The Seventh Book…

VII. A Lengthy Preamble: Walking upon a Pragmatic Middle Path Between Both a Radical-Conservatism and a Conservative-Radicalism

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark…
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts…
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness….

A Preview of *The Seventh Book*... Part I: Interpreted as 'A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption...'*

The Seventh Book… was written as a way of 'selling' three volumes of essays written under the title of *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*. (i.)

In the same vein this *Preview* is set up so as to tantalize the reader in the hope that a few philosophical souls might feel their curiosity piqued, either through support or opposition to such positions, that they might then be tempted to critically probe and explore such ideas, many of which are quite radical...[1] as I am soon about to demonstrate. (ii)

In a rare, transient moment of insight I recognized the fact that few people will read over more than three thousand pages of densely detailed phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential exercises exploring and scrutinizing a wide range of topics.[2] For a start I doubt that I would be able to sit down and read these essays from start to finish. So, how to sell such an idea when I, the author, cannot count myself among its readership? Then the fiendish idea arose 'why not write a short book, with the intriguing title, *The Seventh Book*...' Then, heavily footnote this short synopsis to those three volumes, divided between six books, and hope to create a readership also for the latter, even if only online. (iii)

So, now, I have the problem of creating a readership for this slim tome, titled, somewhat mysteriously, as *The Seventh Book*... and not merely *Book Seven*. Hence this *Preview*. (iv)

Now, I did joke with a friend that if I were to include in its title certain marketing word like 'Treasury, or 'Secrets', or 'The Hidden Wisdom', I might start to sell at least a few copies. But, I would not find the requisite quality of readership required to both decipher and debate these scratched out revolutionary scribblings of mine. I may lack for insight, but, do not wish to trade my integrity for any form of commercial advantage, and, so, instead, merely brand this *Preview* as interpreting this book as *A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption*. (v)

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* For latest version (1PreviewVII): www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

[1] In this book, and elsewhere, I argue that we need to be conservatively logical in positioning in order to arrive at a possibly radical sense of a chaotic-like re-positioning, and, that such radicalism would then be conventionally re-appropriated as a further step in this sequence of logical repositioning… to be then followed, again, by further dialectically oriented radical re-positioning, and where such once 'impossible thoughts' are then now rendered as 'possible', etc. Indeed, many of the ideas in *The Seventh Book*… could not be much more radical, and could well be seen to denigrate, say, 90 percent, even maybe 95 percent, of traditional philosophical topics, tropes, themes, and techniques, etc.

[2] The expression 'phenomenal-phenomenological' is designed to alert the reader to the understanding that I have that not only do we constitute intentional object(ive)s from our own senses of overlapping sets and series of intentional perspectives, but, that, such objectives from their side in these simulated interactions are also implicated in such acts of intentional constitution, etc. So, e.g., icy cold water is experienced as 'icy cold water', and, in that regard we would also expect a certain degree of communal consensus to form in that same respect especially given the intersubjectivity of genres for how we phenomenologically experience water, in a meta-textual sense of perspective, etc. Then, from both the conjunction and balanced suspension of the former we are then put in a position to experience the concrete, historical specificity of that being experienced, say, this "icy cold water" as entertained in this specific moment in time, etc.

Besides this P*review, The Seventh Book*… is divided into three parts, and the first part is in three sections. The first section, the text proper, so to speak, is divided between twenty-four modules in which I summarize my approach to the topic of Philosophy as a Discipline, and, by extension, the nature of how to conduct all serious forms of disciplinary behaviour… as a service to the secular world that excludes no one. The next section is a commentary on this first section. The third section is a commentary on the single work 'redemption' as it occurs once in this first section, and where it finds some rudimentary, insufficient comments in the second section. (vi)

In the course of writing this first part, this word 'redemption' slipped into my text as the most apposite expression of what was being discussed at that point... (vii)

Now, 'redemption' is admittedly a religious expression, but it does have a set of secular denotations as well. E.g., this IOU for $20 is meant to be redeemed for $20. In a conventional religious sense, it might mean something like ‘performing a certain action in the hope of finding some form of atonement for some state of being deemed to be less than perfect’. Now, I do not discount that type of meaning, but, instead, prefer a more positive take, namely, the situation where either a person or group of people feels impelled to do a certain form of response, deemed as ‘responsible’, lest in not performing such a deontological demand that they then would feel the need for some form of retrospective redemption as compensation for not having performed in the manner duly expected. In an existential attitude, such a deontological response could be badged as a form of 'existential redemption'. I.e., by enacting what is discerned as being responsible lest, in not doing what seems to be required, one might regret such non-observance and then later feel beholden to have to enact some further form of performative recompense. It could be argued, therefore, that the primary purpose of this book is to promote the recognition of the existential dimension in human experience lest one intuitively respond to our defective responsiveness by entertaining an additional need for some form of existential redemption for not having performed the requisite form of existential responsibility as was deemed to have been required in that original act of intervention. Also working on the premise that all intervention is inescapable, be that in the form of either certain actions, non-actions, and/or the deferral of our inactions. (viii)

Of course, that might be the primary objective, but, along the way much philosophical and disciplinary work and emendation will need to be done in order to arrive at a position where we can better foster this development of such insight. To this end, we will need to jettison much of what we think is conventionally correct. Realize that every discipline, more often than not, is a living scandal, a travesty of the truth even if we were to accept the provisional validity of such provisional-statements disseminated by such fraudulent traditions. Take Physics, for instance. Physicists themselves state they only know about 4.7 percent of their topic and can only speculate about the rest under the rubric of 'dark this' and 'dark that'.[3] And even then, they cannot integrate this small fraction of this field given the incommensurable quantum nature of the microcosm *versus* the equally incommensurable world of the macrocosm as a world of relativity. But, such sci-

[3] I.e., ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’.

entists speculate that as the world was once a very small singularity, and that black holes, too, behave as singularities, such situations also need to be understood in a similar manner, where, as an imperative, these two fields need to come together. Unfortunately, much anguish is being ever-expressed at such a lack of current comprehension given this need for the metaphorical 'left hand to grip and take a firm hold upon the right hand'... (ix)

But, at least these disciplinarians persevere, although, I might add, sometimes expending vast quantities of money seemingly chasing mythical mirages, and with little to show for such efforts. (x)

History, too, has its own scandals. So much so that sometimes we need to do a 'history of the historian' in order to understand 'where they are coming from' and 'where they seek to return', rightly or wrongly, as some 'professionals' have far too many ideological axes to grind to count as reliable exponents of their mis-appropriated craft.[4] (xi)

As for the noble 'science' of philosophy,[5] just where should one begin? (xii)

In *The Seventh Book…* the first three modules deal with the topic of relegation from the perspectives of the general, particular and specific orientations respectively. By 'relegation' is meant 'the relegation of so-called 'philosophers' to the metaphorical second bench or third tier', and, where they need to be re-titled as 'philo-sophists' (with all due apologies to those serious sophists who, I suspect, knew well how to give Plato a run for his money). (xiii)

I argue there that we need to take an economic perspective, i.e., attempt to understand the topic under consideration from a trimodal sense of perspective. That all forms of uni-modalism and bi-modalism just cannot work, and, if they should work it is because a trimodal sense of perspective has been covertly imported, and where such smuggling is all so conveniently over-looked. (xiv)

Take the impossible position of a realist. Please imagine the following. From the perspective of the intentional economy, first, with its focus upon the intentional object(ive),[6] second, with a sense of intent in part motivated[7] from a pole of apparent inten-

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4 Refer, e.g., to the essay (just started) titled: 7W. *Re-Viewing Historians and Their 'Histories'*: The Pragma*tics of the Historical Prospect* (Prescience7W).

5 An idea disseminated by, e.g., Edmund Husserl who was but one more exponent in a long chain that some might view as starting with Plato who may well have been merely channelling Pythagoras, and so on. Like all disciplines, philosophy does have its theory (as a form of science), practice (as a critically conducted artform), and critique (as a potentially radical form of review), but, as an application (*techne*) it must remain ever treated as provisional, a work in progress, that awaiting radical forms of innovations, etc.

6 I prefer to refer to the (imputation of an) 'intentional object' as an 'intentional objective' because not all intentional objects are spacio-temporal in their semantic delineation, such as, e.g., abstract nouns, various situations like the situational recreation of music along with their textual scores, etc. (as being difficult 'to point to' but still possessing a definitive sense of reference).

7 The intensity of motivation I would argue has its basis in emotive, pre-intentional, pre-cognitive functions; informed through intentional details; and, then decisively re-directed through trans-intentional, trans-cognitive acts of judgment.

tional motivation, and, third, all accompanied by an ever-present sense of intentional subjectivity, with the semblance of that subjectivity directly experienced in keeping with the nature of its intentional object(ive)s, then the thought of being able to just isolate and entertain the intentional object(ive) as if it existed in itself, by itself, is just totally ludicrous. Like chopping off the end of a stick in the hope of ending up with a one-ended stick. Such an impossible argument would also equally permit a similarly one-eyed view of both the rationalist and the idealist.[8] How such people could even think such nonsense might be explained by the observation that such short-sighted people seem to be mesmerized by their favourite metaphors and in preferencing them, and treating them as if in a literal mode, automatically relegate themselves from the professional ranks of the working philosopher, ever open to the provisional nature of our evolving readings of this world at large. Banished to the dark and noisy fringes to be found surrounding each and every discipline… (xv)

So, all forms of uni-modal preferentialism must be immediately discounted as total nonsense! Similarly, we must dismiss the impossible dualities of all forms of bimodalism. In this regard, causation just cannot be philosophically understood in the simple terms of a 'cause' and its imputed 'effect'. We have been told this for almost three thousand years![9] If the 'cause' is concurrent with its imputed 'effect' then there can be no difference, no distinction between that 'cause' and its so-called 'effect'. Or, if they are not connected, then how can that 'cause' have an 'effect' when they are not directly interrelated and connected?! (xvi)

The bimodal parties in a relationship need to be appreciated and those terms of reference have to be, therefore, at a minimum, trimodal in orientation. Similarly, the unimodal needs to be found in a contrasting relationship, and, that semblance of a contrast, be it either fostered overtly or covertly, then needs to be appreciated within the relevant construction of a trimodal field, etc.[10] (xvii)

In a bimodal logic, we could not even open a door let alone go through an open doorway. E.g., if a door is shut then it is not open, and v.v. A door that is already ajar is open. In such a logic that door could not be opened being already either open or not open. But, of course, we do open doors and go through open doorways, so, obviously, our logic

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[8] As respectively isolating the intentional poles of either intentional motivation as intent or intentional subjectivity respectively. Without an intentional object there could be no intentional objective, and without an intentional objective there could be no intentional intent (to focus on such intentional objectivity). Then to imagine an intentional sense of subjectivity without the contrasting reference to its co-associated intentional objectivity, and v.v., is to proffer no sense and semblance of such co-associated subjectivity. Economically, all three aspects of intentionality have to be imputed as co-occurring (and the same applies to any other configuration of the intentional economy, or any other economy whatsoever for that matter!).

[9] E.g., through the endless debates of various dialectical conundrums; the paradoxes of Zeno; the philosophical works of Nagarjuna, etc.

[10] By etc.' is meant noting each relationship exists in its co-associated relational situatedness and where such situations, in turn, are embraced in sea of relationships, and so on. A bimodal functionalism is equally impossible. If all we had were either 'opening' or 'shutting; then doors could be neither 'fully opened' nor 'fully shut' since a door is either 'being opened' or 'being shut', and, 'being opened' or 'being shut' means it can be 'neither fully opened nor fully shut', etc.

of opening doorways, etc., needs to be trimodal in its formulation. Now a closed door is rendered ajar, and, then an ajar door is rendered fully open, and so on.[11] (xviii)

So, as for all unimodal positioning and all bimodal positioning, both must be totally discounted! We need to say goodbye to such childish nonsense and no longer be thought of as simple-minded 'philo-sophists' impossibly professing either to be so-called 'realists', 'empiricists', 'anti-realists', 'idealists', 'rationalists', 'materialists', 'dualists', or so on. Sadly, this list is all too long, reinforcing the idea that all philosophy is just another scandal ridden profession whose professionals just do not deserve to be paid let along listened to, and then so foolishly emulated. (xix)

To be lumped in with such miscreants we must also add the wayward 'absolutists' and the non-practising 'relativists', and all other parties not professing a 'pragmatic' disposition![12] [13] (xx)

But, is there any redemption for such professionals? Yes, of course, they only need to read this manual and take to heart its guidelines to find philosophical 'salvation', i.e., 'the ability to recognize the existence of this existential dimension in our relationships and act accordingly' and, thereafter, not feel the need for some suitable form of existential redemption should such situations calling for such responsible-responses not be enacted. And, how might such a path be trodden? By suspending[14] all ideological nonsense[15] and being open to what is already waiting there as that 'found to hand'.[16] How might this 'turning around' be achieved… quite simply… **read on..!!**[17] (xxi)

And, on that note, let the games commence…[18] (xxii) N.T., Penrith, 29.10.22.

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11 Assuming the three logical states of 'shut, ajar, and open'.

12 Invoking a form of pragmatism, in the spirit of Richard Rorty, that cannot be reduced to some form of mere expediency. In effect, accepting a deontological orientation without reference to so-called 'First Principles', all impossibly treated so-called 'ethical principles' when extrapolated beyond their true social status as mere 'ethical guidelines', etc.

13 To this list we could also add all ideological extremists 'thinking impossible thoughts', and, those misspending their energies on conspiratorial forms of metaphorical and mythical-like thinking… ever-descending down rabbit holes of detached probability that could be circumvented by the suspension of belief, whether ideological or non-ideological in orientation, and, the non-suspension of disbelief (given that disbelief is a form of suspension as noted in paragraphs 303-304).

14 By the exercise of 'transcendental suspensions', along the lines as proposed by Edmund Husserl, but, will be better explicated as 'extensive suspensions' in this manual.

15 Where all ideological thinking is treated as either 'extremist' and/or 'impossible to entertain'.

16 All suspensions must start with what is to hand, be that as some form of prejudice or pre-judgment. In this regard, on reflection, we might envisage philosophy, like any discipline, must both begin with the secular world and end in the secular world as well! Otherwise, how could the exercise of our disciplines be of service to others in this world at large?

17 An expression briefly noted by Vasubandhu in his terse exposition of Buddhist Philosophy (titled: *Vimsatika*). Or, we might translate a similar idea as a 'revolution', as a 'turning around of our positioning'. I.e., giving voice to the radical when a 'radical shift in perspective is being called for'.

18 This *Preview* formed the *Keynote Address* for First Mini-Conference, 2022, of The Continental Philosophy Group held on the 13th of November 2022.

Index

Preview: Part I: Interpreted as
'A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption...'

Index

Part I - General Theory

Pre-Introduction

A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption

Introduction

I. Philo-Sophists:

1. Relegation I 101
2. Relegation II 201
3. Relegation III 301

II. Philosophers:

1. Economical Theory 102
2. Logical-Dialectics 103
3. Hermeneutical Theory 202
4. Phenomenal-Phenomenological Theory 203
5. Non-Systematic-Existential Theory 204
6. Truth Determination 205

III. Philosophizings:

1. Transformational Theory I 104
2. Transformational Theory II 206
3, Ordered Theory I 207
4. Ordered Theory II 302
5. Rectification 303
6. Deconstruction 304
7. Re(-)Normalization 305
8. Systematic-Existential Theory 401
9. Disciplines 402

IV. Beyond Philosophies:

1. Pragmatism 403
2. Suspensions 404

3. Interventionalism 405
4. Imputational Theory 406
5. Trans-Imputational Theory 407
6. Re(-)Emergent Theory ('The Eternal Return') 501

Postscript A: Philo-Sophists, Philosophers, Philosophizings, & Beyond Philosophies: Acting as a Commentary with a Sub-Commentary in the Footnotes

A Post-Postscript as a Commentary on the Metaphorical Concept of 'Redemption'

Part II - Critical-Practice:

**The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook:
A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping
Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines**

Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

1. Critical Practice 502
2. Disciplinary Considerations 503
3. Ordered Re(-)Considerations 504

B. Six Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Semantic-Phenomenological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 601
2. Aesthetical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 602
3. Deontological/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 603
4. Pragmatical/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 604
5. Hermeneutical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 605
6. Ontical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 606

C. Six Trans-Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Metaphysical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 701
2. Psychological Sub-Disciplinary prospect 702
3. (Radical)Theological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 703
4. Political-Economic Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 704
5. Scientific Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 705
6. Historical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 706

Trans-Critical Practice

1. De-Relegational Re(-)Considerations 707
2. Inter-Ordered Re(-)Considerations 708
3. Pragmatic Re(-)Considerations 709

Part III - Radical-Critique

A Philosophical Guide to the Existential Dimension:
Some 'Final' Last Words...

Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

1. Philosophical 'Ramifications' 801
2. Pragmatical 'Ramifications' 802
3. Provisional 'Ramifications' 803
4. Profitable 'Ramifications' 804
5. Political 'Ramifications' 805
6. Personal 'Ramifications' 806

A Structural and Functional Commentary on Part III

A: Afterword, in the form of an open letter

B: Supplement A: Some Loose Threads…

C: A First Digest

1. Advanced Imputational Treatment 901
2. A 'Non-Standard' Pragmatic-Existentialism 902

Bibliography

The Seventh Book…

VII. A Lengthy Preamble: Walking upon a Pragmatic Middle Path Between Both a Radical-Conservatism and a Conservative-Radicalism*[19]

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* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

[19] This essay, effectively, is a continuation of these recent themes of the pragmatic and the existential, and so on as has evolved over the first six books of these three volumes designated simply under the rubric of '*Pursuit*'.

Part I - General-Theory

A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption

0. Pre-Introduction

The only viable philosophical 'path' to metaphorically walk upon is one that is not ideologically over-promoted and is one that does take a pragmatic stance by accepting the provisional nature of our being in this world at large[20] whilst also recognizing, at the same time, that some things are less provisional and need to be cautiously accepted at face value, whereas, other things should be treated as more provisional in orientation. (0)

Now, in this single sentence alone, there is more than enough material for an entire volume of philosophical reflections. E.g., the expression 'viable' implies that which 'pragmatically functions in the manner that is intended and profitably expedites the intentional objectives of the disciplinarian in question'.[21] That such functioning presupposes an 'economic point of view' in which impossible dualisms are duly dispensed with and replaced by 'working trimodal approaches to what is already to hand'. Moreover, I have argued and will argue that a 'philosopher' is a 'disciplinarian' and that there are a similar set of rules to be followed for the well-functioning of any discipline. That to overlook or ignore such profitable practices traduces that discipline and it is one of the reasons why such miscreant professionals, like 'philosophers', deserve to be mocked as 'philosophists'. Admittedly channeling the illustrious Plato and his contempt for sophists, but, where I would like to add, that he, too, could be seen as a fellow companion of such dark

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[20] This sentence basically revolves around one positive injunction and one negative injunction, namely, not to over-promote ideological extremism, and, to treat all positioning as provisional, albeit with varying degrees of provisional treatment/non-provisional treatment. The next paragraph supplies a short, optimistic commentary on this sentence and indicates that these attitudinal treatments are exercised through the use of an extensive suspension (based on ideas of the 'transcendental suspension'. Volume II, at considerable length, explores a more complex reading of this concept of the suspension all subsumed under the expression 'extensive suspension' given, among other things, that the functioning of the suspension must also take into account the role of an automatic de-suspension, etc.).

[21] In Book 6, the reader will recognize that a suitably constructed, exercised, and critiqued 'pragmatic position' is defined as a 'viable, qualified, anti-representational, pragmatic disciplinary prospect', where by 'disciplinary' is meant 'that any discipline could be inserted into that space, giving a prospect in question, as long as it conforms to the rest of that 'pragmatic definition'. We should also note that the openness of a 'pragmatic position' must also include elements like 'the deontological orientation (devoid of so-called ethical principles' extrapolated beyond the limits of their usefulness as mere [intracultural/intercultural] 'guidelines'), as a positive form of nihilism given that, in economic terms we can promote neither an impossibly pure or purified form of presentationalism, representationalism nor anti-representationalism/re-presentationalism, and, must also recognize a pro-relational, existential orientation in the ensuing complexity of such evolving re(-)positioning. Where, by the nomenclature of '(-)' is meant a continual, economic recycling of significance generated in and through such an economic approach as being adopted and adapted to the explication of the relational situation in question (and where both relevance and competence are to be measured through comparative forms of e/valuation).

arts deserving an historically retrospective relegation, albeit tempered with much qualification amid our gratefulness for his philosophical innovations, and, where the sophists, in turn, deserve to see the 'warm light of day' along with a certain degree of de-relegation as worthy opponents of Plato, indeed, and thence from there onwards, as equal worthies in the long succession of philosophers from Aristotle, and all the other luminaries, either recorded or not recorded by the annals of history. Recognizing, too, that their 'conversations' are not the sole preserve of the Western world but must also embrace the equally wonderful worlds of India and China, and everywhere else in between. Then, we might well ask how do we approach a disciplinary quest from a provisional point of view? Through the utilization of an 'extensive suspension', a more comprehensive and thorough way of perceiving the 'transcendental suspension' as insightfully pointed out by the likes of Edmund Husserl and others following on in his wake. That, by the use of the suspension, we shall get to know our 'limitations' beyond which we should not stray, as pointed out and demonstrated by Immanuel Kant. Then, we must also understand that with every suspension, a state of affairs also at the very basis of just simply asking and answering a question,[22] we will automatically invoke, as well, an immediate de-suspension for, otherwise, we would be indecisively trapped for all eternity in the relativistic hell of that suspension.[23] Thankfully, we are immediately projected back into this world of living-experience, to be existentially re-immersed in the full, concrete, historical specificity of our existences, where our intentions are textually recorded upon the fabric of this world in a form of lived-experience.[24] There we recognize, encounter and engage with this dialectical tension between living-experience and lived-experience, and where the suspension allows us to 'walk both sides of the street' metaphorically. Indicating, yet again, how a middle path is to be walked upon. An existential fact of our existence that the radically-radical could not be thought or if it were to be approached then such innovative ideas could not be shared with others, and, that equally, the conservatively-conservative would totally misrepresent such conservatism since the formation of the conservative attitude, itself, can only be through the institutional-like acceptance of innovations in the first place. On the other hand, as the situation calls it out, let us on some occasions be radical-

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22 Explored under the rubric of an 'interrogative economy' consisting of a rhetorical 'either/or' (as a dis-conjunctive suspension), a first metaphorical answer or reply (as a conjunctive suspension centered on 'like' being equal to 'both like and not like')., and, a second answer or reply, namely, the literal treatment of an apparitional suspension expressed through the continual 'as if, as if, as if…' (being, in effect, as a balanced suspension of the former two suspensions just noted. All three suspensions then working together to become the 'overall transcendental suspension').

23 'Relativistic' by virtue of the fact that in the suspension all positions, content-wise and function-wise, are all equally counter-balanced, etc. Indeed, it is only at the point of the suspension, and it immediately becoming de-suspended, that we find the indecisive world of the relativist who could not function as such (being both simultaneously paralysed and deconstructed as such). As indicated, each suspension is automatically followed by a de-suspension that immediately removes us from the suspension each and every moment the suspension is being utilized.

24 In this one sentence, I am channelling a number of philosophers from Heidegger, Sartre, Hegel, and others. Treating Hegel, e.g., as the other side of the Kantian coin and his tendency to deal with an ahistorical view of time, judgment, value, etc. Then, to get from a Kantian perspective to an Hegelian-like point of view we can invoke a more existential understanding to the extent that sees us as 'thrown' into this world, having to intervene, be in an engagement with the same besides our mere passively observing it (through patterns reading/re-reading, etc.) of or actively engendering patterns of behaviour (through forms of writing/re-writing, etc.).

ly-conservative, and on other occasions let us be conservatively-radical. Furthermore, as I see it, we need to be conservative in order to logically deconstruct what is either irrelevant or nonsensical to thereby clear a space for the thematization of the suitably radical, pursue a world of innovations, develop 'final' vocabularies as articulated by Richard Rorty, and, dare I say it, actually enter into a 'process of progress', one step at a time, ever circumscribed by the application of the suspension and all the other tools available to the truly philosophical disciplinarian. A discipline that is perceived, by myself, to be an economic interaction between one part phenomenology, one part hermeneutics and one part existentialism… with all parties stirred and creatively commenting upon each other in a noisy feast of provisional delights. If in attending such a banquet it is recommended by common sense that we eat this food laid out for us today, and not wait a month or a year, in a similar vein let us partake the fruits of this labour in the here and now since 'the provisional nature of all things is ever to hand… and should be consumed accordingly'. (1)

Obviously, from my point of view, one paragraph can never fully explicate a single sentence, despite the fact that an optimist, like myself, might try… (2)

Now, based upon my previous six books, contained in these three volumes of essays under the rubric of *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline* I will no longer be as so cautious in the expression of my estimation of my wayward fellows and happily demonstrate how a vast assortment of ideologues and extremists deserve to be relegated to a second bench if not an even more a distant third tier.... preferably out of earshot if not out of sight. In this vein, let me already declare over-ardent realists, idealists, dualists, empiricists, rationalists, materialists, and many other magicians of the impossible, as 'philo-sophists'; disciplinary practitioners who do not deserve to even be heard let alone be paid, and who might be better just avoided by the *cognoscenti*, those who are little bit wiser in such matters… those practical minded folk who prefer to work in more profitable fields... and, thereby, proffer assistance to all of us who reside as residents in a secular world… (3)

I have already mentioned the name of the neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty. To my mind he had to deal with a disciplinary establishment traditionally mired in pseudo-disciplinary practices that deserved to be only deconstructed which he duly did with great skill and successfulness. However, to successfully replace such a vast array of incredible disciplines, ever-demonstrating their well-entrenched vested interests, with a pragmatic prospect he was not so successful. Such efforts, in those postmodern times, would have been somewhat wasted given that if your opponent is already bankrupt there then seems little point in either working with them or working against them. In this regard, Rorty's reluctance to pursue an anti-realism might well be a case in point and why he preferred to work for demonstrating the need for an anti-representationalism rather than entering into one more tennis match with a player who has invited such a game without realizing, effectively, that they are virtually 'paralyzed' since they cannot do what they say, and, cannot say what they think they can do (given their unrecognized economic paralysis). (4)

In working on my Three Critiques of Neo-Liberalism I came to the conclusion that to criticize the arrogant hegemony of such a major discourse we need to envisage a

political-economic discipline given that to deconstruct a neo-liberal mindset in either a political sphere or an economic sphere would be doomed to utter failure. I also came to the political understanding that in order to subvert and replace a major discourse that we had to do just that, namely, deconstruct that discursive frame of reference and then re-place it with a more viable alternative that could not be so successfully counter-deconstructed, in turn, by the unreconstituted left-overs and remnants of that former fraternity. However, I also came to the important qualification of that idea that, to a certain extent, if we were to adopt a skillful existential approach, we could both deconstruct and reconstruct such a defective edifice in one go. But, as no one has perfect existential insight into such matters it would probably be better to harmoniously operate on both tracks simultaneously, i.e., on a two-track non-existential program and on a one tract existential program. (5)

The reforms I am instigating in this *Seventh Book* are just that, i.e., reformations that are meant to radically re-form the basis of our disciplinary pursuits. On one hand, as much as I would like to move on in the course of my research, still, I will need to both deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the effective, although, it is also true that I hope that this laborious task on many other occasions, might be more successfully performed in one set or series of manoeuvres. In this preamble, it is my intention to annoy as many people as possible, tread on as many toes of my disciplinary friends not so much to merely castigate them as to remonstrate with them in the hope that some of these ideas, like the miracle of sunflower seeds, might be found to grow and reseed, and grow again, well after my name is completely forgotten… since, as dogmatic as I might sound, everything here is put forward on a provisional basis only... like a banquet, with many dishes, that all deserve to be consumed, but, unfortunately, or fortunately, just one dish at a time, and where it makes sense to understand that as much as we might like to eat everything, unlike the indiscreet gourmand, a more discrete gourmet knows it might be better not to eat and digest too much but see put upon their plate a more representative selection of such nutritious fare. But, I will also jest and joke, and through such humour, temper my critique as more directed upon what people stand for or do not stand for rather than lending itself to anything all too personal, although, well-recognize that the dogmatically over-committed will then find my radical-criticism, or critical-radicalism, as quite personally unsettling… and, for that aspect alone I tender my apologies, since no ill-will is being signaled whatsoever… but, gladly, will take some small pleasure if such misrepresented things are radically ‘turned around’ when called for… and when and where others, and myself, might also find a modicum of delight in the apparent progress that we, too, can make as we become a more perceptive reader, more insightful person…. (6)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 28.9.22.

Index

Part I - General Theory

A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption

Introduction

I. Philo-Sophists:

1. Relegation I 101
2. Relegation II 201
3. Relegation III 301

II. Philosophers:

1. Economical Theory 102
2. Logical-Dialectics 103
3. Hermeneutical Theory 202
4. Phenomenal-Phenomenological Theory 203
5. Non-Systematic-Existential Theory 204
6. Truth Determination 205

III. Philosophizings:

1. Transformational Theory I 104
2. Transformational Theory II 206
3, Ordered Theory I 207
4. Ordered Theory II 302
5. Rectification 303
6. Deconstruction 304
7. Re(-)Normalization 305
8. Systematic-Existential Theory 401
9. Disciplines 402

IV. Beyond Philosophies:

1. Pragmatism 403
2. Suspensions 404
3. Interventionalism 405
4. Imputational Theory 406
5. Trans-Imputational Theory 407
6. Re(-)Emergent Theory (‘The Eternal Return’) 501

1. Introduction to Part I – General-Theory

This Seventh Book will act as a coda to the *Pursuit* and will basically fall, first, within three parts, with the first part divided into three sections, namely, *Philo-Sophists*; *Philosophers*; *Philosophizings*; and, second, with a provisional conclusion titled *Beyond Philosophies* (all spread over twenty-four courses) as per the preceding *Index*. (7)

Where, by 'philo-sophists' is meant failed, so-called 'philosophers' who deserve only to be relegated to a second rank (as 'deplorables') or third tier of demotion (as 'incorrigibles'), preferably being neither seen nor heard (although, having through misrepresentation seized a major discourse, it is difficult to avoid such noisy miscreants).[25] (8)

By 'philosophers' is meant 'those first class philosophical, non-ideologically oriented disciplinarians who carefully observe what is to hand, exercise suspensions, and are capable of delivering suitable forms of rectification, deconstruction, and an ongoing, progressive re(-)normalization of their discourses in a manner that creates, preserves and conservationally expands positive forms of e/valuational formation for the beneficial dispensation of the secular world whilst at the same time diminishes negative e/valuational formations. (9)

Intuitively apperceiving a need for *The Seventh Book*… to act, in part, as a coda to the *Pursuit*, hence this first part, *Part* I, philosophically dealing with *General-Theory*, in the form of *A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption*… (10)

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[25] The reader will find, as they travel through these three books within The Seventh Book… that things are not as simple as they first seem. In the subtle pragmatic privileging of an 'anti-representational economy' (which could also be referred to as either the 'presentational economy' or the 'representational economy' or, again, as the re-presentational economy', on account of the trimodal nature of these factors falling within the same overall economy despite these different names being given to it). Indeed, it will be later explained that for philosophers representing disciplinarians regarded as sitting on so-called first class seating that their qualified 'position' is equivalent to a perspective that relatively privileges an anti-representational economic perspective that is also equivalent to a re-presentational orientation which is realized as such through taking 'imputations as both non-extrapolated and as suspended'. In a contrast to so-called 'first class seating', philo-sophists are met with a relegation to a second rank should they regard 'imputations as both extrapolated and suspended'. Then, should philo-sophists regard 'imputations as both extrapolated and non-suspended' then they would automatically be further relegated to a so-called 'third rank'. However, although it would seem natural for philosophers to ignore and not relate to these 'failed disciplinarians', the joke is on everyone given that for an anti-representational economy to be realized all three positions need to be situ for a successful process of both suspension and imputational treatment. Given that in any economy all economic moments are relatively incommensurable it implies that not any one moment could be arrived at, attained and obtained, or, i.e., fully appropriated! That with subtle forms of privileging of the anti-representational economy, all three economic moments need to entertained and dynamically balanced within the (extensive) suspension etc. Or, again, in the subtle privileging of the anti-representational orientation, transformational retreatment needs to be exercised in such a manner that permits the advent of potentially radical forms of re(-)interpretation should such ensuing innovative, relatively unconventional forms of insightfulness call for the same. That for this to occur, such philosophical insightfulness calls for a dialectical interaction between all three economic factors of re-presentation, presentation and representation. Just as the 'existential nature of such insightfulness' call for the 'relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential!' Or, in the form of a metaphor, medicine in small doses is medicine, but, in larger does could well be poisonous! Implying that the over-preferential treatment of the anti-representational orientation is just as disastrous!

I. Philo-Sophists

1. Relegation 101

An ‘agile philosopher, or pragmatic disciplinarian’ in ‘their respective prospect,[26] has two tasks to perform to the best of their ability, namely, **deconstructing the defective and re(-)constructing**[27] **the effective!**’[28] (11)

By performing and delivering on those two roles the disciplinarian in question does not deserve to be relegated, either to a second tier or a third tier (where the latter bench must be reserved for those who are totally insightless, and remain unreconstituted as a result, i.e., as measured in terms of this implicit test as outlined defining the ‘agile philosopher or disciplinarian’. (12)

Now, **no positioning can be suitably entered into that is essentially incoherent, is unable to be appreciated, and travels far beyond the limits of its theoretical deployment, practical employment, and either its critical and/or radical redeployment.** (13)

But, as no position can be absolutistically coherent (because of the dialectical nature of its phenomenological presentation, hermeneutical representation and its existential re-presentation) **what is required is its relatively consistent logical deployment, etc.** (14)

Then, **appreciation cannot begin in either unimodal or bimodal terms of reference, but, must start from a trimodal economic frame of reference, etc.** (15)

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[26] A ‘disciplinarian’ is ‘a person who performs short-term projects and long term programs within their disciplinarian prospect’, preferably, within the orbit of a ‘pragmatic’ (super-)prospect (defined as a ‘viable, qualified, anti-representational prospect that is economically pragmatic’, i.e., as ‘subject to all economic limitations and non-limitations’ (where the latter is that domain of relative freedom that allows the constructive formation of positive contributions to be existentially formed within that discipline and, from thence, can be devolved to the secular world as can be validly thematized theoretically, utilized practically, and refined, be the latter either more critically reformed and/or radically re-formed).

[27] The nomenclature ‘(-)’ implies an ongoing economic process.

[28] In my criticism and appreciation of Richard Rorty, e.g., it is my understanding that he performs the first of those two roles superbly, but, is only half successful in that second more creative role of maintaining an ongoing re(-)construction of more viable form of pragmatism, albeit ever provisional in complexion. In the latter regard, a vast range of novel vocabularies needed to have been articulated in order to put an anti-representational ‘position’ on a more forward footing. Merely disposing of your enemy does not win the war (under normal circumstances). Retrospectively, I perceive this *Pursuit* as attempting to fill that gap. I.e., creatively understanding what is ‘economically’ needed in order to pursue and refine the disciplinary orbit of the philosophical prospect in terms of its passive theoretical ambit, active practical remit, and its engaged critical, and radical, composite. I.e., allow the philosopher, e.g., as an example of a disciplinarian, to actually make a positive contribution to the secular world where we must all reside in order to both suffer and enjoy what freedoms we can only obtain through(-)others as we make both our individual and collective passages through this world at large.

Because the unimodal is without appreciation, and the bimodal, too, is without such appreciation given that appreciation demands additional meta-terms of reference. (16)

On the other hand, the trimodal 'economic' perspective can appreciate both unimodal and bimodal features within the orbit of that relational economy (given that its metaphorical 'circulation' of e/valuational formation has the metaphorical 'opportunity' of being able to do so within those 'wider', trimodal terms of reference). (17)

And economies, in turn, can be further appreciated in trimodal meta-economic settings (and hence the basis for such further ideas like the proposition of archetypal economies, economic complexification, etc.[29]). (18)

So, therefore, it behooves either the critical and/or radical disciplinarian to completely dismiss all forms of non-relative uni-modalism and bi-modalism given that such positionings cannot even be appreciated as such! (19)

Thence our ensuing dismissal of unimodal forms of realism, empiricism, idealism, rationalism, materialism, and bimodal forms of dualism, and so on and so forth! (20)

The concept of appreciation demands higher meta-terms of reference, which if either absent or unable to be sufficiently present, implies the immediate disqualification, i.e., relegation, of such short-sighted positionings! (21)

Hence inevitable relegation through either insufficient logical consistency, an inability to proffer forms of meta-appreciation, and/or, transgresses the natural limitations of its deployment, etc. (22)

Logical inconsistency includes being relatively incoherent in its presuppositional and suppositional formulations; unresolved contradictions; defective utilization of its current logic; misinformed uptake of narrational facts without an adequate evidential basis; narrations and discourses being built upon fallacious arguments and narratives; incorrect applied patterns of dissemination; invalid forms of truth determination or non-validated form of truth determination, etc. I.e. whatever disestablishes the integration and integrity of such structural-functionally constructed forms of edification, that, hopefully, can be considered to be both relevant and competent to perform those intentional objectives; overseeing, in the process, where such prospective edifices engender an authenticity in a suitable enrichment of an appositely ensuing e/valuational formation.[30] (23)

But such general understandings of relegation can be further reinforced through the deconstruction of a particular focus on such impossible edifices and their pointless demonstrations of a non-apparent edification (given this deep-seated discordance between what 'they say they can do' and 'what they can actually do in practice'). (24)

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29 Both economic concepts will be discussed in Economic Theory 102, paragraphs 62-96.

30 Hence a confluence in these four concepts of relevance, enrichment, competence and authenticity.

2. Relegation 201

As noted, unimodal and bimodal formulations in positioning cannot operate as they stand, and, when they do seem to operate as stated it is because, covertly, they have imported wider terms of reference. (25)

E.g., a philosophy that states that 'the entire world is an illusion' can make no sense as it stands. If illusion is all that exists then the word 'illusion' has no distinctive significance, no economic contrast. But, more likely, in the usual misuse of such metaphors, there is a world of non-illusion, termed reality, and, by implication, this former realm of illusion must be forsaken in order to find this other realm of non-illusion. Hence this covert importation of such bimodal terms of reference. But, still, this relationship between the world of illusion and the realm of non-illusion can only be appreciated in trimodal terms. But, then, if the world of illusion and the world of non-illusion are separate realms then the entire world cannot be illusory. Or, if the realm of illusion and the realm of non-illusion overlap, and are to be equated, in some manner to some degree, then it follows, again, that the entire world cannot be just dismissed as mere illusion. To my mind, when and where such religious metaphors of illusion, and similar, etc., can operate with some currency, can proffer an economic surplus in significance formation, is when such metaphors, first, are not impossibly literalized, and, second, are suggestive of a form of experiential exploration borrowing from forms of either phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential methodologies, etc. So, e.g., if the world were to be provisionally treated as 'if it were a mere illusion' then we would arrive at a viable and valid technique for exercising some form of the transcendental suspension (as an aspect of the extensive suspension[31]). An open attitude of religious (or non-religious) exploration reinforced by the parallel utilization of similar genres exploring a similar series and/or set/s of techniques (just as either the perception and/or apperception of existential experience can be shown, historically, not to be the sole preserve of religious philosophers). (26)

Then, over the course of various philosophical traditions, the problematic nature of causation has been rendered more problematic when merely exercised in bimodal terms of reference, namely, in terms of 'cause' and 'effect'. If cause precedes effect without connection, then it cannot be a cause. Or, if cause and effect co-occur then such talk about causes and effects, as separate entities, is and must be sheer nonsense, and so on. Better, is it to talk about trimodal economic conditions (in a conditional economy of the relatively pre-conditional, conditional and the post-conditional) that devolve about the three (relatively incommensurable) time dimensions of the relative past, present and future (in an economy of the temporal). Or, invoke more sophisticated scientific versions of temporal treatment (as refracted through a philosophy of transformational retreatment as will be explored and scrutinized in sections III.1 & 2). (27)

Without a doubt, realist pretensions are quite bizarre and, all too often, sadly not recognized as such. This fraudulent focusing alone on intentional objectivity, at the expense of an intentional economy, and all other relevant economies, cannot and should not be economically proposed in such uni-modal terms of reference. (28)

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31 As extensively argued in Volume II (Book 2).

In the intentional economy we have an intentional focusing on intentional objectivity that can only mistakenly arise as an isolated experience through an impossible suppression of both the intentional motivation, or i.e., intent, and intentional subjectivity (referred to by transcendental phenomenologists, rightly or wrongly, as 'transcendental subjectivity'). (29).

There can be neither a logical priority nor a temporal priority on the intentional object(ivity) given that it is only in economic terms can such objectivity be focused upon, etc. (30)

Furthermore, through the impossible extrapolation of empirical experience beyond its natural confines, as if in the apparent 'externality' of the natural world, as simulated through perceptual experience, etc., it follows that the impossible pursuit of a realist point of view cannot be anything other than problematic. (31)

Taking upon itself, through the impossible literalizing of perceptual metaphors, etc., an idealistic stance as if by default. Given that the imputation of the so-called 'real' cannot be recognized, cannot be encountered, and/or cannot be engaged, it follows that such an imputed reality has no pragmatic functions whatsoever. (32)

Conversely, a reversed criticism can also be made to apply to another impossible genre of philosophical practice that also has no pragmatic merit, namely, idealism and its many allies. (33)

Yes, all experience is constituted in the apparent consciousness of intentional experience, but, to reduce such experience merely to conscious experience is to overlook the fact that the economics of intentional experience cannot be conducted apart from intentional objectivity and intentional subjectivity (in keeping with such intentional objectivity, etc.). To prioritize recognition over either encountering of intentional objectivity and/or engagement of intentional subjectivity is to impose the apparent realism of such an impossible idealistic position (pursued through the over-promotion of intentional motivation). (34)

That similar argument can be run to demolish positions that have a tendency to over-promote one or two aspects of the intentional economy or under-promote one or two aspects of the intentional economy. So, e.g., an idealism that over-promotes intentional subjectivity at the expense of intentional objectivity and/or intentional motivation is also to be exposed and duly demolished. (35)

Similarly, the proposition of a fraudulent materialism that over-promotes relational participants in a relational economy at the expense of the relational economy, etc. (36)

But, a demolition of positional attitudes based upon a misplaced specificity or misinterpreted specificity of intent can also be duly relegated. (37)

3. Relegation 301

Just as there are misplaced philosophical attitudes that are too general or too particular in their focus, so, too, those attitudes that misinterpret the specificity of concrete, historical experience also deserve to be duly relegated. E.g., those historical traditions which maintain an unbalanced prejudice for or against either universals or particulars. Or, e.g., those historical traditions that over-emphasize either the mere duration of experience or the mere flux of experience that also deserve to be equally deconstructed. (38)

The nature of experience is dialectically constituted through a variety of overlapping economies where the specificity of all contributions needs to be respectfully recognized, etc. Relegation, therefore, can also proceed on the grounds of a defective specificity of performance. (39)

Of course, as all things can never be equal, it follows that we should pay more attention to that which is more pragmatically profitable and beneficial. I.e., where those aspects of experience that either create a positivity of e/valuational formation, preserve a positivity of e/valuational formation, and/or establish a conservational expansion in a positivity of e/valuational formation can all be defined as 'both profitable and beneficial in their ensuing e/valuational formation/s'. (40)

In our philosophical researches, in order to establish a suitable basis for disciplinary forms of research, we need to recognize that we must work with 'what is to hand' and not 'so-called first principles' or so-called 'last principles' or so-called 'middling principles' somewhere in between the former impossible to find specimens as much beloved by all misguided philo-sophists. (41)

Thence, e.g., my proposal of phenomenal-phenomenological correlations,[32] hermeneutical accommodations, and (non-systematic) existential transformations, etc. (42)

What is to hand is to be found in the form of an imputation in its imputational situation, i.e., its relational-situatedness. (43)

Imputations are naturally extrapolated and treated as such be that in either provisional terms and/or in non-provisional terms of reference. (44)

In phenomenological treatment forms of suspension are supplied (under the auspices of an extensive suspension). (45)

In such ensuing interrogation, we apply forms of rhetorical, metaphorical and apparitional treatment both individually and collectively. (46)

In our recognition of this interrogative economy, etc., we observe, in provisional terms these levels of suspended non-extrapolation; suspended extrapolation;

[32] Arguing that phenomenological constitution is dictated both subjectively and intersubjectively/inter-objectively/objectively. Hence the 'phenomenal-phenomenological' must be a dialectical mix(ture).

and, non-suspended extrapolation of imputations. All else deserves to be relegated (and either to be left ignored or duly rectified, deconstructed, and re(-)normalized) accordingly[33])! (47)

But relegation can also proceed on the grounds of a defective specificity of performance. E.g., the over-promotion through ideological zeal or the under-promotion through intellectual apathy of any form of an economic combination (of relatively incommensurable correlativities or economically ordered distinctions[34]). (48)

It could be said that relegation is circumvented when positions are suitably suspended (and de-suspended) and economically re-sited in a manner in keeping with the requisite nature of the economy being provisionally invoked. (49)

So, e.g., a relatively open-minded, non-ideologically circumscribed 'realist' or 'idealist', or similar, in a moment of semi-insightfulness within a partial understanding of the intentional economy, e.g., might decide it would be more wise to suspend both their positioning and its obvious counter-positioning, but, in not fully re-siting such a partial understanding within a more complete sense of the economic would then promote the suspension of that concomitant duality. However, although suspended, not being fully re-sited in economic terms such positioning will also fail. (50)

Or, e.g., although being conversant with the pragmatic deconstruction of either traditional and/or non-traditional forms of ideological positioning, in assuming an anti-representational stance without suspending the same such ensuing positioning will also be defectively promoted. (51)

In a provisionally constructed economy, say, of hermeneutically oriented representation, given that it must also include both phenomenal-phenomenological presentation and existentially oriented chaotic forms of re-presentation (which can also be treated as anti-representationally equivalent) it would follow that such an economy could be called either 'representational', or 'presentational', or 'anti-representation/re-presentational', depending on the orientation being operated with, but, at the same time, that none of these orientations should ever be over-promoted at the expense of their economic contrasts within the invocation of the relevant nature of that overall economy. Moreover, we should also recognize that such economic correlativities can only be approached but never attained nor obtained through some form of definitive appropriation. Thence the relative absence of such an economic partner or partners despite the suspension of the remaining parties or party will also realize, accordingly, the specificity of a defective stance. (52)

So, all economic parties, as correlativities, should be co-present in either overt and/or covert terms of reference. (53)

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[33] As will be explained later, e.g., in Rectification 303, Deconstruction 304, and Re(-)Normalization 305.

[34] Which will be explored in detail in a more appropriate context for doing that type of exposition).

On the other hand, if an economic aspect is sufficiently thematized and duly suspended then the entire economy can be co-presented through economic induction[35] given the existential, pro-relational self-expression of such economic correlativity. (54)

The implications being that economic correlativity must preserve a certain isomorphic transformational invariance between those correlativities,[36] despite their relative incommensurability by virtue of their economic interactivity,[37] and, should our recognition, encountering and engagement[38] be sufficiently developed then the exercise of a suitably adequate suspension should reveal such relevant and apposite correlatively expressed information. (55)

However, the disciplinarian needs to ascertain, either intuitively and/or through evidence, whether they, themselves, or some other party or parties, has sufficiently developed a stance worthy of promotion and suffers neither from over-promotion or under under-promotion. (56)

Persistent ideological over-commitment results in the formation of a pseudo-psychosis whilst an inadequate stance results in deficient forms of responsiveness be their requirement either non-existential in orientation and/or existential in orientation. (57)

All ideologies, effectively, are extremist through over-commitment and the non-utilization of either a proper, appropriate and/or apposite suspension.[39] (58)

A ‘pseudo-psychosis’ has the experiential hallmarks of a psychosis but positioned only in respect to the ideological positioning being over-promoted through associated forms of either epistemological or ontological over-commitment’. (59)

Once recognized, this condition is easy to differentiate given that the over-committed party or parties are proportionally resistant to the intensity that those counter-arguments are being presented regardless of whether such counter-arguments are either understood or not understood, well-formed or not well-formed, etc. (60)

On the other hand, a worthy exponent or opponent for debate is amenable to processes of ideational transformation, and v.v., as situated within the economics of that presentation or counter-presentation which then naturally takes the form of an open, non-resistant, pragmatically receptive dialogue (preferably enacted with a ‘suitable’ existential complexion). (61)

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35 The concept of ‘economic induction’ will be explored in detail in paragraphs 389, 583, etc.

36 Refer to Transformational Theory I (104) & II Transformational Theory II (206)

37 Where we note the dialectical formula that ‘relative incommensurability is equal to relative commensurability’, albeit on the relevant and apposite level of its economic activity.

38 The three economic aspects of relational interaction (and which fall, respectively, under the sub-disciplines of hermeneutics, phenomenology and a non-systematic-existentialism).

39 ‘Proper’ when ‘correctly enacted in a phenomenal-phenomenological orientation’, ‘appropriate; when ‘correctly enacted in a hermeneutical orientation’, and ‘apposite’ when ‘correctly enacted in an existential orientation’. ‘Suitable’ when ‘effectively enacted in a dynamic balance of all three orientations’, and, ‘unsuitable’ or ‘non-suitable’ when ‘not enacted in a dynamic balance of all three orientations’.

II. Philosophers

1. Economical Theory 102

Economical theory, as a hypothetical framework for exploring the circulation of e/valuational formation, can be applied to financial economics, but, generally, not v.v.[40] I will approach this topic under the following three headings of the articulation of its basis in the archetypal economy (as constructed along gestalt lines); the application (of such ideas in a particular sense or specific situation); and, the appreciation of an overall economic context (along with concepts like 'economic complexification', etc.). (62)

What basis do we have in order to insist, as a bare minimum, on relevant trimodal terms of reference? (63)

We could invoke the concept of appreciation to the extent that higher terms of reference are recognized as needed in order to follow through on such appreciation (along with a return to that initial basis through transformational retreatment). (64)

So, e.g., the univocal cannot be appreciated either in or of itself or through itself, and, therefore, a univocal perspective cannot be entered into in order to be able to observe whether that apparent 'emission' even belongs to its relevant economic system in its systematic context or relational-situatedness (and where such considerations must equally apply whether conceived of in either theoretical, practical and/or critical terms of reference,[41] i.e., where, in respect to the latter, we conservatively pursue a mode and manner that is both critical in its practical application of its entailed logic and then radically pursue its post-critical application, when and where necessary, in order to then dialectically observe the more radical lines of a relatively chaotic semblance of re-direction when this economic aspect is apparently found to be evident or is made evident through apposite forms of intervention[42]). (65)

But a similar argument also applies to the apparent univocality of the relationship between bimodal parties. Hence the implication of a minimum requirement of a trimodal-

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[40] I.e., an economical theory (of relational dynamics) and, obviously, not a financial theory of economics. I.e., that there exists this asymmetry between philosophical economics and financial economics.

[41] As usual, the qualifications entered into in the brackets can, at this stage, generally be ignored. However, the subtitle is finding its *raison d'être* here to the effect that conservative and radical inputs and outputs need to work hand in hand. I.e., in an indirect agreement with Kant, that the practical is logically corrected and this is the conservative basis for research and, thereby, prepares the ground for a dialectical irruption of the relatively radical as we enter into greater degrees of alignment with the living-reality of that economy through the lived-reality of such responses, etc.). Hence the necessary relationship between the conservatively-critical and the radically-radical to the extent that the critical is necessary for the radical to be manifested and where the radical, once adequately appropriated, can then take on a more conventional and conservative sense as the 'newly minted' (but where all too often the radical origins of the critical, in time, are overlooked).

[42] Where 'intervention' is to be regarded as a 'mix of either non-existentially oriented inputs and outputs and existentially oriented inputs and outputs (through the existential transformation of the former)'.

ly constituted economy (in which, in this case, the bimodal 'current' between the overt bimodal parties can be observed within that economic context[43]). (66)

Therefore, at a bare minimum, to either appreciate univocal 'emissions' or bimodal 'currents', trimodal terms of reference, as 'systems', need to be either overtly or covertly present regardless of whether this be wittingly or non-wittingly understood. (67)

Of course, in order to explicate the implicit 'presence' of a 'system', a meta-systematic frame of reference needs to be recognized and hence the recognition of relational economies as falling within their trans-economic spheres of influence.[44] (68)

But, that granted, that trimodal terms of reference must be either explicitly or implicitly recognized, we would then need to ask in what form does this set of economic interactions between 'emissions, currents and systems' take given the relative-incommensurability in evidence between these forms of economic correlativity[45])? (69)

But a model to interrelate these three forms of correlative-incommensurability is already to hand in the form of an archetypal economy envisaged as a gestalt economy (entertained in parallel as a form of systematic economic complexification[46]). (70)

Hence, in archetypal terms, there is proposed a certain background field (World), a certain correlatively related foreground sense and semblance of focus (Object), and, the certain co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity (Ego) (be that conceived of in intentional, trans-intentional and/or transcendental terms of reference, etc., but, where by 'transcendental is usually meant 'trans-cognitive/trans-intentional acts of judgment' [better articulated through a hexa-modally constituted form of ordered analysis]). (71)

Then, with this archetypal structure being proposed as the basic structural-function behind the formation of all experience, albeit through reiteration on many levels of epistemological constitution, it then merely behooves us to ask what economic aspect

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43 Reference is made to unimodal 'emissions' that are incrementally added or subtracted from a systematic context prior to its chaotic re(-)self-organization. Where bimodal considerations are conceived as analogically like 'currents' or 'potential differences', albeit as conceived of in their respective economic systems (which, in turn, are relationally-situated in their respective relational-situatednesses)

44 Or, we might put this observation, rhetorically and metaphorically, as economic systems all the way up and all the way down. Of course, in focusing upon a grain of sand the whole world does not need to be directly looked at even though, holistically, that one grain of sand through the economics of its relational interactions must also indirectly reference the entire world at large, albeit as if by default.

45 An obvious difference, to begin with being the fact that such aspects of an economic relationship are respectively, unimodal, bimodal, and trimodal in orientation. Hence this reasonable supposition of a relative-incommensurability between such hypothetical 'emissions, currents, and systems'.

46 'Systematic economic complexification' is that 'alignment between two economies in terms of the archetypal economy able to support a productive commentary one upon the other, and v.v., but, which, in this instance, is an alignment fostered along gestalt lines, i.e., between a background field, a foreground field under focus, and, the sense and semblance of intentional (or transcendental) subjectivity in keeping with the economic correlativity in question. So, e.g., a visual field necessitates the apparent 'presence' of a visual perceiver (regardless of how we might wish to or not wish to define the nature of such a necessary feature in conscious experience).

is in question and in what manner does relevant forms of economic complexification enrich our understanding of that economy in question. So, e.g., in a process of focusing we are entertaining an orientation upon the phenomenal-phenomenological orientation dealing with the semantic mapping of essentially distinctive experiences in their atomicity like, e.g., 'saltiness', 'liquidity', 'containment', etc., and their more molecular-like combinations when semantically allowed like, e.g., a 'glass of salty water'. That, given this orientation upon the analytical nature of the reductive orientation we find we are taking a phenomenological orientation, and orientation on the past (and its histories of the past), etc. Hence, e.g., this correlation, through economic complexification, between the retrospective and the reductive nature of the analytical orientation, etc. Either overtly or covertly, a reference is made to the archetypal nature of the gestalt economy in order to relatively ground such parallel forms of economic complexification as envisaged between the retrospectivity of past experience, in the temporal economy, and, the reductive nature of analysis, in an economy of treatment (given that only three general forms of treatment are only available, namely, analysis along with synthesis and nomination[47]). (72)

But, then, why should we accept this off-the-shelf approach to taking up, first, any form of an archetypal economy, and, second, its construction along gestalt lines? (73)

First, we could run a pragmatic argument to the effect that this heuristic modeling works, which can be explored by yourself, and, second, we could run, again, an argument from appreciation. (74)

To appreciate something, that something must be able to be focused upon. But, then, in order to exercise such intent, we need the requisite background field in order to focus such selective focusing. Last, we must co-opt some form of intentional-like awareness that demonstrate the (conceptual) sense and (perceptual) semblance of subjectivity in conformity with that type of intentional focus, etc., as this co-occurrence is always evident in intentional experience. I.e., when something is 'seen' there is co-occurring, evidentially, the subjective experience of our being aware of that same type of experience and an awareness that we are able to iteratively experience that type of experience (regardless of how we might ontologically and/or epistemological model and explain this working imputation of a co-associated subjectivity). Noting, at the same time, a more general sense of subjectivity in which all these different types of subjectivity also appear to experientially cohere within this more encompassing overall imputation of subjectivity (again, entertained as a working imputation without regard as to how we might either ontologically and/or epistemological model and explain such co-associated subjectivity). Hence the trimodal 'economic conjecture' of 'focus, focusing such focus, and, the apparent 'focuser' focusing on such focus'. As expressed in the mnemonic of 'field, focus, and frame (as an enacted act of framing)'. (75)

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[47] Noting 'past' is related to 'analysis', 'future' is related to 'synthesis', and, 'present' is related to 'nomination'. Hence, e.g., the co-associations of recall, expectation, and the immediacy of current anticipation. Or, again, in a textual economy, with textual deposition, meta-textual input, and, non-textual simulations, and so on.

So, to conclude this exploration of this basis we need to note the acceptance of trimodal economic terms of reference as paralleling the archetypal economy of a gestalt background, foreground and co-associated sense of appreciation in the corresponding form of subjectivity because, moreover, the univocal and the bimodal cannot be appreciated in either unimodal or bimodal terms of reference necessitating the minimum requirement of a tripartite economy. (76)

Now, this basis granted, how do we apply such an archetypal idea to whatever type of research that is currently in question, being placed under such interrogation? (77)

Admittedly, by being creative, but, holding, as an article of faith, that this trimodal structuralization will be already mirrored in language, and, where our heuristic propositions can be error corrected, over time, through the emendations of economic complexification, etc. Let me demonstrate this pragmatic approach. (78)

E.g., in noting, hypothetically, the 'presentation' of the phenomenal-phenomenological oriented inputs and an apposition with the hermeneutically oriented genres of behaviour as qualified 'representations' we can run the completion of this circumscribed economic 'system' by proposing the linguistically 'matching' imputation of 're-presentations' given that this so-called 'third moment' of the non-systematically existential is open to chaotic processes of 're-direction'. So, we line up and align presentations, representations, and re-presentations' with these three sub-disciplinary orientations of 'the phenomenal-phenomenological, the hermeneutical, and the non-systematically existential' respectively. (79)

Such aligned forms of schematization can be further reinforced by noting the descriptive nature of the phenomenological, the prescriptive nature of the hermeneutic (and its utilization of genres of behaviour and their instructions as entailed), and, creative designation of the existential as relatively 'proscriptive'. Hence in this scheme we can view the existential orientation as relatively more 'proscriptive' rather than either 'descriptive' or 'prescriptive' in orientation. Interpreting 'deontological-like injunctions' or 'experiential imperatives' as more 'proscription' rather that either 'descriptions' or 'prescriptions'. So, e.g., an existential attitude concomitant with an existentially oriented pattern of intervention may well oversee, in this situation, the feeding of a hungry person, be that by direct means (by giving them food to eat, e.g.) and/or indirect means (e.g., ensuring that someone or some institution will see to it that that person is both fed and fed soon). (80)

A similar parallel can be observed in my configuration of a textual economy, namely, in a configuration that consists of the three relatively incommensurable economic correlativities of the meta-textual, textual, and the non-textual.[48] However, to be noted

[48] The linear direction of this hypothetical progression from meta-text to text to non-text can be seen to mirror a 'harmonic economy' given that the hermeneutic is background oriented and hence relatively consonant in its characteristics; that the phenomenological focus is relatively dissonant in experience, whereas, the resolution of these two parties realizes a certain type of progression that is instrumental in a process of resolution. I will argue later that relationships are only realized through processes of ongoing resolution that avoid a final more definitive sense and semblance of an ending. That those relationship which find a definitive form of resolution, thereby, must cease to arise in the midst of such experience.

is the observation that with the adequate ‘representation’ of one economic correlativity the entire economy in question is then simulated through such ‘economic induction’. (81)

But, through economic complexification, we might wish to introduce different parties for one or two of those economic moments and invoke, therein and thereby, semi-hybrid co-economies. E.g., in introducing the anti-representational orientation as more sympathetic of the non-systematic-existential orientation we might run in direct apposition to the so-called third moment of ‘re-presentation’ the moment of the ‘anti-representation(al)’. Noting, that this so-called third moment has now taken on a wider range of epithets. Hence the radical nature of this third moment (from the potentially chaotic moment of re-direction) and its ability to simulate the representation through the ensuing lens of a positive nihilism. Let me illustrate this co-association of such hybrid economies:

Presentation		Presentation	
*		*	
Representation	Re-presentation	Representation	Anti-Representation (82)

We could argue that these hybrid economies, which could be called the re-presentational and the anti-representational economies respectively, merely do different forms of work, but, that, at the end of the day, all this applies to the same type of economy in question (albeit as found through either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of e/valuational formation associated with the application of that form of economic interpretation). (83)

When set up in this definitive manner, we can say that the re-presentational and anti-representational economies, effectively, are equivalent (and enriched through such forms of applied co-characterization through internal economic complexification). (84)

The primary intent behind the construction of such applied economies is to have them work in such a manner so as to find surpluses of significance emerging that are much greater than the mere sum of their invested inputs, and, are as heuristic devices, instrument in comparatively greater forms of such ensuing e/valuational formation. (85)

Hence these ideas of discerning and delineating relevant economic constructions that are instrumental in producing iterable patterns of e/valuation that are relatively more productive and profitable (primarily meant in a non-financial sense). (86)

Now, let me direct our attention to the open-ended nature of relational contexts in which economies are devised to be both experientially productive and profitable. (87)

In a world of emplacement, we find we are embodied, embedded in the realm of the other, and, environmentally embanked in a world at large. (88)

Paralleling this we could propose the relatively incommensurate economic correlativities of ‘the practical domain of the relatively personal and private but open for business’, ‘the theoretical domain of the relatively public and political’, and the arbitrated sphere of the environmental (and, in the political-economic economy, of the dimension of the stylistic and its potential for radical-criticism, etc.). (89)

So, e.g., in a radical critique of the neo-liberal paradigm we should find that it cannot be done purely in either political or economic terms. Hence the tripartite economic realm of the political-economy as divided between the public spheres, private spheres and the spheres of the stylistic (equivalent to existential and arbitrational domains, etc.). (90)

Now, this very useful concept of economic complexification has already been demonstrated when we note that one of the economic polar orientations is matched by another in either the same economy or in a similar economy. (91)

Hence vast chains of imputed equivalencies. Just as histories of the past can enter into apposition with analysis or reduction, with matters of recall, the practical domain of business, etc., in the political-economy, and so on. (92)

These economic ideas are also crucial for understanding processes of transformation(al retreatment), processes of conformal truth determination, the ways and means for circumnavigating so-called ‘first-principles’, ‘last-principles’, and so on. (93)

In regard to the latter, it is proposed that we deal with phenomenological correlations, hermeneutic accommodations, and non-systematic-existential transformations (although also inclusive of relatively non-existential transformations). (94)

Moreover, we can construct ‘vertical economies’ when dealing with different levels in the organization of epistemological hierarchicalization[49] (in what could be called the ‘epistemological hierarchy’). Hence our dealing, e.g., with pre-cognitive emotions, affect, etc; cognitive intentions (as intentional aspirations, etc.); and, trans-cognitive judgments (concerning the former). Or, in horizontal economies we can deal with, e.g., processes of causation to the extent, e.g., we deal with conditional aspects rather than a bimodal configuration of a so-called ‘cause’ and a so-called ‘effect’.[50] Hence their replacement by ‘the pre-conditional, conditional and the post-conditional’. (95)

Thence the trimodal constitution of economies, their archetypal nature, and the meta-economic appreciation of their relational-situatedness. (96)

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[49] Ascension in this hierarchy is metaphorically granted through increasing epistemological complexification. So, e.g., a judgment is directly with respect to the conceptual and only indirectly with respect to the perceptual. Therefore, the activity of judgment must be more complex than that of conceptualization given that judgment necessitate conceptual materials in order to make a judgment. Therefore, through such organized inclusion it follows that judgment is more organized that conceptualization (although the ensuing judgment is able to be retreated back to its initial meta-status by virtue of transformational retreatment)

[50] Refer to paragraph 27.

2. Logical-Dialectics (and Dialectical-Logics) 103

Disciplinarians all too often work under the false belief that logic alone is at the center of all things, and, that all we have to do is 'think clearly and distinctly' to oversee a thorough resolution of all problems be they disciplinary or secular in orientation.[51] (97)

But, logic is tempered by the dialectical, and v.v! (98)

Because we cannot even think in such a perfected manner because our thinking is qualified economically besides being limited historically, through education, or having imperfect or absent frames of reference that would be needed to resolve issues either already met or not yet encountered. (99)

Because, conservatively, we need to apply what logical approaches we already have as a work in progress, and, radically, qualify the same dialectically also as a parallel work in progress, and v.v. (100)

So, given the need for a logical economy how might one be provisionally constructed? (101)

By utilizing the three so-called logical principles of Logical Identity, Excluded Middle, and the equally imputed need for Non-Contradiction.[52] (102)

But, by merely taking what counts as an identity, through being reconfigured through economic forms of re(-)configuration, we end up with an infinity of logics. (103)

Similarly, through noting limitations, seemingly real or imposed, and altering identities we have already opened ourselves up to a dialectical approach. (104)

That granted, how might we then construct a dialectical economy? (105)

By noting the three so-called dialectical principles of Dialectical Non-Identity, Non-Excluded Middle, and the equally imputed need for Non-Non-Contradiction (in an acceptance of identificational overlap… (106)

Be that in logical subjects, frames of reference, the articulation of parallel arguments (as in acts of suspension), the invocation of probabilities, the recognition of a non-definitive form of potentiality and non-absolutistical forms of actual identity, etc. (107)

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[51] 'Clearly and distinctly' is an allusion to Descartes and the so-called Enlightenment. Here critiqued by the need to note our limitations, the limits of logic, that logic is tempered by dialectics, that we cannot think definitively in any indubitable sense, that the requisite frames of reference have to be in place in order to advance in that co-associated field, etc., etc. However, this formula does have a role to play in the practical dimension of phenomenal-phenomenological research where through eidetic reflection, etc., essential-like experiences can be semantically clarified through reiteration, etc. But, even here there are natural limits that cannot nor should not be transgressed.

[52] Which to my mind also parallel, respectively, the three forms of treatment articulated in a philosophy of transformational retreatment of nomination, relation, and predication.

3. Hermeneutical Theory 202

The entertained progression from the hermeneutical orientation of background fields to phenomenological focus to non-systematic-existential simulations of subjective experience, etc., sets the stage for the philosophical economy through the integration of these three relatively-incommensurable sub-disciplines of hermeneutics, phenomenology and existentialism within the commensurate economy of the philosophical. (108)

Where, as well, this linear interpretation of such overall economic commensuration provides a working basis for harmonic theory,[53] the ongoing resolution of relationships, existentially oriented patterns of relational intervention, the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension, the economy of the extensive suspension, transformational retreatment, ordered analysis, and all other sub-disciplines both within the philosophical discipline and outside the same. (109)

Simply put, the hermeneutical is involved in matters of interpretation, etc. (110)

As a sub-discipline I have already explored the hermeneutical economy under the headings[54] of hermeneutical interpretation (of what is found to hand), phenomenological reinterpretation (critically through logically and semantically clarified inputs), and existentially oriented re-interpretation (should such relatively radical re-interpretations need

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53 I.e., moving from a consonant field, to a dissonant focus, to the resolution entailed in the relational frame/s of reference. Now, the stages in this progression are arbitrary in the sense that in the cyclical nature of an economy any point could be started with in a linear reading of that overall economy. So, different reading could be proposed by starting at different points and in heading in either direction. A harmonic reading, as noted, in effect, starts with World, then proceeds to Object, and through the ongoing dynamic balance of the former then enters a state of resolution in the Ego moment (be that in a definite and final sense or in an ongoing and non-final sense [given that definitive resolution is the metaphorical 'death' of that relationship]).

54 Refer to the recent essays where I have had to interpret the 'economy of interpretation' along the following lines, namely, 'hermeneutical *interpretation*, phenomenological *reinterpretation*, and non-systematic-existential *re-interpretation*' that, together, form an ongoing economy signified by the nomenclature of 're(-)x' as in '*re(-)interpretation*'. Normally, the underlying convention is hermeneutic '*rex*', phenomenological '*x*', and non-systematic-existential '*re-x*' and where the entire economy is '*re(-)x*'.E.g., in the 'representative economy' (or in either the presentative economy or re-presentative economy depending on the emphasis of the type of research being conducted) we have 'hermeneutical representation, phenomenological presentation, and non-systematic-existential re-presentation in the progression of an ongoing economy of re(-)presentation'. In the exception to this conventional rule as formulated by myself this executive decision was made in the light of hermeneutically taking interpretations as already found in a pre-critical phase; subjecting them to re-interpretation through conservative, conventionally oriented forms of logically exercised deconstruction, to be then followed by relatively radical, chaotic-like process of re-interpretative re-direction in order to pursue processes of re(-)normalization that oversee the re(-)alignment of 'the interpretations of that relational situation in play' with 'the relational situatedness of those situations also found to be in play' (in that type of contra-grammatical format as noted). The more usual 'rex' pattern noting that in 'hermeneutic rectification' we basically find 'forms of approbation for the correct, i.e., appropriate choice of genres of behaviour being adopted and adapted, etc.' Therefore, through instances of disapprobation we refine the utilization of the genres involved by moving towards the finding of suitable forms o approbation in this same regard. So, e.g., I wish to eat a certain pear but find it is not soft enough to eat by merely biting into that pear. So, in this instance, I might get a knife and then cut it into small pieces for chewing. In effect, modifying my overall genre of 'eating a pear' by cutting it into bite-sized pieces.

to be taken up as a consequence of the 'logical cracks' found in such conservatively oriented exploration and scrutiny). (111)

Through the reiteration of economic complexification, the hermeneutical orientation can be 'evidently and evidentially' redefined as meta-textual (through the adoption and adaptation of traditional genres of behaviour, etc., integral to both the 'writing' and 'reading' of textual phenomena), future oriented (towards speculative histories of the future), relationally oriented, pro-narrational in its attitudes, intersubjective, conventionally construed and constrained, etc. (112)

A hermeneutic orientation is concerned with meta-textual devices for both 'writing' and 'reading' co-associated texts[55] (be they classical like letters, books, etc., or non-classical like walking along a beach, and waving at someone in the distance, etc.).[56] (113)

Without the meta-textual dimension, no text could be either written or read! (114)

Communication necessitating some adequately suitable alignment with intent, reinforced through patterns of iteration, hence re(-)alignment through ongoing realignment hermeneutically, deconstructive re-de-mis-alignment, and non-systematic-existential re-alignment (in the simulation of relatively non-textual terms of reference which can also be paralleled with an anti-representational perspective given that we have no access to the so-called pre-constructed or so-called first-principles, etc.). (115)

Meta-textual includes genres of behaviour, modes of narrational and textual construction, the utilization of conventional elements as found to hand in the form of either ontically integrated facts or non-evidentially connected factoids, and all other manner of conventions, etc. (116)

Genres are sequences with three correct patterns of performance and three incorrect patterns of performance, namely, the relatively correct or incorrect up-taking of the right pattern of performance at its correct moment for its correct enaction (non-dis-sequencing/dis-sequencing), the relatively right pattern of performance but at either the right moment or the wrong moment for its enaction (non-mis-sequencing/mis-sequencing), or the non-confusion or confusion of the relevant mix of genres that need to be separated (non-contra-sequencing/contra-sequencing) (and/or a mix of the above). E.g., we have the three following mis-performed instances, e.g., pouring tea into the saucer having missed the cup, pouring tea into the saucer having forgotten to put the cup on

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55 We could say 'either reading and/or writing' but, in truth, even in writing we are also reading the same, etc. Hence their co-occurrence since we could also consider an act of reading as a form of 'writing or rewriting for ourselves' in order to read the text already written.

56 Interpreting those footprints to signify someone was intentionally heading along that beach in a certain direction for whatever reason or reasons, Similarly, that their deliberate act of waving was also enacted for some intentional purpose, be that to attract someone's attention, or to say hello, or merely to chase away an annoying fly or mosquito, etc. That without a sufficiently contextually treated situation the number of interpretations of the intentional behaviour presupposed is left in an even more open-ended situation of possibilities. Indeed, a potential array of infinite possibilities, where, of course, none can be equal.

the saucer; and putting the teabag into the toaster whilst making both tea and toast in the same period of time. (117)

The mapping of super-genres, genres, and sub-genres (and noting their more probable sequential pathways[57] and applications) also somewhat mirrors the semantic mappings of phenomenological patterns of categorization. (118)

So, e.g., in the usual patterns involved in the eating of an uncooked apple are focused by the intent to eat an apple and mirrors the super-phenomenological genre of eating a piece of fruit, which, in this instance, the genre of eating an apple… (119)

Such potential parallels supply modes for either real-time confirmation and/or retrospective verification in establishing conformal[58] processes of truth determination (in a Tarskian context). (120)

Setting up the opportunities for parallel forms of commensuration between the phenomenal-phenomenological and the hermeneutical, and v.v; the hermeneutical and the existential, and v.v: and, the existential and the phenomenal-phenomenological, and v.v. etc. Where, ultimately, alignments between all three sub-disciplines established conformal approaches to a semantic theory of truth determination along relatively less provisional lines (although scoped as provisional in broader terms of reference). (121)

The hermeneutical, in intentional terms, can be seen as relatively functional in comparison to a relative phenomenological emphasis on 'objective' intentional content, but, where there is a need to then balance and transcend both in their conjunction in order to proceed onward to a harmonic process of resolution, i.e., judgment (of such conceptualized treatment) (122)

Then, through a dynamic of all three moments we move toward a more 'systematic' sense and semblance of the existential. (123)

This thematization of a pro-relational orientation paving the way for a more existentially attuned process of intervention that generally creates preserves and conserve the richness of e/valuational formation. (124)

The meeting and matching of active and passive orientations, through suspension, engendering a sense of pro-relational engagement. (125)

Thence this meeting and matching, through an overall suspension, of hermeneutical expectations and phenomenological recall with the immediacy of existentially oriented anticipations. (126)

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57 Through the use, e.g., of Markov chains, etc. Through noting mis-sequencing, etc. Refer to 411.

58 'Conformal' in the sense of being either confirmed and/or verified on a number of occasions in such a manner that, overall, reinforces such truth determinations (by such evident or evidential means). 'Conformal', by extension, also implies 'alignments progressively realized between rectification, deconstruction and/or re(-)normalization, etc.'

4. Phenomenal-Phenomenological Theory 203

The ‘phenomenological’ is treated in particular types of experience as a product of the phenomenal-phenomenological orientations since even though experience is constituted in an intentional form the formation of that process is dictated economically, i.e., as a shifting mix of seemingly subjective, inter-subjective, and objective inputs (as well as subjectively-intersubjectively, and objectively and inter-objectively, and, of course, collectively as subjectively-intersubjectively-inter-objectively). (127)

How are such orientations to be proportionally delineated? Through suitable processes of imputation! (128)

Hence the provisional imputation of such orientations in their finding relative delineation in conformal treatment through hermeneutically oriented rectification, phenomenologically oriented deconstruction, and ongoing non-systematic-existentially oriented re(-)normalization. (129)

E.g., as demonstrated in our obvious abilities to differentiate, say, a ‘dream apple; from a ‘non-virtual apple’ from the ‘memory of a well-remembered apple-eating event’, etc. (130)

Because of the relative modal richness of the phenomenological experience of engaging a non-virtual apple *versus* the relatively virtual apple experience, be the latter entertained in a dream, or in a memory, or in an imaginative act of desire, and so on. I.e., determinations made in terms of the modal density of the spectrum of modalities being experienced, the delineation of their individual intensity, and the general propensity for the ‘re-iterated’ to be ‘iterated’ in the apparent relational situation in question (besides additional considerations of salience, consilience, and propinquity or proximity). (131)

The semantic mapping of essential-like phenomenological characteristics closely paralleling the meta-textual mapping of genres. (132)

Hence their relative atomic possibilities, along with all possible and impossible molecular forms of conjunction. (133)

Hence, e.g., ‘saltiness’ discerned by the tongue; ‘drinking a glass of brackish water’; and drinking from a cup with no bottom to that cup’. (134)

Finding overall forms of alignment with other states of affairs through the use of conformally treated imputations. (135)

Generally, finding negative forms of conformation through successful forms of imputational reiteration enacted through implementing conventionally deconstructive processes of logical re-de-mis-alignment, etc. (as a type of error correction). (136)

5. Non-Systematic-existential Theory 204

The so-called third moment (of Ego in the archetypal economy) gives us the nomenclature of a 'non-systematic-existential moment'. Whereas the systematic sense and semblance of the existential is realized in an extensive suspension of the overall economy. (137)

By such a transformation, from the non-systematic to the systematic, enacted patterns of intervention are more inclined to take on an orientation that is relatively existential (in its systematic sense and semblance). (138)

As a so-called third moment,[59] we observe processes and patterns of harmonic resolution. (139)

Now, too much or too little consonance, dissonance or resolution spells the end of the simulated relationship as a relationship of simulation. (140)

Since the relational, too, is in existence through ongoing resolution and not through either the lack of resolution or through the definitive finalization of such resolution. (141)

The relational emerging as an excess or surplus of e/valuational formation. (142)

Hence the equivalence of these concepts of an 'existential difference' or 'excess' or 'surplus' or 'dynamic differential' or 'facticity',[60] etc. (143)

Now, given the usual desire for ongoing resolution in our relationships, at least in the coursing of our more important relationships, this preference can be realized in the understanding that existentialization (in a more systematic sense) is arrived at through the ongoing existentialization of the relative non-existential it follows that we must find forms of existential accommodation with the relatively non-existential![61] (144)

That the existential orientation takes on a distinctive complexion and once recognized can be re-recognized, re-encountered and re-engaged as such.[62] (145)

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59 As the third moment through historical happenstance given that in my analysis of texts I started with the textual, then the meta-textual, to be followed by the non-textual and where the latter parallels the Ego moment in the archetypal economy. So, this is just a convention! In this sense the non-systematic-existential can be viewed as a metaphorical 'door' to or 'exit' from the relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existential (as it would be more usually referred to in a philosophical context)

60 'Facticity' is the extent the psychic experience of a 'whole-and-its-parts' of a distinctively discerned relationship is found to exceed the mere 'whole' as 'the mere sum of its parts' through emergence. E.g., we could sweep a courtyard full of Autumn leaves with the head of a broom, but that task is better expedited with an intact broom. This 'difference', in our experience of that situation, can be viewed as an 'existential difference' (as passively encountered *versus* a dynamic 'differential' or engaged 'distinction').

61 As pointed out by Martin Buber when he explores the relationship between the 'I-Thou' and the 'I-It'.

62 That the systematic-existential will be explored in module 401.

6. Truth Determination 205

A Tarskian theory of truth determination does not tell you how truth is determined but gives you the format, of form, for its assessment. (146)

The form of that format is such that 'the meta-proposition *P*' is true (t) if and only if (iff) the object-proposition *p* is evident (as 'evidence' in some form or other)'. (147)

Hence *P*' t iff *p* (implying, should this relation hold, that *p* is a statement rather than being treated as a mere proposition). (148)

Therefore, it is natural to perceive truth as applying to the propositional-statement even though its truth determination is not determined purely in terms of that mere proposition alone (on its object-level in meta-status). (149)

The dynamics of this misdirected attitude can be accounted for in a theory of transformational retreatment, i.e., where the pretreatment in being subjected to some form of applicable treatment takes on a meta-status advanced by one degree (through suspension), but, where, in retreatment, this process can be reversed (through the automatic desuspension). (150)

Now, in the application of this semantic approach, truth determinations can be either confirmed or not confirmed in real-time and/or verified or not verified retrospectively giving us a conformal approach to truth determination through such valid forms of iteration. (151)

But, this conformal approach is only a beginning since through either perceived or apperceived forms of alignment, entered into through processes of rectification, deconstruction and re(-)normalization, an overall economy of ongoing re(-)alignment can be entered into be that realized either advertently and/or inadvertently/ (152)

But, as already stressed, because truth determination cannot be relationally entered into in a form completely lacking in resolution or as possessing definitive resolution it follows that truth should be regarded as being delivered only in a provisional form and format even though, on the balance of what is seemingly evident or evidential (in a more formal setting), there need be neither need nor desire for either the indubitable or the non-indubitable! (153)

Thankfully, because neither orientation can be either attained or obtained because such impossible appropriation could be neither recognized, nor encountered nor engaged as such. (154)

Why dream about having a fortune of one hundred million dollars if you already had ninety-nine million dollars in the bank (especially if you were foolish enough to lose most of your fortune if you were to try to obtain an impossible to obtain difference by means that were both truly unobtainable and far too expensive to engineer). (155)

III. Philosophizings

1. Transformational Theory I 104

‘Retreatment’ is an economic approach to the understanding of transformation in order to resolve an open-ended set of problems. (156)

E.g., as a way of economically integrating the relative incommensurabilities of the hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential sub-disciplines within the orbit of the philosophical discipline; the problem of change and the apparent continuity of identity; interactions within and between both like and unlike states; the (overall) hermeneutic circle (of comprehension); as an understanding of different forms of treatment (within and between disciplines); the dynamics of suspensions and de-suspensions; etc. (157)

Let me, first, more simply explicate this concept of retreatment, demonstrate its utility, and, second, explain how it can be used to resolve various philosophical conundrums, and, then, metaphorically explicate how the mechanism of retreatment, itself, can enact such a process of transformational treatment. (158)

Three states in a process of transformation are proposed, namely, pretreatment, treatment and retreatment. (159)

I.e., respectively, the pre-critical representation of what is hermeneutically to be found to hand; the applied presentation, hopefully, of the requisite critical phenomenological treatment required; and, the potentially radical retreatment delivered through the existential re-direction of the relational situation to hand. (160)

In effect, an integrated method for bringing the relatively incommensurable sub-disciplines of the hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential together within the orbit of the philosophical discipline. (161)

Broadly paralleling the critical-radical techniques of rectification, deconstruction, and re(-)normalization (to be explored in more detail in modules 303-305). (162)

Now pretreatment as represented is taken up; then it is subjected to a process of treatment in keeping with the economy in question (which could be characterized as falling within one, two, or three general economic types of treatment, namely, those processes that would subsume the phenomenological particulars of either relational-synthesis, predicational-analysis, and/or logically subjective-nomination[63]) where, through such ensuing treatment, is elevated by one meta-degree to form the critical product of treatment; but, which through the specificity of retreatment is now de-elevated by one meta-degree returning the retreated product to a state on par with the initial meta-state represented in pretreatment. (163)

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63 Which in turn, more basically, arise as a holistic presentation, respectively, of the hermeneutic, phenomenological and existential orientations.

I.e., pretreatment, as represented, is given a relative object-level in meta-status; then, through treatment, it takes on a meta-status elevated by one degree; that is then returned to the original meta-level of the pretreatment through an ensuing process of retreatment. (164)

Why? Because when we represent something, regardless of whether it is being subjected to a process of treatment or not, it takes on a higher meta-status elevated by one degree. This rule has no exceptions other than the anomalous meta-rule that notes retreatment returns such treatment to its original meta-status (as found in the pretreated product, and, where this retreatment does not further elevate that process by one more meta-degree). (165)

Just as the builder of a house made of bricks must eventually enter that house built of bricks despite being built in a process of synthesis (synthetic treatment). (166)

Critically, we carefully note the initial pretreatment product, the distinctive pathway taken to realize the treated product, the distinctive retreatment pathway exercised in order to arrive at the retreated product (etc.). (167)

Hence the critical advantage of this transformational scheme for carefully differentiating these different inputs and the nature of the final retreated product as the output of that overall process of treatment. (168)

Diagrammatical representation of transformations 1 -2 - 3:

2. Treatment Product

Treatment Pathway *Retreatment Pathway*

1. Pretreatment Product **3. Retreated Product** (169)

E.g., we could imagine a pile of bricks are imaginatively piled up to form a house that is then duly built in the retreated state of the former state of its imagined treatment). Logically, we have to note differences along the way. So, e.g., a brick is a material object that cannot be entered (like the entering of a house), and, that the house that gets duly built is also a material object but, in this instance, is also as a logical entity that can be logically entered.[64] (170)

How does this scheme resolve a number of philosophical (and disciplinary) problems (besides the economic integration of the philosophical discipline from the three rela-

[64] In this regard we could say that this property of being able to be entered by a person effectively emerges through that act of retreated synthesis.

tively incommensurable economic correlativities of the hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential sub-disciplines[65]). (171)

Now, 'the problem of change and the apparent continuity of identity' devolves about the fact that in a process of transformation, to a certain extent, we must also deal with the preservation of relative continuities in the form of the imputation of relative-objectivities otherwise there could be no logical subjects subjected to the relatively superficial imposition of change. I.e., that underlying our appreciation of a certain relational-situation the preservation of a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance must be observed. So, we see a pile of bricks that then become reconstituted through a synthetical forms of treatment that realizes the material form of a house built of bricks. Hence this dialectical relationship between pretreatment, treatment and retreatment. (172)

That 'interactions within and between both like and unlike states' can be organized within this transformational scheme. E.g., a glove can be made to fit a certain hand because there is engineered an isomorphic fit between the finger-like sections of those gloves and the fingers of those hands that will be able to wear that those same gloves. Unlike trying to wear a left-handed glove on the right hand even though that glove is still finger-like in its construction. So, we can say, metaphorically, that certain transformationally preserved structures on the object level are preserved on the meta-levels of both treatment and retreatment even if those states are distinctively different epistemologically or ontologically. Just as, e.g., 'a non-virtual apple can be eaten' and 'a dream apple can also be eaten', albeit within the course of a dream whereas an embodied agent I can eat a material apple, and, as dream subject I can also eat an apple, albeit in the virtual state of that specific dream. (173)

Where 'the (overall) hermeneutic circle (of comprehension)' can be understood once translated into a trimodal economic context of transformation where underling the relationship between wholes and parts is relatively preserved in act of both 'writing' and 'reading'. Where, a narrative can be allowed to unfold through the transformations of that narrative, etc. (174)

Just 'as an understanding of different forms of treatment' must produce different forms of transformational productivity', and, with a consistent application of transformational logic, etc., such transformations will also possess a certain degree of integrity in both their formation and consequential ramifications, etc. (175)

This heuristic tool of transformational retreatment can also be applied on an inter-disciplinary level of operation. So, e.g., in our theoretically being able to relate a pragmatic historical prospect to the construction of a pragmatic scientific prospect, and, within the discipline of history, of our being able to relate the relatively incommensurable histories of past, future and present within the economic discipline of history itself. (176)

But, in order to understand 'the dynamics of suspensions and de-suspensions' and the de-anomalization of the meta-rule of retreatment we need to complicate things. (177)

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65 Given that pretreatment is hermeneutically oriented, etc.

2. Transformational Theory II 206

The rule that states all treatment is elevated by one meta-degree has an exception in the meta-rule of retreatment. Please explain. (178)

In the formulation of the six orders (as about to be explored in the next two modules) I discovered that the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing within the archetypal economy (of World, Object and Ego) could distinctively simulate the apparent constitution of these six orders (in their cognitive and trans-cognitive formulations). (179)

Then, in a more insightful way of seeing how these orders were constituted it came to my attention that such subtle preferencing/de-preferencing could be arranged through processes of de-suspension and suspension respectively. Moreover, by invoking an automatic type of de-suspension with each type of suspension I could explain both why it is the case that we are not usually trapped in the suspension, and, how de-suspension parallels this meta-rule of transformational retreatment as being arrived at through a de-elevation in meta-status by one degree. (180)

As an economy, in a circulation of e/valuational formation, transformational retreatment should also be able to be better understood in a circular, non-linear format. This can be arranged by supply a process of posttreatment (where retreated productivity is merely substituted, more or less, for the original pretreatment product. Hence the following addition to the previous diagram of a 'posttreatment pathway':

2. Treatment Product

Treatment Pathway *Retreatment Pathway*

1. Pretreatment Product **3. Retreated Product**

Posttreatment Pathway (181)

But it stands to reason that circular, non-linear structures should also be able to be read in a counterclockwise direction as well as clockwise. Hence the dialectics of this these various cross-interactions. (182)

That, in treating products and pathways as distinctively different orientations we then arrive at the generality of these six orders through various forms of de-suspensional preferentialization and suspensional de-preferentialization which will now be explored in detail in the next two modules. (183)

3. Ordered Theory I 207

An ordered approach was first adopted as a way of explaining and transformationally interrelating the multifarious senses of existence present in the utilization of the verb to be (and accounting for various impossible and possible states along the way, such as square/circles, round-tabletops, abstract nouns, Father Xmas, facts, etc.).[66] (184)

Orders can be proposed as arising from the subtle preferential/de-preferential treatment of the moments of the archetypal economy, but, to date have been developed both for the cognitive/intentional level dealing with conceptual-perceptual processes, and, more importantly, on a trans-cognitive/trans-intentional level of judgmental explication detailing with six distinctive types of judgment, namely, first, essential semantic determination; second, aesthetical determination; third, deontological determination; fourth, pragmatical determination; fifth, hermeneutical determination; and, sixth, ontical or factual determination. (185)

Diagrammatically, these orders can be depicted either in a linear format or in a circular, more economically oriented format… as will be depicted below (starting with a general linear depiction; a linear cognitive depiction; a linear trans-cognitive depiction; and, a circular trans-cognitive depiction of the latter). (186)

Why this designation of 'orders'? Because a certain sense of order must prevail given that epistemological given that more complex epistemological states must imply some conceivable linear progression able to metaphorically analogue such pre-

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66 Over many years an ongoing process of reconciliation was undergone in the evolving formation of an overall ordered philosophy. For a start, there was a movement from a linear format to also including a circular format; a shifting from a bimodal approach to the resonance between the relatively incommensurable natures of conceiving/conception and perceiving/perception, as well as the bipolarity between trans-intentional judgment (of conceptual functions/concepts) and that being judged in intentional terms of reference (as intentional content). The intentional being seen to fall within the Cognitive Aspect of the epistemological hierarchicalization of consciousness, whereas the act of judgment is being seen as being enacted in trans-intentional terms of reference within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect. Eventually these tensions were resolved by primarily proposing a circular, hexamodal model based upon the trimodal nature of the archetypal economy (with Object at the first order, Ego at the third order, and, World at the fifth order). Moreover, each order can be conceived of as possessing a relative incommensurability *vis-à-vis* their adjacent orders but contained within the dialectical circumscription of the economy in question. Furthermore, a distinction was drawn between Cognitive Orders and Trans-Cognitive Orders where the latter demonstrates the particularity of six distinctive types of judgment, albeit within the general nature of the judgmental process itself. The specificity of such judgment finding its expression through e/valuational formation. Then, the phenomenal-phenomenological sub-discipline (centered on the first order), the hermeneutical sub-discipline (centered on the third order), and the existential sub-discipline (centered on the third order and encompassing the 'space' between the non-systematic and the systematic orientations) of the existential) is also conceived of as forming the 'philosophical economy' (complemented or supplemented by the pragmatical economy based on the second, fourth, and sixth orders). Such a scheme also invites forms of isomorphic transformational invariance that allow us to think, speak, write and read, relate to others, and so on. Although one more heuristic device, an ordered philosophy appears, at least to me, to go well beyond a mere playing with ideas since it is my contention that there is much value to be gained from taking up this type of approach, that, in this regard, will prove invaluable in other areas of our philosophical researches given the underlying contention is that such a philosophical tool cannot be merely reduced to its mere patterns of implementation.

conditional steps, etc. So, e.g., the concept of a ‘circular square’ or ‘square circle’ cannot be contemplated and, therefore, such an intentional product cannot move to a higher state of relative representation in which such epithets duly find their relative integration. Thus, a table-top that is square can be given a second ordered status, and so on. Then, such content can be thought about as moving from an integrated conceptual thought to an integrated process of conceptualized reception, that, if not an abstract noun or similar, can then be viewed as that which could possibly be perceived in and through a fourth ordered process of individualization. To complete this account, we then note our migration to the fifth order of this provisional scheme in the hope that such ensuing research has factual like content that can then be better evaluated in sixth ordered ontical or factual-like terms of reference. (187)

In a generally ordered linear format we have the following:[67]

Subsistants				Existents				Subsistants		
1^0	/	2^0	/	3^0	//	4^0	/	5^0	/	6^0
				Ideation		Perception				
		Integrated essential thought content				Non-integrated possibilities				
Non-integrated essential thought content								Factually integrated actuals		

(188)

In the above depiction of this scheme, we can treat ‘existents’ as intentional ‘processes’ whose intentional ‘contents’ are ‘subsistants’ that are either integrated or not integrated, where such subsistants are relatively internal in the form of thought content or relatively external in the form of factual-like states in regard to the intentional objectives being placed under such considerations (and in such co-associated background contexts, etc.). (189)

Now, let me apply this general format to the particularity of the Cognitive Aspect and the trans-Cognitive Aspect respectively. (190)

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67 ‘//’ can be viewed as the resonance between the relatively incommensurable states of conception and perception (a per Kant). But we can also conceive of a similar incommensurable status between all six orders. So, e.g., a thought is not a fact, and, the non-integration of the thought of a table-top that is both square and round at the same time cannot and should not be countenanced as integrated thought through not being able to be experienced in integrated ideational terms of reference, etc.

In a cognitive format we have:

Non-integrated Ideas Possible facts[68]
Semantic essentials[69]

1^0 / 2^0 / 3^0 // 4^0 / 5^0 / 6^0

Integrated semantic thoughts[70] Images[71] Valid facts

(191)

In a trans-cognitive format as a distinctive type of judgment:

Semantical (mapping) Deontological Potentials

1^0 / 2^0 / 3^0 // 4^0 / 5^0 / 6^0

Aesthetical Pragmatical Valid statements
Non-virtual actuals[72]

(192)

In a non-linear, circular, trans-cognitive, judgmental format:

Aesthetical Deontological

2^0 **3^0**

Semantical Pragmatical

1^0 * **4^0**

Ontical Potential

6^0 **5^0** (193)

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68 Potentiality being a mix of possibility, probability, and potency.

69 Or, pre-essential essentials.

70 Or, essential-essential (as the cognitive basis for trans-cognitive aesthetic experiences).

71 Regardless of whether such images are perceptual, remembered, imagined or dreamt, etc.

72 Expressed as conformally valid propositional-statements, albeit in provisional terms of reference.

Now, set up to be expressed as a subtle preferentialization/de-preferentialization of the archetypal economy we get the following:

Deontological 3^0
[*Existential*]

EGO (E)

Aesthetical 2^0 Pragmatical 4^0

OBJECT (O) **WORLD (W)**

[*Phenomenological*] [*Hermeneutical*]
Semantical 1^0 Hermeneutical 5^0

Ontical 6^0 (194)

Now, relative preferential treatment is +ve, and relative de=preferential treatment is -ve. Where…

Semantical 1^0	=	+O/-E/-W
Aesthetical 2^0	=	+O/+E/-W
Deontological 3^0	=	-O/+E/-W
Pragmatical 4^0	=	-O/+E/+W
Hermeneutical 5^0	=	-O/-E/+W
Ontical 6^0	=	+O/-E/+W (195)

E.g., the deontological can be seen as a subtle preferentialization of the Ego moment and, simultaneously, a de-preferentialization of both the Object moment and the World moment, etc. (196)

But, how should we account for these subtle forms of preferentialization and de-preferentialization? This will be explained in the next section by invoking, respectively, de-suspension (as delivering a form of preferential treatment) and suspensions (as delivering a form of de-preferential treatment). (197)

In a more advanced understanding of this topic I will demonstrate, first, its utility in a linear manner, and, then, explore it from the perspective of a philosophy of transformational retreatment. (198)

4. Ordered Theory II 302

In this linear format a proposition can be a valid conformal fact if and only if it can travel through all six orders and be a positive resident in that sixth order:

1^0 2^0 3^0 4^0 5^0 6^0

round/table

1^0 **2^0** 3^0 4^0 5^0 6^0

round-table

1^0 2^0 **3^0** 4^0 5^0 6^0

idea of round-table

1^0 2^0 3^0 **4^0** 5^0 6^0

image of round-table

1^0 2^0 3^0 4^0 **5^0** 6^0

possibility of round-table

1^0 2^0 3^0 4^0 5^0 **6^0**

specific fact of round-table

…so, in this scheme, for a proposition to be valid statement it needs to be able to enter the sixth order as a conformal fact. Invoking a Tarskian semantic approach, we could declare that this sixth ordered status is attained because the meta-proposition that entails 'the specific fact of a certain round-table' is true iff there is a specific fact of a certain round table. I.e., that this transformational shift from the fifth order to the sixth order conformally applies (199)

Or, we could arrive at the same conformal truth determination by noting, in the following linear sequence, that the second order applies if the first order is able to be integrated in semantic terms of reference; then, that integrated thought can be conceived as such; and, obviously, can be conceived as a conceptual process with such ideational content; further, can then be perceived; then can be thought of as possible; and, an in the requisite inventory of facts, is then found to be not only probable but, more importantly, is found to be potently manifested. Or, in broader Tarskian terms (order n)' is true iff (order n) is either directly evident and/or is indirectly evidential… implying that the same truth conditions must apply to all prior orders should some form of ideational configuration meet these necessary conditions. So, 'tabletops that are both round and square need not apply', but, round-tables and square-tables can be considered past a second order (and find a sixth ordered status when they reference a specific fact through either a conformal confirmation and/or a conformal verification, etc. So, e.g., I am in this specific restaurant and can suitably see around me that there are both specific square table-tops and specific round table-tops. (200)

'But, what if I were dreaming?' We could answer, 'so what!?' For the verification of a sixth ordered candidate our phenomenal-phenomenological reception only needs to address, as a relative-objectivity, i.e., as a relative objective representational imputation, a certain state of affairs that measures up to a full meeting with the modal expectations that we would hope are experientially present in our full engagement with such an encounter, be that type of interaction directly and/or indirectly being related to in our engagement with that form of intentional objectivity. So, e.g., in this restaurant, in ordering a meal and eating it on this table I find both this table and that meal both similarly meet such modal expectation.[73] (201)

Or, we could run the candidate of 'Father Xmas' through this same ordered scheme and we would find, generally, that this possible state of affairs has no sixth ordered status even though the fact of Father Xmas does occupy a prominent role in certain cultures as a mythological figure only, and, therefore, as a cultural fact, but, not as a valid instantiation of that cultural landscape (just as we can find multiple people playing the

[73] Namely, modal density of the modal spectrum present; the modal intensity of those modalities considered both individually and collectively; modal propensity to iteratively reinforce the experiential status of that being related to; (plus salience; consilience; and propinquity through proximity of positioning). Such discernment using an economic interaction of correlations, accommodations, and transformations (where the latter are either relatively existential in orientation or not relatively existential in orientation; and so on).

role of Father Xmas, but, as we know and some children do not, that such instances are not a valid instantiation of this mythical figure *per se*. (202)

Taking a non-linear, circular format let me now proffer an explanation for this concept of subtle preferentialization/de-preferentialization. (203)

Deontological 3^0
[*Existential*]

EGO (E)

Aesthetical 2^0 Pragmatical 4^0

OBJECT (O) **WORLD (W)**

[*Phenomenological*] [*Hermeneutical*]
Semantical 1^0 Hermeneutical 5^0

Ontical 6^0

…in the diagram above, let it be proposed, say, that the Object moment is suspended (bracketed, put out of action, dynamically balanced, etc.). I would argue that in the ensuing automatic invocation of a process of de-suspension the other two moments of Ego and Object would be both preferentially treated giving us, as a result, the pragmatical orientation. (204)

Or, if both Ego and World were to be suspended then the Object moment would be preferentially treated and, as a result, the nature of our trans-intentional judgment would take the form of a phenomenal-phenomenological attitude towards the intentional objectivity currently under such scrutiny. (205)

By these more functionally explained means recreating the same table as presented in paragraph 195. (206)

Now, let me integrate an ordered philosophy within the orbit of a philosophy of transformational retreatment and observe how the incorporation of an ordered approach acts as a useful commentary on such processes of transformation. (207)

For convenience, let me rotate the diagram in paragraph 194 by 120^0 in order to virtually align the same with the diagram in paragraph 181. (208)

The economy of transformational retreatment can be viewed in the following fashion by superimposing it on a circular trans-cognitively ordered economy:

1^0
Object
2. Treatment
(Deconstruction)
Phenomenological E/Valuation

6^0
Ontical E/Valuation

2^0
Aesthetical E/Valuation

*

5^0
World
Hermeneutical
1. Pretreatment
(Rectification)

3^0
Ego
Existential
3. Retreatment
(Re(-)Normalization)

4^0
Pragmatical
(4. Posttreatment)

…in traveling from 1. Pretreatment to 2. Treatment we go through the 6^{th} order of the ontical, i.e., provisionally understood, as conformally valid facts. Then, in traveling from 2. Treatment to 3. Retreatment we go through the 2^{nd} order of the aesthetical (as a form of integration if not headed over to a process of harmonization in that existential-deontological orientation of the 3^{rd} order). This overall progression is also conducted from the relatively general to the relative the particular to the relatively specific. Last, we can note that posttreatment travels through the 4^{th} order of the pragmatical. We may, surmise therefore, that 4. Posttreatment need not necessarily be the mere substitution of retreatment productivity for the initial state of the pre-critical pretreatment product. Then in the same vein, we can note that a reversal of the progression from the 1^{st} order to the 5^{th} order via the 6^{th} order could also reconstitute the evolving pretreatment product more in line with a factual assessment of this world at large. Hence these three possible inputs that could be applied to the pre-critical pretreatment product in this process of an evolving economy of ongoing re(-)constitution. The dialectics, therefore, of such a circular economy would also suggest that this temporal or sequential approach to transformational retreatment, although to be seemingly observed over time, does not occur in this simplistic fashion, but, rather, in and through the evolving spontaneity of this economy of transformational retreatment. (209)

Now, in the form of an objection it could be pointed out that as the hermeneutical is already meta-textual in orientation in the fifth trans-cognitive order how is it then possible to review the phenomenal-phenomenological orientation in the first trans-cognitive order as elevated by one met-degree? (210)

There is always a conceptual tension between the linear and circular, between the logical nature of the sequential and the simultaneous-spontaneity of the dialectical orientation. However, because all meta-levels are being exercised concurrently it is merely a difference in emphasis that allows us to metaphorically travel from one orientation or meta-level to another orientation or meta-level. Indeed, it is the apparent preservation of an isomorphic transformational invariance, i.e., relative-objectivities to be reviewed as identifiable-continuities that allow us to think in intentional terms of reference; enter into trans-intentional forms of judgment; cognitively and trans-cognitively focus on pre-cognitive states like perceptual sensations, motor responses, pains and pleasures, impressions and affect or mood, acts of judgment and volition, etc., along with consequential considerations of our enacted deliberations as we inescapably intervene in this world passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and find a circumscribed degree of mutual freedom in our engagement through(-)others… as we navigate, negotiate and arbitrate in this world at large… (211)

Re-viewed in this light we see such an emphasis being placed upon a certain aspect of the transformational economy conceived of in a linear sequence from the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutical pretreatment to the first trans-cognitive order of phenomenological treatment to the ensuing existential (and deontological) retreatment in the third trans-cognitive order in and through a process where such subtle preferential treatment is being arrived at through the suspension(s) of the other two moments in the archetypal economy and where the effective force of the de-suspension is immediately directed to the apparent emphasis of that economic moment currently in question. Let me delineate this dialectical process in more detail (even though such language is more analogical in orientation, albeit rhetorically set up to supply such an apparitional-like reading as here being outlined[74]). (212)

So, to engineer this linear sequence of pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment (and its conversion into a circular process through posttreatment) let me articulate in hypothetical terms how this progression is dialectically organized in relatively non-dialectically oriented language (and imagery). (213)

Through the simultaneous suspensions of both the Object moment (in the first order) and the Ego moment (in the third order) we are automatically presented with a de-suspensional emphasis directed towards the hermeneutical World moment (in the fifth order). Here, through rectification we generally find the approbation of the requisite suite of genres of behaviour needed to invoke given that considerations of problematicity are recognized and written through the utilization of the meta-textual genres expressing the ideation concerning the same. Hence, usually, the need for a minimal degree of rectifica-

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[74] Refer to the delineation of the interrogative economy in the section dealing with Suspension 404. The apparitional suspension being the continual as if, as if, as if, etc. Refer to Suspensions 404.

tion in the utilization of such meta-textual genres. Just like, e.g., if I wanted to eat an apple in front of me, I must decide on whether I will merely bite into it or use a fruit knife, etc. (214)

To then psychically proceed to treatment, exercised in the analytical orientation of the first order as a process of deconstructive-reduction/s through the critical application of all relevant logical forms of treatment in the negative removal of contradictions, inconsistencies, non-integrated incoherencies, etc., processes of suspension are now directed towards the World and Ego moments with the re-direction of intentional emphasis upon this Object moment in first trans-cognitive order (first cognitive order involving the semantic focusing on our intracultural-intercultural mapping/s of atomistic, essential-like phenomenological categories (as well as noting their semantic rules for their integration in a second order). (215)

Interestingly, as we travel through the ontical disposition of the sixth order (concerning the delineation of provisional, conformally valid truth conditions) it could also be argued that our arrival at the de-suspension of the first order necessitates our evidential passage through this preceding sixth order. I.e., that in order to exercise a process of narration in the first order we must also avail ourselves of the factual content being provided by the sixth order (arrived at through the suspension of the Ego moment. I.e., refer to diagram to picture these details in our overall process of treatment…

1. Object/Treatment

6. 2.

5. World/Pretreatment **3. Ego/Retreatment**

4. (216)

The operative mechanism involved in treatment being the negative and analytically oriented processes of deconstruction.[75] (217)

Similarly, in our progression to the stage of retreatment we must pass through the second order of aesthetically oriented inputs (which we may assume involves matters of integration, i.e., following those semantic rules that allow for the molecular treatment of semantic essentials [discerned through forms of eidetic reflection[76]]). So, ‘red-tabletops’ are allowed but not ‘red tabletops that are both round and square at the same time’. (218)

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75 As detailed in Deconstruction 304.

76 Essential experiences conceived of in phenomenal-phenomenological terms of reference only.

Then, we ‘proceed’ to retreatment where, through the ensuing de-suspension, meta-elevation in the phase of treatment is automatically reversed in retreatment. This specific de-suspension being arranged through the simultaneous suspensions of both World and Object moments. This phase can be viewed as the potentially radical revelation of what is to be arrived at through such processes of incrementally reiterated suspensions of the other two moments of World and Object. This primary mechanism in this moment is that of an ongoing process of economic re(-)normalization where potentially radical shifts in direction can be instigated through re(-)self-organization, i.e., a chaotically directed process of re-direction, which should be expressed, preferably, in and through a pro-relational existential orientation. ‘Re(-)normalization where forms of alignment are to be ‘progressively’ re(-)engaged and, hopefully, instigated. (219)

In a simplistic view of retreatment, we perceive the retreated productivity arrived at merely substituting for the pre-critical pretreatment commenced with. However, in an ordered setting, transformational retreatment in a form of posttreatment can be seen as traveling through the pragmatic fourth order where processes of pragmatic discernment could also be invokes as to how the pretreatment is to be reconfigured in more pragmatical terms of reference. In addition to this we could also envisage a reversal of direction where the sixth order, and its concerns for factual conformality, also can have an input (preferably in a frame of reference that is duly suspended and not over-written through ideologically distorted patterns of imprinting along with their ensuing over-commitments and a subsequent pseudo-psychosis[77]). (220)

Now, what are the ramifications of this re-contextualization of transformational retreatment within an ordered scheme? (221)

A better metaphorical understanding of the mechanisms behind the process of treatment/retreatment given that the very nature of intentional ideation and trans-intentional judgment, etc., are dependent upon the very existence of such processes. (222)

As a consequence, we can invoke this method for carefully delineating where we commence in the hermeneutical configuration of pretreatment; what evidential considerations should be present; just what processes of deconstruction should be implemented in such critical, conventional forms of treatment; just what aesthetic inputs are to apply in the integration of such treatment; in what potentially radical form should such ensuing existential specificity is to be arrived at through processes of re(-)self-organization; what pragmatical implications need to be immediately addressed in the re-configuration of the pretreatment productivity… from hermeneutic generality to phenomenal-phenomenological particularity to existential specificity (in our responses). (223)

Now, the focus is on delineating the ramifications of this formula of ‘rectification, deconstruction, and ongoing re(-)normalization’ as the basic tools for the operation of a pragmatic philosophical prospect (and as also applicable to any other disciplinary prospect through ongoing processes of re(-)adoption and re(-)adaptation). (224)

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[77] Or, noting the opposite defect of an under-commitment where existentially oriented inputs are not duly observed in our responsive and responsible patterns of intervention being, therein, exercised.

5. Rectification 303

‘Rectification’ is ‘the refinement of meta-textual genre uptake through ongoing processes of re(-)adoption and re(-)adaptation of this aspect of textual production’. (225)

Because problematicity, whether disciplinary or secular in orientation, is defined in terms of the mix of the genres being re(-)appropriated, and, hence, our appreciation of the same can be expressed through degrees of either approbation and/or disapprobation along with those refinements when adjustments are perceived as be necessary. (226)

So, e.g., when deciding to eat an apple I might chose to bite into that apple or use a fruit knife. Or, when faced by a piece of unknown fruit given to me to sample, I might well need to ask how do I eat that piece of unknown fruit? Perhaps asking myself if it looks as if it needs to be skinned like a banana or peeled like an orange or eaten whole like an apple or would I need to cook it first like a quince, and so on? (227)

Consequently, such refinements would also help us to re(-)appreciate the nature of that problem be such problematicity already non-virtually recognized or discerned through its virtual problematization. (228)

Taking what is to hand and refining our approach towards a re(-)appropriation of that topic. (229)

In this we refine, either intuitively or in more detail, the integration of our mapping of the genres being brought to bear both on the problematic nature of our topic but also the definition of our mapping of the genres being adopted and adapted for our directly dealing with that topic. (230)

I.e., as to which genre is prioritized over another in a hierarchy of genres and as to how an individual genre should be sequenced or re(-)sequenced accordingly. (231)

Hence this relatively more active positive approach in supervising the functionality of our genre appropriations in relatively pre-critical pretreatment (in comparison to the passive application of conventional forms of logic in the negative regularization of deconstructive practice subsumed under the aegis of treatment). (232)

As a place to begin, we fall back on past forms of understanding. (233)

Recognizing that moments of pretreatment will become progressively reorganized over time, but, preferably re(-)self-organized in the adoption and adaptation of a pro-relational approach to the relational approaches already being adopted and adapted through such ongoing processes of rectification, etc. (234)

Then, from such generality, we procced to the particularity of the phenomenal-phenomenological domain as a practical sphere for critical forms of conventional treatment. (235)

6. Deconstruction 304

‘Deconstruction’ is here perceived to be is a ‘relatively negative form of regularization in which practical issues are critically treated through the auspices of relatively conventional forms of logic in which we either remove and/or resolve contradictions, incoherencies, evidential inconsistencies, fallacious arguments, mistaken premises, false conclusions, ideological forms of bias, mis-appropriation of information (through an appreciation of defective information as either uninformed information, disinformation, misinformation, and/or mal-information, etc.), along with the apposite de-hierarchicalization of power structures, etc.’ (236)

The operative mechanism of deconstruction is the utilization of an extensive transcendental suspension in which the form of the text is reduced (and, therein and thereafter, harmonized accordingly through a process of re(-)normalization). (237)

That such a reduction is primarily analytical, but, without exempting rectificational synthesis and both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented forms of nomination. (238)

Setting the stage, hopefully, for more pragmatically oriented, re(-)self-organized patterns of suitably re(-)directed existentially oriented transformation with the potential to take a more radical stance in the ensuing course of such proceedings enacted in an openness to such re(-)normalization. (239)

This treatment is also primarily phenomenal-phenomenological in scope. (240)

‘Phenomenal’ in the sense that ‘lived-reality is shaped in and through living-reality in which we directly interact with this world at large despite the part we play in intentional constitution of such phenomenal influences, etc.’. (241)

‘Phenomenological’ in the sense that we appropriate and map essential phenomenological characteristics in a metaphorical atlas of maps with varying degrees of intracultural and intercultural integration and non-integration, re-integration and disintegration, etc. (242)

Although the operative mechanism within treatment is the utilization of an extensive transcendental suspension, still, the emphasis on this first trans-cognitive order, and its adjunct orders of the sixth and second, is only realized through the simultaneous suspensions of the third and fifth orders. Then, primarily in the first order, the constitutional form of that being focused upon can be more clearly explicated. (243)

Ideologically neutralized through the use of applied suspensions, subjected to conventional forms of both logical deconstruction and an ensuing reintegration, and, therein, elevated by one degree in meta-status in preparation for the specificity and possible radical re-organization that could be enacted through ensuing patterns of re(-)self-organized processes of resolution, i.e., re(-)normalization. (244)

7. Re(-)Normalization 305

'Re(-)normalization', as noted, is 'the relatively radical re-organization that could be enacted through the permitted uptake of ensuing patterns of re(-)self-organized processes of resolution'.[78] (245)

Here we engage a process of ongoing relational re(-)alignment dependent upon both rectification and deconstruction along with patterns of resolution preferably of an existential orientation. (246)

Hence its implication in observing both relatively non-existential and existential patterns of responsiveness and, hopefully, responsibility in the ensuing conduct of our relationships. (247)

Through such ongoing relational resolution, the facticity of our relationships is hopefully (incrementally and non-chaotically) augmented and (non-incrementally and chaotically) enhanced in either their overall creation, preservation, and/or conservation of a positively enriched sense and semblance of e/valuational formation. (248)

Given an appreciation of ordered forms of e/valuational formation it follows that an overall sense and semblance of 'value' should fall under the those six orders as constituted through the subtle preferentialization/de-preferentialization (enacted, respectively through de-suspensions and suspensions) as centered around those archetypal moments of World, Object, and Ego which then give us, respectively, patterns of e/valuational[79] formation that fall under the headings of function/functionality, identity/identification, and, value/valuation (which, in turn, fall under the primary heading of the existentially deontological, and, secondarily, under the adjuncts of the aesthetical and the pragmatical trans-cognitive orders). (249)

In essence, 're(-)normalization' is 'the entire economy of rectification, deconstruction and re-normalization operating in such a fruitful, speculative manner that it occasions re(-)self-organized patterns of existentially oriented reconstruction that are allowed to suitably manifest themselves in such a manner so as to both augment and enhance the creation, preservation and/or conservation of e/valuational formation in the relationship in question as represented through its apparent relational-situatedness. (250)

Hence this understanding that re(-)normalization oversees the integration through re(-)alignment of relationships as preparation for the more systematic-existential. (251)

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[78] Adapting a mathematical concept used in physics where infinities are replaced by observed valued. Here I have adapted this broad idea by noting that inputs from both rectification and deconstruction along with any propensities for re(-)self-organized processes of resolution enter into an overall process where incremental forms of alignment are realized through ongoing realignment which has been explicated as rectificational realignment (basically conducted as a form of ongoing genre approbation), deconstructive re-de-mis-alignment (as a form of error correction utilizing conventional logical inputs), and the uptake of relatively radical re(-)-self -organization that follow on from forms of ongoing resolution, i.e. re-alignment.

[79] I.e., reading 'e/valuational formation' as 'both trans-cognitive 'evaluation' (as an act of judgment) and valuation (as the delivered content of that judgmental act)'.

8. Systematic-existential Theory 401

The so-called third moment (of the philosophical economy or archetypal economy) is the ‘non-systematic-existential moment’ or ‘existential moment’ for short. I would argue that through a double suspension of the phenomenological moment (Object) and the hermeneutical moment (World) we arrive automatically at the existential moment (Ego). When we suspend all three moments in a dynamic state of balance through ongoing pro-relational resolution we then arrive at the systematic sense and semblance of the existential, albeit as a work in progress (that ideally should arise through an ongoing process of re(-)self-organization). Thence the manifestation of an existentially oriented experience in which we experience an apparent alignment with our relationship/s in their relational-situatedness. An experience with distinctive existential hallmarks signifying the specificity of the immediacy of an ongoing and continuing sense and semblance of the present; distinctive existential predicators of future existentially oriented experience and probable behaviour/s; and, existential indicators of past historical existentially oriented conformity. That, in effect, such semblances of pro-relational alignment are holistically stamped on textual production and can be delineated as such through their re(-)simulated sense and semblance of such an attunement by virtue of its re-simulated distinctiveness. So, e.g., in our reading of a novel such indications of relative authenticity or the relative lack of the same would also be expressed in a similar manner… making little difference between the relatively non-virtual and the virtual. What, then, can be delineated? (252)

As existential hallmarks, I would argue that we apperceive the immediate specificity of the present in the immediacy of its continuing duration which might be metaphorically compared to ‘the eternal moment’, the ‘here and now’ (*hic et nunc*), etc. (253)

As an existential predictor we apperceive the apparent intention or intentions to promote the richness of the relational-situation in question in their relational-situatedness (through the perception of either imminent creation, preservation and/or conservation of e/valuational richness… as if through the simulation of certain imperatives). (254)

Similarly, as an existential indicator we are presented with a similar array of evidence to the same effect, namely, the past promotion of the richness of the relationship or relationships in question in their relational-situatedness (through the perception of the apparent creation, preservation and/or conservation of e/valuational richness in formation as having occurred). Presenting with a sense of the ‘ahistorical’ in such treatment. (255)

Such apperceptions and perceptions finding a certain degree of conformity along with the virtual or non-virtual simulation of the relatively presented or absented degree of apparent authenticity either being presented, or to be presented or was represented, and, finds itself being re(-)presented through this ongoing economy of re(-)presentation enacted through the reiteration of such re(-)simulations. Making the argument that through processes of resolution, through the ensuing re-direction of intentions, we find the relational nature of experience holistically expressed especially when enacted from a pro-relational perspective. I.e., we holistically experience the nature of a relationship and the extent that that relationship is effectively self-authenticating itself through these process-

es of re(-)self-organization (that are similarly re-iterated through the re(-)simulation of the same). A process on par to the phenomenological reception of the phenomenologically essential in experiential terms of reference (in our recognition of both atomistic[80] and molecular[81] forms of characteristic identification [which must not be mistaken for Aristotelian ideas of essences or any other impossible philosophical notions mis-constructed along similar lines as all too often espoused by 'philo-sophists', i.e., those relegated philosophers who only deserve to be demoted, and, preferably, ignored[82]]). (256)

In the support of such contentions, I am arguing that existentially oriented experience is distinctively perceived (in experience) and apperceived (upon reflection). That, without such distinctive recognitions, this dimension, effectively, will be overlooked, or worse, just denied by the non-*cognoscenti*. Optimistically, I would claim that most of us already have such an appreciation 'that only needs to be further refined', or, at least, worked with to reach that point of becoming a fully 'self-recognized-recognition'. (257)

Moreover, given the existential orientation is to be enacted and recognized through the 'existentialization of the relatively non-existential' such a delineated differentiation needs to be both exercised as distinctive types of correlation, and, thereafter, accommodated as a distinctive process of existentially oriented transformation. (258)

On the understanding that what we have to work with are 'correlations, accommodations and transformations'… when invoked, respectively, on phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential terms of reference when exercised on 'horizontal' terms of reference, i.e., when operating within a similar level or set of levels of epistemological organization. Say, in the Cognitive Aspect, or, the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of Judgment, or, between the same, etc. (259)

Introducing here 'vertical' terms of reference in regard to 'distinctions, meta-distinctions and transitions (as transformations within a distinction or set of distinctions[83])'. So, e.g., in truth determination, from a Tarskian perspective, we note content in the meta-distinction (consisting of correlations, etc.) is true iff the distinction is evidently present in some form or other. (260)

Now, let me introduce the observation that in each and every economy there are only three prominent forms of economic operation. E.g., basically, subsumed under forms of phenomenologically oriented correlations, hermeneutically oriented accommodations, and existentially oriented transformation (paralleling the archetypal economy).[84] (261)

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80 E.g., 'saltiness' as experienced in a process of eidetic reflection or recollection.

81 E.g., 'drinking' a 'liquid' (that may or may not be salty).

82 Unfortunately, something that is very difficult to do given their control over major philosophical discourses, etc.

83 E.g., translated-transformations in space such as only one of the following, namely, movement, rotation and reflection. Hence the observation in paragraph 261 that reflects this observation that each economy only has three distinctively prominent forms of operative transformation (or transition).

84 We can reverse engineer this claim along the following lines. Each relative economic correlativity within a specified economy has a primary form of functional operation. Therefore, each economy would have three prominent modes of functional operation. However, because of the holistic nature of each and

So, e.g., in the economy the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension (as an economically trimodal translation of the hermeneutic circle) we find only analyzed parts, synthesized wholes, and transformationally oriented wholes-and-parts'. Or, e.g., in the interrogative economy we find the promoted exercise of rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional manoeuvres only., etc. Or, e.g., in the gestalt economy we find backgrounding (as a form of contextualization), focusing (as a form of objectifying), and subjectifying (through the co-association of intentional [transcendental] subjectivity, etc. (262)

In a collectivization of existential hallmarks, etc., e.g., we might surmise that there is also a sense, and experiential semblance, where the existential can be treated as a trans-historical imputation, albeit as an imputation only, but still as an imputation that transcends both the merely historical expressions of past, present and future, and, the specific immediacy of current existential experience in the concrete historical re-presentation of the present as is to be experienced in a non-systematic orientation. So, e.g., when we read in a novel of a certain character enacting what appears to be obviously an existentially oriented pattern of existential intervention, we might surmise that the resolutional qualities of such enaction must transcend the mere historical expression of that same type of event if such an event were to be reiterated in relatively similar existential circumstances I.e., if it were to be both resimulated with a similar configuration and if it were to be experientially reperceived (and reapperceived through judgmental reflection) by different people with the same abilities to appreciate those same imputed existential characteristics. That similar rhetorical structures, etc., could be used to elicit similar responses… as a basis for the writing of novels, etc. That, in accepting the convolutions of this complex argument, it would appear that both the writer and reader would need to delineate a number of different senses to be attached to historical tenses (already complicated by historical perspectives where in different languages we find different constructions to report on actions that have stopped or are continuing, whether desired or merely reported, or are still continuing across different historical period of time, etc.). So, e.g., the 'historical' past (as neither present nor future in the time-period being more directly discussed); the deconstructive 'ahistorical' sense of time; the 'trans-historical' sense of existential time apperceived from a relatively timeless sense of the present. Similarly, the semblance of an 'historical present'; the 'specific concrete sense of the present' as discerned in and though the existential moment; the 'trans-historical semblance of the present' that a novelist or religionist or moralist might invoke, regardless of whether they are relatively right or wrong to have made that type of claim but where it is at least understood as a timeless claim. I.e., if *A* in situation *s* enacts *x*, and *x* is suitably discharged harmonically, then *x* must be judged as suitably apposite, etc. But, I would add that such a claim is not essential to the holding of an existentialism (as perceived as founded upon the non-systematic-existential moment becoming more universally treated within the configuration of that type of situation in question). So, e.g., the assassination of Julius Caesar might be seen as

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every economy this does not mean that there can only be one functioning operation per economic correlativity. So, e.g., in the deconstructive purview of the phenomenological nature of the first cognitive/trans-cognitive order/s it does not mean we merely find forms of analytical reduction even if that is the primary disposition of deconstructive analysis. Similarly, this holism applies both horizontally on the same epistemological plane (or planes) but also vertically between relatively different level in epistemological organization. In effect, paralleling the imputation of the trimodal nature of the underlying archetypal economy.

morally ‘wrong’, whereas the hypothetical opportunity to assassinate a person like Adolf Hitler might be perceived to be quite otherwise?[85] (263)

Existentially oriented experience just cannot be either recognized, encountered, and/or engaged without the exercise of a suitable suspension (in a form I have technically delineated as an ‘extensive suspension’[86]) but which at this point of my exposition could be temporarily referred to as a ‘transcendental (phenomenological) suspension’ courtesy of the work of Edmund Husserl. For a start, the ideological mindset is antithetical to such experience. Then, all ideological positioning needs to be suspended in order to then procced to such an awareness. That, moreover, it is through such an open suspension that we then infer the existential through the non-systematic-existential moment and, thence, through continuing to exercise a more thorough ‘transcendental suspension’ that then allows us to proceed; from a more material orientation to that of the non-systematic relational orientation, and, thence, through a(n en)deepening of that suspension, to a more mature sense and semblance of a pro-relational, systematic-existential orientation. (264)

The intellectual difference in contemplating the same semblance of a shift from the historian ‘doing history’ to the apparition of ‘history doing history’ itself through forms of re-righting/up-righting in a possible process of an engaged compensation for past injustices, etc.[87] Or, e.g., ‘the relational-situation in its relational-situatedness doing the relational-situation it its relational-situatedness’… ‘being radical’… re(-)framing… metaphorically ‘turning things upside down, back to front, and inside out….’ (265)

As intimately bound up with ideas on the expedition of responsive and responsible patterns of existentially oriented intervention. Just as if those same patterns of enaction were to be written up in a novel and were to elicit in most of us similar patterns of existential recognition, encountering and engagement, or, at the very least, an irrepressible admiration for the same regardless of our intracultural and intercultural education and influences. That, just as the ‘pragmatic attitude’, therefore, should not be equated with ‘mere expediency’ and, therein and thereby, invites the persistence of the deontological, albeit as purged of all so-called ethical principles, being read as much more than mere guidelines, so, too, we should see the invitation of the existential at the very center of such a responsive-responsibleness that, at the same time, is not non-cognizant of the import of parallel aesthetical and pragmatical influences as well, etc. Moreover, that such an open, existential attitude should be central to our entire appreciation of all ordered phenomena, and, made, as well, the living-basis for all secular and disciplinary modes of behaviour regardless of ideas concerning mere contingency. (266)

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85 Abandoning ‘principles’. No doubt Julius Caesar had his detractors as well which might well have been one of the reasons why he felt the need to tell his side of his military campaigns? E.g., Books *On the Gallic Wars* (*Commentarii de Bello Gallico*), and, *On the Roman Civil War* (*Commentarii de Bello Civili*).

86 As primarily developed in *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline* in Volume II, and with a few later refinements in Volume III. The reason for this elaboration of the ‘overall transcendental suspension’ mirroring, e.g., the three suspensions central to the interrogative economy, is a recognition of the need to also economically include an automatic de-suspension and, then, the intimate part played by the suspension in the conversion of virtual simulations into non-virtually enacted causally oriented simulations. Refer to the module Suspensions 404.

87 As discussed in the essay *Pursui*t, III.7V.

9. Disciplines 402

All functions are to be economically understood, and, the economic nature of disciplines is no different. Let me demonstrate the ramifications of this point. (267)

Each well-constituted discipline could well make the claim, rightly or wrongly, that they are engineering a beneficial set of circumstances for a certain set of inhabitants who reside in the secular world. I.e., either creating positive e/valuational formation, preserving and/or conserving the expansion of the same. That, in effect, each discipline has a distinctive sense and semblance of a 'mission' which we could view as both its passively descriptive 'disciplinary difference' or its dynamically active, prescriptively articulated 'disciplinary differential'.[88] That an appositely executed suspension of the former should deliver a co-associated, distinctive expression of its existential engagement as its specific form of 'disciplinary contrast' to the extent such an overall sense and semblance of a mission diverges from all other disciplinary missions. Otherwise, disciplines would be seen to overlap and sometimes be mere equations possessing the same apparent mission-statements even if expedited with some minor differences.[89] That granted, we must therefore assume that distinctive disciplines have distinctive differences, etc. Hence this overall concept of a 'disciplinary distinction' whose difference forms a distinctive differential contrast with other disciplines. (268)

But, we can then ask 'just what value does this phenomenologically understood disciplinary distinction have (in regard to both that discipline *per se* and its ostensive benefits as being engineered on the behalf of the secular world *per se*)? Overlooking the value[90] generated within the discipline itself, be that relatively non-financial and/or financial in scope, we should approach this question from a hermeneutic perspective in order to enquire as to 'which genres of behaviour indicate such an imputed beneficial sense and semblance of e/valuation being sought by that discipline?' This could be called the 'meta-distinction of that discipline in question, i.e., its 'meta-distinction'. (269)

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88 Senses of definition conducted, respectively, in a phenomenal-phenomenological orientation and a hermeneutical orientation. That a dynamically balanced suspension of the former then gives us a non-systematic-existential contrast

89 Like the contemporary medical field, e.g., where we have a range of therapies from the orthodox to the less orthodox, but, all out attempting the same type of mission, namely, their being 'therapeutic'. Of course, whether that is the case or not is up to forms of critical and radical appreciation preferably based on an existential basis able to discern the twin pillars of a pragmatic discernment, namely, authenticity (of disciplinary interactions) and competence (in the discharging of either such self-perceived and/or other-perceived missions being seemingly dealt with by that discipline in question).

90 More correctly understood as the 'e/valuational formation' rather than the mere 'value' viewed, primarily, through a deontological lens, and, secondarily, through aesthetical and pragmatical lenses, and forms of e/valuation expanded to take in besides existential value/valuation, considerations of phenomenological identity/identification and hermeneutical function/functionality (as per paragraph 249). Hence my usual reluctance to merely talk simplistically about 'value' given my complex take on this issue. Furthermore, an ordered approach would also lead us to discern both individual and collective expressions of an ordered appreciation that cannot be reduced to any one order let alone the fact that the judgment of evaluation delivers a corresponding sense and semblance of valuation more corresponding to the ordered nature of its genesis.

Furthermore, as this distinctive form of a beneficial service is being engineered by that discipline primarily on the behalf of the secular world we must further enquire as what absence of a difference there is between such beneficially intended service and the secular world in which this benefit is to be existentially directed and experienced. (270)

Hence the articulation of the disciplinary economy as possessing the relative economic incommensurabilities as instrumental in the unique formation of a disciplinary distinction, a meta-distinction, and a non-distinction.[91] (271)

Predicated in such a manner we then observe that all disciplines, as economic formations, must also possess the same archetypal structural-functions as any other economy… and be regarded accordingly. (272)

Such granted, we are now in a position to work in the opposite direction, namely, thematize the mission of a specific discipline, articulate the type of value formations being intended, and, delineate in which manner a discipline that is existentially operated can pragmatically function in the requisite manner that is both authentic and competent. (273)

Provisionally defining 'authenticity' as 'as that to be discerned through the exercise of an ongoing extensive suspension that is suitably pre-informed and well-exercised in such a manner so as to insightfully comment upon the current nature of that research (either from the self-perspective of that discipline itself and/or from the other-perspectives, say, from the perspective of a philosopher or sociologist, or a political-economist, or an existentialist, etc.)' (274)

Provisionally defining 'competence' as 'as that ability to adequately fulfill such intentional objectives that are reasonably well-designed and well-defined within that discipline in question, and, where the disciplinarian functions to the best of their abilities through exercising a suitable series of suspensions as well as being receptively aware of the ramifications of the ensuing transformations expedited by the suitable application of such critical and radical means', and by such means, therein, delivering both 'relevance' and enrichment in e/valuational formation. (275)

I.e., by professionally applying the formula of 'rectification, deconstruction, and ongoing re(-)normalization' under the auspices of suitably exercised suspensions! (276)

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[91] These ideas on a disciplinary economy were first thematized in my *Theological Investigations*, Volume II, being formulated in regard to a similar set of theological differences. There, I argued that theologians, theists, etc., entertained a broader vison of the world than the secularist whereby their broad vision of the world minus the secular component gave them this sense and semblance of a 'theological difference'. The next two questions asked were just what value does this imputed difference possibly possess (which was answered in a hermeneutic mode by seeking those genres where such value was to be either both suffered and/or enjoyed), and, just how are we imputed to relate to such e/valuation in such a manner given that there could be no absolutistical difference between the secular world and the world of the imputed Divine?' on the grounds that that which does not exist for us can have no existence for-us and we need not be there for-it, etc. Hence the import of this necessary non-theological difference (otherwise such a theology would have no meaningfully significant value either for-us and we for-it… which would be both fatal for any theology and any discipline predicated on such an unbridged chasm between the ensuing postulation of such differences, etc.).

Seen through this set of lenses we can now seek to define the primary mission of the philosophical discipline (despite the controversial nature of that type of task). (277)

To my mind, namely, through the perception and apperception that the philosophical mission is to delineate those methods that better explicate those positive approaches to truth determination that deliver a relevant enrichment in e/valuational formation that assists in overseeing more insightfully beneficial ways of expressing our individual and collective passages through this world at large, albeit through the auspices of a viable, qualified, anti-representational pragmatic approach to all relevant disciplinary prospects that progressively create, preserve and conserve the enrichment of both our intracultural and intercultural interactions within a secular sense of the overall life-world'. (278)

Of course, there is relatively nothing in that expanded definition that is at all controversial[92] (given the exegesis as outlined to date), but, no doubt, through a lack of critical and radical appreciation it would be disputed by both philo-sophists and philosophers alike. As previously intimated, the former, hopefully, can be suitably ignored, and, the latter need only be patiently listened to in order to then be as patiently addressed so that their serious concerns can be sufficiently redressed in such an apposite manner so as to effectively assuage those genuine concerns. (279)

Ideally, the role of the philosopher is to proffer forms of beneficial supervision through either indicating and/or exercising existential interventions within this world at large without being too diverted by other matter that do not so directly contribute to our being more 'productive' of e/valuational formation through our relationships given the amplification of our freedoms through the arbitrated auspices of others. (280)

Hence this mission for the enaction of truth determination, etc., that occurs in a viable, qualified, anti-representational, pragmatically open semblance of a prospect effectively designed to be of assistance to those who are resident in a secular world, who may or may not be disciplinarians, and who may or may not be religious.[93] (281)

([92] Of course, I am being ironic. Still, through such humour I am suggesting that a somewhat non-controversial course could be charted by taking those patient steps that, both in themselves and collectively, would seriously avoid much of what traditionally would have been counted and courted as controversial, albeit often for good reasons through misinterpretation and forms of misdirected practice. That this course could be conducted, and controversy somewhat obverted, by 'dealing with what is to hand; carefully noting our correlations, accommodations and transformations; patiently applying rectification, deconstructions, and re(-)normalizations; by trying to be as non-mis-informed as possible; recognizing what limitations exists as limitations *qua* limitations, etc., and, by such small steps, entertain the semblance of our making some degree of hard won progress, increment by increment. At least arriving at those points in time when certain controversial issues no longer appear as controversial as when they were first received. Needless to say, having no truck whatsoever with more traditional forms of controversial material given an expected implicit exposure of the misconstruction of their impossible formulations that so shortsightedly created, perpetrated, and perpetuated such seemingly non-philosophical, controversial propositions in the first place.

[93] Such an approach, like the sub-discipline of existentialism, being able to be used by religionists and non-religionists alike, i.e., assisting but neither promoting nor subverting such non-secular forms of choice.

IV. Beyond Philosophies

1. Pragmatism 403

Almost by default a pragmatic philosophy, that is not reduced to mere forms of expediency, needs to be exercised in both an authentic and competent manner over the course of its exercise. (282)

Moreover, it also needs to be articulated as existentially motivated, as observant of both deontologically and pragmatically oriented ethical concerns, as positively nihilistic, as well as being anti-representationally 'represented'.[94] (283)

That, even though both language and experience are predicated upon the apparent continuity for(-)us of relative-objectivities that are transformationally invariant isomorphically, still, such observations should be neither mistreated as absolutistical-objectivities nor dismissed as non-representative in any form whatsoever! By the observance of such means, are we able then to pragmatically walk a middle path… within the constructive guidelines of a viable, qualified, anti-representationalism. (284)

Since what does not exist for(-)us cannot be there for us, and we need not be there for(-)it![95] (285)

'Authenticity' in a pragmatic-existentialism can be defined as 'the expression of our being in the world in such a manner that is not contaminated by ideologically preferences given their suitable suspension and through an ensuing receptivity to our relationships that allows them to express through(-) us an ongoing, mutual augmentation and enhancement of an e/valuational formation for the mutual enrichment of both ourselves-and-others.[96] (286)

Or, with some unusual brevity, 'in our observing a mutual alignment with our relationships in their relational-situatedness'.[97] (287)

Where 'competence' calls for a pragmatic approach that reveals a relative successfulness being arrived at in either a disciplinary or secular framework'. (288)

By their joint application, we find a suitable arbitration of our aspirations! (289)

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94 As explored, e.g., in the series of essays operating as an introduction to the topic of pragmatism as found in *Pursuit*, III.2W-2Z, and elsewhere in Book 6. By 'represented' is meant as participating in a representational economy (that is equally presentational and re-presentational/anti-representational by virtue of the fact that we need to observe and be observant of the apparent continuity of 'relative objectivities' as they appear through processes of transformational isomorphic invariance (as explored in a philosophy of transformational retreatment, etc.).

95 A maxim that applies to both theists and non-theists alike.

96 More succinctly expressed by Lindsay Mell as either 'mutual relational experience' or 'equitable relational pragma'.

97 Where 'observing' is to be interpreted through 'passive encounters, active recognitions, and engaged patterns of pro-relational interactiveness'.

2. Suspensions 404

An integrated ‘theory of the transcendental suspension’, in the formation of an ‘economy of suspension’, is better expressed as an explanation of the *raison d’être* of the need for an ‘extensive suspension’. (290)

I.e., accounting for the need for a ‘transcendental suspension’ as exercised through an interrogative economy, as the basis for exercising aspirations and arbitrations, as implicating the need for an equally opposite de-suspension lest we be ‘eternally trapped in the suspension’, and as a mechanism to interpose between virtual and non-virtual modes that representatively simulate and intervene in and through causal phenomena. (291)

We could interpret the phenomenal-phenomenological economy (as exercised by the subdiscipline of phenomenological practice) as consisting of analytical-like reductions, the synthesis of reconstituted processes, and suspensions arrived at through either the individual suspensions of the former or, preferably, the balanced suspension of both parties, and, thence, even more preferably, the suspension of all three parties (representing respectively phenomenological, hermeneutical and non-systematic-existential inputs to the overall philosophical economy). That third party being seen to emerge from the suspensions of the former two parties. Thence ‘the overall transcendental suspension’ central to the interrogative economy and, by extension, to all economies. (292)

That this same format of the overall transcendental suspension also mirrors the functionality of ‘the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension’ (as a trimodal translation of the bimodal nature of the hermeneutic circle). (293)

In asking a question we invoke the ‘interrogative economy’ that is ‘posed as a rhetorical question with an implicit an answer in to two parts, namely, a first metaphorical reply, and, a second apparitional reply when suitably read along more literal lines, albeit when viewed ‘as if’ a provisional imputation, etc. (even though by habit will be reviewed, more often than not, in a relatively non-imputational light)’. (294)

Functionally structured in this manner, the overall transcendental suspension, as mirrored in the interrogative economy, comprises three distinctively different suspensions situated in a performative state of an overall suspension through the dynamic balance of all three moments. Let me explain. (295)

The rhetorical suspension is a dis-conjunctive suspension of the ‘either/or’. To propose a well-formed question, we already imply the existence of one or two, or more possible relies. So, e.g., the theist asks, ‘does God exit?’ with, for them, only one replay, namely, ‘God does exist’. Hence the truncated form of a rhetorical question. Or, ‘is the action of killing this murderous dictator morally right or morally wrong?’ might well be regarded as having two solutions. Or, in asking the question ‘are you depressed?’ we could be presented with three replies, namely, ‘yes, I am depressed’, or, ‘no, I am not

depressed' meaning either 'I am manic' or 'I am neither manic nor depressed'. That, in effect, a dis-conjunctive suspension is a type of suspension. (296)

That, in forming a reply to a question, I would argue that we meet at first with a metaphorical form of reply. "Is that John over there?' 'Yes, that person does look like John'. Now a metaphor is a conjunctive suspension, namely, that as centered on the analogical use of 'like' that needs to be read as 'both like and not like' (but not 'is'). Now metaphors cannot be treated literally. However, the usually expected reply to most question is not intended to be left in a metaphorical state hovering between both 'like' and 'not-like". Hence the second reply. (297)

Now, I would argue that a more literal second reply is foundered on an apparitional suspension entertained through an eternally repetitive 'as if, as if, as if…, etc.' By such means noting the observation that we are not privy to the absolutistically indubitable nor do we need to be so bound since on the probability of truth determination we do not need nor would recognize, encounter, and engage such an impossible form of truth determination even if one were to be presented to us in broad daylight. (298)

Then, the overall transcendental suspension can be read as enacting a dynamic balance of the above.[98] (299)

From a perspective of 'transformational retreatment' we might view this progression as one of 'hermeneutically asking a question (pre-critical pretreatment), making a phenomenological reply (as a critical form of treatment), and, when suitable process of resolution is realized, then entering into an apparitional second reply (as a potentially radical form of retreatment in which we will meet with the full, concrete specificity of historical existence, etc.). (300)

Traditionally, suspensions have been compared to, among other things, the running of either contra-intentional content in apposition with the presentation of its intentional content, and/or, running counter-processes in apposition with the presentation of its intentional processes. So, e.g., setting metaphors against anti-metaphors (as a device much loved by poets and the writer of religious texts, etc.). In the process entertaining a dynamically arrived balance that in itself acts a form of suspension from whose depths we might hopefully exist with some degree of insight, or, at least, some inkling of what an author may or may not have been up to. (301)

Or, running local or global suspensions by 'bracketing' or 'putting out of action' or 'disabling', or disenabling', or 'writing out of imaginative existence through some form of virtual erasure', etc. By such means forcing us to confront the apparent intentional constitution of that being suspended by such temporary means. Running a more global suspension by doing this to 'our accumulative experience of the entire world in its imaginative totality'. (302)

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[98] The above is also highly reminiscent of Boolean algebra. A (rhetorical) 'or', a (metaphorical) 'and', and 'not' that could be read as provisional in tenor when treated as 'as if', etc?

Or, another strategy is to liken the world to an illusion or dream, or something that is ephemeral like a drop of dew, a bubble, and so on. A tactic often chosen in religious texts for inducing a series of suspensions.[99] However, such religionists, like other ideologues, get their metaphorical knickers in a knot when they take such similes all too literally. The metaphorical suspension of 'like' should be read as 'both like and not like' and not as a literal 'is'. However, as pointed out, the second reply to the rhetoric of a question is a literal is either the affirmation of a literal reply or the confirmed or verified absence of the same. So, there is this one exception where a metaphorical 'like', or 'not like', can be superseded by a literal 'is' although this is interpreted by myself as being seen through an apparitional-like lens with the iterations of 'as if, as if, as if…' (but never to be perfectly taken up in some indubitable form of a 'being being being' or 'an is that is that is that is' (even though we more often experience practical degree of insurance and assurance that allows us to establish a basic conformal economy that cannot be completely overrun by any form of a promiscuous disbelief or diabolical skepticism or perfect paranoia, and so on, and so forth. (303)

A healthy suspicion has many philosophical uses, but, a rampant denialism, or similar, has no place in the vigorous functioning of a well-adjusted discipline. (304)

Now, the trimodal constitution of the 'interrogative economy' is viewed by myself 'as one part rhetorical, one part metaphorical and one part apparitional' (where the latter expression might be tentatively defined 'as if somewhere in the middle of the following contragram' "'the simulation of reality' and 'the reality of simulation'." Moreover, the dynamic balance of these three parties can also be seen to form an additional suspension in its own right. (305)

However, if this idea of the suspension is going to do more of the work requested of it then we must also add the impetus of a de-suspension (as previously introduced to establish a subtle sense of an economic preference for one or two economic polarities to establish, amongst other things, the expedited expedition of an ordered analysis. (306)

In this regard we can superimpose a trimodal economy of the suspension (established through the 'interrogative economy' and referred also to as an 'overall transcendental suspension') as 'one part suspension', 'one part de-suspension', and, 'one part that is both the suspension and the de-suspension that is also duly suspended through a process of a dynamic balance' incorporated in the trimodal terms of reference being superimposed (upon the overall transcendental suspension), namely, this 'extended suspension'.[100] (307)

But, the plot need to thickens somewhat further. If we are going to see the suspension as also hovering between the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual then we can invoke the suspension in this additional sense as also being able to enact a certain

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99 E.g., the Buddhist *Diamond Sutra* (*Vajrasutra*) in the Perfection of Wisdom tradition.

100 In a similar manner to the construction of the overall transcendental suspension as one part phenomenological, one part hermeneutical, and, a duly balanced product of the former' then incorporated within the trimodal terms of reference of that overall transcendental suspension (e.g., as in paragraph 121-125).

degree of responsiveness subtle shifts in emphasis upon the chaotic nature of this boundary the ensuing, therein and thereby, the re(-)direction of specific patterns of behaviour (hopefully, of a pro-relational existential characterization). For the sake of simplifying such complexity let me diagrammatically represent this 'extensive suspension':

……**The Extensive Suspension**……

Virtual Simulation	Non-Virtual Simulation	Sus. of Vir. + Non-Vir.

……**The Extended Suspension**……

Suspension	De-Suspension	Sus. of Sus. + De-Sus.

..……**The Overall Transcendental Suspension……**
[The Interrogative Economy]

Rhetorical (Hermeneutical) Dis-Conjunctive Sus.	Metaphorical (Phenomenological) Conjunctive Sus.	Apparitional (Non-Systematic-existential) Sus. of Con. Sus + De-Con. Sus (308)

Now, what importance has this extensive concept of the 'suspension'? As the gateway to and exit from the transcendental dimension. although, more correctly, such entry and exiting is more a metaphor given that such a realm is completely inescapable and ever present… should we be insightful enough to apperceive that! (309)

Indeed, knowing how to intuitively exercise a suspension is the difference between an ideologue and a professional disciplinarian, between a philo-sophists and a (transcendental) philosopher. (310)

Now, although the source of such inspiration is Husserlian, in my opinion this philosopher initially confused reductions with suspensions, and v.v., and had not quite migrated to a trimodal economy in a more direct recognition of the need for the synthesis of reconstitution as the third party in the performance of the overall 'suspension'. (311)

As the gateway to the systematic-existential, enacting a middle path, volition through resolution, giving the pragmatic an existential ethics, and a positive flavour to the inevitable nihilism of "'the world of simulation' as 'the simulation of world'," etc. (312)

3. Interventionalism 405

Now, if to be only recognized for one thing, the extensive suspension can be apperceived to be as if a supervisor of relational resolution and ensuing patterns of intervention devolving from the same. (313)

Whether we wish to concur, or not, we need to recognize, and understand, that we are intimate intertwined in this world of the other through whom we find our all-meaningful sense and semblance of freedom; since, more or less, we are powerless to act merely on our own (contrary to those ideological ideas that disseminate such delusional myths that are otherwise to this fact of our being in this world at large[101]). (314)

Hence this idea that we cannot escape from entering into forms of intervention, be they non-existential or existential in orientation! (315)

Therefore, it behooves us to act responsibly, and, be responsive, accordingly, in the light of this necessary concern and care that we need to show within the orbit of our relationships. (316)

Continuing to strive from a well-informed material perception of the world to a relational understanding of the same through narrational shifts in discourse, and, thence, to an existential appreciation of a pro-relational orientation instituted by our relationships themselves through overseeing such ensuing chaotic re(-)self-organization able to advance an enrichment of those same relationships in their relational-situatedness. (317)

Such considerations being mindful of our embodiment, embeddedness, and embankment in a world where intervention is inescapable and where it behooves us to act accordingly. (318)

Through processes of ongoing relational alignment, entered into through re-alignment, advanced through hermeneutical realignment (and error mitigation), phenomenal-phenomenological re-de-mis-alignment (as a form of error correction), and non-systematic-existential re-alignment, all suitably ensconced in a mutual process of systematic-existential attunement... as an experience of solidarity. (319)

Promoted through the suitable exercise of appropriate forms of rectification, proper forms of deconstruction, and apposite forms of ongoing re(-)normalization. (320)

Watering and weeding our relationships as if the most precious flowers in this garden of the world in accordance with our psychic proximity to the same. (321)

By being fully observant[102] of our relationships so as to create an existential surplus of e/valuational formation able to better create, preserve, and conserve the quality of our relationships even if only perceived and apperceived as imputations. (322)

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101 As foundational to the dissemination of a misguided over-promoted neo-liberalism, e.g., etc.

102 Implying passive observance, active observance and engaged forms of observance.

4. Imputational Theory 406

Without the observation of relative-objectivities, as continuing moments of isomorphic transformational invariance, there could be no representative imputations. (323)

That without the suspension of our simulations of such representations there could be no patterns of intervention, existentially oriented or otherwise. (324)

Hence the necessitated observance of 'a theory of imputation' as 'the imputation of a certain theoretical perspective' able to assist us as a fruitful fiction in the navigation, negotiation and arbitration of our passages through this world at large in this world of the other… (325)

In navigation we circumvent the orbit of obstacles; in negotiation we enter into the evidence of relational forms of exchange; and, through arbitration we trade social aspirations and personal ambitions for the fertile formation of varying degrees of mutual empowerment, and, sadly, all too often, those socially mis/informed patterns of discriminatory dis-empowerment (with varying degrees of conformation/disconformation). (326)

Confronting the contingency of a world at large through the relative privacy of a personal domain, the intersubjectivity of a public domain, and the personal-interpersonal domain of a sphere of arbitration. (327)

In a world of natural inequality, since nothing can ever equal anything else, even itself, except through mental acts of fiat that create such unnatural balance, it follows that we must expect a world of contracts to be contracted thus, i.e., through inequality. (328)

But a contractual world is foundered, thankfully, on a compactual world since no contractual relations could be even contemplated if they were never going to be honoured and acted upon accordingly; hence there must exist a certain non-unreasonableness. (329)

So, in walking into a café we can order a coffee, given this extensive world of arbitration that has anticipated such expectations as 'my walking into a café to order to order a coffee…' (330)

But this world of arbitration could not pre-exist this 'simple request for a cup of coffee' if its contractual relations did not imbibe some mutually adequate degree of realizing such contractual expectations and their co-associated forms of recompense even if entered into in the favour of those who exerted more dominant forms of disseminated power. (331)

But, often, in times of crises these inequalities can be somewhat leveled when people more overtly assist each other… just as, e.g., when someone slips and falls in the public space of shopping center, and when and where people, spontaneously, without much thought, are quickly seen to assist that distressed person… (332)

Interestingly, the relations between the contractual world and the compactual world economically belie the relative incommensurability of these two correlatively defined domains, indeed, acting as if a third party in this economy as the contractual-and-compactual (e.g., just as ‘free’ parks in Australia also incur a ‘cost of upkeep’). (333)

That without imputations there would be nothing to suspend, and, without suspension there would be no world delivered through the potential enrichment of the de-suspension. (334)

But what are the ensuing ramifications of ‘a world of imputations’ exercised in ‘the imputation of a world’… regarded, if you wish, as the overall life-world perceived and apperceived as an overall world-of-life? (335)

That, surely, without ‘a world of imputations’ there would be no ‘imputation of a world’! (336)

The economics of a world of relational interactions guaranteed to possess just enough ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ to ensure, for(-)us, the effective functioning of our imputations, their suspensions, their resolutions, their relational facticity as greater than that merely invested in the metaphorical ‘material’ and ‘life’ of such a world… (337)

Where such surpluses of e/valuational formation are usually found to hand, to some degree, in order to enrich the course of our interactions in this world of the other as we stand passively with(-)others, actively before(-)other, and find our freedom only through(-)others… (338)

Taking a relatively more existential course when we suspend our ambitions and aspirations in through the world of arbitration where negotiations cannot be but the tip of this tacit iceberg that structures all sense and semblance of ‘place’ and ‘significance’ in this overall world-of-life. (339)

That a profound pragmatism recognizes this world of imputations as we walk a path between both their impossible absolutistical existence and non-existence. (340)

Ever giving with one hand and taking away with the other… (341)

As we accept such recognition, encountering and engagement that gives significance to our emplacement in this world at large. (342)

An imputed world of virtual emplacement that is ever displaced in non-virtual experience to be then continually de-displaced through our intentional striving for significance as mutually arrived at in and through an ever-imputed sense and semblance of ‘place’… (343)

Thence the dialectics of our apparent existence in this world of the other..! (344)

5. Trans-Imputational Theory 407

But, it could be further argued that 'the imputation of imputations is non-imputatively oriented!?' Be that non-imputational in scope, not imputatively oriented *per se*, or merely to be meta-imputatively considered. That, more correctly, the mere reduction of *x* to a concept of *x* is neither possible nor acceptable (given, too, the non-reducible nature of the emergent, etc.). What are the non-existential and existential ramifications of such a qualified observation? (345)

Or, similarly, it could be argued that the suspension of a suspension is a non-suspension, or not a suspension, or a meta-suspension, etc. And that we must accept – since without 'the suspension of the suspension' we would be forever psychotically trapped in the suspension (if not otherwise neurotically trapped outside); in a world that is without value; with identity and identification, without function and functionality, and, without value in any form… neither aesthetical, nor pragmatical, nor deontological in scope... (346)

But, we do live in a world with positive forms of e/valuational formation that can be found to hand, and, hence, we must be able to confront both the suspension, and the suspension of the suspension, and so on and so forth. (347)

So, although we must surmise, through imputations, that the world cannot be other than nihilistic in a positive sense, being anti-representationally constituted in its apparent presentations and its seemingly invariant representations, but, that, as well, ever-present chaotic processes of re-direction can only continually impose the shocking rupture of the radical upon us should we be insightful enough to apperceive this surprising semblance of difference, this disturbing disposition equally co-associated with our being in this world, in our being in a world of the other, a world awash and stricken with the contaminations of the non-existential but, fortunately, ever open to forms of amelioration through those existential influences that countermand such alienation, such inauthenticity, such displays of bad faith… those deficient forms of behaviour that need to be existentially rewritten, re-righted, up-righted, and so on. (348)

A path of 'redemption' is ever-open to us through the very experience of the suspension, the suspension of the suspension, in and through the ongoing suspension already at the very center of our absented-presence, presented-absence… (349)

Since, if our existence were presently-present, as presence, there would be no transformational change, and, if absently-absent there would be nothing to change. (350)

But, from nothing, something emerges, and, from something, nothing emerges too… the shadow of a ghost with an elusive smile… hopefully, ever-walking upon a middle path….[103] (351)

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[103] There can be no absolutistical reduction and, equally, there can be absolutistical emergence. Through the ensuing persistence of intentionally re-directed causal consequences 'the shadow of a ghost with an elusive smile' will forever walk on even though all compounded identity is finitely compounded.

6. Re(-)Emergent Theory ('The Eternal Return') 501

Meaningful significance is either won or lost through re(-)iteration… as if suspended in and through the ceaseless re(-)iterations of the eternal return..? (352)

As if the entire world is reborn and dies in each and every moment… (353)

Through an economy of re(-)iteration, significance is both generated and disseminated, then dissipated, but, never entirely lost. (354)

Therefore, it behooves us to act or not act, or defer from acting or non-acting, should the occasion call it as it is, as if on the behalf of all eternity. (355)

Moreover, it should be ever the case that in our intentional deliberations we should responsibly behave as if we had to both suffer and enjoy such patterns of intervention as if they were to be re-lived in the same sequences… as if for all eternity. (356)

That that thought, alone, should concentrate the mind and impel the person to be more responsibly receptive of the inescapable impact of their interventions in this world at large… (357)

Given that significance is generated through an economy of re(-)iteration. (358)

A harmonic interaction, to some extent, between the consonance of 'mere' iterations repetitively-repeated; and the introduction of dissonance through the apparent divergence of 'sheer', iterated difference; and, the ensuing resolution of 'bare' iteration in the reiteration of rhetorical tropes, memes and themes, that establish the apparent continuity of circumscribed forms of significance, and so on. (359)

Knowing, full well, that too much consonance, dissonance or resolution, or, too little consonance, dissonance or resolution are all equally fatal to the life of the relationship in question. (360)

Thence, again, this persistent call for 'the walking of a middle path…' (361)

That through the suspension we can trace out and enact the harmony of such a path. (362)

Taking an existential turn, and existential return, through the ongoing repetition of the eternal return, through the imputation of imputations, through the suspension of the suspension... (363)

Pragmatically taking an existential sense and semblance of discovery regardless of whether one is a non-religionist or a religionist, whether one is insightless or insightful, regardless of whether one is a philo-sophist or a philosopher..!![104] (364)

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[104] Just as existentialism, historically, is neither the preserve of the religionist nor the non-religionist.

Postscript A: Philo-Sophists, Philosophers, Philosophizings, & Beyond Philosophies: Acting as a Commentary with a Sub-Commentary in the Footnotes

This concise, but dense book, is written between these four headings, as noted in this title. Let me proffer a selective commentary; where I will be offering additional arguments, details, comments, and observations at specific points in this text… beginning with an introduction to the nature and intent of my thinking. (365)

Philosophy, like all disciplines and secular attitudes, has its limits. The philosopher recognizes such natural limitations and expects to find such limitations, whereas, in contrast, the philo-sophist ignores both such constraints and restraints, and, more often than not, forgets that such obstacles should exist, should be recognized, encountered and engaged as limitations *qua* limitations.[105] (366)

Or, as Kant might put it, the illusion of such non-recognitions creates mistakes with an ensuing confusion characteristic of such misrepresentations that might not even be registered as such. (367)

As a case in point is the arrogant disposition to entertain the false belief that logic is perfectly explicated as if it were to be entertained as the 'in and of itself for itself'.[106] Yes, in provisional terms, logic works, but, there are limits. In the logical economy, as in any economy, it is just not possible to perfectly entertain identity either as a definitive principle of identity or a definitive identity perfectly appropriated over the course of its simulation. Hence the recognition of a 'space' for the dialectical economy working somewhat in apposition or contraposition to the same. We forget such 'forgetting' when we make a claim that exceeds our ability to do as such. So, e.g., an apple is an 'apple' but can never be 'just an apple'. It could be a 'gift', it could be a 'bought apple' or a 'found apple picked on an apple tree' that could also be 'stolen', or a mythical apple, and so on. Then, throw it hard enough at someone in an argument and its could equally become 'the imputed instrument of injury that could then potentially lead to the death of that person hit by such a solid object'. Even in the gestalt economy we need to recognize this same experiential fact that we can neither perfectly focus on the mere point of focus nor shift our background attention to merely attending upon that gestalt background in its impossible separation and isolation. Similarly, all notions of an attendant intentional subjectivity likewise cannot be pure focused upon and isolated as if there were to exist some self-existent entity conveniently entering into acts of intentional presentation, representation and re-presentation.[107] The reason, too, why such re-iterated 're-presentation' can be

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105 I define 'relational interaction' as 'hermeneutical recognition, phenomenal-phenomenological encountering, and non-systematic-existential engagement'. A 'pro-relationally oriented interaction', in a 'relatively systematic-existential orientation' is realized through 'the dynamic balance of these three economic orientations (or their economic equivalents in the application of some other relevant economic interpretation and exposition)'.

106 Hence one of the basis ideas directing the module Dialectical-Logics 103.

107 In an economy of representation, that through its trimodal constitution, like all economies, could also be construed as an economy of phenomenological presentation or non-systematic-existential re-

viewed along anti-representational lines at the same time. Or, why a pragmatic philosopher is a 'nihilist', albeit as a philosopher, or disciplinarian, who must also see themselves as a 'positive nihilist' given that, for them, existential re(-)e/valuation is predicated on the thorough absence of an unchanging substance whose definitive 'presence' would completely impede the possibility for the execution of all manner of transformational possibilities in and through the specific immediacy of the here and now. Change is predicated on such an absence. On the other hand, the existentialist is not immune to experiencing the simulation of a simulated sense of presence given their experiencing existential surpluses when open to such a possibility. An excess in e/valuational formation that cannot be reduced to the mere material presentation of its relational basis given its emergence in and through a pro-relationally oriented sense of perspective. That even the apperceived sense and perceived semblance of the 'existential' is a case in point by virtue of the fact that the existential re-e/valuation arises through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential and never through the relative (or non-relative) existentialization of the relative (or non-relative) existential! (368)

The philo-sophist either forgets such limitations and/or sees limitations that do not exist as such. In this short book, I treat such mistakes, and their ensuing confusions, as occurring on three 'vertical' levels of economic formulation, namely, in general terms of reference, in particular terms of reference, and in specific terms of reference hence the use of this motif in the construction of these first three modules (on the topic of relegation) in this *The Seventh Book*…[108] (369)

11-24 A pragmatic disciplinarian demonstrates 'competence'[109] as an agile disciplinarian through 'deconstructing the defective and reconstructing the effective!'[110] (370)

We could also argue that another requirement of authenticity (and relevance) is arrived at in a similar manner, namely, deconstructing those defective aspects in either self-performance and/or other-performance, and, reconstructing those effective aspects in either self-performance and/or other-performance (with the latter as those defects and non-defects being either perceived and/or apperceived in others)! (371)

How does the pragmatist operate *vis-à-vis* others? Through either acting as a mirror in the demonstration of their good faith, or through remonstration entered into in good faith, or through circumventing such indirect or direct displays of disapprobation should that be felt to be more effective for all the parties concerned as enacted, again, through a similar display of good faith. (372)

So beholden is philosophy, and all other disciplines, to this absolutistical addiction to the definitively logical that much of what passes for 'research' needs to be dismissed as just so much ideological nonsense. Seemingly respectable, but, totally fraudu-

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presentation. Note that in the next sentence, re-presentation can be equated with anti-representation on the grounds of a positive nihilism in keeping with a potentially radical pragmatism.

108 Relegation I-III as Relegation 101-103.

109 Pursuit, III.VII.275, 288, footnotes 3, 66.

110 *Pursuit*, III.VII.11. henceforth referred to as '(VII.) paragraph/footnote'.

lent… as long as such an addiction is mindlessly adhered to. Logic by its very own cannons would and should have dismissed such over-misrepresentation of its abilities a long time ago! (373)

That a critique of the logical should reveal the dialectical, just as the open observations of causation should have revealed the relatively indeterminate world of the chaotic. (374)

Of course, we should not pursue the opposite tack, namely, being illogical. In this we just need 'to recognize that all things have their limits' and 'that the existence of such limits should be recognized to the best of our abilities without transgressions'. (375)

19 Since the commencement of the *Pursui*t I have had to answer a question posed on the front-sheets in Volume III, namely, by 'beyond criticism' what might be meant? Of course, it is tongue in cheek, in one sense, with the suggestion that 'a critically enacted act of criticism could be beyond criticism being so critically-critical that it nails that critique'. But given the demand for ever, open, non-indubitable, provisional treatment this aspiration must be immediately deconstructed. On the other hand, this provocative question was answered by the imputation of a radical sphere of concern that operates beyond the mere conservative application of logical forms of critique. Under the impetus of this revision, I now envisage my trimodal division of the 'theoretical, practical and critical spheres of disciplinary research' to now be more configured along the following lines (amplified by comparisons conducted through economic complexification) to now read: (from a relatively political-economic-stylistic orientation as) political-theoretical (policy formation, hermeneutical, pre-treatment, etc.); practical-critical (e.g., the business world, deconstructive treatment etc.); and, the radical-critical (spheres of the stylistical, arbitrational, potentially-existential, radically oriented retreatment, etc.). So, more simply put we could note theoretical-theory; critical-practice; and, radical-critique. (376)

20 'Realism', e.g., can also be deconstructed by other means that just invoking this general notion of the impossibility of purely appreciating either unimodal or bimodal formulations although closely allied. E.g., in the intentional economy, the appreciation of the intentional objective, regardless of any incidental ontologically oriented considerations, cannot be entertained in such a manner that a logical or temporal priority be given to that intentional objectivity since the intentional economy has no meaningful existence apart from its trimodal economic formulation. Although such an understanding must rule out a naïve formulation like a strict realism, etc., still, we could also argue, that because the intentional economy is trimodally constructed in its 'philosophical representation' that this could be construed to imply that a working philosophy would need to be one part relatively modified realism, one part relatively modified idealism or rationalism, and one part relatively modified subjectivism… but, then, we obviously have no truck with a strictly constructed classical realism (which should also be recognized as just not being able to be meaningfully constructed as such!), etc.[111] (377)

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111 Hence, e.g., my arguments in Pursuit, II where I ask the rhetorical question 'where is Father Xmas (Pere Noël)?' Answering along the lines that we need to invoke relative forms of realism, rationalism or idealism, and forms of subjectivism in order to be able to answer this question by proposing a mythical

Another argument against a strictly (impossible) realism is to note that the use of metaphors has limitations, namely, the necessary invocation of their non-literal treatment (with the one exception when we can go from a first metaphorical reply to a second apparitional reply, and even then the apparitional is not treated, i.e., mistreated as absolutitistically literal or indubitable, etc.). (378)

So, in order to dismiss a strictly classical realism we do not have to invoke an 'anti-realism' as the very foundation of such formulation are impossible to conceive, and thence, totally fraudulent should such impossible notions be disseminated. (379)

Therefore, the prospect of the scientific life-world cannot operate along the lines of a classical realism![112] Hence my pragmatic proposal for a 'viable, qualified, anti-representationalism, etc.' (380)

Which 'classical' philosophers, in the light of such epistemological constraints (e.g., as imposed by economic appreciation, etc.) might escape from this dialectical-logical net, if at all? I suspect none! Plato is as misguided as his sophistical opponents it would seem. Aristotle's impossible versions of 'substance' are as ridiculous as worms wriggling on the end of a working fishhook. Kant's 'vision' of the noumenon is just as much a blackmark since 'what we cannot relate to, either directly and/or indirectly, is not there for us, and, we need not be there for it (as any respectable theologian should be well aware of). Husserl's notion of an indubitable science makes for an intriguing metaphor, but, to be literally misconstrued is to make a mockery of such a 'science' (but, in the time of the *Crisis*, may well appear to have been recognized as a forlorn hope already about to be dispensed with?). Please, present a philosopher who escapes form such displays of economic nonsense? Even Wittgenstein II and his attempts to solely present language games as merely 'language games' oversteps implicit pragmatic boundaries given that although e/valuational formations emerge through the playing of such games that this excess in 'value', in turn, cannot be reduced to the mere exercise of those games *per se*! Since we must also play within the unique specificity of this world at large and not some other. So, accordingly, those games are highly dependent upon that value that can be released in 'this world at large' and not some other (impossible) world at large, but, given this that world could be different, but, however, is not different, still, the point follows that such value cannot be derived from the mere playing of those games alone! (381)

So, if every philosopher is tarnished by this same dialectical-logical brush what hope is there for this discipline of the philosophical, or, by extension, any discipline whatsoever? (382)

Here, we need to be optimistic. No one is irredeemable, although, they have to first invoke a transcendental suspension in some form or other… which would rule out all

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form of existence. Where, by 'etc.' is meant, unfortunately, most of classical philosophy be they Western or Eastern in their historical derivations.

[112] Hence a number of essays where I set out to explore this implication, as the consequence of this type of argument, in Book 6.

obstinate ideologues. Without this ability to question one's own positioning then no progress can follow. On the other hand, merely by taking up this simple act of questioning, in effect setting up the invocation of an interrogative economy,[113] we can make a first few tentative steps towards such redemption. I.e., as a philosopher, and not as a philo-sophist, but, as a disciplinarian who can proudly sit on this first tier, albeit as one more disciplinarian on the eternity of an endless period of probation… (383)

24 Noting that Relegation 101 takes a more general stance, whereas, Relegation 201 takes a particular stance (in an alignment with the phenomenological and its preoccupations with the semantic mapping of phenomenological 'essentials' which can be read as 'particulars' (as can be discerned, e.g., through eidetic reflection, etc.).[114] So, even though we can discuss phenomenal-phenomenological experience of the 'relatively-essential' we are, in effect, dealing with 'particulars' (less general that generalizations, but, not as specific as specifications). In Relegation 301 we move to the existential world and its focus on the immediacy and specificity of the concretely historical. (384)

27 The history of philosophy's near-infinite attempts to understand causation, as a relationship between case and effect, should be presented as a salutary exercise in so far as bimodal (and unimodal) schemes are and must be a complete failure in this same regard. Much better to begin from a conditional perspective by noting, e.g., pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions (as incorporated, e.g., within a philosophy of transformational retreatment, etc.[115]). (385)

38 A bimodal economy between universals and particulars only appears to work through the covert importation of a trimodal perspective in some form or other.[116] Hence my scheme of universals, particulars, and specific(ation)s, mirroring, respectively, the hermeneutical, the phenomenal-phenomenological, and the non-systematic-existential domains (or philosophical sub-disciplines). (386)

39 As noted 'the nature of experience is dialectically constituted through a variety of over-lapping economies'. I.e., through economic correlativities, the impossibilities of definite logical appropriation given such restrictions in a gestalt economy[117]; and, economic complexification; meta-relational appreciation of hierarchical constructions relating to transformational states; relational situatedness; the dialectical nature of multiple, ongoing modes of interaction, etc.). (387)

47 It was stated (in bold): 'In our recognition of this interrogative economy, etc., we observe, in provisional terms these levels of suspended non-extrapolation; suspended

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113 Refer to, e.g., 291-295, etc.

114 E.g., refer to paragraphs 72, 132, 185, 188, etc. By substituting 'particulars' for such 'relative-essentials' we might save ourselves having to proffer lengthy forms of defence, clarification and differentiation, still, particulars are not without their problems (and are also being redefined in trimodal terms rather than merely in an apposition with universals or their equivalents).

115 As explored in Transformational Theory 104 &206.

116 Facing the same problems as the bimodal causal model of 'cause and effect' as noted.

117 Refer to paragraphs 75-76. Etc/.

extrapolation; and, non-suspended extrapolation of imputations. All else deserves to be relegated (and, therein and thereafter, either to be left ignored or debated, and, hopefully. duly rectified, deconstructed, and re(-)normalized) accordingly.' (388)

The reasons for this paragraph 47 being highlighted in bold are more than one. It proposes, for a start, an economy of suspensions and extrapolations that mirror the fact that to over-promote any one of these experiential attitudes is to disestablish that economy in an equal measure. Those three attitudinal orientations are: non-extrapolated-extrapolations that are suspended; extrapolated-extrapolations that are suspended; and, extrapolated-extrapolations that are not suspended. The implication is that there are three tiers, namely first, second and third, and, that we would find ourselves relegated to a second or third tier in accordance with how we position ourselves to and hold these three orientations. So, proposing a suspended non-extrapolated-extrapolation implies your non-relegation to a second or third rank. But, of course, as they already occurring in an economy it follows that we cannot do away with either extrapolations or suspensions. Moreover, as these three attitudinal orientations mirror, respectively, the anti-representational orientation, the deconstructed presentational modality and the pe-critical hermeneutical modality of the hermeneutic orientation its follows that, whilst proposing an anti-representationalism, equally, we cannot do away with both a presentationalism and a representationalism, albeit as heavily qualified by these economic constraints. Or, put another way it is only through the dynamically balanced suspension of both the presentational and the representational that we get an anti-representationalism , and, that it is only in the ongoing dynamically balanced suspension of all three orientations that we can then start to entertain an existential orientation along with its holistic pervasion of that experienced state of affairs. Moreover, we could also invoke the concept of 'economic induction' by arguing here 'that if we were to effectively reconstitute an adequate representation of any one economic correlativity then as a holistic representation of that economy in question it would follow that the rest of that same economy would and must also adequately present itself in experience'. This concept accounts for the experiential fact that through forms of economic holism the complexities of the economy, indeed, of any economy (given their archetypal constitution), can be considerably mitigated in and through the apparent simplicity of its parallel evocation (given this economic correlativity between all economic aspects in the constitution of that economy). Furthermore, we can note that the so-called third moment of the 'anti-representational moment' also equals the so-called third moment of a relatively chaotical 're-presentational moment', which, in turn, is to be equated with the so-called third moment of the relatively 'non-systematic-existential' (as well as the arbitrational sphere, and so on). That, by such equation, through such economic complexification, we can further enrich our economic readings of this third moment of the anti-representational, etc. Hence the ramifications of this paragraph extend from promoting an anti-representationalism but not over-promoting the same (or, for that matter, under-promoting the same); giving a method for determining either non-relegation from a first tier to relegated ranking to a second tier or to a third tier; proposing a method for the induction of an expanding sense and semblance of the existential dimension, and so on, and so forth. All in all, the fine makings of a dialectical sense of positioning that promotes an anti-representationalism (and its potentially radical, re-directed existentialization of the sphere of arbitration, the stylistic domain in the political-economy, etc.). (389)

What is meant by a ‘non-extrapolated-extrapolation’ and an ‘extrapolated-extrapolation’, and is the latter possible (given this qualified prohibition of the x of x being non-*x*, not-*x*, meta-*x*, etc.)? (390)

By ‘non-extrapolated extrapolation is meant ‘merely entertaining the phenomenological form, etc., of that presented through that process of extrapolation being presented. And, by ‘extrapolated-extrapolation’ is merely meant ‘the imputational extrapolation as it operates as an imputation (be that either relatively suspended or left relatively unsuspended’.[118] Now, we must start with what is to hand, and, that is an imputation. Furthermore, that imputation is extrapolated. Therefore, to understand the phenomenal-phenomenological form of that imputation we suspend the same. Then, in order to understand the suspension as a ‘suspension’ we must suspend that suspension… which is what automatically happens in the de-suspension. However, there is a difference, namely, that an imputation is an ‘imputation’, and, where through such appreciation we no longer view it as ‘a window on to the world’ but more as being in touch with a world that is no longer divided up completely up between the dichotomous senses and semblances of the separately subjective, the non-subjective objective, and the inter-subjective-and-inter-objective domain of experiential division divided up in keeping with the currency of non-suspended imputational extrapolations, etc. (391)

And how do we operate on a first tier in order to avoid relegation to a second or third rank? We either ignore such subtleties, and find ourselves automatically relegated, or, we wholeheartedly seize the same through deliberate processes utilizing hermeneutical forms of rectification (of meta-textual aspects of textual production), apply methods of deconstruction in a relative logical systematization of our researches (on a phenomenological level of semantic presentation) along with an ongoing intent for re(-)forms through the re(-)normalization of the same… when and where we seek to refine our overall alignments with our more important relationships, preferably from the exercise of an existential orientation… along with the co-associated creation, preservation and conservational expansion realizing an enrichment of e/valuational formation as would be expected to be entailed in such existentially oriented synchronicity, spontaneity, simultaneity, and such simulated-similitude, to that extent relational situatedness has us experiencing such experience ‘as if experience were experiencing experience…’[119] (392)

In the light of the above, from a dialectical perspective, it could be said “that a first-tier philosopher is not just a first-tier philosopher, but, if a first-tier philosopher

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118 ‘Relatively-suspended, etc., by virtue of the fact that, as a resident in an interrogative economy, it must imply some degree of suspension by virtue of that residency, but, obviously, not enough to count for a relatively suspended state if not suspended more intensely in that more overt sense.

119 Although the semblance of the apparitional is being alluded to here, more correctly, from an economic perspective, we entertain the interrogative economy from the perspective of its economic totality as well as needing to be both suspended and have that suspension suspended

thinks that they are just a ‘first-tier philosopher’ then they are neither ‘first-tier’ nor a ‘philosopher’.”[120] (393)

59-60 A ‘pseudo-psychosis’ can be directly discerned when, in debate with such a person, that it is felt that that person ‘pushes back’ far too intensely through over-commitment (with a strong emotional element) and shows an equally inverse desire to understand your own positioning in order to merely debate its potential for a deconstructive program, etc., that might reveal its apparent competence and integrity along with the authenticity of the person disseminating such positioning. By ‘deconstructive program, etc.’ is meant ‘running any form of positioning through conventional forms of logical assessment in order to detect anomalies and either remove or resolve such elements, be they contradictions, inconsistencies, demonstrate a lack of disciplinary competence and integrity, or poorly reflect upon the apparent authenticity or inauthenticity of the person arguing for such positioning; presuppositions, suppositions, and post-suppositions; narrational facts, styles of narration, modes of de-anomalization; premises, arguments and conclusions; various forms of disciplinary transgression such as over-commitment or under-commitment, unimodalism, bimodalism, non-economic patterns of treatment, absolutism or relativism, absolutistically indubitable or non-indubitable claims, impossible states of affairs, incorrectly exercised applications of suspension, etc. Or more succinctly, incorrectly utilizing either critical and/or radical processes of ‘rectification, deconstruction, and ongoing re(-)normalization’ in order to’ either augment and/or enhance[121] the ensuing e/valuational formations pursuant upon such suitable forms of treatment’. (394)

62-96 A ‘philosopher’ is a ‘disciplinarian who wittingly and/or unwittingly ‘observes’ a philosophical sense of difference, meta-difference and non-difference (as per paragraphs 268-269[122]) and desires to continue to traverse such a middle path (e.g., through a dynamic balance and ensuing suspension of such disciplinary orientations, etc.). Whereas a ‘philo-sophist’ is a ‘non-first-tier disciplinarian who obviously transgresses either conventional forms of logical assessment and/or radical forms of dialectical assessment, etc., and, who, at the same time, is either insightless and/or shows no desire to emend their evident errors when such defective forms of logical advice, and redressement, are clearly pointed out to them’. (395)

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120 Making an obvious allusion to the type of saying in the Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom tradition where it is stated, in various formats, ‘that a bodhisattva who thinks they are a ‘bodhisattva’ then they are not a bodhisattva’.

121 In the use of a technical language implied where ‘augment’ is equated with ‘positively incremental, non-chaotic enrichment’ and where ‘enhance’ is equated with ‘positive, non-incremental, chaotic enrichment’ of the primary relationship/s in question.

122 Where we treat disciplines as ‘economies’ in their own right. Each distinctive discipline having a distinctive sense of disciplinary difference, differential and distinction, etc. (as per footnote 39, etc.) but, at the same time, having the same archetypal construction as any other discipline (given, as economies, their ensuing generation and circulation of e/valuational formation albeit as refracted through their exercise of a distinctive sense and semblance of a disciplinary difference, etc.). For rigor we can equate (disciplinary) ‘difference’ with ‘difference’; ‘differential’ with ‘meta-difference’; and, ‘distinction’ with ‘non-difference’. So, e.g., a ‘disciplinary meta-difference’ could be also be referred to, equally, as either a ‘disciplinary meta-differential’ or a ‘disciplinary differential’ (as long as the latter is not confused with a disciplinary difference or a dynamic differential, i.e., non-reducible emergent facticity in an existential excess over the ‘whole treated as the mere sum of its parts).

65 An argument for the inferred economic nature of experience is presented. Basically, the unimodal cannot be appreciated on its own terms of reference because we would need wider terms of reference (as the basis, e.g., for transformational retreatment, etc.). Then the integrity of the bimodal relationships itself cannot be appreciated on its own terms of reference. But, trimodal terms could supply a third party to do just that. Of course, we must also note that economic relationships, in their trimodal circulation of e/valuational formation are also relationally-situated (in our embeddedness in a sea of relational interactions, etc.[123]). (396)

78 Now the question is asked, 'how do we construct economic terms that reflect both the archetypal nature and currency of the current economy that is relevant to the pursuit of the objectives conceived of as directing that research?' I answered: by being creative, but, holding, as an article of faith, that this trimodal structuralization will be already mirrored in language, and, where our heuristic propositions can be error corrected, over time, through the emendations of economic complexification, etc. (397)

Now, such an approach is declared to be 'pragmatic'. I.e., defining and refining such terms that work for us in that same regard. In that same quotation I note a role to be played by the concept and practice of 'economic complexification' (as defined by myself). Let me demonstrate this broad approach in order to bring us to a point we can see there will be times when we do not need to invoke the utilization of a parallel economy (in an act of economic complexification) in order to contrast, qualify, comment on, add value to a set of economic terms being subjected to such a potentially creative processes of parallelization (on the assumption that the same type of archetypal economy epistemologically constructs the economics of all intentional states [as judgments delivered in conceptual and/or perceptual terms of reference] and trans-intentional processes]as judgmental acts]).[124] For the sake of convenience let us assume we have two well-defined economies with terms already settled as individually paralleling the moments of the archetypal economy (constructed along gestalt terms[125]), namely, an economy of time, and, and economy of the general modes of transformational treatment (as they also parallel the economy of the comprehensive hermeneutic circle of comprehension [where I have trimodally translated the bimodal relationship of 'whole' and 'parts' co-associated with that whole]). (398)

The economy of time, as a temporal economy, is usually divided up between the relative-incommensurable economic-correlativites of 'future, past, and present'. (399)

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123 Refer to 318.

124 The intentional can be subjected to a cognitively ordered analysis, and, judgments can be subjected to a trans-cognitively ordered analysis as explicated in modules 207 &303.

125 Refer to 18, 70, 129, diagram in 194, etc. Basically, the archetypal economy consists of the three dialectical moments of the background field (World), foreground focus (Object), and co-associated sense of intentional subjectivity (Ego). Moreover, if read in this order we have a harmonic reading given this progression of consonant preparation, given the commonality of the field; dissonance of focus, through the introduction of difference; and, the experiential resolution entailed in the Ego moment. This will be discussed above.

The economy of general modes of treatment (paralleling the hermeneutic circle of comprehension as a trimodal translation of the bimodal hermeneutic circle) is as follows, 'synthesis (whole), analysis (part), and nomination (whole-and-parts)'. In this frame of reference (or that of the 'comprehensive hermeneutic circle') there can only be these three distinctive types of transformational treatment. Hence the codified observation that all economies only have three distinctive forms of treatment that can be defined within those economies.[126] (400)

Now assuming that the same type of archetypal economy can be imputed in both economies then we should be able to parallel both economies in sch a manner that we can creatively account for that form of parallelization (although other combinations need not be completely ruled out on the dialectical ground that the relative incommensurability of these economic correlativities cannot be non-relatively (absolutistically) definitive[127]). So, let me supply my parallel readings here (in an alignment with the archetypal economy and the sub-philosophical disciplines in that same parallel alignment):

Future	**Past**	**Present**
Synthesis	**Analysis**	**Nomination**
(Whole)	(Parts)	(Whole-and-Parts)
World	**Object**	**Ego**
Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism (Non-Systematic)

(401)

Now, the concept of economic complexification implies that when we have economies mutually co-aligned (and in an alignment with the archetypal economy as constructed along gestalt lines of 'field, focus, and frame'[128] and their parallel in World, Object, and Ego) we should find such alignments as potentially supplying a commentary that

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126 This observational point is made in paragraph 261. The reader might like to contemplate, on this observational point, that the economy of movement within a three-dimensional space/four-dimensional space/time consist of, and only consists of, translation, rotation, and reflection. Can we conceive of a fourth operation within those spatial terms of reference (as in a flat universe, a curved de Sitter universe, or a hyperbolic anti-de Sitter universe???)? Or, better, treat gravity as just a fifth dimension? As a 'Malacena equality' with the five dimensional conformal aspect?

127 I confess that such a qualification is very much 'having your cake and eating it' if it were not qualified (by this meta-qualification that) where, in turn, we should note that a preferential parallel reading can and should be made, sought, well-argued for, and preferred.

128 Refer to 75.

would mutually enrich the parallel reading/s of the two economies in question. So, in the diagram above we seen that analysis is past-oriented, and, that the primary sub-discipline to explore that parallelization would be phenomenological, i.e., phenomenal-phenomenological (given that in and through the suspension, in whatever the form or complexity of its application, we would neither preference the imputation of and the imputations stemming from either the phenomenal and/or the phenomenological in orientation (since neither orientation can be entertained in some impossible sense or semblance of state of a pure conceptual isolation, etc. Hence my reading of the phenomenological as phenomenal-phenomenological unless the sub-discipline of the phenomenological itself is being referred to as a sub-discipline *per se*. Although, again, as not absolutistically isolated from the other two correlative sub-disciplines of the hermeneutical and the existential [with the implication that our research can invoke relative objectivities between relatively incommensurable correlativities through the explication of relative-objectivities discerned in and through transformational retreatment, etc., albeit as refracted through either the same economy and/or through economic complexification). (402)

In this same vein we can also argue that the dynamically balanced suspension of any well-represented economy should present us with the same type of suspension (namely, an 'overall transcendental suspension' regardless of the economy being invoked. Refer to module Suspensions 404). (403)

The reader might also like to construct a similar type of argument for paralleling 'field' with 'consonance', 'focus' with 'dissonance', and 'frame' with 'resolution', and, reading this linear progression as a way of accounting for harmony (say, in a piece of well-constructed music, etc.). (404)

Now, if one were not to invoke patterns of pre-constructed complexification how does one account for possible economic aspects acting as relatively incommensurable economic-correlativities within a certain economy? Creatively! Let me demonstrate this in the follow exercise. (405)

If the sub-discipline of phenomenology is primarily semantic and descriptive, and, hermeneutics in its formulation of genres of behaviour operates along a prescriptive sense of formulation, how might we delineate the nature of the non-systematic-existential orientation within an economic set of designations noted as 'descriptions, prescriptions, and *x*?' Just how might we define *x* as being *x*-like in orientation that would satisfy this economic incorporation within this 'economy of description' that could equally be nominated as an 'economy of prescription' and as equally an 'economy of *x*-likeness'? The place to look, I would first argue, is in a natural language that has probably already supplied a convenient term lest we feel we have to creatively nominate an expression to do the work required through such creative re-designation. One possibility here is to just nominate the 'existential moment' as (primarily) 'proscriptive' and then read this to mean that 'the existential use of deontological-like imperatives or injunctions of a compactual nature as 'negative' in the sense that those behaviours that should not be exercised are being proscribed. So, confronted by a hungry person, say, who is literally starving to death, then our not feeding them, by direct or indirect means, is to be understood as 'proscribed'. I.e.,

'we should feed that person', and, ensure, by direct and/or indirect means, that they get fed (without, as well, over-feeding that starving person given that too much food under such circumstances also has its dangerous complications). So, problem solved! If we wished to substitute a concise formula for our three philosophical sub-disciplines, then we could define '*x'* as 'proscriptive', or as 'a process of proscription'; giving us the useful mnemonic of 'descriptions, prescriptions and proscriptions'.[129] (406)

Aligning the 'proscriptive' aspect with the 'existential moment' then leads to ask 'how does proscription operate in existentially oriented ethics or a pro-relationally oriented vision of what is meant by our being moral, etc?' Interestingly, we could interpret this to mean that the existential orientation proscribes what should not happen with the inference that we need to directly address such proscriptions with the observance of suitably enacted patterns of response based upon such implications in such a manner so as to augment and enhance the overall enrichment of that primary relationship in terms of its e/valuational formations. A prime example here is the rhetorical question 'how should you face seeing a person who is not just hungry but literally starving to death?' An existentially oriented proscriptive attitude, to my mind, would insist, as an existential imperative, i.e., with a deontological sense of force, that you oversee, either directly and/or indirectly, the appropriate feeding of that person. Not so much that you should feed that person *per se*, but, rather, that you should not leave that person to die through a lack of food, with the implication that you organize that form of necessary relief in some appropriate manner. (407)

Or take, again, the proscription about 'not killing people'. Despite complicated forms of intracultural and intercultural qualification of this ethical guide-line, say, in times of war, legal punishment or legal deterrence, etc., we can already observe its proscriptive nature rather than our treatment of it as a prescriptive demand. The difference, say, between 'this is how you bake a cake' versus 'this how you should not bake a cake'. Or, perhaps more apposite to this argument, is the following comparison, e.g., 'this is how you should drive a car' *versus* 'this is how you should not drive a car' which entails a different set of driving skills, etc. I.e., where the latter involves our needing to know the rules of the road, etc., i.e., howe 'should effectively' relate to others, and so on. (408)

'Economic complexification', therefore, is an attitudinal position that argues that we have the potentially fruitful possibility of comparing one economy with another, given the demonstrable relevance of such a comparison, and, where such a trimodal economic alignment is arranged, either directly or indirectly, through the auspices of an archetypal economy or its equivalent. So, e.g., in this regard I would argue that we can align, say, 'analysis' with the 'past tense' and with the primary sub-discipline of 'phenomenal-phenomenological' processes of 'deconstruction' as 'treatment' (in the treatment phase of transformational retreatment conducted in accordance, of course, with best phenomenological practice). Where, in effect these dialectical factors or aspects, as just noted, are in an alignment with the Object moment in the archetypal economy. (409)

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129 As noted in 80.

97 Then, there is the logical delusion that even though the logical is seemingly operated along definitive lines over the course of its apparent operation, still, such definitive precision is an illusion in absoutistical terms of reference because even that defined by the implicit economic principle of identity cannot be definitively defined except in and through constrained forms of circumscribed representation. E.g., that person in the distance looks like my friend 'John'. But, as I philosophically accept that I have neither access to indubitable knowledge nor non-indubitable non-knowledge I accept the possibility that I could be wrong even though I have verified in the past that this person is called John, and, that he has recognized me by waving to me, and, where we are now currently talking to each other about things already mentioned with each other in the past, as a form of present confirmation, that, indeed, I am talking now to this person called 'John'. As a practical, non-philosophical person, I just accept that through either verification and or confirmation of forms of verification and confirmation that, as a conformally valid statement, I genuinely believe the intentional thought that "I am talking to this person called 'John'" is true because 'I am taking to this person called 'John'' (as per a Tarskian definition of a positive truth determination). Now, although this contortion is definitely contorted, and not natural, still, we must recognize, philosophically, that all truth determinations should be treated as provisional, as works in progress, even if we were so assured about the truth of our uttered statements, we were prepared to massively gamble on their re-ascertained conformal approbation. However, throughout this we must also accept that the conformal appreciation of a certain situation should not be formally sanctioned as beyond a process of revision, that, even our identification of the elements of those statement and their truth determination deserved to be both treated as provisional but not needing current forms of re-assessment if that were not deemed to be seemingly necessary. In other words, we do not live, nor should we live in a world of either absolute doubt nor absolute non-doubt but accept that truth statements come with varying degrees of conformal validity or non-conformal non-validity. Or, again, our world is a provisionally understood one where we have no access to either absolutisitical conformality or non-conformality and where such indubitableness or non-indubitableness is neither needed nor required, but, where logical definitiveness in both truth conditions and participating logical elements has no absolutistical form of representation and where none, indeed, is required. That, theoretically, there ever is a space for the dialectical given, too, that pure acts of identification could be neither recognized nor encountered nor engaged! That the theoretical nature of this argument is reinforced along gestalt lines to the extent the aspects of the archetypal economy cannot be even entertained through their separated non-economic isolation, etc. Therefore, the logical principle of identity cannot absolutistically claim to have access to perfect forms of identity subsumed under perfect forms of identification! Moreover, if that is the case, then an absolutistical principle of identify just cannot be upheld philosophically (and, similarly, from the perspective either of some other disciplinary world or the specificity of the secular world). Furthermore, that being the case, thence the hypothetical 'space' for the parallel dialectical treatment of such a logical economy (as per paragraph 106, etc.). (410)

108-126 'Simply put, the hermeneutical is involved in matters of interpretation, etc.'[130] I.e., meta-textual features that assist in prescribing genres of behaviour that, in parallel,

[130] Refer to 110.

both write and read certain patterns of behaviour that fall within their overall orbit. As noted, such instructions are also sequentially organized (as per paragraph 118). E.g., avoiding sequential errors like mis-sequencing (through invoking that sequence out of sequence); dis-sequencing (through invoking the defective uptake of a certain sequence); and, contra-sequencing (confusing genres)… as exemplified when making tea and toast for your breakfast and you spill the hot water or hot tea over the side of the cup; or, forget to put the cup on the saucer and then pour the hot water or hot tea on to the saucer; or you inadvertently put the tea-bag into the toaster (instead of a slice of bread). (411)

As per footnote 33, the overall economy of interpretation can be expressed as hermeneutic interpretation, phenomenological reinterpretation and existential re-interpretation.[131] (412)

116 Meta-textual conventions concern both textual formations and narrations as well as all other forms of intentional experience, be that from conception (in a third cognitive order) to perception (in a fourth cognitive order), be that from conformally understood facts (in a sixth cognitive order) to factoids (as only possible states of affairs that should remain in a fifth cognitive order), etc.[132] (413)

127-136 The phenomenological sub-discipline, within the philosophical economy, through imputation, delineates whether the intentional formation currently in question, more or less, is constituted in intentional consciousness from either the phenomenal orientation or the phenomenological orientation of the person themselves. Just as in a vivid dream a relatively intact gestalt integrity tells us that the overall dream imagery is self-created by the dreamer themselves, and, to what extent our memory also may or may not recognize its bits and pieces as having once been evoked more along phenomenal lines of construction in an economy of re(-)construction (in contrast to the more phenomenological nature of imagination formed in virtual acts of fantasy). (414)

In effect, semantically mapping both the apparent, i.e., imputed, formation and derivation of such phenomena. The semantic rules of mapping determining whether atomic particulars, as essential-phenomenological-like experiences (in a first cognitive order), can take certain molecular formats (in a second cognitive order). Just as saltiness and liquid-likeness can combine in the form of a ‘salty-solution’, say, like in the tasting off either sea-water or a savory-soup. On the other hand, the semantically delineated shapes of ‘squareness’ and ‘circularity’ cannot be successfully combined in the same object in the same period of time. Hence a (table-top that is simultaneously both) square and circular can never be either presented, represented and/or re-presented as a ‘square-circle’, i.e., being only a ‘square circle’ (that forever remains only in the first cognitive/trans-cognitive orders).[133] (415)

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131 As explored, e.g., in the essay: *Pursuit*. III.7Q. Existential Discernment? Part I: Non-Existentially Oriented Treatment: Transformational Retreatment within a Pragmatic Prospect.

132 The judgment of relative facts and factoids is also conducted, respectively, in sixth and fifth trans-cognitive orders.

133 A point of nomenclature, a first cognitively ordered ‘squareness and circularity’ cannot be combined in the second ordered format of ‘x-y’ (as linked by the short hyphen), i.e., as a ‘square-circle’.

137-145 Here we need to deal with the subtle distinction between the 'non-systematic-existential' as the so-called 'third moment' (in a linear reading of the Ego moment in the archetypal economy as constructed through the use of a gestalt lens) as the topic of this module and its closely related topic of the 'systematic-existential' as explored in the module Systematic-existential Theory 401. (416)

The former distinction (through the utilization of the extensive suspension) is both the 'doorway' and 'exit' to and from this more systematic sense of the existential in which an existential complexion can be discerned, refined, and promoted over the course of our relationships in this world at large. (417)

In this module (204) a number of themes are addressed, e.g., relational emergence, designated as 'facticity', implying that all relationships are different and are ever changing in such considerations, reflecting to that extent the processes of resolution are being entered into. Connected to such ideas is noted the need for ongoing relational resolution, and, that existentialization in the more systematic sense is realized through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential. As far as the thematization of the relatively non-systematic-existential is concerned we could argue that the dynamic balance of the first two moments, i.e., the hermeneutical and the phenomenological, induces the third moment, and, that the dynamic balance of all three moments then induces a shift from the 'relational' to the 'pro-relational nature of the relatively systematic expression of the existential'. (418)

Focusing on the apparent nature of the non-systematic-existential introduces ourselves to an orientation on the specificity of the concretely historical, whereas, through a dynamic balance of all three moments there is a shift towards the systematic-existential as expressed under past existential indicators, future existential predictors, and current existential hallmarks, like e.g., spontaneity, synchronicity, simultaneity; the trans-geographical; an ongoing, encompassment of the trans-subjective, inter-subjective, objective, inter-objective appreciation of the overall life-world (as a failed linguistic attempt to understand the 'empowerment' supplied from such a pro-relational perspective of the apparent relationship itself (charged to so behave from this perspective of its own facticity).[134] (419)

146-155 Truth determination might be better looked at under a number of headings. Let me propose the following three: A Semantic Theory of Truth Determination; Evidential Supports; and, Implications re the Appreciation of Imputations. I.e., the semantic nature of truth determination; evidence; and, the application of such ideas to the determination of a sixth ordered status (in both cognitive and trans-cognitive formats), the ensuing ine-

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Whereas, salty-water is determined as possible from past experience, and, allows us to link a glass to that same combination, namely, 'a glass-of-salty-water'. These comments about 'orders' being explicated in modules 207 and 303.

[134] As a metaphorically analogued mechanism used as an explanation to insightfully clarify the nature of existentially oriented patterns of intervention (as explored in module 405).

quality of imputational formations, the correctional role that can be played by the twin concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’, and the philosophical use rectification, etc. (420)

146 As stated: A Tarskian theory of truth determination does not tell you how truth is determined but gives you the format, or form, for its assessment. Hence the role played by evidence, and, what counts as evidence. I.e., direct or indirect sense perception, testimony, and inferences, etc. The appreciation of what counts as evidential being supported by those considerations that fall under: Implications re the Appreciation of Imputations (which, I would argue, are being sketched out through the entirety of this Seventh Book, and elsewhere, by both myself and others pursuing such similar ambitions. (421)

151 Conformal truth determination begins with either the real-time confirmation or retrospective (and prospectively predictive) verification of the same topic or event already subjected to either confirmation or verification, but, does not stop there given the complexity of inputs in assessment and appreciation of truth determination (as indicated by those three headings just lent to this topic).[135] (422)

155 The desire for the indubitable is unbecoming and will oversee the deconstruction of your philosophical ‘fortune’ should one be as unwise to over-pursue such an expensive predilection. (423)

Now moving from ourselves as both critical and radical philosophers to the finer details of how we enact such philosophizings. (424)

156-177 Transformational Theory is divided between modules 104 and 206 in order to simplify this overall approach to the resolution of ‘an open-ended set of problems’. (425)

E.g., that the verb ‘to be’ covers a huge territory; appeared to suggest a linear evolution from non-integrated semantic distinctions to their aesthetic-like integration, and, on to possible facts and then their conformation as propositional-statements; as a method for dealing with the transformational interactions between disparate entities that was further simplified through retreatment; as a way of connecting the relative incommensurabilitues between conceptions and perceptions, as well as the intentional contents, like the former, and trans-intentional inputs of judgments, etc. (426)

163 And a host of other philosophical problems as duly noted. (427)

By proffering an economic solution to resolve a set of economic problems. (428)

159... That basically devolves around pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment where the latter de-elevates by one meta-degree the elevation by one meta-degree undergone in processes of critical appreciation (given the demand for relatively higher terms of reference) in somewhat of a potentially radical return to the concrete specificity of the relatively

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135 E.g., by needing to note the role to be played in a more comprehensive theory of conformal truth determination by, e.g., transformational retreatment; disciplinary limitations; processes of rectification, etc., etc.

non-systematic-existential moment (and its ability to re(-)write pretreatment through posttreatment). (429)

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161 As a technique for rendering the relative incommesurabilities of economic aspects relatively commensurable within the orbit of their respective economies. (430)

173-183 In order to explain how de-elevation by one meta-degree is not a process of treatment ideas centered on the suspension, and it automatic de-suspension, are now being introduced. This solution also resolves the question of the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing being hypothetically entertained in earlier versions of an ordered philosophy... as a segue into the next two modules dealing with an ordered philosophy. (431)

184-224 Ordered Theory is divided between the two modules of 207 and 302 in order to simplify this overall approach to the complexities of this topic. Ordered divisions, as similarly constructed sets, occur on different levels of the epistemological hierarchy that collectively constitute the apparent sense and semblance of the psyche. (432)

Those epistemological aspects dealt with are cognitive (intentional) and trans-cognitive (trans-intentional judgment) in orientation, invoking both linear and circular readings and implying transformational theory in the making of a transition from order to another. (433)

195 The six distinctive types of trans-cognitively ordered forms of judgment are semantical, aesthetical, deontological, pragmatical, hermeneutical, and ontical (factual) forms of e/valuational formation, and, their schematic *raison d'être* is accounted for, theoretically, through the subtle preferential/de-preferential treatment of the moments of the archetypal economy, which, in turn, are accounted for though the relative impact of de-suspensions *versus* suspensions respectively. (434)

209 Further integrating both transformational retreatment and the formula of rectification, etc., within an ordered perspective (as per diagrams, etc.). (435)

225-251 The formula of rectificational pretreatment, deconstructive treatment, and the re(-)normalization of retreatment, etc., is now more closely explored in modules 303, 304, and 305 respectively. (436)

Rectification is pro-hermeneutic in its preoccupation with meta-texts, etc. (437)

226 It also defines the 'problematicity of genres' through noting those 'genres that constitute distinctive patterns of problematization', and v.v. (438)

236 Deconstruction is defined through the invocation of relatively conventional forms of logical treatment. (439)

239 The operative mechanism being the suspension of the relevant textual situation in the form of a reduction relatively rendered logically consistent (within reason). (440)

245 Re(-)normalization is defined as is ‘the relatively radical re-organization that could be enacted through the permitted uptake of ensuing patterns of re(-)self-organized processes of resolution’. Or, in effect, through forms of ongoing alignment entertained and enacted through re(-)alignment (i.e., through processes of realignment, re-de-mis-alignment, and re-alignment as noted elsewhere). (441)

The intent being to bring our understanding back to that which is to hand, albeit as refracted through such pre-critical, critical and radical means of re(-)explication. (442)

Likened through the use of an analogy of the tuning of a harpsichord with an electronic tuner: where the note of the strings when struck are to find an alignment with notes being aimed for with the tuner, in harmony with the right swinging of the tuning hammer used to raise or lower pitch, etc. (443)

Where re(-)normalization is not so much the primary objective but ‘progressive’ processes of re(-)normalization, as indications of resolution, existential attunement, progressive empowerment, etc. (444)

251 As preparation for processes of pro-relational re(-)orientation towards the systematically existential.[136] (445)

252-281 The important topic of the systematic-existential is now being directly dealt with in module 401. As a simplified way of viewing this re(-)orientation, as a continual economic process of re-orientation, **given that the existential is the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential, is to imagine a shifting from the relatively material to the relatively relational (non-systematic-existential) to the relatively pro-relational (systematic-existential in regard to how the relationship is finding its alignment in its relational situation *vis-à-vis* the mutual arbitration of our aspirati1ons, etc., in relation to both a differentiation and integration of consequentially ensuing patterns of e/valuational formation/s.** (446)

The delineation of the systematic presentation, etc., of the existential falling under the three headings of indicators, predictors and hallmarks. (447)

Evoking an existential use of language with key expressions or expressions redefined as relevant and key in that same regard, e.g., authenticity, engagement, appositeness, attunement, solidarity, resolution, harmony, love, creativity, responsive-responsibility, interventional enrichment of relationships, freedom, etc. Moreover, this orientation has the potential to be radical, to demand radical responses in a redefining of responsibility. Perhaps leaving no stone unturned? Invoking and being receptive to an economy of re(-)framing, i.e., hermeneutic reframing; phenomenal-phenomenological framing through the logical clarification of deconstruction; and, chaotically re-directed re-framing through potentially finding the need to ‘permit’ and ‘author’ a process of radi-

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136 Various essays throughout the *Pursuit* explore this topic of the existential, especially Book 6. E.g., *Pursuit*.III.7S: Existential Discernment Part III... where I try to integrate a number of co-associated themes.

cal re(-)normalization. Perhaps, along the way, witnessing 'our' **metaphorically 'turning things upside down, back to front, and inside out….'**[137] (448)

Intimately related to the suitable application and expedition of an extensive suspension, overseeing processes of resolutions, along with empowerment and a mutual amplification of freedom... (449)

As reflected in the pragmatic shift where the disciplinarian who 'does their discipline', when, in an existential orientation, it becomes more that 'discipline acting on its own behalf''. (450)

In module 402 it is stated: All functions are to be economically understood, and, the economic nature of disciplines is no different. The ramifications of this position are now explored. (451)

In effect, each distinctive discipline has a distinctive sense of a passive disciplinary difference, active meta-differential, and, engaged non-distinctness. I.e., a difference as to how the disciplinarian sees the world; how the meta-differential divides up a world of e/valuation; and, an overcoming of the distance between disciplines and the secularity of the world at large. (452)

Navigating such 'terrain' the disciplinarian explores their distinctive take upon this world at large, this overall world-of-life, and, hopefully, can proffer the requisite degree of beneficial re(-)engineering stemming from such research and its critical and radical forms of appreciations. (453)

280 The work of the disciplinarian, hopefully, being deemed to be profitable (in all senses of that expression) and competent (as defined relatively and not in any absolutistical sense). (454)

That the work of the disciplinarian should occur in a 'viable, qualified, anti-representational, pragmatically open semblance of a prospect effectively designed to be of assistance to those who are resident in a secular world, who may or may not be disciplinarians, and who may or may not be religious'.[138] (455)

Just as the existential dimension is not the sole preserve of the 'religious'. (456)

282-364 Why 'Beyond Philosophies'? (457)

Why this torrent of words, this twisting of syntax, the endless tumbling of novel concepts and neologisms… towards what end is this text being continually re(-)directed, being driven? From whence have we come… and to whence will we arrive, if ever? As an evolving work in progress has 'progress' been made? And, if we were to seek a 'be-

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137 Paragraph 265.

138 Refer to 20, 364, etc.

yond' that is 'beyond philosophies' would not that demand that there is 'no beyond' in the first place?[139] Given that 'the beyond or yonder of a beyond' is 'not a beyond'. (458)

Could such a puzzling circle be squared? (459)

In simple speech **'if we attempt something, we should try to do it well, at least to the best of our abilities, even if we do not fully succeed!** If there ever were a mission statement behind this enterprise, it would be my belief that **'we need to think more clearly and distinctly whilst also recognizing that there be no completely definitive clear and distinct ideas in the first place!'** In the process making the admission that no discipline, philosophy included, has ever been able to proceed in such a manner to claim that they have been operating in as critical and radical a fashion that should have been demanded of that discipline. Name one philosopher who has not disappointed us by either straying down one more near-pointless *cul de sac*, or in making some impossible claim, or self-deconstructing their own advice, and so on and so forth… myself included. (460)

Now, I do not claim some self-perfected spirit of prescience, but, I do believe the discipline of philosophy could be and should be a bit more open-minded and welcome those relatively more radical attempts 'to push the boat out a little further', to ironically create those 'final vocabularies' highlighted by Richard Rorty. **In effect, be more insistent and persistent, more ruthless and vigorous in instituting processes of rectification, deconstruction, and re(-)normalization..!** (461)

In effect, by attempting to think more clearly, we might, from time to time, actually make some small incremental steps that could be safely designated as 'progress' even though, knowing full well, that 'dismantling nonsense' is the more effective mantra of the builder of edifices as they take away what no longer serves our purpose and carefully replaces it with an instantiation that might, optimistically, be charitably termed as 'possible evidence of our having made some small degree of progress in that same regard'.[140] **That, to this end of being both radically-critical and critically-radical, let me proceed with the rest of this commentary whilst noting that the import of this important 'clarification of our thinking' is 'to better serve others that they might better serve us!' Given that our freedom is only to be found through others that by such 'clarification of intent' we might also 'clarify and extend the limits of our own individual and collectively experienced freedoms..!'** (462)

282-289 Pragmatism 403 observes its non-reduction to mere expediency implying a certain openness to the deontologically-existential; with a focus upon competence and authenticity; and, a provisional definition of a 'viable, qualified, anti-representationalism' that is also 'positively nihilistic' and 'approached through the suitable exercise of exten-

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139 On the strength of the argument that 'the beyond (or yonder) of the beyond' is 'not a beyond', is a 'non-beyond', or, at best, perhaps only a 'meta-beyond'? On the strength of the argument that the '*x* of *x* is not-*x*, etc.' E.g.,' the heat of heat is not heat' (being temperature, which does not have a temperature *per se*).

140 Of course, it is the small incremental steps that bring us to chaotic points of bifurcation or emergence, hopefully of a profoundly positive nature from the perspective of e/valuational formation.

sive suspensions' (able to disconnect all forms of ideological extremism and their ensuing over-commitments or under-commitments[141]). (463)

284 A viable pragmatism, exercised within either a disciplinary prospect or the secular world must walk a middle path with relative transformational continuities whilst avoiding their non-provisional over-promoted presence or under-promoted absence. (464)

Because the so-called third moment of a chaotically oriented 're-presentation' parallels the so-called third moment of a provisional 'anti-representationalism' as well a non-systematic-existentialism, and so on (as can be argued for through economic complexification). (465)

290-312 The topic of the Suspension 404 is complex because the extensive suspension encompasses the apparent work of the so-called 'transcendental suspension'. (466)

Encompassing the 'three suspensions of the interrogative economy' as representative of the 'overall transcendental suspension', itself automatically invoking the economy of the de-suspension in the 'extended suspension', as situated within the 'extensive suspension' as it interfaces the virtual world of the intentional, etc., and the non-virtual world of the causal. (467)

Starting with Husserl, albeit as initially re-interpreted as a trimodal economy of a suspensional-reduction, reductive-analysis and reconstitutional-synthesis.[142] (468)

301... The application of the 'suspension' can be invoked through the practical utilization of a number of analogies, techniques, methods, etc. E.g., through dis-valuation; suspicion or skepticism; bracketing; through asking questions (either/or), making metaphorical comparisons (like as both like and not like), and running apparitional near-literal 'second replies' (as ifs), etc. (469)

Running the de-suspension of the 'suspension' as a model for volition, existential intervention, enaction of apposite forms of judgment, intimating through 'the simulation of the simulation' that which is not relatively simulated, cannot be dismissed as pure simulation, etc.[143] The mindful application of the extensive suspension enacting a middle path! (470)

313-322 Interventionalism 405 recognizes that we cannot escape being in the world with others, and v.v., regardless of either our actions, non-actions and/or inactions. (471)

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141 Defining 'ideological' as 'a form of extremism', and v.v. A relativism, e.g., would be characterized as relatively inducing a lack of commitment, etc., whereas, in a contrast, the promotion of forms of absolutism would more than likely induce co-associated forms of over-commitment.

142 Creatively mirroring, in my ahistorical re-interpretation, Husserl's earlier confusion of the suspension and the reduction, his eventual separation of the suspension and the reduction, and his overlooking the need for a reconstitutional-synthesis in order to dynamically balance the former, etc. Hence this 'radical re-interpretation' rather than a 'mere interpretation' or a 'logically critical reinterpretation'.

143 E.g., 'relative-continuities' as 'relative-objectivities' as 'relatively preserved through isomorphic transformational invariance' in 'transformational retreatment', etc.

Thence the necessity for our pro-relational, existentially oriented manner of intervention in order to oversee the progressive re(-)enrichment of our relationships through their arbitrated creation, preservation and conservation. Our appreciation of those relationships, in their relational situatedness, is arrived at through rectification, etc. Finding genre approbation through refining our choice in the set of genres being adopted and adapted. An approach that can also exercise 'error mitigation' by avoiding those genres already recognized as 'mistaken', i.e., as either defective or impossible (and, thereby, lending themselves to overseeing our inevitable relegation). Either rendering covert aspects as overtly corrected, or resolving overt defects, or merely avoiding the uptake of impossible economic models, as invalid genres of disciplinary behaviour.[144] In deconstruction, we observe the full force of the logical within the circumscription of its limitations, advancing integrity, consistency, coherency, non-contradictoriness, clarification of objectives, rejection of non-evidently based narrational facts, removal of fallacious arguments, seeking conclusions fit for purpose, etc. In ongoing re(-)normalization we seek 'the apparent alignment of our simulations of reality' with 'the apparent reality of our simulations', and v.v. Prioritizing, however, those propositional-statements with a stronger sixth ordered basis over 'evidential material' seemingly less fit, but, where all narrational facts are still treated as 'provisional' (despite how we might wish to interpret the same in the light of lived-experience). Still, even though in finding such progressive alignment, through processes of re(-)alignment, we should also be aware of the potentially radical nature of chaotically re-directed patterns arising from re(-)normalization. Hence, 'shadowing rectification, deconstruction and re(-)normalization' we have 'progressive error mitigation, error correction, and the speculative confirmation of evidential conformation'. E.g., as when possibly recognizing a friend, called John, in the distance. The genre is 'recognizing a friend' and 'not naming a famous television personality of film star'. I see this person seems to be the right age, has the right hair colour and physical build, etc. My speculation that 'this distant person' is 'John' is confirmed when I wave and they wave back, etc. Reinforcing this idea of 're-normalization' (as a process of re(-)alignment) by provisionally supplying empirical information and finding an overall process of either continuing conformation or disruptive dis-conformation. (472)

Taking into account, both individually and collectively, our experience of solidarity through our embodiment/s, our embeddedness with others in a world of the relational acting as our overall life-world, and our environmental embankment in this world at large. (473)

323-351 Imputational Theory 406 as noted through necessity: Without the observation of relative-objectivities, as continuing moments of isomorphic transformational invariance, there could be no representative imputations (albeit also provisionally treated as chaotically characterized, potentially radical, anti-representationally oriented simulations [operating in an anti-representational economy that equally does not discount relative-representations and relative-presentations, relative-objectivities, the inescapable utilization of imputations, etc.]). (474)

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144 Immediately ruling out, therefore, all forms of uni-modalism, like, e.g., realism, idealism, etc., and, bi-modalism, like, e.g., dualism, causalism (based on causes and effects), etc.

324 And: without the suspension of our simulations of such representations there could be no patterns of intervention, existentially oriented or otherwise. (475)

333 Translating Jonathan Sacks' 'covenantal' with the religiously neutral expression 'compactual'. An expression indicative of a general non-power differential in contrast to contractual agreements. (476)

Because through the extensive suspension we can virtually entertain what could be done and, perhaps, envisage what should be done through expressions of such solidarity, and, through the de-suspension transform such experience into non-virtual terms of reference, albeit, more often than not, as arbitrated through(-)others through such forms of inescapable solidarity, sadly, all too often barely recognized as such. (477)

Sadly, the world is all too beholden to ideological illusions and nonsense. **But, by what we fall, by that, too, we may rise!**[145] (478)

340 That a profound pragmatism recognizes this world of imputations as we walk a path between both their impossible absolutistical existence and non-existence. (479)

345-351 Trans-Imputational Theory 407 concerns the understanding that even imputations *qua* imputations are appreciated in elevated terms of reference by one meta-degree in meta-status. (480)

Moreover, even the suspension of the suspension must be a non-suspension, not a suspension, a meta-suspension... and thence our metaphorical path of redemption. (481)

Given this positive form of erasure... (482)

349 Because: A path of 'redemption' is ever-open to us through the very experience of the suspension, the suspension of the suspension, in and through the ongoing suspension already at the very center of our absented-presence, presented-absence… (483)

350 Since: if our existence were presently-present, as presence, there would be no transformational change, and, if absently-absent there would be nothing to change. (484)

351 But: from nothing, something emerges, and, from something, nothing emerges too… the shadow of a ghost with an elusive smile… hopefully, ever-walking upon a middle path…. (485)

352-364 Re(-)Emergent Theory 501 is subtitled 'The Eternal Return' because: Through an economy of re(-)iteration, significance is both generated and disseminated, then dissipated, but, never entirely lost, and, therefore, it behooves us to act or not act, or defer

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145 Through the extensive suspension, and so on and so forth...

from acting or non-acting, should the occasion call it as it is, as if on the behalf of all eternity.[146] (486)

356 Moreover: it should be ever the case that in our intentional deliberations we should responsibly behave as if we had to both suffer and enjoy such patterns of intervention as if they were to be re-lived in the same sequences… as if for all eternity... because it is through such 'openness' and 'iteration' that existential significance is both generated and experienced. (487)

358 Since: Given that significance is generated through an economy of re(-)iteration... it implies that existentially oriented significance is generated through an economy of existentially oriented re(-)iteration. (488)

The so-called third moment is also characteristic of harmonization through resolution generated within an economy of repetition (between mere iteration, sheer iteration and bare iteration[147]). (489)

360 Being mindful that: Knowing, full well, that too much consonance, dissonance or resolution, or, too little consonance, dissonance or resolution are all equally fatal to the life of the relationship in question. (490)

Knowing, through reflection upon historical experience, and so forth, that an existential-pragmatism, as a pragmatic-existentialism, belongs to no one, and, yet, belongs to everyone! (491)

Further answering the question 'what is beyond criticism?!'[148] (492)

A critical life lived radically in and through a chaotic suspension, finding redemption through a sacrifice of the ambitious for the aspirational but only able to be realized through the solidarity of arbitration...[149] (493)

A conservative approach to the conventions of logic, and, a radical approach to the existential discoveries to be discerned through dialectical innovations... (494)

Entertaining a relative clarification of our thinking through pre-well-informed suspensions and through an openness to a continual de-suspension of the same... (495)

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146 More than enough grounds for a viable religious life, should that be entertained, be that with or without theistic convictions, with or without religionist or agnostic predilections, etc.

147 A topic closely scrutinized in four short essays under the title: *From Mere Repetition to Sheer Repetition*.? (2.11.14-29.11.14). On Page 4 of my homepage site.

148 Beyond the critical is the radical, and beyond the radical is the existentially led life... and its openness to both the critical and the radical... and, from thence, our ability to experience what once would have been the impossible. Refer to *Pursuit*, Book 5.

149 With an obvious allusion, again, to Richard Rorty. In effect, cashing out how 'solidarity' is to be achieved as a 'pragmatic' work in progress, through innovations, through an existential openness to others, etc.

Appreciating the consequences of our actions, non-actions and inactions to the best of our abilities... (496)

Being of service to others, be that either as disciplinarians and/or as residents in this secular world... (497)

Treating all subjectivity as if it were an illusion lest our pre-judgmental prejudices were beholden to such illusions... (498)

But, seeing ourselves in all things given their constitution is both by(-)us and before(-)us... but, that it is the world, alone, through(-)us, that gives back to(-)us, through requisite forms of sacrifice, all sense and semblance of freedom...[150] (499)

Since: from nothing, something emerges, and, from something, nothing emerges too… the shadow of a ghost with an elusive smile… to be seen ever-hopefully walking upon a middle path..!! (500)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 19.10.22.

[150] I.e., in and through an economy of interactive-observation wherein we find and refine our working solidarity with(-)others through behaviour consisting of a passive observation enacted by(-)us, active observation for(-)us or before(-)us, and, an engaged observation through(-)us in which we mutually thematize the freedom that is to be collectively realized through our negotiations conducted within a sphere of the arbitrational in which we dialectically mediate personal ambitions of a private realm with social aspirations in a public realm, and v.v.

A Post-Postscript as a Commentary on the Metaphorical Concept of 'Redemption'

In the main text the sole mention of this word 'redemption', given its religiously neutral context, may well seem to stand out and appear to need some form of explanation:

> A path of 'redemption' is ever-open to us through the very experience of the suspension, the suspension of the suspension, in and through the ongoing suspension already at the very center of our absented-presence, presented-absence… [349] (501)

Moreover, in the *Postscript*, in the form of a commentary, it is noted:

> Here, we need to be optimistic. No one is irredeemable, although, they have to first invoke a transcendental suspension in some form or other… which would rule out all obstinate ideologues. Without this ability to question one's own positioning then no progress can follow. On the other hand, merely by taking up this simple act of questioning, in effect setting up the invocation of an interrogative economy,[151] we can make a first few tentative steps towards such redemption. I.e., as a philosopher, and not as a philo-sophist, but, as a disciplinarian who can proudly sit on this first tier, albeit as one more disciplinarian on the eternity of an endless period of probation… [383] (502)

Furthermore, I noted:

> Moreover, even the suspension of the suspension must be a non-suspension, not a suspension, a meta-suspension... and thence our metaphorical path of redemption. [481]

Given this positive form of erasure... [482]

> 349 Because: A path of 'redemption' is ever-open to us through the very experience of the suspension, the suspension of the suspension, in and through the ongoing suspension already at the very center of our absented-presence, presented-absence… [483]

> 350 Since: if our existence were presently-present, as presence, there would be no transformational change, and, if absently-absent there would be nothing to change. [484]

> 351 But: from nothing, something emerges, and, from something, nothing emerges too… the shadow of a ghost with an elusive smile… hopefully, ever-walking upon a middle path…. [485]

> 352-364 Re(-)Emergent Theory 501 is subtitled 'The Eternal Return' because: Through an economy of re(-)iteration, significance is both generated and dissemi-

[151] Refer to, e.g., 291-295, etc.

> nated, then dissipated, but, never entirely lost, and, therefore, it behooves us to act or not act, or defer from acting or non-acting, should the occasion call it as it is, as if on the behalf of all eternity. [368] (503)

What are the ramifications of this concept of 'redemption'? Do they have religious implications, etc? (504)

Here, I have tried to scrupulously adhere to a middle path in introducing this concept of 'redemption' and all other related existential conceptual co-associations. I have neither promoted nor demoted the general positioning of, say, a theist, or a religionist, or a spiritualist, or an agnostic, or an atheist. My intent is quite different, namely, to introduce such ideas that they might be taken up by either someone who is affiliated or unaffiliated, be they religious or otherwise, hopefully, through critical and radical processes of adoption and adaptation that adhere to the provisional, open-ended guidelines established in this *The Seventh Book*. (505)

Such ideas that are also intended to be explored and scrutinized by disciplinarians, and, again, hopefully adopted and adapted by such specialists that they might be able to perform a better service to others, preferably, as viewed, an appreciated, from the perspective of the secular world. (506)

With these circumscriptions in mind just what is entailed in this concept of 'redemption' and other allied concepts of an existential orientation.? (507)

To this end let me explore the following… (508)

The expression 'redemption' has various denotations of which some are religious and others not religious. Let me concentrate on the latter in order to choose where I wish to head in this attempt to spell out the ramifications of this expression, namely, a delineation of its present implications, future consequences, and past resonances in significance-formation. (509)

In this regard let me propose the following five ideas I wish to extract from the semantic background behind this more general concept, namely, a certain 'cost' that might be envisaged as the expense involved in making an act of investment through the 'purchase' of such behaviour; the successful divestment of a certain sense and semblance of 'freedom' to be attained and obtained in and through the 'mutual enrichment' of our ensuing co-associated relationships; that the success of this process is either some form of emendation of and/or for the making of some kind of amends that might be perceived as being needed to have been undertaken; that this entire process can be appreciated by the individual or individuals directly involved as such; and, that this same ascertainment, theoretically, can be similarly appreciated by a certain set of other subjects not so necessarily involved, or as if not involved at all, when viewed from the apparent perspective of the primary relationship/s in question. Broadly speaking we might refer to these five ideas as the cost of redemption; that the value of that activity that sets up such redemption is to be seen as an enhanced form of freedom, in the process successfully making amends;

and, that this overall semblance of redemption can be both self-perceived and other-perceived along conformal lines of validation. (510)

So, e.g., this cheque for $*x* can be redeemed for $*x*. Or, e.g., these long years of study have paid off to such an extent that your life is now very comfortable and one where you do not have to work at least five days each week, every week, just to break even. Or, e.g., even though you received money knowing it was stollen you banked every last dollar of it and never spent one cent, and, in your last will and testament, you envisaged directing your saving to a variety of worthwhile charities.[152] That, e.g., in remaining in your job, in this notorious call-center, for at least year you redeemed your faith in yourself as a person who could demonstrate that they could be a worthwhile candidate to employ despite the obvious difficulties you patiently endured in your one year of employment there. That, e.g., it is obvious to others, too, that you are someone worth employing given that most people appreciate the pressures people operate under in working in a very busy and stressful call-center and that you managed that position for one year. Anyhow, that is the general drift. Admittedly, redemption is usually used in a religious context, but, as indicated. it is not necessary that it be curtailed purely within that type of environment. (511)

For the sake of brevity, let me just assume that I intend this expression 'redemption' to mean more simply something along the lines of 'the successful overcoming of certain defects, or difficulties, through the persistence of certain efforts that achieve a relative state of freedom. in some apposite form or other. in the manner, more or less, as initially envisaged'. (512)

In the light of this provisional definition let me now presuppose that an understanding of initial conditions could be expressed as its 'pre-existential conform', i.e., an initial understanding of currently perceive conformal expression, albeit in pre-critical terms of reference as a form of pretreatment (as would be envisaged in a theory of transformational retreatment as explored earlier). Moreover, if critically treated as an 'existential conform' then, if successfully enacted as such, hopefully, would realize an apposite 'existential transform' over the course of the enaction of that ensuing process of transformational retreatment. Approached in this manner, we first assume a hermeneutic translation to the extent that we come to understand what we are dealing with along with both the problematics and objectives entailed in the genres of behaviour being up-taken in exhibition of that pre-existential conform. A 'conform' to the extent that we have a very good idea of what we are dealing with, as a conformal set of truth determinations in terms of a valid representation of actual phenomenal-phenomenological configurations being discerned and delineated in our open, pre-critical experience of that situation in question. Then, by understanding the existential potentials of that situation, through exploring vari-

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[152] Still, even though those monies were knowingly received as stollen, it could be argued, say, by a judge in a court of law, that as this person did not directly obtain a benefit from that stollen money that they partially redeemed themselves by such behaviours, and, where it would also be needed to take into account the manner as to how they received such funds, be it through coercion or a desire to protect the thief, fear of retaliation should the moneys be returned, and all other matters pertinent to such considerations. By such means, arguing for at least, some form of partial redemption if not full redemption.

ous relevant forms of critical treatment and discerning their potential existential characteristics and overall character resident in that situation, we could then invest in that 'pre-existential conform' now as a potential 'existential conform'. Then, enacting what seems to be existentially required that existential conform, through such performance, then takes on the nature of an 'existential transform' through 'the ensuing course of such transformational retreatment'. (513)

Now, the 'redemption' in such a process occurs when those five ideas, as previously noted, can be duly observed in 'our' close scrutiny of the transformations involved in our ostensive 'existential interventions' entered into in that relational-situation in question. I.e., asking what was the cost of redemption; how was that act delivered; to what extent either certain difficulties and/or defects were overcome; was such 'redemption', either self-perceived and/or self-apperceived as a form of relational freedom through relational enrichment, and v.v., being experienced as such by those subjected to such apparent 'redemption'; and, could we safely assume that a sufficiently a well-informed audience might come to the same or similar type of conclusion or conclusions? (514)

However, to proceed further with this argument I would need to tie up some loose ends concerning the nature of conformal truth determination, the relevance of such a performance, as well as predicated such an act upon both the authenticity and competence of that performer exercising this form of existential intervention. (515)

It is a valid observation to note that all people do perceive the world differently and, therein and thereby, will apperceive values differently as well. On the other hand, it would be wrong to think people apperceive considerations of value in such a radically diverse way that no degree of commonality whatsoever could be found between any two or more individuals. Indeed, this hermeneutic dimension of the pre-critical in pretreatment is predicated on a certain necessary degree of inter-subjectivity, in their understanding of each other, and, inter-objectivity, as to how they see the world conforming to certain intracultural and intercultural notions on what there is to be seen, etc. Therefore, even in this pre-critical phase a certain conformity to truth determinations is already presupposed. Hence their representative translation in the form of this idea of a 'conform'. I.e., the invocation of a certain set of genres, addressing considerations of both problematicity and intentional objectives, in which truth determinations already to hand are taken up, is an assumption that by itself should not be too controversial. Of course, questions taken up by both disciplinarians and secularists alike can be problematic for a sinking raft of reasons. Here we must trust that the interrogator, the person asking questions, is both authentic and competent, and the questions they ask and work towards answering are relevant to the proceedings currently to hand. (516)

Now, although such proceeding could be conducted by two people possessing both similar sets of values and perspectives on life, still, all people are different and, as it is the case in chaotic theory, that small incremental additions or subtractions can be party to profoundly different outcomes, then it follows that we must ask 'just how should such cognitive differences be navigated, negotiated and arbitrated even if both parties are mutually aligned in general terms of reference, etc? (517)

Or, extended to the wider domain of research and debate, just how should people presenting with opposing mindsets, possessing different data points, divergent skill-sets, operating with dissimilar intentional objectives, etc., ever be able to be on the same page in terms of their self-apperception and other-apperception conceived of in terms of their securing some notion of their possible existential redemption both with-themselves and before-others, etc? Here I would like to introduce the concept of an 'iterative complexification of conformal fields through ongoing re(-)normalization', etc.' in the suitable formation of mutual forms of understandings sufficient to resolve such problematic forms of inter-communication and the co-associated strivings for sufficient degrees of mutual consensus and social solidarity, etc. (518)

Let me explain what is involved in this form of communicative clarification. Simply put, we seek to find forms of alignment, through processes of re(-)alignment, i.e., re(-)normalization, etc., by arguing that as all economies have the same epistemological enstructuralization, i.e., economic in orientation, and archetypally economic in general terms of reference, it follows that through iterative process of complexificational comparison we should be able to find those relative-continuities, i.e., those relative-objectivities expressed through transformational retreatment as isomorphic transformational invariances seemingly held in common between different systems of intentional formation and communicative dissemination. Or, in other words, given, epistemologically, that our structural-processes that simulate informative patterns of understanding are both intentionally constituted (written) and reconstituted (read) in archetypal terms it follows that through the iteration of suitable forms of complexification we should be able to determine less represented economic correlativities both in that same economy and between different economies, and, therein and thereby, set up forms of conformal concordance between any two different economic systems.[153] Of course, as noted, this is dependent upon observing what appears to be comparatively more relevant for such observers whilst the quality of their research must also depend upon both their authenticity and competence in realizing a resolution of such considerations. A key indicator for the possible existence of such authenticity is the suitable utilization of an extensive suspension, able, at very least to induce the requisite richness of appreciation required for either self-apperception and/or other-apperception into such matters. Then, as an indicator of successful resolutions is the comparative degree to which the iteration of e/valuational formations are inclined to exceed the value of that that being invested in the pursuit of such productive performances. (519)

In other words, the gestalt nature of epistemological fields guarantees that through direct or indirect reiteration of memetic or thematic tropes in one economic field that it

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153 With respect to economic correlativities we should note that in an economy we need to have at least three relatively incommensurable-correlativities. Interestingly, they mutually co-define each other through the joint negation of the other two correlativities. So, therefore e.g., a = -(b + c). It, therefore, also follows that the entire economy can be regarded as 'zero', or 'empty' given that the sum of a + b + c must also equal a + b +{-(a + b)] = 0 (given that c = -(a + b). Last, we should also note that given such correalativities are already in an economy it must follow that 'relative-incommensurabilities' can also be read as being equal to 'relative-non-incommensurabilities' (given their commensuration within their respective economies).

should be possible to find correlative correlates, etc., in other fields demonstrating similar symmetries, motifs, patterns of response, existential ramification, etc., etc. (520)

However, to demonstrate such apparent parallelisms or contrapositions, such thematic components and contrasts, etc., it is necessary that all relevant fields in question be viable and able to be actively performed, at least to that extent where such fruitful co-associations can be entertained that would allow one to then intuit apparent processes of conformal co-alignment, explicate relevant ramifications of existential patterns of intervention, be the latter in either virtual and/or non-virtual terms of reference etc. (521)

In more detail, just what is entailed, and what are the ramifications of such iterative complexification? (522)

Each and every economy is envisaged as trimodal in its complexion. This trimodal configuration is between at least three relative economic-incommensurabilities within their co-associated economy. Distinctive patterns, arising in one economic-correlativity are either wittingly or unwittingly disseminated throughout that entire economy through forms of correlativity being entertained within that same economy, or, in any co-constructed relevant economy apparently simulating relatively isomorphic patterns of co-production, i.e., where the measure of relevance is the comparative extent that economic aspects respond productively to comparative complexification, etc. Now, let me exemplify what is being referred to here under this rubric of ‘complexification’. (523)

Let us imagine we are historians attempting to construct the biography of a certain individual. Relevant records are consulted, perhaps the person in question is also able to be interviewed, maybe co-associates of that same individual might also be able to be interviewed, etc., etc. Now, certain logical constraints exist in this type of research apparent anomalies will need to be removed from such constructions or adequately resolved. So, e.g., that person can only be born in a certain year and it is certain that that biography cannot have that person born in two different years, and that it is only when we are uncertain as to the actual date birth that we might, instead, consider an appropriate window when that event might have occurred. Similarly, a person can only have one definitive date of death, but, in the event of their not being deceased or our not knowing the exact time of that event should it have already occurred then again a window of probability or probable likelihood might need to be delineated instead. Then, in between these two types of fixed points a biography could be constructed on the grounds that that person, being a person, will demonstrate certain identificational-continuities. as relative-objectivities, over the course of the reconstruction of that biography (referred else were to the ‘existential descriptor’ in question). Then, certain features can be delineated with enough commonality with other examples exhibiting the same commonality, in terms of the certain generalities, particularities, and specificities, that can be referenced and co-referenced in forming this essential representational conformality under such construction. (524)

Moreover, by such means, it might also be the case that certain developments can also be articulated and reinforced through the reiteration of such aspects being found to

be conformally present and evident. That by such research we can begin with the relevant pre-existential conform, then proceed to our being able to give that same conform its specific set of configurations as its existential conform, and, then, through the apparent resolution of various existential pressures determine to what extent and in what manner that existential conform then takes on or does not take on the complexion of an existentially oriented transform vis-à-vis or a relatively non-existential transform. (525)

Now the point of choosing the historical re(-)construction of a human subject, in order to construct a certain biography, is that it should prove to be a more accessible example in this demonstrative regard. That, in essence, the same general principles, as guidelines, will be in utilized and observed regardless of whether our topic is an object, an event or a series of events, a community or nation, scientific materials or theories, a philosophical position or ideologies, historical processes of reconstruction, etc. Moreover, such re(-)constructions, as limited representations, can be further enriched through informative comparisons already to hand or to be found to hand in the furtherance of such research. E.g., in the economy of the temporal we might assume that certain reasonably selected processes that have generally occurred in the past can occur or cannot occur again in the present and, likewise, in their reiteration or non-reiteration in the future. Just as, e.g., human subjects are currently assumed to have been born, and, that no individual will escape their eventual time of death, and, that as biographically configured they can only be born once and then after that date meet a time of permanent death on only once occasion likewise. Then, in entertaining informative contrasts with the biographies of other human subjects, we can through such complexification enrich the biography of that person in question on the grounds that similar patterns of behaviour were either observed or not observed, and, if observed, would have been observed within the reasonable conformance of those conventions both operative and understood by that subject in that period of time under such scrutiny. Invoking on this occasion pattern of complexification of both a temporal complexion and of a human disposition. (526)

Now, in the philosophical arena variously selected sets of complexified patterns can be similarly observed and scrutinized for conformal conformation, etc. E.g., in interviewing people in a phenomenal-phenomenological approach certain apparent relative-objectivities can be compared to certain hermeneutically approached objectivities that also appear to reinforce such isomorphic transformational invariance. I would also argue that we can do the same in an existentially oriented approach that focused on the lived-specificities to have been found in the life of that individual in question. Or, e.g., we might wish to do an in-depth ordered analysis of the life of a certain individual and entertain to what extent various propositions can migrate through these orders to end in the form of propositional-statement finding conformation in that sixth order. Or, e.g., with people with different value-systems, we might wish to find to what extent people entertain similar attitudes despite such variation in their beliefs, patterns of intracultural and intercultural variety, etc. (527)

Similarly, in the expedition of interdisciplinary studies, of whatever kind, knowing that a commonality of archetypal structural-functions are utilized in all epistemological processes of cogitation, it follows that processes of commensuration are always open

even if they should prove to be relatively profitless, i.e., relatively non-relevant, under the specific circumstances of their comparisons. Hence this designation of such conformation as being arrived at through ‘iterative complexification of conformal fields through ongoing re(-)normalization, etc.’ By ‘etc.’ is meant rectification and deconstruction, along with whatever other measures are found to be of assistance in these processes of conformation. By ‘re(-)normalization is meant an economy of ongoing re(-)alignment, and where such alignment is progressively realized through rectificational realignment conducted in a pre-critical, hermeneutically oriented domain; deconstructive error correction through critical processes of re-de-mis-alignment conducted in a phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented domain; and, relatively radical processes of chaotically oriented re(-)alignment conducted in an existentially oriented domain. (528)

Complexificational enrichment is also assisted by determining which archetypal aspect we are wishing to find forms of virtual, interactive resonance… be that within the same referential economy or between different economies. Previously, I noted that in the ‘representative economy’ (which could equally be referred to as the ‘economy of presentation’ or the ‘economy of re-presentation’) I observed how this so-called third moment could also be construed as ‘anti-representational’ in its complexion. E.g., by being construed as an imputation that is neither extrapolated nor non-suspended. By such means setting up a state of mutual complexificational enrichment by equating these two designations as co-referentially coincident in both of these two economic representations of economies dealing with relative-continuities as relative-objectivities observed as such under isomorphic transformational invariance. The implication being that ‘chaotically oriented re-presentations’ have the same reference to ‘those imputations under consideration (re)treated as both non-extrapolated and as suspended’, etc. Moreover, such considerations oriented towards either ‘presentation’ and/or ‘representation’ must also conform to such attitudinal reconfigurations being arrived at through such relatively subtle forms of exploration and closer scrutiny. I.e., as substance-less, relatively insubstantial, empty, conventional designations that cannot be literally construed as either materially-bound or immaterially-bound, but, for all that, still acting as conventional designations through demonstrating conformal patterns of circumscribed iterative stability, etc. Moreover, patterns of iteration that, for us, can be progressively enriched through mutual processes of both complexification and conformal-conformation, etc. (529)

By ‘conformal-conformation’ is meant our ability, first, to either confirm in real time, and, second, when and where applicable, find other forms of conformation where all forms of validation correctly conform to both a Tarskian semantic approach to truth determination and the relevant rules for evidential assessment pertinent to that topic in question. (530)

Why this level of scrutiny? To establish the further enrichment of our comparatively treated topic or topics; the reiterative establishment of conformal validation; and, the reiterative assessment of existential trajectories exercised in responsive patterns of intervention in terms of their apparent existential responsibleness that could be enacted over the time periods in question, be they under consideration in either retrospective, current and/or prospective terms of reference. Hence this concern with ‘conforms’ and

‘transforms’ scrutinized in terms of their ‘apparent existentially and non-existentially oriented inputs and outputs’, etc. (531)

First, let me lament the sorry state of professional disciplines and how it would seem to be the case that most disciplinarians have relegated themselves to at least a second tier if not, on many occasions, a third tier. In effect, we have here in this observation, the makings of a shocking exposé in which most professionals barely register the sorry status of their current intellectual life and the deeper disrepair of their professional practice. (532)

Second, let me retrieve some degree of optimism that not all disciplinarians are permanently incorrigible, without redemption, and that many, after a successful process of remonstration, will attempt to be authentic, and more professional, in progressing the course of their researches. (533)

Third, let me discuss the nature of e/valuational formation and the co-associated topic of what is entailed in the positive enrichment of our relationships. (534)

Fourth, in the light of this concept of relational ‘enrichment’ let me explore the nature of ‘intervention’ and, more specifically, the nature of ‘existentially oriented intervention’. (535)

Fifth, let me reintroduce this neutral concept of ‘redemption’. (536)

Sixth, let explore the outlines of a philosophy of consequential analysis. (537)

Seven, let me highlight the ramifications this disquisition has on re(-)positioning in the general exposition of a truly, well-performing pragmatic philosophy. (538)

Eight, and last, let me sum up the ramifications of these ideas on existentially oriented re(-)positioning and the implications it has for notions that fall under the headings of productive forms of ‘relevance’ and progressively established, positive, evidently-evidential ‘enrichment’ along with a seriously rigorous re(-)e/valuation of the professional under the additional headings of ‘authenticity’ and ‘competence’, and, what role these four notions might play in the cautious explication of either a religious philosophy or a non-religious philosophy that explicitly recognizes that all envisaged imputations have three provisional formats, namely, first tier imputations as imputations *qua* suspended, non-extrapolated imputations; second tier imputations as suspended but extrapolated; and, third tier imputations as neither suspended nor non-extrapolated.[154] (539)

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[154] Restated: ‘first tier’ being imputations that are ‘both suspended and non-extrapolated (into either the fictitious, so-called ‘external world’ and/or the equally fictitious so-called ‘internal world’, etc.)’; the ‘second tier’ being imputations that are ‘both suspended and extrapolated’; and, the ‘third tier; being imputations that are ‘both non-suspended and extrapolated’.

i. I have expressed by thoughts that, at some time or other, all philosophers can be found to be somewhat annoying.[155] However, to be more honest, it would be a very easy task to paint most philosophers most of the time as no more than 'philo-sophists', i.e., 'apparent philosophical professionals arguing for impossible states of affairs most likely being simultaneously 'entertained' in impossible patterns of cogitation without the requisite insight that such nonsense is both 'being dispensed' and needs urgently to be 'dispensed with'!'. (540)

In the philosophical sphere, I have argued that we need to rule out various styles of philosophical argumentation that are fundamentally fallacious once, e.g., an economic perspective is properly understood, etc. In this regard, in conventional terms of reference, if appropriate forms of qualification and scoping are not going to be suitably applied then we need to rule out, almost without exception, all forms of uni-modalism, bi-modalism, absolutistical claims for indubitable knowledge along with all relativistical claims for the skeptical invalidation of all sense and semblance of knowledge; and, either visions and versions of philosophical positioning based on either premises of pure, unmediated states, entities, bases, and so forth, with or without access, through the necessity of relational-interaction, to either so-called 'things arising in, of, or from themselves alone', and so on. Indeed, not much of traditional philosophy will remain after the application of these six prohibitive headings of the 'uni-modal, bi-modal, absolutistic, relativistic, unmediated, and the non-interactive' (through being non-relationally engaged/relationally non-engaged). But, in this sad fact, I do not despair. All disciplines can be suitably salvaged when carefully approached and 'appropriately rectified, properly deconstructed, and appositely re(-)normalized, etc.'[156] (541)

But, let me move on to point out that, currently, there is not one discipline, that springs to mind, that is not obviously flawed in its own distinctive way… that optimistically speaking, would not eventually invite the suitable specification of suitable modes of remediation through processes of rectification, etc. (542)

So, where next to run this terrible review, this tragi-comedy of errors and a false pride being taken… in such seemingly 'artful pretense' and for 'a professional edifice that was envisaged as being able to last a thousand years', certainly the lifetime of the professions pushing such fraudulent constructions despite what financial merit might be gained through their more practical promotions? (543)

Take the historian. It would appear that we may well need to cast a much more-busy eye over 'the history of the historian themselves' rather than 'the endless subtleties of their historical expositions' given, sadly, that many professionals appear to lack the authenticity needed to run their research along non-ideological lines. Instead, happily profiting from such deceptions and such seemingly self-deceptive practices that could

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155 E.g., refer to paragraph 381. Naturally, I cannot exclude myself from this list, but, at least I do see myself trying to make amends in that department, find my own forms of redemption (through, e.g., exercising an anti-representational economy. Refer to paragraph 591).

156 Defining 'suitable' to include 'appropriate, proper, and apposite' as applied to the 'hermeneutical, phenomenological and existential respectively'.

well even have taken in those professionals themselves given their apparent inability to merely conduct the prerequisite of a well-exercised, initial suspension. (544)

Or, let us cast now our skeptical gaze over the realm of science, and the influential realm of physics in particular. Yes, we have benefited from the endless spill-overs of such research in the form of everyday gadgets, still, just what percentage of their discipline is uncontested and non-controversial, is relatively settled and happily forms a form of consensus that is proudly claimed to be self-evidently conformal in the overall integration of its truth determinations? So, to settle the correct score, so to speak, the domains of relativity and quantum physics remain almost incommensurable. That, here, the nature of matter is still deemed a 'work in progress', whereas speculations on putative topics like, e.g., so-called 'dark matter' and so-called 'dark energy' seem to be little more that unsubstantiated speculations despite billions spent on the unrepentant chasing of such reluctant chimeras, such all-consuming shibboleths? Such an ever-present scandal that the majority of the topic of physics appears to be basically unsettled despite our being the beneficiaries of that small percentage of their topic that has been so fruitfully productive, so profitably employed, so instrumental in changing the ethos of the Contemporary era (as an age of surveillance, simulation, meta-work, in the development of the virtual, and so on, and so forth? And, hopefully, of course, in the delineation, dissemination, and promotion of an existential perspective and its profound intra-cultural and inter-cultural shifts in an appreciation of its e/valuational formation [i.e., in its 'value' production[157]). (545)

Is there just one discipline that escapes this crisis of professional integrity? (546)

Alas, in my estimation, that is the case! (547)

ii. However, as noted, we need not despair too much. Obviously, there in much in most disciplines that allows them to function to some extent. Just, that with a clarification of their thinking, these so-called 'professionals' could do a lot better. (548)

One would think, e.g., that the classification of a philosopher as no more than a 'philo-sophist' might concentrate their motivation to focus on the expediting the recovery of a more professional stance… although the word 'recovery' might be better replaced, here, by the descriptor of their making a 'discovery'. (549)

Let me proffer three reasons for my qualified optimism, namely, that disciplinarians must already be working with what is seemingly working even if only operating at a bare minimum in this regard; that insight may well be ever-present but not sufficiently connected with the necessary degree of self-apperception and other-perception; and, through skillfully being 'set up' more often than not only needs to be then pointed out as already present in a certain sense, and, in this 'turning around', present such a 'discovery' as more a process of recovery after all! (550)

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157 Noting, in a harmonic reading of the archetypal economy of World-Object-Ego, that ordered value takes six kinds of e/valuational formation besides the three forms of 'value' taken up in the scheme: 'identification/identity formation; functionality/functional formation; and, valuation/value formation'.

That, undoubtedly, the first step here is the instigation of a suspension in any form whatsoever! Then, from that suspension, reductions and reconstitutions will follow, i.e., respectively, phenomenal-phenomenological analyses, and hermeneutical investigations. That a dynamic balance of these latter moments will then return us to a more fully fleshed out sense and semblance of the suspension with an existential complexion along with the possibility of then moving from the non-systematic-existential examination, of the specificity of the concretely historical, to the more systematic-existential examination through a dynamic balance of these three moments as just noted.[158] (551)

iii. E/valuational formation is a more complicated, but more accurate way of saying 'value formation' (as a trans-intentional process of evaluation with valuational content in an intentional form/at). (552)

In ordered e/valuation, trans-cognitively ordered judgment and its cognitively ordered content delivered through the former, I have noted six distinctive kinds of evaluation that should not be confused, namely, (pre-essential-essential) semantical value; aesthetical value; deontological value; pragmatical value' hermeneutical value; and, ontical (or factual) value. (553)

From the perspective of the archetypal economy with the World moment centered in the fifth (trans-cognitive/cognitive) order I envisage our perception/apperception of considerations of hermeneutical possibility; the Object moment coinciding with phenomenal-phenomenological content in the first order; and the Ego moment implicating existential e/valuation from a third order. Respectively, we have the following types of e/valuation, namely, functionality and function; identification and identity; and, valuation and value. (554)

Now, neither economic aspects nor facets experienced therein, can be entertained in a non-relational mode, without interacting with the rest of that economy and the relational situation that that relationship, in turn, is also found to possess. So, therefore, such relative distinctions can be drawn, but, just not absolutistically! The implication being that a dialectical encompassment of the entire economy in its relational situatedness would do better justice to its relational representation, but, as limited and as mortal as we are, such infinities must escape us and be better re-presented through iterative processes of ongoing re(-)normalization in which such alignments to be discerned are to be accepted as presented, represented and re-presented (in and through, e.g., a chaotically oriented, an anti-representational modality invoking imputations that are suspended and not extrapolated, etc.). (555)

iv. Now, the harmonic interactions of these economic aspects, and entailed experiential facets, oversees the emergence of an 'existent surplus' that cannot be reduced to ei-

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158 I.e., the phenomenological moment of analysis/reduction; the hermeneutical moment of synthesis/reconstitution; and, the non-systematic-existential moment of the suspension (as a dynamic balance of the former). Note that by 'suspension' is meant, in historical terms, the 'transcendental suspension', but, in a more thorough exploration of this notion is more accurately meant an 'extensive suspension' as explored in the module Suspensions 404.

ther those economic aspects and facets, or, the incidental coupling of processes of economic complexification in which entertained (either between economic moments as relative-incommensurable-internalities and) between either directly and/or indirectly aligned archetypal polarities of World, Object and Ego acting as 'relative-incommensurable-externalities'.[159] (556)

Hence the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of this phenomenon of enrichment realized through emergence as an existential surplus or existential excess in e/valuational formation. (557)

Such enrichment of the primary relationship, and its relational-enrichment through pervasion of the relational-situatedness of the primary relations implies that there will also exist an inter-social aspect to this phenomenon of enrichment, in effect, as if by default, is representative of our freedom to be in this world with(-)others, before(-)others, and, more directly, to find our freedom through(-)others (through processes of arbitration, etc.[160]) (558)

That the prime *raison d'être* behind 'existential intervention' is 'to engineer, on balance, positively oriented states of relational enrichment (both non-existential and existential in input and output)'. (559)

v. Now, let me return to this important concept of 'redemption'. (560)

Simplistically treated, we could declare the concept of 'existential redemption' as one part negative, either in fact and/or through relative default, and, one part positive through the ensuing enrichment arrived at through a competently enacted process of existentialization basically self-organized by that primary relationship in question'. (561)

I.e., either through making amends, and subsequent amendments in some apposite form or other and/or through enrichment when we find ourselves moved into a more existentially positive sense of relational territory. E.g., either advertently and/or inadvertently hurting someone's feelings and then feeling the need to verbally backtrack in the form of an effective apology. E.g., in conversing with a friend undergoing a period of intense stressfulness we might have moved them to think less about, or even forget for a few moments, the nature of that stressful period, and, in doing so, move them into a better sense of an 'existential emplacement' through the existential nature of their current embeddedness within that skillfully enacted conversation. In this act of conversing there is no active redemption for yourself, i.e. in a psychic movement from a relatively negative state, although, for the stressed-out party, this temporary distraction could be viewed, by yourself, as a form of 'passive redemption', albeit temporary under those circumstances. On the other hand, given a shared experience, the non-stressed-out party might also be a

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159 Economic complexification is usually conducted between different economies, but, the same principles apply in observing how conforms and transforms migrate between the three economic-correlativities of World, Object, and Ego.

160 In effect, linking both private and public realms through this third realm of the arbitrational (along with its potential for existential refinement and its commensurate existentially oriented enrichment).

virtual party to such stressfulness albeit as mutually and empathetically experienced in simulated terms of reference (in which case they might see themselves as also the active party virtually experiencing such temporary redemption in this broad sense of the difference being made through such relational enrichment). (562)

In other words, this neutral concept of 'redemption' is being cast in a situation where through non-virtual application of suitable forms of consequential analysis either a negative situation is relatively salvaged and/or a positive state of betterment is merely engineered through the existentially apposite nature of such relational engagement. (563)

Ideally, therefore, the intent behind existential intervention is to engineer such positive states of relative existential redemption. (564)

Therefore, in order to institute such existential events of redemption, in this neutral sense, it behooves us to appreciate the nature of a 'consequential analysis'! (565)

vi. The 'consequential', quite naturally, 'focuses upon the post-cognitive as the post-intentional appreciation, in probabilistic terms, of the consequences of either the actions, non-actions, and/or inactions of both ourselves and others as either directly and/or indirectly either suffered and/or enjoyed by ourselves and others'. (566)

Consequential analysis entails the virtual visualization of relevant causal trajectories, an appreciation of their probable impact in terms of engineering either positive levels of enrichment and/or negative levels of de-enrichment in overall e/valuational formation, and, then, the timely decision to non-virtually enact one of those identified trajectories preferably with the intent to either relatively augment and/or enhance the positive enrichment of that relationship and/or to either relatively de-augment and/or de-enhance the relatively negative de-enrichment of that same relationship whilst also being quite mindful of the relational-situatedness of that primary relationship in question. (567)

Note, I have defined elsewhere 'augmentation' as 'the non-chaotic, incremental addition or subtraction of incremental inputs', and, 'enhancement' as 'the chaotic, non-incremental expression of an exponential increase or decrease in the positive or negative enrichment of a chaotically re-presented state of affairs'.[161] (568)

Now, the potential problematicity of such an existential 'calculus' is considerably obviated in hermeneutic terms given that we have already approached such a situation through the lens of the set of genres being used to invoke such problematicity, and, where, certain options will also be co-presented in our conventional understanding of that set of genres being taken up.[162] This initial focus can be better fostered by either noting

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161 Note my nomenclature of '-' represents 'chaotic re-presentation'. That '(-)' represents an 'ongoing economy' involving, say, 'presentation, representation and re-presentation (or anti-representational state of affairs, i.e., as an imputation that is both suspended and non-extrapolated)'.

162 Please note that the word 'calculus' is being pointed out as problematic since the existential is delivered in and through an existential spontaneity that is not calculative, nor sequential by nature, in the delivered power of its re-directed expressiveness (yet, although treated as an intuitive response, hopefully

what is currently found to be problematic or by problematizing that relationship in its relational-situatedness by metaphorically 'leaning' on it or 'stressing' it at various points. Similarly, matters of 'relevance' can be addressed by noting 'which pathways being envisaged appear to possess a greater range of positive e/valuational resonance, responsiveness, resolution, apposite-engagement, etc. (569)

Usually, we exercise an intuitive approach based on certain habits that may or may not be conducive to the performance of an existential refinement in how we manage to enact an apposite, suitably well-informed manner of an engaged response over the course of that specific period of intervention. (570)

Either fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, reflections, delivered in hindsight, will usually jointly declare both for(-)us and to(-)others the relative effectiveness of such interventions along with the subsequently discernment of the relative merits and/or demerits found co-associated with such relatively existential and non-existential inputs and outputs. (571)

Obviously, it is at these points in time when such reflections will demonstrate the relative redemption or relative non-redemption that was being realized through the course of those interventions. Recognizing, as well, that processes of intervention are inescapable since the non-delivery of non-actions or inactions is just as much an interaction with others as is the delivery or receipt of actions. Therefore, it is in our mutual interest that we should usually observe patterns of intervention that have an existentially oriented imprimatur as if signed with an authenticity of being in keeping with the existential nature of those eventful interactions. Hence this need for us to respond through responsibleness forms of responsiveness! (572)

vii. That, it is this responsive-responsibleness that is at the core of the pragmatic attitude. Since to positively augment and enhance our primary relationships is to ensure a greater freedom for others through(-)us, and, in turn, to ensure a greater degree of freedom for(-)us through(-)others! (573)

Hence the indirect significance of this practical concept of redemption as a positive and productive guide to the mutual enrichment of our relationships in their relational situatedness! (574)

Now, enrichment is realized through either re(-)enrichment and/or the removal of a deficit in enrichment.(575)

Hence the close alliance between apposite patterns of pragmatically re-directed re(-)positioning conducive to such re(-)enrichment. (576)

Noting the formula (as utilized in our understanding of alignment through processes of re(-)alignment) that re(-)enrichment can be duly observed through (hermeneutic

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with a responsible complexion, still, it is not completely divorced from any calculations that preceded such spontaneity, etc.).

rectification of) reenrichment, (the phenomenological deconstruction of) re-de-mis-enrichment, and the existential re(-)normalization of) re-enrichment (where the latter is arrived at through chaotic enhancement orchestrated through incremental augmentation that brings us to a point of either chaotic bifurcation or chaotic emergence). (577)

Thence our adoption and adaptation of these three forms of enrichment in order to augment and enhance our relationships, and to suffer and enjoy all co-associated forms of freedom, as discerned in and through the individual uniqueness of each and every relationship to that extent being found to be relevant to 'our' relational-situatedness. (578)

viii. To conclude, let me tentatively proffer these additional points as instrumental in further developing an appreciation of this concept of 'existential redemption'. (579)

This provisional conclusion notes the following key points, as headings, namely, a. authenticity; b. competence; c. relevance; d. enrichment; e. imputations; f. relegation; g. de-relegation; and, h. redemption. (580)

a. Whether as disciplinarians or as secularist, regardless of religious affiliations or non-affiliations, the individual needs to ensure that they operate from a position of relative authenticity. (581)

And authenticity begins in the 'suspension' and ends in the suspension (and where the suspension automatically de-suspends itself lest we be trapped for all eternity in a perpetual suspension)! (582)

Now, perform the suspension well, utilizing any method being adopted and adapted, and, through economic induction a fully developed extensive suspension will be appositely simulated. (583)

That, by such re(-)beginnings, the philo-sophist becomes a philosopher, the disciplinarian becomes a professional disciplinarian, and, the secularist becomes more fully human! (584)

b. That by such re(-)beginnings the person becomes relatively more authentic, and, thereby and thereafter, discovers, and uncovers, the potential to be and become more competent in those tasks and missions they set before themselves… albeit as preferably refracted through the holistically experienced nature of the relationship itself. (585)

c. 'Relevance' like 'competence' being proportionally reflected and measured in the relative fruitful productivity or the relative non-fruitful productivity of the events being observed within a certain relationship in the apparent uniqueness of its relational-situatedness. (586)

d. That measure, measured in both existential terms and in non-existential terms, is discerned through an appreciation of the relative richness of the relation-

ship in question and to what extent it is currently de-enriched and could be re-enriched… (587)

Such re(-)enrichment calling for the apposite utilization of a consequential analysis. (588)

e. The performance of any form of examination, analysis and/or investigation,[163] **etc., calls for the relative clarification of our thinking to that extent that then allows us to proceed with the requisite clarity of motivation and distinctness in successful advancement.** (589)

Defining the semblance of a certain manner and degree of progress, but only when such research is left open, not closed, is ever regarded as provisional, and existentially appears to be continually re(-)self-organized by that relationship in question in the responsible uniqueness being fostered within its own relational-situatedness. (590)

But such apparent clarity found to insightfully pertain to either such future foresight, past after-sight and/or present oversight, and, is best fostered within an anti-representational economy that is one part hermeneutical foresight, one part phenomenal-phenomenological insight, and, one part existential oversight. (591)

In effect, entertaining imputations as imputations *qua* imputations. (592)

f. **Anything else deserved instant relegation.** (593)

g. **But, through suspension de-relegation can be re-commenced.** (594)

Through entertaining the suspension… entering into rectification, deconstruction, and re(-)normalization. (595)

Through maintaining an anti-representation economy that is a dynamically balanced mix that contains one part that radically simulates 'the suspension and non-extrapolation of that set of relevant imputations' (Tier 1); that is also one part that critically entails 'the suspension and the extrapolation of those same imputations' (Tier 2); and, one part that pre-critically entertains 'the non-suspension along with the extrapolation of those imputations as being 'found to hand' (Tier 3). (596)

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163 These terms are reserved, respectively, for the pursuit of hermeneutical, phenomenal-phenomenological, and existential forms of research. Ideally, in the instantiation of a suitable state of 'suspension', all three need to be dynamically balanced, etc., and by such means relatively represent the entailed economy in question.

That, in over-identifying or under-identifying with any one of these tiers, in the treatment of imputations, is to find yourself near-incurably addicted to the 'medicine' while ceasing to be mindful of the 'disease'.[164] (597)

That through the ensuing clarification of the relational economy in question, in its qualified anti-representational treatment, we find the pragmatic simulation of those trajectories that ensure the relational enrichment of those relationships finding themselves subjected to such re(-)self-organized existential self-appreciation, and, therein, our iterative conformal self-apperception. (598)

To find ourselves doing otherwise is to miss such redemption, whereas, instead, cultivating our relationships and finding and enacting such responsible courses of enaction is to find such redemption… (599)

Thereby concluding this *Post-Postscript* in the form of a commentary on the single instance of this word 'redemption':

> A path of 'redemption' is ever-open to us through the very experience of the suspension, the suspension of the suspension, in and through the ongoing suspension already at the very center of our absented-presence, presented-absence… [349]
>
> …should the occasion call it as it is, as if on the behalf of all eternity…[165] [368]
> … [as if] an endless period of probation....[166] [383] (600)

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164 To some extent the joke is on us, whether as philosophers or secularists. No imputational modality can be definitive entertained. That to engage an anti-representational stance means entertaining both a presentational and representational stances simultaneously whilst subjecting all three to an ongoing extensive suspension. In effect, all three tiers have to be co-present without the prioritization or preferential treatment of any one position. However, such an open, existential attitude is quite different from an attitude that merely promotes any one of those correlative attitudes.

165 The implication intended, first, is that if it were worth doing once, then, all things being equal, such existentially oriented behaviour should be re(-)iterated as such. Second, that the consequences of existential behaviours leave a positive imprint upon this world at large in such a manner to outlive the temporary nature of human existence along with its misplaced yearnings for immortality...

166 A question that would be asked, more than likely, is why a lengthy commentary on the sole mention of this single word 'redemption'? What motivated such intent? The question of intent is a difficult question to answer most of the time since, in my understanding, it is usually the case that all people are never fully in control of their own intentional thinking, and, therefore, to ask them why something was done, or not done, is often met with a reply that does not seem to do full justice to what was intentionally committed or omitted, etc. Or, put another way, we might well have a number of good reasons, but, that some of those reasons are 'up our sleeve', so to speak, and in remaining there are relatively unknown even to that person themselves. Perhaps those reasons are contradictory, or forgotten, or eclipsed by more pressing issues, and so on. As good hermeneuts, we might be able to expose some of that covert ideation through asking the right questions, but, then again, such interrogations, and subsequent interpretations, may well add very little to such a reconstructed form of speculative understanding. Now, with this potential excuse also up my sleeve, I still would like to answer that question. I may not be able to fully explicate what my intentions were, but, on reflection, it appears to me that the insertion of this unusual word into my main text has awakened for me how the existential appositeness of this expression did seem to neatly portend what I was trying to do on a number of fronts. So, e.g., it struck me that there is no reason why a word with strong religious denotations and connotations might not be revisited from an existential perspective in order to reclaim the original type of existential insight that found itself embedded in such religious thinking. It has

Completing this *Manual* within *The Seventh Book*…

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 23.10.22.

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been an argument of mine that if something historically persists through time it must do so for good existential reasons. Moreover, this concept of 'redemption', in its existential sense, seems to proffer a perfect fit in how I would like to express the existential concept of 'enrichment' and how, as an existential imperative, it might help us to understand what might motivate this idea of pursuing an enrichment of our relationships through processes of existentially oriented intervention by acting on the behalf of that relationship, albeit with one subtle twist. On one hand, people might feel the need to make amends, and accordingly, atone for previous missteps, etc. However, on the other hand, people may well find forms of motivation where they desire to do something not as a form of atonement but because they feel it is something that should be done, but, if they were not to commit themselves to its enacted performance might then feel as if they were committing a form of practice less than perfect. But, in committing themselves to its enaction, in a sense, redeem themselves before-themselves by insisting to themselves that they proceed in a manner that, to them, has them aligned with this intuitive need to see undertaken such a venture. A performance that could also be viewed as a process of redemption before-others as well, more certainly with those people who are of a similar mind and who, too, might well have proceeded along the same lines by overseeing a very similar pattern of enaction if they, too, had been 'called upon' to do so. Or, in other words, do what they have to do lest in hindsight, through its non-commission, they then feel the need for some form of prospective redemption for not having performed what was existentially 'asked of them' in the first place. So, for me, the appositeness of this expression, even if also invoked to do something slightly different from its traditional usage, appeared for me to be a very valid way of recycling such religious terminology. Of course, this expression also has a range of meanings that, e.g., invoke a commercial world, say, in the redemption of bonds, and other financial instruments. That, all in all, to answer this question of what might have motivated me to single out such an expression could be partially indicated in the following reply, namely, a desire to find an apposite expression that revisits the religious idea of redemption but divests it, as much as possible, of religious connotations in order to re-explore and re-apply the same type of co-associated phenomenology albeit as subtly redefined in the manner as noted. That, moreover, this whole process of reinvesting in this traditional concept also proffers an example where religious terminology can be revisited and repurposed for these existential ends just as, I have noted on a number of occasions, that the philosophical subdiscipline of an existentialism, itself, has been equally taken up by both religious parties and non-religious parties alike. That, in revisiting the existential-phenomenology behind such 'institutional language' the apparent *raison d'être* being utilized behind such expressions can then be re-invoked through the reuptake of such neutrally 'suspended' treatment in such a manner that both the religious and the non-religious could equally re-appropriate such deeply insightful language in a manner that better suits and enhances their disciplinary ends regardless of whether those parties are either religious or non-religious in the respective affiliations. In the same vein, I should also confess that, despite the comprehensive nature of this summarization, many strands are still left to be unravelled and re-knotted, and, that this *Post-Postscript* was an opportunity to attempt, yet again, to work once more on such convoluted issues that I am still continuing to work through… that I am all too happy to share with others also perplexed by such multivarious considerations… and, where I will ever remain grateful for the input of such insightful contributions. N.T., 24.10.22.

Part II - Critical-Practice

The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook: A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines

Index

Part II - Critical-Practice:

The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook:
A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping
Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines

Preview: A Prospective Commentary on the Expression 'Formidable'
Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

A. Disciplinary Considerations

1. Critical Practice 502
2. Disciplinary Considerations 503
3. Ordered Re(-)Considerations 504

B. Six Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Semantic-Phenomenological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 601
2. Aesthetical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 602
3. Deontological/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 603
4. Pragmatical/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 604
5. Hermeneutical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 605
6. Ontical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 606

C. Six Trans-Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Metaphysical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 701
2. Psychological Sub-Disciplinary prospect 702
3. (Radical)Theological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 703
4. Political-Economic Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 704
5. Scientific Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 705
6. Historical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 706

D. Trans-Critical Practice

1. De-Relegational Re(-)Considerations 707
2. Inter-Ordered Re(-)Considerations 708
3. Pragmatical Re(-)Considerations 709

Part II - Critical-Practice

The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook: A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines

Preview: A Prospective Commentary on the Expression 'Formidable'*

A definition of the word 'formidable' might note something, more or less, along the following lines, namely, 'that able to inspire fear or respect as an attitude to be shown towards something that is impressively large, powerful, intense, comprehensive, or capable…' As in, e.g., 'a formidable opponent', etc. However, in the context of this exposition, hopefully, let me just run with 'that which inspires respect through being comprehensively capable of acting in a manner as indicated through the use of this *Philosophical Handbook*'. In this *Preview* as *A Prospective Commentary on the Expression 'Formidable'*, let me briefly sketch out why a certain truthfulness is being deliberately intended in this immodest form of 'self-advertisement'. (i)

Obviously, the next question to ask is "why is this *Philosopher's Handbook* to be seen as 'formidable'?" In a response to the anticipation of such a rhetorical question I will now lay out the *raison d'être* behind this polemical tract in the form of a brief defense (that will also act as an first introduction to this second book, Part II, situated within this tome titled *The Seventh Book*… which, in turn, acts as a 'coda' to the three volumes entailed in *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*). (ii)

In Part I, I imply the claim that most of the discipline of philosophy is patent nonsense, and, that this observation extends to all the other disciplines we are so mesmerized by, like, e.g., history or science, theology or political-economics, and so on. However, as a 'potentially self-respecting and respectable' discipline, philosophy, along with other disciplines, are all forms of practice that are worth salvaging. Indeed, that it is an imperative for us to reconstitute such a viable core, at the center of each different disciplinary world, lest we suffer the consequences of such neglect. No doubt, taking on board as well, a hideously malformed pretense that such professionals are performing the requisite degree of 'oversight' within the perimeter of their own professions… that then allows us to falsely believe that 'all is well in this land of Nod'.[167] Therefore, it behooves us to act in the interests of this world at large, this overall sense and semblance of a life-world, to act accordingly. Indeed, for all of us to become 'formidable', in turn, and where we be-

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* This Second Preview is also published separately in the document (2PreviewVII.doc). For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

167 A complex allusion to a realm of fantasy, or, to the mythical realm of Nod… where Adam could buy a second wife (deconstructing the more literal interpretation of the biblical myths of the Creation in Genesis); the imaginary land of Noddy and Bigg(y) Ears, courtesy of Enid Blyton (childhood heroes of mine along with Donald Duck, Scrooge McDuck, and Gyro Gearloose, and luck Gladstone Gander. Both Superman and Batman did not figure on this list. How I survived my childhood, I do not know?). Or, just the land of Nod, where, in nodding off, you just 'go' to sleep…

come ‘comprehensively capable’ of turning back this tide of such blatant displays of ignorance and obscuration lest we all be overwhelmed, existentially, in the face of a raft of crises that so imminently beacon to inundate us both metaphorically and literally! (iii)

Given this pretext, let me demonstrate why this *Handbook* could bestow this status of ‘formidable’ on a seriously working philosopher, and, by extension, to their fellow disciplinarians working in the field of all potentially viable disciplines in general? (iv)

In Part I, *A Manual for Existential Redemption*, I argue that in the many halls inhabited by insightless philosophers, or rather, philo-sophists, with all due apologies to genuine sophists, we are overrun by unimodalists and bimodalist, along with dogmatic absolutists and part-time relativists, plus the all too innumerable non-pragmatists and non-existentialists… to the extent that what remains are very few sensible souls actually left able to expound any reasonable shape or form of philosophy itself. Let me demonstrate this sad, and somewhat, painful to make observation. (v)

Imagine, if you would, although you might find it better if you preferred to decline such an invitation, of being kidnapped upon a darkened street late one night, with a friend, whilst both of you were walking towards an empty bus stop. Both of you were grabbed from behind, anaesthetized with chloroform, and you will wake up sitting in a chair, completely naked, and fully tied up. Now, the first thing you see, with your head bent downward, is your own navel. It slowly dawns on you that you might have seen that before, and correctly draw the inference that it belongs to yourself. But, where exactly are you? Staring at just your navel will not tell you this! You lift your head and see that you are in a totally vacant warehouse, except for your friend sitting opposite who is still asleep. They, too, are sitting in a chair, completely naked, and fully tied up. You can see their navel, and staring at this navel, too, is not going to tell you where you are. Only by looking around you do you realize that you have been kidnapped, and are tied up in this large, empty building. You have never seen this room before. Where this building is, you have no idea. Terrible thoughts cross your mind… am I going to be killed, am I going to be ransomed? You sigh, and ask yourself, “just what is a philosopher worth? Could that amount be ever enough to pay such a ransom?” (vi)

But, let me say, all this was just a terrible dream, a horrible nightmare. An event, however, that could be used to highlight certain facts about our very existence in this world before others. (vii)

Unimodalists are like people staring at their own navels who think that they can also understand ‘where they are at the same time’. Bimodalists are like people staring at the navels of other people who think that they, too, can also understand ‘where they are at the same time’. Only by looking around at that room did those kidnapped subjects realize that they were in the midst of a very large and empty space that had the appearance of a warehouse or factory, etc. That their predicament was such that they were sitting in chairs, completely tied up whilst being fully naked. To know anything else about their current situatedness they would at least need to be either told, in a truthful manner, or to

be untied, and to get themselves up from that chair and then look for a window or door, and so on. (viii)

'Unimodalists' include, in a long litany of such miscreants, 'realists, anti-realists, rationalists, empiricists, idealists, materialists, positivists, reductionists', and so on. 'Bi-modalists' include 'dualists, simple causationalists, all specialists and non-specialists trapped in binary thinking', and so on… (ix)

More correctly, we cannot even focus on a single point… indeed, perception needs a relational difference between two or more points in order to just register such a difference. Then, that relationship need to be situated in its relational-situatedness just for us to 'appreciate' the potential significance of such a non-isolated relational reference.[168] So, such short-sighted folk cannot claim what they say they are doing through running arguments conducted in either unimodal or bimodal terms of reference! (x)

Dogmatists, in turn, try to legislate their agenda into philosophical existence, usually posing as a well-entrenched major discourse, through a simple misguided act of fiat. Something that even members of a minor discourse, likewise, cannot even execute. As for relativists, acting more as part-time disciplinarians, the argument that 'all views are equally true or equally false' can only ever exist in the inner moments of a suspension about to be immediately disrupted in the automatic de-suspension of such a domain. (xi)

Alas, the world is in need of more pragmatists and existentialists ever-attuned to the being of others… given that our freedom in this world can only be mutually guaranteed through the arbitrated auspices of others. Imagine trying to make a simple cup of coffee entirely through the machinations of your own efforts! Good luck with that. (xii)

The moral of my dream sequence, is that there is a need to invoke trimodal terms of reference in order to be able to expedite 'our' passage through this world at large, this overall sense and semblance of a life-world… (xiii)

Of course, I do not wish to be seen as a person who mocks the intellectually disabled and philosophically handicapped, suffice to say that it is quite acceptable to chide someone who is somewhat tardy or somewhat tendentious in a way that does not benefit either the speaker or hearer being incited to enact such impossible advice… (xiv)

Putting paid to such nonsense, is a negative way to find your 'formidable philosophical sense of self'. In a more positive sense, we need to see how this world works in concert with others… through the ministrations of a host of disciplinarians as they make our secular world, hopefully, a place more pleasant as a place of habitation that, in time, will be less beset by an existential series of portentous crises to which we have to collectively respond in an existentially organized manner. In this, we have no other choice! This planet Earth is our sole, true home, for we have none other, and it should be responsibly cared for by(-)us on the behalf of all others, and, v.v. To this end, this *Handbook*

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[168] I.e., arguing, as a bare minimum, for a trimodal sense and semblance of positioning *contra* all unimodal and bimodal forms of impossible positioning.

notes that it acts as a guide to the mapping of both ordered and trans-ordered sub-disciplines. But, what basically is meant here..? (xv)

In a very simplified version, let me just say that in entertaining the archetypal aspects of a gestalt understanding of perception and intentional apperception through the subtle preferencing or non-preferencing of an intentional objective as 'Object', and intentional background as 'World' all experience by a corresponding co-associated sense of an intentional subject as 'Ego' six distinctive kinds of (trans-intentional) judgment can be delineated. These six types of judgment are, a phenomenological-semantics (in a mapping of categories culturally expressed through language); an aesthetics (where we appreciate the integration of such semantic inputs); an existential and ethically motivated deontology; a functional and ethical pragmatics; a hermeneutics centered on potentiality or possibility; and, an ontics where collections of facts are kept for their later use in the formation and dissemination of our narratives. (xvi)

Then, through the rhetorical use of a double affirmation of these ordered disciplines we arrive at a set of trans-ordered disciplines. A double affirmation is simply in the form of 'the *x* of *x* is not-*x*, or is non-*x*, or is meta-*x*'. So, e.g., 'the heat of heat is not heat but temperature which is neither hot nor cold', since a temperature does not have a temperature. (xvii)

So, with phenomenological-semantics (or a semantic-phenomenology) we find 'that the semantics of semantics is not semantics *per se*, but, upon reflection, must be, in effect, metaphysics', a sub-discipline which, in this case, deals with seemingly fundamental-like categories being utilized in a viable semantics. (xviii)

Similarly, doing this same type of manoeuvre, we would find that 'the aesthetics of aesthetics is a psychology' in which we see how different aspects of the psyche integrated within a certain aesthetic domain are able to be translated into a division within our psychological understanding of that same sense and semblance of a psyche. (xix)

Or, where 'the existential treatment of the existential borders on the thematization of a pro-relational sense of subjectivity that for a religious person may well be bordering on the advent of a theological-like way of both thinking and responding'. (xx)

Then, 'the pragmatics of pragmatics introduces us to a world involved in a dissemination of power as exercised in and through a political-economy'. (xxi)

That, 'the relative potentiality of potentiality is the realm of science' as it seeks to better understand to what extent potentiality is possible, and where what is possible is probably possible, if not potently inevitable, and so on. (xxii)

That the 'fact(ual establishment) of facts naturally leads us to the world of the historian (and, from there, a plethora of other possible disciplines, etc.)'. (xxiii)

The formidable insight to be gained here is that an interdisciplinary approach to disciplinary behaviour is not only argued for but also closely charted in theoretically oriented intentional terms of reference. So, e.g., from facts we get histories, from semantics we get a corresponding sense of metaphysics, and so on. A provisional sense of mapping that allows us to find the relative existence of the relatively non-provisional; giving us the stability of space to put forward various relatively non-provisional forms of positioning. The type of ground in which an historian of the Roman Empire, e.g., does not need to seriously question the existence of that Roman Empire along with certain key events within its historical ambit like, e.g, that Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C.E. (as a declaration of a civil war), etc.[169] (xxiv)

Now, although not a gambling person, let me lay down the following wager, in what I see as the safest of bets, namely, that in the observation of motion through space there can only be translation, rotation and reflection. (xxv)

I.e. there no fourth form of motor-translation can be observed in a simple, non-disrupted locality in space-time. Or, in other words, we have something simply moving in a certain direction, in an inertial-like act of translation, that will change direction from time to time (should either another force be applied and/or some form of resistance be experienced). Then, second, in an act of rotation, that object could be turned. In a third possibility, that object could be shifted through reflection. Now, under such terms of reference there is no fourth possibility. (xxvi)

Should you think of a fourth possibility, I will happily buy you a cup of coffee and even lash out to add a large piece of cake with an ample supply of cream on the side. But, my belief is that this is the safest of bets. (xxvii)

To make this wager more able to be imagined, visualize yourself playing billiards on a billiards table. You can, with your cue hit one ball, in a certain direction on that table. If skillful enough, you might be able to impart some spin to that ball by hitting it on its side rather than on its center. Last, we observe balls reflecting off the cushions on the sides of that table. So, the challenge now is to imagine a possible fourth type of motor translation upon that two-dimensional surface of that billiard table. Good luck... (xxviii)

Now, you might be wondering about the point of this dare. The obvious point I am trying to make is that economic thinking is trimodal in nature and just trimodal in nature! Unless we change the economic rules of the game currently underway, and simply begin another form of economic behaviour with its three modes of operation, in each and every economy there is no single mode of operation, no double modes of operation, and no fourth or more modes of operation as well. Just as, e.g., in a process of 'treatment' there is either analysis (as a process of reduction), or synthesis (as a process of reconstitution), or nomination (as a process of identification).[170] (xxix)

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169 10th January, 49 B.CE.

170 An example of another dare or wager. In a process of treatment (subject to transformational re-treatment) there is only these three dialectical combinations, namely, analysis, synthesis, and nomination. A fourth party cannot be envisaged. They also form the three dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle of

That entering into our reflections upon any language game, in entering into the economics of its performance, more correctly we have to simultaneously entertain these three operations, where all three economic modes are operating as if at the same time, albeit whilst applying a subtle preferencing or subtle de-preferencing of one or more of these operators operating in that field of economic employment…[171] (xxx)

That to assume our formidable philosophical sense and semblance of self, or as a formidable disciplinarian in our respective field/s of expertise, we must put aside the impossible, childish behaviours of the unimodalist, the bimodalist, the dogmatic absolutist, the part-time relativist; and, by such means, cease to be the dysfunctional non-pragmatist and the selfish non-existentialist in order to humbly assume a role more in keeping with the economics of this world at large… so that we might be of better service to others, indeed, find 'our' freedom as that to be mutually found only through(-)others..!! (xxxi)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 22.11.22.

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comprehension' [being respectively parts, whole and whole-and-parts] which is my trimodal translation of a 'hermeneutic circle' (which also parallels the moments in the overall transcendental suspension at the center of the 'extensive suspension'. When modes of 'economic inter-translation' are available through a direct or indirect mediation by the hypothetical 'archetypal economy'). That this definitive trimodal rule also has profound ramification for the interpretation of an anti-representational economy and for a much deeper understanding of the nature of relegation (as also needing to observe 'de-relegation' and a possible 'delegation' when the relegated miscreant, either as a philo-sophist or as a mis-disciplinarian or as a more dysfunctional dys-disciplinarian, eventually sees the 'light', becomes reformed and through such a change of heart, such a 'turn-around', in their adopting and adapting a revolutionary-like process of re-direction actually instantiates, in their very own person, an instance of 'philosophical progress' or 'disciplinary progress'. In that regard, who can say then "there is no such thing as 'philosophical progress!', etc?" However, as just noted, an even more profound ramification of this definitive trimodal rule is that our very best, ongoing interpretation/s of an anti-representationalistic stance is that the anti-representationalist can only subtly preference such a subtle position given that it is to be arrived at through both a suspension of the prepositioning of both a presentational and representational stance and, then, a joint suspension of all three positionings as well. Forever a work in progress and something that can be only be approached and never appropriated. Hence the potential de-relegation of the relegated miscreant as long as they come to understand the dialectical subtlety of such subtle preferences where all imputations are treated (through transformational retreatment) as a dialectical mix of both extrapolation and non-extrapolation, suspension and non-suspension, albeit with a subtle preference for the anti-representational mix of a 'suspended non-extrapolation of the imputative structural-functions resident in that specific imputation'. That once this approach is realized as that which cannot be fully appropriated, only subtly approached and subtly appropriated from a existentially oriented, pro-relational perspective, that that candidate can then be nominated, for as long as they maintain such an attitude, as a working, *bone fides* 'delegated philosopher' (given such 'de-relegated delegation'). But, such 'formidable' things, as noted here, are only given an advance advertisement being more fully explicated in the third section of Part II).

171 Because each of these economic operators in a certain economy is relatively incommensurable, but, equally, also correlatively constitute each other in that same economy. Where any one operator can be defined through the joint negation of the other two operators (implying only two operators are needed to initially define that same economy). Moreover, through economy induction, the well-explicated exposition of any one operator is enough for the rest of that economy to be simulated through the correlativity of such dialectical moments or polarities. At the same time, as noted, no one moment can be absolutely approached and appropriated. Only subtly approached and subtly appropriated from a position of the subtly suspended non-extrapolation of the ensuing e/valuational formation of at same resident imputation.

The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook: A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines

0. Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

Upon completing *A Philosophical Manual for Existential Redemption*, for a few days at least, I was under the misapprehension that I had exhausted my topic and had comprehensively pointed out what had needed to be said, even if only duly noted as either a single comment or as a footnote to work done in the *Pursuit*, or elsewhere. But, alas, doubts quickly surfaced that, despite numerous points being raised and duly noted, that little consideration had been conducted for a number of philosophical sub-disciplines, say, aesthetics or ethics, or, in what manner should I account for the invitation or exclusion of such sub-disciplines, say, a philosophy of history or a philosophy of science, and so on. That, in effect, I now needed to articulate just how the practice of philosophy might be critically conducted? (0)

There have been occasions where I have pointed out that there is a difference between, say, a 'philosophy of history' and a 'history of philosopher'… where the former is 'philosophy' and the latter is 'history'. I have also suggested that, between the contragrammatical way of holding them in apposition with respect to each other, they might well, collectively, coincide with and express a middle ground, perhaps more in touch with phenomenal-phenomenological reality as an orientation to be faced, and, when necessary, confronted? Upon further reflection, the semblance of a reality that, through such thematization, may well intersect, in this world at large, with other contragrammatical interactions, say, 'the philosophy of science, and, the science of philosophy', or, 'the science of history, and, the history of science', and so on, and so forth? Perhaps defining this world at large, this overall life-world, as that domain where such disciplinary contragrams intersect, etc? Perhaps inevitably meet and, to some degree, mutually co-define each other? A paradox of sorts, where the secular world finds its definition through the confluence of disciplines, certainly the more influential and productive, those skill-sets that contribute a certain relevant-enrichment of our interactions with each other and, where we hope, such professionals and amateurs are also both competent and authentic in the discharge of their duties as disciplinarians.[172] (1)

In the *Manual* we find three pages devoted to the economic nature of disciplinary prospects.[173] It was argued that even disciplines should be economically approached,[174] and, one scheme for doing just that noted a disciplinary difference as a disciplinary dif-

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172 Where these qualities of relevance, enrichment (of our relational interactions), competence and authenticity in disciplinarian activities are explored in the essay: 7W. *Re-Viewing Historians and Their Histories'*: *The Pragmatics of the Historical Prospect*.

173 'Prospect' is the 'disciplinary domain in which short-term disciplinarian projects and long-term disciplinarian program are conducted'. So, e.g., the philosophical prospect and the historical prospect, etc.

174 *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.267

ferential, along with a meta-disciplinary difference, and a non-disciplinary difference.[175] It was explained, that this vision of the disciplinary difference was to be found by accepting the vision of the disciplinarian in question and then subtracting a secular sense of the world shared by both disciplinarians and secularists alike. That the vision of the passive 'difference', and its more active expression as a 'differential', has, as an orientation, an existential counterpart, that could be seen as indirectly 'engaged' as a re-presentation that is here defined as its disciplinary 'distinction'. (2)

Another way to further enrich such ideas, is to invoke alignments that favour a commentary through economic complexification.[176] So, e.g., a disciplinary difference is primarily express through a phenomenal-phenomenological use of language and with the full investment of critical procedures in order to deconstruct relatively unresolved logical and dialectical inconsistencies, etc. I.e., as a form of error correction. (3)

In a contrast the proposition of disciplinary meta-differences, acting more as active meta-differentials, would invite forms of error mitigation where erroneous manoeuvres are to be avoided through the appropriate invocation of genres of activity that are presumed to be both productive and relevant. In effect, arguing that the value to be had in e/valuational formation is channeled through those genres of behaviour that better express such inclinations. So, e.g., in invoking a philosophical meta-difference, more as a philosophical meta-differential, the implication to be drawn is that distinctive genres of behaviour are being promoted as modes of error mitigation in which we further focus on what works, on what is found to work and is presumed to work in that type of circumstance in question. I.e., as a form of rectification in which we weed out those genres that are either less relevant or not relevant at all to such proceedings. (4)

Last, I proposed a non-disciplinary difference, acting more as a disciplinary 'distinction', in which we seek to find forms of mutual enrichment through a productive return to a more secular sense of domain. That, ideally, disciplines and sub-disciplines can enrich our many worlds without, at the same time, effectively removing us from a secular world. This disciplinary non-distinction invoking a world of specificity, concreteness, immediacy, the historical as existentially engaged in the here and now. An 'immediacy' born in resolution, whose ongoing simulation is re(-)constructed more chaotically through the spontaneity of re(-)self-organization along with its ability to generated innovations, things once though impossible or could not even be thought, the ironic finality of 'last' vocabularies, etc. (5)

Now, what applies to disciplines must also apply to sub-disciplines (and super-disciplines). So, if a disciplinary prospect can be meaningfully dissected and re-

175 Ibid., 271.

176 Running a trimodal economic approach also opens us up to a number of economic techniques for enriching such discourses. E.g., invoking 'economic complexification' on the grounds that 'as different economies are all hypothetically constructed upon archetypal terms of reference it follows that in an archetypally instituted alignment between such economies such parallel economic polarities can fruitfully commentate upon each other. Just as, e.g., analysis, as an economic mode of treatment, appears to parallel the moment of past in a temporal economy, and, in contrast, synthesis appears to parallel a future sense of temporal orientation, etc.

assembled through this economic lens of disciplinary differences, disciplinary meta-differentials, and disciplinary non-distinction then it follows that sub-disciplines, etc., accordingly, can be treated in a similar manner. So, e.g., a professional working within the aesthetic prospect[177] might find it both relevant and enriching of their research to invoke this type of economic lens by observing correlations, accommodations, and transformations within and between these aesthetical differences, aesthetical meta-differentials, and aesthetical non-distinctions… (6)

Further enriching such research through productive modes of economic complexification in which we apply this formula of rectification (through error mitigation), deconstruction of critical practice (through error correction), and re(-)normalization as a process of ongoing re(-)alignment. (7)

I could confess that this preoccupation with an economic perspective eventually becomes something akin to an imperative. Then, in seeking to accommodate different approaches through such economic complexification, such things have a habit of finding their own way in the world, quite often forcing one to alter and modify previous patterns of thinking. E.g., much of my research is structured along the lines of the heuristic device of 'theory, practice and critique'. In such a scheme one would believe, quite naturally, that what is 'practical' is 'practical' and what is 'critical' is 'critical'. However, that straight forward approach, recently, has been seriously undermined, and emended, by taking on board the notions that practice needs to be observed through a critical lens, and, a critique needs to find room for a radical sense of review. (8)

On the title page of each essay in Volume III one subtitle reads '*Beyond Criticism*'. On one hand, this is a veiled joke. What philosopher would like to be so thorough in the formulation of their research that they, too, would be seen by others to have taken a position that is 'beyond criticism'. On the other hand, read through an interrogative economy we would ask 'what is beyond criticism?' That 'answer' is not to be received in silence but through a recognition that a critique, on some occasions, needs, when called upon, to express a radical sense of resolution that might well defy current conventions, social expectations, polite rules of engagement, and so on. That, the radical usurps the critical in a critique and where the critical, instead, is to be more applied to the enactment of practice. Hence the utilization of this general expression of 'deconstruction' as applying to the performance of a practice in which we remove error and run with those methods that appear to be consistent, non-contradictory, coherent, and, are both relevant and enriching, demonstrate a certain degree of requisite competence and authenticity, etc. (9)

That this tendency for self-emendation through the paralleling of economic schemes, through economic complexification, etc., is to be welcomed. Alerting us also to the fact that all research must be accepted as provisional in status. Of course, some forms of provisional circumscription are to be regarded as less provisional, whereas, other forms of provisional circumscription are to be regarded as more provisional. Indeed, if our lives were led in a manner where we had no form of trust in the relative stability of

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177 I.e., operating within the cognitive/trans-cognitive (judgmental) second order of the Aesthetical.

our research, we would find it incredibly difficult to even prepare an evening meal let along make a simple cup of tea… (10)

As just remarked, I had written this additional section, Part II, as an exercise in an attempt to understand the means for realizing the performance of *Critical-Practice,* as a way to find room for semantics; aesthetics; ethics; pragmatics; the scientific-like study of possibility; and a philosophically oriented sub-discipline dealing with facts, or 'ontics'. These represent the six orders as introduced in the *Manual*.[178] Then, mapping these philosophical sub-disciplines from a meta-disciplinary sense of perspective would then give us, more or less, a metaphysical take on semantically invoked categories (as utilized as the basis for the phenomenal-phenomenological sub-discipline); treating semantic integration as the laying down of psychological categories; where a relatively deontological ethics would existentially head us towards a relatively radical sense of the theological should the professional wish to head further in that same direction; where pragmatics implicates power in the form of the everyday operations of the political-economy; where questions of possibility or potentiality invite a philosophy of science; and, where an interpretation of apparent 'facts', automatically presents us with a philosophy of history and its appreciation of that type of work conducted within the historical prospect… (11)

Hence the *raison d'être* of this second book titled: *The Formidable Philosopher's Handbook*: *A Philosophical Guide to The Explication of a Mapping Within and Between Ordered and Trans-Ordered Sub-Disciplines*. (12)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 15.11.22.

178 As Ordered Theory I 207, and Ordered Theory II 302.

A. Disciplinary Considerations

1. Critical Practice 502

In deconstructing the relatively defective and in continually re(-)constructing the effective (as the relatively non-defective)[179] **we will need to invoke classical forms of logical argumentation, the construction of productive narratives, and, emend the former through dialectical innovations when and where called for, be such qualifications either critical and/or radical in orientation, etc.**[180] (13)

Hence this critical attention to logical argumentation, constructing narratives, and importing critical and radical dialectical qualifications when and where they prove to be pragmatically demonstrated as necessary. (14)

The conventional use of logic can be divided between presupposition, suppositions, and post-suppositions, with suppositions intermediating through the use of pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions, in turn, approached in either virtual and/or non-virtual terms of reference. (15)

Ultimately, however, one must seek for an alignment between the same in causally-effective, non-virtual terms of reference. (16)

Using whatever philosophical and non-philosophical tools we have to achieve that outcome, e.g., conventional logic, etc., transformational retreatment, ordered analysis, post-conditional consequential analysis, narrational modes of dissemination, apposite forms of dialectical re(-)qualification, etc. (17)

In effect, constructing a complex program as if along the lines of software. (18)

But, metaphorically, squaring a circle in which both linear and circular processes are organized to account for economic modes of e/valuational formation. (19)

Invoking both the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘provisional’ through noting a productive dividend whilst also observing the limitations imposed upon such a narrowing of possibilities. (20)

Accounting for both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented forms of apparent surpluses, i.e., productive excesses in e/valuational formation over the outlay of investments. (21)

Organizing the apparent supervision of a harmonization of both through ‘existential attunement’ expressed through relevant-enrichment and competent-authenticity. (22)

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179 *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.11.

180 Here ‘etc.’ indicates the rest of this handbook, Part II, utilizing methods as outlined in the Part I, etc.

2. Disciplinary Considerations 503

Just as a disciplinary prospect was treated as a disciplinary economy so, too, should we treat the relativity of sub-disciplines and super-disciplines. (23)

I.e., through the lens of a disciplinary difference, disciplinary meta-difference, and a disciplinary non-difference. (24)

Mirroring the phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical and non-systematic-existential moments respectively as archetypally paralleling focus, field, and frame (as a form of subjective 'framing'). (25)

Now, 'difference' can also be viewed passively as 'difference', actively as a 'differential', and engaged (in a more pro-relationally direction) as a 'distinction' (in the sense of amplifying an emergent surplus in e/valuational formation, i.e., in the making of a distinctive sense and semblance of difference). (26)

Now, in terms of an appreciation, or, rather a meta-appreciation, of the same, we can also invoke a hyper-difference, a hyper-meta-difference, and a hyper-non-difference as a way to segue towards a trans-ordered perspective. (27)

Just as, e.g., an appreciation, or, rather meta-appreciation, of semantic distinctions discerned through phenomenal-phenomenological means introduces us to a working metaphysical appreciation of such categories, and, where our experience of such integrated fields of interest give us a working psychology to the extent we recognize such distinctive forms of experiential categorization, etc. (28)

E.g., philosophical reflections on the scientific understanding of visual perception would have us recognize that that the empirical nature of a visually perceived intentional object(ive) is an amalgam of various types of input such as object-recognition, with occasional facial-recognition, the discernment of linear features and gestalt simplifications, an ability to focus on detail, distance perception, colour discernment, background field notification of movement, and so on imply the hierarchical integration of such diverse inputs superimposed upon transcendental-like notions of space-time, identity, transformational preservation of relative objectivities, the imputation of existential descriptors, etc. (29)

That the extraction of such integrating features gives us a ready to hand metaphysics whose imputations, however, should not be extrapolated beyond their theoretical deployment, critical-practical employment, and critical-radical re-deployment. (30)

Pragmatically approaching such categories from a subtle anti-representational attitude that notes a dialectical interplay between presentation/s, representation/s and re-presentation/s. (31)

I.e., that all imputations should be both extrapolated and non-extrapolated, as both non-suspended and as suspended (giving us three imputational states). (32)

Meeting the non-ideological through a suspension of the ideological, i.e., the suspension of either our prejudices and/or prejudgments, although, ultimately, making, first, no ultimate distinction between either prejudices or prejudgments, and, second, making no ultimate distinction between suspensions and non-suspensions, extrapolated imputations and non-extrapolated imputations. (33)

Because, economically, that is how the world works. (34)

As if fully immersed in this world at large and as if detached from the same, whilst, at the same time, just economically operating in between such metaphors.[181] (35)

As we narrate to each other and ourselves such things as 'found to hand'. (36)

Assembling provisional facts, running narratives, whose critical point supposedly end in a de-anomalization of the problematicity driving such narratives. (37)

However, at the same time, our relationships are psychically dependent upon a continuation of such realized qualified relational resolution. (38)

Because through too much or too little consonance, dissonance or resolution there is a failure in relational performance and, ultimately, relational continuation. (39)

Therefore, the establishment of a minimal existential role in the creation, preservation and conservational expansion of our relationships, although, preferably, we should build upon such a minimum existential 'footprint'. (40)

Hence the qualified stance of a philosophical positioning that attempts to oversee such relational-enrichment, etc. (41)

'Economically simplified' through 'economic induction' where through the adequate exercise involved in the thematization of but one correlative aspect in any economy through correlativity the rest of the economy is co-thematized accordingly. (42)

So, through the use of either appropriate enquestioning, proper metaphorical exemplification, and/or apposite existential apparitional treatment harmonic emergence is ensured on the basis of such economic co-relativity. (43)

E/valuational formation being disseminated through the suitable use of narratives at the center of our disciplines, sub-disciplines and super-disciplines, and, by such means, through both suspensions and de-suspensions, returns us to a world of the secular. (44)

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[181] Hence the utility of our being able to appreciate an interrogative economy. I.e., the interrogation of the hermeneutical rhetoric through enquestioning, a first metaphorical reply informed through phenomenological input, and a second reply of either assent or dissent enacted in an existentially oriented apparitional mode with productivity taking a necessary mixture of both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented e/valuational output. Refer to paragraphs 47, 262, 294, etc.

3. Ordered Re(-)Considerations 504

Central to an understanding of this *Handbook* is this distinction between 'ordered sub-disciplines'[182] and 'trans-ordered sub-disciplines'. (45)

So, e.g., a cognitive (or trans-cognitive judgmental) first ordered proposition of a 'square circle' cannot be integrated like a cognitive (or trans-cognitive judgmental) proposition, say, like a 'square-table' or a 'red-table'.[183] (46)

From a meta-appreciation or trans-appreciation of the semantic categories implicated in the phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of experience we get a metaphysical appreciation of semantic categories. Hence trans-ordered (transformational) translation a semantic-phenomenological discipline we get a metaphysical discipline. Then, from the latter we can take either an epistemological orientation through a subtle focus on intentional motivation as an 'epistemologist' or exercise an ontological leaning as an 'ontologist'. (47)

But, taking a position on how such categories are experienced individually, and more importantly, through patterns of second ordered integration then gives us the trans-ordered discipline of a psychologist. (48)

Hence, in the light of the above we get the ordered sub-disciplines of the semanticist and phenomenologist as well as aesthetician, and, the trans-ordered sub-disciplines of the metaphysician and its subsidiary sub-sub-disciplines of the epistemologists and ontologist, as well as the psychologist (and by extension the psychiatrist, and other therapeutic psychiatric specialists, etc.). (49)

In the same vein, by similar arguments (of the meta-appreciation of a transformational-translation, etc.) we get third ordered deontologists as existentialists and ethicists, and, trans-ordered theologians on the understanding that a progressively insisted upon trans-subjective re-orientation, in effect, incrementally moves us closer towards a theological sense and semblance of direction (numinous). But, just as existentialistic methods can be equally adopted by both religionist and non-religionists alike, it follows that such an orientation can be truncated as non-religious or left non-truncated in either a radical theological format or a more traditional theological format whilst, preferably, being subject to suspensions and approached as provisional, as a work in progress, as ever awaiting a sense of postponed finality, etc., or just poured into more traditional moulds, albeit re-presented as being continually qualified as both 'non-fixed' and 'ever-open'. (50)

Where pragmatic considerations in a fourth order produce pragmatists along with ethicists (where the latter are existentially mindful of both deontological and pragmatical influences along with potential aesthetical implications), and, where from a trans-ordered perspective, we find the unfolding of the political-economy in question and its considerable variety of specialists. (51)

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182 Orders as discussed in modules 207 and 302. Refer also to the Introduction, paragraph 11.

183 Note the nomenclature of a '-' (hyphen) indicating at least the status of a second order.

Hence, e.g., political-economists, politicians, political scientists, pollsters, etc; economists, business managers and executives, bankers, the management of political parties, etc., stylists, compliance officers, political executives, social critics, etc., etc. (52)

In effect, as observers of political power through the observation, manipulation and engagement of parallel indications of the same through transformations enacted by voters, votes, representation, the direct and indirect exertion of influence, donations, money, debt, obligations, promises, and so on and so forth. (53)

Thence the dissemination of power by such means through the relative co-operation of others within a sphere of the arbitrated in which personal ambitions and public aspirations are intermediated both individually and collectively. (54)

Where, by the hermeneut or hermeneuticist,[184] the hermeneutic appreciation of potentiality, in a fifth cognitive or trans-cognitive order when perceived as possibility or probability or potency, becomes translated into the trans-ordered discipline of science (as appreciated philosophically). Hence the scientist, in all their variety, and the appreciation of the philosophy of science, etc., albeit from the scientific objectives being perceived as intended, etc. Hence the trans-ordered positioning of the scientist, etc. (55)

Similarly, the meta-appreciation or trans-appreciation of the truth determination of factual presentations establishes the positioning of the historian, etc. (56)

Recognizing that the truth determination of possible facts must comply fully with ordered regulations, evidential considerations, intentional objectives, modes of interpretation, and narration, etc., otherwise such candidates take on the status of ‘factoids’. (57)

That no conspiracy could function without such hypothetical factoids, and, obviously, ceasing to be a conspiratorial when those tentative ‘factoids’ fully become ‘facts’ and suitable modes of historical interpretation effectively accomplishes this ordered transformational-transition from the fifth order to the sixth order. (58)

Now, given this hexa-modal scheme of these orders, on whatever level of the epistemological hierarchy it is to be situated,[185] the same is economically grounded on a trimodal economic pattern based upon the gestalt economy. Implying that rules for both intra-ordered and inter-ordered forms of analysis as well as intra-trans-ordered and inter-trans-ordered forms of analysis, along with any migration from one to the other, must be in full compliance with ordered regulations in general, in particular, and specifically. (59)

Accounting, therefore, for all such philosophically treated sub-disciplines. (60)

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184 The ‘hermeneut’ as ‘one who applies hermeneutical methods and insights, etc.’, whereas, the ‘hermeneuticist’ is ‘one who applies a general, theoretical approach to the pursuit of this topic’. The ‘critical-radical conjunction of the former’ realizing a sense of the ‘critical-radical hermeneut’, i.e., scientist, etc.

185 I.e., on pre-cognitive, cognitive, and trans-cognitive levels of epistemological organization (including, as well, post-cognitive outcomes as the causal consequences of such enacted transactions, etc,).

B. Six Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Semantic-Phenomenological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 601 (First Order)

The phenomenologist is a semanticist, and v.v., especially if critical methods are adopted, such as, e.g., suspensions, complying with ordered conventions, etc. (61)

Because the human psyche, first, is pre-structured to generally make such distinctions, second, frames of reference map such distinctions accordingly, i.e., with respect to our adoption and adaptation of cultural conventions which also implies a parallelization of hermeneutic input to the extent all distinctions are genre-driven, and v.v. (62)

That the exception proves the point as in colour blindness can be shown to an absence of this ability to make such distinctions that, otherwise, are available to the non-colour blind. (63)

Hence the possibility for error correction when parallel phenomenological analyses are compared with hermeneutical investigations, and v.v. (64)

Where the addition of existential examinations can further such processes of error correction, and ongoing re(-)normalization, through comparative phenomenological analyses and hermeneutical investigations. (65)

Eidetic reflections being one method to establish the extent or range of a certain phenomenological distinction (in its hermeneutical and existential contexts, etc.). (66)

Error mitigation being put in place through the ascertaining the relevance of co-invoked genres of behaviour. Existential considerations delivering ‘points of relevance’ and where the assessment of comparative productivity can also act as potential indications or ‘existential seals’ of successful research. (67)

From the perspective of a textual economy we can entertain the phenomenological as overseeing the intentionally directed deposition of texts inscribed upon the face of the world through the parallel invocation of a number of potentially ascertainable channels. Just as writing a letter by hand inscribes the page of that letter, wears down that pen, inscribes certain memories of having written that letter, and so on besides creating a series of parallel texts upon its successful reception. (68)

But, without hermeneutically oriented meta-textual instructions there could be no sequences of textual inscription, etc. Neither writing nor reading, neither re-writing and re-reading, etc. (and no real distinctions between the same through reiteration). (69)

The specificity of a text being received in non-textually oriented forms of simulation. Therefore, texts cannot be reduced merely to textual inscriptions. Hence the economic range of phenomenologically appreciated forms of semantic categorization, sequential organization of textual depositions representing the same, etc. (70)

2. Aesthetical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 602 (Second Trans-Cognitive Order)

The ordered integration of semantic units and phenomenological complexes establishes, in part, the nature of aesthetical experience, and v.v. (71)

Where the aesthetical experience is further fostered through processes of ongoing relational resolution be that either in virtual and/or non-virtual terms of reference. (72)

Where resolution is primarily centered on the archetypal moment of Ego which coincides with the third order. (73)

As noted, value, as valuation, is one aspect of e/valuational formation along with identity, as identification (of the Object moment) and function, as functionality (of the World moment). (74)

Or, we could describe the expression of aesthetic influences of the second order as the intersection and interaction of third ordered resolution and the integration of the first order. I.e., paralleling the modes of retreatment of nomination and analysis (or reduction) but not synthesis (or reconstitution) implying a distinctive difference between the latter and integration (because synthesis can be regarded as a field phenomenon). (75)

The implication that follows that value can be seen, individually and collectively, as a potential mix of deontological value along with both aesthetical and pragmatical values. (76)

However, from an archetypal perspective, harmonization, through resolution, etc., can be viewed as the archetypal progression of World (background field), Object (dissonance), and Ego (resolution) (and hence the influence of the adjacent third order). (77)

Again, harmonization, as an ongoing process, is maintained through ongoing resolution entered into through neither the presence of too much nor the insufficient absence of either consonance, dissonance or resolution. (78)

Where, through economic correlativity, consonance can be defined as the joint negation of the other two moments, namely, as the joint negation of both dissonance and resolution, etc. (79)

Aesthetics can also be seen to implicate a matter of style, as the distinctive stylistic manner of resolution being entered into. I.e., how the relatively dissonant is being resolved in the context of the relational-situation in question. (80)

Hence art works in any medium or set of media; its indirect relation to both deontological and pragmatical modes of ethical resolution; drama being viewed as the resolution of relationships; and its disestablishment being directly influenced by ethical disruptions unless encapsulated by a more positive form of existential reframing.[186] (81)

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[186] E.g., pictures or plays depicting heroic deaths framed as forms of sacrifice for others, etc.

3. Deontological/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 603 (Third Trans-Cog. Order)

The ethical field, for the ethicist, etc., is naturally divided by third ordered deontological considerations and fourth ordered pragmatical considerations (along with possible aesthetical influences either reinforcing or disrupting the same, and v.v.). (82)

But the potentially problematic nature of such overall considerations is usually resolved through the application of conventional modes of resolution. (83)

As demonstrated in the example of the bridge-building architect who must build a bridge that does not fall down and is safe, whilst being strongly built within the reasonable limits of a budget, that, hopefully, is also aesthetically successful as a constructed object to be seen upon the landscape. (84)

Because we already have these conventional mechanisms for resolution that are both intra-ordered and inter-ordered. (85)

Proffering an explanation why every moment is not an existential nightmare of indecision, etc., although things become problematic again when we have a clash of either ethical and/or pragmatical paradigms. As an analogy of this we have a party of Japanese husbands and wives with European husbands and wives outside an opened door of a lift, or, when an inhabitant of a nation that believes in directly looking at the other person they are talking to confronts and inhabitant of another nation that believes indirectly looking at the other person to be a proper display of better manners. (86)

Proffering an explanation why, in most, if not all, situations with relatively equal but different deontological and pragmatical interpretations of an ethical-situation, it is better to follow the former given that it can be considered to be as more likely closer to an ‘existential reading’ of that same situation (as is evidenced in court rooms with the verdicts of juries). (87)

The difference between an ‘existential reading’ and a ‘deontological reading’ is that the former also takes onboard a ‘pragmatical’ approach while still favouring a ‘deontological’ reading. Hence, in this regard, the equivalence between an ‘existential reading’ and a ‘pragmatic’ reading (in its primary sense of being a ‘philosophical tradition’). (88)

Thence the necessary implication of deontological considerations within a suitably expedited pragmatic approach along with its alignment with an existential reading. Hence the implication, furthermore, that conventional ethical principles should only be regarded as only ethical guidelines and not as self-existent authorities standing alone in such matters. (89)

Because principles naturally conflict, needing to be either discounted or promoted; have no direct role in the usual coursing of business through the intra-cultural and inter-cultural mediation of conventions for such social patterns of resolution; and, by virtue of being impossible states with which we could have no possible interaction! (90)

4. Pragmatical/Ethical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 604 (Fourth Trans-Cog. Order)

As argued, ethicists need to pragmatically mediate and intermediate between both deontological and pragmatical descriptions of an ethical situation which, fortunately, to a great extent, are already pre-arbitrated through cultural conventions. (91)

Then, from an existential perspective, such mediation and intermediation should follow from relational reflections upon an adequately informed representation of the relational situation in its relational-context arrived at through economic simplification, complexification, induction, etc. (92)

'Doing ethics' more through 'ethics doing ethics'. (93)

So, how are such reflections to be enacted without, ostensively, being directly conducted (in egotistical terms of reference)? (94)

Through being adequately well-informed, placed within an extensive suspension, and then duly allowed to self-express itself through an ongoing re(-)self-organization of the presentation of that well-represented situation as apperceived through the ensuing de-suspension with the re-production of its apposite re-presentation... (95)

I.e., through [re(-)]self-organization an existential ethos is expressed. (96)

Such resolutions being re-producible, but, not necessarily re-directed as a uni-modally defined response. (97)

Different people in similar situations perhaps finding different responses that hopefully produce comparable degrees of relevant enrichment, etc. (98)

Thence the preferred preference for both an existentially oriented sense of responsiveness and an existentially discharged semblance of responsibility. (99)

Hence a differentiation between the merely 'pragmatical', as the 'relatively expedient', and the 'pragmatic' as the existential expression of what is more suitably apposite as a response given the context of the relational-situation in question. (100)

Where the pragmatic style can be experienced with aesthetic relief, and, where the pragmatical can be experienced with ethical relief. (101)

Just as a well-constructed and well-functioning door is experienced aesthetically, and, an apposite ethical response is met with ethical relief as in the equitable resolution of a heated argument. (102)

On a deeper level, values are rendered intermediated and commensurate just as economical parsimony could also be rendered as a deontological virtue, and v.v. (103)

5. Hermeneutical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 605 (Fifth Trans-Cognitive Order)

From perception and perceptual-like states content is extracted as ‘facts’ as resident within a system of co-associated facts. (104)

Such facts, treated as possibilities occupy a fifth cognitive/trans-cognitive ordered status. (105)

Possibility can be expressed on a discontinuous spectrum as potentialities, probabilities, and potencies. I.e., as more or less mere possibilities, as possibilities that could be probably realized, and pre-events on the cusp of realization. (106)

Those facts that realize a full complement of modal expectations then find a sixth ordered status as long as there is an alignment between the phenomenal-presentation and its representational-designation. (107)

So, dream events have presentations that are fifth ordered in ordered status, whereas, the fact of the dream itself is represented as a sixth ordered phenomenon, in a contrast, on the other hand, the eating of a non-virtual apple has a sixth ordered status on both counts. (108)

In an alignment between presentation and representation we realize a sixth ordered status, and in non-alignment presentations are left with a fifth ordered status. (109)

Foundered first on the establishment of the preceding four orders (considered in a linear format). I.e., as logically coherent, as being able to be conceptually experienced, and entertained as perceptual possibilities in the form of events, etc. (110)

That differential determination being promoted through other forms of alignment, say, modal density, intensity, propensity; salience, consilience, and propinquity. (111)

I.e., encountering a full complement of expected phenomenological modalities; with the requisite intensity; and, reiterating certain tropes, themes or memes reinforcing the presented significance of being represented. (112)

I.e., finding an apposite relevance; meeting a connection to other fields of endeavour, and, being found to be find the necessary psychic proximity to the apparent reality of the relational-situation in question. (113)

Where ‘facts’ that can find no further ordered progression and are represented with an evidentially unsupported status should be regarded as ‘factoids’ unless novel circumstances are found that then supply the requisite evidential supported status. (114)

Because the experiential totality of the world of the world is not a factoid we should also consider the precedence of apparent actuality over apparent potentiality, and not v.v. (as counter to that as often expressed in philosophical terms of reference). (115)

6. Ontical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 606 (Sixth Trans-Cognitive Order)

A practical hermeneut works with possibility and probability, and, an ontical specialist works with probability and potency masquerading as apparent ‘actuality’. (116)

E.g., emending a text on the grounds of probabilities born from expectations, and, in comparison, ascertaining the apparent reality of a set of facts as imputations that are highly probable and which can be conventionally short-circuited as currently well-established even though all truth determinations can never be ascertained as incontrovertible from a philosophical perspective. (117)

Indubitable experience can be neither entertained nor can completely non-indubitable experience. (118)

Because such a logically definitive definition can be neither encountered, neither recognized, nor engaged. (119)

So, the difference between a fifth order and a sixth order is a matter of degree still a distinctive difference can emanate from such a differential status. (120)

On the other hand, in a nightmare a person with a defective heart could die if ‘they dreamt they were about to be stabbed’ is a state that can be accounted for on the grounds that the dream, itself, has a sixth ordered status. (121)

Hence, too, the importance of introducing and utilizing the twin concept of both ‘insurance and assurance’. (122)

I.e., finding the ‘insurance’ that ‘in truth determination we can always, hypothetically at least, reverse our judgments to find a position with a greater degree of assurance’, and, then, from that position of greater ‘assurance’, consider ‘recommencing those chains of factual suppositions, etc.’ (123)

The implication being that all facts have a different degree of factual establishment, be that as imputed, despite their division between our determinations of a fifth ordered proposition and a sixth ordered propositional-statement. (124)

So, that ‘Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ is more assured as a sixth ordered fact than what we think ‘he had actually eaten for breakfast’ or whether that day he rode on a horse, or walked, or swam across this river, etc. (125)

Hence the mediation and intermediation of ordered interpretations, given conventional genres for dealing with such representational imputations and that all representations are built upon deeper, pre-conditional levels of intentional constitution and factual-interconnectedness. (126)

Extrapolating a different set of disciplinarians through meta-appreciation. (127)

C. Six Trans-Ordered Philosophical Sub-Disciplines

1. Metaphysical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 701 (First Trans-Order)

Each order is left through a positive truth determination. In effect, our appreciation of that propositional status allows us to progress through the orders (whether regarded as linear or circular or as dialectically simultaneous in format). However, in meta-appreciation, or trans-appreciation, we intentionally focus on the functional-structures of its propositional-representation and from that transformational-translation enter into a different, but interrelated, field of trans-ordered activity. (128)

Just as phenomenologically entertaining the intentional form of semantic categories, either individually and/or collectively, is primarily a metaphysically oriented type of pursuit that must not be mistaken for the fraudulent exercise of traditional forms of metaphysical practices. (129)

Having no truck with entities that are either designated as ‘self-existing’ or ‘other-existing’ as well ignoring all timeless principles, be they so-called ‘first principles’ or ‘last principles’ or ‘middling principles’ in between, because such non-relational first ordered designation can be neither encountered, nor recognized, nor engaged. (130)

Because ‘what is not there for us is not there for us’, and, ‘we need not be there for them’. (131)

But such ‘designations’ are ‘imputations’, and, as ‘imputations’ we need not have any concern over ‘whether such states of affairs are anything other than imputations set in a co-associated sense and semblance of an imputed world’? (132)

Regarded as ‘mere imputations’ where no imputation can equal any other. (133)

On the other hand, as imputations we can consider whether they are being imputed as ‘imputations that are both non-extrapolated and suspended’, or ‘imputed as suspended but as not non-extrapolated’, or, as imputations that are neither suspended and not non-extrapolated (i.e., proposed as being extrapolated)’. (134)

Extrapolation is the “projection of spatio-temporal entities in some historical period of time and as inhabiting, therein, a so-called ‘external world’, or, introjected as mental entities inhabiting a so-called ‘internal world’.” (135)

Moreover, as imputations *qua* ‘imputation’ we can metaphysically categorize such distinctive presentations upon the basis of their phenomenal-phenomenological representations, etc. (136)

Therein and thereafter, establishing ‘correlations, accommodations and transformations’ along with their ‘referential and trans-referential status with, when relevant, apparent forms of translation’. (137)

E.g., correlating sweetness with sugariness, saltiness with salinity; accommodating sweetness and bitterness within the general range of particular types of taste; and finding saltiness of a soup is increased with the addition of more salt. (139)

E.g., noting the relational-situatedness in question, and the relevant contextualization of the same, plus, when and where relevant, how objects within a certain situational distinction in space and time are either moved, rotated and/or reflected in a certain spatio-temporal situation. Just as when, historically and culturally, cultural conventions might frown on an adulterous relationship kept secret, but, then punish that same adulterous relationship when it is now no longer successfully conducted in a secret manner. Adding, for completeness, how objects in in a situation can be transformationally-translated without being transformationally-transformed in a more radical sense of distinctly altering a certain relative-objectivity through the breaking of certain transformational periods of non-isomorphic invariance. So, moving a plate on the surface of a table is a translation, whereas, dropping that plate on to the floor and breaking it is an event of transformation. However, despite such distinctions, no distinction can be economically entertained without suppressing or non-suppressing these other distinctions. Because, economically, through economic correlativity, a correlation is the joint negation of both accommodation and transformation, etc. That, similarly, situatedness of a situation is the joint negation of both that situation and translation conducted within that situation, etc. (140)

That an appreciation of considerations of identity, function and value is metaphysical in tenor. (141)

And can be rendered intermediated on the epistemological grounds that, e.g., ‘identity’ is ‘the joint negation of both function and value’, etc. (142)

And, where all trans-ordered forms of evaluational formation, in turn, can be intermediated given their ordered basis. (143)

So, e.g., the integration of semantic categories pertaining to the imputed formation of an artwork can be invested with aesthetic potentials on aesthetic reception assuming that some form of an apposite harmonic progression can also be delineated within the field of that artwork. By ‘appositeness’ is meant ‘pertaining to an appropriate genre constructed with proper attention to its phenomenal-phenomenological presentation that, therein, a corresponding harmonic trope can be conventionally determined as co-present, and, where it effectively induces an aesthetic response augmented through representational interest’, etc.[187] (144)

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[187] I am not arguing that this definition of aesthetic reception is definitively contained within this clumsy definition. On the other hand, I am suggesting that the relevant bones of the matter are being duly laid out. Namely, conventional delineation of a tentative artwork, being aesthetically received and, hopefully, finding a richness of aesthetic content through the successful performance of the requisite harmonic trope able to establish that type of response, albeit able to be reiterated for a certain number of people exercising due regard, whilst being sufficiently conversant with such aesthetic conventions, ‘etc.’

Hence a circumscribed, non-traditional form for our metaphysical enquiries. (145)

Now, that granted, the corresponding sub-discipline is as a metaphysician, albeit working as a disciplinarian in this new style of endeavour that avoids all traditional use of conventional metaphysical categories. (146)

Abrogated, if only through the continual use of an extensive suspension. (147)

I.e., treatment as imputations whether presented, represented and/or represented either form a relatively anti-representational orientation or a less radical sense of perspective. (148)

However, such abrogation is more profound given that all intentional objectives, metaphysical in orientation or otherwise, are treated as imputations *qua* imputations, i.e., effectively, as being continually suspended, and, both consequently and subsequently, as being experientially de-suspended simultaneously. (149)

Giving us direct relational interaction with this world at large within this overall sense and semblance of a life-world. (150)

As one set of imputations *versus* all other sets of imputations. (151)

Where all sets overlap given the economic correlativity and provisional forms of delineation exercised between all correlations, accommodations and transformation, etc., despite the iterated appearance of modes of economic re(-)iteration. (152)

Otherwise, there could be no world there for-us, and, no means for realizing that overall amplified degree of freedom to be thematized through mutual forms of navigation, negotiation and, especially, arbitration, etc. (153)

The possibility of encountering, recognizing and engaging patterns of circumscribed, relative, isomorphic, transformational invariance establishing the transcendental-possibilities for both identity and non-identity of correlations, etc. (154)

Thence their transcriptions in the form of convenient forms of limited language designation as orchestrated and deposited through the intentional interventions as intentionally expressed through textual depositions. (155)

Re-appropriated in and through the utilization of a textual economy which, in its constitution, is but a theme and variation on the imputation of an archetypal economy as expressed, say, in gestalt terms of reference, etc. Giving us, therefore, notions of World, Object, and Ego, along with all their harmonic re(-)iterations. (156)

Thence this non-traditional metaphysics extrapolated through meta-appreciation of the phenomenological, etc., preferably treated as a process of existentially oriented imputation through the continual utilization of the extensive suspension, and so on. (157)

2. Psychological Sub-Disciplinary prospect 702 (Second Trans-Order)

From the aesthetically oriented meta-appreciation of phenomenological modes of accommodation, etc., the trans-ordered discipline of a philosophical-psychology can be educed. (158)

What is meta-appreciation, as trans-appreciation, instrumental in connecting ordered sub-disciplines with trans-ordered sub-disciplines within the orbit of our philosophical scrutiny? (159)

E.g., from phenomenologically delineated semantic categories paralleling their hermeneutical genres of invocation, along with their imputed existential parallelization, we can educe metaphysical-like categories, such as space, time, subjectivity, identity, change, functions, values, etc. Then, through further forms of integration, this allows us to generated corresponding psychological categories for their individual and collective entertainment, especially when viewed through the theoretical backdrop of the epistemological hierarchy provisionally erected as a description of how different levels in epistemological organization are viewed within a co-associated psychology. All this can be questioned, but, as the topic of enquestioning already implies a dialectical presupposition of such categories and their schematic mapping we should ask how does this metaphor extend? (160)

The key metaphor of ‘mapping’, I believe, is probably best viewed as ‘diverse collections of maps in varying degrees of mutual coherence’. I.e., more as ‘an atlas of atlases’ rather than a ‘mere atlas of maps’. Giving the disciplinarian, in any discipline, the task of progressing ‘processes of integration’, whilst, at the same time, without necessarily observing a linear path in that same regard. (161)

In a psychological mapping of particular phenomenological types of experience, we can describe the range of behaviours that could be judged to be situated within the same, and, in what manner they would usually function within the range of such expectations. Outside such a range could be regarded as either defective or not non-defective. Just as colour blindness might be considered a defect, through the absence of a certain modality in sense interpretation, but, in a more marked contrast, blindness, whatever its origins, would be considered to be a more marked absence of function, still, without automatically casting any form of aspersions upon the character and abilities of that blind person. Still, from a delineation of defective and absent modalities psychology moves closer towards the discipline of a psychiatry. ‘A’ psychiatry given that such defects and absences can be viewed from an infinity of perspectives, and, an imputed so-called ‘orthodoxy’ should be pragmatically e/valuated. Treating all major discourses as both blessings and as curses. Ever proffering a seemingly viable point of entry but framing all critiques through their own hegemonic points of view, and being, therefore, resistant to the inevitable supersession by radical minor discourses that should be welcomed on pragmatic grounds and not merely disputed ideologically. (162)

Noting the existential observation of mine that adopting and adapting skillful modes of deconstruction can ensure the existential supersession of a major discourse when the time is right for its radical removal, whereas, in non-existential approaches we need to both deconstruct and replace such relatively defective ideologically resistant constructions. Where, again, the test of such overall deconstruction is an e/valuation of the 'relevant-enrichment conducted through authentically inspired competence', etc. (163)

Meta-appreciation also notes that as everything is an imputation, we have no need to explore what is not an imputation. On the other hand, as all imputations are not equal, on the principle that 'there is no absolute equality in any form whatsoever', we may surmise some imputations are more oriented imputationally, and v.v. (164)

Now, given an imputation is an imputation *qua* imputation, and, there is no equality between imputations, in terms of their status as 'imputations', we may then educe that some imputations are less secure in their interconnectedness with others, whereas, others might well be more secure, not only individually and even more so collectively. Just as the factuality of facts occurs in a hierarchy of factual secureness (allowing us to operate with those twin concepts of 'insurance and assurance;). (165)

With the imputation of an epistemological hierarchy how might we provisionally schematize a possible working psychology? (166)

Working from the Physiological Basis in the Sensory-Motor levels of organization with sensory input and motor output. (167)

Moving 'up' through the Pre-Cognitive Aspect, or Affective Aspect, with Impressions (like pain, and pleasure, etc.) and Moods (like euthymia, hypomania, depression, elation, sadness, etc.). (168)

Then, on to the Cognitive Aspect as an intentional level in epistemological organization and our invocation of an intentional economy, etc., along with the use of a Cognitively Ordered Analysis. (169)

Then moving 'up' from intentional economies to trans-intentional judgments entered into on such cognitive content as being reflected upon through such deliberations. Utilizing the use of a Trans-Cognitively Ordered Analyses, etc. Where the 'etc.' itself becomes a metaphysical-like question to the extent we might also be plugged in with other through a mix of intracultural and intercultural interactions, etc., and inviting again a further act of metaphysical like speculation as to whether a final 'etc. is either necessarily absent or inescapably present? (170)

Each level, in our ascent, proffering a relatively radical perspective given such ongoing emergence. Where various observations and regulation, etc., could be hypothetically entertained. E.g., that each level is entered or left through a transcendental suspension of that level or aspect. Where 'level' equates to the degree of epistemological organization, and, where all levels and inter-levels of organization, without exception, are eco-

nomically envisaged either with regard to intent or on a more foundational level for the aspect in question. I.e., with the archetypal economy on one hand, and, other the other, more akin to software, a provisional plethora of heuristic devices apparently 'plugged' into such a scheme. (171)

That all horizontal and vertical economies can be envisaged as relative incommensurable, but also relatively commensurate by virtue of their constituting the economies in question. Noting, also, this correlativity conjectures to take place between phenomenal-phenomenological and hermeneutical inputs and existential outputs, etc. (172)

Hence the following diagrammatic depiction of this psychological scheme:

An Impossible 'Etc.' or a Possible 'Etc.'?[188]

Trans-Cognitive Judgment
[6 Distinctive Forms of Ordered-Judgment]

*

Aspect of Cognitive Intentionality
[6 Distinctive Ordered Forms of Intentional Orientation]

*

Pre-Cognitive, Affective Aspect
[Impressions-Mood]

*

Physiological Basis
[Motor-Sensory Concerns]

* * * * * *
The Imputation of a World at Large (173)

All schemes are provisional, but, some would be more provisional than others. Treated, indeed, as functionally-structured imputations, pragmatically treating, therein, the imputation of 'economies' as 'useful fictions' or as 'heuristic devices'… *all the way up and all the way down*… (174)

By such schematization, imputing psychological categories and dialectically noting their simultaneous relative incommensurability and economic commensuration. (175)

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[188] Indicating either an intersubjective level or levels of intracultural-intercultural communities… or an overall life-world… as a possible something more (conjectured along theological lines?)?

3. (Radical)Theological Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 703 (Third Trans-Order)

Although for some people the conjecture of a theological domain is both impossible, and not felt to be either necessary or required, as being surplus to their requirements, for others, it has been made the backbone of their existence in their world before others be that either by-them and/or for-them. In this *Handbook* the conformal existence of the Divine, in some form or other, is not being made an object of our concern. It being only my intention to carve out of a philosophical space for such a topic, and, thereby, making hypothetical room in this trans-ordered scheme for this topic in its diverse generality along with the diversity of its disciplinarians. Just as it is possible for a philosopher to be a 'philosopher of science' without being a scientist, so, too, a philosophy of theological concerns must be possible without that scrutiny necessarily requiring a professional theologian to be in charge so to speak. Of course, it could be better to have a traditional disciplinarian to explicate their traditional discipline, and not someone antithetical to such practice. Still, as all parties should be practitioners of a(n extensive) suspension it follows that a philosophical appreciation of that discipline in question is both possible and potentially an opportunity to proffer forms of insightfulness beneficial to all parties be they either religious or non-religious in their dispositions, just as it can be historically shown that existential practice is not the sole preserve of either religionists or non-religionists.[189] A point that can be clearly demonstrated by looking at the historical rollcall of those thinkers who, in hindsight, would be deemed to have been 'existentialists' and, who at the same time, either professed some form of a religious faith or otherwise. (176)

Now, in also making room for a radical theology it is a point to be debated whether parties, committed to that aspect of this discipline, could arrive at that destination through either a critique of traditional theology and/or by arriving through the taking of a more direct path or through some indirect detour, say, through the sacralization of the secular world itself, or by some other avenue where the everyday world is somehow transformed, perhaps through the application of a 'radical theological turn'?[190] But, be this discipline or philosophical sub-discipline exercised and supervised by either a more tradition approach or the taking of a radical route, what might be said about the meaningful regulation of such a profession in general terms of reference? To this end, let me proffer the following guidelines that might establish the existential merit of such a valiant attempt? (177)

The putative sense and semblance of the Divine can be either defined, either directly or indirectly, or, merely indicated, either metaphorically and/or rhetorically. I.e., through a (metaphorical) theology of 'presence', say, in an emergent, non-reductive existential form or format, or, through a (rhetorical) theology of 'absence', say, through invoking some form a *via negativa*; or, by more indirectly pointing in a manner that is either metaphorical and/or rhetorical in scope (without reference to more traditional tropes, themes, and memes). With this door now ajar… what else could or should be 'said' or 'silently inferred' to further enlarge this disciplinary space? (178)

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189 Refer, e.g., to the essay titled: *Existential Discernment*: *Part* III; *Pursuit*, III.7S.3,18-20.

190 Rather than, say, a non-radical theological turn or turning around of the non-theological or secular?

That such a theology is better crafted as a 'process theology' since all else, it would seem, based on unchanging absolutes and similar, should soon threaten to self-deconstruct and send its loyal and subservient servants to the proverbial second bench, if not to that dreaded third tier…[191] (179)

Furthermore, all philosophies, theological or otherwise, that pay no heed to relational interaction should duly note the dictum 'that what is not there for us is not there for us, and, we need not be there for it..!' (180)

That any discipline, theological or otherwise, should be productive and profitable, be of service to the secular world. In effect, proffer a relevant-enrichment in e/valuational formation, and, also command and reward professionals that attempt to be both competent and authentic... (181)

Indeed, argue for and exercise an existential approach as to how we could or should related to one another in such a manner so as to orchestrate the enhancement of our freedom to be in this secular world, be that in our standing passively with(-)others, moving actively before(-)others, and finding a mutual form of freedom through(-)others; through our engaging(-)others as if there were no existential difference between one's own sense/s of self and both the subjective and intersubjective being of the other... (182)

Tentatively seeking the possible, through a non-tentative sense of faith, by awaiting that which is yet to come as if it were to come… through energetically accepting the novel, the diverse, the different, the critical, and the relatively radical… by seeking to think and to form final 'last' thoughts through an acceptance of our creativity, by thinking that which once would have been impossible… by seeking to engineer change through positive processes of chaotic bifurcation or emergence, patterns of re(-)direction arrived at through existentially enriched forms of re(-)self-organization… by passing into realms of being not previously thought… (183)

By attempting to see beyond the mundane nature of the communal to divine a sense of the secular that existentially comes alive through suspension of simple notions like 'service', 'civility', 'respect', 'love', 'concern and care', in a further fostering of the unique… by pouring old wine into new bottles and pouring new wine in to vintage vessels..? (184)

In essence, seeking and refining an existential take on the relatively non-existential through this dialectical embrace of difference and in distancing ourselves form sameness, mere conformity, forms of institutionalized alienation, and so on… (185)

But, these notions, as innocent guidelines, such as a process re(-)orientation; engagement; relevant-enrichment, competence and authenticity; a mutual fostering of freedom; awaiting a recognition of possibilities; existentially embracing the radical, as just noted, are meant in the spirit of a reform that transforms any number of topics, from the

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191 One of my general findings to be found in my *Theological Investigations,* Volume I.

theological to the non-theological, from diversion to entertainment, from misinformation to conspiracies, from being alone to being lost in a crowd… could practically also be found, as suggested, in a 'theology of the secular'..? (186)

In a traditional theology I noted, on a number of occasions, as one more instance of a disciplinary economy, that we could delineate the manner in which a certain theology distinctly sees the world through the invocation of a 'theological difference' by extracting from that articulated overall sense and semblance of a theological vision our current consensus on the nature of the secular. Then, by perceiving this 'difference', as a 'theological difference', as not necessarily something that is just passive, since pure passivity, I would argue, is not something that could be purely entertained in that extreme, and impossible, manner, it could well be the case that such could also act as an active 'differential' that functions in the world in ways as yet not even fully comprehended… Indeed, could even act in such a manner so as to distinctly leave its mark, its footprints, it signature… upon the existential unravelling of its handiwork… with ourselves as either its witting or unwitting agents for such change. (187)

In the same vein, we could and should also ask just what difference does such a difference, such a differential, such a distinctive distinction have in this world at large? In effect, seek to delineate this 'theological meta-difference', or 'theological meta-differential', or 'theological meta-distinction' hold in the pursuit of such a theology, be it traditional or radical in the extent of its desires, its ambitions and aspirations.[192] (188)

Then, given this quest for value of such a disciplinary pursuit we must also ask in what manner this distinctive sense of difference and meta-difference might make, must make in the secular world given that just cited dictum 'that what is not there for us may as well not exist for us…' Hence this necessity for the further delineation of a 'theological non-difference', or a 'theological non-differential', or a 'theological non-distinction'… by asking that theologian how such a discipline functions in the secular world itself? (189)

Then, an adventurous theologian, or philosopher of theological thought, could further enquire, as a meta-theologian, through a process of meta-appreciation, or trans-appreciation, just how a meta-theological difference, etc. might operate? Just how a 'meta-theological meta-difference', etc., might operate, and, just how a 'meta--theological non-difference', etc., might operate across the breath of their disciplinary endeavours? Perhaps, by such a measure, further inviting a sense and semblance of the radical to manifest itself in the coursing of such a pursuit. Given that all e/valuational formation arises through the economic nature of those invoked disciplines, therefore, it behooves the professional disciplinarian, whatever their discipline or sub-discipline, to seriously enquire as to how their practice can enrich the lives of others, and, here, I am confident, that by incorporating an existential tack that this aspect of their brief would be duly discharged in a more successful and economical manner… (190)

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192 In my explorations of the aspirational economy, I treat desires as personal ambitions and social aspirations. However, since our freedom is to be mutually engendered through(-)others it follows that an aspirational economy has to be incorporated within the relevant orbit of an arbitrational economy.

4. Political-Economic Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 704 (Fourth Trans-Order)

Now, I make the trans-ordered claim that the meta-appreciation of the pragmatical fourth order lays the foundations for the viable explication of a political-economics. (191)

In a political-economics we can observe, either directly or indirectly, the dissemination of power, either by design or by default, through following the flows of information available to us, as is evident through the circulation of money, credit, debt, interest rates, fees, obligations, promises, insurance, employment, unemployment, those desiring full employment, pensions, demographics, purchases, consumption, and numerous other indicators of political-economic significance through transactions as exercised by government, political parties, businesses, importers and exporters, interest groups, consumers, and so on, and so forth… (192)

It stands to reason that forms of correlativity must exit between these aggregated sources of such 'information', but, the complex world is not simple and the simplicity of the world is complex and chaotic in complexion. That, in effect, measurements cannot be perfectly accurate, and the reference frames for such measurement, themselves, cannot be perfectly coherent, non-contradictory, able to be fully appropriated, etc. But, that should not stop us from trying and perfecting those models that seem to proffer insightful understandings of such complex-simplicity, that, in relational theory, should also act as if holistically engendered, with a certain degree of integration and integrity along with intended, mis-intended, unintended consequences, along with completely non-intended consequences. I.e., as mix of the relatively non-chaotic and the relatively chaotic (although it might be safer to assume, covertly, the latter would be more dominant?). (193)

As argued elsewhere, the political-economy needs to entertained as an enjoined 'super-discipline' (with the hyphen) as neither politics nor economics, as separate sub-disciplines, could explain, e.g., the full functioning of neo-liberal ideological influences at work in an overall economy, etc. (194)

Moreover, it was also argued, in order to orchestrate a more effective sense and semblance of an economy, that policy formation was central to the functioning of this entire enterprise. Hence this necessity for this integration of the theoretical, the practical and the critical as exemplified, respectively, in part, by politics, business and the necessary economic incorporation of a 'stylistic' sphere of influence (parallel with the sphere of arbitration) to act as the so-called 'third moment', as a so-called 'third force' in the overall political-economy. This dimension, through various arguments, was delineated as comprising social critics and various forms of Media; executives operating beyond the more limited horizons of management; compliance officers overseeing infractions in the business world, etc. Interestingly, this dimension (at the confluence of both horizontally critical and vertically critical aspects of a 3 x 3 political-economic-stylistic matrix) must also include the political executive, who, by the very nature of their deliberations, might be the only branch of government that deserves to preserve some limited form of qualified secrecy?[193] (195)

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193 Areas of interest explored in Pursuit, III, in essays prefixed by 2A, 2C, 2D, 2I-2K, etc.

Given this interest in observing the dissemination of political-economic ‘power’, it stands to reason that this economy be preferentially designated for such considerations. Still as sub-sub-disciplines, we can also explore politics, economics and stylistics as economies in their own right. But, like all things, creative processes of contextualization have the potential to bring to any party a greater wealth of sense-significance, meaning, and meaningfulness. (196)

The meta-appreciation, in turn, of the political-economic itself perhaps being the better perspective for the creating of political-economic models for monitoring such economic flows of information. Such a transformational shift in perspective could also be instrumental in the realization of radical shifts in perspective as to how such an apparent entity is to be more informatively viewed, as preparation for more successful forms of intervention, hopefully, with an existential tenor. (197)

Now, as a process of exploration, we might suppose, hypothetically, that ‘the psychology of psychology’ (as a non-psychology or meta-psychology), effectively, is a ‘sociology’ (including as well such topics as anthropology and cultural studies, etc?)? By such means setting out, directly or indirectly, to observe diverse forms of psychological interaction on an intersubjective level of expression?). (198)

Then, one step further, that a sociology of sociology (as a non-sociology or meta-sociology) may well be instrumental in the formation of a ‘politics’ (as the discipline to ‘observe the multi-various transformational movements of diverse forms of sociological power?’). (199)

But, as political influence cannot be explicated purely in political terms of reference hence the invocation of the political-economic. Thence this coupling of the pragmatic expediency of financial aspect of the economy with their conjunction with the political as usually nominated as the prime arbiters of political power. (200)

But, again, as previously intimated, ‘power’ cannot be understood purely in contractual terms of reference nor in the form of a simple command economy. Hence the additions of the existentially oriented compactual economy along with ideas of the economy of dissemination in which people act as nodes in networks and where dissemination is fostered through an element of choice even if subverted through a variety of non-existential forms of coercion, etc. (201)

Such non-existential influences being physical and psychological coercion; inequitable forms of so-called cooperation; adherence to inequitable conventions; exploitation through the having to meet physiological necessities; alienation; excesses forms of proliferations; the displacement of work by the proliferation of forms of meta-work; manipulation through forms of deception, misinformation, misappropriation, institutionalization; various forms of inappropriate punishment and rewards; non-compactually constructed contracts, etc., etc. Therefore, it behooves the disciplinarian to counteract and replace such forms of inauthenticity, etc. (202)

5. Scientific Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 705 (Fifth Trans-Order)

The meta-appreciation of potentiality, or possibility, is preeminently the purview of the scientist (although we could also add architects, agriculturalists, designers, artists and craftspeople, etc.). (203)

Potentiality comes in various grades, such as, e.g., possibility, probability (or likelihood) and (and an inevitable) potency, whilst, philosophically, it is debatable whether either pure potentiality or pure actuality can exist let along be perfectly thought. Hence the parameters that limit this ordered topic and its trans-ordered appreciation. (204)

It could be argued that a hermeneut[194] works with textual units in a textual economy whereas the trans-ordered hermeneut works with textual economies inserted within super-textual economies. Because the hermeneut interprets textual situations,[195] whereas, the scientist interprets situations subjected to textualization. The 'interpretative economy' being hermeneutical presentations of narrational facts, the phenomenal-phenomenological use of representations preferably of the primary narrative/s, and the non-systematic-existential re-presentation of its narrational critique/s (taking either critical and/or radical processes of re-direction in a manner that is either overt and/or covert).[196] (205)

The depiction of such disciplined activities takes place through the medium of co-associated narratives and should be amenable to the existential test of 'relevant-enrichment through competent-authenticity', etc. (206)

To be noted, narrations occur on the delineation of three levels of explication that need to be both carefully correlated and accommodated in order to observed the suitable sequencing of informative transformations, etc. (207)

I.e., so-called 'narrational facts'; narrational 'narratives' being either overtly and/or covertly operated with; and, narrational 'critiques' being either overtly and/or covertly subscribed to, preferably in a stance of genuine membership, be that either partially (through non-suspension) or impartially (through suspensions), in part or in whole (but rarely the latter as that a definitive degree of resolution usually oversees the termination of that narrational relationship, and, usually, people prefer to either preserve or conserve their narratives without their demise through imposing such definitive forms of resolution unless that is conventionally expected[197]). (208)

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194 The hermeneut usually works towards that end of the spectrum entailing 'generality-particularity-specificity' through more dealing with specificity, whereas, in disciplined contrast, the hermeneuticist is preoccupied with matters more general.

195 A 'textual situation' is code for 'either a text or a series and/or set/s of texts'.

196 Recently, in invoking an approach of transformational retreatment, I have had to change my nomenclature from 'hermeneutical representations' to 'hermeneutical presentations', and, 'phenomenological presentations' to 'phenomenological representations' (given that the latter are critically reworked through deconstruction of the intentional form through such processes of reiteration).

197 E.g., as when we pay our bills; discover our lottery tick is 'not a winning ticket'; or exit a restaurant after having paid for the meal, etc.

Fortunately, for us, nature also ‘thinks’ in economic triplicities. Let me demonstrate this ever-reiterated phenomenal commonality. (209)

In time, we have the temporal economy (and sub-economies) of future, past and present approached through histories of the future, past, and present (along with the relatively incommensurable dimension of such descriptions, etc., and hence the different manner such histories are conducted). (210)

In space, we can mathematically envisage, etc., a flat Minkowski space, a curved de Sitter space, and a hyperbolical anti-de Sitter space.[198] (211)

In particle physics the Standard Model deals with three forces (excluding gravitation – to my mind, as not so much a force as a localized field phenomenon?), namely, electro-magnetism, strong and weak forces.[199] (212)

Or, in (re)treatment through reductive-analysis, reconstitutional-synthesis, and nominative-identification… with no other modalities. (213)

Or, in chaotic transformational-transitions with analytical ‘bifurcations’, synthetical ‘emergences’, and phase changes that might be considered to be as either ‘pre-re-bifurcational’ or ‘pre-re-emergent’ depending on whether a state of greater organization is being either entered or left. (214)

Or, the simple manipulation of an object in space through transitional-translations, rotations, or reflections. (215)

Or, in traditional physics with solids, liquids and gases (but with a host of phase changes in between such major phase changes[200]). (216)

Or the philosophical-metaphors of economic ‘systems’ situationally breaking down in it re-situated bimodal currents and unimodal emissions… (217)

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198 Running a potentially fruitful line of speculation, we might conjecture that as we find the Malacena Duality operating between the latter (in anti-de Sitter space) and Conformal Field Theory we might suppose that entanglement invokes the same type of dimensionality? Refer, furthermore to the next footnote.

199 In turn, we might surmise gravitation has three relatively incommensurable phenomenological modalities to be envisaged as co-occurring, namely, normal gravitation, so-called ‘dark matter’ and so-called ‘dark energy’. That different circumstances trigger distinctive re-arrangements in the localization of such field-forces? By such a general mechanism proffering a potential explanation of the so-called Big Bang or Big Whimper as the so-called ‘Initial Singularity, so-called ‘inflation’, the singularity of ‘black-holes’, ‘dark matter’ associated phenomena, apparent ‘dark energy’ phenomena, and the end phase of universal expansion in the ‘Great Ripping’ and ‘Final Contraction’??? But, such ideas are presented as ‘speculative conjectures’.

200 Apparently, liquid water is a complex mix of phases that are both overlapping and co-occurring?

Like, too, the trimodal characterization of quarks[201] and gluons. Even the 'bimodal' leptons with two quarks become trimodal with gluons (and where the latter contribute most of the apparent mass). (218)

The point being made here is that even physics needs to be economically translated in trimodal terms in order for the scientist to operate more competently. But, are not some states ostensively bimodal? Like, e.g., the hydrogen atom (needing, therefore, to act as a molecule) whereas, a contrary and more competent interpretation would note that hydrogen is not merely a proton and an electron since the very phenomenological nature of hydrogen, itself, emerges from such a combinational-system that cannot be reduced merely to one proton and one electron. (219)

But, then, how can we account for electrons having merely two charges, two spins? Or, is this counter-argument necessary since no two electrons can co-occur in a physically contrived situation other than when combined with atomic structures (through the invoking of the Pauli principle?) which makes the same point in reverse, i.e., through the absence of this alternative, namely, the non-co-occurring co-existence of an electron and a positron?[202] (220)

Now, as all disciplines are conducted through the use of narratives what does this philosophically say about the practice of the scientific method, etc. (221)

A collation of correlative and non-correlative facts, their theoretical accommodations and ensuing inference of processes of transformation, etc. (222)

Through an effective data-base; manipulation in a competing field of narrational structural-functions, and their critical assessment with varying degrees of either critical and/or radical criticism. Where a strengthened science is realized through the forging of

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201 Which can also be treated as schematically hexamodal (but also with three colours along with a state and anti-state variants). Then, no arrangement can be logically simplified being dialectically exemplified with even more indeterminate, exotic possibilities including rarer quark combinations, tetra-quarks and penta-quarks all adding a marginal shifting in theoretical mass values, etc. Given the naturally precise values of the electron, one is tempted to envisage a similar scheme in the constitution of the electron (as being noted in the next footnote)?

202 Perhaps sometime next century scientists will be able to demonstrate that even electrons are structured just as protons are regarded to be structured with quarks and gluons (and where some quark combinations, hitherto presumed to be merely triplets, can also act as tetra-quarks and penta-quarks. However, I would argue that these latter combinations are hybrid triplets intersecting, e.g., as might occur in the following pattern: (a, b, (c), d, e} giving us a penta-quark orientation, and, where a tetra-quark orientation might be seen to overlap in this manner: (a,(b, c), d). But, this is just speculation on my part. This possibility for the structuring of the electron is also hinted at in the fact that quarks are given a charge as a one third the fraction of the electron. Moreover, quark combinations are also 'regulated' by certain rules pertaining to 'colour' where mesons, e.g., constructed from two quarks, as a quark and anti-quark (plus gluons), have their colour cancelled by colour plus anti-colour, and, where hadrons, e.g., are constructed from three quarks plus gluons and where three different colours (or anti-colours) collectively cancel to create a similar 'colourless' end result (and where all such classes of particles, it would seem, neatly falling with certain class symmetries). The primary point to be made here, in this text, is that a trimodal economy, indeed, sets of trimodal economies are implicated and need to be explicated in the articulation of such imputed symmetries, etc.

pathways of resolution between competing paradigms, subject to varying degrees of either critical and/or radical assessment. The intrusion of chaotical processes of re-direction often heading such research in a more radical sense of direction. (223)

Hence the current success of realizing an actual tension between quantum theory and relativity theory, but, the current failure in not being able to forge a deeper sense of interconnection between the same. (224)

So, we have three sets of relative incommensurabilities in our dealings with such narrational facts, narratives, and narrational critiques. On each of these three levels, we could argue that dialectical-like forces are ready to disestablish ruling paradigms even though, more likely, such transgression will be near-completely overlooked. The choice of facts determining relevant genres of behaviour, and v.v. Narratives may find themselves straying especially if the apparent logic of a text unravels and heads us off in a direction not inconformity with previously stated claims and aims.[203] (225)

As for the scientific method, we would need to envisage the overlapping of a number of narratives, e.g., logical, dialectical, observational, mathematical, phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, existential, and various other transformational strategies that should include drawing on the close scrutiny of 'rectification, deconstruction[204] and ongoing re(-)normalization', etc. (226)

That a pragmatic approach to scientific research needs to carefully invoke a viable, qualified anti-representational, positively nihilistic perspective on such practice. Let me explain. (227)

By 'viable' is meant a 'discipline where what is meant to function does function, more or less, as intended' in a productive manner. (228)

'Qualified' by virtue of the fact that 'no process of truth determination can be either rendered indubitably conformal (and valid) nor rendered indubitably non-conformal (and invalid)'. (229)

By 'anti-representational' is meant 'imputations treated as imputations *qua* imputations, and, where they are fully suspended (through extensive suspensions) and are neither extrapolated (into the impossible reaches of the so-called 'external world')'.In other

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[203] As an illustration of this 'not sticking to the official text' are those amusing situations on Russian state television when a propagandist gets carried away with the rhetoric of their own arguments, and knowledge, and by doing so more closely reveal the nature of their own thinking on that topic being more truthfully commented on. But, in committing such carelessness, especially on more than one occasion, it is probably best they do not go too near an open-windows or make an un-gloved contact with the doorhandles of their current residence. Sadly, being honest does not always pay, indeed, it may well cost, be more costly. However, how should such considerations be negotiated and arbitrated is best existentially engaged.

[204] 'Deconstruction' is being used in the sense of 'applying critical conventions in order to harmonize through resolution the readings being adopted and adapted', but, not in its literary sense (although being conducted at the level of a narrational process such procedures are not that far removed from its literary cousin).

words, a dialectical state of affairs where we need a simulated interaction with presentations and representations in order to inaugurate such a working attitude that cannot be reduced to anyone aspect of that ensuing overall economy. (230)

By ‘positively nihilistic’ is meant ‘our ability to entertain an anti-representational stance as overlaying both presentational and representational simulations without the engaged destruction of the same’. (231)

By ‘pragmatic’ is meant ‘operating under the sufficient influence of a(n extensive) suspension in order to oversee non-ideologically re(-)directed choices better able to assist us in our passages through this world at large’, but, ‘without resorting to mere expediency, without the denial of the necessary implication of an existential orientation, and with the recognition that a range of options might be our best option to accept and adopt without being doctrinaire and selective about anyone of those viable possibilities’. (232)

In the *Pursuit*, Volume III, an attempt has been made to explore the links between an existential-pragmatic attitude and how such ideas might be able to be transferred to the sub-discipline of history, and, then from history, to the sub-discipline of science in general terms. (233)

On a very basic general level of explication science could be argued to be a very specialized type of history. (234)

I.e., from past experiences certain rules are inferred from the iteration of certain conformities discerned in certain topical sets of observations. (235)

Then, certain future predications are predicated on the basis of either such observed and/or inferred regularities. (236)

Where, in the present selective observations and experiments are focused upon in order to test the conformal nature of such predications through experiments designed to answer those question. (237)

The data from such scrutiny being progressively harmonized with both past observations, subsequent predictions, and present experiments. (238)

Both limitations and irregularities being taken into account through processes of ongoing re(-)normalization. Hence this close association with the sub-discipline of history, albeit with certain distinctive differences reflected in its highly structured used of scientifically oriented genres of behaviour. The re(-)construction of narratives attempting to capture, in part, these processes of harmonization. Where, in essence, the apparently accessible ‘possible treatment of potential ascertainment’ is instrumental in the evolution and successfully conducted practical exercise of a scientific attitude within the confines of the scientific-life-world along with the overall institution depth of behaviour entailed in such a life-world that clearly demarcates it from all forms of pseudo-science. (239)

6. Historical Sub-Disciplinary Prospect 706 (Sixth Trans-Order)

The ‘historical’ is ‘the recording of a sequence of events over a certain period in time along with the attempt to interpret the relevant pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditional consequences’. (240)

Within a temporal economy, as noted, we can entertain histories of the future, of the past, and present. (241)

Such notions are relatively incommensurable, but, where such incommensurability is rendered relative commensurable by virtue of the fact that they are correlative and contained within their respective relationships. (242)

So, e.g., a history of the past usually entails the collation of relevant texts subjected to ongoing re(-)interpretation. (243)

Where a history of the present looks for reiterated tropes, themes and memes from a statistical perspective as might be found in a close scrutiny of contemporary media, interviews, social commentary, etc. (244)

Finding levels of conformational correlativity between hermeneutical forms of error mitigation exercised over the appropriateness of our choices in investigating genre specifications, and error correction in the properly exercised deconstruction of phenomenal-phenomenological forms of analysis, whilst finding further forms of conformational alignment through appositely delineated, existential forms of conformational examination. Our temporal orientations in historical research overseeing which aspects could be subtly preferenced. E.g., in a history of the future that would fall more upon hermeneutical considerations, etc. (245)

That a history of the future is more concerned with the apparent terminations of historical trajectories and a speculative appreciation of the same. (246)

Furthermore, all existential and non-existential inputs into the enacted forms of history can be reviewed in terms of the apparent presence or absence of current existential hallmarks, future existential predictors, and past existential indicators. (247)

As already implied, the narrational nature of disciplines implies three levels of research standing in need of suitable forms of harmonization. (248)

Hence our concern with the collection and collation of the requisite historical facts as narrational ‘facts’ and not ‘factoids’. This prior status being worked towards through ‘insurance and assurance’, acceptable forms of evidential ascertainment, correct sequentialization of evidential gathering, sequencing of those events themselves, their causal analysis (in the light of various second level hypotheses), etc. (249)

A second level in historical research consists of a gathering and harmonizing of those hypotheses put forwards as modes of interpretation for the integrating and making better sense of those collated facts. Thence the power of the narrative, as is in evidence when conspiratorial factoids 'poison' the proceedings and the better established facts of competing narratives are not able to displace the former. Where such desired deconstruction must occur on the level of narrational replacement with the assistance of narrational critiques. As noted, such a process could be accomplished in a one-step existential manoeuvre is suitably discharged, and, a two-step non-existentially oriented project or program. However, in reality, such a campaign is better organized through a harmonization of both approaches. (250)

Indeed, by such means conducting a better process of 'doing history'! (251)

On a third level, more successful shorter-term projects and longer-term programs in the rectification, deconstruction and re(-)normalization of historical research will need to appeal to either overt or covert narrational critiques at the center of narrations given either this explicit or implicit desire to oversee the de-anomalization of the anomalies driving that narrative in the first place. Because nothing is done without the requisite motivation, and, successful motivation is best delivered through the co-occurrence of an alignment between pre-cognitive, cognitive, trans-cognitive, and post-cognitive objectives as inputs and outputs. E.g., without some form of emotional input and provocative output an artwork would be artistically 'dead'. That this insight models the performance of all forms of motivation, etc. That the pursuit of historical research is no different. (252)

Thence the 'doing of history', but, historical research and emendation is better existentially conducted as 'history doing history'.[205] (253)

As well as being aware of 'historians and their histories', i.e., critically and radically both evaluating the merit of their research in terms of the apparent relevant-enrichment of their profession performed by such disciplinarians and evaluating their practice of historical methods in terms of a competent-authenticity that can be either demonstrated and/or argued for. (254)

Just how is history performed existentially? (255)

Through 'suspension, suspension, and then more suspensions', and, 'observing the suspension of a "suspension of disbelief"' in a manner as best called for![206] As a test, we should note the relative presence or absence (of at least three out of the following four factors) of 'relevant-enrichment' of their discourse seemingly supplied through their 'competent-authenticity' as disciplinarians.[207] Observing existential hallmarks, etc., and, engaging in best existential practice in order to better expedite such historical research with a view to also possibly observing patterns of re-righting and up-righting, etc. (257)

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205 As explored in the recent essay: *Pursuit*, III.2V titled: *Re-Righting 'History' through the Use of a 'Pragmatic' narration*: *A Pro-Relational Accounting of History Doing History'*.

206 As noted in: 8B. *A Conspiracy of Conspiracies is*..? *Pursuit*, III.8B.

207 As explored in the essay: 7W. *Re-Viewing Historians and 'Their' Histories*. *Pursuit*, III.7W.

D. Trans-Critical Practice

1. De-Relegational Re(-)Considerations 707

Officially, a philosophical miscreant, as a philo-sophist, or as a mis-disciplinarian or, worse, as the more dysfunctional dys-disciplinarian, are all to be relegated to either a second rank or a third tier. No first-class seating for these reprobates. The serious working philosopher, or earnest disciplinarian, would rather deal with the tasks to hand than to have to yet again refute such forms of blatant extremism or patent nonsense espoused by such poor exemplars of their disciplines… (258)

Noting in the *Preview* to this Formidable Philosopher's Handbook that relegation, by implication, should be visited upon the unimodalists, bimodalists, the dogmatic absolutists, the part-time relativists, the non-pragmatists, and the non-existentialists, and all such similar miscreants. (259)

As already noted, we are to deconstruct the defective and improve upon the effective![208] (260)

Some philosophers have had to spend an inordinate amount of time deconstructing the historical accumulation of such philosophical nonsense, or disciplinary detritus, and, as a consequence, have had less to time to reconstruct a pragmatic enterprise more capable of contributing to human solidarity, and so on.[209] (261)

However, as much as we might like to see such philo-sophists *et al* relegated to a second rank, if not preferably to a third tier, unfortunately, or fortuitously, for all parties, we have to endure a love-hate relationship with such miscreants given that the subtleties of establishing and maintaining a working anti-representationalistic stance is predicated on a dialectical relationship continually operating between the (relative) positions of the presentationalist, the representationalist, and the anti-representationalist (and re-representationalist), albeit with a subtle preferencing of the latter through the exercise of a suspended, non-extrapolation of the structural-functions resident in the imputational reference being currently worked with to hand. (262)

However, what prevents such relegated candidates from realizing a certain degree of de-relegation is their insistence on maintaining either a certain degree of unacceptable extremism or impossible absurdism. I.e., in their maintaining a refusal to contemplate only their subtle approaching and their subtle appropriation of more acceptable notions exercised and maintained within the embrace of a suitable suspension. In effect, suspending both imputative positioning and their natural extrapolation exercised through imputative structural-functions along with their subsequence production of e/valuational formations preferably in a form that is comparatively amplified through the 'existential test' of an apparent relevant enrichment of a co-associated authentic-competency. (263)

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208 E.g., *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.11, etc. *Pursuit*, III.VII.II.13, etc.

209 The perceptive reader will realize that this is my positive critique of Richard Rorty *et al*. I.e., those other pragmatists impeded by such institutionalized resistance, etc.

So, we could say that ‘the joke is on us’, the serious working philosopher, etc., given that, either virtually and/or non-virtually, non-anti-representationalistic positionalists also ‘have to be spoken with’, at least metaphorically if not literally, in order to exercise the subtle balance needed to maintain the subtleties of this dialectical stance entailed in a working anti-representationalism! Let me explain. (264)

In an echo of the pre-critical to the critical to the radical/post-critical trajectory of transformational retreatment we could envisage a similar provisional working anti-representationalism operating through a procession of three stages:

i. Forming and noting imputations as extrapolated and non-suspended.
ii. Reforming and renoting imputations as extrapolated and suspended.
iii. Re-forming and re-noting imputations as non-extrapolated and suspended.

Hence the three forms of co-associated metaphorical seating, namely, respectively of third tier, second rank, and first-class seating. (265)

By ‘extrapolated’ is meant ‘treating intentional objectivity as if projected beyond the presentational limits of such ideation (be that as either intentional object, or object-state, or abstract conceptual objective, etc.)’. (266)

By ‘suspension is meant enacting an extensive suspension which, for convenience, can be thought of as a ‘transcendental suspension’. Inducing a suspension through sufficiently entertaining (within the interrogative economy) either a rhetorical suspension, or a metaphorical suspension, or an apparitional suspension.[210] (267)

Or, by invoking any other method that works, e.g., disvaluation,[211] running dialectically, back to back, either intentional contents and/or intentional functions, contra-gramming, etc. I.e., this appearance could be illusory (what if that were to be the case?); this is both red and not red (as if asking the question ‘is this red (or not red)?’; between, e.g., ‘the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy’, etc. (268)

Therefore, the subtle position of the first-class anti-representationalist is the subtle preferencing of imputations that are ‘not extrapolated and are suspended’. (269)

But, the ‘joke’ is somewhat upon us since to dialectically arrive at this subtle preference of the anti-representational stance, we must first engineer the co-associated states of the third tier representationalists and the second rank presentationalists. (270)

Fortunately, for us, and unfortunately, for them, we accept and maintain that our experience of such economic states as relatively incommensurable, and, therefore, as both unattainable and unobtainable through forms of intellectual (mis)appropriation. (271)

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210 As per paragraphs Part I.294-312.

211 As a process of ongoing devaluation.

So, although elements of presentational and representational positioning must be co-present with anti-representational thinking such dialectically organized experience must be both suspended and treated as non-extrapolated lest an automatic relegation be re-imposed upon such extremist or impossible positioning. Sadly, all too often, we can be our worst enemy in such subtle matters (through falling back on the habits of such non-critically engaged thinking). (272)

An anti-representational stance can be neither attained nor obtained, but, through non-extrapolation and suspension can be subtly approached with consequences that cannot be dismissed as merely subtle in their ensuing complexion, etc. (273)

Just as small amounts of yeast in bread making does make a difference. (274)

Linked through economic complexification, the anti-representational economic moment can be closely paralleled with the potentially chaotic and radical nature of the so-called expression of the re-presentational moment. (275)

However, moving 'deeper' into our dialectical progression, migrating from linear terms of reference to the circular, and thence to the spontaneity of existentially oriented experience, it behooves us to recognized the qualified circumscription of such correlative positionings. (276)

That, economically, not one orientation can be misappropriated implying that misappropriation automatically heads us back to either a second rank or a third tier. (277)

That all three positional operators have to be co-present, and, only those three economic operators as co-defined in that economy in question![212] (278)

However, as also noted, the co-definition of any two operators in the same economy will also allow us to define a third through their joint negation.[213] (279)

Moreover, through economic induction, the properly approached, sufficiently detained and suspended focus on one relative incommensurable economic correlativity is able to induce the non-incommensurable nature of an economy *per se*.[214] (280)

Hence our six orders (usually referring to their trans-cognitive, judgmentally oriented evaluative incarnation). (281)

Thence their trans-ordered treatment, within this trans-ordered schematization, where, e.g., the semantic appreciation of phenomenological-derived semantics gives us the metaphysical sub-discipline within this trans-ordered topic of metaphysics, etc. (282)

Now, let us scrutinize the transformational implications of this approach. (273)

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212 As noted in the *Preview to the Formidable Philosopher's Handbook*, xxix.

213 *Ibid*., xxx. Refer to footnote attached to this paragraph (no.170).

214 Refer to the previous footnote (noting the same footnote as cited).

2. Inter-Ordered Re(-)Considerations 708

As a rule of thumb, we can note the following prominent forms of ordered-trans-ordered transformation or ‘migration’:

1. Phenomenological-Semantics *versus* Metaphysical Categorization
2. Aesthetical (and Stylistic) Concerns *versus* Psychological Considerations
3. Deontological-Existential Orientation *versus* Theological-like Speculations
4. Pragmatic Concerns *versus* Political-Economics
5. Hermeneutical Delineation of Possibility *versus* Science
6. Factual Considerations (Ontics) *versus* Historical Preoccupations (284)

Representing the trans-ordered formation of such topics through the apposite use of representative matrices. (280)

Given the philosophical economy is one part phenomenal-phenomenological inputs, etc., we could represent this as standard archetypal economy without subtle preferences and de-preferences, i.e., (W, O, E). (285)

Now, ordered forms of focus are expressed through a format that notes the subtle preferences/de-preferences that ordinarily affords the expression of that particular order are to be denoted by ‘+’ and ‘-’ being, respectively, ‘preferencing’ and ‘de-preferencing’ (to be understood, respectively being arrived at through ‘de-suspensions’ and ‘suspensions’). (286)

Now a preference upon the phenomenological-semantics in a first order is expressed as the following matrix (-W, +O, -E). (287)

So, e.g., the philosophical appreciation of the same could be expressed as the philosophical matrix followed by the matrix for the first order (not noting its specific status as either cognitive or trans-cognitive in orientation at this point since as we will assume that we are operating only in a trans-cognitive orientation unless qualified otherwise). Hence the following representation in the form of a double matrix:

(W, O, E) x (W-, O+, E-) (288)

Now, if we want to enter into a trans-ordered perspective, we need to preferentialize the first matrix in this double matrix operation. So, e.g., the phenomenological-semantics of phenomenological-semantics realizes, as already noted, a form of metaphysical appreciation which can be simply represented as follows:

(W-, O+, E-) x (W-, +O, E-) (289)

Thus, by such means, a whole table of matrix functions can be spelt out as representing ordered formations, trans-ordered formations, the philosophical appreciation of the former (in the form of a double matrix or triple matrix respectively, etc.).[215] (290)

So, e.g., we get the following table for the sub-disciplines associated with the following archetypally ordered representation:

1. First Cognitively/Trans-Cognitively Ordered Semantic-Phenomenological E/Valuation

W
O+
E

2. Second Trans-Cognitively Ordered Aesthetical E/Valuational Formation

W
O+
E+

3. Third Trans-Cognitively Ordered Deontological/Existential E/Valuational Formation

W
O
E+

4. Fourth Trans-Cognitively Ordered Pragmatical E/Valuational Formation

W+
O
E+

5. Fifth Trans-Cognitively Ordered Hermeneutical E/Valuation (of Possibility)

W+
O
E

6. Sixth Cognitively/Trans-Cognitively Ordered Ontical E/Valuation (of Facts)

W+
O+
E (291)

However, for convenience, let us assume ‘philosophical appreciation’, defined as ‘one part phenomenal-phenomenological analyses, one part hermeneutical investigations,

[215] Refer to Postscript A where these tables are completely tabulated.

and one part (non-systematic) existential examinations', is just assumed as the last matrix to be invoked in an overall series of matrix operations, i.e., in the form of (W, O, E), and, that the subtle preferencing of an archetypal orientation is denoted merely by the use of '+' rather than invoking the '-' as, e.g., (W, O+, E) instead of the more formal representation of (W-, O+, E-) [indicating a first cognitive or trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically semantic (as non-integrated, atomic essentials)]. (292)

Moreover, let us represent the segregated operations of the matrix in a vertical format in order to better accommodate and account for second, third and fourth levels of operation, etc. (293)

These six relatively distinctive classifications can also be given a circular representation as follows (in which, focusing on either the relevant archetypal moment or pair of moments, give us the following six relatively incommensurable trans-cognitive forms of judgment[216]):

3^0. Deontological-Existential

EGO

2^0. Aesthetical 4^0. Pragmatical

OBJECT **WORLD**

1^0. Phenomenological-Semantic 5^0. Hermeneutical

6^0. Ontical (Factual) (294)

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[216] Note that the trans-cognitive act of judgmental appreciation is 'evaluation' whereas the value of that judgment is valuation. Note also that value, technically pertains to just the second, third, and fourth orders respectively (of the aesthetical, deontological/existential, and pragmatical respectively). Note furthermore, that reading the internal matrix in the order of W, O, E also spells out the linear format for a process of harmonization.

In such a circular scheme, let us argue (in a linear manner) that (clockwise) progression or (anti-clockwise) retro-progression is always incremental stepwise through adjacent orders. (295)

So, e.g., a first ordered list of the following pre-essential atomic-like constituents 'red, tabletop' can be treated (through aesthetic-like integration) as a second cognitively ordered 'red-tabletop'. Then, cognitively, it can be treated as a third cognitively ordered 'idea', then, perhaps, given perceptual expression as either a perception or as an act of the imagination as a 'visually represented red-tabletop', etc. The perceptual visualization then automatically accounts for its status as a possibility, and, a definitive appreciation of that status then gives us its ontical determination (as either a relatively ascertained factual fact or as only the positive determination of its absence. Just as Santa Claus, e.g., has no sixth ordered ontical existence as a fact, but, does exist as an ontically confirmed element in the comprehensive inventory of a mythical universe (concerned, at the very least, with relatively recent Western mythologies). (296)

Now, in entertaining a Trans-Ordered form of appreciation we can now invoke a double (or triple vertical[217]) set of matrices (to the extent such implications sufficiently represent the overall. Or, in migrating from one ordered or trans-ordered sub-discipline we can invoke a set of quadruple matrix operations (as in e.g., 'the philosophy of history' *versus* 'the history of philosophy', if, say, we were to carefully travel from one sub-discipline to some other, etc. (297)'

'Orders' are called 'orders' because their expression is arrived at 'through enacting those existential sequences that are apparently open to us', and, appear to be equally 'there for us' intersubjectively? (298)

'Trans-ordered orders', that we might controversially argue over, are, in effect, 'the correctly entertained meta-ordered ordered-equivalents. (299)

Invoking the principle that the *x* of *x* is not *x*, being, perhaps, non-*x* or meta-*x*, or some other transformational version of *x*-likeness, albeit where and when such a status requires such elevation by a further degree. (300)

Hence transformations that are either inter-ordered, inter-trans-ordered, or either trans-ordered-ordered or ordered-trans-ordered in orientation and complexion. (301)

Where making adjacent translations can be treated as open to transformational re(-)sequencing, i.e., e.g., as migrations if the pre-conditions are favorable for such a transformations. (302)

Non-adjacent translations and diagonal translations, can be referred to as mutations can only be enacted if suitably intermediated (rather than mediated by conventional transformational pre-conditions between either adjacent orders and/or trans-orders. (303)

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[217] Alluding, e.g., to the implicit mode of philosophical appreciation as the last step in a series of matrices, namely, (W, O, E).

Hence, intuitively, with the right preconditions able to be envisaged we can form the requisite tabulation of those open transformational rules that prove to be of assistance to us, etc. (304)

Hence the following table of trans-ordered sub-disciplines and their (co-associated range of) topics:

1. $1^{0.}$ Metaphysical E/Valuation (As the Trans-Ordered Appreciation of the Ordered)

W W
O+ O+
E E
(Step2 Step 1)

2. 2^{0}. Psychological Appreciation (Of Semantic Categories)

W W
O+ O+
E + E

3. $3^{0.}$ Existential/Theological Appreciation (of E/Valuational Themes)

W W
O O
E+ E+

4. 4^{0}. Political-Economic Appreciation (of the Dissemination of Power)

W+ W+
O O
E+ E+

5. 5^{0}. Scientific Appreciation (of Probability/Possibility)

W+ W+
O O
E E

6. 6^{0}. Historical Appreciation (of Interpreted Facts)

W+ W+
O+ O+
E E (305)

Now, I need to resolve an interesting conundrum, namely, in an ordered setting incremental, sequential steps were observed between adjacent orders be that in a linear format or in a circular format, and, therefore, it would be natural to observe the same on a trans-ordered level and between inter-trans-ordered-ordered frames of reference. To facilitate this sequential transformational treatment between adjacent orders, be they ordered, inter-trans-ordered or inter-trans-ordered-ordered, would mean ruling out all direct forms of diagonal transitioning here defined as 'mutations'. In other words, what is directly permitted is inter-ordered incremental transitions, inter-ordered incremental transitions and direct inter-ordered-ordered forms of transitioning. But, where direct diagonal forms of transitioning are forbidden. So, with these rules in place how would we account for transformations seemingly entertained between non-adjacent displacements and diagonal forms of displacement? E.g., respectively, say, between a first ordered semantics and a fifth ordered hermeneutics, or, say, between, a first trans-ordered metaphysics and a fifth trans-ordered science. Or, diagonally between, say, a first ordered semantic-phenomenology and a fourth trans-ordered political-economics (defined with the hyphen!), or, between, say, a six trans-ordered history and a second ordered aesthetics etc? (306)

What is problematic here is this seemingly sensible transformation rule (about enforcing no non-diagonal and diagonal mutations), and, the observation that to say things like 'a phenomenology of the political-economy (or where the political-economics involved in the dissemination of power from a phenomenal-phenomenological) can be sensibly discussed in terms of a relevant a phenomenological-semantics and where such mutations and non-mutations all seem to make sense to varying degrees (or, at least, arguments could be constructed to allow, say, a contragrammatical 'science of aesthetics' (in terms of a methodological appreciation of aesthetic theory and practice) *versus* 'an aesthetics of science' (in terms, e.g., of an '*ethos*' or a '*zeitgeis*t', and so on), etc. (307)

As a digression, a similar problem for me manifested in the 3 x 3 matrix of the political-economy arranged between theory - (critical-)practice - (and a potentially radical-) critique (with the latter emanating from economic interactions between politics, economics and stylistics). Let me illustrate this as follows (with Theory = Political Sphere; Practice + Economics (Business World), and Critique = Stylistic Dimension):

	Theory	Practice	Critique
Theory	Legislature	Economists	Cultural Critics (Pol. Propaganda)
Practice	Civil Service	Managers Political Parties	CEOs
Critique	Select Committees	Judiciary, Police	Political Cabinet Compliance Officers (308)

The rule is there can be no informal fraternization between diagonal or complex diagonal interactions in your specific disciplinary capacity (here now defined as ‘mutations’), whereas, in your specific disciplinary capacity you can have both informal and formal interaction as long as they occur on the vertical or the horizontal, and, in terms of the permitted expectations on conduct all informal practices should be rendered formalized should that be more appropriate. (309)

So, e.g., a political member of the legislature can ‘fraternize’ with all members on the first horizontal place and on the first vertical column, but not with any departments arrived at through some form of diagonal transitioning (through mutation). On the other hand, such relationships are not ruled out entirely but should be discharged on a formal, transparent basis. E.g., a politician could open a new business venture but not be there to discuss the running of that business or be amenable to discussing financial issues. E.g., a member in the last department (say as a minister on the front bench) should not informally interact with members of the legislature unless acting along formal lines, and, of course, preserving cabinet secrecy and all other relevant cabinet privileges, etc. (310)

Similarly, all members of both the legislature or the executive branch should only have formal, transparent, public interactions with the organizations of their respective political party machines, where the latter should act and be seen as operating as independent political businesses. (311)

Where politicians, e.g., should have direct dealings with the members of their civil service who, in turn, can have direct dealings with business managers dealing with the day-to-day business of running a business being utilized to convert political policies into enacted practices through the commercial power of the business world, etc. But, it should be deemed to be improper for a politician of either the legislature or the executive to have direct dealings with the business world (as one method to ensure that a diminished degree of corruption, on the part of either or both parties, is properly overseen) and, in the same vein, politicians should only have formal transparent dealings with business arrangements of their political parties (treated as businesses in the business of raising money, advertising, etc.). (312)

Here, in the scheme of this matrix, improper relations are to be avoided by formalizing those relatively forbidden diagonal relationships. (313)

That a similar method could be here proposed, namely, mutations can only be approached through the formal mediation of a third part preferably with a philosophical disposition, i.e., where mediation is enacted through such relatively effective formalization. Meaning, e.g., that a philosophy of *x* could interact with a philosophy of *y*, even though, as a mutation, such interactions were initially deemed to be ‘not respectable’ in the light of proposed forms of non-direct or diagonal interactions treated as informal, improper forms of reference without the superimposition of viable patterns of apposite intermediation., etc.(314)

So, e.g., ‘a trans-ordered history of an ordered aesthetics’ is intermediated by observing ‘a philosophy of trans-ordered history’ in interaction with a ‘philosophy of aesthetics’, and so on. In effect introducing a 3 x 3 matrix in conjunction with a second matrix that is 3 x 2. Hence, in this example we would have the following:

A philosophy of trans-ordered history X a philosophy of an ordered aesthetics...

{W	W+	W+	X	{W	W	
O	O+	O+		O	O+	
E	E	E}		E	E+}	(315)

In contrast a philosophy of trans-ordered history X a philosophy of a trans-ordered psychology would find its representation as a six-fold matrix:

{W	W+	W+	X	{W	W	W	
O	O+	O+		O	O+	O+	
E	E	E}		E	E+	E+}	(316)

So, the point of this digression is that this prominent transformational rule could be preserved by adopting forms of intermediation when and where necessary. Now, let me look into a range of other transformational rules that first allow us to progress in an ordered fashion; then, in a trans ordered-ordered fashion; and, last, in an inter-trans-ordered fashion; e.g., respectively, from square table to red-tables, possible facts to conformable statements; from semantics to metaphysics, and interpreting facts to histories; and, moving from metaphysics to psychology, etc. (317)

In effect, establishing a firmer sense of an overall territory for our being able to enter into interdisciplinary forms of research, etc. Besides having already established the economic nature of disciplines as *qua* disciplinary economies (with disciplinary differences, differentials and distinction; etc.), now, we can fill in the specificity of what might be needed in regards to a specific form of interdisciplinary studies. At least entertaining that aspiration whilst also recognizing it as a potentially fruitful work in progress that may well not find a non-definitive and satisfactory form of resolution. (318)

The following general explication of transformational rules, as the necessary preconditions for an ordered incremental series of permitted, non-intermediated transitions, will concern itself here with such possible migrations and not (relatively forbidden unmediated) mutations. (319)

That, in this regard, this ability of the philosophical economy to appreciate any topic, be it ordered, trans-ordered or even hyper-ordered (as meta-trans-ordered in organization, e.g., the history of history of history, or, the psychology of psychology as an effective form of sociology and, thence as a potential political precursor), does somewhat set it apart from other disciplines to this extent (as being also entailed by any reflective sense of disciplinary appreciation). (320)

Now, in a linear format, the first order is concerned with atomic phenomenological units of experience. In a cognitive format this interest is with subsistent intentional content (intentional objectivity). In a trans-cognitive, judgmental format this concern is more with judgmental evaluation of such content (valuation). (321)

Then, in a linear format, the sixth order is concerned with the integration of spatio-temporal events as conformal facts naturally converting propositional representations of subsistent content, as events, into provisional statements (that naturally get read as 'statements' if presented with a high degree of conformation (i.e., in confirmation and verification, etc.). Confirmation being supplied through a Tarskian approach plus the establishment of those relevant evidentiary considerations that allow you to confirm such apparent conformation (without insisting on or approaching any form of indubitable demands). (322)

In a circular form, be our primary interest cognitive or trans-cognitive in orientation, we can re-proceed to the first order from the orientation of the sixth through an atomization of the phenomenological-like units that appear to semantically underlay the propositional representation[218] of such relatively conformal or relatively non-conformally treated events. Just as dreams, e.g., occur as sixth ordered events with only relatively fifth ordered content can illustrate this last observation. (323)

Now the sequential rational behind this ordered philosophy, which by extension acts also as a relative foundation in epistemological organization for trans-ordered (and hyper-ordered) forms of phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, etc. (324)

In a cognitive format, the first order represents the non-integrated subsistent thought content of ideas, etc. Such subsistents[219] can be viewed as relatively atomic, essential-like in experience (and can be explored through eidetic reflection[220]). (325)

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[218] Acceptance of this qualified aspect of representation supplies a valid reason why the anti-representational economy needs to take on board a qualified representational economy (as well as a qualified phenomenal-phenomenological presentational economy). The idea of an imputational approach intermediates all three economic aspects of that economy and supplies this notion of 'qualification', in part, through the intermediation of suspensions/non-suspensions, extrapolations/non-extrapolations. Each aspect, including the anti-representational orientation, also being treated as economically incommensurable despite relative overall economic commensuration, etc.

[219] Spelt as either 'subsistent' or 'subsistant'. In a cognitive format such intentional content is contrasted with existents, namely, third ordered 'concepts' and fourth ordered 'percepts'.

[220] In exploring salty liquids we could explore varying intensities and differences in taste.

In being able to be integrated in a molecular format such pre-essential-essentials become essential-essentials (and in nomenclature this is represented by the use of a second ordered hyphen. So, e.g., 'no tablestops that are red, round and square simultaneously', but, 'red-square-tabletops' as an integrated thought has a second ordered presentation as having an 'integrated molecular structure'. (326)

Now, what has a second ordered status can be ideationally thought as an idea or concept, be that either in an abstract or non-abstract form, etc. What has an abstract ideational form cannot be perceptually envisaged except through possible forms of exemplification. So, e.g., 'love' cannot be perceived, but, a 'loving couple' could be imagined (in fourth cognitively ordered terms of reference), be that perceptually, through memory or imagination (as in the reading of a novel), etc. (327)

Then, what can be imagined can be given a subsistent form as a possible fifth ordered state of affairs. Here possibility or potentiality can be viewed under various degrees of instantiation, e.g., as mere possibility, or, as possessing a certain probability, or, through an idea of potency implying its inevitable possession of a sixth ordered status as a conformable fact within a certain period of time. (328)

Then, when a fifth order possibility becomes established in a sixth order it takes the form of a potentially recordable historical event (be that new status ascertained through either inference, testament, and/or direct sense-perception. (329)

In a trans-cognitive orientation we more explore the type of judgments involved in a process of cognitive judgment plus the observation, overall, that judgment falls within six relatively distinctive and incommensurable domains, namely, a phenomenal-phenomenological semantics (subject to textual deposition); the aesthetic integration of the former; existentially oriented deontological forms of judgment; pragmatical forms of judgment (that hopefully also include an existential input); hermeneutical considerations of possibility (through the exercise of envisioned meta-textual genres of behaviour, etc.); and, a determination of ontical status as conformal facts (through the existence of an intracultural-intercultural 'body of knowledge' capable of making such ascertainments, etc. With the evaluation of value/valuation primarily centered in the third order; hermeneutical functionality in the fifth order, and existential judgment in the third order. (330)

In a trans-ordered format, we seek to determine the respectively, the first ordered semantic appreciation of semantic input as a form of metaphysical enquiry. (331)

Hence the second ordered aesthetics of aesthetics which gives us our psychology in which we can experience these different, distinctive, relatively incommensurable forms of epistemological organization. Hence, e.g., visual perceptions falling within a perceptual psychology, and, e.g., ideas falling within an ideational psychology by virtue of their aesthetic-like integration within the epistemological hierarchicalization of intentional experience (albeit as refracted under the working headings of the Pre-Cognitive,[221] Cognitive, Trans-Cognitive [Judgment], Post-Cognitive [of inferred consequences]). (332)

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221 Dividing the Pre-Cognitive into Motor-Sensory and Affective sub-aspects.

Hence, similarly, the existentially-oriented deontological treatment of the existentially oriented deontological as a potential precursor to theological or theological-like modes of treatment. At least to the extent value, e/valuational formation, etc., is to be viewed intraculturally and interculturally, etc. (333)

Where the pragmatic appreciation of the pragmatic, effectively, is an appreciation of the dissemination of power in society hence its primary concern with an exploration of the political-economy (as the mechanism and medium for such dissemination) (as presented under the tripartite division of the 'political-economical-stylistical'[222]). (334)

Similarly, the possibility or potentiality of possibility or potentiality gives us a sense of the scientific (in terms of an articulated set of methodologies, etc.). (335)

Likewise, the factual interpretation of factual interpretations automatically presents us with the sense of the historical. (336)

Hence, by such matrix-like manipulations, we arrive at the first trans-ordered classification of the metaphysical; the second trans-order of the psychological; the third of the potentially theological; the fourth of the political-economic; the fifth of the scientific life-world; and, the sixth of history. Hence these additional sub-disciplines can be added to those ordered sub-disciplines of the phenomenological, aesthetical, existential/ethical-deontological, and pragmatical-ethical, the hermeneutical, and the evidentiary (as might be used in a court of law, e.g.). (337)

That a hyper (meta-trans-ordered) approach can then be explored, e.g., as in a history of history, etc., however, vastly simplified through the intermediation of a philosophical approach in which the same outcomes can be orchestrated merely through the adoption and adaptation of general philosophical-economic approach to that topic to hand, be it ordered or trans-ordered, etc. Hence the additional utility of that philosophical matrix (of W, O, E). (338)

Now, what are the advantages of ordered and trans-ordered approaches, etc? (339)

Hopefully, by such means, we can find the philosophical precision to better appreciate processes of presentation, representation, and re-presentation, and, thence, the qualification of an apposite anti-representational treatment, all facilitated through the utilization of a philosophy of critical, and potentially, radical retreatment, etc. Thence our ensuing concern with both critical and potentially radical consequences! A primary concern for the seriously committed, non-over-committed or under-committed philosopher, and, by extension, all other disciplinarians. (340)

Thence the critical-practical consideration of both the pragmatic and existential implications of these explorations! (341)

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222 As already briefly discussed in this text. *Pursuit*, III.VII.II.191-201, 308.

3. Pragmatic Re(-)Considerations 709

In what existential sense do pragmatic re(-)considerations[223] constitute the psychological basis, and thereafter, for the formidable philosopher or disciplinarian? (342)

By providing a certain relative degree of prescience over the less insightful participant unable to avail themselves of such an important understanding. (343)

In effect, totally re(-)constituting the philosophical rules of that discipline, and, by extension, re(-)constituting the regulation all disciplines. (344)

Effectively, avoiding self-relegation and promoting a subtle, ongoing, responsive and responsible, existential, anti-representational re(-)positioning. (345)

As should fall under the overall heading of a 'qualified, viable, pro-relational, existentially responsive and responsible, anti-representational pragmatism'.[224] (346)

'Qualified' in the sense that this 'pragmatism' is not just pragmatic in the sense of promoting the merely expedient (as might pertain to a utilitarianism, etc.). (347)

'Viable' in the sense of pertaining to 'productive forms of practice'. (348)

'Pro-relational' in the sense that 'a subtle preference is to be given to the relational *per se* in the form of recognizing that our relationships cannot be equal, deserve to be preferentially fostered accordingly, that the source of our freedom is in and through our relationships with others as we find ourselves emplaced in the triple domains of embodiment, embeddedness and embankment as we make our passage through this world at large, both individually and collectively, as we make our progress through this overall world-of-life' where the specificity of experience is sequentially emplaced, displaced and de-displaced through the ongoing arbitration of all our aspirations.[225] (349)

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223 On many occasions I have tried to draw a distinction between the 'pragmatic' as a viable philosophy and the 'pragmatical' as the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order dealing with functionality and matters more expedient in both ethical and non-ethical terms of reference (in contrast to the deontological and relatively more existential tenor of the pragmatic treated as a viable philosophy (in a total contrast, and on a different level of imputative standing, to unimodal 'realism', et al, etc.). In this regard we might redefine (on a par between the 'non-systematic-existential' as a the so-called 'moment' and the 'systematic-existential' as an 'overall pro-relational orientation towards the relational *per se* as discerned in its overall embeddedness') to the 'non-systematic fourth order of the pragmatical' *versus* the 'systematic pragmatic' as a 'viable, overall philosophical attitude that has a subtle pro-anti-representational bias being realized as such through exercising and maintaining a suspended, non-extrapolated suspension within the extensive suspension'.

224 Among other things, we can add a positive nihilism to this list of epithets. Refer to II.386-387, etc.

225 Understanding, of course, that most of our aspirations will never be met. However, despite the fact that intentions can be virtually called into existence effortlessly their non-virtual realization is realized through arbitration that ever demands a prioritization of our aspirations. Hence this progression of virtual emplacement, non-virtual displacement, and a partial non-virtual de-displacement. That embracement of our existence is entailed, therefore, in both embodiment, etc., and in emplacement, etc. The 'aspirational

Being ‘existentially responsive and responsible’ results from ‘the instigation of a subtle pro-relational attitude entered into and left through the auspices of an extensive suspension, etc.’ (350)

Where the ongoing exercise of an ‘anti-representational re(-)positioning’ is realized through the adoption and adaptation of a ‘deeply pragmatic attitude’. An ‘attitude’ cultivated through ‘an informed suspension refracted through the exercise of a well-developed sense of the pragmatic disposition able to harness a working anti-representational economy’. (351)

Where ongoing ‘re(-)positioning’ is taken for granted given the provisional treatment of all ‘final’ vocabularies, the working through of critical consequences of our explorations and being innovatively open to the potentially radical nature of an insightful responsiveness based on the potentially chaotic re-direction of harmonic processes of relational resolution. (352)

Hence, e.g., the formula of pre-critical hermeneutical rectification, critical phenomenal-phenomenological deconstruction; and ensuing potentially radical existential process of ongoing re(-)normalization. (353)

I.e., through error mitigation, error correction, and the ongoing refinement of the relatively non-erroneous. (354)

Hence our deconstructing the defective and re(-)constructing the relatively effective. (355)

Whilst being apperceptive of the probable consequences of our enactions exercised through either action, non-action, and/or inaction. (356)

On the understanding that we are immersed in this world at large and that our interventions therein, through enactions, are inescapable with the equally inescapable implication being that our interventions, therefore, should always be characterized as relatively existential in orientation. (357)

Where ‘relative existentialization’ is defined as the ‘relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential’. (358)

But the ‘pragmatic attitude’ is also ‘cognizant of the functionality of that in question along with the formation of identity through identification (achieved through re-identification)’. (359)

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economy’ being seen as ‘the qualified realism of ‘where’, the qualified idealism of ‘why’, and the qualified pragmatism of ‘how’.

Given that e/valuational formation is productive of value through valuation, identity through identification, and function through functionality and that non-existentially oriented forms of valuation also have a viable role to play in this world at large. (360)

These complex ways of re(-)seeing the experiential world granted, just how does the philosophical disciplinarian inadvertently take on a formidable role?[226] (361)

Let me demonstrate this imminent likelihood under the following twelve descriptive headings, namely, logics, dialectics, economics; phenomenology, hermeneutics, 'non-systematic' existentialism; non-dogmatism, as an inter-disciplinarian (working under the sub-headings of the ordered, trans-ordered, and hyper-ordered), as an open disciplinarian; as a 'systematic' existentialist, pragmatist, and radical philosopher. (362)

Under the broad heading of 'logics' we should learn to construct reasonable arguments that generally conform to best logical practice; where we avoid blatant contradictions, inconsistencies, incoherencies, and disreputable conclusions; and, which are amenable to non-impossible outcomes that, whilst potentially advantageous to oneself, also non-existentially augment and existentially enhance a mutually expansive freedom to be shared in by others. (363)

In a 'dialectical openness to the necessity of qualification' we remain 'ever open to an ongoing qualification of the logical' given that the gestalt nature of 'foci, fields and frames' can never be nor should be the sole preoccupations of our disciplinary interests given, too, the impossibilities of both unimodalism and bimodalism, etc. (364)

Hence an appreciation of the economic under the general heading of economic qualifications concerning relative incommensurability, economic commensuration, correlativity, non-attainment and unobtainability of identity, the insistence on only three economic modes per economy, economic complexification, identification through the joint negation of the two other economic parties; induction and simplification, and other ideas like the relative emergence of non-reductive forms of identification in a context of pro-relational empowerment, etc. That, ultimately, there is no ultimate identification, functionality and existential hallmarks without understanding, to that degree necessary, the economics of our relationships. (365)

Phenomenology, through phenomenal-phenomenological research of potentially interesting phenomena, should give us the requisite skills to begin the re(-)construction of the format, formation and form of those narratives being refined through deconstruction along with their ensuing processes of error correction, etc. (366)

The utilization of a hermeneutical understanding should assist us in the rectification of our genres of behaviour, etc., through error mitigation, etc.[227] (367)

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[226] I.e., as an exemplary disciplinarian, be they either a philosopher and/or an exponent of some other discipline.

[227] Hence, usually, our general approbation and assurance of such choices in genre formation (especially in the light of how they also collectively define the very parameters of the topic in question. Howev-

That given the conventional overlooking of a ‘non-systematic’ existentialism there is recognized the need for an innovative non-textual simulation in which forms of relational alignment are rendered incrementally realigned through ongoing processes of re(-)normalization in which educated guesses, e.g., therein and thereafter, are rendered progressively conformable, and so on.[228] (368)

Under the heading of a non-dogmatism, let us be dogmatic for this first and last time, namely, by relegating anyone, including ourselves, should they stray into either extremist possibilities and/or impossible form of extremism as are to be found under the classifications of the unimodal, bimodal, dogmatic absolutism, part-time relativism, non-existentialism and non-pragmatism, and so on, and so forth! (369)

As an inter-disciplinarian we can work the interconnectedness of the ordered, trans-ordered, and hyper-ordered and where the philosophical can fruitfully mediate both migrations (in an adjacent sequentialization in such a schematization) and mutations (where non-adjacent forms of classification involving multiple processes of sequentialization can be obviated through a more general form of philosophical appreciation). (370)

Then, as an ‘open’ disciplinarians, we remain ever receptive to innovative approaches to the provisional creation of newly formed ‘final’ vocabularies, etc. (371)

Whilst as a ‘systematic’ existentialist we remain ever receptive to the power of the existential to speak on both our behalf and the behalf of our relationships, and, indicate, therein and thereby, how inescapable patterns of interventions could be better instigated in such states of relational-situatedness. (372)

As ‘pragmatists’ we take a ‘viable, qualified, existentially re-directed responsive and responsible anti-representationalism’ to heart. (374)

Through such an attitude we meet the radical philosopher happy to abide in the positive nihilism of such a subtly qualified anti-representationalism. (375)

How could such a person not be formidable?! (376)

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er, in the form of error mitigation they can also make relatively radical differences in outcomes when we realize that those current meta-textual parameters are being seen as ill-suited for that topic being explored, and, therefore, then now invite some degree of fundamental re-direction in the making of a new set of hermeneutical choices in genres, etc. Still, given the hermeneutical thrust of those explorations such re-directions taken up could well be minor in the reconstitution of that enquiry, still, again, could also chaotically result in vastly different outcomes to those initially expected and then found anticipated in the immediacy of current experience).

[228] The distinction between non-systematic and systematic merely notes that the former is the so-called third moment in the philosophical economy, mirroring the intentional economy, etc., and, that the latter is more correctly the existential per se, i.e., as received in and through a pro-relational attitude founded upon the intuitive exercise of suspensions, automatic de-suspensions, etc.

Even if one were to only partially follow this handbook, even if they were to reasonably emend some of the interpretations of its observations and instructions, how could that person not become a formidable exemplar for the type of research being both critically and radically engaged? (377)

So, in that light, just how is such a pragmatic attitude to be engaged? (378)

Let me summarize this to the best of my abilities under the following twelve headings, namely, presentation, representation, anti-representational orientation; suspensions, de-suspensions, nihilism; e/valuational formation, expediency, non-expediency; openness, and 'relevant-enrichment… meeting competent-authenticity'. (379)

Under 'presentation' we understand the need for phenomenal-phenomenological input along with its critical deconstruction. (380)

Under 'representation' we understand the need for pre-critical narrational 'facts' rather than the use of uncritically formed, non-acceptable 'factoids'. (381)

Under the 'subtle preference for an anti-representational orientation' we balance both presentation and representation in order to form and inform a re-presentational stance, that, then, collectively, altogether in a state of ongoing balance, gives us the working dynamics of an anti-representational economy, albeit with the maintenance of a subtle preference for the latter orientation. (382)

Or, by understanding the imputative nature of pre-intentional input, intentional processing, and trans-intentional output, and, subjecting the same to suspended non-extrapolation we arrive at this same economy of the anti-representational albeit with a subtle preferentialization of the latter (rather than either suspended-extrapolations or non-suspended-extrapolations[229]). (383)

Hence the utilization of suspensions, in the midst of an induced extensive suspension, which can be achieved through the intuitive use of a variety of strategies as already indicated[230] (and thence promoted through economic induction[231]). (384)

The hypothetical mechanism of automatic de-suspensions producing this subtlety of preference.[232] (385)

Where the philosophical consequence of an anti-representational, suspended, non-extrapolation of imputational simulation/s is a positive nihilism. (386)

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229 Where such obstinate preferencing ends in the relegation of such adherents to the second rank and third tier respectively. No first-class seating for these reprobates, be they philo-sophists, mis-disciplinarians or dys-disciplinarians).

230 Refer to II.268, etc.

231 Refer to I.54, etc.

232 As occurs in an ordered schematization, etc., and in the subtle exercise and maintenance of a relatively pro-anti-representationalism.

‘Positive’ in the sense that through the understanding of the impossibility of a logical absolutism and the fruitfulness of a logical non-absolutism we can revel in the revelation of the existential, and so on. (387)

Hence the (intersubjective) possibility for insightfulness and our (subjective and intersubjective) insightfulness into this same possibility… (388)

Re-directing the rectification, deconstruction and re(-)normalization of e/valuational formation. (389)

By avoiding the expediency of a pragmatic attitude devoid of an existential deontological appreciation we discover the expediency of the truly pragmatic attitude. (390)

Therein, we discover the non-expediency of the pragmatic attitude that is both responsive and responsible to our relational-situatedness. (391)

In an openness to a range of possibility some of which would have been impossible to envisage without such innovative re-appreciation of our current relational-situatedness. (392)

Finding, as a test, that our discernment of the ‘relevant-enrichment’ is apparently to also be exercised through the instantiation of a ‘competent-authenticity’, and v.v., and that such appreciative recognition should intuitively stand us in good stead. (393)

Since existentialization of the relatively non-existential should oversee the relevant-enrichment to be realized through our relationships in a process of novel creation, preservation and conservation of such ensuing e/valuational formations. (394)

Having the faith to let things set their own course even though we might appear ‘to be the captain of the ship’ despite what others may or may not think, still, ‘we know better…’[233] (395)

That there can be ‘no captain of the ship’ is a nihilistic insight that should not frighten us, indeed, should be welcomed. (396)

As our relationships should be in charge, yet, also, in turn, self-empowered through ‘the relationship of our relationships’ to act on their behalf even if that could prove detrimental on some occasions for one or more participants in that primary relationship.[234] (397)

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233 ‘We know better’ is intended in an ambiguous sense, but, where both readings are to be considered to be read as intentionally ‘valid’.

234 The open concept of ‘the relationship of all relationships’ potentially opens up for the religious person the possibilities of a theological-like dimension (hence the extrapolation portended in the third trans-ordered ‘existentially-deontological reading of the existentially-deontological’. But, like the use of the expression ‘existential’ such a possibility need not be taken up in a religious sense by the relatively non-religious. This idea being further explored in Part III in a looking at the collective significance of existen-

Finding our mutual freedom through others as they find their mutual freedom through us… becoming mutually formidable through mutual co-empowerment! (398)

Realizing relational 'attunement' through prospective 'atonement' discerned through obviating a need for 'existential redemption' by being 'proactive in our existentially re-directed interventions'... (399)

For, in truth, we are already formidable and can be even more formidable when we act on the behalf of our relationships… and, therefore, 'no one' could ask for more..![235] (400)

Completing this *Handbook* within *The Seventh Book*…

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 30.11.22.

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tially oriented motivations for the intracultural-intercultural enhancement of experience through time for later generations of agents after other earlier generations have died, and so on. A simple analogy being the so-called fallacy of the debt obligations to be 'suffered' by younger generations having been incurred by older generations if such debt positively added to social capital through time. Such as the creation, preservation and conservation, e.g., of infrastructure that will be enjoy well into the future, etc. Of course, this argument assumes that such obligations are wisely expedited (which, unfortunately, is also the case).

[235] Because a positive nihilism recognizes there is 'no one' who could ask for more, indeed, could ask for anything. Of course, on a conventionally extrapolated, non-suspended level of discourse 'the lived-reality of living-reality' is to be found much as we had left it, moment by moment, albeit, hopefully, with some 'small' additional degree of mutual existential enhancement… and some small non-existential enrichment as well….

Part III - Radical-Critique

A Philosophical Guide to the Existential Dimension:

Some ‘Final’ Last Words...

Index

Part III - Radical-Critique

**A Philosophical Guide to the Existential Dimension:
Some 'Final' Last Words...**

Index

Preview:

Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

1. Philosophical 'Ramifications' 801
2. Pragmatical 'Ramifications' 802
3. Provisional 'Ramifications' 803
4. Profitable 'Ramifications' 804
5. Political 'Ramifications' 805
6. Personal 'Ramifications' 806

A Structural and Function Commentary on Part III

A: Afterword, in the form of an open letter

B: Supplement A: Some Loose Threads…

C: A First Digest

1. Advanced Imputational Treatment 901
2. A 'Non-Standard' Pragmatic-Existentialism 902

Bibliography

A Third Preview: The Non-Finality of an Apparent Finality

I am left wondering how a preview, as a pre-viewing, can see something not yet formed? Part III, at this moment of writing this text, is only a title, a subtitle and a set of six headings. Barely a ghost of a text, indeed, considerably more in the form of a meta-text. The merest spectre of a possible discourse. But, be that as it may, as ever, let me persevere and discuss that which as yet has not been discussed, and, I confess, barely thought through... but, about to be revealed to whom, I might add, will be all concerned parties, including myself. Hence these brief jottings on the nature of evaluation, valuation, value… on the nature of the 'valuing of value' which is a different matter,[236] indeed, and should introduce us to the existential dimension… to which, I am hopeful, this *Guide* might direct us towards both as an introduction and a better understanding… for 'all' parties concerned…' (i)

We might surmise that 'the meaning of meaning' is 'meaningfulness'?[237] When people say they are looking for 'the meaning of life' what they may well be saying is that they are looking for 'the meaningfulness of their existence in this world at large'. A 'semblance of a world' that I would like to describe as 'being shared in a vision of an overall life-world as collectively lived with(-)others, before(-)others, and especially through(-)others...'[238] Therefore, in this regard, we will need to make a distinction between 'value *per se*' and the 'valuing, disvaluing, and devaluing of such value *per se*'. That, with respect to the latter, let us more reflect upon the possibility of a positive evaluation of such relatively immaterial valuation since it would appear that both disvaluation and devaluation, inevitably, would lead us back to a realm of mere value judged more along the lines of either its positive approbation or its negative disapprobation… but, where, at the end of a process of negation, it would leave us with the value-less, a complete absence of value much on a par with the spending of our wages or capital, or, worse, the gambling away of our wages or capital.[239] What, then, can we say about such

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236 On the understanding that 'the *x* of *x* is not *x per se*, being non-*x* or meta-*x*, etc.' Opening up, in effect, a relatively incommensurable chasm between 'a meta-value reduced back to the realm of non-pro-relational (counter-spiritual 'materially' oriented) e/valuation' *versus* 'the pre-relational emergence of an existential realm of (counter-material, 'spiritually' oriented) e/valuation'.

237 To render this argument more complicated some people could argue that 'the meaning of meaning is meaninglessness' running a nihilistic argument, be that either in negative mode, or, preferably, in a positive mode. Perhaps running a transcendental-like argument that 'meaningfulness' is 'meaninglessness' on the grounds that without a nihilistic basis there, otherwise, could be no transformational realization of both meaning and meaningfulness, etc. or, without an emptiness of substance there could be no substantial-like transformation, etc. (as refracted through a Buddhistic lens).

238 As noted elsewhere, the nomenclature '(-)' means 'the presence of an ongoing, trimodal economy where working proposals, hopefully, are continually updated in a stream of "relevant enrichment expedited through competent-authenticity" instigated by both ourselves and others'. Here the economy implied is one being passively standing with others, acting actively before other, and being engaged through others.

239 Others might argue here, that an asymmetry exists on par with the idea of 'goodness' to the extent that 'badness' or 'evil' can only be thought and experienced as that arrived at through a relative deprivation of that goodness, like, e.g., the rotting of an apple. That, when it has completely rotted away nothing is left including its non-goodness implying that the non-good, say, evil, or, the lesser in value, is more the relative absence of the good, or value, etc. (and that such bimodal categorization is not between equivalent ontological or epistemological states?)? Either way, a path exists for differentiating 'value' from the 'valuing of

to-be-valued ‘meaningfulness’? Now, if we were to explore this idea through a negative nihilistic lens, we may well then conclude that such potential ‘meaningfulness’ is equally ‘meaningful-lessness’ granted that ‘the meaning of meaning’ is ‘just not meaning’, and, therefore, could, instead, be rendered, as a ‘meaningful-lessness’. On the other hand, through a more optimistic lens of a positive nihilism, such meaningfulness could well be viewed as an emergent realm of meaningfulness that just cannot be reduced to its material footprint, ruling out, at the same time, all vestiges of a negative nihilism. That in taking this direction in this argument, in taking this ‘turning’, all choice in this specific matter, therein and thereafter, must also effectively rule itself out likewise! Leaving us, thereby, with a realm of value *per se* and another realm of meaningfulness *per se*. That this latter realm can be none other than an existential dimension where the positive valuing of valuing must be differentiated from the mere value of value, where the latter can only be a realm of the relatively non-existential. That, despite an obvious incommensurability between these two orientations in significance generation, still, they must also be accommodated given that the latter arises from the former, and that as all relationships are reciprocally entered into, it follows that the existential domain must also be able to inform the relatively non-existential, and v.v. (ii)

In delineating these two realms of the relatively non-existential meaning and relatively existential meaningfulness just what correlations, accommodation, and transformations might be envisaged as operating both within and between such relatively incommensurable realms of experience? To what extent could such interactions be envisaged? Surely, as the person can experience both domains it follows that such a distinction must also be relatively non-incommensurable, implying, furthermore, that some form of an economy must be in place between both orientations rendering such relative economic incommensurability relatively commensurable by virtue of the existence of such an overall economy. Otherwise, we would be left with two different people experiencing two different realms of experience and where neither could meet each other, and so on. Let me explore further this idea of meaningfulness as an existentially oriented phenomenon, asking under what conditions is the relatively existential being experienced? To advance these reflections, let us reflect upon the analogical metaphors being explored in the following meditation upon meaningfulness… (iii)

In a previous review[240] I disparaged the unimodal nature of navel gazing as one-pointed and just not able to inform us as to where we were in the world, and, by extension, as also being unable to appreciate itself as ‘navel gazing’. A point *qua* point tells us nothing about where that point is, and what that point exactly is or could be. Indeed, if we can recognize our navel as being ‘our navel’ then our meditations are not just one-pointed. Or, put another way, the sheer precision of a single point just cannot be per-

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value’ that would allow us to tentatively run this economy between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential in a non-bimodal format given the accommodation of these relative incommensurabilities within the relative commensuration of the requisite economy required that would allow us to run such a tentatively relative, non-absolute differentiation. A state of affairs reflected in the rule that ‘relatively existential arises through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential’.

240 The second *Preview* to part II.

ceived (because perception, and its apperception, is both 'a relationship between relative points' conducted 'within the co-related field of perception', etc.[241])… (iv)

Imagine if you would a virtual line, or string, running from the core of your psychic being and out through your body, let us say through the navel, and extending out into the immense depths of space traversing past the Milky Way, way past this local galactic cluster, say for 13.7 billion light years, and perhaps even further. Along this line, or imaginary string, let us ask just one question at any chosen point, namely, "just what value is being experienced, if at all, here, at this point of our choosing, as we find ourselves being ourselves within this world at large?" (v)

Let us start in the central midst of our embodiment. We ask ourselves this question here, but, find nothing of value. What value could possibly be found at the so-called center of our being when, without some form of relational contrast, no contrasting sense of a relationship would be able to be discerned! A point is a point, and with a point there is no point in asking "what might ye be" when the answer can only be nothing, zilch, bugger all… (vi)

We travel now some distance along this string and look down upon the world far below us. With the miraculous gift of a wonderfully powerful eyesight, we are humbled as we see billions of people just like us making their way across the surface of this Earth. What special value could I possibly possess that might set myself apart from these people who appear as if upon one huge anthill – am I no different from these specks of animated matter? (vii)

Now, passing the edge of the Milky Way, I become privy to the sight of a myriad of other worlds, some inhabited like Earth, and upon their surfaces I contemplate all their creatures both bright and small. With the induction of a profound humility, I perceive myself humbled by such a sight, realizing that before the sight of some I am little more than a worm, a minute flea, not even worthy of being looked down upon… (viii)

Extending every further out into the dazzling darkness of a near empty space ever filled with the unexpected my humility now know no bounds… feeling as if reduced to a single gain of sand on the roaring shores of some giant sandy planet shrouded in haze of endless storms… (ix)

But, in a moment of insight, I am taken back. I lived in a world where I valued others, those people that enriched the course of my life, and, where some of these good folk indicated through small admirable signs of reciprocity, they did value me in some small way or other just as I might value them, in turn, meeting the glimmer of an undisguised smile or the friendly sound of a repeated greeting… (x)

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[241] By 'etc.', we can read the necessary co-related sense and semblance of a subjectivity in keeping with the nature of that overall field. Just as the seeing of a series of points must involve the co-association of a visual perceiver able to visually discriminate between those same points in that same semblance of a visual field.

The core of my inner being had as much 'heart' as an onion peeled back to finally reveal its innermost depths of being… an empty-emptiness as was to be equally had in the depths of space. No, what meaning and meaningfulness we will experience, from time to time, must be had when shared, when we stand in the midst of welcoming folk whom we recognize in a manner similar to how we find ourselves welcoming them… (xi)

The moral of this image is that along this infinite string no value could be found except in the proximity of ourselves with others, when and where we share a reciprocity with others in a manner that they, too, in turn, will share with us… (xii)

Through the uniqueness of our differences each and every different relationship must also be profoundly unique, special, completely incommensurable yet find commensuration in its own sense and semblance of a world, the world of that specific relationship. To enter into such a world, we must simultaneously leave it at the same time… through the auspices of an extensive suspension.[242] Ever thrust back into the concrete, historical specificity of a living-experience ever re-lived as re-lived-experience, forever on this cusp between sheer meaningfulness and mere meaning… finding through the appearance of such choice which realm we might prefer even though we must walk with a foot in both domains... as if straddling this abyss in between… walking with a limp if we cannot balance both sides of this existential equation. (xiii)

But, analogies can only take us so far before they deserve to self-deconstruct… insightfully offering us an additional, dialectical-like commentary in the face of their imminent dissolution…[243] (xiv)

For the sake of simplicity, let me proffer the confusion and perplexity emanating from the following to make a similar point.… Before us, to the left, we have the domain of the relatively non-existential world of mere meaning and value, and, to the right of us, we have the relatively existential world of sheer meaningfulness and the relationally valuable. Which would you choose? But, before you choose, be forewarned that neither choice is possible. To choose the relatively existential we must choose the non-existential and subject it to relative existentialization, whereas, to choose the non-existential we must choose the existential and then subject it to relative de-existentialization. Can we win here? Of course, we can, by metaphorically walking a middle path… where both existential and non-existential have a part to play, working together to both discern, differentiate and integrate those correlations, accommodations and transformations that need to be made in order for us to walk with both of these legs… since we need both legs to walk upon this middle path…. (xv)

In this *Guide*, this map to the existential dimension, let me attempt to square this metaphorical circle through noting how, in this instance, we need to forget the following

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242 Where each act of suspension automatically invokes a de-suspension, and so on, and so forth.

243 Invoking the 'fallacy of the over-extended analogy'. But, where their failure is equally informative. An invaluable object lesson in dialectics. Our success in failure, and, our failure in the midst of success.

instructions in order to follow through… hopefully meet with at least some small degree of success. (xvi)

In essence, there can be no final instructions because when we arrive, we have arrived. But, as intimated, our arrival is also our departure… and, our very departure is the necessary condition needed to return once more… in an eternal recurrence… for without such meaningful re(-)iteration of meaning there could be neither 'meaningful-meaning' nor the 'meaning of such meaningfulness'… (xvii)

Just as a person has a shadow, and, the shadow of a person must have that person co-present with such a semblance… just as substantial as the bubble that contains the full-emptiness of what it encompasses within… when pricked… (xviii)

But, such is the 'value of value' when some would say it is 'the valuable', 'the to-be-valued', and, where others might say it is 'valueless, without value'… and where we, in this world, must learn to existentially differentiate and discern the meaningfulness of both positions, whilst walking a middle path in between the same..!! (xix)

…ultimately learning to differentiate and discern 'the existential value of the non-existential' and 'the non-existential value of the existential'..!![244] (xx)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.12.22.

[244] Because, for a start, we do not live by bread alone! Equally, we cannot live on 'the smell of burnt offerings', so to speak. Or, said another way, the existential value of the existential is without such value, sheer emptiness, and, where the non-existential value of non-existential value is equally valueless – leaving a middle path with only a non-absolute relativity between the existential orientation and the non-existential orientation… but, still, being left with the exquisite need for a subtle preference for the former (on par with a subtle 'pro-anti-representational stance' as discussed in Part II. E.g., refer to II.382).

Part III – Radical-Critique
A Philosophical Guide to the Existential Dimension
Some 'Final' Last Words...

A. Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

This *Radical-Critique* is a broad disquisition on the topic of 'value' in the hope that, in working towards a better understanding of its genesis, we can better tap into its beneficial emergence as mutually engineered through the auspices of others. (0)

Since intentional aspirations, in whole or in part, have to be refracted through an intersubjective domain of arbitration in order to be realized in non-virtual terms of reference. (1)

Where such an understanding is fundamental to any realistic appreciation of the existential nature of freedom and its co-associated freedoms, obligations, compromises, along with a need to prioritize such intentional objectives in this mutual domain of the arbitrated. (2)

Hence the aspirational channeling of a realistic 'where', an idealistic 'why', and a pragmatic 'how' within the private domain are also hermeneutically appreciated in a public realm and arbitrated within this third dimension of the relatively existential. (3)

Where by 'radical' is meant, in two senses, both 'a distinctly different and innovative way of re-formulating this and other topics', and, 'with distinctively different and innovative ways of re(-)directing behaviours preferably enacted with an existentially oriented input and output'.[245] (4)

As an *Introduction* to *Part* III, we can note the exploration of this topic under the six headings, noted in this third index, of the *Philosophical* 801, etc. (5)

The broad nature of this topic is technically reflected in how I use this expression 'value' in different contexts. (6)

Value is realized through a trans-intentional process of judgmental evaluation in which valuation is delivered in an intentional form. Hence my use of the technical nomenclature of 'e/valuation'.[246] (7)

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[245] 'Re-direction' with the use of the nomenclature of '(-)' indicates 'relatively radical processes of dialectically instigated re-direction' *versus* relatively critical redirection (in which the canons of logical theory are systematically applied as needed in order to deconstruct anomalies, inconsistencies, incoherencies, and unresolved contradictions, etc.).

[246] To make these distinctions clear in e/valuational formation we are dealing with the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of judgment that in its appreciation of intentional content, therefore, is trans-intentional in its comparative epistemological organization. In contrast, intentional processes are enacted within the Cognitive Aspect. However, under general circumstances the expression 'cognitive' is equivalent to 'intentional', etc.

Moreover, the intentional representation of value is refracted through what I perceive to be six distinctive forms of trans-cognitively ordered judgment in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, starting with the first order of trans-cognitive judgments of a phenomenological-semantics in form of various mappings of phenomenologically distinctive categories... and, ending in the sixth order of ontical or factual ascertainment where propositions become provisional statements, namely:

1^0 Phenomenological-Semantics
2^0 Aesthetics (Including an Existentially Oriented Aesthetics)
3^0 (Non-Systematic-existentially Oriented) Deontology
4^0 Pragmatics (Including an Existential Pragmatics)
5^0 Hermeneutics (As an Appreciation of Possibility)
6^0 Ontics (Factual Ascertainment) (8)

Not to be confused with an intentional approach to ordered analysis conducted within a Cognitive Aspect, namely:

1^0 Atomic Phenomenological-Semantics
2^0 Molecular Phenomenological-Semantics
3^0 Conceptual Ideation
4^0 Perceptual Ideation
5^0 Hermeneutics (As an Appreciation of Spatio-Temporal Possibility)
6^0 Ontics (Factual Ascertainment)

…where the productive valuation of trans-cognitive judgmental evaluation is automatically given a cognitive form in intentional terms of reference. (9)

Implied in the expression of ‘ordered’ is that all epistemological levels are depended upon their pre-conditional entrance into, exercise and exit from all prior orders and levels (Aspects) of epistemological organization (that, by necessity, takes on a hierarchical presentation in theory). (10)

Where such sequencing can take place on either a linear or circular format, or, in experience, a rather direct sense and semblance of spontaneity (where the latter will take on, on balance, either an overall existential or non-existential complexion). (11)

But, more importantly, in terms of the archetypal economy of World, Object, and Ego, and perceiving ordered value being phenomenal-phenomenologically centered on a first ordered prioritization of identity and identification, a third order of hermeneutically promoted function and functionality, and, a non-systematically third order of privileged deontological-like judgments of value and valuation. In the light of this ordered scheme, I prefer to use the expression ‘value’ as applying, primarily, to the third order of deontological-like judgments (without the necessity for ethical principles as anything other than

their acting as incidental ethical guidelines), and, secondarily, with aesthetical and pragmatical input.[247] (12)

Therefore, the primary sense of 'value' is deontological e/valuation, in a third trans-ordered order, preferably from an existential perspective, plus, the secondary complementation with either second ordered aesthetical and/or fourth ordered pragmatical contributions, again, preferably with both taking an overt existential orientation. (13)

Whose, *sine qua non* of the presence of a relatively existential complexion should be the 'relevant-enrichment realized through competent-authenticity', and similar.' (14)

Now, although orders, in any form, on any level of the psyche, are relatively incommensurable in any trimodal economy, be that hexamodally reinterpreted in an ordered perspective, or otherwise, through economic commensuration distinctive orders can interact to either amplify or de-amplify co-associated patterns of ordered formation in a manner that could be either mutual or non-mutual. Just as in a snuff ballet, however beautiful the dance steps or ritual actions conducted therein, once the perception that a non-virtual death is to be enacted or is being enacted such automatic thoughts of distaste should immediately render the whole performance as despicable, inhuman, totally unacceptable, as existentially disruptive and unproductive, etc. Despite the observation that for some audiences through repetition they can become insensitive to the existential ramifications of such obnoxious patterns of enactions.[248] [249] (15)

Hence this primary focus on the deontological, and, a secondary approach on either the aesthetical and/or the pragmatical... all preferably enacted from an existential sense of perspective. (16)

Whence this existential overlay? Whence this sense and semblance of an existential dimension? (17)

As discerned from a pro-relational perspective that may well need to entail a trans-pro-relational sense of perspective as well given that our relationships are just as embedded in a world of the relational as we are in our individuated relationships within this same world of the relational. (18)

Finding our entrance to and exit from the existential dimension through the auspices of a suspension exercised, either wittingly and/or unwittingly within the induced embrace of an extensive suspension... (19)

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247 Without confusing fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatic input/output with the far broader reach of a viable, qualified pragmatic philosophy, etc., that carefully takes on an existential sense of the deontological, pragmatical and the aesthetical. etc.

248 The expression 'enactions' includes, here, either the commission, omission, and/or deferral of non-responsible-responses.

249 As, e.g., in the Roman arena, the publics' recorded fascination for public executions, etc.

But to flesh out the concerns behind such a scheme... let us begin our reflections on this topic by contemplating the various ramifications of the following... (20)

B. *An Entertaining Interlude...*

Imagine Shakespeare's Play *Julius Caesar* reframed in the following manner:

The 'special' one off performance of this play has been announced by The Apparitional Theatre Company. It is by invitation only. Notable persons of the community will be invited to attend.

Once every one is seated, the play begins...

In a spectacular simulation of lightning and thunder, sparks and a mysterious fog, upon an empty stage... a booming voice echoes the divine ways of the Gods...

Ho, ho, behold a stage to show,
Filled with all too human sorrow...
And fickle joys and laughter knows;
Where awesome bets are waged by foes
And furtive friends alike as well
By all the playful Gods who call
How fated luck or fortune fell
In how their deadly dice did fall
Upon this waiting world below...

Insane laughter resounds around the stage... and this ancient play begins.

Then just before the scene where everyone knows Caesar is about to be stabbed a silent visual message is relayed across the top curtain of the stage:

Tonight's special performance will see the death of the actor playing the role of Julius Caesar, a person whose acting skills have left much to be desired and who will be neither missed nor mourned in the illustrious world of professional, full-time actors...

More insane laughter resounds around the stage…

Enters Julius Caesar in a throng of actors.

Caesar is stabbed many times while the same insane voice recites the single word yes, yes, yes, Yes, YES... ever more loudly every time Caesar is stabbed... with everyone drenched in copious amounts of 'blood'... the line 'et tu Brute'... is now to be said by Brutus... ironically pointing with his dominant hand toward himself.

Then the booming voice begins again... upon an unlit stage.

So, so, these seated folk just sit
And passive sat, still, complicit
In this deadly double plot,
Tonight, he died, suspecting not.
This perfect audience stayed
From each immobile seat not strayed,
For you were warned his death was told,
Upon these boards this actor held
His life within your hands foretold...
The deeds be done and he be felled
And so... upon your head displayed
This guilty crown must equal fit...

Insane laughter resounds around the stage…

In a flash of light and instant fog the stage is cleared except for one white robed figure resembling the dead Julius Caesar, with mask, with head bent down...moaning:

A chorus of the actors softly sings:

Woe, so woeful
Are we tonight...
In this murder
Most deceptive done ...
Amid the dark
Our deeds have gone
Beyond the page…
Far past the bounds
Of wrongful right...
And frightful wrong...

Another flash of light, more fog, the second Julius Caesar immediately disappears (beneath the stage)...

A short moment latter the bier with the bloodied corpse of Caesar is slowly raised from beneath the stage...

Insane laughter this time resounds around the theatre hall...

The play continues, as if nothing unusual has happened, but, as actors, as if on edge, they enter back upon the stage... as if wishing to be oblivious to the fact that this apparent murder has seemingly occurred (and not just a simulated assassination).

Then the play comes towards its ends...

Insane laughter, flashing and sparks are seen once more, amidst the fog... a projected candle appears. (flickering upon the dry icy fog)...

The same hollow voice recites these additional, final lines:

Blow, blow upon the candle seen...
From screaming child to tearful teen,
From corpulent, well-filled out frame
To fallen corpse now just a name
Laid low upon this slab stone cold,
Each soul is called an 'actor played'
An echoed tale, eternal told,
A simple part with death delayed,
All life is short, so fraught and mean...
*Blow, blow upon this candle see*n...

The projected candle is invisibly snuffed out (by a strong gust of wind)...

A muffled laughter is to be heard... and actors enter upon the stage for their curtain call... minus Julius Caesar. Then, perhaps, he is symbolically seen in a white robed 'double' with a mask... to be revealed as a woman; refusing to reveal to the audience as to whether he is still alive or truly dead... as if, as if, as if... we could not say). (21)

Ok, this revamped version is a bit more dramatic or more the tragic farce depending on how it be directed, and then played out accordingly.... (22)

Why this simulated entertainment..? (23)

Because the theme of 'value' is being continually alluded to either directly or indirectly, through declarations or provocatively asking questions... a series of traditional questions. Let me reflect now upon this scenario, this play within a play. (24)

Now, 'a play within a play' should imply that either 'the inner play or the outer play is not really a play *per se* with respect to the primary 'play' in question'. In this instance the simulated death of Julius Caesar is the inner play... but the framing in this *An Entertaining Interlude* reverses this semblance. The upcoming of a murder is then intimated to the audience. They have inadvertently been invited to come to see a 'snuff play'.. and in refusing to actually entertain that type of event remain seated passively, perhaps suspended and 'paralyzed'. Then, if that were to be the case, this death is not being simulated, is not taking place in any playful sense as traditionally understood. (25)

Deontological imperatives, then, are starting to undermine the aesthetic value of that same play... in the stead of the latter, a new ethos begins to stalk the audience, namely, an apparitional tension between 'the apparent death of Julius Caesar and the expected non-death of the actor' *versus* the simulated death of Julius Caesar along with the very

realistic, ‘real’ death of the actor playing that same role. Which interpretation is right, and which interpretation is wrong? If we have trouble differentiating these different events apart, we obviously have a tension as yet not resolved. We see actors proceeding to play their parts and, at the same time, the bloodied corpse of the dictator seemingly lifeless upon his bier. We might well suspect that nothing is theatrically amiss, but, as yet, we do not know! (26)

As if, as if, as if... either way, we would not know... we could not know?[250] (27)

This play also seems to portend, through its re-framing, that there can only be a negative nihilism. How could such darkly beset sequence of downbeat metaphors be ‘turned around’ and given a positive nihilistic glow if that were at all possible? Just how might the explication and expedition of an existential dimension transform such an otherwise dreary prospect that only in death are we left with our name alone, if known, and, no doubt, too, to be soon forgotten. Such issues will be duly dealt with over the course of this third part, Part III of this current book. Suffice to say, we have a metaphorical shadow that records the good in this world that emerges through our arbitrated auspices before the sight of others, and v.v. As if our metaphorical ‘footprints’ can re-count and preserve that emergent value registered through this realization of an excess surplus that arose and could well continue to ever overflow as if from a lost bank account replete with funds a long, long time after our ‘delayed demise’... (28)

Then, a host of other question might well arise in the minds of that perplexed audience. Did that same ‘Julius Caesar’ this time die upon a stage? Did he know of his imminent murder? Did he agree to die for the sake of this spectacle, a true artist, alas, perhaps cursed with a deadly disease about to achieve a more slow and painful, unsightly death soon to be sequestered far, far away from public sight..? (29)

But, then, the dilemma is this if those actors know this murder was a real murder to be and not its simulation could they truly act the part just as ‘a drunken actor playing the role of a drunkard’ may well fool no one, not even a simple child. That game of the actor is both ‘the apparent illusion of reality’ and ‘the apparent reality of the illusion’. With not enough information to decide either way we are forced to guess, and, how the audience divides along those lines is truly in the hands of those actors. (30)

Theatre is also an illustration of the power of the suspension. Point a ‘loaded’ gun at an audience and see how they visibly quake whilst politely remining in their seats. Or have actors suddenly pass through the audience feigning a fearful fight and everyone does not know where to look as if this violence is to flood all around them. One part absorbed and one part detached, and lose that dynamic balance and it all falls apart as if it were either dramatically real or as if it were too patently poor to wind in and wind up any poor soul, fooling no one. (31)

Indeed, too, one part suspension of disbelief and one part suspension of all belief. But, in a contrast to our passage through this world at large, we must forgo

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250 Assuming these actors play their parts very well. Ever suggesting a certain doubt…

the former and insist upon the latter... as-if, as-if, as-if... this world were not just a 'deceptive' dream....[251] (32)

C. A Statement of Intent Re-Introducing this 'Introduction'

As already to be noted this disquisition on e/valuational formation has to contend with many miscellaneous overlapping meanings masquerading behind this seemingly innocent expression 'value'.[252] In order to defuse such inevitable confusion hence the *Pre-Introduction and Introduction*, this current *Re-Introduction* to the same, along with the first major section of this text titled: Philosophical 'Ramifications' 801 (with, therein, a more definitive treatment of this topic). (33)

That we have to contend with a sixfold (hexamodal) ordered e/valuation, along with both its trans-ordered and its hyper-ordered configurations (where, admittedly, the latter sub-topic has hardly been approached through being barely indicated as a further field of complex possibilities). Then, importantly, within the ordered domain, I focus this topic of value upon the three forms of ordered e/valuational formation more centered upon the third trans-cognitive order of the existential moment of the deontological and its two adjuncts of the second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical value and the fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical e/valuation (that also should both be supplied with an engaged existentially oriented input and output). (34)

That, in a similar manner to this focusing on value, (in this more focused tripartite form of valuation) we can also extend this tripartite approach to our focusing on both identity through identification and function through functionality. Invoking a circular form of the trans-cognitively ordered economy we can diagrammatically represent the following: (Note the secondary 2^0, 4^0, and 5^0 are co-shared in this scheme as 'adjuncts'):

First, tabulated this gives us the following:

Value (and Valuation):

Primarily Deontological with Aesthetical and Pragmatical Adjuncts

Identity (and Identification)

Primarily Phenomenological-Semantics with Aesthetical and Ontical Adjuncts

Function (and Functionality)

Primarily Hermeneutical with Pragmatical and Ontical Adjuncts (35)

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[251] Indeed, putting aside all metaphysical nonsense that this world were just an illusion; masquerading as and masking a foolish notion of an impossible 'deeper' world that needs to be found waiting below.

[252]

Second, diagrammatically, in a circular format, we note the overlapping of adjuncts:

(Non-Systematic) Existential Moment
Primary Deontological

3^0 EGO
'Value'
Secondary Aesthetical - Secondary Pragmatical

Aesthetical **2^0** **4^0** Pragmatical

*

1^0 OBJECT **5^0 WORLD**
'Identity' 'Function'
Phenomenal-Phenomenological Hermeneutical

Primary Phenomenological-Semantic Primary Hermeneutical

Secondary Aesthetical - Secondary Ontical Secondary Ontical - Secondary Pragmatical

6^0 (36)

Now, let me briefly outline the significance of these considerations concerning primary orders and their adjuncts. (37)

So, e.g., in my classic example of an architect of a bridge, the relatively incommensurable trans-cognitive orders of the deontological and pragmatical have to be accommodated in order to design a bridge that, first, does not fall down and injure its bridge-goers, and, second, is built within the confines of a reasonable budget. However, this incommensurability is conventionally rendered somewhat accommodated through existing conventions that allow that architect to design within these deontological and pragmatical expectations. As I have previously also noted, it is to be hoped that this architect also includes the element of the aesthetical in their design, and, thereby, scoring a perfect trifecta in this instance, in terms of the overall value (valuation) of this construction project, as expressed through these three 'competing' and 'overlapping' forms of deontological, pragmatical and aesthetical e/valuational formation. Moreover, of course, it is to be further hoped that an existential overlay is also to be engaged across the execution and successful expedition of this construction project (entailing a minimization of injury, suitable compensation for all workers involved in its construction, a strict compliance with all well-functioning building codes, etc.). (38)

Hence this attention to these details, where I have noted ordered, trans-ordered and hyper-ordered forms of e/valuation; intra-ordered focusing on the deontological and its two adjuncts; along with all relevant existential considerations of the former. Now, in an ordered format we get both Trans-Cognitive (acts of judgmental appreciation) and Cognitive (judgments delivered in an intentional formation, format and form). Then, as noted, a Trans-Ordered format (not to be confused with a Trans-Cognitive Format under the heading of 'Ordered') is in the format of the ordering of an ordered format. Hence the semantics of semantics giving us our access to metaphysical-like forms of treatment. Or, the integrated semantics of the semantics[253] of aesthetic-like states gives us a ready-made psychology in which these integrated forms associated with experientially distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological fields automatically present us with a psychology (in which these phenomenological categories are found as the intentional content in question). But why stop there? What is the 'metaphysics of metaphysics', e.g., nothing other than the archetypal format for truth determination? So, this experience of heat falls within the spatio-temporal dimension under the concept of temperature. There, the temperature of temperature is effectively asking whether the determined temperature is correct? I.e., metaphysical. I.e., in a metaphysical dimension the temperature *x* is temperature *x*; in a meta-metaphysical dimension that temperature *x*' is true iff temperature *x* (is found to correctly apply as such). Of course, it is up to the reader to find either some form of consensus in such speculative matters or not, on a case-by-case basis. Needless to say, as well, that the more rarefied such speculations the less 'value' will be found in our utilization of the same. Continuing in the same vein, in a hyper-ordered orientation, we could argue, e.g., that 'the psychology of psychology is sociology (or anthropology)'. That, perhaps, 'the sociology of sociology is politics', and, 'the politics of politics gives us the political-economy' also to be derived from 'the pragmatics of pragmatics'. If we were to ask 'how political power is disseminated?' we would have to answer 'in and through the political-economy!' Similarly, the political-economy could also be just represented through the economy interactions involved between its economic correlativities of the political, economical, and the stylistical sub-sub-disciplines (which, from a chaotic perspective is to be realized through the integration of the re(-)self-organization of such relative economic incommensurabilities?[254]). Moreover, let me look more closely at the philosophical 'ramifications' of the same; where by 'ramifications' is meant 'implications, consequences, and prior histories' invoking, respectively, the distinctively different histories of the present, future and past. 'Distinctively different' by virtue of the fact that such histories need to avail themselves of different techniques. The past need access to textual documents, etc. The future invoking trajectories, like the metaphorical 'gravity' of cost-cutting curves, etc.[255] Histories of the present, in contrast with the former, need to develop statistical measure for determining intracultural and intercultural preoccupations, themes, tropes and memes, and similar. The iterative nature of both the Media and Social Media should simplify the research required to successfully prosecute such a task. (39)

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253 Considerations of both logics and dialectics can be found within both the trans-cognitive/cognitive first orders the phenomenologically-semantic (given the analytical-like nature of semantic definitions, etc; implying that such an economy entailing the interactions of a logics-dialectics is already in operation).

254 I.e., in effect, through (suitable forms of) commensuration.

255 Refer to the introductory essay titled 12D. *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruption* (*Pursuit*, III.12D) (not yet written).

1. Philosophical ‘Ramifications’ 801

Value, in the form of both meaning and meaningfulness, is to be only found in ‘deconstructing the defective and re(-)constructing the effective’ with consequential ramifications that can be both critical and radical in orientation.[256] (40)

As a disquisition on (my understanding of) the nature of ‘value’ this topic can be viewed through a variety of interlinked perspectives where such linking accommodation can be conducted from an understanding of judgment refracted through an ordered perspective, i.e., through the generality of the meta-textual hermeneutics of accommodation, through the particularity of phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of correlations, and the specificity of a non-textual, existential transformational retreatment, etc. (41)

Given the theoretical perception that value is centered on the Ego moment in the archetypal economy of World, Object, and Ego, it can be read through a harmonic lens as a moment of resolution, harmonization, along with the ability to interlink and align a causal approach in the effective realization of aspirational intent, albeit as primarily exercised through an intersubjective world of arbitration, etc. (42)

In general, economic terms, we can also view judgmental e/valuation, refracted through a six-fold ordered perspective, as function (and ‘functionality’ under the World moment), identity (and ‘identification’ under the Object moment), and, value (and ‘valuation’ under the Ego moment. (43)

In ordered terms, there is the implication that valuation viewed through the Ego moment is primarily third trans-cognitively ordered deontological e/valuation, and, secondarily, as second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical e/valuation and fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical e/valuation.[257] (44)

Correctly, therefore, ‘value’ in this more specialized sense of third, second, and fourth trans-cognitively ordered complexes of e/valuation. (45)

I.e., in a mix of distinctive and, sometimes, overlapping deontological, aesthetical and pragmatical e/valuations where these relative commensurabilities can through economic commensuration either positively amplify or negatively de-amplify such processes of overall e/valuation. (46)

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256 As noted, e.g., I.11, II,13, 355, etc.

257 By ‘trans-cognitive’ is merely meant that ‘the intentional economy, situated in a Cognitive Aspect in the epistemological hierarchy of the psyche, is appreciated in judgmental, trans-intentional term of reference in a Trans-Cognitive Aspect of that same mapping of the psyche. This mapping is in terms of its relative epistemological organization given that if the intentional were appreciated in judgmental terms, then that act of judgment must possess a higher order of epistemological organization in order to entertain both the intentional content, etc., and its judgmental appreciation. Hence this distinction between the Trans-Cognitive and the Cognitive and this epistemological fact is reflected in the nomenclature of the expression ‘e/valuation’ signifying ‘the judgment of evaluation and its judgment of valuation’.

So, e.g., the perfect or imperfect workings of a door can either enhance or de-enhance its aesthetic reception; just like a well-design cup or mug for receiving heated beverages, etc., and, where the perception of an aesthetic style or the lack of the same can also alter our e/valuation of such mutual or non-mutual considerations likewise. (47)

Or, as already recounted, despite our over-exposure to simulated violence and murders in various forms of media, still, many people would find that the non-simulated act of violence or murder to be totally objectionable and unacceptable (even though through excessive exposure to the same this rejection as both 'objectionable and unacceptable' can be persistently undermined and diminished as in the regular spectacles of the Roman arena, the public's morbid fascination with public executions, etc.). (48)

Or, where if all things are equally weighted in a court room between deontological arguments and matters of pragmatical expediency the former form of judgment will be given precedence, but, however, through the over-weighting of arguments for the latter even the deontological can be overridden through either the rewriting of evidence as such and/or through direct or indirect forms of coercion. (49)

Thence the distinctive nature of these three ordered forms of relatively incommensurable of judgments whilst also recognizing their mutual or non-mutual influences through more deeply seated forms of accommodation. (50)

Where such correlations and accommodations must also be seen to take on a mix of existentially oriented and non-existentially oriented forms of e/valuation despite the existential being primarily aligned with the deontological, and, secondarily, with either aesthetical and/or the pragmatical. (51)

Recognizing, too, metaphorically, that we neither live by 'the smell of burnt offerings' nor 'by bread alone'. (52)

That an accommodation between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential is to be sought, and, where, preferably a harmonization of such ends and means are better worked towards... (53)

'Seeking forms of compromise without compromise'; i.e., without undermining denotations by connotations, and, where outcomes demonstrate relevant-enrichment through the exercise of apparent authentic-competency... through, on balance, the enrichment of either relational creation, preservation, and/or conservation as appreciated from a pro-relational perspective. (54)

However, even the pro-relational perspective stands in need of a trans-pro-relational perspective given that our relationships, too, are embedded just as we are embedded in our relationships, and, our very embeddedness simultaneously intersects a potential infinity of relationships. (55)

Thankfully, such complexity of intuitive appreciation, as a process, need not span an infinity of time given conventional modes for dealing with such intra-relational and inter-relational anomalies. (56)

Although such mechanisms can cause personal and inter-personal grief either through non-conformity or through the conflict of shifting ethical paradigms and co-associated expectations, etc.[258] (57)

Still, when we begin such a process of resolution, we must begin with the conventional for the same hermeneutics of the problematic are already framed by such considerations. (58)

Now, given the complexity of 'value', as appreciated as a phenomenological format, form, and formation, that as such is either recognized, encountered, and engaged[259] in and through a process of e/valuational formation, what can we say, and say clearly, that then can be utilized in the dissemination of power (as refracted through the arbitrations of the political-economy) under the heading of 'ramifications'? (59)

Therefore, it behooves the critical-radical philosopher, or a critical-radical disciplinarian, in their use of this idea of 'value' to clearly spell out just what is being focused upon. Invoking discriminatory processes of correlation, accommodation, and transformation, etc.,[260] in order to clarify and link either non-existential and/or existential e/valuation; deontological e/valuation; either aesthetical and/or pragmatical e/valuation in the form of an adjunct; trans-cognitively and cognitively ordered e/valuation, trans-ordered and hyper-ordered forms of e/valuation; with the necessary adding of either philosophical and/or disciplinarian overtones like whether a pragmatic or non-pragmatic orientation is being invoked, and so on, and so forth. But, from the delineation of such complexity must arise a more dialectical appreciation of this phenomenon of e/valuational formation! (60)

Hence a *raison d'être* for this disquisition, in part, since a host of other related and not so related issues will also be addressed (and, hopefully, redressed, at least provisionally, as a work in progress, etc.). (61)

A primary argument being made is this, that in a disciplinary use of such expressions like value, identity, function, various states of existence, etc., an ordered schemati-

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258 The type of phenomenon that can be viewed through the discernment of apparent continuities, discontinuities, and non-continuities.

259 I.e., hermeneutically 'recognized', phenomenologically 'encountered', and existentially 'engaged'.

260 The 'etc.' is important here as we have three more items to add to this list, namely, 'distinctions, meta-distinctions, and (and one rather more mundane item of) 'transitions' (in which we merely chart movements in a certain distinction, say, through a certain time and space as indicative of apparently coherent, relative objectivities that have the requisite re(-)self-organized potential to advance and maintain such relative transformational objectivity and co-related integrity from a causal perspective). With regard to 'distinctions, etc.', they are invoked in order to account for a Tarskian semantic approach to truth determination (in order, e.g., to account for transformational-transitions in an ordered scheme, and, ultimately, in judgments of ontical determination of facts supported in evidential terms of reference, etc.).

zation should be able to conventionally, critically and radically unpack either the generality, particularity and/or specificity being either denoted (or 'connoted' indirectly as an allusion in some form or other, etc., be that either rhetorically, metaphorically, and/or in an apparitional manner), preferably, being conducted through both an existential and pragmatic perspective.[261] (62)

So, with this ordered schematization in mind, how do we then philosophically account for the existential re-e/valuation of the same as already indicated as a necessity for the creation, preservation, and conservation of the experiential richness and enrichment of our relationships? Or, in other words, how do we make this transformational-transition from a relational attitude to a pro-relational attitude? (63)

In the e/valuational economy, trimodally divided between 'identify (Object), function (World), and value (Ego)', I have claimed that value, in those (pre-)ordered terms of reference, is primarily, deontological in the relatively incommensurable orientation of the third trans-cognitive order (centered on the Ego moment in the archetypal economy) with supplementation from its secondary adjuncts of a second ordered aesthetical e/valuation and a fourth ordered pragmatical e/valuation.[262] (64)

Once understood, we should realize the ordered primacy of a purified deontological attitude to the center of the existential dimension in pro-relational experience. By 'purified' is simply meant completely devoid of any ideological contamination from precritically treated so-called 'ethical principles' in the dynamic-mechanics of ethical judgment other than as possible intracultural-intercultural guidelines for initiating the presuspended approach to the specificity of our explorations of that current topic in view. In other words, the deontological imperatives, if and when discerned, will come directly from our existential, pro-relational appreciation of the specificity of that relationship being placed under such an existentially oriented sense and semblance of this type of concerned review. Hence the question now becomes 'how do we make this transition from a relational appreciation of the participants in our discernment of a certain relationship to an apparent pro-relational appreciation of that overall sense and semblance of that relationship *per se*, albeit as also viewed within the wider context of its relational-situatedness?' Given that it is natural to understand that a contextual reading of a situation is required since the enactions entered into in one relationship can affect the relational standing of both ourselves and others in some other adjacent relationship given such interconnections, etc., be such influences intended or unintended, etc., given, too, that our discernment of the boundaries of our relationships must overlap otherwise we would most certainly live in many possible, disconnected worlds of experience rather than in the semblance of that same sense and semblance of 'the' world that is there both for us and others. Call these openly accessible grounds of experience 'the world at large' or 'the

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261 Although more correctly, there is no difference between a(n existential-)pragmatism and (a pragmatic-)existentialism when suitably enacted (through suspensions, etc.).

262 I.e., in terms of a subtle preferencing of the archetypal moments in the archetypal economy generated between World, Object, and Ego moments, deontological e/valuation is W-, O-, E+; aesthetical e/valuation is W-, O+, E+; and, pragmatical e/valuation is W+, O-, E+. The coincidence of the E+ preferencing alone deciding the primacy of the deontological in these considerations.

overall life-world', or whatever. On the other hand, we should also recognize the relative incommensurablility of these multi-various worlds of relational experience without imposing the nonsense of an absolute sense of incommensurability since in any economy commensuration is also established between all relevant economic modalities given their simultaneous economic correlativity. Yes, we can have our cake and eat it here. For us, all relationships are incommensurable but only relatively incommensurable. Just as, e.g., a person A can see a certain movie with a person B and relate what they both saw to a third person C, who, to date, had not seen that same movie. Person C has not seen that movie, but, has been told something about it. Even though only A and B saw that movie, still, something of that experience of moving-going can be related to C. But for all that, C has not directly experienced that movie seen by both A and B. Just as there is a private dimension to subjective experience then, obviously, there is also private side to circumscribed relational experience. That granted, how do we make this transition from a relational appreciation of the parties within a certain relationship to a pro-relational treatment of that same overall relationship. By directly participating within that relationship and then discerning its sense of relational 'presence' from the perspective of its apparent phenomenological integrity? Accepting such a all-pervasive phenomenon of a qualified 'presence' on the grounds that the nature of relationships is experientially perceived, and apperceived, through an emergent orientation, otherwise, no sense and semblance of that relationship could be discerned to any degree (whilst scoping that sense and semblance of a 'degree' by recognizing that absolute non-comprehension would rule out all experience of the relational simulation through representation, etc., of that relationship in question whilst equally ruling out the absolutistical [mis]appropriation of that same experiential representation of that relational presentation on the economic ground that such unnecessarily extreme attainment and obtainment of an economic modality is just absolutistically impossible). Now, such a limited concept of 'presence' must be perfectly acceptable on the reasonable grounds that relational identity and identification emergently arises through processes of synthesis that cannot be reductive treated merely in an analytical modal orientation otherwise we could not review the synthetic integrity also being correlatively co-presented and duly represented by such imputational forms of extrapolation, etc. Just as in a process of analysis, the synthetic orientation is presupposed as the basis for that process of reduction, and v.v. Like the well-fitted experience of a hand in a glove, both analysis and synthesis must pre-supposed each other (once a 'hand' is further defined as that 'which can wear a glove', and, a 'glove' is defined as 'fitting the shape of a hand'). The emergent treatment of 'relative-presence' rules out both the non-interaction of a mere world of simple particulars, and, as well, the sheer integration of the simple unity of some form of universal substance or self, etc. In the former vision of the nonsensical, there would be nothing subject to change along with no possible processes of interaction and relationships therein and thereby, and, then, in the latter, there would no form of change whatsoever and neither sense nor semblance of the relational could evolve and find forms of representation accordingly. An emergent, scoped sense and semblance of 'presence' is inescapable. Once understood through a suitably constructed economic lens, it cannot be other than non-problematic. What is problematic, and ever remains problematic, will arise in those situations when all forms of mistreatment are formulated that are either impossible to simulate or attempt to simulate the impossible, and, where, either way, impossible claims are made that just have no supporting basis whatsoever! Where

such arguments have no foundations of any form, and, where the educing of possible ramifications, either philosophically and/or non-philosophically, must equally be just as fictitious! (65)

Therefore, this question remains: how do we engage a pro-relational attitude in our appreciation of the representation of the relational elements to be discerned as present within a certain relationship? (66)

Now, each relationship expresses a certain degree of non-reductive 'presence' (otherwise we could not relatively experience the apparently unique contours of that relationship *per se*). The apparent 'facticity' of a relationship, the experiential sense that a relationship is more than just the sum of its parts, i.e., the mere sum of its relational elements, is to be approached and duly recognized through the imposition of an extensive suspension. Through the devolving de-suspension, we come to immediately and directly experience something of the essential-like nature of that relationship as established through the representative representation of its relational participants. Obviously, a relationship must both reflect the nature of our relational interaction with the same and its relationship with us. E.g., I am about to drink this cup of tea just made by myself. But, for a short period of time, I cannot drink that cup of tea as it is too hot, and, therefore, must wait until it has sufficiently cooled. Obviously, I can dictate the ensuing nature of that relational experience as 'a cup of tea about to be drunk', but, at the same time, that cup of tea dictates, to myself, that 'it is too hot to immediately drink in this current period of time'. (67)

Now, we also need to note that this relational sense and semblance of 'relative-presence' arises through an ongoing process of resolution in a manner in keeping with the experiential nature of that same relationship. That, as resolution is harmonically registered in the Ego moment of the harmonic progression of World, Object and Ego, it also follows that such ensuing e/valuation must also be primarily in deontological-like terms of reference with adjuncts in both aesthetical and pragmatical considerations, should such additional considerations need to be reviewed in those slightly wider terms of reference. Hence the experiential basis for this observation, of mine, that the pragmatic value of the pragmatic philosophical position must also arise and be relatively centered in this third trans-cognitive order of the deontological! Moreover, I also need to make the further claim that this 'centering' is and should also be both directly co-associated a coincident with an existential orientation. **Hence this qualified equation that the existential orientation is both primarily deontological and pragmatic in its orientation (and schematization within a comprehensively ordered frame of reference)!** (68)

In more simple terms, we could say that the complexity of this argument for delineating the existential orientation, devolves around this equation between the pro-relational, the harmonic moment of resolution, the experience of such resolution as primarily deontological, etc., and, that the process of pragmatic resolution could never be just a mere matter of a fourth, trans-cognitively ordered exhibition of merely pragmatical value, that would be roughly equivalent to considerations of mere expediency, given that the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of existential experience is not primarily locat-

ed in that fourth order (but in the third). Given, e.g., that in our meeting a hungry person whose sheer presence as 'a hungry person' is to be registered as 'not just a person who needs to eat', but, also, 'as a person whom we need to find food for, if they cannot do this for themselves'. From the confirmation of the description that this person is 'hungry', to the prescription that 'they will need to eat soon', and on to the existentially understood proscription that 'we should not let that hungry person remain hungry, and die, without suitably intervening in some apposite form or other'. Obviously, we cannot live by descriptions and prescriptions alone since it is also the same imperative for us, too, that we continue to eat, etc., in order to survive (on the implicit understanding that the relational richness and enrichment of this world is dependent upon the suitable discharge of all such imperatives by all relevant parties, and so on). (69)

These considerations granted, if only hypothetically, what can we infer (in order to reinforce this argument to date)? (70)

One of the deeper arguments behind this complex positioning (that existential value is centered in deontological value [without reference to so-called ethical principles {other than as potentially useful, provisional guidelines in an initial pre-critical hermeneutical phase}] and where such e/valuational formation is being primarily realized through ongoing harmonic resolution refracted through the Ego moment in the archetypal economy) is various equations conducted in an orientation of economic complexification conducted between relevantly aligned economies situated in the intermediating context of an ordered framing. Let me clearly spell out the underlying simplicity and merits of this very sophisticated strategy. (71)

In the harmonic economy we move (dialectically) from 'consonant field (World moment) to dissonant focus (Object moment) to the resolution of the tension between the former realized in and through a co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity (Ego moment)'. The Ego moment coincides, primarily, in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological. Therefore, through this ordered coincidence (with the underlying archetypal economy) we can declare that resolution is primarily experienced in third ordered deontological terms with secondary inputs from its adjuncts in the second and fourth orders, namely, respectively, the aesthetical and the pragmatical. In other words, through alignment (with the archetypal economy) a certain moment can comment upon another moment in another economy possessing the same archetypal alignment, which, in this instance, is the Ego moment. (72)

In this same regard, from previous reviewings of a wide range of other potentially useful economies, we could also say that the Ego moment is coincidental with the present tense (in the temporal economy centered on tense) along with a sense of existential immediacy, as well as being oriented towards specificity, proscription (rather than phenomenological description and hermeneutical prescription), the potentially radical sense of chaotic re-directedness, etc. That, by such means we can further enrich our understanding of this archetypal orientation through applying such forms of skillfully constructed parallelisms. (73)

Then, through existential coincidence with the Ego moment, epithets used to describe the existential orientation can also be taken up, e.g., immediacy (as already noted), spontaneity, synchronicity, simultaneity, trans-geographical non-locality (in a pro-relational identification with the essential, holistic nature of the relationship from an extensive suspension of a merely relational perspective), a trans-personal-interpersonal orientation, etc. (74)

Moreover, in expanding the sense and significance of a pragmatic philosophy as extending well beyond simple considerations of a mere pragmatic expediency (that might be somewhat countenanced in a more practical, pragmatic, fourth trans-cognitive order) the same can be seen to considerably overlap with the characteristics of an existential positioning and its apperceptive interpretation through invoking requisite forms of existential hallmarks (along with relevant retrospective existential indicators and prospective existential predictors) subject to the necessary pre-condition of having been refracted through the suitable utilization of an extensive suspension... (75)

Given our entrance and exit from the existential dimension is through the suitable utilization of an extensive suspension (whose exercise can be better expedited through a process of invoking an economic induction[263]) we can also state, e.g., that an existential pragmatism is deontologically oriented (but not exclusively), and, where an existential-deontology is and must also be pragmatic (in a sense, however, that cannot be reduced merely to the third order, or any other order, given that the ongoing resolution of the existential is primarily discharged through the concrete, historical, specificity of the living-present coincident with the Ego moment (in the archetypal economy). (76)

This philosophical enrichment of our understanding accepted, through complexification, induction, noting existential characteristics or their absence, etc., what philosophical ramifications could be seen as following upon the wake of this relatively radical idea that a pragmatic philosophy (in its non-ordered or non-trans-ordered sense, etc.) is practically centered in an existential-deontology (sadly overlooked when surrounded by more dominant, conventional forms of philosophical practice). Of course, as already noted, such primacy is also tempered by secondary adjuncts (as well as by the third-party 'influences' of tertiary orders given the overall existential impact when realized in the midst of any economy[264]). (77)

We can also surmise some form of causal alignment is also engineered where resolution is not only able to re-form intentional processes, but, also, must be able to re-form ensuing behaviours in a relatively non-virtual format, formation, and form. (78)

Given that philosophical positioning is and should never be just a passive affair, residing in a virtual sphere of influence, on the strength of that observation let us segue into a pragmatic philosophy, albeit able to exercise passive-encounters, active-

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263 'Economic induction' occurs when a certain economic moment is suitably suspended, and, where through economic correlativity, and overall economic commensuration, the entire economy becomes suspended likewise by virtue of this essential-like economic holism (as expressed through such relatively incommensurable economic correlativity'). Refer to *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.54, 81, 389, 583/II.42, 280, 384.

recognitions, and forms of engaged-engagement that are both able and capable of taking up a relatively existential sense of orientation u a realization of such open, qualified, non-ideologically driven pragmatic sense of re(-)positioning... (79)

Interestingly, as argued elsewhere, I have noted that philosophy, as a discipline, appears to have a distinctive sense of disciplinary 'space' (like each and every discipline). I.e., its disciplinary difference (in a passive sense, along with an active 'differential' and an engaged 'distinction' [in an existential orientation]). Humorously we might refer to this co-shared area or 'arena' of disciplinary contestment (or *argon*)[265] as possessing a 'unique sense of voice'. Of course, while individual philosophies in their noisy mix of possible and impossible squabbles would dispute this non-apparent unity of 'voice', still, their very ability to dispute with each other in this same market place (*agora*) of ideas is a testament otherwise to such a more superficial way of viewing such collective forms of behaviour. Furthermore, given that disciplines, ostensively, are there to proffer a service to the secular world, we might dialectically like to view the secular world as a region of non-secular-differences, etc. (i.e., as in the three sub-forms of a non-secular difference/differential/distinction, along with the three forms of a non-secular difference/meta-difference/non-difference[266]). I.e., an anti-disciplinarian approach to difference/s, differential/s, and distinction/s; as applied to non-secular differences meta-differences, and non-differences. As applying to the secular almost as if through a *via negativa*? Hence an appreciation of non-secular differences, etc., as a way or reclaiming the secular world and its continual encroachment through an eternal colonization of the disciplinary. Thence the possibility of a negative domain that presents itself with a certain secular *je ne sais pas* in which the radical contingency of the potential irruptions of the existential attitude can parade itself in the world at large with some alacrity, clarity, *éclat*… (80)

As if the darkness of the material world is illuminated by the light of an existential surplus spilling effortlessly over into the void designated as 'secular'… (81)

Or, as if the darkness of the secular world has a force of it own that adds a weight and a gravitas to the dictates of disciplines that could not be achieved if the world were left alone to endlessly repeat itself, *ad nauseum*, without this necessity for subtle imperfections… (82)

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264 Through the existentialization of first ordered, fifth and sixth ordered forms of productivity). Or, if we were preoccupied with the relative primacy situated in a first trans-cognitive order we could say, then, that our secondary adjuncts would be the second ordered aesthetical and the sixth ordered ontical, and, where tertiary influences in this instance would entail the deontological third order, the pragmatical fourth order, and, the fifth order of the hermeneutical.

265 An idea evoking the idea of philosophy being exercised through the invocation of a Philosophical Decision that sets up this relatively distinctive discipline of the philosophical (as refracted through the non-philosophy of Laruelle, e.g.).

266 Giving to this (positively) 'negative' vision of the secular world a matrix in the form of a 3 x 3 structure.

2. Pragmatical ‘Ramifications’ 802

In this next section of Pragmatic ‘Ramifications’ I explicate more closely this ‘exploration in value’ from this philosophical positioning of a ‘qualified, pragmatic anti-representationalism’. (83)

More correctly, Part III could be titled more simply as ‘a disquisition on e/valuational formation’. (84)

As refracted through its Pre-Ordered Format of the archetypal ‘World’ [functionality], ‘Object’ [identification], and ‘Ego’ [valuation]; an Ordered formatting in Cognitive and Trans-Cognitive Formats [and its six corresponding disciplines of semantics, etc.]; a Trans-Ordered Format [and the disciplines of metaphysics, etc.]; and a Hyper-Ordered format [and its associated disciplines of the meta-metaphysical, etc.]’. (85)

However, a more complete scheme would note the ten categories of the Non-Ordered (nature of the secular world); the Pre-ordered Format (of the archetypal economy); the Pro-Ordered Format of the philosophical economy); the Ordered Format under Cognitive treatment of the intentional) and Trans-Cognitive (treatment of the former through trans-intentional judgmental appreciation); plus the two possibilities to be explicated of the Pre-Cognitive Format (as an appreciation of the Affective Aspect) and the Post-Cognitive Format (of consequential analysis, etc.); then, the Trans-Ordered Format (of the reiterated meta-treatment of the ordered, etc., with metaphysics, psychology, theological possibility, political-economy, science, and, history); Hyper-Ordered Format (through the reiteration of the Trans-Ordered); and, the Hybridly Ordered Format (through the symmetrical and asymmetrical reiterations of the former, say, trans-ordered reiterative treatment of the trans-ordered, or, the trans-ordered reiterative treatment of the ordered, etc.). (86)

However, a pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism is ordered oriented but not ordered specific, i.e., more oriented towards the third order of the deontological, but, non-exclusively (to the extent of inescapably influencing the entire economy in question). (87)

That within the Ordered Format we focus first on the third trans-cognitive order of the Deontological, along with its secondary adjuncts of the Aesthetical and the Pragmatical, and, then, its tertiary influences over the remaining three orders of the Hermeneutical, Ontical, and Phenomenological(-Semantic). From this ordered perspective we can then extend our explorations to include the trans-ordered, etc. Hence this overall mapping of ‘e/valuational formation’. (88)

Now, in the previous section it was intimated that a more general pragmatic e/valuation should not and could not be reduced to the apparent expression of a mere expediency to be found in the pragmatical fourth trans-cognitive order (even though the pragmatical nature of the fourth cognitive order can be seen to come in an open list of a

variety of flavours, from the efficacious to the effective, from the economical to the efficient, etc.). (89)

That such a ‘reduction’ (to the merely pragmatical [in all its flavours]) cannot apply given the centering of ‘valuation’ in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, etc. Moreover, we could also add that pragmatical considerations come in a variety of pragmatical flavours[267] and that a reduction to any one or any set of the same would also be impossible (given the impossibility of the appropriation of any dialectical moment through both non-attainment and non-obtainment[268]). (90)

Furthermore, it is also necessary to demonstrate that an existential-pragmatism (/pragmatic-existentialism) cannot be reduced merely to the third trans-cognitive order of the Deontological Order. A reduction to this third order is also inappropriate given the archetypal moment of Ego is also shared with the secondary adjuncts of the Aesthetical and the Pragmatical. Hence the primary, but, non-exclusive focus of existentially oriented e/valuational formation being seen to be discharged through that third trans-cognitive order. But, given such an understanding of this non-exclusive discharge through its primary focus in the third Deontological Order, would we be right to assume that the existential could have no direct influence on the remaining three orders that are neither primary nor secondary in orientation? No, because we must also recognize the existence of an economic correlativity between all six orders just as there must pre-exist an economic correlativity on an archetypal level of the pre-ordered. I.e., through overall economic commensuration, of the current economy in question, even relative economic incommensurabilities are ‘overcome’, or ‘bypassed’, or ‘subverted’, etc., by a relatively deeper economic non-incommensurability. The ramifications of such an understanding highlighting the all-pervasive need for a dialectical approach to all forms of relatively superficial logical reasonings, and so on. (91)

Now, with this overall ordered re(-)framing having been undertaken, we are now in a position to understand the pragmatic disposition of a pragmatic philosophical position constituted through an anti-representational lens, and, importantly, its coinciding with an existential orientation centered non-exclusively in the Third Trans-Cognitive Order of the Deontological, etc. I.e., outline, in finer dialectical-like detail, the formulations of this ‘disquisition on e/valuational formation’ from both pragmatic and existential perspectives. (92)

Without the apparent representation of that to-hand the imputations of that seemingly being presented could not arise, and, similarly, the apparent presentation of that being represented to-hand could not arise likewise. (93)

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[267] These pragmatical flavours can be arranged under an ‘e’ mnemonic, e.g., but not exclusively, economical, efficacious, effective, expeditious, explicative, explanatory, expositional, emendational, enactive, etc.

[268] Because of our inability to completely approach such a moment, hence it non-attainability, and, therefore, our inability, too, to appropriate the same, i.e., hence its non-obtainability.

Moreover, without the dynamically balanced suspension of the former there would be no epistemological room for our engagement with that perceived as being chaotically re-presented through the spontaneity of some process of re-direction. (94)

Then, through economic complexification, the identification of an anti-representational moment could be made with this so-called third moment of a non-systematic sense of existential ‘re-direction’. (95)

Furthermore, without these orientations there could be no imputations able to be subjected to either extrapolation or non-extrapolation, non-suspension and suspension… giving us the three levels of the suspended and non-extrapolated, the suspended and extrapolated, and, the non-suspended and extrapolated. (96)

Understanding that these three levels of the ‘re-directed anti-representational’, the ‘presentational’ and the ‘representational’, respectively, as economic correlativities cannot be possessed and appropriated, i.e., can be neither attained nor obtained. (97)

Implying without qualification that representation, presentation, and re-presentation are all characterized as anti-representational in orientation given the non-attainment and non-obtainment of any one dialectical moment as that mistakenly to be mistreated as the so-called ‘in and of itself’, or ‘through itself’, or ‘from itself’, etc. (98)

Hence this ‘anti-representationalism’ regardless of whether we are more focusing on this qualified understanding of presentations, representations, and/or re-presentations, etc. (99)

But, what characterizes such an understanding as ‘pragmatic, existential, and positively nihilistic’ in tenor? (100)

In a harmonic progression of the archetypal economy the so-called third moment of the ‘Ego’ is primarily concerned with relational resolution. In an existentially oriented pattern of resolution such ensuing resolution is enacted for and from the benefit of the situated-relationship in question. Taking a situated stance given, e.g., that the ethical outcomes of a relational perspective could, and perhaps should, be overridden by a more nuanced pro-relational process of appreciation. E.g., in the classic dilemma of returning a borrowed weapon to the owner of that weapon, who, in turn, wants to kill either the person returning that weapon or someone else (regardless, for these considerations, as to whether such use is suitably justified or not). Hence the necessity for wider terms of reference in the practical expedition, e.g., of ethical considerations, through the invocation of the apparent situation of that relationship in its apparent relational-situatedness in this the world at large. (101)

The process of judgment, be its existential or non-existential in its overall orientation, is dependent upon a process of judgment exercised through the overall quality of its input, judgmental appreciation, and the discrimination exercise in permitting certain aspect of the ensuing judgment from either being enacted or not. E.g., we could be angry

with someone, perhaps, on balance, with due cause, but, if we formed the intention ‘to punch them in the face’ it would more than likely behoove us to desist from such a desired, incommensurate response (even if on some very rare occasion it might then be merited). So, in the light of this cursory analysis it follows that the quality of the output is dependent upon the quality of the input, the judgment arrived at, and to what extent such a resolution should be exercised as the final response through some form of meta-appreciation. (102)

Similarly, it follows that the quality of an existentially-oriented judgment is dependent upon the quality of the input, and the quality of both the judgmental and meta-judgmental processes exercised in that overall responsive-situation plus the adequate observance of those pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions that oversee a relatively successful process of apposite existentialization of that response in question. (103)

So, what are these additional pre-conditions, etc., that transform a relatively non-existential response into a relatively existential response? (104)

Without doubt the application of the appropriate pre-conditions, proper conditions, and apposite post-conditions all framed by the requisite degree of a suspension needed to expedite this process of existential transformation. (105)

Hence the suitably sufficient invocation of a suspension able to instigate and enact an existentially oriented response… along with the automatic de-suspension capable of enacting the to-be-desired response in question to that extent forms of meta-appreciation will allow and permit such an uptake in specifically engineered behaviour. (106)

Now, given the unattainable and unobtainable appropriation of even judgmental and meta-judgmental determinations its follows that even the appearance of a sole response as the definitive response we cannot assume that the responsive pathway enacted is either exclusively valid or apposite given a non-indubitability of judgment and where it could conceivably be argued that a number of apposite responses could be entered into that possess the requisite degree of existential trans-e/valuation. Or, in other words, in a certain situation more than one solution could possibly be taken us in the enaction of a suitable response, and, where we can never know absolutistically if the response being taken up is definitively the best even if it were possible to relatively evaluate the quality of those responses about to be possibly enacted or have already been enacted. On the other hand, it would seem tenable to argue that either a non-suitable or impossible response could and should be demonstrated to be as such? (107)

To enact an existentially oriented response just what pre-conditions, etc., are necessitated? Suspensions, suspensions, and suspensions! I.e., suspensions of the input, processes of appreciation, and processes of meta-appreciation in our selective discrimination as to which responses will be permitted and exercised, and which will not be so permitted, and whose potential uptake of the latter will be either suitably downplayed, diverted, obstructed, or, suitably reconstructed (through a process of re(-)normalization in which we seek to refine the apposite nature of that ensuing response perhaps either

through trial or error, virtual appreciation, and/or, in regard to past behaviours and our reflections upon the same, etc.). (108)

That, an apposite response, in tune with our relational environment, should be able to declare its own authenticity and competency through the existential quality of that ensuing process of responsiveness to the extent that that primary relationship finds itself suitably enriched with such relational relevance. (109)

Where the enhancement of our relationships has obvious pragmatic properties and qualities… as well as overseeing suitable, existentially oriented forms of responsiveness and responsibility. Hence the natural confluence of the pragmatic with the existential (and v.v.). But, how does such a relationship between the pragmatic and the existential contribute to our appreciation of a positive nihilism? (110)

Because identity, through identification, can never be fully appropriated it follows that the non-nihilistic could never be attained and can never be obtained. Hence a nihilistic position must apply given the existence of both identity and identification, etc. (111)

The existential reiteration of phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented experience implies that the value of such experience emerges through such iteration and hence its positivity is guaranteed. (112)

Of course, the apparent quality of that ‘positivity’ is highly dependent upon our ability to both discern and enact that which has a relatively greater degree of value, the nature of that e/valuation, and, the consequences of such enacted forms of commission, omission and inaction, etc., as expressed within both that relationship and its relational-situatedness. (113)

Hence, we can make the following conclusions in this regard. (114)

Under a principle of non-equality, where no forms of exact equality can ever be indicated except provisionally, it follows that there can be, ideally, no equivalent solutions except when treated provisionally in that manner. (115)

That we cannot declare any candidate as definitively the most suitable given our inability to expedite such non-relative, absolutistical forms of judgment except in provisional terms of reference. However, from experience, we know ‘provisional’ is usually more than good enough for enacting such considerations. (116)

Moreover, although non-suitable responses can be ruled out as such, such positive responses must be ever treated as provisional given this existential positioning of a pragmatic anti-representationalism. (117)

3. Provisional ‘Ramifications’ 803

The running of apparitional suspensions, namely, of the ‘as-if, as-if, as-if… sends us into a subjunctive mood more reflective of the provisional nature of all imputations. What are the advantages of such a re(-)positional transformation? The existential enhancement of our intuitive abilities to better appreciate the existential richness of living-reality as refracted through lived-reality, and v.v. Indeed, our ability to be both surprised and not surprised at the non-chaotic ‘twists’ and chaotic ‘turns’ of our experiences, both individually and collectively, as collated, as we make our communal passage through this world at large. Indeed, in a sense, running a living prospect of discerning histories of the past, present and future in terms of their non-chaotic continuities, their non-chaotic and chaotic discontinuities, and chaotic continuities.[269] Indeed, the pre-conditions for ensuring that an ongoing process of re(-)interpretation is to be found represented in an openly translated re(-)interpretations of this overall life-world that become ever-competitively refined, albeit provisionally, in such a manner so as to positively contribute to both intra-cultural and intercultural ‘solidarity’.[270] (118)

Indeed, without some degree of representation we could construct no imputations, and, without some degree of the re-presented anti-representational we could experience neither non-radical change nor radical change should they present themselves to us. (119)

Moreover, just as the presented orientation and the represented orientation are neither attained nor obtained likewise the re-presented orientation, as the anti-representational orientation, can be neither attained nor obtained because if it were to be appropriated it would not be anti-representation in tenor. Thence all economies must be likewise, i.e., as anti-representational in complexion. (120)

In the same vein, there can be no appropriation of an indubitable truth, nor, for that matter, the non-appropriation of a non-indubitable truth. Strictly observed truth and falsity can only apply to an *a priori* construct conceived of in such a manner that its limits can be both reached and obtained. So, e.g., a suitably constructed questionnaire could be completed and a perfect score might be able to be obtained. On the other hand, we cannot claim to have an indubitable understanding that ‘that was so’ other than to see such a reasonable or unreasonably realized understanding constructed in a similar manner along such an *a priori* manner. Only through and upon such imputational treatment of our representation of the world at large can we appear to make progress in such ascertainment and co-associated patterns of discrimination. Moreover, between the impossibilities of the non-relative, absolutistical truth and falsity we find the possibilities of practical truth determinations, albeit subject to such qualifications. In this in-between-land we entertain positive and negative probabilities. Furthermore, through the application of a rule of non-equality in identification we could say that no probability is ever identical in is ascertainment with any other or even in the matters of the history of its own discernment. But,

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269 A set of ideas to be explored in a new essay titled: 12D. *The Great Transformation aka The Great Disruption.* (*Pursuit*, III.12D).

270 With an obvious reference to Richard Rorty. In effect, trying to spell out how this ‘solidarity’ might be better fostered?

again, we are saved from endless indecision from having an *a priori*-like understanding of what is in question, or, rather currently what is not seen as in question. Then, given such inequalities we must also recognize the role insurance and assurance[271] will play in such ascertainments given what is to be reasonably gained is to be gained from the relative 'strength' of our current positioning. So, in historical reasoning, e.g., that although 'Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a fact that could be questioned for the professional historian a vast range of other questions in Roman History would see their time more profitably spent. Thence the hierarchical treatment of such propositional-statements where no statement could be ever a pure statement, either positively or negatively formulated, but, where all propositional-statements are to be found somewhere in between with an associated sense of a probability even if treated as a true or false statement in the practicalities of our passage through this world at large. (121)

Hence the probabilistic treatment of all Tarskian determinations of truth e/valuation. (122)

Where all justifications are presented as evidential supports tempered by such an overall qualification that, admittedly, in the practicalities of life, can usually be overlooked by the non-disciplinarian once decided one way or the other. (123)

Such a philosophy, as this existential, pragmatic anti-representationalism, parallels a positive nihilism and not a negative nihilism. (124)

'Value' is everywhere to be found in our imputational understandings and better viewed through the requisite form of ordered appreciation and delineation. (125)

So, semantic categories are viewed phenomenal-phenomenologically in either a first Cognitively Ordered Format and/or first Trans-Cognitively Ordered Format, and, their integration is viewed through a second Cognitively Ordered Format and through an aesthetic lens conducted in a second Trans-Cognitively Ordered Format, etc. (126)

But, 'the value of value has no value *per se*', being non-value, not-(to-be-)valued or meta-valued, etc. Hence its nihilistic tenor. (127)

But, again, such 'value is either to be valued or not to be valued' implying its potential positivity in the practicalities of living our lives (in the world of the other). (128)

Moreover, through ever-present possibility of existentialization, such positivity can also be potentially enhanced and not just incrementally orchestrated in relatively non-existential terms. (129)

The twin arguments of an amplification of either the e/valuational formation of the resident relationship and/or the e/valuational formation of that situatedness itself rules out the impossibility of a negative nihilism as an observational fact of our existence in this world of the other. (130)

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271 Refer to Part I.303, 420; Part II.122-123, 165, 249.

4. Profitable ‘Ramifications’ 804

That ‘value’ is everywhere to be found and can be existentially enhanced through apposite processes of incremental augmentation or incremental de-augmentation.[272] (131)

Reaching a transitional point of chaotic-transformation arrived at either though bifurcational division, emergent accommodation, and/or phase changes of either increasing or decreasing trans-epistemological-ontological organization (TOE).[273] (132)

Where both intentions and transitional states of chaotic transition are registered in multiple streams of textual depositions, although, it could be successfully argued, that even intentional states are the result of chaotic transitions in the evolution of our intentional lives. (133)

As a model proposing chaotic transitions either between and/or within each intentional moment. However, through iterative retention and reiterative protention we then find re-iterative forms of transformational re-direction of our intentional content-and-processes. A suitable promotion of such a process orientation towards the re-directed assists us in our existential transformations of such experience. (134)

Turning the potentially profitable into the veritably profitable through this pro-relational enrichment of our relationships as we find them situated in the overall life-world, this open overall world-of-life (whose range of possibilities could be hypothetically assigned to the transcendental possibilities of the Transcendental but where such a transformational set of possibilities is to be regarded more as a fruitful fiction). (135)

Where the possibility of such a possible course of enaction is granted, probabilistically, but, where the sun total of possibilities is more a useful fiction for us to calculate within in terms of a consequential analysis, and so on.[274] (136)

A positive nihilism guarantees the possibility of both relational enrichment through either relational creation, preservation and/or conservation as well as relational de-enrichment through either de-creation, de-preservation and/or de-conservation(al expansion). (137)

A ‘guarantee’ in the sense that we need both the relativity of ‘that nominated identity which is observed to change’ and that ‘denominated change itself’.[275] (138)

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272 In order to bring us to a chaotic point of bifurcation, emergence or phase change.

273 Making no non-relative, absolutistical distinction between epistemological and ontological orientations.

274 Because ‘pure transcendental possibility’ is as impossible as ‘pure transcendental actuality’ to think given our total inability to either non-relatively recognize, encounter and/or engage such ‘fictions’ (and where, more correctly, such intentional entertainment must be exercised in an economy simultaneously entailing encountering, recognition and non-systematic-existential forms of collective appreciation).

275 Denomination delineated in terms of predicates and relations. Nominations delineated in terms of identities and their co-associated phenomenological-semantic mappings.

Such identity, functionality and valuation being supplied economically and read through a lens of transformational retreatment (as discussed elsewhere[276]). (139)

Further exploring the concept of e/valuational formation through an ascertainment of relevant-enrichment realized through competent-authenticity, and v.v., delivered through apposite suspensions and their automatic invocation of a de-suspension (as the operative mechanism for instigating such enacted volition). Treating this formula to the following economic translation represented diagrammatically:

(**Ego**)
Duly Observed-Suspensions/De-Suspensions

(**Object**) Relevant-Enrichment Competent-Authenticity (**World**)

As horizontally paralleling…

(**Ego**)
Arbitrational Domain

(**Object**) Aspirational/Private Domain Public Domain (**World**)

As vertically paralleling …

(**Ego**)
Arbitrational

(**Object**)
Aspirational

(**World**)
Causal (140)

276 Part I, refer to the sections on Transformational Philosophy I and II.

An appreciation of the intentional constitution of ensuing e/valuational formation can be discerned through the utilization of the following parallels:

World	**Object**	**Ego**
Modal density	Modal intensity	Modal Propensity
Consilience	Salience	Propinquity (141)

E.g., using this scheme above, how would we differentiate, in an existential, anti-representational pragmatism, the experiential differences between, say, a relatively non-virtual experience of an apple, as a phenomenon, and, a relatively virtual dream apple (or a remembered or imagined apple eating experience) being experienced as different kind of phenomenon by virtue of our perception and apperception of such schematic differences in line with expectations, testimonies, and/or inferences, et c? (142)

By comparatively noting, hermeneutically, the richer spectrum of modalities that are present in the relatively non-virtual type of experience relative to its apparent comparison invoked in the relatively virtual type of experience, i.e., in terms of the relative density of modalities apparently experienced as being present (realized, metaphorically, through forms of mere repetition). (143)

Similarly, in line with phenomenological expectations (usually set by the relatively non-virtually oriented type of experience, or similar) in terms of the intensity of the experience being realized in those modalities noted as being present both individually and collectively (realized as relatively dissonant, metaphorically, through forms of sheer repetition). (144)

Then, in a non-systematic-existential orientation we note, either subjectively and/or intersubjectively, the re-iteration of tropes, themes, memes, etc., (in what might be termed, mnemonically, the ‘bare’ re-iteration of such motifs in such a manner so as to reinforce those ensuing forms of such provisionally attained and obtained understandings). Such propensity being arrived through the rhetorical setting up of the re-iteration of relatively isomorphic tropes memes, themes, etc; in effect, saying the same thing differently, innovatively, in the novel terms of an ‘final’ vocabulary, etc. (145)

Similarly, in wider terms of reference, consilience allows us to merge vocabularies and find, therein and thereafter, either novel vocabularies applying to older problems, etc., or, less novel vocabularies applying to new problems, etc. (146)

Salience, extending our critical appreciation, and our vocabularies’, dealing with that under focus of our current attention. (147)

Propinquity, or ‘psychic proximity’ or ‘closeness’ in ‘our alignment with the pro-relational appreciation of our situated-relationships’, continually refining our experience of the semblance of our direct contact with living-reality as refracted intentionally

through lived-experienced. This ‘simulation’ as a ‘simulation of simulation’, as a ‘non-simulation’ establishes the direct nature of both perception and apperception given that, from a nihilistic perspective, there is no substantial difference between ‘that simulation of that perceived’, etc., and ‘that perception of a simulation’, etc. This ‘semblance of proximity’ is an indication of the epistemological fact that all relationships are directly experienced is arrived at through such psychic ‘closeness’ in and through pre-conditional alignments, relatively successful and adequate appropriation of relative objectivities arrived at through transformational retreatment; the suspension and de-suspension of the same; the non-reductive, holistic nature of relational emergence; and so on, and so forth... given the direct nature of actively engaged interactions.[277] (148)

Now, this finer attention to detail accepted, in more broad terms we have the confluence and economic interaction between a public sphere, a private sphere, and an inter-subjective-subjective sphere of the arbitrational. Without the apparent interaction between all three spheres there could no freedom for the individual whatsoever. No domain of the other with its collections of hermeneutic genres of behaviour, no intentional aspirations, and no non-existential mechanisms (or operators) and no existential mechanisms (or operators) for profitably mediating the former. (149)

Hence the freedoms entailed in the purchase of a ‘simple cup’ of coffee, etc. (150)

Genres of behaviour are intersubjectively disseminated within a hierarchical mapping that closely mirrors the phenomenological-semantic mapping of our collective sense of world and expressed through relatively meta-textual means for reiteration subject to processes of re/adoption and re/adaptation, etc. (151)

Where, metaphorically, there can be no one map but a collection of maps, or, rather, less incorrectly, an ‘atlas of atlases’ mirroring both intracultural and intercultural discontinuities, continuities, contradictions, forms of accommodation arrived at through ongoing patterns of resolution. Hence the provisional nature of this ‘world’. (152)

Mirroring the semantically classified world of the phenomenal-phenomenological that both dictates and is dictated to in textual term of reference. (153)

Such mirroring allows us to engage in processes of error mitigation and error correction in a further refinement of the relatively non-erroneous through a dynamically balanced process of suspension gives us the further mirroring of the concrete specificity of historical experience, hopefully, in and through a process of apparent existential spontaneity, etc. Through the ensuing suspension of such directly engaged non-textual simulation we then experience the e/valuational formation attendant upon a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential as expressed through its predictors, indicators, and hallmarks… as meet the freedoms and non-freedoms to be found within the political-economic realm of the other. (154)

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[277] Otherwise, there would be no real and effective modes of causal interaction in keeping with the nature of the relationship in question. Or, in essence, no absolute and ultimate difference between the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual.

As noted, we can think of value as either ordered, trans-ordered, hyper-ordered, etc., or, in the more comprehensive list, as non-ordered, pre-ordered, pro-ordered, etc. Let me explore the latter listing in more detail… then returning to the instantiation and exercise of a relatively existential overlay in order to comprehensively understand this overall phenomenon of e/valuational formation. (155)

The 'non-ordered' is envisaged as 'not ordered in the sense that although the secular world is continually configured through various forms of ordered overlays, still, through emergence, let us argue for an experience of the secular world that cannot be reduced to its mere, continually imposed re(-)configurations arrived at through the ever-overlapping exercise of disciplined forms of ordered activity, whilst, at the same time, not arguing that this semblance of an "existential difference" is separated from this same experiential basis of our being in the world as embodied, embedded, and embanked in the world at large… in a state of emplacement realized through displacement and de-displacement…' let me elaborate. (156)

That, although all forms of ordered e/valuational formation can be existentially re(-)oriented, in essence, the current argument being made is that the existential is an experience of the secular subjected to existentialization. (157)

Hence the ensuing divide between the religious person and the non-religious person as to whether their perception and apperception of an 'existential difference' is to be 'experienced', respectively, either through the adoption and adaptation of a religious lens and/or a non-religious lens.[278] (158)

The implication being that the secular world possesses a certain degree of autonomy wherein the person can find their overall sense and semblance of freedom and all its infinite variants. But, the paradox is this, that only through(-)others can freedom be found through successful forms of arbitration that permit the expedition of private ambitions in a public world of social aspirations, and v.v. (159)

That, throughout this tacit, implicit, unwritten contract, all too often barely recognized, we find the mechanism of 'sacrifice' as the operative process for this overall expedition of freedom and the freedom therein to mutually expedite both our social aspirations and our personal ambitions. (160)

Hopefully, 'giving up a little to gain somewhat more', from our own point/s of view, although, the compactual-contractual nature of this relationship is highly reflective of the political-economy in question in whose overall domain such profitability is to envisaged. (161)

Where it is obvious that democratically inspired co-operative cooperation, rather than relatively coercively co-opted cooperation, is to be better sought after, but, equally

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[278] By 'lens' we can read 'meta-textual genres of behaviour', and, in this instance, where these genres, themselves, are viewed as either 'religious' or 'non-religious' in orientation.

obvious, the social system is question is going to qualify and modify the profitability of the overall nature of such interactions and transactions.[279] (162)

By such means refusing to mistreat the secular world as merely a blank slate to be ever transcribed by disciplined theories, practices, and critiques; as refracted through politics, business-economics, and stylistic considerations, etc., and their mis-directed ideologies, technologies, and short-sighted criticisms, but, which can be either critically and/or radically ameliorated through 'rectification, deconstruction, and all suitable forms of ongoing re(-)normalization, etc.' (163)

Hence our needing to find room in this secular vision of the world at large for that existential *je ne sais pas* that cannot be merely reduced to both discipline inputs and outputs, etc., nor separated and segregated from the net import and impact of the same! (164)

But, as to whether such a realm is 'religious' or 'non-religious' in scope and orientation, let us leave that unnecessary question, that need not be asked, ever left unanswered… since the existential resolution of the secular is only to be found through its ongoing suspension.!! (165)

At the root of all economic formation, at the basis of all intentional ideation, etc., is the archetypal economy… regardless of whether it is to be envisaged in either hypothetical or non-hypothetical terms of reference. (166)

In essence, 'heuristic devices all the way up, and all the way down!' (167)

That the working concept of the 'archetypal economy' is no different. (168)

But what is the World, the Object, and the Ego? To what extent does this rhetorical use of metaphors actually depict a World, etc., that, in effect, represents this so-called 'reality' of the world at large, etc? (169)

Here, having redefined the nature of representation through an anti-representational lens; given the unattainability and unobtainability of any one economic correlativity it follows that representation cannot be discerned in and of itself, etc., and, can only be relatively discerned through its contrastive conjunction with its economic correlatives of both presentation and re-presentation at the same time. (170)

In simple terms we might say that representation is redefining itself through an ongoing, progressive economy of re(-)presentation. (171)

I.e., as a presentational past process of re(-)presentation being continually projected into a future oriented representational process of re(-)presentation whilst being altogether updated in a present process of re-presented re(-)presentation. (172)

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279 An observation explored in the essay titled: *Pursuit*, III.2I: Part I: *Reinvesting in the Idea of an Economy*; *Pursuit*, III.2J. Part II: *Re(-)Creating the Democratic Universe*.

I.e., through a process of a continual re(-)alignment between histories of the past, future and the present. (173)

Or, harmonically re(-)constructed in a reading of future, past and present… where an existential reading is set up through the suitable exercise of an apposite process of suspension (and then existentially delivered through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension). (174)

Now, are such rhetorical devices, in their heuristic functions, representing the real(ity of the so-called 'external world')? (175)

Correctly, such a question cannot be asked because, when correctly reformulated, 'that of which we have no relational access to cannot be there for us (and we need not be there for it!)'. (176)

Reconsidered in another form, we could ask, 'do metaphors image the world?' 'No', when such 'representations' are misconstrued 'non-pragmatically', and, 'yes', when 'pragmatically re-construed'. (177)

Where the simulation of simulation through, retention, etc., directly gives the evidently non-simulated in the sense that we understand its phenomenological characteristics, etc. (178)

Otherwise, how could we differentiate a 'dream apple' from a 'non-virtual apple'? Or, tell apart a 'remembered apple' from our appreciation of the phenomenal-phenomenological re(-)construction of imagined idealization of this type of fruit? (179)

Given the modal complexion of its hermeneutical representation in the light of current expectations; in what manner and to what degree it appears to phenomenally dictates its own presentation, and, the history of its re-presented simulation (where, as a general rule, the relatively non-virtual is more inclined to radically re-present itself to us, etc., given the relatively richer modal complexion of the relatively non-virtual). (180)

Resolving this questioning by realizing how, pragmatically, we directly engage 'the simulation of the world' in 'the world of the simulation'… and where representation, presentation, and re-presentation correlatively co-define each other in an ongoing process of mutual, relative, transformational isomorphic invariance continually redefined through economic re(-)thematization where no form of identity can be substantially misidentified given the total economic absence of such impossible identifications. (181)

Just as our meta-textual genres of behaviour are hermeneutically formulated for us intersubjectively through intracultural and intercultural forms of communal expression, so, too, the living-experience in this world at large dictates to us how this same inter-objective sense and semblance of the world is continually re(-)constructed in a manner, preferably, in keeping with the existential resolution of our private ambitions and public aspirations. (182)

Through the productive and pragmatic confluence of hermeneutical representation, phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, and existential re-presentation we are more inclined to run with what works and put to the side that which does not proffer such relevant-enrichment in e/valuational formation. (183)

Philosophically, we should drop that which is either too extreme or demonstrably impossible… and this can be discerned through the suitable utilization of the extensive suspension, etc. (184)

Indeed, this is what is imputed to occur in the 'philosophical process' of topical appreciation… giving philosophy a hitherto rarely deserved recognition as the sole occupant of the Pro-Ordered genre and format. (185)

Now, the promotion of this Pro-Ordered Format may be seen, incorrectly, as a strategy to give philosophical appreciation a certain preeminence, but, such philosophical appreciation is at the basis for all forms of disciplined behaviour should those disciplinarians exercise a certain degree of requisite professionalism. (186)

Where all disciplinarians are reduced to the same humble depths through the required utilization of the extensive suspension. (187)

Still, as a matrix, we could propose that all forms of philosophical appreciation have the format of (W, O, E) as a preparatory step in the appreciation of the ensuing disciplinary topic for exploration (that in turn, can be found given its own distinctively ordered representation in a potentially lengthy series of matrices). E.g., the aesthetic as the Second Trans-Cognitive order is (W-, O+, E+) giving us the following philosophical representation of the same in the form a double matrix:

(W, O, E) (W-, O+, E+) (188)

Hence the Pro-Ordered Philosophical Economy and its appreciation of whatever topic is placed in apposition to the same, be that non-ordered; pre-ordered; ordered; trans-ordered, etc., etc. (189)

Quite simply, the Ordered Economy arises through the preferential/de-preferential treatment afforded these archetypal moments of World, Object, and Ego. I.e., we have the following Trans-Cognitively Ordered Format. (190)

1^0	W-, O+, E-	Phenomenologically-Semantic E/Valuational Formation
2^0	W-, O+, E+	Aesthetical E/Valuational Formation
3^0	W-, O-, E+	Existentially-Deontological E/Valuational Formation
4^0	W+, O-, E+	Pragmatical E/Valuational Formation
5^0	W+, O-, E-	Hermeneutical E/Valuational Formation
6^0	W+, O+, E-	Ontical (Factual) E/Valuational Formation (191)

That the same rules also apply to the distinctive ordering of the trans-ordered, hyper-ordered, etc. (192)

In this metaphor of preferentialization, we can translate ‘preference’ as ‘automatically delivered through the de-suspension’, and through the ‘suspension’ we meet with this idea of the ‘de-preference’. (193)

So, e.g., phenomenological-semantics and its emphasis upon the particular atomic-like essential experience is arrived at through suspending both World and Ego moments and inducing a de-suspensional preferencing of the Object moment through such a freezing of the former and the automatic unfreezing of the latter. (194)

Similarly, the apparent preferencing of the Object and Ego moments in the formation of aesthetically oriented experience is realized through the suspension of the World moment which we could analogue as the freezing of the World moment and the automatic unfreezing of the Object and Ego moments simultaneously. (195)

As complex as this might sound, it significantly simplifies this concept of preferential treatment contrasted with the simultaneous arising of the co-associated de-preferential treatment, and v.v. But, no theory is definitive… if the ground-rules are currently accepted then find something better… which is the pragmatic path to follow in all regards. (196)

It could be argued, by extension, that this hexa-modal economic transformation of the trimodal archetypal economy can be applied to all epistemological level of organization, say, e.g., in terms of pre-cognitive considerations of motor-sensory phenomena; affective considerations of sensations, impressions, mood, affect, etc; along with post-cognitive appreciation of consequential considerations (but this intuition has not been substantially explored in regard to the examples cited). (197)

In a Trans-Ordered Format, we would find the following double matrix:

1^0	[W-, O+, E-	[W-, O+, E-	Metaphysical E/Valuation
2^0	W-, O+, E+	W-, O+, E+	Psychological E/Valuation
3^0	W-, O-, E+	W-, O-, E+	Theological-like E/Valuation
4^0	W+, O-, E+	W+, O-, E+	Political-Eco. E/Valuation
5^0	W+, O-, E-	W+, O-, E-	Scientifical E/Valuation
6^0	W+, O+, E-]	W+, O+, E-]	Historical E/Valuation (198)

In this double matrix we note that doubling is envisaged only between similarly numbered orders (whilst considering linear or circular progressions in terms of number only within the same format. (199)

So, e.g., (semantics) x (semantics) gives us metaphysical-like categories such as, e.g., time, space, agency, etc. (200)

So, e.g., just as we can move from the third order to the fourth order, or second order, in a trans-ordered format we should be able to progress from, say, the third trans-cognitive order of the theological-like basis to a political-economy, or, to a psychological field of consideration. (201)

In this we could be creative, in an attempt to move, say, from the metaphysical to the psychological (on the basis that an integration of the essential, in a shift from the atomic to the molecular is mirrored in our shift from the metaphysical to the psychological as our ability to experience the same or similar categories in experience?); etc. (202)

In a Hyper-Ordered Format, we have the following form of (structural-functional) reduplication, namely, (trans-cognitive) x (trans-cognitive). (203)

So, e.g., (metaphysics) x (metaphysics) is meta-metaphysics, i.e., an appreciation of the import of metaphysical thinking. (204)

In metaphysical thinking, e.g., we have the categories underling distinctive forms of experience. In this regard, we could say that in an economy defined in terms of time and space we would note the preference of the latter for perceptual experience and the preference for the former in ideational thinking. In a suspension of either perceptual experience and/or ideational experience we would then find that both time and space would be given an ahistorical and ageographical form, but, in the automatic de-suspension we would then be presented with an existenialization of experience through its delivery in the form of its concrete historical specificity. Such transformational retreatment giving us a way of better of understanding the existential nature of pro-relational experience. Hence this meta-metaphysical appreciation of existentially oriented experience recast in this dynamic mould of concrete, historical specificity. (205)

E.g., (psychology) x (psychology) could be read as sociology (and where sociology reduplicated could then be read as the political [and as making a political contribution to a political-economics through which we experience the dissemination of power as compounded in a certain mix of both the contractual and compactual contributions along with a resolution of the same as extended through aspirational-arbitration/arbitrated-aspiration, etc.]). (206)

E.g., (potential theological-like contribution) x (potential theological-like contribution) could be read as through a variety of lens, say, spiritual, or immaterial, or existential, or pro-relational, or psychic, or communal (*esprit de cour*, and so on[?]). (207)

E.g., (politic-economics) x (politic-economics) could be read as politically oriented form of consequential analysis, or similar(?). (208)

E.g., (science) x (science) could be read as meta-science, our ability to formulate scientific guidelines for pragmatically improved forms of doing research, i.e., running hypothetical imputations in hermeneutic terms, doing retrospective phenomenological

research, and existentially evaluating current predictive alignments between the former, etc. (209)

E.g., (history) x (history) could be read as meta-history, preferably existentially conducted through an innovative, re(-)self-organized and re(-)self-corrective, open regime; enacted through an adaptable, provisional, pragmatic, positively nihilistic lens; that is non-exclusively receptive to deontologically oriented experience, and so forth. (210)

Hybridly organized ordered formations taking place between relatively asymmetrical parties, e.g., (trans-ordered) x (ordered), or (hyper-ordered) x (ordered), etc. (211)

Where philosophical appreciation is understood as either an implicit or explicitly articulated addition of the pro-relational (matrix) (in its archetypal form as philosophically treated as one part hermeneutical, etc.). (212)

Now, given this functional, trimodally structured imputative scheme how are we to understand the instigation, maintenance, and appreciation of existentially oriented e/valuational formation? (213)

By reference to its being suitably suspended (through the invocation of the extensive suspension be that fully articulated or, more often, arrived at though an understood process of economic induction). (214)

The process of suspension has already been outlined. For convenience, it can be recapitulated under the three headings of ‘global, local, and (inter-)subjective’ (215)

A ‘global suspension’ is ‘the dynamically balanced suspension of the archetypal background which can be arrived at, e.g., through the rhetorical asking of a question, or, through invoking forms of disvaluation or devaluation where, e.g., the world is seen as a dream, as empty, as a bubble, a brief bolt of lightning, and so on… in co-association with an apposition of noted genres, imputing rectification, error mitigation, inviting approbation with a more open, pragmatically refined sense of genre, etc. (216)

A ‘local suspension’ is ‘the dynamically focused balancing of contra-intentional contents *versus* counter-intentional processes… in a process of deconstructive error correction through enacting processes of re(-)de-mis-alignment, etc. (217)

A(n inter-)subjective suspension is the bracketing of subjective experience (along with a bracketing of relevant intersubjective experience)… through running continual apparitional suspensions that treat the literal as if apparitional in nature… in sympathy with a positive nihilistic, anti-representationalism… that almost inadvertently reveals the progressive alignment with the relatively non-erroneous through an absenting of error-formation to that extent that appears to pragmatically make sense in a sense that is more aligned with our progressively worked for pro-relational appreciation of our relational-situatedness in question. (218)

Needless to say, through the deconstructive clearing of obstructions the hermeneutical orientation is clarified through progressive forms of economic induction to the extent we find a better, more attuned, pragmatically working, representative simulations of our emplacement in this world at large… (219)

Passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and engaged through(-)others in a such a manner that we find an amplification of our overall freedom to be in this world-of-life through a mix of both incremental, non-chaotic orchestration and non-incremental, chaotic enhancement… preferentially enriched through existential attunement of that primary relationship in its relational-situatedness. (220)

'Existential attunement' merely indicates an 'improved relational understanding of the relationship in question as those agents in that primary relationship find their representatively alignment as that-to-be-understood through the pragmatic awareness to the fluctuating presence or absence of an existential orientation as expressed through its co-associated existential predictors, indicators and hallmarks, and so on. (221)

By 'presence' or 'absence' is meant, respectively, 'the experiential existence of an apparent existential surplus or excess', whereas, in contrast, we find 'a relative diminishment or absence of existential characteristics points to a relative absenting or absence in e/valuational formation'. (222)

Hence this qualified understanding of a phenomenon of apparent presence (and absence). (223)

Now, a nest of problems dealing with volition will be addressed. (224)

Given the automatic invocation of the de-suspension how do we account for a series of problems such as our being able to make a decision; sustaining the deliberative process; being able to discern a difference between being more responsible and less responsible; and, how do we actually discern being responsible itself, etc? (225)

For a start we must refract such problematicity through a non-binary frame of reference; just as the switching on of a light switch necessitates the switching on the switching system first (e.g., giving us the three options of 'on-off', 'on-on', and 'off-off'). (226)

However, giving a role to trans-intentional judgment, intentional content and pre-intentional affection-emotional (motivation) we might prefer to invoke three levels of switching. Let me explain my thinking here.[280] (227)

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[280] Hitherto I had invested in a top-down model but, now, considering the powerful role of emotions in a process of motivation, and how e/motions might switch a more causal link in the alignment between the virtual and the non-virtual, I now propose a more bottom-up form of modelling as my now preferred option (as explained in the next proposition).

We form an intention, say, ‘lifting my arm to drink a glass of water’. I decide to do just that. However, I can imagine myself doing this only in virtual terms of reference, so, the mere act of deciding, as a judgment to lift my arm and drink from that glass, would seem to be insufficient to enact that pattern of behaviour in non-virtual terms of reference. However, should I be very thirsty, then I would be more motivated to enact this pattern of behaviour. Indeed, the emotional intensity of my motivation must give my trans-intentional judgment the additional weight to do just that. Still, by an act of will I could still suspend that act from being instigated. Therefore, we might reason that if the intention is formed (and informed hermeneutically as to which patterns of behaviour are being invoked), and, a judgment is about to be made that ‘I would like to enact that pattern of behaviour’, should the requisite emotional intensity be also present then, when all three ‘switches’ are de-suspended, I would duly enact this pattern of behaviour by finding myself “lifting my arm and drinking from that glass”. (228)

Now, I would like to draw the following points. Yes, some suitable form of trans-intentional judgmental ‘permission’ is needed to enact this pattern of enaction, but, without the requisite emotional alignment the instigation of this pattern of activity would only remain virtual in orientation. However, with the requisite emotionally weighted motivation the synchronization of a ‘triple switching’ would then oversee the successful commission of this pattern of performance in non-virtual terms of reference by virtue of this process of alignment being exercised through an economy of re(-)alignment. (229)

We might also argue that in a contest between ‘virtual abstention’ and ‘virtually envisaged emotional intensification of desire’ a point might be reached where the latter overrides the former and ‘forces a permitting of such a pattern of enaction’ (as if in the grips of an ‘addiction’). Or, e.g., as in absence of will-power as might be observed in a very young child unable to resist temptation (despite promises for a profitable rewarding of such abstemious behaviours should such will-power had been successfully evidentially demonstrated). (230)

Invoking this mechanism of a triple switching in order to explain the continuity of an act of suspension despite the automatic invocation of the de-suspension by rending this activity as a process of circulation in an economy able to continually re(-)invoke the continuation of that suspension in question. Just as envisaged in a process of transformational retreatment that oversees a refinement of the intentional configuration of the hermeneutics of the pre-critical moment through the posttreatment re-directed from the resolution entered into from this stage of retreatment to reshape that pre-critically presented material to hand.[281] (231)

Implied, therefore, is an economic concept of epistemological alignment in vertical terms of reference, and, by implication, as well, an alignment in horizontal economic terms at the same time (in the formation of the requisite intent). (232)

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[281] More often in the form of an approbation of the choice of genres about to be enacted, otherwise, exercised as a form of error mitigation through a rectification of that mix of genres being invoked (either in virtual or non-virtual terms of reference).

Defining a relatively definitive act of enactive judgment as that which occurs through the requisite alignment of the Affective Aspect, the Cognitive (Intentional) Aspect, and the Trans-Cognitive (Trans-Intentional) Aspect. Otherwise, such enaction must remain only virtual in orientation. (233)

Now, given these wider terms of reference, how might we model an appreciation of our behaviour, and, how might we understand the instigation and appreciation of responsible behaviour exercised in an existential frame of reference (rather than being merely refracted through conventional canons of either intraculturally and/or interculturally approved patterns of behaviours)? (234)

Let us imagine that just as our emotions can 'weight' our intentions with the aspirational force of being motivated emotively, if not then forcing the permission for their non-virtual enaction, in a similar manner the facticity of our relationships can through their emergent sense of presence equally weight the aspirational intent to oversee patterns of behaviour in alignment with the latter. Especially if contrary factors were to be suspended, and remain suspended in an economy of suspension, then trans-intentional permission might then be reweighted in a pro-relational direction rather than in a relatively non-existential direction directed by emotional forms of motivation, egotistically centered intentional directedness, perhaps ideologically driven in a direction that needs to be more suspended, etc.[282] (235)

In essence, in an act of appreciative discernment we should better trust the inherent trajectories of our relationships rather than the trajectories of our emotional desires, but, even better, would be the overseeing of an alignment between all three aspects of the affective, cognitive, and that trans-cognitive discernment of the pro-relational all suitably suspended and definitively de-suspended in and through an act of alignment realized in an economy of re(-)alignment… that subtly preferences the pro-relational nature of the existential… (236)

What ramifications are to be envisaged through the wider understanding of this union between volition and existential discernment that has the former empower the performance of the latter, and v.v? (237)

As a guide to the existential dimension overlaying relational experience let me approach this topic under the headings of the hypothetically-theoretical, the critically-practical, and the (possibility of performing a) radically-enacted critique. (238)

The 'existential' is 'relational experience viewed from a pro-relational perspective, i.e., that emergent differential that remains after the merely relational elements are subtracted from the emergent totality of the relationship in question as realized through ongoing processes of resolution'. As a metaphor, this existential differential is much like the difference between 'sweeping an Autumn backyard with a broom' and 'merely utiliz-

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[282] If the existential orientation is reviewed as the resolution of the relatively non-existential then its follows that it need not be the case that the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential need be non-harmoniously opposed to the valuation of the other.

ing the disconnected head of that same broom'. With the former we have a greater semblance of freedom to sweep with a power to rearrange the world accordingly. (239)

A pro-relational orientation is also holistically realized, i.e., the relational information is equally present at any 'point' throughout the entire orbit of that relationship (i.e., its static ambit, its active remit, and its engaged composite). Indeed, through ongoing resolution, the tenor of the relational resolution being invoked is resonant throughout the psychic extent of its relational boundaries. Moreover, born from re-directed resolution it has the ability to re-direct behaviour, be that either along critically interpreted conventional modes of application and/or in a radically re-directed direction, perhaps, in a manner that, to that period in time, had not even been envisaged. Hence the invocation of novel innovations, final vocabularies, and so on. (240)

Hypothetically, we envisage an 'existential differential' as an 'existential excess or surplus in e/valuational formation… with the weighted power to promote behaviours possessing a relevant existential complexion'. (241)

In practical terms we take either a 'critical path of deconstruction' in order to 'clear obstructions, obviate improved patterns of behaviour, etc., i.e., observe patterns of error correction, etc.', or, we follow a more 'radical-like turn of events' given 'the re-directed nature of a progressive patterns off pragmatically realized re(-)alignment with the relatively non-erroneous.[283] (242)

Such transformational-transitions can be observed through existential hallmarks in the present tense; future existential predictors of highly probable relational trajectories with pro-relational enrichment; and, past indicators of highly probable relational trajectories as having been instigated, etc., through appositely engaged patterns of resolution as exercised through the requisite suspensions and de-suspensions as required. (243)

That the holistic nature of existential resolution is signaled through the sampling of such apparent designations. E.g., fruitful and appositely re-directed behaviour that is being directly experienced in the present; or indications of a mutual love that were had in the recorded past; or, expectations of a successful future given the current trends apparently heading in the direction of a 'relevant-enrichment to be realized through a process of competent-authenticity' as suitably engineered through the requisite suspensions and their automatic de-suspension as sufficiently structured through apposite forms of pro-relational weighting, intentional discernment, permission, arbitrated-aspirations to perform and improve upon such performances being entertained within the course of the relevant relationships in question albeit as to be found to hand in their relational-situatedness. (244)

In radical terms we note the possibility of occasional dramatic shifts in the re-direction of causal and virtual trajectories. (245)

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[283] The working of the critically-practical and the radically-critical presuppose the suitable working of hermeneutic oriented processes of error mitigation, etc.

Along with the exhibition and utilization of novel languages, innovative patterns of behaviour, the articulation of uniquely new forms of consequential resolution… distinctively different characterizations that isolate the apparent 'presence', as an experience of existential difference, in the presentation of an 'existential moment' or 'existential period' in time. (246)

Where the relationship has a metaphorical 'life of its own' engineered through progressive forms of ongoing re(-)self-organization instrumental in the mutual relational-enrichment of that relationship in question as holistically reflected in and through that apparent relational-situatedness in question… where, by such innovative means, a competent-authenticity is being made evident through appositely amplified forms of such critically augmented and radically enhanced patterns of e/valuation… that, at the end of the day characterize the existential moment or period in question. (247)

That this 'existential moment' or 'period' could be seen as an existential 'event' as we holistically find it unfolding within its 'event horizon', i.e., those terms of reference that indicate the 'orbital extent' of that relationship in question, etc.[284] (248)

As an analogy let me image this economic 'orbit' through noting again the following dialectical process of treatment: coins in our pocket or wallet are said to be 'had' or 'possessed'; a friendship is described as 'had' too, but, at first, meaning more 'shared', when, more correctly, those friends should be seen as being shared by that friendship in question by virtue of the fact that the relationship emerges and is 'greater than the sum of its parts'; be they either non-subjective elements and/or subjective agents, etc. (249)

Thence the dialectical and holistic nature of relational emergence, which, when experienced from a pro-relational point of view, in an alignment with that existential difference of that relationship in its relational-situatedness, can be experientially differentiated as qualitatively different form the relatively non-existentially oriented experience co-associated with such existential experience. (250)

The discernment of this 'existential difference' in relational experience is to be had through this process of 'existential appreciation' and 'discernment'. (251)

Because this distinctive difference can be distinctively recognized, encountered, and engaged, therein and thereafter, discerned, reported, and understood. (252)

Be that in real time, reported time, or in a projected period of time expected to conform to existentially oriented experience. (253)

Thence this guide to the existential dimension along with its dissemination of the critically redirected and radically re-directed as refracted through arbitrated-aspirations in the expedition of social aspirations and personal ambitions, and so on and so forth. (254)

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[284] 'Orbit' is technical language for 'the economy of passive ambit, active remit and engaged composite (of a suspension of the former)'.

5. Political ‘Ramifications’ 805

The confluence of public, private, and arbitrational spheres of interaction gives us, as if by default, the semblance of an overall life-world expressed both locally and globally as a world of the political, economic and stylistic, i.e., the political-economic. (255)

Given this argument for an existentialization of personal-interpersonal experience, just how is this re(-)orientation translated to the existentially oriented realm of the arbitrated, and v.v? (256)

This sphere of the arbitrated is usually overlooked if not completely unreviewed, but, the *raison d’être* for such is the relative lubrication or catalyst of our relationships in order to better expedite, in parallel, both social aspirations and personal ambitions. (257)

Phenomenological categories are semantically mapped and reflect hermeneutic mapping of their co-associated genres. Just as, eating a specific kind of fruit, say, an apple, falls as a sub-genre within the eating of a piece of fruit, which, in turn, falls within the super-genre of eating food in general in a world now divided between edible and non-edible, etc. Thence the mapping of our world in an ‘atlas of atlases’. Thence the development of techniques for paralleling hermeneutical error mitigation, phenomenological error correction, and processes of relative non-systematic-existential alignment with the relatively non-erroneous as an ongoing process of re(-)normalization. An operative mechanism for such economic correlativity is the relatively intersubjective genres of behaviour as mapped both intraculturally and interculturally. That this mechanism is one way of explicating how the arbitrated dimension mediates within and intermediates between phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential domains. So, e.g., as noted the simple request for a cup of coffee from a barista involves a complex range of mediations and intermediations where various mechanisms oversee that vast range of exchanges. E.g., a variety of financial instruments, currency, debt, obligations, promises, prices and pricing mechanisms, wages, insurance, stocks and shares, bonds, future oriented projections, etc. By such means we find the relatively mutual dissemination of power given this relative win-win situation where in each and every transaction some degree of mutual benefit must be enjoyed and not non-relatively suffered by each and every party founded on a pre-explication of contractual behaviour ever founded on some form of a compactual basis since, without the latter, such agreements could not be entered into with a reasonable degree of good faith even though in a disparity of power relations the proportion of what is non-mutual in that relationship will be reflected non-existentially. Conversely, the existential is realized to that extent the mutual is existentially mutualized, is overseen to the actual benefit of all engaged parties. That, as an observation, given the pro-relational attitude acts to the existential benefit of that relationship it follows that existentialization of a relationship, in its relational-situatedness, can extend that benefit to all the parties of that relationship, preferably, in an equitable manner. That, as an inference from such an observation, we can deduce that social solidarity arises and emerges from the net accumulation of such positive interactions, and, that, when there is a promotion of an existentialization of those individuated interactions, the net emergence of an existentially oriented social solidarity can also be mutually promoted. (258)

Hence the basis for social solidarity is promoted through the promotion of an existentialization of personal-interpersonal behaviour. (259)

That mechanisms that promote this communal solidarity should be preferenced, and, those counter-mechanism that de-promote the same should be de-promoted. (260)

That it is obvious that a pro-democratic milieu is more conducive to such social and political existentialization. But, should a better form of governance be created then let that form of political transformation be realized. However, in the meantime (of the Contemporary era) let us work with what is already to hand, and adopt and adapt those measures that refine the expedition of a democratic ethos. (261)

E.g., insisting on wide-spread forms of transparency (except in executive deliberations); personal accountability in the process of policy formation; group or communal responsibility of all forms of political organization (in order to avoid scapegoating); protection for whistleblowers and other respectable mechanisms utilized in the critical monitoring of political behaviours; the providing of those means thought to be necessary to establish suitable form of media coverage in both Old Media and Social Media; institution of committees for fearless supervision and oversight, the maintenance of reasonable forms of record keeping; arbitrational mechanism for overseeing social forms of equity like wages, e.g; well-paid politicians that should be penalized for politically unacceptable behaviours; appropriate support for those existing mechanism that promote the requisite institutions that support a democratic *polis*, and *vice versa*, etc., etc. (262)

Hence the inescapably important role of arbitration in the functioning of the political-economy and its coincidence with the existential sphere of the stylistic. (263)

Where the dissemination of power is mediated within and intermediated between the public, the private and the arbitrated spheres of influence. (264)

Where the very basis for overall freedom, in all its varieties, is to be realized through the functioning of this arbitrated domain, and, where its functioning is promoted through an existential promotion exercised both personally and interpersonally. (265)

But, an asymmetry exists between the personal and the interpersonal domains to the extent that the personal needs to be better organized interpersonally in order to better expedite the functioning of the political-economy for the betterment of all parties. (266)

Hence the promotion of interpersonal freedom through the promotion of personal freedom, and v.v. But the fruits of personal freedom need to be primarily expedited through a continual re(-)formation of the political-economic dimension. Recognizing that the fruits of social solidarity only emerge through social organization, as a work ever in progress, that deserves to be kept pragmatically re(-)viewed within the overall orbit of a suitable expedited existential event horizon... (267)

6. Personal 'Ramifications' 806

Now, some 'final' last words…[285] in the form of both a summary and an intimation of where things could go from here..?[286] (268)

The 'existential' is a 'valid experiential phenomenon that arises from an emergent awareness of our relationships in their relational-situatedness, that, unfortunately, is more overlooked but not completely unreviewed since we have an intuitive understanding that there is that sense and semblance of a difference even if not fully recognized, encountered and engaged as such. (269)

On the other hand, once sufficiently recognized as such, it can also be encountered and engaged in each and every moment… stretching the event horizon into an existential stream of experience since there is no division between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential. Because the relatively existential arises through the existentialization of the relatively the non-existential, and v.v., and, where the relatively non-existential is approached through the de-existentialization of the relatively existential.[287] (270)

In a disciplined approach we can note how language is categorized in such a manner so as to reflect our physiological constitution albeit as intraculturally and interculturally refracted through language, etc., which in turn reflects our hermeneutic hierarchicalization of genres of behaviour, and, where the suspension of the former gives us our access to a non-systematic sense and semblance of the existential, and, where the suspension of all three economic moments then gives us a more systematic specificity of the existential. Hence the constitution of the archetypal economy between the three economic correlatives of World, Object, and Ego and its existentialization through dynamically-balanced suspensions and de-suspensions... (271)

That no economic correlativity can be appropriated given it can be neither attained nor obtained, where a relevant isomorphic transformational invariance allows us to dialectically envisage some logical object(ive) that both cannot non-superficially change

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285 Perhaps needless to say that 'final' is meant in an ironic sense evoking the 'final vocabularies' of Richard Rorty, where, through incremental increments in experiential behaviour, radically altered chaotic shifts in direction (re-direction) can introduce us to the innovative novelty of new forms of language that hitherto would have been unable to have been thought… hence 'the thinking of the impossible' (which as a paradox can be diffused in the manner just explicated).

286 'Could' rather than 'should' since there are an infinite number of responses, some more profitable than others… where 'profitable' should not be reduced to the 'merely pragmatic'… indeed, creating a 'space' within the deontological… where the existential is non-exclusively deontological in the explicit sense of not dealing directly with ethical principles, other than as ethical guidelines should they be required to merely initiate such reflections, etc.

287 The progression from 'moment' to 'period' to 'event' to 'event horizon' to 'stream' is intimating a possible basis for trans-e/valuation of e/valuational formation in how we might wish to existentially approach either the 'secular abyss' and/or 'the abyss of the Divine' where words will directly fail us…? With more than a passing nod to the work of John D. Caputo; *The Weakness of God*: *A Theology of the Event*; Indiana University Press, 2006.

and can superficially change, etc., as an intentional necessity at the very basis of trans-formational experience itself. (272)

E.g., rectification through the hermeneutics of error mitigation in refining the choice in the mix of genres of behaviour to be adopted and adapted as relevant to the topic in question; deconstruction through the phenomenology of error correction; and the existential retreatment of overseeing an ongoing re(-)alignment with the relatively non-erroneous as an ongoing process of re(-)normalization.[288] (273)

Where, through subtle forms of preference and de-preference a hexa-modally ordered scheme can be envisaged and articulated. (274)

Where relative preferences are arrived at through de-suspensions and relative de-preferences are arrived at through focused suspensions. (275)

Where reduplication of an ordered approach realizes a trans-ordered form of creative accounting that is arrived at through argumentation supporting such innovative thinking, and, hence our accounting the disciplines of the metaphysical; psychological; theological and secular trans-e/valuation; the political-economic; scientific; historical. (276)

Where reduplication of a trans-ordered approach realizes a hyper-ordered form of an accounting of the disciplined 'space', and, hence from the psychological our arrival at the sociological, etc. (277)

Where all forms of asymmetrically ordered reduplication are productive of a hyper-ordering of disciplinary approaches, etc., such as, technically, the implicit philosophical appreciation of any form of disciplined ordering. (278)

Where the philosophical discipline is implicitly understood as a pro-ordered/pro-archetypal treatment of either the phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential, etc. Inadvertently, this does give to the philosophical discipline a relative preeminence since all forms of disciplinary and secular appreciation must involve some form of philosophical-like appreciation. Still, this implicit aspect can be overlooked (especially in a matrix-like representation of a specifically ordered form of reduplication). (279)

Where all other disciplines can be creatively accounted for through various forms of ordering, trans-ordering, hyper-ordering, hybrid-ordering, etc. (280)

But, despite the structural-functions supplied through disciplined behaviour within a secular sense of world, the secular world cannot be reduced to just these forms of ordered input… with the implication that the existential dimension is basically pro-secular in orientation. Proffering, as an extrapolated projection, a basis for the existential

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[288] Where existentially oriented alignment, through ongoing re(-)alignment, is its own reward given the differential emergence and overflowing of the ensuing existential excess in relatively positive processes of e/valuational formation both subsequently and consequently. Hence the basis for a Post-Cognitive Format for dealing with the expedition of a consequential analysis, etc.

and/or theological-like trans-e/valuation of the secular… along with its imparting of the trans-e/valuation of this 'world at large' as 'the overall world-of-life'… as to be pragmatically re(-)understood in this disquisition on re(-)e/valuational formation… (281)

Where the existential dimension is 'entered' and 'left' via the expedition of a suitable extensive suspension (along with its emphasis upon an overall transcendental suspension [mirroring an interrogative economy]; and extended economy of suspensions balanced with de-suspensions; and the promotion of patterns of productive causal alignment through re(-)alignment, etc.). (282)

Where an automatic de-suspension returns us to this world of the secular. (283)

Accounting for the relative existentialization and relative non-existentialization of experience through suspensions and de-suspensions mediating within and intermediating between the Affective, the Intentional, and the Trans-Intentional.[289] (284)

Where we seek to permit the weight of existential resolution to radically instigate and exercise a sense of permission more in keeping with the enrichment of our relationships as they are found to be relationally-situated. (285)

Thence the seeking of relevant-enrichment through suitable suspensions and de-suspensions as arrived at through the display of a competent-authenticity. (286)

That, just as the disciplined economy of disciplines can be discerned through invoking a relevant phenomenal-phenomenological, passively oriented difference; and an active differential, and an engaged distinction, along with both a hermeneutical meta-difference, etc., and an existential non-difference, etc., it follows that a non-disciplinary approach to the secular world can also be discerned, similarly, as difference, differentiation and distinction of a secular difference, along with both a secular meta-difference, etc., and a secular non-difference, etc. (287)

Where, through an extensive suspension, the pro-relational expression of the existential returns us to this secular world at large… where living-experience is textually deposited as lived-experience, etc. (which can also virtually be 're-lived' through both suspensions and de-suspensions)! (288)

Where, increment by increment, the existential is ever-ready to radically reveal this same world at large, this overall world-of-life, and bring us to an innovative point in lived-experience where we can pragmatically start to think the impossible… (289)

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289 As 'Aspects' reflecting the progressive epistemological hierarchicalization of consciousness from the Pre-Cognitive Aspect/s to the Trans-Cognitive Aspect (of judgment). E.g., in a comparison between 'the mere intention of *x*' and 'the judgment of the intention of *x* (in a certain frame of reference *y*)' it is obvious that more epistemological organization is involved in the latter act of judgment given the additional overlay of judgmental activity to also consider in the virtual or non-virtual reconstitution of these two processes. Similarly, more 'organization' is involved in the non-virtual given its co-option, as well, with an alignment with a causal domain.

Paralleling transformational retreatment from the pre-critical, to the critical, to the potentially radical… through engaging with the post-critical retreatment of the pre-critical in a dialectic that cannot forget what has gone before and aspires to think what has not yet been thought… (290)

Recognizing that 'the imputation of a world' is 'the world of imputations, and v.v.…'[290] (291)

Inhabiting a world of three levels of conjectural division, namely, 'both suspended and non-extrapolated'; 'both suspended and extrapolated'; and, 'both non-suspended and extrapolated', that respectively, can be designated as 'anti-representational', 'presentational', and 'representational'. (292)

Hence the relative non-relegation of the first division (metaphorically) to the prioritization of first-class seating; and, then, relegation of the deplorables in the second division to a second tier; and, thence, the third division of these incorrigibles to the further relegation of a third bench as befits the individual standing of this disparate mix of both insightful and insightless philosophers and their fellow disciplinarians. (293)

But, that the philosophical joke is on us for thinking like this… because through economic correlativity in an economy of imputed relegation there can be no non-relative relegation and no non-relative non-relegation given their mutual reliance on the joint negation of the other two correlative parties in order to co-define any one level of non-relegation or relegation, or any one process of relegation or de-relegation, etc![291] (294)

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290 In *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*, in *The Seventh Book*…, etc., concepts like 'imputation', 'simulation', 'representation', etc., are all 'painted' with the same qualified anti-representational brush but 'tarred' with the same traditional connotations and implications, misguided presuppositions, philosophical ramifications, fraudulent logical-dialectical constructions, etc. Economically, no correlative party can be either over-preferenced or under preferenced, be that either in terms of a past prioritization, current privileging, and/or future promotion. Consequently, ideas like 'imputation', themselves, cannot be 'extrapolated' beyond the limits of their current formulation. Otherwise, to invoke Kant, such transgressions can only end in 'endless confusions' until rectified, deconstructed, and pragmatically re(-)normalized, and so on.

291 In effect we, ourselves, do not relegate these 'deplorables; and 'incorrigibles', but, they relegate themselves. As for us, we have to dialectically include a qualified instance of their positioning in order to make some degree of relative progress, be that through error mitigation, error correction, and re-alignment with the relatively non-erroneous, and, hopefully, take on board the requisite degree of existentialization through engineering a relevant-enrichment arrived at through competent-authenticity, and v.v., in a manner that justifies itself in comparative terms. In this regard, we can be neither a pure relativist nor a non-relative absolutist. Holding a position that is unbalanced and extremist or epistemologically impossible (as a unimodalist or bimodalist, etc.) implies that being a pure anti-representationalist is just as philosophical improper as being a pure representationalist or a pure presentationalist. The same equally holding in a negative sense. E.g., being a pure presentationalist (say, as a non-relative realist) is just as improper as thinking you can become an anti-presentationalist (say, as an anti-realist) (and equally ruling out an anti-anti-respresentatinalism). If the unimodal nature of a non-relative realism is untenable then an anti-realism must be as equally untenable! I support Richard Rory's intuitions and comments to this effect (as per *irony, solidarity, and contingency; Introduction*). So, at the end of the day, we do not need to relegate such philo-

That, through a mutual process of relevant-enrichment engineered through the intuitive utilization of suitable suspensions, along with their automatic, synchronized invocation of local, global and subjective forms of de-suspension, we can meet with a positively re-directed passage through this world at large through the ministrations of such processes of pro-relational re(-)self-organization as experienced in and through this ongoing re(-)constitution of our freedom as experienced both individually and collectively..!! (295)

Albeit as a person, hopefully, who recognizes their own limitations, but, where through(-)others, together, we can find an enhancement of our collective freedom through a mutual arbitration of our aspirations… better delivered in and through a more socially organized form of collective political engagement.[292] (296)

Where the promotion of social solidarity better expedites both our collective and individual passages through this world at large, be that progression expedited either critically and conventionally or radically and non-conventionally… pragmatically deconstructing the relatively defective and re(-)constructing the relatively effective. (297)

Finding our relationships have an existential life of their own, and, in alignment with our relationships, permits such a practice to take effect, should that be deemed both 'probable' and 'profitable'.[293] (298)

Where, through avoiding a need for existential redemption, we too can become formidable philosophers, and, through our self-exemplification, and act as an existential guide in our own right..! (299)

Hence the false finality of these old beginnings and new endings in this disquisition on the nature of e/valuational formation as mutually refracted through both non-existential and existential perspectives..!! (300)

Noël Tointon, Within the Imputation of a World in a World of Imputations, 24.12.22.

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sophical miscreants for they very effectively do that to themselves. As for us, we need to take on board a modified and qualified stance of such extremism or impossible positioning in order to fulfil the required economics of the philosophical vocation.

[292] As an implicit argument or 'call' for an ongoing democratization of the political life-world.

[1] Implying, through consequential analyses, a need to justify which pattern of e/valuational formation better fulfills the objectives in which it has its genesis. I.e., comparing one virtual set of relevant-enrichment with another virtual set (where, hermeneutically, the parameters of such a comparison are already set in the evolving objectives as seen to-hand). Then the virtual is enacted in non-virtual terms of reference. Moreover, it is natural for ethical discernment to preference what is relatively 'close', but, as noted by Rorty, instigates an expansion of a local regionalism to eventually include the relatively universal (even if the latter is never ultimately realized). Refer to this type of discussion by Richard Rorty; *Pragmatism as an Anti-Authoritarianism*; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021; Chapter 8: *Justice as a Larger Loyalty*.

A Structural and Functional Commentary on Part III

To be noted is this contrast that Part III is a concerted series of arguments utilized to navigate a somewhat systematic landscape of e/valuational formation in comparison to Part I where the results of years of reflections are briefly summarized. Should the reader desire to better understand how such ideas evolved in this *The Seventh Book*… they can refer to work done either in a pre-*Pursuit* period and/or in the *Pursuit* phase. (301)

By 'structural' is meant 'intentionally understood content', and, by 'functional' is meant 'as that which has devolved through arguments' (without making too much of distinction here other than to note this emphasis in Part III as text operating more through a set of parallel series of arguments, etc.). (302)

As noted, this exploration on value is more 'a disquisition on e/valuational formation'.[294] (303)

Simply, we might argue that this disquisition concerns itself with pre-ordered, ordered, trans-ordered, and hyper-ordered patterns of e/valuation, or, more correctly, with (secular) non-ordered, pre-ordered, (philosophical) pro-ordered, ordered (in Cognitive and Trans-Cognitive Formats [with the possible addition of Pre-Cognitive and Post-Cognitive Formats]), trans-ordered, hyper-ordered, and (more complex) hybridly ordered patterns of evaluational formation (where all formats, as trimodal formations, could be nominated and denominated in the combinatorial form of suitable matrices). (304)

So, before starting, let me define these ten types of ordered format with their distinctive, but interrelated, forms of e/valuational formation:

Not-Ordered Format: Despite the apparent colonization of disciplinary input, from a hypothetical perspective, we could imagine the sense and semblance of a secular world can be visualized as being able to distinctively emerge apart from and without being merely reduced to such disciplined input.

Pre-Ordered Format: In an archetypal economic perspective we impute the existence, as economic correlativities, of a World moment (field), Object moment (focus), and Ego moment (frame).

Pro-Ordered Format: Treating the general nature of philosophy to be a variable mix, depending on philosophical objectives, and, when sufficiently suspended, to then be one part hermeneutics (World), one part phenomenology (Object), and one part non-systematic-existentialism (Ego); and, by such means, retreating the pre-ordered format as a pro-ordered philosophical basis for all forms of philosophical reflection as refracted, therein and thereafter, through an ordered perspective in some form or other (as noted in this division of ten types of ordered possibility).

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294 *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.0.

Ordered Formats: Moving from a tripartite pre-ordered format through the lens of a pro-ordered format to a hexa-modal format through the relative preferencing/de-referencing of one or two of those pre-ordered/pro-ordered correlative polarities (and where 'preferencing' is treated as 'de-suspensional in orientation', and, 'de-preferencing' is treated as 'suspensional in orientation').

> **Cognitive Format:** Hexa-modal treatment of intentional content.
> **Trans-Cognitive Format:** Hexa-modal treatment of trans-intentional judgment.
> **Pre-Cognitive Format:** Imputed ordering of pre-intentional processes-content.[295]
> **Post-Cognitive Format:** Imputed ordering of consequential ramifications.[296]

Trans-Ordered Format: Taking a certain trans-ordered format and 'multiplying' it by that same trans-ordered format creates a meta-order higher in meta-status by one meta-degree, e.g., a phenomenological-semantics of a phenomenological-semantics is invocative of a metaphysics; the aesthetics of aesthetics is innovative of a psychology (reflecting the psychological recognition and integration of such integrated phenomena), etc.

Hyper-Ordered Format: Taking a trans-ordered format and multiplying it with a trans-ordered format creates a hyper-ordered format, e.g., the psychology of a psychology is invocative of a sociology, etc.

Hybridly-Ordered Format: Where ordered phenomena with the same ordered number, but not necessarily the same meta-level of articulation, or, a different ordered number, but not necessarily with the same meta-level of articulation, are 'multiplied', on one or more occasions, with either the same or different, in order, thereby, to invoke a wider range of hybrid forms of ordered phenomena, e.g., the aesthetics (second trans-cognitive order) of the political economy (as the fourth trans-ordered order) could be read as possibly articulating the stylistic aspect/s of that same political-economy in question; or, e.g., exploring the contra-grammatical tension between 'the history of philosophy' and 'the philosophy of history', etc.[297]

Super-Ordered Format: The general discipline of 'philosophy' given its definition as 'one-part hermeneutics, one-part phenomenal-phenomenology, and one-part non-systematic existentialism'.

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295 Not currently dealt with in any reasonable form of an exploration dealing with emotions, mood, motor-sensory inputs, etc.

296 Not currently dealt with in any reasonable form of an exploration that, when suitably conducted, would need to note histories of past, present and future; consequential analyses; the aligned nature of casual processes, etc.

297 Now, the discipline of (doing) 'history' can be viewed as 'the sixth trans-ordered format' (through 'multiplication' of 'the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical with the ontical'), and, where the primarily philosophical positioning, as a disciplinarian, is to be viewed through a pro-ordered format be that either adequately suspended or not adequately suspended.

Non-Standard 'Non-Ordered' Format: The symmetrical reduplication of inter-ordered phenomena.[298] E.g., the trans-ordered reduplication of history (histories), as the history of history. (305)

As noted, these combinations can be expressed through the use of matrices should that approach be pragmatically useful. (306)

Now, despite the global integration of this ordered scheme, under these ten headings, such formats also need to be subjected to the following important 'qualitative reconstitution', namely, our accurately noting either the relative presence or the relative absence of some sufficiently suitable form of pro-relationally oriented existentialization… to be arrived at through a dynamically balanced pre-ordered/pro-ordered reading of the situation in question in its apparent situational-context and its non-exclusive existential emergence in and through the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological orientation. Basically, the entry into a sufficient degree of existentialization realized, either advertently and/or inadvertently, as exercised through a shift from the relational orientation of the participating elements of that relationship in question towards the apparent pro-relational integrity of the same situated-relationship itself. (307)

Now, relative existentialization, as an ongoing economic process of pro-relational re(-)orientation can be instigated and/or observed through economic induction (of its correlative parties) on either local, global, and/or subjective levels of experiential expression. Namely, on a local level of expression through either the contra-positioning of intentional content and/or the counter-positioning of intentional processes; on a relatively global level through a more wholesale process involving the bracketing of a background field through either a process of relative devaluation and/or disvaluation; and, on a subjective level through any suitable form of a subjective *epoche*… where similar methods can be exercised on all levels of economic involvement. (308)

That, for convenience we can schematically regard the 'non-systematic-existential orientation (of the so-called 'third moment') as just the dynamic balance of local and global levels of inductively organized suspensions, and, where the relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existential as induced and exercised through the dynamic balance of all three polarities of the local, global, and subjective. (309)

Extending the concept of 'economic induction' to the 'economic induction of the extensive suspension' itself on the grounds that 'if one or more economic moments can be suspended then a more collective, overall sense of an extended suspension, in turn, can be further induced on the level of all three economic moments (of World, Object and Ego). The 'pro-relational co-option' of the Ego moment then pro-relationally harnessing processes of resolution through an alignment with volition in this same respect, where, more correctly, the emergent pro-relational integri-

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298 Refer to *A First Digest* (*Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C).

ty of the situated-relationship itself has the apparent agency to co-opt such processes of harmonically re(-)self-organized behaviours (as orchestrated through processes of such ongoing re(-)normalization). Hence the 'pragmatic' tenor of this stance (rather than the mere expediency of a more limited fourth trans-cognitively ordered 'pragmatical' approach that, at the same time, cannot be excluded from our overall existential considerations given the existential orientation is not and cannot be exclusively deontological in tenor [through the implication/s of economic correlativity, etc.])! (310)

i. Now, let us commence. 'How do we value value?' Words like 'value', 'meaning', 'significance', 'being', 'existence', and so on, are all highly problematic for the philosopher *et al*.[299] The *raison d'être* of an ordered philosophy is to critically clarify the level and economic range entailed in such distinctions that we may feel we already understand, but, when we are trying to be philosophical demonstrate, more often than not, our philosophical incompetence in such matters. However, despite any superfluidity of arguments promoting this or that ordered formation, still, the value involved in the appreciation of such classifications, as are applied to those correlations, accommodations, and transformations being subjected to such concern and care, should be found to arise, primarily, through the usefulness of such a scheme to defuse such otherwise inevitable philosophical or disciplinary complications. E.g., confusing the intentional thought content with its ideational processes; or, confusing the trans-cognitive act of judgment with the delivery of a cognitive form of judgment in its requisite propositional format; or, confusing pragmatical judgments with deontological judgments, and v.v., etc., or our not being able to accommodate the same (in a process of transformation as demanded by a responsible person who commissions an architect to suitably design the building of a bridge that is both safe and where its costs fall within the range of a reasonable budget, e.g.), etc. (311)

Hence the philosophical necessity for this disquisition, etc. (312)

ii. In all respects, we need to run an argument for a nihilistic reading in order to account for the veritable possibility of more probable forms of transformation. On the other hand, given the emergent presence of value everywhere in this world-of-life we also need to account for this aspect, and its existentialization, through invoking a more positive form of nihilism. (313)

iii… 'Correlations, accommodations, and transformations' is a formula originally proposed to both subvert the misguided disciplinary world of so-called First Principles, or so-called Last Principles along with Middling Principles, and, as a positive way of conducting philosophical processes, etc. 'Correlations' involve 'the particularity of phenomenal-phenomenological analyses'; 'accommodations' involve the generality of hermeneutical syntheses; and, 'transformations' involve 'the specificity of existential processes of examination'. Needless to say, all three are economically correlative and, therein and thereafter, mutually linked. (314)

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299 'Et al' is alluding to 'all authentically-competent disciplinarians'.

In addition to this formular there is either added to this formula either ‘consilience, salience, and propinquity’,[300] or, the formula ‘meta-distinctions, distinctions, and transitions’.[301] Where ‘transitions’ are ‘translations within a distinction (and not as transformations between distinctions, etc.)’. Or, to consilience, etc., is pre-added the formula of ‘modal density, intensity. and propensity’.[302] (315)

Again, the disciplinarian formulations that are either unimodal or bimodal are disparaged for the good reason that they fail to make economic sense other than when being refracted through a convenient trimodal economy (which proves exactly this same point![303])! (316)

A meditation on this economic point is entertained… (317)

xii. For (psychic) ‘proximity’ we can also read ‘propinquity’. (318)

xix-xx. Our needing to ‘walk a middle path in between the positive nihilistic world of meaningfulness and the equally nihilistic world of the meaningless (all too often to be found in disciplinary disquisitions) and discerning to both differentiate and accommodate these apparent extremes as if paradoxical ‘equivalents’ (which, as a conundrum, can of course can be resolved and diffused in a similar manner to that as just outlined). (319)

xx. As noted …ultimately learning to differentiate and discern ‘the existential value of the non-existential’ and ‘the non-existential value of the existential’. Following on from this necessary relationship between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential we should also recognize that ‘the existential significance of the existential is without significance’ as ‘the non-existential significance of the non-existential’.[304] (320)

> This *Radical-Critique* is a broad disquisition on the topic of ‘value’ in the hope that, in working towards a better understanding of its genesis, we can better tap into its beneficial emergence as mutually engineered through the auspices of others. [0]

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300 Refer to Part III, 146-148.

301 Refer to Part I, 260. The distinction between meta-distinctions and distinctions is aid in a Tarskian process of truth determination, and, ‘transitions’ is a method to account for the movement of objects, object-states, etc., within a distinction. E.g., translation, reflection and rotation in a spatio-temporal distinction.

302 Refer to Part III, 141, etc.

303 So, e.g., should we feel it necessary to critique the so-called ‘realist’, e.g., in an in-depth exploration of their texts we could point out to them where they do make sense but, unfortunately for them, at the expense of their own unimodal (or bimodal) modelling, etc. That, what does make sense can be neither unimodal nor bimodal, and, what does not make sense is either non-trimodal in orientation and/or poorly constructed in such terms (and, therefore, deserves to be rectified, deconstructed and re(-)normalized).

304 In a similar manner we need to observe that ‘the relativization of the qualified absolute is as possibly significant’ as the absolutization of the qualitatively relative’, but, that ‘the absolutization of the absolute is as without significance as the relativization of the relative’. All too often disciplinarians and non-disciplinarians try to import such nonsense through forms of over-extrapolation of the impossible and over-commitment to the impossible, or, under-extrapolation to the possible and the under-commitment to the possible (as could be demanded by current existential discernment and prospective existential redemption).

In this single sentence the entire significance of this third part is entailed and where all else is irrelevant (but, where this frivolous claim can be equally deconstructed in the fact that the rest of the text is needed in order to discern and comment upon the greater significance of this small set of claims. Namely, that the appreciation of the genesis of e/valuational formation is necessary in order to better understand, both philosophically and non-philosophically, the confusing world of value (which is noted to be as confusing as our understanding/s of being, existence, etc; sense, meaning, and meaningfulness; objectivity, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and so on); that value in its broadest sense is emergent and cannot be understand reductively; and, that freedom is basically realized through the auspices of others… (321)

How, then, do we square this set of propositions with the earlier proposition that the exercise of philosophical appreciation is engineered through a joint process of pragmatic deconstruction and reconstruction? Because it is through this process, carefully enacted, that philosophical and non-philosophical value can be thematized, appreciated and allowed to critically and radically influence the course of our 'profitable' existentially re(-)directed behaviours! (322)

3. This paragraph outlines the contours of the aspirational economy that, however, is relatively ineffective without its successful incorporation within the economy of arbitration. Interestingly, it calls (by implication) for the economic cooperation of qualified forms of realism, idealism, and pragmatism (given the non-exclusive treatment of either such realistic, idealistic, or pragmatic inputs [and outputs]). (323)

7-12. For this purpose of differentiating, accommodating, and transforming different forms of e/valuational formation we find the heuristic device of 'orders' within whose embrace we can try appreciate all forms of 'value', both non-existentially and existentially, both in a discipline world and in the world of the secular. (324)

13. Here a definition of the process of existentialization is reintroduced, namely, relevant-enrichment refracted through competent-authenticity/authentic-competence… with the understanding that this orientation is expedited through the suitable exercise of extensive suspensions, and de-suspension. Moreover, it is also argued that the primary sense of value (third trans-cognitive order), whether existentially oriented or non-existentially oriented, is deontologically located with secondary adjuncts in the aesthetic (second trans-cognitive order) and the pragmatic (fourth trans-cognitive order). (325)

Hence the noted observation that existential e/valuational formation is non-exclusively deontological in tenor. Where, it needs to be stressed, a non-classical sense of the 'deontological; is being referred to, namely, 'without direct reference to so-called ethical principles, etc.' (326)

15. The point is made that one order can undo the e/valuation of another (as well as amplifying the same through non-chaotic augmentation and chaotic enhancement). E.g., a play could portray a murder that if it were to be literally enacted would automatically

disestablish its aesthetic pretensions. However, this same observation can be deconstructed by noting that people will attend public executions, as the Romans did in going to the arena for centuries to view much that would be similar. Hence evidence for the reiterated perversity of the human character? (327)

31. As one way of demonstrating the nature of the suspension we can note the general behaviour of the audience *vis-à-vis* their specific behaviour as if they were not members of an audience being confronted by a similar type of situation. (328)

32. In regard to the dangerous 'rabbit holes' of conspiratorial thinking it is suggested that we generally avoid the suspension of disbelief and defer instead to the suspension of belief (that is then automatically de-suspended). Avoiding also the extreme position that wants to declare the world as more than just 'like' a deceptive dream. The apparitional moment of the 'as-if, as-if, as-if…' being the third moment in the interrogative economy that decides whether we are being with the literal or not (by reference to the signature of their modal complexions, etc.). (329)

40. *Value… is to be only found in 'deconstructing the defective and re(-)constructing the effective' with consequential ramifications that can be both critical and radical in orientation*. This distinction between the critical and radical is very important in the context of a pragmatic philosophy. It is a distinction between 'the merely reiterated in terms of the conventional canons of the logical', and, 'the dialectical implications entailed in the re-iterated chaotic bifurcations, emergences and phase changes'. If those chaotic changes are relatively positive in orientation, then we could benefit from an exponential level of profitability. (330)

42. A harmonic reading is a dialectical progression from the World moment to the Object moment to the Ego moment as a sequence of consonant background field, the dissonance of a foreground focus, to a resolution of the former through some form of framing of the same. The harmonic moment of resolution is also coincident with the non-systematic-existential moment wherein we discern the concrete historical specificity of that under review. Ongoing resolution also establishes the relative 'facticity' of a relationship along with its emergent, non-reductive sense and semblance of 'relational presence'.[305] (331)

47. Although economic correlativities are relatively incommensurable, still, through the existence of an economy in question, its economic correlativities must also be economic non-incommensurable, i.e., economically commensurable. To illustrate this point we have the apparent aesthetics of a well-designed door being reinforced when being utilized, but, where an ill-fitting and dysfunctional door will quickly undermine those same aesthetics, etc. (332)

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[305] 'Facticity' being 'the extent that a relationship manifests a sense of presence above and beyond the mere summation of its relational element or mere embodiment'. 'The experience of presence', being a valid phenomenon given the non-reductive nature of the emergent relationship.

49. Where the deontological has a power over the merely pragmatic as often demonstrated in a court of law where juries may well feel impelled to side with this second trans-cognitive order of the deontological. (333)

53. Recognizing that the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential as found co-occurring need not be seen as antithetical to the 'value' of each other. (334)

58. 'We must begin with that is to hand', hence our invocation of the hermeneutical, as the pre-critical, as that which frames our dialogical relationships and their depicted forms of narration, indeed, frames and makes sense of the very set of probable questions that will most probably will be asked. (335)
63-68. The question is asked: *how do we make this transformational-transition from a relational attitude to a pro-relational attitude*?[306] Basically, by invoking an existential attitude instigated, etc., through the utilization of a suitable suspension and its delivery of an insightful de-suspension. (336)

67. An argument is presented for a qualified understanding of 'presence' given relational 'facticity' and the emergent, non-reductive nature of relationships. (337)

69. In an economy of phenomenal-phenomenological descriptions, hermeneutical prescriptions, and (non-systematic) existentially oriented proscriptions… the argument is run that the existential is exercised from a proscriptive point of view. I.e., informing you through an experientially simulated existential imperative as to 'what not to do'. Implying that a double negative in this regard would or should lead to a process of recognizing the need for some form of apposite existential redemption. Hence, the need for a concerned, proactive, prospectivity and its careful delivery of a proscriptive resolution that is apposite within the relational-situatedness of that currently to-hand. The classic example here is what to do with a hungry person, i.e., you should not leave them hungry and from there in a position where they would starve to death. In this hypothetical situation you have an infinite set of possible responses to contemplate, but, of course we would only consider those that are effective and relatively to-hand. Pragmatically, there is no definitive response in this type of situation, but, whatever works needs to work… since the prime objective is to successfully oversee the feeding of that person. So, this 'double negative' as just cited, in this situation, first, is 'that you should not leave a hungry person in your purview in a state of hunger', and, second, your response was 'that you did not leave that person in a state of hunger by overseeing that they got fed'. Given, such a situation, then, 'you should not leave that person hungry', and, as a concerned and caring person, you discharged your duty 'by not avoiding what needed to be done albeit by whatever route you chose to fulfill that compactually oriented sense of duty'. Again, 'you should not shirk your duty', and, in that specific situation, 'you did not avoid doing your duty'.[307] (338)

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306 Also being asked a second time in paragraph 66.

307 We could say that this double negative is a bit 'stretched', but, as the proscription is negatively formulated, then, its negation is the dutiful discharge of that same proscription. Or, it is not the case that this person has not been fed.

85-86. A scheme of four divisions prepares us for a more comprehensive scheme under ten headings. The beauty of this latter scheme is such, that, hypothetically, we could creatively account for all forms of disciplinary behaviour as well as an existentially oriented non-disciplinary world of the secular. (339)

Moreover, treating philosophical appreciation as a pro-relational matrix mirroring the archetypal economy and its attempts to appreciate an ordered matrix or a trans-ordered matrix (arrived at through reduplication of the matrix of concern), etc., then all correlations, accommodations, and transformations, etc., can be ideally accounted for through such hypothetical matrices in their unlimited operations upon each other. Just as, e.g., the philosophical appreciation of the aesthetic (second trans-cognitive order) would be:

(W, O, E) x (W-, O+, E+) (340)

> Without the apparent representation of that to-hand the imputations of that seemingly being presented could not arise, and, similarly, the apparent presentation of that being represented to-hand could not arise likewise. [93]

What is meant and what is not meant by my use of this world 'representation' (and its economic co-associate 'presentation')? For myself, 'what is being represented' is 'the reiteration of a presentation that through 'progressive' retention takes on an almost ongoing, self-refining sense of self-identity that borders on the re(-)self-organized process of thematization'. In other words, what is being 'represented' is 'the reiteration of the representation itself'. I.e., the preservation of the transformational isomorphic invariance being currently experienced plus the more superficial transformations imposed upon the same. On the other hand, this representation (of itself) is not of that which cannot be represented through being mistreated as some other worldly, inhuman, eternally 'True Reality' or 'Truth' that by its very nature totally discounts its existence as that there-for-us since "what is not there for us is not therefore us, and, we need not be there for it"! Therefore, the classic idea of representation is not be being represented here! (341)

Representation is conceived of as in an economy of representation (which is equally an economy of presentation or re-presentation). I.e., one part representation (World), one part presentation (Object), and one part re-presentation (Ego) where this latter moment of re-presentation is chaotically oriented, and, in addition, is also equivalent to the moment of anti-representation which, therefore, renders this representational economy as also anti-representational in orientation. How should we understand this apparent 'sleight of hand'? In a trimodal economy of imputation the anti-representational orientation is 'both suspended and non-extrapolated', and, therefore, anti-representational in tenor. A state of identification reinforced through economic correlativity, economic complexification (through the coincidence of other features in an archetypal alignment with the Ego moment) and negatively as neither presentational nor representational in this economy of anti-representation/representation (consisting of the three moments of representation, presentation and anti-representation). However, the clinching argument here is that as representation, presentation, and re-presentation are all unattainable and unobtain-

able it follows that their economy must also be one of an anti-representationalism. Hence this equivalence (and its closer focus in a parallel with the imputational moment that is both suspended and non-extrapolated which is also coincidental with the moment of re-presentation). Moreover, from the joint negation of both the moment of presentation and the moment of representation we arrive at the moment of re-presentation/anti-representation… (342)

Hence 'representation' is 'the persisting of that which is transformationally isomorphic, as a relative objectivity or continuity, that through re(-)iterations takes on an intentional form able to be appreciated in trans-intentional terms of reference in conscious awareness' (but, at the same time is nothing to do whatsoever with that which cannot be interacted with, does not change, has no form of human constitutional construction and involvement, is neither linked to nor subsists in some realm beyond space and time, etc., etc.). (343)

102. The quality of the output reflects the quality of the input, etc. The observation is also made that we can form a certain judgment, but, that judgment, in turn, needs to be meta-appreciated in order to better appreciate the quality of that output. But, if that were to be the case, would it not imply level upon level of appreciation, i.e., a proliferations o meta-levels? No, of course not! But, how do we explain our escape form this conundrum? By reference to the circulation entailed in the economy of transformational retreatment. Where retreatment as posttreatment is able to modify the initial (set of) judgment arrived at, etc. So, problem resolved. (344)

104-106. The important question is asked: how do we transform the non-existential into that which is existential in orientation? The answers supplied, in summary, is a process with suitable pre-conditions, etc., subjected to a suitable suspension able to deliver a suitable response in and through the invocation of a suitable de-suspension…[308] (345)

108. Some degree of trial and error is involved in a pragmatic response as we search for a response that more appropriate, etc. This idea is entailed within the concept of an ongoing 're(-)normalization'. (346)

111. An argument for a nihilistic position is now articulated, namely, as all forms of identity can be neither attained or obtained, therefore, all non-nihilistic forms of identity could not and cannot be appropriated… The determination of a 'positive nihilism' is arrived at through the observation that we also live in a world of value, a world of e/valuational formation that can be positively amplified through pursuing positive forms of re(-)e/valuational formation that, hopefully, are existential in complexion. (347)

117. The overall philosophical concept that argues for both the non-relative, absolutistical non-indubitability and indubitability of truth determination implies that all judgments should be treated as 'provisional' even those judgments we might otherwise

[308] As noted, the de-suspension is usually delivered automatically, and that is the case, however, the concept of 'permission' implies the necessary alignment on three epistemological level of psychological organization for the full delivery of a 'suitable response'.

bet the house upon (and, despite this qualification of the ‘provisional’, would still perform this same bet). (348)

118. A number of points are made that should contribute to an advancement of social solidarity (a social aspiration voiced by Richard Rorty). However, this transformation is effectively centered in the arbitrational sphere of influence, preferably, when subjected to suitable processes of existentialization. The mechanisms that would both represent and present such a transformation are not spelt out, and, indirectly indicate one of the future directions where further research should be taken. (349)

119. Now the argument is made that without representation, as here understood, there could be no imputations, and, without a sphere of the re-presented anti-representational there could be neither non-radical change nor radical change! In effect, giving us two of the three moments of the economy of imputation as previously delineated. Mediating these two economic moments we need to infer a third, namely, that possessing ‘both a suspension and an extrapolation of intentional content’. Recognizing, in the process, the important distinction between change that is both relatively non-radical and critical and that which is both relatively radical and critical. Since it is with critical input through deconstruction that we can innovatively entertain those steps that supply a relatively radical tenor to our proceedings. The realization of the promise of the instantiation of a positive radicalism hopefully contributing an exponential rewarding of such innovative, chaotically oriented, re-self-organization. Noting that all innovation is incrementally realized through tweaking different stages in the sequential performance of that genre of behaviour being invoked (and through that adoption, adapting it to the exigencies of the relational-situation to-hand in such a manner so as to realize the positive objectives either wittingly and/or unwittingly achieved). (350)

120. *In this in-between-land we entertain positive and negative probabilities*. Meaning probabilities that are either more likely or less likely for an occurrence of that situation to arise. *Furthermore, through the application of a rule of non-equality in identification we could say that no probability is ever identical in its ascertainment with any other or even in the matters of the history of its own discernment*. Contra Leibnitz… even an identity is never absolutistically identical with itself given change, albeit in the apparent maintenance of the presentation of a co-associated relative-objectivity and the imputation of its *a priori* semblance of its co-occurring continuity. But, given the selective nature of our discrimination in such matters, just as on some situations we might see individual trees and on other occasion the extent of a forest, and where the possibility of this oscillation implies the artificial nature of our discrimination… other than to the extent the particularity of such discriminated phenomena still presents with a persistence in phenomenological characteristics that, with due proximity, can be found reiterated more or less at will, and, therein and thereafter, be found to reinforce the expectational reliability of such presentations. Just as individual trees are seen to make an individual glade, or grove, or forest, and, can then be relooked at once again as apparent entities in their own right. Obviously, we normally walk a middle path in such dialectical re(-)positionings. In the same vein, the observation that the ontical determination of various historical claims cannot be equal implies that we have reasonable grounds for the twin concepts of ‘insurance and

assurance', i.e., that we can always return to a previous position of greater positivity in truth determination and then start again in the rewriting of our provisional strings of truth-claims in which we take a certain degree of assurance that we might then be on somewhat firmer ground through the clarification and appreciation of such claims, be they operating with either an overt or covert complexion in that same regard... (351)

129-135. It is an observational fact that value, in its broadest sense, can be discerned everywhere. In this regard it could also be argued that without a nihilistic 'basis' there could be no e/valuational formation of any kind. That there is value to be observed everywhere implies that this nihilism cannot but be, on balance, anything other than positive in tenor. That granted, we now look into the difference between non-chaotic augmentation and chaotic enhancement (and how the latter can be a much faster route to realizing an exponentially greater surplus in e/valuational formation). That the chaotic point of bifurcation or emergence or a phase change is approached incrementally. As an observation we could say that in a progression of increments a point of bifurcation etc., would be inevitably realized just as heating ice produces water, and heating water produces steam, etc. (352)

148. 'Simulations' like 'representations' are 'simulations of simulations' (just as 'representations' are 're(-)presentations of themselves in an evolution of thematized significance generation') and are never simulations of that regarded as pre-simulated, or trans-simulated, etc. However, given the non-appropriation of economic correlativities through non-attainability and unobtainability, and, all relationships ae directly engendered, it follows, therefore, despite a nihilistic reading, that we are in a direct relationship with that being engaged despite its epistemological presentation and ontological-like representation. That, perception, conception, and judgmental apperception, etc., are all directly engaged. Indeed, given the absence of a non-nihilistic substantialism, along with the non-existence of either a so-called external world (or worlds) and the corollary of a so-called internal world (or worlds) it follows that engagement must be directly engendered for how otherwise could we account for 'the simulation of direct engagement' and 'the direct engagement of the simulation' in question. For convenience, supplying relatively provisional objects, object-states, objectives, an inter-objective space, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, etc. Treated in an imputative frame of reference we have the imputation of direct interaction being simulated in all three states of imputation, surviving both extrapolation and non-extrapolation, both non-suspension and suspension. Otherwise, the fabric of the imputation could not be initiated, thematized, expedited, etc. (353)

149-150. The economic correlativities of the public and private spheres of influence are mediated through the arbitration of an arbitrated sphere of influence. Thence the basis for our freedom in 'our working with others as they work with us'. The basis for social solidarity being 'centered' in these operations of the arbitrated sphere but economically radiating out into both the public and private spheres given the economic definition of any one 'correlativity' as 'the joint negation of the other two correlativities in that economy in question'. Then, that granted, what are these 'mechanisms' or 'operators'? Those processes that positively promote either non-existential e/valuational formation and/or existential e/valuational formation, but, preferably where they harmoniously work together, cooperatively, and so on, given 'that existentialization is the relative existentialization of

the relatively non-existential', etc. Implied, in this context, is the need for further research to ascertain these relevant mechanism and operators, etc., that promote the relevant-enrichment through competent-authenticity as mediated through suitable suspension/de-suspension, etc. (354)

151-154. Economic correlativities are both relatively incommensurable *vis-à-vis* each other and also mirror each other in terms of a relatively invariant isomorphic correlativity by virtue of being in the same economy. This economic understanding granted, it means we can run phenomenological analyses back-to-back with hermeneutical investigations, and, similarly, with existential examinations. Upon such a basis we can also run processes of phenomenological error correction, hermeneutical error mitigation, and, non-systematic-existential alignment in an attempt to minimize the relatively erroneously nature of our imputations as revised to date. Along with evidential support, competent testimony, the use of a conventional logic plus the re-directed innovations of radical shifts in appreciation, etc., the reiterated refinement of a Tarskian determination of truth determination can be progressively and fruitfully entered into… whilst accepting that each and every iteration of a truth determination should be hypothetically treated as provisional even if not so treated in that exact light under more practical circumstances. (355)

155.165. In this section some quite radically innovative ideas are tentatively introduced for both critical and radical re-appreciation. E.g., although the secular world is treated to an endless succession of disciplinary inputs if we were to accept that a secular difference, differential and distinction could be ascribed to the secular world along, with a secular sense and semblance of meta-difference, etc., and non-difference, etc., then we should be allowed to conjecture that the non-reductive nature of the secular world (in our experience of its *je ne sais pas*) is coincidental with the existential, and v.v? One more reason for recognizing that whether the secular world should or should not be seen in a religious light is up to the religious or non-religious person respectively, but, at the same time, that such a non-reductive existential dimension does appear to support this form of an identification between the secular and the existential? In effect, arguing that the pro-relational attitude is equally coincidental with the secular, etc. (356)

This same section also broaches the idea of 'sacrifice' which should not be rendered purely in religious terms given its deeper basis underlying the nature of the social system in question. Just as the broad concept of 'existential redemption' likewise implies that this once religious idea, and others, can be refracted through a more secular sense of setting (just as, likewise, it is an observation that an existential philosophy can be adopted and adapted by both religious and secular fraternities equally… proffering one positive avenue for a dialogue between these inheritors of a secular world). (357)

166-184. Our philosophical and hermeneutic tools are to be regarded as /'heuristic devices'. But, even though such devices will be suspended, still, they invite the difficult question of to what extent, if at all, they reflect or mirror the world in some trans-metaphorical or non-metaphorical or apparitional sense? However, such considerations can be short-circuited once we recognize that we have seriously retranslated a series of ideas through an integrate set of economic images, ideas, concepts, etc. Such ideas of 'presentation',

'representation', 're-presentation', 'anti-representational', etc., are all interlinked through the requisite sense of the economic, i.e., as relatively incommensurable economic correlativities, etc. Given all such correlativities, and all other concepts, etc., can be neither attained nor obtained it follows that no sense and semblance of the represented, e.g., etc., could possibly be mistreated in any classical form or format invoking the impossible concept of the external world, e.g., etc. Why is such a metaphor impossible to envisage in an apparitional, literal mode of treatment? Because no metaphor can be treated literally unless it can be transformed in and through an apparitional lens in a literal sense that can be subjected to a relatively definitive form of truth determination? The invocation of the metaphor 'external world' is essentially contradictory because the world is proposed as if seen through the eyes of an agent and then through the eyes of a homunculus and then through the eyes of a meta-homunculus, and so on… rendering this metaphor as literally impossible to exercise in a definitive literal sense. That an 'internal world' is also as equally impossible to envisage. Seemingly able to work as a metaphor but, again, impossible to definitively translate into a literal mode of envisualization. Indeed, just how many external and internal worlds do we need when, correctly, none are needed in any non-metaphorical sense. (358)

184. The advice given is that we need to avoid both the extreme and the impossible… revealed through the use of a suspension? How is that possible? Through the suspension we enter judgment, and therein and thereby, explore the conventional, investigate the hermeneutical and error mitigation, delineate the phenomenological and error correction, test out the integration, integrity and alignment of our current imputations through realignment in a context of apparent evidence, testimony, inference, within and between either overtly and/or covertly conducted histories of the past, present and future, etc. How otherwise could this not be the case given an overall suspension is at the center of the interrogative economy[309] (along with the rhetorical suspension, etc.) and all other economies, disciplines, conventional modes of comportment, and so on and so forth. (359)

The text notes again, indirectly, the conventional concept of the 'transcendental suspension' albeit as refracted through my more complex concept of the lens of the 'extensive suspension'. The former is inspired through the work of Husserl, the latter extends those ideas through a complex economic lens that takes on board the interrogative economy (as the 'overall transcendental suspension'), the imputed observation of the necessity for a de-suspension (in the 'extended suspension'), and a need to relate to a causal world (in the fully developed concept of the 'extensive suspension'[310]). (360)

185-189. Now, the implication is drawn that the discipline of the philosophical is somewhat different from all other disciplinary economies being treated as pro-ordered mirroring the archetypal economy of the pre-ordered. Pro-ordered being one part hermeneutical, one part phenomenal-phenomenological, and one part non-systematic-existential. This accepted, the further implication is drawn that a philosophical attitude is either explicitly recognized or implicitly non-recognized. That understood, we can drop this aspect as

309 I.47, 262, 291-295, 308, etc.

310 Where ideas of 'trans-intentional permission', 'intentions', and 'motivation, etc.' come together in the enaction of behaviour, etc. Refer to III.229, 235, 284, 285.

potentially redundant. On the other hand, should it be explicated in conjunction with that disciplinary topic or topics under philosophical exploration then this can be represented in the form of a complex matrix, as a series of matrices, as outlined. (361)

190-202. Now we look more closely at the archetypal constitution of both orders and trans-orders and their representation in the form of a complex matrix, etc. (362)

203-214. This type of consideration is now extended to hyper-orders and hybridly constituted orders (the difference hinging on a sense and semblance of symmetry/asymmetry, etc.). (363)

215-218. Now the topic of a (transcendental) suspension as understood within the extensive suspension is being approached through the three headings of 'local, global and subjective'. (364)

These definitions of the global, etc., are indirectly referencing the archetypal economy albeit more directly through the invocation of the interrogative economy. E.g., the global suspension, concentrates on background fields and utilizes the rhetorical 'either/or'. Interestingly, all circular economies can be read in both clockwise and anticlockwise directions. In this reversed light, instead of arguing for a first metaphorical reply and a second apparitional reply, we could argue that the apparitional 'as-if, as-if, as-if…' could be extended to read 'as-if like', meaning, 'as-if both like and not like'. Then, continuing in this direction, in further reading the 'both like and not like', we could argue for the 'as-if-like an either /or?' and by such means rephrase the course of our response accordingly. That in this instance, moving from the 'provisionally literal' to 'interrogative enquiring'. (365)

219. Without a suitably adequate degree of deconstructive clarification it is suggested we have, as a result, a relatively obstructed understanding of the relationships currently being hermeneutical represented through forms of error mitigation meeting general positive approbation. Such ideas referencing the formula: rectification, deconstruction, and ongoing re(-)normalization'. 'Emplacement' refers to either 'our aspirational emplacement, an arbitrated displacement, and, a selectively realized de-displacement arrived at through intersubjective processes of re(-)normalization,' and/or, 'our embodiment/s, embeddedness/es, and embankment/s within this world at large'. (366)

220. The concept of 'attunement' (or 'at-onement', etc., as a process of integration, and integrity-formation) is implicating a recognition of the need for suitable degrees and forms of relational alignment through exercising an economy of re(-)alignment.[311] Such improved 'alignment' also comes with a general improvement in our insightful understanding of that primary relationship in its relational-situatedness. Both alignment and insight, not necessarily in an exact reflection of each other's differential transitions, being arrived at through both non-chaotic incremental orchestration and chaotic non-

[311] Then mentioning here of an 'economy of' re(-)alignment, correctly, is redundant since the nomenclature of '(-)' indicates just that, namely, 'processes of hermeneutic reiteration, phenomenal-phenomenological iteration, and non-systematic-existential re-iteration'.

incremental enhancement (hopefully with a positive complexion). That the latter, enhancement, although not incrementally engineered is arrived at through an incremental progression in order to realize either that bifurcation, emergence and/or phase change. However, both forms of amplification are instrumental in a re-adjustment of our current experience of an overall semblance of freedom. (367)

222-235. Now we approach (needlessly) the philosophically vexed topic/s of presence (and absence). But such an idea need not be controversial if by 'presence' is read 'our experience of an emergent difference, differential, and/or distinctiveness in our pro-relational representation/s of our relationships (in their relational-situatedness)'.[312] Hence this qualification of 'apparent presence' or 'relative presence' or 'simulated sense of presence'.[313] (368)

It cannot be stressed too much, but, in the light of the work done to date in this dialectical re-visioning/revisioning of representation, economic correlativities, etc., there is just no room for such misguided traditional concepts, like, e.g., substance, presence, etc. (and various, apparently negative concepts, like, e.g., absence, a nihilistic positioning, etc.)! (369)

What is this 'nest' of problems about to be addressed (and redressed)? (370)

Problems dealing with volition, will, the enactment of intentional objectives, the exercise of a motivated intentional intent, etc. Or, more specifically, just how do we engineer an enacted act of non-virtual deliberation? (371)

In paragraph 225 these problems are partially listed. In essence, a basic problem is the lack of a non-binary (and non-uni-modal) modelling of those problematic issues. For a start, we note previous work that widens the terms of reference around the metaphor of a 'switch', as in, e.g., 'the use of a light switch'. But this metaphor is extended to invoke a process of triple switching in order to account for this nest of problems such as, e.g., just how does the virtual take on a non-virtual form of causal enactment, etc. (372)

The concept of 'permission' is re-explored. Briefly paraphrased, we could say such problematicity is defused given the introduction of a third term in some form or other. It being suggested that it is possible that the sheer weight of 'affectively constituted motivation' is sometimes so powerfully motivated that it is able to override instructions to the contrary issued by permission.[314] That, when all three levels in epistemological organization are aligned, and de-suspensions are relatively non-obstructed, then the co-option of a causal dimension follows accordingly somewhat in the wake of its prior virtu-

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312 Conversely, but not symmetrically, by 'absence' is meant 'either the relative absence (or absenting) of such presence, or the absence of a set of nominated state/s, predicate/s, or relation/s, or the complete absence of an extreme or impossible notion of the substantial, or similar'.

313 On the further understanding that simulated 'simulation' means 'only the simulation of a prior simulation and not otherwise, with no relation whatsoever to that the imputation of a pre-simulation state of affairs that is not-simulated, etc.'

314 Refer to III.335.

al formulation. Or, in essence, preferencing a re-direction of behaviour rather than a mere virtual redirecting of simulated behaviours. (373)

236-237. How might we define 'responsibility'? 'Positively in terms of those sequentially enacted steps that are productive of a relevant-enrichment, etc., and, negatively, in removing those features that are obstructive of the former'. By such an attitude there is promoted, hopefully, a more competent expression of one's own authenticity. Paradoxically, this freedom to be is to be enacted more through letting the trajectories of our relationships express their own re(-)self-organization, etc., rather then the fingerprints and footprints of our aspirations, etc., to that extent we are in a productive position to oversee the execution of these arbitrated ambitions through the auspices of others.(374)

238. Part III claims to be a 'Guide' to the existential dimension. In this regard, just where do we start? (375)

We are told that this is directed through the three headings of the hypothetically-theoretical, etc. In other words, through the combined auspices of Part I, Part II, and Part III as entailed in this 'The Seventh Book...'. (376)

239… So, what is this existential dimension? That *relational experience viewed from a pro-relational perspective, etc*. Such a concept is also intimately linked to our experience of an overall sense and semblance of freedom.[315] The metaphor of the intact broom and disconnected boom-head illustrating this inescapable interconnection. (377)

240. Now we briefly considered the holistic nature of pro-relational (and relational) experience.[316] I.e., the ability for the information entailed in a certain relationship to be spread through the ambit/remit and composite, i.e., 'orbit' of a relationship equally from every point in that same relational orbit. Phenomenologically we can experience this in our analyses of distinctive experiences, through eidetic reflections, through the apparent nature of existentially oriented experiences, etc.[317](378)

241. An 'existential differential' is defined as 'an existential excess capable of promoting and re-directing existentially oriented behaviours'. (379)

242-254. A number of observations are made as preparations and performances for the instantiation of a relatively productive existential orientation (that could be either subjectively engaged or intersubjectively engaged; where the latter state of affairs is attested to in the attentive reception of the aesthetic, etc., as a phenomenon apparently able to be shared by both individuals and groups of individuals alike regardless of whether the

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315 This expression 'sense and semblance' is used to indicate both our conceptual and perceptual forms of appreciation, along with an apperceptive appreciation of the negated unity of the former in an act of trans-intentional appreciation, i.e., judgment.

316 Richard Rorty, on numerous occasions, refers to the holistic nature of pragmatic experience. Here, I am trying to account for this coincidence between the pragmatic and holistic experience by reference to the holistic nature of existentially oriented experience.

317 As existentially witnessed, e.g., in an experiential unity of histories of the past, present and future, etc.

members of the latter are in direct communication with each other or not. Although this intersubjective alignment is also further promoted more quickly through the recounted sharing of such a phenomenon [such as, e.g., a movie, a novel, a play, a famous painting, etc. Witness the additional delight and insight afforded through such an intersubjective exercise in these and other forms of mutually entered into processes of 'pragmatic' understanding]). (380)

246. The existential portends the potentially radical… at any moment, often unannounced: *Along with the exhibition and utilization of novel languages, innovative patterns of behaviour, the articulation of uniquely new forms of consequential resolution*, and so on and so forth. (381)

247-248. The existential is seen 'to have a life of its own'. We might explain this by reference to the concept of 're(-)self-organization'… as in evidence in the semi-independent trajectories of our relationships seemingly having a momentum of their own, and as capable of entertaining chaotic moments of re-direction, be they perceived or apperceived as either relatively dramatic or less dramatic, and perhaps not necessarily observed as such. That *this 'existential moment' or 'period' could be seen as an existential 'event' as we holistically find it unfolding within its 'event horizon', i.e., those terms of reference that indicate the 'orbital extent' of that relationship in question, etc.* Later, I will argue that these moments can be further linked to form an 'existentially oriented stream of experience'. (382)

249. The pro-relational, existential orientation has been described elsewhere as 'back to front, upside down, and inside out' as a series of metaphors to indicate that the holistic nature of pro-relational space-and-time is quite different in experience from a more relational, materialistic conception of the same. As a metaphor of this dialectical upending or 'turning-around' I note that *a friendship is described as 'had' too*, like a pocket full of coins, *but, at first, meaning more 'shared', when, more correctly, those friends should be seen as being shared by that friendship in question by virtue of the fact that the relationship emerges and is 'greater than the sum of its parts'*. As a geometrical metaphor we might declare non-existentially oriented experience as like that had in either flat Minkowski space or the curved space(time) of an de Sitter universe, whereas, in a contrast, the pro-relational is seemingly entertained in a hyperbolical space(time).[318] (383)

…254. Existentially oriented experience is distinctly different from relatively non-existential experience. Hence existential hallmarks, etc. Therefore, it follows that the dissemination of existentially oriented political power should also be perceived and apperceived as distinctly different in tenor. (384)

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318 Can we take this metaphor further to suggest that the quantum phenomenon of entanglement occurs in a hyperbolical-like space(time)? Noting the fact that the Malacena Duality is an apparent, correlative phenomenon between conformal field theory and the exposition of an anti-de Sitter space(time). That, in a similar fashion, we have a correlative state of affairs between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential by virtue of the fact that 'the existential is the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential'.

255. The confluence of the public, private, and arbitrated domains give us the political-economic sphere of influence (designated as trans-ordered duplication of the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical). In this regard, we note that the public sphere parallels the political domain, the private sphere parallels the economic, and the stylistic sphere parallels the arbitrational domain. Archetypally, these three domains mirror World, Object, and Ego respectively. (385)

256. Even though the existential is personally instigated through an alignment of pre-conditions conducive to this transformational-transition, still, in the dissemination of power the spirit of the existential needs to find an intersubjective basis through conducive forms of arbitration with an existential complexion. However, we should not despair (too much) for the arbitrated sphere of influence is predicated on an existential basis, i.e., the relevant-enrichment of our relationships, etc. Thence the question posed in this paragraph in light of the observation noted in paragraph 257... (386)

258-259. The argument is made that social solidarity[319] can be fostered through an existentialization of both personal and interpersonal power relations. But what might be a comprehensive listing of such mechanisms conducive to the experiments, etc? That must be left to be pursued through further research. Although it should also be noted that the existential complexion of a compactual basis already underlies the operations of the contractual dimension.[320] (387)

266-267. But, an asymmetry exists between the personal and the interpersonal domains to the extent that the personal needs to be better organized interpersonally in order to better expedite the functioning of the political-economy for the betterment of all parties. Hence the formula or motto ‘don’t get angry, get organized!’ (388)

268. Now, some ‘final’ last words… channeling Richard Rorty yet again. Pragmatic code for provisional truth determination, working with the best forms of competencies and skills we have… innovating, when necessary, thinking thoughts hitherto that had been impossible to have thought… in essence, being pragmatic to the very best of our abilities. (389)

269. *The ‘existential’ is a ‘valid experiential phenomenon that arises from an emergent awareness of our relationships in their relational-situatedness*… admittedly more overlooked, however, once recognized the distinctive nature of existentially oriented experience will then not be so overlooked. ‘Valid’ in the particular sense of being ‘a phenomenologically distinctive type of experience’ like all other distinctive types of experience treated as equally valid. However, given that it ‘underlies’ or ‘overlies’ all intentional

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319 ‘Social solidarity’ was a pragmatic objective articulated by Richard Rorty. I have argued here, and elsewhere, that we need to invoke an arbitrational sphere of influence intermediating a private sphere and a public sphere in order to advance that objective of ‘solidarity’. However, the mechanisms, both existential and non-existential that further such a project, need to be better discerned, defined and delineated, and further refined, and so on. Hence this need for further research.

320 In a contractual relationship power relations between individuals and organizations, etc., are never treated as equal. The converse is true for the compactual basis that must underly the operation of such agreements (or promises, deontologically enacted behaviours, etc.).

experience and underwrites or ‘overwrites’ all relevant-enrichment, etc., of all positive e/valuational formation its practical-recognition is vitally important in the expedition of both a disciplinary life and a secular life. (390)

270. That once the existential event horizon is sufficiently recognized as such, *it can also be encountered and engaged in each and every moment… stretching that event horizon into an existential stream of experience since there is no division between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential. Because the relatively existential arises through the existentialization of the relatively the non-existential, and v.v., and, where the relatively non-existential is approached through the de-existentialization of the relatively existential.* Such an attitude means we could, hypothetically, engage an existential orientation through our daily life, day after day. However, the practical exigencies of life will forever interrupt this pleasant reverie, still, on the other hand, our awareness of this streaming of life-experience can placed on hold in the background of our consciousness , idling as if it were, ready to reappear should the occasion ‘call’ for such (relatively internal) mediation (of the current relational landscape), or (relatively external) intermediation (between a number of relationships), or, indeed, existential remediation of the relationship in its relational-situatedness. As already noted, the experience of the existential orientation for some people is a religious-like experience and, for others, an enriched secular type of experience. At the end of the day there is no need to decide such an issue other than to accept its experiential trans-e/valuation of relatively mundane, relational experience… and call it what you will. Indeed, being ‘pragmatic’ in such matter, regardless of one’s own religious preferences or non-preferences. (391)

271. Our imputed world of experience has a certain dialectical objectivity – from the apparent continuity of relative-objectivities through relatively isomorphic transformational invariance to the alterations in identity, functionality and valuation imposed in a more superficial manner to the intentional objective in question. Hence the formulation of a philosophy of transformational retreatment and on to the twin concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’, etc. Thence the transcendental-like basis for the very possibilities of truth determination, identification, the determination of functions, and so on. (392)

274-394. It is with some amazement that the entire world, as able to be engaged, can be accounted for within the integrated complexity of an ordered philosophy. From the non-ordered, non-ordered-reduction of the secular world as approached through a veritable variety of ordered formats to the individual ordered formats. Hence the pre-ordered, etc. That, through various forms of reduplication higher ordered formats can be thematized. That, asymmetrical forms of reduplication will also produce hybrid formats. (393)

282-284. That the existential orientation, or ‘dimension’, is entered via the extensive suspension, finds some form of suitable causal alignment,[321] and, is then automatically left, in part or in whole, via the ensuing de-suspension… returning us to the world of the secular with a status in keeping with the form of existentialization either more fully entered

[321] That alignment being either with virtual patterns of brain activity and its epistemological correlates, etc., and, on to enacted patterns of non-virtually oriented behaviours in a co-opting of overtly oriented causal responsiveness, responses, responsibility, etc.).

into or not so fully entered into. In the process, observing various degrees of relevance in both existential and non-existential terms of reference… Where, as an interrelated converse, the secular world, too, can be designated as having a non-disciplinary, secular difference, differential, and distinction as well as having a meta-secular difference, etc., and a non-secular difference, etc. In the process, granting the secular world to be its own semi-autonomous economy along with its coincidence with its distinctive existential underwriting (or overwriting[322]). (394)

291-292. Recognizing that 'the imputation of a world' is 'the world of imputations, and v.v.…' For how else could we navigate this world at large, etc., if it was not first entertained as an 'imputation', i.e., as a possible conjecture, etc? (395)

292. Entertaining an overall, imputed sense and semblance of a world divided three ways, namely, on a first level of a suspended non-extrapolation of imputed content; a second level of a suspended, extrapolation of imputed content; and, a third level of a non-suspended, extrapolation of imputed content. In this regard, the first level is anti-representational in orientation; the second level is presentational in orientation, and the third level is representational in orientation. (396)

293. Hence the relative non-relegation of the first division to first-class seating; and, then, relegation of the deplorables to a second tier; and, thence, further relegation to a third bench respectively for the totally incorrigible; such seating arrangements applying equally to both philosophers and their fellow disciplinarians. Now, as first-class philosophers we would spend most of our time with other first-class members. Occasionally, we might correct a member of the second division, but, totally avoid those remaining incorrigibles. And we already know who they are, the unimodalists and bimodalists; the conspiratorial fabulists and literally mis-construers of metaphors; the logical literalists and the dialectically deaf, dumb, and blind… in a long list beginning with realists, idealists, empiricists, rationalists, materialists, absolutists, relativists, and so on *ad nauseum*! (397)

> **But, that the philosophical joke[323] is on us for thinking like this… because through economic correlativity in an economy of imputed relegation there can be no non-relative relegation and no non-relative non-relegation given their mutual reliance on the joint negation of the other two correlative parties in order to co-define any one level of non-relegation or relegation, or any one process of relegation or de-relegation, etc!**[324] [294]

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322 Balancing the metaphors of 'underwriting' with its corollary of 'overwriting' (along with an implicit cancelling of each other in its being upright, along with a re-righting of comportment, etc.).

323 A part of this joke is the case that, in this 'economy of potential relegation', there can be no 'pure' first class seating! Because such a 'seat' can be neither attained nor obtained, and, therefore, cannot be sat upon! For a more detailed explication of this imputational topography refer to *Pursuit*, III.7Z.122-125.

322 As per footnote 290: This 'turning around' on our understanding of relegation means only deplorables and incorrigibles self-elect to maintain this state of relegation. A 'deplorable' is a 'pseudo-philosopher or philo-sophist' who runs 'extrapolated imputations albeit whilst suspended', whereas, an 'incorrigible' is a 'pseudo-philosopher or philo-sophist' who runs 'extrapolated imputations without adequate suspensions'. Merely asking questions, e.g., is not exercising an adequate suspension. As for the reputable philosopher, taking a first-class seating, they must appropriate a qualified and modified version of

Or, put another way, we could say that our imputation of a world, as refracted through a suitable economy of imputation, necessitates the mutual cooperation of the first division, the second division, and the third division because, as economic correlatives, we could not define the anti-representational stance of the first division (as anti-representationalists) as nothing else other than the joint negation of the second class (as presentationlists) and the third class (as representationalists). So, yes, in the philosophical world, as in the disciplinary world at large, we do have our exemplary members operating to the pragmatic best of their abilities, but, we also have the deplorables and incorrigibles who in effect isolate and exile themselves to a philosophical wilderness, some form of a disciplinary Siberia, the emptiness of an intellectual desert... They may appear to be talking to each other, but, the more incorrigible they are the more they think they sensibly communicate with others, when, in living-reality, they are not even talking to themselves if their speech is ever-riddled with improbable extremes and impossible themes... (398)

295-300. In a sense we have gone full circle. We start with the relatively pre-critical to hand, and the attempt to rectify the same through error mitigation; then, move on to the critical, realized through the deconstruction of the defective through error correction; and, thence, to the potentially radical consequences of the retreated as arrived at through ongoing pragmatic processes of re(-)normalization in and through re(-)alignment with that provisionally regarded as relatively non-erroneous…[325] (399)

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such economic correlativities. Hence just as philosophical appreciation can be defined as pro-ordered, i.e., one part hermeneutics, one part phenomenology, and one part non-systematic-existentialism, in a similar manner the same first-class philosopher is one part qualified representationalist, one part qualified presentationalist, and one part qualified anti-representationalist… because only in the balanced suspension of all three economic polarities can we conduct suitable forms of philosophical exploration, albeit subtly preferenced/de-preferenced and reduplicated, symmetrically or asymmetrically, when the disciplinary topic or topics in question calls for the same. By 'qualification' is meant 'the recognition that economic correlativities, as polarities, cannot be appropriated because of their non-attainment and their non-obtainment'. In effect, a more sophisticated 'reading' of the philosophical problem posed in the *Pursuit*, Volume II, 'Where is father Xmas (Pere Noël)? The solution adopted there, and understood by all children no longer fooled by the perpetration of a cultural lie, that we needed to be one-part qualified realist, one part qualified idealist, and one part qualified pragmatist given this 'aspiration' 'to know where Father Xmas is?'. Given this aspiration, even before it's suitably tempered by an economy of arbitration, we needed to first fulfil the minimal, mutual, modified realistic, idealistic and pragmatic conditions of the aspirational economy before proceeding to eventually understand that this 'mythical character' can only have a 'mythical form of existence' despite the proliferation of images and persons purporting to represent this sole figure within this continually evolving cultural myth. That in any ideological form, we just cannot make effective progress, and, neither can we make any real progress if were to adopt any pure, uni-pragmatic form of an approach. That to achieve the requisite, relevant-enrichment authored by the authentically-competent, as exercised through the suitable exercise of all required suspensions and their duly delivered de-suspensions, we must accept the world to function and work together through many moving parts and what could be more pragmatic than the recognition of this idea of a 'mutual-reciprocity' at the existential core of each and every relationship?

[325] But we should also note that there are both symmetries and asymmetries between suspensions and de-suspensions. That latter are more able to express 'the life of (the situation in) that relationship' if rendered relatively non-obstructed… as a way of accounting for this process of existential re(-)alignment.

Hence this disquisition on e/valuational formation operates at the same time as a radical guide to our pragmatic navigation, negotiation, and arbitration in and through the experiential domain of an existential dimension…

> **Where, through avoiding a need for existential redemption, we too can become formidable philosophers, and, through our self-exemplification, act as an existential guide in our own right.!!** [299] (400)

Completing this first section in Part III of *The Seventh Book*…

Noël Tointon, conventionally afloat upon this floating world… 30.12.22.

A: Afterword, in the form of an open letter…

Dearest Reader,

Although not superstitious, I would rather my 'final' last words not be a testament to a static sense of an ending, but, more a dynamic prelude to what else can be said, be that either by myself or others. However, in truth, we are still carrying on a conversation with the dead, even though we might be talking to those who do give a passable performance of being alive and living, although not necessarily full of wit and wisdom… (a)

In the wonderful world of Chinese poetry there is a genre of the death poem, The last poem of a poet written on their death bed… perhaps by a poet too feeble and bedridden to be written with their shaking hand, but, taken down through dictation by a fellow poet, or loved one… demonstrating such devotion to this form of art. (b)

Alas, philosophical problems have a deplorable tendency to never die and ever persist upon an intellectual landscape. If, by chance, I have been able to dispatch just one such insistent mirage then I will rest content. But, as in all probability I have failed in this endeavour, it is my hope that some more able spirit might be able to proceed to pick up on my meager jottings and, therein and thereafter, complete this task that has apparently eluded my very best efforts in this same regard… (c)

'Death' has been designated as merely 'a change in state'.[326] *In the writing of this* The Seventh Book… *late at night I lost an evening's work through a computer error of mine, seemingly, a premonition of things to come. Indeed, no text can see out the death of time itself. The ultimate fate of this overall world-of-life, apparently, is the great ripping apart of time and space itself… against this inevitable backdrop, this abyss at the end of all time, even this simple ambition of finally being read, and meeting some mutual degree of understanding, must pail and fade into total insignificance... (d)*

But, without such destruction nothing could be constructed, and then reconstructed, and so on. In this hopeful fact of existence, let us trade a negative nihilism, in a radical change of pace, for a positive form ever resonant and resplendent in the promise of a fruitfully productive process of e/valuational formation… in whatever form it might eventually take…. (e)

Noël Tointon, both somewhere and nowhere, without a name, 31.12.22.

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326 E.g., in certain forms of Buddhist philosophy.

B: Supplement A: *Some Loose Threads...*

Metaphysical Ramifications of Relational Resolution: Concerning a Qualified Rehabilitation of the Ideas of The 'Center' and the 'Essential' Along with an Exploration of the Symmetries and Asymmetries Between Suspensions and De-Suspensions in the Context of An Existential-Secularism: As Refracted though the Pragmatics of Constructive Insight Where Relational Integrity of the Life-World Can also be Read as an Existential-Theology Through the Putative Theologicalization of the Existential Event Whilst also Insisting upon an Ongoing Suspension of all such Treatment In the Viable Formation of an Open, Pragmatic and Positive Nihilism...*[327]

> Interestingly, an existential philosophy is not the sole preserve of either religionists or non-religionists. Indeed, both fraternities happily invoke its apparent methods and insights, and, in this regard, we might marvel how this state of affairs might proffer profitable grounds for dialogues to be conducted both within and between such fraternities. Then, how might this observation be utilized for engineering fruitful interactions and responses across the spectrum of both disciplinary and secularist pre-occupations? Upon what grounds could this hope be successfully engendered?[328]
>
> [18]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In the quotation above, from an earlier essay, I ask a certain rhetorical question, namely, how might an existential approach, by implication, radically confront all disciplines and the secular world from the enriching perspective of the enaction of an existential orientation? Hence the apparent *raison d'être* of this essay. However, since writing *The The Seventh Book*... a number of themes have arisen that need to be further addressed hence the following essay, and, that I have had to sketch it out more in the form of a series of hypothetical axioms[329] if only to more quickly work through these additional issues in need of being tied up... a process, I should add, that can never be finished and where such 'axions' stand in need of debate from the perspective of their being understood but not their automatic acceptance... In referencing the title, I will be arguing that we have to do this, primarily, from a secular point of view since 'it is in our being in the world' that allows us to then 'invest, hopefully, in the productive utilization of those disciplines able to assist us in our making our passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively'. That such a passage can also proffer a theological reading

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* For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

327 This essay, effectively, is a continuation of these recent themes of the pragmatic and the existential, their overlapping, etc.

328 Pursuit, III.7S.18.

329 Taking up this idea from François Laurelle. Wishing to create a certain understanding 'axiomatically' rather than impossibly attempting to present or represent the way reality is supposedly configured, etc., in metaphysical-like terms of reference.

through the non-ideological treatment of the existential as an ‘event’ that acts as if a ‘doorway into and from a more theological-like treatment of the overall life-world that, equally, can also be read along the lines of an existential thematization of a secular vision of a world through the mutual arbitration of our freedom therein...’ (0)

Implicitly, an economy of interaction is envisaged between the private sphere, and its phenomenological and semantical preoccupations; the public sphere, with its hermeneutical emphasis upon genres of behaviour; and, the existential sphere where we encounter relatively engaged patterns of resolution in our relationships through arbitration that, hopefully, contribute to their progressive, ongoing re(-)enrichment in e/valuational formation. I.e., that are productive of suitably relevant forms of enrichment that appositely address matters of identity (identification), function (functionality), and value (valuation) along with ideas of competency and authenticity, etc.[330] (i)

First, I will explore this relative experiential primacy of the secular world albeit through the pre-acceptance of the pre-conditional ONE (the One Not-Evaluated/Not-Explicated). That given this sense of the ONE enters into economies of representation, presentation, re-presentation, etc., it follows that we cannot claim the precedence of any one economic feature, but, we can claim the relative precedence of an existential difference along with a necessary co-associated non-existential difference. Thence the metaphysical configuration of this type of philosophical exploration.[331] (ii)

Next, I will explore both the metaphor of ‘centering’ and our discerning the ‘essential’ through phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential lenses whilst also abrogating both the ideas of an actual center and the impossible existence of traditional concepts of essence. (iii)

Then, I explore how a disciplinary approach can contribute to an existential enrichment of the secular world, and v.v. (iv)

From questions about the nature of the suspension, etc., as the primary mechanism for the existentialization of experience, this topic will then be looked into in greater depth through an appreciation of the symmetries and asymmetries to be discerned between suspensions and de-suspensions along with the deeper ramifications presented by such explorations. (v)

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330 Technically, trans-intentional judgmental evaluation is productive of positive forms of responsive and responsible valuation in terms of identity/identification, function/functionality, and, value/valuation as discerned in and through an economy of e/valuational formation. A theme that is also pursued in *Pursuit*, III.7W, *The Seventh Book...*, and elsewhere. Where, as an experience of value, we have the primary field of the deontological (purged of all so-called ethical ‘principles’ be they either so-called ‘first principles’, ‘middling principles’ or ‘last principles’), and, as secondary adjuncts, we have both aesthetical and pragmatical contributions as well.

331 Carefully taking a few, selectively chosen leaves from Neo-Platonism and some ideas presented by, say, François Laurelle whilst also carefully avoiding all nonsensical ideas like that of a pure immanence or a pure transcendence, and similar.

Next, I will address the possibility of a theological-like treatment of a secular vision of the world through exploring the existential nature of the ‘event’ as if it were a ‘portal’ to an ‘experiential appreciation of the integration and integrity of the overall life-world’. However, such ideas, in their acceptance by the religious person, should not be allowed to transgress on to an ideological level of dissemination through the preservation of an ongoing suspension in their simulated exploration. That, in effect, such ideas also have an equally important in our re(-)investing in a viable sense of the secular world. (vi)

Last, I will note the ensuing ramifications of these ideas in the form of a series of provisional conclusions, etc., as refracted through a neutral, open, pragmatic, existential, deontologically oriented, positive nihilism.... (vii).

1. The Relative Priority of the Secular World

Without a sense and semblance of a ‘world’ there would be nothing and we would be nowhere, indeed, naught. (1)

But nobody thinks, whilst they see themselves as ‘living’, that they are naught. (2)

Moreover, what freedoms we have we find through arbitration within a world of the other. (3)

The sense and semblance of ‘one world’, there for all of us, despite its reception, however, as seeming to be as if a bewildering multiplicity of themes and variations. (4)

Given, for a start, that we can see, or overlook, the potentially conflicting semblance of our various senses of self through reflection and self-reflection, etc. (5)

And that the potentially problematic to be found in our passage through this world at large is usually already defused through the application of certain historical conventions set up to resolve such issues such as e.g., certain classic contestments between the deontological and the pragmatic, as, furthermore, already enshrined in law and regulations, etc. (6)

Where through the apparent resolution of such a variety of themes and variations it then further reinforces this sense and semblance of the transcendental-like unity of this ‘world-as-lived’, this ‘overall life-world’, ‘this world at large’. (7)

Hence the metaphysical notion of the ‘ONE’ as the pre-experiential basis for such ideas, etc. (8)

I.e., the ‘One-(as)-Not-Evaluated’, or the ‘One-(as)-Not-Explicated’, but, which, when given some form of explication, then presuppositionally heads us in that distinctive direction of philosophical delineation. (9)

Arguing for the viable domain of the metaphysical, as a discipline, through symmetrical reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenological categorization of the semantic, etc. (10)

Given that the categorical treatment of the categorically distinctive in phenomenal-phenomenological experience is meta-categorical, and, therein and thereby, can be treated as if it were a metaphysically oriented discipline. (11)

By such creative means, we can account for the articulation of all disciplines. (12)

Charitably extending the viability of any discipline through the experiential 'presence' of a positive disciplinary difference, etc. (13)

But deeming the exercise of such a discipline to be 'fraudulent' when it transgresses the natural limits of either its deployment, employment and/or re-deployment through misrepresented modes of mis-employment. (14)

The 'ONE' can be imputed as the 'living-basis of living-experience', but, rendered as that which has been textualized in 'lived-experience'.[332] (15)

Thence its intentional deposition as a textual situation, deployed through an appropriate meta-textual genre of behaviour and, therein and thereafter, simulated in and through non-textually oriented experience within the parameters of the textual economy in question. (16)

As a relatively circumscribed, pre-conditional unification of an imputed basis for experience, nothing more and nothing less..? (17)

But, since the ONE, economically, can neither be just purely represented, nor just purely presented, nor just purely re-presented it follows that any attempt to do so is to talk nonsensically and behave accordingly. (18)

However, what we can point out is the irreducible 'presence' of an existential difference![333] (19)

And, just as importantly, a non-existential difference, etc... and the positively differentiated evolvement on the experiential part of both meta-facets. (20)

Hence the 'richness' of existential and the non-existential contributions, but, more importantly, the evolving enrichment of their positive differentiations. (21)

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[332] 'Living-basis' reflecting the hyphenated concept of the 'life-world', as a 'world-of-life'... along with its implicit reflection of the 'suspension of both the epistemological and the ontological' as the 'trans-ontological-epistemological' (TOE).

[333] Meaning that by 'difference, etc.', we should read as 'a passive difference, as an active differential, and as a distinctively engaged distinction'.

To illustrate these points, we note that ‘we can neither live by bread alone nor the smell of burnt offerings’.[334] (22)

Just as a hungry person needs a bowl replete with food rather than a plate filled with mere existential platitudes! (23)

More importantly, noting positive differentials in our experience of these existential and non-existential differences (as differentials, etc.). (24)

I.e., as processes of relevant-enrichment. (25)

Just as leaving a hungry person hungry and being instrumental in their ensuing death contributes to a diminishment of the enrichment of this world for all of us in this world. (26)

A hungry person has less freedom to both be and become, whereas, a dead person, has relatively lost that same possibility for freedom. (27)

Recognizing, too, that ‘the relatively existential is realized through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, etc.’ (28)

A positive meta-existential differential development contributes to the relevant-enrichment of the primary relationship in question. (29)

That can then enrich its relational embeddedness. (30)

Thence the co-development of both the pro-relational and the relational. (31)

Thence the co-associated ideas of both ‘competency’ and ‘authenticity’ through a process of pro-relational alignment of that primary relationship in its relational embeddedness. (32)

As mediated and intermediated, hopefully, through existential oriented patterns of relational transformation overseen through suitable processes of suspension and non-obstructed processes of de-suspension.[335] (33)

Through ongoing resolution, we invoke a form of ‘centering’ through the increased gestalt integration of the overall state of our ensuing epistemological organization. (34)

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334 *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.52; and footnote 243.

335 Invoking horizontal-like processes of mediation, etc. Within the primary relationship, and vertical-like processes of intermediation between relationships, etc.

2. ‘Centering’ as a Practical Metaphor and the ‘Essential’ as Descriptive

The use of metaphors as metaphors *qua* metaphors can be useful if both relevant and do not overstep the boundaries that would involve their mis-employment. (35)

I.e., when we promote their transgression, say, through unimodal, bimodal, absolutistic, relativistic, illogical or extremist forms of theoretical deployment, etc. (36)

E.g., through suitable forms of an ongoing resolution we advance the degree of our current gestalt integration in what metaphorically appears to be a ‘centering’ of our subjective resources. (37)

Thence the utility of this type of metaphor as long as it does not invite deconstruction through the mis-employment of such an expressive-device. (38)

Interestingly, from a relational point of view, we have the ‘integration’ and ‘centering’ of a relationship in relatively ‘external’ relational terms of reference. (39)

Whereas, in the relational holism of a pro-relational perspective, experientially internal to that relationship, every point in the orbit of that relationship acts as an equal ‘center’ in that primary relationship, and, equally, in the overlaid relational world of its embeddedness.[336] (40)

By such means salvaging the idea of a ‘center’ through the metaphorical treatment of a process of ‘centering’ whilst dismissing all ideas of a pro-relational sense and semblance of an absolute center invoked through any mis-employed metaphorical form of transgression. (41)

Similarly, we can salvage ideas of the ‘essential’ through recognizing the relative distinctiveness, and relative phenomenological purity of distinctively focused phenomenal-phenomenological treatment of the semantic in its experiential atomicity and molecularity. (42)

Along with similar metaphors when approvingly applied to our utilization of appropriately invoked forms of genre once subjected to appropriate error mitigation. (43)

In the eating of this apple, I find myself relatively unhindered in the discharge of an appropriate alignment with my correctly exercised sequences of actions, as adopted and adapted to these current circumstances, etc. (44)

Or, too, the apparent purity of an alignment with the relatively non-erroneous as experienced through the apparent ‘purity’ of an existential specificity in line with my

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336 Having defined elsewhere the expression of ‘orbit’ to ‘encompass the passive ambit, the active remit, and the engaged composite of that sense and semblance of a relationship in its relational embeddedness’.

phenomenal-phenomenological recollections, hermeneutical expectations, and my current existential anticipations, etc. (45)

Without insisting that such relative at-onement is arrived at through any form of a nonsensical and absolutistical sense and semblance of a purity of experience or being, as some form of pure experience or pure being, where, laughably, misinformed people will insist on thinking they are talking about the 'in itself' as 'the in itself and for itself', etc., *ad nauseum*. (46)

Salvaging the relative concept of 'purification', be that in either religious or non-religious frames of reference, without transgressing the metaphorical boundaries of what otherwise would be an impossible concept.[337] (47)

3. An Existential Perspective on both Disciplines and the Secular World

Without a secular sense and semblance of the world at large there could not be the confluence of disciplines either individually or collectively. (48)

Still, despite such enrichment, the secular world, through the irreducibility of its existential secular differences, etc., and non-existential secular differences, etc., has not lost itself... (49)

Thence our experience of the secular world as both the *je ne sais pas* and as the *je ne sais quoi*!? (50)

Because the emergent, in all its experiential forms, cannot be reduced! (51)

As the very basis of pro-relational experience, etc., in living-experience. (52)

Both the positive and negative flows of existentially oriented and non-existential oriented experience devolving from the symmetrical and the asymmetrical interplay of both suspensions and de-suspensions, etc. (53)

4. The Symmetries and Asymmetries between Suspensions and De-Suspensions

Although it is conjectured that with each act of suspension we get an automatic invocation of a de-suspension, still, the metaphorical 'landscape' in between must con-figure the imputed manner of our being projected back into this world in and through the realized specificity of the ensuing moments of resolution as experienced in and through that primary relationship. (54)

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337 E.g., we can relatively purify gold of its impurities, but, we can never be certain that we have completely purified that same material already 'purified'. Not being able either to recognize, encounter and/or engage this state of the purified as the purified *qua* purified, etc.

As demonstrated in the conjectures of an ordered philosophy based on the ensuing perception and apperception of a subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of the correlated archetypal moments being ‘presented’, etc., in the articulation of any economy. (55)

Hence, e.g., the symmetry of the invocation of a de-suspension, and the asymmetry of its ensuing expression dependent upon the specific configuration of its ensuing expression. (56)

In this regard we might suppose a relatively defective overall suspension can only be productive of a relatively defective de-suspension. (57)

Or, metaphorically, that a de-suspension is relatively ‘obstructed’ from expressing the positive trajectory of the primary relationship if defectively suspended in the first place. (58)

Where being either imperfectly rhetorical (e.g., in the inappropriate asking of a question), imperfectly metaphorical (e.g., in supplying an improper *a priori* first reply), and/or imperfectly apparitional (in identifying an inapposite form of a literal second reply). (59)

Hence these defective asymmetries can be treated as forms of obstruction given that they act as effective impediments in the mis-directed delivery of a relatively non-existential resolution of a suitable series of responses. (60)

In this regard, upon reflection, a typology of such obstructions could be profitably delineated. (61)

Such as are listed in any list of philosophical mistakes, e.g., under the heading of the illogically presented, ideologically represented, and the relative misinformed instantiation of the process of re-presentation, etc. (62)

Given that in any economy we need to progressively deconstruct the pre-critical, radically re-direct the critical when called for, and, radically reconstruct through a critical lens the pre-critical and its conventions should that be necessary too. (63)

Thence this qualified concept of a ‘purification of our standing’ through the ‘progressive clarification of our economically oriented research’. (64)

Treating the existential and non-existential dimensions of the event of resolution as a template for such an evolving, pragmatically oriented, progressive economy allowed to be self-realized through a non-obstruction of such insightfully informed processes of re(-)self-organization, etc. (65)

As already had in experience through processes of error mitigation, error correction, and ongoing alignment with the apparently non-erroneous nature of our relationships as progressively appreciated through a pro-relational stance (66)

Exemplified through a relevant-enrichment from a competent-authenticity as should devolve through the relative non-obstruction of our relationships to harmoniously express their own patterns of resolution both on our behalf and on their behalf. (67)

Where pragmatically there are no absolutely perfected modes of expression only those modes that suitably express all that which is required for the overall, ongoing enrichment of our relationships. (68)

Hence this philosophical configuration of a pro-relational, existential 'ethics' that is primarily deontological in orientation but not at the general expense of either pragmatical and/or the aesthetical. (69)

Without a need to invoke so-called 'ethical principles' other than as 'pre-critical guidelines' (that may well need to be radically reconfigured in 'progressive' processes of transformational retreatment as the unique specificity of certain situations is ever found to evolve). (70)

In this regard, not confusing a pro-relational ethics with a relational ethics given the inescapable presence of the existential complexion as characterizing (the raw material of) all our relationships. (71)

Enaction being viewed as a triple switching of intentional objectivity, pre-intentional motivation, and trans-intentional permission, and, where it is best instigated through suitable processes of suspension and their more aligned forms of non-obstructed de-suspension in and through a process of causal alignment.[338] (72)

The existential focus of our relationships being seen to act as an 'event' whose existential sequencing becomes an 'existential event horizon'. (73)

5. Putative Forms of Theological Treatment

For some, the existential is read as a religious experience, whilst, for others, it is read as an enrichment of secular experience. (74)

Where the event horizon can be seen to intersect and proffer the basis for either set of interpretations. (75)

Whilst potentially proffering profitable dialogical forms of fruitful interaction both within and between such styles of interpretations. (76)

Thence defusing potential conflict through the imposition of this form of a suspension of what otherwise cannot be other than ideological patterns of confusion. (77)

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338 Alluding to *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.226-233.

Wherein all such preferences are merely recognized, encountered, and engaged as such without the impossible reification of their imputational extrapolation, etc. (78)

‘Observing’ the absent-presence/present-absence of the ONE through the irreducible nature of an existential difference, differential, distinction, etc. (79)

And, more importantly, ‘observing’ the positive differentiation of the same through the passive, active, and engaged engagement of our pro-relational identification with our embedded relationships, etc. (80)

As ‘enacted’ through permitting our relationships to express themselves on our behalf. (81)

Hence for some ‘the theology of the event’ and for others ‘the secular enrichment of our lives’ is such that where, through the extensive suspension, there can be no impelling reason for us to ideologically differentiate between the same! (82)

Thence the metaphysical-like ramifications of relational resolution... (83)

Where emerges, through the ONE, from the integration and integrity of the life-world, is found a metaphorical ‘voice’ through the irreducible presence of an existential differential and its positive differentiations, but, from which we then detour should we be deaf to such mutual demands... (84)

Acting as an existential theological event horizon for some, and, for others, as a secular event horizon where we meet the historical, concretely unique, existential specificity of our direct engagement in this overall world-of-life. (85)

Totally unmediated through the auspices of the ONE. (86)

Whose presented ‘presence’ is re(-)presented through the irreducible nature of the emergent. (87)

Hence the qualified salvaging of this metaphorical concept of ‘presence’ through our experience of such existential differentials and their meta-evolution. (88)

As better delivered through a ‘centering’ of our intentional appreciation through an existential purification of the relative erroneous in our critically receptive exposure to the emergent, re(-)self-organized nature of experience... (89)

Thence the causal possibilities for a ‘progressive realization of an insightfulness’ in understanding the ensuing nature of our stance in this world as engaged with(-)others, before(-)others, and through(-)others. (90)

6. Provisional Conclusions, Comments and Observations

As ever a work in progress... there can be no non-provisional conclusions.... (91)

So, no need either for so-called ‘First Principles’, ‘Last Principles’, and ‘Middling Principles’. (92)

Starting with pre-critical, hermeneutically oriented accommodations, critical phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented correlations (through correlation either with themselves and/or between accommodations and transformation), and, non-systematically existentially oriented transformations. (93)

I.e., advertently or inadvertently through exercising rectifications, deconstructions and re(-)normalizations. (94)

Where suspending the pre-critical gives us the critical, the suspension of the critical gives us the pre-critical, and where the balanced suspension of both the pre-critical and the critical gives us the radical nature of the post-critical, and, where the balanced suspension of the pre-critical, the critical and the post-critical gives us an intimation of the systematically existential... (95)

Helping us to find a ethical reciprocity in our direct interactions with others, in our indirect interactions mediated through other others, and in and through those moments of spontaneity as realized through the irruptions of the compactual to heave apart the relatively non-existential aspects of a contractually oriented secular sense and semblance of an evolving integration and integrity of ‘The World’, as the ONE, into which we are ever existentially thrust... (96)

Helping us to deconstruct the relatively defective and re(-)construct the relatively effective as we work through our histories of the past, present, and future, etc! (97)

Find our existential freedom through the arbitration of others... (98)

In the evolving formation of a qualified anti-representational, deontological and pragmatical pragmatic philosophy that proffers an existentially positive nihilism through an ideological absenting of substance, presence, absence, center, essence, beginnings and endings, along with all forms of an illogical intentional purification, self-reification and other-reification, and so on and so forth..!! (99)

Where we learn to differentiate, through pro-relational re(-)self-organization, the relatively emergent from the relatively non-emergent..!!

...in an impossible task of attempting to ultimately tie up ‘some loose ends..’ (100)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 16.1.23.

C: A First Digest

C: A First Digest*

In this, *The Seventh Book*…, to date 48 modules have been sketched out with which to work through in order to obtain an essential understanding of this anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism. However, although the writing of *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*, in three volumes, is drawing to a close, my latest findings, developed through more recent research, have not found a summarized representation within its confines. To rectify this omission, I have included 2 more modules dealing with, namely:

901: Advanced Imputational Treatment, and,
902: A Non-Standard Pragmatic-Existentialism (i)

In thoughts pre-echoed in the previous section titled *Supplement A*: *Some Loose Threads*… I noted:

> …in an impossible task of attempting to ultimately tie up 'some loose ends,,,'
> [100]

…that, although this mission must ultimately fail, still, we must feel it to be a worthwhile process to undergo, albeit ever-mindful that, although we cannot do this 'perfectly', still, we must hope that there is merit in forever attempting the impossible… (ii)

Hence this *A First Digest* that, to some extent, has been written to stand alone in so far as all definitions and arguments will be at least sufficiently sketched out that they can be read in their own right. Of course, for a greater depth the reader would need to refer to this book in which this summary is contained. Moreover, the extended-essay 12D was also conceived of as a 'commentary on this text before it was written' and thence the extensive use of footnotes citing this same, recent text. (iii)

Hence this more mature philosophical presentation of an Anti-Representational Pragmatic-Existentialism as now refracted through a critical-radical, non-standard stance in re(-)positioning/s....[339] (iv)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 15.2.23.

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* For latest version (1PreviewVII): www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage5.html

339 In this first digest, although not currently contemplating a second, I will be refining what I would like to see found in my more definitive version of a 'final' anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism. In this 'perfect philosophy', as an ongoing participant in a process of 'perfected philosophies', like 'final vocabularies' and 'definitive histories', through both my own efforts and the relevant work of all others, Needless to say, hopefully, 'perfected' is meant to be read in an ironic sense (like the subtitle *Beyond Criticism*) and be seen in the shadow of the work of Richard Rorty where I have endeavoured to further flesh out prominent details of his pragmatism as ever a 'work in progress'.

Part III.C: A First Digest

Index

1. Advanced Imputational Treatment 901

2. A ‘Non-Standard’ Pragmatic-Existentialism 902

Miscellaneous Appendices, Postscripts, etc:

A: Appendix A: A Parallel Dictionary…

B: Appendix B: Representation of the Systematic-Existential, etc.

C: Postscript: Some Additional Considerations

D: Rules for Determining a Non-Standard ‘Non-Ordering’

E: Guidelines for Conducting a Process of Consequential Analysis

F: Conundrum: *Hypothetical Polyvalency of Truth Determination*

G: The Re(-)Concluding of a Conclusion

H: Delineating the Non-Historical, etc.

I: Differentiating Economic *versus* Non-Economic Commentaries, etc.

J: Differentiating and Delineating a Viable Sense of the ‘Absolute’

K: The Scope of the Non-Economic, etc.

L: Note: Two Styles of Commentary

1. Advanced Imputational Treatment 901

‘Imputations’ as ‘conjectures’ about the world at large,
presented as ‘seemingly valid configurations of the overall life-world’. (1)

An economy of imputation, like all economies,
needs to be explicated trimodally. (2)

In natural expression treated as ‘extrapolations’[340]
with or without the requisite degree of suspensions.[341] (3)

I.e., as apparent objectivities projected to have an existence in either
the impossibility of the so-called ‘external world/s’ and/or ‘internal world/s’. (4)

Reintroduced in a first version in order to provisionally explicate
extrapolations, suspensions, and types of relegation. (5)

Hence the first version which, through deconstruction,
then informs a more fit second version as below:

A 1st Imputational Scheme with Relegation for Second and Third Class Inhabitants

First-Class Seating	Non-Extrapolation	Fully Suspended
Seating on a Second Tier	Extrapolation	Fully Suspended
Seating of a Third Tier	Extrapolation	Not Suspended

A 2nd Imputational Scheme with only Self-Referred Forms of Relegation

First-Class Seating	Trans-Relational Suspensions
Seating on a Second Tier	Local (Content) Suspensions
Seating of a Third Tier	Global (Functional) Suspensions (6)

With self-relegation, and non-other relegation of such professionals under
the rubric, respectively, of ‘first-class philosophers’, ‘deplorables’, ‘incorrigibles’. (7)

Of course, the joke is on us if we were to refer such disciplinarians for relegation given that a qualified anti-representationalism depends on the qualification, persistence of

340 *Pursuit,* III.VII.II.266.

341 *Pursuit,* III.VII.II.267. By ‘requisite’ is meant ‘adequate’, beyond ‘the simple asking of a question’, etc.

all economic correlativities, e.g., as a qualified representationalism, a qualified presentationalism, and a qualified re-presentationalism…. and their collective suspension.[342] (8)

We can easily transition from the first scheme to the second through deconstruction of the former; e.g., the hermeneutic mode of the pre-critical, in being rectified, necessitates suspensions even if absent to merely begin with. (9)

Hence 'suspensions all the way down and all the way up... so to speak'.[343] (10)

I.e., through revision, a suspension of relational functions; next, relational content; then, the relational dimension itself as discerned through the uniqueness of our appreciation of lived-experience as approached both individually and collectively. In effect, re-defining 'extrapolations' as 'not trans-relationally oriented', i.e., that 'which arises through a misconstruing of relative-objectivities, e.g., etc., as non-relative, absolutistical-objectivities be they reviewed as either 'representations' and/or 'presentations'.'[344] (11)

Upon much reflection, and starting from a point of relative non-insightfulness, I would like to venture that this scheme can be more deeply understood, respectively, as our entry that ventures into the realm of full 'global suspensions' as 'suspensions of all relevant intentional functions'; then proceeds to the realm of full 'local suspensions' as the further venturing into the 'suspension of all relevant intentional content', and thence to a realm of full 'trans-relational suspensions' as 'the joint suspension of the former through a full suspension of all relevant trans-relational re(-)presentations of our primary relationships in their co-associated, relationally understood situatednesses'.[345] (12)

'Trans-relational' is equivalent to 'pro-relational' and 'systematic existential' whose perspective is from a trans-cognitive stance as trans-intentional, etc.[346] (13)

Whereas 'global' and 'local' refer to the intentional, respectively, in terms of hermeneutically oriented functions, and, phenomenologically oriented content. (14)

That when the so-called 'third moment' of the 'non-systematic-existential' is sufficiently suspended within the non-systematic existential economy then the economy of the systematic-existential is allowed to emerge in its own right which then leads to the overt expression of the latter.[347] (15)

'Imputations', as 'conjectures' supply a logical dimension to this scheme ultimately interested in non-relegation, the anti-representational, the economic, and qualified freedom of the trans-economic, trans-relational, etc. (16)

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342 *Pursuit*, III.VII.II.264/III.294.

343 *Pursuit*, III.12D.119.

344 *Ibid*., 120.

345 *Ibid*., 118.

346 Where 'trans-cognitive'/'trans-intentional' along with 'trans-conceptual'/'trans-perceptual' are synonyms for my use of the word 'transcendental' (when used in a positive sense).

347 As diagrammatically represented in Appendix B.

2. A 'Non-Standard' Pragmatic-Existentialism 902

Where to begin, and where to end?
Nowhere other than with what is already to hand![348] (17)

Through emergence all individuals, in their individuation,
are both ultimately irreducible and potentially irrepressible.[349] (18)

'Authorities' can be thought of as operating through universals in order to impose order and directions that mark out individuals subject to such authorization.[350] (19)

But individual authorities, in their emergent individuation, are also individuals in their own right, although found possessing different phenomenologies.[351](20)

Distinctive forms of authorization can be viewed as establishing Philosophical Distinctions or Disciplinary Distinctions that separate that marked out from the One. (21)

A serious exploration of the Individual, as a Person in-the-Person,[352] needs to recognize this overlooked Distinction and reverse its imposition of forms of universal order(ing). (22)

Through an extensive suspension[353] this can be accomplished. (23)

What results is not a traditional philosophical stance such as, e.g., a humanism, realism, dualism, idealism, correlationism, absolutism, relativism, etc.[354] (24)

Avoiding uni-modalist and bi-modalist positions, having no truck with any form of ideological absolutism or relativism, and so on. (25)

It has been claimed that such non-positionings can be expressed through imputations treated as non-ideological, non-representative axioms?[355] (26)

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348 The following is my current version of a 'non-standard philosophy' or 'non-philosophy'.

349 As individual subjects.

350 *Pursuit*, III.12D.203.

351 We can 'wave' to another individual subject, but, we cannot 'wave', in the same manner, to a community, organization, institution, or nation, etc.

352 Imitating Laruelle's use of expressions dealing with 'Man' as an 'Individual' 'prior' to its being marked out by authorities, etc.

353 An 'extensive suspension' is introduced and comprehensively explored in the *Pursuit*, Volume II, and this exploration is extended in Volume III. The central idea of the extensive suspension is that it accounts for, on three different levels, an inner economy, as exemplified, e.g., by the interrogative economy along with its overall dynamic balance and suspension as an 'overall transcendental suspension', an imposed process of an automatic de-suspension as an 'extended suspension', and, virtual and non-virtual forms of an alignment enacted on a causal level giving us, altogether, an 'extensive suspension'.

354 E.g., François Laruelle explicitly rules out both a traditional humanism and dualism. On misunderstood economic grounds I am ruling out all forms of ideological extremism as per paragraph 25.

355 *Ibid*., 218.

But nomination, predication and relations are dependent upon the identification of processes of relative, non-absolutistical objectivities through relative transformational isomorphic invariances as discerned in and through a philosophy of transformational re-treatment, etc.[356] (27)

As exemplified in comparing the narrative of this contrived fabulation (philo-fiction) with the emendation of passports in terms of an additional non-binary designation of gender.[357] (28)

Demonstrating the coercive exercise of power over all individuals where, unfortunately, not all individuals can be reduced to those imposed forms of binary schematization, etc.[358] (29)

But, given that individuals have a potential for being irrepressible, such variations in individuation were eventually taken on board by those official branches of those more progressive forms of governance implying that even authorities can be reformed. (30)

In altering relatively fundamental decisions there follows the implication that even authorities can be found amenable to positive forms of relatively non-existential and relatively existential transformation. (31)

I.e., therefore, through processes of corrective re-direction all forms of individuation can entertain processes of constructive alteration. (32)

Although, arguably, Decisions once made cannot be unmade except through incremental piecemeal forms of modification, although not without chaotic consequences should they arise.[359] (33)

Indeed, through incremental alterations, chaotic processes of transformational-transitioning can be approached and crossed through either bifurcation, emergence, or the induction of a phase change. (34)

The resolution of a relational anomaly is experienced as a form of re-direction as exemplified through our experience of humour.[360] (35)

That the conformation of truth determination can be read along the same lines through the invocation of a Tarskian frame of reference preferably accompanied by suitable forms of positive evidential support.[361] (36)

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356 E.g., in an economy where relations, predicates, and nominations are defined as economic correlatives. By transformational retreatment is meant a certain philosophical tool dealing with pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment on different meta-levels of consideration. Refer to the relevant modules in this regard.

357 Ibid., 167, 184, 218.

358 *Ibid*., 240, etc.

359 *Ibid.*, 152.

360 Refer to the opening sections of *Pursui*t, III.12D.

361 *Ibid.*, 161.

Narratives are motivated by processes of de-anomalization but whose persistence as narrations is guaranteed through partial, incomplete forms of ongoing resolution (otherwise through too much or too little consonance, dissonance, or resolution we meet the metaphorical 'death' of that relationship be it a narration or otherwise).[362] (37)

Judgment, commencing in the extensive suspension, demands the co-occurrence of inputs in a fusion of histories of the past, future, and present (as is found at the very basis of a science through a matching of past interpretations, future predictions, and forms of experimentation that were being observed in the present[363]).[364] (38)

On the other hand, through the de-suspension, the unidirectionality of resolution, individuation, authorization, emendation, etc., are all conducted in accordance with the arrow of time be that in either virtual and/or non-virtual terms of reference.[365] (39)

The primary value of a non-standard sense of positioning is that we can take a trans-economic perspective on that found to hand which is equivalent to none other than the exercising of an existential stance![366] (40)

Hence the emergence of the systematic-existential despite its economic confinement within the economic, albeit now re-confined within the economy of the systematic-existential. (41)

In an economy of the systematic-existential[367] that subsumes the economy of the non-systematic-existential, genres of existential behaviour, and the irreducible expression of the systematic-existential itself, which is to be found as equivalent to the 'facticity' of the primary relationship in question. (42)

I.e.,' the extent that primary relationship is in existence above and beyond the mere summation of its material basis as instantiated through its relational parties'. (43)

Hence this existential distinction between relational parties and the trans-relational, where an existential attitude is an open, pro-relational attitude. (44)

Revealing a profound sense and semblance of freedom through the trans-relational, existentially oriented trans-economic transvaluation of the economic. (45)

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362 *Ibid*., 232.

363 With the implicit criticism that for Laruelle to maintain 'philosophy', or a non-standard 'non-philosophy', is a 'science' he would need to recognize the import of this extensive suspension and the immediate deconstruction of such a position through the ensuing, automatic de-suspension (albeit in accordance with my understanding of the extensive suspension in this same regard).

364 *Ibid*., 225.

365 *Ibid*, 225.

366 *Ibid*., 241. Given the transcendental/trans-cognitively experienced equivalence between the trans-economic and the trans-relational, etc.

367 The systematic-existential economy, in its relationship to the economy of the non-systematic-existential, is diagrammatically represented in Appendix B.

Finding a ‘freedom through re(-)arbitration alone’ that cannot be other than existential in orientation.[368] (46)

Such a freedom being guaranteed as a freedom through ‘a freedom of choice’ even if forever economically re(-)appropriated.[369] (47)

Existential emendation applies even to institutional authorities despite their tendencies for increasing institutionalization, proliferation of regulations, having a preponderance for preferring meta-work, situational alienation, disempowerment of all agents and other forms of agency,[370] and the potential incremental diminishment in ethical and moral awareness, etc. (48)

In a non-standard discipline we can point to three forms of authenticity, namely, recognition of individual individuation; the active and suitably expressed expression of the uniqueness of that individuation; and, finding forms of trans-relational, existential alignment in our relationships (especially those that are more important to us, i.e., have a greater psychic ‘proximity’ for us).[371] The latter being both a recognition and expression of such arbitrated alignment. But, in lived-reality there is no difference as all three devolve from suitably informed, relatively non-obstructed de-suspensions, etc. (49)

The ‘ordinary’ can be assigned to individuals when registered in the exercise of a suitable extensive suspension as the so-called ‘unmarked’ as ‘prior’ to the universally differentiated processes of authorization exercised by Authorities.[372] That the so-called ‘ordinary’ is marked out as ‘non-ordinary’ by Authorities but through authentication becomes ‘extraordinary’. (50)

When and where the ‘ordinary’ becomes ‘extraordinary’ through a recognition of their uniqueness; in the negotiated recognition and expression of the same, and when individuals, individually or collectively, seeks productive forms of alignment with the individuation of their relationships in the uniqueness of their current situatedness. (51)

From such trans-relational re(-)positioning flow forms of existentially oriented interventionalism. (52)

Where interventionalism is unavoidable since all forms of enactment act as forms of intervention whether such observations are either passive, active, and/or engaged; whether they are covert or overt; whether intended, mis-tended, unintended or not intended; whether they are pursued through action, non-action or inaction. (53)

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368 *Ibid*., 173, etc.

369 *Ibid*., 213-214.

370 As imposed in emergencies, when exercised from outside those organizations, as occurs in the natural exigency of event detrimental to the authoritative operations of that individual entity, bad faith, the rewarding of forms of inauthenticity, etc., etc.

371 *Pursuit*, III.12D.221,186-188, etc.

372 *Ibid*., 100, 184-188.

It could be argued that emendation is pursued through rectification, as exercised through error mitigation; deconstruction, as exercised through error correction; and ongoing re(-)normalization,[373] as realized through engineered forms of trans-relational alignment, etc. (54)

Where alignment is to be pragmatically realized without aspirations to appropriate a certain ideal, other than as a directional guide, through observing, instead, the relative objectivity to be found in reports interpreted as establishing that aligned state of affairs through their reporting progressively realized forms of re(-)alignment.[374] (55)

The archetypal nature of the economic was then focused upon along with the concept of a 'parallel dictionary' in order to assist in processes of 'economic complexification' in which 'one economy is aligned with another in order for each party to act as commentator or commentary on the other, and v.v.' This concept of economic complexification was later expanded to include formal and informal forms[375] of comparative 'philosophical complexification' (or 'disciplinary complexification' [as well as forms of enrichment that could be further exercised through forms of rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional forms of complexification]).[376] [377] (56)

That the use of a parallel dictionary in economic complexification, philosophical complexification (formal or informally organized), disciplinary complexification, etc., is trans-economic in orientation, and, therefore, can be considered as non-standard. (57)

In questioning the subtitle as to what was *Beyond Criticism* the answer was the relatively radical.[378] (58)

That the nature of a critique recognizes the critical nature of the practical and the radical potential of the radically-critical. (59)

Along with all disciplinary tools be they standard or non-standard. (60)

With the critical preparing the path for the chaotic discovery of the innovative nature of the radical, along with the pragmatism of its final vocabularies, definitive(-like) histories, etc., and, where the critical will eventually re-appropriate the radical in due course.[379] (61)

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373 Correctly, 'ongoing' is redundant with the nomenclature of '(-)' signifying economic circulation.

374 As explored in the anecdote of the tuning of a harpsichord. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12D.26-32.

375 'Formal' being conceived of as in an alignment with the archetypal economy (of field, focus, and frame/framing. I.e., w.r.t. World, Object, and Ego).

376 Refer to Appendix A to see such a parallel dictionary. *Ibid*., 68.

377 *Pursuit*, III.12D.236.

378 *Ibid* 123-124.

379 *Ibid*., 229.

Non-standard methods can also use supplementation and simplification.[380] Furthermore, the non-standard can be viewed as a hyper-ordered/non-ordered appreciation of the trans-ordered, etc., along with a focus on the 'trans-relational suspension' of the relational representation of the relevant relational situation in question (as explicated in an advanced imputational treatment) where the de-suspension explicates the re-directed unidirectionality of the causal. (62)

An analogy that describes the non-negative nature of non-philosophy, as non-standard philosophy (or discipline) is non-Euclidean mathematics (by supplementing geometry with its reconsiderations of curved spaces and hyperbolic spaces).[381] (63)

That a 'science of philosophy' is a 'science' and not a 'philosophy'…just as a 'philosophy of science' is a 'philosophy' and not a 'science'.[382] (64)

I would argue that a non-standard discipline recognizes the trimodal nature of the economic and the unified nature of its trans-economics and systematic-existential appreciation.[383] (65)

It can be healthy for all super-disciplines, disciplines, or sub-disciplines to delimit their coercive power, albeit within reason.[384] (66)

A de-mystification of a discipline can be arranged through noting its distinctive Distinction as expressed through its passive disciplinary differences, meta-differences, non-differences (along with its active differentials, meta-differentials, and non-differentials; and its engaged distinctions, meta-distinctions, and non-distinctions).[385] (67)

In a non-standard appreciation of the dissemination of power we realize subjects as the nodes of transmission and who can also de-authorize the same either non-existentially and/or existentially.[386] (68)

…just as an anti-representationalism underpins the functioning of the economic, indeed, is necessary in order to permit such functioning, it would follow that the expression of the systematic-existential, in its re(-)constitution and re(-)enrichment of our relationships, cannot be disqualified on such ground, and, therefore, we should understand that an economic appreciation of this conceptual mechanism for existential re-e/valuation is far from being inappropriate. Moreover, it should also be far from impossible given its necessary re(-)appropriation of ourselves within this general, universal sphere of the economic as lived in this ordinary realm of the world as lived. Following that lead, we can unravel the ramifications of this natural fact of our existence, namely, the ordinary nature

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380 *Ibid*., 135.

381 *Ibid*., 136-138.

382 *Ibid*., 137.

383 *Ibid*., 142-143.

384 *Ibid*., 150.

385 *Ibid*., 170, etc. Similarly, an inter-ordered form of reading might also achieve the same result?

386 *Ibid*., 174-175.

of our existence as irreducible individuals in the world must naturally find forms of economic expression and so we need only observe these forms of individual expression to articulate just how we are both economically bound, and unbound, and re-bound in this overall world of life, this life-world as shared[387] by others...[388] (69)

Hence a non-standard appreciation of the philosophical discipline should recognize some version of a systematic approach that is positively nihilistic, and as a qualified anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism. (70)

With ethical morality and an understanding of race relations that should neither be uni-modal nor bi-modal in attitude, but, preferably expressed as a viable form of a non-standard pragmatic-existentialism.[389] (71)

The instigation of trans-economic forms of alignment can be viewed as 'spiritual' but should not be not seen as 'spiritualistic', although a secularist might prefer instead to utilize such 'non-standard' expressions like 'existential', or 'pro-relational', or 'trans-economic', trans-relational, etc.[390] (72)

As a very general observation we might say that a standard philosophy, etc., seeks complexification whilst a non-standard philosophy, etc. prefers to find forms of simplification[391] (through economic and trans-economic resolution)?[392] (73)

That a pragmatic philosophy is best expedited in the terms of a qualified economy consisting of qualified anti-representational re-direction, a qualified presentational directedness, and a qualified representational redirectedness. That from an economic perspective, such overall and individualized forms of qualification should demonstrate that no economic correlativity could be ever be treated as having an independent, definitive form, as having a state of the so-called 'in and of itself', or similar.[393] (74)

That, by virtue of this virtual-like state of affairs, that the relatively non-virtual, unilaterally, could transformationally come into both relatively relational and relatively non-relational forms of apparent existence through the ensuing process of resolution working in an alignment between either the intentional and/or the causal (without, of course, insisting on an absolute division between the same since we should not overlook the fact that the very gestation of the intentional also emerges upon a causal basis). That through such alignments between the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual they mutually come into co-associated patterns of existence together.[394] (75)

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387 Passively by(-)others or with(-)others; actively before(-)others; and engaged through(-)others.

388 *Ibid*., 179,

389 *Ibid*., 122, 154.

390 *Ibid.*, 139, 217.

391 Without sacrificing non-existential and existential forms of relevant-enrichment, etc.

392 *Ibid*., 223-224.

393 *Ibid*., 228.

394 *Ibid*., 228.

That, when a pro-relational or trans-relational perspective is entertained, we find an existentialization of experience along with the existential simplification attendant upon such ensuing processes of relational resolution through the de-suspension.[395] (76)

Moreover, from a harmonic appreciation of such patterns of resolution we can find an existentialization of both the 'individual/s in the world' and 'authority/authorities in the world' (despite their relative differences in phenomenology, etc.[396]). That just as individuated-individuals and individuated-authorities emerge through forms of existential surplus in e/valuational formation so, too, can judgments themselves take on surpluses, such excesses in existential e/valuational formation, and where we might surmise much of that additional facticity is directed, namely, towards an ongoing qualified de-anomalization of our relationships. Indeed, empowering, but also qualifying, such processes of identification and resolution, such processes of correlation and accommodation, etc.[397] (77)

Furthermore, we can continually establish a qualified sense and semblance of an economic freedom from the economic to the extent that the systematic-existential can apparently 'imprint', 'emboss', 'corrugate'… the ensuing re-directed lines of resolution in directions that appear to deliver an ability to either chose relatively novel forms of interaction or relatively conventional forms of interaction to the mutual benefit of those relationships.[398] (78)

That from a representative comprehension of our relationships, albeit in their relative simplicity, despite all background forms of economic complexification, we are presented with veritable forms of choice that would be absent if we were purely left within an economy dealing only with the non-systematic-existential. Experiencing a profound sense and semblance of freedom through this ability to enter into processes of ongoing re(-)arbitration rather than the interactions and iterations of an economy consisting merely of just mono-dimensional processes of arbitration.[399] (79)

So, what does that say about ourselves, and, the nature of both critical and radical forms of critique along with our abilities to muster such forms of recognition, encountering and engagement, through the ensuing alignments exercised within the auspices of such judgments? That we be social-individuals with both an ultimate irreducibility and a potentially irrepressibility.[400] (80)

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395 *Ibid.*, 228.

396 E.g., we can point to, nominate and denominate the predicates and relations pertaining to an individual, however, we cannot do this with respect to institutions in the same manner (despite a common use of similar forms of language).

397 *Ibid*., 228.

398 *Ibid*., 228.

399 *Ibid*., 228.

400 *Ibid*., 228.

That non-philosophy is pragmatic given its pre-emption of the ideological and other forms of extremism through the utilization of suspensions, etc.,[401] within an economic perspective, etc.[402] (81)

That the historical prospect needs to recognize both the differentiation and the fusion of histories of the past, histories of the future, and histories of the present along with the six provisional axioms for conducting historical interpretation, namely, Definiteness, Variability, Provisionality, Expediency, and, Identification and Proximity[403]; along with the requisite methodologies for the effective establishment of evidential conformation, etc.[404] (82)

As 'histories' given that determinations need to be made between the co-existing possibilities of different trajectories, etc; without the exhaustion of any one perspective or perspectives in general. (83)

That every major and minor life-world should have their histories, and, where we no longer indulge in the sheer authority of so-called official 'histories'. (84)

From 'doing history' to 'history doing history' given the presence of 'upright' people able to 're-right' history, or any other discipline.[405] (85)

Histories of the future primarily observe continuities, histories of the past primarily observe discontinuities, and histories of the present primarily observe the innovative nature of non-continuities.[406] (86)

That the writing (inscription) and the reading (interpretation) of these histories of the past, future, and present are being continually conducted by communities of historians, be they professionals or amateurs; as individuals who are never working alone even if they publish their research by themselves, through their own efforts alone, albeit in their unavoidable use of the report(ing)s of others.[407] (87)

Each reputable discipline seeks to find conformal forms of alignment in line with their distinctive disciplinary views on the secular world. (88)

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401 I.e., by taking de-suspensions and either their obstruction and/or non-obstruction into account.

402 By abrogating all forms of non-economically oriented theory, etc., and, using, but not transgressing, a range of profitable heuristic devices like, e.g., orders, trans-orders, complexification, simplification, economic induction (and their promotion of extensive suspensions, etc.), etc.

403 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7Z. Basically that history has a definitive shape unlike quantum indeterminacy; an infinitude of non-equally weighted interpretations that need to get to the specificity of the situation; the provisional nature of all disciplinary research; the demands placed upon the disciplinarian for interpretative definitiveness; the need for ethically impartial, non-neutral identification; and, a recognition that proximate identification should be relatively non-virtual.

404 With conformation taking place in a Tarskian scheme through real time confirmation/retrospective verification of confirmation/verification, etc.

405 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7Y.

406 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7Z, etc.

407 Hopefully, acting in a reputable manner in their differentiating misreported 'reportings' from non-misreported 'reports' and harmonizing the latter in suitable forms of disseminated narrations.

Hence the need to discern a difference between relatively reputable ‘reports’ and relatively less reputable ‘reportings’. (89)

Differentiating ‘facts’ from ‘factoids’ in the light of the transformational portability of the former, etc. (90)

Differentiating reports from conspiracies by discerning the authority or lack of authority co-associated with those who disseminate such apparent ‘information’. (91)

Where ‘spin’ and its lengthier form as ‘propaganda’ is always evidence of present anxieties being experienced on the behalf of the authorities and their agents. (92)

That from the perspective of the non-standard philosopher or disciplinarian all narrations are forms of fabulation, but, where their progressive de-mis-representation can correct both the perception and apperception of such errors, etc. (93)

But, even mistruths are just that, namely, mistruths, not total non-truths. (94)

Hence such mis-representation can never be total, just as there can be no perfect psychosis… hence the pursuit of alignment through re(-)alignment is to be valued.[408] (95)

That, in this regard, this alignment through re(-)alignment, this ‘atunement’ or ‘atonement/at-onement’ or ‘redemption’[409] of experience is the result of the re(-)directed derivation and delivery of consequential-imputations, observed in forms that are either passive, active and/or engaged, and which can be seen, on balance, to be either relatively critical or relatively radical in complexion, and taking forms that are a mix of the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential, may well be seen as performing a series of decisive-like acts apparently entering into the ongoing re-constitution of that current Philosophical (or Disciplinary) Decision being here re(-)enacted in that very moment in time rendered more susceptible to the ensuing forms of authorization being ‘stamped’ through such re(-)enactment...[410] (96)

Such altered ‘imprinting’, ‘embossment’ or ‘corrugation’[411] observed upon these authorized bodies of experience, on reflection, should be clearly seen to represent the form and degree of authenticity, or its relative absence, that was then being currently entered into.[412] I.e., as a mix of an authenticity of either a recognition of one’s self as an

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408 Hence the twin concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’. That we can retrace our ‘steps’ and then re-proceed.

409 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.VII,I.*Preview*. ‘Redemption’ being redefined as ‘being proactively existential in such a manner so as not to need to repair damage done through a later process of redemption as ordinarily understood (be that in either religious and/or non-religious terms of reference). Refer to *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.Preview I.

410 *Pursuit*, III.12D.217.

411 ‘Corrugation’ being my expression for a ‘4D form of imprinted treatment’.

412 In printing we have two-dimensional printing, three-dimensional embossing (e.g., as in blind printing or *gaufrage*). Then, as a suggestion, a four-dimensional ‘corrugation’ of experience (as the ‘rough-

irreducible and irrepressible individual, and/or relational alignment with this recognition, and/or trans-relational re(-)alignment as harmonically arrived at within our more important relationships.[413] (97)

That such a performance, on all levels, is better expedited upon a stage suitably 'well-lit' by an extensive suspension capable of promoting forms of existential enhancement propelled[414] through the requisite resolution stemming from the definitive-like de-anomalization of experience decisively enacted through such forms of re(-)arbitration along with the sense and semblance of an ensuing freedom to be distinctly found co-associated with such trans-relational forms of intervention.[415] (98)

A process of intervention that for the religious person could be described as 'spiritual' but not as 'spiritualistic' in orientation, and, for the non-religious person, as just profoundly 'existential' in its qualities of inspiration. A process of intervention in this world at large, this overall world-of-life that cannot be avoided since even to entertain a process of non-action or a deferral of action is also to enter into interactive forms of interventional enactment.[416] (99))

Hence a relatively non-standard presentation of a 'non-philosophy', as refracted through an hyper-ordering of the six non-orders of a non-metaphysics, etc.,[417] along with its equation with an equivalent qualified anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism as a form of trans-economic transvaluation of lived-experience **as arrived at through an uni-directional, ongoing re(-)arbitration… as reflected in its 'depths' of resolution and expression as a relatively unilateral determination..!!**[418] (100)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 9.3.23.

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ness' or 'non-flatness' of the geographical landscape/relational contours of our relationships as experienced over time)?

413 *Ibid*., 217.

414 'Propelled' through the de-suspension (as per paragraph 39, e.g.).

415 *Ibid*., 217.

416 *Ibid*., 217.

417 Refer to Postscript A.101-110.

418 Which, in effect, gives us a much deeper appreciation of the nature of 'our' overall freedom along with our ability, therein, to exercise matters of choice. Where 'our' is literally meant from an 'interpersonal perspective' given our individual inability to do not much else other than breathe, move (and where we might decide to die [if we were to live in a world without the mutual expedition of our individually formed, yet socially channeled, aspirations given the inescapable role played also by authorities, etc., in the co-authored manufacturing of such intent]). Furthermore, the relative uni-directional re-directedness of both the causal and the economic demonstrates this momentary exhibition of this freedom to choose and be chosen, to exercise choice… but, where such determinations need to be economically re(-)appropriated in order to be further interpreted, acted upon, etc….

A: Appendix A: A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities

Type of Economy:	**Archetypal World**	**Archetypal Object**	**Archetypal Ego**
Philosophical:	Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism
Temporal:	Future	Past	Present
Herm. Circle:	Whole	Parts	Whole-and-Parts
Criticality:	Pre-Critical	Critical	Pot. Radical
Harmonic:	Consonance Theory	Dissonance Practice	Resolution Critique
Descriptive:	Prescriptive Relations	Descriptive Predicates	Proscriptive Nominations
Directedness:	Redirected	Directed	Re-Directed
Mod. of Error:	Mitigation	Correction	Align. with Relatively Non-Erroneous
Iterations:	Reiteration	Iteration	Re-Iteration.
Representation:	Representing	Presenting	Re-Presenting/ Anti-Representational
Retreatment:	Pretreatment	Treatment	Retreatment/ Posttreatment
Textual:	Meta-Textual	Textual	Non-Textual
Continuities	Continuities	Discontinuities	Non-Continuities
Philosophical Tools:	Rectification	Deconstruction	Re(-)Normalization
Interrogative Eco.	Rhetorical Dis-Conjunctive Sus.	Metaphorical Conjunctive Sus.	Apparitional Dynamic Bal…
(Imputational:[419]**)**	Non-Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Non-Extrapolation...
(Imp.Eco read as:)	(Global Suspensions)	(Local Suspensions)	(Trans-Relational Suspensions)[420]

[419] The imputational economy is discussed in modules 406, 407, 901.

[420] *Pursuit*, III.12D.68.

B: Appendix B: Diagrammatical Representation of the Systematic-Existential, etc.

Systematic-Existential Economy

EGO
Systematic-Existential Moment

Non-Systematic-Existential Input Existentially Oriented Genres of Intervention

<----------**OBJECT** **WORLD**

Non-Systematic-Existential Economy

Ego
Non-Systematic-Existential Moment

Phenomenological Moment Hermeneutical Moment

Object **World**

How to read this diagram:

1. The non-systematic-existential economy forms the 'Object moment' of the systematic-existential economy.
2. Where behaviours flow from the systematic-existential economy in an 'existential relationship' with the primary relationship in the uniqueness of its relational situatedness be that in either a relatively systematic-existential orientation and/or a relatively deficient systematic-existential relationship.
3. But, in a more aligned state between the relatively systematic and the relatively non-existential economies archetypal alignment is more isomorphically entertained in parallel??
4. The systematic-existential must present with a higher degree of epistemological organization within the epistemological hierarchy in its constitution of an apparent 'psyche' (or 'individual person')
5. Hence this tentative, provisional proposal, as here diagrammatically represented, as one creative way of attempting to relate the relationship between the relatively non-systematic-existential and relatively systematic-existential economies.
6. The implication being that in a relatively non-aligned state non-systematic-existential input can be rejected, but, in a greater degree of alignment it would not be rejected unless the overall situational reading calls for that form of existentially oriented intervention?

C: Postscript: Some Additional Considerations

It takes time to settle in with new and novel ideas, given that their ramifications are incrementally taken on board. From a sudden chaotic re-positioning to an incremental repositioning thereafter as conducted before that transformation in outlook. (101)

A standard super-ordered (philosophical) appreciation is of the ordered and trans-ordered, whereas, a non-standard appreciation is of the trans-ordered as viewed through a hyper-order perspective.[421] (102)

Hence the standard reading of metaphysical topics, e.g., but their non-ordered reading through a hyper-ordered perspective. (103)
The difference also being a matter of refining the process of the extensive suspension to focus on the suspension of the relatively trans-relational as explicated in an advanced imputational approach. (104)

Where this dynamically balanced suspension of the suspension of both intentional functions and content can be read as parallel forms of standard meta-appreciation, existential trans-appreciation, and non-standard non-appreciation. (105)

Differentiating a global or broadly defined standard metaphysical reading as being just a (meta-)appreciation of the super-ordered or ordered or trans-ordered. (106)

Differentiating a local or narrowly defined standard metaphysical reading as being just a symmetrical trans-ordered reading of the phenomenologically semantic. (107)

With a non-standard reading of a global or local metaphysical topic being treated in a symmetrical hyper-ordered perspective. (108)

In spite of the reversibility of the economic, at least hypothetically, a unilateral causal force rules all forms of economic transformation, be that either passively read, actively written and/or existentially engaged through this prospective guarantee of our overall freedom from the ongoing re-directedness of such re(-)arbitration. (109)

Hence it behooves us to seize the day and exercise a proactive form of existential redemption through positive re(-)alignment[422] rather than rue the day through envisaging forms of relational restoration devolving from forms of retrospectively oriented redemption.[423] (110)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 10.3.23.

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421 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12H.Section B.

422 *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.

423 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12H.22.

D: Clarification of the Rules for Determining a Non-Standard 'Non-Ordering'

1. A non-ordered status is arrived at through following three rules that, respectively, are positive, neutral, and negative. (111)

2. 'Duplication' is 'the reduplication of relevant pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions for the formation of either ordered or inter-ordered products'. (112)

3. 'Ordered products' are 'either trans-cognitively or cognitively oriented, i.e., as trans-intentional judgmental processes with intentional judgmental content'. (113)

4. A **Positive Rule** states: That a non-standard 'non-ordered' status is arrived at through the symmetrical reduplication of either ordered or inter-ordered products. (114)

5. A **Neutral Rule** states: That 'symmetrical' is defined as 'that which would supply a commutatively informed non-significant contragram'. E.g., as in 'the philosophy of philosophy' *versus* 'the philosophy of philosophy' preserves an effective commutativity (that would not be observed, e.g., in, say, 'the history of science' *versus* 'the science of history' [given that the former is 'history' and the latter is 'science']). (115)

6. A **Negative Rule** states: That the 'symmetrical reduplication of an ordered product is to be treated as being ruled out as non-standard' given that it is to be deemed to possess only a *de facto* non-ordered status. So, e.g., the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitively ordered order ('facts' treated as 'actual facts') in the form of a history (to be read as 'histories') only has a *de facto* non-ordered status, and, thereby, is to be discounted as being 'non-standard' and counted as 'standard'. On the other hand, the re-duplication of the trans-ordered status of history, as a history of history can be treated as being both a symmetrical hyper-ordered product and as a non-ordered product, i.e., as 'non-history'. (116)

7. 'Philosophy' can be treated as 'super-ordered' (being one-part hermeneutics, etc.) and where the 'philosophy of philosophy' is 'meta-super-ordered', i.e., as 'non-ordered philosophy' (and is equivalent to a 'broad definition of metaphysics' in contrast to the 'narrow definition of metaphysics' as 'the phenomenological semantics of phenomenological semantics' which could also be deemed to be an 'ontology' or a 'non-phenomenological semantics'). (117)

8. Where 'the reduplication of orders' gives us 'trans-orders', and, 'the reduplication of trans-orders' gives us 'hyper-orders', etc. (118)

9. Where the effective determination of ordered and inter-ordered phenomena is a unilaterally oriented expression of the epistemological depth and form of the ensuing resolution of either advertently and/or inadvertently invoked suspensions and their relatively obstructed/non-obstructed de-suspensions. (119)

10. Hence the dynamics of inter-ordered phenomena and the formation of non-standard forms of non-ordering. (120)

E: Exploratory Guidelines for Conducting a Process of Consequential Analysis

Although this topic is nominated as a form of 'analysis' more correctly it is a form of exploration dealing with general investigations; the particularity of analyses; and, the specificity of examinations of existentially oriented phenomena, given, respectively, the rectification of hermeneutical error mitigation, etc; the deconstruction of phenomenal-phenomenological[424] error correction, etc; and, non-systematically and systematically[425] oriented existential processes of alignment enacted through progressive re(-)alignment with that deemed to be relatively non-erroneous, etc., i.e., as realized through process of ongoing re(-)normalization. (121)

Moreover consequential explorations, suitably conducted, are multidimensional being concerned with the contextualization and clarification of relational situations; the imputed choice of various relevant trajectories posed as applicable in the circumstances as represented;[426] the imputed probable outcomes speculatively envisaged through e/valuational formation as applying to those more probable trajectories; the careful comparison of such 'economic' speculations all preferably conducted from a virtual existential perspective that is both trans-economic and trans-relational in orientation. (122)

However, this imputation of this necessity for existential appreciation cannot be at the expense of the relatively non-existential given that the former arises through the transformation of the latter and also usually has a role to play in such overall considerations.[427] (123)

Furthermore, an existential interventionalism is mediated by the thematization of the non-systematic existential, and v.v.[428] (124)

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424 The concept of the 'phenomenal-phenomenological' argues, in effect, that although we constitute intentional experience a considerable fraction of such experience is also dictated to us through a competing mix of subjective, objective, inter-objective, and inter-subjective factors.

425 I.e., 'non-systematic' as applying predominantly to the 'so-called third moment of the non-systematic existential', and, 'systematically', as applying predominantly to 'the overall relationship in question as reviewed from a trans-relational sense of perspective, as represented, and, not from the mere perspective of the relational parties themselves as found entailed in that relationship in question.

426 The manner that such representations are presented will considerably dictate what is either relevant or not so relevant in our consideration of probable trajectories that could arise over the course of our evolving appreciation of that primary relationship being exercised through, hopefully, suitably apposite patterns of intervention. I.e., patterns that are appropriately apposite, properly apposite, and appositely apposite (intended also in its standard and non-standard senses).

427 E.g., a visitor drops by and we fear our premises might be too cold. So, given that form of appreciation, we turn the heater on in that room. Such a feature is non-existentially constituted in itself as just 'the heater being turn on', but, in this instance, this action is instituted through the existence of such existentially orientated motivation. Similarly, wages realized through some form of work, trade or service equally can be seen to have a non-existential complexion as well as possible existential orientation (through, say, relatively fair forms of remuneration) and/or non-existentially orientation (through, say, relatively unfair forms of remuneration).

428 Hence the shift from 'freedom through arbitration alone' to 'freedom through re(-)arbitration alone' (along with its element of 'enactive choice' being able to be enacted between an economy of the relatively non-systematic existential and the more epistemologically organized economy of the relatively systematic existential).

Hence the additional necessity for a non-standard approach to either fully complement critical economic considerations and/or fully supplement radical trans-economic considerations over the course of such explorations. (125)

Various stages need to be sequentially and collectively exercised in this genre of consequential research…[429] (126)

Compiling a pre-well-informed understanding of the primary relationship/s in question as a guiding overall representation. (127)

Discerning commonalities of that field or fields being observed; articulating the problematic through noting what is relatively dissonant; and, tentatively proposing solutions as forms of relational resolution that are best dictated by that type of situation being scrutinized. (128)

Creatively and speculatively discern, at first in virtual terms, the more probable pathways for relational parties that are either directly or indirectly involved in the potential exercising of either certain expected and/or unexpected patterns of intervention by those parties. (129)

In effect, discerning, through reasonable expectations, those more likely outcomes along with their more probable consequences devolving from such enactions, i.e., as either actions, non-actions, and/or inactions through processes of deferral, moreover, as observed either actively, passively from a relational perspective and/or through patterns of existentially oriented engagement seemingly enacted from a trans-relational perspective. (130)

But, how are such forms of consequential discernment best expedited? Through extensive suspensions! (131)

Ever mindful, too, that with intended consequences we also have partially mis-intended consequences, un-intended consequences, and not intended consequences which can be found to co-arise from the ensuing impact of non-expected forms of unanticipated causal formations. (132)

Moreover, all such ‘intended consequences’ will also be misrepresented through forms of interpreted ideality and simplification on the part of all parties. (132)

Although such mis-representation can never be completely mis-interpreted, and, to some extent, can be ‘progressively’ re-de-mis-interpreted, etc![430] (133)

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[429] As outlined in paragraphs 127-130. Such considerations being simplified by the introduction of extensive suspensions, and, further simplified, through the economic simplification of the de-suspension and its revelation of the pattern of that which is to be understood as being relatively more resolved, be that either in a terminal and terminated format or to be continued as a work in progress.

However, the daunting task of such appreciation is somewhat obviated by seeking to essentialize the complexities of such considerations along patterns of both economically enriched appreciation and patterns of trans-economically enriched appreciation. (134)

Given the ensuing economic simplification through resolution that can devolve from the suitable application of extensive suspensions and the automatic invocation of de-suspensions that, hopefully, are relatively non-obstructed over the course of their delivery. (135)

That such cautious optimism is well-founded given the inescapable emergence of a trans-economic, trans-relational existentially oriented interventionalism.[431] (136)

The non-reductive nature of such appreciation, as an existential surplus, further reinforcing the idea that we are attending to a consequential appreciation that is not just analytical in scope. (137)

In effect, metaphorically 'listening' to our relationships from an existential trans-relational perspective in order that they may inform ourselves as to how to suitably intervene in a pursuit of their collectively enriched advancement be that through either the creation, preservation and/or conservation of their relational environments in the very midst of a secular sense and semblance of a world at large. (138)

Thence our relational emplacement through an inevitable displacement in non-virtual experience that, through cooperative forms of re(-)arbitration, can eventually oversee, hopefully, some degrees of an aspirational successfulness through an ensuing de-displacement. (139)

Hence this working understanding of the interactive relationships to be entertained between the relatively non-existential, the relatively non-systematic existential, and the relatively systematic existential in both the formation of a progressively integrated critical, standard economic comprehension with a radical, non-standard, trans-economic comprehension, and v.v., in the exploration of the ensuing resolution of such consequential considerations. (140)

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430 Here, a carefully cautious vision of progress is being argued for. Namely, if our background forms of appreciation are continually enriched with richer forms of discrimination then such patterns of e/valuational formation will be progressive realized. Hence the motto 'deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the effective (as the less defective)'. Furthermore, it is argued that through careful critical preparation the way is left open for the recognition of the chaotic advent of positive, radical, non-standard forms of supplementation, etc.

431 'Intervention' in our relationships is deemed to be 'inescapable' given that all actions, non-actions, and inactions have a role to play in the constitution of those trajectories entered into as we course through this world at large, this overall world-of-life (as somewhat already guaranteed through the imputed transcendental basis of the Life-World/World-of-Life). Here, I also insist upon the inescapable nature of the emergent formation of an existential surplus or excess in e/valuational formation. Such 'inescapableness' being further reinforced by virtue of the fact that we cannot escape, can never escape, the emergence of such emergent forms of e/valuational formation given, for a start, the trans-intentional nature of judgments, etc.

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 21.4.23.

F: Resolution of the Conundrum *Hypothetical Polyvalency of Truth Determination*

1. Given the apparent objectivity of the interpretation of truth determination need not be univocal in its interpreted expression then it follows that logically there is no reason for insisting on an imputed univocality of a validly projected truth determination? (141)

2. That a logical tension appears to exist between the infinite-like, multiple possibilities in the interpretation of a certain relational-situation and the imputed objectivity of the same. (142)

3. Can we instance examples here in order to explore this logical tension between fifth trans-cognitively ordered possibilities with the semblance of a potential polyvalent sixth trans-cognitively ordered factual status? (143)

4. Two types of examples come to mind, namely, a truth conditional complementation between the exercise of relevant overlapping perspectives and a truth conditional supplementation exercised within the reference of one factually-oriented perspective whilst overlooking the pseudo-problematic situation where the provisional nature of all prior truth determinations in a certain instance was later proven to be wrong (given the then non-co-occurrence of those differing content-interpretations in truth determination. E.g., the imputed murder weapon of the exhibited gun when it was shown that the lethal bullet could not have been fired from that exhibited weapon). (144)

5. E.g.., when it was shown as a fact that the antique gun was both in the collection of a certain person, and, where it was also shown to have been the gun that fired the lethal bullet (in a situation involving either an imputed act of deliberate murder or unintentional homicide). (145)

6. In the representation of generalities, the presentation of particularities, and/or in the representation of uni-lateral-like resolutions of specificities whilst all ever qualified by the provisional nature of truth determinations. (146)

7. Where, as an example of complementation, we might cite the uni-directional nature of intentional resoluteness in the form of enacting a program of financial saving for a certain objective, say, travel, but either re-directing the product of such behaviour in some other intentional direction in either part or in whole, say, for medical expenses or so on). (147)
.
8. However, despite these two qualifications of supplementation and complementation we could then argue for a *de facto* univocality of re-directedness despite such qualifications (given the forever persistent possibility that all truth determination is provisionally situated for-us). (148)

9. Therefore, despite such qualifications we must practically adhere to the *status quo* that proclaims a univocality in the assertion of truth determinations despite their dialectical gestation... inviting a potentially radical resolution that is simultaneously both economic and trans-economic in orientation despite the inevitable re(-)appropriation of the unilat-

eral nature of the latter within conventional economic patterns of performance that, hopefully, are critical in orientation. (149)

10. But what overrides all such considerations is the holistic nature of living-reality in which all delineated objectivities co-inhere with, before, and through the illusion of each other... to be unilaterally de-suspended in a non-absolutistical alignment with our perspectives, abilities, and collective interpretations.[432] (150)

[432] Where this holistic argument establishes a qualified polyvalency in co-determined truth determinations. Just as, e.g., this person is a male and that person is a female, and, where both persons are humans, etc. I.e., where the property of 'humanity', along with an infinitude of other nominations, properties, and relations could be perceived to pervade both human subjects, etc.

G: The Re(-)Concluding of a Conclusion

1. The reconcluding of a conclusion is a non-conclusion where a re-concluding is relatively radical. (151)

2. The critical treatment of the critical is non-critical, namely, radical, and, the radical treatment of the radical is non-radical, namely, critical… where all else is neither critical nor radical. (152)

3. Thence the relatively non-existential, the non-systematic existential, and the systematic existential where the latter can be equated and identified as the radically existential in relative terms of reference. (153)

4. Relative terms of reference because no identity can be thought economically through either pure economic or pure non-economic terms of reference. (154)

5. Thence our observance of a middle path between the conservatively radical and the radically conservative and our non-observance of either the not-conservative or the not-radical. (155)

6. Given the conservative and the non-conservative, the critical and the radical all need to be harmonized. (156)

7. Thence this middle path where the relatively critical needs to be radically retreated and the relatively radical need to be critically retreated. (157)

8. Naturally observing a middle path though the apposite use of extensive suspensions and their relatively non-obstructed de-suspensions... (158)

9. Hence the harmonization of the non-critical, the non-radical, and the not-critical and the not-radical given this economy between the relatively systematic and non-systematic forms of the existential, and the relatively non-existential. (159)

10. Thence the positively productive response and responsibility issuing from following that tailored form of a middle path..!! (160)

H: Delineating the Non-Historical, etc.

1. The economic progression in general is a pre-critical determination of relevant narrational facts in the generality of their apparent factual situation or situatedness. (161)

2. Then their critical narrational particularizational treatment
in phenomenological terms. (162)

3. Followed by their potentially radical, re(-)directed specification. (163)

4. But, non-historically or trans-economically or pro-relation we observe the reversal of this conventional paradigm. (164)

5. Namely, first, the existentially oriented revelation of its radical re-specification of the factual situation in its relational situatedness. (165)

6. Then it's phenomenalizational treatment through critical forms of properly treated conventionalized re-appropriations. (166)

7. Its completion through a return to a pre-critical rectification of the overall narrational process subjected to such economic and non-economic transformational retreatment, and v.v. (167)

8. With the following implications, namely, the mutual co-existence of both progressive models. (168)

9. Returning to a simulated holographic semblance of the world at large consistent with all fifth ordered possibilities and their apparent sixth ordered probabilities, albeit as refracted from and through a variety of perspectives resonant with the overall sense of 'our' emplacement therein. (169)

10. Where, through suitable forms of re(-)alignment we find, overall, progressive forms of pragmatic re(-)alignment in an attunement with our abilities to re(-)interpret the same. Then, through the coursing of a non-historical thematization the thematization of the historical is appreciated where, otherwise, a clarification of the historical would be impossible... because whatever can be given a close economic reading could and should also be given the qualifications of a trans-economic reading, and v.v.... (170)

I: Differentiating Economic *versus* Non-Economic Commentaries, etc.

1. Economic texts, commentaries, etc., in a
critical format should be overseen along both
negative and positive economic approaches,
and, where, in contrast, the same approach
applies to non-textual formations, namely,
depromoting the relatively economic and relatively
promoting the non-economic within reason. (171)

2. Where by ‘non-economic’; is meant ‘pro-
relational, or trans-relational’, or, in effect, ‘the
systematically existential’ given the primacy of its
relational situatedness. (172)

3. Being experientially derived through
suspensions in some suitable form and
expressed to a suitable degree. (173)

4. To that extent the non-economic can be
unilaterally observed through requisite modes of resolution. (174)

5. Ruling out, economically, all forms of
exclusively constructed unimodalism, bimodalism
in either relativistical or absolutistical formulations,
and, pragmatically ruling in all conventionally accepted
forms of practice overseen by critical economic procedures
such as evidential considerations,
appropriate premise formation, relevant logical argumentation,
correctly arrived at conclusions skilfully
supported by ordered analysis, inter-ordered analyses,
transformational retreatment,
consequential analysis, etc. (175)

6. Taking a radical, non-economic stance
through the apposite use of suspensions, etc. (176)

7. Therein and thereby, proceeding from the
specificity of the systematic existential as
unilaterally demonstrated in experiential terms of
reference as realized through processes of
ongoing resolution. (177)

8. As evidenced through our explication of either
existential hallmarks, indicators, and/or predictors. (178)

9. As characterized by existentially oriented patterns of resolution that contribute to an overall augmentation and enhancement in positive e/valuational formation in either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of those relational loci instrumental in such forms of distinctive and resolute expression. (179)

10. With the implication that a non-economic form of writing and reading is a re-directed, radical, potentially disruptive process, etc., instigated through apposite suspensions and delivered though the automatic invocation of relatively unobstructed de-suspensions.[433] (180)

11. Hence the outline of a method for the recognition, encountering, and engaging either a non-economic text or commentary, etc., versus an economic text or commentary, etc., be the latter either critically and/or non-critically explicated. (181)

12. Understanding that, despite a resolute unilateralism, the non-economic cannot escape its economic re(-)appropriation. (182)

13. E.g., radically treating the philosophical economy, etc., through suspensions, etc., in order to arrive at the non-philosophical economy, etc. (183)

14. The dialectical nature of the non-economic radically turns around all manner of re-direction through that form of qualification. (184)

15. Re(-)accommodating either the complementary and/or the supplementary. (185)

16. I.e., respectively, a critical qualification of the radical and/or a radical qualification of the critical. (186)

17. The relatively radical being relatively arrived at incrementally and reappropriated accordingly in economic terms of reference. (187)

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[433] Better facilitated through an overall suspension of all related ideological factors

18. Understanding that the critical treatment of
the critical can only be radical, and, that the
radical treatment of the radical can only be
critical if correctly approached and performed. (188)

19. So, e.g., a non-philosophical commentary is
a radical turning around of a critically constructed
text that will or should recognize its inevitable
economic reincorporation. (189)

20. Hence this method for transforming either our
reading and/or writing of a text or commentary
regardless of its original or final format..!! (190)

J: Differentiating and Delineating a Viable Sense of the 'Absolute'

1. On Differentiating the 'Absolute' from the 'absolutistical'
we approach the former through suspensions, etc.,
and the latter through their relative absence. (191)

2. Where a science of philosophy cannot be a
'philosophy' but must be a 'science'
albeit in a non-conventional format. (192)

3. Through non-reductive emergence hence the uniqueness of
the One, the World, Individuals, and Authorities.[434] (193)

4. 'The uni-lateral nature of the last instance' being
realized through 'moments of economic resolution'. (194)

5. Where the pragmatics of such relatively
unobstructed resolution is to be differentiated from
mere pragmatical expediency. (195)

6. Thence the emergent, non-reductive, existential
uniqueness of the One, the World, Individuals, and Authorities... (196)

7. Thence the dialectical relationship between
economic circulation and a chaotically redirected causal unilateralism. (197)

8. Where the relatively critical prepares a path for
the relatively radical with its immediate economic re(-)appropriation. (198)

9. Hence a science of the philosophical through a pro-relational treatment
of the relevant representation of a set of relationships
in their relational situatedness where the relatively existential
is realized though the relative existentialization
of the relatively non-existential. (199)

10. Thence an absolute philosophy as pro-relational
and trans-relational, i.e., in the taking of a non-
philosophical stance… as instanced by expressions
like, e.g., 'Absolute', etc. (200)

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[434] Obviously alluding to categories as explicated by François Laruelle, albeit as qualified by myself (given the critical re(-)appropriation of the radical, etc.)..

K: The Scope of the Non-Economic, etc.

1, The expression ‘scope’ has two senses, namely, range and extent;
i.e., as a distinctive phenomenon, and, its phenomenological limitations. (200a)

2. As refracted through its phenomenal-phenomenological treatment
and the limited scoping of its hermeneutical pre-treatment... (200b)

L: Note: Two Styles of Commentary: Critical-Literal and Radical-Creative

1. Two styles of commentary, namely, critical-literal and radical-creative,
i.e., genetic transformation (through economic means)
and epigenetic(-like) modification (through non-economic means).[435] (200c)

2. E.g., history of the past as the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order,
whereas a history of the present would be an epigenetic-like reading
through preferencing the non-systematic existential with retreatment reflecting same
implying a history of the future as an observance of the systematic existential...or,
in effect, permitting the systematic existential to be critically re-appropriated....[436] (200d)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 17.5.23.

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435 As per Postscript I (171-190).

436 These last two postscripts inviting extension, and, these appendices and postscripts inviting the exposition of a future commentary?

Bibliography

The following volumes, books and essays are a selection that can be found on my homepage site.

[**Analysis on the nature of Things** (pre-1970) – not currently on homepage site]

[**The reanalysis on the Nature of Things** (approximately 1977-1984) – Envisaged in 12 volumes of which just over 7 were realized – not currently on homepage site]
Summary in 500 Propositions

Miscellaneous essays on five pages, etc. (refer to home page site)
Miscellaneous Essays in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, etc. (refer to home page site)

Miscellaneous Essays in Psychology (refer to homepage site)

Insight (1999) (7 essays)
Beyond Therapy (2001-2003) (16 essays)

Essays on Value (1990-1991) (15 essays)

Theological Investigations in Three Volumes plus One Volume on Religious Topics (Miscellaneous essays)

Three Volumes dealing with Economic Circulation and Chaos Theory, etc.

Circulation: Volume I (2009-2010) (25 essays)
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The Existential Economy: Volume III (2013-2014) (in 3 books) (50 essays)

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The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume I – The Prosecution of Philosophy as a Discipline (Book 1) (2018-2019)
(19 essays)

Volume II – The Practicality of Philosophy as a Discipline (Book 2) (2020)
(1 extended essay)

Volume III – The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline
(Books 3-6, The Seventh Book) (2020-2022) (approximately 100 essays)

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

An Approximate Chronological Index

(In Three Volumes [Volume III not finished])

Volume I The Prosecution of Philosophy as a Discipline (Book 1)
Volume II The Practicalities of Philosophy as a Discipline Book 2)
Volume III The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline (Books 3-7)

Volume I: The Prosecution of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Book 1

How Should Philosophy Present its Defense, and,
How Could Such a Defense Be Presented??
Given the Indiscriminate Dissemination of Philosophical Dissimulation;
I.e., Fake Philosophy, and so on,
How Can the Critical Delivery of Judgment Be Conducted
Be that Critique Philosophical in Orientation or Otherwise…? (1.9.19)

First Essay:
The Prosecution of Philosophy (x.11.18)

Second Essay: Sailing into a Storm of Controversies:
Should the Roof of the Sydney Opera House be Unfurled for Sale?
Presentation for the Mini-Conference 2018 at The Continental Philosophy Group
(9.11.18)
[Plus set of six news articles re same used in essay above]

Third Essay:
The Philosophy of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Philosophy (22.11.18)

Fourth Essay : How Insightful is Insight? (3.12.18)

Fifth Essay: Can We Invoke a Philosophical Turn? (2.2.19)

Sixth Essay: An Ordered Resolution of Philosophical Problems? (23.2.19)

Seventh Essay: The Philosophy of Power and the Power of Philosophy (26.3.19)

Eighth Essay: The Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy (9.4.19)

Ninth Essay: The Philosophy of Art and the Art of Philosophy (14.5.19)

Tenth Essay: The Philosophy of Science and the Science of Philosophy (30.5.19)

Eleventh Essay: The Philosophy of Value and the Value of Philosophy
And, the Politics of Value and the Value of Politics (25.6.19)

Twelfth Essay: The Philosophy of Philosophy as 'No Philosophy'…
As the Philosophy of Freedom and the Freedom of Philosophy! (24.7.19)

Appendix A: The Philosophy of Power and the Power of Philosophy:
A Set of Reflections on the Nature of Power… (16.5.19)
Presentation for The Continental Philosophy Group 9.6.19.

Appendix B: The Philosophy of Power and the Power of Philosophy:
A Set of Reflections on the Existential Dimension and Power… (30.6.19)

Appendix C: The Philosophy of Power and the Power of Philosophy.
The Existential Exercise and Circumscription of Power (30.6.19)

Appendix D: Existential Re-Construction of the Political-Economy
Through Engaging its Malcontents
And Promoting its Progressive Proponents (22.6.17)

Appendix E:
That the Philosophy of Philosophy is Non-Philosophy:
Exploring Non-Philosophical Dimensions:
Moving Beyond Philosophy as a Discipline (21.8.19)

Appendix F: Fragments of a Philosophical Autobiography:
Examining the 'Insightful' Nature of Insightfulness:
A Discourse Illustrated with the Assistance of Personal Anecdotes
Introduced Without Regard to either Their Chronological Occurrence
Or the Temporal Progress of Their Retrospective Re-Assessment (1.9.19)

Appendix G: An Overview of The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline
Through Noting its Prosecution, Practicalities and Prescience
The Continental Philosophy Group Conference Presentation 2019 (10.11.19)

Volume II: The Practicalities of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Book 2

An Extended Essay: On Causation, Intentionality, Judgment and Existential Re-E/valuation (21.9.20)

Plus
Six Lectures on the Practicality of Philosophy as a Discipline
plus
Where is Father Xmas, and Commentary,
plus
Addressing Humean Concerns re Causal Experience...
Plus
Postscript. (16.9.20)

Volume III: The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

In Five Books (Books 3-7)

Book 3

Title Page, etc; Introductory Extended-Essay on The Critical Dimension

Book 4

3 short Essays re Covid-19

6A. Re-Arranging the Deckchairs… Whilst Staring into the Abyss..!?
6B. A Philosophical Approach to an Integrated Set of Policy Directions
6C. Dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic (22.3.20)
6D. Covid Contestations - An Update on the COVID-19 Pandemic. (1.2.22)

3A. The Future of Work?
Do Our Evolving Ideas on the Nature of Work ‘Work for Us’?! (6-12.7.20)

8A. The Past Does Not Exi(s)t - The Future Does Not Exi(s)t
Where Do We Wish To Go, and, How Do We Wish To Get There??
Formulating an overall re-direction in policy formation (a working paper for an Open Forum) (9.8.20)

4B. Interpreting the Phenomenon of Collecting (3.9.20…)

2A. Critiquing the Political-Economy
First Conference Paper (Performance) 2020 (1.10.20)

2B. Recent Wounds and Ancient Sores:
The Problematic Prospect of the Neo-Liberal Landscape:
Creating New Predicaments and Overlooking Older Inequities
Re-Framing the Opioid Crisis and
The Obesity Epidemic in a Time of Plague
(Second Conference Paper 2020) (26.10.20)

2C. Paging the Media: O Where Art Thou?
(Looking at the place of Media in the Political-Economy) 30.10.20

4A. Some Philosophical Reflections
On Personal Identity versus Interpersonal Interaction (9.11.20)

2D. Re-Seeing How Institutions
(Re-)Constitute the Political-Economy? (13.11.20)

2E. The Future of Democracy in a World of Cultural Polarization?
A Commentary and Meta-Commentary
On "How the 'Culture War' Could Break Democracy" (3.6.21)

1X. Thinking Six Impossible Philosophical Thoughts
Before Breakfast:
Discerning the Acceptable Limits of Philosophical Theory? (12.12.20)

1Y. Thinking Six More Impossible Philosophical Thoughts
After Breakfast:
Discerning the Acceptable Limits of Philosophical Practice? (16.12.20)

1Z. Thinking Six Further Impossible Philosophical Thoughts
Before Bedtime:
Discerning the Acceptable Limits of Philosophical Criticism? (24.12.20)

1B. Can the Nihilist Live Happily with Conundrums? (1.1.21)

1P. Series of Reflections on What it Means to Be ‘Critical’?
Part I – General Investigations (16.1.21)

1Q. Series of Reflections on What it Means to Be ‘Critical’?
Part II – Particular Analyses (28.1.21)

1R. Series of Reflections on What it Means to Be ‘Critical’?
Part III – Specific Examinations (26.1.21)

1S. The Working through a Resolution of Four Problems:
Dealing with the Re(-)Purposing of Narrational Critiques,
Countering *Ad Hoc* Determinations,
Disciplinary Integrity, and, Mutual Arbitrational Re(-)Presentation (2.2.21)

1T. Summary (Shorter Version) (5.2.21)

1C. A First Blueprint for a Critical Format:
Ways and Means for Critiquing All Forms of Philosophical Positioning? (12.2.21)

Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy
That is Critical, Existential and Insightfully Productive:
In Six Parts 1D - 1J
.
1D. Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy
That is Critical, Existential and Insightfully Productive: Part I (1.4.21)
.
1E. Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy: Part II
From Aesthetic Authenticity to Ethical Authenticity
And Thence to Existential Authenticity? (3.4.21)

1F. Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy: Part III
Relegation and Deconstruction (4.4.21)

1G. Engineering the Pursuit of a Progressive Philosophy: Part IV
Reconstruction Through Existential Transformation (8.4.21)

1H. The Nature of Philosophical Motivation: Part V (9.4.21)

1I. Ramifications: Existential-Consequentialism: Part VI (10.4.21)

1J. The Resolution of (the Problem of) the (Extensive) Suspension? (13.4.21)

1K. Deconstruction, Reconstruction, Suspension,
Philosophical Motivation, and the Existential Dimension:
An Extract from Extended-Essay 1A: Written as the Basis for a Presentation (14.4.21)

1L. The Automatic ‘Foundational’ Defaults
For a Critical-Existential Philosophy? (24.4.21)

1M. The Epistemological and Ontological Status of
Relational Simulation? (26.4.21)

1N. Exploring Relational Simulation through the Lenses of
Complexification, Simplification and Induction (26.4.21)

1O. Assessing the Apparent Authenticity of Simulation (7.4.21)

1U. Defining Competence in the Philosophical Discipline? (10.5.21)

1V. Defining Competence from an Inter-Disciplinary Perspective? (11.5.21)

1W. The Relative De-Privileging of Perspectivism and
The Relative Privileging of a Qualified Essential Holism:
The Tentative First Few Steps towards a More Engaged Form of
Metaphysics? (21.5.21)

4C. Just Who Are Real Australians? A Working Paper (7.4.21)

2E. The Future of Democracy in a World of Cultural Polarization?
A Commentary and Meta-Commentary
On “How the ‘Culture War’ Could Break Democracy” (3.6.21)

2H. Keynote Address re this Topic (11.6.21)

2F. Tulsa: A Template for Overseeing a Process of Long-Term Reconciliation (8.6.21)

2G. A Proposal for an Economic Logic? (6.6.21)

4A. Some Philosophical Reflections
On Personal Identity versus Interpersonal Interaction (9.11.20)

Book 5

Imagining the Possible versus Reimagining the Impossible:
A Series of Essays Inviting a Radical Re(-)Thinking of the Political-Economy, etc:

(Twelve Essays) On a Critical-Radical Re(-)Imagination of Truth Determination
(Plus a Supplement A)

2I. Part I: (1): Reinvesting in the Idea of an Economy (24.6.21)

2J. Part II: (2): Re-Thinking the Political (6.7.21)

2K. Part III: (3): Radically Re-Thinking of the Political-Economy (11.7.21)

2L. Part IV: (4): A Radical Re-Thinking of Philosophy (24.7.21)

2M. Part V: (5): A Radical Re-Thinking of Metaphysics (19.7.21)

2N. Part VI: (6): A Radical Re-Thinking of Theology (26.7.21)

Three Essays Re(-)Imagining Deconstruction

Part I: (7):2O. An Integrated Understanding of Deconstruction (29.7.21)

Part II: (8): 2P. What Role has Deconstruction in the Transformation of an Existential Attitude? (1.8.21)

Part III: (9): 2Q. A Demonstration of Deconstruction (8.8.21)

A Critical and Radical Approach to Truth Determination:

Part I: (10): 2R. Re(-)Taking a Theoretical Perspective (7.8.21)

Part II: (11): 2S. Re(-)Taking a Practical Perspective (18.8.21)

Part III: (12): 2T. Re(-)Taking a Critical Perspective (24.8.21)

Plus 2TA. Supplement A: A Dialectical Reconsideration of A Critical and Radical Approach to Truth Determination and a Re(-)Imagining the Philosophical Discipline From an Existential Perspective (4.11.21)

2U. A Delineation of Co-Nominated Conformal Identification
Between Different Forms of Transformational Accommodation (27.821)

10A. An Explorative Delineation of an Economic Basis
For the Scientific Discipline (2.9.21)

10B. A Metaphorical Way to Approach Both Quantum Entanglement and the Relative Decoherence of a Non-Quantum Sense of World (13.10.21)

10C. The Inevitable Supersession of Quantum Physics, etc? (31.10.21)

2V. A Restatement (In Six Parts) of What is Meant by the Expression

‘What it Means to Be Philosophical?’ from a Disciplinary Perspective
Conference papers for The Continental Philosophy Group, November 2021 (25.11.21)

10D. Has Quantum Supersession, etc., Been Demonstrated?
Paper for Open Forum, December 2021 at The Continental Philosophy Group (3.11.21)

10E. Quantum Supersession Contracted, and, Is the Right Anti-Science? (10.12.21)

10F. Speculative Reconfiguration of the Hypothetical Landscape in the Physical Prospect (2.11.22, just started)

7A. An Overall Philosophy of History (and Not a History of Philosophy) Parts I (18.11.22)

7B. An Overall Philosophy of History (And a History of Philosophy): Part II (23.3.23)

5A. For What Purpose/s Education? (6.12.21)

11A. Theological Questions and Answers *versus*
Theological Answers and Questions? (just started)

12B. Legal Treatment *versus* Existential Retreatment!?
A Relatively Systematic Approach to Legal Theory
(An Evolving Brief - 7.2.22)

9A. Arts and Crafts, and Values in a World of Re(-)E/Valuation:
Is there an Existential Difference in Valuational Formation? (24.2.22)

12A. Navigating an Existential Secularism and Environmentalism (5.1.22)

[6D. Covid Contestations - An Update on the COVID-19 Pandemic (1.2.22)]

12C. A Brief Statement of Philosophical Intent:
The Outline of a Relatively Systematic Approach to Conducting
Philosophical Research (28.2.22)

Book 6

2W. The Pragmatic Prospect: Part I:
The Pragmatism of Pragmatism..??
Approaching a Critical Appreciation of this Topic (25.3.22)

2X. The Pragmatic Prospect: Part II:
The Simulation of Simulation..??
Approaching a Radical Re-Appreciation of this Topic (of Pragmatism) (16.4.22)

2Y. The Pragmatic Prospect? Part III:
The Interpretation of Interpretation..??
Re(-)Approaching a Pre-Critical Re(-)Appreciation of this Topic? (12.6.22)

7C. 95 Theses:
Ninety-Five Proposition to Test Our Faith in Our Acumen in Predicting
Political Trends in Australian, US, and World Politics:
Can We Give Our Approbation to these Following Articles of Faith?
A Light-Hearted Look at the 'World' We Have Inherited
And Have to Seriously Reconsider (15.6.22)

2Z. The Pragmatic Prospect: Postscript:
The Freedom of Freedom..??
Nothing to See Here! Move on!
An Existential Interpretation of 'Our' World of Experience (27.5.22)

The Pragmatic Prospect (In Three Parts, and one Postscript) (Edited 24.10.22)

7D. Doing History, Doing History, Doing History..? (20.6.22)

7E. The Possibilities of a Pragmatic History
Within a Pragmatic Prospect?? (24.6.22)

7F. That a 'Pragmatic Prospect' is a 'Pragmatic Disciplinary Prospect'
E.g., as a 'Pragmatic Philosophy' or as a 'Pragmatic History', etc… (25.6.22)

Three Essays On Working Towards the Construction of a
Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic Historical Prospect

7G. A Brief Delineation of a Dialectical-Logics/Logical-Dialectics
As Preparation for the Philosophical Explication
Of a Pragmatic (Historical) Prospect
Given the Deconstruction of all Forms of Ideological Extremism
E.g., Realism, Idealism and All Other Impossible Instances of the Same (2.7.22)

7H. Why is 'Doing History' so Problematic?
On the Possibility of Constructing
A Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic Historical Prospect? (5.7.22)

7I. Why is 'Doing Existential History' so Problematic?
On the Possibility of Constructing
A Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic
Historical Prospect? (Part I) (5.7.22)

7J. A Commentary on the Postscript:
On the Economic Construction of a Pragmatic 'Template'
As Preparation for the Philosophical Explication
Of a Pragmatic Scientific Prospect (9.7.22)

7K. Exploring the Various Problems Encountered
Whilst Attempting to Construct
A Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic
Disciplinary Prospect? (10.7.22)

7L. A Series of Currently Unprofitable Pragmatic Reflections
On a Variety of Scientific Concepts and Their Possible Interrelation (30.8.22)

7M. Mythic Manipulations:
From a Pragmatic Perspective, upon Reflection,
It Seems Most People are Set up to Fail for the Benefit of the Few;
'If this is the Case?' then "Please Explain!" (22.7.22)

7N. Why is 'Doing Existential History' so Problematic?
On the Possibility of Constructing
A Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic
Historical Prospect? (Part II) (8.8.22)

7O. Why is 'Doing Existential History' so Problematic?
On the Possibility of Constructing
A Viable, Qualified Anti-Representational Pragmatic
Historical Prospect? (Part III) (20.8.22)

7P. An Overview: Existential Observations of a Pragmatic Historical Prospect (25.8.22)

7Q. Existential Discernment?
Part I: Non-Existentially Oriented Treatment:
Transformational Retreatment within a Pragmatic Prospect (4.9.22)

7R. Existential Discernment?
Part II: Existentially Oriented Treatment:
Transformational Retreatment within a Pragmatic Prospect (9.9.22)

7S. Existential Discernment?
Part III: Overview: The Relatively Radical Ramifications of
An Existential Orientation (30.8.22)

7V. Re-Righting 'History' through the Use of a 'Pragmatic' Narration:
A Pro-Relational Accounting of 'History Doing History' (19.9.22)

7T. On Discerning the Existential Dimension in Experience:
Developing, Applying, and Refining
Our Existential, Economic and 'Pragmatic' Disciplinary Tools (26.9.22)

7U. Is Kant an Existentialist?
Outlining Formal and Informal Approaches to How Such a Quest
In Philosophical Complexification Might be Addressed? (15.3.23)

7V. Re-Righting 'History' through the Use of a 'Pragmatic' Narration:
A Pro-Relational Accounting of 'History Doing History' (19.9.22)

7W. Re-Viewing Historians and 'Their Histories':
The Pragmatics of the Historical Prospect? (10.11.22)

7X. The Great Disruption aka The Great Disruption:
Running Histories of the Past, Present and Future in Order to Discern
Probable Continuities, Dis-Continuities, and Non-Continuities? (12.1.23)

7Y. The Hermeneutics of the 'Virtual' Re(-)Presentation of the War in the Ukraine
(11.1.23)

7Z. A History of Histories: (In Two Parts)
Discerning Methodological Symmetries and Asymmetries
Between Histories of the Past, Present, and Future (19.1.23 - 27.2.23)

12D. Beyond Criticism? A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…
An Open-Ended Extended Essay… (9.3.23)

12EFG. Background Notes for a Series of Podcast re *The Seventh Book*… (31.3.23)

12H. For Philosophy in the Contemporary era, 'Where to?'
(Notes for an Open Forum: 9 April 2023) (10.3.23)

The Seventh Book…
(In Three Parts, and Afterword, Supplement, & A First Digest)

VII. A Lengthy Preamble: Walking upon a Pragmatic Middle Path
Between Both a Radical-Conservatism and a Conservative-Radicalism
(31.12.22 - 9.3.23)