reality of bribes and other forms of corrupt behaviour) and that this one of the important reasons we have a Civil Service, or hire Consultants, that are charged to supervise such intermediated interactions. (1053)

Equally important, is my disquisition on inter-ordered phenomena as the topical basis of disciplines, and, how their disciplinary codes are co-opted by systems in the historical performance of their resident disciplines. I am arguing here that in an in-depth understanding of how disciplines function, admittedly through the pragmatic use of a range of heuristic devices, we should find ourselves in a better position to understand just how these systems, etc., operate in the formation of their expositions that are then textually deposited as the corresponding disseminations of their distinctive discourses with causal ramifications. Let me clarify the import of this broad statement of my objectives in interconnecting inter-ordered phenomena with disciplines as both embraced and enveloped by systems in order to proffer patterns of performance, that hopefully, are existen-

tially oriented from a pro-relational perspective that oversees the progressive existential enrichment of our relationships as we make our passages through this world at large both individually and collectively since the very fabric of our freedom is ultimately guaranteed only through our arbitrated cooperation with others (contrary to Neoliberal fantasies about the false independence of so called competitive agents who can only operate parasitically upon and through the social structures already put in place through cooperative patterns of social arbitration). (1054)

So, what are inter-ordered phenomena? On a trans-cognitive level in epistemological organization, i.e., on a trans-intentional level of judgment of our intentional objectives I see the formation of six distinctive types of e/valuational formation of which three varieties can be deemed to be 'value' *per se* in a more socially understood use of that type of term, namely, the second order of the aesthetic, the third order of the relatively deontological and existential,[311] and a fourth order of the relative expediency of the pragmatical (but a term not to be confused with the concept of the 'pragmatic' as in the promoting the stance of a 'pragmatic philosophy, etc.'). Listing these six trans-cognitive orders in the order of their conventional numbering (and ignoring here their cognitive counterparts) we have...[312]

Order	**Trans-Cognitive Order**	**Cognitive Order**
6^0	Ontical	Ontical
5^0	Hermeneutical Possibility	Possible Facts
4^0	Pragmatical	Perceptions
3^0	Deontological	Conceptions
2^0	Aesthetical	Essentials
1^0	Phenomenological	Pre-Essentials [17] (1055)

But, rather than just a linear depiction, a circular depiction can also be represented. We can do this by invoking an archetypal economy consisting of moments of a background sense of World, a foreground focus on the intentional Object(ive), and a co-associated sense of intentional subjectivity designated by Ego... and linking, respectively, these moments or polarities or economic correlatives with the fifth order, the first order and the third order:

Ego/3^0

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Object/1^0 **World**/5^0 (1056)

311 Where this non-systematic existential orientation (of the so-called third moment of Ego) is relatively deontological but cannot be reduced purely to the deontological alone (because existential imperatives will also include pragmatical and aesthetical components, or aspects ,as well).

312 *Pursuit*, III.12X.33.

Then, filling in the orders in between we get:

3^0
Existential
(Deontological)
Ego

2^0 Aesthetical 4^0 Pragmatical

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Object
Phenomenological
(Semantic)
1^0

World
Hermeneutical
(Possibility)
5^0

Ontical
6^0 (1057)

In effect, we move from a trimodal economy (of the archetypal economy) to a hexamodal economy (of an ordered economy). So, the obvious question to ask would be, 'how can this transmutation be realized?' This will be shortly explored. (1058)

Now, it should be stressed that we are dealing with the transmutation of a series of heuristic devices that, as heuristic devices, should be judged on the positive advantages they bring as pragmatic forms of modeling whose functions, hopefully, will rhetorically and metaphorically[313] 'illuminate' both the course and comprehension of these proceedings. Of course, in the meantime you will have to accept my word that they have a fruitful use (in our eventually coming to understand how the codes at the center of systems can functionally operate in the evolution of an exposition, which through textual deposition, then becomes the dissemination of a text or set of texts with causal ramifications, i.e., with present implications and future consequences, etc.[314] (1059)

Importantly, to the course of these proceedings, I also define a 'philosophical economy' as 'one-part hermeneutical (fifth order), one-part phenomenological (first order), and one-part existential (third order)', and, of course, by implication taking on board the three other orders as well. Hence the concern of 'philosophy' with these ordered considerations of 'semantics, aesthetics, existentially oriented ethical considerations of the deontological and the pragmatical, along with hermeneutical considerations of possibility

[313] As per the interrogative economy (in the asking of a question) we can also add 'apparitional' (or the literal 'as if, as if' or the Boolean 'not not-this') to this list of the moments of the rhetorical and metaphorical (analogical).

[314] The 'etc.' can also implicate a past dimension (in terms, e.g., of its processes of re(-)interpretation and the current force such interpretations may or may not have on the present, etc.).

and ontical considerations concerning evidential criteria for the formulation of facts, valid conformal narratives as presenting facts rather than factoids, etc.'[315] (1060)

Moreover, as central to such considerations is the self-defining philosophical emphasis on a conformally determined patterns of truth determination which will also be shortly explored. (1061)

So, how is this transmutation of our interest able to migrate from the imputed trimodal nature of the economic to the structural-functions of the hexamodally constituted orders? By virtue of a subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of these economic correlatives designated (for convenience) as World, Object, and Ego (that could just as well be denoted as 'world, object, and ego'). Now, a moment or pole that is preferenced implies the automatic de-preferencing of the other two poles, and v.v. Similarly, the preferencing of two poles simultaneously leads to the automatic de-preferencing of the remaining moment or pole. This type of process, described as the subtle preferencing or de-preferencing of one or two such poles, gives us six permutations corresponding to these six trans-cognitive orders as noted. (1062)

Hence the following patterns of preference (+) and de-preference (-) gives us the respective orders:

+O/-E/-W	=	1^0	Semantical/Phenomenological
+O/+E/-W	=	2^0	Aesthetical
-O/+E/-W	=	3^0	Deontological
-O/+E/+W	=	4^0	Pragmatical
-O/-E/+W	=	5^0	Hermeneutical
+O/-E/+W	=	6^0	Ontical[316] [22] (1063)

Furthermore, we can also view this process of a preferencing of one or two poles as an expression of the de-suspension wherein the suspension automatically de-suspends itself. An aspect of the process of the suspension, as a pre-condition for a process of judgment, that is historically overlooked by both traditional philosophers and phenomenologists. (1064)

Now, I would like to look at what I call the process of 'reduplication'. E.g., when we consider something like 'the fifth ordered possibilities of fifth ordered possibilities', or, 'the sixth ordered actual facts of sixth ordered actual facts' where we get respectively, the disciplines of 'science' and 'history'. Expressed in notation (translating x^0 as x^1, and reduplication as x^2):

$5^1.5^1 = 5^2$ (science), and, $6^1.6^1 = 6^2$ (history) (1065)

This same approach on a more global, less localized basis, also means that the disciplinary topic of philosophy as P (previously defined as one-part phenomenology 1^0

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315 'Factoids' presented with the appearance of 'facts' but lacking an adequate evidential basis.

316 *Ibid*., 22.

or 1^1, plus $5^{0,}$ plus 3^0) by reduplication becomes P^2 which I have called 'Metaphysics' (M) in its repurposed sense, as redefined over the course of this *Book* 9). I designate this reduplicated philosophical appreciation (of philosophical appreciation) as 'metaphysical' in both its overall tenor and complexion for a variety of reasons, but, basically, I have such an expression to hand that does similar philosophical work, albeit as subjected to the extensive philosophical reforms instituted in this extended-essay, and other essays. Hence:

$$P^1.P^1 = P^2 = M^1 \text{ (1066)}$$

Now, as every ordered order and inter-ordered product, etc., is to be viewed as distinctive examples of inter-order ordered phenomena, and, as such, is to be viewed as the topical basis for a discipline, and, as every discipline operates with a distinctive code (or set of codes) and therefore possesses a distinctive sense of difference (or differential) then it behooves us, as philosophers exploring inter-ordered phenomena, to attempt to understand how these disciplinary differences (or differentials) are expressed in the historical contexts of their systematic envelopment and embracements, or developments (given that the 'psychic center' of all disciplines can migrate over time, be subjected to chaotic processes of emergence, bifurcation, and/or phase change, etc.[317]). (1067)

What, then, distinctively defines 'philosophy' from some other 'distinctive discipline'? On much reflection, I believe this is or should be an earnest focus on truth determination (on a basis that is pre-conditionally, conditionally, and post-conditionally approached[318]), and, determination in a form that is evidentially re-iterable, i.e., 'conformal'. That in defining 'philosophy' as 'the (valid) conformal appreciation of truth determination/s' must also define my repurposed sense of the 'metaphysical', as a conformal metaphysics' as 'the (valid) conformal philosophical appreciation of (relevant) truth determination/s as a (valid) conformal philosophical appreciation of truth determination/s'. Although, correctly, 'valid' and 'conformal' have the same reference or meaning. (1068)

Now, taking a leaf from my philosophy of transformational-retreatment, 'every process of treatment will invoke the counter process of retreatment' which can also be viewed as a process of de-reduplication. Implying that metaphysical explorations will automatically be retreated within the embrace of its resident philosophical explorations, hopefully, as an innovative process of philosophical re-vitalization (which, as you must surmise, gives this metaphysical dimension an important role to play in the pursuit of our philosophical explorations). (1069)

Last, on this topic of inter-ordered conjugation is the equally significant concept of 'duplication' when one inter-ordered type of product is conjugated with another inter-ordered type of product. E.g., as in the further explorations of a certain discipline where, say, a certain disciplinarian (e.g., an historian or philosopher) wishes to explore either the history of philosophy as an historian, or, the philosophy of (doing) history (in the pursuit

317 Where, more correctly, all three aspects are part of 'the economy of chaotic transformations'.

318 In order to further differentiate it from all other discipline that, quite rightly, should also, ostensively, be concerned with the correctly observed disciplinary formation of valid truth determinations.

of historical research) as a philosopher. In this process we should note that this function, duplication, is not commutative. I.e:

$6^2.P^1$ (as doing history) is not equal to $P^1.6^2$ (as doing philosophy) (1070)

Where an inter-ordered economy, among other things, can be defined as the application of the (symmetrical) operations of reduplication and de-duplication, and the (asymmetrical) operations of duplication. (1071)

Where these operations can be seen as the 'codes' that distinctively organize the historical processes of functioning systems. (1072)

Hence, e.g., the distinctive operations of The Legal Fraternity and its concerns solely, either directly and/or indirectly, with legal matters. Or, the concerns of The Business World and its understandable preoccupations with either the creation, preservation, and/or the conservational expansion of fourth ordered pragmatical concerns with profitability, etc. Now, I mention these two examples here in order to pose a philosophical problem and quickly resolve the same (in terms of its inter-ordered topicality). (1073)

In this *Book* 9, for various reasons, I declare The Legal Fraternity to be a business centered primarily in The Business World. So, if that were to be the case, then how would we differentiate businesses that are not directly concerned with legal considerations from The legal Fraternity primarily acting as a business? (1074)

To begin, we can see a business as being basically fourth ordered pragmatically oriented processes concerned with considerations of expediency, in this instance with the creation, preservation, and conservational expansion of an ensuing profitability (in order for that business, as a business, to survive) (B). Then, we can consider the legal codes, i.e., 'laws, etc.' (L), as utilized by The Legal Fraternity, to have been first created within the system of The Political Legislature as enacted within the Overall Political Sphere. Then, for the relevant legal codes to be utilized they need to be applied to an overall set of texts that legally represent the legal situation or situations in question that necessitated a possible course of legal intervention (I). These last considerations being treated as a legal transcription of the legal anomaly or anomalies about to be discerned and resolved through an application of such rules of transcription, etc. (T). We could depict these codes and rules as follows:

B > L > T => I [> J > I'] (1075)

If such considerations needed to go to trial, in some form or other, then the executive-like codes of judgment, exercised by either judges and/or juries, would then need to be both invoked and applied (J) in order, hopefully, to obtain a definitive judgment (I'), etc. (1076)

That, in invoking forms of legal appeal, ideally, there would be an attempt to determine if it could be shown that there was the defective invocation of these codes, rules,

etc., and if that had a relevant bearing on the form of the judgment originally delivered I' (I''). (1077)

I have chosen this example to illustrate how the potentially problematic can be addressed intra-systematically. That, by inference, the observation can then be drawn (as a conjecture), that problematic social issues should be effectively addressed, and, hopefully, redressed in efficacious terms of reference, by exploring either the intra-systematic and/or extra-systematic locations of such points of possible anomalization, and, therein and thereafter, suitably deal with the same accordingly. (1078)

That, it is my aspiration, that the complexities and complications of this discourse on inter-ordered phenomena, as the topical basis of disciplines, as the coded operations central to the functioning of social systems, might be forgiven since it is my hope that such scrutiny could be of assistance in this detection and resolution of either intra-systematic and/or inter-systematic forms of anomalization forming the root causes of both traditional and contemporary social problems, be such problematic issues presented in either a relatively intractable form(at) of in a form(at) that could be successfully addressed should the apposite political will be suitably expressed to resolve such matters (but, where, unfortunately, most political processes are reactive in orientation rather than proactive in the manner more usually required). (1079)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 18.1.24.

12Y. A Second Digest
(That Can Be Appended to *The Seventh Book*…)

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12Y. A Second Digest
(That Can Be Appended to *The Seventh Book*…)*[319]

0. Preamble

Numerous ideas evolved over the course of writing this *Book* 9. In this Second Digest, I proffer both a condensation of these concepts and a more integrated snapshot of how I see them at this moment of time. Reproduced in a summary format they deserve a commentary, but, this specific book should also be able do that, and, to that end, I have supplied references to this text itself. (i)

This digest is divided into six sections mirroring, first, the four headings under which this book has evolved, second, various interactions entertained between these four key motifs, and, last, how these ideas are representative of a positively nihilistic, anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism and existential-pragmatism.(ii)

These four key motifs are:[320]

1. A more detailed exploration of inter-ordered phenomena.
2. The resuscitation of metaphysics as a complex inter-ordered phenomenon.
3. The re-siting of disciplines in their systematic contexts.
4. Utilizing such insights in order to suitably address contemporary anomalies.

[iv] (iii)

Many of these ideas had their origin in *The Seventh Book*… and, here, in these two shorter essays and the extended-essay, I have taken some delight in developing such notions, knowing where to begin but not necessarily where I would end in pursuing the evolution of their unfolding. If by chance the reader, or audience to these ramblings, should take some interest and enjoyment in their recounting, and meet some additional pleasure in critiquing their tentative presentation and discussing their possible merit, then with that hope I find some further contentment in having brought this difficult work to fruition… (iv)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 12.1.24.

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319 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

320 Refer also to *Pursuit*, III.12V.33.

1. Inter-Ordered Phenomena

As noted, inter-ordered phenomena are ‘phenomena’ that can be phenomenal-phenomenologically analyzed, etc.[321] [2] (1)

An ‘order’ is a ‘distinctive mode of intentional behaviour operating within a certain aspect of the psyche’. In each aspect of the psyche, I perceive the existence of six distinctive, but ‘economically’ interrelated, orders. So, e.g., in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect dealing with trans-intentional forms of judgment’ I perceive the existence of six distinctive types of judgment, namely:

1. A first ordered phenomenologically oriented approach to the linguistic mapping of semantic categories (as atomic propositions);
2. A second ordered aesthetically oriented integration of atomic propositions (in the form of molecular propositions);
3. A third ordered existentially and deontologically oriented forms of evaluation (without reference to any impossible invocation of so-called First Principles, etc.);
4. A fourth ordered pragmatically oriented evaluation (dealing with, e.g., considerations of expediency, effectiveness, efficaciousness, economic parsimony, etc.);
5. A fifth ordered hermeneutical considerations of potentiality (e.g., as either possibility, probability, and/or potency, etc.);
6. A sixth ordered approach to ontical, i.e., factual, considerations (where propositions provisionally become statements of either perceived or interpreted fact). [3[(2)

As a simplified formula these judgmental orders, from the first order, respectively, are phenomenological(ly semantic); aesthetical; (existentially-) deontological; pragmatical; hermeneutical(ly-potential), and ontical(ly-factual). [4] (3)

These orders are ordered because we can propose transformational rules that take us from one order to any another given their underlying basis is economic. E.g., following semantic rules for the molecular integration of atomic propositions we can say that ‘this glass of water is salty’ (regardless of whether this is true or false, because it is stated, in this instance, that that ‘water’ tastes as ‘saline’; that water can be salty in taste; and, water in the form of a ‘liquid’ can be ‘contained within a glass’). On the other hand, ‘table-tops’ can be ‘round’ or ‘square’ in shape, etc… [5] (4)

Now, orders can be perceived as coded expressions ‘dealing with the distinctive nature of their ordered topic’. (5)

Where ‘ordering’ is conceived of as ‘the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of one or more economic correlatives as reviewed, say, through the lens of the archetypal economy of World, Object, and Ego, respectively, as hermeneutic, phenomenological, and existential in orientation. (6)

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321 *Pursuit*, III.12V.2-5.

Where de-preferencing occurs through suspensions that automatically invoke the force of the de-suspension to subtly preference that economic correlative or that pair of economic correlatives not being de-preferenced in the first place. (7)

This is much easier to imagine, and model, when we divide the archetypal economy into three archetypal sub-economies, respectively, of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic which then extends this autonomy to the overall economy of the economic or its envisaged equivalent. (8)

An extensive suspension entailing the overall transcendental economy paralleling, say, the interrogative economy; its incorporation of an economy of the de-suspension (extended suspension) (lest we be eternally trapped psychotically within or neurotically outside the suspension); and the non-economic recognition of a causal dimension lest be trapped in endless economic circulation without non-virtual expressions of resolution. (9)

Economies can be envisaged in a linear format, a reversed linear format, a circular format and its reversal, and the dialectics of a simultaneity of economic functions along with the expression of a transformational history. (10)

The simplistic linear progression of World – Object – Ego is instrumental in a harmonic reading. (11)

Now, the conjugation of orders can be enacted in symmetrical and asymmetrical forms nominated as, respectively, reduplication or de-reduplication, and, duplication and de-duplication in the reversal of its coded manipulations. (12)

A single process of duplication is non-commutative, but, more correctly, an economy consists of the continual co-presence of reduplication, duplication, etc. (13)

Reduplication is envisaged as occurring through a process of metafication in which there is an elevation in meta-status by one degree as encompassed in a philosophy of transformational retreatment as a process of treatment through forms of deconstruction.[322] In effect moving us from hermeneutic pretreatment towards phenomenological treatment. E.g., the facts (as 6^0 [or 6^1]) of facts ($6^0.6^0$ [or $6^1.6^1$]) as instrumental in the formation of 'history' (as viewed, in the plural) as 'histories of the past, present, and future') (6^2). (14)

Duplication is enacted as a form of treatment. (15)

The process of de-reduplication oversees a process of de-metafication and moves us towards an existentialization of experience through the force of the de-suspension, although, more correctly neither the existential orientation nor the non-existential orientation can be non-economically appropriated and isolated (because in each and every form of economic articulation reduplication, duplication, etc., must be co-present as economic correlativities). (16)

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322 As explicated in *The Seventh Book*…

Hence the complexity of inter-ordered phenomenal (which as a general expression will include the ordered, inter-ordered, hyper-ordered, hybridly ordered, globally ordered (like the topical discipline of the philosophical), etc. (17)

The reduplication of conformal philosophical appreciation produces the resuscitated working concept of conformal metaphysical appreciation. (18)

Where, through metaphysical manipulation of inter-ordered phenomena, in general, we are given the metaphysical transformation of the same. So, conformal philosophical appreciation of conformal philosophical appreciation gives us conformal metaphysical appreciation, be that acting either with respect to itself in general terms, or, more particularly or specifically with all other inter-ordered phenomena. So, in regard to the first trans-cognitive order we get (conformal) semantic appreciation whereas in regard to the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order we arrive at a conformal appreciation of a categorical metaphysics (sematicism[323]). (19)

Six cognitive orders, as trans-intentional judgmental cognitive content, mirror the six trans-cognitive orders except for the third order of conceptual ideation, and, the fourth order of perceptual imagination or simulation. (20)

Through reduplication of the six trans-cognitive orders we get the following:

	Trans-Cognitive Order		**Reduplicated Topic**
1^0	Phenomenological/Semantic	1^2	Categorical Metaphysics[324]
2^0	Aesthetical	2^2	Psychological, etc.[325]
3^0	Deontological/Existential	3^2	Political[326]
4^0	Pragmatical	4^2	Business[327]
5^0	Hermeneutic Possibility	5^2	Science
6^0	Ontical/Factual (Evidential)	6^2	History[328] [75] (21)

This forms the inter-ordered topicality of this subject signified as ‘Topic’. (22)

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323 *Pursuit*, III.12X.887-891.

324 Abbreviated as ‘semanticism’

325 Psychology reduplicated becomes sociology, etc.

326 I had originally defined this reduplication as existential but moved that down to the deontological (but which cannot be reduced to the same, just as the pragmatic is not to be reduced to purely the pragmatical as some form of expediency. On the other hand, the systematic sense and semblance of the existential will also co-opt an element of the pragmatical in keeping, when and where ‘necessary’, with the trajectory of the primary relationships in question with a view to observe either the richness of its creation and/or the enrichment of its preservation and conservational expansion of the same (where the rarity of a super-conservation being treated as some form of hyper-conservational expansion in relational enrichment [and on occasions mirroring the concept of a super-profit]).

327 Order hybridization with the political gives us the topic of ‘political-economics’ which lends its name to the super-system of the ‘Political-Economic’ within the open-endedness of the Political-Economic Environment.

328 *Pursuit*, III, 12X.75.

2. The Resuscitation of a Conformal Metaphysics

The reduplication of a conformal philosophy (P [or P^1]) produces a conformal metaphysics (M [or M^1]) where M^1 = P2. (23)

But this 'resuscitation' of a conformal metaphysics must not be confused with a traditional non-conformal metaphysics (although a careful explication of both topics could reveal a commonality of intentions rather than methods despite the non-tenable nature of most instances falling under the umbrella of a Traditional Metaphysics). (24)

Why resuscitate (the name of) this topic of such ill-repute and risk a confusion between a 'Traditional Metaphysics' with this 'Contemporary Metaphysics'? Because this 'Contemporary Metaphysics' is 'the conformal philosophical appreciation of a process of a conformal philosophical appreciation', and, that this form of reduplication, in critical and radical understanding, has a central role to play in the re-vitalization of the philosophical discipline (through the de-suspended retreatment of that process of reduplication as realized through the automatic invocation of a process of de-metafication). (25)

'Conformal' means the 'close observance of a valid truth determinations'. (26)

Because the emergent nature of conformal appreciation involves reiterated processes of either re(-)conformation and/or re(-)verification, etc., that cannot be reduced to either merely logical, the dialectical or that just pertaining to narratives, etc. (27)

Where the 'reduplication of the philosophical' as 'the conformal philosophical appreciation of a process of conformal philosophical appreciation' has a prominent non-economic edge to it capable of instituting relative processes of insight through either our recognition, encountering, and/or engaging with processes of recognition, encountering, and/or engaging, and, where the reiteration of the conformal can establish an intersubjective basis for the progressive realization of patterns of social consensus. Recognizing the evidence of dis-continuity, non-continuity, and continuity as characteristic, respectively, of histories of the past, present, and future… That in preparing for such changes we at least put ourselves in a better position to deal with the inevitable reconstitution of our world and where our voice is better to be heard lest in not being heard these changes will be imposed upon us by others rather than being self-imposed through the collective reflections of our communities in which those who are deemed to be responsible need to existentially accept such responsibilities in all seriousness on our behalf..!![329] (28)

…I have declared the resuscitation of this discipline of the metaphysical to be 'relatively non-controversial'...[330] provided we do not stray beyond the suitable observance of a pragmatic philosophy…[331] Thence the import of this topic. (29)

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329 *Pursuit*, III.12W.38

330 Of course, it can be re-rendered controversial by either disputing or misinterpreting these provisional philosophical guidelines as are being developed within this *Book* 9.

331 *Pursuit*, III.12V.96. Where a 'pragmatic-existentialism' or an 'existential-pragmatism' has been defined as a 'positively nihilistic anti-representationalism', etc. Refer to *Preamble*, ii, etc.

3. Disciplines as Enveloped within Social Systems

Even though we might think the discipline of the metaphysician is born from and returns to the super-discipline of the philosophical (through retreatment), and, by extension, can be co-opted to irradiate and radiate the insightful pursuit and impetus of all respectable disciplines, still, we should recognize that all disciplines are historically framed by their being enveloped and embraced by their respective Systems… for how else could we observe their chaotic emergences, bifurcations, present themselves with phase changes in state, take the multiple historical forms they have with their distinctive discourses that we can observe in histories of the present, discuss through forming histories of the past, and speculate about in reasonably conducted histories of the future? (30)

A 'system' historically co-opts a certain number of disciplines and distinctively defines their general operations through the use of a general code that, from a hyper-economic perspective, conventionally defines which types of texts are amenable to the application of that general code along with the particularity of its disciplinary codes/s. So, e.g., the Legal System deals with legal codes that only apply to relevant types of legal texts and not to any other type of text. Economically this code operates with or without the codes pertaining to relevant sub-disciplines. Non-economically, we get expositional emissions in the form of discursive judgments, that, in this instance, must be either legal in nature or as forms of preparation for either the former or the enaction of the consequences of a legal judgment, such as, e.g., imprisonment, fines, being declared not guilty, as having the case dismissed or the ordering of a retrial, and so on. (31)

Now, systems are relatively conservative, but, can change usually through forms of super-systematic imposition where certain transformational shifts of the code often present a delayed recognition of social attitudes, etc. E.g., the laws of the Legal System are debated and enshrined in law through legislation by the political class (acting within the Political System within the Political-Economic Environment). Hence, e.g., slavery is no longer positively found in Property Law but, thankfully, with a negative presentation in General Law. (32)

A cursory glance at society within the apparent encompassment of the local Political-Economy establishes a hierarchy of local Systems, e.g., Academia, the Business World, Health System/s, Legal Fraternity, Political Establishment, Traditional-Media and Contemporary Social-Media, and so on. (34)

Where which systems are either in or outside a local Political-Economy can be defined through definitions, and, where the Political-Economy, as a social phenomenon can be treated in general terms, but, where all envelopment is contained within the open-ended embrace of the Political-Economic Environment. (35)

Just as the transformational-transition from the trimodal archetypal economy to the hexamodal economy of orders is realized through subtle preferencing, etc., that this philosophy of de-suspensional preferentialization, the entailed philosophy of transformational-retreatment and segmentation of the Political-Economy in general are all better

facilitated through the trimodal nature of the economy of the economic (comprising the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic sub-economies). (36)

Where through the parallelization of economic complexification we can treat the hyper-economic, in orientation, as theoretical, hermeneutical, political, concerned with pre-treatment, etc; the economic as practical (and critical), phenomenological, business oriented, concerned with treatment, etc; and, the non-economic as critical (and radical), existential, stylistic, concerned with retreatment (and post treatment). (37)

The economy of the economic, consisting of the trimodal sub-economies of the hyper-economic, etc., can be represented by the Political-Economy by a vertical 3 x 3 matrix giving us 9 sectors:

	Hyper-Economic	**Economic**	**Non-Economic**
Non-Economic	Committees of Enq.	Police Compliance Officers	<u>Political Execs</u> Execs/Judges
Economic	Civil Service	Business Political Parties <u>Judiciary</u>	Managers
Hyper-Economic	<u>Legislators</u> Academia	Policy Planning	Medias Social-Media

[20][332] [206][333]

(38)

Moreover, as an exercise in understanding the relative power-differential between representatives of these nine sectors I proposed, in *ad hoc* terms, that the theoretical nature of the Hyper-Economic be assigned 1 unit of power, the practical dimension of the Economic be assigned 2 units, and the critical dimension of the Non-Economic be assigned 3 units. Hence the following approximate representation of this ad hoc exercise from the perspective of the overall Politic-Economic (in general terms of reference) (as superimposed upon the same grid above:

	Theoretical/**t**	Practical/**p**	Critical/c
C	3	6	9
P	2	4	6
T	1	2	3 [167][334] (39)

[332] *Pursuit,* III.12W.20.
[333] *Pursuit,* III.12X.206.

Such an *ad hoc* representation hints at the power disparities present in the Political-Economy. E.g., that civil servants are paid more than legislators. E.g., the highest pay goes to those who act as executives, etc. (40)

That these sectors could be number accordingly, beginning with the intersection of the theoretical/theoretical, etc:

7	8	9
4	5	6
1	2	3 (41)

The following observational-rule was also proposed, namely, that professional relationships could and should be directly observed between members on vertical or horizontal rungs of this matrix but that either diagonal and/or non-linear connections should not be directly observed but should be appositely mediated. So, e.g., legislators in the sector 1 can directly interact with civil servants in 4 or policy planners in 2 but not directly with members of the business world in 5, and v.v. That political executives in 9 should not directly, non-transparently interact with legislators in 1 unless they wear both hats (as the Front Bench in a parliamentary system), in which case cabinet secrecy needs to be duly observed (to ensure fearless political advice in cabinet). Interestingly, business executives in sector 9 should deal with their managers in sector 5 via their managers in sector 6. (42)

But how to account for this observational-ruling? Direct relationships are facilitated by an intersectional commonality, whereas, indirect relationship benefit from being mediated. That the society overall benefits from the performance of this type of respectful professionalism(?) However, all member of any sector should still have the freedom to 'migrate' in the pursuit of ensuring the realization of their objectives as defined by their professions, be that mediated or relatively unmediated. So, e.g., a certain scholar might wish to publish their work and so a relationship needs to be forged between an academic in Academia (sector 1) and the publishing business in The World of Business (sector 5). Moreover, we should also note that certain systematic worlds have more than one apparent primary location in the sectors of the Political-Economy, but, that is more an illusion given systematic constellations with discrete sets of responsibilities reflecting this mapped out constitution by this heuristic device of a 3 x 3 matrix. E.g., the Political World, e.g., has Legislators (1), Political Executives (Prime Ministers, Presidents, Ministers in Charge of Portfolios, Ministries, etc.) (9), and the organization of their Political Parties as businesses (9), Committees of Enquiry (7), etc. Hence a 'systematic constellation' but where the elements of that constellation still need to duly observe traditional forms of propriety as seemingly encapsulated in this observational-ruling..? (43)

Hence this schematization of the Political-Economy with its resident Systems and Systematic-Constellation (each operating with their own discrete coded operations). (44)

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334 *Pursuit*, III.12X.167.

4. The Resolution of Contemporary Social Problems

Societies have been seemingly confronted by an array of Traditional Social Problems that appear to have been intractable? (45)

But the very trends in social behaviours that promote the apparently problematic can also be unwound. Hence the need for a certain degree of optimism along with the individual, communal and political demonstrations of the requisite goodwill that will be required! (46)

That we need to be prepared for imminent disruptions because histories of the future have already determined that degree of concern (in energy production, transport, food production, etc.).[335] (47)

If only politician, *et al*, could be proactively motivated (and not thwarted by vested interests)! (48)

However, with the advent of sociological and technological non-continuities characterizing this current era of the Contemporary, as could be delineated in histories of the present, we will be presented with novel problems that will naturally demand novel solution in many instances. In this regard, through the incremental development of contemporary solutions we may well have to often 'travel' far beyond the mere application of traditional solutions. To this end a general method is being put forward, namely, the recognition of anomalous situations arising either intra-systematically and/or inter-systematically. (48)

A prime example, e.g., being the 'obesity crisis' as it spans both Traditional and Contemporary dimensions. (49)

With complex science pointing out problems in scientific terms, and, where a relatively adverse intersections of systems is exaggerating the anomalous nature of the social problem(s) in question. (50)

Given that one problem can call forth many other problems, and, where more than one solution might well be needed. (51)

Noting a difference between a pragmatical 'effectiveness' (dealing more with symptoms) *versus* a pragmatical 'efficaciousness' (dealing with root cases, etc.) (52)

Where solutions of the 'obesity crisis', as viable compromises, would be needed to resolve the mismatching of coded intentions operating in the disparate systems of the worlds of Business and Health as intersected by Food Industries sited in the former. (53)

Where all ensuing relevant disseminated discourses, need to harmonize their disparate inputs from within and between Topics, Systems and their Expositions. (54)

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335 E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.7X: *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruptor*.

5. Systems, Topics and Expositions, etc.

A harmonization of inter-ordered topicality with multi-overlapping systems was provided in the form of a hyper-economic noting of systems, an economic utilization of inter-ordered phenomena in the form of disciplines, etc., and their ongoing harmonized resolution in the form of expositional formations disseminated in the form of discourses within the relative confines of the relevant world of the Political-Economic as situated within the 'openness' of the Political-Economic Environment. (55)

Where Systems plus Topics produce Expositions disseminated as Discourses. (56)

Such open-ended 'openness' being demonstrated through the advent of innovation, novel solutions, so-called 'final vocabularies', so-called 'definitive histories', and so on. (57)

All instrumental in the evolving formation of social consensus… (58)

The basis for civil society regardless of the type of political system imposed or self-imposed upon the same. (59)

But where the democratic nature of reasonably conducted public discourse better benefits the democratic functioning of political discourse in general even if the political system in question is relatively non-democratic. (60)

Therefore, over time, a relatively non-democratic polis generally operates to the detriment of its civil society. (61)

That the same observation applies to so-called relatively democratic forms of governance where increasing democratization, transparency, and the sharing and apportioning of responsibilities, etc., will see the further, automatic existential enrichment of that civil society. (62)

With positive changes in coding, hopefully, better reflecting, eventually, such existential advancement, and v.v. (63)

Where, usually, a relative super-system reconstructs the coding of a co-associated sub-dominant sub-system, etc. Otherwise, how could slavery have commenced let along be relegated to the sad and sorry chapters of not-too-distant political history. (64)

Where these political attitudes have a better chance of being successfully advanced through clear and distinct forms of conformal political appreciation. (65)

Thence the advantageous necessity of articulating a positively nihilistic, anti-representational philosophy pragmatic-existentialism better able to function through the absenting of all forms of disruptive, ideological distortion… (66)

6. Articulating a Positively Nihilistic, Anti-Representational Existential-Pragmatism

Making little distinction, if at all other than through forms of emphasis, between a ‘pragmatic-existentialism’ and an ‘existential-pragmatism’. (67)

‘Nihilistic’ in the sense that neither an absolutistical ‘materialism’ nor some form of absolutistical ‘idealism’ nor some equally impossible form of an absolutistical ‘relativism’, along with all other forms of unimodalism , bimodalism, etc., are not even noted other than as deserving to be dismissed. (68)

‘Positively nihilist’ in the sense that in that format, formation, and form what functions ‘functions’ because it is nihilistically conceived. (69)

Having dismissed, e.g., the absolutistical unity of Mind or Truth along with the equally impossible philosophical notions of a totally discrete sense of Self, and, bimodal notions of ‘cause and effect’, etc. (70)

Equally dismissing all misplaced notions of a traditional representationalism! (71)

Because such metaphorical notions cannot be mistreated in literal terms of reference in a conformal philosophy, etc. (72)

On the other hand, through the delineated and observed uniqueness of relationships along with their unilateral re-directedness of non-economic demonstrations with causal implications it does follow that we can intervene in this world at large and that, hopefully, we will do so from a relatively existential point of view. (73)

‘Representing’ the potential trajectories of our relationships with different comparative expectations in terms of their consequential consequences, etc. (74)

Where the appearance-reality distinction needs to be relegated to the world of the poet, and, where from the world of poetry we need to thematize our optimistic aspirations for fruitful forms of arbitration as exercised through the auspices of others. (75)

‘Representations’ in a representational economy being co-defined hyper-economically, economically, and non-economically, i.e., respectively through non-chaotically oriented representations, and presentations, and chaotically oriented re-presentations. (76)

The notion of representations being preserved through propositions expressing non-propositional simulations alone. (77)

Through propositional alignments conducted between relevant propositional locations, etc., coupled with conformally treated patterns of isomorphic transformational invariance. (78)

Arguing ‘alignments’ are to be entertained between ‘the integration of various propositional strands in relevantly related propositional locations’. That such processes, by their very nature, when correctly located, do not transgress their own conventional (boundaries and functional) limitations, and, at the same time, will also supply both an augmentation and enhancement of non-existential and existential pattens of relational enrichment to be better fostered in our more important relationships… such alignments are crucial in connecting inter-ordered topics with their historical formations as distinctively expressed through systems.[336] Upholding both the conjecture ‘that all respectable disciplines have an inter-ordered location’[337] as well as the conjecture ‘that all disciplines have a primary systematic location’. (79)

Thence the advantageous necessity of articulating a positively nihilistic, anti-representational philosophy pragmatic-existentialism:

> **Working tirelessly to deconstruct the relatively defective,**
> **and to re(-)construct the relatively effective…**
> **and all that that entails both non-existentially and existentially..!!**[338] (80)

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336 *Pursuit,* III.12X.994-995.
337 *Pursuit,* III.12X.951, etc.
338 *Pursuit,* III.12X.1000.

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part I:
Conformalized Transformational-Retreatment:
The Reversal of the Philosophical Economy
In the Exercise of an Economy of Insight-Formation

BOOK 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part I: Conformalized Transformational Retreatment: The Reversal of the Philosophical Economy In the Exercise of an Economy of Insight-Formation*[339]

0. Preamble

In a previous essay[340] I looked at 'philosophical exploration' as a technical approach conducted under the headings of 'Facts, Functions, and Finalities', and, where 'functions' are to be approached through the headings of 'conjectures, observations, and interpretations'. Originally, I envisaged the latter, i.e., interpretations, under the linear direction of proposing a reasonably interrelated set of conjectures that took observations as evidence and where their combination would be interpreted, or, rather, re-interpreted in the light of the interactions discerned within and between the former. However, instead of treating conjectures as generalities that needed to be fleshed out through the particularities of phenomenological observation and the implied specificities of close hermeneutical interpretations, I thought the reverse would make better sense if a process of economic complexification were to be appealed to. So, interpretations would isomorphically align with hermeneutical pre-interpretations in transformational retreatment, the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of observations would remain the same, namely, as a process of treatment, but, conjectures would now be viewed as dealing with the specificities of possible existential patterns of insightfully appreciated approaches to interventions called for by an existential appreciation of the trajectories of our more important primary relationships as inspected both individually and collectively. That, through such 'retreatment', with this emphasis upon the envisaged insightfulness of such conjectures, we could suppose that through this reversal of the philosophical economy we now need to take on board the ramifications of an economy of potential, existentially oriented processes of instantiated insightfulness, and where the optimistic ideality implicit in this reading of appreciation is only tempered by the fact that such processes are open to various forms of distortion and obstruction should these processes of suspension be either improperly, inappropriately and/or inappositely conducted (i.e., through not being suitably instigated under the auspices of well-informed and well-applied suspensions, etc., as exercised under the requisite rules supervising hermeneutical, phenomenological and existential forms of philosophical input, etc.). That, in effect, by reversing the philosophical economy (within the exercise of an economy dealing with transformational retreatment) an economy of insight-formation was being enacted, preferably, under the aegis of an existentially informed process of intervention. In this essay let me look more closely at the ramifications, i.e., implications and consequences of this critical, and potentially radical style of an approach to the specificities of our interactions with others. Where, in an anti-representationally approached form of 'representationalism' advanced through an economy of ongoing re(-)presentational forms of alignment the de-suspended forcefulness of the conjectural-representations have the power to continually emend our conformally retreated appreciation of this world at large, this overall world-of-life… (0)

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339 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

340 *Pursuit*, III.XD.

1. Exposition

Let me explore this re-conceptualization of 'conjectures' (and the implicit role to be played by the same in a repurposed metaphysics). (1)

If I were to make the (metaphysically oriented[341]) conjecture 'that all economies are trimodal in orientation' then it would be true to say that this proposition(al-statement) could be read as a general proposition. On the other hand, if I were to be looking at this specific economy then this conjecture takes on a precise level of specification. In this economy being scrutinized I would expect to find it is either implicitly and/or explicitly trimodal in constitution. Say, for the sake of this argument, if I were to delineate three apparent economic correlativities, say, 'bing, ping and ting' then we can nominate that specific 'economy' as either a 'bing economy' or a 'ping economy' or a 'ting economy'. Now, to complicate matters further we might also find, say, another possible correlative aspect, namely, 'ching'. Given this apparent complication, should we review this ching economy as tetra-modal or a completely different economy from say a bing economy? No, through economic complexification we have no need whatsoever to propose a separate conjecture but attempt to understand in what manner 'ching' is isomorphic with either 'bing' or 'ping' or 'ting'. For the sake of this argument let me propose that both 'ting' and 'ching' are apparently isomorphic. I.e., that 'ting' and 'ching' are either consonantly non-focused and background oriented (in gestalt terms) or dissonantly focused and foreground oriented or exhibit some form of subjectivity in keeping with the nature of the epistemological activity noted. So, in this regard this type of problem is resolved.[342] (2)

Therefore, in this example just posed, I am also arguing that a certain conjecture can be read in general terms, but, when applied to a specific situation it takes on the specificity of that situation in question. Furthermore, its logical precision is also invoked. We are no longer, e.g., just dealing with the possibility of a trimodal economy, that just needs us to delineate which correlative modalities are present, should be readily apparent upon the requisite degree of reflection, but, that that is exactly the case and of course we might misread that situation, still, that situation needs to be read in just that manner (but not guaranteeing that we will correctly read the same, etc.)! That, in effect, conjectures in this sense are not only descriptive but also prescriptive, and by extension, existentially, will also have a proscriptive role (in this economic review of phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented descriptions, hermeneutically oriented prescriptions, and existentially oriented proscriptions). In other words, seen in this much broader light, conjectures are to be understood as also capable of being specific, as having a certain logical force beyond the merely *a priori*, etc. (3)

What are the ramifications of this type of re-positioning? (4)

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341 As exercised in our philosophical appreciation of the philosophical economy as constructed and retreated through the use of such conjectures.

342 A similar state of affairs can be seen in the Parallel Dictionary of Correlatives where 're-presentation' is aligned with 'anti-representation' (on the dialectical grounds that is a subtantialistic or materialistic metaphysics were involved as would be presented in a classical modelling of a misguided representationalism then a process of chaotically oriented re-presentation could not arise in those impossible terms of reference). Refer to Part II, *Appendix* B.

As intimated, a ‘conjectural economy’ can also be reviewed as an ‘observational economy’ and, equally, as an ‘interpretative economy’. Interestingly, in this regard, observations are more treated as arrived at through phenomenological ‘particularities’ rather than sense-data ‘specificities’. The implication being that in our experience of the specific we need the co-associated force of conjectures, etc., to have us reach this more detailed form of experiential fine turning… (5)

These ideas are also meant to link in with my anti-representational treatment of representative-alignments conjecturally refracted through suitable forms of economic treatment and transformational-transitional retreatment. Arguing, here, that all transformations, more correctly, are transitional in some sense or other. I.e., not the absolutistical transformation of one thing into something entirely different. So, e.g., ‘sliced bread’ is still bread (where the relative content is preserved under the transformational-transition of ‘slicing’), and, where a puddle of water evaporates and where those molecules of water still persist as water molecules (given this type of transformational-transition where the initial form of the puddle is lost but the transformational content persists, i.e., as water molecules currently residing in the domain of air). (6)

That these views on transformational-transitional retreatment naturally invite my twin concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’. I.e., if we feel our research is possibly wrong, we always have, at least hypothetically, the option of retreating in our treatment pathway to a point of greater assurance, and, then, re-proceeding, hopefully, in a better direction with a greater degree of relative conformal assurance. That such assurance may well seems to be assured, but, we should always be ready to review the situation given our treatment of the same must also be treated as potentially provisional (despite the apparent degree of assurance being currently arrived at). (7)

In all of this, working with conjectures (with varying degrees and forms of conjectural forcefulness either augmenting and/or enhancing our observations and interpretations) the interconnection between disciplines, primarily, is code, and, the historicity of that code within a system can be used to account for the history of that discipline within the overall history of that system. Therefore, alterations in the relative relations between super-systematic, systematic, and sub-systematic codes need to be noted, etc., and related to their intended consequences, etc. E.g., as exemplified by the recent historical bifurcations of philosophy; the necessary emergence of political-economics; and, the phase changes in how we are to be seen to perform historical research, etc., given the fashion to repeat certain modes of historical research at the expense of others, etc. (8)

What we are dealing with is the hierarchical organisation of sets of code. (9)

Where alterations are either non-chaotic and/or chaotic in orientation, either deliberative and/or non-deliberative in intent, and, through such transformational-transitions will, to that same degree, permit us to re-write the historical course of such disciplines… by noting such discontinuities, non-continuities, and continuities (characteristic, respec-

tively, of histories of the past, present and future), along with other forms of expediency, contextual considerations, there initiating defective forms of social interaction, etc. (10)

Chaotic changes, etc., occur within the relative stability off higher systems, and, do not necessarily alter relatively substructural changes. (11)

Thence, in more immediate terms, changes have a more immediate sense of focus. So, e.g., a more traditional form of philosophy historically bifurcated within Academia not outside that disciplinary form of bifurcation nor outside the system of Academia. (12)

That from a pro-relational perspective, experienced through a trans-relational lens, a holism is generated that is expressed through its relevant economic correlativities. That through such trans-relational re-orientation we can come to better appreciate the conformal philosophical sense of positioning from its inescapable relatively conformal metaphysical reflections entered into upon the same. (13)

Hence this more intimate linking, through representative forms of alignment, between the various economic aspects that constitute an economy that even in ideal terms of reference must also witness the holistic nature of conjectural economies. (14)

Now, in retreatment we could also argue that the force of the de-suspension can fine tune our conjecturally oriented representations without needing to invoke either absolutistical forms of modelling nor relativistical forms of de-modelling. Indeed, making an argument that conjectures are both forcefully enacted and re-enacted through apposite forms of progressive economic retreatment in which we witness transformational retreatment… and where through forms of conformal reiteration assurance is generally reinforced. Further arguing, on the back/s of such conjectures, etc., that an economy of insight-formation can be expedited and expressed through the forceful nature of the de-suspension. In effect, through a reversal of the philosophical economy, albeit as read, and re-written, through our conformal metaphysical appreciation of the same. (15)

That, ideally, the better perspective on the metaphysical reversal of the philosophical economy is to trust processes of de-distortion and non-obstruction might better prepare us for what could well transpire as processes of insight-formation along wither relatively critical or relatively radical lines of explication. Where, effectively, well-pre-informed and well-performed (extensive) suspensions suitably conducted can proffer the best pre-conditions and conditions for what might well be termed relatively de-distorted and relatively non-obstructed processes of holistically oriented, emergently realized patterns of insight-formation as expedited through such processes of transformational-transitional retreatment… That, by such means, at least in theory, we can reinforce this idea of a relatively valid conformal process of appreciation enacted, and able to be reiterated through effective re(-)enactment, through the use of conjectural patterns of observation and reinterpretation, and so on and so forth… albeit as circumscribed by an awareness of both its assured and provisional status…. (16)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 6.2.24.

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part II:
A Critical Philosophy with Radical Ramifications:
Let us Ask "What Can this Re-Purposed Metaphysics Do (and Not Do)?

BOOK 9

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A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part II: A Critical Philosophy with Radical Ramifications: Let us Ask "What Can this Re-Purposed Metaphysics Do (and Not Do)?

0. Preamble

In this essay this question expressed in the subtitle is addressed. By 'ramifications' is meant 'present implications and future consequences.' To this we can also add the 'suitable reconstruction of past interpretations'. Previously, I have argued a disciplinary 'space' can be found for a re-purposed metaphysics through the reduplication of the philosophical discipline, i.e., that a (valid) conformal philosophical appreciation of a (valid) conformal philosophical appreciation is not only possible but both crucial and inescapable for conducting the re-vitalization of a conformal philosophy. To this end I will argue how the transformational-transitions in the 'progressive' establishment of a discipline in general, and philosophy in particular, and specifically in the productive focus of its application in this world at large, can be both supervised and scrutinized in detail in order to ensure it conformal conductance through such critically observed explications and applications. That by such attention to the supervision of such progressive processes of (re-self-)organization the critical explication of that to hand has the potential to reveal radical ramifications that whilst incremental and superficial in application need not be non-consequential in the output of its radical import. By 'progressive' is here meant our being able to scrutinize the representative-re(-)constructions to hand, from their imputed origins in the trimodal nature of the archetypal economy through to their hexamodal inter-ordered constitution within disciplines as historically embedded within systems and the role they play in the overall Political-Economy as viewed through an overall positive nihilistic, anti-representational, pragmatic, and existential point of view. In further this attention to detail in this 'progression' from the archetypal to a pragmatic-existentialism I outline twelve stages in which this metaphysical attention to detail can be applied. That, by such means, we can determine the 'metaphysical competence' or 'fitness' of how that philosophical or disciplinary project or program is both constructed and functions within the overall environment of its philosophical or disciplinary prospect; to what extent a certain philosophical or disciplinary application is productive, i.e., instrumental in either suitably augmenting and/or enhancing a comparative beneficial enrichment of e/valuational formation; and, can be demonstrated to have the requisite degree of an re-iterable re(-)productivity, i.e., conformal re-iterability of philosophical or disciplinary patterns of transformational retreatment. (0)

1. Introduction

This essay will be explicated under twelve headings, namely, Introduction (through Contextualization); Conformation; Representative-Conjectures; Competence; Productivity; Re(-)Productivity; Economic Considerations; Inter-Ordered Phenomena; Disciplinary Phenomena; Systems; Political-Economics; and (the Viewpoint of) a Pragmatic-Existentialism. (1)

The background to this essay is recent work done, e.g., in Book 9 where I note the possibility of a conformal metaphysical appreciation and supervision of the philosophical discipline and its ensuing re-vitalization. In asking how this might be accomplished I tender the following as a heuristic guideline. (2)

By ‘conformal’ is simply meant ‘conforming to a Tarskian frame of reference in terms of truth determination’, and, less simply, in ‘assembling evidence through the utilization of best practice ensuing reiterability, by applying both negative and positive forms of deconstruction of phenomenal-phenomenological descriptions, emending hermeneutical prescriptions through rectification, and through ongoing re(-)normalization proscriptively re(-)specify the format, formation and form of our conjectures as insightfully productive processes of re(-)constructed-representations that appear conform to and to proffer a pragmatic and existential enrichment of relational experience’. Or, more simply, adopt and adapt those means and measures that ensure a better working understanding of lived-experience as being that which is seen to conform to lived-experience *qua* lived-experience, indeed, finding reasonable degrees of assurance without chasing the impossible specter of an indubitable truth and all other philosophically conjured creatures inhabiting a similarly impossible zoological garden. (3)

Hence my introduction of a ‘progressive mapping’ of twelve stations as an heuristic device for ensuring that the entire extent of the philosophical or disciplinary process is properly supervised and where the end-product has been competently arrived at. I.e., where we have generally conformed to the rules present in the transformations arrived at in all stations and where the transformational-transitions between these stations are equally as well observed. Where these twelve stations are as follows:

1. (Tri-modal) Archetypal Economics
2. Economics
3. Non-Economics
4. Hyper-Economics
5. (Hexa-modal) Ordered Phenomena
6. Inter-Ordered Phenomena
7. Disciplines
8. Inter-Disciplinary Considerations
9. Systems
10. Inter-Systematic Considerations
11. (Nova-modal) Political-Economics
12. A Positively Nihilistic, Anti-Representational Pragmatic-Existentialism (4)

These stations can be divided between the headings of Economics, 1-4; Inter-Ordered Phenomena, 5-8; and Systems, 9-12. However, in looking more closely at the transformational rules within stations and the transformational-transitional rules between stations the following sections of this essay have been allotted, namely, Economic Considerations, 1-4; Inter-Ordered Phenomena, 5-6; Disciplinary Phenomena, 7-8; Systems, 9-10; Political-Economics, 11; and, a Pragmatic-Existentialism, 12. (5)

2. Conformation

The idea of the 'conformal' as equating 'valid truth determination' is conducted within a Tarskian frame of reference. I.e., a sentence or proposition (P) is true (T) if and only if (iff) evidence (p) is found for the content of that (true) statement. Let me notate this in the following manner:

P(p)' is T iff P(p) or P' iz T iff p. (6)

In other words, we can translate this to mean, 'the meta-proposition is true if and only if there is evidence for p'. If true, then the proposition in question is a statement (as a true proposition in evidential terms of reference[343]). (7)

Of course, how we account for 'evidence' is not non-problematic. I approach this by running an anti-representational pragmatic approach by arguing that there is sufficient alignment and linkage between propositional-statements[344] that are already deemed to be 'true', albeit in provisional terms of reference despite the degrees of assurance we might also furnish that network of propositional-statements both collectively and individually. In a more comprehensive point of view, I am arguing for an emergent sense of a relatively definitive discernment in truth status (until the time that status becomes partially deconstructed should that event concerning such re-consideration in truth determination be ever realized. Taking a more sequential approach I ague that truth determinations need to be reiterable, i.e., reconfirmed in real time and/or re-verified retrospectively. However, given continual processes of conformance we eventually arrive at an emergent process where assurance is established in multi-dimensional terms of reference through supporting patterns of alignment realized through propositional forms of linkages, etc., that are not non-anti-representationally derived. That this nexus of support also implies that alterations in truth determination can only be relatively superficial and incremental in extent but not necessarily immune from the ensuing devolution of radical ramifications where on occasions radical reinterpretations, causal implications and causal consequences will manifest themselves in a form of definite re-direction devolving from the last, next or first instance.[345] Thence the relatively emergent nature of conformalization (about to be more formally presented through the pragmatic explication of an *ad hoc* Comprehensive Philosophical Scheme and its twelve stations). (8)

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343 Where it then has, in an ordered scheme, a sixth trans-cognitively ordered status. Where by 'trans-cognitive' is meant the 'judgmental appreciation of the cognitive (and its intentional products, as passive intentional content and active intentional functions)'.

344 Perhaps, through being cautious, we can treat all 'statements' as 'propositional-statements' given that our assurance in their truth status can be neither indubitably nor non-indubitably held. I.e., there will be occasions when a coherent statement is shown to revert to its coherent propositional status only (and hence revert to a fifth trans-cognitively ordered status as a possible state of affairs_.

345 Echoing François Laruelle. Where by 'last instance' is meant (by my instituted definition) a 'pattern of behaviour that is merely represented, i.e., will be merely reiterated'. In the 'next instance' is mean a 'pattern of behaviour with the potential for existential import', but, where it is only realized 'through enacted permission in the first instance'. More correctly, we have a non-economic economy of definitive responses consisting of all three possibilities since the existential is realized through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v. (and where the existential, therefore, can never perfectly or absolutistically enacted, etc.).

3. Representative-Conjectures

This idea has been recently evolving once I understood, through economic complexification, that the existential orientation is arrived at through a specification of intentional content, etc. Or, in other words, existential insights take the form of specifically focused, reiterable representative-conjectures that could well find further degrees of conformable specification. I.e., that have an internal logic that re(-)presents itself until such time, should that occasion arise, when we must definitively call into question prior interpretations in such matter. But, again, such a process of revision must be understood as partial, etc. (9)

That the 'representative' nature of such evolving conjectures is arrived at through an anti-representative orientation concentrating on alignments in the textual economy, parallels arrived at through economic complexification, further evidential reinforcement of ongoing processes of re(-)conformation, etc. (10)

In other words, there is no appeal to either 'the impossible or the unnecessary'. I.e., those invoked states of representation that are impossible to realize (in archetypal economic terms of reference through being ideological extremist through the impossible invocation of unimodal or bimodal formulations, etc.) and unnecessary given forms of representative-like alignment already exist between propositional-statements, etc. For how else are we to understand 'our being together in this world at large' if all we could experience were mere propositions solely entertained in their economically isolated presentations. (11)

So, in an economy of alignment between representative-conjectures what exactly are these forms of inter-linkage, etc? (12)

There is no such thing as a text *qua* mere text in itself. We need meta-textual instructions to tell us what type of text it is in terms of its genre, etc., and how we are to read it. So, e.g., a 'letter' is not a 'laundry list', although the former could include the latter, and, we should not mistake a 'love letter' for a 'business letter', and v.v., and so on. Moreover, in the textual economy, as here envisaged by myself, we can imagine a non-textual dimension where we forget we are reading and entertain simulations provoked through our reading of that text. By such means explaining how it is that when we read, say, a novel we might find ourselves swept up in its imaginary or non-imaginary landscapes, feeling emotions, identifying with the situations being recounted, etc. That, even from a meta-textual perspective we have its parallels between writing and reading, and, textually, other parallels presented through forms of linkage presented both content-wise and context-wise. Then, through the form of either implicit and/or explicit inferences, etc., we find a series of imperatives that further reinforce the conjectural nature of our experiences as they find forms of non-existential and existential specification. Moreover, just as when we tell a lie we have to speak more the truth in order to tweak our misrepresentations of the facts, so, too, in reverse, to speak the truth we have to partially lie in order to focus more on what is felt to be more to hand in such reports… but, where, at the same time, pure truth telling and pure lying are equally impossible! (13)

4. Competence

‘Metaphysical competence’ or ‘metaphysical fitness’ is when our ‘narrational reports are conformally fashioned in such a manner that they do not violate either transformational rulings and/or transformational-transitional rulings, e.g., as situated either within and/or between these twelve stations in this Comprehensive Philosophical Scheme as here about to be presented in greater depth. (14)

As this Comprehensive Philosophical Scheme is an heuristic device, therefore, it is presented in an *ad hoc* manner through the very nature of its devising. However, on both pragmatic and existential grounds I will argue that it has an important rule to play in this conformal metaphysical supervision being asked of it through both the critical and radical ramifications that can be unleashed through its suitable application. (15)

In practical terms, a faulty connection in this chain of imputations will render the issuing narrative as representing a defective position. Unfortunately, much that passes as creditable philosophical or disciplinary research and application is faulty in its presentation, but, where such defects are more often than not overlooked by a misinterpretation of the final output of its report(ing)s more in line with expectations (that obviously cannot be argued for given such overall defective processes of conceptual thematization). (16)

Although linear in its explication, all stages in this Scheme are meant to dialectically co-occur in a simultaneous contrast to the evolution of our conformal appreciation of its conjectural-representations. However, once such delineations are non-economically determined in the re-directed instance of an historical moment in time then such potentially radical considerations then move into a hyper-economic moment of ongoing enacted re(-)appropriation, hopefully, with an overall critical tenor and the specificities of a critical complexion. (17)

The economic, in its archetypal translation, has a trimodal constitution where the so-called ‘third moment’ is resolution in orientation, but, if the circulation of value is endless then a moment of resolution could not be realized through a definitive act of resolution in the last, next, or first instance (through processes of mere reiteration, existential potential, and existentially oriented enactment). Hence the necessity of invoking a non-economic rupture in which the virtual finds non-virtual enactment. However, how could this non-economic rupture be appreciated unless hyper-economically re(-)appropriated? The hyper-economic also being invoked in order to ‘economically’ appreciate these relatively definitive acts of causal involvement and intervention. The necessity for the invocation of this process of re(-)appropriation is to account for the hermeneutical rectification of the type of involvement being focused upon. However, should the non-economically re-directed input be too chaotic and too radical in complexion then its appropriation could not even commence. Hence the need for incremental sequencing of hyper-economic re(-)appropriation where the relatively-radical can be appreciated but where the radically-radically both cannot nor could be appreciated (other than through these bite-sized chunks of re(-)appropriated materials that, at the same time, re(-)organize

these sequential processes of appreciation from a meta-textual, hermeneutic sense of perspective). (18)

Competence being evaluated in terms of the objectives set by a philosophical short-term project or long-term program and whether these objectives are met in either postulated theoretical terms, the critical enactment of practical terms, and/or the radical ramification of critical terms exercised as a critique. That in the metaphysical supervision a philosophical process or disciplinary process competence is also evaluated on whether the station in question has been correctly arrived at in transformational-transitional terms of reference, is suitably engaged in transformational terms of reference, and whether the appropriate transformational-transition rules are enact in order to move onto the next aspect in the hierarchically constituted epistemological envelopment and development of all the aspects imputed as needing to be present in the completion of this overall process of supervision. (19)

As an heuristic device, this Scheme acts as a formal checklist in order to ensure that all conformal expectations are duly met and enacted. Informally, certain segments deemed to be less relevant, can be overlooked in order to expedite the appreciative resolution of that philosophical project or program. E.g., if our primary interest is in a certain disciplinary or interdisciplinary anomaly or imputed problem (arrived at through problematization) then it would seem relatively pointless to re-contextualize that process within a systematic frame of reference. However, given the overall objective is to conduct a process of exploration and scrutiny from both a pragmatic and an existential point of view then attention to that type of outcome should remain paramount. (20)

That competent supervision, regardless of whether it is either informally or formally conducted, demands a reasonable degree of conformal alignment from both pragmatic and existential senses of perspective. (21)

That competent supervision should also be productive through overseeing a resolution of our objectives. Where, through negative deconstruction the relatively defective is removed, and, where the relatively constructive is suitably re(-)constructed. Similarly, in pursuing the pragmatic formalism of this Scheme we remove defective non-contributions through denying either transformational or transformational-transition rules that were or would be non-conformally enacted, but, affirming those rules where their enaction was, to all appearances, competently discharged. (22)

Where non-existential productivity is successfully arrived at through suitable forms of non-existentially oriented patterns of resolution, and, where existential productivity is arrived at through suitable forms of existentially oriented patterns of resolution. Where both patterns of resolution are thematized economically, causally expressed non-economically, and hyper-economically re(-)appropriated. However, even though the non-existential and the existential co-occur given their necessary interdependence upon each other, still a preference is to be entertained for the latter through non-incremental enhancement rather than incremental augmentation in e/valuational formation. (23)

5. Productivity

Productivity is measured in comparative terms, being conducted in either positive virtual and/or positive non-virtual terms of reference with an obvious preference for the latter. Pathways for positive non-virtual e/valuational formation naturally proceed through a thematization of positive virtual terms of reference and their eventual enactment. (24)

Therefore, 'comparative' in a number of senses, e.g., between the apperceived ramifications of possible and probable, if not potent, causally actionable pathways; between the apperceived results of non-enacted and an enacted causal pathway; and/or, between the perceived causal ramifications of comparable parallel situations taking similar or different causal directions in enactment. Without being able to entertain such possibilities there could be no non-virtual ethical forms of moral judgment able to be entertained in a present(ed) moment of consideration. (25)

From a trans-cognitively ordered perspective e/valuational formation takes six forms from which we can count three distinctive forms of value *per se* (as defined), namely, second ordered aesthetical value, third ordered deontological value, and fourth ordered pragmatical value (that is expedient in orientation). From a pro-relational perspective value can be treated as existentially oriented in either it current situatedness, retrospective fact, and/or through existential transformation primarily from a deontological perspective without being reduced to the same (given its non-existential basis in lived-reality). (26)

Ideally, a qualitative change is positively understood when a relative benefit is obtained through either the effective or efficacious resolution of an anomalous situation or the more positive advancement of our psychic sense of positioning with respect to either our own senses of self and/or to others as we find ourselves related either directly and/or indirectly. (27)

It is a truism to say that no two situations are the same in either fact or in experience, still, phenomenologically, we will recognize a relative benefit when a positive differential is discerned. E.g., if someone were to win a lottery jackpot; or found the prescribed antibiotics worked as envisaged; through serendipity found something, or someone, whose existence was also fond to augment and enhance the course of their daily existence, etc. In the light of these examples, it follows that we must broaden the concept of resolution, as a harmonic process, to also encompass these notions of a positive non-chaotic 'augmentation' and a positive chaotic 'enhancement'. Recognizing, of course, that not all change is necessarily the result of the resolution of relational anomalies or the resolution of processes of problematization (as, e.g., in the asking of questions, etc.). Rather, instead, what appears to contribute the form of a positive benefit. Therefore, in a similar manner, we must question what actually contributes an existentially oriented sense of beneficial augmentation and/or beneficial enhancement? To which we could reply that whenever pre-conditions are re-configured that contributes to such augmentation and/or enhancement, with a preference for the latter. (28)

6. Re(-)Productivity

That by ‘re(-)productivity’ is meant ‘the reiterable demonstration of a comparative production of an excess, on balance, in the positively determined e/valuational formation (productivity) that can be demonstrated as beneficially present in the augmentation and enhancement of both our individual existences and in our relationships with others’. (29)

That it makes better sense to understand that this idea of a ‘positive benefit’, in both non-existential and existential senses, occurs both non-contextually and contextually. E.g., in the winning by an individual of a lottery or the resolution of an illness with antibiotics versus a nation more able to feed itself or is finally able to remove the belligerent parties who attempted to invade its sovereignty. That the co-associated idea of ‘resolution’ will applies to either the parties concerned and/or to the relational situations in question. (30)

In the following Scheme is outlined a progressive pathway for determining if the final outcomes in our scrutinized attention to the application of a philosophical or disciplinary process is representative of having taking a positively conformal (valid) approach to the discourse in hand, i.e., can present a re(-)productive validation of the productive stance taken in that discourse to hand. (31)

This ‘progressive’ pathway has twelve stations under the broader headings of the economic; inter-ordered; disciplinary; systems; political-economics; and, a pragmatic-existentialism. Those twelve stations, starting with the trimodal nature of the archetypal economy, are as follows:

Economics
1. (Tri-modal) Archetypal Economics
2. Economics
3. Non-Economics
4. Hyper-Economics

Inter-Ordered Phenomena
5. (Hexa-modal) Ordered Phenomena
6. Inter-Ordered Phenomena
7. Disciplines
8. Inter-Disciplinary Considerations

Systems
9. Systems
10. Inter-Systematic Considerations

Political-Economics
11. (Nova-modal) Political-Economics
12. A Positive Nihilistic, Anti-Representational Pragmatic-Existentialism (32)

However, in a need to clearly state either our past, current, or future philosophical objectives or our past, current or future disciplinary objectives we should begin from this 'zero-position' of provisional clarification. Then, in order to advance to the next station, we must also conform to the requisite transformational-transitional requirements that would allow us to make such 'progress' in our 'progression' through this Scheme… finally arriving at a pragmatically oriented and existentially oriented re-positioning that once again should remain as 'provisional' in status, at least theoretically or hypothetically, despite the degree of conformal assurance achieved as a beneficial result of our progression through this Scheme. (33)

Hence the need to articulate twelve stations and their distinctive transformational pathways, and, twelve inter-stations with their distinctive transformational-transitional pathways. Hence 1, 2, -12 stations, and 0-1, 1-2, -11-12 inter-stations. So, the primary task for the rest of this essay is to outline just what transformational rules and transformational-transitional rules need to be applied, with the former being invoked at these stations and where the latter establish these pathways between these stations. Although, admittedly, we have here an *ad hoc* heuristic device, but, from a pragmatic perspective we should adopt and adapt that which can be shown to have a greater degree of comparative relevance to the thematic nature of the pursuit or pursuits being undertaken. Here the type of pursuit is either philosophical or disciplinary in orientation, albeit from the perspective of a conformal metaphysical process of appreciation (along with its transformational re-treatment in terms of the philosophical or disciplinary perspectives being subjected to such scrutiny). (34)

That once our objectives are thematized, the primary objective of this scheme is to ensure the credible progression from the archetypal economic to a viable productive pragmatic-existentialism. That should any transformation within a certain station or between any station be shown to be non-viable then we must either reject or deconstruct such a maladapted progression as either non-viable and/or accept the need for its conformal re(-)construction and oversee the ensuing delivery of the requisite degree of conformal assurance that would critically meet reasonable expectations thematized in that same regard. (35)

Now, although, ostensively, we begin with an archetypal economics, given that coherent instances of non-contradictory significance must already have incorporated such considerations, we might also surmise that as all problematic or problematized situations already have the form of representative-conjectures,[346] at least implicitly if not explicitly, then we must come to an understanding that all processes of progression through this Scheme are more a matter of relatively superficial patterns of emendation be that through

[346] On the understanding that all well-formed questions already presently entail, either implicitly and/or explicitly, at least the coherent outline of a resolution of either that anomalous problem or problematization being held in question. We should also note that the seemingly definitive resolution of a relational anomaly should end that relational narrative, however, given the re-problematization of its situational-representation, through a reformulation of its representative-conjectures, the relational narrative in question is given a temporal reprieve. Hence, by this inferred observation, we can account for this other observation that we rarely wish to dissolve our representative-relationships merely through their definitive resolution.

either hermeneutically oriented rectification, phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented deconstruction, and/or existentially oriented ongoing re(-)normalization (and would be better appreciated through the exercise of a perspective noting transformational retreatment' as explored elsewhere[347]).[348] (36)

In line with the formula of 'Topic + System + Exposition = Discourse (with causal implications, etc.)' we can note that stations 1-8 are topical, 9-10 are systems related, and 11-12 are expositional, and, where through dissemination, they then become discursive in a non-virtual sense. (37)

Ideally, the overall objective is to discern and implement a pragmatic-existentialism as an existential-pragmatism… and by such means deliver an ensuing augmentation and enhancement of the relational party or parties as well as, more importantly, the enrichment of that overall primary relationship in question. (38)

By 'economic' is meant a 'circulation of dialectically constituted value between the trimodal confines of its unattainable economic correlativities within its economic contextualization'. With the understanding that no economic correlativity can be isolated and can be discerned in and through itself except when rhetorically-analogically treated and qualified as such, and, that, equally, no relationship can be isolated and discerned in and through itself except when rhetorically-analogically treated and qualified as such. Just as a shadow can be seen on a wall, but, cannot be separated from that same wall and its situatedness except in a linguistic form mirroring either rhetorical, metaphorical and/or apparitional forms of qualified treatment. In archetypal terms unqualified treatment is ruled out of court as 'unthinkable'. Just as we can talk about a shadow qua shadow but where no shadow per se can be extracted from (our perception of) its shadow-forming situatedness. Still shadows can be cast in a shadow-forming type of situatedness, but, cannot be recognized, encountered, and engaged in a non-relationally form of isolation.[349] Thence the archetypal rules out that which cannot be non-archetypally entertained. Arguing, therefore, through the (extensive) suspension for the non-presence of all forms of ideological extremism as formulated in absolutistically impossible forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, and relativism. That the mere presence of such impossible forms of ideation automatically rules our any form of conformal metaphysically organized progression through this Scheme. So, e.g., the simple utterance that a position, say, is an example of 'scientific realism' or implies any form of a 'cognitive idealism', etc., is more than enough to disbar any form of progress whatsoever. Indeed, we then need to ask if debating or being informed about such parties is even worth our while? That what success they might appear to have can only be through their overlooking such ideological extremism despite their protestations to the contrary. What is 'impossible' is precisely 'impossible to contemplate'! Hence our understandable reluctance to even entertain such impossible notions. But, let us proceed… (39)

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347 As per *The Seventh Book*…, *Book* 9, etc.

348 As noted elsewhere, the nomenclature of '(-)' alerts us to a process of ongoing economic thematization, i.e., re(-)thematization, etc.

349 Semantically, we talk about just shadows *qua* shadows but, correctly, not in lived-experience.

7. Economic Considerations[350]

As zero-station point of departure we begin with a succinct summary of the problem or problematization being placed under such schematic conformal scrutiny. (40)

E.g., a representative formulation of the obesity crisis, or a personal or financial problem, or whether a philosophical position is tenable and credible, etc. (41)

By 'representative' is always meant no more than a 'circumscribed set of propositional-statement that appear to suitable and adequately present a series of alignments that purport to 'represent' through such entailed 're(-)presentation' the to-be-essentially-understood configuration of a certain relational situation' (and, where, by a certain relational situation is meant a certain relationship or series and/or sets of relationships). What is never meant is 'representative' in any 'impossible and unnecessary non-anti-representational form of representation'. Or, in other words, the selection and integration of a set of representative-conjectures that in their semantic sense can progressively specify an adequately comprehensive modelling of the apparent 'situatedness' of the relational situation in question as brought to our emergent, non-reductive attention by such a format. (42)

Where by a 'representative-conjecture' is meant our ability to focus specifically on an essential-like understanding of the representative-situatedness in question through articulating a set of closely interlinked propositional-statements through processes of either observable alignment and/or conjectured imputation. E.g., I perceive a bowl of apples on this table in the kitchen where all these identified attributes of the apples, like, e.g., sight, touch, smell, and taste, etc., are perceived by myself, along with their co-associated perceptions of their contextual emplacement, such as the bowl, kitchen table, kitchen, etc., are obviously interlinked through a certain set of temporally and geographically circumscribed perceptual inspections, and where from certain apperceptions I also know that these same apples were bought by myself in the markets yesterday, placed in this bowl by myself, and, indeed, are ready to eat, and so on. What is not meant, and is never meant, is any non-relational relation whatsoever to both impossible and unnecessary references to any imputed representational state that cannot be articulated through anything other than propositional-statements imputed to indicate the required conjectured, conformal patterns of alignment that can be ascribed with a tentative provisional degree of ascertainment despite the degree of commensurate assurance demonstrated through the supporting richness of either multiple instances of either confirmed and/or verified ascertainment. That, given these iterable reinforcements of such representative-conjectures, the apparently non-disputed internal logic of their semantic demonstration along with an emergent, non-reducible element of assurance it is beholden to us to more accept the articulation of such demonstrations as conformally constructed rather than dismiss their simulated representativeness as merely fabricated in virtual terms of reference… since the de-suspension of the suspension of such interrogations only continues to reveal an assurance of such presentations until such a time they are found to need partial, relatively superficial forms of reconstruction or meet an outright form of rejection. (43)

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350 For convenience, a summary mapping of this Scheme is supplied in paragraph 124.

For convenience let me notate these ‘progressive’ shifts between transformations and transformational-transitions with the same notion used in the abbreviated mapping of this Scheme in Appendix A (paragraph 124, as falling under the heading supplied). (44)

S:0. Departure Station: Succinct ‘representation’ of problem/problematization

As discussed elsewhere, all narratives are driven advertently, or, more likely, inadvertently, by the anomalies that they are either knowingly and/or unknowingly designed to de-anomalize. ‘Anomalies being either already discerned as problematic and/or treated in a problematic manner in order to either terminate, sustain and/or deepen a process of resolution. (45)

Prior to departure we ask, “just what is either problematic or being problematized, and, just what objectives would we like to ‘tentatively’ observe in the ‘progressive’ resolution of such processes of interrogation?”[351] (46)

Ideally, not everything is found as problematic, but, anything could be rendered problematic through questioning. (47)

In practical terms, questions are raised usually in a context where we have a good idea of either the possible outcome/s or the desired outcome/s. (48)

In an appreciation of chaotic responses, we normally have a reasonably good idea of what might occur or what range of possibilities might ensue… along with our assessment as to whether such changes are either positive, neutral, or negative, etc., for either ourselves and/or others, and, therefore, to what extent such expected responses might proffer a ‘benefit’ in some form or otherwise. (49)

S:0-1. Suspension, and de-ideological separation of extremist positionings

As good philosophers or disciplinarians we suspend both the articulated nature of both the problematic and problematized, and its articulated objectives for resolution. (50)

S:1. (Tri-modal) Archetypal Economics: Recognition of trimodal framework

Through the utilization of the suspension and the avoidance of all forms of ideological extremism we should quite naturally expose a trimodal economy that can then be rendered as fit for purpose (in line with the resolute objective of seeking and finding a suitable resolution of the problematic nature of our enquiry). (51)

Delineating what is phenomenal-phenomenologically foreground (in our focus) of a certain textual situation, discerning what is relatively background (in meta-textual,

[351] Of course, we are being ‘tentative’ in our officially seeking a suitable and provisional form of reply through resolution, but, much more hopeful of realizing the actual degree of conformal assurance being sought in line with the required reasonable nature and limitations of our expectations as long as we avoid the appearance of an extremist, ideologically constructed economy.

hermeneutical terms of reference), and entertain what might possibly re-present itself as a form of existential insightfulness, presenting some sense and semblance of a required resolution along with the application of its ensuing solution. (52)

S:1-2. Economic Complexification of trimodal economy in question

Accepting a trimodal scaffolding, relevant economic considerations are arranged through economic complexification… (53)

Having determined the type of economy or economies in question we determine relevant economic correlativities and then align the same in archetypal terms of reference. E.g., if we were dealing with a complex economy concerned with both presentation[352] and treatment modes[353] then we could muster to hand 'presentation, representation, and re-presentation', and, 'analysis, synthesis, and nomination'. Then, upon careful reflection upon the nature of the archetypal economy, we could envisage the following forms of overall alignment:

Presentation:	Presentation	Representation	Re-presentation
Treatment:	Analysis	Synthesis	Nomination
Archetypal:	**Object/Foreground**	**World/Background**	**Ego/Subjectivity**
(Philosophical:	Phenomenological	Hermeneutical	Existential) (54)

Now, to simplify such reflections, we could also consult a predetermined dictionary in this same regard. E.g., *Appendix* A: *A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities* in *The Seventh Book*…[354] (55)

The value of complexification is such that it enriches our evolving appreciation of any individual economy… (56)

S:2. Economics: Economic simplification through economic integration

Then, from the harmonic interactions of a specific economic, we arrive at a relative integration of its circulations of e/valuational formation, from which, at a certain historical point in time, this semblance of resolution is non-economically expressed in a relatively definitive act of the last instance or first instance, or next instance (when the first instance takes an existential stance and is then instantiated in the last instance of the next moment). (57)

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352 This 'economy of presentation' could just as well be nominated an 'economy of representation' or an 'economy of re-presentation' (hence, these correlativities understood, we could also nominate as the 'economy of re(-)presentation').

353 Modes of treatment comes in three flavours and only three flavours, like every other economy, namely, in this instance, 'analysis, synthesis, and nomination'. (Note, in a contrast with 'treatment', the 'economy of transformational retreatment' is divided between 'pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment').

354 *Pursuit,* III.VII.III.C.Appendix A.100. Reposted in Appendix B.

S:2-3. Articulation of resolutional considerations

The economic by itself, purely in economic terms, would be nothing more than endless cycles of e/valuational formation… thence the necessity for the irruption of the non-economic and its implication of a causal dimension (in this transformation of the virtual into the non-virtually non-economic). (58)

S:3. Non-Economics: Seeking definitive resolutions in last, first, and next instances

From such non-economic irruptions, the economic is put on an historical stage and converts the relatively potential or virtual (in a trans-cognitive firth order) into the actual and non-virtual (as expressed through a trans-cognitive sixth order). By such means, and through topical codes, etc., linking systems and inter-ordered phenomena (through the medium of disciplines and their distinctive use of disciplinary behaviours). Where 'definitive instances of the last instance' merely reiterate near-identical-like processes of represented identity. The 'first instance' indicating 'existentially positive territory for intervention as if acting on behalf of that primary relationship' that then becomes followed through, should that intervention be permitted, through definitive instances of the 'next instance'. (59)

The 'last instance' is re-directed behaviour that becomes the new norm through mere reiteration. On the other hand, the first and next instances indicate a more radical sense of chaotically induced re-direction (whose re-directedness is determined through economic resolution that more successfully escapes the relatively economic). (60)

But a problem can be discerned if we make a distinction between the impossible hyper-economic reception of the radically-radical and the possibility of the reception of the relatively-radical… (61)

S:3-4. Meta-textual translation of hermeneutic re(-)appropriation of resolutions

All too often innovations are not appreciated as if 'new wine in old bottles cannot be drunk' (if such old fashioned 'wine' no longer looks and tastes like 'old fashioned wine'). Here I propose an incremental model. The analogy has been made 'that if bread is sliced in the bakery (rather than the corner store grocery) it needs to be wrapped'. I.e., the innovation of slicing the bread then incrementally needs the innovation of it being packaged, i.e., wrapped (as one of the most convenient ways of doing this). Of course, with wrapping can come product branding and self-advertising, then the government insisting on truth in advertising along with other innovations (such as my suggestion the range of the protein percentage of the bread should then also be reported as one legislated measure in the broad-spectrum approach to and reversal of the obesity epidemic'). (62)

This incremental model suggests that radical information needs to be 'digested in bite sized mouthfuls' rather than in 'large undigestible mouthfuls' of the same. (63)

The following suggestions also need to be made, namely, innovations need to be suitably recognized, encountered, and engaged and that this is best facilitated through a critical presentation of the relatively anomalous in a requisite 'suspension' as a 'suspension of belief'; and, that the ground for such a transition in appreciation needs to be critically pre-prepared; that critical preparation is supportive of this transformational-transition; that in order to appreciate the relatively-radical, increment by increment, that is critically supported then we also then need to supply a 'suspension of disbelief' in order to rule out that which is relatively non-critically non-supported; and, by such measures preserve a general notion of conformally oriented conformalization of process. Thence the functioning of the hyper-economic in its ongoing re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical on an incremental basis. That such rectifications of process recognition, etc., are basically hermeneutically oriented by virtue of the need to transformationally-transition our meta-textual appreciation of the evolving genres arising through this ongoing re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical. That, similarly, in dealing with the novelty of contemporary social problems and in re-dealing with traditional problems from a novel perspective the imputation of this hyper-economic sub-economy within the overall economy of the economic is very much a necessity (in order to account for innovation, the causal re-direction of the non-virtual, the formation of new genres of behaviour given the advent of non-continuities in cultural-intercultural expression, etc.) (64)

S:4. Hyper-Economics: Identification of critical or radical shifts in positioning

Thence the necessary imputation of the hyper-economic in order to economically appreciate the import of the relatively non-economic. (65)

That such transformational-transitions can be pointed out through identifying the alterations and innovations of the relevant meta-textual genres in question. (66)

Thence the possibility for the meaningful uptake of disciplines through the historicity of the non-economic and its comprehension of the relatively-radical through the lens of the hyper-economic. (67)

Sifting the relatively conformal from the relatively non-conformal nature, say, of conspiracies, misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, poor scientific methodologies, political malpractice, etc., through this delineation of the relatively supported critical treatment of the relatively-radical versus the non-critically unsupported treatment of the relatively-radical (and that which draws on a misappreciation of the radically-radical, etc.). (68)

By 'support' or being 'supportive' is meant 'the relative richness and intensity of conformal interconnections between critically-pre-prepared forms of hyper-economically oriented comprehension of the apparently radical, the innovative, etc.' In effect, paralleling the phenomenologist's reply to the misguided empiricist retort that the former disciplinarian has no access to the so-called real, the reality of the pre-represented, when the latter notes the overall richness of present anticipations in the light of past experiences and future expectations, etc. (69)

8. Inter-Ordered Phenomena

S:4-5. Identification of basic judgments being exercised

The distinctive nature of a discipline is based upon the types of judgment operated with by its distinctive mix of genres plus the range of intentional objectives ostensively expressed by that discipline. So e.g., an artist is not primarily concerned with ontical facts *per se*. Just as to day, the historical reality of the depiction presented in Goya's famous painting *The 3rd of May* 1808 (painting completed in 1814[355]) is irrelevant whilst at the same time the dramatic emotions depicted and realized through our simulated identification with the same can intensify in all probability our experience of this painting in lived-experience (given the clash and resolution of emotions is an important contributor to the overall aesthetic impact of a work of art as understood in my theoretical reading of aesthetic reception). On the other hand, aesthetic intensity (second trans-cognitive order) can intensify the (fourth ordered trans-cognitive) pragmatical aspects of a work of art to the extent it appears to express a message in some form or other. In this regard, this innovative painting seems to express the idea of the revolutionary in a number of ways... (70)

S:5. (Hexa-modal) Ordered Phenomena: Identification of relevant orders

The processes and content of judgment in a discipline is its 'topic' and is based upon a reading of the distinctive differences between types of judgment as 'orders' (and their accommodation here under the trans-cognitive category of 'trans-intentional/trans-cognitive judgment'). (71)

These six distinctive types of judgment are from the first order to the sixth, namely, are phenomenological-semantic e/valuation; aesthetical; de-ontological-existential; pragmatical; hermeneutical possibility; and, ontical or factual e/valuation. (72)

'E/valuation' in the double sense 'that a judgmental process of trans-cognitive evaluational formation delivers a cognitive form of valuational formation. (73)

S:5-6. Identification of relevant disciplines and their inter-ordered configuring

The distinctive uptake of these trans-cognitive orders, from the first order, already supply material for six distinctive types of disciplines, namely, the semanticist/phenomenologist; aesthetician and artist; deontologist and existentialist; the pramaticist (not to be confused with a much broader pragmatist); hermeneuticist/hermeneut; and factologist (as a collector of evidence for use in a narrative, say, as utilized by an historia). (74)

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[355] Also known as the *El tres de mayo de* 1808 en Madrid or *Los fusilamientos del tres de mayo*, Museo del Prado, Madrid. It was commissioned by the provisional government of Spain, at Goya's own suggestion, on the expulsion of the troops of Napoleon and the restoration of King Ferdinand VII (as per Wikipedia).

But, from reduplication, duplication (along with a non-commutative reversal of duplication), and de-reduplication (as a commutative reversal of reduplication) is formed a wider basis for disciplinary topics. Indeed, I will argue, as a conjecture, that the topicality of all disciplines can be accounted for in inter-ordered terms of reference. So, e.g., the psychologist is 2^2 and the sociologist is 2^3, so the philosopher (P) is $(51 +11 + 31)^1$ and the metaphysician (M) is P^2, the political economist is $(4 + 3)^1$, the historian is 6^1 and the scientist is 5^2, etc. (75)

Thence the role of the inter-ordered (including ordered, bi-ordered, inter-ordered and hyper-ordered, in both focal and background formations, etc.) allows us to entertain the variety of disciplines in all their topical variety. (76)

S:6. Inter-Ordered Phenomena: A clarification of inter-ordered coding utilized

Through duplication and reduplication, along with the de-suspension of de-reduplication, we find a plethora of topical possibilities. By doing so, we impose different forms of coding. So, e.g., 'the conformal philosophical appreciation' of 'conformal philosophical appreciation' is not philosophical appreciation *per se* but metaphysical appreciation by definition (being either meta-philosophical and/or non-philosophical in orientation). Similarly, 'the ontical appreciation' of 'ontical appreciation' is not the ontical appreciation of a factologist (in accordance with by definition of that discipline) but the historical appreciation of an historian (in accordance with my definition of that latter discipline) since 6^1 is not equal to 6^2. (77)

Now, furthermore, in duplication we have one code dominating the exercise of another, effectively, either within a discipline or between disciplines. So, e.g., this historical appreciation of philosophy is the historical appreciation of its topic area being focused upon. Being non-commutative we note, e.g., that 6^2.M is not equal to M.6^2. Thence the dominance of one discipline over another through the exercise if its distinctive types of judgments as meta-textually codified in appropriate genres of behaviour (and as reflected in specific discipline in a system controlling a sub-discipline in that overall discipline (as occurs in the focus of a sub-field of law within the legal field), or where one discipline controls another, or where one system effectively dominates a sub-system or another system (as could be understood in an unresolved resolution of the systematic preconditions for the obesity crisis where the business world of food industries overrides the imperatives of the health system, e.g.). (78)

Where the concerted uptake of a distinctive set of hyper-ordered phenomena effectively instantiates a transformational-transition to a discipline, be that uptake entertained in a *de jure* or *de facto* sense of format, etc. E.g., if I am questioning the evidence associated with a certain set of facts then I am acting, advertently or inadvertently, as a factologist. E.g., I put six apples in that empty fruit bowl yesterday and can now only see five… so, someone has removed and perhaps eaten one of those apples. Who might that be? I remember now, I put one of those apples in my lunch box last night, and I have yet to eat it. (79)

9. Disciplinary Phenomena

6-7. Identification of discipline/s being invoked

Historically, disciplines have already been named and delineated in functional terms. So, astrology, e.g., is invoked to give a statistical evaluation of the person's characteristics, maybe an essential appreciation of their historical trajectory, attempt to define compatibility between people and institutions, etc. On the other hand, e.g., astronomy is invoked to determine the constitution of the cosmos, calculate orbits, predict the time and place of eclipses, etc. Even though both disciplines might have similarities in method and materials, still their objectives could not be more diversely different. However, the point remains, that disciplines are already defined in cultural and intercultural terms. But, in topical terms of reference it is for the philosopher or some other disciplinarian to determine both the topical and objective basis of a certainly historically predefined discipline. So, both 'astrology' and 'astronomy' are 'sciences' (through utilizing forms of calculation), but, the former has objectives that are either diagnostic or prognostic whereas the latter has defined itself as falling within the systems-sphere of science which we might judge as falling primarily within the system of academia and, secondarily, within the world of business given the applied value of its techniques, etc. Astrology, in contrast no longer falls within Academia and often locates itself in the nebulous world of 'arcane sciences' whilst often not being too far from the world of business for a practising astrological professional (regardless of how we might view the conformal nature of their business[356]). (80)

So, how do we discern an inter-ordered topical basis for a certain discipline along with the delineation of its expressed objectives? (81)

We can appeal to how such considerations that are already pre-prepared in that regard, e.g., as delineated in this essay or elsewhere. Or, by using such classifications as precedents we can then move to nearby disciplines by noting the apparent semblance of proximity, similarities in objectives, etc. (82)

That, in this process of topical delineation we also note that distinctive disciplines also have a set of distinctive differentials (namely, a differential, meta-differential, and a non-differential). (83)

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356 I am very sympathetic to some forms of astrological research, namely, the diagnostic aspects, on the basis of personal experience, but, highly skeptical of it value in business terms as generally practiced. Then, again, we can point to a number of other practices that are even more dubious both historically and in contemporary terms. E.g., the progressive whittling away of the hegemony of the Freudian psychoanalytic empire in the sphere of psychiatry seems emblematic of a general lack of evidence-based research in the field of medicine, etc. So, the moral of this general observation, I would like to think, is that rather than being disparaging perhaps it behooves us to enquire as to which disciplines are discerned as proffering greater degrees and qualities of e/valuational formation and chose to patronize them rather than being merely critical of a long list of potential miscreants. Just as when we fly overseas, we naturally prefer our airline pilots to be professionally trained, and, when we wish to be entertained, say, by a travel documentary, we can then enjoy the opinions expressed there be they formulated either wisely or unwisely, and so on.

7. Disciplines: Articulation of disciplinary differences, non-diffs. & meta-diffs.

The philosophical discipline has been noted to possess not only a preoccupation with the conformal delineation of valid processes of truth determination but also with a desire to appreciate such mechanisms that allow us to pursue such objectives. This can be read as its primary philosophical difference and as its primary disciplinary differential on the grounds that all distinctive disciplines must possess a distinctive sense and semblance of such a differential. (84)

So, e.g., a theology invokes theological ideation (and such ideation could possibly be extracted through the extrapolation of various metaphysical notions such as the apparent transcendental unity of the overall life-world/world-of-life along with or without various conceptions of the numinous, etc. And, a science invokes its exploration and interpretation of the probable-possibilities that occur in its field of expertise (and hence its classification through the symmetrical reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order). And, a historian works with the material supplied by a factologist (be that supplied either by professionals, themselves, and/or the historical tradition itself). (85)

As a result of research on this topic of disciplinary differences or differentials let summarize my findings (as the position to then commence its overall critical appreciation through relevant forms of philosophical debate). (86)

The conjecture is outlined ‘that a distinctive discipline possesses a distinctive sense of disciplinary difference, i.e., a different way of seeing and treating the secular world’. Just as a theologian, e.g., envisages the non-controversial acceptance of a secular world plus the potentially controversial imputation of some sense and semblance of the Divine or Numinous, so, that therefore, this ‘disciplinary difference’ is ‘their overall vision of the world minus this secular contribution’. Such a difference is conceived of primarily in phenomenal-phenomenological terms of reference. (87)

The following question is then asked, ‘what difference does this difference make (if at all?)?’ That this type of question attempts to determine how the co-associated imputation of value is to be experienced in experiential terms of reference by appreciating through which genres of behaviour such value is to be experienced. So, e.g., the theologian might invoke genres like prayer, meditation, contemplation, etc. Or, the historian might note how histories of the past have something to say in the formulation of histories of the present or future. Just as empires rose and fell, e.g., in reflection upon this observation they might wish to ask either themselves and/or other historians, ‘will our current democracies do something similar, and so on, and so forth?’ Or, the theoretical scientist might argue that quantum computing might not be very useful at present, but, soon, it could make quite a difference (especially in convergence with any other number of other disciplines, like AI, additive 3-D printing, autonomous driving, voice recognition and generation, etc.[357]). That such considerations of meta-differentials are primarily hermeneutical in orientation. (88)

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[357] In effect, making an allusion to robotics.

But, a third type of question also needs to be asked, namely, just how do such differences transcend or traverse this potential chasm between these disciplinary differentials and these disciplinary meta-differentials, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the secular world itself? In effect, seeking to delineate a non-difference between the apparent world of that discipline, and disciplines in general, and the residual world of the secular (despite an all-pervasive colonialization by disciplines potentially operating in an adverse, contractual, non-compactual[358] manner if left unsupervised and unchecked?)? (89)

The theologian, e.g., will well-note the potential devastation of the disciplinary insight (of relational interdependence) 'that what is not there for us is not there for us, and, we need not be there for it!' But, this same insight needs to apply to all disciplines. Namely, just how does a certain discipline perceive little or no difference between the world of their profession and how we are also inescapably enmeshed in the secular world at the same time… and, that we need to maintain a harmonic relationship between both worlds, indeed, all worlds, within this overall world-of-life. That it should be known that this difference, or, rather non-difference, is existential in both tenor and complexion. (90)

7-8. Identification of disciplinary dominance or disciplinary amalgamation.

But, no discipline operates in isolation from either the secular world or the world of other disciplines. That, none ever being equal to any other, their interactions can often take the form of one dominating another, or, entering into (unequal) mergers, or, chaotically, splitting through bifurcations, or, through the emergence of new and novel disciplines, or, find transformations through phase changes within an already recognized discipline, etc. (91)

8. Inter-Disciplinary Considerations: Note relevant inter-disciplinary economics

On an inter-disciplinary level of exposition, we can envisage the economic interactions of disciplines. Indeed, without such overlap, between both disciplines and systems, there could be no world as we have come to know it. That through the progression of such thematization we have developed islands of technology with various fragile forms of interconnections between the same. A moment's reflection here should reveal to us the immensity of what is not known, but, let us be grateful of what we have to work with and extend and enrich these diverse interconnections… (92)

Now, our appreciation of any discipline or set of disciplines is to be found in the manner of their historical enmeshment in a world of systems… (93)

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358 'Compactual' being 'a pro-relational, trans-relationally experienced dimension in interaction based on existential insights that are primarily deontologically in flavour with a general absence of an apparent differential in power relations'. It is the dimension within which working contracts, with a pragmatical disposition, need to be formulated and exercised. Interestingly, it is the interactions between the necessary presence of both dimensions that can be more illuminative of our relationship, etc. Where, hopefully, a pragmatic dimension is to be more fully thematized and enacted.

9. Systems

S:8-9. Articulating relevant historicity of the discipline/s in question

The following conjecture has been posted, namely, every discipline has a topical basic in inter-ordered phenomena. Of course, how we might account for a certain discipline may well involve a complicated process of creative reasoning and other people may well dispute that line of argument, and may or may not supply their alternative interpretations. Moreover, all disciplines must be understood as being historically enveloped and embraced within the historicity of a certain system (or systems or sub-systems?[359]). But, in the political-economy, over time, certain disciplines may either chaotically bifurcate, or merge, or emergently emerge and/or change state, and so on.[360] (94)

As noted, historicity is developed non-economically and then makes its more permanent mark in hyper-economic terms of reference through the formation of novel genres of behaviour. (95)

This disciplinary development of historicity being situated in the distinctive historical context of its system in which it finds cultural-intercultural embracement and envelopment given the relative permanence of hyper-economic rules of meta-textually oriented writing and reading of genres co-associated with that incorporated 'disciplinary situation' (as 'a specific discipline and/or a series and/or set/s of disciplines'). (96)

How might we sensibly discriminate between, say, 'astrology' and 'astronomy'? Both disciplines could be initially treated as 'sciences' and, therefore, as examples of a discipline centered in 5^2 (i.e., the hermeneutical possibility of the hermeneutic possibility/possibilities?)? Historically, we can treat them as have different objectives despite paying some form of attention to astronomical phenomena. Others would dispute the evidence put forward in the pursuit of their respective disciplines. (97)

As a charitable rule we could state 'that all systems are productive of more divested value than that invested in such form of investment', but, importantly, it is 'the differential quanta and reliability of such excess value that should be allowed to tell us whether one discipline is more productive than some other in both individual and collective terms of reference. However, in general terms, given the general nature of lived-experience, we should be able to ascertain the relative value of a certain habit or procedure and by extension generally evaluate to what extent a certain type of practice has through its reiterated performance in its co-associated social setting in question. (98)

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359 A question to ask – is it possible for a discipline to occupy two or more systems (more or less equally) at the same time and would think that that is not possible. Or, one system could lose a discipline and that discipline could be taken up in a different system over time? So, chemistry, e.g., evolved out of alchemy but can no longer be seen as belonging to that now disrespected discipline.

360 E.g., respectively, philosophy, political-economics as a hybrid discipline, metaphysics (in its emergence from the symmetrical reduplication of philosophy), and chemistry from its transformation of its the alchemical basis, etc.

S:9. Systems: Noting systematic framing and malformations of discipline/s

The observed evidence for the conjoining of both systems and disciplines is cultural, etc. (99)

In the observance of the interaction within and between systems and between disciplines produces for us our current understanding of the world of systems and their internal worlds of disciplines, etc. (100)

So, e.g., we find the overall food industry as contained within the world of business, and the discipline of history usually pursued in an academic setting or a *de facto* academic-like setting. (101)

Upon closer observation we can either perceive and/or apperceive or infer the possible failures of a certain system and/or the failings in an overlapping of certain systematic situation (as explored in *Book* 9). Such defects could be either the advertent or inadvertent mis-utilization of factual contributions, faulty processes or functions, and/or the relatively external manipulations of vested interests, etc.[361] (102)

By systematic faming we note how a set of genres appear to be both commonly and persistently organized. So, restaurants fall within the food industry but are also often closely connected with the entertainment industry (as when a cinema or theaters recommend a certain nearby restaurant, and v.v.). (103)

S:9-10. Articulating possible overall problematic inter-systems interactions

Social problems within and between systems being a mix of either traditional and/or contemporary problems whose anomalous natures can possibly be resolved in either traditional and/or contemporary terms of reference. Where a 'contemporary problem' could be defined as 'involving either recent historical problems and/or a form of problematicity devolving from the recent formation of non-continuities not historically seen before' in which innovative responses have not yet been adequately developed. (104)

S:10. Inter-Systematic Considerations: Noting adversely contrasting codes

Hence the historical delineation, where possible, between traditional social problems perhaps needing the innovation of contemporary forms of resolution and/or contemporary problems needing a successful mix of either traditional and/or contemporary modes of resolution. Where anomalous situations that remain problematic also become contemporary by default. (105)

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[361] The latter as evidenced in the reluctance of the nicotine industry, e.g., to admit to a whole series of deceptively mistreated factual inputs and adversely experienced consequences of this type of practice that is so obviously bad for health (and where such information suitably disseminated is so obviously bad for profits in this line of business. To have got away with such dangerous nonsense many people must have looked the other way besides just smokers exercising a persistent level in self-denial).

11. Political-Economics

S:10-11. Proposing solutions/resolutions of intra/inter-systematic malformations

Although individual systems or cooperative forms of alliances between systems might be capable of amelioration of systemic malformations, still, a much more successful form of respite is more likely to be sought through the political-economy by recourse to suitable process of policy formulation and, thereafter, the implementation of a variety of apposite strategies as to be continually refracted, both responsively and responsibly, through such a set of working documents. (106)

Once an overlapping of systems and their disciplines can be articulated and problematic interactions noted then we are in a better position to invoke political-economic means of resolution. Hence political policy formation, and, hopefully, the adequate and successful implementation of the same along with its ongoing critical supervision with an ability to positively and productively respond to the need for either relatively-critical and/or relatively-radical points of emendation and intervention. (107)

S:11. (Nova-modal) Political-Economics: Noting forms of implementation, etc.

That the 3 x 3 matrix is an heuristic device for dealing with the political-economy through noting the different roles to be played by different segments or sectors within the same. Therefore, policy formulation and implementation necessitates the suitable invocation of the same although a more thorough approach in mitigation through rectification, error correction through deconstruction (both positive and negative in scope), and ongoing re(-)normalization of social processes through apposite forms of intervention operating from either the individual level and/or up to the national or international levels of intervention. Where, hopefully, interventions also invoke a pro-relational, existential orientation along with a mindfulness placed upon both mis-intended and unintended consequences. (108)

Perhaps interestingly, for the reader to decide, the philosophical economy can also be translated through a similar 3 x 3 matrix (of preferentialization[362]) and where its three levels can also correspond to these economic aspects of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic. In such nova-modal scheme we can account for the symmetrical reduplications of the hermeneutical (in the fifth trans-cognitive order and symbolized by ‘World’ or ‘W’), the phenomenologically-semantic (in the first trans-cognitive order of ‘Object’ or ‘O’), and the existentially-deontological (in the third trans-cognitive order of ‘Ego’ or ‘E’). That in such a scheme the other orders of the 21, 41, and 61 are arrived at through duplication and where we have two versions depending on which aspect is more dominant. E.g., where the subtle preferential (re)treatment of both W.O and O.W gives us expressions of the ontical sixth trans-cognitive order of factual determination. Similarly, W.E/E.W (in the expression of the pragmatical fourth trans-cognitive

[362] Hypothetically as derived from the imputed forcefulness of the de-suspension in a reversal of the economy in question. In this instance form the reversal of the philosophical economy (and its conformal metaphysical supervision).

order) and O.E/E.O (in the expression of the aesthetical second trans-cognitive order). Representing this matrix below:

	W	**O**	**E**
Existential Non-Economic (**Ego**):	4^1	2^1	3^2
Phenomenological Economic (**Object**):	6^1	1^2	2^1
Hermeneutic Hyper-Economic (**World**):	5^2	6^1	4^1

(109)

What might be able to be read into this matrix representation is that, e.g., the execution of political power in the ninth segment, ideally, should be existentially oriented and one would need to further ask just how this orientation might be generally expedited? Or, again, that the expression of the pragmatical (in the fourth trans-cognitive order) has two directions in the realization of the same, namely, a contractual writing of the compactual *versus* the compactual writing of the contractual (and, where, ideally, an appropriate balance should be preferentially preferred)? Or, again, in a reversal of the conformal metaphysical economy (M) as the reduplication of the philosophical economy (P^2) we might expect these types of e/valuational formation to flow through the segmentation of the political-economy (given this hypothetical sharing of the same type of archetypal matrix [and its paralleling of the overall economy of the economic[363]]?)? (110)

But, this interesting digression does lead into the question just what exactly might happen when we have a reversal of the philosophical economy or when considered form the perspective of its metaphysical reduplication (as represented above)? (111)

One observation we might like to make at this point is that through the thorough exercise of a suspension forms of ideological extremism cannot persist post the de-suspension (since they should be eliminated within the suspension). That should forms of ideological extremism persist, then we must assume that the suspension was not suitably exercised in a thorough manner, and, we would then need to ask ourselves should we continue to relate, debate, and remonstrate with such ideologues (from, to put it crudely, conducting some form of a cost-benefit analysis). From the sidelines we can already note that what might appear to work in such defective philosophies can only arise from their overlooking both the impossible and unnecessary aspects of their ideological positioning. That, it is not that we cannot learn some interesting philosophical manoeuvres from such misguided exponents, only, that if they cannot 'see' the archetypal nature of their mistakes we will be wasting everyone's time. (112)

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[363] As a more precise modelling of the de-suspension and its role in the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of these archetypal moments (or poles, economic correlativities, polarities, etc.) by virtue of its ability to entertain suspensions on all three hypothetical levels of economic organization in the economy of the overall economic.

12. Pragmatic-Existentialism

S:11-12. Ensuring pre-conditions and conditions for pragmatic-existentialization

Such progressively translated preparation now leads us to the 'positionless position' of a 'pragmatic-existentialism' (as, equally, an 'existential-pragmatism'). 'Positionless' in the sense that through suspensions, etc., we can now no longer have any truck whatsoever with any form of ideological extremism be it either absolutistically constructed or relativistically constructed, be it some overt or disguised form of unimodalism or bimodalism, be it a classical form of an impossible and unnecessary representationalism, be it a negative nihilism or worse, some form of a substantialistic or materialistic anti-nihilism, etc. Hence our exciting departure from all manner of philosophical and disciplinary impossibilia like, e.g., so-call 'scientific realism', 'empiricism', rationalism[364]', all other forms of 'realism' (including 'anti-realism'), 'idealism', 'dualism', etc., *ad infinitum*… Where such exponents, relegated as recidivists, should explore the poetical world of literature where it is perfectly acceptable to traduce a perfectly good metaphor by mistreating it through a literal lens, and so on and so forth. (113)

S:12. Positively Nihilistic, Anti-Representational Pragmatic-Existentialism:

The end result of such an excursion is a positively nihilistic, anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism. (114)

A positive nihilism is the end-result of an archetypal critique of mis-formulated concepts like, e.g., substance, material, bimodal concepts like cause-and-effect, etc. Such misguided notions involve the impossible treatment of metaphors beyond their suitable levels of theoretical deployment, practical-critical employment, and critical-radical redeployment. Where, in effect, a 'positive nihilism' equals an 'anti-representationalism' but with the potentially positive connotations of e/valuative augmentation and enhancement, etc. Because, only in such possible, non-impossible frames of reference can all forms of e/valuational formation arise (be they considered in either negative and/or positive terms from the perspective of an existential frame of reference reviewed, say, as a certain level and form of relational enrichment enjoyed by the relational participants in that relationship in question be that through either relational creation, preservational maintenance, and/or conservational expansion). (115)

Where a pragmatic-existentialism, or existential-pragmatism arises, by default, through the dialectical resolution of our representative-conjectures when properly reviewed through economic, inter-ordered, disciplinary, systematic, and political-economic points of view… preferably in a collective integration of all such perspectives. However, quite rightly, an asymmetry exists to the extent that the observance of any defect in this progression will rule its productivity entirely out of court unless suitably remedied. Then,

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364 Since it could be argued that even anti-realists are still playing by the same impossible rules and doing something, quite frankly, that is quite unnecessary. However, as a step on the path to an anti-representationalism that is to be commended as long as even anti-realism itself is also totally deconstructed!

on the other hand, intuitively we should also note the successful productivity that arises from its correct application. (116)

So, what can this Scheme accomplish, and, equally, what can this re-purposed conformal metaphysics either accomplish or not accomplish? (117)

I have argued that a repurposed conformal metaphysics can and would re-vitalize the philosophical discipline. Here I argued why and how this can occur. Namely, through the correct application of a set of sequential perspectives in which defective formulations can be noticed and either emended or outrightly removed. Then, along the way, room is made for fruitful forms of debate and arbitration wherein pragmatic forms of consensus, ideally, can be realized. However, human interactions of all varieties can be messy and such a process should not be criticized as anything other than as a 'work in progress', although, it is also true, that we do not live forever and forms of resolution are to be more desired than endless dialectically subtle forms of equivocation. However, here we are saved, more often than not, through the forcefulness of the non-economic, via the de-suspension (of the extensive suspension) to deliver forms of definite resolution of the last, first, and next instants where we are 'called upon' to accept our interventional roles in the expedition of our relationships and be instrumental in the furthering the augmentation and enhancement of the freedom that naturally devolves from the same. That from the arising of such 'clear and distinct instructions' we are existentially beholden to pragmatically intervene for the mutual benefit of not only ourselves but also others. Called upon to accept the relatively-radical when it should 'call upon us' in this metaphorical personification that the philosopher, metaphysician or disciplinarian, or secularist can interpret in any way they like as long as they do not overstep and break the rules entailed in this Scheme. A Scheme, that I would like to stress, is nothing other than an heuristic device that only 'mirrors' what actually happens in living-experience, albeit as refracted through our many interpretations of lived-experience. (118)

That which can be done is that which can be performed, and, that which cannot be performed is that which cannot be done! Such an understanding could not be more pragmatic. (119)

Then, that which can be performed better is to be preferred and by pragmatic forms of interaction such issues should find evolving and innovative forms of ongoing resolution. Indeed, such an understanding could not be more pragmatic. (120)

Finally, given our freedom is only to be primarily found through others, then let us be more fully mindful of others. Where such pragmatism could not be other than existential in this same respect. (121)

Thence this preference for a positively nihilistic, anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism as advanced through a conformal metaphysical re-vitalization of a conformal philosophy or a conformal discipline or, indeed, a conformal secularism..!! (123)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 5.2.24.

A. Appendix A: A Mapping of this 'Progressive' Conformal Scheme:

0. **Departure Station:** Succinct 'representation' of problem/problematization

Economics
0-1. Suspension, and de-ideological separation of extremist positionings
1. **(Tri-modal) Archetypal Economics:** Recognition of trimodal framework

1-2. Economic Complexification of trimodal economy in question
2. **Economics:** Economic simplification through economic integration

2-3. Articulation of resolutional considerations
3. **Non-Economics:** Seeking definitive resolutions in last, first, and next instances

3-4. Meta-textual translation of hermeneutic re(-)appropriation of resolutions
4. **Hyper-Economics:** Identification of critical or radical shifts in positioning

Inter-Ordered Phenomena
4-5. Identification of basic judgments being exercised
5. **(Hexa-modal) Ordered Phenomena:** Identification of relevant orders

5-6. Identification of relevant disciplines and their inter-ordered configuring
6. **Inter-Ordered Phenomena:** A clarification of inter-ordered coding utilized

6-7. Identification of discipline/s being invoked
7. **Disciplines:** Articulation of disciplinary differences, non-diffs. & meta-diffs.

7-8. Identification of disciplinary dominance or disciplinary amalgamation.
8. **Inter-Disciplinary Considerations:** Note relevant inter-discipl. economics

Systems
8-9. Articulating relevant historicity of the discipline/s in question
9. **Systems:** Noting systematic framing and malformations of discipline/s

9-10. Articulating possible overall problematic inter-systems interactions
10. **Inter-Systematic Considerations:** Noting adversely contrasting codes

Political-Economics
10-11. Proposing solutions/resolutions of intra/inter-systematic malformations
11. **(Nova-modal) Political-Economics:** Noting forms of implementation, etc.

11-12. Ensuring pre-conditions and conditions for pragmatic-existentialization
12. **Positive Nihilistic, Anti-Representational Pragmatic-Existentialism:** through adoption and adaptation of pragmatic & existential interventions & innovations (by identifying pro-relational and trans-relational orientations, alterations, transformations, and e/valuations, etc.) (124)

B: Appendix B: A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities[365]

Type of Economy:	Archetypal World	Archetypal Object	Archetypal Ego
Philosophical:	Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism
Temporal:	Future	Past	Present
Herm. Circle:	Whole	Parts	Whole-and-Parts
Criticality:	Pre-Critical	Critical	Pot. Radical
Harmonic:	Consonance Theory	Dissonance Practice	Resolution Critique
Descriptive:	Prescriptive Relations	Descriptive Predicates	Proscriptive Nominations
Directedness:	Redirected	Directed	Re-Directed
Mod. of Error:	Mitigation	Correction	Align. with Relatively Non-Erroneous
Iterations:	Reiteration	Iteration	Re-Iteration.
Representation:	Representing	Presenting	Re-Presenting/ Anti-Representational
Retreatment:	Pretreatment	Treatment	Retreatment/ Posttreatment
Textual:	Meta-Textual	Textual	Non-Textual
Continuities	Continuities	Discontinuities	Non-Continuities
Philosophical Tools:	Rectification	Deconstruction	Re(-)Normalization
Interrogative Eco.	Rhetorical Dis-Conjunctive Sus.	Metaphorical Conjunctive Sus.	Apparitional Dynamic Bal…
(Imputational:[366])	Non-Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Non-Extrapolation...
(Imp.Eco read as:)	(Global Suspensions)	(Local Suspensions)	(Trans-Rel. Sus.)
[Economic	Hyper-Economic	Economic	Non-Economic] (125)

365 Originally posted as Appendix A: *Pursuit,* III.VII.III.C.A(ppendix A).

366 The imputational economy is discussed in *The Seventh Book*… modules 406, 407, 901.

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part III:
Existential Emendation through De-Suspension
In the Context of Trans-Relational Subjectivity

BOOK 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12Z. Metaphysics Repurposed: Part III: Existential Emendation through De-Suspension In the Context of Trans-Relational Subjectivity

0. Preamble

In Part III, we explore the conjectural forcefulness of the de-suspension. In asking the question, 'how do we take a pro-relational existential orientation?' the reply is proffered, 'that through trans-relational subjective identification existential intervention is enacted on the simulated behalf of the primary relationship in question'. Thence the enacting of this 'existential difference' between 'a trans-relational sense of subjectivity' and 'all other non-trans-relational senses of subjectivity'. In a repurposing of a conformal metaphysical appreciation of the philosophical let me now explore the ramifications of the conjunction of these two ideas, namely, that the existential is experienced through a trans-relational sense of subjectivity, and, that conjectural emendation can be promoted and exercised through the relative de-distortion and non-obstruction of a well-exercised (extensive) suspension and its automatic invocation of its de-suspension. (0)

1. Exposition

The first thing we need to note is that an economy of reception is not and cannot be just passive in orientation. We chose what to watch or listen to even if we (mistakenly) think we remain purely 'passive' in such 'passive-activity'. Now, the speculative exposition of the trimodal constitution of such an economy (of reception) in conjectural terms must then also supply the element of 'activity' (as a correlative contrast to passivity). But, wait, we know there must be more (on such conjectural grounds, namely, that each specified economy is specifically trimodal in the specific fleshing out of its archetypal constitution). Then, in that regard, we could also add the element of 'engage(ment)' implying an anticipation that a pro-relational, existential complexion to this economy of reception must also exist. Of course, the reader or audience can supply any third element here but its defining features need to be apposite to this economy of reception (and by extension an economy that is also now cognizant of both activity and engagement). (1)

Therefore, when read in this conjectural or economic fashion, we can also treat this economy of reception as paralleling an economy of enactment or participation. (2)

As a mnemonic we might note this as 'watch, walk, and work'. Or, 'listen, learn, and lobby (others)'. Or, entertain, enter (the relational arena), and engage (in this relational arena entailing the entire 'world' of our relationships) (be they either primary, secondary or even tertiary in relational status with respect to either 'us' individually or 'ourselves' collectively). But, putting such poetics aside, what ramifications does this have for an economy of (transcendental, i.e., trans-intentionally/trans-cognitively appreciated) subjectivity? (3)

Subjectively, we identify with the intentional objectivity in question. So, if we are visually perceiving then we do so as a visual perceiver, and so on. Appealing to the following conjecture, beyond the mere iteration of this type of observation, that all intentional activity has its co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity. Therefore, in appealing to this conjecture we must also assume the position that when we are relating to others we must do so through a trans-relational lens, where this sense and semblance of perspective must take on, or at least simulate, a trans-relational orientation. But, in doing so we must also disabuse ourselves of the notion that subjectivity can never be entirely subjective in a solipsistic fashion. A fact of our existence further reinforced by the inter-subjective nature of meta-textually constituted, hermeneutic genres of behaviour in which we think through intentional forms of ideation already carved out for us, even before our being born, in cultural-intercultural terms of reference. Indeed, the very 'wine' of our thinking and thoughts could not be there for(-)us without such bottles and glasses able to contain the cultural form of such ideation as represented in language and through language itself. The fact that language, more or less, represents itself must be the case as we do not find words 'floating freely in the world around us', and even if we find such linguistic traces in texts it is also true, they do not read themselves and neither can we read them apart from exercising a textual economy that must travel far beyond words on a piece of paper or on the screen of a computer or phone. Indeed, in appreciating the textual economy we need to also invoke both meta-textual and non-textual dimensions (and all other isomorphic, creative ways in order to explain how we manage to write upon the surface of this world and then read what appears to have been both apparently written and apparently intended even if we can never be fully certain that we have successfully understood what was possibly being conveyed through that disseminated text[367]). (4)

The ramifications of this conjectural understanding that an economy of reception cannot be purely passive or, indeed, merely active, but also must implicate a world of engagement in which we engage others *qua* others and not merely others *qua* our own senses of self has the logical implication, i.e., conjectural force, that subjectivity must also be understood in a trans-relational frame of reference. (5)

Such an understanding must also follow from the epistemological (and psychological) fact that we can neither entertain so-called 'pure internal worlds' nor so-called 'pure external world' and that for any philosopher to claim otherwise clearly demonstrates that they are not worth their metaphorical 'salt', so to speak, and deserves to be relegated to a backbench or even further from away from the serious pragmatists who wishes to deal only with what is possible and that which fully merits our concern in the aspiration to find 'a working form of consensus that mutually benefits both themselves and others'. (6)

I.e., as, non-metaphorically, there can be no so-called 'internal worlds' and 'external worlds' it must follow that we cannot but inhabit an arena of relational interactions with varying degree of mutual engagement and that, therein, we must do so with a trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity. That, even if it were to be (incorrectly) argued that such involvement is merely simulated because simulation cannot be claimed to be just simulated, given that it is being experienced, and that experience cannot be just

367367 Who among us could claim to fully understand the inexhaustible symbolic intent of a great poem?

simulated, and so on, it follows that we are inescapably immersed in this world at large, this overall world of live (whether we admit to such a fact of our existence/s or not)! (7)

Therefore, we must be resigned to this experiential fact that we already live in a world passively with(-)other, actively before(-)others, and find our very existential freedom in and through that arbitration to be experienced through(-)others, and, hence, our full conjectural acceptance of our trans-relational being in this world at large… along with the trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity economically co-associated with such lived-experience. That in our identification with such trans-relational subjectivity we engage an existentialization of the relatively non-existential (and v.v.). (8)

That, I would further argue that such identification is automatically entailed when an extensive suspension is entertained, and, that every moment of our intentional lives, and their trans-intentional judgmental appreciation, we do so through the auspices of a continual series of such enacted suspensions. (9)

But, given the explicated complexity of the 'extensive suspension' (under the encapsulated headings of 'the economy of the overall transcendental suspension', and its envelopment within the economy of the de-suspension as an 'extended suspension', and its causal implications in its further envelopment within an 'extensive suspension') how could this possibly be the case since where do we start in pursuing the expedition of such complexities in order to enact such identification? Basically, it is as simple as 'falling off a log', since the moment we cease to think about our actually staying on that log is very the moment we would fall from its narrow confines (although to also think too much about both 'falling off and staying on' that log would also contribute to our falling off that same log through some form of paralysis, be that from fear, an inability or perceived difficulty to move, or otherwise). The point being made here is that such 'suspensions' are entertained every moment of our intentional lives, and, moreover, through the mere enaction of one small facet of such a state of affairs the rest of that affair is automatically invoked on the grounds of 'economic induction'. Through economic correlativity all economic correlatives mirror each other and a form of isomorphic transformational-transitional invariance is inevitably observed. I.e., a bit like dropping a bright red cordial into a glass of water, where, very soon the entire glass takes on a reddened hue. Similarly, by merely entertaining one economic aspect of the economy of the suspension a suspension, therein and thereby, will be observed. Or, given an economy is in a continual state of ongoing resolution, in a persisting of its representative-expressions in lived-experience, it also follows through the definitive-like nature of the last instance, and the first instance, and our permitted existentially oriented intervention in the next instance, that such responsiveness (and ensuing responsibility) is more or less as simple as 'falling off a log' since such identification is expressed through either such advertent or inadvertent identification. On the other hand, in the assuming of such existential re-positioning we may either permit or abstain from following through on such required permission to be entertained in the next instance be that performance waylaid through forms of distortion or obstruction either actively engendered by ourselves or others and/or as met in our passages through this world at large. However, even here such complexities can be either navigated (around), negotiated, and/or arbitrated through the exercise of well-pre-

informed and well-performed extensive suspension that finds itself open to the living-experience of our living-with-others by virtue of the experiential fact that the emergent existential totality, richness, ongoing re(-)enrichment, excesses and surpluses of e/valuational formation can conformally emend the course and entailed trajectories of our relational-representations through the forcefulness of the evolving de-suspensions automatically invoked through the very act of the suspension itself. Otherwise, obviously, we would be forever trapped within the suspension. and, thereby and thereafter, would be unable to debate such a situation. That your ability to entertain such a state of affairs, indeed, any state of affairs, means we have this freedom to do so and it is through such identification with others, with our relationships that we must also accept the existential fact that in this world at large we also have this ability to identify with our relationships whilst also being free to appreciate the same through both suspensions and de-suspensions, and, through the enaction of well-pre-informed and well-performed suspensions we will also meet less with the co-associated distortions and obstructions to be recognized, encountered and engaged over the course of our passages as exercised through this world at large. Hence our ability to find an ongoing conjectural-representative refinement of our being in this world-with-others through the conformal forcefulness of the de-suspension in the wake of being more observant in our processes of suspensions, be that through entertaining questions, analogies, apparitional conjectures, through being curious or just following through on possible trajectories, and so on and so forth. (10)

But, we do not live in a fully transparent world. Such would be both impossible and unnecessary to contemplate. The ongoing transformational-transitions in our representative-conjectures are forever a work in progress. The evolving appreciation of our being in this world at large, in a world-with-others, progresses step by step. Conformal assurance in this process of an evolving consensus can never be taken away from us nor can it not be there for us to begin with! We live in a world, in large part, already ‘carved’ out for us. We work with others, we find the circumscriptions of this world upon us lessened through the arbitrations of others, and v.v. We have to equally prioritize both our personal ambitions and the social aspirational of others in order to realize some of these motivated intentions. Our real freedoms are found through others just as others aspire to find their freedoms through us. And what could be more pragmatic than that. In such matters we have to find working forms of agreement not only with others and ourselves but also with this world at large… in and through working forms of conjectural-representation that must also find reasonable forms of an alignment with this world as lived. Not through represented parallels with a pre-represented sense of world that cannot be experienced let along even thought about, given, thankfully, such nonsense could never be recognized, neither encountered, nor engaged. (11)

Conformal assurance is there for us to both enjoy and suffer since absolutistical claims for change are just as impossible as absolutistical claims that nothing changes. Transformation, therefore, is always transitional. Slice the bread and the ‘sliced bread’ remains. Observe a puddle of water evaporating, still, we know ‘the molecules of water, themselves, do not evaporate into nothing’. That it is within this no-person’s-land, in between the impossibility of extremes, that we watch, walk, and work in this world at large… together. That through a pro-relational, trans-relational identification with our

relationships that we can directly experience the existential dimension in which is forever 'forged'[368] such forms of alignment, where, on occasions, we find agreements to sometimes to disagree along with our disagreements we agree to also entertain, in the process understanding the relative differences between such somewhat mutually fashioned forms of our being in this world together. A mutual comprehension of self, others and world… that does not deserve to be undermined by serious misinterpretations, factoids, fabulist fantasies, conspiracies, fallacious arguments, false conclusions, unnecessary and impossible philosophies, and all other manner of distortions and obstructions, be they either self-produced and/or disseminated-by-others. (12)

But, by working with what is suitably found to hand a certain degree of conformal assurance will also be always found to hand, indeed, a certain residue of truthfulness… just as even in the most heinous of lies a truthful vision of the world must first be unfolded before the dissimulation is conjured up in its midst… just as in the midst of a truthfully related narrative we will also need to misrepresent our take on the world since we have no time to describe it in full, and, by doing so, we must gloss over the less relevant details in order to make our more important points. But, then, who wants to be a listening party to a narrative that never ends… (13)

So, to conclude, and leave my account of how metaphysics revitalizes philosophical discourses, and by extension both disciplinary discourses and secularist dialogues as well, let me once more 'mis-represent' my overall argument by stating that, through a trans-relational identification, forms of suitable assurance in the progression of our conjectural-representations, both existential and non-existential in orientation, can be entertained, reiterated, and disseminated through attentive forms of supervision that, hopefully, would be well-exercised through a well-pre-informed and well-performed suspension, and along with the emergent forcefulness of its automatic invocation of a de-suspension, be effectively emended through relative forms of de-distortion and diminished obstruction, that would eventually both augment and enhance our overall conformal assurance in an ongoing consensus being arrived at in and through our evolving appreciation of such matters..!![369] (14)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 7.2.24.

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368 The ambiguous word 'forged' is pre-echoing the points about to be made in the next paragraph.

369 Where processes of mis-representation can be both progressively mitigated (hermeneutically) and error correction through being re-de-mis-represented (phenomenologically) and find a more assured form of conformal assurance even if such insured 'assurance' is also forever entertained as 'provisional' in status; even if it is to be ironically re-badged as a 'final vocabulary', or a 'definitive history' or as 'a progressive work no longer in progress', etc. Furthermore, through the non-reductive nature of conformal assurance we can also entertain the ongoing emendational contributions also to be associated with an existentially oriented process of retreatment viewed as an ongoing process of re(-)normalization.

2. Postlude

As ever, things have no true end, except through an act of fiat or observation. Let me address some additional thoughts. (15)

In Part II, paragraph 109, I proposed a 3 x 3 matrix to re-explore the appreciation of the philosophical economy (by the metaphysical economy). Along the central diagonal starting at the left and heading right we observed three forms of reduplication only coinciding with the archetypal correlatives of World, Object, and Ego. Metaphysically, we might think of these as dealing with the hermeneutical formation of meta-textual genres, a categorical metaphysics (dealing with relatively fundamental metaphysical notions like time, space, identity, etc., but not explored in this *Book* 9), and considerations of subjectivity (only partially explored, say, under the rubric of trans-relational subjectivity *versus* non-trans-relational forms of subjectivity). Even more interestingly would be the proposal to run a 6 x 6 matrix in order to cash out all six ordered forms of reduplication, i.e., by such means we would then be also including 2^2, 4^2, and 6^2. This inter-ordered appreciation of the orders could then be seen as taking on a metaphysically oriented appreciation of the same. But, as 5^2 and 6^2, e.g., are associated, respectively, with the disciplines of science and history should we then considered such topics as metaphysical in orientation? So, e.g., in our metaphysical appreciation of the philosophical economy we would also need to take a categorical, psychological, existential (in the sense of an integrated ethical re-positioning through a re(-)normalization of the contractual and the compactual/pragmatical with the deontological?), scientific, and the historical dimensions of this broad inter-order topic of the metaphysical? Or, should this process (of reduplication or duplication) continue with the metaphysically oriented appreciation of, say, the historical taking either a 6^3 or 6^4 form and format? No doubt some interesting things to further reflect upon… (16)

Another interesting consideration is to ask what is the difference between my apparent use of ‘formation’ if it were to be placed in a contrast with ‘function’? And, in the same regard, is a conjecture a formation or a function, or, both? To diffuse this question, I would like to propose a ‘function’ as being ‘critically filled, relatively’, (say, the writing of letter even if certain rules can be broken like, e.g., not signing the same or addressing it to a specific entity) *versus* ‘the relatively-radical discovery of how to fill a formation’ as defining a ‘formation’ where we find what specificity is to be found rather than perfunctorily supplied. In this regard, a conjecture would seem to straddle both domains, i.e., in general terms indicating how it acts as a function, and, more specifically, as assisting us to discover what apparently can be found to fulfill its specifically instantiated specification.[370] (17)

N.T., 8.2.24.

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370 So, e.g., ‘e/valuational formation’ is a discovery of both evaluation and valuation.

12ZZ. A Conjectural Summary
(And Commentary)

BOOK 9

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

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A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

12ZZ. A Conjectural Summary (And Commentary)*[371]

0. Foreword

The notion of conjectures surfaced in *Book* 9 and it would be more efficient in a critique of the metaphysics being repurposed there that the framework for such ideas be clearly articulated (so that my reader or audience can disagree or qualify such ideas, indeed, perhaps even run counter-conjectures or anti-conjectures, etc., should such processes be able to be suitably conducted?). Hence this summary of my more prominent conjectures that have been either explicitly or implicitly proposed. Then, in order to put some form of flesh on such proposals a brief commentary has been appended. This outline of an essay then supplies, in effect, a provisional conclusion to *Book* 9, albeit from the perspective of some of it more important conjectures. 'Conjectures' could be defined as 'those re-iterable, logically codified observations framed in probabilistic terms of reference able to be applied to the specification of the detail of a certain relational situation'. Or, alternatively, as 'the logical codification of observations through alignments finding conformal assurance in application to either perceptive orientations (using cognitively ordered treatments) and/or apperceptive orientations (using trans-cognitively ordered and inter-ordered treatments). So, e.g., if we were to sequentially observe ninety-nine white swans, one after another, then a relatively safe bet would be that when the next swan is seen it would more likely be 'white' even if we know that not all swans (especially in Australia) are just white. In effect, arguing on a deeper level that we can move from 'descriptions' to 'prescriptions' and, thence, when more applicable, to moral-like 'proscriptions' if called for on the understanding that the deeper epistemological or psychological economy has the incorporation of these three economic correlatives of phenomenological 'descriptions', hermeneutical 'prescriptions', and existential 'proscriptions' (an argument as outlined in propositional-statement 4.1.2) (contrary the following of a more superficial implementation of the naturalistic fallacy where, in this type of instance, we are proposing, instead, a provisional conjecture and not a non-provisional deduction).[372] (0)

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[371] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[372] The conjecture in propositional-statement 1 is a case in point. E.g., if a certain disciplinarian were an historian doing historical research then given that they deal with the temporal economy of past, present, and future then, either advertently or inadvertently, they are also dealing with histories of the present and the future (since it is impossible to purely imagine the mere sense and semblance of the past without also some form of a cognizance of the present and the future. Therefore, that granted, it behooves them to also spell out those facets of their research that are not just past oriented when that type of non-past orientation is judged as applicable, say, when comparing the findings of their own research to that of a fellow disciplinarian. Perhaps also suggesting that their findings should act as a starting-guideline for how future research might be better conducted, and so on). E.g., refer to the essay: III.7Z. *A History of Histories*.

1. Summary

1. That all philosophical and disciplinary arguments are inescapably economic and that that observation should be recognized, etc., and duly acted upon accordingly. (1)

Hence a major thesis promoted in *The Seventh Book*… and elsewhere. (1.1)

'Acted upon' by avoiding the impossibly non-economic and that which is economically irrelevant. (1.2)

That in our inspection of a certain position we need to ascertain its economic credentials. (1.3)

If not economically viable, it needs to be either ignored or rendered economically viable. (1.3.1)

If economically viable it needs to be ascertained as relevant, and its economic correlativities need to be explicated, interrelated, accommodated, retreated, harmonically appreciated, viewed as economically, non-economically, and hyper-economically interrelated, etc. (1.3.2)

By 'recognized, etc.' is meant the philosophical economy of hermeneutic recognition as 'prescriptions', phenomenal-phenomenological encountering as 'descriptions', and non-systematic existential engagement as 'proscriptions'. (1.4)

By 'phenomenal-phenomenological' is meant the conjectured observation that it is arrogant for us to think that it is just our individual selves that construct the world in intentional terms of reference, enter trans-intentional judgments, experience the thematization of pre-intentional affects, arbitrate single handedly the flows of intersubjective forms of significance, etc. (1.4.1)

Although, on one hand, distinctively different, it is quite natural to propose transformational rules between descriptions, etc., just as in seeing a train arrive every hour we then expect a train to arrive at least once an hour, and, would be upset should it not arrive at least once every hour. (1.4.2)

By 'non-systematic' is merely meant 'acting as the so-called third moment, as the economic correlative aligned with subjective experiences (in keeping with its current co-associated intentional objectivity, etc.)'. In a contrast, the systematic refers to the existential orientation that arises through the overall (extensive) suspension of these three economic moments.[373] (1.4.3)

2. That all economies are trimodal and only trimodal in archetypal terms of reference. (2)

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[373] By 'extensive suspension' is meant a 'comprehensive suspension that takes into account the interrogative economy, the de-suspensions, and causal implications from the conversion of the relatively virtual to the relatively non-virtual, etc.

As exemplified in gestalt terms, e.g., under the headings of background (World), foregrounded focus (Object), and subjectivity (in keeping with the former) (Ego). (2.1)

If more than three modalities are apparently invoked, then they need to be accommodated in trimodal archetypal terms of reference. (2.1.1)

Where the linear reading of 'World-Object-Ego' is seen as a harmonic progression (even though, resolution is a dialectical, atemporal affair once we disregard its sequential entertainment and its subsequent temporal consequences).[374] (2.2)

3. That the appreciation of any economy necessitates the overlap of economic-complexification[375] since an economy cannot be appreciated on just its own terms of reference. (3)

Thence the invocation of more than one economy regardless of whether the second economy, etc., is non-explicitly articulated, etc. (3.1)

Implicating also the non-economic, etc. (3.1.1)

4. That economic circulation of e/valuational formation cannot be just 'circular' (metaphorically) hence the 'space' made for both the non-economic and the hyper-economic (in its appropriation of the former). (4)

The distinctive nature of unilateral re-directedness in causally oriented decision making demands both the non-economic irruption from the economic along with its economic re(-)appropriation through the hyper-economic (either through hermeneutic mitigation and/or hermeneutic re-appropriation of the relative-radical but not the radically-radical [unless the latter is sequentially rendered in relatively-radical 'bite sized units] within the 'overall economy of the economic'). (4.1)

5. That all disciplines have a topical basis in inter-ordered phenomena along with an aspirational set of objectives that act as both disciplinary directives and limits. (5)

By 'inter-ordered' is meant 'ordered, locally or globally ordered, bi-ordered, inter-ordered, hyper-ordered, etc.' (5.1)

An order becomes inter-ordered through reduplication, and then altered through duplication, de-reduplication, and de-duplication (as a counter-process to duplication). (5.1.1)

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374 As exemplified in the phenomenological conundrum, 'upon aural reception, is a tune a mere sequence of notes or the effective totality of the same?' Or, again, 'what makes one tune memorable and another non-memorable?'

375 The running of two or more economies in parallel based upon a reading of an underlying archetypal economy as referenced in propositional-statements 2 and 2.1.

Although correctly the economy in question must also comprise the entire presence of reduplication, duplication, and de-duplication although certain features will be either promoted or de-promoted. (5.1.1.1)

The qualification of an aspirational set of directives is necessary in order to account for the objectives of a discipline and differentiate alterations in its historicity, say, as in the Legal Fraternity where not too long ago ‘slavery’ was filed under ‘property law’, etc., and, today, thankfully, where this practice is no longer legal (through an alteration of aspirations legislated by the Political Legislature). (5.2)

6. That all disciplines are distinctive in their aspirations and hence perform the required code necessary for their system’s envelopment and historical embracement. (6)

The historical intersection of disciplines and systems is through the historicity of codes along with changes exercised within the same. (6.1)

Given that changes in either a super-code, or a system’s code, or in its sub-codes characterizes changes in the historicity of that discipline in question within its co-associated system, etc. (6.1.1)

Hence our serious concern with the adverse overlapping of codes in terms off the formation and resolution of both traditional and contemporary social problems. (6.1.1.1)

7. That all disciplines are enveloped in only one specific system in any historical period of time, but, therein, disciplines can either bifurcate, emerge, or change phase. (7)

E.g., astrology was once an acceptable discipline in Academia but being since relegated elsewhere no longer belongs directly in Academia except as practice when subjected to academic appreciation, say, from an historical perspective. (7.1)

E.g., bifurcation as in the recent division of traditional philosophy into science, psychology and how philosophy is generally viewed today. (7.2)

E.g., witness the emergence of the hybrid topic of ‘political-economics’ (with the hyphen) in order to account more fully for the functioning and proffering of a working critique of a Neo-Liberalism as a major discourse. (7.3)

E.g., phase-like changes in state can be observed in the succession of various fashions as to how the discipline of history is to be performed or not performed. (7.4)

8. That the appreciation of a system cannot be enacted within its own terms of reference hence their inclusion in the open-endedness of both the Political-Economy and the Environment of the Political-Economy. (8)

Just as, e.g., a conformal philosophy is better appreciated in conformal metaphysical terms of reference (albeit as repurposed). (8.1)

9. That if after a reasonable period of time in transformational-transitional retreatment there is found to be little or no difference between retreatment and mitigated pretreatment then we have the apparent application of the definition of the 'relatively-critical'. (9)

Or, in reverse, the application of the 'critical' in re(-)normalization is a process that smooths over matters of difference once the rectification of hermeneutic mitigation is completed, etc. (9.1)

10. That if after a reasonable period of time in transformational-transitional retreatment we find a noticeable difference between retreatment and mitigated pretreatment then we have the apparent application of the definition of the 'relatively-radical'. (10)

But, in reverse, if the semblance of difference cannot be re(-)normalized by critical means then we have the relatively-radical to have deal with through innovative forms of hermeneutic re(-)appropriation, etc. (10.1)

11. That all transformational processes proceed through transformational-transitions being neither absolutistical transformations nor absolutistical non-transformations. (11)

Because extreme forms of transformation cannot be comprehended as a certain 'something' given that the logical subject in question has been entirely transformed without the semblance of causal connection. (11.1)

Even in a matter and anti-matter interaction of annihilation the complete conversion to a state of pure energy without matter is not realized. (11.1.1)

Because an extreme form of non-transformation is as equally untenable since our interaction with that state of affairs, and vv., are predicated on the changing consequences arising from our intervening interactions, etc. (11.2)

Because this is the way things are observed to change, i.e., through transitions, just like, e.g., 'sliced bread' or 'the evaporation of a puddle of water, etc.[376] (11.3)

12. That as transformations are transitional thence the twin concepts of 'insurance and assurance'. (12)

Being transitional we can retrace the sequential nature of our progress in matters of judgment, and, then have the insurance of being able to re-start from a point of greater assurance, etc. (12.1)

13. That the existential orientation is experienced through a trans-relational sense of subjectivity. (13)

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376 As discussed in *Pursuit*, III.12Z.I.6 & III.12.

All subjectivity primarily reflects the primary characteristics of our intentional productivity, and, pro-relational existential experience is observed to be no different in that same regard. (13.1)

14. Conjectural emendations can be promoted and exercised through the relative de-distortion and non-obstruction of a well-exercised (extensive) suspension and its automatic invocation of its de-suspension. (14)

Hence the pathway of transformational-transitional retreatment, through the de-suspension, along with the existential nature of our inescapable inability to not intervene in this world at large, this overall world-of-life, etc. (14.1)

15. That although a repurposed metaphysics is the conformal philosophical appreciation of a conformal process of philosophical appreciation through emergence it cannot be reduced to the same hence the relative independence of a repurposed metaphysics in the critical and radical life of a revitalized philosophical discipline regardless of whether its relation to Academia is either *de jure* or *de facto* or a mix of both.[377] (15)

The symmetrical reduplication of a topic realizes the emergence of a different topic. Thence the relative (inter-)dependence of the metaphysical discipline. Thence the advent of the non-economic as well, etc. Thence the critical and radical possibilities for patterns of innovation, and, their hyper-economic re(-)appropriation over time. Thence the evolution of a consensus at the center of a positively nihilistic, anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism. (15.1)

'Anti-representational' because of 'the non-substantial nature of experience' and 'where patterns of propositional-statement-alignment mirror the representational state in question where there is no relation whatsoever to the pre-representational, etc., given that the same is both impossible to contemplate and unnecessary to be even bothered about! (15.1.1)

Where there is 'no relations whatsoever' because there are no so-called 'internal worlds' and no so-called 'external worlds'. (15.1.1.1)

Because, being without such impossible divisions, the transcendental-like unity of the overall life-world has no use for such non-sense nor need we be preoccupied with such impossible considerations given that there is no necessity to entertain either the formation, form, and/or format of such poetic fictions..!! (15.1.1.1.1)

16. A central conjecture presented the interpreted observation that 'topic plus system plus exposition' when disseminated gave us a 'definitive' discourse along with its causal ramifications... (16)

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[377] This list is *ad hoc* and not exclusive of other conjectures that could also be added to this open-ended list.

By ‘ramifications’ is meant ‘past interpretations, present implications, and future consequences as are to be discerned, respectively, through histories of the past, present, and future’. (16.1)

Where these same histories are predominantly centered, respectively, on discontinuities, non-continuities, and continuities. (16.1.1)

I.e., characteristic disruptions; the disruptions attendant upon relatively novel phenomena; and, the fact that humans will still need to eat, drink, sleep, and avail themselves of required forms of shelter, etc. (but not which potentially disruptive formats will be invoked in order to reperform such behaviours). (16.1.1.1)

2. Afterword

In the potentially critical and radical critique exercised through dialectical repositioning the ‘weak’ side of any major discourse and its official arguments, more often than not, are turned on their heads and deserve to be so reversed since no conformally valid position can be entirely presented through the implied exhaustion of any one perspective let alone the simple exhaustion of just a single perspective. As all disciplinarians worth their salt attempt to present a valid conformal approach to truth determination it behooves philosophers to do better and appreciate both the formation, form and format involved in such efforts along with the natural limits of such endeavours. That as the meta-appreciation of such a pursuit cannot be reduced to the epistemological level of the mere appreciation in question it follows that the outline of this metaphysics as here repurposed has an important role to play in the re-vitalization of this discipline of the philosophical. A process further reinforced through the utilization of and further development of technical concepts such as, e.g., ‘transformational-transitional retreatment’ as exercised through ‘suspensions’ and their hitherto overlooked automatic invocation of the ‘de-suspension’ and its being re-defined as a process of ‘de-reduplication’, and so on and so forth... along with the ramifications such shifts in insight-formation have for the evolving formation of consensus building, novel vocabularies, definitive histories, innovative discourses, and all manner of other ways of re-seeing this world at large. Sadly, albeit also with some excitement, all too often such approaches are urgently needed to resolve a plethora of social problems, both traditional and contemporary... as we witness the advent of this Contemporary era that, undoubtedly, will be characterized through the endless arrival of continual disruptions..!![378]

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 12.2.24.

[378] As noted in the essay: *Pursuit*, III.7X: *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruption*.