12I. On Reflection… A Series of Essays on the Topic of Reflection

BOOK 8

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark…
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts…
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness….

A series of essays on the topic of reflection…

looking into the nature of travel; the meta-modern advent of the Contemporary era; authenticity; optimism; positive nihilism; transcendental suspensions; narratives; subjectivity; intersubjectivity; the existential dimension; secularity… along with a search for a viable and reputable philosophical residue in a world that needs to deconstruct the illogical and the nonsensical and promotes the ongoing consensus of an existential-pragmatism…

Index

Preface (To Book 8)

Twelve Sets of Reflections

1. 2I. Reflections on Travel
   Both Philosophical and Non-Philosophical in Orientation
2. 12J. Reflections on the Imputation of a Contemporary Era
3. 12K. Reflections on the Putative Imputation of Authenticity?
4. 12L. Reflections on (the Existential Re(-)Constitution of) Optimism..?
5. 12M. Reflections on the Viability of a Positive Nihilism?
6. 12N. Reflections on the Philosophical Strategy of 'Being Reflective'?
   Exploring the Nature and Function of the 'Transcendental Suspension'
7. 12O. Review: On Reflection… An Overview
8. 12P. The Navigation, Negotiation, and Arbitration of 'Dialogue':
   The Respectful Treatment of Pseudo-Psychotic Ideation
   Through Indirect Deconstruction Devolving from Focused Mutual
   Reflections on Highly Probable Consequential Outcomes?
9. 12Q. Reflections on the Phenomenology of Subjective Experience

10. 12R. Reflections on the Hermeneutics of Intersubjective Experience

11. 12S. Reflections on the Existential Ramifications of a Positive Nihilism:
    In Time and Out of Time:
    A Pragmatic-Existentialism through an Integration of
    Economic, Non-Economic, and Hyper-Economic Perspectives
12. 12T. Reflections on the Exercise of the Philosophical Discipline
    Within the Secularity of the Overall Life-World

12U. *On Reflection*: A Random Review –
A Re-Construction of Key Ideas by the 'Reviewer':
A Skeletal Commentary, &.
A Reply to the Criticisms Raised Concerning
Certain Themes in these Reflections

Preface

What had started out as six (Non-Cartesian) mediations *On Reflection...* has morphed into seven; where, in the last set of reflections, the themes explored in the first six I duly attempt to integrate in a relatively coherent format. Such an approach, understandably, could be read as a 'systematic philosophy'. However, I do not feel we can be absolutely systematic, rather, less-incoherent, and would quip, with some degree of truth, that I am actually being 'anti-systematic'. By radically deconstructing everything unfit for (philosophical, disciplinary, and secular) purpose I seek to find that residue that seems to be left working, i.e., is pragmatic in its temperament. Moreover, in the process, through maintaining the exercise of (transcendental) suspensions, the practitioner can no longer be accused of adopting and adapting conventionally preferred forms of ideological extremism. Thereby, somewhat 'progressively' removing themselves from the distortions attendant upon such mistreatment of our many overlapping perspectives upon this world at large, this overall world-of-life in which the ongoing significance of our lives and our interactions are continually being arbitrated in and through our 'standing' before others. However, in this interlinked collection of essays, my primary purpose is more 'to reflect upon the nature of reflection' to that extent that such an incestuous-like task might bear a fruitfulness of insightful progeny that might warn us, at the very least, to what extent that this type of a trajectory has both its opportunities and limitations... (i)

In the first set of reflections, on travel, I review this topic from both philosophical and non-philosophical perspectives. The latter perspective, the reader will soon discern, is ambiguous, and, the travel referred to is very much my more recent shifts in thinking towards what I deem to be a more radical, non-economic style of thinking that, equally, cannot escape its economic re(-)appropriation from what would be more a hyper-economic sense of perspective. (ii)

The second set of reflections once again seeks to better understand the nature of the advent of the Contemporary era, which, on this occasion, is conducted more from a meta-modern and hyper-real sense of repositioning. From reflections upon recent cinema, and other more visually received art-forms, I draw the conclusion, amongst other things, that certain 'existentially oriented sentiments and expectations' (as 'existential feelings' or 'transcendental emotions') are being reconstituted in a qualified format in this current era after the negative press they have, on balance, been persistently given in the Post-modern era. By 'qualified' is meant more 'expressions of aspirational hope that are relativistically diluted' rather than 'absolutistically undiluted forms of expression'. (iii)

One of these 'transcendental emotions', or rather 'trans-intentional sentiments', is that of 'authenticity'. This somewhat necessary aspect, for the effective functioning of our relationships, is being explored in this third series of reflections. (iv)

In the next set of reflections, the theme of a 'qualified optimism', as an important and necessary existential sentiment, is more closely looked at. Furthermore, its relational necessity, is recognized as automatically converting a 'negative nihilism' into a 'positive nihilism'. (v)

Now, the theme of our reflections is upon the inescapable nature of a positive nihilism. 'Inescapable' in the sense that it is the only way 'we can actually entertain a viable appreciation of our being in this world at large'. In effect, challenging us to understand that the only working (philosophical, disciplinary, and secular) perspective upon this sense and semblance of an overall life-world is through a suitably conducted anti-representational, positively nihilistic, existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism! Indeed, quite a challenge. However, as ever, I do not immediately seek your inevitable assent, but, rather, your understanding in the hope that such re(-)positioning[1] can be both better comprehended and fruitfully critiqued... (vi)

As I perceive so-called 'transcendental-suspensions'[2] at the center of our reflections, I feel it necessary to explore this complex topic in depth. I begin with a relatively orthodox set of readings, and, then, from 'observing' the internal logic of such a functionally oriented conceptual tool I feel it necessary to then further explore a series of less conventional perspectives, that, to my mind, are actually more orthodox in tenor. But I will leave that reassessment to the reader themselves... (vii)

In a seventh series of reflections, I attempt to tie up these miscellaneous strands to form a more integrated point of view that, hopefully, is considerably less inconsistent and more capable of assisting us in our reflections upon our passages through this world, both individually and collectively. That we can be truly pragmatic in our working relations with others, and, where by such means, we can successfully both augment and enhance[3] the overall freedom to be had through this arbitration of our aspirations as to be enacted in both personal and social terms of reference. (viii)

However, despite such lofty ambitions, it is also my hope that some enjoyment might also be found in following the many twists and turns of these fragmentary mediations designed to elicit a more pragmatic approach to the ensuing existential enrichment of our relationships, something usually sought by all peoples regardless of what is misused to divide us in the first instance... (ix)

...in effect, as a small token to be presented as an indication of my ever-to-be-qualified philosophical optimism..!! (x)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 13.7.23.

---

[1] The nomenclature of '(-)' indicates and ongoing economy progressively thematizing the philosophical, i.e, phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential e/valuational formation, hopefully, being focused upon. The expression 'philosophical' also being a proxy for both 'disciplinary and secular modes of life, etc.'

[2] The reader needs to recognize that by my use of the expression 'transcendental' is usually meant 'trans-intentional' and 'judgment exercised through trans-conceptual and trans-perceptual means in a Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the psyche'.

[3] I technically define 'augmentation' to mean 'positively oriented, non-chaotic increments' preferably exercised through critical means, and, 'enhancement' to mean 'positively oriented chaotic, non-incremental occurrences' that will take a suitably radical trajectory that is relatively-radical and not non-relatively radical in their experiential reception.

Then, a seventh series of reflections became an eight. If people are not capable of engaging the dialogical contours of a philosophical debate just how might such people be engaged, if at all? As a solution to this puzzle, I propose the use of an auto-narrative in which the protagonist eventually finds themselves, hopefully, confronting the consequential ramifications of their own beliefs, etc., on their own terms, primarily, in their own time. (xi)

A further three sets of reflections attempt to mutually demonstrate the economic correlativity between phenomenological considerations of subjectivity, hermeneutics considerations of intersubjectivity, and the existential ramifications of the same. (xii)

The twelfth series of reflections will be pre-occupied with secular issues as a *de facto* pre-introduction to topics to be addressed in *Book* 9, namely, the overall nature of the metaphysical, how other disciplines, similarly, are configured somewhat by our considerations of what I term to be ‘inter-ordered phenomena’ as introduced and briefly outlined as a topic in *The Seventh Book*… (xiii)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 7.8.23.

12I. Reflections on Travel
Both Philosophical and Non-Philosophical in Orientation

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12I. Reflections on Travel both Philosophical and Non-Philosophical in Orientation*

Life is but a short trip through time…

This first short essay explores the idea of 'travel' from both philosophical and non-philosophical orientations.[4] Meaning some philosophical observations about travel in the Contemporary world and also shifts in my thinking as I have also had to explore both recent 'economic', philosophical and non-economic, 'non-philosophical' shifts in my own thinking. 'Economic' thinking insists on a 'trimodal economy in our presentation and exploration of each and every economy when brought forward for such scrutiny'. However, the economic circulation of such (e/)valuation(al formation) could not get off the ground, so to speak, without the co-existence also of a unilateral sense of re-directedness as pointed out by the non-philosopher, or non-standard philosopher, François Laruelle. It is all very well that we have a circulation of value, but, in the causal direction of time's arrow the world, obviously, is not just constituted as a mere 'circulation' in such economic terms. Where, in effect, among a number of other considerations, which will also be pointed out in this essay, a non-philosophical approach questions the presuppositions as to how philosophy itself is to be performed, enacted, and acted out upon the stage of our intellectual expectations. But, first, let me start with a haiku. (0)

As a number of you will know I have recently returned from a short trip to South Korea. In preparing for my flight back to Australia, I retrieved my house keys from my small backpack and put them in my pocket. Hence this haiku:

*House keys in pocke*t.
Warm trousers and umbrella...
Half a world away.... (1)

The implication, more or less, is that Winter is the season to where I am travelling to, and, where I was, the weather was more like Summer. That I could put my house keys in my pocket from half a world away, with the hope of going very soon through my front door, tells you that the world we now inhabit is no longer the world we have intellectually and culturally inherited from, say, our grandparents. Given such spatial and temporal 'proximity', along with a profound global interconnectedness, it makes, say, Russia's war, or, rather, 'special operation', in Ukraine, along with all other military and civil conflicts, as something that is quite obscene and, for many people, too, a series of anomalous event that is more personal in the light of our now knowing people from these many regions of the world that once would have been mere names on some foreign, unlooked at map buried in an unopened atlas. (2).

Now, when we travel, we hope to do so with the accompanying of our luggage. In this regard we might just travel lightly or, also pack, say, a suitcase. As an analogy, what are the three economic conditions or factors that that would allow me to connect with my luggage if not carried on board by myself? (3)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

4 The expression 'non-philosophical' is ambiguous as this essay will point out.

Hence this economic observation, as an analogy, that we need to entertain a necessary alignment between the three aspects of this economy in question in order to successfully pursue the intentional objectives of that specific endeavour, i.e., successfully reconnect with my luggage. Therefore, without thinking too much, we would note the necessary trimodal conditions of 'a suitcase', 'the plane we are travelling in',[5] and 'the very presence of ourselves at the end of our destination hopefully connecting with a reconnection with our luggage'. Now, if any one of these three factors is not co-present at our destination, we are not going to be able to successfully collect that luggage. Hence the economic moral of a necessary alignment in order to perform the economic tasks perceived as possible within the specific compass of that economy. (4)

Now, I would argue that every 'economy' is similarly constructed and that, consequently, this metaphor of 'alignment' is central to such understanding. As a further illustration of this 'observation' let us unravel the following set of ideas and images. (5)

To illustrate the fact that Contemporary philosophers have to also contend with an exciting and diverse world of science and learn to speak languages that no longer seem to be in plain English let met proffer the following item of news: It has been recently reported that "physicists have been able to 'program' non-Abelian anyons in a manner that parallels the structure of a Borromean ring."[6] So, having clearly demonstrated this last point (that philosophers will also need to confront these complex worlds of scientific-speak) let me quickly translate what is to be discussed here as something that I will take up as a further illustration of my economic model and how its appreciation must also be non-economic in orientation, as relatively non-economic in tenor. (6)

In translation this technical statement can be read to say that 'in two dimensions the apparent observation of virtual-like particles, anyons, can be constructed in a similar manner to Borromean rings (in an ordering that is non-commutatively engineered)'. Now we can imagine Borromean rings to be an assembly of interlinked rings, say three or more, where they cannot be pulled apart, but, if any one of those links is broken then that assembly will now easily and immediately fall apart. That this form of topological stability is something to be desired, say, in quantum computing; hence the potential impact that this form of structural programming could have in that type of field. (7)

Do we have a way of analoguing this topological stability being alluded to? Yes. Imagine a four-sided cardboard box with four flaps. The box is filled, and we then put the first flap under the second, and so on, with the fourth flap being forced under the first

---

[5] Our luggage could have been put on another flight, say earlier or later, but the same principle of alignment holds.

[6] Researchers have used a quantum computer to create virtual particles and move them around so their paths form a Borromean-ring pattern. The exotic particles are called non-Abelian anyons, or nonabellions for short, and their Borromean rings exist only as information inside the quantum computer. The link to this article (d41586-023-01574-0#) in the magazine *Nature* can be found by googling 'non-Abelian anyons' and 'Borromean rings'. Refer also the article in New Scientist, 12 August 2023, p.40-42, by Phillip Ball titled: *When does a simulation become real*?

flap. In effect, we have a Borromean-like structure where the flaps on that box now act as a stable lid. (8)

In mathematics, some functions are commutative and other functions are not commutative. So, e.g., because in simple multiplication 2 x 4 = 8, and 4 x 2 = 8 it implies 2 x 4 = 4 x 2. In this instance the order of the operations involved does not matter. However, in previous essays I have, in effect, discussed non-commutative operations. E.g., I have argued that 'the philosophy of history' is a 'philosophical procedure', whereas, in a clear contrast, 'the history of philosophy' is an 'historical procedure'.[7] That, in effect, a different order gives us two quite different types of discourse, indeed, topics in two different disciplines. (9)

Now, we can imagine a three-sided box, say, the package for a very expensive, upmarket perfume could also be shut in a similar manner. Or, indeed, a five-sided box or a six-sided box, etc., but, not, of course a two-sided box or a one-sided box because the latter so-called boxes, as 'boxes', can have no existence whatsoever. (10)

Here, we have a perfect metaphor, or analogy, for the nature of an economic philosophy, namely, three aspects (or more) that are necessarily inter-locked and mutually inter-self-supporting in a correlative-like manner. Moreover, this same rhetorical device can also illustrate an appreciation of the economic in the form of the relatively 'non-economic'. Imagine lifting up such a box, turning it over with this self-supporting lid facing the ground, and where we pull out one of those flaps... to witness the obvious expectation that the contents of this box, as an event,[8] will now immediately spill on to the ground in that same moment of time. (11)

Hence the intimation of this dialectic between the relatively 'economic' and the relatively 'non-economic'. However, we have to be careful not to insist on the pure possibility of dualistic thinking and, instead, recognize that these two orientations are intimately interrelated, whilst equally noting that we cannot merely insist on the sheer unidirectionality of the non-economic as something in 'itself'. Just as we cannot imagine either

---

[7] As discussed in detail, e.g., in *The Seventh Book*… In *Book* 9, this topic will be explored under the title of the asymmetrical nature of inter-ordered phenomena in comparison to the symmetrical nature of inter-ordered phenomena, e.g., the phenomenological-semantics of phenomenological semantics is a meta-phenomenological-semantics/non-phenomenological-semantic which can be regarded as a 'relatively narrow and passive, categorical form of metaphysics'. More correctly, philosophy should be regarded as super-ordered given my recipe that 'philosophy' is 'one-part phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one part existentialism'. The symmetrical inter-ordered form of 'the philosophy of philosophy' giving us a 'meta-philosophy' or 'non-philosophy', which could also be read as 'broad, active form of metaphysics'. An existential, pro-relational form of metaphysics completing these three descriptions of anchoring this philosophical category of 'metaphysics' and structuring the functions of this inter-ordered approach in delineating both the nature and limits of this viable, newly re-formed philosophical sub-discipline of meta-physics.

[8] In using this work 'event' (*événement*) I am alluding here to various French philosophers, and others. E.g., Derrida, Laruelle, Caputo, etc. We can treat the virtual economic moment of resolution as circulated, but, in shifting to a causal, non-virtual frame of reference we need to take on board the unilateral re-directedness of the last moment. Treating an existential pattern of intervention, in contrast, as observing more the re-iterated unilateral re-directedness of the first moment, etc.

a two-sided box or a one-sided box. Therefore, we need to come to the understanding that the 'critical nature of the economic' co-defines the 'radical nature of the non-economic', and v.v. Indeed, I would argue that such events are incrementally engineered and where the 'relatively radical' could not be appreciated if it could not also be re-integrated back into some form off an economic setting, and v.v. Hence the subtitle of my recent text *The Seventh Book...* which states: *A Lengthy Preamble: Walking upon a Pragmatic Middle Path between both* ***a Radical-Conservatism and a Conservative-Radicalism***.[9] (12)

This brings me to the next controversial reflection upon my philosophical travels. Is the philosopher absolutely bound to completely separate 'descriptions' from 'prescriptions' (and 'proscriptions'), and v.v? Namely, is the philosopher allowed to make the 'philosophical observation' that a certain 'pattern of description' stands in need of an analogical mechanism that cogently 'prescribes', hermeneutically, the meta-textual configurations that structure that mix of genres involved in the very articulation of such propositional statements? Obviously, in the productions of the textual economy both textual 'descriptions' and meta-textual 'prescriptions' must mutually cooperate *contra* the blanket prohibition of the naturalistic fallacy or any other critically prohibitive device that forbids our not taking such a carefully conducted passage from a descriptive 'is' to a prescriptive 'ought' (and thence to an existential 'proscriptive should not'), and v.v. Such an important ruling works on a textual level, but, in a textual economy, other rules effectively override this well-worn prohibition normally exercised in a superficial logic (operating without the semblance of a requisite degree of economic 'depth'[10]). (13)

In a similar light I would like to criticize Richard Rorty, albeit in the midst of my admiration for his work, that to propose the democratic necessity, say, of 'social consensus' the philosopher should also propose a mechanism or a set of mechanisms for such a 'philosophical observation'. Recognizing, of course, that such proposals need to be pragmatically useful, are to be ever treated as provisional, and forever as works in progress... often proposing what, hitherto, would have been the 'impossible' through the advancing of so-called 'final vocabularies', or 'definitive histories'… as new and novel ways of imagining lived-reality, and so on. (14)

Continuing on with this topic of travel and luggage let me seek to make a pragmatic distinction between 'philosophical luggage' and 'ideological baggage'. A non-philosopher, as a non-standard philosopher, always recognizes that the philosopher, through necessity, has to travel with a certain degree of presuppositional baggage, etc. Philosophical arguments are founded on philosophical presuppositions that, hopefully, interested parties can agree upon as both relevant and essential to the formation of the

---

9 My emphasis here is presented in bold.

10 E.g., treating the 'textual economy' as 'as an epistemological assemblage that is one-part phenomenological text, one-part hermeneutical meta-text, and one-part as the ensuing non-systematic existential non-text given the balanced suspension of the former two moments, etc.' 'Depth' also alludes to the near-totally overlooked overlay of both non-economic and hyper-economic forms of re(-)positioning! Knowing that there is this overt neglect of such economic matters along with the sheer absence of all forms of non-economic and hyper-economic insightfulness we stand to be both amazed and suspicious as to how all kinds of disciplinarians can seeming conjure up what passes as a rational argument in the all too ideologically driven pursuit of their disciplinary objectives.

ensuing arguments, etc. A non-philosopher will critique such presuppositions, such luggage, that they, themselves must also carry in their own right. However, through the use of apposite (transcendental) suspensions such luggage is duly exposed as present, and, thereby, as able to exhibit just how it appears to be constituted, and so on. On the other hand, given the relative absence of such deep suspensions the philosopher is then in imminent danger of becoming no more than an 'ideologue', a 'person who ideologically over-presents their current positioning through forms of over-commitment that can only distort their argumentation if not suitably suspended'. Such 'over-commitment' inevitably presents as a 'form of philosophical non-engagement through the non-conducting of an open dialogue'. In an excessive form, this type of format is witnessed though the ensuing presence of a 'pseudo-psychosis' in which the ideologue resists argumentation with the same intensity, if not more, than that which is brought to bear upon it through forms of counter-argumentation.[11] Whereas, in contrast, a 'philosophical dialogue' is a 'more relaxed meeting of minds in which the parties come to understand their differences in positioning with respect to each other and may well find increasing forms of mutual consensus along with civils expression of disagreement'. Now, no one has all the answers and through thoughtful suspensions we can test the apparent utility of our philosophical luggage, be that our own or that of another person, and duly discard what baggage should be left on the wayside if I am permitted to use this rather environmentally unfriendly metaphor... (15)

We should also note, as a qualification or correction, that the mindless relativism of under-commitment should also be avoided by both the philosopher and non-philosopher.[12] Situations will arise, especially of a moral character, where a well-reasoned, reasonable stand should be taken, albeit in and through the mutual openness of a working dialogue..![13] (16)

So, in articulating a certain philosophical observation through the subtitle to *The Seventh Book...* have I supplied an adequate method for understanding 'the philosophical necessity for our needing to take a middle path *between both a radical-conservatism and a conservative-radicalism*?' (17)

In understanding how I was to make that connection is to understand the somewhat radical shifting of the contours of the trajectory of my philosophical thinking entered into well within the last year. In constructing this text of *The Seventh Book...* with forty-eight modules I carved out the parameters for the constitution of an economic phi-

---

[11] Whether 'psychotic' or 'pseudo-psychotic' the hermeneut should be able to demonstrate the presence of a potential insightfulness, through investigating statements made by the person themselves, even though, more often than not, such insightfulness is neither integrated nor positively acted upon, i.e., fully connected. Of course, we can be optimistic that this might eventually occur and, for the pseudo-psychotic people this does occur when they decide to exit their conspiracies, or leave a certain cult, no longer give a blind adoration to political figures that many people think do not deserve such devoted loyalty, etc. This topic is explored in a seventh set of reflections (*Pursuit*, III.12N).

[12] Of course, by now, we should realize that by 'non-philosopher' I mean 'a non-standard philosopher as well as other disciplinarians and secularists'.

[13] I.e., through entering into existentially oriented patterns of intervention on the behalf of our relevant relationships (a topic that will be explored in the last two sets of reflections).

losophy to then have to add a segue through a forty-ninth module to a fiftieth module dealing somewhat exclusively with an appreciation of the economic through the radical nature of a non-economic lens. Although already intuitively understood, witness the subtitle to this volume, a mechanism for exercising both a radical-conservatism and a conservative-radicalism was finally articulated through introducing a form of non-economic appreciation, namely, the taking of a non-philosophical approach to the very nature of the economic whilst also recognizing an inescapable dialectic between both the 'relatively economic' and the 'relatively non-economic' (and their inevitable re(-)appropriation in some form of a hyper-economic contextualization). (18)

By taking this 'radical turn', joy of joy, I was also able to further make connections between the 'relatively non-economic' and the 'relatively existential'. Indeed, the 'non-economic' as 'trans-relational' (and 'meta-relational') would also allow me to equate it with the 'pro-relational nature of the existential' where 'relational experience' also takes on 'the emergent point of view of the relationship itself (albeit as it, in turn, is relationally emplaced in a relational world of relationships)'. Indeed, forming an economic compression in a richness of significance that not only describes the living-reality of lived-experience through phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented descriptions, but also both prescribes the rules for its meta-textual, hermeneutic formation along with also the necessary prohibitions, or 'proscriptions', whose necessary absence would also oversee the existentially oriented instantiation of such pro-relational experience...[14] (19)

Hence the radical shifts in the contours of my recent philosophical and non-philosophical travels... (20)

Now, let me end with the following image. Suppose I were to buy an expensive perfume at the duty-free counter at the airport and I find it is packaged in a three-sided box with its flaps overlapping in a Borromean-like manner. I unwrap the cellophane, and if I were to lift it up, turn it over, and underdo one of those flaps what would I expect would happen? Of course, this bottle of perfume would immediately fall out. But, prearmed with this causal expectation, I arrange it so that I catch this falling bottle with the same hand that undid this package. In this image we have an analogy as to how we normally deal with an anticipation of causal experience. Indeed, in an economy of 'catching that falling bottle of perfume' I have overseen an alignment between the upturned box, the falling bottle, and my free hand that successfully catches this same falling bottle. Making, obviously, the point that the radical, non-economic falling of the bottle of perfume is successfully re(-)appropriated in a contextual '(sub-)economy of catching' that must observe this necessary economic alignment between the box, the bottle, and my free hand outstretched to catch the same. (21)

Now, let me end these travels with another haiku:

[14] In effect, invoking a textual economy consisting of textualized phenomenological descriptions; meta-textual, hermeneutical prescriptions; and simulated non-textual existential proscriptions.

Front door key is turned.
Back where I left; through widow...
` *See leaves still falling....* (22)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 24.5.23.

2. The Philosophical Journey Ever-Continues…

Having been asked to write these reflections on my recent shifts in my philosophical thinking, as entailed in this essay, I decided to write a further five sets of reflections much in the spirit of the meditations of both Descartes and Husserl. However, in writing a summary of the ideas developed in those six 'meditations' and finding I had ten headings that needed to be interwoven and somewhat integrated found I had a seventh essay. The first set of six reflections dealing with this metaphorical topic of travel; metamodernistic nature of the Contemporary era; authenticity; optimism; a positive nihilism; and, a constructive-deconstruction of transcendental suspensions. As one of my themes is the rehabilitation of metaphors of light, I have quite provocatively titled that seventh essay: *Review*: *On Reflection… an Overview*.[15] (23)

Then, responding to an observation made in an online meeting I realized, *quelle horreur*, that not all people are capable of conducting a philosophical style of argument, say, in the form of an open dialogue. That when being confronted by people with overcommitted epistemological or ontological standpoints that there is just no point in entering into a philosophical encounter with such ideologues. However, I believe it is one of the many tasks of the philosopher to try to make an existential difference in their passage through this overall world-of-life, be open to all manner of different views about lived-reality, the question then becomes 'just how might we engage with such a person?' The person who is in the thrall of a conspiracy, or demonstrates a blind commitment to some political leader or polarized political position, or is so wedded to a religious cult that gets its members to uncritically override even matters of common sense, and so on. I answer that conundrum by 'walking in the opposite direction'. Let the person concerned, in their own time, unravel the convoluted details of their own world view and either let them eventually deconstruct its most unlikely tenets or, gently and carefully, proffer a few consequential consequences of such positioning in the hope that this person, again in their own time, will more carefully reassess the merits or non-merits of their dogmatically articulated patterns of thinking. Exploring this approach of engaging in a process of a(n auto-)narration, rather than the form of a philosophical debate, forms the content of an eighth series of reflections. (24)

[15] Arguing, e.g., that in exploring the interrogative economy (involved in the asking of a question – at the center of all philosophical and disciplinary practice) that a first reply takes a metaphorical form and, therefore, the metaphorical cannot be voided. Rather, what should be avoided are certain mistakes such as when we mistakenly literalize our metaphors; reify our metaphorical models, not be observant as to the limits of the metaphorical, etc.

The next three series of reflections concern the phenomenology of subjectivity; the hermeneutics of intersubjectivity; and the existential nature of lived-experience in order to demonstrate the correlativity of these three disciplines and how in their mutual running together we have an invaluable form of error-correction in the practice of psychological interviews, assessments, and so on. (25)

The last essay, number twelve, addresses philosophical concerns that have arisen in the secular world, such as, e.g., the experiential nature of the existential, the nature of toxic relationships, how should environmental issues be better approached in the face of rampant denialism, can we pursue a viable metaphysics that insightfully charts both its pitfalls and its highlights, proffering novel ideas on how 'we might better live a good philosophical life as citizens through a deep and mutual openness to both the concern and the care of others… given that our freedom can only creatively arise through our cooperation with others!!' (26)

Then, shock horror, I recently discovered I had tentatively created two apparently quite different definitions of my evolving concept of the 'metaphysical' and their integration has inspired me to start a Book 9. In this book, barely started, with some excitement, I will at last be able to find a philosophical place for the discipline of the metaphysical and, therein, explore how this discipline is accordingly configured. In the process, also exploring how other disciplines and professions can also be accorded the uniqueness of their own disciplinary points of view, and the range of perspectives that can be entertained therein. So, my travels continue..!!

The storm lashed roof leaked…
Filled the bucket placed beneath…
Then it overflowed…. (27)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 7.8.23.

3. But, Wait, There Is More..!

As they say, "there is no rest for the wicked," and, I must be truly wicked to find no rest whatsoever. A few days after finishing this addition to this first essay in a series of reflections, after a long week of trying to find a distinctive differentiation between 'affective emotions' and 'transcendental emotions', rebadged as 'existentially oriented sentiments and expectations' that the latter must also have an intersubjective appearance given their trans-relational locus in the pro-relational emergence of our relationships that cannot be reductively reduced merely to all relevant relational participants and parts, etc. It has long annoyed me to hear people uncritically talking about their aesthetic 'feelings', and so on, where such forms of appreciation, as judgments, should not be reduced to mere emotions of an affective complexion since the uncritical use of such language can only end in endless confusions, fallacious arguments, and conclusions definitely not worthy of a true philosopher or disciplinarian. (28)

That in observing such sentiments, e.g., like trustworthiness, honesty, optimism, authenticity, love and other deep-seated noble affections, etc., as mere 'emotions' on an affective level of psychological organization is to completely misunderstand such phenomena. Having a pro-relational locus in our relationships implies that they must also have an intersubjective complexion... which totally rewrite this entire topic from also an intersubjective orientation (even if primarily trans-relational in their origination).[16] This chimes in well with 'the look of others' as explored by Sartre. As I noted in the ninth series of reflections, on the topic of the phenomenology of subjective experience:

> 'Stealing something' is one thing, but, 'being seen stealing' only compounds the complexity of the experience. Just as we might quip 'that murder is a messy business', but, 'an even messier business when observed by bystanders' since the latter might well wonder if they will also be added as collateral damage in that overall affair? Such considerations reinforcing this point that even if the relative presence of existential sentiments and/or the relative absence of the same is a trans-relational state of affairs it must also take on the appearance of an intersubjective orientation and complexion.[17] [24] (29)

Such insights enriches this topic of the imputed intersubjectivity of existential experience and completely exploding misbegotten topics like 'the impossibility of knowing other minds', and similar pseudo-conundrums of that ilk. (30)

No doubt such novel ideas will continuing 'to keep me on my toes' so to speak, force me 'to continue my philosophical travels....' (31)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 7.8.23.

4. The Recent Advertising of this First Essay in this Series *On Reflection*… Noted:

12I. Reflections on Travel both Philosophical and Non-Philosophical in Orientation

I have recently travelled to South Korea and was there for a couple of weeks. I have used the metaphor of 'travel', and some other allied metaphors, like e.g., 'luggage', to illustrate some quite dramatic shifts in my philosophical thinking that have occurred within the last year. One of those changes is to take on board the concept of the non-philosophical, non-standard, non-economic ideas of the French Philosopher François Laruelle. It is all very well to endless propose 'economic circulations of value' but we would not travel very far if we did. On the other hand, if the engines of a jet plane didn't turn over properly then, equally, there could be no unilateral directedness of travel... with the moral being that we need the cooperation of both models of interaction in order to

---

16 I.e., both subjectively and intersubjectively oriented experiences are refracted through the pro-relational emergence of the trans-relational nature of the primary relationship in question. Implying, therefore, e.g.., one cannot be purely in and of oneself in either an optimistic or trustworthy state, etc., given that both subjective and intersubjective experiences are refracted through this relatively existential dimension of the trans-relational!

17 *Pursuit,* III.12Q.24.

existentially engage the ensuing enrichment of lived-experience... This short essay, the first in a set of essays looking at the broad topic of reflection, proffers a series of thoughts on these idea of travel as a mirror to how we might deal with change whilst walking a middle path between the contest of both conservative and radical ways of seeing, more or less, exactly the same phenomena as we make our passage through this shrinking world at large.... (32)

12J. Reflections on the Imputation of a Contemporary Era

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12J. Reflections on the Imputation of a Contemporary Era*

Drama is ever in the resolution of relationships…

In the previous essay, 12I. *Reflections on Travel...*, one expression in this short essay, namely, 'Contemporary', stands out for having no explanation as to why it was capitalized.[18] Elsewhere, I have conjectured that we are witnessing the advent of the Contemporary era as the post-post-modern successor of the Post-Modern, itself, the successor of the Modern age. Along with all the difficulties in formulating a seemingly valid history of the present let me now revisit this philosophical topic in the hope of being able to better articulate the imputation of a set of distinctive differences that would allow us to successfully make such a supposition.[19] That such a revisiting of this topic is called for given my recent recognition of a 'non-philosophical' need to proffer a trans-economic appreciation of an economic reading of the intentional nature of phenomenological constitution given the unilateral directedness of both causation and intentional experience *contra* the circulated nature of the merely 'economic'. Time's metaphorical 'arrow' heads in one direction, and one direction alone, namely, towards the future, with both the past and the currently present never being able to be (actually, i.e., non-virtually) revisited! So, as much as we might like to talk about a temporal economy, consisting of the trimodal aspects of past, present and future, the phenomenon of time, itself, cannot be reduced purely to the circulation of an economy despite the fact that our experience of time must also be understood in economic terms of reference given that we can intentionally revisit the past and also make conjectures about what might happen or what might not happen in a future period of time. Indeed, such conjectures also play an important role in the formation of a consequential analysis without which there could be no moral sense of responsibility. Therefore, in the light of such concerns, given my recognition for a non-philosophical appreciation of the economic and subsequent reflections on the shifting nature of cultural phenomena, especially in regard to how we might better read the nature of Contemporary cinema, permit me to further reflect on this difficult question "are we witnessing the advent of a Contemporary era?"[20] (0)

In the previous essay it was argued, analogically, that the irruption of the relatively-radical had a unidirectional sense of directedness that, to be adequately comprehended, also needed to be economic re(-)appropriated.[21] In a vivid sense, implying that only in the reappropriation of a one quantum jump at a time can we hope to at least understand that same sense of re-direction and that, metaphorically, two quantum jumps would leave us without comprehension unless, sequentially, we could also reconstitute the apparent pro-

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[18] *Pursuit*, III.12I.0,6. Noting, respectively, the use of the two expressions, namely, a 'Contemporary world' and a 'Contemporary philosopher'.

[19] Refer to recent essays *Pursuit*, III.7V, 7W, 7Y, 7Z, 12D, etc.

[20] Or, put another way, "am I allowed to capitalize this word' contemporary', or, are we merely attesting to no more than a continuation of the Postmodern era? Or, Modernism by another set of styles and name?

[21] This nomenclature of '(-)' indicates a trimodal economic approach to the processes being referred to. In this instance of 're(-)appropriation' that would be 'phenomenal-phenomenological appropriation, hermeneutical reappropriation and non-systematic existential re-appropriation'.

gress and reversal of such a progression. Hence a dialectic between, on one hand, the critical formation of incremental processes that spark the apparent chaotic-like advent of the radical, and, on the other hand, the critical reappropriation of the same that then would allow us to at least start to understand something of that radical nature of those novel innovations being reflected upon. Or, in language that Richard Rorty might well use under such circumstances, our recognition of the need, and apparent utility, of finding the formation of a so-called 'final vocabulary' that would allow us to at least start to understand what, previously, hitherto would have been impossible to have been thought.[22] To starkly illustrate the necessity for this continual formation of novel language imagine speaking to a friend who had been in a coma, say, for thirty years, and has now fully regained consciousness. How would you get across to them the idea, say, of a 'smart phone'. Perhaps you might talk about it as 'a phone, that you can put in your pocket, that also has access to an almost infinite amount of information and images, a device whose use is also that of a camera, alarm clock, watch, encyclopedia, television, and so on...' hence the appellation of 'smart' in order to both describe and differentiate such a phone from a more classical understanding of the 'telephone'... (1)

Earlier reflections on the delineation of the imputatively envisaged 'historical' characteristics of the Contemporary era appear to have stumbled on how my intuition that this period in time might recognize an existential choice to be authentic, i.e., to positively instantiate both the sense and semblance of the existential, could be profitably modelled given, on one hand, a very rudimentary understanding of how we might co-opt a history of the present, and, on the other hand, just how might we better model the irruption of the existential as that which is both experientially and morally-radical. In other words, just how do we go about historically exploring current trends and innovations from an 'historical' perspective, and, just how do we deal with radical experience that at first does not seem to be 'economic' in extent given our existential permission to allow ourselves to travel in radical directions as if exercising a leap of faith through the placing of a profound trust in the mutual coursing of our relationships in the hope that in our acting on their behalf that they, in turn, would act on our behalf as well. Or, quite simply, how can we appreciate an apparent historicity of the present era, and, just how do we deal with apparent demands and imperatives of this imputation of an existential dimension given the somewhat radical nature of such a 'calling' that could be either 'spiritual' or 'delusional', or, indeed, an unhealthy simulation of both proclivities without any hope of unravelling the simulation of such a complex weaving of our ways... indeed before, no doubt, the addition of the potentially terrible and terrifying sight of others..?[23] (2)

---

[22] Where the word 'final' must be understood in an ironic sense as never being really final, but, more that which 'we have better arrived at in the last instance' that, no doubt in time, will need to be revisited, once again, and so on (and, therefore, the appellation 'best' cannot be applied in the light of the envisaged pragmatics of a future need for an inevitable process of continual conceptual modification. Indeed, as a process 'grounded' on a philosophical appreciation of the provisional nature of the 'relatively definitive' despite our treatment of the 'apparently definitive' as currently 'definitive' and thence the ironic nature of a so-called 'final vocabulary', a 'definitive history', the questionable acceptance of the seemingly immutable nature of a scientific 'law', and so on).

[23] I.e., 'spiritual' in the non-religiously denominational sense of mutually enhancing the value (e/valuational formation) of our relationships. 'Delusional' in the sense that we think we are operating on the behalf of our relationships when we are only misguidedly expediting either our own aspirations and/or the aspirations of others as we enter into uncalled for and unwarranted patterns of relational intervention.

So, let me confront these two prior issues first before exploring a cinematic take on how the Contemporary era could well be delineated using examples from an exploration of the apparently distinctively 'different' nature of current cinema that better exemplifies these potentially indicative transitions and transformations in cultural expression and artistic expectations. (3)

In approaching the detailing of a history of the present I would like to utilize the following shortcut. In exploring an economy of intentionally directed enaction (involving either action, reaction, and/or inaction) I would like to invoke a trimodal economy of activity, passivity, and engagement. Now, in contemplating an active pattern of behaviour we could argue that we are being future oriented. In order to exercise a movement of myself, be that either in part of my embodiment, say, lifting my arm or smiling, or, in the entire shifting of my body, say in walking from point A to point B, I must first envisage in virtual terms my doing that in intentional terms of reference. Hence this temporal orientation towards the future involved in the contemplation of action. This being my intention to enact very soon such a pattern of behaviour. In a clear contrast, the nature of my receptivity to a current process of interpretation or some act of remembrance entertains both a certain passivity and a temporal orientation towards the past. In either situation, I either act and/or react to the ensuing nature of the intentional directedness being entertained from the perspective of my being an intentional agent *qua* being just an intentional agent. On the other hand, in some degree of existential involvement we entertain a process of engagement, be that through enacting a pattern of action, reaction and/or inaction, but where this time such directedness, ostensively, is issuing from the emergent perspective of the primary relationship in question. The degree a pro-relational attitude is being entered into being directly indicative of the apparent extent an existential orientation is being observed in the very 'here and now'.[24] Such observance, in this instance, being 'engaged' rather than being merely experienced in either active and/or passive terms of reference. The existential immediacy of engagement being observed in the living immediacy and unfolding, unique, concrete, historical specificity of the present. (4)

Now, from previous work done on delineating the different historical styles involved in detailing histories of the future, etc., I noted that a preoccupation with a history of the present is better spent noting the possible delineation of what I termed to be 'non-continuities', i.e., those chaotic patterns of behaviour that indicate relatively-radical shifts in direction through the demonstration of instances of sheer 're-direction' rather than mere 'direction' or 'redirection' where both of the latter can be treated as a causal pattern of behaviour that appears to considerably conform to conventional expectations. E.g., the sort of difference between hitting a billiard ball well below its center of gravity with such a force that is it is propelled off the surface of a billiard table *versus* the requisite hitting of the billiard ball with the cue and continuing to do the same in definitively pursuing the end of that game, hopefully, in such a manner that would allow one player to successfully

[24] Where we can delineate and differentiate between an historical sense of the present and an existential living-sense of an enduring 'here and now' (*hic et nunc*). Most likely as an existential phenomenon realized through a re(-)invested emergent existential surplus arising from the systematic existential reinforcing this distinctive semblance of both contemporaneity and an apparently increased subjective integrity.

win. In a contrast, I noted histories of the future involved more the detailing of continuities, whereas, histories of the past would be more concerned with noting discontinuities. E.g., the type of difference to be found in our safely assuming 'that people in the future will still need to eat' (as an expected form of continuity) *versus* a recognition that in the historical records we will find 'periods in time that might oscillate between plentiful harvests and terrible periods of famine, and where such surpluses and deficits, etc., have the habit of seriously re-writing the ensuing course of history' (as expected forms of non-continuity). (5)

In other words, in observing current phenomena it is more worth our while to look out for moments of time in which the relatively-radical seems to be making an entrance and attempt to better understand how such apparent anomalies are being resolved through the relatively non-conventional manner of their social incorporation should that form of cultural uptake become more evident and perhaps more prevalent in its novel conventionalization. E.g., not too long ago, libraries would be places that prioritized all forms of silent behaviour, whereas, now, most people think nothing about answering their mobiles or watching videos without headphones, or having group conversations, and so on. So, in this regard, libraries are no longer as quiet as they once were although the practice of reading aloud has not yet returned as was once the norm, two thousand years ago, in the Greco-Roman period. (6)

In seeking to find such shifts in behaviour that might earmark our contemporary times as having the makings of this Contemporary era, we need to note these repetitions of such relatively novel behaviours as collectively indicating the evident existence of the apparent advent of this sense of a new *ethos* or *zeitgeist*. (7)

Now, let me attend to how we might better model our reception and experience of the relatively-radical given my insistence that repetition of the novelty of the relatively-radical might better help us to detail a history of the present. That in order to delineate the evident existence of this so-called 'Contemporary' era I will certainly need to point out just those distinctive characteristics that would allow me to make such a valid distinction. As previously stated, I will use my exploration of contemporary cinema as my initial entrance into this particular philosophical topic with the intention that such articulated insights will hopefully find an application to other areas of cultural performance from the artistic to how people may well be re-ordering the everyday manner of their interactions with others. (8)

In previous essays I have noted that the exercise of a critical approach is a quick avenue to take in incrementally setting up the chaotic advent of the relatively-radical. Of course, the appearance of the relatively-radical could occur through sheer happenstance, but, that through careful forms of deconstruction of logical non-conformity where such an occurrence of the chaotic-like irruption of the radical is better promoted. 'Relatively-radical' because the radically-radical is not something that can be comprehended. All such re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical is both a sequential and an incremental process; where comprehension is only afforded step by step; just as our ability to walk from one place to another can only be exercised in exactly that same type of manner.

That understood, how might we better model this paradoxical-like pattern of behavior? On one hand, we have the critically guided, sequentially conducted economic gestation of a chaotic moment that then immediately emits a definitive expression of behaviour that we could deem to be a ‘unilateral response of the last instance’ to echo the language of the non-philosopher, or non-standard philosopher, François Laruelle. The paradoxical appearance here, at least in superficial terms, is that we have the circulation of economic activity on one hand, and, on the other, we have the unilateral re-direction of behaviour that would seem to be anything other than circular in nature. Moreover, this paradox is further compounded in so far as this radical sense of re-directedness now needs to be further re(-)appropriated economically in order to be suitably comprehended. Metaphorically, a bit like being a frog being self-ejected from a pot of boiling water and then falling into the roaring fire of the open hearth... an inescapable migrating from one economy and being then re-incorporated into another... (9)

I would like to analogue this type of chaotic situation and its re(-)appropriation, first, along the unimodal lines of an ‘emission’; second, along the bimodal lines of a ‘current’; and, third, along the trimodal lines of some form of a more ‘systematic, economic process of contextualization’. (10)

In this first regard, we can treat the irruption of the relatively-radical as if it were an emission. As if a quantum-like emission that then can be reabsorbed given the propriety of its reabsorption exactly as if it were a quantum unit of information that precisely fits the exact manner of its reabsorption. Now, in this model, it stands to reason that the unilaterally re-directed discharge of that form of information in relation to its economy of gestation would have it take on the appearance of the relatively dissonant. Hence, we could term this dissonant phase of the emission as ‘the relatively definitive unilateral determination of the last instance’ (again to echo the type of language as could be used by Laruelle). However, in finding its re(-)absorption we would now perceive its reabsorption to be more along the lines of its ensuing ‘resolution’ within the contextual confines of that economy that re(-)appropriates that uptake of information. Hence in this respect, we might now like to refer to this latter phase of resolution as ‘the relatively definitive unilateral determination of the next instance’ as realized through this harmonically oriented form of re(-)appropriation. So, in leaving as a ‘unilaterally re-directed emission it is ‘relatively dissonant in the last instance’, but, in being successfully re(-)absorbed it can now be deemed to have entered a moment of ‘unilateral resolution in the next instance’. (11)

Another approach is to interpret this virtual progression from an emission and to a state of re(-)absorption as if it were like some form of a nuclear ‘current’ or ‘current of energy’, say, electricity. In this metaphor we must assume both a dialectical difference and a similarity in order for the manifestation of this ‘virtual current’. I.e., that a potential difference exists within the commonality of that field that permits the creation and reception of this metaphorical semblance of a ‘potential difference’. That difference envisaged as existing between the initial economy and the ensuing contextualization of that economy that successfully oversaw it ensuing re(-)absorption. In effect, contextualizing that potential difference in the wider context of an economy capable of utilizing that relative difference between the so-called ‘last instance’ and the so-called ‘next instance’. (12)

However, from either a unimodal or bimodal perspective this idea of a contextualization of that emission or current would then suggest its better representation within the invocation of a more systematic, more encompassing form of an economic uptake. That, in effect, the initial economy along with any semblance of the relatively-radical and its virtual re(-)absorption would suggest that such unilateralism is more fully contained within that more systematic economy of contextualization to the extent that the exhibition of a unilateral re-directedness is immediately cancelled out within the context of that more encompassing economy of contextualization. That, given such contextual encompassment, we might regard such definitive moments of both the last instance and the next instance to be both equivalent and analogically imputed to the very same extent that the circulated information in an economy, indeed, in any economy, is equally imputed, i.e., merely inferred along analogical lines and no more simulated or non-simulated than the manner of our perceiving "'the experience of reality' as no more phenomenologically different that the 'reality of that same experience'."[25] (13)

That, from the results of such metaphorical machinations, in formulating a history of the present, in order to better differentiate the advent of those distinctive characteristics that might indicate the commencement and continuation of this 'Contemporary' era, we would note, hopefully, the apparent existence of those features indicative of 'the non-continuities imputed to be those relatively-radical instances' that would allow us to validly make such an ascription. Now, having set up such an equation, between the 'relatively-radical' and those imputed 'unilateral, re-directed expressions of the last and next instances' as distinctive 'non-continuities' that, then, this would let me argue that such 'distinctive moments of experience', upon close scrutiny, are being precisely entertained from a 'pro-relational sense of perspective as moments with the complexion of a more systematically presented semblance of the existential'.[26] In other words, such 'radical non-continuities' in question are being found to be experienced as 'systematically oriented existential expressions' indicative, no more and no less, than 'processes of existentially oriented engagement'. That, in effect, the relative presence of such a surfeit of existentially oriented moments of engagement could be read as indicating a re-orientation towards the existential spontaneity indicative of an existential orientation at the imputed center of our pro-relational experience. That, arguably, such a change from a preoccupation with relational parties to relationships *per se* is now characterizing the perceived nature of Contemporary experience. Or, conversely, their relative absence, despite such expectations, could also be construed as the relative inability of Contemporary actors to act as if it were more true to type whilst discounting a return, or mere relapse, to either Post-modernistic and/or Modernistic patterns of behaviour. (14)

---

[25] I.e., alluding to my maxim that phenomenological reality better resides at the phenomenal center of its representative contragram. I.e., in this instance, between "'the experience of reality' and 'the reality of experience'."

[26] With the inference that not all such instances, memes, and innovations, etc., are necessarily existential in complexion. Rather, as prominent indicators of the Contemporary era it is my suggestion that they are existential orientations in those instances. 'Orientations' by virtue of the fact that, dialectically, the existential is realized through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential (and not the existentialization of the existential).

Now, let me state these arguments also in reverse in order to reveal my more basic intuitions about the envisaged existential nature of Contemporary engagement through its implicit emphasis upon the relational dimension and its more evident expression through the irruption and resolution of the relatively more radical aspects to be found in interpersonal experience, etc., and, as I would conjecture, are to be found represented and highlighted in Contemporary cinema. (15)

That to appreciate the distinctive contours of contemporary experience and discern their temporal differentiation from other eras in time we would need to attend to noting the detailing of various histories of the present in order to focus on this feature of non-continuities so as to demonstrate the relative presence, or absence, of such a differentiation that would allow us to then point out and characterize, or catalogue, as well as confirm this imputation of the relative uniqueness of this interpretation of Contemporary phenomena *vis-à-vis* non-Contemporary phenomena. In this regard it is my tentative suggestion that in a psychic movement from relational parties participating in relationships to those overall relationships themselves, *per se*, that we would then witness this movement from relatively non-existential interpretations to the exhibition of either explicit and/or implicit interpretations with a more prominent existential tenor or complexion. Hence, in this regard, it would be my contention that we should observe a shift from either mere passivity or activity to a more existential sense of engagement, either through its highlighted presence and/or absence in which those relational parties experience and express either certain existential emotions, sentiments, insights, aspirations, and so on and/or the relative absence of the same. That in order to perform this form and degree of an existential re(-)orientation towards the relational we would need to both invoke and exercise certain rhetorical manoeuvres and tropes that would allow us to express either the relative presence or absence of such existential expectations, be they explicitly entertained or only implicitly enacted. Now, so much for theory let me explicate such ideas through an interpretation of their instantiations in a corresponding interpretation of Contemporary cinema, etc., that might support such a theoretical re-positioning towards an existential sense and semblance of such 'contemporaneity'. (16)

I would like to note a recent podcaster and film critic by the name of Thomas Flight who has made a number of filmed essays on this topic of film criticism and is the author of the YouTube podcast *Why Do Movies Feel So Different Now*? In this essay he notes that a common comment made relating to the 2022 movie *Top Gun*: *Maverick* is that 'they do not make movies like that anymore'.[27] He attempts to explain this frequent observation made about this specific movie by noting that it could be classified as 'Modernistic' in its overall tenor. I.e., a straight forward telling of a story, not complicated by any prominent form of self-referential insertions, indeed, a simple narrative with no concerns and conflicts about the nature of its narration, its cultural emplacement, and our social embeddedness in little other than an optimistic universe, and so on. In such an optimistic world you persevere and you will succeed. Despite all the obstacles along the way you will inevitably succeed and all karmic-like debts will be duly repaid, and so on. This, the author explains, is very much a Modernistic attitude and temperament. But, in general, cinema has moved on to posting either Post-modernistic and/or Meta-

[27] *Top Gun*: *Maverick* is An American action drama film directed by Joseph Kosinski.

Modernistic approaches to film making... and where this critic casts the latter as a Post-Post-modernistic approach arrived at through promoting an 'oscillation' between these former approaches of the Modernistic and the Post-modernistic that collectively contributes to a Post-Post-modernistic succession he terms as 'Meta-Modern' (and which I would equate with my nomenclature of 'Contemporary' [and perhaps also 'Hyper-Modern',[28] etc?]). (17)

As a participant in this oscillation between modernistic and post-modernistic approaches we could define the latter as 'partaking pronounced degrees of self-referential reflexivity along with an implicit or explicit commentary on the nature of the current art-form being performed or art in general along with either implicit and/or explicit forms of commentary and criticism re the same, etc. That, where the meta-modern arises for this critic is in and through the sustaining of this process of oscillation. In this regard, to my mind, I would like to add that this oscillation can also become blurred with both modernistic and post-modernistic approaches being exercised simultaneously. The movie *Beau is Afraid* (2023)[29] in a surreal second half ably demonstrates this last observation. Let me cite this movie... with the following spoiler alert... (18)

This movie, I was informed by a friend, had one reviewer referring to it as 'one panic attack that was three hours long'.[30] For me it was a series of tragic-comic sequences, each one piled on top of the other, and, where the optimism of the audience that the primary protagonist would be resilient enough to survive everything thrown at him, in a subliminal evocation of a modernistic optimism, was, of course, completely dashed in the final sequences of this movie. As we progress through this terrible set of horrendous adventures this poor, benighted and wounded individual, having survived a car accident and a series of stabbings, among other forms of turmoil, stumbles into witnessing a play (within this movie) and where he mistakenly identifies with the central character as if this actor were portraying his life and his life alone. But, then, over the course of this identification we find the film patently deconstructing itself as this central actor considerably ages whilst the three sons in his family, that he has been on a quest to find, have barely aged at all. Moreover, after finding them at last, and after a long, impassioned embrace, he tells his sons that his father died in the very act of his procreation and that in the light of this familial disease he has remained a virgin. Who in the audience didn't see that coming? The 'sons' then realize that this aged figure could not be their father after all... Now, we know that we have entered a play and that this landscape is surreal, but, at the same time, that it has an emotional intensity that belies its obviously simulated appearance. In this part of the narrative the audience has had to suspend the reality of their disbelief whilst also perhaps recognizing that they have done exactly that right from the very commencement of this movie. Scattered throughout this movie we will also find a wealth of self-referential-like references to the life of this protagonist along with the ongoing deconstruction of a host of classical tropes from killing both your mother and father, the

---

[28] Perhaps defining the 'Hyper-Modern' as an attempt to be super-realistic in the manner as to how cinematic details are to be focused upon and conveyed to the viewer in order to vividly represent either a super-real or surreal vision of an implied multi-verse as if it were merely detailing a vision of a more conventional landscape.

[29] An American surrealist tragicomedy horror film written, directed, and produced by Ari Aster.

[30] The duration of the movie was posted as 179 minutes.

slaying of monsters; and, thrown into the mix, the satirical use of Freudian motifs, the paranoid provoking or disconcerting stares of strangers, a bewildering invocation of a variety of emotional responses, and so on. All in all, quite a journey... that could not be explained in the integrated terms of a mere four-dimensional modernistic universe. (19)

So, now, the important question to ask is 'how can such a performative approach, through either the oscillation and/or the blurring of both modernistic and post-modernistic inputs, etc., can actually contribute to the distinctive emergence of a Contemporary, or Meta-Modern, form of a non-continuity in artistic-cultural practice?' (20)

Here, I believe, that the resolution of these provocative forms of input, in finding a certain set-up mode of resolution, would effectively enact an existential-like 'take' on the simulation of such proceedings. Such a demonstration takes either the form of explicitly simulating an existential orientation through either the depiction of various existential sentiments and/or the implicit recognition of the patent absence of such forms of authenticity. So, in this movie, as already recounted, the intense love of the father for his three sons is totally unfounded given that he is not their father after all. Similarly, the ever-vocalized love of the mother for her son is demonstratively absent. When the son is finally able to make it to the faked funeral of the mother, and discovers his mother is not dead after all, despite his disheveled and wounded appearance she makes absolutely no enquiry as to why he appears in such a guise without the requisite suit as insisted upon as previously stressed earlier in the film. How can you evince an authenticity of affection for someone when you don't even properly see them when they stand before you? Here the non-existentially oriented domination of the mother over the life of her son is palpably self-evident. A theme reinforced in the portrayed life of the mother, through a chronological set of photographs displayed at this fake funeral, emphasizing her success as a business woman, and, where the various products initially created by her company for the welfare of her son are displayed as important milestones in her business career all of which are duly advertised with images of her son. A very creepy, self-referential element that only reinforces this absence of an existential authenticity whose very absence, or very presence, constitutes this distinctive form of Contemporary cinema. Just as, in the same vein, the pronounced love of the father for his three sons is equally undercut by the fact that this protagonist thinking of himself as a 'father' is totally unfounded in fact, and very explicitly deconstructed by this movie. In effect, arguing that either the existential presence and/or the existential absence contributes to the impact of Contemporary culture given either this direct and/or indirect emphasis on relationships *per se* rather than just the mere machinations of individual relational parties going about their intentional lives as if they lived in either an atomistic or atomized world of individual agency, acting out on a landscape or mindscape with nothing less and nothing more! (21)

Throughout this movie, *Beau is Afraid*, the main protagonist, Beau, visually depicted as just an ordinary person, shows extraordinary resilience and perseverance. In the last scene of the movie, appositely immersed in a trope surreally invoking the proceedings of a 'last judgment' the protagonist is unfairly judged as 'guilty'. The audience intensely feels the injustice of how these proceedings are manipulated given that a pre-ordained judgment is rendered on a short-sighted interpretation of very circumstantial

evidence. Then, along with the demise of his defense lawyer, and where no evidence is taken from the condemned person themselves, it is obvious that such a religious and legal-like process is not being authentically engaged. At this point the last vestige of a modernistic optimism held by the audience for the successful survival of this protagonist is already dissipated in the recognition that these proceedings are heading to their only conceivable denouement, namely, an inevitable death, in this instance, by drowning. Still, to the very end, this 'hero' continues to struggle… but, finally, this succession of adverse circumstances has subsumed both this subject and the contents of this film. (22)

Now, this film could easily be written off as 'nihilistic', as just a visual essay in the pointlessness and futility of human existence; where all creatures are heading, each in their own way, to their own inevitable death, and, all else, is not much more than a postponement of this inescapable fate. However, elsewhere, I have made a distinction between a 'negative nihilism' and a 'positive nihilism'. On reflection, it is my understanding that this film flirts with the former but practices and, therein and thereby, expounds a version of the latter. Let me explain. (23)

Invoking this idea of an 'oscillation' in Contemporary cinema, and other forms of artistic and cultural expression, we could say that the post-modernistic deconstruction of a modernistic optimism would naturally head us off in a direction that could be deemed to be negatively nihilistic. However, it is my contention that an ongoing recovery of an existential sense and semblance of relational authenticity will then re-cast this negative nihilism along more positive lines. In effect, this post-modernistic deconstruction of modernistic tropes is in turn deconstructed if only through ensuing forms of suspension entered into and realized through this 'oscillation' between or 'blurring' of a modernistic futural optimism and a retrospective post-modernistic pessimism. In the midst of an existential engagement, be that either with one's own sense of self and/or with others the stage is then set for the positive transformation and consequences of such a more healthy and creative way of being-in-the-world despite the fact that our being-is-still-heading-towards-our-own-death (in this philosophical allusion to a Heideggerian use of language). At no point does our hero, presented as if an anti-hero, ever appear to be a person who is about to cease to struggle, or give up and just seek death despite the continual onslaught of a succession of horrendous events any one of which could well break the determination to survive of most people. I would like to argue that from this counterbalancing of a modernistic sense of a future optimism and a post-modernistic sense of a retrospective pessimism emerges an existential sense and semblance of the Contemporary moment that endures as a form of engagement wherein both passivity and activity are somewhat transcended through the immediate non-inactivity of the ensuing spontaneity of an apposite form of responsiveness and responsibility that irrupts and emerges from such suspended-suspensions. Hence, despite the near-overwhelming inauthenticity surrounding this protagonist this same person never seems to succumb to initiating and practicing forms of inauthenticity himself. As a case in point, let me discuss the following scene as it unfolds towards the end of this film in order to stress this observation. (24)

The Freudian psychiatrist is already set up as someone who this movie is obviously deconstructing. The couch is in the center of the room, the chair sits slightly higher

than the couch, the couch has the patient tilted backwards. We get predictable dialogue, the psychiatrist has a strange, immovable smile, along with an unctuous manner, and so on. However, be that as it may, this does not mean that such a character, themselves, does not believe in the nature of their vocation and, as a professional, practices in full accordance with the understood standards of that profession. Given that he can write scripts for medication we must assume that he has been duly certificated in that regard. But, this rug of such expectations is entirely pulled out from under us when we discover that this therapist has recorded every psycho-analytical session and has shared them with the mother of the protagonist. Indeed, hundreds of them, noting especially number three hundred as a particular classic having been discussed by both his therapist and his mother. Yet, despite such an unprofessional attack upon the personal integrity of this individual, Beau, still continues to respond in such a manner that he obviously intends to survive such criticisms levelled at him through a misconstruing of his very own words once revealed in confidence to this obvious charlatan of a therapist. That, despite such inauthenticity from both his therapist and mother, and his own words being used against him, still, he continues to respond with a degree of strength that demonstrates, to my mind, his unwavering authenticity and personal self-integrity. Indeed, this chasm between the inauthenticity of the therapist and the patient is further reinforced in the psychiatrist writing down the single word 'guilt' which the audience well-knows is just a total misreading of the patient's actual being-in-the-world… The film, in effect, is giving us a vital clue as to how to interpret the last scene, the surreal simulation of a last judgment whose existence and soundness of judgment we may well all call into question… indeed, so enigmatic and difficult to interpret that many people have wondered online what the meaning of that scene could be that it immediately comes up as a prominent topic for discussion in Google searches. There, I found the best interpretation to be that we should not overread it, just take it at face value, treat it as a classic trope concerning the unfolding of a 'last judgment' where the prejudgment of 'guilt' will play out its distorted and inauthentic commentary on the accidentally heroic life of this individual who deserves to survive but is condemned by those who have no true understanding of his predicament. Maybe, that we are doomed to be misunderstood, but, for all that, it is for us to better understand ourselves and both find and cultivate an existential sense of perspective throughout the trajectory of our own existence despite the somewhat distorted understandings of others. Recognizing, encountering and engaging those islands of authenticity we stubble upon through fortuitous forms of happenstance? (25)

Now, let me restate the outlines of this complex argument whose basic premise is 'that in Contemporary forms of cultural expression we are finding more an emphasis being placed upon the existential sense of the moment where through a pro-relational reorientation from the relational perspective of our primary relationships *per se* there emerges a recognition, encountering, and engagement with a spontaneity of authentic involvement despite those elements of inauthenticity that might also mar, but, importantly, also contrast, such requisitely apposite processes of harmonization spontaneously arising over the course of such problematic exigencies to be found in our living-in-this-world with(-)others, etc.' That, given this emphasis being placed upon 'the living-moment', 'the eternal present', and so on, hence the more prominent sense of the contemporaneity being brought to the fore in such cutting-edge expressions of Contemporary culture. (26)

First, in order to delineate a history of the present, from exploring a plethora of histories of the present, I needed to focus on what I have previously discerned as influentially distinctive in pursuing that form of historical research, namely, an identification of so-called 'non-continuities'. I.e., those chaotic-like irruptions of forms of subsequent iteration that emerge from a creative synthesis of prior genres of behaviour and whose novel vocabularies, etc., need to be articulated in order to better appreciate the emergence of such relatively unprecedented patterns of behaviour, be they personal or social, be they cultural or technological, etc.[31] (27)

Second, it is my contention that such non-continuities are relatively-radical expressions of behaviour and that a philosophical appreciation of such phenomena better utilizes a dialectic between economic and non-economic approaches that philosophically re(-)appropriates the latter once again within the wider contextualization of the former. That, in this instance, in our explorations of Contemporary cinema in particular and in Contemporary culture in general, I would like to argue that such relatively-radical innovations are primarily of an existential presentation and complexion. (28)

Third, that through an 'oscillation' between and/or a 'blurring' of both modernistic and post-modernistic attitudes and approaches, etc., an existential and authentic sense of contemporaneity can be simulated that intimates a positively nihilistic sense and semblance of value formation all the more highlighted when forms of inauthentic presentation are introduced in order to accentuate such an experiential contrast. (29)

Of course, the complexity of this overall argument would be better tested if other instances of Contemporary culture were to be both similarly explored and found to confirm the general drift of this form of argumentation. But, be that as it may, let this essay stand as an introduction to this difficult type of discussion given that we are attempting to understand the historicity of the present when more traditional, conventional historians would argue that this form of research can only be appreciated through a lengthy lapse of time. On the other hand, given the observation that films like *Top Gun*: *Maverick* stand out as an older-style type of film 'no longer made today' then we might well question the wisdom of such short-sightedness and seek to enquire just why films like, e.g., *Beau is Afraid* are seen instead as wonderful examples of Contemporary artforms that can no longer be subsumed under the lens of either a modernistic or post-modernistic take on cinema, and, as well, in the process be wondering if other similarly representative forms of current cultural and social expression are also contributing to the ongoing formation of a new *ethos* or *zeitgeist* that equally deserve this existential appellation of the 'Contemporary'? (30)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 31.5.23.

---

[31] Although, more correctly, we cannot draw such a hard distinction between the advent of personal and social memes, between cultural and technological innovations, etc., given that all such inputs contribute to our overall recognition, etc., of the ensuing thematization of a new *ethos* or *zeitgeist*, and so on.

A. A Series of Postscripts

I would like to add to this essay a small number of miscellaneous points. (31)

1. This oscillation referred to (and/or blurring) mirrors the economic dialectic already present in my vision of the economic. That from a balanced interplay of foreground phenomenologically oriented focus and hermeneutically oriented background field I conceive the gestation of the non-systematic existential along with its simulated subjective sense and semblance of framing. Then, in turn, when all three of these moments are dynamically counter-balanced we move from a non-systematic existential orientation to a more systematic sense of the existential. Hence, in view of this modelling, we might surmise that the Contemporary era, in the advent of this relatively-radical shift towards the pro-relational, chaotic-like re-presentation of the existential, would be marked out, first, with an embryonic existentialism and, then later, with a more fully developed version of the same? (32)

2. I agree with Thomas Flight that artists, be that in cinema or elsewhere, do not consciously say to themselves 'let me create a post-modern work of art or a meta-modern counterpart', etc. On the other hand, like the baking of a cake and following a recipe, some of these creative decisions might well take on a more deliberate process of instantiation along those lines especially when emulating previous artworks that were well-received. However, be that as it may, the incremental introduction of such features, such as focusing of moments of reflexivity, questioning the construction and reception of narratives, etc., may well head a text towards its more post-modernistic expression and along with its recognition as such. But, then, again the presence of such features alone does not make for this shift in either the *ethos* or *zeitgeist*. As a salutary reminder in this regard, one of the most reflexive texts, to my mind, is that of *Don Quixote* by Miguel de Cervantes, but, that that text, as influential as it has been, it did not spark an early form of a Post-Modern philosophy. That, what is needed to make this cultural transition or transformation is a slow incremental buildup of such elements that, in reaching a certain critical point, can then initiate and chaotically support the distinctive continuation of this overall sense and semblance of that type of a cultural transition or transformation. (33)

3. As a point of qualification, I am not assuming that all instances of the relatively-radical are existentially oriented, and v.v. My contention, more, is the interpreted observation that this appellation of the 'Contemporary' embeds this existential insight that with an increasing emphasis on the pro-relational orientation we would be more inclined to meet an existential sense and semblance of this time orientation along with the other existential hallmarks I have argued co-occur in existentially oriented experience. (34)

4. That, in discerning the distinctive features in exercising a history of the present, we should also ask ourselves as to what other distinctive features, beyond the mere focusing on non-continuities, might also be found relevant in the practical thematization of this type of research. That, given this connection with the existential orientation, we could surmise that a certain number of co-associated features might be found accordingly. (35)

5. I have noted Thomas Flight's use of the alternative expression for 'metamodern' namely, 'hypermodern' invoking some sense of a hyper-realism? Caputo also uses the same expression in his outlining of a 'weak theology' as a way of doing 'radical theology' (which I believe he would also equate with a 'secular theology').[32] In seeking some form of an interdisciplinary comparison, perhaps through the mediation of the existentially oriented concept of the 'event', what might we look for in this apparent use of a possibly similar set of concepts?[33] To begin with I perceive at least three uses in this expression 'hyper-realism' (and allied concepts like 'hyper-modernism'). There is the visual artistic use where we find a focused visual emphasis upon detail that may well also invoke an intense cultural expression of identification for a certain audience. E.g., a landscape depiction divided equally between a vivid yellow wheat field and an intense blue sky would be read by a Ukrainian patriot as an explicit depiction of the Ukrainian flag. Now, if upon this depicted landscape we were to read the inscription 'Crimea belong forever to the Russian Federation' a Ukrainian patriot would read that message as intended in an ironic sense, whereas, a Russian, without recognizing the intended depiction of the Ukrainian flag underneath the inscription, would read it in a more literal sense. Or, in a similar vein, when the First Lady of the US attended the coronation of Charles III in a blue outfit and her granddaughter accompanied her in a similar yellow outfit this combination of colours was not perceived and interpreted as merely coincidental. A second and more philosophical sense can be invoked through referring to the use by Jean Baudrillard, say, around 1981 when he argued that the non-virtual, or (or that once treated as real) was being overlapped by the virtual to the extent that we were now finding it difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle such parallel inputs with an ensuing social confusion issuing both between and from the same.[34] Third, I would also like to envisage a third 'radical and metaphorical' or 'expectant' sense, after Caputo, where the apparent reality of a certain topic was insufficient to do justice to our experience of that topic given our being able to be the potential witness to a superfluous excess of value (in an open, existentially received process of e/valuational formation) that emerges in [a suspension] of our suspended awareness of the living-contours of that same topic. Hence Caputo's noting that the hyper-real transcends both real and anti-real, is experienced in and through an event, say, as a sense of a 'call' (and its being taken up as a 'vocation' through being so 'called') or found being formed or informed through the promise of a 'promise', and so on. Now, putting these three senses to together of the 'visually-focalized', along with both the 'philosophical' and 'the radically metaphorical', as just alluded to, how might

---

[32] John D. Caputo; *The Weakness of God*: *A Theology of the Event*; Indiana University Press, 2006. E.g., p. 9-12 in a section headed *A Hyper-Realism of the Event*. Explored by this author in Chapter Six: Hyper-Realism and the Hermeneutics of the Call, p.113-124.

[33] To my mind, potentially mirroring a similar understanding of an existential sense of time, i.e., as having an ahistorical sense of the historical in a sense of existential duration, but, also rooted in the immediate spontaneity of the unique specificity of a concrete sense of the historical?

[34] As articulated, e.g., in his initially controversial book titled: *Simulacra and Simulations*, 1981. Such ideas were evolving before that date. Another way of defining hyperrealism or hyperreality is to argue that 'this experiential attitude arises when there is an conflation or implosion between what is apparently representing and what is apparently being represented' (although other would claim that such a differentiation between representation and the represented is an illegal manoeuvre in the first place given the deconstruction of the impossible philosophical notions of 'external worlds' and 'internal worlds, etc.' However, such a concept of the hyper-real could still be advanced if, pragmatically, a social confusion were to arise from a conflation of activities of qualified representation with their qualified treatment as referents, etc.).

we then re-conceptualized the sense and semblance of the hyper-real, and thence its portrayal of the hyper-modern in culturally distinctive terms given that one era or epoch will ever succeed another and that the Post-Modern would be naturally seen to invite a potential series of reactions against, say, its negative nihilism, non-integrated use or overuse or misuse of reflexivity, continually calling the act of narration into question when we cannot be other than 'story-tellers', and so on? Invoking a pro-relational existential reading of the 'event' I would also hazard the possible return to an optimistic sense of authenticity even if the course of our lives is such that we cannot be other than beings whose lives end in physical death but may well also contribute to a sense of social and cultural continuity through a direct or indirect remembrance of the example that we may have advertently or inadvertently set over the course of our existence with(-)other, etc.[35] So, e.g., in returning to the visual use of an oil painting or photograph of 'a golden wheat field under a deep blue sky' as representing the Ukrainian flag, etc., a patriotic Ukrainian would more than likely treat that type of representation in an intensely experienced cultural uptake that could also proffer the sense of a possible future period of peace and prosperity, such symbolic abundance, and so on. In effect, experiencing such imagery in such a manner that that type of depiction could never be seen purely in the terms of a mere landscape, indeed, could only be read through a hyper-real lens where its reduction to the mere depiction of an agricultural landscape could barely be contemplated, in this instance, by that type of a culturally aware person in tune with its apparently intended symbolic representationalism, etc. Or, inserting such an attitude into the background of a post-modernistic critique of modernism we could surmise, perhaps, that a hyper-modernism, as a cultural overlay, could well take on the form of expressing sentiments of a more existential flavour to the extent, say, some represented examples of relational authenticity would be present, through either their relative presence or absence, in order to expose the non-existentially inauthentic behaviour of those individuals or organization, communities, institutions or nations that just behaviour in a non-existential manner, i.e., as representing those forms of agency that either contribute nothing to a relationship, or are parasitic on that relationship, or, worse, actively seek to undermine positive forms of e/valuational formation that otherwise might arise within the orbit of that same relationship in question. Or, more subtly, where forms of intervention could enhance other relationships in the relational proximity of that primarily relationship being considered in the first instance. Where, all in all, our interests and expectations are directed, if not radically re-directed, towards a more positive enrichment of those same lives, relational entities, etc., as being found represented in that specific cultural situation subjected to such in-depth patterns of exploration. Where these aspects of the hyper-real, in their own way, are seen as contributing to an enrichment of the relationships as being reviewed in that 'Contemporary' setting..? (36)

6. It is my intuition that an exploration of the idea of an 'event', e.g., as discussed by Jacques Derrida, John D. Caputo and François Laruelle, and others, could be a possible 'clue' in any discussion on this imputed changing nature of time perception that I believe

[35] I.e., passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and engaged through(-)others. Finding a non-systematic sense and semblance of both an existential freedom and e/valuational formation through the latter, but, meeting with a systematic sense and semblance of both an existential freedom and e/valuational formation through a dynamic balance of all three economic moments where the latter takes on a radical complexion that then finds itself critically re(-)appropriated in economic terms of reference.

is embedded in the existential contemporaneity of the Contemporary era (and one reason why I, and others, have chosen this specific appellation (with a capital 'C') for the imputed advent of this new era?). In this regard that the 'event', at the beating core of experience, is more existentially revealed or exposed through a relatively non-superficial form of deconstruction, etc., as might be exercised in a more theoretical, non-appositely constructed framework. (37)

7. I would also like to assume that there has always been this 'blurring' of the non-virtual in orientation and the virtual in orientation given a 'pragmatic' recognition that we cannot make such an absolutistical distinction in the first place (in either the first or last instance or in the next or future instance). Moreover, that it is the existential nature of the 'event', through a 'recovery' of a surplus of e/valuational formation, to more or less speak for itself through ongoing de-suspensions (as the suspension of suspensions) to the extent that those virtual and non-virtual contributions we make and those non-virtual and virtual contribution made by the event itself can all somewhat be self-delineated in and through an authenticity of experiential discrimination. Just as, in this movie *Beau is Afraid*, the audience seems privy to the 'suffered authenticity' of the main protagonist (Beau) in an apposition to the relatively 'non-suffered inauthenticity' of other participants (the mother, the Freudian psychiatrist *et al*).[36] That I would like to propose that this 'self-discriminating authenticity of discernment in the midst of the simulation of hyper-real experience', in this regard, would be a prominent hallmark at the cutting edge of Contemporary cinema and all forms of Contemporary artistic and cultural endeavour, or, at least, that it be found in an embryonic form ready to be taken up by the audience should it be found to hand so to speak, be that either wittingly or unwittingly? Thence, in this regard, the possible return of an occasional, realistic, highly qualified form of optimism quite different from an all-pervasive, non-deconstructed modernistic use of such sentiments and expectations...? (38)

8. Thomas Flight's use of the concept and practice of 'oscillation' is referring to work first proposed by the cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker in their 2010 essay, *Notes on Metamodernism*. There oscillation is not to be thought of as a balance; rather a swinging between 2, 3, 5,10, innumerable poles (where certain sentiments are being stressed and re-balanced through sentiments opposed to those being first promoted).[37] Such ideas have been controversial with some people dismissing the idea of a 'metamodernism' in either whole or in part.[38] From a personal per-

---

[36] We could provisionally define 'authenticity' as 'the consequence of the ongoing resolution through de-suspensions of the working-representation of the primary relationship in question in its relational situatedness to that extent there is an observed engagement with either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of positive relational enrichment of the e/valuational formation co-associated with that overall experience of that relationship in its relational situatedness by all the relevant relational-parties'.

[37] Refer to the article by Luke Tanner; Metamodernism: A Brief Introduction; January 12, 2015. Link: https://www.metamodernism.com/2015/01/12/metamodernism-a-brief-introduction/

[38] Some ideas about this controversy and a series of critiques re this concept and practice of 'oscillation' can be seen in the article by Greg Dember titled: Metamodernism: Oscillation Revisited; February 27, 2023. Link: https://medium.com/what-is-metamodern/metamodernism-oscillation-revisited-b1ae011abf3c Similarly, the article by Jonathan Rowson; Is oscillation the beating heart of Metamodernism? If not, does it even have a heart? Posted March 8, 2021. Link: https://systems-souls-society.com/is-oscillation-the-heart-of-metamodernism-if-not-does-it-have-a-heart/

spective, it is my opinion that this type of controversy is a bit like disabled, unanchored ships stationed just off the sides of a rugged coastline in the middle of a violent storm where at the end of this conflagration all 'craft' will have been fatally beached. Instead, with some adequate anchoring, these ships will be tossed about but the movement of adequately anchored arguments will not be so fatally compromised if properly situated, and both critically and radically prosecuted. Or, in other words, without some adequate epistemological framing, conducted through both economic and non-economic lenses, such well-situated intuitions and observations, such well-constructed arguments and provisional conclusions will more than likely be superficially deconstructed with little or nothing to show for such a relatively fruitless, time-consuming endeavour. For me, this practice of oscillation neatly fits my previous expositions of an economic vision of a philosophical economy that is one-part phenomenal-phenomenological description (textually oriented); one-part hermeneutical prescription (meta-textually oriented); and one-part the simulation of a non-systematically formed existential proscription (non-textually oriented). That to dynamically balance these first two economic moments, whether you call it an oscillation (or a blurring) or a dynamically balanced (transcendental) suspension, the end result, through economic correlativity, is to call attention to the third economic moment of a relatively overlooked non-systematic existential moment. Then, I have argued, that the invocation of a suspension automatically invokes a de-suspension that then promotes an emphasis and thematization upon this third moment of the non-systematic existential along with its experiential characteristics of resolution, and that which existentially expresses the specificity of the historically concrete. Moreover, from a re(-)balancing of all three moments there is then the further induction of a relatively radical sense and semblance of the systematically existential where the emergence of existential e/valuational formation is continually re(-)invested in a prolongation of the experience of an existentially oriented sense of duration engaged to that extent such a surplus is continually being re(-)invested. Furthermore, this somewhat radical exposure of the 'event' must then be re(-)appropriated economically in order to then make supplementary sense of that semblance of that apparent revelation of the event being expressed through such existential openness (whose necessary precondition is the placement of a suspension that puts all ideological pre-configurements/disconfigurements out of action over the extent of that overall suspension). That in this instance, the once impossible is now 'possibilized' along with the further ironic extension of a so-called 'definitive history' or 'final vocabulary' (the latter as per Richard Rorty), and so on. However, in the midst of such critical economic and radical non-economic re(-)framing/s, despite the necessity for such an ongoing re(-)appropriation of the emergent experiential presentation of such events, the presentation, etc., of such events must still escape complete appropriation given their phenomenological presentation or hermeneutical representation or chaotically oriented existential re-presentation as stamped with the persistence of an 'existential aura' ever-declaring an eternal '*je ne sais quoi*', which, at the same time, will also continually extend the apparent insightfulness arising from the ongoing deconstruction of a finite *je ne sais pas…*! (39)

N.T., 7.6.23.

Blub for Discussion of this Topic On the Imputed Advent of the Contemporary Era?

From the Postmodern to the Post-Postmodern/Contemporary/Meta-Modern?

Just as the Art Deco succeeded the Art Nouveau, and the Postmodern succeeded the Modern era, it is natural to ask what will inevitably succeed the Postmodern? What indications, or evidence, is there that we might currently be moving beyond the Postmodern? In the posted podcast by Thomas Flight titled: *Why Do Movies Feel So Different Now*? the topic of the Meta-Modern is discussed through the lens of recent cinema. Noted in this same podcast, the idea of the Hyper-Modern is also mentioned. This topic of the hyper-real will also be looked at from a number of perspectives including comments made by the radical theologian John D. Caputo in an attempt to better understand if the imputed advent of the Contemporary era or the Meta-Modern era, as the successor of the Postmodern, is taking a different approach to the experience of time, relationships, personal and interpersonal authenticity, and is invoking both an existential stance and a positive nihilism (rather than a negative nihilism often associated with a Postmodern critique of narrative, subjectivity, etc)? In this structured discussion (also posted below) let us collectively evaluate the merit of such proposals, add our own observations, and attempt to see if we can reach some form of a working consensus on this controversial set of interconnected themes?[39] (40)

Brief Outline of the Presuppositional Structures Enstructuring this Essay

1. A reasonable *a priori* view that one epoch follows another.

2. How do 'observe' this within current patterns of textual production – artistic or otherwise? By conducting a history of the present! More correctly, 'histories'.

3. Therefore, an invocation of an 'observance' of non-continuities, etc. By 'etc.', we can mention various aspects noted in this essay like, e.g., the proposal of oscillation/blurring of modernistic and post-modernistic orientations; an altered sense of time perception on the existentially contemporaneous; radical *versus* critical; identification of some forms of radical experience as positively existential; a pro-relational and re-qualified revisiting of authenticity, optimism, other (transcendental) sentiments and expectations; a non-economic reading of the economic and its economic re-contextualization, etc; a deeper, pluralistic reading of a hyper-real viewing of deconstruction, the 'event', positive nihilism, and so on…. (41) N.T., Paddington, 11.6.23.

---

[39] These themes being, e.g., the advent of a new *ethos* or *zeitgeist* (in the form of the Contemporary era with a capital 'C'), history of the present, non-continuities; non-philosophy/non-standard philosophy *versus* economic philosophy, chaotic theory, the notion of the radical *versus* the critical; hyper-realism, the event, authenticity, negative and positive forms of nihilism, oscillation (and blurring as techniques for inducing the emergence of meta-modernistic readings/interpretations), suspensions/suspended-suspensions, reflexivity; a pro-relational, existential appreciation of time, the relational nature of relationships *versus* relational participants in a relationship, the formation of value; a realistic reclamation of a scoped, highly qualified semblance of optimism, etc?

B. An Additional Postscript: *Asteroid City* as a Thoroughly Meta-Modern Text

Recently read online a review of the film Asteroid City directed and produced by Wes Anderson, 2023. In the review, if I can remember correctly, it said that this film was found annoying by some people and instantly recognized the possibility of a meta-modern or hyper-real text characteristic of my evolving imputation as to how the Contemporary era is characteristically defining itself.[40] So, I made a mental note of going to see this film and from the outset try not to be annoyed by my pre-understanding that it is probably operating in a hyper-real domain. (42)

Having duly done so, in seeing this film, instead, I was thoroughly entranced but could easily see why some viewers might find its 'oscillations' could be disruptive (in our conventionally seeking a unified transcendental point of reference?). The 'oscillations' in question are set up between the working playwright (seen at the beginning of this movie), the empty theatre, the outline of a play about to be enacted, the quick segueing off into what looks like a film set and, by a stretch of the imagination, as a real locale (although that notion much later becomes disabused when one of the characters in this 'film' goes inside what looks like a rock to then find ourselves back in this theater in what we must safely assume to be the original theater cited at various times during this sci-fi adventure' to then exit on a balcony opposite another theater also with a balcony over the street). But I put 'oscillations' in single quotation marks since once (these transcendental reference points for the viewer in) these settings are understood we seem to be continually reading them one after another as a play, as a film set, as a film, as a real landscape (although the latter is continually undercut by these shifting senses of a setting). Therefore, I would like to understand this movie as invoking my concept of 'blurring' rather than progressing through a series of clearly delineated oscillations, instead, in this blurred 'vista' it is now us, ourselves, that is continually oscillating between these various shifting forms of (transcendental) reference. The provocative nature of this film, in this regard, has us continually questioning whether we are seeing a play, a film, the portrayal of real events, and so on, and, where we are only mentally equipped to see one setting at a time even though we also know that the film, in terms of its possible settings, is all of the above. (43)

The point of this last postscript is to note the observation that if blurring is the primary mechanism for inducing a hyper-real re-evaluation (of our co-associated emotional review) of the text being presented then the mind will naturally oscillate between one (transcendental reference) point or perspective even if all points or perspectives are understood as if seemingly being blurred together. That, in effect, in blurring, we will do much of the oscillation without the text having to do as much. (44) N.T., 12.9.23.

---

[40] I cannot exactly recall this specific review that prompted this intuitive response. However, I see the Guardian has two quite opposed reviews that could be used to make a similar point, namely, some people will love this movie and other will be less moved by the sheer brilliance of its style. One criticism of mine is that like many texts it does not quite seem to know how to end on a high note, although, the refrain, being sung, that quips, "You can't wake up if you don't fall asleep" has the qualities of attempting to be a 'memorable' last line, more or less, of a play. Those two opposing reviews in the Guardian are: Peter Bradshaw; *Asteroid City review – Wes Anderson's 1950s sci-fi is an exhilarating triumph of pure style*; Tuesday 23 May 2023; and, Mark Kermode; *Asteroid City – smug Wes Anderson comedy falls to earth*; Sunday 25 June, 2023.

12K. Reflections on the Putative Imputation of Authenticity?

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12K. Reflections on the Putative Imputation of Authenticity?*

Life is a series of meditations on the nature of 'authenticity'…

In the previous essay, 12J. *Reflections on the Imputation of a Contemporary Era*, one expression in this essay, namely, 'authenticity', stands out as needing both a working definition and an understanding of just what is being meant within the context of an interpretation of a 'pro-relational, existential dimension of experience'.[41] (0)

A tentative definition of authenticity was supplied in a footnote with which, I must confess, we find an assembly of too many 'moving parts':

> We could provisionally define 'authenticity' as 'the consequence of the ongoing resolution through de-suspensions of the working-representation of the primary relationship in question in its relational situatedness to that extent there is an observed engagement with either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of positive relational enrichment of the e/valuational formation co-associated with that overall experience of that relationship in its relational situatedness by all the relevant relational-parties'.[42] (1)

Taking another tack, from an economy of authenticity to its non-economic appreciation, and, from there, then returning to that same economy in a more radical sense of having suitably implemented an existentially apposite pattern of relational intervention, almost as a motto, I would like to note the following as a starting point for this exploration:

> In an economy of apparent authenticity 'the authentication of authentication is not a mere process of authentication', and, in returning to such an existential stance 'such authentication is not authenticated but progressively enacted'. (2)

So, it must be asked, "Please explain!" Just what is meant in moving from an economic orientation to a non-economic orientation, and, then back to the former stance in expediting an 'open' attitude in the expedition of so-called 'existential authenticity'? (3)

Or, put more simply, 'just what does being 'authentic mean' in this current Contemporary era?' given my formerly implying that certain positive sentiments and expectations will be re(-)presented in and with a qualified existential orientation as to how those protagonists will be re(-)presented, in that same regard, in those works of art like, e.g., cinema or novels, or, indeed, over the normal course of daily life itself..? (4)

In the following reflections let me take a relatively non-superficial approach to this phenomenon of authenticity and work towards an existential reading of the same. (5)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

41 *Pursuit*, III.12J.21, 24-26, 36, 38. In a similar vein we could also explore the concept of optimism, and other positive sentiments and expectations in a similar light? Refer to the following essay, 12L.

42 *Pursuit*, III.12J.fn.19.

Part I: A Non-Existential Reading of Both Authenticity & Inauthenticity

Everyone has some idea of what 'authenticity' is, or could or should be, but, do we have an 'existential experience of authenticity' quite apart from its everyday sense, its non-existential semblance as conventionally understood? Hence the 'putative' nature of this enquiry. So, in working with what is to hand, what is apparently implied in normal parlance, let us start from this point of view and explore if we can proceed past this conventional understanding to a pro-relational, existential form of experience where 'authenticity', I believe, is supposedly thought to reside, to have its 'true home' so to speak. I.e., in such an experiential manner that the existentialist can claim, should they take this position, that their use of this expression cannot be reduced merely to its more conceptually understood role of what is 'genuine' or 'real', or what is 'honest' and 'morally upright', and so on? In effect, that this intuition that existential 'authenticity' travels far beyond mere notions, say of a 'non-deceptiveness', as that being 'correctly described', as arising in a process that is not a product of simple 'imitation', as being prescriptively 'true to itself', as that not countermanding certain socially held *a priori*, moral or ethical 'proscriptions', and so forth. (6)

In such an enquiry, an obvious place to start is the widespread use of this expression in the art market. Let me propose the following hypothetical situation or thought experiment. (7)

Imagine, if you would, an extremely wealthy art collector whose intent is to collect the very best of the best. Unfortunately, for them, the very best artworks, e.g., oil paintings, are more than likely to be locked up, for all eternity, within the confines of museum collections. But let this not deter this collector as they make a list of future 'acquisitions' they will procure by dishonest means as will now be outlined. Having developed a cutting edge, portable form of additive 3D printing, they have to hand a small device that can create a thin film that perfectly replicates the surface of an oil painting. Starting with the Mona Lisa, La Giaconda, this avid collector oversees the infiltration of the people charged with daily cleaning the Louvre during the hours this art gallery is closed to the public. While, ostensively, cleaning the security cameras, and blocking the view of this famous painting from its central monitoring, for a few minutes one of the other 'cleaners' replicates an extremely close copy of this painting and then substitutes it for the real thing. This collector running this as an experiment in order to see if that substitution will be noticed over the next few days and should this plan be successfully enacted they will then extend it to a number of other museums like e.g., the Prado, Uffizi, Metropolitan, Hermitage, The National Gallery in London, the AGNSW, and so on. Having successfully masterminded such a daring substitution they then extend this program of acquisition to adding twenty more paining from a list of conceivably from the top one hundred. That, by such means they can personally enjoy such famous works of art in the privacy of their own substantial dwelling. At the same time, as envisaged, the art-world will be both none the wiser and not left without a near perfect copy of these same works of art as now permanently misappropriated by this potentially very 'successful' collector. Of course, no collector could see themselves as truly 'successful' if they cannot show off the artworks in their collection and so, with this in mind, they also arrange a display of

their premises with these wonderful ‘copies’ of these famous works of art although billed as ‘very close copies’, commissioned for reproduction in their own overseas workshops, with the sole purpose that such works of art can also be enjoyed by a public who will also get to admire many genuine works of art also on display, especially in the long galleries open, from time to time, for public viewing. Indeed, a double deception will be master-minded. The originals have been substituted whilst the public looking at these ‘reproductions’ will actually be seeing the real thing. Before too long this collector puts this dastard plan into action and then duly opens their art palace for the admiration of a ‘discerning’ public. However, should suspicion ever fall upon this collector, all the original ‘reproductions’ can, at a moment’s notice, be rotated and switched with the less well-copied versions, conveniently reproduced using the same software for this form of printing, albeit reprogrammed to remove all micro-details of the originals. These lesser reproductions being very profitably sold in the shop attached to this veritable Palace of the Arts, the exhibits there being the very best money could either overtly buy or covertly purloin. (8)

Of course, this is only a thought experiment. For this acquisitive collector this is a win-win from their point of view. They have the real thing to savour on a daily basis, and, the public have copies to view that, until discovered, will be regarded as very close to the real thing. Then, too, the public can also unwittingly view the real thing in this collector’s mansion albeit as viewed as ‘very good reproductions’ supposedly overseen in these overseas workshops commissioned to reproduce these works of art and which will also be found in the shop attached to the exit of this mansion open to the public for a reasonable fee. All in all, a very good business plan unless this scheme is exposed. However, as a form of insurance, this same collector ensures that these copies for sale are also produced from the original paintings but with the addition, at random, of many, many minor defects that will skillfully disguise themselves as ‘copies’ originally derived from their original origins. Also as noted, these originals can also be immediately rotated with these lesser reproductions should the authorities be in a position to eventually admit publicly that their originals had been reproduced, in all probability, not before the apprehension of this mastermind, their organization, and the safe return of these originals to their respective institutions or legal owners. (9)

In reviewing this thought experiment, to my mind, we should note the following three important points, no doubt among many other points that could also be raised, namely:

1. That if copies are exhibited that are so perfect as to not invite suspicion they may as well be treated as the ‘real thing’ until the time of their ‘genuine exposure’ should that time be arrived at;

2. That provenance in the form of a sufficiently complete history of the production and preservation of the artefact in question must expose the creation of their ‘origins, and therein and thereby, express either their true status as either an ‘original’ or ‘originally initiated and authorized reproduction’, or, either as a non-original, non-initially created or non-authorized reproduction or as a contrived ‘recreation’ (in the ‘spirit’ of a certain style belonging to a specific artist or school or period or era of manufacture);

3. But, that this first point is somewhat considerably diluted if multiple copies are found to hand that invite suspicion of that overall collection of reproductions either in part or in whole... (10)

In addressing these three points we can note that, pragmatically, through considerable social consensus, if *x* is treated as an original *x* then, pragmatically, it may as well be treated as an original *x* in the absence of creditable suspicions or reasons otherwise. Of course, the process of 'genuine' exposure is also a minefield in its own right, and, usually, can only be successfully exerted, rightly or wrongly, with some form of socially accepted 'authority' able to re-adjust such public opinions. Moreover, it stands to reason, that if a full history were to be represented then such 'originality' or 'non-originality' would be exposed accordingly, but, of course, a full history can never be presented, i.e., represented, and we must settle for a sufficiently detailed and argued historical form of treatment able to decide one way or the other, if that were possible, where, eventually, in the court or courts of public opinion such discernments might be officially announced. Last, originals do find original acts of reproduction, but, it is in the quantity of reproductions that will call into further question any one of those denominated members of that grouping. E.g., artists have been known to paint one or two copies of their own works and all such works would then be treated as originals by either that artist or their workshop, and, in the light of that observation it is sometimes difficult to note which artefacts came first, were actually painted by either the primary artist and/or members of their workshop or, indeed, some of these workshop painters perhaps painting in another workshop in a similar period of time using similar materials, and so on.[43] The point being made, however, is that if we were to find too many multiple copies of a certain work of art then we would then naturally question such apparent authenticity, or indeed, this more now apparent inauthenticity of, at least, some of those works, even if each work of art could be treated at face value as an original artwork in its own right. (11)

Now, this idea of authenticity in the art world does permeate our presumed 'experience of authenticity', but, in 'being authentic' we must would need to sail a course that notes a more experiential tack. Let me investigate this line of attack by introducing, first, a more moral or ethical dimension into these phenomenological explorations... (12)

In a second hypothetical situation, or moral thought experiment, let us reflect upon the following: There are two young boys, say, ages 9 and 7, and where the older boy on seeing an empty milk bottle, with a month's milk money for the milkman inside, decides to steal the same. Unfortunately, the older boy suspects he was seen and gives the money to the younger boy and tells him to put it down a drain around the corner from this scene of the crime. The younger boy does as directed, but, feels that both 'the stealing of this money' and 'the disposal of this same money down the drain' to be acts that, should his parents find out, he no doubt will be in 'severe trouble'. Of course, all the relevant parents are duly notified and a short period of interrogation ensues. The younger boy confessing immediately to everything and appears to escape not much more than an intense

[43] E.g., in discerning the origins of La Giaconda on exhibition in the Prado once thought to be by the hand of Leonardo da Vinci but now thought to be manufactured in a workshop slightly later in time?

telling off along with the additional messages ‘that crime does not pay’ and ‘don’t do everything older people tell you to do unless you are on board with your doing as directed’. (13)

Needless to say, as you might suspect, I was boy B, and, in hindsight, I now see that one of the consequences of this ‘filching of the milk money’ meant that I had to walk up the hill once a month to the milkman’s house in order to pay our family’s bill for a month’s supply of milk. Occasionally buying a bottle of cream if one was left over that day given that our family neither possessed a fridge nor car (in that period of time in order to head over to a supermarket only just starting to be built). (14)

So, what moral reflections might we hypothetically entertain in reviewing the pre-existing complexities to be discerned in this ethical situation? For a start, taking a leaf from the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, it is one thing to commit a crime or misdeed in some form or other, and, another to be seen doing the same. Even worse, for the performer of such a conventionally understood act of misbehaviour, be that through either commission or omission, or, for that matter, even though ethical hesitation or deferral or mere passive enablement, being seen to have misbehaved is one thing but even worse is to be seen seeing yourself as having being seen as entering into the commissioning, etc., directly or indirectly, of that same socially perceived ‘defective’ pattern of performance. For most people, the ensuing sense of shame may well be a more vivid experience than any moral deliberations initially expended over whether to commit or omit, etc., the deficient performance of behaviour at the very center of such reflexive forms of appreciation. However, for a few ever-straying souls, in a continual re-badging of their misbehaviour as ‘what people all too often do anyway’, especially ‘when not detected’, salve their diminished semblance of a vestigial conscience with such a formula that basically ‘they are no better and no worse than all other people’, and so on. Into such a camp the psychopath or sociopath, or narcissist, or a person with some other form of a personality disorder, although knowing that society would disapprove of such conventionally pre-understood forms of misbehaviour, still, blithely, will commit the same especially if they feel either entitled and/or able to escape the social, moral, and legal consequences of such iterated patterns of misbehaviour. That, with this immoral minority exempted, we may well surmise that for most people in the light of pre-accepted moral guidelines, say, as socially formulated in the form of so-called ‘ethical principles’, that under normal circumstances they neither generally wish to perform such conventionally pre-understood defective patterns of misbehaviour, would certainly not wish to be seen as if performing such misdeeds, and, even more, would not wish to be seen ‘being seeing’ as if misbehaving along those same lines... (15)

That this observation brings me to the point of view that from the perspective of ‘authenticity’ and ‘our being authentic’ that not only do we have to contend with the considerations of either moral or immoral or amoral performances and that not only are there such patterns of action or non-action or inaction, but, also, their being reviewed by others, then our witnessing, in either real time and/or in retrospect, such behabiour or misbehaviour being witnessed by others, but, even more importantly, **our own reviewing of our-**

selves in that same regard, quite apart from what others may or may not think, what others may or may not have witnessed, and so on! (16)

That, in essence, we should also contend with our own self-review, that the looking upon our own sense or senses of self, solely issuing from ourselves, and, that that type of consideration figures in our potential experience of what it means 'to be authentic' even if refracted through some form of an indirect social lens!? (17)

That our openness to this form of self-review, constituted both subjectively and inter-subjectively, whilst also emerging from and beyond both domains, proffers a segue into an existential appreciation of what it means to experience this sense and semblance of what is entailed in this nominated and pre-understood experience of 'our being authentic'. That such an experiential re(-)orientation that is 'pro-relational', and can be neither reduced to purely subjective nor intersubjective considerations, nor, for that matter, trans-subjective criteria as promulgated from either non-secular or secular forms of discourse, well-deserves to be read and written in and on its own terms of reference, namely, existential terms of reference. To this end let us imagine:

...the '*temple curtain is rent from side to side*' and that we '*now must enter the inner sanctum*' of this sphere of influence all too often overlooked in our being 'all too human, all too human...'

…when our very humanity, itself, might be more precisely defined by this emergent dimension of experience wherein we come to engage such authenticity, so to speak, '*face to face*', in and through this experience of our relationships, albeit from the point of view of those same relationships themselves..?[44] (18)

Obviously, I am making the putative case for 'the imputation of the authentic' as 'a distinctive type of phenomenal-phenomenological[45] experience that emerges from our interactions with both ourselves and others, and, cannot be reduced to the bits and pieces that constitute any one relationship *per se* (and, in turn, are all emplaced within an overall relational world of relationships *per se*)[46]. Therefore, let me establish this possibility, and, then, let you decide for yourself whether such a distinctive type of experience has a part to play in configuring your own experiences of this world at large? (19)

---

[44] I.e., in effect, defining a 'pro-relational perspective' as 'that which emerges and cannot be reduced to the mere catalogue of the relational participants and part in that relationship in question, etc.'

[45] Without arguing for its intentional constitution/trans-intentional (judgmental) appreciation as either being just self-constituted by us/by(-)us or other-constituted [by-it/by(-)it]. Reading the nomenclature of '(-)' as a trimodal economy (but not just as a trimodal economy given the non-economic unidirectionality of moments of resolution devolving from its evolvement and their then ensuing, and ongoing, economic re(-)contextualization as will be looked at later in this essay).

[46] Where this relational world might be apperceived by some philosophers and theologians as that which could be identified with some sense and semblance of the One (as, say, per Laruelle, Plotinus, *et al*)?

Part II: An Existential Reading (and Writing) of both Inauthenticity & Authenticity

However, first, let me give two examples from personal experience where the possible self-perception of the 'look of the other', or, 'the look of others' does seem to considerably reconfigure just how we also come to see ourselves despite whatever sense of self-understanding or self-worth we may or may not believe we actually possess despite the ensuing struggle with such anticipated 'perceptions of others'… (20)

One weekend, many years ago, I took a bus and found myself sitting by myself on the back seat of that busy bus. Unbeknownst to me, overnight, during a lengthy period of rain, the polystyrene content of the backseat had become waterlogged. Although not visibly wet nor immediately felt, my body heat had warmed the waterlogged content of the seat and only noticed that the back section of my trousers was completely wet on getting off that never-to-be-forgotten bus. It was with acute embarrassment that I walked the streets of the town thinking that people would think I had had a plumbing malfunction but, knowing at the same time, that I had only sat on a waterlogged bus seat. Quite a paradoxical-like experience, and, one disconcerting memory of what otherwise turned out to be a completely uneventful and non-memorable day. (21)

In the same category, in an anticipation of what others might think, I could also recount a similar type of experience. Just before leaving Aotearoa New Zealand, in the middle of Winter, for a few months before making my economic migration, I had a blocked tear duct on one side of my face and, in cold weather, an uncontrollable tear would periodically emerge to slide down my cheek. Again, I found this to be acutely disconcerting because, in my imagination, not unreasonably, I felt people would associate this all too visible tear with their thinking that 'I was sad' even though there would be only one tear drop at a time on only one side of my face and I was definitely not unhappy other than having to continually confront this paradoxical-like experience. (22)

I mention both of these anomalous-like experiences to illustrate, first, the power this notion of 'the look' can have over the person even when they know, themselves, that observant people will most likely be misinterpreting the true nature of that type of situation, and, second, the only escape from that type of experiential anomaly is to suspend that miscellany of readings and misreadings and, with some strength of self-resolve, just get on with what that day originally had in store for you regardless of what you might think people 'might be thinking or not thinking', and so on. That, on reflection, both such a suspension and the self-eliciting of such a positive self-resolve is called for in order to successfully escape the potential psychological entrapment issuing from the multi-layering of this set of laxer-like, reflexive mirrorings.[47] (23)

Hence, too, this segue as to how we can make this transformational-transition from merely entertaining and identifying the relational participants in a relationship, be that conducted either individually or collectively, and, instead, identifying with the experiential emergence of that apparent relationship itself as it finds its relational emplace-

[47] Advice, I believe, that could also be extended to both circumventing and neutralizing the mental perseverations arising in a post-traumatic stress disorder?

ment in an open-ended life-world of the relational *per se*. That, in essence, this pro-relational, existential dimension is also to be experienced through the suitable exercise of suspensions… and, that such an awareness, once encountered, recognized, and engaged, duly finds an existential sense and semblance of a world that, metaphorically, I would like to think is ***'turned upside down, inside out, and back to front'***. Indeed, a bit like wearing a jersey in a similar manner… where, obviously, we are not conforming to conventional patterns of practice as to how that type of garment is usually worn. Indeed, the type of experience like the just noted biblical reference to 'the tearing of the temple curtain'. An experience that can be conventionally disconcerting, both for yourself and for others, but, not disconcerting in a paradoxical sense given the usual accompanying of a decisive, uni-directional discharge of intent of a resolute, 'clear and distinct' semblance formed through an apposite process of a harmonic resolution of what, otherwise, might have remained as paradoxical or riven, and, thereby, as anomalous.[48] A state of affairs, that should we have the requisite eyes to see and the attentive ears to hear, along with the self-resolve to permit the enacted performance of such existential imperatives, where we find it to be as if 'we were to be called upon to enact these apposite demands that, seemingly, are expressly set out to enrich the lived-quality of our relationships'… or, at least in accordance with the following theoretical guidelines and observations about to be explored in this essay? However, lest we unwisely get ahead of ourselves let us put on hold, for example, this existential presupposition that 'in acting on the behalf of our relationships they, in turn, will beneficially act on our behalf…' (24)

'Existential appreciation', in effect, is being reviewed as a 'clarified form of judgment', ensuing through and from harmonic resolution, whose 'power' devolves from this emergent ability of the relationship to enact its own directives through a unilateral harmonization of what, otherwise, might be, and remain, dissonant and problematic. (25)

Of course, it can only do that through 'us' where, as I have noted elsewhere, intentional aspirations can only be resolved and realized through their being economically exercised in a domain of arbitration, that is neither purely subjective nor purely inter-subjective, but, at the same time cannot be exercised apart from perceived forms of both subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. As an economic form of enaction it must meet a mix of passivity, activity, and engagement in and through our lived-interactions, respectively, with(-)others, before(-)others, and through(-)others. By such means, and only through such means, can it then deliver a semblance of freedom that cannot be experienced by any other source or approach! That, to seriously believe our freedom can only be gained through either the sheer force of our own actions or just through the mere actions of others, alone, is just a delusional form of thinking. Correctly, only through our economic cooperation enacted passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and engaged through(-)others can we, both individually and collectively, participate in an existential economy from which our shared stake in an emergent world of freedom, through an experienced freedom of the world, can such freedom be imparted and experienced both collectively and individually. However, this sense and semblance of a 'radical and qualified

[48] A deliberate reference to 'clear and distinct ideas', echoing epistemological ideals of the Enlightenment, but from an existential sense of perspective, and, not from any ideological point of view, be the latter either empirical or rational, either realistic or idealistic, and so on.

freedom' that can only emerge through and from our relationships in a manner that cannot be simply reviewed through an economic lens. Our experience of the existential, as a resolution of anomalous intent, therefore, cannot be reduced merely to the economic. Given the uni-lateral re-directedness of intent, as trans-intentionally determined through judgment and discharged intentionally, we must also accept the relatively non-economic nature of such potentially disruptive patterns of behaviour. Through the incrementally arrived at chaotic irruption of each dialectical moment (be that through either a form of bifurcation, emergence, and/or a phase change) there issues forth the relatively radical that in order to be successfully re(-)appropriated can be neither too radical nor too non-radical in complexion. If it were to be too radical, it then cannot be meaningfully and successfully re(-)appropriated, and, if it were to be too non-radical (or merely critical or uncritical), it could not decisively alter the course of our behaviour and the natural inertia of our intent would merely have us sailing on forever in the same direction, both literally and metaphorically. (26)

Hence the existential nature of such a qualified and circumscribed form of a lived-freedom has an economic basis, but, is discharged in non-economic terms, that, in turn, can only be appreciated through forms of an ongoing contextualized process of economic re(-)appropriation. 'Qualified' because this semblance of the radical can be 'neither too radical nor too non-radical, and, 'existential' to some extent by virtue of the fact that this harmonic process with its uni-lateral re-directedness of resolution can only be discharged and re(-)appropriated through suitable forms of suspension and de-suspension…[49] (27)

In this 'squaring of the circle', so to speak, in our moving from the economic to the non-economic, and then back to its economic re(-)contextualization, we have a succinct model for seeing both sides of this metaphorical 'coin' where one side is economic and is circulated, and, where the other side is non-economic and seemingly non-circulated. Indeed, by such means, accounting for both the uni-lateral irruption of judgmental evaluation and thence its circulated forms of valuation as realized through its realized forms of economic re(-)appropriation. (28)

We could say, in its most decisive uni-lateral expressiveness, that resolution takes on an 'essentially clear and distinct-like' manifestation in experience, albeit in a qualified form and never in an indubitably pre-conceived format. However, please note that such 'essential clarity' is not to be viewed through the impossible construction of an absolutistical lens given that no presentation of a substantially-oriented sense of a so-called 'objective reality', or 'subjective reality' is ever intended in this type of an 'ongoing economic basis – non-economic irruption of the relatively radical – and the 'final' process of re(-)appropriation through economic re(-)contextualization'. Instead, and this must be stressed, that only a holistic sense of the existential is being meant. That, effectively, only from a pro-relational sense of perspective is a holistic semblance of perspective ever intended. Let me explore the pro-relational dynamics of this sense and semblance of the

[49] Where the 'de-suspension', as the 'suspension of the suspension', has us propelled from the potential paralysis of the suspension; and hence expressing the apparent 'resoluteness' of such harmonic resolution.

‘essential’ in order to further clarify this equating of the ‘chaotic’ with the ‘holographic’ in this version, and vision, of a ‘pro-relational existentialism’. (29)

In a ‘philosophical economy’, defined elsewhere as ‘one-part hermeneutically prescribed, one-part phenomenal-phenomenologically described, and one-part non-systematically existential in its proscription of behaviour’, the epithet ‘essential’ can be applied both individually and collectively to the trimodal articulation of such an economy. Let me explain and further explicate how a systematic-existential reading of a certain relational situation could also be construed as essentially enacted through the invocation and research conducted along the lines of a holographic style of treatment. (30)

In previous essays I have described both the essential-like nature of phenomenological descriptions and the essential specificity of the relatively non-systematic existential (as the so-called ‘third moment’ of the philosophical economy). In the former we have the example of recognizing a brackish taste as ‘salty’ and where the increased sampling and reversed dilution of its salt content merely reinforces such a phenomenological description of a practically indubitable-like ‘saltiness’. Or, that in our experience of the historical specificity of a certain situation we precisely engage both the historical distinctiveness and uniqueness of our experience of that same situation (for otherwise that experience would then be denominated and nominated as an experience of something else). Similarly, from a meta-textual, hermeneutic point of view, in reviewing the genres of behaviour implicated in the unfolding delineation of our current concerns we are essentially focused on a certain set of genres required to successfully conduct and enact our intentional focusing on the phenomenal-phenomenological currency of those same concerns. To illustrate these three forms of essential experience, and their emergence in a relatively systematic format, let me recount my reading of the act of eating a piece of fruit, for example, an apple, using, say, a fruit knife to both peel and chop that piece of fruit into small, bite-size pieces to eat. (31)

The invocation of an appropriate set of genres of behaviour (in both our ‘reading’ and ‘writing’ of lived-experience) requires a general appreciation of what is thought to be involved. In ‘the eating of an apple’ the general horizon of my attention is to be focused on an overseeing of this performance. Should my mobile ring, and I wish to answer that call, then my attention is now switched to the essential generality of another set of genres, say, putting the apple and fruit knife down, picking up my mobile, and answering it. However, when I return to this task of eating this apple, the essential generality of such intent is once again focused on in order to enact the execution of this task. Then, once the apple is eaten, or I wish to eat no more of that apple, then the essential encompassment of this task is re-directed elsewhere. I follow a new train of intentional directedness. From a phenomenal-phenomenological perspective I find my intentional constitution of my experience of eating this apple is both self-directed by myself and other-directed by the lived-experience of that apple to the extent it resists or does not resist my appropriations of that form of intentional objectivity. At this psychological level of experience, we are dealing with certain co-associated particularities, e.g., apple-ness, skin-likeness, the apparent juiciness of the apple, the sweetness or otherwise of that same apple, etc. Then, on a more specific, non-systematic existential level of experience we note the distinctive, unique

specificity of that apple experience in the immediacy of its current historical engagement. I am eating this apple, and this apple, I discern, is more than adequately tasteful and so I persevere with my ingestion of this piece of fruit. Hence my use of these three forms of essential clarity, i.e., this set of genres and not some other set of genres; the distinctive description of what is being eaten, namely, it is an 'apple'; and, the distinctive specificity that I find in the very eating of 'this apple' being eaten. Now, behind this progression as outlined we can also supply a harmonic reading. The consonant nature of the hermeneutic field is concerned with the generality of the activity relating to this phenomenon or set of phenomena to be focused upon, and, then, the relative dissonance of such phenomenological particularity is harmonically resolved through our experiencing the distinctive specificity of that current engagement. Now, each of these economic stages is enacted through a form of suspension that I will not elaborate in the context of this essay. Suffice to say, however, that when all three economic moments are entertained in the form of an ongoing dynamic balance a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential is set up to be experienced and potentially recognized, encountered and engaged as an existential experience *qua* systematic existential experience. In and through this form of an overall emergence we then experience the e/valuational formation of that form of lived-experience, i.e., its trans-intentional judgmental determinations and their intentional expression as enacted forms of experience as seen to possess that co-determined form of a valuation. At this level of more integrated psychological experience, we meet either a relatively primary focus on the deontological, and/or a relatively secondary focus on either the aesthetical and/or the pragmatical forms of evaluation and valuation (along with less focused forms of attention being placed upon tertiary considerations of either the semantic, hermeneutic, and/or the ontical or factual status of these deliberations). So, in the context of my having eaten that apple, I might note whether this apple was stolen or bought or picked from one of my apple trees; noting that it was regarded as a beautiful, good-looking apple; that it was an apple that was very tasty and fully satiated by residual hunger at the end of the meal in when this specific apple was eaten; and, yes, it was an apple and not a pear, indeed, a very nice example of the golden delicious variety; that in 'reading' this situation the use of a fruit knife successfully expedited my 'writing' of this situation through the genres invoked; and, lastly, the eating of that apple was definitely conducted at the evening dinner table and not in some dream or some recovered memory reencountered from either my recent or distant past. (32)

Of course, at no stage in this philosophical report am I invoking anything other than what is conventionally to hand, and, certainly I have no need to resort to an impossible access to non-experientially observed entities and states like so-called 'objective reality' or a 'subjective-ideality' or an 'inter-objective domain of the world as it is in itself for-itself', and so on. (33)

Hence this cautious use of this expression 'essential' in which I will now invoke its holographic associations in order to reinforce this metaphorical denotation (and both of its subsequent critical and radical connotations). (34)

By analogy, I am arguing that the essential-like natures of hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential experience (both relatively non-systematic and relatively

systematic in orientation and extent) are to be experienced much like how we can view a hologram. Cut a hologram in half and the three-dimensional-like scene to be viewed remains, albeit in less detail. That this process can be repeated until, eventually, through a progressive loss of detail, nothing identifiable is left that can be definitively viewed. So, a holographic photographing of a chair remains the holograph of a chair at any point within the relational field of that hologram.[50] Thence, note, that my use of this expression 'essential' is being utilized in this similar type of context, namely, that relational fields that are pro-relationally viewed will be viewed with the same essential topography, i.e., existentially… where the essential distribution of information in that field is equally encoded non-locally within the entire ambit of that field, albeit as when we intervene to have that field seen from the local perspective adopted in a specific viewing when being entertained in that selected section of that same field when this localized intervention is adapted to realize this perspective, etc.[51] (35)

In effect, further arguing that issuing, non-reductively, from a hermeneutical, a phenomenological, and a relatively non-systematic existential set of 'readings' there will also emerge an overall sense of the systematic existential that, in experience, will manifest itself in this goldilocks region of the relatively radical that is neither too radically radical nor too critically or noncritically non-radical. For reasons, as previously supplied, the non-economic nature of the radically radical cannot be economically and successfully re(-)appropriated as it stands[52] and the merely critical or non-critical, non-radical nature of relatively non-economic experience will just not be adequately registered in the desired 'perturbations' of our jointly entertained intentional and trans-intentional thinking[53] required to follow through on a specific strand of thought and then our ability to entertain new strands in our thinking, either associated or not associated with the former! (36)

How do such ideas impact upon our understanding of (systematic) existential experience and co-associated notions of such (transcendental/trans-intentional) 'sentiments and expectations',[54] like, e.g., that of (this imputation of) authenticity, etc? (37)

Basically, a complex set of equations are being either overtly or covertly set up between these carefully delineated (transcendental/trans-intentional) concepts of 'the pro-relational' perspective on (pre-)relational experience; 'the existential (in its systematic

---

50 I would also like to conjecture that we can entertain 'tuneable holograms' by virtue of the hermeneutical mapping of genres of behaviour and their finer sematic detailing of various hermeneutic outlines associated with certain topics, etc. Such arrangements of genres forming 'libraries' or 'atlases' of such forms of mapped behaviour, etc. Just as in 'the eating of a piece of fruit' we fall back on the most probable patterns of behaviour we have associated with the eating of that particular kind of fruit.

51 Echoing the mondological 'observations' of Leibnitz in this regard.

52 Unless suitably 'digested' sequentially. Being re(-)appropriated in an economy of suitable economic re-contextualization.

53 As indicated in the formula of an 'e/valuational formation', i.e., 'as a process of trans-intentional judgment (evaluation) delivering an intentional judgment (valuation)'.

54 Arguing, in effect, that such 'sentiments' as 'transcendental/trans-intentional or trans-cognitive feelings' are not 'feelings' in an affective, pre-cognitive, pre-intentional sense (like, e.g., lustfulness, sadness, pain, etc.) (*versus* such sentiments, like, e.g., love, melancholia, well-reasoned forms of anxiety and angst, etc.). Thence my careful use of this expression 'sentiments' (along with their ensuing existentially oriented and re-directed expectations, etc.).

sense)'; 'judgment' as 'the trans-intentional resolution of intentionally posed anomalies'; 'the non-reversible, non-economic irruptions of the relatively radical that are uni-laterally formed in processes of historical resolution that escape the confines of the economic but become progressively re(-)appropriated in and through some form of applicable economically re-directed re(-)contextualization, etc. (38)

Hence, e.g., the following representative equation (performed from a transcendental/trans-cognitive sense of a pro-relational perspective):

Existential = Pro-Relational = Judgment = Resolution = Sentiments, etc. (39)

Hence, therefore, in this regard, my existential recognition that I am permitted to equate, say, 'authenticity', e.g., with (the enactment of a specific act characterized as an act of) 'good faith', the possible resolution of certain relational anomalies, an imperative to engage the better proposition of a trajectory that would more likely enhance the e/valuational formation of a certain relational situation (as emplaced within its web of relational interconnections as situated within the open-ended extent of the overall life-world), etc. (40)

In a first encounter with such ideas, as noted above, we would see a rather bewildering complexity of notions, both existential and non-existential in orientation, but, that through this form of this open equation, as just outlined, and conducted from the trans-intentional perspective of judgment, we then would find the profound form of this radical simplification, which, in turn, is further amplified through the application of both various economic and non-economic strategies as discussed both elsewhere and later in this essay.[55] (41)

Moreover, in the same vein, it would be apposite to mention here that the very formation of the existential orientation in its systematic sense is induced, thematized, enacted and acted upon through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, not through the impossible relative existentialization of the relatively existential. Just as in experience of art it is the harmonization the relatively defective, in the form of the dissonant, that harmony is realized in and through such a process of resolution. As noted elsewhere, 'that either too much or too little consonance or dissonance or resolution is definitively 'fatal' for the ongoing expression of an artfully oriented experience'. Where, in the experience of a certain relationship, resolution must be ongoing for that relationship to persist in historical time and enter into both our intentional awareness and its trans-intentional appreciation as a suitably exercised form of judgment, and, thence, to be possibly acted upon, etc! (42)

Now, a veritable nest of questions and problems will need be addressed given this economic-non-economic modelling of intentional experience and its trans-intentional appreciation (as a form of judgment). (43)

---

55 Refer to, e.g., paragraphs 49, 74, 84, etc.

For a start, is there any actual form of an equated relationship between, on one hand, say, ‘our apparent experience of truth (or truthfulness)’, and, on the other hand, say, ‘authenticity (and being true to the nature of our own sense/s of self)’. Otherwise, the objection might be raised that ‘would it not be inconceivable that a person ever in the habit of lying and being deceitful could also be acting in an authentic manner given that the true nature of their being is to ever act out as a compulsive liar and as a deceitful person’? Hence our consideration of this **first transcendental (or trans-cognitive), existential conundrum** and the theoretical necessity for its resolution if we are to make progress in the clearly delineated formulation of, say, an ‘existential-pragmatism’, e.g. (44)

Intuitively, for many people this problem is more a ‘pseudo-problem’ given our belief that authenticity and deceitfulness are contrary experiences that if ‘left in the same room, so to speak, would quickly deconstruct each other if their interactions were not wisely deconflicted. In the light of this belief, let me propose the following provisional solution of this puzzle (or rather non-puzzle). For a start, in order to successfully tell a lie, the liar would need to entertain, more or less simultaneously both versions of the reduplicated narrative they wish to overtly express in the form of a lie and covertly entertain and suppress as the true version of this account and as that version they do not wish to disseminate. Now, we could propose the proposition that the integrity of the person, and their concomitant authenticity, is established as an experiential fact when, collectively, they are ‘on the same page’ with themselves, so to speak, and that this integrity would be expressed in a matching of the covertly presented form of a certain narrative, in the intentionally directed formation of that narrative, and in its overtly expressed dissemination of the same. Hence the truthful person must be more integrated as a person, and less riven with the duplicated entertainment of contrary narratives as would be internally demonstrated, both psychologically and epistemologically, by the non-truthful person. Hence if we were to make a simple transcendental, i.e., trans-intentional (trans-cognitive) non-equation ‘between integrity and authenticity’, on one hand, and, on the other hand, a ‘state of lying and its lessened sense of self-integrity in the person entertaining such non-truthful and deceitful intentions’, then, it follows, that ‘such a dishonest person, generally, is less integrated, psychically, and, therefore, cannot be as authentically integrated as the relatively honest person’. Of course, this argument does not hinge on the impossible recognition, encountering, and engagement with the absolutistical formation of indubitable truths since, pragmatically, what currently appears to be indubitable-like is more than good enough for most purposes, and, where, in the goodness of time, we can individually address anomalies (in either confirmation or verification, i.e., conformation), should they occur and require amelioration.[56] Furthermore, as an exception that proves the same point, if one were to lie for good reasons, say, for self-preservation or the preservation of others, then it would behoove the person to lie given their need to ensure that either the non-de-creation, the non-preservation, and/or the non-conservation of evaluational enrichment of the relationship/s in question. Just as most people would agree it would be the right thing for an impoverished father to steal bread for their starving family even though stealing, under more normal circumstances, is generally treated as a less authentic form of behaviour. The moral fact of the matter being that whatever diminishes the value

[56] I.e., through the formula of hermeneutic rectification, phenomenological deconstruction, and relatively non-systematic and systematic forms of existential renormalization as explored in previous essays.

formation of a relationship without adequate forms of compensation, more or less, self-defines itself as inauthentic behaviour, i.e., as non-existentially observant forms of practice, etc. (45)

Let me now address a further series of conundrums, problems, and potential objections that can arise in the presentation of this existential philosophy (as listed in the advertised blurb to this presentation[57]), i.e. questioning the implications of this transformational-transition to an existential re-orientation; how might we avoid delusional forms of perception and apperception; to what extent this existential re-orientation is neither reductively intersubjective nor subjective whilst not escaping such an interconnection; what pragmatic utility this existential re-orientation has and to what extent our existentially working on the behalf of our relationships is mutually beneficial for us given this optimist belief that our relationships are mutually self-engendered; does this search for authenticity, etc., actually put us 'pragmatically' on a path to mutually thematize viable forms of social consensus, along with the formation of apposite forms of innovation, etc; and do such insights help us to recognize, encounter and engage a 'Contemporary spirit' in the cultural progression of this putative advent of a Contemporary world, and so on and so forth? (46)

In a **second existential conundrum** let me first address, again, the envisaged relationship between apparent truthfulness and authenticity? 'If we have no indubitable access to the full and formal conformation of truth-reports then would it not follow that all forms of truth-reporting could only be designated as simulations of apparent truth-telling, and, therefore, that all simulations, apparently truthful or otherwise, as simulations *qua* simulations would it not imply that all reports could only possess an equal status as mere simulations of truth-reporting to varying degrees'? I.e., that 'without requisite standards for truth reporting we are all in 'the same boat', so to speak, whether we be absolutists, relativists, or pragmatists, and so on'? (47)

To quickly and succinctly reply to this second existential conundrum, let me simply point out how a transcendental or trans-intentional phenomenologist would aptly respond to this deceptive line of questioning.[58] Yes, we might require such standards if we were working in the workshop, say, of a goldsmith or a silversmith, but, in lived-reality this problem, usually, is easily resolved through comparative forms of scrutiny. A dream apple just has a qualitatively different presentation to that of our eating an apple at the end of a meal or our fond memories of my eating the most delicious apples I have ever experienced as grown in China, etc. Then, we can note that apples in dreams may well be experienced as 'delicious', but, they do not over time satisfy and satiate our physiological forms of hunger that will force us to wake from the mere experience of our eating apples in just our dreams alone. That even a cursory phenomenological analysis would soon reveal these qualitative differences between different types of phenomenological experience. As a mnemonic formula, for convenience, I have tabulated this under the six headings of ***'density, intensity, propensity; consilience, salience, and propinqui-***

---

57 As noted in Postscript B.

58 E.g., an ideologue promoting a naïve correspondence theory, or, say a realist or empiricist, or an idealist or rationalist, etc.

ty'. I.e., under the heading of **'density'** we note the spectrum of phenomenological modalities experienced in our reception, say, of the eating of a non-virtual apple *versus* the eating of an apple in a dream. As already noted, the latter do nothing for the satiation of our hunger. Moreover, in line with expectations set through our eating of non-virtual apples, we find dream apples to be deficient in other ways as well. Then, we usually find the **'intensity'** of our experience of those individual modalities, overall, to be somewhat lacking in detail. On the other hand, in intensely vivid dreaming we are also even more aware that it is us that is constructing such imagery[59] from our own side in such virtual interactions and that even then the density or spread of such individual modalities and our experience of the apparent intensity of such individual modalities would still appear to be ever lacking that existential richness of detail to be found in non-virtual forms of recognition, etc.[60] Then, under the heading of **'propensity'** that through a persistent iteration and mutual reinforcement of key tropes, memes and/or themes, etc., we find from the existence of such bare repetitions the ability to further reinforce the apparent stability of such intentional appreciation as that being constructively iterated through processes and modes of past intentional retention, future-oriented protention, and current apprehension. In **'consilience'** we find the apparent density of overlapping frames of reference as another approach that can reinforce the conformation of our readings of a certain situation when progressively commented upon by such a concentrated concatenation of that miscellany of perspectives, etc. With **'salience'** we find the intensity of relational resolution as another factor in either positively supporting or negatively contra-supporting such forms of conformation under the focus of such attention. Last, we have my concept of **'propinquity'** or 'standing' in which the relative proximity of ourselves to the topic or topics in question can be decisively and definitively leaned upon in order to reinforce the conformation of our readings of that proximate situation to hand, and so on. That, by such means, and other techniques, from the scrutiny of those re(-)presentations to hand, etc., we have the ability to differentiate between different sets of intentional presentations in terms of their apparent integrity, as expressed in the comparative terms of their modal densities, the intensity of those identified and delineated modalities, and so on. A bit like inspecting a bag full of banknotes, both genuine and counterfeit, and discerning, more as a matter of probability, from the richness or poverty of internal evidence, as to which notes were most likely to be legal tender without needing to have to hand a specific banknote already guaranteed as genuine. However, this analogy, like all metaphors, should not be over-extended beyond its reasonable limit of deployment.[61] (48)

---

[59] Say, as experienced sometimes on going to sleep (as in hypnogogic dreaming) or in awakening from sleep (as in hypnopompic dreaming).

[60] I.e., invoking the formula for relational interaction, namely, 'hermeneutic recognition, phenomenal-phenomenological encountering, and existential engagement'.

[61] E.g., I am not arguing for some form of an intrinsic substantialism. As a similar analogy we could invoke the findings of an art historian specializing in the history of Chinese painting coming across a trove of paintings all ostensively painted by the same artist and which were collected after the death of that artist by a certain wealthy individual. Where, on internal cross referencing, they would find certain seals that could be used to authenticate certain paintings and, conversely, where imperfectly formed close copies of those same seals could then be used as one way to differentiate inauthentic paintings from authentic paintings seemingly painting by that artist. However, art historians are also all too well aware that all too often under the weight of commissions famous artists would often resort to their pupils performing this task in the style of their master. Or, on other occasions, the master would stamp the successful work of a pupil with their own seal as a personal sign of commendation and, no doubt, also acting as a way of assisting in

In dealing with the ramifications of coming to understand and accepting the differential merits of pro-relationally treated existential readings of our lived-experiences and not merely relying on relationally treated non-existential readings alone it is very hard to know just where one should begin. For a start, the application of such an existential attitude allows us to recognize, encounter and engage the panorama of a whole new world of pre-existing and innovative patterns of e/valuational formation not hitherto overtly accepted to date. Indeed, through the openness of such an approach we have the consequential ability to enhance the degree and quality of our overall freedom to be in this world with(-)others, and so on. Rather than exhaust ourselves in forming an endless list of such enhanced possibilities let the findings of this essay, instead, illustrate such a claim which, rightly, should be evaluated by each individual person for themselves. (49)

As a **third existential conundrum** let me philosophically explore the potential problem as to 'how we might avoid delusional forms of perception and apperception, etc?'[62] It is all very well and good to be 'blessed' with apparently existential insights, but, how do we know that we are not also experiencing, from time to time, say, delusional thinking, or experiencing various illusions, or finding ourselves unaware of the fact that we could be hallucinating, or swayed by faulty logic, and/or imperceptibly blinded by our own ideological biases, and so on and so forth? (50)

Through harmonization of our re(-)presentations, etc., the gestalt integrity of the individual is promoted, and v.v. Just as in dreams, with an advance in our psychic integration we then become more likely to find ourselves in a position to make more successfully such differential conformational attributions along with a much-lessened chance of getting it radically wrong although there is no guarantee that we will ever obtain a perfect score under any or all circumstances. However, the point does hold that with the right tools and approaches, the right education in such matters and the requisite degree of an active discernment such forms of differentiation should be able to successfully amplify our apparent, non-virtual standing in such matters. Indeed, with greater degrees of gestalt integrity, and through not being asleep or inattentive, etc., we should find ourselves in such a position to more successfully make such differentiations. Just as the more awake we are the less we will mistake the productivity of our dreams, conjectures, wishful thinking, etc., with those lived-realities as found outside the realms of those forms of phenomena that deserve less preferential forms of treatment or close reading, etc., albeit as suitably suspended and, therein, with greater hopefulness, finding themselves more definitively de-suspended, and so on.[63] Or, in other words, suitably developed forms of

---

the commercial sale of that same work, etc. For such machinations of the antique Chinese art market refer to James Cahill; The Painter's Practice: How Artists Lived and Worked in Traditional China; Columbia University Press, N.Y, 1994.

62 The problems noted in paragraph 46 as extracted from the blurb for this presentation as recorded in Postscript B.

63 The implication being that suitably suspended forms of textual production are better able to be definitively resolved and find, thereby and thereafter, through ensuing de-suspensions, more intense forms of radically conformable forms of resolution (through the more successful instances of a realized economic re(-)contextualization arising from the provoked issuing of relatively radical non-economic formations able to be re(-)accommodated accordingly, etc., through such forms of transformational retreatment). I.e., find-

existential insightfulness should have the power to make such differentiations for us and separate out for us such metaphorically 'straying goats' from those more 'wayward sheep'. (51)

As for discerning whether our own thinking or the thinking of someone else is delusional, or ideologically overwrought, or other-deceptive or self-deceptive, and so forth we have to come to an understanding as to our own 'standing' along with the apparent standing of others. In the 'writing' and 'reading' of truth-reports, given an existential (and 'transcendental', i.e., trans-intentional) equation between authenticity, truthfulness, our alignment with our world-as-lived, etc., we must hope that the necessary pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions are also in an alignment in regard to such matters. Sufficient evidence of such an existential alignment should present itself through our noting and interpreting the requisite existence of a mix of existential indicators, existential hallmarks, and/or existential predictors should such a process of harmonization already be in place. A topic that will be discussed towards the end of this essay, but, suffice to say we might note, e.g., respectively, an acknowledgment of trust, prior expressions of good faith, an understood history of kept promises, etc.; perhaps in conjunction with signs of a spontaneity of good will, a genuine demonstration of affection, an openness of engagement, etc: perhaps also in conjunction with the voicing of aspirations that are reasonably achievable, indications of an ability to succeed, the existence of a trajectory that appears to heading in the right direction, etc. All in all, a miscellany of indications that would support the contention that both one's own self and the selves of others are working collectively together in the domain of arbitration, etc., in order to advance those goals that appear to promote the general enhancement and fruitful enrichment of our relationships when viewed from a pro-relational perspective. Where such appreciation is realized through the suitable exercise of suspensions along with their invocation of relatively non-obstructed de-suspensions, etc. (52)

Now, we could make the following claim. That over time it could be established, through careful scrutiny and suspended, non-ideologically distorted reflections, that our openness to the existential would and should reward us with the requisite psychic integrity to discern this apparent semblance off an existential objectivity in such a manner that existential insight goes hand in hand with an expression of past existential indicators, present existential hallmarks, and future existential predictors. That, that granted, with apparent evidence of such insight these existential expressions should also be co-present! On the other hand, with a lack of existential insight the presence or absence of such expressions of an existential orientation would, unfortunately be either not looked for or just overlooked. (53)

In a **fourth existential conundrum** we ask 'how is it possible, and if so, to what extent this existential re-orientation is neither reductively intersubjective nor subjective instantiated whilst not escaping such an interconnection (through economic correlativity)'? Or, in other words, 'if existential objectivity in truth-reporting is possible is it the case, through emergence, that such objectivity can be neither reductively treated as either

---

ing relatively definitive forms of resolution arising from such well-organized suspensions and (the existential intensity of) their ensuing de-suspensions, etc.

intersubjective or subjective in orientation whilst equally not escaping, through economic correlativity, both these spheres of the intersubjective and public world and the more subjective and private realm of experience'? (54)

That this problem has some roots in Richard Rorty's delineation of the private sphere and the public sphere as 'incommensurable' in his book *Contingency, irony, and social solidarity* (1989). (55)

However, in a relatively recent set of essays[64] I set out to resolve that conundrum by noting only a 'relative incommensurability' between these two domains of the private and the public; the proposing of a third domain of a sphere of arbitration wherein the existential was relatively centered; and, that through economic correlativity this overall economy of the private, public and arbitrated necessitated all three relative domains in order to exercise a form of economic correlativity coincident with the full extent of the overall life-world. However, in the formulation of this fourth existential conundrum the question is asked to what extent the existential domain cannot be reductively mistreated as either intersubjective or subjective in scope or as both only intersubjective and subjective in extent (and by default overlooking and bypassing this conjectured domain of the arbitrated and its implied ability to escape such reductive forms of mistreatment?)? Or, more simply, in what manner does the existential domain, centered in this sphere of arbitration as a relatively non-systematic sense and semblance of the existential, through its manifestation as the emergent basis for the relatively systematic existential, can actually escape from that form of centering? I.e., as bypassing considerations of intersubjective objectivity, subjective objectivity and all forms of a reduction to both a combination of just intersubjective and subjective forms of an imputed existential objectivity? Or, just how should we view this imputed experience of a so-called 'existential objectivity' if we are not permitted to reduce it to just forms of economic productivity (given the radical advent of both its non-economic emergence along with its immediately enacted economic re(-)contextualization)? Obviously, our standing here cannot be just written in economic terms of reference nor in the mere combinations of its economic correlativities, etc!? (56)

As a quicker way to expedite a resolution of this fourth conundrum all we need to note is that through an acceptance of the trimodal nature of economic correlativity it must be impossible to extract any one or two such economic correlatives and reduce the ensuing economic productivity of that economy to the same. Moreover, the same rule must apply to the economy of the re(-)contextualization of the relatively non-economic. So, therefore, e.g., in the economy of the private, public and arbitrated domains of economic formation we can neither declare the formation of such imputed existential objectivity, based upon such an overall life-world that entails such an economy, to be either merely subjective or intersubjective; as just both subjective and intersubjective; and/or as neither both subjective and intersubjective. In effect, reasoning that existential objectivity, should it exist as imputed, must dialectically escape such forms of confinement whilst at the same time being interconnected through the necessary pre-condition of that economic basis. But, that through non-economic forms of systematic existential resolution, again, it must escape such forms of confinement whilst through economic re(-)contextualization,

---

64 E.g., *Pursuit*, III.2W-2Z, etc.

at the same time, cannot also 'escape such an escape' through such a necessary form of re-connectedness with the extent of the overall life-world and its ongoing encompassment of these domains of the private, public, and arbitrated. That granted, why this concerned with such a conundrum? Because in any attempt to discern the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of existential objectivity such anti-economic and non-economic manoeuvres must fail to reduce such an experiential state of affairs to the non-coincident restrictions imposed through either economic and/or non-economic forms of delineation (without, at the same time going down either impossible absolutistical or relativistical rabbit holes, or a bizarre mix of the same!)! That, in essence, such imputed objectivity possesses this semblance of objectivity quite apart from such forms of a misguided reductionism, indeed, any form of reduction... (57)

A **fifth existential conundrum** looks at the question 'what pragmatic utility this existential re-orientation has and to what extent our existentially working on the behalf of our relationships is mutually beneficial for us given this optimist belief that our relationships are mutually self-engendered'? (58)

The rhetorical question could be posed, 'if I were chopping wood for the Winter fire, just what could the so-called existential dimension do for me?' Obviously, from a physical or material perspective, 'chopping wood' is just 'chopping wood'. But, everything we do is both self-shaped and other-shaped. It would be both wrong and shortsighted for us to just believe there are no existential connections between the variety of behaviours people enter into. The wood could have been given or bought, or collected, and then stored. Those trees may have been planted with that purpose in mind. And do we know the names of the people who made your axe? Then, you have preferred to have bought that firewood already chopped, and so on. Are you sharing the warmth of your fireplace? Would you chop wood for the elderly lady next door, and so on? Look just a little closer and you will find the co-inhabitation of a relatively non-existential realm with a relatively existential realm… especially in light of the fact, as pointed out already, that 'the existential orientation arises from the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v.'[65] (59)

However, despite this overlapping of the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential should we maintain this 'existential optimism' that 'if we invest in our relationships, they will re-invest themselves in us'?[66] With the understood exceptions of natural and social exigencies; the mis-intended and unintended consequences of our ac-

---

65 Paragraph 42.

66 It has also been pointed out to me that without this element of 'optimism' intentional motivation would be like 'a train that would hardly be able to leave the station' so to speak. This aspect also further points out how existential sentiments (transcendental emotions) are all experiential emanations of each other, as the same holistic phenomenon, but viewed from differing perspectives) to the extent that without optimism, e.g., there could be no expectations for the 'trustworthiness' of another person to be in evidence in our relationship with them, and without 'trustworthiness', there could be no 'authenticity' and 'honesty', and so on. Marking a profound difference between 'affective emotions' (and 'cognitive emotions' as conceptually directed transcriptions of the former?) and such 'sentiments (existential emotions/transcendental sentiments)', etc., given this holistic nature of the latter (to be identified and equated from a transcendental point of view, i.e., from a trans-intentional, judgmental perspective in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect). That these ideas will be explored in the next essays in this series *On Reflection*...

tions, etc.; and the fact of the death of others and our own inevitable death should we be so optimistic? Indeed, let us enquire by what possible mechanisms that could be in operation that ‘if we should work on the behalf of our relationships that they would also work on our behalf? (60)

For a start, I would like to argue that just as our own senses of self are seen to emerge through our embodiment and social emplacement that a sense and semblance of agency in our relationships could also be envisaged, Moreover, through emergence it could be argued that with any existential surplus that would be to hand the same could be utilized to empower such an envisaged sense and semblance of agency. That the ensuing re-direction of such a psychic force could well be occasioned through non-economic processes of relational resolution given that the very facticity of that relationship itself arises through just this fact of its existence. Moreover, this apparition of agency may well merely co-opt our participation in some form or other and, through an existentialization of our own inescapable interventions in our relationships with(-)others, etc., inform us and instruct us as to how to act accordingly. Then, observe to what extent and in what manner our expectations might or might not be met given that ‘by what we sow, we shall hopefully reap’. (61)

Thus, the possibility of such an overall mechanism does appear to be to hand if only through the ever-enacted arbitrations of our own aspirations as directly mediated and indirectly intermediated with(-)others, before(-)others, and through(-)others… Then, through an endeepened existentialization of our own behaviour, we, too, would be as if agents charged with the exercised enaction of such existential agency? Indeed, the overlapping facticity of our relationships, to that extent they are greater than the mere totality or sum of their relational parts is a direct reflection of such potential empowerment and actual re(-)empowerment as re(-)directed through such processes of resolution, etc. (62)

Therefore, with those exceptions as duly noted, perhaps it can be understood, and demonstrated through experiential reflection, that there is this mutual relationship between our own sense/s of self, as relational participants, and our relationships, as viewed form a pro-relational perspective (as exercised through such suspensions and, hopefully, their relatively unobstructed de-suspensions, etc.). (63)

In fulfilling our obligations with others, in proffering small indications of our concern and care for others, and so on, it stands to reason that the accumulation of this goodwill created in the midst of our relationships may well act with this semblance of agency for the mutual relational enhancement of those relational participants in their relationships. That cultivated in ‘this spirit of an existential openness to the existential richness to be both discovered by us and to be revealed to us’ it is to be hoped, that with enough existential insight, we can see beyond the material pretensions of a short-sighted world all too often enmeshed in troubles of its own making. That as we take our sojourn through this overall life-world that we will find an existential ‘(en)lightening’ of our path as we make both our individual and collective passages through this same overall world-of-life together, both in a world of the other and in an existential world that is the true source of all positive e/valuational formation…given that there is not much we can do

without the necessary presence of others… and, that in the formation of this realm of lived-experience its very being is predicated on the very presence, and relative non-absence, of such goodwill(?) (64)

We needn't be a gambling person, therefore, since it is a safe bet that if we were to demonstrate a certain concern and care for others, and, that, amongst those others, some will demonstrate a similar concern and care for us..!? (65)

Hence the mutual designs we have on our relationships and the mutual designs they, in turn, will have on us, and v.v. (which, in turn, is reflected in an ensuing optimism but which, at the same time, is also predicated on the presence of the same, and v.v.). (66)

As a **sixth existential conundrum** we can question 'to what extent, if at all, does this search for authenticity, etc., actually put us 'pragmatically' on a path to mutually thematize viable forms of social consensus, along with the formation of apposite forms of cultural innovation, etc?' (67)

Perceiving, or apperceiving, that our emergent relationships have a degree of self-agency, even if only extended, either wittingly and/or unwittingly, through our own emergent sense and semblance of agency, still, the net result of such enaction is that we live in a world-of-life that cannot be reduced merely to an endless catalogue of relational participants and parts, the mere listing of relational bits and pieces, and so on. That, in responding to such an open world, in our being responsive to the being of others, there soon evolves a world of responsibility. Indeed, a realm of responsibility that cannot be reduced to a plethora of mere responses. Thence our acceptance of a world that both makes us and is also made by us, a realm of responsibility that cannot escape an existential complexion, but, also one that can be further leavened by the application of such an existential overlay. (68)

Therefore, we do not live in a world where we 'merely chop wood', and simply do all other similar acts over the course of our lived-day. In finding our freedom 'alone' through(-)others it follows that whatever better facilitates this world-as-lived must also shape that same world through this existential lens along with the enrichment of our lives in this world-of-the-other. Therefore, whatever better shapes this world, existentially, must better shape, on balance, the course of our own lives as enacted through this same overall world-of-life. Existentially, we could argue, that the very existence of social consensus is an existential indication that we are already, through interpersonal necessity, working with(-)others, etc. So, it behooves us to augment and enhance such social consensus along with the plethora of all other existential forms of expression indicative of this existential dimension… as the primary source of 'our' freedom.[67] (69)

In this light, the cultivation of an existential sense and semblance of authenticity, among other things, is obviously called for if only as a necessary pre-condition for the

[67] Contrary to the ideological short-sightedness espoused by, e.g., neo-liberals, *et al*. A freedom that is 'ours' because it is realized in and through this dimension of the arbitrated both founded upon and enriched by existential strategies based upon the pre-existence and strengthening of a social consensus, etc.

augmentation and enhancement[68] of this lived-dimension underpinning this desired ongoing enrichment of our being with(-)others, and so on... That, in such a world, through our openness to this existent dimension, which we both reveal to ourselves through our relationships and is revealed to us through those same relationships it follows that in the creativity of such an openness that innovations would and should devolve from the cultivation of such a devolution of existential insightfulness. Indeed, finding that the relatively radical is more ably revealed to us through the critical preparation of our labours given the prerequisite of an openness to this dimension of existential objectivity to be discerned through the ongoing resolution being realized through a harmonization of our relationships… (70)

That the very facticity of our relationships, as an excess in e/valuational formation (value[69]), emerges through the ongoing harmonic resolution of those relationships; where, at the very 'center' of our relationships, this existential dimension is the living-core of all relationships.[70] A holographic world of non-local value[71] where this essential semblance of a 'center' can be found at the locality of any point experienced within the discerned orbit[72] of any one relationship…[73] (71)

A **seventh existential conundrum** enquires 'if such insights, as discussed or intimated, adequately help us to recognize, encounter and engage a 'Contemporary spirit' in the cultural progression of a putative Contemporary world how might such characteris-

---

68 In technical language we have incremental, non-chaotically oriented 'augmentation' and non-incremental, chaotically oriented 'enhancement' in e/valuational formations.

69 Technically we have six varieties of ordered trans-cognitive value (e/valuational formation) but where I define 'value' as 'primarily, third ordered deontological value, and, secondarily, second ordered aesthetical value and fourth ordered pragmatical value'. Not confusing 'pragmatical value' with 'pragmatic value' as seen either in expedient terms of reference, or, more usually, through an existential lens (in the philosophical articulation of an existential-pragmatism). Note trans-intentional evaluation in judgmental terms within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, and, intentional valuation is in the Cognitive Aspect in the hierarchical schematization of the epistemological organization of the human psyche. For a clarification of such notions refer to *The Seventh Book*…

70 The metaphor of a 'center' is used for a number of reasons, but, albeit in a highly qualified manner. Witness the last sentence of this paragraph 71. This metaphor also alludes to a process of meta-integration (through a suspension of both differentiation and integration), the existential pursuit of integrity (that cannot be absolutistically integrated), etc. That, from a pro-relational sense of perspective, the 'center' of a relationship is experientially situated at every point within the orbit of that relationship.

71 As two interesting points to note: First, theoretical physicists now claim that the maximum informational density of a singularity is constrained by the maximum amount of energy that can be stored on the two-dimensional surface of the event horizon of that singularity. Second, as an analogy of this insight into the nature of holographic representation we can observe that people attend a cinema to watch a two-dimensional set of moving images on a screen and where, through a certain loss of transcendental distance, we happily or unhappily construct the 'living-reality' of a three-dimensional world from such information.

72 Elsewhere I have defined a relational 'orbit' as the collection of 'a static and passive ambit, an active remit, and an engaged composite (where the latter is a composite' in being arrived at through a dynamic suspension of the former two moments with the ensuing realization of the so-called third moment of the non-systematic existential').

73 An insight that a radical theologian might wish to extend to 'the relationship of all relationships' as the 'One', as might be articulated by the non-philosopher François Laruelle, *et al*? With the implication that a 'radical theologian' would also a 'non-theologian' among many other things such as, e.g., being a 'secular theologian', 'non-metaphysician', etc.?)? Refer to *Postscript* A: Points Five and Six.

tics be defined and articulated?'[74] In effect, asking is there this Contemporary era, and, what are its key characteristics that historians would be able to correctly delineate should this putative phenomenon be non-virtual and not just a virtual ghost dreamed up by academics and artists desiring more to break with the recent past and, in doing so, then be seen as being 'more fashionable, presenting themselves as a cultural commodity with a potential to find a greater commercial value, and so on? (72)

I must confess that now armed with this rudimentary scheme of these Modern – Postmodern – Contemporary categories, as a way of differentiating overall artistic style (and its potential shaping of cultural forms of social practice), and reading the latter through both meta-modernistic and hyper-modernistic lenses, that I am now finding this mapping, for me, has a lot to offer in terms of possible insights, deeper forms of understanding, a better comprehension of my own reactions to these perhaps somewhat incommensurable forms of cultural practice. Let me elaborate on these recent shifts in my philosophical thinking on this topic of the putative advent of the Contemporary era. (73)

This persistent 'oscillation' or 'blurring' of the so-called 'real' and the so-called 'non-real', on reflection, on my witnessing certain recent plays, movies and paintings seen, and novel read, does seem to induce this making, through an ensuing emergence, of a new style of artistic endeavour that cannot be reduced to just possessing either a modernistic and/or a postmodernistic complexion.[75] Indeed, something new is being thematized. Interestingly, in attending a very modernistically oriented play, basically recounting a traditional style of narrative with no postmodern critique of its use of that narrative, along with little semblance of any reflexive commentary on that same play, I was disconcerted to find what I would term a 'hyper-modern insert' when the other two characters, that should not have been in the same room, entered together to chant in unison, in quite a bizarre fashion, certain accusations about the main protagonist. In this blurring of real and imagined, in a conflation of speech and thoughts, in retrospect one of the high points in this drama, I found myself being quite disconcerted by how out of place this hyper-real insert 'felt' with respect of the rest of this play that, otherwise, took only a modernistic style of trajectory. But, I suspect, that this type of an innovation, almost as a form of fashion, be that appropriated either wittingly or unwittingly, could be something that is hard to resist given the apparent success of this use in other plays, movies, etc., of such a device. The next play I saw was constructed almost entirely along these lines of blurring the non-virtual with the virtual, and v.v. It immediately set the tone of that play and, consequently, was not experienced as out of place. Basically, you sat back and through a suspension of disbelief went along for the ride. Then, in a recent novel, one I confess to having given up reading halfway through, was also found to be disconcerting, and in hindsight, for a similar set of reasons as experienced in that first play just noted. The book started out as a novel with the introduction of some characters, often little more than as just names of people in the same room. Then, in other sections it turned into a memoir of sorts where biographical details about those previously named without such detail were

---

[74] A 'conundrum' by virtue of the fact that we are questioning the existence of both the existential and the Contemporary as well as hoping to articulate their phenomenal-phenomenological characteristics should these states of affairs be considered to non-virtually exist?

[75] Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12J.29, etc.

discussed along more factual lines. In hindsight, I might have been a little less disconcerted by these conflations of style if I had become more aware of the intentions of the author who I suspect may not fully know themselves what exactly they were up and hoping to achieve through such a seemingly disorganized approach? I was also annoyed by the loading of the text with ore, the accumulation of various literary devices that contributed little to the text, impeded its flow, and reinforced more an overwhelming sense of a negative nihilism more in sympathy with a postmodern approach. On the other hand, the next occasion I find myself being disconcerted by a certain text I will ask myself if those sections could be read as hyper-modern inserts and if they were to actually add a relatively successful enrichment of that text despite the presence or absence of that type of a reaction on my part. Indeed, hopefully, arising to the occasion with the requisite forms of suspension needed to better enjoy that same text.[76] However, I suspect the apparent shock value of such inserts will soon become considerably lessened in the imitative hands of less able practitioners… (74)

In raising the point that something 'new' is being created it would be apposite to ask just what else might define the meta-modern and hyper-real attributes of Contemporary artworks in the ongoing advent of this Contemporary art-world and era?[77] (75)

Here, I would like to reiterate my previous observations[78] that it is my belief that certain existential 'sentiments and expectations', as highly qualified forms of modernistic sentiments and expectations, are being re(-)thematized over the course of such narratives, disquisitions, expressions of art, and so on, and, which must inevitably contribute, too, to the *ethos* or *zeitgeist* of the times?[79] (76)

A first comment to make is that this re(-)qualification of such existential 'sentiments and expectations' need not be intentionally expressed with the full cognizance of the author or artist, etc.[80] Alternatively, in the hand of a more perceptive practitioner or cultural exponent this non-intended oversight may well not be the case. (77)

Second, as intimated, what applies to the existential sentiment of 'authenticity' may well equally apply to some other existential sentiment, say, 'honesty', 'goodwill', 'compassion', 'passion', 'loyalty', and so on. (78)

---

[76] I.e., suspensions of either disbelief and/or belief; and other suspensions at the center of rhetoric, metaphor, and apparitional forms of simulation, etc.

[77] E.g., paragraphs 49, 74.

[78] In the previous essay, *Pursuit*, III.12J,21, 24-26; and in the earlier sections of this essay, e.g., paragraphs 0-4.

[79] E.g., our apparent acceptance of the blurring of journalistic standard, the prevalence of fake news and the indiscriminate use, by the accusers of fake news, that they, themselves, are all too often the primary disseminators of the same?

[80] Such existential 'sentiments' can also be nominated/denominated as 'transcendental emotions', i.e., 'trans-intentional/trans-cognitive emotions', etc. I prefer to use 'sentiments' lest we confuse such emotion with affectively oriented emotions which I am aware happens all too often given a flat epistemological landscape utilized by most philosophers and other cultural commentators.

Third, through emergence, a relatively incommensurable background is created *vis-à-vis* modernistic and postmodernistic trajectories contributing to the distinctive nature of such trajectories. (79)

No doubt, a range of additional observations and insights could be articulated, so, my best advice is that "we need to watch this type of space"… and closely observe Contemporary artforms and carefully read the relevant literature in order to elucidate the cutting edge of this form of aesthetics, besides also focusing on possible cultural ramifications beyond the confines of the artworld…[81] (80)

An **eighth existential conundrum** will conclude this essay. 'Does this imputation of the existential find an overall, positive conformable truth-report? I.e., is this imputation of an 'existential objectivity' an experiential fact of our being, or, is it just a figment of our imagination… should it be the case that others, too, have also non-ideologically envisaged such an existentially oriented phenomenon? (81)

For myself, I find the idea of an existential dimension as philosophically inescapable by virtue of the fact that we could not see how to relate to relational bit and pieces, encounter relational participants and parts without a parallel pro-relational sense of perspective. However, this question of the existence of the somewhat overlooked existential dimension of the existential is better left to each individual to decide for themselves. Here, in this essay, e.g., I must presuppose that it exists in order to denominate its nomination. Therefore, the primary question is now what are the phenomenological contours of such an experience that would successfully demarcate it from a non-existential orientation? (82)

For a start, we should resist seeing this dimension of experience from just either a static or passive point of view. Instead, we could entertain either an active point of view or, better, one that is existentially engaged, i.e., a perspective that operates from a pro-relational point of view (as if through the 'eyes' of the relationship itself). (83)

From an active perspective we find a more dynamic sense of positioning. An appreciation of trajectories seemingly heading in a certain direction having come from a certain history of the past that can never be fully appropriated and, therefore, better deserves to 'seen' through a suitable set of relevant histories able to detail for us the apparent sense and semblance of the specificity and uniqueness of that trajectory despite our having to dialectically construct this more in-depth form of an appreciation. From a pro-relational perspective, we entertain a form of engagement in which an e/valuation of that relationship in question is more discerned through an appreciation of the essential-like nature of its apparent constitution. This form of assessment can be approached both sequentially and non-sequentially. Sequentially we can hermeneutically locate ourselves through discerning which sets of genres of behaviour will allow us, effectively entertain, i.e. engage, in such a manner within that relationship through some appropriate form of 'reading' and 'writing', i.e., in a configuring and re-configuring of that that type of situation. Phenomenologically, we can focus on a clarification of the semantic characteristics

[81] As just tentatively noted in footnote 29.

of that situation through a mapping of the phenomenal-phenomenological detail of that form of engagement. Then, in a non-systematic existential orientation we can further detail the specificity of those phenomenological characteristic and move towards a better understanding of the possible trajectories that relationships appear to be unfolding and to what extent we might be able to better intervene on the behalf of that relationship in order to select a relatively better choice in the range of possible future histories being co-defined by that relationship. Non-sequentially, we find our previous research is able to come together to some extent and through resolution discern which trajectories are better whilst allowing the surplus of e/valuational formation co-associated with the gestation of that relationship to be re(-)directed in a manner that better enhances the ensuing valuation of that same relationship. That, through suitable forms of suspension and overseeing relatively unobstructed processes of de-suspension we can find ourselves being 'charged' with such responsibilities. On one hand, made responsible for overseeing the enaction of such course correction should that be necessary, and, on the other hand, energized to enact such better trajectories from metaphorically tapping into this surplus of e/valuational formation at the center of all relationships. This excess in value being able, through resolution, to enforce such processes of re(-)direction should we permit such intuitive forms of re-direction. Hence our entertaining the trajectories of our relationships from either passive, active, and/or engaged modes of both reception and intervention. (84)

In this context, authenticity is basically an attempt to essentially appreciate the nature of our relationships, prioritize those in which we have more standing, and, exercise our responsibilities in accordance with the corrections of those trajectories that generally enhance the richness and enrichment of those relationships that are more important for us. Being able to experience the essential nature of those relationships, therefore, is crucial for our being able to existentially operate on their behalf, etc., and forms the epistemological and psychological basis for this existential sentiment of authenticity. (85)

As noted, my use of this expression 'essential' must not be confused with, say, Aristotelian essences or any notion of substantial persistence, neither should we confuse it with impossible notions, say, of noumena or things in themselves or the for-itself or non-relational realities lurking behind appearances, and so on. On the other hand, an essential-like experience can be had in either hermeneutical or phenomenological or existential terms of reference. E.g., be pre-occupied with the eating of an apple and the general nature of that task is 'eating an apple', no more and no less, E.g., sip a glass of brackish water and our recognition of it as 'salty' is our recognition of it as essentially 'saline' in taste as this experience can be phenomenological described as a distinctive kind of particular experience. E.g., read a wonderful novel, and then should you be asked if you liked that book you can immediately answer, "yes" because, for you, the specificity of the experience of your reading that book can be essentially rendered in that precise manner even though if you were to be asked, "why," your reply might take some time to relate your insightful observations, their nuances and qualifications, and so forth. To some extent we might wish to better explain this ability to experience the essential (and I am not in any sense arguing that we are experience essences or the essential *qua* essential) by enlisting a dialectic between both economic and non-economic modes of thinking. The link here being the uni-lateral re-directedness of harmonic resolution. Critically, we pre-

pare ourselves for such a decisive sense of judgment through the setting up of a harmonic process. Ask a question, and we invoke a rhetorical entrance to a process of judgment. Suggest a metaphor, and we invoke a process of interrogation by another route. Or, take the delivery of a judgment in an act of judgment at face value, as if the apparition of a ghost, and, by suspending and re-questioning the same and it may either well-confirm or disconfirm that original judgment.[82] The moment of resolution being experienced as a sudden 'exit' from that same economy, but, in order to understand the import of such resolve we now immediately need such an insight to be re(-)appropriated in some relevant and resonant form of economic re(-)contextualization in order to find such insight as 'insightful'. Implicit in such manoeuvres are both suspensions and de-suspensions. As intimated the essential 'center' of a relationship is revealed through a de-suspension of the metaphorical 'orbit' or the psychic 'field' of the relationship in question where each and every point in that relational domain is able to reveal the essential experience of that relationship, albeit from the perspective of where that now isolated 'point' lands in spatial and temporal terms of reference, relative to our 'standing' in both subjective and objective terms of reference as well meeting its contextual emplacement in both inter-subjective and inter-objective terms. That a certain existential objectivity should be able to be discerned in all forms of judgment since by such means we can discern what is thought to be factually correct or incorrect and such judgments, be the relatively right or wrong, can also be appreciated by others. Of course, no one is perfect because an ideal perfection can be neither recognized, encountered, nor engaged. But, on the other hand, suitably set up ensuing judgments can and do find a certain objectivity given the dynamics of their resolution. Yes, we can be misled, but, the very possibility of being able to undo such forms of mis-perception, or mis-apperception, effectively confirms this observation. That, at least with a reasonable richness in input, an output can be formed whose objectivity can be discerned through the adequately sufficient reiteration of that judgmental process. On the other hand, despite the recoverability of an apparent judgmental objectivity upon our passage through this world at large we need to be mindful that through enaction (be that through either action, non-action, and/or inaction) the consequences of such enactions are written more in a non-economic mode. 'The living hand that moves cannot erase all forms of writing once written'. Therefore, it behooves us to be more than mindful since the ensuing consequences of such deposited forms of behaviour themselves cannot be undone. Hence this call for being responsible and doing so in an authentic manner. As noted in *The Seventh Book*… it is better to practice a form of 'proactive redemption' (i.e., pre-emptive redemption) rather than having to perhaps find forms of 'retrospective compensation' that can never ever erase (the consequences of) the consequences arising from either the commission or omission or deferral of forms of behaviour that were less than responsible in their deposited patterns of enaction. Thence the import and impact of these existential sentiments and expectations associated with such experiences centered on authenticity, mindfulness, concern and care, goodwill, good faith, trustworthiness, respect and respectfulness, sympathy and empathy, a spirit of honesty, and so on and so forth… (86)

---

82 Outlining, very briefly, an interrogative economy.

As we can conjecture ‘that existential objectivity underlies such sentiments and expectations’ let me now set out a series of argument that support that contention (and, hopefully, defuse this potentially contentious and controversial topic). (87)

A number of formulae were noted that would assist us in this type of task. E.g., the list ‘density, intensity, propensity; consilience, salience, and propinquity (or standing)’. E.g., in dealing with a certain experience, say, in entertaining a dream apple, we would note that in having a history of subjective-intersubjective experiences with apple phenomena, etc., that we would realize in the act of dreaming that that dream apple was eventually unable to satisfy our physiological experiences of hunger… so, in that respect, a full complement of expected modalities was not being met. I.e., the density, or spectrum of modalities co-associated with apple phenomena, in this instance, would not be met and that in not meeting such expectations it would or should become obvious to us that we were not dealing with a non-virtual apple phenomenon. Moreover, we would also find that to a great degree the apple phenomenon was being more dictated by my imagination rather than the more normal encountering of a non-virtual apple. Similarly, under the heading of ‘intensity’ we may well find a dream apple to be very delicious, still, in looking more closely at it in the dream it would suffer a vast degree of a deficit in detail and where this deficiency of expectations was not being met would also tell us that we were not dealing with an example of a non-virtual apple phenomenon. Again, in dealing with an apple, say, with our desire to eat it, we find an iteration of experiences that spell out the bare essentials of what we are dealing with. So the apple was bought or picked from a tree; we are able to hold it and smell it; we rotate it and check it for ripeness and any aspects that are not so edible; we bite it or use a knife to cut a chunk; we note its crisp, juicy sound and savour the delicious taste of that specific apple and hence accept the propensity of this specific phenomenon to be an apple phenomenon (regardless of whether it is a non-virtual apple or a virtual apple being imagined in a dream or merely remembered, and so on… (88)

Why this level of phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential detail? Because in reading the writing of this phenomenon we have in this phenomenal experience (of either dream apples or non-virtual apples) an ability to discern how it is both written and being read, being re-written and re-read, etc. We have no need for classical essences and substances, precisely no truck with impossible notions like noumena and things in themselves, and so on. Purely from scrutinizing the phenomenon itself we can find through such an exploration all that we need to know along with, as well, the very limits of such knowledge… which Immanuel Kant, himself, warns us that should not be transgressed. So, what could be more pragmatic than that?! (89)

That, by such reasonings, we can determine the relative or apparent objectivity of that being explored in conventional terms of reference by such pragmatically applicable means. But, that granted, how can we find a sure footing in dealing, say, with the existence of the existential; existential objectivity; its equation with authenticity from a trans-intentional or pro-relational sense of perspective? Or, too, just what connection do these topics have with truth determination and the formation of what I have termed as truth-reports? (90)

In another list I noted 'existential indicators, existential hallmarks, and existential predictors' that, respectively, would be determined through and appreciated within histories of the past, histories of the present, and histories of the future. Under the heading of 'hallmarks' I would contend that the more greatly integrated nature of existential experience would stamp itself accordingly on our experience of present behaviours. I have already mentioned that existentially oriented experience is quite distinctive and can be somewhat disconcerting or shocking or non-conventional or intensely apposite, resolute, well-harmonized, a working solution surprisingly well-able to resolve a certain problem, and so on. Hence the observation that existential experience can metaphorically seem to be ***'turned upside down, inside out, and back to front'***. That this distinctiveness is explained by me as that which essentially characterizes existential experience, and, that I would categorize this under the following four headings, namely, temporal (immediacy, spontaneity, synchronicity, simultaneity, etc.); spatial (trans-geographical, pro-relationally non-local, etc.); subjective (with the semblance of authenticity, trustworthiness, honesty, transparency, integrity, etc.); and subjective (consensus-forming, social solidarity, as able to present a joint sense of collective purpose, etc.).[83] That, effectively, by the iteration of pointing our such a distinctive type of phenomenon that to that same extent the imputation of an existential dimension can be ascribed with that same degree of experiential existence. Furthermore, given such hallmarks, etc., we can also confirm through conformance, alignment, enrichment in e/valuation, etc., the requisite degree of evidence that would allow us to support the contention that this existential dimension, for the many reasons as outlined above, presents itself with a certain degree of objectivity as long as the limitations on such insights are not unduly transgressed… (91)

Now, in the light of the above, let me suggest a series of arguments that would allow us to equate this experience of an 'existential objectivity' also with the experience of an 'existentially oriented authenticity' (and, by such an avenue, furthermore regard 'authenticity' as a 'proxy for other existential sentiments and expectations' [as aspects that we might surmise would also be exhibited and utilized in Contemporary forms of cultural production, albeit their being given the qualified re-uptake of such more traditional notions, etc., as discussed in the previous essay[84]]). (92)

In order to expedite this task more efficiently let me use the set of headings 'descriptions, prescriptions and proscriptions' referring to approaches that, respectively, are phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential in scope. (93)

We can either formally or informally describe, and analyze, our encountering of experiential states that are both regarded and treated as 'authentic'. Formally, this would involve the use of suspensions and, hopefully, relative unobstructed de-suspension (through a suspension of the ideological construction of those identified forms of obstruction). By such means, then describing the particular characteristics co-associated with this

---

[83] A theologian of some description might wish to add a fifth category here under the rubric of 'spiritual' and, hopefully, characterize it non-ideologically and non-economically under a series of suitable heading that are both relevant and resonant in the context of their theological reflections.

[84] *Pursuit*, III.12J.36, etc.

type of phenomenological nomination. In this process of denomination, we would note the observance of co-occurring predicates and relations whilst also determining to what extent these attributes would appear to be either dictated by the apparent intentional objectivity in question and/or by our apparently being involved in the constituting of the same, etc. In an informal process of scrutiny, we might note to what extent conventional ideas and practices would inform our usual understanding of our topic, namely, our experience of instances of authenticity, noting also exceptions and qualification, etc. (94)

Under the heading of prescription, we would investigate the co-associated genres of behaviour experienced in conjunction with this type of experience. E.g., in the signing of a contract there is an expectation that the compactual context of that contract would be duly observed and that we would authentically be aware of such obligations and genuinely seek to uphold all reasonable expectations in that same regard… By such means, observing, in these investigations, how authenticity is being generally exercised in that domain of practice, etc. (95)

Through the thematization of proscriptions it is my belief that existential imperatives, in a deontological orientation, are both engaged and enacted. E.g., in reading a novel, we may well ask if the presence or absence of existential indicators portend, respectively, either the presence or absence of this sentiment of authenticity. That, in such a vein we would also expect the co-association of other existential sentiments and expectations, like e.g., honesty, good faith, trustworthiness, and so on. Interestingly, we would also need to examine to what extent the narration itself, say, through the 'voice' of the narrator, was also being authentic or inauthentic. E.g., in the masterpiece of Marcel Proust, we would be hard-pressed to find any form of authentic behaviour, yet, in the obsessive ruminations of the narrator I would conjecture we do find a certain authenticity to the extent the narrator, Marcel, grapples with those ruminations, obsessions, his attitudes towards others, his motivations, his missed opportunities, and so on. But, I would like to leave that observation of mine to the more expert scrutiny of those who are better able to reflect upon this labyrinthine text. Suffice to say, that in dealing with the critical scrutiny of Modern, Postmodern, and Contemporary forms of textual production, and their cultural ramifications we would need to take into consideration these various aspects along with the fact, as noted by myself, that there may well be a certain incommensurability between representative examples of such styles (even though it would also be true that no instance of production could exemplify itself purely in those yet to be fully determined, relatively incommensurable terms of reference. In this regard, I would suspect that more derivative forms of production would more imitate such shifting fashions without really understanding the artistic motivation or *ethos* being entered into behind more representative expressions of those distinctive eras?). (96)

In summary, what might I provisionally conclude, etc? (97)

First, that authenticity is a distinctive phenomenon that most of us would recognize but might well struggle to define other than linking it with similar types of existential sentiment that are co-associated with similar existential expectations. (98)

Second, in a similar manner, that existentially oriented experience is also a type of attitude that most of us have experienced, but, that we might also have difficulty in defining given that such an important aspect of our living in this world-of-the-other appears to be consistently overlooked. Indeed, we barely seem to have critical access to the very language that might allow us to better comprehend the radical nature of this pro-relational attitude and the transformations of behaviour seemingly dictated by our confrontation with its delivery of existential imperatives, our having to deal with its unconventional demands, its insistence, on occasions, to step outside our conforming to certain social norms, and so on. That a very clear example of this lack of a transcendental, trans-intentional language in dealing with such existential experiences is the confusion between 'affective emotions' and 'existential emotions' (with the latter discussed in this essay under the rubric of 'existential sentiments and expectations'). (99)

Then, in this essay I noted the nature of existential objectivity as being essentially experienced but having nothing to do whatsoever with impossible classical notions of essence or substance, etc. Moreover, that from an existential, pro-relational perspective we are also permitted to equate this existential objectivity with other existential sentiments like, e.g., authenticity, optimism, truthfulness, etc. (100)

That, fourth, the suggestion is made that 'authenticity' can stand in as a proxy for other transcendental, trans-intentional sentiments, and, by extension, in the evolving formation of Contemporary artforms and cultural expressions we should expect the relatively prominent uptake of other more traditional notions, albeit highly qualified and circumscribed (as explored in the previous essay in regard to notions of a meta-modern optimism, e.g.). (101)

Last, as an evolving work in progress, from our continuing delineations of such seemingly radical shifts in cultural fashions, through the ongoing researches of such commentators, we may well expect their drawing our attention to a cultural parting from more overt forms of a derivative Postmodernism, as exemplifying a relatively negative nihilism, and, a general cultural movement more towards a Contemporary expression of a relatively positive nihilism (but that separate topic would need to be further explored in a different essay)? (102)

However, as ever, let me state that I do not seek forms of assent, although such forms of approbation are always welcome, still, I would rather encounter and engage an in depth understanding of my various positions in the hope that that they will meet with the requisite degree of criticism that would then, through their relative resolution, allow me to move on to other topics of interest… given the suitable deconstruction of those arguments that prove to be defective or, perhaps, not quite so deficient..!![85] (103)

Noel Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 22.6.23.

---

[85] 'Modestly' echoing the formula in The Seventh Book.... 'deconstruct the (relatively) defective, re(-)construct the (relatively) effective...' E.g., *Pursuit*, III.VII.I.11, etc.

Postscript A: On the Interlinking of the Two Sections of this Essay

Point One: As noted in this essay, the relatively existential, i.e., the existential orientation, arises through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential. Therefore, these two sections of Part I, the relatively non-existential (economic), and Part II, the relatively existential (non-economic), are intimately linked. Furthermore, there is a dialectical relationship of mutual comprehension through the (meta-)economic process of re(-)contextualization.[86] (104)

Point Two: Conventional metaphors head us in the 'right' direction but we more stand in need of existential metaphors in order to focus more directly on the phenomenological nature of this phenomenon of '(non-systematic and systematic) existential experience'. E.g., the look, the promise, the call, taking a stand, openness, relational transparency, the text speaking for itself, etc. (105)

Point Three: What is culturally authentic, yet inauthentically fabricated, but finds itself treated as 'authentic', might as well be regarded as 'authentic. However, this simulation of authenticity is deconstructed through either a revelation of its history (provenance) and/or, in effect, through excessive degrees of unauthorized reduplication, etc. (106)

Point Four: An essential appreciation of the artistic and cultural nature of an artwork or cultural relic or artefact can also be used, say, through connoisseurship, to determine apparent authenticity, but, the reasons put forward for such a determination, one way or the other, will be retrospectively thematized and articulated. (107)

Point Five: An idea not noted in this essay, but which occurred to me just before its first presentation, was an extension of the notion that just as I have argued that we can always divine the full complement of modalities in the invocation of any trimodal economy that we could and should be ever able to divine the unilateralism of the non-economic accompaniment of any economy whatsoever given its non-economic underlay, or overlay, and expression. No economy could come to our attention beyond itself without this necessary aspect of the non-economic in which the ensuing resolutions of that same economy are disseminated within the wider world of this world at large. Or, put another way, without the non-existential economy and its existential non-economic expression, there could be e/valuational formation whatsoever. From this the implication follows that we can always find, to some degree however vestigial, an existential reading of the non-existential economy currently in question. Moreover, it then follows that we can also engage that same economy in an existential manner and hence our invocation of observing an existential openness to a responsible attitude of a proactive redemption as a form of preemptive redemption, and so on.[87] (108)

---

[86] Refer to paragraph 42, etc. Perhaps 'hyper-economic re(-)contextualization' given possible links with a hyper-reality (rather than 'meta-economic'?)?

[87] Points Five and Six have been inspired from my reflections upon my current reading of John D. Caputo; *The Weakness of God*: *A Theology of the Event*; Indiana University Pres, 2006. In this regard, we can equate a 'weak reading' as a non-economic reading' (and where I would argue 'weakness' takes on an ironic semblance).

Point Six: Following on from Point Five, we could make the radically oriented argument that the instantiation of the 'event (*événement*)' underlies all forms of experience and the very motivation of that form of experience.[88] That granted, in a radically oriented form of theology or metaphysics or secular philosophy constructed from an existential perspective, we could also argue that 'the world at large' is none other than this context of event formation, i.e., that, which in turn, could be read as the Event (*Evénement*) pre-establishing, therein and thereby, the mutual co-formation of the world of the One, Authorities and Individuals (in this simplistic ontology as a way of non-philosophically-philosophically rendering this ideal configuration of this non-economic-economic landscape). Then, in this super-economy of the One, etc., we can envisage how relationships might be formed within and between such categories, and so on. (109)

Hence, something of the complex interlinkage implied, and can be argued for, between these two sections. (110)

[88] Channeling certain French Philosophers, like, e.g., Derrida and Laruelle, etc.

Postscript B: Topic: Reflections on the Putative Imputation of Authenticity?

The extensive blurb advertising this essay was as follows:

A series of meditations on the imputation of the notion of authenticity...

In the previous session we looked at the putative topic of the advent of the Contemporary era, as viewed through a' meta-modern' lens where among others, one conjecture was presented that certain positive, modernistic ideas of optimism, authenticity, etc., were able to be resuscitated, albeit in a highly qualified form. E.g., in highlighting the inauthenticity or authenticity of certain contending characters in a movie or play, and by extension in novels, poetry, etc., where the main protagonist could be presented in such a contrast, conversely, as being either authentic or inauthentic. Continuing this discussion, the distinctive phenomenological imputation of this experience of authenticity will be further explored as a proxy for other existential notions like, e.g., optimism, acting in good faith, etc. In a series of 'mediations', in the exploration of this putative phenomenon, we will move from ideas concerning a differentiation of genuine objects from their counterfeited reproduction... to 'the look of others', then to 'the seeing of our being seen by others' to processes of 'a self-seeing of ourselves from a moral sense of perspective'... and thence to 'a more existentially oriented, pro-relational state of being in the world through(-)others, and *vice versa'*. Along the way asking a variety of questions, such as, e.g., how do we discern the implications of such a transformation of perspective; how might we avoid delusional forms of perception and apperception; to what extent, if any, that such apparent experiences of authenticity are neither non-reductively inter-subjective nor just experientially subjective; what pragmatic utility they might have in our intervening in our relationships supposedly on the behalf of those relationships in the optimistic belief that those same relationships will existentially support us in our passages through this world; how might such interventions assist us in finding forms of social consensus, and so forth? Hoping, at the end of this process, to find how such a re-envisaged attitude towards such positive 'sentiments and expectations' might help us to further refine our appreciation of the Contemporary era as it found to thematize an awareness of how far we have moved beyond Pre-Modern, Modern, and Post-Modern modes of being in the world at large, and so on? (111)

12L. Reflections on (the Existential Re(-)Constitution of) Optimism..?

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12L. Reflections on (the Existential Re(-)Constitution of) Optimism..?*

I am optimistic that my optimism is half right, and not half wrong…

The initial *raison d'être* for examining this existentially oriented sentiment ('transcendental' emotion) of optimism was the imputed observation that in Contemporary textual production, in the form of artworks, cultural products, etc., that the postmodernistic disvaluation of a modernistic optimism, e.g., in turn, is now being subjected to a process of a qualified re(-)constitution.[89] Moreover, this occurs across the board with all such existentially oriented sentiments and their expectations, such as e.g., the role of authenticity as explored in the previous essay. However, in taking such observations into a more integrated account, instead, let us focus in the next three essays of this series *On Reflection*… as to how such an understanding, both effectively and collectively, turns all such things on their head. That, e.g., an 'existential orientation' is 'non-economic in orientation'; that the 'presence' of such a re(-)orientation implies the co-presence and co-expression, equally, of all such sentiments in the formation of an existentially oriented process of a motivated interventionalism;[90] that intentional formation could not function without both suspensions and their co-induced de-suspensions with the philosophical implication that the only working philosophy, that truly functions, must be a pragmatic nihilism,[91] and where the existential addition of such sentiments, e.g., optimism, etc., can only imply a positive nihilism in the form of an existential-pragmatism or pragmatic-existentialism. That, with these necessary forms of an interlinkage, the next three essays will focus accordingly on these three interconnected topics, respectively, of optimism, a positive nihilism, and the non-economic characteristics of suspensions, etc.[92] That, in'

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

89 These six essays being *Pursuit*, III.12I.-12N. Note, I almost always use the word 'transcendental' respectively, as a synonym for a 'trans-intentional, judgmental level of epistemological functioning within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect in the epistemological hierarchy'. The word 'disvaluation', as a 'process of devaluation', was coined by myself in my doctoral thesis (both versions I and II). I use the word 'sentiment', and the expression 'sentiment and its expectations', as a way of avoiding conflation and confusion between 'affective emotions' (and their cognitively transcribed and directed use as 'cognitive emotions') and trans-intentional emotions' for obvious reasons as already stated (especially given their treatment under the non-philosophical rubric of 'feelings', and so on). Please note that the expression 'optimism' is usually meant to mean 'qualified optimism' and not a 'modernistic unqualified optimism'. In a sense it is a recovery of a qualified optimism (hence the reference in the title to an 'existential re(-)constitution of the same (and where 'optimism' is also, simultaneously, a proxy for some, if not all, 'existential sentiments', be they the expression of the same one transcendental emotion or many?).

90 Arguing that such an interventionalism, be it existentially or non-existentially oriented, whether exercised through commission, omission, and/or deferral, therefore, is and must be inescapable, something the person cannot escape in their passage through this world, this overall world-of-life.

91 That without an interrogative economy, e.g., we could not think let alone run a philosophical argument. Therefore, all arguments in their pre-philosophical transmission could not be entertained as they are seemingly transmitted without the re(-)enactment of such suspensions, etc. Hence the necessary implication that as they stand, as philosophical constructions, they cannot be entertained without this form of uptake being realized through their non-economic re(-)enactment. Hence their only viable reception through this form of a nihilistic re(-)formation. Furthermore, given the inescapable co(-)invocation of their existential sentiments, such as e.g., optimism, etc., it follows that such a form of pragmatic nihilism, to be viable, can be none other than a positive nihilism.

92 It is also to be understood that nihilism, in its positive, emergent, non-reductive, pragmatic effectiveness is not to be equated with pessimism (although we might be tempted to think that a[n impossible]

essence', these reflections on reflection, as a form of non-reflection, will expose this equivalence between the 'non-economic' and the 'existential'; albeit as re(-)appropriated back into a suitable form of economic reconstitution which for convenience will be re-nominated as a form of 'hyper-economic transformation of lived-experience'. That, both there in and thereby, 'the ordinariness of the everyday' is existentially transmuted, to some degree or other, into 'the relative extraordinariness of the living-experience'. Thence an outline of the overall trajectory of these next three essays on this general topic of reflection. (0)

As a most prescient observation, it was pointed out to me that intentional motivation could not 'get off the ground' without this necessary element of optimism. How could we be well-motivated if we were to be permanently skeptical and despondent about the successfulness of our yet to-be-enacted intentions? Indeed, without the expectations that our everyday intentions could be adequately enacted, with some envisaged degree of successfulness, it becomes obvious that motivation could not effectively function without some form of such optimistic expectations, regardless of whether such expectations, in practice, were well-placed or not so well-placed. (1)

Hence the necessary overlay in the successful performance of our intentional aspirations to recognize the existence of the crucial contribution arising from this existential sentiment of optimism. (2)

Then, from previous work in exploring the enaction of our intentions, I had drawn the conclusion that motivation also necessitated the utilization to a considerable degree of the affective 'weight' of our pre-cognitive emotions in order to promote the force of such intentions both with respect to each other and to enforce the cognitively informed directedness of our intentional aspirations. Hence, this now altered vision of the intentional landscape, namely, that the successful delivery of intent, in all probability, depends, first, on the necessary affective intensification of our ensuing motivations; plus, second, the cognitive ability to direct such overall motivation towards those pattern of behaviour that would most likely discharge such intent; plus, third, our also being optimistic enough to hope, with good reason and foresight, that such intent, on the balance of probabilities, would more likely to be successfully realized. Or, at the very least, our having an educated guess as to what the possibility for success might be given, e.g., that most people will buy a lottery ticket knowing they have little chance of winning, but, hoping, against such odds, that they might still win. Moreover, in proposing an equivalence between all existential sentiments, from the 'transcendental' perspective of the trans-intentional level in epistemological organization of judgment, we may well surmise that all existential sentiments are also either directly or indirectly being co-expressed accordingly.[93] In the light

---

negative could well be allied to such a negative emotion?]). In this regard we could metaphorically treat such a concept as a source of being/becoming effortlessly spilling over in open, plenitude of valuational formation...

[93] Invoking the necessary presence of some existential sentiments is my 'strong thesis'. 'That all existential sentiments are all equally co-invoked is my 'weak thesis' to the extent it is not needed to run the overall argument that a 'positive nihilism needs the invocation of certain positive sentiments' and 'not where all such sentiments are being equally co-expressed'. However, I would contend that if it were to be

of these former conjectures, in this essay, let me explain and argue for the overall trajectory of this complex argument with an emphasis, first, upon this sentiment of optimism. (3)

As a provisional definition of 'optimism' we might proffer the following, namely, 'a general belief, well-founded on past experience, that the reiterated performance of a certain set of enactions should realize the intent of such intentionally directed ideation'.[94] I.e., the hope that the realization of a certain set of intentional aspirations will be achieved in and through an alignment between the private sphere, the causal domain, and one or more of the following, namely, the intersubjective, public sphere; the objective sphere and its focus located within the inter-objective sphere; and/or the sphere of arbitration. More correctly, all spheres will be implicated with optimism finding its primary epistemological location in the 'transcendental, trans-intentional nature of judgmental processes in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect and its devolution of a subsequent process of e/valuational formation.[95] (4)

That granted, how should we account for the 'transcendental', trans-intentional nature and epistemological location of this sentiment of optimism in an overall schematization of intent given that optimism does not manifest either as a process of non-economically oriented judgment or its cognitive delivery of an economic judgment? Then, again, as a precondition for the successful enaction of our intentional aspirations, it would be better viewed as the making of a meta-judgment as to how well a certain process of aspirational deliberations could probably be realized in practice. E.g., the intentional aspiration that 'I would like to eat an apple now' would have little chance of succeeding if it were the case that I currently had no access whatsoever to not even one apple in this moment of time. Any optimism for my quickly realizing that intentional objective would be currently misplaced. On the other hand, if it were the case that, later that day, that I were to go shopping for apples knowing that the shop in question had apples, then it would be my optimistic expectation that I should be able to successfully to discharge this mission. The completion of this task necessitating that I should fulfill all requisite preconditions and conditions to hand, such as, e.g., visiting this shop, finding that shop open, have the required finance to expedite this transaction, be able to carry that bag of apples homeward, etc. Optimism, in this light, therefore, is the estimated proportional judgment that a certain process of judgmental deliberations can be successfully expedited in non-virtual terms of reference. The more optimistic we are, the more likely we believe that we will be successful in the discharging the objectives of our intentional aspirations. I.e., that

---

the case that when this weak thesis is confirmed, accepted through the requisite forms of conformation, then it becomes the 'stronger thesis'.

94 I use the word 'enactions' to mean 'either actions, non-actions, and/or deferral of such enacted deliberations'. I.e., a decisively formed response taken with respect to a certain situation that is enacted in the manner decided upon through the ensuing resolution of those deliberations, be such intent discharged either in part or in whole.

95 Which, in turn, can be schematized as co-present in all trans-cognitive orders albeit with an emphasis usually exerted in and through one of those six trans-cognitive orders (as explored elsewhere) in keeping with the general tenor of those intentional processes. So, e.g., if concerned with a first trans-cognitive order of non-integrated, relatively atomistic semantic content then it would be hoped, optimistically, that such scrutiny would be rewarded in that regard through obtaining a process of a resolution of that same set of deliberations.

in realizing a resolution of our deliberations we would, accordingly, pay sufficient attention to overseeing an alignment between these pre-conditions and conditions, etc., and their ensuing post-conditional discharge of that intentional objective. (5)

Similarly, we could treat all existential sentiments as meta-judgments whose presence or relative non-absence, should ensure the successful enaction of those intentional deliberations in question. Therefore, it follows, e.g., that authenticity, honesty, good faith, affection, empathy, trustworthiness, and all other similar sentiments, are elements in the performance of the enaction of a process of deliberation whose successfulness, or failure, should reflect the relative presence, or absence, of the same accordingly? Just as, e.g., a promise enacted in bad faith has less chance of being suitably discharged given this defectively enacted compactual dimension underlying the contractual. (6)

So, although not judgments *per se*, existential sentiments could be treated as 'meta-judgments' whose relative presence or absence directly reflects on the possibility that those framed deliberations would relatively succeed or would relatively fail accordingly, and v.v. 'Framed' in the sense that they set the stage for how such motivations should be reviewed. I.e., as either more likely or less likely to be successfully discharged (be that either in non-virtual and/or virtual terms of reference).[96] (7)

Hence, we can now account for the 'transcendental', trans-intentional location of such sentiments. But, then, can we account for the possibility that all such sentiments are nothing but different perspectives upon the same existential phenomenon, namely, its existential objectivity as experienced in its unique specificity co-associated with the representation of that fully sited relational situatedness as being experienced by the person or persons directly privy to that same relationship as they duly reflect upon the sense and semblance of that relationship in its sufficiently and essentially understood relational emplacement? I.e., is it the case that all such sentiments are but co-expressions of the relational experience in question, albeit as uniquely configured in our representative appreciation of that same relationship? (8)

In regard to these two following conjectures, let me define the notion 'that existential emotions have a trans-intentional, judgmental ('transcendental') location' as a 'strong thesis', and, 'the notion that all existential emotions are but expressions of the same emotion, albeit as refracted through various cognitive lenses' as a 'weak thesis'; and, where the latter can be reviewed as 'weak' by virtue of the fact that our overall argument, e.g., 'that in the Contemporary era, as in existentially oriented behaviour, such emotions become reconstituted along existential lines given such pro-relational treatment' is the primary thesis for consideration.[97] Although the weak thesis is also tendered, the primary argument to be defended is that we can and should make this distinction between 'affective emotions' and 'transcendental emotions' especially when cognitively

---

[96] E.g., I could think about how a certain promise made by myself could be put into effect in virtual terms of reference, and, thereafter, act accordingly in non-virtual terms.

[97] Interestingly, we could also run the additional weak thesis that all affective emotions, likewise, are 'co-expressions of the same more fundamental affective emotion, albeit as refracted through different cognitive lenses'. The parameters as discussed in next paragraph also applying to this weak affective thesis.

translated, and then their being referred to without being conflated merely under the rubric of 'feelings', or some other similar form of vague emotional language. That, granted, where does such re-positioning now take us? (9)

As a theoretical or hypothetical observation, we could argue that emotions, whatever their form or expression, have a certain intensity, a certain profile in their being then either reiterated or not reiterated, etc., along with the accumulative impact of such repetitions in the form of an overall sense of 'mood', but, not much else? On the other hand, in indirect terms of reference, we need to note that motivation is better served when all aspects of the psyche make a more collectively harmonized contribution to the overall intentional trajectories being either contemplated or enacted as such? Hence the critical aesthetic hypothesis 'that an artwork has a greater harmonic impact should it be resonant on all levels of the psyche (epistemological hierarchy) and those aspects, both internally and externally, are suitably harmonized in their outward expression in their public reception. On the other hand, the 'transcendental center' of such an artwork would still reflect the region of the psyche that possesses the greatest degree of aesthetic resolution as apparently experienced in its public reception. E.g., Amazonian natives might find the rhythmic counter rhythms in a symphony by Mozart, say the Great G Minor Symphony, to be more interesting than, say, the overly subtle vocal writing of Hugo Wolfe.[98] Where, in this instance we must assume our experience of rhythm to be a less epistemologically organized form of experiential recognition. But, I merely digress in order to illustrate this point that motivation can have a greater impact, both aesthetically and non-aesthetically, should it be enacted and harmonized on as many psychological levels in their epistemological organization as possible. (10)

Returning to the topic of 'optimism', as a necessary existential emotion that needs to be entertained in the process of intentional performance, we are philosophically forced, more or less, to adopt this position since without its effective 'presence' motivation would hardly be inspired to function other than, perhaps, at a bare minimum for mere survival alone? (11)

Then, taking the weak thesis into consideration, this same argument could then be extended to read 'that all existential emotions would need to be taken into account for the full functioning of our intentional lives', but, that this is guaranteed by virtue of the fact that all co-expressions of such transcendental emotions are, no more nor no less, than co-expressions of the same overall existential sense and semblance of such transcendental experience. However, this weak thesis can be further weakened to read that it is only necessary that certain transcendental emotions be present for the effective functioning of our intentional lives. On the other hand, we could also find a certain common ground between both this weak thesis and this strong thesis given that in our interactions with others, be those interactions primarily contractual (e.g., as a person who is renting an apart-

---

[98] Referring to an incident in my years as a student at Otago University when one of my philosophy teachers, the Reverent H. Thornton drew my attention to a photograph of an Amazonian native intensely enjoying, it would seem, a Mozart symphony played on an old fashion gramophone as the rebuttal of my simple thesis 'that aesthetic emotions are better reviewed in a more refined state of reflection'. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.4A.14.

ment) or compactual (e.g., as a friend), that there is the assumption that a compactual dimension will be basically observed. I.e., that people will be honest, trustworthy, reliable, and so on. Hence, we can also add such epithets to this transcendental emotion of optimism as generally recognized prerequisites for the more effective functioning of our intentional lives as lived in and through our relations with others. (12)

In the next essay, this observation is important as it renders the necessity of a nihilistic reading of our intentional lives as also necessarily possessing a positive complexion by virtue of this additional necessity of being promulgated in and through the co-expression of such positive transcendental emotions. Otherwise, we would be left with a negative nihilism in which the value of all forms of e/valuational formation would appear to be rendered as valueless, as amotivated, as impotent, and so on. (13)

As a summary of the important points of this essay let me note the following:

1. Optimism must be an important ingredient in the formation and enaction of our intentional lives through others given that without its adequately represented 'presence' we would be basically rendered as amotivated, despondent, barely able to function intentionally given this background belief that 'what we do would have little chance of being successfully put into effect'. I.e., through the requisite alignment between our intentions and their enaction through the co-option of the required causal processes that would oversee the discharge of such intent.

2. That 'optimism' can be perceived to be an 'existential sentiment' ('transcendental', trans-intentional form of a judgmental attitude) if only expressed on a meta-level of judgmental activity as that being needed for the judgment to be successfully put into effect. E.g., I am hungry and wish to eat an apple, namely, this remaining apple left in the fruit bowl. I do this in the well-founded belief, optimistically grounded, that that apple is edible and is neither poisonous nor rotten, that is will help to assuage my hunger, that I will enjoy this experience of eating that specific apple, and so on.

3. That in our reading of cultural activity, apparently acting under the imprimatur of an imputed Contemporary zeitgeist, we can perceive, or rather, apperceive, 'optimism' as a proxy, like 'authenticity', for other existential emotions being more positively evaluated and re(-)constituted in the wake of certain modernistic attitudes as previously refracted through relatively negative postmodernistic forms of critique, etc.

4. As a 'strong thesis' the argument was presented 'that existential emotions have a trans-intentional, judgmental ('transcendental') location'. In other words, in the context of cognitive language and its expression of emotions, feelings, attitudes, and so on, we should clearly delineate 'affectively oriented emotions' from 'existentially oriented emotions' and not conflate the same for various obvious reasons given, e.g., that such forms of conflation, etc., do not assist in obtaining and clarifying such existential insights needed for the rectification (of the relatively effective), deconstruction (of the relatively defective) and re(-)normalization of the functioning of our relationships with others by means of our pursuing such existentially oriented forms of arbitrated intervention...

5. A ‘weak thesis’ of the above was also presented [to the extent that its formulation, along with either its acceptance or rejection, was not necessary for the strong thesis to successfully operate], namely, ‘the notion that all existential sentiments, or ‘transcendental emotions’ are but expressions of the same trans-intentional emotional basis, albeit as refracted through various cognitive lenses’. The implicit argument being that given an equivalence between the ‘existential’, ‘pro-relational’, ‘trans-intentional judgment’ from the perspective of the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, such ‘existential sentiments’, etc., could also be extended this same equivalence to imply ‘that all transcendental emotions can be re-perceived to be none other than co-expressions of the same (intensified) existential sense and semblance of experience itself’ *per se* when correctly delineated as such. But, as noted, the preference for the strong thesis is held in order to just run this parallel argument that existentially oriented experience is more inclined to positively re(-)constitute such existential sentiments in current Contemporary cultural experience should it be seen to take this relatively existential sense and semblance of that form of an epistemological re(-)orientation. (14)

Now, in the next essay in this series *On Reflection*..., let me explore the necessity of a nihilistic reading of intentional experience, and, that the enaction of our intentional lives through our relationships with others is dependent upon a positive reading of such an obligatory nihilism. Presenting, in effect, an existential pragmatism through the perspective of a positive nihilism. (15)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 30.6.23.

12M. Reflections on the Viability of a Positive Nihilism?

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12M. Reflections on the Viability of a Positive Nihilism?*

Dialectics is like feeling the need to pull the teeth of a snake,
Necessary, but not only impossible… but also dangerous….

In the previous essay, the fourth in this collection of a series of reflections, 12L, in exploring the necessary co-presence of optimism for the successful performance of intentional patterns of enaction, we now move on to an exploration of the necessity for a nihilistic reading of our understanding of this world as experienced through the adoption and adaptation of such pragmatic terms of reference.[99] I will argue, given that we can only comprehend this world as lived through considering, e.g., the utilization of simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and so on, that we should then read it accordingly, especially in the positive light of a parallel optimistic reading and/or writing of the same. That the addition of an optimistic overlay produces a positive, pragmatic, and existentially oriented nihilistic philosophy. In this essay, therefore, let me argue why this 'positive nihilistic reading of an existential pragmatism' is the only way a credible philosopher can present a coherent reading of this world as lived and that all other readings, as ideologically misguided, can only deserve to both fail and fall by the wayside! (0)

Hence this 'major thesis', namely, 'that the world is better understood through a complex lens that is pragmatic, existential, and positively nihilistic given the necessary existence of the presence of such existential sentiments like, e.g., optimism, etc., and, that our reading of the world can only be conducted through the auspices of simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and similar'. (1)

To expedite this complex argument let me proceed in the following manner:

1. That, given we must deal with simulations, suspensions, etc., it follows that we cannot read or write the comprehension of any situation whatsoever without adopting and adapting the necessary economic means to conduct such forms of appropriation which, therefore, through the non-absolutistical relativity of economic corrrelativity, cannot be other than nihilistic in orientation.

2. But, the economic, furthermore, could not be comprehended without also adopting and adapting non-economic means for its relatively radical, re-appreciation given this experiential fact that there must also be the co-existence through meta-economic correlativity of

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

99 *Pursuit*, III.12I.0,6. Noting, respectively, the use of the two expressions, namely, a 'Contemporary world' and a 'Contemporary philosopher'. The reader must understand that although we might be able to equate 'pessimism' with a 'negative nihilism' we most certainly 'cannot equate it with a positive nihilism'. Furthermore, much in the manner of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, it is only because there is a (positive) nihilism that the world can be seen to work (and be 'pragmatic' over the course of our lives). 'Simulations' misread as 'not simulation;' as so-called 'realities', as ideologically mistreated imputations, means doing impossible things where if they can be successful to some degree then they are definitely not doing what they say they are doing! Furthermore, this positive, nihilistically treated sense of the world at large is also a plenitude of hopefulness, and so on. Where by 'optimism' as noted in the previous essay, we mean a qualified optimism, and, where 'optimism' is a 'proxy for some, if not all, existential sentiments'.

its economic presentation, non-economic re-presentation and contextual representation in the economy of such re(-)presentation.[100]

3. That a non-economic appreciation is also an existential appreciation of that overall economy with the necessary implication of the requisite presence of certain existential sentiments (if not [the possibility of] all existential sentiments as co-expressions of the overall sense and semblance of the uniqueness of the existential objectivity being manifested in and through the ongoing formation of that primary relationship in question).

4. Thence the necessary co-presence of the existential sentiment of optimism must render such nihilism as positive in complexion to that same degree.

5. That it follows, therefore, that the only tenable philosophy that could be tendered cannot be other than the positive nihilism of an existential-pragmatism! (2)

That to fully expedite this complex argument a number of other subsidiary arguments will also need to be supplied in order to complete the entire totality of this general argument that 'the only credible philosophy could not be other than an existential pragmatism disseminated with a positive nihilistic complexion'. (3)

As this complex argument can be constructed to fall under five headings, as outlined above, then let me work my way through those five sections of this overall argument, and then interlink these same five segments to suitably complete their integrated design. For convenience, as a mnemonic, I will designate those five headings as 'Economic Nihilism'; 'Non-Economic Nihilism'; 'Existential Nihilism', 'Positive Nihilism'; and, a Pragmatic Nihilism (that must also be positively-existential in orientation). (4)

1. Economic Nihilism

Thinking is conducted in and through an economy, say, of the trimodal facets of hermeneutical representation, phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, and existential re-presentation. (5)

But for convenience, let us say that we first work with 'what is to hand', then 'subject the same to (transcendental) suspensions', that then 'automatically invoke desuspensions' that, in turn, then return us to where we began, albeit as modified by such an

[100] Note '(-)' is my nomenclature for an economy (in this case between hermeneutically oriented representation, phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented presentation, and non-systematic existentially re-presentation (with the hyphen indicating chaotically oriented re-direction). The economy indicated in this footnote is also my recipe for the 'philosophical economy'. Furthermore, because philosophical enquiry necessitates asking questions hence the implication of the interrogative economy about to be introduced (which is isomorphic with all other economies) and where the entry into the economic process, like all forms of entry, implicates the exercise of a certain suspension, in this instance of the dis-conjunctive suspension as one moment in the overall transcendental suspension that will be explored in the next essay). In other words, philosophical behaviour cannot escape the use of suspensions, be they either wittingly and/or unwittingly invoked.

economic process, hopefully, whose progress is conducted in a suitably critical manner. Of course, I do not expect the application of this formula to be immediately understood and quickly afforded an affirmative approbation as entirely cogent, and so on. So, in detail, let me recast this argument for an 'economic nihilism' in a manner that might find your eventual comprehension and, dare I say it, your inevitable assent. (6)

The skillful philosopher, like all good disciplinarians, works with what is to be found to hand, as publicly disseminated in the marketplace, the intersubjective agora of ideas. (7)

Now what is found to hand cannot be other than 'simulations of this world' thought to reflect the relational constituents to be found in this world as lived. (8)

In the visual field of perception we construct an intentionally formed image, from a series of such constructed images, constructed from the relationships we both find and impute as we scan that complex field... a field whose complexity notes 'apparent' linear features, colours, focalize points of comparison, spatial location, movement, along with the presence or absence of forms of facial recognition; simplification through an identification of the essential *pragnatz* of certain features through to be present, etc., as well as entering into processes of nomination and denomination (through further forms of identification of both imputed predicates and relations involving respectively, their semantic mapping and their parallel mapping in terms of their hierarchical mapping of genres of behaviour[101]), etc., all tested through processes of confirmation, disconfirmation, and reconfirmation in real time; and verification in retrospectively entertained time, and through parallel forms of conformation, and so on and so forth. For the sake of this argument, let us accept such complexity as an inescapable given. (9)

In summary, if we are neither simple minded naive realists nor too intellectually mesmerized idealists, we would accept the premise that the world is not directly seen *per se* even if directly engaged through living-experience along with our evolving interpretations of the same... (10)

Therefore, as constructed, such construction must be regarded as 'simulations' performed in intentional experience, and, therefore, appreciated, i.e., judged, in trans-intentional terms of experience (given that appreciation of either the perceptual and/or conceptual must be enacted in trans-perceptual and/or trans-conceptual terms of reference. But, upon reflection we should treat the 'trans-perceptual' as none other than 'conceptual' with the implication, as per this paraphrase of Kant, 'that judgment is conducted either within and/or between concepts', i.e., must be enacted in trans-conceptual terms of reference, i.e., trans-intentionally[102]). (11)

---

101 I.e., as sub-genres within genres, and genres within super-genres, etc. E.g., eating an apple with a fruit knife, as a sub-genre in the genre of eating an apple, in turn, as the eating of an apple within the super-genre of eating a piece of fruit (within the hyper-genre of eating, in turn, within the more general genre of ingestion). Arguing also that there is a parallel semantic hierarchy based in the conventional treatment of phenomenal-phenomenological experience.

102 That trans-intentional judgment(al appreciation) occurs in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect in the hierarchical schematization of consciousness (which we could also treat as the 'psyche'). Furthermore, we can

So, what we have to hand can be treated as ‘simulations’, but, where some simulations are more simulated than other simulations in order to phenomenologically account for illusions, delusions, mistaken truth reports, deliberately distorted assessments of experience, and so on.[103] (12)

Moreover, such simulations, regardless as to whether they are treated as simulations or mistreated as non-simulations, through the economic nature of their presentation cannot be entertained purely either in themselves and/or of themselves, and so on. That economic correlativity, between the trimodal constitution of that economic field of experience, implies that neither the representation, nor the presentation, and/nor the re-presentation can be entertained in any isolated, purely focused upon form of experience. **Therefore, that understood, we cannot but accept that all economic correlatives are forms that cannot be appreciated in such absolutistical terms of reference with the only inference that can be successfully drawn being ‘that they are entertained in a nihilistic fashion, and that they can only be appreciated in a similar nihilistic fashion!’**[104] (13)

Hence the necessary inference of an economic nihilism! That, because we cannot absolutistically entertain any one economic modality, as an economic correlativity, in itself, purely on its own terms of reference, hence this position that recognizes we can have no truck with any defective philosophy that thinks we can do otherwise. That this rule applies equally to both realistically mistreated proclivities and idealistically mistreated proclivities leaving us with the only reputable philosophy that is possible, namely, the nihilistic treatment of an antirepresentational pragmatism. However, this rule does permit the performance of a ‘qualified re(-)presentational economy’ as long as we understand that hermeneutical representations, phenomenal-phenomenological presentations, and (both non-systematic and systematic) existential re-presentations, as economic correlativities, are basically working with simulations, suspensions and de-suspensions respectively (and have no connections whatsoever with impossible notions of substance, noumena, mental essences, platonic forms, etc., along with all forms of ideological extremism as entailed in either absolutistically or relativistically confected confabulations, etc., given the impossible nature of such unedifying forms of conjured prestidigitation). (14)

---

also treat this trans-intentional orientation as ‘transcendental’, as well as ‘pro-relational’, ‘existential’, etc. However, in using this expression ‘transcendental’, as transcending the intentional, we must be careful not to treat it as ‘transcendent’ or confuse it with a ‘negative sense of the transcendental’ as the range of possibilities, etc., a certain form of ideational configuration could take and could not take, etc. On the other hand, we can view a transcendental suspension as preparation for a judgment, however, a philosophy of the suspension has a lot more work to do and the next essay will attempt to broach that topic.

103 E.g., as dealt with in the essay on authenticity, 12J.

104 I.e., such intentions are perceived in nihilistic terms as simulations, and, that their judgmental appreciation in trans-intentional terms of reference must equally be in nihilistic terms as ‘simulations’, or ‘trans-simulations’, etc.

2. Non-Economic Nihilism

But, all judgments are realized through harmonic processes of re-directed resolution that must take the form of a uni-lateral directedness given the apparently non-circulated nature of causation and the nature of our interventions conducted in causal terms of reference. Patterns of enaction once performed cannot be undone (hence the pro-relational recognition for a 'prospective redemption' or a 'preemptive sense of redemption' rather than atone for defective patterns of behaviour through forms of compensation that can never undo the ramifications of their original enaction, be that through either action, non-action, and/or inaction, etc.).[105] (15)

Hence the relative radical irruption of the re-directed, uni-laterally directed responses of behaviour entered into by ourselves, as enacted either individually and/or collectively, etc. (16)

Thence the ensuing recognition of the requirement that the radically-radical could not be economically re-comprehended and the non-radically radical would not be registered. Then, the former is better set up in and through critical terms of reference as relatively-radical rather than less non-deceptively through relatively non-critical means. I.e., the relatively radical is better set up through critical means rather than through less critically organized or non-critically organized processes. (17)

Thence this goldilocks region of the critically set up relatively-radical rather than either the radically-radical which could not be comprehended nor the non-radically-radical which would not be registered for comprehension whilst also steering clear of the non-critically-radical as improperly simulated (even if inadvertently it were to be in an accident alignment with a more critically enacted approach). (18)

Where a critically conducted set up usually ensures a more intersubjective approach to the formation of valid truth-reports arrived at through relatively-radical processes of a uni-lateral re-directedness given a somewhat precise sense of re-direction through relatively intersubjective forms of relational resolution more forcefully realized through the harmonic nature of judgmental appreciation. (19)

Or, more simply, by critical means we more successfully arrive at an intersubjectivity of truth assessments. (20)

But, as the relatively-radical can only be comprehended by its successful re-appropriation in and through its suitable economic re(-)contextualization it follows that non-economic considerations, likewise, must be either read and/or written in nihilistically appreciated terms of reference! (21)

Thence, through this trimodal economic correlativity between the economic, the non-economic process of unilaterally re-directed resolution, and its economic

---

[105] Where 'enaction' is being defined here as 'either action, non-action, and/or inaction'; be that in passive, active, and/or in engaged patterns terms of relational interaction, etc.

re(-)appropriation through its economic re(-)contextualization, it follows that we are also presented with a non-economic nihilism (using exactly the same arguments that initially gave us our philosophical recognition of an economic nihilism[106])! (22)

3. Existential Nihilism

The necessary irruption of the non-economic must be reviewed as existential in orientation to some degree or other. But, given that the non-economic is subjected to economic re(-)contextualization, in order to arrive at its economic re(-)appropriation and ensuing economic comprehension, the inference can be successfully drawn that even the existential orientation, present to some extent, given its non-economic resolution, must also be read and written in and through an existential nihilism! (23)

I.e., given the necessary re(-)appropriation of the non-economic through its ensuing economic re(-)contextualization, it follows that even the existential must be both read and written in nihilistic terms of reference, as finding its non-absolutistical significance through it interactive relations within our comprehension of the dynamics of the primary relationship itself (to that extent it finds its relative inter-dependence in the overall world of relationships that constitutes the overall world-of-life). (24)

Or, more simply, from a pro-relational point of view, even if the relatively-radical does turn things seemingly 'inside out, upside down, and back to front', still, our non-absolutistical understanding demands a nihilistic comprehension of whatever is either read and/or written in apparently enacted existential terms of reference. (25)

Hence the necessary acceptance that even the relatively-radical nature of existential experience is similarly refracted through a nihilistic lens given that there can be no other form of economic re(-)appropriation! (26)

4. Positive Nihilism

Now, an existential sentiment that has already been argued as necessary in the enaction of intentional behaviour is that of the entertainment of the requisite degree of optimism thought to be application for the performance of the same, be that either in its intentional consideration and/or in its trans-intentional appreciation (be that either in its virtual performance or its extended performance through a causally implicated, non-virtual form of enaction). (27)

Therefore, because the existential dimension is nihilistic in orientation in its reading and writing of its relational situatedness, given its economic re(-)contextualization, and its responsiveness as enacted from its pro-relational sense of perspective, and, opti-

---

[106] As presented in paragraphs 13-14. Restated, this argument runs as follows: all economic correlatives, being correlatives dependent upon each other, in order to define themselves through the joint negation of the other two economic moments, implies that no economic moment can be absolutistically entertained purely in and of itself, and, that even such an absolutistical thought cannot be entertained (other than as a null set, a set with no referable content). Therefore, no economic correlativity should be mistreated as something that could intentionally arise in and through any isolated form of comprehension, etc.

mism is ever present with both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented patterns of re-directed forms of relationally resolution it must follow that this necessary component of the optimistic, along with the co-presentation of all other positive existential sentiments, be that in part or collectively, implies that an existential nihilism must be positive in complexion and, therefore, cannot be neither present nor presented as some form of a merely negative nihilism. (28)

Let me restate this argument: that because the existential is read through a nihilist lens, given the economic correlativity of its economic re(-)contextualization, and, optimism as an existential sentiment must be co-present, along with all other existential sentiments should they be individually co-present (or, through necessity, as collectively co-present) it follows that the ensuing nihilism must be positive in tenor! (29)

Thence the necessary existence of a positive nihilism and the relative absence of a negative nihilism in our existential appreciation of the world as lived! (30)

5. Pragmatic Nihilism

But, as an existential nihilism is necessarily coupled with the requisite of an optimistic tenor, etc., in order to exercise the possibility of its successful functioning, it follows that a pragmatic existentialism must also be a positive form of nihilism (and never a negative form of nihilism)!! (31)

Hence the following restatement of this argument in more detail:

1. All economic behaviour can only be appreciated in nihilistic terms of reference given that economic significance can only be rendered interdependently through economic correlativity (and not in any isolated absolutistically independent sense be that either self-isolated or other-isolated).

2. That the co-presence of non-economic input, through ongoing relational resolution, implies the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, i.e., the co-presence of an existential contribution, arrived at either overtly and/or covertly in an accordance with the nature of such relational resolution.

3. That the effectiveness of intentional enaction is dependent upon the necessary co-presence of the existential sentiment of optimism rendering either both relatively non-existential and relatively existential patterns of behaviour positive in tenor.

4. Therefore the nihilistic complexion of all forms of intentional and trans-intentional behaviour must be positive in tenor!

5. Thence the positive nihilistic complexion of an existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism!! (32)

6. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Integrated in this form, that all intentional and trans-intentional behaviour, etc., is nihilistic through the interdependent nature of economic correlativity, and, can only function through an optimist overlay, it follows that given this existential contribution, etc., that the pragmatic effectiveness of all written and read behaviours must devolve from this necessary conjunction of a nihilistic complexion and its optimistic tenor as enacted from a pro-relational existential perspective to some corresponding degree or other in accordance with the extent an ongoing process of existential resolution is simultaneously being entered into. (33)

Now, that granted, it only behooves me to demonstrate that there can be no other reading or writing of behaviour other than through the philosophical lens of this positively nihilistic existential-pragmatism. But, this must follow since all trans-intentional appreciation of the intentional cannot be other than nihilistic through the nature of its economic and non-economic correlativities, and, that a pragmatic effectiveness is rendered)in an alignment with necessary pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions) through an optimist overlay (along with all other co-presented existential sentiments should they also be co-present). Hence this inevitable and inescapable conclusion that the only tenable philosophical stance is that of a positive, nihilistic existential-pragmatism. Moreover, that such a position or stance must also be relatively non-ideological in tenor for the following reasons, namely, the sole presentation and acceptance of 'simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, etc.'. (34)

Earlier, in this essay, it was stated that what the disciplinarian had to work with was that 'which is to hand' and that could be none other than 'simulations' (as duly nominated, and denominated through the use of predicates and relations). Now, in pursuing an economic tack we should also recognize that economies are also predicated on suspensions and the automatic invocation of de-suspensions (preferably of a relatively unobstructed re-presentation, etc.). That, given this necessary role of suspensions, the reputable philosopher, in their recognition of this aspect of the economic constituted through economic correlativity. could never, under any circumstances, promote the acceptance of an ideologically oriented stance as remaining in an ideological attitude (other than as a simulation [which amounts to the same through default[107]). Let me explicate the nature and ramifications of this understanding through the exploration of the interrogative economy as an economic illustration of this specific point. (35)

The interrogative economy outlines the economics of asking a question, which, centered on the interrogation of an 'either/or', i.e., is the answer of the question either a 'this' or a 'that' and that is tantamount to a dis-conjunctive suspension. Now, I have reasoned that the first reply to a question is a metaphorical 'like', namely, a both 'is' and an 'is not', i.e., a conjunctive suspension. However, in reaching a decision in a more literal vein we enter into what I term to be an 'apparitional suspension' as an 'as-if, as-if, as-if...' which is 'a dynamic balance of both a dis-conjunctive suspension and a conjunctive

[107] That the simulation *qua* simulation must be suspended and non-ideological through the suspension of that simulation including any and all ideological underpinnings.

suspension without an identification with the same. In a Boolean logical perspective,[108] we can treat the as-if… as a double negation.[109] The formation of a dialectic where the as-if melds back into an 'as-if?' And so on... (36)

In other words, the dialectics of the economic, as exemplified by this economic reading of the interrogative economy, as exemplifying the dynamics of all economies, is a combination of three interlocked suspensions very much interlinked as if a Borreomean ring, and falling apart the moment anyone of these links is disrupted.[110] In other words, economic correlativity is a correlativity where we can also note that any one corelative party can be defined as the negation of the other two parties ruling out any isolated form of a self-referential or an other-referential, stand-alone, completely independent party or parties. (37)

Having the interrogative economy acting as ideal expression of how we might wish to view all economies it follows, this proxy accepted, that what is to hand is simulated, that the simulated is suspended, and with the immediate suspension of the suspension we engage the sense and semblance of a de-suspension… that then may or may not re-configure that original simulation, and so on. Furthermore, significance emerges through this 'eternal reoccurrence' expedited through such economic means that cannot be reductively (mis)treated without also destroying that same emergent surplus of e/valuational formation, i.e., as an existential excess in value. (38)

Noting, furthermore, that the sense of the expression 'simulation' is not to be misconstrued as the 'simulation of that not being simulated or as that which it is a simulation of', but, merely as a 'simulation of a simulation' as captured in the Husserlian expression of 'retention' (which, in turn, can be treated as an economy of future oriented 'protention', past oriented 'retention', and a present oriented 'apprehension'). That, through such careful definitions we arrive at a position or stance that cannot be based on impossible notions like, e.g., Aristotelian essences; Platonic forms; impossible forms of representationalism; unimodal constructs; bimodal forms involved in the modeling of causation; eternally unchanging substances; the misguided attempt to truncate the intentional economy into either objective realities (realism), and/or objective idealities (idealism), and/or reified forms of subjectivity (soul, self, spirit, person, and so on), At the same time ruling out all forms of ideological extremism including all unfounded forms of absolutism and relativism, etc… (39)

Given that it is as if we are forever constituted through an 'eternal dialectic' that is both economic and non-economic in orientations, and the latter is existential in orientation, and, where the existential must positively inform all forms of productive behaviour it follows, therefore, that the only reputable philosophy that could be adopted and adapted

---

[108] Where all logical procedures can be written as simple or complex configurations of the logical operators 'or', 'and', and 'not'.

[109] E.g., 'is that John over there?' Meaning is that either John or not John. 'Yes, it is like John'. Meaning 'that this person is both like and not like John'. But a positive second reply takes a literal form, namely 'that is John'. Meaning 'it is as-if, as-if, as-if… that person is (provisionally accepted to be) John' or 'that person is not not John', i.e., 'is John'.

[110] Refer to the first essay in this series *On Reflection... Pursuit*, III,12I.6-8, etc.

by a reputable philosopher is and must be a positive, nihilistic, pragmatic-existentialism that avoids all forms of ideological extremism given the necessity for the recognition and acceptance of the ongoing re(-)occurrence of simulations, suspensions, de-suspensions, and all things similar, etc. That by such viable means, we can set out to successfully make sense of our place in this life-world, this world-of-life, this realm of the relational in which we find our existential freedom through the relational arbitrations of both ourselves and others… in the emergence of a sense of world that cannot be reduced to any one form of economic correlativity..! (40)

Thence the reputable philosopher can be none other than a positive, nihilistic pragmatic-existentialist.!! (41)

That, given the important role of (transcendental) suspensions, in the next essay, 12N, let me explore the complexities of this topic since the very nature of reflection is enacted through the auspices of what I will refer to as an 'extensive suspension'…. (42)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.7.23.

Advertising for the Fourth and Fifth Essays *On Reflection*…

9 July: Topic: That a Reputable Philosophy Can Only Be a Positive Nihilistic Existential-Pragmatism?
In a series *On Reflection*... I will be looking at the Fourth Essay (12L) and the Fifth Essay (12M):
From a prescient comment made in the last session, I have taken up the suggestion that the existential emotion of 'optimism' is necessary for the successful exercise of our enacted intentions. This will be explored in the Fourth Essay.

In the Fifth Essay I will argue that as we only deal with 'simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and similar', it follows that all discourses must be nihilistic in complexion given that the formation of all forms of writing and reading must follow a similar course. Then, in conjunction with the previous essay, this implies that all discourses must be positively nihilistic and not negatively nihilistic in orientation. Where through apposite suspensions, a pro-relational, non-reductive, emergent existentialism can also re-evaluate and re-enrich our relationships...

Thereby illustrating how a reputable philosophy can only be a positive, nihilistic, antirepresentational existential-pragmatism!

Moreover, such a position cannot be ideologically characterized as 'extremist' given the utilization of continual suspensions, etc. However, despite the seemingly incontrovertible-like nature of this argument, assent is not being sought only understanding in the hope that it can be duly tested... hence this philosophical challenge that I hope you will take up, namely, is the only viable and reputable philosophy those examples that well-exemplify an existential-pragmatism?(43)

A Diagrammatical Representation of Economic Correlativity

Perhaps one image (or diagram) is worth a hundred words..? (44)

/\

Towards Synthesis…

Phenomenological Orientation
(Metaphorical 'Like')

*

Hermeneutic Orientation
(Rhetorical Either/Or)

Towards Analysis…

V

Existential
(Apparitional As-If…/Not Not)

Towards Nomination…

V

Note: Economic correlativity implies 'towards' but also 'our never getting there'! E.g., synthesis, etc., but our never being able to definitively get there… since, e.g., synthesis must be a synthesis of something other than that synthesis itself, therefore, a pure synthesis is an impossibility that can be neither recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged, etc…. (45)

12N. Reflections on the Philosophical Strategy of 'Being Reflective'? Exploring the Nature and Function of the 'Transcendental Suspension'

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12N. Reflections on the Philosophical Strategy of 'Being Reflective'? Exploring the Nature and Function of the 'Transcendental Suspension'*

The reflection on reflection is a non-reflection…

0. Preface

To my mind, without a doubt, from reflections and observations, from reasonable arguments and consequential ramifications, the role of the so-called 'transcendental suspension' is both central and crucial to the effective and successful expedition of philosophical practice along with the exercise of all disciplines, and, also, the very course of our secular lives. I note my use of the expression "so-called 'transcendental suspension'" because in the following explorations of this philosophical concept that, in order to utilize its methodology, the relative simplicity, as first developed in a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, is considerably deconstructed and transformed far beyond those historical terms of reference. However, although the ensuing re-interpretation might well be considered to be non-orthodox, in order to effectively apply this concept, it is my belief that this complex re-working of its application to be more orthodox in spirit... but, will happily leave that to my more learned reader, or audience, to discern and assess the merits of that relatively tacit claim... (i)

Quite bluntly, I would claim that without a suspension, in some form or other, we could not ask a question; we could not answer a question; we could neither assess our own positioning in the world nor appreciate the perspectives of others, we could neither entertain what we might wish to do nor enact those same aspirations, and so on..! (ii)

In the previous essay, 12M., I noted the need to clearly articulate the phenomenological nature of transcendental suspensions. However, as my complex concept of the 'extensive suspension' does more 'philosophical work', whilst transforming the same, I thought it best to explicate that concept instead, but, in the process I will also delineate a more conventional and evolving understanding of the 'transcendental suspension'.[111] Hence the first section of this essay will focus on a more orthodox reading of this philosophical concept of the transcendental suspension. However, through a creative series of critiques this approach will quickly segue into a relatively less orthodox series of readings that I would contend are no less 'orthodox' given that they are more the product of my own working out what are the deeper implications to be uncovered in a closer reading of an original, relatively superficial, more orthodox sense of positioning…[112] (0)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[111] Basically, I will be arguing that in order to explicate the full potential of the 'transcendental suspension' I will need to eventually delineate my more complex working concept of the 'extensive suspension'. Thereby taking into account the economics of the interrogative economy, de-suspensions; an interface with causal forms of alignment, etc.

[112] Given the difficulties of this essay, in which I am continually redefining the nature of the 'transcendental suspension' and where I eventually define it as an 'extensive suspension', or simply the 'suspension', in Section 6 I have supplied a numerical mnemonic that might better assist us in that regard.

1. An Evolving 'Orthodox' Interpretation of the Transcendental Suspension

Both components of this effective compound 'transcendental-suspension' easily invite various forms of misinterpretation. 'Transcendental' does not mean 'transcendent' but, rather, an appreciation of how an apparent intentional formation is being apparently constituted. Then, in exploring the 'suspension' we find it cannot be just an act of suspension. Then, in invoking a parallel or implicit concept of 'appreciation', to my mind, indicates higher meta-terms of reference (just as, metaphorically, 'climbing a mountain or tree' may help us to better understand the topography around that mountain or tree). That, to some extent, we have to 'stand back' in order to 'better view that being reflected upon'. By 'apparent' I am indicating 'a form of phenomenological treatment in which the phenomenon or phenomena in question are looked at more closely in order to see how they are distinctly presented and put together', so to speak, over the course of their experience. That to some extent, we have to 'freeze' that being looked at, and then proffer a reduction or analysis in order to observe as to how that constitution in question appears to have been assembled and maintained over the reiterations of its presentations (in both subjectively and intersubjectively oriented experience[113]). Hence the retrospective orientation of the ensuing reduction which, therefore, should not be confused with the suspension *per se* which seems to be done in an ongoing sense of the present and which is to be conducted as an introductory stage that is first needed in order to then exert that reductive form of a phenomenal-phenomenological type of analysis. The expression 'suspension' can also be equated with 'bracketing' or '*epoché*' in which we 'put aside' or 'fix' or 'paralyze' or 'render as inoperative' both our ontological and epistemological commitments as to whether that being 'framed in this manner' either exists or does not exist, whether it is beautiful or not beautiful, whether it should be considered to be morally good or not morally good, and so on. By this strategy, we hope to 'neutrally' describe what is observed if only to note what prejudices, as pre-judgments, are present and, therein and thereby, neutralizing those prejudices by at least noting their being present, and presented as such, and where such positioning is countermanded by the contra-positioning of such intentional content (treated primarily as predicates) and the counter-positioning of such intentional processes (treated primarily as relations). In effect, adopting and adapting a working sense of neutrality through a recognition of what forms of bias are present, and then balancing the same through their being counter-weighted, and so on… (1)

But, in order to work out what this transcendental phenomenological approach entails has already meant re(-)interpreting[114] how this type of approach is to be put into effect… (2)

---

[113] Dismissing private language arguments, and noting the necessarily pre-existing intersubjectivity of linguistic experience as a precondition for the very 'fact' of 'the existence of such communication'. We should also note the economic correlativity involved in the collective conjecture of private, public and arbitrated spheres of operation.

[114] '(-)' being my nomenclature for 'an ongoing process of economic reconstitution between its three explicit or implicit tripartite parties being either noted and notated or implied as being present'. In this instance as a process of thematization being fostered between the economic polarities of (hermeneutically oriented) reinterpretation, (phenomenologically oriented) interpretation, and (existentially oriented) re-interpretation. The latter modality being perceived to be relatively chaotic in its recourse to processes of harmonic resolution entertained through relatively-radical expressions of 're-direction'.

To begin with, I would contend that Husserl, the pioneer of this approach (admittedly in his continual re-interpreting of Kant, Descartes, and others) initially confused the idea of the 'suspension' with the methodological work of the ensuing 'reduction'. I would also contend, but somewhat speculatively, that by articulating a role for 'reductive analysis' that the maintenance of the overall suspension would also need the dynamic counterweighting of an equal role for some appropriate form of 'synthesis' or 'reconstitution'. Taking these trends into account, and treating the suspension as a form of dynamic balancing, has led me to creatively re-read the role of 'the overall transcendental suspension as that incorporating an economy of suspensions, reductions, and reconstitutions. The imputed fact that all economies are assumed to mirror this same type of economic constitution will be looked at in the next section of this essay (under the concept of economic complexification, etc.). (3)

Now, for a start, the use of the *epoché* can be approached in two ways, either globally or locally. In a global approach we can advance the philosophical thesis that the entire world can be imagined as if 'cancelled' or 'erased' but 'without its destruction' and where what we are left with, philosophically, as a 'phenomenal-phenomenological residue', is merely a 'world of appearances that are intentionally constituted in this residue of phenomenologically oriented consciousness'. Or, more practically, we can locally focus on a certain distinctive type of phenomenological experience and, therein and thereafter, attempt to articulate what is distinctively essential about that type of experience (and note how it is has possibly found for itself a distinctive place or should find a distinctive place in an extensive web of semantic expressions constituting the natural language used in order to indicate and interrelate such naturally (pre-)interpreted experiences. Where a 'transcendental sense of perspective' merely indicates how 'those intentions are textually deposited through the prejudicially pre-judged confines of natural experience'… (4)

Hence my contention that the 'transcendental', as opposed to the prejudicial nature of natural experience, in effect, is none other than the 'trans-intentional nature of judgment…' That, therefore, 'judgment' is 'trans-intentional', and, paraphrasing Kant must be 'trans-conceptual (and trans-perceptual)' given a 'judgment' must be realized through an 'appreciation of the conceptual (and the perceptual) but 'cannot itself be reduced to the conceptual (or perceptual) *per se*' which, more strictly, is intentional in nature and the material from which judgments are made, and into whose midst, will be delivered back into through the deposition of texts be they either relatively overt or covert in the manner of their deposition.[115] I.e., as either evident texts or artefacts[116] of our in-

---

115 Or, paraphrasing Kant, we could say 'that the transcendental perspective allows us to observe in which domain ideas of conceptual understanding are formed *versus* sensuous perceptions of an imaginative nature, etc.' That, by such means we can avoid an 'amphiboly' of representations, i.e., our no longer 'confusing' their origins, phenomenological constitutions, spheres of functioning, etc. In the same manner, we can avoid mistaking (both pre-integrated and integrated) intentional content from intentional functions; along with the non-mistaking, and confusing, trans-intentional judgments from intentional content delivered through the performance of those judgmental functions, etc.

116 Such intentional depositions being divided between what I have termed as 'classical texts' and 'non-classical texts' without a hard and fast division between the same. Say, the type of difference between a letter or shopping list *versus* a photograph or a trail of footprints, etc. The latter also trailing off into the

tentional lives visibly imposed upon the metaphorical 'fabric and face of this world' or covertly entertained in conscious processes with little deposition other than upon the streams of intentional experience *per se* to the extent that we can verbally articulate the same and/or merely remember such events as having been entertained.[117] (5)

But, lest we believe, mistakenly, that I am are the sole creator of such a phenomenological world, where it is true my intentions are constituted in 'my' intentional consciousness, still, such a short-sighted observation, as it stands, should not be able to proscribe their living-reality for(-)us, as also 'our' experiences, as if those relations are purely constituted by us and by us alone given that we can also communicate and 'share' such experiences through language, etc., with others.[118] Indeed, that sense of 'our' is not just subjective and singular but also portends a world of influences from their own sense of perspective, be they either objective (say, a glass of salty water), inter-objective (a glass of salty water sitting on a table), and/or inter-subjective (a glass of salty water poured out for me by someone else besides myself, and, where both parties are or become cognizant of what is occurring, etc.[119]). Hence 'our' is more rightly 'objective, inter-objective, and intersubjective, than just being subjective in orientation'. (6)

Just how do we enter a transcendental suspension? By following a global or local strategy capable of doing this 'turning around' of this process of intentional constitution for us, by us, in such a manner so as to expose those essential features apparently resident in that apparent constitution being so closely scrutinized through the use of the suspension… (7)

But, in this use of the concept of the 'phenomenologically essential' just what is being treated as essential? That which is experienced as 'essential in phenomenal-phenomenological experience'. Nothing more, and nothing less![120] (8)

A glass of brackish water, once its taste is recognized and determined to be salty, remains as 'salty' despite what additional amounts of salt you might add to that same glass of water. That in phenomenological experience we are out to describe the relative presence or absence of such phenomenological essentials. However, given the suspension, we are not in a position to determine or even contemplate the substantial existence or material existence of such suspended forms of treatment.[121] (9)

---

realm of conscious experience where we merely have rarefied forms of deposition metaphorically 'imprinted' on brain chemistry, probabilistically rerouting the potential pathways 'reshaping' the neuronal architecture, etc.

117 I am making an indirect allusion to the textual economy as explored and scrutinized under the headings of phenomenological 'texts', hermeneutic 'meta-texts', and non-systematic existential 'non-texts' (as 'simulations').

118 Where the intersubjectivity of language has already shaped the formation of such ideation, and so on.

119 Say, perhaps as a joke, or, as a glass of salty water to go and gargle with, etc.

120 As typified in our recognition of a glass of salty water as being 'salty', and not 'sweet' or just 'pure water', etc.

121 Correctly, we need the de-suspension of the suspension to force us to confront the unique, concrete, historical specificity of that which we are both actively engaging and passively being engaged with along with a pro-relational sense of our 'engagement engaging such engagement directly'.

Another way of understanding this phenomenological use of this notion of the 'essential' is to perform a series of eidetic reflections. By imagining, e.g., the relative addition or removal of salt in that glass of water we can then imaginatively understand something of the experiential range and limits of what it means to entertain an experience of a saline-like taste. That within this field of experience, a saline experience is recognized as distinctively different from, say, a sweet taste or a bitter taste, etc. (10)

Hence, under the transcendental suspension, the use of this neutral expression 'phenomenal-phenomenological' initially, neither rules in nor rules out the phenomenological origins of that experience as an experience constituted by us, for us, or, is constituted by us of that which is not us (and not just by us). Just as, we might surmise, the salty experience of a glass of saline water is more 'dictated' to us by the saline solution and is not just dictated for us, by ourselves, merely from the representative nature of the imputed phenomenon or phenomena in question. This meta-observation can help to explain the constant existential surprise we can experience in meeting new forms of existentially rich phenomena which, most likely, could not be there for us if we were to merely imagine that form of constitution… just as our overall experience of a non-virtual apple is a richer experience of an apple that an apple phenomenon that is merely imagined or remembered or experienced in either a vivid dream or less vivid dream.[122] (11)

An understanding that also settles the question just what is to be considered as 'real', as 'beautiful', as 'true', etc., in line with those ontological and epistemological presuppositions? I.e., that which aligns with the usual reception of such modal forms of experience being simply counted as that which experientially defines that same type of experience, effectively, as a standard point of reference. As previously noted, the eating of a non-virtual apple would soon assuage physiological pangs of hunger whereas a dream apple, or a remembered or imagined apple experience, would usually indicate the eventual non-satiation of such needs. Hence the designation of the former as representatively experienced as 'non-virtual'. Obviously, without any need or form of recourse to imputing the additional existence of either the non-natural, or the supernatural, or the trans-empirical, or the trans-rational, pro-theological, and so on. Dismissing, therefore, any need to invoke such impossible, non-phenomenologically experienced entities and states, and so forth… (12)

The phenomenologist, in practice, has to hand a wide range of strategies with which to emulate this phenomenological attitude (that suspends all forms of ontological and epistemological biases). E.g., they could (utilize an interrogative economy, either in part or in whole, and) ask a question and immediately set up a dis-conjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'. Or, e.g., invoke an apposite metaphor *x*, and by such means immediately invoke a conjunctive suspension centered on an analogical 'like' that implies both "a 'like *x*' and a 'not like *x*'." This approach can also be achieved through invoking a meta-

[122] By such means proffering an argument against the sole constitution of intentional experience as might be put forward in an absolutistical form of idealism. The 'form' of this argument also countering the impossible arguments of the absolutistical realist. E.g., the world is experienced, is experienced in experience, and, therefore, cannot be just be an experience of that which is not being experienced, etc.

phor of disvaluation[123] or a series of metaphors of disvaluation, as in the religious use of comparing the world to an illusion, or a dream, or a evanescent bubble, a shadow, a reflection in a mirror, a fleeting cloud in the sky, and so on. Or, by invoking a literal, and apparitional-like, reading through invoking the 'as-if *x* is as-if it were *x*, as if-it were *x*, and so on'…[124] (13)

But, then the question becomes, in what manner do these different types of suspension inform or not inform the formation and utilization of a transcendental suspension and, with this enquiry, we would then need to adopt and adapt a 'less orthodox approach' that, to my mind, is no less orthodox or more orthodox than more conventional approaches. Indeed, giving flesh to such considerations as to what the transcendental suspension both is and is not, as well as closely detailing a host of subsidiary considerations such as, e.g., how do we enter such a suspension, how do we exit the same and avoid being trapped there, what follows from the critical use of this method, just how do questions get definitively answered, how do judgments form in a critically conducted fashion, how are decisions intentionally enacted, just how do we co-opt a causal dimension in the enaction of our intentions, just how should we envisage the non-economic formation of the radical, and so on and so forth? (14)

2. A 'Less Orthodox' Series of Interpretations of the 'Transcendental' Suspension

As intimated earlier, a distinction was needed between the idea of the suspension and the idea of the reduction. Moreover, if we were to entertain the overall transcendental suspension as a 'dynamic balance' then any focus on the reduction (as an 'analysis'), e.g., also needed to be counter-balanced by a process of reconstitution (as a 'synthesis') (along with the maintenance of the suspension *per se*). Exercising such an attitude, effectively, is an economic reframing of the transcendental suspension, a process nominated by myself as 'the overall transcendental suspension'.[125] (15)

The basis for this approach is rooted in a (harmonic) gestalt reading of experience, i.e., the triple proposition of a (consonant) background 'field', the introduction of a (dissonant) 'focus', and, (resolution) through the subjective 'framing' of a co-associated type of experience being exercised.[126] So, e.g., in visual experience we have a 'visual field', a

---

123 'Disvaluation' is an expression coined by myself in my Thesis, in both versions I & II. Basically, it means 'an ongoing process of devaluation'.

124 Or achieving the same effect through a double negation where one negation negates the other negation. Hence this type of 'suspension through a double negation'.

125 Where the overall suspension, e.g., mirrors the interrogative economy (and, as well, all economies when properly observed and constituted). Basically, 'the overall transcendental suspension' could be defined as a 'dynamic balance of suspension (nomination), analysis (predication), and synthesis (relations)'.

126 I.e., in order to account for the invariably co-associated sense of (transcendental/trans-intentional or intentional) subjectivity the relationship between field and focus in a first field is appreciated in a more encompassing second field lending us by such means the third moment of framing, resolution, subjectivity, the non-systematic sense and semblance of the existential, etc. The, in such a scheme, we may surmise, as method for modeling or metaphorically, that the unilateral nature of resolution is either internal to this doubling of fields with an economic complexion, and/or irrupts beyond such terms of reference into a third

'visual focus objectively exercised within that field', along with the subjective sense of a 'visual perceiver'. (16)

This basic tripartite or trimodal economic structure typifies all forms of economic behaviour. As exemplified, e.g., in the interrogative economy where the field is rhetorically and hermeneutically oriented (through the use of a dis-conjunctive suspension), where focus is metaphorically and phenomenologically oriented (through the use of a conjunctive suspension), and where the framing is subjectively experienced as apparitionally oriented in experience, i.e., as if literally treated, albeit provisionally, and existentially through an ongoing dynamic balance of the former suspensions...[127] (17)

Given the archetypal nature of the gestalt field is perceived as underlying all economies, as exemplified by the interrogative economy, or any other economy, a number of important ramifications follow. E.g., all economies can be assumed to possess a similar semblance of economic structuralization with the implication that one or more economies, properly aligned modally, in terms of its archetypal economic correlativities, can and will act as a commentary upon each other. Hence my concept of a parallel dictionary[128] where, e.g., the 'retrospective orientation' of (our focus upon) the 'reduction' has this commentary from a 'temporal economy', and v.v. Where, that granted, implies, upon further reflection, that 'framing' is 'present oriented', and, 'field' has a 'prospective orientation'. Although the 'framing' can be thought of as the 'suspension' in an earlier reinterpretation of Husserl, in the light of this dynamic re-reading we can now interpret, in order to avoid confusion in our use of this term, by rebranding the suspension as 'the overall transcendental suspension' (entailing the interlocking of these three distinctive suspensions of the dis-conjunctive suspension, etc., within this overall 'transcendental suspension'). (18)

A large number of other implications can be drawn from further reflections.[129] E.g., these trimodal orientations are economic correlativities that can only be moved towards but neither attained or obtained.[130] Moreover, they mutually define each other. So, e.g., 'field' is neither 'focus' nor 'framing', etc.[131] We can also propose the rich concept, or economic tool, of 'economic induction'. In its first sense it meant that if we were to well-develop just one aspect of an economy, say expressing the type of distinctive suspension that typifies that type of correlativity then 'through the backdoor', so to speak,

---

field or setting as a non-economic force about to be re(-)appropriated in that hyper-economic context. Of course, like all metaphors, the analogy can only go so far.

127 In effect, also as an equivalent of either a double negation and/or apparitional suspension through a reiterated 'as-if'...

128 Refer to The Seventh Book... Pursuit, III.VII.III.C.A(ppendix A)

129 Looked at in detail in the *The Seventh Book*... But the list continues to expand as explored chronologically in later essays, i.e., those as written in 2023.

130 The basis for the argument outlined in the previous essay where this non-attainment and non-obtainment, this inability to perfectly appropriate, either in part or in whole, any one or more economic correlativities with the implication that such readings can only be already nihilistic in orientation. Metaphorically we could analogue this non-attainment, etc., as 'like fingers pointing towards the Moon but never being able to touch it'.

131 The formula being 'one correlativity is defined as 'the joint negation of the other two correlativities, etc.'.

the other two economic correlativities would also be induced along with an ensuing sense and experiential semblance of the overall transcendental suspension. In the process, considerably simplifying the process of inducing an overall transcendental suspension.[132] In a second reading,[133] it would follow that in observing the tentative form of a working economy then, through economic induction, the other parties of that overall economy should also present themselves if not overtly, at least covertly.[134] That, it then behooves us to look more closely in order to find the three forms of correlativity that better define their co-associated economy.[135] E.g., if one were to propose the focus of phenomenal-phenomenological 'descriptions' then we would and should find ourselves met with, say, hermeneutic 'prescriptions' and existential 'proscriptions'. Just as a temporal economy would be found to have the natural expressions of 'past', 'present', and 'future' already naturally pre-presented for their use within the dialectics of this temporal economy. That this creative type of reading can be applied to all economies (as well as supplying their further commentary through relevant forms of economic complexification as already noted). (19)

But, of course, the economic comes with its own vast set of problematic issues that through creative forms of resolution can considerably expand our philosophical appreciation of the economic, etc.[136] E.g., in asking how we enter into an overall transcendental suspension we should also be asking how do we exit from the same? Hence the addition of the following concept of 'de-suspensions'.[137] (20)

Suspensions enacted through either dynamic forms of balance, and/or through local and global forms of parallel contra-positioning of intentional content and counter-positioning of intentional processes, and/or through economic induction resulting from the detailed use of rhetorical, or metaphorical or the apparitional treatment (of the literal), etc., 'introduces' us to the economy of the overall transcendental suspension. But, then

---

132 Hence the allied concept of 'economic simplification' in which complexity is rendered less complex through process of resolution, along with the specificity of semantic mapping arising from our engaging of such existential specificity (as to be observed through its unilateral semblance of an ensuing re-directedness), etc.

133 The first reading can be nominated as 'the economic induction of the (overall transcendental) suspension', and the second reading can be nominated as 'the economic induction of a trimodal complexion'.

134 Given that they are co-present/co-presented.

135 Keeping an open mind as to how best, i.e., pragmatically, define the economy in question. I.e., without absolutistically dictating how we will trimodally define the contours and configurations of an apparent economy (given that through economic complexification we might find it better to run two parallel economies simultaneously, etc., or, leave open a second possibility for one of the moments being entertained).

136 By 'etc.' here I am signaling the imminent introduction of the relatively non-economic and its hyper-economic re(-)appropriation. Refer to paragraphs 28.

137 This concept also assisted in a better understanding of how subtle forms of preference or de-preferencing could give rise to an 'ordered economy', say, in trans-cognitive terms of judgment wherein I argued that there were six basic forms of judgment, namely, semantical, aesthetical, deontological, pragmatical, hermeneutical (dealing primarily with possibility) and ontical (factual). The invocation of a double suspension of two moments in an economy induced a preferencing through the ensuing force of the de-suspension that effective enacted that form of preferencing. Or, alternatively, suspending one economic moment meant a preferencing the other two moments through the ensuing force of the de-suspension.

the integrity of this suspension can then be dialectically countered balanced against its invocation of the ensuing de-suspension (hopefully, in a relatively non-distorted manner). Then, a third moment can be entertained as the dynamic balance of the first two moments of the suspension(s) (acting as the overall transcendental suspension), the automatic invocation of the ensuing de-suspension, (D) and, then the dynamic balance of the former acting as the third moment of this economy of the suspension (or de-suspension, etc.) (S + D)[138]. Hence, diagrammatically, the mapping off this economy of the de-suspension and its nomination as the 'extended suspension':

(S + D)

*

S D (21)

However, to regularize such notation and run it in parallel with the economy of the overall transcendental suspension, through a process of complexification, we would need to assume that the de-suspensional force of the de-suspension both internally and externally acts only through the moment of resolution as the joint (negation of the) combination of both the suspension and the de-suspension (given its parallel to the so-called 'third moment' of any economy, and, therefore, being paralleled with the moment of resolution). (22)

But, given the philosophical problem/s of volition and the fact that the virtual nature of the intentional needs to maintain, somehow, a close connection and alignment to the non-virtual nature of the causal dimension this same tripartite structure can be further replicated in order to account for the enaction of our intentions in an economy nominated by myself as that pertaining to the 'extensive suspension'. In this instance as Causal (C), Non-Causal (N), and the dynamic balance of the former as (C + N)[139]... which can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

(C + N)

*

C N (23)

Again, with the implication that the manifestation of intent is discharged unilaterally through the so-called third moment of (C + N). (24)

Metaphorically, we might like to refer to these unilateral discharges of resolution in a relatively non-economic orientation and format as breaks in symmetry entered into

---

138 More correctly, the dynamic balance of '(S + D)' is also negated. Refer to the next footnote.

139 More correctly. The balanced suspension of (C + N) is also negated given their economic correlativity as noted in paragraph 22, footnote 20, and the next footnote.

through the de-suspension of the suspension despite and in spite of the subtle balancing of the suspension and de-suspension with the coupling of the third moment of resolution taking the archetypal form of (the negation of) the 'suspension + de-suspension'. (25)

Furthermore, we could argue that suspensions are the suspension of those semantic components found to hand acting as 'simulations' given their economic basis as economic correlativities (and where no correlativity can be neither attained nor obtained, i.e., as that which cannot be appropriated (or where such claimed forms of appropriation can only be dismissed as impossible 'misappropriations'). Hence, the following formula taken up in the previous essay: 'simulations, suspensions and de-suspension, and all things similar'.[140] (26)

Hence this triple modeling of the economy of the overall transcendental suspension within the de-suspensional economy of the extended suspension, itself, in turn, within the causal economy of the extensive suspension. Obviously, in order to account for this more comprehensive economy of the extensive suspension we have had to travel far from both the economy of the overall transcendental suspension and individually articulated forms of the transcendental suspension as explicated by Husserl, and other early transcendental phenomenologists. But, so be it - 'different horses for different courses', although, all incorporated and integrated here upon the same racecourse of the extensive suspension. (27)

But, now a further complication also needs to be seriously taken into account, namely, the apparent irruption of the unilateral re-directedness of the non-economic! Given, e.g., that the causal, through the arrow of time, is not just economic in appearance, and the enaction of volition appears to follow in a similar manner despite also having an economic basis (paralleling the so-called 'third moment' of resolution). (28)

Therefore, there is a need to address the apparently radical nature of such irruption along with its identification with the existential (preferably in its systematic form[141])? So, let me proffer the following account in order to make sense of such complications that, to my mind, are centered upon our experience of the transcendental suspension, albeit be that in a simplified and naïve format or through the lens of the extensive suspension. (29)

Now, what follows (in this paragraph) may appear to be some form of a digression, however, let me refine this modelling of the overall transcendental suspension in conjunction with a de-suspensional economy (of the extensive suspension) inserted within a causal economy (of the extensive suspension) in order to philosophically refine its

---

140 Treated as the trimodal material of an economy, we would need to retreat 'simulations' as 'that having been simulated' given that simulations are correctly observed through the emergence of the non-textual under the irruptive force of the de-suspension as a so-called 'third moment'. 'So-called' because such numbering is arbitrary, and, we can number anyway we like given there can be no true first moment in a process involving economic correlativity and the dialectics of their mutual co-defining of each other through their co-occurring 'joint negation of each other'.

141 I.e. the 'systematic existential' as 'arising through an ongoing dynamic balance of all three moments (i.e., the hermeneutic, phenomenological, and the non-systematic existential)'.

architecture. Although I started with the overall transcendental suspension in my slow, but eventual, development of the concept of the extensive suspension we could have just as well treated the overlay of the extended economy and its being overlaid by the extensive economy in reverse. In effect, switching a transcendent style of modelling for an immanent style. The intuition there being that the non-virtual causal dimension interconnects through forms of either alignment and/or broken alignment with the virtual intentional dimension, and is to be seen more as an arrangement that is suggestive of our understanding of ourselves as being more deeply seated in our emplacement in a world of embodiment, and so on. That, starting from the overall transcendental suspension, we have the ability to set up a process of causal control through either our direct and/or indirect relations over the de-suspensional economy contained 'within' that that then could extend a more attenuated sense of control over those repertoires of causal processes that allow us to make our passages through this world at large. Now, we could argue on economic grounds that the economy of the overall transcendental suspension has a relative isomorphic parallel to both the economies of the extended suspension and the extensive suspension. Therefore, it behooves us to articulate, at least analogically, how the differences between the economic and the non-economic can be delineated despite a commonality in structural-functions? In order to clarify these different sets of distinctions let me first note that the non-economic 'externally' irrupts between different levels in economic organization, from the evolving patterns of resolution being exercised through the so-called third moment, whereas, in a contrast, 'internal irruptions', within a specific economy, can be engineered through the conjunction of subtle forms of preferencing and de-preferencing as modelled in an archetypally ordered economy. Let me explain, first, the latter. On a trans-intentional level of judgmental appreciation, within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, I argued that the hypothetical imputation of six distinctive form of judgmental activity could be realized through the subtle preferencing or de-preferencing of the three economic correlativities comprising the economy on this level of epistemological organization.[142] Importing the archetypal gestalt moments of World (W), Object (O), and Ego (E) all six distinctive types of judgment could be engineered by the subtle preferencing (+) and de-preferencing (-) of the same. So, e.g., preferencing the Object moment gives us atomistic, semantic judgments. At the same time, this relative form of preferencing could be equally engineered through a de-preferencing of both the World moment and the Ego moment. Therefore, as an equation we could note that in general, usual terms of reference that in the First Trans-Cognitive Order Semantic E/Valuational formation arises through:

$$O+/W-/E-\ldots$$

I.e., the relative stressing of semantic considerations is dialectically arrived at through either preferencing the Object moment and/or engineering the double de-preferencing of both W and O moments. Or, in the formation on the second order and its focus on aesthetical forms of e/valuational formation we have the following forms of preferencing, etc:

---

[142] 'Preferencing' is defined by myself as 'a mix of either future promotion, and/or past prioritization, and/or present privileging'.

O+/W/-E+…

That by such subtle preferences and/or de-preferences all six distinctive forms of evaluational formation can be arrived at.[143] That, therefore, in the hypothetical internality of an isolated economy. Furthermore, in order to account for such subtle hypothetical preferencing and de-preferencing I argued that this was achieved, respectively, through de-suspensions and suspensions. Now, in shifting to the relative externality of an economy, I would like to propose that the effective irruption of a unilateral re-directedness occurs (between economies) through an intensification of the third moment (with its co-associated existential pretensions, anticipated spontaneity in the very midst of a living sense of the present, etc.) to that extent when such an irruption can extend beyond its original economy. However, in the extended economy, seen as consisting of suspensions, de-suspensions, and simulations, I would like to argue that the de-suspended irruption (of the act of de-suspension from the suspension) occurs through the third moment of simulations and not through the moment of de-suspension per se in order to preserve this intuitive insight that irruption is exercised through the non-textual moment of simulations given its co-association with existential spontaneity, its present historical orientation, etc. How can we account for this overriding of the moment of de-suspension itself? Quite easily if we recognize that the third moment can be metaphorically viewed as a hybrid amalgam of both suspensions and de-suspensions, and, that in a breaking of its symmetry both the force of suspensions and de-suspensions can sequentially follow and be reiterated (and where its reiteration can also be viewed as a clue as to how processes of hyper-economic appropriation can also be engineered). So, let me recapitulate using the following diagram (already referred to in paragraph 21) where the elements represented are S (Suspensions), D (De-Suspensions), and (S + D)[144] as a hybrid resonance of both suspensions and de-suspensions:

(S + D)

*

S D

The implication being that if both S and D are subjected to the imposition of suspensions, as a form of de-preferencing, then we would be preferencing (S + D). Then, given the implied instability of (S + D), with these two parties as contraries, which, through the opposition of D to S, and v.v., could just as well be rewritten as either (S – D) and/or (D – S).[145] That understood, we could well-surmise that a hyper suspension/de-suspension of

---

143 The reader can follow this up by attending to the relevant modules in *The Seventh Book*…

144 Where, as noted earlier, (S + D) should also be viewed as negated.

145 Similarly, '(S + D)' could just as well be rewritten as '(D + S)', besides '(S – D)' or '(D – S)'. Indeed, this inherent instability could also be seen as a mechanism for our understanding how the third moment can be instrumental in presenting, i.e., 're-presenting' a chaotic complexion!

(S + D) (in whatever formula adopted) would then give us the relative emission of a unilateral-like re-directedness as would be required from this degree of modelling. Hence the subtle difference in 'internal irruptions occurring through the third moment that do not engineer an external form of irruption' and 'external forms of irruption that engineer a relative unilateral emission between different levels in economic organization in ode then account for the hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the same. That, arguably, the same types of economic and non-economic processes occur and are occasioned across the organized entirety of the epistemological hierarchy and let us analogically 'perceive' how different levels in economic organization can be better understood and how the non-economic will find forms of re(-)appropriation in such a highly structured, multi-levelled arena as the psyche. So, with that disquisitional digression articulated, where to now? Just how should the so-called 'transcendental suspension' be explained given these economic and non-economic complexities? (30)

3. Provisional Conclusions re the 'Transcendental' Nature of Reflections, etc.

In this overview, in reviewing this mix of different ways as to how to more fully comprehend the nature of the transcendental suspension', very early on it was noted that the expression 'transcendental' merely indicated, in the contexts of these current explorations, etc.,[146] that we were taking a 'trans-intentional perspective in the appreciation of how our economically constituted representations, presentations, and re-presentations were apparently being constituted in intentional consciousness'. Hence this equation between my overall use of the expression 'transcendental' and 'trans-intentional' on the Kantian grounds that judgments could not be reductively mistreated as merely conceptual, but rather, as trans-conceptual, etc., i.e., as trans-intentional (given that conceptions and perceptions are intentionally presented, etc.). (31)

That this equation, conducted from this transcendental perspective of the 'trans-intentional', was also extended to the evolution of my ideas concerning the complex notions of the 'existential', 'judgmental appreciation', and 'the non-economic irruption of a unilateral, chaotically re-directed e/valuational formation involved in both the formation of ideation and volition along with their necessary forms required for an interactive expression of behavior interconnected through patterns of textual deposition, etc.'[147] (32)

In the fourth essay in this series *On Reflection*…, dealing with the existential and transcendental/trans-intentional sentiment or emotion of optimism, etc., this same equation was noted to involve an equation between some, if not all such sentiments and expectation devolving from this more organized level in epistemological organization as would be involved in the relative formation and expression of Pre-Cognitive, affective emotions, etc. (33)

---

146 I.e., philosophical, historical, Husserlian, etc., or as under the rubric of the 'extensive suspension', economic, non-economic readings, etc.

147 On the understanding that even the virtual nature of our intentions is enacted through forms of causally re-directed volition.

In the evolution of this concept of the ‘transcendental suspension’, as introduced by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th century, it was noted that there were global and local suspensions in which the presentation of phenomenological experiences is to be approached, first, through the suspension, and then subjected to analytical-like processes of a differential reduction. (34)

I conjectured that Husserl’s trajectory would eventually also include the counterbalancing of a moment of reconstitutional synthesis to counter-balance the analytical nature of the reduction and, therein and thereby, form a dynamic balancing leading us into an economy of the transcendental suspension. (35)

The question was asked, ‘how are suspensions metaphorically ‘entered’ in experiential terms?’ The counter-question was also automatically posed, ‘how do we experientially ‘exit’ from such a process?’ (36)

Globally, we can imaginatively treat the word as if it were a dream or similar, as if it were an apparitional shape of a ghost… and then go ahead to describe the particularly distinctive intentional configurations of their static contours and dynamic configurations. Locally, we can focus on the phenomenal-phenomenological form seemingly being arrived at through a partnership that, apparently, is being both dictated by us and also dictated to us by the nature of such presentations, etc. In the process setting out to discern the relevant existential richness of the phenomenon or phenomena in question. In the process, bracketing and suspending the relevant ontological and epistemological presuppositions that pre-interpret, interpret and re-interpret those appearances that appear to resist such reductions and by such means basically expose the particularity of their apparent constitutions as laid out in intentional terms or reference, i.e., either conceptually and/or perceptually (although more correctly the potential possibilities of both orientations need to be left open. I.e., in some situations, we can only conceive of those appearances that are abstractly conceptual and can be treated in an integrated manner, and, on the other hand some ‘appearances’ can only be more fully comprehended in spatio-temporal terms of reference, be that either in current terms of reference or historically (be that in a single orientation or in a mix of histories of the past, present and/or future). (37)

Or, this topic of the suspension can be approached in a more economic sense, as a dynamic mix of trimodal parties, through invoking, e.g., an economy of interrogation, say, by asking a question, or suggesting an analogy, or treating the literal presentation of phenomenal representations as if they were an apparition, or similar. The latter method bringing us to the pragmatic philosophical understanding that as the economic forces that constitute an economy such attempts at appropriation of these economic parties is nothing more than nor less than their entertainment as mere ‘economic correlativities’. That therefore, it follows that we can neither attain nor obtain the full appropriation of the same thereby rendering our reading and writing of all aspects of textual production as nothing more than, nor less than, the integrated reception of patterns of deposition that can only support a nihilistic treatment and appreciation. On the other hand, we must also accept the experiential fact that all economic representations are never equal and will possess differing degrees and formations of a relative existential richness along with the possibil-

ity of further enrichment or de-enrichment. That, usually, the existential dimension oversees a 'progressive' enrichment and re-enrichment of our relationships, and, therein and thereby, determines the apparent existential status of our relational involvement in those relationships subjected to such existential scrutiny and appreciation, i.e., 'existential reflection'. Where, it should also be pointed out, reflection entails a mix of passive, active and engaged orientations[148] and never the mere treatment of our reflections as occupying only a passive role. (38)

As for our metaphorical 'exit' from a state of suspension this is achieved through an economy of the de-suspension, automatically invoked with each and every suspension, hopefully, executed in a manner that is not obstructed and distorted through unsuitable ideological forms of ontological and epistemological biases, etc. The ideological distortions in the ongoing formation of our relationships ceasing to be 'extremist' in complexion through the application of an effective process of suspension, beginning with the implication of the overall 'transcendental' suspension. The overlay or underlay of an economy of the de-suspension rendering, in either qualified transcendent and/or immanent terms a certain 'height' or 'depth', the former device or strategy as more an 'extended suspension'. (39)

Then, in adding a causal interface we render the extended suspension as an 'extensive suspension'. (40)

Thence this 'more fully worked out constitution of the transcendental suspension' is to be seen as that which can be identified with the 'extensive suspension'. That this identification, in practice, etc., renders such an approach as not this 'less orthodox set of interpretations', but, more correctly, and effectively, as a 'far more orthodox approach'. Indeed, a far more orthodox approach given that its working-rational also sets out to constructively deal with both a critical-economic and radical-non-economic pursuit of a anti-representational pragmatic nihilism in the form of a pragmatic-existentialism or 'existential-pragmatism'! (41)

Why this level of concern in spelling out the complexities of this topic of the 'transcendental' suspension? Because this suspension, in all its phenomenological complexities is central to all forms of reflection. Indeed, furthermore, it is also crucial to the enaction of all forms of consciously re-directed behaviour. Let me explain. (42)

In order to more fully understand different forms of behaviour we need to have some understanding of the intentional dimension and all the difficulties entailed in such a necessary approach. Then, in order to form conjectures about the intentional drivers behind the formation of all forms of behaviour we also need to appreciate the trans-intentional dimension of judgment given that only through such appreciation can we come to the level of understanding that would allow us to both critically and radically

---

[148] An 'engaged reading or writing of our relationships' can be treated as taking a 'pro-relational, existential stance' wherein we identify with those relationships, themselves, and hopefully, act accordingly in the integrated pursuit of both their best interests and our best interests, etc.

comprehend the existential and pragmatic dimensions of our existence,[149] be that approach more before(-)others hermeneutically, with(-)others phenomenologically, and,

[149] I was questioned about this expression 'the existential and pragmatic dimensions of our existence'. Let me give the following lengthy reply as to what is being implied through my use of this expression. 'Dimensions' metaphorically allude to expressions like the 'transcendental dimension' or 'existential dimension' which I interpret as 'orientations' that can never be absolutistically attained and obtained, i.e., appropriated. Moreover, in the light of that inescapable fact of 'economic life', we can say 'dimensions' given that different people, at different times, will have, and must have, at the very least a slightly different take on experiential reality to those around them, given that 'living-experienced', is both subjectively and intersubjectively refracted through the textual lenses of 'lived-experience' (in a contest more or less between 'my' experience and 'our' experience). However, as orientations they will be experienced distinctively in the light of their specificity of their apparent constitutions as interpreted in such lived-experience. On the other hand, in regard to the sense and semblance of the existential dimension *vis-à-vis* the sense and semblance of the pragmatic dimension I do not wish to draw any distinction other than as to how we are to find ourselves getting towards that type of orientation. For me, they are virtually equivalent given from a transcendental, pro-relational, existential, trans-intentional/trans-cognitive perspective they are equivalent. I.e., in opening ourselves up to being oriented in the requisite manner to the nature of our relationships from their pro-relational sense of perspective, that, in that orientation, they would be found to be relatively identical, nothing but different nominations for our experience of the same 'transcendental' type of phenomenon (reading, of course, as already indicated, the expression 'transcendental' as 'trans-intentional', etc.). This equivalence, from this trans-intentional perspective (of judgment) also allows me to note that the type of philosophy that I am explicating is both an 'existential-pragmatism' and a 'pragmatic-existentialism'. I.e., if you are existentialist then, hopefully, your approach is also pragmatic, or, if you are a pragmatist then, hopefully, your approach is also existentially oriented. Furthermore, as noted in other essays, I draw a distinction between the relative expediency of the fourth trans-cognitive order of 'pragmatical' judgment (be that in either a moral mode or in a functional mode) *versus* the open-ended existential 'writing' of 'pragmatic' experience that I perceive as being more channeled through a primary, non-exclusive deontological existential lens. Therefore, my use of the expression 'pragmatic' should not be misread as merely or exclusively 'expediently pragmatical'. In my first explanation of this expression, I invoked the dialectical transformations necessary in order to understand a 'pro-relational' or 'existential re-orientation', i.e., 'dimension', namely, a shift from, say, 'possession' (e.g., I have a dollar in my pocket) to 'having' a relationship, say, a friendship, which we might first understand as 'the sharing of a friendship', but, which, from the emergent perspective of the relationship (that experiential excess greater than the mere sum of its relational participants and parts) should lead us to turn this sharing on its head as, instead, the 'existential fact' that 'the relationship shares us in its embrace of this friendship', and so on. By such means, illustrating how the pro-relational dimension turns the existential (and pragmatic) metaphorically 'upside down, back to front, and inside out'. In an additional explanation I would like to note that in our existential 'reading' of a relational situation, in our working interpretation of the received ideality of its apparent relational situatedness, as a response on our part, 'that what is good enough may well be more than good enough' should we follow up such responsible-responsiveness in a process of enaction that oversees a realization of that empathetically receptive type of a response. We should also note that in my reading of existentially oriented phenomena, we meet with a series of 'proscriptions' seemingly demanded by our reading of that relationship in question, which, in turn may well be seen to demand some form of a re-written response on our part. An existential orientation (initially in its non-systematic sense as the third moment of the economy in question) is derived from a dynamic balance of phenomenologically oriented 'descriptions' and hermeneutically oriented 'prescription'. I.e., issuing forth as 'proscriptions', i.e., as 'responsible forms of responsiveness that are neither described nor prescribed but rather negatively proscribed'. So, e.g., 'this homeless person on this park bench beside me looks hungry' could be treated as a phenomenological description, but, as a hermeneutic prescription we get the recognition of the pattern of behaviour 'that when we are hungry, we need to eat, and should get to eat lest our death be arrived at through a fatal form of starvation'. Now our existential response to our reading of this situation, proscriptively, is, therefore, 'that we should not leave a hungry person in a state of hunger (just as we should not leave ourselves in a fatal state of hunger [lest the overall richness of this world of life be diminished through such death and loss of relationships with either ourselves or that person where life was truncated

existentially, through(-)others (in both non-systematic and systematic senses). Moreover, only through a process of interrogation, and other forms of economic behaviour, etc., can both the disciplinarian and secularist pursue their path through this world together. That, central to both our philosophical reflections and our reflections upon a secular world, is this invocation of such 'interrogations', and all that that entails. That the multi-faceted complexities of this suspension is crucial for the full functioning of our intentional lives, etc. Where the inescapable exercise of the overall transcendental suspension contributes to the economics of our arbitrated existence in this overall world-of-life; where the economics of extended-suspensions contribute to the non-economics of the de-suspension; and, where the hyper-economics of a causal world is non-virtually navigated and negotiated through the exercise of the sense of the extensive suspension. (43)

Admittedly, the complexities of this topic are potentially endless, however, through forms of economic induction and simplification[150] we learn to navigate, negotiate and arbitrate the defusing of such potential perplexity.[151] As noted, through economic induction, the sheer development of one economic facet of experience, through the metaphorical backdoor, so to speak, is capable of overseeing the full expression of that overall economy currently in question. Moreover, in the process, further delineating the contours and configurations of that same economy therein being economically represented and presented, and non-economically re-presented in and through a unilateral re-directedness that, hopefully, assists in the existential enrichment and re-enrichment of our lives as lived in this inspiring world of the other. A world wherein we find the simulated semblance of our overlapping primary relationships subjected to the ensuing mix of the economic, non-economic, and hyper-economics inputs and outputs that can contribute, more often than, to our effortless passage through this overall world-of-life. This same semblance of a world that has us acting for a short period of time as one more relational participant upon this thin veneer of a stage that we may view as our 'home' despite our more natural homelessness underlying the anxieties of such a fragile and tenuous form of existence. (44)

---

through death by starvation])', but, how this relatively deontological and existentially experienced demand should be pragmatically discharged is something that is to be left to us given that any number of possibilities will arise, some more probable than others, and, hopefully some more effective than others (and that we would rationally prefer the latter). However, at the end of the day, the route we choose (to resolve this existential anomaly being experience by us from a pro-relational sense of a re-orientation in such relational matters) would more than likely not take some absolutistically definitive unimodal form of a response, and, therefore, it is left up to us to delineate the dimensionality of our choice in such matters. In this situation just sited we might share our lunch with this homeless person, or, give them some money to buy a meal, or, buy them a meal of their choice, or inform the nearby services able to appositely respond to the pressing needs of this homeless person with the bringing of some food, and so on and so forth. Hence this intention on my part to both intuitively equate pragmatic (but not 'pragmatical') with 'existential', and, at the same time, leave open, as to how our intuitive appreciation of this approachable but ultimately unobtainable dimension might be responsibly responded to, and so on… Hence, hopefully, these illustrations of this dialectical notion of 'existential and pragmatic dimensions' might be better understood.

150 Paragraphs 19, 21. Or, refer to the appropriate modules in *The Seventh Book*….

151 Which can be quite aptly be referred to as the 'spaghettification' of philosophy, other disciplines, or attitudes within both the secular and religious spheres of cultural performances.

However, even though the tides of happenstance may periodically come in... and inevitably will go out... we can still take some small degree of comfort in the existential fact that our lives must continue to demonstrate a positive nihilism in order for the mere maintenance of the everyday ordinariness of our existence... yet, which on occasions, too, will also existentially reveal an extraordinariness of spirit as we innovatively and progressively grapple with those regions of existence that, once, could not have been even contemplated... for such is the potential power and philosophical insightfulness promised through the more artful pursuit of our reflections.?! (45)

Then, again, can either the serious disciplinarian or the concerned secularist entertain such a grand vista given that our 'place in this world' is as prominent as a 'single grain of sand randomly placed upon the immensity of a near-endless beach'. With the advent of each novel form of a telescope, do we not shrink ever further before the cosmic proportions of a universal realm of space and time that seem to defy all forms of reasonable comprehension? But, if we were to 'positively' read ourselves as nothing but a 'nihilistic text' we would rightly perceive that we possess no intrinsic value[152] to begin with, and that what value we do find along the way is to be realized and refined only through our interactions within this troubled world of others, preferably finding forms of resolution with an existential tenor and complexion. Indeed, refusing to find intrinsic forms of evaluation and seeking, instead, only those forms of valuation instigated, both written and read, as penned by 'our' own hands, in our finding and re(-)creating, through suitable forms of reflection, the mutual fruitfulness of our making our own way, both individually and collectively, through this same world at large. Indeed, entertaining a radical sense of passage where we enter into our reflections without entertaining the thought that we are entering into such reflections... and, by such means, be more guided by the living-experiences to had in our relationships by deferring to the much greater evidential richness and enrichment to be had through the very trajectories of our relationships themselves... should we be more mindful that we are ever beholden to such an all too often untapped resource and source for such existential re(-)e/valuation..!! (46)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 8.7.23.

4. A (Set of) Guiding Observation(s)

'The' guiding observation behind the trajectory of this essay, that deserves to be duly registered, is that the so-called 'transcendental suspension' is the symbolic tip of the metaphorical 'iceberg' as to how the practice of reflection is to be engaged through the full functioning of suspensions that, I believe, would serve us better if understood under the complex concept of the 'extensive suspension'. In this latter regard, we would be taking into more detailed account, first, an interlocking variety of suspensions (as noted under the concept of 'the overall transcendental suspension' as best illustrated by the earlier

[152] Whilst not discounting the observational fact that everyone is different, and that some of those differences will be more central or basic, etc., to the expression and being of each and every person finding themselves being expressed by such distinctive 'orientations', conventional 'compromises', radical senses of re-direction entered into, and so on…

exploration conducted of 'the interrogative economy'). Second, the important role to be played by 'de-suspensions' (to date, totally overlooked by philosophers, be they phenomenologists, hermeneuticists, existentialists, *et al*) which is addressed by myself under the concept of the 'extended suspension'. Third, a need to note, and not avoid, the immense role played by a virtual-intentional – non-virtual-causal interface necessitating the extension of the extended suspension under the more encompassing concept of the 'extensive suspension'.[153] (47)

In the light of the above, we also need to note that by 'transcendental' I have overseen its relatively radical re-interpretation as not so much 'transcendental' in its classical senses (after Kant, *et al*),[154] but, as '(economically) trans-intentional in orientation', i.e., as occupying a differentially greater degree of epistemological attention being paid to the judgmental orbit of the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the Epistemological Hierarchy (psyche) on the logical grounds that the appreciation of the conceptual must be trans-conceptual in orientation, and so on. Moreover, there can be no simple, unitary act of a (non-complex) suspension given that to even ask a non-complex question, and then answer it in any non-complicated manner, must entail the sequencing (and dialectical-like integration) of a series of suspensions metaphorically both 'within' intentional moments and between the same.[155] (48)

At the same time, it cannot be stressed enough, that all forms of intentional appreciation must involve processes of reflection that entail complex forms of suspension and that without some degree of a suitable philosophical rigour in this department this, and all other disciplines, indeed, the course of secular life itself, will be like one more 'heavy military tank trying to traverse the bogginess of a muddy field regardless of whether the anticipated 'progress' of that vehicle be over a small paddock or the relative geographical vastness of the countryside itself… (49)

Last, I would like to note that our 'coherence in argumentation' should not be superficially confused with our plying the 'absolutistical sophistry of a systematic philosophy'. Rather, as an anti-systematic philosopher, we need to do so much work along the lines of rectification, deconstruction, and re(-)normalization of the discourses already to hand, and so on (as argued elsewhere), and, therefore, that the hard-working disciplinarian has little time to devote to such a relatively unedifying process of speculative construction. However, on the other hand, given a permanent, prescient need for an ongoing re(-)construction of both our arguments and our motivations, there is a role to be ever-played by our step-by-step renovation of what remains, and remains to be innovatively re(-)addressed through an observance of such a residue in an openness of spirit that welcomes the non-exhaustion of our points of views and the potentially infinite over-lapping

---

153 Comprehensively explored in *Pursuit,* Volume II., and then further detailed in certain later essay in *Pursuit,* Volume III.

154 Explored elsewhere under the rubric of a 'negative transcendental utilization' (noting epistemological limitations of experience) and a positive transcendental utilization' (noting epistemological possibilities of experience)

155 I.e., as per the interrogative economy with the proposition of the dis-conjunctive suspension of the question and its first reply in a metaphorical mode through the use of a conjunctive suspension, etc.

of those novel perspectives that both augment and enhance such a pragmatic-existentialism… such an existential-pragmatism..!! (50)

N.T., 14.7.23.

5. An Evolving Worksheet Exemplifying the Application of the 'Suspension'

As noted, this expression 'transcendental suspension', given the considerable evolution undergone, as briefly charted over the course of this essay, it is better that we treat it as an 'extensive suspension', or, just as a process of 'suspension', etc., in which we choose a form of application judged to be more suitable for the objectives of the type of philosophical or disciplinary treatment about to be both envisaged and enacted. (51)

Therefore, given this evolution in my interpretative treatment of this concept, let me articulate, in a more practical form, the various formats that were indicated over the course of this essay. Let me do this through notating the evolving formation of the following 'worksheet' in order to exemplify the functioning of these various approaches eventually being gathered and integrated together under this rubric of the 'extensive suspension' (or, for convenience, which can be referred to as just the 'suspension'). For the sake of simplicity let me utilize this following simple proposition, in the format of a perceptual report (p), that 'this cat (c) is sitting (fs) on that mat (m)'. (52)

Now, over a series of stages, let our philosophical treatment of this proposition *p* evolve as I demonstrate a progressive enrichment of both the nature and function of this concept that will eventually be designated as an 'extensive suspension', or, more simply, as just the 'suspension' as arrived at through being entertained in the current manner of its deployment.[156] (53)

In merely bracketing this proposition (p) 'c.fs.m' we can notate this *epoché* as:

(p) = (c.fs.m) (54)

As suggested, we can read this either globally '[proposition p] and/or locally {proposition p}.[157] Hence:

Either [(c.fs.m)] and/or {(c.fs.m)} (55)

At this stage we can read the *epoché* as a suspension of the formation of all (distinctive) forms of e/valuation. For convenience, borrowing from my use of a general ordered analysis conducted on a trans-cognitive level of exposition (i.e., as distinctive types of judgment) we can note a suspension of the following six types of judgmental e/valuation, namely, first ordered phenomenological-semantic e/valuation; second or-

---

156 I.e., in either its theoretical deployment, and/or critical employment, and/or critical (and radical) re-deployment.

157 Refer to paragraphs 4, 7, 19, 34, 37.

dered aesthetical e/valuation; third ordered deontological e/valuation; fourth ordered pragmatical e/valuation; fifth ordered hermeneutic(al possibility) e/valuation; and, sixth o[158]rdered ontical (or factual) e/valuation. (56)

The expression 'e/valuation' merely indicates that a trans-intentional judgment (in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the epistemological hierarchy, i.e., psyche) delivers an intentionally formed judgment (in the Cognitive aspect of the epistemological hierarchy of psychological organization).[159] Hence an evaluation(al judgment) delivers the intentional content in the form of a valuation.[160] (57)

Now, in a suspension of these six distinctive types of e/valuation we should be left with the mere form of the expression without ether epistemological or ontological commitments to either its semantic reality per se other than as a propositional expression describing the intentional configuration or constitution of the experience per se albeit other than as being in a propositional format; as not being a judgment of either the beautiful or the not so beautiful; as devoid of moral value (whether expressed in both a deontological or pragmatic orientation); as not considering is practical applications and consequences, along with all considerations of being economic, effective, efficacious, expeditious, and so on); as possessing a hermeneutic possibility merely beyond it merest sense and semblance of being just possible; and, lastly, as to whether the proposition in actually expressing either an actual factual, non-virtual state of affairs or as a non-factual, state of affairs with only a virtual factual-like status. Treating the propositional-like report, or set of propositional reports in question, to either a complete global suspension as if the entire world were merely like an illusion, or dream, or ghost, or a reflection in a mirror, etc., or, doing something similar but on a much more local sense of scale. Hence the suspended treatment of the *p* in terms of the six orders:

Either [(c.fs.m)] and/or $\{(c.fs.m)\}^{1\text{-}6}$ (58)

So, we desist from treating the propositional form in a variety of ordered modalities, in this instance, as a true factual state of affairs even though we know we are truly seeing an actual cat actually sitting on an actual mat. For philosophical purposes, or, indeed, merely for making judgmental assessments of this relational situation to hand, be that in either a disciplinary orientation or a secular orientation, we need to be in this position of observing the 'bare bones', the 'mere intentional constitution of what appears to be to hand' in order to then proceed through the enaction of any form of judgment given that the judgment demands a dis-conjunctive suspension to initiate the judgment, and a metaphorical conjunctive suspension in order to continue the interrogative act of judg-

---

158 Which can be conducted under the mnemonic list of 'e's'. E.g., expediency; effectiveness, expeditiousness; efficaciousness; economical; expertly treated; efficiency; etc.

159 Where it is obvious that a 'judgment of *x*' must be more epistemologically organized than the mere intentional content of *x per se*. Moreover, for a judgment to take place, for reasons not here enunciated, *x* must be in a conceptual format with the automatic implication that the judgment of *x* must be trans-conceptual, i.e., trans-intentional, etc.

160 Thence our avoiding a confusion between judgmental acts and the delivery of judgmental content in an intentional format.

ment, and, then, the apposite form of negation in some form or other in order to definitively articulate an apparitional suspension of the as-if, as-if, as-if...[161] (59)

So, the suspension of the 'bracketing' or *epoché* is necessary before we can articulate the ensuing analysis '/...../'of the constitution of the proposition p to its reduced constituents, namely, c, fs, and m. Hence:

/Either [(c.fs.m)] and/or $\{(c.fs.m)\}^{1\text{-}6}$/ = /c, fs, m/ (60)

I.e., the analytical reduction of this proposition gives us the analyzed contents of c, fs, and m. (61)

In applying such bracketing, in effectively paralyzing various ontological or epistemological claims, in blocking various forms of e/valuational determinations, before during (and after) such research, a dialectical approach is engineered that runs, back to back, either a contra-positing of intentional content and/or a counter-positing of intentional functions.[162] So, e.g., in entertaining these parallel forms of a dialectic we effectively create a temporary, non-destructive form of erasure. E.g., 'this cat is sitting on this mat' becomes counter-balanced by 'this (possible) non-cat is not sitting on this possible non-mat (at the same time):

c + (-c).fs + (-fs).m + (-m) (62)

The upshot of such manoeuvres calls into question the original form of the e/valuational formation initially supplied with the hope that such contestments might further clarify the phenomenological presentation/s held in such a form of abeyance in the hope that when we exit such reflections we might have a better understanding of our prejudices, pre-judgments, biases, the very intentional constitution of those phenomena, and so on on. (63)

But, it was argued that a suspension, if read as a dynamic balance or dynamic suspension (DS), needed the dynamically treated balance, collectively, of the economical constituents of the suspension (*epoché*), the reductive-analysis, and the synthesis or reconstitution of the same ('\.....\'). I.e:

DS = [(p) + /p/ + \p\] or {(p) + /p/ + \p\} (64)

Moreover, from our exposition of the interrogative economy, i.e., the asking of a question, etc., the dynamic suspension (in the form of an economy of the dynamic suspension) would entail, collectively, the following (sequence) of operations, namely:

DS = apparitional susp. + conjunctive susp. + dis-conjunctive susp. (65)

---

161 Refer to paragraphs 13, 17-18, 47.

162 Refer to paragraphs 1, 21.

But, we also know, through economic correlativity, that the apparitional suspension, e.g., as with any correlativity, is equivalent to the joint negation of the other two suspensions. Therefore, it can be replaced accordingly, namely.

DS = -(conj. susp. + dis-conj. susp.) + conj. susp. + dis-conj. susp. (66)

I have also argued that the dynamic suspension, when effectively and efficiently enacted from a pro-relational perspective, oversees a relatively systematic existential expression of that economy, which, e.g., if constituted as a philosophical economy, is also that treatment afforded of an economy regarded, respectively, as one-part non-systematic existential in orientation, one-part hermeneutical in orientation, and one part phenomenal-phenomenological in orientation in their collectively contributing to the systematic existential treatment of that overall economy in question. I.e.:

Syst. Exist. treatment = DS of non-syst. existential + herm. + phenom. inputs (67)

I have also argued that given a dialectical sequencing from the hermeneutical (through its consonant background) to the phenomenological (through its dissonant sense of a foreground) to the non-systematic existential (as a process of resolution) we also obtain a parallel harmonic contribution as a parallel harmonic reading of that same economy in question. I.e., consonance (con) + dissonance (dis) + resolution (res) enacts a harmonic reading, and, potentially, a self-harmonizing existential sense and semblance of an economy. Hence:

Herm. con. + phenom. dis. + rel. harmon. res = ongoing harmonization (68)

But, such an economy (through economic complexification) can also be treated as equivalent to ‘the (economy of the) overall transcendental suspension (in its mirroring of the philosophical economy, the economy of interrogation, etc., etc.). (69)

Now, the need to incorporate an automatic arising of the de-suspension also produces the following ‘economy of the de-suspension (de-susp)’ (where the so-called third moment, in a harmonically aligned sequencing, is the joint negation of the first two moments, namely:

De-susp = overall tr.sus + de-suspension -(overall tr.sus + de-suspension) (70)

But, in order to account for both causal alignment and the exercise of our intentional objectives we can now finally arrive at the ‘extensive suspension’ as ‘the pro-relational treatment of the extensive economy consisting of virtual intentions (virtual) (as equaling the economy of the extended suspension) plus the non-virtual plus the joint negation of the former moments, preferably, expressed with a suitable existential complexion. I.e:

Extensive suspension. = virtual + non-virtual -(virtual + non-virtual) (71)

Or, this joint negation, as just noted, can be better understood as 'the non-systematic existential aspect acting as an extensive 'de-suspension' in its non-textual simulation of that 'being simulated', which then through transformational treatment becomes the merely simulated material as hermeneutically found 'ready to hand'. Thence, in the original formula noting 'simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and similar', more correctly we should note 'the pre-simulated already to hand, the suspension of the same, and the ensuing de-suspension acting as that systematic existential force capable of engendering the non-textual simulating of simulations, and, this emergent mix all other things of a similarly constructed nature, etc. Hence, the pre-simulated plus the suspension of the pre-simulated plus the joint negation of the former, acts as a de-suspended, systematic existential force capable of simulating simulations, and so on (which, through retreatment, become the new pre-simulated materials to be re-suspended, etc.).[163] Hence:

Pre-simulated simulations, suspensions, de-suspensions acting as simulations (72)

A formula whose critical processes of correction parallel:

Rectification + deconstruction + re-normalization = ongoing re(-)normal.[164] (73)

As a short digression we can also note that the role of the de-suspension also acts as subtle force that engenders various forms of ordering in e/valuational formation. That, e.g., in the archetypal economy of hermeneutical 'World', phenomenological 'Object', and subjective 'Ego', and, where the suspension of one element produces the net, subtle, preferential, deconstructive expression of the remaining two parties, and, where the suspension of two elements produces the net, subtle, preferential, deconstructive expression of the remaining party. So, e.g., first ordered trans-cognitive phenomenological and semantic inputs are arrived at through the subtle preferential de-suspensional treatment of the Object moment through the effective suspension of the moments of World and Ego. That by a varying combination of such means, six trans-cognitively ordered forms of e/valuation can be arrived at.[165] (74)

And, similarly, through inter-ordered relationships between these trans-cognitive orders all philosophical and disciplinary topics can be arrived at explicated in The Seventh Book... E.g., where the metaphysical, in a narrow sense, can be accounted for through the semantic treatment of the semantic...[166] (75)

Now, let me account for, and notate, the irruption of the relatively-radical of the non-economic, and, mediated/immediate re(-)appropriation in a process of hyper-economic contextualization. (76)

---

163 This topic of transformational retreatment is summarized in *The Seventh Book*... in those modules dealing with this topic.

164 Whose inputs are, respectively, hermeneutical, phenomenal-phenomenological, and non-systematic existential in orientation, and, where hopefully, a suitable systematic existential complexion can be duly arrived at through a dynamic suspension of all three parties. That, the overall critical-radical process of correction can be collectively referred to as an 'ongoing process of re(-)normalization'.

165 As per *Pursuit*, III.VII.

166 Refer to footnote 59.

In any economy of the hermeneutically pre-simulated ‘pretreatment’; the phenomenologically deconstructed ‘treatment’, and the ongoing potential resolution of the non-systematic existential ‘retreatment’ of the former, through a process of de-suspension, an irruption of the relatively non-economic needs to be economically re-appropriated hyper-economically (and, therein, to be re/treated as ‘relatively-radical’ and not be overlooked as the impossible to comprehend through being too ‘radically-radical’). Hence:

Hyper-Economic Retreatment
/\
*
*
The Irruption of the Relatively Non-Economic[167]
/\
*
*
The Relevant Economy in Question

[Pretreatment + Treatment + Retreatment[168]] (77)

That, at this point in time, the extensive suspension is better modeled, and notated, through the invocation of an economy of the hyper-economic (along with all the variety of suspensions entailed therein and as entailed in the overall transcendental suspension, the extended suspension, and the extensive suspension (as refracted non-economically). (78)

Thus, although we begin with an exposition of the transcendental suspension, the complexities of this topic of the ‘(extensive) suspension’ considerably supersede the theoretical limitations entailed in this historical concept of the ‘transcendental suspension’. That, given the centrality of the ‘suspension’ in dealing with the economic, the non-economic and the hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the latter hence the need to delineate this superseded territory. Given the place of the ‘suspension’ in all manner of reflection; the causal enaction of our intentions; the force of the de-suspension to subtly express distinctive differences in ordered e/valuation; the complexity of inter-ordered phenomena... it follows that the exposition of the ‘suspension’ needs to travel far beyond the initial simplicity of the so-called ‘transcendental suspension’. (79)

` N.T., 22.7.23.

---

167 Through the de-suspensional force of the resolution enacted through retreatment.

168 As viewed through an economy of transformational retreatment. Refer to *The Seventh Book...*

6. A Numerical Mnemonic to Better Comprehend the Sequential Transformations of the 'Transcendental Suspension' as also Notated in the Evolving Worksheet

The Mnemonic is 1, 2, 3', 3'', 6', 6'', 9', and 9' (& 12[169]). (80)

1 & 2 Under the headings of 1 and 2 we have my understanding, rightly or wrongly, that Husserl initially confused, unimodally, the suspension with the reduction, and, then bi-modally separated them.[170] (81)

3' Under the heading of a first 3' we have my intuitive reading of a late Husserl as taking both an historical and a hermeneutical turn giving the 'transcendental suspension' a trimodal complexion, namely, suspension (effectively as a balance of reduction and reconstitution), reduction (analysis) and reconstitution (synthesis).[171] (82)

3'' By taking on board, quite possibly under the influence of Heidegger, the historical situatedness of interpretative experience (contrary a Kantian-like ahistorical reading of 'transcendental' experience), and, that all textual elements are functioning in a hermeneutical meta-textual mode of functioning (within a set of genres that control the parallel writing/reading of distinctive patterns of behavior utilizing culturally based semantic mappings of phenomenal-phenomenological content, etc.).[172] (83)

At this stage we are now defining a 'transcendental suspension' as 'the overall transcendental suspension' with a dynamic balance envisaged as being entertained between those three economic correlativities despite how those economic correlativities are being co-defined by the disciplinarian in question.[173] (84)

This then paves the way for a second heading of 3'' under various forms of economic modelling as advanced by myself, e.g., under the economies of the gestalt (namely, of Ego, World, Object), interrogative (rhetorical questioning, metaphorical first reply, a possible, literal, apparitional second reply), intentional (intentional objectivity, motiva-

---

169 If we were to explore inter-ordered phenomena (as mapped out in *The Seventh Book*…) where one set of six orders interacts with another set of six orders. E.g., in the 'symmetrical first trans-cognitively ordered phenomenological-semantics of phenomenological-semantics' we arrive at a relatively narrow concept of the 'metaphysical'. Similarly, the fifth ordered hermeneutical possibility of hermeneutic possibility gives us the discipline of science (in some form or other), whereas, in a contrast, the sixth ordered factual or ontical forms of e/valuation of this same ontical field (of the factual) gives us, in effect, the discipline of history (in some form or other). In an asymmetrical interrelationship we find other aspects of disciplinary behaviour. E.g., 'the fifth ordered possibility of sixth ordered facts' and 'the facts of possibility' give us, respectively, apparent 'evidential assessments' versus the apparent 'probabilities associated with those evidential truth determination in question', etc. In effect, such asymmetrical interactions give us different non-communicative products, It is my intention to explore such ideas in Book 9 with the tentative title '*The Re*(-)*Purposing of the Concept of the Metaphysical along with the Re*(-)*Appraisal of Philosophical Ideas Conducted through an Exploration of Inter-Ordered Phenomena*.'

170 Refer to paragraphs 1-3, 34.

171 Refer to paragraphs 15, 35.

172 Refer to paragraphs 15, 35.

173 In effect, multiplying threefold the concept of the Husserlian noetic-noematic correlativity. I.e., as taking place between subjectivity (Ego), background field (World), and focalized intentional objectivity (Object). Such correlativity being extended to both the Extended Economy and the Extensive Economy.

tional intent, subjectivity, (re)presentational (presentation, representation, re-presentation), temporal (past, present, future) textual (text, meta-text, non-textual), etc. The observation was also noted that these economies are archetypally aligned (and can be commentated upon through the use of a parallel dictionary, say 'retrospective past' aligned with 'reduction', and so on).[174] (85)

6' Treating the economy of the suspension as metaphorically above or below (or behind or before) the economy of The Overall Transcendental Suspension gives us (as a matrix of 3 x 3) the double economy of the Extended Suspension (in which we make a first attempt appreciate the philosophical consequences and ramifications of this novel feature of the de-suspension (looked at more closely in a deeper reading of the subtle privileging/de-privileging of ordered phenomena[175]).[176] (86)

6'' Under this heading we have ordered economies[177] (e.g., when and where e/valuational formation takes into account the six trans-cognitive orders starting with the first order then heading to the sixth order, respectively, phenomenological-semantic e/valuation; aesthetical; deontological; pragmatical (in both moral and functional senses); hermeneutical possibility; and, ontical or factual actuality, albeit as at least provisionally treated in hypothetical terms. (87)

I have argued[178] that in a relative suspension, dynamic balance, of one or two economic polarities (namely, Ego, World, Object) we get a corresponding relative de-suspensional force imposed on the other one or two economic polarities which, in the process, is capable of organizing a subtle form of preferential/de-preferential treatment in the realizing the corresponding sense of an order. E.g., a 'suspension', or dynamic balance, of the economic poles or moments of both Ego and World in the Trans-Cognitive (Judgmental) Aspect of the psyche advances a first ordered subtle emphasis upon the phenomenological-semantic forms of e/valuational formation.[179] (88)

9' We get the three economies of The Overall Suspension, the De-Suspensional Economy as an Extended Economy; and the Economy of Volition in some form of causal alignment. This more complex version of the suspension I have titled the Extensive Economy. (89)

9'' Reading the 'Extended Economy' as 'Non-Economic' (along with its unilateral, re-directedness of intent) and the volitional aspect of the Extensive Economy as Hyper-

---

174 Refer to paragraphs 16-19, 22, etc.

175 As articulated, e.g., in *The Seventh Book*…

176 Refer to paragraphs 22, 39.

177 Although any epistemological level of organization could be treated through a sixfold ordered lens this usually refers to either the Trans-Cognitive Orders or the Cognitive Orders starting with a first ordered concerned with the treatment of pre-integrated essential-like content; then, integrated content; ideation; perception; hermeneutic possibilities; and, finally, ontical factuality.

178 E.g., *The Seventh Book*…

179 Refer to paragraph 39, etc.

Economy now gives us a Non-Economic Economy whose dynamic balance expresses the full force of the (Non-Standard/Non-Philosophical) Extensive Suspension.[180] (90)

We can also invoke a mnemonic '**12**' as the inter-ordered interaction of ordered economies. E.g., the phenomenological-semantic x phenomenological-semantic as instrumental in forming a narrow definition of the 'metaphysical' (as more or less, the categorical understanding of categories, etc.).[181] (91)

7. The Recent Advertising of this Sixth Essay in this Series *On Reflection*… Noted:

12N. Reflections on the Philosophical Strategy of 'Being Reflective'? Exploring the Function and Nature of the 'Transcendental Suspension'

In a sixth essay on the practice of philosophical reflection I now explore the function and nature of the 'transcendental suspension' beginning with Edmund Husserl and then moving on to a re-reading of this phenomenological approach to also include both hermeneutical and existential inputs as well as noting innovations from both economic and non-economic/non-philosophical perspectives. Having argued we deal only with 'simulations, suspensions and de-suspensions, and similar', (the latter being totally overlooked in philosophical theory) the very notion of a 'transcendental suspension' will, through such necessity, be totally renovated. Given 'reflection' is central 'to enacting judgments on our intentional lives and both being responsive and responsible in the light of the same' it follows that this topic has an importance well beyond the mere historical treatment of this topic. (92)

---

180 Refer to paragraph 76-79, etc.

181 Refer to the relevant modules of *The Seventh Book*… Also refer to footnote 59.

12O. Review: On Reflection… An Overview

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12O. Review: On Reflection… An Overview*

The economic reflection of economic reflection is a non-economic reflection…
The non-economic reflection of non-economic reflection is hyper-economic reflection….

If we were to re-read the previous essays, just what might we provisionally conclude?[182] Is the notion of reflection another misleading metaphor, or, can metaphors cease to mislead once we understand their economic limits? That, in some measure the economic is limited by the non-economic, which, in turn, itself, is limited by the economic, or rather, the hyper-economic. Hence the stirrings of a dialectic that might just be what is needed to return us to this world-of-life with some small degree of both optimism and philosophical insight, indeed, presenting the possibilities for a 'viable, positive, nihilistic, anti-representational pragmatic-existentialism', or if more succinctly abbreviated, as an 'existential-pragmatism'? (0)

In a challenge posed in the advertising for the fifth essay, on a Positive Nihilism, I noted:

> In the Fifth Essay I will argue that as we only deal with 'simulations, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and similar', it follows that all discourses must be nihilistic in complexion given that the formation of all forms of writing and reading must follow a similar course. Then, in conjunction with the previous essay, this implies that all discourses must be positively nihilistic and not negatively nihilistic in orientation. Where through apposite suspensions, a pro-relational, non-reductive, emergent existentialism can also re-evaluate and re-enrich our relationships...
>
> **Thereby illustrating how a reputable philosophy can only be a positive, nihilistic, antirepresentational existential-pragmatism!**
>
> Moreover, such a position cannot be ideologically characterized as 'extremist' given the utilization of continual suspensions, etc. However, despite the seemingly incontrovertible-like nature of this argument, assent is not being sought only understanding in the hope that it can be duly tested... hence this philosophical challenge that I hope you will take up, namely, is the only viable and reputable philosophy those examples that well-exemplify an existential-pragmatism?

To draw these and other points together let me Preface this Review with the following notions and conclusions, comments and observations, etc. (1)

0. Preface

That there is a need to opposing the spaghettification of philosophy, and similarly in all other disciplines... (2)

That the 'transcendental suspension' is central to all reflection, i.e., at the very basis or center of all forms of reflection needed for positive forms of enacted transformation. Hence its philosophical, disciplinary and secular importance. (3)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

182 Basically, I will be arguing that in order to explicate the full potential of the 'transcendental suspension' I will need to delineate my working concept of the 'extensive suspension'.

Reflection has a bad name but that should not be necessarily so. A nihilistically oriented reading would and should be respectful of both metaphors, etc., and their limitations. A Goldilocks reading that is neither a relativistical negative nihilism nor an impossible absolutism. Hence the place for a positive nihilism where the inability to appropriate economic correlativities is duly recognized. (4)

In this Review let me look at these issues raised and how they overlap in our reflections upon reflections? Hence my addressing the following under ten heading:

1. Why such bad press for the notion of 'reflection'?

2. Why is the 'suspension' central to philosophical reflection, disciplinary research and secular concerns and enquiries?

3. How do we enter and leave this complex suspension, and, what are its ramifications?

4. How do we deal with the dialectic between the economic and the non-economic?

5. How do we account for an economy that includes de-suspensions?

6. How do we account for the causal dimension assuming an alignment between virtual and non-virtual forms of intentional enaction?

7. How do we account for this *x* of *x* is not *x*? Recognizing that there is a need to take an approach that understands transformational retreatment.

8. Just how might such considerations find their reflection in this Contemporary Era?

9. What is or are the role of existential sentiment/s and expectation/s (transcendental emotion/s)?

10. What integrates this topic of reflection... this complex and evolving understanding of the 'transcendental suspension?! (5)

Undercooked, we get indigestible spaghetti; whilst overcooked, we get a bland lump of pasta. Hence the need for a Middle Path. It is my hope that this aspiration, through this collection, these sets of reflections is on the way to being achieved? (6)

Asking ourselves, is it the case that the only viable philosophical approach is that of a diligently conducted antirepresentational, positive, nihilistic existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism along with the use of all relevant disciplinary tools judged as suitable for those enquiries conducted under such consideration? (7)

1. Why such bad press for the notion of 'reflection'?

Here ‘reflection’ is a proxy for ‘visual’ metaphors in general. Is such a bad press deserved? Yes, and Postmodern critics have successfully gone to town and had a field day demolishing the proclivities of Modernist philosophers in this regard, whenever they have impossibly treated their metaphors in such a literal fashion. But, can such metaphors, visual or otherwise, be avoided? No! Because, as I will show, the interrogative economy, e.g., at the basis of a philosophical economy, and as an exemplar of the economic in general, depends upon the suitable performance of a metaphorical contribution as a so-called ‘first reply’ in order to run that economy in its entirety, indeed, any economy through the non-reductive emergence of an overall semblance of the ‘economic’ (along with the emergence of its non-economic processes entailed in ensuing expressions of resolution, and, then, their ongoing re(-)appropriations within the hyper-economic). ‘Being philosophical’ entails ‘our asking and answering questions’, i.e., ‘entering into the rhetorical strategies involved in an economy of interrogation able to find apposite forms of resolution’. As noted, as a ‘first reply’, we are presented with metaphorical-like solutions that are then headed in a more literal direction, as a ‘second reply’ in what I have termed to be the ‘apparitional’ phase of the so-called ‘third moment’. Let me demonstrate this set of dialectical sequences in the following situation where we set about to identify a certain person, who, in the distance, looks like a friend of ours called ‘John’. (8)

Looking into the distance I think to myself that ‘that person looks like a friend of ours called John’. To my friend I say out loud, “that looks like John over there?” I ask both myself and my companion, “Is that John over there?’ In any economy, in an interrogative economy we can start at any moment (which is why the so-called third moment, as a convention, is called ‘the third moment so-called’. As you will note, in the above I have already started with the so-called second moment of the metaphorical (as the so-called ‘first reply’). ‘That person’ looks *like* ‘John’. (9)

So, taking up the conventions about to be displayed in this example, let me start with the first moment as a rhetorical process as involved in the asking a question. ‘Is that John over there?’ Asking any question invokes the dis-conjunctive suspension of the ‘either/or’. (10)

As a first reply we both note, “Yes, he does look like ‘John’.” The first reply is in the form of a metaphorical-like comparison. The invocation of a metaphor, any metaphorical device, be it a simile or an analogy, or similar, involves entertaining a conjunctive suspension of ‘both like and not like’. ‘Yes, that person looks like John’ means that person is ‘both like John and not like John’. (11)

In the devolvement of the second reply, we make a literal-like decision to the effect that in questioning the metaphorical reply we now either answer the same in the affirmative or in the negative. Yes, ‘that person not only looks like John’, but, ‘is John’. Or if we were mistaken, then, we would answer in the negative. No, ‘that person who we thought ‘looked like John’, in truth, ‘is not John’. Performing a literal response, as a second reply, to this question invokes what I call the apparitional ‘as-if, as-if, as-if...’ given

that, technically, we are never in a one hundred percent definitive position to proclaim something as absolutistically true except in provisional terms of reference although conventional forces will make that type of determination for us when we can safely assume we have sufficient evidence, etc., to make that philosophically illegal manoeuvre. For practical, non-philosophically inspired convenience we can make that illegal manoeuvre well-knowing that, in this instance, we are mutually assured that 'this person is John', who now waves to us, then and comes over to talk to us as our mutual friend 'John'. (12)

Metaphors cannot and should not be treated in a literal manner given that the function 'like' is a conjunctive suspension that, as it stands cannot be treated in literally definitive manner. 'John', the 'person', cannot be 'both John and not John at the same time'! In an affirmative second reply the metaphorical collapses to 'is John'. Or, in the negative situation, the non-affirmative second reply the metaphorical collapses to 'is not John'. That, only in the collapse of the first reply can a provisional second reply be non-metaphorically called forth in an apparitional-like state of affairs. (13)

Then, if we were to question the apparitional moment, should that be enacted, an interrogative economy is recommenced. Implicating once again, a metaphorically oriented first reply and its potential possible collapse in the form of either a literal affirmation or literal dis-affirmation (or, should a definitive second reply not be available then this dialectical economy can then start over again through a process of either rhetorical interrogation or metaphorical re-comparison, etc.). (14)

The philosophical moral of my introducing this interrogative economy, as an obvious basis for the philosophical economy, is to demonstrate that metaphors are inescapable but also need to be critically dealt with appropriately. Although metaphors cannot and should not be treated in a literal manner, as they stand, the metaphorical first reply can collapse to reveal to us a relatively more definitive form of literal treatment. But, in that case, we are no longer dealing with the metaphorical *per se*. In other words, a metaphorical contribution in the transformational treatment involved in the resolution of a question cannot be escaped, and should be critically addressed in such a manner that we make a relatively clear distinction between so-called 'first replies' and 'second replies', and so on. To drive this point home more clearly, that there is a difference between the metaphorical and the apparitional, consider the cultural metaphor that 'the eyes are like the windows to the soul'. As a metaphor we entertain the comparison that the eyes re like windows, but should that metaphor collapse we get either that 'the eyes are windows to the soul' or 'the eyes are not windows to the soul'. In the first instance we get the situation where we need a homunculus-like person looking through their eyes as they then look through the physical eyes of the individual in question. But such a solution is not a solution since it implies an unresolved infinite regress. In the latter instance, the metaphor is aptly deconstructed. Therefore, the world is not as simply seen as if transparently seen through a pair of eyes, but, where ensuing imagery must be constructed along with all that that entertains (in gestaltwise terms of reference, etc.). (15)

This third moment of the apparitional has also to be looked at through the lens of a negation (and also the implicit lens of a double negation). Let me explain. (16)

Just as the archetypal-like nature of the economic can be modeled on my trimodal reading of the interrogative economy, we can also read the same type of phenomenology through, say, a similar economic reading of a Boolean algebra. Where we can parallel the rhetorical 'either/or' with the function of 'or', the metaphorical like (as both like and not like) as 'and', and the apparitional moment through the use of negation. But, if a single negation were to be invoked how might we then account for the use of a double negative as supplying the literal force of the resolution seemingly entered into in the third moment? I.e., on one hand, invoking the joint negation of the other two economic correlativities in order to account for the third economic correlativity (regardless of the order these moments are to be counted) and/or applying a double negation to the as-if... in order to assert its relevant modal description (be that either impossible/non-virtual, possible/virtual, or actual/non-virtual). To begin this explication, let me commence with the following analogy of a spatial economy consisting of an ensuing emergent economy arising from the imputed interaction of three dimensions. (17)

Through economic correlativity we can say of any one moment that it is the joint negation of the other two economic moments. E.g., we could provisionally define a line 'as not a point but as a linear sequence of points' (whose linearity is either projected in one, two or three dimensions, etc). Similarly, a flat two-dimensional surface' is not a line but a flat space generated by either the translation, rotation, and/or reflection of a one-dimensional line, etc. For convenience, we can imagine a 'three-dimensional space' being generated 'as not a flat two-dimensional space but as a three-dimensional space generated through either translation, rotation, and/or reflection of a two dimensional plane, etc.' Now, just as in a temporal economy, e.g., we can clearly say "that the 'past' is 'neither the present nor the future', etc.", then we could similarly say that "that the first spatial dimension is the not the second dimension, and v.v., and so on." Using the usual conventions, we could note that the *x* axis is not the *y* axis, and v.v. Hence the *y* axis is the not-*x* axis. Moreover, as 'the *z* axis is neither the *y* axis nor the *x* axis' then this would give us '*z* axis' is 'neither the *x* axis nor the *y* axis', and, therefore, '*z* axis' is equal to 'not the *x* axis and the not-*x* axis' with the implication of a 'doubled' negation, or, a joint negation, i.e:

$$z = -(x + y) \qquad [= \qquad z = -(x) + -(y)] \quad (18)$$

Of course, such conventions are just conventions, and the order we run them is to be conventionally pre-decided as part of the protocols to be taken up in that same regard. However the point remains, as economic correlatives can only be relatively defined through their mutual negation with the necessary consequences, as ramifications, that there can be no definitive economic interdependence of any one correlativity from their co-associated correlatives in any economy whatsoever, and, that this necessary ruling applies both individually and collectively; given, likewise, that no economy, in its own right, can also be treated as independent because its apparent appropriation, in turn, cannot escape being appropriated in an economic process (be that in wider terms of reference

or as an apparent hyper-economy capable of re(-)appropriating the relatively-radical nature of the relatively non-economic, etc.[183]). (19)

The (Boolean) operation of negation can also be introduced as a double negative on the understanding that the factual assertion of the apparitional 'as-if...' is better promoted through the use of a double negation. So, e.g., the apples in this fruit bowl exist (at this designated point in historical time) by virtue of the fact that this fact 'is not-not true' (invoking an implicit form of set theory, or, that existence correctly is ascribed to a class and not the nominated articles in that class). Recognizing that different types of negation, at the same time should also not be confused.[184] (20)

However, the important points to be made here are 'that economic correlatives are defined through the joint negation of the other two co-associated economic correlatives', and, 'that no economic correlative can be defined in either pure unimodal or pure bimodal terms of reference given their economic presentation, etc. (21)

The upshot of this partial digression is that a metaphorical proposition can become a potential factual statement, as a second reply, only through the collapse of the conjunctive suspension and the co-association of a literal assertion of a truth determination in keeping with the pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions that would collectively permit that assertion (to assert that kind of truth determination through the double negation of its class classification within those stated modal terms of reference, and, importantly, where any statement has a factual alignment with the relevant conditions, etc., thought necessary for that ordered form of assessment to be treated as evidentially, and factually, 'true'[185]). (22)

That, in effect, either philosophically or non-philosophically, we cannot escape the use of metaphors, be they either visually oriented or otherwise, and, correctly treated, their utilization, whilst being inescapably necessary, hopefully, will be correctly organized (through a suitable process of transformational retreatment,[186] etc., and, is literally supported on good evidential grounds, etc.)! (23)

---

183 Where such not-economic considerations will be explored in the fourth section of this essay. Where 'non-economic' does not mean 'independently not economic'.

184 E.g., it is true to say that this fruit bowl has no apples within its compass does not negate that nominated fruit bowl as designated. On the other hand, the fact that there are no apples in that fruit bowl, at this moment in time, does not necessarily imply that items of fruit have ever been in that bowl at some period of time, etc. Similarly, that 'Humpty Dumpty had tea (or did not have tea) with the current King of France, who is also bald', would correctly be proposition that could never be a statement for a variety of (ordered) reasons (from failing to make a transformation from a first cognitive order to the second cognitive order, etc., and also from failing to travel from a firth cognitive order to a sixth cognitive factual order. Refer to the appropriate modules in *The Seventh Book*...).

185 Apologies for the complexity here as I am also taking into consideration such propositions as 'the fact of an apple being there in this fruit bowl in a certain historical period of time', 'my current memory of an apple being there in that fruit bowl', the fact 'that I am currently imagining what it would be like to see an apple in that fruit bowl regardless of whether there is an apple in that fruit bowl or not', and so on).

186 Refer to the relevant sections of *The Seventh Book*...

2. Why is the 'suspension' central to all forms of research and enquiry?

If the previous essay, 12N, were to establish one conclusion it would be that the (the imputation of a) so-called 'transcendental suspension' (in theory, practice, and through criticism) cannot be treated as something that is simple, as merely involving a single mental operation, as non-complex in its ensuing psychological complexion, as something that can be avoided or escaped from, indeed, as a process that is entirely unnecessary for an economy to operate whatever the intentional objectives of that economy (or set of overlapping economies) in question. But, should a so-called 'transcendental suspension' be reviewed under the auspices of either 'the overall transcendental suspension' (invoking a series of dis-conjunctive, conjunctive suspensions, and a balance of the former treated through their joint negation), or further invoking an economy of the de-suspension under the rubric of an 'extended suspension', or, reviewed through the non-economic and/or causal lens of a virtual/non-virtual alignment in a more comprehensive 'extensive suspension' it becomes obvious that we are not dealing with a single, simple, intentionally directed mental operation despite the apparent simplicity of such intent! However, contrary to this discovered complexity of lived-reality, a unilateral-like simplicity of non-economic functioning will also be advanced through both processes of economic resolution and its conjectured potential for unilateral forms of non-economic expression. Such a phenomenal-phenomenological appearance of re(-)directed integrity, manifesting with such a literal or apparitional semblance of simplicity, seemingly proposes a definitive definition in intentional objectivity that would also somewhat undercut our perception of the complexities required to attain that state of apparent judgmental clarity if and when such an enacted clear and distinct state should arise, and as it continually must and does arise, under normal circumstances, over the conscious course of our intentional lives, more often than not, from moment to moment...[187] (24)

So, in the light of such complexities, let us, therefore, rebadge the 'transcendental suspension' as more 'a complex process involving sequences of certain types of suspension' that need to be correctly 'observed' in order for the maintenance and re-direction of both the apparent continuance and continuity of our intentional lives. (25)

That, in effect, the so-called 'transcendental suspension' is symbolically central to the intentional course of our lives, be that as either philosophers, disciplinarians, and/or secular participants in this overall world-of-life! (26)

---

[187] Here, I am making a deliberate allusion to the so-called 'clear and distinct ideas' of Descartes, *et al*. However, on one hand, I am stating that there is this phenomenological type of such apparent experiential integrity, but, at the same time, on the other hand, I am also arguing that this deceptive illusion of such simplicity arises through dialectical-like forms of economic resolution and non-economic irruption (and its immediate/mediated re(-)appropriation in hyper-economic terms of reference as will soon be explored later in the fourth section of this essay).

3. How do we enter and leave the 'suspension', and, what are its ramifications?

Of course, such an 'entry' and 'exit' from the so-called 'transcendental suspension' are expressions that act as metaphorical descriptions that should not be read too literally. Arguably, as permanent orientations, living our lives in states that are both suspended and not suspended, and where both orientations are ever-present to some degree, over the course of our conscious lives, more correctly 'we never need to leave nor enter' this orientation of the 'suspension'. However, given fluctuations of emphasis between the intentional course of lives and the need for their trans-intentional appreciation (as a process of reflection) we can quite naturally refer to the use of such metaphors, albeit within the limitations imposed upon their use of such metaphors. Such restrictions granted, we can now talk about, in this figurative sense, of being 'inside' and 'outside' the suspension, and our either being potentially 'trapped inside' and/or 'trapped outside' the same. So, now, the implicit question of how do we enter the suspension and how do we leave the same can be asked within those restricted terms of metaphorical reference. (27)

I am ever reminded here, of my first attempt to ride a bike where I should have thought about 'how do you stop riding a bike' before exercising the obvious recognition 'that riding it merely requires pedalling'. Luckily, whilst setting a circular course on an empty street intersection, I then headed for a convenient hedge to fall into to survive with barely a scratch or two. Similarly, in 'entering' the phenomenological singularity of the so-called 'transcendental suspension', as a philosopher or otherwise, it would be wise of us to know how we can 'exit' from that different state of affairs. Although phenomenologists, *et al*, wax lyrically about how to (metaphorically) enter such an orientation barely a thought has been given as to how we might exit. For me, upon reflection, it seems obvious that to 'exit' we merely 'suspend such a suspension' through 'suspending the suspension itself', in a process of 'de-suspension'. I.e., in making 'the act of suspension itself the subject of the next suspension' so to speak. That, just as the act of suspension has certain ramifications, so, too, has the act of the de-suspension a different set of ramifications which will need to be both differentiated and identified, and, then, integrated within the overall arc of the ensuing process here being symbolically referred to as a simple 'transcendental suspension'. (28)

Noting here, merely by the way, that a differential tension between suspensions and de-suspensions, and the relative obstruction or non-obstruction of the latter, contribute to how we perform certain types of evaluation and the ensuing clarification or non-clarification of their ensuing (ordered and inter-ordered) patterns of judgment, etc., (but that this aspect of this topic better deserves to treated elsewhere[188]). (29)

---

188 Refer to various modules in *The Seventh Book*… that deal with these topics of ordered, trans-ordered, and inter-ordered phenomena.

Metaphorically, I would like to argue that being 'trapped within the suspension' is tantamount to being psychotically 'captured', but, in a contrast, being 'trapped outside the suspension' it is as if the person is neurotically predisposed to express pattern of maladapted habit formation (along with the conjecture that daily circadian rhythms are then divided in contrast to psychotic patterns of what should be a daily pattern being then spread over the extent of two or three days, depending of the apparent severity of that illness). Psychoses of various kinds are generally well-delineated in psychological literature (between Affective and Cognitive Aspects of the psyche, although, to my mind, Trans-Cognitive (Judgmental)Aspect in the form of various psychopath/sociopath, narcissistic psychoses are not so well recognized). On the other hand, the condition of 'neurosis' (other than a post-traumatic stress syndrome in a military context manifesting, say, as a so-called 'war neurosis') is barely recognized these days. However, I still feel room needs to be made for this psychological contrast between psychosis *versus* non-psychotic/non-neurotic states of relative equilibrium *versus* neurosis need to be observed if only in terms of the phenomenology to be associated with these possible disturbances/non-disturbances in circadian rhythms, etc., as just articulated.[189] (30)

But, the complications of an additional 'economy of the de-suspension' do not stop there as we must also take into our account an enacted process of volition that must also necessarily implicate the unilateral re-directedness of a non-economic approach being entertained from a causal perspective... not forgetting, of course, that we are not just embodied in this apparent world at large, this overall world-of-life, but, also, both embedded in an intersubjective sense and semblance of world and embanked in an interobjective sense and semblance of world…. (31)

So, how do we enter and leave the 'suspension'? Be that in either a deliberate sense or in an automatic manner, over the course of our lives, moment to moment, that is exercised without direct intentional deliberations in that regard? (32)

Quite simply, through enacting a suspension of the (overall transcendental) suspension itself, and so on![190] (33)

---

189 I believe there is definite evidence for circadian disturbances in psychotic illnesses. As a psychiatric nurse I have often witness psychotic patients, say, with either hypomania or endogenous depressions seemingly expressing a daily circadian rhythm over two or, sometimes, three days. E.g., a depressed person eating one day and not the next. Or, the manic patient sleeping relatively better one night and not the next night or the next two nights (if their illness is even more marked). Then, in a reactive depression the patient would have trouble getting off to sleep whereas a patient with an endogenous depression would more likely suffer from early morning awakening. Or, in a more neurotic disposition eating six small meals over the course of the day, or, experiencing a bi-phasic sleep pattern (that may well be a more normal pattern for the person where, under the exigencies of current work practices and lifestyles, has to also be suppressed in order to conform to the expected course of the pressures of our more modern lives?).

190 By 'so on' is meant a multivarious suspension of all aspects and levels of the extensive suspension. Or, in effect, just as the suspension is not a simple, single act of entering a suspension, i.e., the de-suspensional force is equally complex (both sequentially and synchronically). Therefore, it is necessary to account for the ensuing complexity of the de-suspension as well. Refer to this section and the next section.

With the application of any force there is the reactive response of an opposite and equal force, be that exercised in a non-virtual context and only somewhat in a virtual context since that reactive course of that latter response can also be diverted virtually. Indeed, in virtue of this potential re-formation of a response that a process of de-suspension can enact more than just an automatic reaction circumscribed under the mere rules of a 'reactive process of reflection'. Furthermore, given this virtual ability to also entertain parallel courses of potential possibility and evaluate and calculate their individual merits and then permit the re-imagination and enaction of those focused upon senses of choice then we may better understand the counter-role played by the overall deployment of the de-suspension in such deliberations. On occasions we also have the possibility of then changing those trajectories once again should it appear to suit such revisions in such aspirations given that we must also mutually conspire to further such intended desires of our necessary working with both 'our' personal ambitions and social pretensions (with which the individual must continually interact with). (34)

Just how might we better visualize this aspect of the de-suspension (as a force that releases us from the potential, relativitistic paralysis of the suspension)? (35)

A number of years ago, in a moment of partial insightfulness, given that the formation of insight is always enacted in small incremental steps, but on occasions with an impact greater than the mere incremental shift necessary to finally and chaotically release that influential output, I came to the understanding that in my ordered analysis what was deemed to be subjected to a relatively preferential sense of privilege (or de-preferential treatment) could better be accounted for through the invocation of a de-suspension as the *modus operandi* for supplying this subtle sense of a differential process of privileging, etc., despite the overall de-privileging of the suspension itself. Hence the use of this epithet 'subtle'. E.g., in focusing on intentional objectivity as imputed in the first order (be that reviewed in Cognitive or Trans-Cognitive terms of reference) I implied the need for the subtle privileging of the Object moment (in the Archetypal Economy of Object, World, and Ego) *vis-à-vis* the relative de-privileging of the moments of World and Ego. Then, some years later, in another apparent moment of partial insightfulness I reasoned that by relatively suspending the moments of World and Ego (within the overall context of the transcendental suspension or, say, the overall transcendental suspension as one way of economically reading the suspension) we could automatically re-direct a de-suspensional force towards the relatively non-paralysed Object moment (in which we can focus on conducting some form of a phenomenological semantics, etc.). Or put less elegantly, we can have our cake and eat it at the same time. I.e., both an overall suspension and its subtle warping, both a suspension and a de-suspension. I.e., conduct an overall suspension whilst subtly preferencing certain ordered outcomes. Thence the genesis of this concept of the de-suspension. An aspect that then invited the need to formulate an economy of the de-suspension (superimposed or rendered as immanent to that of the overall transcendental suspension) which was then referred to as the 'extended suspension'. However, an additional complication manifested in the form of how we might speculate further in order to account for volition. Just how does an alignment between the virtual and the non-virtual accomplish the enaction of our intentions in terms of the latter? Or, in terms of this simplistic modelling, just how does the force of the de-

suspension chaotically tip the visualized non-virtual possibilities in a process of enaction that oversees this alignment between the virtual and the non-virtual, or v.v. (say, in an asymmetrical deferring to the gathering of evidence in the formation of a reality-based process of truth determination, etc., where the apparently evidential is more allowed to make its mark on our ongoing appreciation of this world at large)? This latter economy of volition being taken into this modelling of this suspension to form the so-called 'extensive suspension'. (36)

To articulate this modelling of the imputed economy of the de-suspension what principles or guidelines might we envisage as both pertinent and relevant to such proposals? (37)

A That we can define a 'subtle suspension' as 'the imputed 'bracketing' or 'putting out of action', through some form of a balanced suspension, of either one or two economic moments with the de-suspension being automatically invoked and released through respectively, over the other two moments or through that remaining single moment'. (38)

B That the 'ensuing resultant of such a de-suspensional focus' is 'that the specifically re-directed force of the imputed de-suspension induces and expresses the corresponding particular type of ordered e/valuational formation from an ordered repertoire in keeping with such a subtle, pre-conceived particular sense of focus'. (39)

C That such an 'imputed discharge' can be treated as if 'non-economic in tenor' even though its 'appropriation' must be 'economically re-appropriated in an economy of contextual re-appropriation', i.e., in the 'relative hyper-economy'. (40)

D Moreover, in an understanding and experience of more complex forms of ordered phenomena we must consider the possibility of either the same or similar type of situation between the imputed reduplication of symmetrical or asymmetrical types of ordered phenomena, albeit between differing levels in epistemological organization. Whereby, by such metaphorical modelling, we can account for both non-complex forms of ordered phenomena and complex forms of ordered phenomena. (41)

Let me now nominate these four principles or guidelines, as conjectures, for imputing the existence and range of ordered phenomena just noted as 'A, B, C, and D'. (42)

Now, to make some initial sense of such definitions, as conjectures, let me exemplify them as follows. (43)

Conjecture A establishes the basic mechanism for differentiating the six distinctly ordered forms of e/valuational formation in a specific aspect of the epistemological hierarchy (psyche). So, e.g., in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect I would argue that we have the following distinctive forms of ordered e/valuational formation beginning with the first order, namely, phenomenological-semantic evaluation; the, a second ordered aesthetical evaluation; de-ontological evaluation; pragmatical evaluation; hermeneutic evaluation of possibility; and, ontical or factual evaluation of actual historical determinations (albeit as

treated in an eternal state of provisional qualification regardless of whether their currently assessed probable status is practically non-dis-confirmable). Now, this declaration made, it behooves me to indicate how subtle balances and imbalances between suspensions and de-suspensions are capable of inducing and expressing such qualified, ordered forms of e/valuational formation.[191] (44)

Hence the following table where '+' indicates de-suspensional force of focus *versus* the '-' of the suspensional suppression of the economic moment or moments subjected to the same along with the resulting ordered formation in question. The three archetypal moments being World (gestalt background or field), Object (focus on intentional objectivity), and Ego (intentional subjectivity reflecting the intentional field being invoked):

E/Valuational formation in the Trans-Cognitive (Judgmental) Aspect

First Order:	Phenomenological-Semantical E/Valuation:	-W+O-E
Second Order:	Aesthetical E/Valuation:	-W+O+E
Third Order:	Deontological E/Valuation:	-W-O+E
Fourth Order:	Pragmatical E/Valuation:	+W-O+E
Fifth Order:	Hermeneutical-Possible E/Valuation:	+W-O-E
Sixth Order:	Ontical/Factual E/Valuation:	+W+O-E (45)

Now, to demonstrate what is being represented in this scheme let explain, e.g., the formation of phenomenologically oriented semantic value in the first trans-cognitive order. Here we get atomically presented, non-integrated, phenomenologically oriented essential experiences such as found in encountering saltiness, sweetness, the loudness of a noise, an experience of painfulness, and so on. That we can focus on such non-integrated phenomenological essential-like features because we subtly suspend the archetypal moments of World and Ego and through the ensuing de-suspensional focus on the moment

191 It would be tempting to call all ordered forms of e/valuational formation 'values', but I have reserved this expression for three orders only, namely, second ordered aesthetical value, third ordered deontological value, and fourth ordered pragmatical value. The expression 'e/valuation formation' notes the formation of judgmental evaluation in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect and its delivery of a cognitive, i.e., intentional, form of valuation. Hence this contrast between judgmental appreciation in the form of a process of 'evaluation' and the delivery of intentional content in the form of 'valuation'. I should also point out, as noted in the previous essay (*Pursuit,* III.12N.ff.39), my distinction between 'pragmatic' (and its being equated with the existential in its systematic sense) as in a pragmatic philosophy, and, the pragmatical as confined within the fourth trans-cognitive/trans-intentional ordered e/valuation of the 'pragmatical'. In a separate footnote in that essay (footnote 48) I noted a mnemonic of 'e', e.g., 'economical', 'efficaciousness', 'effectiveness', 'efficiency', etc., as a way of understanding this distinction of the pragmatical along the lines of its being expedient, etc. However, we could also point out that in a deeper analysis of ordered phenomena such distinctions will be further dissolved and merged together. E.g., the idea of what is 'economical', as in 'our being economical', also possesses a certain subliminal-like deontological force to the extent that 'we are being called upon to be non-wasteful, etc.' In a similar manner, as in the exploration of the compactual basis of contractual behaviour we find a deontological underpinning of those required contractual demands which must also remain reasonably acceptable, and so on. Hence, like all philosophical concepts, both economic and non-economic in orientation, they must be qualified and remain qualified, i.e., remain within in non-absolutistical confines given the impossibility of bot imagining and executing absolutistical demands.

of Object we encounter that being subjected to such phenomenological scrutiny. Semantically, we map such reductively focused encounters in intentional objectivity in a hierarchical scheme that mirrors the performance of those co-associated hermeneutic activities, as genres of behaviour, that allow us to encounter such expectations when and where they should be presented as being present, be that in direct non-virtually oriented sensory experience or indirectly in imagined, remember or fantasied virtually oriented experience (where, in the latter, we cannot meet a full complement of such modal expectations): I.e., in a suppression of the World and Ego moments we subtly preference the Object moment = -W+O-E (or, invoking the nomenclature for major and minor musical scales, we could represent the same as wOe or w.O.e. where the emphasis is obviously on the Object moment):

Hence 1^{o} (first order of the phenomenological) = -W+O-E- (or wOe/w.O.e.). (46)

Or, if one archetypal economic moment is subtly preferenced, we get a corresponding focus between two economic moments, e.g., as in the second ordered expressions of aesthetical e/valuation (as in the relative integration of essential-like experiences)[192] we get a resulting focus on other the two moments of both Object and Ego. (47)

Hence, this accounting for a subtle focusing upon either one or two economic moments through the subtle suspension, respectively, on the other two moments or single moment. We might depict this diagrammatically in these two types of situations as follows:

	-E			**+E**	
	*			*	
+O		**-W**	**+O**		**-W**

Phenomenological-Semantic ***versus*** **Aesthetical E/Valuation** (48)

In the previous diagram I have attempted to illustrate how the suppression of the subtle suspension of one or two economic moments releases an opposite two or single economic moments with the corresponding form of ordered e/valuation associated with that type of subtly configured form of iteration. Obviously, an ensuing focus on the reductive contributions of the Object pole, as a result of the subtle suspension of both Ego and World moments, will focus on the semantics of phenomenological forms of discrimination in the light of its conventional treatment as mapped hermeneutically, etc. This se-

192 E.g., on an intentional level in the Cognitive Aspect, say, in the integration of a salty-drink (of water) versus the non-integration of, say, a ‘square circle’ or a ‘green noise’, etc. Arguing, by default, that our ability to find the integration of certain essential phenomenological inputs is an aesthetical-like process that obeys the required semantic rules, etc. (along with our ability to perform the requisite hermeneutical genres in which such integrated phenomena are able to be encountered in an integrated state, e.g., like in our trying to drink a glass of brackish water but not our ability to see a ‘green noise’ [except in an ‘exceptional’ or ‘unusual’ process of synaesthesia which substantiates their usual non-integration by default]).

mantic mapping, in effect, mirroring how the hermeneutics of meta-textual genre formation is similarly mapped. So, e.g., in experiencing a salty taste in a glass of water that is in the phenomenological field of taste (or tasting) we find the mapping out of a liquid, on one hand, and, a salty taste, on the other. Their successful ability to be semantically conjoined then implies a second ordered status both cognitively and trans-cognitively (and, where the latter is experienced under the heading of 'aesthetical'). (49)

In this same diagram, I have illustrated how the aesthetical-orientation (in the successful conjoining of different semantic categories is conventionally arrived at in its phenomenological-hermeneutical mappings) through the single suspension of the World moment resulting in the dual emphasis upon both Object and Ego moments (at the basis of the aesthetical experience as a so-called 'second trans-cognitively ordered experience (in this ordered scheme)'. (50)

Now, I have felt it necessary to take this detour into my accounting for the distinctive nature of ordered phenomena in order to illustrate the force of the de-suspension, which, as I have stressed before, is totally overlooked when dealing with the experience of 'suspensions' as a phenomenon. I have also felt it necessary to give a brief exposition of what is meant by the expression 'inter-ordered phenomena' and account for it within, more or less, the scheme already to hand albeit now conjoining two adjacent levels of aspects in the psyche. Hence the guiding principle, as a conjecture of D. But first, let me continue this brief exposition of these additional guiding conjecture of B and C. (51)

In this second conjecture of B, I note how these subtle suspensions and ensuing de-suspensions mark out distinctive forms of ordered experience. Namely, that the 'ensuing resultant of such a de-suspensional focus' is 'that the specifically re-directed force of the imputed de-suspension induces and expresses the corresponding particular type of ordered e/valuational formation. So, e.g., a resulting focus on the moment of Object is phenomenological and semantic in orientation. That a joint focus on both Object and Ego moments is aesthetical in orientation and is also manifested in our cognitive ability to form integrated semantic combinations in line with conventional expectations in a recognition of 'an ordered repertoire in keeping with such a subtle, pre-conceived particular sense of focus'. Similarly, a sole focus on the Ego moment is indicative of a deontological orientation, whereas, a conjoined focus on both Ego and World moments is characteristic of pragmatic experience (be that in either an ethical mode or in a functional mode prioritizing some form of functional expediency). Then, a singling out of the World moment deals with possibility, potentiality, probability, potency, etc., i.e., hermeneutic likelihoods rather than impossible or unlikely likelihoods, etc. Last, from the possibility of possibility we establish the actuality or non-actuality of our assessments in an historical field of factual considerations. This latter orientation being arrived at through the de-suspension of both World and Object moments. (52)

Hence this heuristic nature of the ordered scheme. (53)

That, if the de-suspension is regarded as if it were being subtly re-directed (somewhat like the chaotic re-direction of the so-called third moment but in a super-

imposition upon these relatively more basic economic processes) then we might find it worth our while to also review such re-directedness as both chaotic, able to colour existential experience, and none other than as non-economic in tenor or complexion. That, viewed in that light, we then need to conjecture the non-economic necessity of a hyper-economic process of economic contextualization in order to make sense of the non-economic irruption in question, in this instance being ordered in its complexion. (54)

This now brings me to D, the fourth conjecture proposed as a heuristic modelling of how we can experience the presentation of an inter-ordered phenomena. 'Inter-ordered' merely means the actively ordered assessment of a passively ordered assessment'. Such 'reduplications' of ordered complexes can take either a symmetrical (and commutative) format and form or an asymmetrical (and non-commutative) format and form. Let me illustrate these distinctions. Now, I would like to conjecture that a narrow definition of the possible discipline of the metaphysical can be arrived at through the symmetrical reduplication of the first trans-cognitively ordered orders. I.e., that the 'semantic-phenomenology of a semantic-phenomenological results not in a 'semantic-phenomenology but in a meta-semantic-phenomenology' which can be read as a 'narrow definition of the metaphysical'.[193] Hence in this light we can note the following imputations of distinctive inter-ordered phenomena along with their respective disciplines:

1^o x 1^o = the semantics of semantics = metaphysics (in its narrow sense).
2^o x 2^o = the aesthetics of aesthetics = psychology, etc.[194]
3^o x 3^o = the deontological nature of the deontological = existential, etc.[195]
4^o x 4^o = the pragmatical treatment of the pragmatical = the political-economic.
5^o x 5^o = the possibility of possibility = the domain and profession of science.
6^o x 6^o = the actuality of actuality = the domain of the historian. (55)

On the other hand, the asymmetrical reduplication of ordered states of e/valuational formation produce different inter-ordered states of affairs. E.g., 'the possibility of conventionally treated actualities' is different from 'the perceived actuality of possibilities'. The first combination runs a probabilistic assessment whereas the second runs a set of concerns more interested in the evidential status of that being placed under such scrutiny. I.e., 6^o x 5^o is not equal to 5^o x 6^o. (56)

Just how is such asymmetrical duplication or symmetrical reduplication to be modelled? (57)

By invoking a philosophy of transformational retreatment. I.e., by invoking an economy of pre-critical hermeneutic pre-treatment; critical phenomenological-semantic

---

193 'A broad definition of the metaphysical' has already been supplied as the 'philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation, which, 'not being philosophical', but 'meta-philosophical', can be treated as 'metaphysical in a broad sense'. Since the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation is not philosophical *per se* but meta-philosophical, etc. Such a symmetrical, reduplicated scheme between ordered parties is outlined in *The Seventh Book*… under the appropriate headings of its relevant modules.

194 By 'etc.' is meant the tentative reduplications of psychology of psychology as sociology, etc.

195 In a movement from the non-systematic so-called third moment of the existential to its more systematically oriented sense holistically pervading an experience of the relatively pro-relational.

treatment; and post-critical existential retreatment (along its posttreatment of the pre-critical, etc.)… a process where the elevation by one meta-degree in the process aspect of treatment is reversed, through the de-suspension in the retreatment/posttreatment phase of this dialectically conceived economy.[196] (58)

In other words, in a simplistic modelling, we could imagine an ordered process of evaluation, conducted from the perspective of the Trans-Cognitive Aspect, as transforming a prior process of ordered valuation, as conducted from the perspective of the Cognitive Aspect. (59)

Hence the range and value of this working concept of the 'de-suspension' (hitherto completely overlooked within the profession of the philosopher *et al*). (60)

In the light of the above I would like to conjecture that the re-directed forcefulness of the de-suspension also has a considerable role to play in the enaction of our volition. Let me briefly explain (this aspect of the extensive suspension) in which the role of volition is to be modelled. (61)

We could conjecture, e.g., that in the suspension of the virtual, an alignment with the non-virtual could be instigated in such a manner that results in an exercise of our volition, hopefully, in a reasonable tune with the intentional objectives of our arbitrated-aspirations, etc. (62)

That, all in all, a more central role must be found for the conceptual contribution of the 'de-suspension' given that the imputed non-economic and existential forcefulness of the de-suspension is now implicated in a wide range of judgmental phenomena; their implementation in either simple or complex forms of e/valuational formation; and their co-associated professions found able to co-opt the natural utility of such orientations, be they presented as either simple or complex in their evolving constitution and tenor. So, in this manner, e.g., we could conceive of 'science' as 'evaluating the possibility of certain possibilities, etc.', whereas, in a contrast, we could conceive of 'history' as the 'factual assessment of the factual assessment of a certain set/s and sequence/s of events, etc.' Whilst also arguing for a non-commutative-like state of affairs, say, between the asymmetrical inter-ordered relations pertaining to 'the science of history' *versus* 'the history of science', or, 'the philosophy of history' *versus* 'the history of philosophy', etc.[197] (63)

---

196 'Dialectical' in the sense that these 'sequences' are to be entertained as 'co-existing and not sequentially distributed over time (despite this sequential modelling of the same)'. Refer to the relevant modules in *The Seventh Book*…

197 Correctly, 'philosophy' as a 'discipline' is a 'super-ordered phenomenon' given my recipe for its configuration as one-part phenomenal-phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one-part existentialism (in both its non-systematic and systematic formats). But this rule applied to asymmetrical inter-ordered phenomena still holds. Furthermore, this super-ordered form is also the parent of ordered philosophies along with the philosophical appreciation of all entailed inter-ordered phenomena, etc. Refer to the relevant sections of *The Seventh Book*…

4. How do we deal with the dialectic between the economic and the non-economic?

In order to start to understand the nature of this relationship between the economic and the non-economic we have to envisage what roles are to be played by subtle forms of the de-suspension within the economy in question, ongoing processes of resolution expressed through less subtle forms of the de-suspension within that same economy, and how such processes of ongoing resolution are chaotically re-expressed by that represented relational situation in its hyper-economic re(-)contextualization assuming an economic process of re(-)appropriation is necessary in order to transform the apparent novelty of the relatively-radical into an apprehended, relatively-critical pattern of comprehension. Or, in other words how do we relate subtly informed ordered formations of the de-suspension; the overall expression of a less subtle de-suspension in the economic moment of resolution, moment by moment; and, how non-subtle moments of chaotic re-expression, from time to time, can manifest with a non-subtle, de-suspended sense of re-directedness? (64)

One way to clarify these three varieties of de-suspension is to revisit the non-economic idea that the imputed 'arrow of time' is an illustration of the non-economic. Although we can talk about a temporal economy of past, present, and future, still, the historical sequencing of events cannot be understood in those economic terms alone. But, I would also argue that the so-called 'arrow of time' as well cannot be appreciated in simple unilateral terms of reference. Some causal trajectories it would appear, more or less, are very much just more of the same, whereas, on the other hand, we find evidence for events that suddenly strike off in new and novel directions that no longer can merely be regarded as just 'more of the same'. Of course, we are never presented with a change that is so radical that we can no longer comprehend the differential manner of its transformation, since, if that were to be the case, the connectedness between those events could no longer be comprehended. So, yes, we could push a boulder down a hillside and then watch it bounce on downwards until it stops, but, if a missile were to be suddenly seen to descend on a nearby building, and you were to survive this explosion, you would see the destruction of that building whilst still recognizing the situatedness of that situation for you as being a transformation of your situatedness but not the absolutistical transformation of that same situation. Therefore, it would appear that we need to make a distinction between 'the unilateral directedness of the last moment' and 'the unilateral re-directedness of the first moment' should the latter be arrived at in and through a chaotic moment of relatively-radical re-direction. This idea, and its three distinctions of the expression 'subtle', is already somewhat embedded in the economic ideas of presentation, *versus* representation *versus* re-presentation. In regard to the observation of these more visible moments of chaotic re-direction, now referred to as 'unilateral re-directedness of the first moment' (and not 'the last moment') I would also like to re-define as 'events' (making a direct allusion to the work of Caputo, Derrida, Laruelle, *et al*).[198] (65)

---

198 I have been inspired here to make this necessary distinction in my reflections upon reading John D. Caputo; *The Weakness of God*: *A Theology of the Event*; Indiana University Press, 2006. The word *event* parallels the French *événement*. Treated in an existential context of intervention it becomes 'the re-iteration of the unilateral re-directedness of the first instance/s' rather than 'the mere reiteration (without the hyphen) of the unilateral re-directedness of the last instance'. By such means differentiating between virtual and non-virtual intentionality, and, then, between the relatively non-existential and relatively existential.

So, how should we review this overall concept of the ‘de-suspension’? (66)

We could say ‘that what occurs within the sphere of the economic stays within the sphere of the economic, albeit in a holistic form encoded through economic correlativity’. That, the subtleties of ordered and inter-ordered phenomena would find a presentation therein in keeping with the deliberations of that economy. Deliberations that would represent that relational situation with a certain complexion, i.e., as dealing with distinctively informed, unique forms of ordered e/valuation, etc. That such representations of its relational situatedness could then be reexpressed through all imputed moments of relational expressiveness, that, on occasions, would then find chaotic moments of a relatively-radical re-expressiveness, where the latter are then to be reviewed as unilaterally re-directed moments of the first instance. In effect, as relative non-continuities (given that absolute non-continuities have been ruled out as impossible to relate to [given that they can be neither recognized, encountered, nor engaged in experiential terms]). Hence, by this differential strategy, we can now account for the role of de-suspension as acting as a ‘presentation’ relatively internal to the representation of its relational situatedness, as a ‘representation’ expressed through its ongoing, incrementally reiterated sense of resolution, and, those moments of re-presentation that demarcate an ‘event’ expressed through a moment of a unilateral re-directedness of the first instance, and, whose comprehension also demands some form of ongoing (hyper-)economic re(-)contextualization. That granted, how might we better comprehend and illustrate this economic re(-)appropriation of the relatively non-economic? What is it about a single event that then needs to find itself being reiterated? (67)

Quite simply, any unilateral moment of the first instance, as an event, would find no form of comprehension! I.e., it would be the case that there would be neither recognition, neither encountering, nor engagement (the latter from any sense of a pro-relational semblance of an orientation in experiential situatedness)! Therefore, how might we account for the experience of an event given that in the metaphorical ‘blink of an eye’ noting would be seen? (68)

If the obvious perplexity of that conundrum is granted, how then do we form any informed process of ideation that such an event had transpired? Through its economic re-appropriation reiterated, therein and thereafter, through the process of ongoing resolution, albeit within a hyper-economic sense of context. Or, in other words, more simply put, no relational situation, in both its representation and its relational facticity, is ‘an island unto itself’! We exist in a veritable sea of overlapping relationships, along with their representations, a few more prominently presented and most others without overt forms of representation. The extended implication being that even the limits of subjectivity must overlap with intersubjectivity, and v.v. That, therein and thereafter, to some extent, the relatively-radical nature of events are hyper-economically re(-)presented through various forms of re(-)iterated resolution for if that were not to be the case there would no relationships there for us to experience along with all that that would entail, nothing more and nothing less than a completely negative nihilism… which just could not be experienced, and certainly could not be experienced as such. With the direct implication that all

talk of a negative nihilism is a complete nonsense on par with the deluded ideation that the world, instead, has a substantial footing in what would be an untenable speculation that experience could exists in such an eternal world without change. Hence the necessity for a middle path, since there can be no other… (69)

Let me reiterate and argue for these implications just listed. For a start, the hyper-economic is the default setting of our being in this overall world-of-life; in our passive being with(-)others, our actively being before(-)others, and in our finding engaged degrees of an existential freedom through(-)others. (70)

Previously, I made the imputed observation[199] 'that what remains within aa specific economic sphere remains within that economic sphere'. Now, we can make the additional observation that what is intentionally expressed must forever remain expressed (regardless of whether that is covertly or overtly published, or persists or does not persist as a well-supported factual situation with sufficiently interpreted evidence for that factual state of affairs as having occurred [as either a set/s and/or series of facts] or not). (71)

That granted, at least hypothetically, we now need to ask, 'in what non-economic manner and in which hyper-economic context these forms of intentional resolution are expressed, be they as either unilateral representations (reiterations) of the last moment or as unilateral re-presentations (re-iterations) of the first moment?' (72)

Such questioning seemingly setting us up to understand that forms of resolution not intentionally expressed are and remain as 'virtual' in epistemological orientation, whereas, in contrast, expressed forms of intentional resolution are, and will persist, as 'non-virtual' in orientation. Therefore, we could treat a non-expressed economy as intra-economic in its intent, and, expressed intentional resolution, as overtly expressed motivation, can be deemed to be 'extra-economic' in both its resolution and expression. So, motivated forms of intentional expression must occur within some form of a hyper-economic contextualization otherwise such radically-radical expressions would not be able to be economic re-appropriated, and, therein and thereby, neither recognized, encountered, and/nor engaged, i.e., relationally appreciated. Thus, we must be dealing with the relatively-radical, in need of critically conducted re(-)appropriation in an extra-economic setting. Given that 'no relational economy is an island unto itself' it should not be too difficult to identify which economy or economies are proffering the apposite context for such forms of imputed hyper-economic re(-)appropriation, i.e., successful forms of extra-economic appreciation. Let me illustrate this imputed phenomenon of this envisaged form of extra-economic re(-)appropriation. (73)

Say, I decide to go to the nearby village to do my shopping. If I merely make this decision and have not yet currently acted upon that resolution, then, such intent is merely intra-economic in its resolve or extent. However, the moment I put my backpack on, then head out the front door in order to walk to this village to go shopping, then, this internalized form of intentional resolution is being externalized through those sets of actions. Here the extra-economic pre-conditions, conditions, and post conditions, associated with

199 In the sense that what I don't intentionally publish to the world at large remains unpublished.

the expression of such intent, set the scene for the extra-economic activities being undergone. E.g., taking my backpack; walking, engaging the roads and pathways on route to this village; dealing with shops, their merchandise or services, their vendors; and all that this pattern of intent entails sets the extra-economic conditions for the successful expedition of such intent. I.e., the invocation of the requisite patterns of navigation (avoiding cars, etc.), negotiation (talking to vendors, etc.), and arbitration (using money or credit to make various purchases, etc.). Obviously, in a real-life setting, a plurality of economies is being co-opted, i.e., taking up all the relevantly appropriate meta-textual genres of behaviour in order to realize the intentional objectives of such intent, etc. However, in a hypothetical situation one might merely theorize that there exists some form of an extra-economic context in order to simply expedite the successful realization of such intent. I.e., we could perhaps be permitted to just roll this plurality of economic contexts into a simple relatively non-complex sense of an extra-economic environment in order to hypothetically deal with this issue of the relatively non-economic, be that with either reiterated expressions of the last moment or re-iterated expressions of the first moment (wherein we can then later deal with an explorations of such 'events' treated more as 'occurrences to be better understood, and appreciated, as operating in their respective existentially oriented fields of pro-relationally re-directed interaction', i.e., as, hopefully, existentially oriented patterns of interventions). (74)

So, in dealing with this dialectic between the relatively economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic what might we surmise? At some stage, we must be able to move from the intra-economic to the extra-economic, i.e., overseer the realization of our intent, be that in both reiterated or re-iterated formats. I have previously argued that we would do that through invoking some form of an extensive suspension in which an alignment between the virtual and the non-virtual was able to be crossed. We should also be able to treat the initiation of a pattern of a unilateral last moment as being initiated, to begin with, as a first moment of unilateral re-directedness on the understanding that the retention of the same would convert it to a pattern of the last moment? But then in that advent, when does an event cease to be an event? Or, when does a pro-relational existentially oriented event persist with that form of motivational orientation and, therein and thereby, persist as an existential form of intervention? In answering this question we could either argue for the persistence of an existential complexion and/or argue for its existentially apposite re-instantiation through an existential process of re-constitution, preferably on an ongoing basis through a process of both economic and non-economic re(-)constitution. (75)

Thus, at this point, what might we surmise? **Economic processes of resolution can be treated as non-economic in orientation when externalized in an extra-economic process of hyper-economic contextualization. Such 'events' must be, in effect, non-economic, at least to begin with, and, where an existential complexion is inaugurated through a pro-relational sense of 'orientated-ness' (and not merely upholding some simple existential oriented-ness in that regard?). Moreover, the relatively radical nature of such events, existentially oriented or otherwise, cannot be too radical in complexion in order to be 'comprehensively' re(-)appropriated, preferably in a critical manner.** (76)

5. How do we account for an economy that includes de-suspensions?

In the light of the above, we can now note the important role performed by the de-suspension. Basically, we can now argue that whilst suspensions initiate processes of judgment it is only through de-suspensions that can we inaugurate processes of resolution be that intra-economically or extra-economically employed, i.e., where by resolutions we either see the formation of only virtually oriented intentional formation or their externalized expression projected through processes of enacted volition. Therefore, without this important concept of the de-suspension, as a qualifier of the suspension, in all its many forms, there could be no intent be that either virtually enacted or non-virtually expressed. It follows, therefore, that the extensive suspension, in so far as it is formulated to take into account the overall transcendental suspension, the economic input of the de-suspension, along with the additional role of the latter in the projected exercise of our intentional resolutions, that we cannot avoid this topic of the 'de-suspension'. That we must take on board the crucial roles being played by the de-suspension on all levels of economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic functioning. Moreover, given that all judgmental processes involve the subtle expression of the de-suspension in the formation of distinctive types of e/valuational formation we must also take into account the fact that de-suspensions can also subtly alter our appreciation of such ensuing ordered forms of value, and so on. Furthermore, as orchestrating all inter-ordered phenomena, and through either symmetrical or asymmetrical forms of ordered interaction, we are also left with the fact that the epistemological basis for all viable forms of disciplinary behaviour is also firmly rooted in such a 'fertile soil'. So, given such apparent complexity, how might we simplify our appreciation of this concept of the 'de-suspension'? (77)

De-suspensions figure in and on every level of both economic and non-economic activity. In this regard we can note the relatively subtle use of both suspensions and de-suspensions, etc., in ordered forms of e/valuational formations; this basis being used in a less subtle format in the formation of our virtual deliberations as enacted both trans-intentionally and intentionally; then their non-virtual expression in a non-subtle format with their exercise operating either in an unrefined, non-existential orientation and/or in a non-subtle but refined existential orientation; where the latter is exercised in forms of relational intervention enacted from a pro-relationally informed and treated perspective. Briefly, let me re-articulate just what is involved in this scheme that notes the relatively subtle, less subtle, and the non-subtle use of suspensions and de-suspensions, etc? Asking, moreover, in what manner a philosophy of transformational retreatment might further unify this scheme of the relatively subtle, less subtle, and the non-subtle? (78)

In a philosophy of 'transformational retreatment' an imputed observation concerning all processes of treatment, namely, that 'through 'metafication'[200] there was, initially, without exception, 'the necessary elevation in meta-status of that being treated by one degree', and that this was rendered as the application of a certain principle with one exception, namely, 'that in the resolution of all processes of treatment this prior ruling would need to be reversed, i.e., retreated and de-elevated by one meta-degree (lest we epistemologically ascend into ever higher and higher forms of metafication)'. The philo-

[200] My expression for this 'process of an automatic elevation by one meta-degree in status'.

sophical problem as to how both metafication and de-metafication were to operate was finally solved through the invocation, respectively, of both suspensions and de-suspensions. (79)

Economically, we also needed to note that there could be only three types or styles of treatment, namely, analytical or reductive; synthetical or reconstitutive; and nominative (arrived at through a product of the explicit or implicit dynamic balance of the former); and, given their status as economic correlativities it follows, more correctly, that they mutually co-define each other through their joint negations. I.e., that there can be, e.g., no explicit treatment process of analysis without some implicit form of both synthesis and nomination, and so on. (80)

This process of retreatment, to be observed in all processes of treatment, invoked three 'ideal' economic stages, namely, pre-critical pretreatment, critical treatment, and post-critical retreatment (along with the posttreatment of the initial phase of pretreatment), etc. By 'ideal' is merely meant the aspiration and hope 'that such processes of treatment/retreatment will be critically conducted, and, when and where relevant, will also be radically reviewed when necessary'. (81)

In ordered processes of treatment, we subtly emphasize/de-emphasize one or two economic moments in the representation or simulation of the relational economy in question (as previously alluded to[201]). So, e.g., in preferentially focusing on intentional objectivity (the archetypal economic moment of Object) we also in a subtle sense de-preferentially treated the correlative economic moments of both Ego and World. 'Subtle' because we cannot focus exclusively on any one economic moment given their mutual correlative status as already defined through their joint negations. To think that we can do otherwise is to think 'that we can think the impossible', or, rather, 'unthink the possible' since what cannot be possibly thought cannot be thought! Given that to relate to that being simulated it must first be able to be simulated, i.e., recognized, encountered, and engaged as such.[202] (82)

Upon this basis of ordered determinations in e/valuational formation (as phenomenologically semantically constituted; aesthetically implicated, say, in terms of style; deontologically implicated in potential existential terms of possible arbitration, etc; pragmatically configured/re(-)configured in terms of various forms of (cultural) expediency, etc; along with considerations of hermeneutically oriented possibility, potentiality, probability and potency, etc; and, all as being incorporated, to some degree, within various histories possessing an assortment of co-associated factual-like determinations, etc. (83)

Less subtly, we invoke processes of resolution in which we seek to resolve apparent anomalies in our simulated models of experientially interpreted reality and where

---

201 Refer to paragraph 45, etc.**

202 I.e., hermeneutically recognized meta-textually, phenomenologically encountered textually, and existentially engaged non-textually (i.e., simulated through a viable process of simulation where we can also argue 'that the simulation of simulation, through retention, etc., is, in effect, that which also acts as if were like a virtual process of non-simulation').

through processes of de-suspension we seek to form virtually oriented patterns of intentional resolution in trans-intentional terms of judgmental appreciation… without their being enacted in non-virtual, so-called 'actual' terms of reference.[203] (84)

Or, in effect, in less subtle terms of reference, through de-suspensions intentional patterns of resolutions are formulated and coherently thematized in a virtual format without being acted upon. (85)

But, in the enaction of our aspirations, albeit as navigated, negotiated and arbitrated in this world at large, through requisite forms of motivational intensification, we let the apparent forcefulness of our de-suspensions act out such deliberations in non-virtual, causal terms of reference. In effect, permitting such de-suspensions to textually re-shape the natural and non-natural configurations of our overall world-of-life as found to hand, be that through either acts of commission, omission and/or deferral (with the latter being exercised through either postponement or cancellation, or a mix of the same). (86)

Where all processes are pervaded with the effective presence or absence of a pro-relationally attuned refinement of these manifestations of the de-suspension, etc. (87)

As noted earlier, we can also state that 'the de-suspension' is 'the suspension of the suspension', and, that this could be defined as 'when one, two, or three economic correlativities are held in a dynamically balanced state of apposition'. Here, one economic moment can be virtually entertained in apposition through simultaneously invoking either its contra-intentional content and/or counter-intentional functions in that state of juxtaposition. That this apposition can be approached through invoking, say, either a global or local suspension, or by focusing on any one moment in the interrogative economy, or by allied means such as metaphorical dis-valuation, and so on. Where, in effect, any form of intently focusing on any one economic correlativity would see induced at least the covert thematization of its other correlativities along with the productive induction of a corresponding extensive suspension. Similarly, the focusing intently on either one or two moments would also induce the subtly ordered thematization of the e/valuational formation in question… And where the dynamically balanced suspension of all three moments would automatically realize an extensive suspension. That, upon this ordered basis, we can further note the less subtle formation of our virtual deliberations and their non-subtly enacted non-virtually oriented enaction; with the latter taking either a relatively non-refined, non-existential instantiation or as being reframed through a process of existentially oriented intervention (as a type of event as yet to be further explored)! (88)

---

[203] Given that all intentionally oriented experiences are 'real', are actually being entertained, e.g., from disabling hallucinations to delusions, from mere aspirations to do *x* and the actually doing of *x*, etc., it follows that we cannot critically refer, unduly, to the privileging of certain types of experience as 'real' when it is the case that all experiences are being entertained! That, philosophically, we must avoid making this mistake and critically redefine, if need be, just what is to count as more viable or less viable in this regard, say, in terms of the current modal complexion vis-à-vis reasonable modal expectation re the same. As noted elsewhere I have proffered the following formula to assist us in this type of ontical e/valuational formation, namely, the phenomenologically oriented modal headings of 'density, intensity, propensity; salience, consilence, and propinquity or standing'.

6. How do we account for causal alignment between virtual/non-virtual intentions?

For a start, in explicating the structures of the extensive suspension as divided between; first, the overall transcendental suspension; second, the economy of the de-suspension; and third, its causal processes involved in the non-virtual enaction of such virtual deliberations, we need to be mindful of not over-reading either our spatial and/or temporal metaphors. Be these aspects, with respect to each other, treated as 'overlaid', or 'underlaid', be they 'before', or 'behind', and so on it would probably be better to be relatively agnostic in such matters. In one respect, we could assume that causal phenomena, as processes of directedness, along with redirection and re-direction, would need to be located in sensory-motor or physiological regions of the psyche, yet, on the other hand, given the epistemological organization involved in the enaction of our intentional and trans-intentional deliberations we could quite easily also argue for the converse of this former sense of positioning. Obviously, the moral to be drawn from this observation is that the integrity of the psyche is necessarily involved and that all levels must be aligned and co-opted in this pursuit of exercising, collectively, not only the intentional directing of our embodiment, but, also noting the functions involved in both our embeddedness with others and our embankment in an environmental sense of world. So, therefore, we are advised not to unintentionally conflate variously possible metaphors that might work in one metaphorical setting but not necessarily work in some other rhetorically pre-constructed context (given the intimate economic correlativity argued for in the interrogative economy between rhetorical, metaphorical and apparitional orientations). In the light of the need for such caution it may well pay us to take more of an integrated over-view to the extent that we perceive that the necessary forms of alignment, however configured, must be in place, in order to proceed with such forms of causal enaction where the relatively virtual informs the relatively non-virtual, and v.v. Indeed, such reciprocity is called for given such alignments already in place between, say, the motor and sensory domains of the more physiological basis of our embodied being; or, say, between, the affective and cognitive interactions of our emotions; let alone the interactions necessary between the cognitive and trans-cognitive aspects of the psyche inescapably involved in the formation of our judgments, and, in turn, their judgmental appreciation along with their co-associated responses and our being responsible, and so on. (89)

Suffice to say, that as an embodied person socially embedded in a world of embankment constituting this world at large necessitates the requisite forms of alignment between all those contributing factors that enable our passage through this same world at large. That, in effect, we cannot and should not absolutistically demarcate these aspects of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity and inter-objectivity (lest we wish to enter the murky world of so-called 'philosophical' controversies from which, otherwise, there can be no escape!)! (90)

7. How do we account for *x* of *x* as not *x*? Through transformational retreatment!

The treatment of the *x* of *x*, be that through a simple or complex uptake of analysis, synthesis, and/or nomination, automatically invokes a process of metafication, i.e., its elevation by one meta-degree.[204] As such it follows that '*x* of *x*' as *x*', elevated by one meta-degree, cannot and should not be equated with '*x*' as it stands (in the relative object language, at least before de-metafication and all that that might entail given different transformational pathways, retransformational pathways, different points of pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment, etc.). (91)

Interpreting this formula that the '*x* of *x* is not *x*, or is meta-x, or is non-x', is one avenue for approaching the non-economic through the utilization of a non-standard, non-philosophical approach to this type of issue. Namely, e.g., 'that the economic nature of the economic is not economic being meta-economic, and, therefore, non-economic'. (92)

Of course, with metafication comes an automatic de-metafication where we are returned to the relatively initial object level in meta-status, albeit now subjected to the transformations involved in our making that type of return to where we metaphorically 'began'. Therefore, in the light of such transformation we may well need to insist that things are not equal even if the original meta-status has been reclaimed through this process of transformational retreatment. Furthermore, in a non-economic philosophy given the necessity for a reclamation of the relatively-radical in the wider terms of its, hopefully, critically treated hyper-economic re(-)contextualization (through the ensuing uptake of its posttreatment) it also follows that we must exert the requisite care not to conflate these various forms of transformational productivity. (93)

As earlier intimated, at least implicitly, automatic de-metafication comes from the automatic de-suspension of the economy in question as an ongoing process of resolution be that enacted less subtly and expressed merely virtually or non-subtly expressed through corresponding forms of non-virtually oriented enaction. But, the question now remains to be asked, 'in what sense is such re-directed resolution existentially oriented even if it were to arise as a non-systematically existential moment? Or, rephrased, to what extent is the economic resolution of our relationships, as the very basis of their evolving facticity,[205] able to be categorized either as an event that persists as a re-directed response and/or merely as an event that persists through a process of reiterated representation? (94)

Or, more succinctly, to what extent is the economic expression of the non-systematic existential moment of ongoing resolution the product of a unilaterally re-directedness of the first moment (with a hyphen) or the mere redirectedness of the last moment (without a hyphen)? I.e., just how does a systematic sense and semblance of the existential manifest in and through some form of the non-economic, etc? (95)

---

[204] This idea is first approached in this series of essays titled *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline* in Volume 1, in the 12th essay. *Pursuit*, I.12, & E.

[205] Where the relation in its relational situatedness cannot be reduced merely to the collected sum of its relational participant and parts through the non-reductive presence of this excess of relational facticity.

8. Just how do such considerations find their reflection in this Contemporary Era?

Assuming the Contemporary era is unwittingly overseeing, through forms of existential retreatment, a qualified resurrection of certain modernist attitudes that may have been deprecated through various forms of critical postmodernistic treatment, be they exercised either validly and/or invalidly, we now need to answer this question, as previously asked, in what manner can a process of pro-relational identification with our relationships be instrumental in their taking on a pro-existential complexion and all that that might entail? (96)

Or, more succinctly, to what extent is the unilateral nature of an event pro-existential or not pro-existential (in the evolving of its ensuing complexion as it occurs in and through a non-economically oriented process of an expressed resolution that becomes further enacted through some form of causal intervention?)? (97)

Or, even more to this point, to what extent is the non-economic actually 'existential' in complexion (in order to then ask 'if that understanding would alter our ensuing vision of an existential attunement with the multivarious instantiations that constitute 'our' experience of an overall relational situatedness, albeit as conducted from our own subjective set of personal perspectives?')? Hence this First Existential Conundrum, namely, how do we differentiate, if that were possible, between non-existential oriented responses and existentially oriented responses given the non-economic genesis, through the causal expression of resolution, as entailed in both types of imputed experience? (98)

To resolve this philosophical puzzle, this First Existential Conundrum, let me make the following tentative points of possible clarification under these provisional explanations: persistent existential complexion through ongoing existentialization; existentialization as existentialization of the relatively non-existent; recognizing a need for informed processes of representation; the suspension of ideological processes of distortion; the advantage of exercising relatively unobstructed processes of de-suspension; recognizing the holistic re(-)normalization of pro-relational processes of relational reciprocity; pro-relational inscription; the emergent re(-)informed re-writing of relational reporting; pro-relational facticity inducing positive forms of e/valuational formation; the deontological imperative for observing relational processes of re(-)enrichment through exercising a suitable 'set of tools' that would include the utilization of either the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of positive e/valuational formation; the counter-formation of defective relationships through an expansion of this 'tool box' through the additional inclusion of either de-creation, de-preservation and/or de-conservational forms of relational re-writing; the existential augmentation and enhancement of pro-relational motivation through the induction of requisite application of transcendental emotions, and so on. (99)

Now, let me unpack this series of twelve explanations that, as an integrated set of imputed observations, will attempt to clarify this question as 'to how we might better understand the existential implications of non-economically expressed forms of economic resolution?' (100)

i. An oft repeated requirement has been the insistence on 'the ongoing existentialization of the existential orientation' given that its mere reiteration, as stated, would quickly cease to be either proper, appropriate, and/or apposite as a process of intervention to be reapplied within that relational situatedness in question should such iterations be merely the application of unilateral redirections of the same reiterated last instance. (101)

ii. Furthermore, such 'existentialization' is 'the existentialization of the relatively non-existential' and not of the relatively existential', and v.v.[206] (102)

iii. That we need to recognizing there is an existential requirement for informed processes of representation. In this regard, we need to pay attention to all relevant factors where 'relevance' is self-defined as 'that which makes a differential difference to consequential outcomes, preferably towards a positively enriched outcome, etc.' Hence there is a need to note and foster positive outcomes along with the isolation and separation of those factors that might potentially promote negative outcomes. 'Positive outcomes' in a consequential analysis being measured, in part, through the progressive appearance of processes of positive enrichment being exercised through ongoing re(-)enrichment. (103)

iv. There is also the pressing need for the suspension of ideological processes of distortion given, e.g., that pseudo-psychotic phenomena can be induced by overinterpreting and over-committing oneself to those ideological forms of extremist ideation. On the other hand, relativistically under-inspired motivation is also very much a contradiction in terms, and, consequently, should also be avoided. (104)

v. That the advantage of exercising relatively unobstructed processes of de-suspension is usually self-evident in the positive enhancement to be found in the e/valuational formation under review. (105)

vi. That the holistic re(-)normalization of pro-relational processes of relational reciprocity have a prime role in maintaining an existential orientation through invoking the incremental augmentation of economic processes of rectification, deconstruction, and re-normalization, etc. (106)

---

[206] Where 'de-existentialization' is 'the de-existentialization of the relatively existential and not the relatively de-existential'.

vii. Through a dynamic balance being instigated between pro-relational inscriptions. Where inscriptions can be textually deposited through the exercise of a well-informed overall transcendental suspension, etc. (107)

viii. That existentially oriented attunement oversees the continual emergence of suitably re(-)informed processes that will effectively keep re-write those relational reports in question. (108)

ix. That our reception of an apparent pro-relational facticity should also induce positive forms of e/valuational formation in keeping with the nature of that reporting. (109)

x. Moreover, the deontological imperative for overseeing relational processes of relational re(-)enrichment can be exercised through the adoption and adaptation of a suitable 'set of tools' that would include the utilization of either the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of positive e/valuational formation, etc. (110)

xi. Furthermore, the counter-formation of defective relationships could also be supervised through an expansion of this same 'tool box' through supplying the additional inclusion of either the de-creation, de-preservation, and/or de-conservation of forms of relational re-writing, etc. So-called 'toxic relationships', 'bad actors', and so on could be approached through an isolation and diminution of the adverse impact arising in such relationships, given, on balance, that overall existential e/valuational formation is relatively enhanced through such forms of existentially supervised insulation, etc. (111)

xii. That the existential augmentation and enhancement of pro-relational motivation through the induction of the requisite application of transcendental emotions, etc., generally, is to be both desired and sought after. (112)

But, in taking a more intersubjective tack, how might various speculative observations and insights assist in the formation of the distinctive *zeitgeist* or *ethos* constituting the advent of this so-called 'Contemporary' era? (113)

In a previous set of reflections,[207] it was suggested that a process of hyper-modern oscillation or blurring of both modernistic and postmodernistic attitudes actually contributed to this transformational-transition to the imputed advent of this current era along with the semblance of an entailed hyper-reality. This basic argument granted, despite a plethora of possible permutations and mutations to arrive at this type of occurrence, what rationale could be put forward as an explanation for the same? Moreover, does this rationale illuminate the epistemological nature of the overall mechanism involved in the

---

[207] *Pursuit*, III.12J.

ongoing generation of an existential sense of resolution as expressed in and through our interventions. Hence these following considerations. (114)

xiii. That no absolutistical distinction can be drawn between the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential given that both orientations are 'orientations' of the same phenomenon. (115)

xiv. That any oscillation between these two orientations would induce the need for some form of existentially oriented harmonization wherein more positive features, arising from both orientations, would and should ostensively re-express themselves in the further strengthening of the existential aspect given 'that existentialization is of the relatively non-existential'.[208] (116)

xv. That the non-economically expressed harmonized resolution of the 'existentially oriented event' could be imaginatively, i.e., metaphorically, re-defined as 'the uni-lateral re-directedness of the first instance as 'the re(-)iteration of the same instance' and not merely the unilateral redirectedness of the last instance. (117)

xvi. That this existentially induced orientation is evidently the case providing, furthermore, that the hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the existential event is successfully comprehended and acted upon accordingly from the pro-relational perspective of the relationship in question, its situatedness in turn, and our situatedness, albeit as subjected to the qualifications of our all too human limitations. (118)

xvii. That the successful expedition of an existential re(-)orientation is realized through the imposition of an overall suspension of the economic considerations in question along with all relevant information representing that situation. (119)

xviii. Furthermore, that the existential re(-)orientation is existentially focused and thematized through the subtle preferencing of the Ego moment arising from the ensuing force of the de-suspension arising from the subtle suspensions (and relative de-preferencing) of both the archetypal moments of World and Object. (120)

xix. That, although centered in the deontological orientation of e/valuational formation, the existential event is not exclusively deontological and must also take on board both aesthetical and pragmatical secondary considerations as well when being suitably called for (as well as not being in conflict with tertiary adjuncts or considerations, like e.g., contradicting certain well-accepted facts, certain impossibilities, certain semantical categories not capable of being articulated or integrated, etc. (121)

---

208 As per paragraph 102.

xx. That the thematization of an existential transformational-transition is being called for is a process that takes time along with our ability to recognize the existential necessity for such a pattern of progression. (122)

xxi. That such a progression is a process that itself needs to be existentially appreciated in what amounts to a form of non-existential appreciation. (123)

xxii. Given that 'the existential appreciation of existential appreciation' is 'not existential' (and not as 'non-existential' if insightfully observed as existential in orientation) and must be 'meta-existential', i.e., as pertaining to the 'non-existential in non-economic terms of reference'. (124)

xxiii. Thence the necessity for its re(-)economic appropriation through hyper-economic re(-)contextualization given that the radically-radical cannot be comprehended and only the relatively-radical can be economically re-appropriated incrementally, etc. (125)

xxiv. Thence the complexity of existentialization as a topic despite the fact that we are merely dealing with the ramifications of a process of harmonization in which virtual intent is rendered subtly preferenced, non-exclusively, in deontological terms of reference, and, where oscillations or blurrings between the relatively existential and non-existential aspects of recent eras contributes to this recognition of the advent of a new era. (126)

That the net impact of these hypothetical imputations and observations implies that existentialization is better realized through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential, i.e., by observing the ongoing re(-)existenialization of those relational representations simulating the apparent facticity of those relationships in question through the re(-)directed re-iteration of those moments of a same first instance as long as such adapations are holistically inspired and advanced through an existential excess of e/valuational formation resulting from such existentially observed patterns of intervention. Hence this need for the existentially oriented re(-)tweaking of such inputs in order to better maximize this deontological imperative for an expansion in e/valuational formations. In effect, arising through the harmonization of incongruent relational configurations along with discordant cultural features or era, etc. That such positive enhancement in existentially oriented e/valuation is indictive, generally, that an existential attitude is being observed, hopefully, to the best of our abilities. Hence the dialectical role to be played by both suspensions and de-suspensions, and where the latter is better left relatively unobstructed through the well-exercised use of the extensive suspension that is both well-informed and is empowered to have us left, similarly, even more well-informed… therein and thereby, better motivating the enaction of those patterns of existential intervention through expressed forms of resolution in keeping with such economics, non-economics, and hyper-economics…. (127)

9. What is or are the role of existential sentiment/s and expectation/s?

Now let me pose a Second Existential Conundrum: in recent earlier work I came to opinion that value is divided between a second order aesthetics, third order deontology, and a third pragmatics. That, despite the need for a thorough extensive suspension, the sense and semblance of the existential is centered in the third order of the existential - activated by a subtle suspension of World and Ego with the ensuing force of the de-suspension primarily centered in this third trans-cognitive order of the deontological. However, this is not exclusive and we also need to take into account the two secondary adjuncts of the aesthetical and the pragmatical. Hence the form of this second conundrum, namely, as the perceived need to defuse potential possibilities of conflict between subtle, less subtle, non-subtle and/or existentially non-subtle forms of suspension, de-suspension, etc. I.e., e.g., that there could exist a potential conflict between subtle suspensions and a well-informed, thoroughly enacted suspension in order to ensure, among other things, e.g., a relatively non-obstructed platform, as demanded, for the delivery of the de-suspension, be that perceived in either radical and/or critical terms of reference. A potentially conflicted state of affairs accentuated by the apparent need for a thorough suspension of all pre-constructed ideological obstructions in order to oversee this hypothetical demand for the expedition of a relatively unobstructed process of de-suspension able to responsibly deliver and permit suitable forms of judgmental responses. In effect, the relatively unobstructed expression of a deontologically centered existential orientation is necessary in order to oversee how processes of existential intervention are to be successfully discharged in that same regard. To further compound this problem, but as also offering a solution to this Second Conundrum, is the need to introduce the role of existential sentiments and expectations (transcendental emotions) as a crucial part of this solution (in the successful resolution of this conundrum). (128)

To begin with we need to recognize that the subtly informed delivery of ordered determinations need not conflict with less subtle forms of intentional resolution along with their relatively non-subtle causal instantiation, be the latter delivered in either a relatively non-existential orientation and/or in a relatively existential orientation. Practical considerations of, e.g., ‘whether I should go shopping today or tomorrow; as to what I should buy; ‘as to which venues I am to conduct such transactions; along with options in the way of the possible mode of transport? and, so on’, are all basically questions of a practical nature. On the other hand, ‘should I visit my dying friend in hospital?’ as requested by my friend, is more of a question of value. If I were to decide to merely go shopping that day, I am sure most people would think that I am abrogating my responsibilities towards my friend. Now, the former, practical considerations are resolved through less subtle forms of deliberation, whereas, in comparison, the latter would theoretically demand considerations of an e/valuation of value. Now, I do not see a real conflict here even if such broad deliberations were to overlap given that our existential sentiments and

expectations may well demand a preferencing of considerations of value over more questions of a merely practical nature (or certain values taking precedence over certain other values). E.g., if it were the case that I was caring for a sick or incapacitated relative or friend, and I had elected to be solely responsible for their care, then, if it were the case that I had no food within my residence it would now become a relatively pressing deontological imperative to rectify this anomalous situation. So, in such a situation it might be necessary to go shopping in order to rectify this looming problem of how t feed my relative and friend along with myself. But, such demands, between the practical and the deontological, and practically between the deontological, need not be in a state of conflict. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to imagine seeing both my dying friend and then my going shopping after having visited them in order to then discharge my responsibilities to the care of my charge. Indeed, concerns of a practical nature and concerns of value need not necessarily conflict. Then, issues of conflicting priorities within either the sphere of the practical and/or those of value likewise need not impossibly conflict. But, is such conflicts are present, how might we normally defuse and resolve this type of a potential issue? Through recognizing the already present eliciting of various existential sentiments and prioritizing some over others in respect to the relatively simple performance of a consequential analysis. Let me illustrate this observation. (129)

If I were not to see my dying friend in a timely manner, I might experience regrets at having been tardy in this regard. Or, if I were not able to feed that person in my care in a timely manner, then I might feel shame among a number of negative emotions. In a more positive light, I would look forward to being with my friend before they pass away. Similarly, I might take some comfort and delight in the fact that I can responsibly take care of that person in my care and enjoy doing so. Hence, this observation that we may well be able to prioritize the performance of either certain actions and/or non-actions over others on the strength of these existentially based sentiments and expectations in so far as they appear to interact with each other in the context of our envisaging certain simulated consequential situations and our responses to the same, as further reinforced in the light of these positive and negative emotions elicited by these consequentially oriented reflections. (130)

But, this two-part resolution granted, namely, that the subtle, the less subtle, and the non-subtle (in both non-existential and existential formats) need not conflict, and where a hierarchical preferentialization of such elicited sentiments should further be able to defuse such potential issues as to how we might or should respond or not respond, etc. So, the question to consider now is, ‘just how do we experience such existential sentiments and expectations as opposed to affective emotions given their joint necessity as contributing forces in the well-motivated discharge of responsible forms of deliberation, be they either in more practical terms of reference and/or, additionally, in terms of a seemingly more important e/valuation of co-associated considerations of value?’ (131)

An argument can be made that motivation needs to not only be formed in cognitive terms of reference but also in suitable, affective terms of reference whose 'weight' is conducive to seeing out the successful discharge of such intent, and, most importantly, that there is similar need for suitable intensity of trans-cognitive sentiments that must also be in place in order to further promote and cement the realized course of such causally oriented forms of intervention. That, in effect, I am arguing that, in the economics of motivation, we need both the affective and trans-cognitive inputs in order to promote and transform virtually oriented cognitive patterns of possible enaction into non-virtually formed patterns of intervention, preferably with an existential tenor or complexion. Now, in order to explore this complex proposition, let me first seek to differentiate such emotions from such sentiment; then, second, delineate the roles played by these different aspects of the psyche; and, third, how such possible patterns of an existentially oriented intervention can then proceed? (132)

It stands to reason that emotions generated in an affective aspect of the psyche must be different, and able to be differentiated, from sentiments formed in a trans-intentional locus within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect. On the other hand, given that such processes are also refracted through the Cognitive Aspect it is not unreasonable to opine that a process of conflation could also occur at the same time? I.e., that trans-intentional sentiments and expectations are confused with pre-cognitive affective emotions and moods. So, this conflation granted, how might we differentiate such distinctly sited forms of epistemological productivity? (133)

On one hand, we have a variety of affective states, like, e.g., sadness, happiness, etc., and, on the other hand, a variety of trans-intentional sentiments such as, e.g., feeling trustworthy, being optimistic (in a realistically constructed frame of reference), feeling a strong degree of love for a certain person, and so on. If this difference were to be granted, how would we discern an imputed difference between affectively oriented emotions and trans-intentionally oriented sentiments? (134)

We could expand our defining of these candidates by supplying some form of a reason, rightly or wrongly, and assume that such reasoning would automatically differentiate their different psychic origins. Or, we might invoke a relational frame of reference as being necessarily present in the formation of sentiments and their expectations versus the relatively non-relational setting of emotions as more or less synonymous, more or less, with the extent of our embodiment alone. E.g., we could say 'being sad because…' where 'sadness' was a reasonable or unreasonable response to certain set of exigencies, or, 'we were sad because we were just being sad', say, because we were suffering from either an endogenous depression or a reactive depression. On the other hand, if we were to say 'optimism that…' the implication that follows is an outlining of the relational setting in which this optimism is being situated. A state of affairs somewhat different from asking 'sadness that…' which seems unable to recount a relational setting? Where 'opti-

mism that…' could well elicit a relationally oriented response to the effect that, in this situation the person in question could be optimistic given the circumstances of their invaluable inputs to that relationship in question as now having them in a successful position of reaping the rewards of such hard labour. However, this process is not absolutistically guaranteed and who knows we might end up given the exigencies of our natural existences. To merely say, 'sadness that… seems to leave us in a grammatical trap that has no direction for resolution as it stands. On the other hand, to unravel the messaging attached to certain forms of relationally oriented sentiments is to give a more clear picture of just the relational situatedness entailed. So, e.g., I could say, 'person A 'feels' trustworthy that, given their honesty and reliability, their work colleagues have said as much among themselves and that these positive sentiments have been intuitively appreciated by this person A whose intention was to be trustworthy. As stilted as this tentative exposition is, I perceive it to have a glimmer of the truth in so far that trans-intentional sentiments and expectations are not so much merely embodied, and practically contained, like affective emotions, but, occur in relational settings that also need to be explicated in order to communicate the full flavour of those types of expressions being utilized to indicate the existence and nature of such sentiments and not o have them conflated with mere emotions of an affective origination. Let me expand upon this intuitive reading… (135)

Now, the door is open, and we can see what might be on the other side? (136)

Basically, it appears that existential sentiments come with a relational story, the semblance of a relational context. E.g., I 'feel' optimistic, in a realistically grounded and cautious hopefulness, that I am right to believe that in the light of what instances of successfulness already to hand that I will succeed in this overall task, either as this short-term intentional project or as a longer-term program (consisting of either sequential and/or overlapping projects). The university student may ever-doubt their ability to win their degree, but, but must also acknowledge that the university in question has not postponed or terminated their course of studies, that they have succeeded so far and that they are motivated and duly behave in a manner consistent with their obtaining this objective barring the completely unexpected… like the country going to war, suffering a massive earthquake, the student having a fatal stroke, etc. (137)

Now, this relational description also hints at the fact that the very sentiments being expressed might well be shared by more than just the person expressing such sentiments. That, in essence, such trans-intentional sentiments and expectations are primarily 'simulated' in intersubjectively oriented terms of reference. That such sentiments of honesty, love, loyalty, being courageous, optimism, being able to forgive, trustworthiness, and so on, all more belong within a public domain… (138)

So, now, the plot thickens (or the sauce or soup starts to thicken if you were to prefer that more literal sense of that metaphorical allusion). Such sentiments, being in the

public domain, mean they must be shared. But, in applying a relational dialectic we move from sharing in the relationship in question to being, more correctly, shared by that same relationship given that the relationship, proportional to its relational facticity, is greater than the mere sum or totality of its relational participants. The implication being that these sentiments are 'simulations', as lived-realities, provoked by the living-reality of our relationships themselves. Although we cannot perfectly divine the absolutistical nature of living-reality, nor do we need do so, as relational participants we cannot be other than in a front-row position to better appreciate the nature of the same. Yes, I might well be courageous by disposition… and, yes, I am not perfect, and there could be occasions when I misread how to be courageous in certain situations… but, still, on balance, it is seen by others that I have and will be expected to act in just such a manner when called upon to be courageous, say, on the battlefield; or, in an act of public speaking; or, in a court of law if it were the case that certain opponents in my chosen profession have defamed my otherwise good name, and I now need to counter their baseless accusations; or, as happens all too often, a whistle-blower has to call out malfeasance by name and in the doing of their deontological duty, knowing full-well they will suffer a great loss in doing so, duly behave in the pursuit of doing their public duty, and so on. (139)

Pausing for a few moments, what might we be about to agree on in the light of the above? (140)

That 'transcendental emotions', i.e., 'existential sentiments and expectations' are primarily relational and that a pro-relational reading implies that such experiences are not just had (like embodied emotions) but also shared intersubjectively, but, more importantly, are shared with us through the auspices of our very relationships themselves. Indeed, that is why we have a metaphorically so-called 'front seat' in the 'viewing' of such phenomena. What else might we assume from the specifics of this style of harmonic reading? That, given the facticity of our relationships is also the successful result of the ongoing resolution of the relativity dissonance internal to a relationship it would follow that the apparent successfulness, or otherwise, of our relationships is a testament to this progress made in such issues of this persistent need for such ongoing resolution. That, in turn, the apparent successfulness or failure of our individual relationships will be reflected in the expression of such sentiments, and v.v. Moreover, given that we appear to carry over much of the basis for this expression of our intersubjectively sentiments it follows that even though each relationship is metaphorically 'a unique world on its own' still no world is an island in the grand scheme of the universe. Just as, e.g., a brave person in one set of circumstances is expected to be brave under a similar set of circumstances acted out in another relational setting, and so on. (141)

But, brave people are not called out to be brave all the time. Only this disposition to be brave is expected to persist unless a radical re-reading of the circumstances will lead us to think otherwise… (142)

This now brings me to re-explore my previous assessment that, rightly or wrongly, all existential sentiments are but expressions of the same existential sentiment, albeit finding different expressions in the light of different situations and different expectations, and so on. In essence, expressions of the psychic integrity of the person or persons involved in those relationships, and, where such degrees of expected integrity are transportable, more or less, across all relationships, to some great extent. (143)

Of course, such a position might appear to be a baseless optimism at its best, but, we expect a person who evinces a certain degree of authenticity to be relatively authentic in all their relationships. As one less than honest politician said of another politician, "you are just too honest." As a relational descriptor, it says just as much about the politician who uttered that confession of sorts. Then, again, as in politics, life is a series of arbitrated compromises with the obvious secret 'that we need to compromise without being compromised'. (144)

However, unfortunately, we have to compromise such a high standard by realistically recognizing that much of this world is lived under rule of dictatorial people ruling through the dictates of their parties and the room for compromising without being compromised itself could be 'fatally compromised'. Still, from time to time, people will revolt from the weight of non-existentially oriented expectations that become too heavy a price for them to continually countenance. That a recognition of the political strength of the non-existential, bad faith, public exploitation, slavery, and all other severely 'compromised' political systems, that generally do not act, primarily, on the good behalf of their citizenry we must ask, "just how do such political regimes persist through time despite their non-existential attitudes to the general well-being of their citizens?" Well, unfortunately, they must be doing something 'right', if only the bare minimum, at least for the more powerful sectors of their political-economies, since the next logical step would be either evolution or revolution in the hope that a more existentially oriented climate might eventually prevail. And that is a lesson of history well understood by those political leaders all too inclined 'to wear a crooked crown'![209] (145)

Do we have some justification for this claim that all existential sentiments, along with their expectations, are first and foremost intersubjectively based, and, mere expression of the same existential emotion or sentiment whatever name we might give it such as 'authenticity', or as 'a spiritual expression of life itself', or as 'a positive, public minded-

[209] We find a distorted echo of this 'not everything can be as bad as it was made out to be' in the tasteless claim 'that slavery in America taught slaves certain invaluable skill they could capitalize on when they were (partially) enfranchised'. Of course, things cannot be absolutely despicable, and intolerable, otherwise there would have been a revolution. As it was, there was a period of evolution that, sadly, is evidently still continuing although not without some considerable degrees of success… witness the political pushback despite the political intransigence by the makers of such disproportionate and hurtful claims.

ness', or as 'the doing of your duty (to your vision of the Divine or your fellow human beings rather than merely to the state), and so on. Although, even here, words seem to fail to name such a synchronous state of affairs? (146)

My intuition that 'expectations' must also play an important role in the shared performance of whatever establishes the prominence of such sentiments can lend itself to the argument that it this expression of social consensus that apparent grounds the uniformity of such an intersubjective understanding. The fact that such an understanding is continually in a state of evolution is not a counter-argument to the proposed validation of this central argument. On the contrary, just as existential sentiment are 'called forth' to be expressed when 'called for' in the context of the type of situation making that deontological-like 'calling' we could also argue, similarly, that consensus is also involved in a process of 'being called forth'. That, indeed, the very grounds involved in a period of an existential process of evolution demands that the relatively-radical be incrementally and sequentially recognized 'progressively' since the 'non-relatively radical', as 'the absolutely-radical', or the so-called 'radically-radical', just could not be comprehended (given that its hyper-economic re(-)appropriation, in a process of hyper-economic contextualization, just could not be commenced let alone completed should those terms of reference not fall within the requisite degrees and forms of economic comprehension necessary for this necessity of such a successful process of re(-)appropriation). (147)

But, such additional speculations put to the side, on the proposed transcendental-like unity of all existential sentiments and expectations, what are the ramifications for intentional motivation in the light of such re-positioning given this recognition of the proposed intersubjectivity of existential sentiments? (148)

Just as a great artwork expresses the totality of the psyche, say, a rich and harmonic interaction between an apposite mix of affective emotions, intellect, pertinent existential observations and insights, etc., we should note the need for our motivations to be also like great artworks, at least to the extent they similarly well-reflect the totality of both the individual and communal senses of the psyche. Put into practical terms we could translate this to mean that we should insist that the well-rounded economy of motivation is better served when appositely composed of one-part affective emotions, one-part cognitive images and concepts, and one-part transcendental (trans-cognitive) sentiments and expectations… a state of affairs best arrived at through the suitable exercise of the extensive suspension (by all parties on the behalf of others). (149)

Or, when our existential sentiments find an intersubjective alignment both among themselves, but, also with respect to the overall expectations of others and, therein and thereafter, are permitted to be expressed as communal expression issuing from the arbitrated domain that maximises the overall freedom of those individuals themselves along with all others, as if by default… (150)

10. What integrates this evolving understanding of the 'transcendental suspension?!

In the previous set of reflections, the concept of the ‘transcendental suspension’ was effectively deconstructed and reconstructed as an ‘extensive suspension’. (151)

As a result, we could say that the extensive suspension was as if a black box under whose hood we could run and integrate a series of complex processes from the economics of the overall suspension, the forceful role to be played by the de-suspension in terms of both ordered phenomena, etc., and enacting acts of volition, and so on. I.e., as encompassing the passive, active and engaged supervision of the subtle, less subtle, and the non-subtle patterns of resolution as forms of virtual and non-virtual enaction with the latter expressed in both non-refined and refined forms of the relatively non-existential and the existential respectively. Integrating this edifice are the operations of the extensive suspension as it links both the virtual sphere and is forever spilling over into a non-virtual realm, and v.v., whilst being all subjected to the critical presence of an ever-present causal dominion. Within the apparent simulation of this causal domain we are, therein, to experience a critical-radical and radical-critical dialectic where from critical forms of research and application we chance upon the innovative novelty of the relatively-radical, and, thence, its hyper-economic re(-)appropriation back within the wider economic contextualization of all experience which we might simply refer to as ‘the overall world-of-life’ or ‘life-world’. Primarily referring here to its experiential sedimentation in a historical process of continual re(-)appropriation of old and novel memes, themes, and so on (rather than it metaphysical-like treatment as the ‘Life-World’ as considered from a more controversial sense of the imputed ‘Transcendental Ideality of the so-called Life-World’ as the transcendental basis for the possibility of all forms of experience *per se*). (152)

Working through these ‘reflections’ is also a covert rehabilitation of visual metaphors. Although well-deserving to be critiqued, there is no reason why such critiques, in turn, should not be further critiqued. In exploring the workings of the interrogative economy, e.g., as would be involved in the simple asking of a question, etc., it is obvious that we cannot avoid working without a metaphorical moment in the expedition of a process of resolution inescapably involved in that very act of interrogation. (153)

That if I were to question ‘if any form of philosophy could be possibly enacted without processes of questioning’, still, such hypothetical considerations are not necessary given the ramifications of economic complexification that states ‘that all economies are mirror copies of each other’, i.e., as transformationally invariant isomorphically, given that all economies, practically and suitably constituted in trimodal terms of reference, can be made to defer to an archetypal sense of a gestalt economy from which we have no form of escape other than non-economically, which, as I have just re-outlined[210] must also, in turn, be economically re-contextualized in order to make hyper-economic sense of the relatively-radical, which quite reasonably, could be identified simply with the non-

[210] E.g., paragraph 152.

economic expression of all forms of non-virtual resolution as 'simulated' in and through our manipulations of causal phenomena…[211] (154)

Therefore, in keeping with this recognition that we cannot escape metaphorical thinking it behooves us as disciplinarians, whether as amateurs or professional philosophers or as the amateurs or professional practitioners of any other discipline, to suitably observe the requisite propriety needed in such matters. (156)

In pursuit of this covert ambition, seeking a philosophical rehabilitation of metaphors, including visual metaphors, when and where appropriate, somewhat provocatively I have titled this essay *Review*: *On Reflection… an Overview*. (157)

As a 'review' I look back onto the miscellaneous topics and themes dealt with in the first six sets of reflections. As an 'overview' I have attempted to integrate these miscellaneous 'headings' within this book that now continues, hopefully, to complete a further five more. (158)

In the next set of reflections, I set out to walk in the opposite direction with a hypothetical person who behaves as an ideological extremist relatively incapable of entering into an even-handed, open, serious, mutual, philosophical dialogue where the convictions of all parties would, quite naturally, be duly tested. In walking in the opposite direction, I will propose the entering into a narrative where either one or both parties can voice a narrative summing up where they stand in the world. In this scenario it is the role of the other party to basically listen, but, on some occasions, to gently ask questions that would devolve around the consequential ramifications of that position being voiced, but, in such a manner, that that narrator finds acceptable to themselves, albeit in front of a receptive audience that although sympathetic is in an understood position of neither promoting nor enabling the consequential course of such a narration. The objective of such an auto-narration is to let the narrator chart a consequential analysis of their own claims in the light of their current positioning in the hope that features eventually determined to be incongruent will find some form of resolution more in keeping with lived-reality of all parties, be they participants in the emission or reception of this self-explicated narration. Although over-committed ideologues might be deemed to be pseudo-psychotically less in suitable forms of alignment with lived-reality, where lived-reality is to be derived from careful expedited and well-informed extensive suspensions, and therein and thereby removed from conventional expressions and pressures of an otherwise generally inescapable default state residing in varying degrees of a social conformity, still, as with any psychosis, I have argued, hermeneutically, that insight is never completely absent, can be demonstrated despite the obvious disconnection had by the 'psychotic' person in question who must still possess, at the very least, some degree of a residual insightfulness. Working on this basis, applying methods that could be exercised within a consequential analy-

---

[211] Of course. that then leaves us with the problem of 'how do we define the overtly existential, say, authenticity, from the obviously non-existential orientation, say, of inauthenticity (as would be present in a toxic relationship, etc.)?' Somewhat addressed, e.g., in paragraph 115, where, as 'orientations' they basically different aspects of the same phenomenon. Otherwise, there could be no 'existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v.'

sis, without pressuring or forcing the person proffering the narration to expound anything other than their beliefs and ideas it is to be hoped that both parties might find a common ground and move closer together through a shared discovery more mutual form of understanding. In this regard, I also believe that the mutual development of our transcendental emotions, i.e., our existential sentiments and expectations, must also play a role in this eventual coming together of these parties, even though, it should never be the case that these disparate parties, or any parties for that matter, should find any complete form of agreement, since, to my mind, that must be a fate worse than death, or, at least, no better than a metaphorical 'Ferdinand the bull endless chewing their cud under the shade of any convenient tree…' What should work for an ever-contented bull does not work for the endlessly restless spirt of the human subject, who in finding themselves as 'person' must continually strive to re-discover themselves through the existentially expansive freedom afforded through(-)others… (159)

Following this eighth set of reflections I will then separately look into the economic correlativity of phenomenological subjectivity, hermeneutic intersubjectivity, and the sense and semblance of existential engagement… through, among other things, the auspices of existential sentiments and expectations, in order to articulate a general transformational isomorphism is and must be in existence between these three aspects of philosophical, disciplinary, and secular experience, inadvertently acting as an error correcting mechanism over the course, potentially, of all manner of psychological sociological and political forms of discourse, etc. (160)

Last, in a return to the secular world, it is my hope to bring back these reflections from whence they began in the hope that such observations and potential insights might be of assistance to us as we make our passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively. (161)

Thence, the prospective perspective of this essay as a form of an 'overview' wherein, through fleeting instances of either oversight, insight, and/or foresight, I am attempting to incrementally and sequentially foster, through the ramblings of these reflections, the fruitful explication of the evolution of this philosophical narrative whilst strictly attempting to avoid the many pitfalls of those over-zealous merchants of metaphors who, alas, actually believe in the literal existence of their deceptive wares..!! (162)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 8.8.23.

12P. The Navigation, Negotiation, and Arbitration of 'Dialogue':
The Respectful Treatment of Pseudo-Psychotic Ideation
Through Indirect Deconstruction Devolving from Focused Mutual Reflections
On Highly Probable Consequential Outcomes?

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12P. The Navigation, Negotiation, and Arbitration of 'Dialogue': The Respectful Treatment of Pseudo-Psychotic Ideation Through Indirect Deconstruction Devolving from Focused Mutual Reflections On Highly Probable Consequential Outcomes?*

We need room to think and room to change our minds;
we should never exempt ourselves from entertaining
an alteration of our views and their ensuing ramifications…[212]

0. Preamble: Pre-Introduction to this Complex Topic Dealing with Divergent Views

In this essay I proffer some practical reflections, primarily, on the philosophical problem of 'how do we respectfully deal with pseudo-psychotic ideation (but not so much with either psychotic ideation or radically divergent political ideation?) that is not directly amenable to philosophically directed deconstructive forms of logic, etc?' In such situations, the latter approach is inevitably unproductive, and, on occasions, can invite forms of unsolicited violence and further entrenchment of such views. By 'pseudo-psychotic' is meant 'the expression of ideation that through either epistemological and/or ontological forms of over-commitment[213] the person, in that regard, and in that regard only, takes on a psychotic-like complexion when either voicing such points of view and/or in being questioned about such points of view should such vigorously asserted ideation be disseminated'. Unfortunately, such an inflexible attitudinal standpoint is all too often not only expressed by people in the secular world but also by disciplinarians, be the latter either professionals or amateurs. Hence the utility of this approach given that the consistently performing anti-systematic philosopher or disciplinarian or therapist will all too often have to confront, and engage, with such intellectual intransigence. Rather than a direct approach to the envisaged deconstruction, etc.,[214] of certain regions of defective thinking, instead, an indirect deconstruction is to be invited, albeit subsequently, to

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

212 Here, I am paraphrasing the observations made by a philosophical friend. In the course of the ensuing discussion, I reasoned that in dealing with pseudo-psychotic behaviour an indirect approach through some mutual form of consequential analysis might eventually initiate a positive and more productive alternation in thinking in that same regard? By 'mutual' is meant a sharing of imagined consequential trajectories with an envisaging of their more probable outcome. The invocation of a 'mutual' approach is to invite the virtual semblance of 'the look' (as per Sartre) albeit along parallel subjective lines of engagement with less of the social opprobrium that might normally accompany such more visible forms of an apparent, self-reflected upon constructions of such presupposed intersubjectivity. The use of the question mark(s) '?' is to indicate a tentative and provisional work in progress that deserves to be closely explored and where general rules for its specific application need to be further nuanced, especially, on a case by case basis.

213 Making a firm distinction between epistemological and ontological ideation to my mind is a waste of time and energy. If, epistemologically, you hold a certain belief, then, you will automatically hold its ontological commitments, and v.v., either advertently or inadvertently. E.g., if I were to believe in the existence of either 'witches' or 'unicorns', then, in my vision of the world there would be either witches or unicorns, regardless of whether, as an imputed fact, I were to be either right or wrong in holding that specific point of view.

214 I.e., deconstruction, rectification, ongoing re(-)normalization, and all other manner of approaches to be exercised with the aspiration for forms of personal and social resolution and consensus-formation, and so on.

the person in question who can, in their own time, safely and respectfully self-critique their own beliefs and practices in the hope that they, themselves, decide to alter those more adverse forms of ideation. As we are all privy to beliefs and concomitant practices that are not in an overall alignment with the lived-reality of this world at large the envisaged target of such interventions is not, and should not be either our religious or political points of view, either our personal or interpersonal perspectives on how we could or should interact with others, but, more a focusing on those over-committed attitudes (and possibly our under-committed attitudes that invite either excessive forms of skepticism and/or an apathetic relativism) in the hope that such relatively adverse form of commitment (or lack of commitment), either individually or in aggregate, either in the past and/or currently and/or in the future, can be more productively transformed primarily for the benefit of that individual themselves. The definition of 'defective thinking' being entertained along the lines of 'those forms of commitment, that through over-commitment, seriously distorted the ensuing appreciation of this world at large in such a manner that has either demonstrable or highly possible adverse consequences that have been either observed and/or are being observed and/or could be observed for either that person themselves and/or others, be the latter either directly or indirectly related to that person in question'. I.e., where from an existentially oriented point of view, a sensible and reasonable argument could be made that in either the creation, preservation and or expansive conservation of a relationship or set of relationships there is an overall loss in the richness and enrichment of e/valuational formation to be had on consequential grounds'. The relatively self-evident observation being made, as a provisional principle for existential assessment and intervention, that the mutual enrichment of our relationships usually benefits all parties concerned and enhances both personal and social forms of freedom devolving from either the creation, preservation and/or conservation of such mutual richness of interactions.[215] Now, let me unpack the potential import, practice, and possible impact of this respectful approach to a form of indirect deconstruction, etc., that

---

215215 Invoking the ethical argument 'that all forms of moral assessment eventually and inevitably refer to some relatively self-evident-like set of observations that should be taken as a 'provisional given' (without ossifying the same as 'intractable principles inhabiting some inhuman world beyond the lived-contours of personal and interpersonal space and time, etc.'). So, e.g., we do not normally kill people because 'we just do not normally kill people'. Or, e.g., we do not normally steal because we, in turn, do not want to be stolen from because 'we do not normally wish to have our possessions stolen' (and if everyone were to continually steal from each other that would ensure, as a consequence, too much social strife, along with a loss of certain practical freedoms through no longer having access to those possessions, and so on). Merely making the point that ethical pronouncements are usually based on relatively self-evident-like observations that, at the same time, should not be elevated to the status of so-called 'ethical principles' (given the necessary provisional treatment of such observations along with their necessary dialectical resolution as a consequence of an inevitable overlapping of contrary perspectives concerning the suitable discharge of behaviours in the light of such potential interpretative conflicts as to the prioritization or discounting of such apparent intra-cultural and inter-cultural observational standards, etc.). An 'existentially oriented point of view' is one that takes a 'pro-relational perspective on the ensuing creation, preservation, and/or conservation of mutual forms of relational richness and enrichment (for the reasons as just noted, etc. I.e., on grounds of the augmentation and enhancement of overall personal and interpersonal forms of freedom/s, and so on)'. Through the suitable invocation of so-called 'transcendental suspensions' (or, rather, 'extensive suspensions') the potential 'mine-field' (or 'mind-field') of ethical controversies should be considerably defused, i.e., metaphorically 'de-mined' along more pragmatic grounds of an ongoing consensus-forming, etc., preferably in the light of having performed an adequate degree of consequential analysis, and so on.

is to be enacted more by default, but, also, to be enacted through neither confrontation nor deception. (0)

To make better sense of the follow discussion (to be more regarded as a virtual dialogue to be entertained between myself and an envisaged audience) let me propose the following suggestions as headings that could be taken up in such matters:

1. Non-psychotic *versus* pseudo-psychotic *versus* psychotic (and neurotic) perspectives,
2. Respectfulness,
3. The nature of so-called 'defective ideation',
4. Direct deconstruction,
5. Indirect deconstruction,
6. Mutual and parallel processes of consequential analysis,
7. The potential consequences of such mutual 'consequential analysis',
8. Possible beneficial ramifications of this 'indirect approach'?[216] (1)

But, with a lot of water under the bridge, e.g., certain novel ideas as developed in the previous essay, let me restart this series of reflections... (2)

1. Pre-Introduction: A Broad Statement of Intent

All people, either wittingly and/or unwittingly, entertain and disseminate discordant forms of divergent thinking. 'Divergent' in the sense of 'differing from the contours and configurations of 'living-experience'. However, given the provisional formation of 'lived-experience', as inscribed in a multi-various variety of textualized formats, as works whose 'writing and reading' are forever endless 'works in progress', it would naturally follow that all people 'suffer', and will suffer, from such a discordant state of affairs regardless of whether this impact is self-originated or other-originated. However, be that as it may, let me note divergent thinking under the following non-exclusive headings, namely, psychotic, pseudo-psychotic, radically divergent, critically divergent, culturally and politically divergent; and subliminally divergent, but, for convenience let me concentrate my attention primarily upon the second heading of the pseudo-psychotic. A pseudo-psychotic state of affairs is induced through the excessive reiteration of ideological over-commitment with a distortion of 'world-viewing' when viewed from that particular type of perspective, but, generally, without the demonstrable psychological distortion of how the world might be viewed from other cultural settings. Like a psychotic orientation, a reaction of resistance can quickly be expressed that is neither amenable to evidence nor good argument, and, which, for some people on certain on occasions, especially when subjected to a process of interrogation (questioning), can elicit forms of unsolicited violence, etc. Given the near-inevitable failure of adopting and adapting a philosophical ap-

[216] One series of beneficial outcomes would be the positive re-writing of 'existential sentiments and expectations'. A recognition of this dimension being instrumental in the re-writing of this proposal from a more intersubjective sense of recognition that such a dimension exists and must be co-opted in order to ensure a greater degree of interventional successfulness. The manner of this intervention attempting to be non-judgmental, relatively passive, and more auto-catalytic in its envisaged functioning.

proach of debate, demands for shifts in positioning, etc., it follows that a new approach, a new model of interaction, is called for. In this regard, I proffer 'walking in the opposite direction'. i.e., running a respectful auto-narration where the party in question merely recounts their world-view, etc. The intent behind such patient reception is to assist the person in interconnecting their own sense of a re-working of their self-positioning and where we must hope a process of indirect or direct consequential analysis will expose those elements that are incongruent with either evidence and/or arguments (as proposed by that person themselves) and where such incongruence will be positively addressed, over time, in their own time, in a manner more aligned with communal and existentially oriented forms of alignment (without privileging either subjective readings [and writings] over intersubjective readings [and writings], or v.v.). Furthermore, the optimistic premise is being entertained that processes of insightfully re-directed re(-)alignment are ever to hand even if not currently availed of on the understanding that just as people can become relatively delusional they can become progressively less delusional as well, whilst, at the same time also recognizing that imputed forms of both relative alignment and relative non-alignment applies to all people all the time and that this same openness of understanding applies equally to communities, organizations, institutions, etc. That such understandings understood, we must also recognize that an insightful appreciation of the human condition is such that 'progress', however defined, is to be measured through the successful application of small incremental steps in repositioning with eventual outcomes then potentially taking on chaotic points of either bifurcation, emergence, or phase changes that in terms of an economy of hyper-re(-)alignment could be either positively existential and/or negatively non-existential in orientation with varying degrees in the profoundness of the unilaterally induced re-directedness of intent (be that of the last moment, the first moment, the same moment, etc.[217]). As well as this relative optimism (that changes in the relative self-appreciation of our own insightfulness can both advance or retreat) there is also the innovative avenue of making an appeal to the intersubjectivity of our trans-intentional sentiments and expectations in the hope of incrementally re(-)writing the same in a more positive existential orientation. That in thematizing such features of our lives we further reinforce the possibility of both self-clarifying and other-clarifying the manner of how our lives are to be better lived in and through our communities and the relationships forged both therein and therebetween. As implied, the emphasis in this process of auto-narration is to be more placed upon a self-clarification of such sentiments even if indirectly refracted through the relative passivity of the narrator's non-judgmental audience. Hence the 'bones' of this walking in the opposite direction being more an auto-narration conducted in an optimistic, non-judgmental setting with the aspiration that consequential ramifications will be understood and addressed by the narrator themselves, in their own time, and at their own speed. (3)

Now, from this broad, general outline let me flesh out its particular features that would then allow the passive party to a process of narration address the specifics of a hopefully successfully pattern of oversight as exercised through this form of an existentially oriented process of 'non-intervention'... (4)

---

[217] I.e., through the mere continuity redirection, a re-directed chaotic change that becomes 'institutionalized', a chaotic moment of re(-)direction that is not currently 'institutionalized' in its reading/writings, etc.

2. Introduction: Mapping out the General Trajectory of this Set of Reflections

First, I wish to explore a respectful schematization of divergent opinions under the following *ad hoc* headings, namely the psychotic, the pseudo-psychotic, the radically divergent, the critically divergent, the culturally and politically divergent; and the subliminally divergent with an emphasis being place upon the second heading of the pseudo-psychotic. (5)

Second, I will explore the conditional features that are to be entailed in the conducting of an auto-narration. (6)

Third, I will be making an appeal to intersubjective existential sentiments and expectations through their mutual thematization and promotion (at the relative expense of non-mutual, non-existentially oriented sentiments and expectations). (7)

Fourth, I will be exploring different ways of evaluating positional changes, over time, as voiced by the narrator in question be that either with the subject and/or the audience of that re(-)continued process of narration. (8))

Then, to finalize this set of reflections, I will proffer a summary and set of open conclusions, albeit operating as a work in progress. (9)

3. Respectful Schematization of Divergent Opinions

The following scheme is respectfully approached as occurring on a descriptive, non-judgmental basis; as a tentative point of commencement; as a systematic-like approach that recognizes these categories can be fluid, can be co-instantiated at the same time, and that all people have the potentiality of falling under all its headings at some point in their life; and, as a fact that there can be no person who is completely free from states of non-alignment whilst at the same time no person can ever be completely non-aligned with the living-imprints of living-experience (as deposited as lived-texts as voiced in the recounting of our lived-experiences as will be inevitably re(-)interpreted in and through a dialectic entered into by both ‘self-and-others’). That in a textual economy of living-experience we will find their simulation in the constructive nature of living-experience re-simulated and re-appropriated in and through their textual-appropriation as texts, and v.v. So, e.g., I am thinking of writing a letter and then find myself writing that letter which I will then read back to myself and possibly emend in order to better express my apparent intent, etc. (which is being ‘progressively’ refined through these internal, parallel, relatively mutual, meta-textual economies of both re(-)writing and re(-)reading, along with the eternal re(-)iterations of the same). (10)

In such matters, the phenomenologist deals with the relevant deposition of texts found to hand; the hermeneuticist deals with the parallel meta-textual genres dealing with the apparent rules for re-writing/re-reading’ of certain types of text; and, the potential or

embryonic existentialist deals with the simulation of non-texts as self-voiced and/or other-voiced by narrators. (11)

'Non-textual' in orientation by virtue of the fact that when we are absorbed in the textual economy, we forget that we are reading texts. Moreover, when we read, e.g., a well-constructed, well-written novel, it can be like as if we were 'there' within 'the world of that novel', but, since we have not be written into such a world it follows that we cannot be there and that our being 'there' can only be as if 'simulated'.[218] Furthermore, it is also the reader's ability to immediately answer if they had enjoyed reading that novel or not it follows that this overall form of appreciation, likewise, must be simulated. Recognizing, of course, that in such simulation we have no direct recourse nor have the need for direct recourse to the imputation of a as-called state that is 'non-simulated'. On the other hand, our engagement must be direct, and, given it is the continuing simulation of a simulation non-economically, we will also experience it as if it were being non-simulated whilst also understanding that such appreciation is not just passively entered into, but, also entered into in both an active and in an engaged manner (when the latter is more conducted from a pro-relational sense of perspective). Hence our potential engagement, primarily, with the intersubjectivity of trans-intentional sentiments and expectations, the recording of our affective emotions and moods, the cognitive contents of our sense-fields, memories, various acts of our imaginations, the propositions and statements of both self and others, etc. (12)

Now, let me work my way through this scheme of divergent opinions starting with psychotic processes of misinterpretation. (13)

A full-blown psychosis is usually manifested, problematically, with a general dysfunction in life-skills. To be very charitable, from the perspective of the psychotic person, the problem may not be for them so much as a problem for others. Either way, institutionalization in some form or other is usually the result of an institutionalized approach to dealing with such ensuing problematicity. Such a state of affairs could be a single episode, recurrent sets of episodes, or on a relatively permanent basis with or without fluctuations in the apparent severity of that imputed illness. Furthermore, the imputed origin/s or cause/s for such an anomalous processes of subjective-intersubjective interaction can be placed under one or more of the following headings, namely, organic (including either physiological and/or chemically-induced forms of psychosis), affective, cognitive, and/or trans-cognitive on the strength of their in their most prominent characteristic features. Hence, e.g., respectively, and non-exclusively, a senile dementia or going into the delirium tremors of alcoholic poisoning; a depression (be that either reactive, endogenous and/or agitated), a state of hypomania, and/or some form of affective agitation); schizophrenia, unreasonable paranoid ideation, other states with disruptive or intrusive hallucinatory or delusional ideation; sociopathic/psychopathic forms of defective judgmental formation and empathy, narcissism, etc. (14)

---

[218] With a similar set of arguments applying to perception, visual or otherwise; memories; imaginations; and so on.

The reason why I introduce this category of the ‘psychotic’ is that some distinctive features are also present in the ‘pseudo-psychotic condition’ and are better understood from that selective sense of perspective. E.g., in confronting a psychotic person with delusional ideation, be it either systematically expressed or non-systematically (non-)expressed, focusing on that aspect is uncomfortable for those subjects who will quickly express umbrage at such an ‘attack’ on their ‘true beliefs’ with an intensity of pushback that is equal to if not greater than the perceived intensity of that confrontation. In such a reaction there could be the possibility of violence and, therefore, this direct from of confrontation could be dangerous for the person pursuing such confrontation be it conducted both civilly and politely or non-civilly and impolitely. Witness my well-known anecdote concerning a certain Louis XIVth:

‘Louis XIVth’: I feel like Louis XIVth!

Nurse (myself): Do you speak French?

‘Louis XIVth’: None of your bloody business!! (15)

I should also add that this specific person had murdered his mother, but, because of his floridly psychotic state was serving his ‘(non-)sentence’ in a locked ward. I daresay, in hindsight, I should have been more cautious in my comments and questions, but, will argue that my relative youth and naivety as a mitigating factor in this incautious exchange. I must also admit some small modicum of envy on my part for both the wealth and good taste of that monarch, along with his cultivation of French music, although, today, I would now admit to more greatly admiring the collecting skills of the Chinese emperor Qianlong... (16)

Now, we could imagine the mother of this “Louis XIVth insisting that he was only a ‘naught boy’ and not a ‘monarch’ to understand the sort of reaction that could have well precipitated her untimely demise... to perceive the nature of that intense pushback common to both psychotic and pseudo-psychotic-like responses to situations in which their psychotic-like ideation is being directly confronted and contested. In either category there is an over-commitment to either the epistemological or ontological commitments entailed in such claims. In this reactive response, that is equal to if not more vehemently expressed than the manner of its perceived reception, we have a distinctive indicator that this type of interaction is not being entered into by one or more parties as a form of a simple conversation or as a mere statement of views, as a process of dialogue or philosophical debate, and similar. Thus, nomenclature aside, the important point to register here is that there are these two different styles of communicative interaction in dealing with the perception of controversial issues by these parties. Indeed, I have referred to such verbal encounters as discovering and uncovering ‘hotspots’, certain metaphorical ‘buttons’ that are better not ‘pushed’ and are best left circumvented or navigated around. The type of strategy many people will intuitively adopt and adapt in order to avoid ‘blowback’ from such over-committed individuals (and organizations containing a certain percentage of such individuals evincing similar forms of over-commitment on a communal level of expression). That such confrontations can also be experienced as potentially

violent which is a good reason for entering into such skillful forms of navigation around the introduction and exposition of such controversial topics. I am sure we all know people in our lives who have us walking on such metaphorical 'eggshells'. (17)

By various strategies, the hermeneuticist should be able to demonstrate these sore-points of potential contention best left non-introduced and uncontested. E.g., if we were to venture into such territory, perhaps unwisely, by asking the narrator with this type of positioning what their reply might be if they were to have heard questions and statements as expressed by themselves we could well expected to meet a disgruntled response in a manner that could be interpreted to imply that, at the very least, they possessed a certain small degree of insight even if not more overly connected to where they find themselves in terms of their current positioning. But, through such over-commitments, they will automatically distort their 'being in the world', albeit only from the perceptive of those hotspots in the case of the less-distorted vision of the pseudo-psychotic individual or community. A reluctance to change a certain potentially discordant narrative can also be read as indicative of a major discourse setting the rules for its continual enshrinement and, thereby and thereafter, obstructing its replacement by a minor discourse capable of adopting the mantle of that former major discourse. Furthermore, when faced with any strange question it might be worth our while to politely ask 'why that question is being asked' in order to give ourselves a certain heads-up that might allow us to quickly change the topic and head towards less controversial, and potentially less violent, territory. (18)

Now, not all people with radically different or strange ideas are necessarily pseudo-psychotic or psychotic in stance. As I have stated elsewhere, the radically radical cannot be understood, only the relatively-radical, given the necessary degree of time, effort and insightfulness. Not too long ago, the medical fraternity would argue that antibiotics for ulcers could be ruled out on *a priori* grounds, namely, because of the strong, acidic nature of the stomach, bacteria could not possibly exist there, so, therefore, that this type of vector just could not be the case, and, so, antibiotics would not be required in any shape or form. However, further research demonstrated that some of these premises, arguments, and conclusions were misplaced, and, that a much cheaper form of medication could be used at the expense of a whole pharmaceutical industry still wishing to promote more costly 'alternatives'. The point of this anecdote being that the radically-radical cannot be appreciated unless broken down into sequences of the relatively-radical, but, even if misunderstood need not be non-aligned with our 'progressively' evolving understanding of lived-reality (as an equally evolving representation of its living-reality). (19)

Indeed, only through the critical hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the relatively radical can we more fully appreciate the critically-radical. Therefore, even though such a person can critically announce novel claims, etc., that are demonstrably true, at least from their interpretative perspective, still, such a non-appreciation of this form of divergence may well render our appreciation as basically non-existent without being able to cast any light on the verity of those same claims until there is a time when they are finally understood and can be evaluated accordingly. (20)

In the second last category we find the mass of public opinion. Societies and their subjects entertain a wealth of details some of which we can guess, or should know as just false. Religious, cultural, and political ideologies, e.g., have a pronounced role to play in carving our certain niches that, on deeper and closer scrutiny, just would not pass muster in a working court of law. Still, that is what everyone is assumed to be thinking and we all act accordingly despite the probably lack of evidence for the positioning of such ideological claims. (21)

Finally, there exists an imputed subliminal level where ideation is divergent without out our being fully aware of the ramifications of that type of divergence. E.g., could it not be said that we are either just too optimistic, given our personal trajectory ends in death, or, not optimistic enough to overcome a not non-unnatural pessimism that will irrupt from time to time over the course of our lives? (22)

As already noted, an auto-narration is a hypothetically conceived tool for dealing primarily with the over-commitments of a pseudo-psychotic individual in the hope of indirectly diminishing the personal and social distortions concomitant upon the reiterated instantiations of such over-zealous positionings. (23)

4. Conducting an Auto-Narration

One reason for my scheme for divergent thinking (thinkers) is to illustrate that there is no one person who is immune from misinterpreted forms of such personal and interpersonal mis-alignment. However, be that as it may, there are vast differences in degree, form and manner between those over-committed souls and those inert people masquerading as relativists, and between the former and the general mass of society less focused on such extremist or impossible details, and usually demonstrating an ample sufficiency in motivation, etc., without feeling the need to over-disseminate certain pro-cultural or counter-cultural forms of ideation along with the seeking of a commensurate affirmation and confirmation of the same. (24)

Obviously, our 'being respectful' does not usually entail being seen to utilize labels that might well be viewed as derogatory. As noted, this labelling is meant to be descriptive for the reason already identified (such as differentiating the presence or non-presence of 'hotspots', as possessing or not possessing controversial 'buttons' or 'trigger-issues', etc., whether we experience pushback, or blow-back, or meet indications of potential or actual violence, actually perceive the presence or absence of certain stressed forms of over-commitment, parallel forms of affirmatory-confirmation/confirmatory-affirmation,[219] etc.). (25)

---

[219] I am merely alluding here to a phenomenon where these people with such over-commitments are actively seeking forms of parallel confirmation and affirmation without the 'insightful' expectation that that would normally be met. Yet, despite such unrealistic expectations these divergent 'voices in the apparent wilderness' expect to be recognized which might be one reason why conspiratorial communities are so powerfully bound together through their continual re-affirmation of such 'mutual' forms of confirmation. Perhaps this 'mutually contrived' process can be seen to be a dialogical mix of both self-affirmation and other-confirmation (in the midst of this apparent 'wilderness' of negative non-recognition)?

How might such a process be initiated and carried out? Honestly! The narratee should inform the prospective narrator that although they will not agree with many of their positions that both parties will seek to find viable forms of middle ground on a variety of neutral issues; that they will not be judgmental and that the same is expected in return; that it is hoped that in explicating one's beliefs to others that one also comes to better explicate one own standpoints to one's own overall sense of self; that as all people are seeking value that in finding a greater coherence in our own sense of positioning is one very powerful way of doing just that; that the narratee needs to express a desire to genuinely understand the narrator and that through such open interaction that they also hope to learn from such a mutual form of interaction and by such means come to a better understanding of people in general, especially those people who voice divergent opinions and beliefs, and so on. In a refinement of this implicit protocol, to reduce the very apparent onesidedness of a narrator *versus* a narratee the former is given permission to part-question the latter in the hope that the narratee, too, can narrate parallel segments of their own self-perceived sense of an overall narration with the mutual understanding that should limits be felt to be reached and possibly breached that a requested withdrawal from that section of the interaction, by either party, can be requested and will automatically be granted by the other party. Of course, such a protocol can be formalized, but, is probably best rendered informally given that this relationship is ostensively operating without a pronounced power differential as it is intended to operate along more compactual lines rather than in the form of a contract.[220] (26)

The idea that by explicating a certain discourse we can better self-understand the constructed nature of that same discourse should be understood by all parties as one of the motivations behind this type of interaction, but, that all forms of transformation of the narration are to be left to the narrator themselves to either conduct or not conduct, in their own time, in their own manner... That, left to the discretion of either the narrator or narratee, periodically it would be normal for either party to ask questions of the other party. However, it is up to the 'professional discretion' of the narratee to ask or not ask for points of clarification along the lines of a consequential analysis to be discerned through seeking the perspective of the narrator on their own perception of the possible, or more probable consequences that could reasonably be expected to be entailed in the exercising of such positions along with all conducted patterns of behaviour that one would expect to be exercised through the lenses of all such specific standpoints. Ideally, such questions posed by the narratee should highlight the connections being thematized by the narrator over the evolving course of their auto-narration. In the pursuit of such fine-tuning of the narrative the narratee needs to express, and stress, that any changes in the overall trajectory of such a discourse are up to the narrator to perform in their own time, etc., but can be voiced at later sessions of this process of auto-narration should the narrator wish to bring up such issues and self-observations, etc. (27)

---

[220] Arguing that contracts are founded, and should be grounded, on a working compactual basis since the non-honoring of a contract by either party reduces the ineffectiveness or the very working presence of that same contract, and where it behooves the contractor, likewise, to also proffer an equitable contract, etc.

No narration is ever conducted purely from the sole perspective of the narrator themselves if it is to be conducted as something other than a monologue. However, the narratee would need to ask themselves how they are to respond as the recipient of this narration? In my opinion, once a non-judgmental transparency is instigated, along with the outline of how this process of interaction is going to work for both parties, a decision needs to be made by the narratee as to what extent they will be relatively diplomatic or relatively non-diplomatic at least to the extent of posing follow up questions that would expose the presuppositions, etc., of the apparent arguments, propositions, and statements voiced by the narrator. Although the ideal objective of this interaction is to assist the narrator to more positively reconstruct their own narrational sense of positioning, still, diplomatically, it might be better to do this in more gentle or indirect ways rather than in a less diplomatic form of a questioning of the validity of the propositions being interrogated more directly. To clarify this diplomatic frame of reference in the light of the stated objectives, let me propose this set of provisional protocols as a tentative working basis for the exercise of the type of interaction that, at the end of the day, would need to be left up to the discretion and skillfulness of the narratee. To this end, let me divide this chart up into the fours subheadings, namely, Objectives, Mutual Benefits, Practice and Ramifications. As a footnote, these headings can be renegotiated by the narrator should they wish to do so. On the next page let me post this provisional protocol. (28)

Under ‘Objectives’ we seek a reasonable degree of transparency. That there are risks to be had by both parties. The narrator is reminded that in articulating their narration they may feel the need to alter parts of its overall trajectory, but, again, this is to be done by them in their own manner and in their time. However, such reconsiderations are to be encouraged on the grounds that a more successful narrative is one that becomes more fit for purpose so to speak. Furthermore, despite being the receptive audience of a certain narration, still, it will be difficult for any party to remain passive and the narrator, hopefully, will give their assent to the narratee being allowed to introduce points of clarification, ask similar types of question, proffer apposite comments, discreetly probe the consequential ramifications of such positioning, etc. (29)

That the ultimate *raison d’être* of this approach is to initiate more positive forms of narrational evolution, albeit as solely initiated by the narrator (on the understanding that such changes, if made, must be self-re-directed). (30)

That such a process has ‘Mutual Benefits’ which can be spelled out by the narratee, i.e., e.g., as rendering a discourse more fit for purposes, etc. (31)

‘Practice’ is to observe certain mutual guidelines in order to ensure, neutrality, non-judgmental attitudes, an attentive reception, etc., and, assist in the expedition of such a narrated discourse. (32)

It is to be hoped that ‘Ramifications’ are mutually beneficial if not ‘therapeutic’ inadvertently for the narrator. (33)

Protocols for a Non-Judgmentally Received Auto-Narration

1. Objectives

a. A mutual clarification of the positioning of the narrator, by the narrator, given the presence of an attentive, non-judgmental, 'neutral' audience.[221]
b. That the narrator, and narrator alone, should they wish, can 'reform' their narrative in any way they see fit.
c. That reiteration can quite often lead to a re-directed form of re-iteration but such choices to head in different directions is the sole preserve of the narrator.
d. That in the dissemination of any positioning to another person, as an audience, renders it in a form more able to be disseminated, at a later time, to another audience.

2. Mutual Benefits

a. Mutual understanding.
b. De-polarization of positioning
c. Discovery of in-common topics.
d. The putting into practical play the mutual acceptance of difference by either party.

3. Practice

a. Mutual engagement.
b. The narratee is to continually re-phrase propositional translations of the position or positions disseminated by the narrator (where such recycling is to be seen as a mark of respect and as a witness to comprehending what was actually being said and meant by the narrator).
c. The discreetly exercised insertion of apposite questions in order to observe further points of clarification with or without the making of an appeal to the existence of intersubjective trans-intentional/existential sentiments and expectations.
d.That the narratee, in turn, can be asked for similar points of clarification re their own positioning should the narratee feel it appropriate to respond likewise in that specific moment of this course of their interaction.

4. Envisaged Ramifications

a. That shifts in positioning could possibly occur over the telling and retelling of that narration that could self-deconstruct that narration, but, with forms of emendation, could also render it in a form that is more competent, integrated, in a more coordinated form for dissemination, etc.

---

[221] By 'neutral' is merely meant the fact that 'the narratee is both non-judgmental and will be attentive to the trajectory of the narration' whilst both parties accept they fact that neither party will either give their assent or their non-assent to the perceived validity of the positioning of the other party in whatever form it takes or will later be found to retake.

b. That there is a risk for the narrator that they might wish to alter their narration, either during and/or after it being narrated, but, that this is something they will do in their own time, in their own way, should they wish to consider such a possibility.
c. As paradoxical as it might seem, the dissemination of a certain discourse means it is now no longer just their private discourse, but, that the privacy of this discourse-sharing will be honoured by the narratee (and where the identifying details of that narration in the reportings of subsequent research will not be directly published should that be envisaged).
d. That such shifts in positioning, should they be found to occur, over the course of the narration, ideally, should be mutually recognized by both parties but that such a recognition should not be insisted upon given the principle that the narratee will do this in their own time, etc.[222] (34)

Each episode, in this process of auto-narration, is its own field of concern, Both the narratee and the narrator need to recognized that neither party will know where it it end, but, it is to be hoped that this process is mutually beneficial (and potentially 'therapeutic' for both parties). (35)

That underlying all forms of intentional behaviour are various motivations some of which will be recognized and others will be overlooked. That entering into a process of auto-narration is no different. That the envisaged clarification of our positionings in life is meant to focus of a more successful delivery of a more positive form of e/valuational formation, and, that all forms of value-seeking need to be better discerned in order to observe objectives that are fit for purpose and where the means to deliver those objectives are equally fit for purpose. That the concerned citizen of this world at large should be ever mindful of the consequences of their patterns of enaction, be they either enacted, non-enacted and/or deferred; be they either active, passive, and/or engaged. (36)

As an interesting point by the way, I could either restart this series of reflections of the course of our narratives by proffering myself as the prime candidate for such a neutral form of scrutiny or, the reader, themselves, could follow a similar type of trajectory? Just imagining such a process could well be salutary given that I have excluded no one from this scheme of divergent thinking/thinkers? (37)

[222] That these protocols can be renegotiated by the narrator at any time during the course of the narration, be that in one episode, or repeated over a number of episodes.

5. Appealing to Intersubjective Existential Sentiments and Expectations

For the sake of this type of hypothetical research project, or longer-term program, I would like to propose the following eight trans-intentional sentiments and expectations on an *ad hoc* basis as examples we might be able to profitably work with, namely, our seeking the need to recognize, encounter, and engage with these factors (be that exploration conducted individually and/or collectively):

1. Optimism
2. Integrity (Authenticity)
3. Contributory (as a charitable desire to indirectly contribute to those in need)
4. Affection (love both non-romantic and romantic in form)
5. Courageousness
6. Trustworthiness
7. Honesty
8. Empathy (compassion, sympathy, etc.). (38)

As a major thesis, I would like to argue that we have a range of sentiments as exemplified above and that all such relational imperatives have a trans-intentional complexion as well as their simulated origins in the holistic nature of the relational situation in question. (39)

As a minor thesis, I would like to argue that all trans-intentional sentiments are but reflections of the same overall relational impulse acting as an imperative in the constitution of that relationship, and subjectively, are acting as simulations in some degree of an alignment/non-alignment with the central simulation of that relational imperative. Because our current argument, for a trans-relational locus for such sentiments, does not depend upon the effective integration of such sentiments we might also refer to this same proposition as a ‘strong proposition’ or ‘stronger proposition’. On the other hand, given some form of integrity is necessary in order to avoid their working at cross purposes some form of harmonization must also be assumed. Let me assign this latter consideration to the status of a ‘minor proposition’. (40)

Therefore, in the light of the above, we are to initially assume this minor proposition, namely, that all trans-intentional sentiment and expectations occur in a relatively harmonized form whose locus is intersubjective, i.e., trans-relational or pro-relational, and, where all subjective experiences are simulations of this simulated locus of such experiences. I.e., where all sentiments are to be construed as subjective simulations of the pro-relational sense of simulation being holistically expressed from a trans-relational sense of a perspective. This means that in entering a similar relationship those involved parties have a similar opportunity to experience the sentiments being expressed by that simulated relationship *per se*. That, that granted, it implies that similar experiences entertaining such experiences of a sentimental disposition could well be in all probability a ‘sharing’ of a similar intersubjectively oriented experience, and, even more so as an im-

perative being expressed through our simulation of that same relationship.[223] That our entry to such a trans-intentional/'transcendental' domain is guaranteed to us through the invocation of the extensive suspension and its unleashing relatively non-obstructed de-suspensions. (41)

What series of argument would support this controversial contention? Given the trans-intentional, judgmental and pro-relationally oriented existential character of such trans-intentional functional-content (in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the epistemological hierarchy [psyche]) it follows that we must differentiate these 'transcendental emotions', i.e., 'existential sentiment and expectations', from the usual class/es of experience entailed in these various expressions normally designated as 'emotions' (apparently centered in affective forms of cognitively refracted experience as impressions like, e.g., pain, joy, sadness, psychic dis-ease as or discomfit in overall body-tone, etc.) given this critical recognition of their being primarily classified and located in the Affect Aspect in the form of 'both individual, affective emotions and their emplacement within the semblance of an overall sense of an affective moods (in keeping or not so much in keeping with the tenor of its overall emotional contributions)'. (42)

These subtleties put to the side, we can note that there should be a distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological difference in our reception of emotions (and moods) *versus* sentiments (and expectations along with 'our' appreciation of our ensuing existential status'). So, the question simply becomes, 'just what is this difference, or what are these differences?' (43)

That stratification in epistemological complexity being the case, we must ask, therefore, "just what forms of differentiation can be made assuming that this difference in epistemological locations between the '(Pre-Cognitive) Affective' and the 'Trans-Cognitive', respectively, is valid?" A first observation that can be made is that we find that there is a greater cognitive complexity entailed in sentiments. Or, put another way, we may well suspect that in order to thematize the phenomenal form of certain sentiments we would need to invoke a greater range of cognitive content. Consequently, we must also recognize the possible need for a greater degree of subtlety and nuance in doing so. E.g., we could express various shades and forms of optimism under a wider range of headings, like e.g., hope, aspirational, as positively motivated, as anticipating a certain degree of successfulness, expectational, etc. (44)

However, a more radical sense of difference is to be found in the emergent, pro-relational location of such sentiments as a result of both economic and non-economic forms of resolution better articulating the clarity of its entailed relational representation to the extent that we are witnessing merely the 'simulations' of such a trans-relational mode of appreciation, albeit, usually, from a personal sense of perspective! (45)

---

[223] More correctly, it is not so much a sharing between relational parties as the relationship 'insisting on the sharing' of this sentimental complexion, as an emergent and overflowing expression of itself, with those parties in a more direct manner of an existential involvement. The type of argument expressed in footnote 39 in the fifth series of reflections. *Pursuit,* III.12N.footnote 39.

In other words, trans-intentional sentiments and expectations do not properly belong to us directly but are simulated as 'simulations of the relational trajectory that the relationship, through us, more or less, would oversee being enacted along with the responses elicited by such identification/s'.[224] (46)

This recognition that our 'transcendental emotions' (i.e., existential sentiment and expectations) have an intersubjective locus and only personally experienced in and through a progressive process of simulation something that is quite shocking! (47)

However, when seriously contemplated, this 'turning around' in positioning proffers a number of obvious explanations that, hitherto, would have been quite overlooked. E.g., the power of the Sartrean 'look' is already entailed in such 'experience'. Moreover, although we might feel brave or courageous this is not a state we usually entertain for any great period of time. Similarly, this necessity for a trans-subjective, intersubjective sense of perspective is also necessary to even run phenomenological descriptions of such phenomena. 'How could I be brave?' if 'my bravery could not be contemplated by others', if only in principle? Or, what is the more essential location of such sentiments given that a relational situatedness must first be postulated for their occurrences, and so on? (48)

Therefore, this 'turning around' of such re-positioning granted, namely, that trans-intentional sentiments are either the relative presence or the relative absence of such experiences, what are the potential ramifications of such relatively-radical repositioning that could be utilized for purposes of either insight-formation, philosophical argumentation, or therapy (say, in the running of a non-judgmental process of auto-narration, etc.), etc? (49)

As the province of such sentiments belongs primarily to the trans-relational status of the pro-relationally oriented experience it follows that such sentiments are not the 'property' of the recipient of such experiences, like affectively based emotional feelings and moods, but, are the responsibility of the subject themselves to the extent those subjects, either individually and/or collectively, can act responsibly on the behalf of those same relationships and through existentially oriented patterns of intervention enact patterns of behaviour that are conducive to their mutual richness instigated through progressive forms of re(-)enrichment, etc. Assuming the relationship in question is not toxic or defectively organized, is existentially repairable, and can function or is functioning in an existential manner then it behooves us to act on its behalf through inescapable patterns of intervention that promote either the creation, preservation, and/or conservational expansion of that overall relationship (rather than necessitating either its de-creation, de-preservation, and/or de-conservation). Therefore, it requires us to philosophically ascertain the ontological status of the relational dimension in order to support this contention that the intersubjectivity our existentially inclined sentiments and expectations are primarily 'intersubjective' and not 'subjective' in orientation despite the fact that such experiences are subjectively refracted in and through cognitive terms of reference, etc. (50)

---

[224] 'Identifications' by virtue of the fact that we are ever witnessing the overlapping intersections of our primary relationships within the overall world of the relational as entailed in my concept of 'embeddedness'. We could also ask to what extent embodied and embanked experiences might also possess a primary intersubjective sense of and semblance of an ontological location?

Therefore, to ground this position through philosophical argumentation we need to ascertain the ontological status of relational experience. I would argue that as relationships emerge (through ongoing economic and non-economic patterns of resolution) and cannot be reduced to their mere sum or catalogue of their relational participants and parts, nor merely to their relevant fields of interobjectivity and intersubjectivity alone, it follows, therefore, that this relational difference cannot be reduced purely to subjective experience and all that that entails. Thence the intersubjective nature of our relationships as representations of our relational situatedness with the obvious observation that they must overlap, have a certain standing with respect to each other, and where no one relationship can be purely isolated in and of its self on its own terms of reference, and so on. Hence their hierarchical disposition with respect to each other along with the co-relative nature of their mutual thematization given their treatment within some form of a viable relational economy that, itself is entailed in a series of other overlapping economies. So, e.g., a father is a son of his father, and being a father must have children in turn making his father, in that situation, a grandparent. That, in a like manner, all relationships must overlap, and where the identification of a certain relational situatedness is the product of some form of cognitive refraction (i.e., interpretation, articulation, purposeful utilization for some reason or other, etc.)… (51)

Now, because the relational character of our relationships cannot be reduced purely to their participating participant and parts, etc., it follows that there must exist a certain 'relational difference' which can be tentatively identified as 'existential', as presenting an 'existential difference, excess or surplus of e/valuational formation, and so on'. As this difference cannot be reduced to personal experience alone of the subject it implies that our sentiments, as expressions of our relational experience, albeit as judgments, cannot be solely subjective in orientation. Therefore, given the non-reductive nature of this relational difference it follows that our experiences of the same, primarily, must be simulations of experiences being simulated by those same relationships. That those same relationships are the primary loci for that type of experience, namely, as existentially oriented sentiments and expectations. Thence the relative intersubjectivity of such trans-intentional experiences. That this must mean that although it can be argued that a certain person under certain circumstances, e.g., is being courageous because they are acting in a brave manner it would be more correctly described as that person conforming, through an 'existential alignment' with the 'call for bravery' being instigated by their relational experience of that same relationship in question. Without that relationship there could be no brave act being called forth by that relationship, and, as there can be no subjectivity without a relational field it follows that no person, by themselves alone, could perform that type of act. That, similarly, the same follows for all trans-intentional sentiments and expectation. Therefore, the apparent observation of a person 'acting in a brave manner' would be better translated as a person 'performing a brave action in the context of their current relationship that simulated the need, as a deontological-like imperative, for that person to behave in such a courageous manner'. That we can measure up in such a regard but that, ultimately, we can never perfectly match our simulations with the simulations being called for and being called forth, but, still, 'good enough' is more often than not 'good enough in lived terms of reference'. Furthermore, that 'being called for' and 'our

being called forth to deliver accordingly' needs to be read primarily in proscriptive terms of reference. Just as the perceived deontological imperative 'that a hungry person should not be left in a state of hunger' does not mean that you, yourself, should feed that person, although that might be a viable possibility, but, rather, that you ensure the situation is such that that person, by the best means available, get something appropriate to eat, etc. Reading, e.g., 'bravery' in similar terms so that 'a non-brave response should not have been performed given the circumstances apparently calling for that act of bravery'. That this primary proscriptive translation of existentially oriented experience is also to be juxtaposed against necessarily informative contrast of the invocation of phenomenal-phenomenological 'descriptions' and hermeneutical 'prescription' given the inescapable economic correlativity that must exist between all economic parties constituting a living-relationship.[225] (52)

What are the ramifications of such a profound paradigm shift? For a start, although we might appear to experience the relative presence or the relative absence of such existential sentiment and expectations, it must follow that as simulations being simulated by our relationships against which we hope to live up to that such experiences had by us can only be simulations of simulations that can only be ideally matched through proscriptively dictated and induced patterns of ongoing re(-)alignment that seemingly demand their better approximations.[226] I.e., our being receptive to such alterations in our relational trajectories, albeit as a 'work in progress' whose 'progress' is 'progressively arrived at through such forms of relational optimization'. (53)

Quite rightly, such experiences cannot be called our 'own' being primarily the preserve of our relationships whose situatednesses are currently being invoked, still, such responsibility for such responsible-responses is 'ours' and our alone! On the other hand, because of the intersubjective nature of our relationships it could also be argued that such responsibility should also be shared to that extent they contribute in some manner or other to the collective formation of such experiences. That contribution being a mix of either passive, active, and/or engaged forms of contribution. So, with the active presentation of food the hungry person would most likely smile, and, through such engagement it would be normal for those engaged individuals to take heart in the direct or indirect dispensation of such charity, given that that hungry person could have been ourselves, and so on. (54)

So, what must we take away from this 'turning around of such positioning'? That such 're(-)positioning' must imply that our agency is experiencing indirectly, that which is 'second hand', so to speak, with regard to our feeling 'the relative presence or absence of such sentiments along with their horizons of expectation', but, that in a firsthand sense had we must take direct responsibility for the apparent patterns of existential intervention

---

225 This economic characterization of a relational economy providing the argument why the existential orientation, enacted through ongoing resolution (in economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic terms of reference) is primarily being read through a proscriptive lens.

226 In the light of previous forms of analysis we could argue that such ongoing re(-)alignment is the result of realignment through hermeneutic rectification (where we follow the meta-textual rules associated with that mix of genres being appropriated), phenomenological deconstruction through re-de-mis-alignment, and ongoing re(-)normalization through those chaotic patterns of re-alignment arrived at through increment realignment, etc.

being entered into by(-)us as responsible-responses to our reading of that primary relationship in question where, it could be argued, that the relationship itself is 'writing' such a response. But, how is that possible? (55)

The mental tendency to read 'relationship' as if no more than 'reified static objects' should be considerably resisted. They have a certain power, reflecting the intensity of their relational facticity, i.e., to that extent the relationship emerges above and beyond the relative materiality of their relational participants and parts, etc. Interestingly, we can reuse a formula for delineating the distinctive nature of the apparent relational field in its manifestation above and beyond the mere sum of their relational constituents. This formula, used to assist us in delineating to what extent a phenomenologically treated experience is determined to not be relatively virtual in orientation is conducted under two sets of three headings, namely, 'density, intensity, propensity'; and, 'consilience, salience, and propinquity (or 'proximity' or 'standing')'. Whereas, in its first use, we find a greater spread of modalities being actively engaged in an experience that is effectively non-virtual ([mis]used in common parlance through its referral as the 'real' or 'actual') in this instance we find a density of one (or, effectively, zero), i.e., just one existential complexion (albeit in all its subtlety of potential sentimental interpretations); an 'intensity' directly proportion to the apparent facticity of that relationship (as a reflection, in turn, of its ongoing resolution of relational dissonance); with a 'propensity' (of tropes, memes, themes, etc.) reinforcing the apparent interpretation being insisted upon as refracted through the relatively univocal nature of its relational resolution as re(-)expressed through the refraction of its cognitive reading/writing. As for 'salience', we find an intensity of expression that highlights its current relevance; whereas, for 'consilience' we a plurality of potentially co-associated evocations arising from such relevance as will be expressed through other ordered forms of specification. E.g., in the general arising to prominence of a certain degree of relational optimism we will also find in what form such hopeful aspirations will manifest themselves should the successfulness of that project or program come to fruition to some extent or other. So, e.g., with the obtainment of a university degree the student might then aspire to a higher degree, or find an appropriate vocation with the use of that specific degree, or take up some other discipline altogether, etc. Or, e.g., in finding the fostering of romantic affection for a certain partner who is reciprocating that same aspire those romantic parties might be speculating on how they might intend to express that bond, and so on. Last, as for the heading of 'propinquity' (which can be read as either 'proximity' and/or 'standing'). (56)

Of course, as already intimated, although not necessary for my general argument, I also would argue the minor thesis/major proposition that there is only one transcendental emotion in each relationship albeit to be discerned as possessing a fluctuating intensity in the midst of each delineated relationship. However, through existentially informed cognitive refraction an array of sentimental expressions can issue from within our relational experience, hopefully, in keeping with its more, or most, pressing existential exigencies. So, in one set of circumstances the situatedness of that relationship might 'call' for the expressions of affection or courageousness or optimism or empathy, etc., and no doubt a certain set of such sentiments in keeping the dominating flavour of the current nature of that situatedness. So, in a situation calling for bravery, it is to be hoped that a

suitable act of courageousness will be acted upon. Just as when the shy person feels it their duty to speak up, despite their dislike and fear of public speaking and, then, duly does so. Or, just as when we are confronted with the news of a terrible event like that of 'missiles hitting an apartment block with the killing and injuring of the misfortunate people inside', or, 'the advent of a destructive earthquake', or, the devastation attendant upon a conflagration we could compassionately feel both empathy and a certain desire to contribute despite what might well be our inability to intervene in such terrible circumstances given a lack of standing in such matters, and so on. (57)

Now, such ideas granted, e.g., that such sentiments are primarily intersubjective, are to be read preferably through the lenses of our relationships, and have an existential complexion matching the facticity of their resident relationships, etc., it follows that they cannot be absent from our narratives, our conversations, and all other communications with others, etc., given that this aspect considerably contributes to their overall motivation along with affective and cognitive contributions, it follows that in an appreciation of our relational interactions we should pay attention to this aspect in so far as it contributes to such expressions of non-virtually oriented relational intervention, and so on. Now, admittedly, given that the philosophical presentation of this turned around, contra-conventional positioning to those of a philosophical persuasion would be hard enough to accomplish then one must wonder if the dissemination of such ideas to the relatively non-philosophical would be possible? However, the need for a well-argued philosophical presentation could be somewhat subverted by merely noting that all narratives are motivated, and, reference, directly or indirectly, that certain sentiments will be motivating our narrative, and that it is quite natural that their attendant expectations should be reasonably inferred as configuring such experiences, and, that, therefore it merely behooves us to note such sentiments that seem to be relevant to that narration and duly take them into our more considered form of consideration given their imputed roles as motiving the trajectory or trajectories of that narration. (58)

Given the advisability of taking a practical shortcut how might we apply this aspect of our considerations to the conducting of a respectfully inaugurated, non-judgmentally received auto-narration? By simply observing that certain sentiments drive the motivation of certain narratives, that they are not the sole property of any one person (and, indeed, can apply to all people), giving a provisional list of such sentiments, and then asking if the narrator might like to add to that same list as well as noting that they can do so anytime they might wish. The list of eight heading already supplied by myself included the following, namely, optimism, integrity, contributory (factors), etc. To this list it might be found that the narrator added, say, being patriotic; that we should 'stand up' for what you believe in; that left unchecked the institutionalization of institutions can and will result in miscellaneous forms of oppression of the public, and so on. (59)

Hence the running of an auto-narration in an environment that is respectful, non-judgmental, etc; where there will be recycling of the narrated text in order to represent in the form of a paraphrase what was being disseminated; invoking intersubjective sentiment for non-directed forms of discussion; hoping, advertently or inadvertently, directly or indirectly that the pre-conditions are set up that the narrator at some stage or other, in

their own time and in their own way, of entertaining the consequential ramifications of their own narration; that this greater awareness of one's own discourse might prompt more thoughtful forms of self-reflection, the requisite modifications of the same, and so on and so forth. (60)

Now, upon what grounds should we entertain an optimism that such patient forms of indirect intervention might lead such narrators to re(-)invest in modifications of their discourses that would then result in forms of narrations more in conformity with the aspirations of their communities whilst still maintaining a personal degree of integrity without any form of a blind conformity to the authoritarian-like dictates of that community, institution, or any other organization or state, etc? (61)

As previously intimated, I believe we have hypothetical grounds for such optimism given that people can and do change their minds, people do leave cults, and after some time will find themselves in a better position in order, more insightfully, to better appreciate their previous attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore, we can hermeneutically observe disparate islands of scattered forms of insightfulness that only need to be better linked and integrated in order, hypothetically, to progressively instantiate such greater degrees of insightfulness. So, the question becomes how might such disconnected forms of insight be metaphorically gathered together and then rendered as that which allows us to operate less covertly, more overtly in a manner more in alignment with the contours and configuration of this world at large? (62)

It would seem that to make progress in a more insightful direction we need to both suspend such ideological notions and then better differentiate the value they have for us. Not so much displacing one set of beliefs and replacing them with some other set, but, rather, modifying those beliefs that better deserve to be modified and then discarding those that are, at face value, more than likely discrediting themselves through patent contradictions; as having little apparent worth; are not instrumental in resolving relational differences; have little or no relevant evidentiary basis or seem to diminish that referential basis in their willful counter-reading of that 'social depository' of evidential facts, etc; do not conform to exhibiting a certain existential richness, and as proffering little or no potential forms of relational enrichment, and so on. In effect, seeking form of e/valuational formation that appear to more positively contribute to an enrichment of current levels of valuation. (63)

How might such insight be discerned or induced? (64)

By setting up the pre-conditions for our recognizing that there is a need for suspensions be they entertained either directly or indirectly, either inadvertently or advertently. A potent factor here is no doubt 'doubt', but, given the respectful conduct of this auto-narration, such a contribution must be set up either indirectly and/or through the auspices of the individual in question themselves. (65)

The very entertaining of a question puts a process of suspension into play. However, in a delusional system or the effective fabricating of a conspiracy, or similar, often

pseudo-questions have pre-ordained pseudo-answers to plug such doubts. But, then, the further calling into question such replies, be that self-directed or other-directed, which may well eventually undermine such *ad hoc* pre-constructions. I would argue that the changes inaugurated through reconstruction of such systematic-like presentations could well fall under four types of heading, namely, sand-bagging, re-purposing, the obvious deconstruction of that system, and, the diametrically opposed. E.g., the application of *ad hoc* fixes to reinforce the system in question; declaring that an earlier anticipation of a crisis has been 'averted' and a new crisis is anticipated instead along with the responses newly demanded by this rewriting of the circumstances necessitating those co-associated warnings, etc., being issued within semblance of that system; the visible falling apart of a system as it loses its integrity and powers of reinterpretation, etc: and, the complete turning around of the ontological commitment from promoting the delusional system or conspiracy, or similar. As an example of the latter, we have the obvious irony of ex-President Trump's claims of 'Stopping the Steal' when Trump, himself, has now been actually indicted for having done just that as exemplified in his famously recorded request 'I only want you to find 11,780 votes, one more than we actually have'. In effect, attempting to 'steal' that very same election. From a psychological point of view this could be referred to as a form of 'projection' - when you claim the opposition are doing what you are actually doing yourself. (66)

As an optimist we might note that as delusional systems or conspiratorial narratives have beginnings, they will also register at some point in time their eventual demise likewise. We could refer to this waxing and waning as the lifecycle of that type of presentation. Then, in the light of the fact that residual insight is never absent, as I have argued can be shown hermeneutically, then it follows that in the waning of that packaged set of beliefs we have an opportunity to ensure its eventual replacement by something more fit for purpose. By no means am I suggesting that the apparent demise of pseudo-psychotic over-commitments might not be replaced by similarly packaged sets of over-commitments, or, even in the advent of a return to conventionally determined normalcy when and where either misplaced over-commitments and/or under-placed commitments might be relatively absent. Given that I would argue that at least 95% of philosophy and the distinctive philosophies of all other disciplines are all practically nonsense, albeit dressed up in a thin veil of pretentious sensibleness, it would be uncharacteristic of myself to suggest the deconstruction of a pseudo-psychotic system would immediately put in play 'the fabulous display of a luminous field of a deeply transparent insightfulness'. Fortunately, all lived-experienced must forever be entertained as an interpretive work ever in progress. Fortunately, because the radically-radical just could not be registered or registered safely. Just as a journey is conducted step by step so, too, the work of either a disciplinarian or a secularist since the non-relatively radical just cannot be registered of all insightfulness attained is the patient reward of the hard work entailed in incrementally re(-)appropriating, critically, the relatively-radical along with the relatively non-radical given the non-existential, ordinariness of lived-existence despite moments wherein we will also experience the existential, non-ordinariness of that same course re(-)experienced through its transformational reception as living-experience. But that progress which can be made is relative, and, that relative progress is its own reward given that in furthering our alignment of lived-experience with living-experience we stand to find a correspond-

ing facilitation of our passage through this world of life, both individually and collectively, in effect, as our finding a certain degree of freedom through(-)others through this progressive re(-)alignment with this world at large. (67)

How might the imputed intersubjectivity of sentiments assist in the respectfully approached unravelling of narrations that, effectively, are or become more easy to deconstruct, whether that be by others and/or by one's own self, on the veritable grounds of their relative inauthenticity. Through ongoing resolution, the disparate parts of all narratives become 'glued together', so to speak. The strength of such binding reflecting the quality of those processes of resolution. Therefore, it follows that the more ad hoc the relations are between those prominent parts of a narrative the more easy that narrative will be found to deconstruct should it be 'leaned upon' in such a manner so as to stress the weaker operations of that narration. (68)

I have argued elsewhere that all narratives are attempts to resolve certain anomalies, but, we also need to recognize the relational fact that the full resolution of a narrative will also result in the metaphorical 'death' of that same narrative. That in the same vein too much or too little consonance, dissonance, and/or resolution will all equally prove fatal for the ongoing historical persistence of that same relationship in question. Hence this dialectical necessity of the need to walk a fine line between such extremes, to only operate within this Goldilocks domain otherwise those narratives will just dissipate and disappear. Hence the individual fragility of any narrative should its *raison d'être* dissolve before us to reveal the narrated world from which it had issued. (69)

As intimated, one of the drivers of a narrative, that which motivates its narrated persistence, besides affective emotions and cognitive forms of ideation desiring such a narrative, is the role of an oversight played by sentiments and their expectations in 'animating' that narrative in question. Narratives also have the propensity to fall into and fit 'narrational holes' of our own making. So, if we were to believe that the country is falling apart, is no longer great, then, say, it is to be expected that a patriotically inspired person would seek out those political narratives that promise to ameliorate such perceived deficits and support those same political narratives. Of course, promising is one thing, but, the ability to fulfill such promises is quite another, and, that mere claims that possible and impossible things can be done should be treated as mere claims until otherwise demonstrated as possibilities, through apposite plans of arbitrated action, that could well render such aspirational objectives in a more substantial light. But, be that as it may, difficult projects and programs demand carefully, well-executed plans of action and if no credible sets of policies are in place, then it would be right to dismiss such objectives as merely aspirational. Most people would be in an agreement with the desire to see realized such aspirational goals, but, that such forms of assent alone should not be merely extended to the disseminators of such aspirations if they can demonstrate nothing more that the mere manufacturing of such assent in the first place. (70)

Given this role of oversight, prominent forms of sentiments should be recognized and registered by the narrator as important drivers of that same narration in question. In this regard, we can ask what is the sentimental tenor of that auto-narration being narrated.

In what sense is it demonstrating the importance of a certain type of sentiment by having already created an anomalous space into which this narrative has been conveniently fitted? What sentiment is lacking or what sentiments are lacking when we explore the nature of that narrative being narrated? E.g., how might we title it? Does that narrative live up to the expectations created by the sentimental absences seeming being both created and filled by the narrator? If the narration, e.g., is overtly political in tenor then we could well ask, "what is the political point of that narrative?' and so on. Moreover, given that I have argued that all sentiments are intersubjectively manifested at the metaphorical center of our relationships, and are holistically expressed therefrom and therein, it stands to reason that we can and could well mutually explore this intersubjective dimension. E.g., in a narration with a certain sentimental flavour, we could ask, "by who is this sentiment being fostered for and for whom is this same sentiment being fostered?" Just as whenever we hear in a political context the utterance of the expression 'reforms' we should immediately ask both ourselves and other, "reform exercised by who for the benefit of whom?" Just as when we hear the time-honoured formula of 'let us make X great again' we should forever ask, "who is to make X great again and for whose benefit?" Or, more succinctly, ask ourselves just 'what does X stand for or represent (since, sadly, all too often it is a form of virtue-signaling where X does not mean X in its entirety and a certain list of 'non-x's' are being covertly excluded even if, literally, they could not be overtly excluded)'. Unfortunately, progressive forms of reform are couched in a positive format that can be so easily undermined by negative forms of commentary, doubt, minor quibbles, etc., that one must wonder if such reforms could alternatively be cast in a negative format, namely, 'do you want the *status quo* to continue along with its adverse policy settings a, b, c, etc., as adversely affecting sections of the community or nation P, Q, and R, etc?'[227] All too sadly, political discourse is driven by persistent attempts to marginalize some form of an 'other' (when true, political freedom is derived through fruitful forms of arbitration). (71)

The stated intent, or maybe the seemingly unstated intent, of the narratee is to put it quite bluntly nothing less than 'to accelerate the lifecycle of a certain set of pseudo-psychotic over-commitments'. On the other hand, that accepted, this 'walking in the opposite direction' is to be respectfully treated by both parties, without any form of judgmental pressures being exerted by either party as well. Given this 'therapeutic' framing, what benefit is there for the narrator if such 'therapy' is not envisaged as an objective to be desired by that same narrator? Despite such a handicap, given this open display of motives, just what has the narratee to bring to this contractual arrangement? I.e., what just what contractual and compactual benefits might the narrator aspire to both finding and find suitably realized through entering into this arrangement. The honest presence of the narratee who, for whatever professional or non-professional reasons, wishes to hear how the world works for a fellow human being that normally would be shunned by someone not sympathetic to their pseudo-psychotic world-view. In the spirit of an ongoing depolarization of antipathy between political fraternities, etc., the narratee can stress to the narrator that in constructing for dissemination a certain narrative they could well be strengthening that same narrative by rendering it 'more fit for purpose' through the very

[227] The reader probably recognizes that I am alluding to the current Yes Campaign arguing in Australia for a very limited, but important, degree of constitutional reform.

act of the reconstructing of it for this specific process of its anticipated dissemination. That in running it past the narratee they will become better able to articulate that same narration, and, in the process, better understand their own point of view in that same regard. If those views are firmly held, and those same views are not being verbally contested by that narratee then they should avail themselves of this opportunity to further clarify their own views if only to themselves through the auspices of this respectful audience. In this regard, the narratee should stress that this is a learning process for them as well and they look forward to the narration of this person representative of those distinctive points of views being disseminated by that type of narrator. In effect, such an occasion could be presented as a form of a challenge to the extent the narrator desires to present a cogent discourse and, hopefully, persuade the narratee to proffer their consent in the form of an affirmation of the validity of that same narration. Obviously, in response, the narratee states, and will restate, that they will assume a certain professional degree of both respectfulness and neutrality in such matters. Moreover, the narratee asks of the narrator that they both should also seek to find topics where forms of agreement, away from its controversial heartland, can be found where both parties can non-problematically give their assent, express mutual forms of both affirmation and approbation, and so on. (72)

Now, should the narratee perceive positive shifts in this controversial heartland, be that in a first session or in later session, or in reports of transformations in viewpoint, etc., the narratee is faced with an unusual dilemma. The implicit driver for a positively perceived transformational re(-)orientation of perspectives is the application of a consequential analysis be that evoked indirectly through the narrator seeking to logically integrate their systematization of their world-view in the midst of cultural perspectives that generally possess a greater degree of a perceived world-alignment, or, provoked by the gentle questioning of the narratee requesting forms of clarification in terms of the to-be-perceived or the to-be-re-perceived consequences of their positioning. I.e., just what ‘standing’ do they think they possess should they insist on articulating this type of position in contrast to some other type of position, and so on, *vis-à-vis* the probable consequences attendant upon such distinctive positioning? That, in the course of a possible transformation in the formulation of their world-views it could well be the case that, advertently or inadvertently, the narrator becomes more aligned with the positioning of the either narratee or their resident culture or their native culture and in the process would then seek forms of approbation and affirmation from the narratee themselves. However, given the respectful neutrality of the narratee, and the agreement to uphold as much with the narrator, would it be proper for the narratee to break that contract should the narrator now no longer be found to espouse their originally controversial, over-committed points of view? Since the sentiment of giving and finding positive forms of approbation is intersubjective, and belongs neither to the narrator nor the narratee would it be right or not right to withhold such affirmation in view of the that positive degree of transformational progress seemingly undergone by that narrator? Rather than my deciding this issue, correctly, let us leave it to the existential deliberations of the relationship of the narrator and narratee to decide such matter. Recognizing at the same time that all human beings need to find positive forms of affirmation, be that through friends, relatives, or those people in support grounds who have already traversed this type of territory. (73)

6. Conducting the Re(-)Appreciation of Differential Positional Transformations

Now, during a first session or a subsequent session, or after the termination of such sessions, the narrator might mention or demonstrate to the narratee that they have altered their points of view, either in part or in whole, *vis-à-vis* the relatively controversial position or positions as previously held. How does the narratee determine if this is the case or not, and, should such deliberations be directly entered into and discussed given the contractual agreement between the two parties to be both respectful and neutral? (74)

Conducting a differential consequential analysis might be the most direct way of determining the truth of such a matter, be that individually exercised by either party or by both parties in consultation with each other. E.g., the narrator might have expressed an over-committed form of ideation with respect to their aversion in accepting the benefits to be most likely conferred in accepting a course of vaccination against Covid in this recent Pandemic. Now, the simple act of refusing to be inoculated is not in and of itself the point of contention. It not unreasonable *per se* to not want to be given an injection. Or, you might have acceptable reasons for currently not accepting such a course of treatment, say, an already recognized adverse reaction to the chemical constituents of such a prophylactic medication. What is more problematic is the underlying ideation constitution such a choice. If in proportional terms certain non-evidenced based ideas are distorting this 'debate' then it is such ideation that upends a more impartial form of calculus. If current statistics suggest that one in a million people would probably suffer an adverse reaction to the vaccinations currently available and that a non-vaccinated person stood a one percent chance of dying from this illness if contracted any gambling person considering such odds would assume that vaccination was the choice we should accept, especially in the light of successful treatments being now formulated to effectively treat such adverse reactions, should they occur. In a suspension of all forms of ideological extremism, and in attending in a balanced manner to the current science already to hand, a more proportionally determined choice can and should be made. Even without taking into account the role we might play in spreading such an illness by not be vaccinated we already have to hand a quantitative assessment of risk that should decide this issue purely on the grounds of that consequentially balanced comparison. Unfortunately, not all issues can be so dispassionately settled, and, all people are prone to a wide varieties of preferences and counter-preferences to ever muddy the waters of a more scientific sense of judgment. (75)

Still, over-commitment to a certain cause (or under-commitment to an obvious cause that should be taken up) is the more problematic feature of such issues given that without viable forms of suspension ensuing forms of judgement will continue to reflect such local forms of psychic distortion. Should we be optimistic that forms of over-commitment can be duly suspended in this regard? To answer this question, let me proffer a series of suggestions that might reinforce a more residual form of optimism and in the process demonstrate to what extent we can take the measure of transformations in attitudinal outlook if and when they should occur? (76)

In the pursuit of a consequential analysis, we can take heart that although divergent thinking is the hallmark of a civilized world, in so far as such divergence is suitably

accommodated, still, a certain degree of progress can be contemplated for a certain number of reasons as here to be revisited in this cursory exploration. (77)

All systematic presentations phenomenologically have a co-associated sense and semblance of a lifecycle given their initial creation and eventual dissolution through forms of rectification, deconstruction, re-normalization, or, indeed, their auto-unravelling with or with the formal or informal application of a consequential analysis. Of course, this transformation of ideological identification may well exceed the lifetime of an individual exponent. However, we are witness, e.g., to those members of a cult or cultic-like behaviour who can, for whatever reason, voluntarily remove themselves from such influences, or, through support networks can accomplish the same objective. In observing such transitions, we stand to gain certain insights as to how such a process might be handled or indeed, better handled. (78)

There is also the optimist observation that residual insight is never lost by such proponents of a divergent presentation, and that this claim can be hermeneutically supported by various stratagems. Therefore, in working with such residual islands of disconnected ideation there is the hope that such a positive transition might be realized. One method for this form of reconnection is proposed through the application of some suitable form of consequential analysis be that applied formally or informally, be that application skillfully supplied by either an analyst and/or by the individual themselves merely contemplating the import and impact of such divergent thinking. (79)

Given the problematic nature of a philosophical or confrontational style of interaction it was suggested that a profitable alternative could present itself in the form of a ‘walking in the opposite direction’, namely, the directly or indirectly assisting of a person in order to help then contemplate the consequences of such an ideological stance in the hope that they might more positively reconstruct their approaches to that topic in their own time, in their own manner. However, despite the natural optimism of this respectful and neutral approach other benefits could also arise for both the person who consents to this form of auto-narration and the narratee as the recipient of this form of discourse. (80)

Another technique being introduced in this type of an indirect approach was the use of the controversial claim that the intersubjective nature of the relative presence and/or absence of trans-cognitive sentiments and their expectations, as motivating strands in our narrations, in conjunction with a consequential analysis, could also be harnessed in this objective of overseeing either the direct and/or indirect positive diminution of divergence along with the existential benefits proposed as arising from the envisaged ongoing re(-)alignment between ‘living-experience’ and ‘lived-experience’. However, it was also stressed throughout this essay that all people experience various forms of divergent thinking, and, more or less, that that is the natural condition of the person, be they acting as either a secularist and/or a disciplinarian. Given that the observation can be made, e.g., that the bulk of philosophical practice is inherently divergent, given the predilection for excessive preferences for either univocal and/or bimodal forms of exposition, it stands to reason that all narrators and narratees could equally considerably stand to benefit from the skillful application of this ‘therapeutic’ approach? (81)

7. Summary: Consequential Re-Positioning as a Tool for Insight-Formation?

An important argument in this essay concerns the claim that the application of a consequential analysis, whether exercised directly or indirectly, inadvertently or advertently, can both positively unravel the adverse ramifications of divergent thinking and possibly be of an assistance in the positive reconstruction of such ensuing re-positioning that, ostensively, could be less divergent. However, we should also note that effective deconstruction and profitable reconstruction do not necessarily go hand in hand, and, therefore, it behooves the practitioners of this field to ensure a supportive environment of those people exposed to such forms of methodology. How might this support be arranged? (82)

Support can be proffered through familial relations, friends, colleagues, therapists, and people in general (in the form of communities, organizations, institutions, etc.). (83)

We could imagine the probable plight of people who once held intense value-informing forms of over-commitment now no longer finding a psychic support in previously held forms of ideological identification. Some might wish to quietly disconnect from such ideas and their friends who strongly attested their identification with such ideation and reconnect with those who never supported such ideation or now no longer support such forms of identification. Obviously, the practice of a consequential analysis itself potentially has consequences that should also be contemplated, and that forms of support should be on hand for people who have submitted to such an exercise. (84)

The basic premise behind this ‘therapeutic-like claim’ that the insightful diminution of divergent thinking is salutary devolves primarily around the contention that, generally, the promotion of forms of alignment usually has a beneficial set of consequences. Of course, this is not always the case. Sadly, in the advancement of psychological insight without an effective support structure in place, the promotion of the insight that a ‘cure’ is needed, and perhaps cannot be currently supplied to the degree required, can have devasting consequences. Furthermore, in making any form of a transition in our thinking it is best that an adequate support structure be in place first before proceeding. Imagine, if you would, how devasting it would be if any number of philosophers, e.g., were to both perceive and apperceive the ‘fraudulent nature of their profession’, if that were to be the case, or, for that matter a disciplinarian were to be as equally insightful. Like a now homeless theologian who has lost their faith such people would be bereft of their old disciplines to the extent they could no longer teach in the manner as currently expected. On the other hand, through finding a mutual support through each other, such more insightful members of a discipline could eventually reform such an enterprise. No doubt the successful making of such a transition would be difficult to contemplate and even more difficult to put into practice. In navigating such transformational-transitions, we need, therefore, to be ever-mindful that both major and minor discourses will need to be navigated around, negotiated with, and arbitrated through new and novel forms of both contractual and compactual agreements. Hence the advice that before entering on such a process, adequate forms of support should be established for all relevant parties concerned… (85)

8. Provisional Conclusions, Observations, and Comments.

In this essay we witnessed the tentative intersection of four fields of theoretical concern, namely, the relatively embryonic treatment of narratives; the over-commitment co-associated with divergent thinking (here primarily of a pseudo-psychotic form); the potential power of a consequential analysis; and, the imputed, primary, intersubjective trans-relational/pro-relational locus of the controversial claim for trans-intentional and relatively existential forms of sentiment and expectations. Given that all people, whether as philosophers, disciplinarians, and/or secularists all exhibit forms of divergent thinking it follows that in the exposure of subtle, less-subtle and non-subtle forms of fabrication we all stand to find forms of benefit, be that 'therapeutic' or otherwise… as would be found arising from the supported unravelling of such systematic-like presentations (as would be further developed through pursuing rectification, deconstruction and ongoing re(-)normalization as explored elsewhere). Given that this research applies economically, non-economically, and hyper-economically, and, few presentations have barely developed a creditable level of economic appreciation, the obvious implication that can be easily drawn is that the critical work of a more radical exponent has barely begun. That, in the next four sets of reflections, I will be further exploring and scrutinizing how the sub-disciplines of the phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential can both mutually support and mutually undermine these more integrated forms of such research and how, collectively, they can existentially proffer a critical-radical/radical-critical re(-)take of how we are to approach life in a secular world…. (86)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 16.8.23.

9. Postscript: The Strategy of a Self-Referred Process of Auto-Narration

Today, the following observation was related, namely, that when conversations on rather esoteric or controversial topics went for thirty seconds, or so, that if by that point in time the audience to the conversation wasn't on board, through either a lack of understanding or generally evincing a lack of interest, the passive party to that conversation would probably express some form of an interjection to the effect that 'you were either wrong to hold that position' or that 'such a position had no interest for that party'. Furthermore, in replying to this expression of either rejection or dismissal and you were to continue to express your ideas, as a reply to such an interjection, in all probability you would find yourself wasting your time proceeding in that direction. Hence that person, in the light of their reoccurring experience, proposed this 'thirty second rule' to the effect 'that interest in a conversation had to be created within that short period of time'. That in failing to capture the concerned interest of the other party you would be met with either some form of automatic rejection or instant dismissal of that topic... if not the dismissal of yourself attempting to continue any form of a conversation. (87)

The question, or philosophical problem, then becomes 'how should we go about expressing such controversial or difficult content in a form of dissemination that would engage the passive party in this regard to actually entertain that form of content in a more positive form of engagement... if only to arrive at more mutual point of understanding,

hopefully, with some feedback on such ideas rather than either their mere rejection or sheer dismal? (88)

To some extent this observation reminded me of the type of person discussed in this current set of reflections who is relatively incapable of entering into a serious philosophical dialogue given that any form of a criticism of their arguments appears to be intensely reflected through a more personal form of self-refraction that is just too uncomfortable for them to accept and tolerate given their excessive epistemological and ontological over-commitments, regardless of whether they are held either rightly or wrongly. Indeed, it seem to matter not whether they are right or wrong in such matters, rather, it is that their intense adherence to their set of positions that can become to problematic for the over-committed party, if not on some occasions, problematic for both parties as, e.g., when a pseudo-psychotic or a psychotic party spontaneously expresses a non-verbal reply in either some indirect or direct act involving an aggressive form of intervention. (89)

Aggressive responses, initiated by the over-committed party, usually devolve around basic forms of absolutistic over-commitment to impossible forms of positioning with either a unimodal or bimodal complexion. Whereas, in a stark contrast, relativists, apparently appear to lack any self-reported form of a commitment, so, consequently, in this state of under-commitment, would be more inclined to just dismiss attempts to entertain that type of conversation since, to this type of person, for them all arguments seem to be equally valid and, therefore, there would seem to be little point in engaging in a discussion of their finer details. (90)

So, how do we profitably engage either such absolutists or such relativists? (91)

One technique worth exploring, to my mind, is to be found in a manoeuvre I would like to call a ‘self-referred act of auto-narration’ or a ‘co-opted auto-narration’. Since putting yourself more forward, under such circumstances, appears to be doomed to failure some other strategy would seem to be called for. So, in this type of situation, let the first party, themselves, ‘walk backwards’ so to speak. Let me explain. (92)

Immediately inform the person being addressed that you are possibly having second thoughts or doubts, either rightly or wrongly, about a certain topic and that you would like to know their considered opinion on that subject. In this first step you need to co-opt the interest of the other party. Once granted, you then succinctly relate the ‘problematic’ nature of your current positioning and quickly ask them for their thoughts on that topic. If rejected outright, then get them to explain their reasoning. Or, if not interested in that type of conversation impress upon them why ‘not being able to make up your mind on that type of theme is problematic for you’. In the process, re-attempt to further eliciting their assistance, and, hopefully, you will be met with a much greater degree of mutual engagement. In effect, it is you, yourself, that is ‘walking backwards’, apparently without any ideological sense of decisiveness, and this self-reflected stance may well be received in either a less threatening manner and/or in a more engaged mode of conversational interaction. (93)

In effect, ‘by posing a question in a context of doubt and asking for the assistance of the second party to help you make up your mind’ is a strategy that some might think to lack a certain requisite degree of self-authenticity. However, it is my opinion that this manoeuvre could well be conducted with a reasonable degree of integrity if you were to maintain a sense of openness, truly believe that all positioning is provisional, and that over time all arguments deserve to be emended in the light of further information, along with the self-understanding and self-presence of mind to believe that should you meet with a better set of arguments than your own that you might well feel the necessity to both appropriate the same and duly do so. That, in this form of self-honesty, such a strategy could well be adopted and adapted with the requisite degree of self-integrity being maintained accordingly. Yes, you might already have some definitively pre-decided views about this life-world, this world as lived, but, still, there is no reason why such ideas should not be tested given that what passes such forms of scrutiny would then prove to possess an even stronger form of philosophical constructiveness and edification. At the same time, imparting the opportunity for the second party to envisage potentially viable forms of a consequential analysis arising from such more detailed considerations. Just as preparing people for the possibility of virtual grief will better prepare them for experiencing actual moments of non-virtual grief. Or, just as in schools and workplaces certain instructions for earthquakes and fires, or similar, may well save lives in the unfortunate advent of having to experience that type of a crisis. (94)

Such a manoeuvre can also be orchestrated from a trans-relational perspective to the extent you are attempting to existentially operate on the behalf of that relationship. Indeed, by adopting and adapting this type of technique to the current situatedness of your relationship with this other party, you may well be delivering a service on the behalf of that relationship itself. That, more correctly, such a trans-relational objective is being overseen along pro-relational lines of an existentially oriented form of intervention... and that such constructive intervention is not being directly enacted on the behalf of the first party alone... (95)

N.T., Penrith, 24.9.23.

12Q. Reflections on the Phenomenology of Subjective Experience

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12Q. Reflections on the Phenomenology of Subjective Experience*

With every phenomenal-phenomenological field we inevitably find
Its co-associated sense of intentional subjectivity…

Hypothetically, or theoretically, a phenomenology of intentional subjectivity might be thought of as a contradiction in terms given that the phenomenological orientation is on the archetypal Object moment and subjectivity is oriented on the archetypal moment of Ego along with its sub-disciplinary focus on an existentialism (primarily in its non-systematic orientation).[228] However, with every phenomenal-phenomenological field[229] of focus invariably there is co-associated with the same its corresponding sense of subjectivity. Furthermore, from the perspective of an overall economic correlativity there is also an underlying isomorphic transformational invariance along with the recognition that no economic polarity can be either attained nor obtained in its own right, i.e., that it is impossible for anyone economic moment (and likewise any one non-economic moment or hyper-economic moment) to be appropriated other than as an approximation, or representation, or simulation, etc. Within the parameters of phenomenal-phenomenological research let us explore the phenomenon of a co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity in all it multi-variability. (0)

As a guide to its introduction, this essay will follow the interactions of a series of concepts in order to better delineate this seemingly contradictory phenomenon of subjectivity given that a phenomenology, primarily, is an analysis of intentional objectivity. (1)

That metaphorical focusing is not merely focusing in the field of intentional objectivity, as occurs in the visual field or when we attempt to delineate a stream of sounds, say, as a conversation, when being issued from a certain location in a three-dimensional/four-dimensional space (with or without a background of other voices). (2)

Just as when we look at a visual background knowing that there is neither a pure, sheer point of focus nor the mere focusing on the entirety of that visual field is possible except in relative terms of reference. Therefore, as we can relatively focus on either the relational relations between apparent points of focus or the background field in a similar manner, then, how might we focus of any co-associated sense and semblance of subjectivity? (3)

As if a certain type of subjectivity threads the identity of that imputed sequences of events? (4)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[228] Basically, I will be arguing that in order to explicate the full range of the intentional, in the perspective of a phenomenal-phenomenological analysis, I will also have to defer to the parallel economic correlativity of hermeneutical investigations and existential forms of examination given this invariable economic co-association between the trimodal polarities of each and every economy.

[229] This expression ‘phenomenal-phenomenological’ alerts us to the fact that we are effectively agnostic as to whether we, alone, constitute intentional experience or our interactive relationships also constitute the detailing of our intentional experiences along with their trans-intentional forms of appreciation.

Knowing that any orientation in economic correlativity is the joint negation of the other two economic correlatives it follows that in order to focus on intentional subjectivity we merely need to jointly negate the polarities of both foregrounded phenomenological objectivity and backgrounded hermeneutical interobjectivity and intersubjectivity. So, the question now becomes, how is such a 'joint negation' to be arrived at? (5)

A similar question arises in an ordered philosophy (relating to the genesis of the six distinctive forms of e/valuational formation, etc., that are imputed to arise within a certain epistemological aspect or level of epistemological organization). Just how does a process of a subtle preferencing or de-preferencing operate in the conceptual terms of some apposite form of epistemological modeling? By treating a process of relative suspension as the means of negation, and, the automatic delivery of the preferencing as arising through the ensuing de-suspension! (6)

So, similarly, bipolar suspensions deliver the relativity of unipolar forms of epistemological focus. Therefore, this ability to relatively focus on the co-associated semblance of subjectivity is arrived at though such a process of suspension-plus-its-de-suspension. I.e., the relative suspension of both the intentional foreground and background. (7)

In a harmonic frame of interpretation, we can read relational-subjectivity as an orientation concerned more with ongoing resolution. Since the definitive resolution of the relationship is the metaphorical 'death' of that relationship, and, no process of ensuing resolution equals the absence of a relationship. (8)

But, economic ideas of relational genesis by themselves cannot account for the unilateral directedness and re-directedness of both causal and existentially oriented patterns of intervention, etc. (9)

Hence the necessity to invoke the counter-idea of the 'non-economic'. Reading 'resolution' associated with the Ego moment as also a moment of economic irruption. This non-economic 'focus' being delivered through a suspension of both Object and Ego moments and the de-suspension being delivered 'non-economically' through the moment of Ego. (10)

So, we can also impute a non-economic sense of self. (11)

Moreover, the relatively-radical nature of such an irruption (and not any radically-radical presentation) must be received in relatively observable portions that have micro-incremental terms of reference. Otherwise, it could not be appreciated in what must be hyper-economic terms of reference. Implying, furthermore, that a co-associated sense of a hyper-economic sense of subjectivity must also be inferred. (12)

Hence the non-virtually modeling of causal intervention through an alignment with the virtual initiated through such non-economic irruption. But, the question to now

be posed is how could we differentiate relatively existential behaviour from relatively existential behaviour in such irruptive terms of reference? (13)

The tentative resolution of this puzzle is to impute the unilateral redirectedness of the non-ongoing 'last' moment *versus* the unilateral re-directedness of the ongoing 'first' moment. I.e., the one-off issuing of a unilateral causal redirectedness *versus* the ongoing re-directedness of a more existentially aligned state of relational affairs. Implying, the imputation of relational re(-)direction through relational empowerment (as will be explored in scrutinizing the genesis of the relative presence of existential sentiments and expectations (and the co-associated relative absence of the relatively non-existential sentiments, etc.). (14)

That granted, just how do non-economic and hyper-economic senses and semblances of subjectivity manifest themselves over the course of everyday experience as we live our lives in this world at large, and, what consequences has this for the inferred 'supervision' of our secular existences? (15)

Now, the following re-use of current modeling might be summoned to account for the above, namely, treating the economic as subjectively oriented, treating the conventionalizing tendencies of the hyper-economic as intersubjectively oriented it would follow that if we were to suspend both (in a state of balanced apposition) then the automatic delivery of the ensuing de-suspension through the non-economic moment could be envisaged as taking on a relatively existential orientation (in its existentialization of the relatively non-existential in the form of the suspended apposition). (16)

In this light we can now proffer this corrective, namely, that although existential sentiments and expectations can be treated as seemingly intersubjectively oriented, more correctly, they are both trans-subjective and trans-intersubjective, i.e., trans-relational to the extent the pro-relational emerges to inter-independently foster its own take on relational experience, ideally, for the enrichment of that relationship. (17)

Through such treatment we can now propose the relatively 'horizontal' economy of the economic and the relatively 'vertical' economy of the non-economic along with its necessary hyper-economic processes of critically received re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical. (18)

Hence, the ongoing restoration of the existential moment occurs through the co-associated nature of the ongoing de-suspension. Thence the unilateral re-directedness of the first moment becomes, trans-economically, and existentially, the (ongoing economy) of the unilateral re(-)directedness of the first moment, whereas, in contrast, relatively non-existential behaviour becomes the unilateral redirectedness of the last moment. (19)

Assuming the potential serendipity of the existential moment can be recognized, encountered and engaged in micro-incremental terms of observance (along with either the possibility of the novelty of 'final' vocabularies, or 'definitive' histories, and so on. (20)

Invoking in relatively existentially oriented relationships the 'toolbox' of 'creation, preservation and conservation(al expansion) in positive e/valuational formation. Extending the range of that 'toolbox' in toxic and relatively non-existential relationships through the addition of 'de-creation, de-preservation and de-conservation'. Noting that non-existentially oriented aspects to our relationships need not be deemed 'toxic' since to live in this world at large we also need to observe the performance of relatively non-existential functions like eating, working, sleeping, and so forth. (21)

Therefore, although so-called 'transcendental emotions', i.e., 'trans-intentional or existential sentiments and expectations' have an intersubjective appearance, more correctly, they should be viewed as emergent aspects of our relationships that are represented by ourselves to ourselves through processes of imputed simulation. Whilst obviously having a subjective aspect through their being experienced by ourselves, and having an intersubjective directedness, their pro-relational locus is primarily trans-relational in origination. (22)

Such an insight better accommodates 'the look of others' as explored by Sartre. Since such experiences have an intersubjective orientation through the auspices of the trans-relational dimension of relational experience.[230] (23)

'Stealing something' is one thing, but, 'being seen stealing' only compounds the complexity of the experience. Just as we might quip 'that murder is a messy business', but, 'an even messier business when observed by bystanders' since the latter might well wonder if they will also be added as collateral damage in that overall affair? Such considerations reinforcing this point that even if the relative presence of existential sentiments and/or the relative absence of the same is a trans-relational state of affairs it must also take on the appearance of an intersubjective orientation and complexion. (24)

So, we can conclude from the relative presence or the relative absence of existential sentiments and expectations that, whilst more correctly having a trans-relational expression of this pro-relational dimension, it also must follow that we can neither overlook its subjective implications nor its intersubjective ramifications.[231] By those means supplying one more avenue to explore the hermeneutics[232] of such intersubjectivity besides nav-

---

230 I.e., both subjectively and intersubjectively oriented experiences are refracted through the pro-relational emergence of the trans-relational nature of the primary relationship in question. Implying, therefore, e.g.., one cannot be purely in and of oneself in either an optimistic or trustworthy state, etc., given that both subjective and intersubjective experiences are refracted through this relatively existential dimension of the trans-relational!

231 I.e., the current implications in present experience along its overall ramifications. Treating overall 'ramifications' as a 'mix of the past sedimentation of dis-continuities, the present implication of both existentially and non-existentially oriented non-continuities, and the consequential investigations arising from (the speculation of) future continuities. Although the latter has been conventionally termed as 'a process of consequential analysis' the generality of its prospective orientation should ore correctly badge it as a process of 'consequential investigations'.

232 Hermeneutics is to be regarded as prospectively oriented. Since the meta-textual dimension in textual experience provides the framework for textual appreciation etc., through supplying the relevant genres of behaviour that also map the economic co-associated categorization of phenomenal-

igation, negotiation, and arbitration; along with the non-private nature of language and communication; observations that we cannot be absolutely ‘alone’; and so on and so forth. (25)

Thence the phenomenological complexity of subjective experience and its implication of intersubjective strands along with the pro-relational nature of the trans-relational dimension of existential experience. (26)

That without a suitable appreciation of the economic, let alone the non-economic and hyper-economic, how could either the philosopher or some other disciplinarian or, indeed, the secularist, critically and radically function in their appreciation of this world at large, this overall world-of-life? (27)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 21.8.23.

---

phenomenological treatment of natural experience. This will be briefly explored in the next set of reflections.

12R. Reflections on the Hermeneutics of Intersubjective Experience

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12R. Reflections on the Hermeneutics of Intersubjective Experience*

We can somewhat focus on a point of focus, or,
we can focus on the background of that being focused upon,
or, we can resolve these tensions between the former
and entertain some form of resolution and economic selfhood
that could then be non-economically acted upon…
giving us, therein and thereby, a more active,
if not also an engaged, sense and semblance of self-making….[233]

We can continue in the same vein and note that the economic orientation of the gestalt background can be textually viewed as hermeneutic in orientation given its 'focus' on the meta-textual emphasis for prescriptions as 'to how we generally enact intentional patterns of activity, i.e., as genres of behaviour through which such ensuing patterns of behaviour are prescriptively to be both 'written and read'?[234] That such a 'focus' on this meta-textual aspect of textual experience is similarly arrived at through a balanced suspension of both phenomenological focus and existential specificity with the automatic invocation of the delivery of the de-suspension preferencing a more hermeneutic outlook. Hence this somewhat subtle distinction between phenomenological focus and economic 'focus' of a certain economic moment, say, in any one of the three modes on offer in terms of their economic correlativity. Just as, in turn, all three economic correlativities also have a co-associated sense of self in the co-determined light of such distinctive forms of 'focus'. Hence the appellations of the 'phenomenologist', 'hermeneut' or 'hermeneuticist', and 'existentialist'.[235] Seeking, over the course of this essay, to better delin-

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

233 'Engaged' implying a non-systematic existential orientation from the so-called 'third moment' of Ego (arrived at through the automatic de-suspension in the balanced suspension of the passive Object moment and the active World moment). The deeper puzzle becomes how do we engage a relatively more existential sense of engagement through the non-economic moment in the hyper-economy of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic? Initially, through a balanced apposition between the economic(s of subjectivity) and the hyper-economic(s of intersubjectivity), but, more ultimately through a dynamic balance of all three moments of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic in this 'vertical' sense of an overall economy (as refracted through the use of extensive suspensions).

234 I am alluding to a similar problem as looked at in the previous essay, namely, how can we have a phenomenological 'focus' on subjectivity when I could argue that the latter orientation is arrived at through focusing on the relationship between foreground and background and distancing ourselves from the same. However, on grounds of economic correlativity and the imputed possession of a relatively invariant transformational isomorphism between such economic orientations along with an understanding of the role played by the automatic invocation of the de-suspension the problem ceases to be problematic as such. Similarly, we can focus on the hermeneutic background through a balanced suspension of both phenomenological 'focus' and existential specificity along the automatic delivery of the de-suspension through that moment of the hermeneutical. Hence the making of this distinction between gestalt 'focus' or phenomenological 'focus' and an economic focus delivered through the directed act of the de-suspension.

235 Similarly, over considerations of the subjectivity of the Ego moment *versus* the subjectivity of the Object moment and the World moment a similar argument is run as in the previous footnote (through invoking the imputed phenomenon of the de-suspension, deeper levels of relative transformational invariance underlying economic correlativity, etc.). I like to define a hermeneuticist as operating form a more theoretical or critical/radical sense of perspective, whereas, in contrast, the hermeneut is more traditionally involved in acts of interpretation through noting lacunae, meta-textual rules, more probable forms of choice in meaning, parallel semantic meaning with the hierarchical treatment of prescriptive mappings of genres (as will be soon explicated in this essay). The existentialist can also be divided, somewhat artificially, be-

eate the hermeneutical nature of phenomena and its parallel connections with the topic of intersubjectivity. (0)

In psychological research, e.g., it has been pointed out, as a research technique for interviews, that phenomenologically conducted reports can be paralleled with hermeneutically conducted reports, and v.v. Such imputed parallels can act as invaluable strategies for promoting forms of error correction in such research. We can argue for the apparent propriety and appropriateness of such parallels on the grounds of economic correlativity which also implicates the further critical and apposite addition of parallel, existentially oriented patterns of reporting. First, let me explore these imputed parallels between phenomenal-phenomenological reports and hermeneutically conducted reports focusing of the same relational situatedness under review, and, second, let me extend these parallels to also include an existential orientation (be the latter relatively non-systematic or systematic in orientation). Then, this initial groundwork conducted, I will continue to relate hermeneutical investigations with an intersubjective dimension in experience from a deeper exploration of the apparent experiential nature of existential sentiments and expectations, etc., as entailed in trans-relational subjectivity. (1)

Very easily I can recall to mind the delicious taste of the last apple eaten, indeed, ingested just a few moments ago. The apple was juicy and crisp to eat, and I used by trusty fruit knife to carve it up into delectable chunks of fragrant and sweet portions to consume. Here you will see, upon reflection, that I am not only noting its phenomenal-phenomenological appearance but also the manner in which this apple was eaten, namely, through the use of a fruit knife rather than just myself biting into that same apple. I use the expression 'phenomenal-phenomenological' to note that it is not just myself alone that is constituting the intentional constitution of the specificity of this experience. Yes, I know that I am eating an apple, that was my intention as exercised over the course of its enaction. But, it was also the case that this intentional object(ive) was found to dictate the manner of its reception as experienced by myself. In the specificity of the moment, moment by moment, the apple dictated that it was 'juicy, crisp, fragrant, and very sweet in its distinctive apple-like range of flavours'. Only a blind idealist would say, "I merely constituted that apple-like experience by myself and by myself alone." Similarly, it would be, indeed, an arrogant realist if they were to say that, "the apple completely dictated my experience of its ingestion". I am sorry to have to say this, and feel the need to say this out loud, "the apple is not eating itself', and, neither is it the case that "I am merely eating something being eaten." In my phenomenological experience of this apple being eaten I am entering into a relationship between 'myself as a phenomenon' and 'the apple as a

---

tween the 'non-systematic existentialist' (more concerned with the simulations of the so-called third moment and the 'systematic existentialist' (more concerned with the overall existential status of their relationships, etc.). The fact that we can talk about 'phenomenologists', etc., implies that all economic moments implicate their own co-associated sense and semblances of subjective identity which is not the sole preserve of the Ego moment. Accounting for this fact on the grounds of economic correlativity along with the preservation of an underlying invariant transformational isomorphism in which all three archetypal economic facets are more deeply emplaced (and, consequently as also underlining the objectivity of embodiment, the subjectivity/intersubjectivity of embeddedness, and the interobjectivity of embankment in this world at large).

phenomenon'. Why make things ideologically complicated. Let us keep it simple, at least to begin with…[236] (2)

Now, on closer inspection we can perceive an overlapping of phenomenological-like fields. So, e.g., that apple in question was perceived to be 'juicy and crisp, fragrant and sweet' to the senses. Apples are understood to be pieces of edible fruit; fruits are understood to be a certain type of product produced by plants, and so on. Or, in the phenomenological realm of tastes, we find sweet and bitter, salty and sour, etc. That, in this instance, this apple had a very distinctive apple-like sweetness, etc. (3)

But, then, in conjuring up such phenomenological appellations we can also note a parallel hierarchy of mapping to the extent it is concerned with how we actively interacted with the intentional object(ive) in question. This apple, eaten by myself, was cut up with a fruit knife and then chewed. I could have just bitten into this apple, or, instead, cooked it, perhaps, making an apple crumble, or, following some other recipe. Perceived as a piece of edible fruit, an apple takes its place in an intricate mapping of 'how we ingest edible fruits' by noting it could be simply eaten by biting into it or by chopping it up. I could also have peeled the apple first and then eaten the flesh without the skin. But, then, I could not peel it like a banana, or pick it apart like an orange or mandarin. That I did not have to cook it first like a quince, or, remember not to chomp into the stone that could still be lurking within a supposedly pitted assortment of dates, or, know that you do not bite into the stone within an apricot or peach. Imagine writing the instruction manual for how humans are to eat pieces of fruit, but, thankfully, we have something similar in a hierarchical mapping of genres of behaviour that parallels how we interact with this variety of fruits that we consider to be edible and can be found relatively to hand… and, which decisively directs the manner of our interaction with this complex type of food. (4)

I would like to argue that this hierarchical mapping of phenomenological experiences and the parallel mapping of genres of behaviour, exercised in order to elicit the former, go hand in hand, and, that neither type of experience can be had without the other. We are not disembodied, neither are we dis-embedded in a social world of the other, and, we should not think we can somehow exist independently of our embankment in a world upon whose soil and sunlight we are so currently dependent upon…[237] (5)

Now, upon further reflections we should observe that genres of behaviour dictate how we are both to 'write' and 'read' all manner of behaviours as exercised by ourselves and all others. We do so by invoking the mix of genres required to expedite our current intentions (that will also need to be arbitrated by the usual practices of the times). I wish to write a letter, or, rather, send an email. Such a message has to have the address of the recipient otherwise it could not be sent. Similarly, the sender might disguise their identity, but, still, that same email has to be sent from a certain address. Then, we might or

---

[236] Admittedly, this is almost a joke. However, on the other hand, we can reduce the distorted impact of ideological contributions by subjecting the same to relevant forms of suspension (through the utilization of extensive suspensions, etc.).

[237] That, even in the immanent advent of factory farming, we will still be dependent upon this world at large, and all its soil and sunlight, and so on.

might not title our message, still, the message to comprehended has to follow certain conventions that allow what is written to be read, and for the writer to also read what they have written as well in order to check that it makes sense, is coherent and not too ambiguous (unless your intentions have you meaning to be deliberately ambiguous for whatever reason or reasons). Writing and reading go hand in hand, and, then, whether the text is meant to be silently read or read aloud, or both (or, again, designed as a podcast in the form that simulates an exciting dialogue, etc.) we will find certain symmetries and asymmetries between these various aspects of textual experience. Furthermore, no text is completely transparent, but, then again, it cannot be entirely opaque. E.g., having to hear people talking on their mobiles can be a frustrating prospect for a number of reasons, one of which must be the use of indefinite pronouns. When they say 'he' or 'him', or 'she' and 'her', or, 'they' and 'them'… just who do they mean? Perhaps instead of merely speculating we could ask such noisy folk to name names for the benefit of those who have to overhear what is being so public said… (6)

In the reiterations of a textual economy, we can note the deposited presence of a text, a co-associated set of meta-textual conventions for how such texts are to be both written and read in parallel, and, what I like to terms as the apparent 'non-textual' content of such texts when their reconstructed significance is being meaningfully engaged. 'Non-textual' in a covert contrast to the overt deposition of the textual *per se*. Somewhat received as an excess of significance that metaphorically overflows and seems to render (the writing and) the reading of a text in a relatively effortless manner (along with a metaphorical semblance of transparence that is only obstructed when we hit an inability to read some section of that text or the entirety of that text because it is in some other language or in a technical language we are not currently privy to). Read a wonderful novel and the world of that novel is simulated in our imaginations. Become so engrossed in our reading that we can 'forget we are actually reading'. Hence my utilization of this appellation of the 'non-textual'. (7)

We also forget that in a reading a text it is not metaphorically 'just a flat piece of paper with writing on it' so to speak. We could image, e.g., an anti-woke parent inserting themselves on the running of a school board, in a school where they have registered their child, taking a voluble exception, say, to a Shakespearean text which goes on and on about a certain mistress. 'No, that sort of text is not appropriate for the moral education of my sibling', loudly insisting that marital infidelity should not be on the syllabus! Hopefully, it would be pointed out to them that the word 'mistress' actually meant 'wife' and that probably sometime in the 18th century did the word 'mistress' come to mean 'mistress as now more currently understood'. Now, the point I am making here is that without a meta-text, indeed, without a textual economy, there could be neither writing nor reading. That we have to understand the meta-textual set/s of conventions associated with the genre of writing under review before we can more correctly appreciate, indeed, even just begin to appreciate the same! (8)

Sometimes, what initially appears to make sense is mistakenly read because we do not utilize the correct set of conventions in order to correctly make our interpreted reading of that text in the first place. As you will quickly understand, the informative role

of hermeneutics is to discern just which conventions are meant to be in play and which conventions are not applicable, and so on and so forth. That as such conventions inform all forms of intentional behaviour it follows that without understanding such meta-textual conventions such behaviours could be neither performed nor understood as such. That even a cursory inspection of such patterns of behaviour should quickly show that they are hierarchically integrated, to some extent, but not absolutistically, will be found in a metaphorical 'atlas of mappings' that will also parallel, to a great extent, our metaphorical 'atlas of mapping' of our phenomenological experiences, and, where both mappings will be expressed through parallel forms of language (albeit with various subtle symmetries and asymmetries). So, e.g., the phenomenological propriety of taking on board an apple-like phenomenon must appropriately appropriate the requisite suite of hermeneutical genes of behaviour that would allow me to do what is being intended, say, to look at an apple, hold it in my hand, smell it with my nose, form the desire to eat it, bite into it and savour the distinctive specificity of its taste through that form of engaged experience. And, as is being hinted at, also form a parallel set of existential experienced reports through reporting on the distinctive specificity discerned through such directly engaged patterns of engagement. Yes, this apple is very delicious. Even better than the one eaten yesterday. Yes, I really enjoyed the last novel I read. Even better than the novel read the week before. All seemingly spontaneously summoned up before my various powers of appreciation. This last novel was read and enjoyed, and, I do not need to mentally reread it in my mind in order to come to this rather effortless conclusion. Of course, in qualifying this appreciation, that could take some time to think over, but, that is a different matter entirely. No doubt, at the end of such reflections, I would be in a similar position to just state whether I had enjoyed reading that novel, or whether, I still wholeheartedly could say I enjoyed it or might now, instead, give a more nuanced semblance of a reply or response. (9)

Indeed, in the light of the fact that the textual economy is one-part phenomenological text, is one-part meta-textual in its implicit invocation of an appropriate set of genres of behaviour, and, is existentially engaged as a non-textual simulation where we need to somewhat forget we are reading (and not 'thinking about the fact that we are reading', or, rather, 'were reading') it follows that only from the conjunction of these dialectical-like aspects necessarily involved in the overall act of reading, or writing, can we start to understand our very ability to either intentionally read, and/or write, the very text that is being found to hand. Moreover, given that both writing and reading cannot be understood through the mere lens of either one or two of these dialectical moments implies that no one moment can be entertained in and of itself or by themselves jointly unless all aspects of this metaphorical 'cake' are 'baked together' so to speak! (10)

Let me put these ideas together and briefly explore how these parallelisms can be entertained, albeit more along the lines of expediting a process of research whose reportings can reinforce a confirmation or verification of their more separate findings.[238] In

[238] Elsewhere I have defined 'confirmation' as a 'process of validation that is being conducted in current time', and, 'verification' as a process of validation that is being conducted retrospectively (or, even prospectively). That reiterated patterns of either confirmation and/or verification are then treated as processes of 'conformation'. That such truth determination basically invokes a Tarskian approach to truth

expanding a textual economy to be included within an economy of interpretation we would note (say, in an appeal to a parallel dictionary) that the meta-textual hermeneutic dimension or orientation is 'general' in orientation and is 'prescriptive'; that the phenomenological nature of the text is 'particular' in orientation and is 'descriptive'; and, that the non-textual nature of the existential dimension (of the so-called third moment of Ego) is 'specific' in orientation and is 'proscriptive' in its primary attitude in that latter regard, etc.[239] E.g., imagine the development of the triple reportings that would arise in the critical narrating of a certain situation where we are exploring, say, 'our perceiving the extreme hunger of another human individual':

> Here is a person who looks hungry and tells us that 'they are hungry', and where we have no evidence to the contrary; 'being hungry' means that 'that person needs to eat lest through extreme hunger they die'; moreover, that this appreciation of the plight of this person, through empathy for that individual, impels us to note that 'that person should not be left hungry!' and hopefully, it is up to us as to work out how to successfully expedite the entailed deontological injunction of that existentially experienced imperative, be that through informing the appropriate authorities capable of addressing that situation, or, our buying that person a meal, or, immediately getting that person something to eat (making sure that, in the short term, they are not given too much food to immediately eat given the risks of overeating under such circumstances), etc. (11)

Or, given the same circumstances, and supervising the feeding of that person, either directly or indirectly, we might want to run a less personalistic form of an overall discourse:

> The hungry person looks 'hungry', being thin, depressed and lethargic in demeanor, that they report as such; being hungry means not having had sufficient to eat for a certain period of time and where an extensive lack of food and fluids will end in their death; this person is in an inevitable state of dying unless a suitable form of intervention supplies the sustenance necessary to disrupt the termination of this condition that will end in an inevitable death… (12)

In running such descriptions, prescriptions and deontologically and pragmatically required proscriptions together gives us a more cohesive text whose demonstrated integration must give it a greater resilience in the public courts of philosophical opinion, disciplinarian involvements, secularist preoccupations, etc. (13)

---

determination (which obviously involves patterns of reiteration given that 'the meta-state is treated as valid iff the state in the object representation is obtained'). However, the methods invoked for the establishment of such isomorphic transformational invariance, in a process of transformational retreatment, is another matter but is pre-predicated on the relevant forms of economic correlativity as being present, etc. Refer to *The Seventh Book*… in order to clarify what is meant by such notions of 'transformational retreatment', etc.

[239] 'Etc.', by virtue of an appeal that could be made to a parallel dictionary where we can supply an almost endless list of epithets to distinctively describe the archetypal nature of such trimodal economic correlativities.

In the simplicity of this contrived example we should see how these three dimensions of the hermeneutically 'prescriptive', the phenomenologically 'descriptive', and the existentially 'proscriptive' should be seen to work together to reinforce the apparent truth determination that deserves to be arrived at in our explorative scrutiny of such a situation should it be registered in the existential specificity of that actual situatedness where there is, indeed, this hungry person, and that they will need to eat, and so on. Obviously, our interpreted truth determinations have crucial ramifications for that hungry person that if they should be truly hungry and we were to misread that situation as, say, a person 'merely faking hunger', all things staying the same, it would seriously lead to their further discomfort and then their inevitable death. (14)

In this appeal to a parallel dictionary, we would observe that this 'hermeneutical dimension or orientation' of the 'meta-textual' as not only 'general in tenor' and 'prescriptive' in practice, but, also as 'intersubjective in orientation'. Furthermore, we should also see it as 'future oriented' or 'prospective' in its temporal outlook and as relatively 'consonant', being relatively situated as 'background' in a harmonic scheme that notes the consonant nature of the relatively background *versus* the dissonant nature of the foreground *versus* the resolution enacted from the harmonic interaction of the former. Where, furthermore, the very facticity of the relationship itself (as a specifically distinctive emergence of identity without being able to be reductively deconstructed in its entirety) as expressed in and through the uniqueness of its relational situatedness, is dependent upon the ongoing resolution of such dissonance within the relational confines of that relationship. Since, quite simply, no resolution results in no relationship, and, definitive resolution is the definitive 'death' of that same relationship. That, consequently, all relationships (and narratives concerning such states of affairs) must continually maintain this effective state of ongoing resolution in this Goldilocks' region between 'too little resolution and too much resolution'. Interestingly, this triple parallelism between phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential contributions to the devolvement of that relationship in its relational situatedness, through such qualified processes of ongoing resolution, must also be brought to bear in both our exploration of narratives and our exploration of the imputed nature of existential sentiments and expectations. Indeed, it should be apparent that such emotional-like states, given their relational locus, should also demonstrate this economic ability to take on not only a subjective appearance but also an intersubjective orientation with the implication that such experiences are not and never can be the sole preserve of the individual thinking that 'they, and they alone, can exclusively experience the existential specificity of such states of affairs'. (15)

Admittedly, we have here a very controversial observation, but, let me attempt to construct a precisely delineated argument in support of such a contention along with the import of its ramifications, especially in the co-presented nature of its apparent intersubjectivity. Let me explain. (16)

In the eighth set of reflections, I proposed the following *ad hoc* set of eight existential sentiments and expectations. Using this list let me explore in what sense we have a philosophical or experiential right to treat such trans-intentional sentiments (as so-called 'transcendental emotions') both subjectively and intersubjectively given the primacy of

their pro-relationally arrived at trans-relational status. These eight sentiments, as first listed, were:

1. Optimism
2. Integrity (Authenticity)
3. Contributory (as a charitable desire to indirectly contribute to those in need)
4. Affection (love both non-romantic and romantic in form)
5. Courageousness
6. Trustworthiness
7. Honesty
8. Empathy (compassion, sympathy, etc.).[240] [38] (17)

In effect, I am arguing that because such sentiments have a primary, trans-relational status, we can equally, more or less, treat such sentiments as experiences that are both relatively subjective and intersubjective in orientation. In other words, they cannot be regarded as just subjective experiences but must also be viewed as intersubjective in orientation at the same time, at least to some extent (given that some experiences are more subjective in orientation and others will be more intersubjective in orientation). Indeed, the hypothetical absence of an intersubjective dimension would preclude such experiences from being experienced in subjective terms of reference, and v.v. That, even though they may have a primary trans-relational status, and even though they cannot be either primarily subjective or intersubjective in the locus of their origination, still, their refraction through either subjective or intersubjective lenses cannot be conducted at the expense of either orientation. Implying that, to some extent, a subjective reading is just as viable as an intersubjective reading, and v.v., and, where neither reading can be ruled out, indeed, must be ruled in in order to make sense of this type of judgmental experience (as primarily trans-relational). That without this simulated semblance of the intersubjective there could be no semblance of a subjective experience, and v.v! In essence, the intersubjective must be entertained as 'present' in order to make sense of the very experience of such subjective awareness, and v.v. In essence, stressing that we cannot 'privately' entertain any form of 'pure subjectivity' without also invoking some contrast with the sense and semblance of the intersubjective, and v.v. Moreover, this must also imply that any sense and semblance of the 'purely intersubjective' is just as bogus a claim in philosophical terms of reference. Of course, this does not mean I cannot entertain some form of apparent privacy in my thinking. Just that I cannot claim to understand what it would mean to formulate this observation in absolutistical terms of reference. That to formulate some form of absolute privacy is a contradiction in terms since that which is 'private' is defined as 'not-public', but, if the sense and semblance of privacy is defined as 'absolutistically private' it must also be 'absolutistically not-public' which can make no sense if it we cannot entertain some form of a contrast between the 'relatively private' and the 'relatively public' in order to prepare the metaphorical ground for such a distinction. If no distinction can be made then no distinction is being made.., and so on! (18)

Now, let me take some time to demonstrate both the establishment of this claim and the ramifications of such relatively-radical re(-)positioning, namely, that we cannot

---

240 *Pursuit,* III.12P.38.

and should not absolutistically separate both subjective and intersubjective orientations in reporting, and, that this inability to definitively separate the same implies an inescapable intersubjective dimension exists within such reports about these trans-cognitive sentiments and expectations, that, therefore cannot be reduced to the status of mere subjective acts of reporting alone, or v.v! (19)

As a background to this argument, we need to note, first, that our basic overall freedom in this world, and all distinctive freedoms therein, is realized through processes of arbitration already being conducted within this overall world-of-life without the direct reference to any one person or group of people. If I were to travel overseas and buy a cup of coffee in a nearby café that café is not directly set up there because of my travelling to this overseas destination. I could change my mind, or end up not travelling to such a destination. So, my part as a potential customer in the successful running of this business of that cafe is completely irrelevant. But, the café does exist to take my order should I be present and in a position to enter into the requisite nature of that type of a contract. In effect, it anticipates on probable grounds (hopefully within the compass of a reasonable and realistically constructed business plan) a range of customers will patronize that establishment and ensure its financial survival (on this anticipation of future business). In this scenario, the 'café' is symbolic of 'this world of arbitration' that 'interfaces the domains of both the public and the private spheres of involvement'. Without such a realm we would all be Robinson Crusoes and if it were not reasonably constituted in a relatively existential manner all of us would have very little freedom other than to breath, to walk, and then choose a spot to conveniently lie down and die. That this pre-introduction now allows us to run with the following considerations. (20)

On the understanding that 'pre-cognitive, affective emotions' and 'trans-cognitive, existential sentiments (and their expectations)' are constituted on different levels of epistemological organization, respectively, in pre-cognitive and post-cognitive (and judgmental) aspects of the psyche, it follows, phenomenologically, etc., that they should be differentially experienced as different in both their direct experiential realization and ensuing indirect representative characterizations as to be discerned in and through their textual presentations, in our various uses of language, and in concomitant forms of behaviour, etc. However, adopting a distinctive semantic filter that differentiates these differing types of texts I have found to be a quite difficult task. E.g., we cannot say: 'Emotion *x* because...' *versus* 'Sentiment *y* because...' given that neither party could be successfully contrasted using this formula unless we could succinctly demonstrate some form of a categorical difference in our reasons or explanations. I am sure we could, eventually, but, I am also sure that this semantic approach, using this type of formula, is not going to expedite this imputed distinction with an expeditious manner. E.g., I could say, 'that I am sad because of reason *x*', just as much as I could say, 'I am optimistic because of reason *y*'. Then, in order to demonstrate that 'reasons *x*' and 'reasons *y*' highlight the articulation of this desired difference I would have to invoke some other semantic formula or set of formulas, etc. Now, because such distinctively different explanations can be added to either type of party, and, where no doubt one would then need to categorize and differentiate such causal explanations in the hope they can be succinctly differentiated. Yes, I am sure such explanations, if correctly applied, would be able to be differentiated,

and, that such distinctive differentiations could be demonstrated. However, that process, undoubtedly, would not be succinct! (21)

Another semantic avenue that appeared to proffer a glimmer of differentiation is to argue that a difference follows when, e.g., we say: 'Emotion/s *x* that...' as a formula appears to makes little sense *versus* 'Sentiment/s *y* that...' which does seem to make sense(?)' E.g., I cannot sensibly say, 'that I experience emotion *x* that…' whereas it does appear to make sense to say, e.g., 'that I experience sentiment *y* that… just as, say, I express the thought 'that I am optimistic that… I will succeed in the realization of the intentional objectives that pertain to the performance of this pattern of behaviour, etc.' But, could we transfer this formula to any other imputed sentiment? E.g., 'I am being or trying to be authentic in my relationship with you that we can both mutually enrich the quality of our relationship, etc.' E.g., 'I am experiencing deep affection in my relationship with you, my friend, that we can and should mutually recognize that our relationship has a great value for both of us, etc.' Admittedly, the application of this formula might need some linguistic filler in order through that form of an expansion it will make better semantic sense of what is being asked of this formula… (22)

E.g., 'I am optimist that...' is a formula that could make sense, say,' I am optimistic that I will pass my university exams this year given that I have long studied for those same examinations'. On the other hand, saying, e.g., I am suffering that, or, I am suffering that it is the case that I am in pain appears to be adding a judgment to the emotions cited in such a manner that it is being transformed into a form of sentimental experience and, from thence, into a potentially existential form of observation (be that through its relative presence or relative absence). (23)

Obviously, the entire psychological arena of both emotions and sentiments is two complex fields of human appreciation that, to be quite honest, are hardly explored in the Western discipline of philosophy to date, but, definitely deserve to be much more closely scrutinized as invaluable topics of future research. (24)

However, the decisive breakthrough here, I believe, resides in the recognition that the trans-relational, pro-relational, existential orientation of a sentiment implies both subjective and intersubjective forms of experience, to varying degrees, without the sheer and complete reduction to either orientation, certainly not at the expense of a co-occurring trans-relational form of recognition, etc. That, that being the case, it would follow that whereas emotions, primarily, could be referred to, basically, in subjective terms of reference, sentiments, in contrast, could not be so differentiated and would need to be recognized as a mix of both subjective and intersubjective orientations. Hence a recognition of this co-existence of attitudinal orientations would not allow us to clearly demarcate 'emotions' from 'sentiments' on either subjectively or intersubjectively oriented grounds. (25)

As a case in point, although we might state that emotions are primarily expressions of our affectively appreciated embodiment, say, as feelings of sadness, happiness, pain, etc., it is also to be observed that under certain circumstances of intensely expressed forms of social participation, say, in spectator sports, that when your team wins you will

feel forms of elation, but, if at the end of the game your team were to lose then, in all probability, you will also feel a profound form of loss and subsequent despondency. Obviously, this type of social observation granted, then we must also accept that affective emotions can also have a relatively mutual intersubjective dimension as well. That, although we can also maintain the relative subjective primacy of emotions and argue for the relative intersubjectivity of sentiments, still, we cannot make a pragmatically definitive distinction between these two fields of experience in terms of either primary or relative subjectivity or intersubjectivity… (26)

To further complicate this comparative form of a differentiation let us consider the following. If optimism, e.g., as a sentiment, is supposedly both subjective and intersubjective in orientation is it not possible for us to also conceive of this type of experience purely in subjective terms of reference. E.g., imagine the following scenario (as a form of experiment by imaginatively taking the hypothetical perspective of a solitary Robinson Crusoe). (27)

I am going to spend the day walking through the nearby bush. It is near the end of Winter and in the last week there was a short period of rain. Thankfully, we are not in the hot and dry fire season of the Summer. At midday, I am planning on eating a prepared sandwich with a hot cup of billy tea. To light a small fire, I have brought some matches and some small pieces of kindling, and will also add a few small dead branches I expect to find near where I intend to picnic for that short period of time. I am optimistic the matches I will bring with me will work when struck. I have placed them inside a plastic bag just in case it does rain, but, expect the weather to be sunny for most of the day. Now, obviously, I am walking by myself, but, have my mobile if for some reason I were to meet any difficulties whilst walking. Indeed, there are snakes, unobserved tree roots to stumble over, falling rocks, and any number of other possible mishaps… but, I have already walked this non-onerous route a number of times and do not expect any problems to arise… (28)

However, the philosophical problem I am seemingly confronted with is my previous claim ‘that optimism is an intersubjectively oriented sentiment’, like ‘all other sentiments’, and am wondering ‘how this could be the case in this scenario when I am basically walking by myself, alone, in my own company, with not a soul to be seen given no one normally walks this track at this time of the year. Admittedly, I could run the argument that I cannot absolutistically have a ‘private conversation’ with myself since the very conventions of the natural language I speak are already pre-defined by those other speakers who have spoken this language, be they either alive or dead, and, daresay, not even born. Of course, I can talk to myself, and if mentally conducted, and not verbally spoken out loud, that conversation is most certainly private in that more conventional sense of that expression. However, it is true that not even Robinson Crusoe could have a ‘private conversation’ in the philosophical context of this special argument that we are social beings first, and, then individuals second. But, for good literary reasons, the author introduces us to Man Friday so that even this castaway is not truly alone. But, in going down this path looking for a defense of this rhetorical argument we are overlooking the elephant in the room, so to speak, or, rather on this island upon which Robinson Caruso

came ashore, or, in my case, in this very bush itself. So, let me introduce you to this overlooked dimension forever framing all forms of intentional experience. (29)

Now, when I am thinking, I am a thinking subject. When I see the world around me, I am also a perceiving subject. In lighting a fire, I am a person intent on lighting that fire. So many senses of self, it all seems so infinitely 'crowded' metaphorically. On the other hand, all these senses of self also appear to co-inhere in a trans-subjective sense of self, the semblance of my embodied personhood that runs together all these different forms of intentional experience to make of them that they are 'my' experiences and not the experiences of some other person. Indeed, when I go to sleep and wake up the next day, I am still the same 'person' even though one day I might wake up as a grumpy person and on some other day as a person less unpleasant to have to deal with. However, despite the obvious persistence of this episodic sense of personhood that makes me feel I am the same person, despite being grumpy one day, and, hopefully, not so grumpy the next, this does not mean that this imputed conjecture of selfhood needs to be objectified and reified as some form of a 'soul' or 'self' or 'spirit' or 'inner ghost' literally threading these disparate experiences and then making them 'my' experiences. In the very occurrence of such events, they are already 'my' experiences, and, so, it is not necessary, or indeed conceivable, that I have to cash out such a demonstrable claim with the imputation of a semblance of agency that is other than being just phenomenological in scope, etc., and needing to take some non-experiential form of subjectivity that would immediately portend a rampant contradiction in terms. Just as when I am seeing the world I am already acting as if 'I am seeing this world' and where nothing additional is needed to entertain this intentional set of events. Just as otiose a fact as imputing a homunculus in order to see my seeing when and where the logic of this argument would imply an infinite series of agents all seeing what was already being seen. On the other hand, this does not remove the emergence of a trans-relational sense of subjectivity at the level of the overall relationship in question that by its very nature frames all others forms of subjectivity apparently entailed within its compass. I am a thinker, I am seeing this world of the bush about me, and, I am also lighting a fire… so many co-occurrent facts, yet, this does not mean that, already, there are at least three people, in the guise of myself, to be found walking along this track. Furthermore, given the non-reductive status of that which is emerging, then it behooves us to accept the phenomenological status of this trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity in addition to all other forms of subjectivity we find woven together over the course of our intentional lives. That, given the epistemological superiority in epistemological organization of this semblance of subjectivity, given its inclusion of all other senses and semblances of subjectivity, it would follow that what embodied senses of subjectivity we experience they must be primarily refracted through this all-encompassing trans-relational subjectivity to the extent all forms of subjective experience are appreciated by virtue of its superior epistemological organization, etc. Indeed, the collective stance of such subjectivity stamps its existential descriptions as possessed by and refracted through this trans-relationally organized imputation of agency. That, as an imputation, as noted, we have no need to then reify such a phenomenological set of self-descriptions as anything other than as an imputation, albeit as embodied and demarcated by the uniqueness of the coherence and historical persistence, as short as it is, as evidentially entailed in that imputed existence of that set of existential descrip-

tions, be such projections conveniently engineered by either ourselves or by others. Where pragmatic considerations, and pragmatic considerations alone, are all that is necessary to run such imputations despite our ever retreating into the potential morass of conventional expectations, and so on. (30)

So, the metaphorical 'elephant in the room, or on the island of the castaway, or in the bush, when I walk this track', is none other than this trans-subjective sense of self, that emergent experiential semblance of subjectivity from which all senses of both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are refracted and textualized within and through the cognitive nature of the intentional, and, therein and thereafter, will take the form of textual reports. That, in this regard, my optimism that these matches will successfully light when struck, is primarily a trans-relational phenomenon that, in this instance, is merely refracted in a relatively subjective sense given that in this aspect of relational experience it is overall cognitive sense of self interacting with this relatively overall, trans-cognitive sense of relational subjectivity. That, in other situations, say, when I am interacting with a group of other people, this (transcendentally necessary) trans-relational experience of a prerequisite degree, e.g., of optimism (being already experienced to some requisite degree in order to activate and maintain that current form of relational activity) could also be perceived as being refracted through that same intersubjective sense of relational subjectivity already being entertained by each and every member in the set of interacting individuals. As a pre-established basis, namely, the existence of this relationship, i.e., between those people actually interacting in that said manner, it must follow that this emergent sense of trans-relational subjectivity must already be in place for the events of that interaction to then find themselves being expressed in accordance with that intersubjective sense of that overall relationship in question. Let me restate this argument by noting two complementary principles. (31)

All too often, in accounting for complex situations, we are wisely reminded to use Occam's Razor. Keep it simple. Unfortunately, it could also be argued that the world is both complex and simple, and, that both facets need to be appropriately referred to. In a simplification of the elements of the above argument let me propose a trans-relational sense of subjectivity, an overall sense of personal subjectivity, and an overall sense of intersubjectivity (as reflecting the primary relationship in question, albeit as also sited within its relevant relational situatedness). Then, such simplicity accepted, we can continue to qualify the same to that extent this is necessary in order to better represent the uniqueness of the relational situation under review.[241] (32)

Thus, what we now have to hand, is the realization that in our overall subjectively oriented experiences we have to contend with not only an embodied sense of subjective experience but also the simulation of its trans-relational subjectivity through which the former is considerably refracted in the first place. That, likewise, in our interactions with others, the same type of situation applies, namely, a lived-semblance of intersubjectivity is simulated just as much as a subjective experience itself is also simulated and refracted through the relative primacy of this simulation of our trans-relational experience. Indeed,

[241] Hence my proposing both the use of Occam's Razor and the qualified use of a counter-Occam's razor at the same time.

that these three ‘correlative’ aspects, in their mutual co-defining of each other through their joint negations, in effect, constitutes this ‘overall economy of relational subjectivity’ which, in the first place, as a trans-relational economy must have a respected precedence, through relational emergence, over the sub-economies of both the subjective and the intersubjective. (33)

What are the ramifications of this trans-relational re(-)positioning in philosophical stance? That both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are to be treated as simulations equally refracted through this simulated semblance of the trans-relational! That in our relationships with others such existential sentiments as optimism, authenticity, affection, and so on, must primarily be refracted through this sense and semblance of the trans-relational. That, in these relationships with others, it follows that such sentiments and expectations will be refracted through this relatively overlooked dimension of the trans-relational, which through emergence, cannot be deconstructed along reductive lines. Moreover, subjectively oriented experience will also be equally refracted through this dimension, and, therein and thereby, find their subjective sense and semblance of a simulated subjectivity. All such ‘simulations’ being as ‘simulations of simulations’, through phenomenological retention, etc., and not as simulations of the pre-simulated or trans-simulated, or through the invocation of any other impossible configuration, and so on. However, in searching for a distinctive differentiation between affective, pre-cognitive emotions and existential trans-intentional sentiments would it not be the case that given both types of experience would be equally refracted, either directly and/or indirectly, through this trans-relational dimension that, therefore, we must ask if the trans-relational orientation of sentiments is capable of proffering this desired form of differentiation *vis-à-vis* affective emotions? It is all very well to note that existential sentiments can also almost always invariably possess an intersubjective orientation, still, the very conventions of a natural language can also intersubjectively express ideas about our affective emotions that would seem to suggest that the possible possession of an intersubjective orientation, alone, would not allow us to insist that this aspect of differentiation is sufficiently achieved on just those terms of reference? But, a solution, I believe, can be found to hand, namely, to the extent that sentiments are both arbitrated and must be present for arbitration in order to be realized, whereas, in contrast, emotions are directly experienced without reference to intermediating processes of intersubjective arbitration whatsoever. E.g., I can say, “I am happy, or sad, or in pain because of explanations *x*, *y* or *z*,” but, I cannot claim these affective emotions are realized through processes of intersubjective arbitration. On the other hand, to say, “I am optimistic, or attempting to be authentic, or that I am in love, or that I am being honest,” is to invoke a relational situation in which these sentiments are being refracted and simulated as sentiments whose various forms of constitution are depended upon this trans-relational dimension in our overall experience of our subjectivity and that such genesis is completely dependent upon being fostered in terms of their aspiration or representation or current appropriation as expedited through suitable forms of arbitration. Let me explain my reasons for presenting this imputed form of potential differentiation. (34)

Usually, emotions have an embodied locus. On the other hand, in many occasions, sentiments appear to be intersubjective in orientation, but, as they arise trans-subjectively, it is the arbitrated nature of their primary genesis that would then allow us to finally prof-

fer this distinction that ‘sentiments are primarily the products of arbitration!’ This makes sense since it is the existential nature involved in the arbitration of human interactions that to some degree must observe the requisite minimum of existential responsibility in order to ensure that all forms of contractual behaviour must observe some sufficient degree of compactual awareness in the performance of those meta-textual patterns of interaction so as to ensure the both persistence of those genres of behaviour along with the inferred profitability of such procedures. I note ‘inferred’ since in the many histories of the medical world, in all its forms, there have been many occasions when procedures are claimed to be profitable medical-wise, but, in evidential terms of reference, can be shown to have either little therapeutic consequences or, quite the opposite, more than likely had deleterious consequences. So, in this regard, ‘arbitration’ is to be viewed as ‘the pre-establishment of those instituted genres of behaviour that generally oversee the inferred successfulness of the intentional aspirations of those relational participants who invoke their enaction in order to experience the realization of those same objectives’. Now, in our dealing with histories of the past, present, and future we will also need to observe the sub-economies, respectively, of representation, appropriation, and aspiration. In other words, how we read the dynamics and mechanics of previous patterns of interaction; the manner in which we are currently taking such modes of behaviour’, and, individually and/or collectively aspire to realize certain intentional objectives, be they personal ambitions and/or socially oriented objectives. However, more correctly, all forms of aspiration, etc., are entered into through forms of both individual ambitions and social aspirations given our need to enacted arbitrated patterns of behaviour wherein we find the primary constitution of our overall sense and semblance of freedom and all freedoms entailed therein and thereafter. So, e.g., the aspiring student wishing to obtain a university degree must do so on the terms of that university, etc. That even if we wished to define an ‘aspirational economy in subjective terms of reference’ as ‘one-part realistically knowing where you are, and one-part idealistically seeking to realize a certain possibly obtainable aspirational objective, and one-part a pragmatic knowing how to connect the former’, still, the aspirational basis for the making of such decisions is primarily enacted upon a pre-established basis of arbitration that transcends the apparent separation between both private and public spheres of consideration, etc. Similarly, if we wished to represent the patterns of interaction seemingly exercised in a certain history of the past, or, are currently in play in the apparent appropriations being exercised in the immediate realization of the entailed objectives in a certain history of the present the necessary acceptance of a certain basis of arbitration just cannot be avoided. Therefore, the role performed by sentiments, as necessary factors in the overall motivation of our behaviour, cannot be and should not be overlooked! As noted elsewhere, optimism plays an important role of firming up our motivation to see out the forms of causal intervention we are entering into or will be about to enter into. Indeed, without such convictions, be they rightly or wrongly entertained, we would be paralyzed. That, the same argument must be applied, and should be applied, to all sentiments and their expectations. I.e., with the absence of any relevant existential sentiment, that correctly needs to be present to some sufficient degree or other, it follows that such meta-textual patterns of enactions, as arbitrated genres of behaviour that both read and write such behaviours, must be sufficiently present in order to realize, hopefully, those same objectives. (35)

Now, given that the ramifications of this re(-)positioning demand that all relevant sentiments contributing to the discharge of such intentions must be co-present, etc., it would appear to follow that all arbitrated behaviour is also a reflection of the fact that all sentimental forms of contribution and collaboration must also involve the co-occurrence of all such factors necessitating such involved forms of observation. In effect, adding a layer of confirmation and verification, and, thence, conformation, to this intuitive insight that all sentiments are but refractions of a common existential impetus to observe our relationships in such a manner so as to realize their qualitative enrichment, along with their creation, preservation and conservation, and not their de-conservation, or their de-preservation, and their de-creation. Hence one overall existential persistence of a general sense and semblance of the sentimental, albeit as cognitive refracted through a wide variety of gestalt lenses, etc., as entailed under the heading of expectations, objectives, responsibilities, duties, obligations, requisite patterns of ongoing resolution, and so on and so forth. (36)

Therefore, in these reflections on the hermeneutics of intersubjectivity, as refracted through the cognitive nature of textual experience, we may currently surmise the following, namely, that even though affective phenomena (emotions) are usually subjective in their primary orientation, and, trans-cognitive phenomena (such as sentiments, judgments, forms of appreciation, and apparent insightfulness, etc.) are usually intersubjective in their primary orientation, we are now in a better position to observe sentiments as primarily arbitrated, and, potentially possessing an integrated uniformity of origination as an overall existential force that despite being refracted through a wide variety of associated and co-associated forms of expectation essentially shares and possesses the same mutual uniformity of its ensuing genesis in its expressed origination. Hence this tentative differentiation on the grounds of an inferred arbitration in the genesis of such expression, and, the even more tentative differentiation on the grounds that the refraction of all expectations of such sentiments is being organized from the single origination of this ‘existential force’ whose exhibition of an existential sense and semblance of responsibility, in effect, underwrites the sole formation of the unification and unity of all such sentiments. However, as noted elsewhere, the conformation of this latter hypothesis is not necessary for the performance of my primary argument, as it currently stands, whereas, the role of arbitration appears to necessarily earmark the constitution of all sentiment!? However, it should also be noted that the co-existence of all relevant sentiments does appear to play a vital role in the performance of each and every individual sentiment. So, e.g., just as a certain degree of optimism is necessary in the causal execution of patterns of existential intervention, and which cannot be avoided, so, too all other sentiments must also co-occur in the successful delivery of such arbitrated patterns of future oriented aspiration, or the arbitration of retrospective forms of representation, or the arbitration of current forms of more immediately desired patterns of appropriation, and so on? (37)

Now, to what extent am I allowed to refer to all patterns of experience as ‘simulations’? Regardless of whether we are envisaging retrospective forms of representation, current forms of appropriation, and/or future forms of aspirational objectivity given the prior necessity of their arbitrational formatting in an overall economy of trans-relational subjectivity it matter not whether we are focusing on trans-relational subjectivity, inter-

subjectivity and/or subjectivity at no stage can we experience a form of an alignment purely and solely with any one of these forms of economic correlativity (in this overall economy of trans-relational subjectivity). We may say 'we have been completely responsible in a certain relationship and did our duty as expected', or that 'we have been completely honest', or 'have had had the perfect conversation or telephone call', and so on, still, being both 'human and all too human' it behooves us to realize that 'being responsible' does not call for us to be impossibly responsible, only that it could be said that 'we did our best', or, that 'we tried to do our best', and so on. Indeed, given these economic correlativities of trans-relational subjectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity can be neither recognized, encountered, nor engaged from the sole perspectives of the trans-relational, etc., it follows that all three orientations can only be apparent simulations in the collective orientations of phenomenal-phenomenological experience, hermeneutical experience, and (and both non-systematic and systematic) existential experience, etc. (38)

Now, this vision of the 'simulated', as 'not simulations of the inferred pre-simulated or the imputed trans-simulated', but, 'as the simulation of simulations (which we can also note as 'non-economic non-simulations' and which will be explored in the next set of reflections)' we can argue that as economic corelativities can be compared with co-associated economic correlativities (or through relevant forms of economic complexification between different economics, etc.) that as economic correlations (whether as already entailed in that economic experience in question or as in some other relevant economic comparison) I must draw your attention to the informative possibility of our being able to run phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented reports against hermeneutically oriented, and v.v., should they be dealing with the same relational situation in question (be that in general hermeneutical terms of reference, in particular phenomenal-phenomenological terms of reference, and/or in existential terms of reference, and, that such forms of parallelization can proffer instructive forms of comparison in the cross-referencing of such report(ing)s.[242] Indeed, such a methodology offers us a method to enact profitable forms of error correction, mitigation; rectification, deconstruction, re(-)normalization, and so forth. Moreover, as correlativities, we can also run such correlations from an existential perspective. (39)

In the production of certain forms of psychological report(ing)s parallel interviews can be entertained from both phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives. Such a comparison, focusing on the same relational situatedness under review, as a result, can also proffer an invaluable degree of error correction in the parallel formation of such report(ing)s. Moreover, given that such an economic correlativity also exists between the phenomenal-phenomenological and the existential, and, the hermeneutical and the existential, it implies that we should also be able to run such a parallelization from the existential perspective as well. What might this entail? (40)

To assist in these processes of informative parallelization it would be worth our while to consult what I term to be a 'parallel dictionary'.[243] I.e., a parallel set of invento-

---

242 Hoping that such 'reportings' are produced more in the form of evidentially based 'reports'.

243 A less detailed parallel dictionary will be found below. A much more detailed parallel dictionary can be found presented in *Pursuit*, III.VII.III, x.y.

ries that note the economic parties presented, represented, and re-presented within the confines of a specific economy that, through economic complexification, parallel the archetypal gestalt nature of economies in general. So, example, under the archetypal headings of World, Object, and Ego we can find the following as very briefly tabulated below:

World	**Object**	**Ego**
Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism
Prospectivity	Retrospectivity	Concurrency
Prescriptions	Descriptions	Proscriptions
Meta-Textual	Textual	Non-Textual
Rectification	Deconstruction	Re(-)Normalization
Intersubjectivity	Subjectivity	Trans-Rel. Subject.
Generality	Particularity	Specificity
Active	Passive	Engaged (41)

By observing the headings above, and other forms of parallelism (as discerned through viable forms of economic complexification) we can generate parallel texts, say, in our interviews with patients, or witnesses, researches, artists, etc. (42)

Certain forms of psychological literature are already replete with this type of approach. I would argue, of course, that by adding an additional existential layer of interpretation should be able to further enrich this type of exploration. (43)

Now, to demonstrate this concept of a mutually 'informative economic parallelization' we envisage a close attention being paid to details that are being either critically and/or radically discerned in a certain relational situation being observed under the relevant economic headings that appear to proffer suitable forms of phenomenological insightfulness, etc. E.g., let me approach this on the neutral grounds of the simple 'eating of an apple' that most people should be already familiar with. (44)

Let me briefly note the following parallels under these three headings of the type of treatment reserved, primarily, for the phenomenological, etc. (45)

By 'phenomenal-phenomenological' is meant 'the semantic description of a textual presentation of those modalities of experience invoked through experiential forms of interaction (be that either virtually or non-virtually analyzed). (46)

By 'hermeneutical' is meant 'the meta-textual articulation of the prescriptive itemization of the relevant mix of genres of behaviour that needs to be involved in the performance of that type of behaviour'. (47)

By 'existential' is meant 'the itemization of the specificity of the concrete experiences being engaged through such direct forms of interactive involvement. (48)

i. Phenomenal-Phenomenological Treatment:

That in our passive explorations we note that this small red object is round, smelt like an apple, looked like an apple, and was inferred to be an apple. The intentional objective was thematized of eating this apple that appeared to be ripe, and, therefore, was assumed to be ready to eat.[244] (49)

ii. Hermeneutical Treatment

That in our actively dealing with an apple we usually note our interactions with an apple will be to eat the same. In order to execute this ambition, we will either bite that apple or cut it up with the use, say, of a fruit knife or similar.[245] (50)

iii. Existential Treatment

In our current engagement with this apple, we expedite its ingestion, noting, on this specific occasion, the distinctively unique sweetness of this piece of fruit. We also note the crunchiness, juiciness, and the attendant satisfaction being experientially enjoyed through our direct engagement with its ingestion.[246] (51)

Hopefully, we can imagine that this type of an approach is to be directed towards more serious forms of research. However, as most people are already conversant with the eating of apples this example might proffer a 'taste' of how this parallel methodology could profitably be seen to operate? (52)

By 'arbitration', what is meant? The 'institutional pre-establishment or conventional establishment of meta-textually formulated genres of behaviour in which patterns of contractual or contractual-like behaviours are anticipated, respectively, either non-virtually or virtually'. By 'non-virtually' is meant 'the institutional pre-establishment of commercial practices preferably on an adequate compactual basis'. By 'virtually' is meant 'the conventional establishment, i.e., conventional expression, of contractual practices preferably on an adequate compactual basis'. Let me illustrate this composite definition. In effect, this definition encompasses the social-psychological distance between commercial institutions like coffee shops, etc., and, the overt and covert rules entered into in the furtherance of either interpersonal relationships (between the simulations of inter-

---

244 In effect, itemizing the phenomenal-phenomenological semantics associated with this analysis of the presentation of an apple representation.

245 In effect, itemizing the meta-textual genres of behaviour involved in our active reading and writing of interactive experiences involved in this interaction with an edible apple. The mapping of the relationship between the mix of genres involved in the performance of a certain type of behaviour also mirroring the semantic mapping of the 'relatively essential nature of the modalities evoked in such distinctive patterns of behaviour whose specification is to be discerned through their existentially oriented articulation.

246 In effect, itemizing, in parallel with the phenomenological analyses and hermeneutical investigations, existential examinations of the specifics being directly engaged in those same distinctive patterns of behaviour. The example cited is merely an outline how these parallel types of scrutiny can be run in a fruitful conjunction with and against each other.

subjectivity and trans-relational subjectivity) and intrapersonal relationships (between the simulations of subjectivity and trans-relational subjectivity). So, in respect to both, in our interactions with either others or our own senses of self, certain conventional forms of interaction are entered into in the progression of our relational interactions that must have an existential basis since the enaction of such interacting is pro-relationally grounded and directed, since, to be otherwise, we would be diminishing both the relational richness and the potential possibility for the future enrichment of that same relationship in question. The primary basis or mechanism for this furtherance of our relationships is founded on this deference for the pro-relational as continued through such processes of arbitration be they institutionalized in a more public sphere of influence or conventionalized on a more personal basis. (53)

Unfortunately, only a few philosophers, disciplinarians, and secularists are actually aware of the economic limitations of intentional awareness and even less of both the irruptive economics of the non-economic and the contextualization of the hyper-economic (which, admittedly, have hardly been referred to over the course of this current essay)… (54)

And such relative ignorance shows… in how languages and arguments, how attitudinal convictions and behaviours, in their expression, dissemination, and reception do little justice to the relational unfoldings of experience given such freedoms and such limitations afforded to us through this overlooked existential dimension of the ongoing arbitration of our interactions with others. But, be that as it may, let us attempt to form, share, and impart such an evolving awareness, step by step, in the hope that such insights will better equip us in enriching the trajectories of our relationships as we make our passages, both individually and collectively, through this world at large, this overall world-of-life.?! To this end, let me in the next essay explore the extent we can successfully entertain and argue for our truth determinations and to what extent such claims are also limited by the very nature of our being in this world… passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and able to find some overall degree of existential freedom in our engagement solely through(-)others..!! (55)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 29.8.23.

12S. Reflections on the Existential Ramifications of a Positive Nihilism:
In Time and Out of Time:
A Pragmatic-Existentialism through an Integration of
Economic, Non-Economic, and Hyper-Economic Perspectives

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12S. Reflections on the Existential Ramifications of a Positive Nihilism: In Time and Out of Time: A Pragmatic-Existentialism through an Integration of Economic, Non-Economic, and Hyper-Economic Perspectives*

The economic reflection of an economic reflection is a non-economic reflection…
The non-economic reflection of a non-economic reflection is a hyper-economic reflection….

In the previous essay I outlined a position where I believe, on the grounds of economic correlativity, that we should be able to run relevant parallel economies, namely, phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential sub-economies (the latter in both non-systematic and systematic forms of existential orientation[247]). In this essay, on hyper-economic grounds, I will argue that we can further exercise the same type of an approach on economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic levels of epistemological organization. That, by doing so, we can more fully explore the co-associated pragmatic nature of the existential attitude and the co-associated existential value of the pragmatic attitude that remains open to a trans-relational subjectivity in an alignment with a pro-relational perspective on our relationships.[248] (0)

In a demonstration of these objectives, in an exploration of the existential dimension (in both non-systematic and systematic forms of existential orientation) let me re-introduce the relevant background to this broad topic as previously articulated by myself through the lenses of an ordered perspective, etc; explore the proposed deontological primacy of a pro-relational, existential ethics; invoke an ethical conundrum in order to highlight how a representative existential approach can be pragmatically instituted; argue for the types of philosophical procedures that are necessary for conducting fruitful forms of research; explain why a positive nihilism is unavoidable in the profitable pursuit of all forms of research, practice, and critiques in an integrated conjunction of both critical and radical forms of exposition (as enacted through the lens of the hyper-economic, etc.); and, then explore the temporal nature of existential experience, etc., ending with a summarization and introduction to the last set of reflections on secularity.[249] (1)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

247247 Basically, the existential comes in two flavours along with the intervening territory in between, namely, the 'non-systematic existential' as 'the so-called third economic moment in any economy', and, 'the integrated ramifications of a dynamic balance of all three archetypal economic moments' in an economy subjected to the intuitive supervision of an extensive suspension (as a more applicable and comprehensive translation of a 'transcendental suspension' that notes the role played by de-suspensions along with the causal consequences enacted through such de-suspensions, etc.). The expressions 'non-systematic' and 'systematic' are relative to the economy/economies in question and have nothing to do with any form of systematic philosophy! If anything, there is a(n anti-)systematic attempt to weed out all forms of defective positioning, etc., and, then, work with the expansion of an existential residue or surplus of e/valuational formation in such a manner that delivers requisite forms of resolution along with the ensuing of those means that further enrich the psychic, relational qualities of those now preferentially treated relationships, and so on.

248 Basically, I will be arguing that in order to explicate the full potential of the 'transcendental suspension' I will need to delineate my working concept of the 'extensive suspension'.

249 This paragraph effectively acts as an Introduction whilst the previous paragraph acts as a Pre-Introduction that succinctly portrays the primary intent of this essay, i.e., the exposition of a more up to date philosophical understanding of what is meant by this expression 'existential'.

1. A Re-Introduction to The Theoretical Background…

The evolving idea of the 'existential', for myself, is refracted through two ways of seeing the economic, namely, as the so-called 'third moment', and, as a dynamic balance of all three moments without any insistence on a purified version of either.[250] As all economic moments can only be relatively moved towards, psychically, and neither attained nor obtained, i.e., nor appropriated in any impossible, absolutistical form(ula) of the so-called 'in and of itself'. In archetypal terms, treating all economies as trimodal economies with the ideal moments of World (as the relevant background field invoked in that economy), Object (as that being focused upon within that field in question), Ego (as the economic form of subjectivity apparently in attendance upon the relationship between the former moments of World and Object. (2)

Now, the iterated linear progression of these three moments of World, Object, and Ego can also be reviewed through a harmonic lens given, respectively, the relative consonance of the field, the relative dissonance of that being focused upon, and the relative harmonization of the ensuing process of resolution being entered into (which is also being experienced as a co-associated form of subjectivity). Moreover, for an economy to persist, this process of harmonic resolution cannot be definitely terminated. Indeed, we could say that definitive closure is the compete death of that economic relationship. Similarly, we can also say, 'that either too much or too little consonance, dissonance, or resolution is also destructive of the relationship being fostered upon such economic grounds'. That, therefore, 'ongoing resolution is necessary for the historical persistence of an economic relationship'. (3)

Hence these two ways of seeing the 'existential'. First, as 'that sense of ongoing resolution being expressed within a certain experiential economy coincident with the third moment of Ego'. Second, as a non-definitive, ongoing dynamic balance of all three moments of World, Object, and Ego. The implication being that the more a dynamic balance is being entertained between these three moment the more the complexion of that experienced economic relationship will move from a local, non-systematic sense of an existential expression to a more wide-spread, more globally expressive, systematic-like sense of the existential in which the characteristics of the existential more pervade the experiential simulation of that relationship in question. Hence the current delineation of existential hallmarks; the future delineation of existential predictors, and, the retrospective delineation of existential indicators. With more notable hallmarks being classified under the four divisions of temporal, spatial, personal and social headings. E.g., noting spontaneity, synchronicity, simultaneity; noting the semblance of the trans-geographical, and so on. (4)

---

[250] A harmonic reading of an economy involves treating the 'World' moment as the 'first moment'; treating the 'Object' moment as the 'second moment'; and the 'Ego' moment as the 'third moment of the non-systematic existential orientation'. Therefore, the third moment is only the third moment through a dictated conventional act of fiat. This theoretical re-introduction is a selective summary of work done in *The Seventh Book…* (and a more detailed exposition will be found there and elsewhere).

Hence, it is already possible that the reader might have recognized the connections that will be drawn, through identification, between these technical terms of the 'existential', 'harmonic resolution', the so-call third moment of 'Ego', and 'intentional (or transcendental) subjectivity'. (5)

Now, in an ordered analysis on a trans-cognitive level of judgmental processes this three-fold economic structuralization between World, Object, and Ego is expanded to include six headings realized through the subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of these same three moments of World, etc., treated as relatively single units/binary pairs. (6)

Let me now diagrammatically represent this sixfold subtle scheme of preferencing/de-preferencing that I argue is at the basis of all forms of judgmental treatment. Where, indeed, in a first order we have phenomenological-semantic e/valuational formation; then, aesthetically integrated e/valuational formation; deontological e/valuational formation; pragmatical e/valuational formation; hermeneutical e/valuational formation (of possibility, etc.), and a sixth order of ontical or factual e/valuational formation:

Deontological

(3)

EGO (E)

Pragmatical (4) (2) Aesthetical

WORLD (W) **OBJECT (O)**

Hermeneutical (5) (1) Phenomenological

(6)

Ontical

Which through preference (+)/de-preference (-) become:

1st Order: -W +O -E: Phenomenological/Semantic E/Valuational Formation
2nd Order: -W +O +E: Aesthetical E/Valuational Formation
3rd Order: -W -O +E: Deontological E/Valuational Formation
4th Order: +W -O +E: Pragmatical E/Valuational Formation
5th Order: +W -O -E: Hermeneutical E/Valuational Formation
6th Order: +W+O -E: Ontical (Factual) E/Valuational Formation (7)

E.g., the essential-like semantic nature of phenomenological evaluation (trans-intentional judgment) and valuation (as the delivery of the ensuing intentional content) is realized through the relative preferencing of the Object moment and the relative de-preferencing of both the World moment and the Ego moment. In a comparison, e.g., the aesthetical e/valuational formation is arrived at through the relative joint privileging of both the Object and Ego moments but in apposition with the relative de-preferencing of the World moment. By such means we can then generate the other four orders as noted. For convenience I am basically dealing with the six trans-cognitive (judgmental) orders as noted of the phenomenologically semantic, etc.[251] (8)

Now, in order to appreciate how these imputed forms of subtle preferencing/de-preferencing were instituted I invoke, respectively, processes of a de-suspensional preferencing in tandem with a suspenional de-preferencing. I.e., that the de-suspension of the extensive suspension (in its complex translation of the transcendental suspension[252]) acts a subtle force that preferences that single dialectical moment or binary dialectical moments being subtly reconfigured accordingly (and, therein and thereafter, being either prioritized, privileged or promoted[253]). (9)

E.g., in order to express the so-called third moment of Ego, coincident both with the non-systematic sense of the existential and the third (trans-cognitive/intentional) order of the deontological this modelling suggests that we relatively suspend the moments of World and Object and, thereby, engineer a de-suspensional preferencing of the Ego moment. By such hypothetical means the sense and semblance of the non-systematic existential is given its expression, which, through a dynamic balancing of all three moments then induces an existential transformation towards a more overt, systematic sense and semblance of the same. (10)

Now, I would like to superimpose on this same archetypal economy another form of modelling that deals with what I like to call ‘transformational retreatment’. In doing this I wish to complement this scheme with a way of understanding the harmonic role of resolution played by the Ego moment (in the linear progression World-Object-Ego mirroring, respectively, consonant field-dissonant focus-harmonic resolution). Then, in more closely scrutinizing the role of resolution I would then like to link it with the relatively chaotic irruption of the non-economic as a way of understanding the intentional progression from virtual ideation to non-virtual ideation. (11)

Treating the economy of transformational retreatment as coincident with the moments of World, Object and Ego (in their harmonic sequencing) we being with the hermeneutic dimension and the representation of the relevant material, therein, to be regarded as in its initial stage of pretreatment. In moving to the next stage of treatment, under

---

251 Technically, we can treat (ahistorical/trans-historical) ‘preferencing’ as consisting of ‘past prioritization, present privileging and future promotion’. Moreover, reading the archetypal economy of World, etc., through a temporal lens we can treat the World moment as prospective or future in orientation, the Object moment as retrospective or past in orientation, and the Ego moment as contemporaneous or currently present in orientation.

252 As explored, e.g., in the sixth set of reflections. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12N.

253 As per footnote 5.

auspices of the Object moment, we find an automatic elevation in meta-status by one meta-degree. However, in order to return to the original meta-status of the relative object-language we then proceed to the Ego moment and its transformational retreatment where we meet a de-elevation in meta-status by one degree. Then, in this transformational economy, the retreated product can then substitute for the initial pretreated product in a process of posttreatment substitution. By such means, hypothetically, we can then begin again with what amounts to a rectification of the initial pretreated product. Treatment observing a relatively broad sense of deconstruction from a de-logical anomalization to a logical reconstruction, etc. The process of retreatment being observed as an ongoing economic process of re(-)normalization whose existentialization is instituted through the de-suspensional force delivered through this moment of Ego, i.e., as an ongoing process of resolution, harmonic alignment between living-reality and its textualization in the form of a lived-reality, and so on. (12)

Although animated by a certain degree of simplicity (through economic simplification enacted through economic resolution) let me represent what has been depicted above through a rather complex concatenation of terminology in the less complex form of a diagram:

(Deontological)
Existential (Retreatment/Posttreatment)
(3^{rd})

EGO (E)

WORLD (W) **OBJECT (O)**
(1^{st}) (2^{nd})
Hermeneutical (Pretreatment) (1) Phenomenological (Treatment)

The Transformational Sequence of Retreatment Being…

1^{st} Pretreatment – 2^{nd} Treatment – 3^{rd} Retreatment (/ Posttreatment of Pretreatment) (13)

Now, although we can imagine the transformation of the virtual presentation of our intentional ideation, in order to convert such intentions into a non-virtual, causal form of enaction I would like to propose the relatively chaotic instantiation of such economic resolution/s through a non-economic form of irruption that to be fully apprehended, in all senses of that expression, then needs to be re(-)appropriated in and through the contextualization of hyper-economic terms of reference. By such means taking the relatively in-

cremental radicalization of the non-economic, step by step, back into the conventional sphere of what, hopefully, is both critically and reasonable re(-)appropriated therein. (14)

Given this modelling we now must introduce a qualification in order to differentially account for both processes of chaotically oriented relatively existential input/output versus chaotically oriented relatively non-existential input/output? To this end, I propose the necessity for an ongoing process of relative existential retreatment/posttreatment enacted through ongoing processes of re-directed re(-)direction *versus* a relatively non-ongoing process of relative non-existential retreatment/posttreatment through ongoing processes of re-directed redirection. Or, in non-economic language we might put this as follows: the unilateral re-directedness of the ongoing re-directed instance of the first instance *versus* the unilateral re-directedness of the non-ongoing redirected instance of the last instance. I.e., richness and enrichment of the existential orientation is conserved through the economy of 're(-)direction' whereas the relatively non-existential process of resolution is merely issued through re-direction and then is merely preserved through reiterative 'redirection'. Hence the unilateral re-directedness of the ongoing replication of the first moment *versus* the mere redirection of the unilateral re-directedness of the last moment. I.e., a difference to be found in sheer re-direction (and its bare re(-)iteration through and ongoing economy of re(-)direction) *versus* redirection.(15)

This distinction between the relatively non-existential process of 'redirection' and the relatively existential process of 're-direction' (conserved through 're(-)direction') is not to be seen through a derogatory lens or a lens of deprecation (or either devaluation or disvaluation[254]) given that we must first 'live by the presence of bread', so to speak, and then, 'aspire to not live by mere bread alone'. In other words, as the existential is realized through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential it follows that both orientations must co-exist because there can be none without the other. (16)

By these means, I have now introduced a modelling of the non-economic process that invokes the unilateral re-direction of either the relatively existential (enacted through processes of re(-)direction) and the relatively non-existential (enacted through processes of redirection). (17)

As the 'non-systematic existential orientation' is coincident with the 'Ego moment' and the subtle privileging of this aspect of the economy is also coincident with 'the deontological nature of the third trans-cognitive order' we must assume an equivalence between the 'existential' and the 'deontological'. What are the ramifications of this equivalence for a pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism (recognizing, as well, that there is a need to differentiate the pragmatic (in a philosophical pragmatism) from the fourth order of the pragmatical)? (18)

---

254 'Disvaluation', as 'the ongoing devaluation of intentional material' is often utilized as a religious device for instantiating a form of transcendental suspension. As in treating the world as if it were an illusion, or a shadow, or an efflorescent flower, or evanescent bubble, a reflection in a mirror, and so on. Refer to Thesis, Versions I & II.

2. The Imputed 'Deontological' Primacy of an Existential-Pragmatism[255]

The internal logic of this ordered scheme, as just outlined, implies a deontological locus, in e/valuational formation, for a non-systematic experience of the existential. Because the 'third moment' of the existential coincides with the archetypal Ego moment, and, the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological form of e/valuation coincides with this same moment of Ego we must surmise, therefore, that the non-systematic existential orientation coincides accordingly with this vision of the deontological. Is this problematic for a pragmatist (such as, e.g., Richard Rorty?) and by 'deontological' what is more correctly meant (as would be envisaged by myself)? Let me address the second question first in order to resolve the former question. (19)

This suggestion that the 'existential' and the 'deontological' coincide in lived-experience (as a lived-interpretation of living-experience) is no accident given the observation of 'existential imperatives' that 'appear to demand we also do our duty, see out our obligations, oversee the mutual enrichment of our interactions, act in the most responsible manner within the coursing of our relationships, and so on'. For myself, this is not problematic. But, what is problematic is the how we might define, or redefine, the nature of the deontological. (20)

The traditional definition of the deontological must be suitably deconstructed, and then reconstructed along more existential, pro-relational, lines in the theoretical putting forward of a more viable reformulation and conceptual reformation. I.e., re-visioned through the lens of a harmonious interaction with this imputation of a trans-relational sense and semblance of both the simulation of an inter-co-associated subjectivity and intersubjectivity arising through relational emergence that, at the same time, cannot be reduced to merely the participants and parts that are to be discerned, no doubt, as relevant within the lived-formation of a certain relationship. The defective ideas concerning the *a priori*-like pre-existence of absolutistical Principles, with a capital 'P', has no place in a critical and radical philosophy that sees no place whatsoever for either so-called First Principles, or Last Principles, or, indeed, even for Middling Principles. On the other hand, conventional principles like the traditional formulation of such principles can be granted admission with an 'observer status' in so far as they are only taken up as 'conventional guidelines' with no indubitable status in the manner of their preferred pre-interpretations of a certain ethical or moral (type of) situation. I.e., as only having a guiding input and certainly not as dictating definitive *a priori*-like outputs. That given a trans-relational ethics is implied, albeit imperfectly approached through a pro-relational sense of an attitude that desires to more perfectly represent a more relevant or essential appreciation of an ethical situation, preferably in its existential specificity, there is no place and there can be no place for the pre-existence of such a priori attitudes. Indeed, given the uniquely experienced existential specificity of each and every relational situation it follows that in a relational ethics we must defer to the emergent integrity of the relationship itself to that extent we are capable of thematizing an adequate ethical representation of the same. In assisting us in our approaching such a goal we can utilize, when suitably relevant, i.e., when appropriate, proper, and apposite such traditionally established ethical

---

255 Treating an 'Existential-Pragmatism' as equivalent to a 'Pragmatic-Existentialism'.

pronouncements, masquerading as so-called ethical ‘Principles’ since it is true that we must start somewhere and, as conventional genres of expected behaviour, such pronouncements, whether formally enshrined in law or informally established in custom, can certainly ‘set the stage’ so to speak. However, this degree of provisional deference is a far cry from our cultural enslavement to such proclamations that if we were perspicacious enough would probably soon realize that such social demands usually benefit preferentially one sector of society over another, or, at least get manipulated to promote such forms of differential benefits? Just as what is defined as ‘noble’ inevitably ends up benefiting, on balance, those same nobles in that nobility. Of course, such attitudes can be extrapolated well beyond those feudal origins to such extent that we forget the social preferences embedded in such an attitude although scratch the surface and such prejudices should be revealed. But, then again, we must start somewhere, and the use of such principles is as good a place as anywhere else, just, that we should not end up in the same court so to speak given our deference is for the primary relationship in question, at least to that extent we are able and capable of appreciating the apparent ethical demands and constraints to be exercised through such intuitively receptive forms of pro-relational comprehension. (21)

Now, a cursory glance at existential-like experience, say, as might be recorded as such in a novel, or play, or film, would, in all probability, quickly exhibit such ethical demands such as being patriotic, as doing our duty, as needing to comply with our reasonable obligations, as acting responsibly, and so on. Indeed, this is the very stuff of drama in which individuals and groups, and communities and nations are found wrestling with such issues, attempt to seek forms of resolution that meets a certain degree of satisfaction that seems to be suitably ‘right’, i.e., as either appropriate, proper, and or apposite given our representative understandings of the primary relationships in question, and, on occasions how they, too, are ensconced in a wider world of the relational besides also having to understand how we are ‘emplaced’ within this same sense and semblance of an overall world-of-life. Our ‘emplacement’ recognizing our embodiments, our embeddednesses in a social world, along with our physical embankments in this world at large; where such emplacements are also displaced through the ongoing arbitration of our aspirations given intentional emplacement through thematization, displacement given the sequential treatment over time necessary in order to eventually realize the relevant objectivity of our intentions to some extent or other, and the definitive constraints equally imposed as we set out to intentionally displace such displacements in the perseverance of attempting to realize our social aspirations and personal ambitions, along with all the other desires as entertained between the same. The intentional passage intended in our crossing over between the virtual to the non-virtual is forever a struggle in which a relative degree of successfulness can only be obtained through the requisite forms of navigation, negotiation, and arbitration that need to be entered into with(-)others, before(-)others, and through(-)others. (22)

Some pragmatists have demonstrated a certain antipathy towards the idea of the deontological which is quite understandable, and perfectly acceptable, if a traditional concept of the deontological is being promoted and promulgated. However, through the lens of a trans-relational ethics no such appeal of any kind whatsoever is to be made to

and through a set of traditional or non-traditional principles however much we would like to give our assent or remove our assent to such a list, be that in part or in full. If any trace or shadow of an appeal is to be made at all it is to the relative 'relational supremacy' of our lived-relationships and the ability to our being able to delineate, to some extent, the apparent existential demands issuing from or through such forms of relational comprehension. As an analogy we could say that a potential difference in ethical outcomes is somehow simulated and in the furtherance of our primary relationships we generally act in reasonable forms of alignment with the same in order to observe the more beneficial delivery of those outcomes as earmarked through such forms of preferential treatment. A form of treatment, hopefully, that is an alignment with the potential trajectories of those same relationships that those relationships be either created, preserved, and/or conserved, and, generally, neither de-created, de-preserved, and/nor de-conserved (unless the overall relationship of our primary relations calls for such forms of relational withdrawal and isolation as might be demanded trans-relationally in our exposure to what might be deemed to be, e.g., toxic relationships, unprofessional forms of collaboration, forms of alliance that promote various patterns of inauthentic behavioral responses, etc. (23)

So, this separation from traditional conventions granted, what is left that could be considered to be deontological in orientation? (24)

The apparent recognition of a certain differential ethical and responsible responsiveness that appears to reasonably demand our compliance with the creation, preservation and/or conservation of our relationships through the performance of specific patterns of enaction, even, sometimes, at the possible expense of the continuation of our own existences? Witness, e.g., those parents who attempt to save their children from drowning, but, instead, end up having themselves drowned. Moreover, from such a frequent observation, where people stand could stand back and then enact better thought-out responses we might also observe, in turn, that at no point do such people first make an appeal to traditional deontological rulings in order to form such what then would be less than immediate responses, regardless of whether they prove to be successful or not successful. A traditional approach to deontological considerations barely seems to surface under such circumstances. On the other hand, in the messy business of murder, the long-term premeditation of such an act might give the commissioners of such activities more than enough time to entertain such deontological considerations if only to circumvent the legal consequences and the social application of an opprobrium usually reserved for those types of miscreants. As Plato would have us believe that 'we cannot knowingly commit wrongful acts' it took Augustine to show that 'people can be in love with the sin itself' just as the sheer stealing of the pears (or apples) in itself was found to be an enjoyable act quite divorced from any intention to eat the same.[256] Now, I am not saying that either

[256] That we have a dialectic with pluses and minuses on both sides of the equation. A situation not unlike the observation that humans find the inflicted suffering imposed upon others, on some occasions, as distasteful, and, on other occasions, as fascinating, as predicated, e.g., by certain spectacles ever-witnessed in the Roman amphitheatres (even in the Christian period despite the criticisms of some early church fathers). Or, take the understandable legal prohibition on the dissemination of snuff movies, and, yet, people will happily watch a respectable person like Agatha Christie supervise the expected dispatchment of a multiple series of murders within the same novel or play. In her defence, we should quickly add, that every

party, or both parties, or neither party are correct in these circumscribed circumstances, but, I would like to say that given some timely reflections people may well act in better manner not just for themselves but also for the sake of others. On the other hand, I would like to say that all too often traditional forms of deontological thinking make little sense on closer inspection, have procedures and dictates that are quite often never complied with, and, that in confronting the often controversial and counter-natural nature of many such demands that the need for common sense and cooler temperaments may yet save the day. In their place I propose that the deontological impetus does exist but is a property, or should be a property or aspect of our appreciation of our relationships in which we meet this sense and semblance of a responsive demand that appears to be both either responsible and/or apposite, has its apparent origins as a differential set of possibilities seemingly articulated by our representative understanding of our primary relationships, and in deference to those same relationships, that we feel impelled, to some degree, to follow and comply with such intuitively discerned injunctions. In this regard, I would like to re-envisage the phenomenological nature of the deontological whose traditional misunderstanding has led to formulating, in the past, of such impossible forms of practice. I.e., in proposing absolutistical 'Principles' from mere observations and reflections upon this hitherto misinterpreted phenomenon of the deontological response along with their conventional enshrinement, with their inevitable warping of both legal and political systems, etc., as set up to insist upon the institution of such ensuing forms of unnatural compliance politically dictated through their co-associated forms of compliance. 'Unnatural' in the sense, e.g., of political powers that insist that a country goes to war in the pursuit of an unjust set of objectives in which more reflective people, themselves, would or should both argue and rebel against. In this regard, we do not have too far to look… as the world is replete with such self-made disasters. (25)

Hence this revised version, and vision, of the deontological attitude along with its differential deontological pressures that would appear to conform with trans-relational expectations and not so much with the conventional expectations of others whatever their origination. (26)

That, in thoughtful deference to our relationships, given their relative relational supremacy, and their psychic inability to be reduced to just their relational participants and parts, we may well find differential deontological pressures that would appear to have us to conform to certain forms of behaviour that may or may not be expected in those circumstances. That in such existentially oriented patterns of intervention we should do so on the behalf of the primary relationship in question. However, to better appreciate the responsiveness of such ensuing responses we should also understand that as we cannot fully appreciate the entirety of a relationship in its relational setting that will equally never possess an absolutistical understanding of what is being demanded or not being demanded of us. That, indeed, that our concerned appreciation of certain circumstances might call forth a variety of existentially oriented responses. Of course, not all responses can be equally valid or invalid, but, then, 'what works is surely good enough' to oversee the effective resolution of these perceived relational anomalies, and so on. (27)

---

murderer usually meets their legal and ensuing penal comeuppance (but, I would like to note, not in *Murder on the Orient Express*, 1934, for reasons as revealed in the denouement of that novel).

Now, given this identification between the non-systematic existential orientation and the deontological orientation we need to ask in what sense could this position be either compatible or incompatible with a pragmatic positioning? (28)

I would answer this question by saying that 'I believe they are basically coincident with each other'. To support this non-obvious contention I would like to argue as follows, namely, that the pragmatic disposition needs to be further motivated by some form of an imperative and that this can be duly supplied by a deontological style of impetus, but, that as in the formation of value (in distinction to e/valuational formation of ordered forms of determination in general) is shared by the second order of the aesthetical, the third order of the deontological, and the fourth order of the pragmatical, we can perceive and, thereby view, both aesthetical contributions and pragmatical contributions as secondary adjuncts in this process of value formation. Indeed, we should not insist on too fine a distinction being drawn between these three forms value formation centered around the Ego moment. The ethical dimension of the deontological is continued into the pragmatical sphere in considerations concerning utility, expediency, effectiveness, the implied imperative to being economical with our resources, and so on, whilst the idea of ethical harmony overlaps with aesthetical ideas on the nature of harmony likewise. Interestingly, we could perhaps surmise that a certain deontological spirit inhabits many, if not all, forms of pragmatical value? In a mnemonic list of pragmatical virtues we might like to note the following open, *ad hoc* list of the effective, the efficacious, the economical, the efficient, the expeditious, the elegant, and so on. When we aspire after a certain objective, we hope to be effective in the realization of those ambitions with such motivation almost acting as an imperative in that regard. Similarly, in being medically efficacious we would wish to resolve the root causes of a certain anomalous situation for the health of an individual rather than merely providing effective relief, say, on a symptomatic basis. Or, how could we understand the expediency of being economical, and being parsimonious with our limited resources, without some form of a deontological imperative? Hence the iteration of certain social pronouncement to the effect that 'we should save our money', that 'we should invest our surplus resources', that 'we should wisely conserve our capital', and so on. I would also like to point out, again, that technically I make a distinction between 'being pragmatic' as in appropriately pursuing a pragmatic philosophy through the utilization of suitably exercised patterns of social behaviour such as consensus, reasonable forms of arbitration, equitable contracts, etc., and, 'having pragmatical' forms of behaviour to observe that relatively fall within the fourth trans-cognitive order comprising considerations acting like imperatives concerning what might be rightly regarded as either effective, efficacious, economical, and/or efficient, etc. (29)

Hence this understanding that the experience of the existential, as in existential sentiments and attitudes, etc., basically coincides with the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, as centered on the archetypal moment of Ego, augmented with second ordered aesthetical contributions and fourth ordered pragmatical contributions with the latter two orders acting as secondary adjuncts in this same regard. That collectively, such imperatives also coincide with a pragmatic impetus as to how we should manage our relationships, preferably from a pro-relationally approached trans-relational perspective. (30)

3. The Exploration and Expansion of an Ethical Conundrum

Recently, a friend of mine, who I will name with the alias of 'Mike', proposed a certain succinct ethical conundrum insisting that his interpretation of its resolution was both valid and that it was suitably circumscribed in the limited formulation that was supplied. Mike's insistence that both of these qualifications applied intensified the controversially receive nature of its reception. Indeed, among the five of us who sought to solve this puzzle we could probably count on at least six solutions to this philosophical problem despite Mike's repeatedly insisting that his solution was the only one that could be correctly arrived at. Mike's Conundrum reads as follows: Mike has a friend who is a taxi driver who has worked for at least three decades in the taxi business but has recently lost his job, basically, because of competition from Uber. He thought about becoming an Uber driver himself, but, in working out what he would financially gain by doing so came to the conclusion that he could not support his family by taking up this alternative form of taxi work. Now this ex-taxi driver has two nieces with very well-paying jobs but who also act as Uber drivers after work hours in order to obtain additional finance. Mike tells us that his friend thinks his two nieces are 'greedy' and that are directly responsible for him losing his job. That they have been instrumental in his losing his job as a taxi driver, although reluctant to mention this observation to his two nieces. In this conclusion, Mike is vehemently in agreement with his friend the ex-taxi driver, further arguing that in ethical considerations the moral field should not be widened to such extent that people cannot be held accountable through a diminution of responsibility, the additional confusion that would be expected to arise through the importation of secondary issues, and so on! (31)

If we were to take Mike's exposition at face value, if we were to put ourselves in his shoes, should he call it a 'conundrum' or a 'logical demonstration of wrong behaviour whose consequences ended in the taxi driver losing his job'? As a 'conundrum', the possibility of a non-controversial solution would be something that would be seriously disputed on a collective basis with little agreement other than that we were permanently dealing with a 'conundrum'. Just as found in his experiment, where his exposition had more solutions and interpretations being proffered than people present. But, then, as a logical demonstration with a definitive resolution it also failed given that no consensus was forth coming when as a group this exposition was discussed for quite some time and not one person was prepared to agree with Mike's interpretation that the nieces of the ex-taxi driver entirely shared in the responsibility of him losing his job given their work as part-time Uber drivers. Putting our philosophical hats on, how might we defuse this puzzle and indicate how, as it is currently constructed, it cannot be resolved? (32)

Mike's intense insistence on the joint responsibility of the Uber drivers was better understood when he related the fact that he, too, was once a taxi driver and could well relate to his friend this ex-taxi driver. This brings me to point out that in better understanding any moral dilemma, or similar, we need to have access to all the relevant information required to resolve that issue, if that were possible, and, subject this essential representation of the ethical situation in question to a suitably exercised 'transcendental suspension', or as re-presented in these reflection the complex-simplifications of an extensive suspension (dealing with overall transcendental suspensions on an economic basic as

well as the economics of both de-suspensions and causally initiated, non-economic process of unilateral re-directedness along with their hyper-economic re-contextualizations, all hopefully conducted in an existential climate receptive to a pro-relational enrichment of all relevant forms of trans-relational subjectivity, and so on). (33)

Now, I did note 'complex-simplifications' in my alluding to a concept of 'economic simplification' in which 'we intuitively just let things unfold to the extent the representations of our relationships can do this for us through the relatively autonomous nature of our relationships along with the conventional nature of arbitration where a wealth of social expectations are built into such customs and where situations are normally defined and operated in accordance with usual practices through the invocation of all relevant genres of behaviour, etc.' To some extent we empower the expression of our relationships through the socially reflexive appropriation of such conventions that, for the most part, then render the daily disposition of our lives as a relatively unproblematic. Unfortunately for either critical and/or radical philosopher, disciplinarians, or secularists any inspections of such conventionally performed practices inevitably end in the discernment and discovery of puzzling anomalies, enigmas, conundrums, paradoxes, *apori-a*s, and so on… the upshot of which, if they are well-motivated, is that they must 'dig' a lot deeper in order to find, hopefully, satisfactory answers, albeit as provisional solutions and resolutions of such tantalizing features that constitute the miracle of human existence along with the travesty of inauthentic behaviours that inflict, both inadvertently and advertently, so much unneeded, unasked for misery upon the suffering backs of others. (34)

Economic simplification is also afforded through another concept of mine previously referred to as 'economic induction'. There, I argue, that if some aspect of the extensive suspension is suitably formed and informed in depth, then the rest of the extensive suspension will automatically follow on the grounds of economic correlativity. I.e., the tripolar nature of the suspension is such that if only one aspect of that economy is sufficiently focused upon then the rest of the economy must follow suit given that, holistically, the simulation of that economy cannot be formed form the isolation of either unipolar or bipolar factor or facets. Just as one side of a well-cut diamond will reflect all the other facets. Or, overall, very much like how we learn to ride a bike or walk along the street. Once we have the routine of a certain memory, we can then forget about how those subroutines operate, just as most people who drive a car do not wish or need to possess the knowledge of an auto-mechanic, and so on. (35)

Of course, a first inspection under the hood of a car for all people would be something that would be found to be quite perplexing. We need a map of some form in order to understand the bits and pieces to be seen there and how they actually relate to each other. Philosophers, e.g., already have such 'maps' to hand, but, unfortunately, many of those maps are not well-drawn nor are they, all too often, well-read despite their many faults and flaws. So, let us get together and see if we can, collectively, defuse this philosophical conundrum so succinctly distilled for us by Mike? (36)

There are many features of this puzzle that we can considerably agree with. However, when put together, it is obvious that a resolution cannot be maintained, except

through an act of fiat, as things stand. Indeed, we could well enquire just what 'standing', to borrow a legal term, these various elements have both individually and when combined. The qualification that, metaphorically, 'we should not cast our nets too wide' in dealing with ethical anomalies is a case in point. This principle is one that, I am sure, is one that we can most certainly agree with, but, we would then need to ask if if it correctly applied in this instance. E.g., we could shrink this metaphorical 'perimeter' and just ask what ethical ramification followed in the wake of this tax driver 'losing' his job? We could ask was he fired, or, did he find it was no longer profitable working long hours with less customers? Or, we might enquire further and ask what other avenues of work did this ex-taxi driver investigate, say, training as a bus driver or truck driver, perhaps finding a position as a chauffeur or as someone working for a delivery firm, and so? Similarly, we could ask just what standing have these two nieces of the ex-taxi driver in so far as this claim that they are responsible for the taxi driver losing his employment? Now we could run the hypothetical argument that if these two Uber drivers were the only two Uber drivers in this country, then it would be most unlikely that this taxi driver would have lost his job given that the competition from Uber, in this instance, would have been infinitesimal small, and, therefore, negligible in comparison. Consequently, we cannot claim that these nieces were solely responsible for their uncle losing his profession. Furthermore, given the near inevitable 'onslaught' of cultural innovations and the seeming acceleration of the rate at which we experience such innovations perhaps we should point blame for its adverse consequences, both intended and unintended, at those authorities and institutions that are in a position to considerably ameliorate the hardships inflicted by such transformations and transitions in cultural practice. All innovations, to some extent, capitalize on the fact that they proffer more efficient ways of doing things, i.e., doing more with less. Surely our political powers that be could institute policies and procedures that oversee a diminishment of the shock administered through the advent of such innovations, say, by suitably taxing such innovations and using those revenues, and other forms of revenue, to retrain those people who no longer have such bypassed professions, better re-educate our children to head in more profitable directions, and so on. Before passing on from this perspective on policy re(-)formation let me add these two additional comments. (37)

Just before 1900, prior to the massive uptake in automobiles, there was one horse for every four people in the city of London. We can easily imagine the huge number of people involved in the overall industry needed to maintain such a population of animals. Still, with the demise of blacksmiths and farriers, stablers, and other cohorts of workers in both cities and in the countryside, they were, historically, very quickly replaced by auto-mechanics, car dealerships, petrol pump attendants, and so on. Now, on reflection we should quickly come to understand that the advent of cars to a great extent has resulted in the ongoing democratization of this technology of transport. Despite the large numbers of horses in London it was most certainly not the case that for every four people one or more persons, on average, would own a horse. Horses were only owned by the very wealthy or by very large businesses concerned, say, with haulage, omnibuses, the military, and so on. Arguably, given that cars, overall, are cheaper has meant more people, comparatively, have been able to own a form of transport other than walking or bicycles. Moreover, given that more people have had increasing access to the same has meant a

widening of the support industries needed to service this industry. That perhaps, on balance, the advent of cars gave more opportunities in employment than the loss of employment attendant upon the displacement of horses (and to this list we should also add the use of oxen). Second, even Uber drivers will eventually receive their historical comeuppance when driverless cars become the standard for personal transport, public transport, and both short-distance and long-distance haulage. Unfortunately, or fortunately, the legal landscape currently is a quagmire of issues that will need to be resolved. E.g., in the advent of an accident, just who is legally liable and culpable? The victim or victims of the accident; the owner of the vehicle which may well be more likely a company acting like a taxi service; the manufacturer of the automobile; the developers of the software; the various distributors of these cars and their software; the legislators who have not foreseen future unintended consequences, and so on. But before too long, I am sure that I will be able to use an app in order to summon such an autonomous mode of transport that will let me know when it has arrived, address me by name when I enter the vehicle, which through voice commands will confirm the destination already chosen or will redirect this vehicle to a new destination. During this trip I will be able to listen to classical music and read a philosophy tome or novel at the top of my reading list. On arrival, no doubt, I will need to be informed that I have arrived, and the expense of this trip will be deducted from a bank account without my needing to do anything in that regard. Welcome to a future that to a great extent is already here.[257] (38)

I briefly noted two guidelines,[258] namely, the need for the adequate representation of the moral situation in question in which all relevant information is presented, and, the need for a suitably conducted 'suspension' in which we explore both the non-existential and existential possibilities for enaction[259] within the parameters of that type of event being therein simulated and explored.[260] To these two guidelines we can add two more as implied by Mike, namely, to the simulation and exploration of such events we need to adequately circumscribe our representation of the same in order to effectively deal with their scrutiny, and, we should be able to exit from such simulated explorations in a manner where we can successful form a definitive resolution of such anomalies since how, otherwise, could we lead our lives successfully if we were not able to do as we make our passage through this world at large..? (39)

Of course, in the pursuit of our research, whatever the topic being simulated for such exploration and scrutiny, a host of other issues will also need to be resolved. (40)

---

257 In South Korea, e.g., all the metro trains are driverless and at first it was a strange experience sitting in the front car speeding along the rails from one station to the next ('as if you were the driver' which I saw some very young children acting out as if they were. Alas, this is one more profession that they will not be able to train for unless they were to actively assist in the running of a boutique railway that operates with historical engines).

258 Paragraph 33.

259 By 'enaction' is technically meant 'either the commission of certain actions, the omission of certain actions, and/or their partial deferral or permanent postponement.

260 As I have noted 'we do not nor should not live by bread alone', and, at the same time, 'we do not nor should not live by all else other than bread'. Then, we should also understand that the relatively existential comes about through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v. Hence the mutual interrelationship necessarily in existence between both the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential. Refer to paragraph 16.

4. A Philosophical Pre-Appreciation of Disciplinary Research

It could be argued that in our research, whatever topics being dealt with, we will need to find this Goldilocks' region between our 'casting a net' either too widely or not wide enough. In this regard, we could be 'pragmatic(al)' and merely note whether 'we have the requisite degree of clarity apparently needed for our observations and arguments, and, whether we are travelling too far and not marshalling our forever limited resources in a relatively non-economical manner'. I.e., if we were to persistently find a lack of clarification then this could mean we would need to extend our representative perimeter, and, then, too, the presence of persistent confusions and digression could well mean the opposite, that we would need to shrink those current terms of reference. But, of course, as noted, a host of other problems may well also present themselves. Indeed, they should be anticipated, and, their current modes of representation should be philosophically appreciated. Moreover, our intentional objectives should also be given an adequate formulation and philosophical appreciation even if cast in an open and provisional format, hopefully, in a format that does not seriously pre-judge and misjudge the outcomes of such explorations and scrutiny given the potentially surprising nature of existentially enriched nature of a well-lived lived-reality, which moreover, itself does not seem to stick to a precise script in such matter. Indeed, in being continually surprised we find a remarkable raison d'être for the unravelling of our existences as we find both the disruption of our mindless routines and, then, their becoming existentially enriched through these events of such serendipitous happenstance. (41)

Of course, I must also confess that I am being an optimist here. Still, without some required degree of optimism we would never pursue the full course of our interactions with others even if we must also avoid, at the same time, all thought of our own ever-immanent death and the inevitable failure of all our enterprises. In the causal unravelling of our relationships, we should forever be surprised, moreover, we should take responsibility for that which we can be directly held responsible for, but, also be resigned to witnessing that which we may well have no responsible control over whatsoever. However, more of our time is actually spent walking between these two extreme forms of experiential reality. And herein lies a dilemma. To what extent are we responsible, and, to what extent should we accept responsibility for the same. How common is it for local politician to say, e.g., that Australia's greenhouse emissions are only a small fraction of those emitted by our planet as a whole. So, how could we make a difference when, even if we did, we would not make that much of a difference after all? Needless to say, that such short-sighted expediency is usually self-serving, the sort of throwaway lines used by industry representatives, social commentators paid for by the fossil fuel industries along with an assortment of other strange bedfellows over-committed to the now-misguided, and mistaken entrenchment, and disastrous consequences attendant upon the persistence of such bad habits. It is the nature of the deontological that we should take responsibility to whatever degree we are called upon to perform the same. As it is, it is drop by drop that the bucket is fill, and, that it can be equally emptied, metaphorically, 'drop by drop'… (42)

Recently, a certain book was cited that attempted to discern the cultural differences and co-associated divergences that ensued in both the thinking and attitudes exhibited by representatives of those cultures in question.[261] In a critique of this work, the criticism that this author continually used to the expression 'Asian' when it was obvious from his comparisons and studies cited that they were primarily meaning 'China' along with an assortment of other distinctive cultures with backgrounds also influenced by Confucian ideas and ideals, say, 'Korea, Japan and Vietnam'. This somewhat sloppy attitude to the normal use of language and its specialized use in the form of terminology was also extended to various studies where, e.g., students were interviewed and where it can be well-pointed out that students, no doubt conveniently to be found to hand, are not representative inhabitants of any culture even if they are not non-representatives of their resident culture at the same time. Such criticisms being noted in more formal critiques of this author's research that, because of such defective methods, whose efforts expended in the course of such research could well be regarded as unnecessarily wasted. In the light of these obvious defects, I noted that there must be a need for critical forms of philosophical appreciation in order to clarify both their disciplinary objectives and the methodologies that would be adopted and adapted over the course of their research. However, given philosophy's well-deserved poor reputation in such matters and the opined need for philosophical specialization such an approach was ruled out as basically impracticable and unworkable. However, as much as I am in agreement with some of these observations, still, it is my opinion that a tightly focused form of philosophical-like appreciation is definitely called for both in the thematization of objectives for such research, but, also, as to how that research can be critically expedited in as pragmatic a manner as possible.[262] To this end let me briefly proffer some relatively simple guidelines. (43)

We already have four guidelines to hand, namely, representationalism and suspension, circumscription and resolution. To these let me add objectives and methodologies, possibilities and impossibilities. Briefly, let me scrutinize what is intended under their eight headings, and proffering, in the process, whatever else might prove to be a necessary addition to this short list… (44)

---

261 Richard Nesbitt (a social sociologist); *The Geography of Thought*: *How Asians and Westerners Think Differently… and Why*; Free Press, 2003. A similar criticism also applies to his use of the expression 'Westerners'. On *a priori* grounds we must assume that there will be differences between cultures, etc., and, that those differences will also change over time and as a result of cultures interacting through travel, media, trans-national forms of education, the continual evolvement of cultures, themselves, within their own cultural confines, etc. The problem then resides in how to demonstrate such differences besides questioning the purposes and intended uses of such cross-cultural forms of research, etc. Such issues present a nest of philosophical issues that even if they were to be resolved, in part, I am sure would make for a stronger research project or program.

262 I.e., applying usable philosophical concepts and practices in order to ensure a relatively enhanced degree of consistency, the coherence of research objectives, a clarification of methodologies, just what deserves to be focused upon and interpreted, re(-)interpreted, etc. At the same time dispensing with all longwinded philosophical histories and endless controversies, along with those persisting ideologies that, correctly, should have deconstructed a long time ago, etc! Of course, it would be my hope too that certain critical and radical ideas put forwards in these essays might also be taken up when and where they should prove to be invaluable. E.g., the economic treatment of both methodology and terminology, the non-economic invocation of relevant non-continuities, etc., the current hyper-economic forms of covertly demanded re(-)contextualization being implied over the course of that supervising discipline, etc.

A ‘representationalism’ implies ‘that we recognize the need to clearly represent what is relevant[263] to the conducting the course of that intended research’. We could do this along logical lines (say, in the form of axioms or through other forms of logical notation) or through supplying phenomenological descriptions; by accurately citing texts or reporting different forms of interpretation and, then, separately and clearly noting our appreciation of such forms of contextualization, etc. (45)

By ‘suspension’ is meant ‘the suitable calling into question of everything within an adequate representation, or through the utilization of other similar strategies, in order to achieve a similar result, namely, our noting our initial prejudices, as original prejudgments, that, as necessary materials that need to be to hand, can, then, through processes of de-suspension, etc., permit our ongoing relationships with such materials and their evolving interpretations to then, metaphorically, ‘speak for themselves’ and, thereby, promote the enaction of patterns of behaviour that through the course of such relatively existential interventions can then be found, generally, to enrich the e/valuational formation of those same relationships.’ Thence our paying suitable attention to a dialectical relationship between both our pre-judgments and, at the same time, not pre-judging the critical and radical results of such explorations and their scrutiny as come to be thematized therein and thereafter. (46)

Under ‘circumscription’ we note the need to ‘neither over-circumscribe nor under-circumscribe the effective perimeters of our explorations’. I.e., articulating only what is relevant to the course of our research and removing from our current concerns those aspects that do not seem to be relevant. To define such boundaries a hermeneutical approach could be undertaken in order to better articulate just which meta-textual conventions will be adopted and adapted to the exigencies of current circumstances. (47)

Under the heading of ‘resolution’ we ‘note the need to successfully resolve the anomalies presented through our enquiries’. That we do this by doing what is necessary and removing those controversial, irrelevant, contradictory, incoherent, inappropriate, non-consequential features that would prevent us from realizing some working solution however provisional its status as a conclusive dissolution of those original features that were found to be anomalous. However, although our objectives should entail this goal, we should also equally recognize when this has not been achieved or when it would be impossible to achieve any reasonable degree of resolution, be that in the past, now, or at some time in the future. (48)

The ‘objectives’ of our research should be ‘stated as clearly as possible while we should ever remain as open as possible to whatever results are eventually obtained’. Recognizing the need to be suitably critical whilst also recognizing the possibility of radical solution that could innovatively demand the possible re(-)formulation of that research along with a re(-)configuration of its methodologies and terminologies, etc. (49)

---

[263] By ‘relevant’ is meant ‘that which make a difference, one way or the other, to the formation of our interpretations and, therein and thereafter, our ensuing conclusions’.

Under the heading of ‘methodologies’ we explore which philosophical or non-philosophical approaches might be called for, explore how the utilization of techniques from other disciplines could be profitably adopted and adapted, attempt to understand, hopefully, from a secular perspective, the intended ramifications of such research should it be successfully realized whilst not precluding results that would not have been expected. (50)

By ‘possibilities is meant working productively within the current limits of our research in order to expedite a relatively successful process of resolution in a provisional de-anomalization of the current problematic motivation that is promoting the course of such research. (51)

By ‘impossibilities’ we can invoke the fact ‘that all critical techniques and their results have limits and that those limits should be recognized, and, moreover, much that passes as acceptable practice may well be traditional procedures that, when suitably comprehended, should just be relegated as either impossible processes and/or just nonsensical claims! Under the rubric of ‘impossible nonsense’ we should note all forms of illogical representationalism, remove ourselves from all improperly formulated economic strategies; question the absence of the non-economic when unilateral re-directedness of causal processes are duly implicated; highlight the absence of all relevant forms of an imputed and expected hyper-economic re(-)contextualization along with all unimodal and bimodal forms of ideological extremism, etc., etc. Given that all formulations, thematizations, and conclusions, and so on, are economically engineered it must follow that through economic correlativity, etc., absolutistically definitive forms of identity can be neither recognized hermeneutically, neither encountered phenomenologically, nor engaged existentially! Whereby we should accept, without reservation, that absolutistical language cannot be thought and relativistically language is a place where we cannot remain given that its impermanent existence is only at the center of our suspensions. That by such simple means we can finally and completely rid ourselves of such traditional baggage as the extremist ideologies of realism, empiricism, idealism, rationalism, dualism, and so on and so forth! (52)

Now, before we move on to the important topic of a necessary positive nihilism as underlying an anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism let me first proffer the following philosophical tool in the form of a matrix that is 3 x 3 that deals with, namely, considerations concerning ‘treatments, arguments, and conditional consequences’ as fall under the (‘horizontal’) headings of the hermeneutical, the phenomenal-phenomenological, and the existential:

Hermeneutical	**Phenomenological**	**Existential**
Pretreatment	Treatment	Retreatment/Posttreatment
Premises	Arguments	Conclusions
Pre-Conditions	Conditions	Post-Conditional Consequences (53)

Second, let me proffer a second parallel ('vertical') matrix that is 1 x3, namely:

Economic Non-Economic Hyper-Economic (54)

The first matrix is a heuristic device for making sure we conduct a reasonably clarified form of representationalism. The second matrix is another heuristic device for making sure we respectfully note both our current limits and that those limitations are being duly noted! Let me briefly explain the critical and/or radical work that is being done through the use of such devices. (55)

The second matrix notes the economic limits or our treatments, arguments and conditional consequences, etc. (56)

The 'economic' implies 'the necessity for some form of a trimodal formalism along with the avoidance of all non-qualified, ideological forms of unimodalism and bi-modalism'.[264] (57)

The 'non-economic' notes the need to recognize differences in a unilateral re-directionism in order to differentially discern the relatively existential from the relatively non-existential, and v.v., etc. (58)

The 'hyper-economic' demands that the contextualization of our research be duly observed and taken into account (hence a corresponding calling, when required, for relevant forms of cross-cultural, inter-disciplinary approaches when and where they are found to be relevant to the reporting of that research). (59)

'Treatments' concern 'processes of transformation retreatment' as touched upon earlier in this essay.[265] By such means we can either informally or formally construct our relevant forms of representationalism as introduced under the heading/s of arguments, etc. Under this heading we also note the role played by hermeneutic rectification, phenomenological deconstruction (as viewed in its broadest sense from discerning the illogical to deconstructing forms of preference, i.e., misguided forms of prioritization, privileging, and promotion)., and existential re(-)normalization. (60)

'Arguments' should be a logic as traditionally understood (and could also be referred to as presuppositions, suppositions and post-suppositions)'. But, such logical conventions also need to be scoped by the dialectical given that all definitions, etc., have limitations, etc. (61)

'Conditional consequences' refers to 'the need for the provision of suitable forms of consequential analysis noting at the same time the relatively existential and relatively

---

264 As discussed in *The Seventh Book*…

265 Paragraphs 11-13. Refer to the relevant modules in *The Seventh Book*…

non-existential consequences of patterns of enactions in terms of their potential for realization as certain possibility, probabilities, and potencies, etc. (62)

However, underlying the very possibility of potential transformations is the need to understand the preeminence of a positive nihilism given, e.g., that economic correlativities, etc., demand that "the 'simulation of imputations' can only be as 'imputations of simulation'" that can be neither referred to in either absolutistical or relativistical formats given the sheer impossibility of such formulations despite linguistic attempts to disguise such rampant nonsense (and where such exponent duly deserve relegation, etc.). (63)

5. Why a Positive Nihilism is Unavoidable in the Profitable Pursuit of Our Research

The expression 'nihilism', I believe, is much misunderstood. We might simply define it, in provisional terms of reference, as 'that understanding where 'both the substantial and non-substantial nature of all imputations must be regarded as a nonsense given that neither absolutistical nor relativistical notions of identity can be meaningfully entertained'. (64)

I further first subdivide this topic into two divisions, namely, the impossibility of a 'negative nihilism' and the necessity for a 'positive nihilism'. (65)

Now, if we were to insist on a substantial philosophy, metaphysics, etc., we automatically invoke a negative nihilism. Similarly, if were to insist on a relativistic philosophy, metaphysics, etc., we would also automatically invoke a(nother version of a) negative nihilism, (66)

For the sake of being thorough let me outline two more varieties of a negative nihilism, namely, reductional and hyper-relational. In the excessive application of a reductionistic approach we end up with practically nothing. E.g., an atom could be thought of as almost empty space with a relatively dense nucleus. But, to say that the atom is just a nucleus and a set of orbitals for its electrons encompassing a near empty space is wrong. Just as saying that a proton is merely a probabilistic concatenation of quarks and gluons encompassing a near empty space is also wrong. Because it is through the relationships between these reductionistically treated parts that we have the phenomenological emergence of both atoms and protons, etc., as something distinctly different from the mere phenomenology of its constituent parts. Then, moving in the opposite direction we have a similar form of an impossible negative nihilism, namely, the hyper-relational emergence of emergent phenomena. E.g., the unqualified argument in transformational treatment that argues that 'all treatment is productive of a relational state of affairs that is subjected to metafication, i.e., elevation by one meta-degree every time a process of treatment is enacted'. If that were to be the case then we could never 'return' to the relative object-language. But this would be a horrendous problem, without qualification, but, we can account for natural qualification through the automatic invocation of the desuspension and, in effect, its subsequent de-metafication. (67)

Then, again, we experience the process of e/valuational formation through both emergence and its de-suspension, and, not thorough processes that are imputed in and through formats that are characterized by impossible forms of absolutism, relativism, reductionism, and/or a relational expansionism. (68)

Now, if we were to abstain from either a substantialistic absolutism or a non-substantialistic relativism, or, either avoid conducting a persistent reductionism or an excessive relational expansionism, then we would automatically invoke the dialectical-logics/logical-dialectics of a positive nihilism (that then needs to be further cast in the mould of an anti-representational, pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism). Let me explain how these divisions operate once more in order to decisively demonstrate the untenability of negative forms of nihilism, and, that the only set of arguments that are tenable must be cast in the form of a positive nihilism! (69)

In the archetypal economy it is stressed that the economic correlativities of focus (Object), field (World), and frame (as a co-associated subjective framing) (Ego) cannot be definitely attained and obtained, i.e., that they cannot be completely appropriated and isolated in their entirety. Given that any one correlative polarity is defined as the joint negation of the other two correlative polarities it follows that any one moment (impossibly) treated in its own singularity could have no meaning being neither recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged as such. That which is not economically presented cannot be presented! Let me pursue a linguistic argument in the furtherance of this same point. (70)

If I were to write on a piece of paper the following name, ‘John’, how might we interpret it when, as it stands, there can be no interpretation other than speculative guesses entered into through linguistic associations, the making of unsubstantiated assumptions, etc. Unless we have a presuppositional basis already preprepared in which this word is inserted, and the meaning of that insertion is prearranged, we have no way of deciding just what might be meant. Is this apparent name referencing to one person called John; all people with the name of ‘John’; is it a question; a process of identification; an assertion of a process of identification; is it slang or a metaphor for the customer of a prostitute or toilet; is it a code word to enact a certain action or series of actions? Without either a context of insertion and/or its embedding in a sentence any sing word (or phrase), in this instance this apparent name ‘John’, just can have no significance whatsoever given that it lacks both a reasonably definitive reference (referent) and a meaning (sense), etc. Then, the further conjunction of both a reference and meaning might well lend to this combination a certain degree of meaningfulness (that might also then intimate to what extent this combination had either existential pretensions and/or some form of a truth determination). However, once placed within a well-formed sentence we are then narrowing down just what might be meant (as well as intimating either existential pretensions and/or the imprint of its prior, concurrent and/or future truth determinations, etc.). (71)

The point of this analysis being that ‘isolates’, as ‘the impossible segregation and isolation of economic correlatives, can have no significance whatsoever other than through either probabilistic associations and/or speculation. So, e.g., the name ‘John’, if in the form of a text it were found written by itself, we might suspect that it probably

names ‘a male person’. Yet, in French, the name ‘John’ usually refers to the name ‘Jean’ which in an English context usually names a woman. That without knowing the background language the name ‘Jean’, e.g., could be either the name of a male or the name of a female were it to be actually used as the name of a single person. With single words, with neither a preset context nor its embedding within a well-formed sentence, confusion abounds since such ‘expressions’ have no sufficient significance and cannot be treated as suitable expressions other than as some form of intentional deposition in the form of a text with an isolated form. Similarly, the word ‘sheep’ by itself does not tell us if one sheep is meant or more than one sheep is intended. Or, again, take the word ‘cook’. Is this word intended to be read as a verb, say, in the form of an imperative, or, does it indicate a referent, namely, a cook, as the person who does the cooking? Given that we cannot significantly focus on a single word, being unable to determine either its referent, or its sense or meaning, or its possible meaningfulness and/or its possible truth value… just who are we to think that we can find significance in an isolated element of experience where, practically, there is no value in such a sterile preoccupation. (72)

In the same manner, absolutistical thinking is completely bankrupt and can only be riven with confusion across the board! Don’t even think you can go there, because you cannot! That to think and say that you can, then such a misguided person only deserves relegation since there is no point in entertaining their senseless arguments since they only masquerade as sensible. (73)

As for relativists, expressing a pure relativism, do not set out to meet one since no one fitting that description will ever be found. On the other hand, a relative-relativist might be found excessively expressing such a philosophy, but, very much like a can of worm where every worm has both the ability and the chance to speak; where a conversation with such a person would be like walking across sinking sand or walking in the midst of a sandstorm and certainly never knowing where you are, or, where they are... That the only ‘home’ the relativist could inhabit, philosophically, is on a momentary cusp between the suspension and the de-suspension, with their good self about to be mis-re-directed in any direction. (74)

Persistent reductionists inevitably deconstruct their own arguments, whereas, relational expansionists can only conflate all forms of thinking in such a refined manner that find no ground that is left to metaphorically ‘stand’ upon! (75)

Where we start must be economically formulated, be that advertently or inadvertently, overtly or covertly, etc. But, resolution implies the advent of the non-economic through the unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment. For all this to occur, etc., there can only be a positive nihilism since if we remove all forms of a negative nihilism and if we were to find that that which is left makes sense then it automatically follows that what we are dealing must be and cannot be anything other than a positive nihilism – where living-experience become lived-experience replete with significance, etc. (76)

How might I philosophically demonstrate this complex proposition? (77)

A well-formed sentence is a miracle of economic formulation. Passive nouns, active verbs, and the interactions between the former where it could be said that 'moving' towards the verb realizes an 'adverb', and, where moving 'towards' the noun realizes an 'adjective'. Then, superimposed upon all sentences are interactive inputs of textual, meta-textual and non-textual forms of contribution. Phenomenologically, we have both phenomenal inputs and phenomenological inputs and the semantic interactions between the same.[266] Hermeneutically we have wholes, parts, and whole(s)-and-part(s) with, respectively, synthesis or reconstitution; analysis or reduction; and, nomination or the indication of a reference. Existentially we have existential indictors, existential hallmarks, and existential predictors. Invoking an interrogative economy, we find we have rhetoric, metaphors, and apparitional-like states (of the as-if/double negations) portending literal-like meanings, the possibility of truth determinations (through Tarskian metafications and de-metafications/de-suspensions), etc. (78)

Such complexity compounded through complexification, and, simplicity arrived at through processes of resolution realized through suitable de-suspensions, etc. (79)

That given significance is apparently present, this must imply the absence of all impossible forms of negative nihilism, and, given transformations through de-suspensions it follows that only through a philosophy of a positive nihilism can we account for harmonic process of resolution. Since if we had to hypothetically deal with isolated correlatives there could be no significance whatsoever. But, if some degree of significance is present then it follows that harmonic process of resolution must have their occurrence within the required form of a working economy. But, processes of economic resolution must also imply non-economic processes of irruption since without the latter there could be neither actual process of resolution nor the causal implication of chaotic moments of unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment. Where unilateral re-directedness of the last moment results in patterns of mere reiteration involving the relatively non-existential, whereas, the unilateral re-directedness of the first moment (and each next moment for some time thereafter) must result in patterns of sheer re-iteration involving a relatively existential orientation. The expert propelling of a billiard ball, as a metaphor or simile, could proffer an analogical differentiation between these so-called 'last' and 'first moments'. Using the cue to propel the billiard in a certain direction is like imparting a 'unilateral re-directedness of the last moment'. Then, if that ball hits the cushion of the billiard table, it is now heads in a new direction producing a new 'last moment of unilateral re-directedness'. However, with an expert billiard player or pool player if they were to skillfully impart a spin to that billiard ball then in the curving of its trajectory across the table (like that of the bias of a bowl) each moment becomes the next 'first moment in its unilateral re-directedness' over the ensuing course of its trajectory.[267] But, as noted, the relatively radical nature of the non-economic moment needs to be con-

---

[266] Arguing, through the suspension, that the world, through experience itself, dictates our 'phenomenal constructs' that, in turn, are also phenomenologically constructed by us in and through their intentional constitution, etc.

[267] Very difficult but it can be done. However, the bias of a bowl in a game of bowls might proffer a better analogy for this unilateral re-directedness of a first moment indicating a relatively existential state of affairs.

textually re(-)appropriated, preferably in a critical manner, within what I term its hyper-economic terms of reference. (80)

This process of re(-)appropriation of the non-economic might also help to explain why most relationships (as representatively expressed through ongoing narratives) are able to persist in an ongoing relational form given that the definitive resolution of our relationship should result in their metaphorical 'death', and, most relationships (and narratives) are not decidedly dispatched through definitive forms of resolution (unless they are in the form of a contract that successfully discharges the terms of that contract). Given that only the relatively-radical is able to be incrementally appropriated in hyper-economic terms of reference, and, given the observational principle of the non-absolutistical equivalence between both logical subjects and modes of identifications (in and between moments of identification of those logical subjects)[268] it follows that processes of appropriation, moment by moment, cannot completely appropriated and perfectly match the relatively radical in the containment of its irruptive reabsorption. I.e., that there must always exist, in open, non-closed processes of interactive absorption a differential between the irruption of the non-economic and its hyper-economic re(-)appropriation that through the imperfect, non-equivalent act of re(-)absorption would imply the more probable persistence of that ongoing relationship (or narrative). (81)

But with one problem solved another problem, or pseudo-problem, now presents itself, namely, how can a definitive process of relational resolution be enacted as in the suitable or non-suitable termination of contractual behaviour? A 'non-suitable termination of the contractual relationship' can be entered into through just refusing to resolve the relationship in question, say, by not paying the rent, or by just leaving those rental premises, etc. On the other hand, a more suitable form of termination could be entered into by asking for the contract to be terminated or by having the relationship terminate at a certain point in time. In effect, we are removing ourselves from that relationship which amounts to the same thing. But, in a relationship that is not closed both obligations and the meeting of those obligations is never entered into in a state of definitive balance except in the suitable termination of that same relationship when and where all relevant parties have recognized the reasonable meeting of all obligations incurred, etc. (82)

Now, is this concept of the hyper-economic merely a conveniently designed hypothetical construct or can we point out, in lived-experience, some indications of this imputed phenomenon? (83)

---

[268] This 'principle' basically states, 'that true equality is only an *a priori* feature of a system and cannot be definitively found in a synthetic format of lived-reality unless countered by some other phenomenon'. E.g., if I were to throw my jersey on to the back of a chair, ideally, in a world without friction, it would slip off in one of two possible directions. But, because I have managed to get it to stay suspended on the back of that chair means I must also invoke a principle of resistance in order to account for its not slipping off the top of that chair. Since the jersey can never fall perfectly balanced on that chair, the non-slipping of that jersey must be countered by some other phenomenal form of input contributing to the static status of that current state of affairs. This principle must also qualify other principles such as 'the equal and opposite production of a reaction' to the extent that such a 'response' cannot be perfectly delivered, say, because of friction, etc.

On reflection this question is 'easily' answered:[269] the hyper-economic contextualization of both economically and non-economically oriented experience is none other than our experiencing the conventionalization of this world as lived, this overall life-world, this world at large as we find it simulated in and through experience from both its perspective and our points of view without recourse to the impossible imputations of so-called 'internal worlds' and 'external worlds'. I.e. a world of living-experience being textualized as lived-experience, increment by increment, as our interpretations of experience themselves evolve in our interactions with(-)others, before(-)others, and in the freedom to be derived through(-)others… (84)

At this point it could be stated **that the 'pragmatic attitude' is 'that observation that notes that which actually functions'!** I.e., Our attending to that which works in what is found to work as refracted through our interpreted reflections upon this world at large. Obviously, in this regard, such an attitude must relinquish all imputed forms of a negative nihilism. But, what is left is not so much a pragmatic philosophical position(ing) as the exercising of a positive nihilism. I.e., an avoidance of what does not work and allowing what works to work through our engagement with this overall world-of-life in spite of those residual imputations remaining, albeit subjected to extensive suspensions. Because we cannot escape from what is needed to hand, namely, all manner of imputations, but, which, through extensive suspensions, then renders the defective as relatively non-defective… (85)

Hence the approbation extended to all forms of ideological extremism, regardless of whether that is extended in either philosophical, disciplinary, and/or secular worlds. I.e., our avoiding, through (the extensive) suspension all forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, relativism, reductionism, and relational expansionism, etc. Now, these defective forms of a negative nihilism can be better understood through following these philosophical guidelines… (86)

For a start, 'relativism' can be viewed as 'a defective form of a trimodalism in so far as the decisive influences of the non-economic and the hyper-economic, through their obstruction, and are just not seen to apply'! In effect, creating a non-dynamic suspension where the automatic invocation of the de-suspension is overlooked. We could review this as a form of reduction in which the dynamic nature of the extensive suspension is obstructed. We can refer to this oversight as a 'reduction conducted to the first degree'. (87)

Now if a process of reduction were allowed to continue, we would then arrive at a reduction to the bimodal formulation of economic correlatives as dysfunctional bimodal correlativities. E.g., those defective philosophies that over-privilege certain impossible

---

[269] Admittedly, I am being ironic. But, then, through economic simplification our metaphysically oriented appreciation of this world at large does appear to take that course of least resistance in our coming to understand this same sense and semblance of 'world'. Although, as well, with some degree of self-exertion, we can also persist in resisting those forms of least resistance that are less productive for(-)us which, otherwise, would merely reduce us to the conventional ordinariness of the everyday and the inauthenticity entailed in the mere exercising of such habitual routines be they either other-imposed and/or self-imposed.

dualities, etc. We can refer to this form of selective oversight as a ‘reduction conducted to the second degree’. (88)

Then, if reduction were allowed to focus entirely on the unimodal presentation of certain economic correlative, then this form of indiscriminate oversight would demonstrate ‘reduction conducted to the third degree’. E.g., as would be found in univocal forms of empiricism, realism, rationalism, idealism, and so on *ad infinitum*. (89)

Collectively, all three forms of defective reductionism could be referred to as forms of defective ‘absolutism’. Hence ‘reductionism’, in all three degrees can be ‘reduced’ to nothing but ‘distinctive forms or varieties of absolutism’. In the same vein, we can view an excessive relational expansionism, without the requisite countering of the required degrees of de-metafication, basically, as another form of absolutism in which the relational, alone, is inordinately privileged in such manner and to such a degree that is far beyond what would be metaphysically permitted (in our philosophical appreciation of the philosophical, etc.). In an absolutization of the already absolutistically constituted, such impossible treatment of the impossible only renders the possibility for all manner of nonsense to masquerade with a superficially false semblance of sense. For the record, the relativization of the relative is equally impossible, whereas, all that we are permitted to entertain, more or less, is the relativization of the absolute orientation and the absolutization of the relative orientation, or, more correctly, only our psychic movement alone between these latter orientations. (90)

To reinforce the significance of these philosophical forms of (metaphysical) insightfulness let me note again the following analogies. (91)

A univocal (i.e., unimodal) form of absolutism is like uttering a single word (or phrase) and expecting to be suitably understood. (92)

A bimodal form of absolutism is like uttering a well-formed sentence and expecting it to be completely understood without recognizing that even sentences are usually uttered in the context of overt or covert paragraphs. (93)

A defective trimodal form of absolutism, i.e., relativism, is a bit like uttering an entire book of detail without either believing one word of it or rejecting the same as if one were merely engaged in the reading a novel (without over-reading it as a disguised form of an autobiography, or discerning the characterization of its locale, etc.). But, we can engage the apparent truthfulness, or otherwise, of our truth determinations! In the usual de-suspension of a well-informed suspension, we find once again that we must confront the biases of the world should they be found to persist and remain… just as people can only walk in one direction at any one moment of time, that we cannot pass through solid walls nor fly up into the sky even if we can imagine what it might be like to be a bird; just as gravity has for us what, forever is relatively downward, just as inauthentic people remain inauthentic in their interactions with us, and so on. How could we think the world is not inequitably constituted otherwise, as pronounced by a relativist? (94)

Then, in an excessive relational expansionism it is as if the need for imputations as the means to begin with are completely dispensed with through a form of a misguided reductionism that overlooks all means to an end… and dispensing with all truth determinations in the process. (95)

Now, in an acceptance of the economic, the non-economic and the hyper-economic, at last we are in a position to define 'the systematic form of the existential', namely, as none other than 'the dynamic balance entertained between these three economic correlativities of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic, that constitute the overall relational economy'. (96)

That through the non-economic, etc., we can now explore the existential. (97)

6. The Temporal Nature of Existential Experience, etc.

Through the deliberations of our intentional lives, etc., and through trans-intentional appreciation and its hyper-economic contextualization, etc., we are now in a position to better understand in what sense facts are either formed by-us and/or for-us, be the latter either delivered by others or by the nature of this world at large… in and through our meeting all thematized forms of a causal unilateral re-directedness. (98)

In our intentional depositions, in our writing and reading of this world at large, once we have discerned the content of the apparent presence of intentional intent, we are then in a position to possibly appreciate the relative 'presence' or 'absence' of its 'existential over-writing'. I.e., to what extent a pro-relational orientation has successfully transformed the text of its enquiry from a trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity (without overlooking, at the same time, the trans-objective, the trans-interobjective and the trans-intersubjective dimensions of existentially oriented experience[270]). (99)

Now, I would like to conjecture that facts are experienced or treated as relatively ahistorical in their presentations. Furthermore, that without a direct or indirect evidential basis these factual-like forms (primarily located in the trans-cognitive sixth order of the ontical) would then be nothing more than (residents in the trans-cognitive fifth order of the possibly-potential, and, therein, as nothing more than) 'factoids' (much beloved by both the dishonest and inauthentic, and those enmeshed in either the creation and/or the dissemination of conspiracies). (100)

In a contrast to the ahistorical presentation of facts, we have the distinctive appreciation of the relatively existential as trans-historical, i.e., as the recognition of engaged encounters wherein we meet the uniquely unfolding concrete, historical specificity of that event as currently simulated to hand along with its characterization of its apparent exis-

[270] To this list, the religious person, understandably, would add a religious dimension, maybe in the form of a traditional or non-traditional theology, or as a radical theology in the form of a non-theology of the event.

tential status through existential hallmarks, existential indicators, and existential predictors. (101)

Given that the ‘relatively existential’ is the ‘relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential’ we now need to ask (again) how we might differentiate the same, be that either theoretically, practically, and/or through processes of critique? (102)

Theoretically, we do this through proposing the non-economic distinction of the ‘unilateral redirectedness of the last moment of the relatively non-existential in its ensuing non-chaotically oriented redirectedness’ *versus* ‘the unilateral redirectedness of the first moment of the relatively existential in its chaotically oriented re-directedness’. But in the unilateral redirectedness of the ensuing moment what distinguishes a ‘last moment’ from a ‘first moment’, or for that matter from a ‘next moment’ (that could fall either way?)? (103)

In the unilateral redirectedness of the last moment in which we merely find the reiteration of redirection realized was merely the recontinuation of the same sense and semblance of redirection then we know we are dealing with the relatively non-existential. On the other hand, in the unilateral redirection of the first moment should we find the reiteration of redirection realized was the non-recontinuation of a merely reiterated sense and semblance of redirection then we clearly know that we are being presented with the relatively existential through such ongoing re(-)presentation. Moreover, the existential tenor of such an evolving complexion, if present, is also concurrently stamped with clear and distinct anticipations of existential hallmarks that then through textual deposition take on the mantle of existential indictors, whereas, in contrast in our existential expectations they would form immanent existential predictors. Furthermore, the apparent presence of a co-associated exhibition of existential sentiments would further reinforce such an ascription that would be, in turn, further confirmed through establishing a positive consequential analysis given that a process of existential enrichment, more often than not, further enriches the existential richness of that relationship to hand. (104)

Therefore, in order to establish a valid existentially oriented set of truth conditions we need the concurrence of these factors of a unilateral re-directedness of the first moment (i.e., an ongoing, positively enhanced form of re-direction), the presence of existential hallmarks, etc., the co-occurrence of existential sentiments, along with the demonstration of the either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of a positive e/valuational formation (unless the trans-relational subjectivity of that represented relationship calls for some form of relational withdrawal through either de-conservation, de-preservation, and/or de-creation of the relationship in question). (105)

In regard to existential hallmarks, etc., we note how they can be classified with respect to time, (the objectivity and interobjectivity of) space, subjectivity and intersubjectivity (although religiously minded people might add a fifth category in term of the numinous or similar). (106)

Under the heading of the ‘temporal’ we find the relatively non-mediated immediacy of engagement with hallmarks of the trans-temporal, i.e., simultaneity, synchronicity and simultaneity, along with the living duration, or endurance, of the ‘living-present’ sometimes referred to as the ‘eternal moment’, or similar. E.g., when two people find themselves suddenly sharing in a similar idea or, when ‘non-concrete’ people naturally laugh at a humorous situation, be that together or individual (say, on recollection). (107)

In terms of the objectivity and interobjectivity of a spatial dimension, reperceived with a trans-spatial recharacterization, we find ourselves ‘directly engaging the specificity of the concretely historical’, which also can be reperceived as our becoming aware of its apparent trans-spatial or trans-geographical complexion. Just as, e.g., when two people in the midst of a telephone conversation, have found they have forgotten that they are geographically separate from each other, and so on. (108)

Under the heading of subjectivity, we note our reperception of a differentially different way of perceiving our overall sense of self along with our various co-associated senses of self. Finding therein a general sense and semblance of a harmonic alignment with these aspects of the temporal, spatial, subjective and intersubjective. Moreover, we should also find an intensification of existential sentiments and existential ‘climates and outcomes’, etc. As they say, “smile and the world will smile with you…” only portrays and portends a mere fraction of what could be positively entailed in the refinement of the existential attitude… (109)

From an intersubjective perspective the productive fruitfulness of this process of a harmonic alignment is extended in its transformation of our emplacement from beyond our embodiment to encompass both our mutual embeddedness and embankment. (110)

That though the positive fruitfulness of the existential attitude we find ourselves metaphorically ‘moving to a position’ where we can recognize, encounter, and engage with the unfolding of innovations that, hitherto, might have been quite recently regarded as ‘thinking the impossible’. Thence the novel creation of ‘final vocabularies’ (as per Richard Rorty), the narration of ‘definitive histories’ (as per myself), the experience of processes of apparent insightfulness through progressive forms of harmonic alignment along with the more productive recognition of those trajectories that are more inclined to proffer forms of existential enrichment, enhanced existential sentiments, and so on. (111)

Now, given the definition of the ‘systematic existential’ as ‘the dynamic balance of economic, non-economic and hyper-economic inputs’ we can now view the ‘existential orientation’ as ‘an alignment between the non-systematic existential and systematic existential as mediated through the non-economic in terms of the evolving resolutions realized through the redirectedness enacted by and on the behalf of the perceived and received representative simulation of the relevant trans-relational subjectivity, etc’. How, is such alignment to be advanced? Through the removal of all impossible forms of negative nihilism as arranged through the suitable utilization of a well-informed extensive suspension as enacted under the auspices of the residual positive nihilism left in play. Thence this logical necessity for us to recognize that the pragmatic functioning of the

philosophical discipline, indeed, any discipline, is predicated on this understanding. That without a positive nihilism there can be no productive forms of engagement, whereas, in the pointless advancing of any form of a negative nihilism what productive functioning remains is by virtue of the fact that to even entertain such nonsense the motions gone through are firmly enacted within the court of a positive nihilism. What are the ramifications of this imputed state overseeing the advancing of an existential alignment that is positively productive? Under a radical heading we find 'all conventional things are turned upside down, back to front, and inside out'. Under a critical heading we find the eventual harmonic resolution and ongoing de-anomalization of such phenomena through the re-contextualized hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of such distinctive features, etc. Where the relatively radical is received in discrete units that allow for incremental processes of re(-)appropriation. Where, by such steps, progressive forms of an ensuing insightfulness are emergently delineated in a recognizable form of significance that becomes both encountered and engaged. However, given the implicit deconstruction of a causal bi-modalism (and a subjective unimodalism), and its replacement by a trimodal form of a conditional economy we now explore the transformational nature of the 'event'. (112)

7. Provisional Summary and Introduction to a Secular Dimension, etc.

Short-sighted ideas of so-called 'causes and effects' are deconstructed and replaced by a conditional economy, i.e., the pre-conditional, the conditional, and the post-conditional. In effect, in the light of an existential writing and reading of phenomena, etc., it follows that we now have to appreciate the interpretative textualization of living-experience as lived-experience in and through its occurrence as an 'event'. What exactly constitutes an event and what are its ramifications philosophically, etc? (113)

As I perceive the chaotically initiated re-self-organization of the 'event' as central to each and every fact let me propose the following provisional ontology in the hope that this metaphysically inspired philosophical form of appreciation can cast some light on this topic (concerning the phenomenological nature of the event). (114)

Let me propose the interpreted observation that a fact devolves from the definitive delineation of the event through chaotically initiated re-self-organization. (115)

So, e.g., a woman becomes pregnant which, as a fact, is either true or false, since she cannot be half-pregnant. (116)

As noted by myself elsewhere, the occurrence of the chaotic event is either initiated through chaotic bifurcation, emergence, or some form of a phase change. E.g., the shattering of the ceramic pot; the explosion of gunpowder when lit; the boiling of water in the kettle or its freezing on the surface of a pond. (117)

That the chaotic configuration of the event is used by us to textually represent an event through the medium of a fact. (118)

But, because there are no external worlds and no internal worlds such factual representations of apparently presented, distinctively constituted events can only be between different texts where an alignment is perceived as a ‘fact’ should its truth determination be positively reviewed. However, in our interactions with the world at large, represented facts can also dictate the constitution of other represented facts because the phenomenological nature of hermeneutical interpretation is such that all things, in their apparent nomination, both dictates and is dictated from their own senses and semblances of a perspective, as a metaphorical ‘point of view’, centered on the event within each and every fact. Just as the heated kettle is hot and boiling water will scold regardless of who switches on that electric device. Recognizing, therein and thereby, that textual formation must also possess the simulation of a non-textual dimension besides the deposition of texts in accordance with meta-textual rules for the writing and the reading of the same. (119)

But, that this non-textual dimension is only imputed through the conformation of inferred alignments, etc. (120)

That all facts, to some extent evidentially stand in need of their truth determinations, otherwise we would be only dealing with factoids. (121)

Hence positive facts with positive truth determinations and negative facts with negative determinations, all else being factoids that could be divided between the possible and the impossible. Impossible factoids being internally incoherent. Possible factoids often being presented as more than quite probable even if evidentially unsupported otherwise. E.g., that Julius Caesar won the civil war he initiated; Julius Caesar was not made emperor given his assignation before his planned accession; my having afternoon tea with the current King of France; Santa Klaus as a cultural fact but not having a spatio-temporal referent. (122)

The introduction of events is sequentially dependent upon a certain set and series of prior events as facts. Just as, e.g., the pregnant mother to be was, herself, born. (123)

The fact of a fact is not a fact, being a non-fact or a meta-fact, actually, its truth value. The truth determination of a truth determination is not a truth determination but its non-truth determination, meta-truth determination… (124)

Facts, ideally, either representatively describe certain spatio-temporal configurations of certain nominations,[271] predicates and relations relating to certain objects/object-states/objectives depicting non-subjects, subjects, interobjective and intersubjective relations within the world at large, or, the representation of such representations be they determined to be either virtual and/or non-virtual in their imputed constitution. (125)

Hence this observation ruling that ‘facts’ are ‘the intentional framing of events that are either primarily determined intentionally or non-intentionally self-determined despite being framed intentionally, but, the former must entail the latter given that all

[271] Nominations of logical subjects that are either non-subjectively or subjectively constituted.

subjects are embodied'. E.g., Julius Caesar was born *versus* a certain volcano Vesuvius that erupted in the year 79 C.E. (126)

We could say, metaphorically, the fact of all facts is the world (of facts). (127)

That without a world of facts there could be no individual facts. (128)

That individual facts are framed as such and have a positive truth determination should evidence support the representative characterization of its centrally distinguishing event. Be such evidence directly observed, delivered through testimony, and/or inferred, etc. (129)

Because facts are framed by us for us there can be no independent facts despite the centrality of their definitive formation as an imputed event. Thence the overlapping of facts, the apparent separation of facts from other facts despite histories that could theoretically contain all possible facts and factoids. (130)

From a philosophical appreciation of the phenomenological nature of the discipline of history, as histories of the past, present and future, (and as an inter-ordered phenomenon constituted through the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order of factual or ontical assessments[272]) it follows that all facts are interlinked through such intentionally activities and form various hierarchies with their truth determinations taking on varying probabilistic degrees of a delineated truthfulness. So, e.g., Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a fact with a more assured form of a positive truth determination than how he did this journey, which must have been undertaken; that what he had for breakfast that day can only be guessed at, but that he had eaten at some times during the week before and after this event must be a given, and so on. (131)

That, in effect, all facts are different, cannot be equal, even if classified together. Just as every person in a room must have been born, but, where each birth must be a different birth (because that is the nature of the event). (132)

That, with this provisional ontology now outlined, what can be said about the nature of events other than their apparent centrality in their framing of a fact? (133)

That events, as chaotic causal phenomena, cannot be explored through the negative nihilism of the defective dualism (as a form of bimodalism) of 'cause and effect', except in limited metaphorical terms of reference, it behooves us to invoke more suitable terms of reference, preferably implicating a positive nihilism. (134)

Does the negation of a negative nihilism imply a positive nihilism? Yes, but only if we can effectively represent what is to hand in reasonable terms of reference within the epistemological limits available to us in order to evidentially frame that required form of representation! (135)

---

272 Refer to this concept of inter-ordered phenomena as discussed in *The Seventh Book*…

I would argue, on reflection, that although the event is central to the creation of a distinctive fact that, thereafter, it can be differentiated from all other facts, still, the event only constitutes the periphery of its instantiated constitution. (136)

In transformational retreatment we note both the underlying transformational continuity through isomorphic transformational invariance and the transformational non-continuity of those relatively superficial aspects that are subjected to those articulated forms of transformational treatment. Just as, e.g., a pot, in being broken, becomes a broken pot, through the event of being broken, etc. (137)

From the transformational perspective of the experience of the event we could say nomination is a phase change, analysis is through bifurcation, and synthesis is through emergence. (138)

From the experiential perspective of the event, given the co-association between the chaotic irruption of the non-economic and the existential through the expression of its harmonic resolution, we must assume its centrality in those experiential terms of reference. Hence this difference between our experience of facts and events. The ‘event of the fact’ is experience in a non-existential ‘light’ *versus* the ‘fact of the event’ being experienced in an existential ‘light’, although no ultimate distinction should be drawn here as ‘facts of facts’ and ‘events of events’ cannot be experienced, respectively, as either ‘facts’ or ‘events’, but, rather as ‘truth determinations’ *versus* the ‘meaningful significance of the same’. (139)

Facts are discerned as ‘facts’ through events that have occurred that differentiate each fact accordingly. On the other hand, it could be argued that thoughts, as events, only occur through transformational-transitions. (140)

How, then, are thoughts initiated, and, how do we write and read the occurrence of existentially oriented facts *versus* non-existentially oriented facts? (141)

By experiencing the unilateral re-directedness of de-suspensions issuing from suitably exercised suspensions, and, where we learn to discern what existentially differentiates the unilateral character of the ensuing moment. (142)

Hence this distinction between the existentially oriented unilateral re-directedness of the first moment *versus* the non-existentially oriented unilateral redirectedness of the last moment. (143)

But, given the momentary nature of the de-suspension we must assume the irruption of an existential experience is economically preserved to some extent after its initiation in economic terms, preferably hyper-economically. Just as, e.g., when fireworks have woven their magic the smoke and smell of their combustion lingers for some time afterwards. Just like, e.g., the strong scent of a perfume can remain in a room for some time after the person wearing it has left. (144)

Now, if two people were sitting on a couch engaging in a conversation, we must assume the 'relational presence' of a 'third person'…[273] (145)

Or, if in the bath the thinking person were deep in thought then we must assume the 'relational presence' of a 'second person'…[274] (146)

Where subjectivity, in this regard, cannot assume the 'relational presence' of only a 'first person'… (147)

Thence the inferred imputation of trans-relational subjectivity, etc! (148)

Thence the shared experiential subjectivity and intersubjectivity of existential sentiments, and our noting the relative absence of the same, given their primary location in trans-relational experience. (149)

Where trans-relational experience is approached pro-relationally, experientially simulated through suspensions and their automatic invocation of de-suspension. (150)

But, given the intensity of sentiments is existentially derived and refracted through a variety of cognitive lenses we could well assume that all sentiments have one existential nature and an infinitude of complex forms of expression in a reflection of the relational situation in question and how it might be approached pro-relationally. Why bring into existence a bewildering variety of sentiments when one would do? (151)

Just as an infinite series of mirrors reflecting each other would produce and infinity of reflections of the same person looking into such an array of images. (152)

The pro-relational being metaphorically 'approached', perhaps through being 'called', and 'spoken to', and duly 'dispatched' through the apparent 'dictates' of deontological 'imperatives'? (153)

Where the existential surplus of the trans-relational, reflecting its facticity, could even impel the experiential simulation of an event, which, in turn, might overflow through the interlinking a series of such events… (154)

By such means trans-relational subjectivity can permit us to act on its behalf, and, therein and thereby, more often than not, assist in the mutual promotion of the existential richness and enrichment of our overall relational experience. (155)

Discerning the existentially oriented experience as existential in orientation through its hallmarks, and so on. (156)

---

273 Channelling Martin Buber; in his set of essays published in English as *Between Man and Man*.

274 I.e., trans-relational subjectivity, etc., plus the subjectivity of the person in question.

Where such events are characterized as occurring in time, in the concrete specificity of the historical, whilst the distinctive facts, of such events, are apperceived outside time in the ahistorical inventory of the historical. (157)

Where the existential leavens experience just as, e.g., the proving of yeast produces an unleavened form of bread. (158)

Dispensing with negative notions of cause and effect, etc., and, demonstrating the ramifications of a positive insightfulness through an appreciation of conditions, and similar. (159)

Introducing us to the existential impetus of the event at the metaphysical 'center' of philosophical appreciation, disciplinary practice, and secular experience.[275] (160)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 5.9.23.

A. Postscript: What Can the 'Existential' Bring to Parallel Textual Explorations?

As an additional postscript to this essay, I would like to briefly note how these three dimensions of the phenomenal-phenomenological, the hermeneutical, and the existential each have unique contributions to make through such parallel forms of textual exploration. (161)

From a phenomenological perspective we can note the tensions, and resolutions entered into, between the phenomenal, if being represented, and the phenomenological (in presenting whatever is being 'represented', albeit, preferably, through the deconstruction of negative forms of nihilism and the promotion of a productive positive nihilism). Through such descriptions, hopefully, realized through the suitable exercise of an extensive suspension or any of its derivative aspects, we should find forms of presentation that could be insightful, existentially rich, open to innovative re-description, trajectories of potential enrichment, etc. (162)

From a hermeneutical perspective we can see how genres function and to what extent they could also be re-adopted and re-adapted to the situations to hand requiring such ongoing clarity. I.e., in what manner the meta-textual prescriptions 'describing' function are to be either observed and/or reconstituted for the relevant purposes required to hand. (163)

To these parallel 'prescriptions' and 'descriptions', we can add existential 'proscriptions' along with a variety of existential themes should they be found to be herme-

[275] This disquisition on facts and events is attempting to both proffer a summary of this essay and introduce us to the last topic in this series *On Reflection*… namely, existential reflections on the nature of secular experience. Furthermore, an allusion is also made to the next book, Book 9 exploring the complex notion of the metaphysical (as the 'philosophical appreciation of the philosophical', through exploring inter-ordered phenomena, etc.).

neutically appropriate, phenomenologically proper, and existentially apposite, i.e., philosophically suitable for the relevant tasks as being envisaged. Such existential themes, e.g., as to what extent depicted interactions are mutually engendered, could be enriched in terms of their e/valuational formations, to what extent they can progressively enfranchise or re(-)enfranchise people in a certain minor or major life-world, and, by such means can then either further empower or re(-)empower the same inhabitants *vis-à-vis* other minor and major life-worlds? (164)

Moreover, all three parallel strands are also implicated in processes of harmonic resolution to be expressed, hopefully, through non-economic and hyper-economic means, etc. The additional input of the existential, finding an experiential sense of definition and force, through the joint negation of the other two forms of input, which in turn, are also similarly co-defined theoretically, practically, and both critically and radically! Without a doubt contributing a dynamic edge to both the re(-)writing and the re(-)reading of such textual formations besides further replicating and reinforming our interpretations of lived-experience. (165)

Noel Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 12.9.23.

12T. Reflections on the Exercise of the Philosophical Discipline
Within the Secularity of the Overall Life-World

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12T. Reflections on the Exercise of the Philosophical Discipline Within the Secularity of the Overall Life-World*

Through the suspension of our suspensions
Our existential interventions are shaped…[276]

A Short Preamble…

Since the penultimate chapter of my *Theological Investigations*, Volume II, I have re-defined the idea of a 'secular dimension' as 'that which is not a disciplinary realm, and, instead, as that sphere of influence in which everyone is a member, and where no one can be excluded, and where disciplines ply their various trades, be their members acting as either professionals or amateurs'. Traditionally, the division is between a secular semblance of a world *versus* a religious sense of that same secular world, albeit as reinterpreted through that religious lens. Hence the idea of a 'religious difference' as 'that religious vision of a world minus a secular vision of that same world'. Now, as a theist you would invoke a 'theological difference', or, if you were a spiritualist, of some variety or other, you would invoke a 'spiritualistic difference', and so on. Now, perceiving, say, a 'theologian' as either a 'theistic professional or amateur' then we could argue, in the context of this type of philosophical landscape, that they should primarily be dealing with the topic 'what constitutes a theological difference'. However, such simplicity is more often than not quite mistaken. I am sure such a professional has to spend much of their time, say, with their students and congregations, fellow professionals and a lay public, dealing with other topics, having to confront the many exigencies of daily life, and so forth. Moreover, the natural question to then ask by either themselves or some other disciplinarian, or as a member of the secular world, is "just what value does this professional approach proffer?" Hence the necessity of a segueing from merely articulating the meaning of a 'religious difference' to then asking 'just what value such a difference might make in meta-religious terms of reference'. Indeed, focusing now on a 'meta-difference'. But, why stop there? Since it is also the task of a disciplinarian to ply their trade in the secular world, we must further ask in what manner does this vision of a 'religious difference' and a 'religious meta-difference' make in the secular world when we must also insist that there can no absolutistical difference between a secular world and any vision of its religious interpretation?[277] Hence, the religionist also has to explore the ensuing ramifications of a 'religious non-difference' between their 'disciplinary vision of the world minus a general secular vision of that same world'. That, in effect, as an implication of this perspective all disciplinarians, too, will need to sing from the same song sheet. I.e., that, in turn, they also will need to clearly articulate their 'disciplinary differences', their 'disciplinary meta-differences', and their 'disciplinary non-differences'. Hence this redefinition of a contrast between a secularist's vision of the world and the disciplinarian's vision of the same world that, obviously, for religious people in the secular world, cannot and

---

276 Summarizing paragraph 100.

277 Indeed, we can invoke the philosophical axiom that 'what is not there for us is not there for us, and we need not be there for it!' Hence the limits, and ensuing contours, of the dialectical path laid out for both religionists and all other disciplinarians alike.

should not exclude a religious or numinous dimension. So, we can assume that this contrast between secular and sacred is already understood, but, that the significance of the secular is now more divided in a contrast between secularists and disciplinarians, with the latter also including theologians, both traditional and radical, theists, religionists, spiritualists, and so on. However, as this essay is primarily focusing on the secularity of the secular world, we must ask, "are secularist merely at the mercy of disciplinarians ever promising to be of assistance in some form or other, or, does a 'secular sense of difference' exist alongside a 'secular meta-difference' and a 'secular non-difference'?"[278] In this regard, I hope to positively answer that the vision of a pragmatic-existentialist, or an existential-pragmatist, can exactly highlight the existence of this secular difference, meta-difference and non-difference, and, in the process proffer a trans-relational semblance of a meaningful form of a reply to the implicit anxiety ever entailed in the perennial question 'what does it means to be human..?' That, in effect, the secular world is not just defined by competing professionals and amateurs, and must equally resist such reductionistic attempts to merely redefine it through our choices of an assortment of disciplinary lenses whose focus will have us both adopting certain strategies and disregarding other forms of practice. Now, in this ambition, take of it what you will, but, more importantly, position yourself in such a manner so as to seriously reflect upon where you, yourself, already stand, or, indeed, might wish to make a stand, given that a 'stance' is no more than 'an ideal aspiration that is partially realized through patient arbitration that can only persist as a work in progress..!!' (i)

[278] A secularistic non-difference being *vis-à-vis* the disciplinary world/s. Jokingly, we could say, "Hi, I am a disciplinarian (of variety x) and I am here to help."

A Twelfth Series of Reflections…

What has the putatively insightful philosopher to share with their fellow philosophers, distinguished disciplinarians, and, most importantly, all earnest secularists, since, quite rightly that should also include everyone?[279] Could there be such a gift, or is it the case that this 'gift' is merely being returned, hopefully, with a little bit extra rather than just the pretense of a 'promise' fabricated within one more fancy wrapping?! (0)

Ideally, in a true act of exchange, with one hand, something should be given, and, with the other hand, something else should be taken away. E.g., it is a hot day and you tell me that you are hungry and thirsty. So, I immediately set about slicing some fresh bread and offer it to you, replete with your favorite toppings along with a large glass of cold water. Then, when you are finished eating and drinking these tokens of your most pressing need, you tell me you are now no longer hungry and thirsty. The point of this analogy being that gift-giving is not just the giving of a gift but a circulation of value plus the unilateral re-directedness of the giving of that gift. A gift that could be anything that could be given and shared, that entered into in an act of both giving and receiving - from a smile to a slice of bread... (1)

Everyone sees things that others do not at first see, so, therefore, all people are insightful in their own way. Without such insightfulness we could not survive. Moreover, insight is not something that belongs to any one person since what is truly insightful needs to be able to be demonstrated.[280] In this regard, insight is not the personal property of any single person. (2)

I would like to proffer the outlines of a positive nihilism, and, in return, help you to minimize, diminish and excise your attachments to all that which counts as a negative nihilism, i.e., those pseudo-philosophical approaches that are ideologically 'wrapped' up as formulations that reveal themselves as having either unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical, or relativisitical forms of characterization, and so on and so forth. (3)

Or, put more simply, if you are a pragmatist, let me present an existential-pragmatism. Or, if you are more of an existentialist, then let me present a pragmatic-existentialism. In this regard, briefly defining 'pragmatism' as 'that, for whatever reason, works', and, defining the nebulous concept of the 'existential' as that which helps us to be pro-relational in our identification with the trans-relational', i.e., in our identifying with the imputed perspective of our apparent relationships as treated both individually and collectively'. (4)

But can a gift, in being given, but, neither received nor accepted, be a gift other than being only a 'gift' in name? (5)

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[279] Basically, I will be arguing that in order to explicate the full potential of the 'transcendental suspension' I will need to delineate my working concept of the 'extensive suspension'.

[280] If not 'demon-strated' or 'demon-(st)rated'. So, now you see the word demon' in the word 'demonstrated', or, as they say, 'the devil is in the detail'. A trite point, barely worth the imprimatur of this practical concept of 'insight', but, still, demon(-)strating this point none the less.

Sadly, what has a philosopher to give that at least one person might be glad to receive and accept? Philosophers, like most disciplinarians, have a deservedly poor press. I thought physicists were the preeminent exemplars of this type of scandal, given that they, themselves, calculate that they only can account for about five percent of their topic.[281] But, on reflection, I find philosophers have a record that is even worse given that they never seem to agree except, superficially, with other paid-up members of their own professional coven; weaving magic from mystery and mystification from magic; continually contradicting themselves; barely cognizant of the economic nature of our thinking and completely unaware of the non-economic and hyper-economic dimensions. Still, like all disciplines, philosophers seem to be in possession of some small portion of their topic that at least gives them the presentation of a certain degree of professional competence. Although, I do not suggest that you lean too heavily on the full-time or part-time representatives of their community without testing the veracity or merits of their advice. Just as that of which I speak I would not expect any less than 'respectful care and caution'. (6)

So, having played the Devil's advocate for disregarding philosophical advice, solicited or unsolicited, let me now argue why we could tentatively proceed with an exploration of the same should we do so with this necessary requirement for our mindfully tendering such 'care and caution'. (7)

In the previous essay it was suggested that we should be able to ask of the philosopher, or any other disciplinarian, when they are presented with a certain problem and a request for their professional help, that they step forward and tell us if they could proffer a solution, a resolution of the representation of that anomalous situation perceived as problematic, or, if that were just not possible. Or, perhaps, whether it might be possible to find a suitable reply if a reasonable period of time were to be aside in order to explore such a question. That, when the possibility of a resolution is possible, the requisite degree of circumscription be applied so that enough information is forwarded that in being integrated in the format of the argument required it is then fully able to establish the formation of its resolution. On the other hand, too much information, and digression into irrelevant details, can only muddy the waters and set us up to lose sight of just what is required to clarify such a solution.[282] Hence, it should be said, perhaps, that there are some grounds for a qualified degree of optimism? (8)

In the same vein it was also said that we need to attend to our 'objectives, methodologies, differentiate possibilities from impossibilities'.[283] It we are not prepared to successfully recognize what we might be looking for then we waste both our time and the time of others. Then, in the light of those objectives, our methodologies should be similarly honed. Sorting out what is possible to attain from that which is impossible to realize.

---

281 I.e., the realm of matter *versus* the imputations of both a currently non-ascertained dark matter and dark energy. A host of other problems and anomalies abound despite the great practical successes of a seemingly irreconcilable quantum mechanics and relativity theories, etc.

282 *Pursui*t, III.12S.44, etc.

283 *Ibid*., 44, 49-51.

What is impossible to appropriate must forever remain a misappropriation of our time and energy, both philosophical and otherwise! (9)

Two more headings, in a set of eight, were also suggested for pursuing a successful form of research, namely, 'representationalism' and 'suspension'.[284] Although the critical (and radical) pragmatist is also an 'anti-representationalist', still, they have to work with what is to hand, like all other people, namely, unavoidable representations of our world as lived as embedded in language and cultural experience, etc. However, through the well-informed and well-exercised use of the 'suspension' (reading 'transcendental suspensions' through the complex lens of 'extensive suspensions'[285]) such representations then take on a characteristic anti-representationalism. Moreover, as it was pointed out, for the technical term 'suspension', in whatever form it is being read, we should also read the concept of the 'de-suspension', etc., since the ensuing 'force' of the suspension resides in the automatic self-deconstruction of the same in and through a process of a chaotic re-self-organization in which an economy of renewed re(-)iterations are non-economically emitted, some of which will be either non-critical, critical, and/or radical in their complexion when inspected more closely. The reception of the relatively chaotic coming about through incremental inputs meeting those points of either chaotic bifurcation, emergence, or change in phase... from time to time, giving rise to the relatively novel, along with shifts in vocabulary, the recording of history, surprising innovations in practice, performance, objective outcomes, and so on. (10)

It is in the non-economic realization of this unilaterally re-directed chaotic overlay that the existential character of the event is recognized, encountered and, therein and thereafter, engaged (through the ensuing existentialization of the relatively non-existential). That the distinctive centrality of the existential event in experience is not to be found in an inventory of facts spun through the concatenation of ideologically oriented narrations invoking ideas not fit for philosophical purpose. In this regard 'the fact of the event' is quite different from 'the event of a fact or a set or series of facts'. Still, they are not completely different since it is through facts that we can recount events, and, the distinctive nature of a fact comes about through the transformational-transitions of the apparent phenomenal-phenomenological surfaces of the fact as it is transmutes from one apparent fact to the next, admittedly through process of imputational representation preferably subjected to well-informed and well-exercised suspensions, etc. Then, we can have the best of the both worlds, namely, that 'world' textualized through representational depositions and the re(-)presentation of a simulated sense and semblance of a world of experience, where such re(-)interpreted experience, itself, must then arise through the necessity of a hyper-economic anti-representationalism that assumes both an experiential realm of imputations and the imputation of a realm of experience where both aspects cannot be cashed out in nihilistic terms of an impossible negative economy. As imputations *qua* imputations, knowing, also, 'that the imputation of an imputation is a non-imputation', just as 'the simulation of a simulation (through intentional retention) ceases to be experienced as just as a simulation' despite the eventful-fact that this (transcendental) illusion of the illusion never ceases to be an illusion, i.e., as an imputed representa-

---

284 *Ibid.*, 44-46.

285 *Pursui*t, III.III.12N.

tion or simulation, etc. Accepting all interpretations, as re(-)interpretations, as pragmatical materials to be found to hand, and, that all interpretations are different and can only be rendered as equivalent through equations constructed by us; and. accordingly, in such terms of reference, will find themselves treated as either valid or invalid' as either non-critical, critical or radical'; as either virtual or non-virtual in orientation, as existentially oriented or non-existentially oriented, as identities in a long list of observations, both conformal and speculative... but, most certainly, where for us there is no need whatsoever to appeal to any misbegotten desires and demands for the so-called 'pre-simulated', the 'pre-imputed', the 'pre-represented', and so on and so forth..! (11)

In other words, as our experience of experience stands, there is no need for a negative nihilism that insists on the represented being other than the merely represented, as anything other than a representation of representation and never the representation of that which is not being represented! Living quite happily with 'representations' as 'mere representations' whose very re(-)iteration of the representational 'forges' the event-full realm of a living-world through the relationships of our relationships as it then traces out a world of facts as a lived-world of experience… as simultaneously subjective, intersubjective, and trans-relational in orientation despite our inability to entertain all economic orientations both equally and simultaneously (other than through their integration over the course of their economic suspensions)... (12)

That central to living-experience is the 'event', whereas, the 'factual-event' is only peripheral to the transformation of a world of facts. The difference is both experiential and conceptual, or i.e., theoretical. The experiential event is experience holistically *versus* the fact of the fact that is merely finding some transformation in its more relatively superficial aspects of its constitution and, thereby, enabling a concurrent form of a continuing identity despite such transformational-transitions in its relatively superficial constitution (as economically represented in intentional consciousness and appreciation). The experiential difference between experiencing the holistically oriented semblance and sense of a trans-relational subjectivity, etc.,[286] as more 'representative of the relationship' (arising through emergence) *versus* a mere catalogue of facts that simply tabulate relational parties and parts, interobjective and intersubjective fields, and so on, along with apparent, relatively superficial, transformational-transitions of the same.[287] The latter is a bit like peeling an onion. The papery outer skin is removed to reveal a more translucent skin underneath whilst the overall historical continuity of the onion, itself, remains preserved. Of course, to continue this process of reduction along absolutistical lines would soon leave us without even the trace of that onion. (13)

---

[286] Where the relational *qua* relational is not only trans-relationally subjective but also trans-relationally objective, as well as both interobjective and intersubjective in orientations. That such an overall trans-relational orientation is approached pro-relationally and, therein and thereafter, both entered and left though the metaphorical 'door' of both suspensions and de-suspensions.

[287] That religionists might want to add a religious category to this list of four phenomenological facets that (metaphysically) enter into the constitution of phenomenal-phenomenological experience, namely, objectivity, interobjectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity (and this fifth possibility of 'either the 'numinous, etc.,' for the religionist and/or an 'existentially non-reductive ineffableness' for the existential secularist).

Now, through the experiential event, we can access a relatively existential orientation in such transformational-transitions *versus* those experiences that have a relatively non-existential complexion. That the metaphorical 'door', and 'exit', to this existential dimension of the trans-relational, as realized through non-economic emission and hyper-economic re(-)appropriation, is none other than that delivered through this endless, momentary succession of both suspensions and de-suspensions... (14)

That the philosophically aware pragmatist, as has been already argued, should recognize the fact that, 'functionally, they are immersed in a world of the deontological imperatives in all shapes and sizes, but, importantly, without any dependence on or necessity for so-call 'Principles', be they the impossibility of so-called 'First Principles', or 'Last Principles', or 'Middling Principles', with the latter being imagined as residents between the former. That the deontological imperatives are central to a pragmatic disposition (not just a pragmatic expediency) with the deontological reinterpreted along 'both experiential lines and through the apparent lens of the trans-relational, etc.'[288] (15)

It should not be necessary for me to have to both make this claim, just noted, and then feel the need to argue for its obvious truth. Namely, in this world of experience we have relationships, experienced from a trans-relational perspective and, within the emergent constitution of those same relationships, we exercise various forms of limited reduction in order to articulate certain relational participants and parts as imputations existing within a variety of relational fields with suitable forms of the temporal and spatial positioning being co-expressed when and where that is apparently relevant, and v.v. That, in the formation of such simulated imputations, we have neither absolutistical access to the trans-relational *per se* nor to their apparent relational participants and parts, etc., *per se*. In effect, we live in 'no man's land', which is expressed as a 'joke', since, we could live nowhere else, and, indeed, can live nowhere else. But, unfortunately, the world is mesmerized by the over-preferencing of a set of prejudices, as a series of prejudgments, that, effectively, on one hand, disparage relationships, and on the other hand, excessively preferences the material bits and pieces found after we have 'dismantled' such relationships. Basically, through the misguided lens of an over-reductionistic bias we almost focus entirely on such 'torn away fragments', whilst, at the same time, generally overlook the fact that even the apparent bits and pieces of the world are equally constituted through various forms of relationally oriented integration. We might talk, e.g., about the 'face' of a certain person, or admire the musculature of their torso, or the graceful use of their hands or feet... almost oblivious to the fact that these parts of the person's anatomy come as a unified package and not as the bundled up contents, say, that might be found in a shipping container. With this bias unchecked we might find, e.g., the disparagement of individual cultures, but, at the same time, waxing lyrically over the prime artefacts of any one of those same cultures. Or, take a simple broom, it practically ceases to function when pulled apart. So, our phenomenal-phenomenological experience of that broom is expedited when it remains intact and is found fit for purpose. Still, in a contrast, we are reluctant to ascribe a similar experience of integration and integrity to the nature of our relationships *vis-à-vis* either the behavioral function we enter into with others or even as found

[288] Thereby ruling out the pragmatic as merely 'pragmatical' and interested only in the pursuing the expedient, the utilitarian, etc.

through our own sense/s of self-experience. I.e., as that this covert imputation of the trans-relational is not something we can handle, or see, then it is overlooked and if not ignored, at least, minimized. But, in this we travel in the wrong direction since e/valuational formation arises through emergence and, alternatively, is ultimately lost when that relationship and its material expressions are reduced to the mere contents of their contextual relationships, a reductive process that cannot be conducted *ad infinitum*. A certain qualified deference should be afforded to all things relational in orientation since those relationships cannot be absolutistically reduced other than in very limited, circumscribed terms of reference. So, e.g., in a forest we can look at one individual tree, then, but not at the same time, we can look at the forest surrounding that individual tree as another apparent entity in its own right should we be in a position to view some part of that forest or the totality of the same. However, on the other hand, we might express a certain covert reluctance to refer to two people in a certain relationship as having a 'relationship', say, as friends, or as family, or as lovers, when for much of the time we are not privy to the non-public machinations of that relationship, and, as a general rule for human behaviour, what is out of mind is out of sight, and, what is out of sight is out of mind, etc. If we can see it, and even better, dismantle it with our own hands, we take for granted the existence of the same. But, the overlooked integrity of that relationship, born through economic resolution and its ensuing integration, when it can be neither seen nor handled, more often than not, is just minimized if not entirely ignored, or worse, disparaged. Just as, e.g., when people forever grumble about their place of work, probably with good reasons, or the running of the government, no doubt seizing on negative indications that merely reinforce that form of a confirmational bias, and so on. So, to suggest that there exists, in interpreted experience, both a qualified trans-relational dimension in parallel to a qualified relational dimension of relational participants and parts one would more than likely be met with a blank stare. Yet, unless both aspects of this simulated coin of the realm is understood as the only currency that can be tendered then there can be little hope of a mutual understanding in such matters. That to not appreciate this dialectical interaction taking place between both the qualified trans-relational and the qualified relational material of that relationship is to indulge in a negative nihilism and continually conjugate with fantastic impossibilities not worthy of either a philosopher or disciplinarian who is, and remains, both critical and radical in the serious conduct over the course of their research.[289] (16)

In order to discern relational bits and pieces we need relationships, and v.v. By 'qualified' is simply meant that 'in a relational economy no economic correlativity or economic form of identity can be entertained purely on its own imputed terms of reference'. So, yes, relationships emerge, but not in ultimate terms of reference, and, likewise, relational participants and parts are reductively delivered, but, not absolutistically. Hence this dialectical interaction between the qualified trans-relational and the qualified relational. To ignore such constraints, and possible freedoms, is to invite impossible forms of thought and inadvertently take on the persona of a clown - a sad figure who is forever laughed at by the 'knowing', but, in this instance, will never have an idea that they are

[289] A critical economy is preparation for the radical expression of the non-economic which is then critically reappropriated in the re(-)contextualization of the hyper-economic.

being laughed at or why they are being politely treated as a figure of fun among the *cognoscenti*. (17)

In the world of the virtual we could say that we are nowhere and everywhere at the same time, indeed, wherever we might wish to be, but, of course, we are embodied where we are, and it is through the non-virtual emplacement of such embodiment that a sense of locality is re-imposed upon us in the irruption of the non-economic moment. That, through such specificity, we come to re-confront this world of our embodiment, along with our embeddedness (with others) and embankment (in this ecologically constituted world at large). Moreover, in seeking the obtainment of our aspirations, be they personal ambitions or social directives, we must also enter into an economy of arbitration entailing aspirational emplacement, the immediacy of our non-virtual displacement, and, hopefully, some degree of success through forms of an eventual de-displacement. I.e., through our triple emplacement in our embodiment, etc., we are to confront the fact of our aspirations as not able of finding an immediate form of realization (unlike the fantastical nature of the virtual), and where, through forms of compromise, preferably without being compromised, we enter into those forms of arbitration that might eventually allow us to realize some of our more pressing priorities. Hence this additional intentional dimension to our emplacement in this world where our freedom is basically realized through our co-operation with others, and v.v. It is true to say, as a virtue, that we should be relatively self-reliant, but, without the ministrations of others even this virtue, by itself, is completely irrelevant! (18)

Elsewhere, I have argued that coincident with a pragmatic attitude is a deontological sense of process, and, that when we are in a harmonic alignment with the same, we initiate a relatively existential approach to what we are currently contemplating in our passage through this arbitrated world of the other. Or, more correctly, what our trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity is apparently contemplating both on its behalf and our behalf along with the behalf of all relevant others to that extent this form an existential embrace can be non-incoherently delineated in such ensuing pathways thematized and objectified through patterns of enaction receptive to such ‘existential arbitration’. In making this’ existential observation’ I am not suggesting that trans-relational subjectivity is perfectly privy to ethical perfection but does have the intuitive ability to divine patterns of behaviour that, on balance, would either create, preserve, and/or conserve patterns of e/valuational formation with a greater, comparative semblance of both richness and enrichment. (19)

Imagine coming across a desperate person who is reluctantly having to beg for food and water through, say, the sudden result of a series of mishaps perhaps not even of their own making. They are starving and they are thirsty. This is their immediate reality to hand. In a reliance upon the kindness of strangers they will be soon be fed and suitably hydrated. Under the circumstances, through a natural reception to the idea of an extension and reception of hospitality, it is the duty of those people in passing to suitably attend to the plight of this person currently in dire need. The pragmatics of this situation demand a deontological approach. Indeed, a compactual approach and not a contractual re-writing of this specific form of situatedness. If this hungry person were to have had money, then

they might have been able to afford a meal or pay someone to prepare something for them. So, let us assume they have no such resources. Therefore, we need to write or re-write this situation in non-contractual terms of reference, i.e., in compactual terms. Effectively, this person is entirely reliant on the functioning of a deontologically oriented process of interaction. So, the pragmatics of this situation needs to be addressed in deontological terms and redressed in and through that same approach. However, because such a pragmatic attitude cannot be reduced to a pragmatical dimension of expediency alone, it must, therefore, find itself being re-written through some form of an existential-pragmatism or pragmatic-existentialism. But, as pointed out elsewhere, the deontological re(-)writing of a pragmatic-existentialism is not beholden to ethical calculations conducted in contractual terms of reference, but, in a form of deontological consideration that attempts to more productively harmonize the key anomalous features that appear to distinctively thematize our compassionate understanding of that situation. Or, more simply, whatever adds richness and enrichment to that overall sense and semblance of a relationship. Not the derivative experience of consulting some rule book for the performance of moral behaviour, etc., but, a reflecting upon our relationships, in the midst of this sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity, in the hope that appropriate forms of behaviour can be duly delivered to the overall betterment of all parties concerned. (20)

Now, contractual guidelines might be considered as proffering some form of an initial assessment or framing of that moral situation in question, or, certain relevant needs could be overlooked whilst other needs might be envisaged that have little actual lived-reality in the context of this hypothetical exploration of our current, overall moral situatedness. How might we obviate such theoretical problems? (21)

Generally, through the suitable exercise of a seemingly called-for strategy, an enrichment of all our relationships could well be earmarked as the guiding principle that is usually worth being adopted and adapted in this regard. However, like all things, the Devil is in the detail and this rule, too, like all other rules, at some point will need to be suitably deconstructed, and then re-written in order to take into account a better appreciation of the unique specificity of the situatedness in question. In this regard, e.g., I am thinking about how the participants in a toxic relationship might be better if they were to exit from such a relationship.[290] If these parties were to find the termination of their relationship through a non-metaphorical ‘murdering of each other’ then, in terms of a simple calculus of a cost and benefit analysis, such a relational ‘divorce’ would be the optimum path to have taken. That a post mortem of this example would assists us in clarifying the type of ethical philosophy actually operating behind this form of a ‘relational ethics’. An ethical philosophy that relatively preferences the relationship but not at the total expense

[290] This section of this essay is a response to an important question that was posed in discussing a previous set of reflections, namely, ‘if the relationship is greater than the sum of its parts how should we deal with the consequences of a toxic relationship?’ In other words, despite the imputation of existential surpluses of e/valuational formation supposedly arising over the course of any relationship is it not possible to also conceive of a relationship that consumes such excesses in existentially oriented valuation to enter relatively negative territories if their relational assessment were to be conducted in a a more realistic form of re-assessment? E.g., as one must envisage in a toxic relationship, in a relationship where the two parties, for whatever reason or reasons are antagonistic, are ‘mutually’ destructive of a basis for a growth of relational trust, affection, and so on?

of its participating parties. Although badged a 'relational ethics', more correctly it should be nominated as a form of 'trans-relational ethics', or, again, as a 'pragmatic-existentialism' or 'existential-pragmatism'. Such a position arguing, e.g., first, that the loss of a party in a relationship is a loss of relational value, and, that the death of one of the parties in a relationship is to be treated as a relative loss. Therefore, e.g., to either destroy a friendship or murder your friend is to realize a relative loss of potentially positive e/valuational formation that could have arisen through the future interactions of those two parties. However, second, if the interactions of those parties are going to be at the overall detriment of that relationship, then it follows that it would be better for those two parties to separate lest they further diminish the remaining, or residual, positive value of their relatively negative relationship or should one party 'murder' the other party, etc. Moreover, the relational situatedness of two parties in a relationship should not conducted at the overall expense of the possibility of all other relationships already being entered into or could be entered into at some future point in time, etc. That an untimely death in this context would be at the expense of other parties that could have entered into a more positive form of interaction with that person who has now deceased. A 'trans-relational ethics' is envisaged here because the relationship is relatively preferenced, treated with a greater degree of qualified deference, but, never at the expense of the sum total of all possible relationships that could be entered into by any one party with all other possible parties, be these relationships experienced on a current timeline or at some possible future point in time. That just as relational participants and parts are incorporated and mutually defined by a certain relationship, that relationship, in turn, like all other relationships, is also embedded in an open-ended world of the relational. This observation is highlighted through an exploration of the following. E.g., when one party in a supposedly monogamous sexual relationship is being unfaithful, they will have to also consider the potential consequences of their actions for the other party in that relationship that was previously defined by both parties as 'monogamous'. Now, I am not making a moral point here, only noting a relational observation that what we do or don't do within our relationships can have consequences beyond the boundaries of those same relationships. That given the sequentially directed nature of our lives, that either investments or disinvestments of our psychic time and energy in a specific set of relationships also implies inverse disinvestments and investments in any other set of our relationships in accordance with how such relationships are being causally approached in our overall sequencing of our interactions, and interactive interventions, with others… across a plurality of overlapping (and potentially conflicting) relationships. (22)

That, generally, but not always, investing our psychic time and energy in a certain relationship should prove, on balance to be a differentially positive phenomenon. However, in their unique specificity, some relationships prove to be much more beneficial for all relevant parties and, understandably, it would behoove us to preference those more profitable relationships. At the same time, also discounting those relationships that might prove to be relatively unproductive, negative, or detrimental to the positive e/valuational formation that could perhaps be mutually found if those same parties were to enter into more profitable forms of relational interaction elsewhere. Now, the tools to engineer this interactive richness and ongoing enrichment, through processes of re(-)enrichment, basically fall under the three heading of either 'the creation, preservation, and/or conserva-

tional expansion of those positive forms of relational intervention', preferably entered into on the behalf of that relationship (given our relational identification with the trans-relational subjectivity, etc., of that relationship in question[291]). That in our relational tool box in order to disengage from negative or relatively less productive forms of relational engagement we could invoke either the de-conservation, de-preservation, and/or de-creation of those more questionable relationships'. (23)

So, as noted, the primary perspective on relational engagement should be conducted from a trans-relational perspective in its broadest sense, 'given that no one relationship is an ethical island unto itself'. That trans-relational perspective granted, just how should we engage with others in a relatively existential manner that contributes to the overall relational richness to be realized through an ongoing re(-)enrichment of our relationships? (24)

As you might come to expect by now, if not suspect already, my simple response to such an enquiry is to understand that our existential 'access' is realized through the exercise of well-informed and well-conducted extensive suspensions where the ensuing automatic irruption of de-suspensions, in the localization of a non-economic mode, will do all the relational hard work so to speak. Let me elaborate on the 'economic necessity' for the implication of this non-economic philosophy. (25)

Extensive suspensions, in lieu of transcendental suspensions, were predicated by myself on the economic grounds of the overall transcendental suspension (as exemplified by the interrogative economy, e.g.[292]), the automatic delivery of de-suspensions (in order to account for subtle forms of preference in the formation of ordered phenomena), and the apparent instigation and control over forms of causal involvement (that is necessitated in our movement between the relatively virtual and the non-virtual, and v.v., and the consequences this has for our survival, etc.). However, if somewhat shorn of its theoretical complexities, what can we say in this regard? (26)

As already intimated, non-economic involvement is necessary since the endless recycling of economic forms of circulation cannot move us from the merely virtual to the actuality of non-virtually oriented interactive engagement. Just staring at an apple, e.g., will not get us eating that apple. Merely thinking about the eating of that apple, again, will not get you eating that apple. In some sense the essential, holistic nature of intentional experience (along with its trans-intentional judgmental appreciation) needs to be short-circuited, meet the realization of a disruptive break in its symmetry, irrupt into the locality of the concrete specificity of that historical moment and enact patterns of interactive involvement within the situatedness of that relationship. Hence this ability of the eco-

---

[291] I note this expression 'trans-relational subjectivity, etc.', that by 'etc.' is meant 'subjectivity, objectivity, intersubjectivity, and interobjectivity, etc.' Metaphorically treating the trans-relational as if embodied in this relationship, etc. A person with a religious disposition might want to extend this list in a religious direction (hence the additional 'etc.'). In noting this fifth categorical possibility, I am neither arguing for nor arguing against such a possibility, but, leaving it open to be taken up by, say, the traditional theologian, the radical theologian, the theist, religionist, spiritualist, and so on.

[292] As involved in the asking of a question through invoking rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional moments as explored in detail elsewhere). Refer to The Seventh Book... Pursuit, III.VII.46-47;262;291, etc.

nomic, through a moment of resolution, to sufficiently find a successful non-economic expression of the same in the historical localization of this unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment. I have deliberately chosen this world 'localization' in order to contrast the relatively non-local nature of the essential, holistic-like experience of the relatively economic if it were to devolve alone through cycles of circulation, as endlessly reiterated patterns of re(-)circulation unable to extend themselves from the relatively virtual into the realm of the relatively non-virtual along with the ensuing uniqueness of its concrete, historical specificity. Now, no longer staring at an apple, or merely thinking about the eating of an apple, but, now, physically engaging it as an object to touch, bite, eat, and suitably ingest through chewing and swallowing… through a unilateral re-directedness of a series of enactions. (27)

The imagined world of the virtual can be both anywhere and nowhere. I could imagine myself having a croissant and coffee in my favourite café in Paris, but, not having a specific café in mind, that would be a sort of generic vision. On the other hand, I could imagine having a coffee in my favourite café in Melbourne, and that would be my imagining a specific location. But, then, being in or near Sydney, I cannot non-virtually localize myself in either of those two previous locations. On the other hand, should the occasion be my walking past a reasonably interesting café, and, at the same time of noticing my desiring a coffee, then, if I have the time, I could permit myself to do just that as long as all other preconditions and conditions do not impede me from executing that intentional objective, like, e.g., not having access to the requisite finance to perform this intention in contractual accordance with its conventional dictates. In other words, let us ask 'just what must be present in order to successfully perform the realization of a simple, short-term intentional project?' (28)

In effect, we are asking how the virtual can be transformed into its non-virtual correlate? Or, in reverse, how our appreciation of the apparently non-virtual can be simulated and re(-)simulated in virtual terms of reference, i.e., say, as in an act of perception rather than an act of mere imaginative visualization, be that either in reference to an understanding of our current spatio-temporal positioning, etc., *versus* our imaginative reconfiguring of that same sense of space and time.[293] Basically, seeking the relevant preconditions and conditions in order to execute this intention and directly find myself experiencing its non-virtual, post-conditional realization. Now, in this regard, I would imagine my motivation must be sufficient in order to execute this envisaged project, and, where the conditions must also be present in order to localize, thematize, and realize this same aspiration in the here and now, albeit as refracted through the necessary forms of arbitration in conjunction with co-associated patterns of navigation (around others) and negotiation (with others). In conditional terms we must be locally present and both able and capable of executing this project. In terms of overall motivation I feel that we need to take into account the cooperation and integration of three levels in epistemological organization, namely, the requisite desire in affective terms of reference, the requisite thematization of what is needed to execute the cognitive refraction of that aspiration, and, the requisite intensity and expressiveness of our existential sentiments that would allow, i.e.,

[293] Say, as in postponing of the intention of having a coffee now and planning to both have this coffee later and/or to have it in a different location.

permit, us to non-virtually, i.e., in causal terms, transformationally transition to this desired state of affairs. E.g., I could be tired having wandered around the city for the last four hours. I could also be hungry and equate the sufficient satisfaction of these needs by sitting down and having a croissant and coffee in a nearby café that I hope will satisfactorily meet the conjunction of all three of these needs. Now, admittedly, I believe we probably have a reasonable understanding of the first two levels in epistemological organization, i.e., in terms of the affective and the cognitive. However, I don't believe we have the relatively reasonable and current explication that is socially understood of this third component of a trans-relational or judgmental need to co-opt some form of an experience of these factors I have termed as 'existential sentiments' (or as 'trans-intentional, i.e., 'transcendental' emotions', etc.). Therefore, let me explore this third aspect given this greater need for its eventual clarification of which this current philosophical scrutiny, I would like to think, plays nothing more than a small part in the ongoing formulations of such social understandings. Obviously, this work in progress needs to be treated as provisional and that much philosophical and disciplinary research will need to be conducted in order to arrive at more refined forms of social consensus in this same regard. But, nevertheless, lets us at least continue this project that, I would believe, is already underway… (29)

On one hand, let us assume that existential sentiments are either positive or negative in orientation. That, in order to organize some form of suitable 'permission', and then act upon the same, we need to engineer the required suspension that, on its desuspension, hopefully, would propel us in the required direction that would allow us to successfully discharge the requisite form of localization needed in order to execute this aspiration in question. Say, I have been walking over the countryside for some time in the middle of a hot day. I then find myself passing an orchard replete with glossy red apples in the middle of nowhere in particular. I look at these apples and the intention forms of scrumping one or two of those ripe-looking pieces of fruit given that no farmer is to be seen in the immediate vicinity. Even though I am stealing those apples, and am not a fan of receiving stolen goods, be they stolen by myself or someone else, still, under the circumstances of my current hunger and thirst, I permit myself to purloin two of those apples. Without difficulty I enter the orchard and quickly pick two choice pieces of fruit. I put them in my backpack and quickly head back to the path I have been taking across the countryside and proceed on my way. Soon, beside a nearby river, in the privacy of a grove of shady trees, I then eat my two very delicious apples... (30)

Obviously, my feeling hunger, and thirsty, are basically affective emotions, albeit as formulated through their cognitive refraction that says I can now discharge that semblance of hunger by eating these two stolen apples. On the other hand, feeling some form of guilt in my stealing these two apples and a fear of being discovered is countermanded by my giving myself 'permission' to go scrumping in this orchard given my perception that I believe that I will not be seen taking these apples. So, I entered the orchard and chose two apples and think I will eat them very soon... and quickly left to resume my travels. Much of this scrutiny of my mental processes is relatively non-controversial. Already in the public domain so to speak. However, what might appear to be more problematic is the overall mechanism needed to arrive at this form of 'permission'. Here, I am arguing that given this (trans-intentional) dimension of judgment we need to invoke

(trans-intentional) processes for dealing with this sense and semblance of a decision made to do one thing and not something else. Such self-interrogation demands some form of an interrogative economy, albeit one written or re(-)written in the judgmental terms of reference.[294] Moreover, for the moment of resolution to be fully realized in non-virtual terms of reference we have to exercise an extensive suspension that suitably oversees the same, namely, the realization of these (arbitrated) aspirations in non-economic terms of their casually effective localization. Given the need for the immediate coincidence of motivation with non-economic realization of intent we might well assume that pre-conditions could be conceived of, primarily, in causally manipulated forms of spatio-temporal localization both able and capable of delivering the desired intent more or less with the degree of an ensuing satisfaction as being optimistically envisaged. Now, as previously reflected upon, such 'optimism' is an existential sentiment usually entertained with a positive orientation. That with the presence of one positive existential sentiment I am sure others might not be too far away. Although it would be tempting at this point to reintroduce the idea that there is only one existential sentiment currently being experienced, albeit with the specificity of a certain existential degree of intensity, but, reflected through the current form of cognitive refraction taking place in the experience of that situatedness at that very localized moment in both time and space. Or, i.e., when we have a form of resolution that reflects the concurrence of the pre-conditional, the conditional (and the thematization of the desired post-conditional) along with the requisite motivation that needs to be enacted on all three levels of epistemological organization, we are now ready to go and do so must mean the localization of such arbitrated aspirations through the immediacy of their 'objective discharge', i.e., the non-virtual, causal realization of such intentional objectivity. What else might we need to consider in understanding this process of non-economically coordinated resolution? (31)

Why is it the case that the potentially radical nature of the non-economically discharged sense and semblance of a possible form of resolution must, in turn, be re(-)appropriated in a hyper-economic process of re(-)contextualization? On this point, let me explain my reasoning. (32)

As a philosophical observation let me say that both the economic and hyper-economic are relatively non-local and holistic in orientation. Yes, we can imagine locality in virtually formulated spatio-temporal terms of reference, say, prior to enacting a certain decision, but, history itself, is only made in the moment of the non-economic and its localization through the unilateral re-direction of the ensuing moment. Therefore, in this regard, a history of the present is 'local' and, as a chaotic phenomenon, could be de-

[294] Previous configurations of an interrogative economy have been centered on cognitive formations of rhetoric, metaphor, and apparitional forms of simulated literalization. In this current state of play, we need to take on board a more judgmentally oriented approach constituted in a 'horizontal' virtual economy. But, again, we need to invoke an economy that can produce this form of a decision through some form of an invoked de-suspensional response. Given the causal implication of such a decision-making process we now need to couple a process of resolution with a non-economic overlay... hence this invocation of the non-economic. But, as we can only appreciate, in small increments, the relatively-radical, and, appreciation demands higher meta-terms of reference it follows that such appreciation must be hyper-economic in orientation. That by doing so, we invoke, comparatively, a 'vertical' sense of an overall, non-virtual economy.

scribed as a 'non-continuity' (rather than as a 'continuity' or a 'discontinuity' [295]). Given the historical is the concrete specification of the unilateral moment of re-directedness we could, perhaps, then assume that a trajectory that is an alignment with its essential expression, in holistic terms, would then be relatively existential in complexion. In other words, enacted with a certain proactivity in keeping with the essential nature of the trans-relational situatedness in question. In effect, allowing, i.e., permitting, the ensuing resolution of deontological pressures to be expressed in a manner that re(-)presents that more aligned state of affairs.[296] That such pressures for resolution will also not be confined to just a deontological format given the not unimportant contributions co-issuing from these secondary adjuncts of both aethetical inputs (say, in the style of resolution entered into) and pragmatical inputs (say, in the co-associated utility also issuing from those positive patterns of e/valuational formation). (33)

Now, let me explore a succession of ideas in a similar vein. (34)

The trans-relational economy cannot be closed given the fact that each and every delineation of a relationship is never completely non-arbitrary. That, in a certain sense, it could be regarded as holistically non-locally-local given its non-economic entry into the local and its non-localization of its relatively economic and hyper-economic inputs and outputs. (35)

That, through a metaphorical 'break' in symmetry, the economic, through resolution, is non-economically emitted... into the specification of the event in both factual and eventful experiential terms of reference, i.e., both in superficially oriented terms as a 'fact' and in non-superficially oriented or essentially experienced terms as an 'event'. Furthermore, we could surmise that the event of a non-economic irruption could be subtly coloured by some form of a preferential bias expressed across the representative status of the trans-relational economy in such a manner so as to induce chaotic processes of either bifurcation, phase-changes and/or emergences. In this regard, we could speculate that those ensuing processes of chaotic re-direction, just noted, could arise from de-suspensional forces preferentially treating, respectively, the relatively economic, the non-

---

[295] Treating the economic aspect of the overall trans-relational economy as retrospective in orientation and, therefore, as more phenomenologically constituted in discontinuous terms of reference versus the prospective stance of the hyper-economic aspect which, therefore, is hermeneutically constituted more in continuous terms of reference (assuming future forms of change and behaviour will reflect past and current practices to a certain degree). Hence the relatively distinctive differences between histories of the past *versus* histories of the future where we assume in the latter, e.g., that people will still want to eat, sleep, travel, communicate, etc. As for histories of the present, we might want to assume a certain proactivity in existentially oriented patterns of behaviour *versus* patterns of mere conformity in relatively non-existentially oriented modes of interaction. Examples of the latter being institutionalization, over-proliferation of routines, irrelevant forms of meta-work, conventionalized forms of inauthenticity, rampant instances of non-transparency of process, forms of objective confusion, and so on.

[296] Where 're(-)presents is to be understood as an economy of ongoing re(-)presentation involving a dialectic between the simulations of phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, hermeneutical representation, and non-systematic existential re-presentation... that takes on a systematic existential instantiation when the trans-relational economy of the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic find an overall form of alignment that generally either creates, preserves, and/or conserves positive forms of e/valuational formation.

economic, or the hyper-economic. So, in this regard, an analytical bias results in resolution through bifurcation, a synthetical bias arises from the hyper-economic preferencing of the emergent, and, through the non-economic we could witness chaotic forms of change more in tune with phase changes. (36)

As noted, the non-economic is contextually re(-)appropriated hyper-economically. The implication being that we can only appropriate small incremental units of a relatively-radical input/output and never the overwhelming irruption of radically-radical inputs/outputs. (37)

That, it must be safe to assume that all aspects of the trans-relational economy, represent the relationship in its apparent situatedness, and, can become a locus for some form of trans-relational change in overall behaviour. (38)

E.g., we could also assume that an existential sense and semblance of 'reputation' is formed in hyper-economic terms of reference through reiterations of behaviours regarded as relatively existential in orientation. That such a reputation is taken up and recognized in hyper-economic terms of appreciation. That the hyper-economic level is capable of also directing behaviours just as much as the economic and the non-economic can direct both enacted patterns of re-direction, albeit in and through the relatively non-economic. Moreover, that the asymmetrical uptake of hyper-economic inputs/outputs is able to extend the life of our represented relationships given this form an imperfect uptake of trans-relational forms of resolution. Given that perfect resolution is the perfected 'death' of that same relationship. Otherwise, imperfect forms of ongoing resolution will oversee the extended life of those same trans-relational relationships as experienced through their non-terminated event horizons (as related, e.g., through their continuing narration/s). (39)

Otherwise, what would be left behind would be nothing more than merely the 'death' of facts (as if stored in a metaphorical 'morgue'). (40)

Hence, from such considerations, we might surmise there is a dialectics of a horizontal relational economy *versus* a vertical economy in the performance of an overall trans-relational economy... along with the critical amalgamation of both approaches in an existential form of appreciation. Where the critical generally pre-prepares the ground for the advent of the relatively-radical expression of the non-economic along with its necessitated critical re(-)appropriation in the contextualization of this equally necessary imputation of the hyper-economic. That this vision of the hyper-economic oversees our appreciation of the non-virtually oriented, causally implicated non-economic irruptions in its formation of histories of the present given any one situation can give rise to an infinity of unequal interpretations, where not one interpretation can be the equal of any other, and, thereby, gives us grounds for the re(-)assessment of such recorded facts. Preferring on balance, and in the light of evidence, more probable interpretations over those that are less probable in status, although not ruling out, at the same time, a dialectics of possibilities where no one single interpretation can exhaust a field of interpretations. However, the persisting, all-pervasive 'presence' of a unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing mo-

ment must also imply that processes of truth determination need not be non-problematic to a great extent given the textual deposition of imputed facts as being included in recorded facts. That these comments will now allow us to segue into determining the nature of the philosophically oriented process of truth determination. I.e., allow us to differentiate and determine the apparent status of both (subsistent) facts and (existent) events. (41)

As indicated earlier, in *a short preamble* to this essay, I argued that each and every viable discipline treated the world of lived-experience, i.e., the secular world, from a distinctive perspective. In this regard, what exactly counts as being 'philosophical' in terms of 'a philosophical difference, a philosophical meta-difference, and a philosophical non-difference?' As unfashionable as this might at first seem, it is my contention that the philosophical discipline is primarily concerned with truth determination. Let me explain and defend this potentially controversial point that, correctly, should not be regarded as controversial. (42)

In reflection upon the philosophical discipline, it seems obvious to me that philosophy is continually refining its variety of theoretical approaches, practical techniques, the pursuit of viable forms of criticism, along with radical qualifications of the former, with a view to ascertaining what is true and all that that might entail. As 'evidence' of this pursuit we find, in various forms, a variety of definitions of what is 'truth', what is to be constituted as 'true' in the light of that definition, and so on. Moreover, as an optimist, I would also contend that a certain pragmatic consensus has been arrived at, through a successful postmodern critique of the modernist project (as entailed in the so-called 'Western Enlightenment', etc.) that, for many philosophers, who, if pressed, would state something to the effect that 'truth is not absolute Truth, but, that which can be validly argued for through well-constructed arguments, etc.' That this form of 'truth' is provisional, needs to be evidentially established, and should play a productive role in our causal understanding of the world. That this approach can be formulated in a logical format as indicated by Alfred Tarski, but, as to how evidence can be educed and produced for such truth determination, unfortunately, that this, as yet, is another matter where consensus has not been sufficiently arrived at (in a suitable formulation that would suit the ill-tempered dispositions of a series of ideologues unable to suspend their own prejudices, i.e., prejudgments in the vexed context of this specific issue? I.e., as a topic that just cannot be suitably discussed by such ideologues!)? (43)

Tarksi's definition of what is truth, what is 'true' as ascertained in a process of truth determination is:

P' is T iff p. (44)

This formula, in English, in my interpretation, can be read as follows, namely, the state of affairs in the (relative) meta-language P' is true (T) if and only if the state of af-

fairs can be found in the (relative) object language (p). By assuming a difference in meta-languages by one degree, in the form as indicated, this formula can be extended to include all levels in meta-status. E.g., 'the truth of the fact as to whether the weather at location x in time t is currently experiencing rain' could be construed, accordingly, as follows, namely, the sentence that states ''it is raining (R) at location x at time t' is true if and only (iff) it is raining (r) at location x at time t:

(R @t/x)' is T iff (r @t/x). (45)

So, by (meta-)extension, the supposedly true statement: {(R @t/x) is a true statement} if the meta-statement of the second meta-degree is true if and only if the meta-statement of the first degree is true which would be the case if the observations made in the object language have already indicated this fact or where evidence could be produced to confirm that fact. (46)

Now, moving on to events, we can argue along the same lines. So, e.g., event E occurred (E) and has truly occurred if 'the sentence nominating the occurrence of event E' truly occurred iff there was this occurrence e.

E' is T iff e. (47)

However, as intimated, although this format for truth determination can be universally applied how that application is to be arranged is quite another matter (that, I believe, could well be resolved in hypothetical terms, first, by adopting this Tarskian format, and, second, adopting and adapting rules for the collection and ascertainment of evidence, and, third, organizing methods for error correction that generally oversee and supervise such well-conducted methods for evidential conformation through reiterated patterns of either real-time confirmation and/or non-real-time verification.[297] (48)

That, implicit in this overall process of truth determination is the assumption that economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic aspects will find a reasonable degree of mutual alignment (further assisted through the suitable exercise of well-informed and well-conducted extensive suspension, etc. Where, in effect, processes of an automatically invoked de-suspension should reveal either the confirmation and/or the disconfirmation of such previously held truth values, etc.). (49)

E.g., at a very early age, I came to understood that the surface of the Earth to be round by disconfirming the previous interpretation that the Earth is flat and confirming,

[297] My suggestion here is to invoke processes of transformational retreatment that utilize hermeneutical rectification, phenomenal-phenomenological deconstruction (in its broadest sense), and both non-systematic and systematic form of existential re(-)normalization.

primarily through various forms of testimony, that the re-perceived fact ‘that the Earth is round’ was the socially preferred option. But, we should also note, in such attitudes, that the existence of the Earth, as localized through my non-virtual embodiment, at no stage had been called into question. (50)

Such an approach can also assist us in dealing with the ascertainment of events in terms of their putative existential e/valuation, i.e., in determining their apparent existential merit be that past, concurrent, or future in orientation. So, e.g., in so-called toxic relationships, we might wish to ascertain whether we would find more positive e/valuational formations being relationally situated either inside and/or outside our relational representations of that toxic relationship? That, when and where alternative relational trajectories could be entertained, that, generally, we should observe those trajectories found to be of more importance to us and in a form or format that could be entertained as being more profitable for us in terms of the comparative establishment or disestablishment of those same relationships in question. That, hand in hand, with this type of inspection in truth determinations, we should also ascertain the role played by positive evidential truth demonstrations *versus* the negative demonstrations of apparent forms of either misinformation, disinformation, and/or mal-information, and so on! That, although, generally, truth determinations should be truthfully exhibited, pragmatically, there will also be occasions in which the truth should not be demonstrated lest that prove to be neither pragmatically applicable nor profitable given that those types of situations should already be deemed to be both non-existentially constituted and non-existentially instituted. That, just as the deontological should undermine the expedient when situationally called for, in turn, the non-expedient should not be allowed to undermine the relational situatedness (obviously being placed in question, unfortunately, through the misguided pursuit of the relatively non-existential as dominating that form of relational inauthenticity). (51)

In this context we can also confront a related, but separate, philosophical issue, or rather issues. Just how is it that relatively non-existential states of affairs, such as e.g., slavery, despotic dictatorships, coercive militaries, etc., can persist in the continuance of their relatively non-existential practices if such persistence, supposedly, is erected on the relational viability of an existential ‘core’ in order to preserve the historical persistence of that specific relationship? And, conversely, how is it possible for an existential relationship to persist with the continuous semblance of an existential expressiveness given the impossibility of being continually existential in both attitude and aptitude, given that people are imperfect, are prone to make mistakes, are forgetful, and, even go to sleep on a daily basis? (52)

In regard to the relatively non-existential, we cannot claim any relational situation is or could be either perfectly existential or imperfectly non-existential give the economic interdependence of the existential upon the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, etc. However, we must assume that, at a bare minimum, some form of existential observance is being adhered to? So, the slave is supplied with adequate food and drink, is nether fatally nor drastically injured by either their master or mistress or by the nature of their work, and so on. Indeed, it would have to be the case, therefore, that masters would need, somewhat at least, to recognize the economic value of their slave and act

accordingly lest they lose the full or partial use of this 'asset', etc. Similarly, dictators must be able to rewards those with whom they need to favour in order to maintain, in turn, their power, dependent, as it is, upon miscellaneous forms of proffered cooperation, be that arrived at either coercively and/or non-coercively. Likewise, military commanders that cannot maintain the requisite degree of military morale, logistics, and so forth, will eventually stand to lose the war even if a first few battles were initially won. (53)

As for this problem of 'ongoing persistence of an existential preservation' we should note, that just as the scent of a person wearing a strong perfume can linger in a room after they have left, in a similar manner the impressive 'odour' of a well-deserved reputation for existential behaviour will also persist, take up a respectable form of 'residence', so to speak. Indeed, become 'lodged' in a hyper-economic sense and semblance of memory and appreciation, and, from that vantage point continue to exert advantageous forms of either trust or potential fear, accordingly, in the relatively worthy or the relatively unworthy. Just as with a positively healthy bank account, a much wider variety of various forms of financial freedom can be afforded as a result. (54)

Now, given this preoccupation with 'establishing valid, evidential forms of truth determination', the philosopher, hopefully, is now better equipped, as a disciplinarian, to be of better service in the secularity of this world at large, sadly, forever awash with a multitude of problems... if only, through suitable forms of reflection, we had the requisite eyes to see, and the required ears to hear..! (55)

Just how should the secular world be philosophically approached, and better understood.?! (56)

For some people, not being religious by either disposition or indoctrination, the secular world might be (mis)construed as all that there is. However, for the moment putting aside how the secular world is traditionally contrasted with the invocation of religious dimension, be that, perhaps, exclusively of one's own religious persuasion or finding room for some or all other religious persuasions, let me proffer, instead, an additional contrast, namely, that of the world of disciplinarians and their various disciplines, be those disciplines regarded as either viable, less viable, or non-viable, or, if not actually detrimental, to the overall coursing of this world at large. Now, that granted, I argued at the start of this essay that each and every discipline could be viewed as promulgating some form of a distinctive 'disciplinary difference'. So, e.g., the theologian's vision of their overall life-world is such that if you were to subtract a secular understanding what you should be left with is a 'distinctive vision of the theological', i.e., a 'theological difference' that, ostensively, would be disseminated by that religious professional. However, things are more complicated, unfortunately, since the following question one must assume will be asked by either that theologian themselves, other members of their profession, congregations, members of other denominations, the secular world itself, "just what value does this theological difference have, indeed, make in the lives of those adherents professing that type of theology, etc?" Hence those distinctive considerations of a 'theological meta-difference' will follow for those people who profess that type of theological difference. And, in time, where a third question will also need to be asked, namely, "giv-

en we all live in a secular world just how does this theological difference and its co-associated theological meta-difference collectively cross this potentially horrendous gulf between the secular world and the non-secular world of the theological? Where we need to note a modicum of common sense to the extent by insisting **'that what is not there for us is not there for us, and, we need not be there for it!!** In effect, philosophically and theologically insisting, that a theological non-difference must also be in place lest the theologian finally admit that a theologically inspired life or lifestyle is just too impossible to actually contemplate, either literally and/or analogically...! (57)

But, essentially, the same philosophical manoeuvres can be ask of any disciplinarian, including that of the philosopher despite their many promising and less than promising incarnations (as 'a rational specimen of a featherless biped'). Indeed, a short time ago, I proposed that the distinctive nature of the philosophical discipline, as a philosophical difference, more or less, was 'that of a person preoccupied with the theoretical nature, application, and critique of processes of truth determination', with the implicit understanding intended that such a pursuit possessed a certain philosophical meta-difference, namely, that there was a positive benefit to be gained, by society, through the suitable adoption and adaptation of such philosophical methods. A process advanced when suitably based on an adequate evidential basis, etc. (58)

Now, in the light of a vast swathe of interminable and unresolved controversies and their perennial displays of successive disciplinary scandals, as so evident in the world of the philosopher and in all other disciplines, one must wonder how any person in the secular domain could survive the reiterated interference and overlapping ministrations emanating from all such confused, and confusing, practitioners. But, we see, under normal circumstances, a relatively unbothered world prepared to enjoy itself to that extent it can, without too much concern for such impossible dilemmas continually presented by one disciplinarian to another, and thereafter, returned, to be endlessly recycled *ad infinitum*. So, just how does the secular world bypass and insulate itself from this addictive state of perplexity so perfectly demonstrated by those apparent professionals, and other, who announce themselves as seemingly proficient in their miscellaneous arts and sciences? (59)

In this regard, it strikes me that the secular world is not so much an arena of competing madness and mayhem, although it can be that, but a realm with a certain degree of self-sufficiency, a place where disciplined forms of an incited motivation can all too often be safely ignored. A marketplace where the discerning customers, themselves, can bring back a certain order and self-respecting responsibility without having to take on board every ruse and remedy disseminated by these competing professionals. Indeed, picking and choosing what is thought to be best to hand, and perhaps wisely seeking their own council, or, at least, the council of those whose existential reputations so clearly precede them... (60)

Now, given this apparent degree of secular immunity to professional fantasies, and, I would like to generally add, to baseless conspiracies as well, should we not accept the fact that bubbling up and emerging through the secular world is an existential stream

of commonsense and living-reality that gives to this overall world of lived-experience a certain distinctive sense of a secular difference, along the value of a certain secular meta-difference... that so successfully interfaces with this wayward world of the disciplinary through some form of a viable, secular non-difference? Or, should we look a little higher, or, at the same time, a little deeper, and reason that worlds of both the secular and the disciplinary spheres of influence, like the dimensions of the private and the public domains, along with the world of the arbitrated, are, at the end of the day not that distant from each other. A private realm of experience completely separate from a public domain would be an absolute nonsense, indeed, the insanity of a world riven into two non-communicating halves much like as occurs within the brain when the *corpus callosum* is surgically cut and dividing, segregating the specific awarenesses of that now psychologically diminished individual...[298] (61)

Such re-positioning granted, if only hypothetically, what can I say, from a carefully crafted philosophical perspective, about the distinctive nature of secular experience (if it were possible to disengage it from disciplinary interpretations?)? (62)

That, it cannot be totally reduced and diminished by disciplinary interpretations and interventions, and, that has an existential life of its own, as to be found in our living-experience and its textualized depositions as lived-experience! On the other hand, the world of the secular still has to be understood through an integrated vision of these overlapping worlds of the disciplinary. But, something that has to proceed cautiously, through well-informed and well-exercised suspensions, in provisional terms, with an integrity much like that to be found in the skillful baking of a cake where we put the ingredients together, carefully manipulate their interactions and, then, through baking, and doing little else, find ourselves presented with the wonderful aroma of a freshly baked cake... hopefully, with a decent cup of tea, or coffee, already to hand in order to savour such a delightful treat, preferably with a good friend or cheerful neighbour... (63)

Obviously, we must be somewhat optimistic in the pursuit of this performance of our hoping to achieve a reasonably competent philosophical approach to whatever might otherwise be left to perplex us... In this regard, can our philosophical and disciplinary reflections be set up in such a manner so as to proffer some form of a profitable resolution of those difficulties that we might be able to resolve, avoiding those that are in the form of impossible formulations and, therefore, have no resolution, whilst also putting to the side those that we might be able to successfully unpack given enough time, energy, skillful and careful attention. (64)

Optimism as an existential sentiment, as previously explored, is and must be a prerequisite requirement for the successful resolution of all current difficulties that fall within the purview of our reasonable discernment. Without this ability to believe 'we might find some degree of success in what we think and do, in what we might plan and attempt to execute...' there would be little point to get out of our beds in the mornings and face the exigencies of the day... (65)

---

[298] Challenging a provocative argument once put forward by Richard Rorty in his book: *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*; 1989.

That granted, just how should we go about trying to understand this existential sentiment of optimism, along with all other such similar sentiments, the type of phenomenological experience that is so easily misunderstood and so easily denigrated, and reduced, to the status of affective emotions? For a start, we should realize that such experiences' are 'not primarily subjective in their origination', in a manner as might be ordinarily understood. Now, 'non-subjective origination' is meant in a very special, dialectical sense that will be explicated by following the course of a short series of arguments that will continually requalify where we will land, eventually, once this course is run. But, bear with me here… (66)

Into the category of existential(ly oriented) sentiments (as trans-intentional 'transcendental' emotions) I would like to tentatively place a number of experiential phenomena, such as, e.g., optimism, courage, honesty, integrity, authenticity, trust, heartfelt affection (love), and so on. In effect, as you might suspect, we have a seemingly open list of various, perhaps Aristotelian-like virtues, and more, and where these apparent types of experience are more recognized as occurring in certain social settings where a public consensus would most likely find various positive forms of social approbation. (67)

With such an *ad hoc* assortment of such potentially ascribed 'socially situated virtues' we first should not reduce them to the status of affective emotions. All too often we will use words like 'feelings', and other forms of affective currency, to mistakenly identify such 'sentiments' as 'mere emotions'. Even I, myself, have to resist this temptation of designating this type of experience as 'transcendental emotions' given the ensuing confusion that would be quite understandably unleashed in the wake of such relatively loose technical terminology. With suitable forms of qualification, such carefully requalified language could be resurrected, but, to avoid our making such a self-made pitfall let us continue to use this designation of 'sentiment'. (68)

Next, I would like to note that the apparent existence of negative sentiments, in contrast to these positive sentiments, is experientially present by virtue of the relative diminishment or absence of the latter (in the form of a certain positive sentiment). So, e.g., we could talk about either 'guilt' or 'dishonesty', but, it is my current understanding that what we are really focusing on, beyond the reification of such negative forms of language which, somewhat, is a different type of issue, in this instance, is very much either 'the lack of integrity' or the relative absence of honesty' as already indicated in the very form of the word 'dishonesty'. (69)

So, putting negations, as forms of privations, to the side, we next need to ask ourselves just how would it possible to be, say, 'a courageous person' or 'a loving partner' in the absence of others or your being a possible partner in the context of either a non-existent or not yet existing relationship. It is true we could refer to ourselves as the sort of person who is 'loving, lovable, caring', and so on, but those qualities are more potential possibilities rather than current actualities. So, this social contextualization of such language would suggest that the origins of this type of language as intersubjectively oriented... (70)

Now, this reading, as a provisional interpretation is quite attractive, and could well lure people, myself included, into thinking that the origination of such experiences must necessitate the relative primacy of a social situatedness in order to more fully understand the unravelling of this phenomenology along these lines... (71)

As evidence for the reasonableness of this reading we could cite the experience of the 'look' of others, as explored, e.g., by Jean-Paul Sartre as now making a greater degree of sense given that such experiences, as sentiments, are already in the public arena so to speak. Surely, if we are seen doing something deemed to be 'immoral', indeed, quite at variance with current public expectations, it stands to reason I will be experiencing what the other person or persons could very easily articulate as 'wrong', and being seen as someone doing something 'wrongful' I could very well experience 'the co-simulated experience of having done something wrongful' accordingly. It is as if I were to clearly know what they are thinking, that I am sure that if in a safe or secure position to tell me so that they could well do so. That, to a great extent even their 'silence' would speak volumes, or their looks of disdain, or, their avoidance of looking at myself could all be read in a similar fashion. Now, given that for many people a large fraction of their self-identity is derived through the approbation or non-approbation of others then this type of negative feedback could well be very painful to bear as an individual singled out for such negative individuation... (72)

However, although an attractive route to follow, it is my opinion that the primacy of this type of experience is centered in the sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity to that extent we can both representatively simulate and identity with the parameters of a certain relationship that we are have actively entertained for at least a certain period of time. Now, to understand this emergent form of identification with a certain relationship being actively entered into we might like to consider the following. To experience some form of self-authenticity, e.g., it would make little sense to say 'I subjectively experience such a state of affairs' (through the mere subjectivity of subjective experience). Under such narrow terms of reference how could I differentiate between my experiencing some form of authenticity *versus* some experience of my being inauthentic, or experiencing neither type of experience, or simultaneously experiencing both types of experience? Or, quite simply, how can 'I subjectively experience subjective experience?' In this regard, I would like to argue that just as my experience or your experience, say, of visual phenomena realizes the co-associated experience of myself or yourself as a visual perceiver, then, in a similar manner entertaining a field of existentially oriented sentiments means my experiencing the same with a sense of subjectivity that has already set me up, and, thereby, permits me to experience that co-associated economic type of phenomenon (as a naturally to be expected form of economic correlativity). So, the question becomes quite simply, what type of subjectivity would permit me to experience that type of sentimental phenomena? For myself, the answer, surprisingly, is also quite simple, none other than a 'trans-relational sense of subjectivity'. As I am experiencing relational phenomena then I must also possess a relational sense of subjectivity. But, in this regard, I am not experience simple bits and pieces of a relationship, namely simulations of its participants and parts, but rather the interactions taking place within the relationship itself

it follows that my 'specific semblance of subjectivity' in this regard must be 'trans-relational in orientation'. 'Orientation' as a matter of course being understood since through economic correlativity and the impossibility of either recognizing, encountering, and/or engaging any form of isolated economic correlativity in an impossible separation from its actual economy of origination and gestation it follows that the corresponding sense of subjectivity must be and cannot be other than trans-relational in orientation. (73)

Now, this overall argument granted, if only hypothetically, it means that trans-relational subjectivity, as an orientation, would also include, to varying proportions both subjectively experienced experience and intersubjectively experienced experience. That more correctly, although trans-relational experience is primarily trans-relational in orientation, at the same time, it cannot exclusively exclude both subjectively and intersubjectively oriented inputs and contributions, without surrendering this trans-relational primacy to either subjective and/or intersubjective orientations.[299] (74)

That, effectively, we now have a very neat way of viewing relatively existential sentiments, i.e., as an economic composite of trans-relational, subjective and intersubjective inputs, but, with a certain trans-relational primacy nonetheless. (75)

Now, let me explain why I would designate such positive sentiments as relatively existential in complexion? (76)

A 'pro-relational stance to trans-relational experience' is basically 'existential in orientation'. In effect, we are experiencing the existential excess or surplus of positive e/valuational formation that emerges in an alignment, and equivalence, with the relational facticity of that relational experience in question.[300] I.e., to that extent a certain relationship is being experienced, the extent the experiential relationship cannot be reduced to the mere inventory of its 'relational bits and pieces', its 'relational participants and parts', etc., is to that same extent it is harmonically expressed above and beyond either the sum of its analysis or the mere synthesis of the same (as likewise the mere inventory of either its relational participants and/or parts). (77)

Now, I would like to further argue that a pro-relational stance experiences the trans-relational identity in question with a certain intensity directly reflecting the apparent facticity in question. That relationships are experienced with certain intensities that to some extent can also reflect the proximity of their relational participants and parts to where we are *vis-à-vis* that relationship as experienced in its trans-relational subjectivity,

---

299 Refer to footnote 14.

300 Where facticity is defined as that experiential excess or surplus of e/valuational formation that emerges beyond the mere inventory of its relational constituents. Utilizing this distinction between 'relational' participants as merely constituting the relational inventory of a relationship *versus* its trans-relational facticity that cannot be just reduced to the former. A bit like smashing up a cake in order to foolishly reduce it back to its flour and eggs along with an impossible separation of all its other relational constituents. Of course, we can separate the shaft of a broom from the head or brush of that same broom, but, we no longer can experience the phenomenon of '(the relative freedom to be associated with) the sweeping with a broom' as experienced with the use of a broom, if we were to substitute merely the head of that former broom.

etc. Moreover, we can also view this facticity being experienced as an existential ‘test; to the extent that ‘that relationship is being experienced as an ongoing process of harmonization (as expressed through its moment of resolution when, in turn, it finds a non-economic form of expression in this same regard). That, all things being unequal, i.e., in their never being exactly equal (except through processes of analytical identification), it follows that all relationships are experienced with different, and fluctuating, degrees of trans-relational intensity... (78)

Now, to further compound the complexity of this argument, through the following process of ‘economic simplification’, we can quite simply note that all forms of existential sentiment exist with a certain degree of intensity, and fluctuations therein, that is directly reflective of the (fluctuating) facticity of the relationship in question. Moreover, with a series of co-presented existential sentiments we could regard them all as but expressions of the same phenomenon co-associated with this emergent facticity but as cognitively refracted, both individually and collectively, through the intentional representations, i.e., interpretations, being brought to bear upon our evolving appreciation of that relationship in question. So, in ‘a person exemplifying integrity’ they are also ‘co-expressing a similar degree and form of authenticity’, and so on. That such a person would also exhibit the requisite degree of courage, or lack of courage, should the situation call for that type of intentional refraction of cognitive experience, and so on. Hence this observation that a situation calling, say, for courage or honesty or heartfelt affection or compassion, etc., or all of the above, would duly do so through that form of economic simplification where the intensity of the experience is equivalent to the degree of its harmonization, and so forth., as subjected, more or less, to the conventional nature of that same type of situation as being experienced in its current situatedness. (79)

So, through this form of simplification, I am strongly suggesting existential sentiments have an intensity of expression equivalent to the facticity of the relationship in question as realized non-economically through moments of non-economic resolution subject to their hyper-economic re-appreciation that would most likely reflect the conventional nature of their re(-)contextualization, albeit in line with current existential expectations of reputation, and so on and so forth. (80)

So, e.g., if a certain situation appears to conventionally call for an act of courageous behaviour or honest behaviour, etc., we would hope that the same would be duly delivered with an intensity of realization also reflective of this co-associated degree of harmonization. (81)

Now, in the use of my expression ‘e/valuational formation’ I am implying the co-delivery of a fluctuating economic mix of aesthetical, deontological and pragmatical inputs and outputs with a primary non-exclusive preference for the deontological (as previously argued). Needless to say, there is no subscription here to the impossibility of so-called First Principles, etc. Rather, the mix of values expressed in processes of e/valuational formation, i.e., acts of value judgment, will primarily include deontological forms of e/valuation supplemented to a certain degree with different degrees of esthetical and pragmatic e/valuation (as ‘adjuncts’). I use this technical language so as to clearly

discuss the value formations expressed in terms of the second trans-cognitive order of aesthetical judgment, the third trans-cognitive order of deontological judgment, and the fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical judgment.[301] So, by such means, when we are discussing ethical question the relevant forms of value are primarily deontological supplemented, when and where appropriate with aesthetical and pragmatical qualifications acting as adjuncts in this regard. Hence my concern to primarily equate a pragmatic philosophy (in the form of a pragmatic-existentialism, etc.) with a deontological orientation, albeit as not exclusively removed from, say, pragmatical considerations of expediency, etc., when that more pragmatical form of an orientation is being called for.[302] (82)

The expression 'existential' (as in 'existential sentiments') is also an expression of the fact that through non-economic resolution the relationship is unilaterally re-directed towards the specificity of the ensuing moment, be that more of the existentially 'first' through re-iteration or non-existentially 'last'; through mere reiteration. However, more correctly, as 'the existential is the pro-relational existentialization of the relatively non-existential' the complexion of the ensuing moment is a more a mix of both first and last moments to varying degrees. Moreover, the idea has been suggested that existentialization is also a reflection of the extent there is a viable, working, trans-relational alignment between the economic, the non-economic and the hyper-economic; a state of affairs, as noted, that can never realize a perfected state of complete alignment.(unless the narrated anomalization of the relationship is effectively de-anomalized through a sufficient degree of resolution that then terminates that same relationship in historical terms of reference). (83)

But, all such complexities in argumentation granted, in order to move on to more pressing considerations, in what manner can the philosopher better serve others in the pursuit of their discipline? (84)

Now, if the philosopher's primary preoccupation is with truth determination, as their central philosophical difference, acting as a distinctive disciplinary differential, in what manner does this have philosophical value, as a philosophical meta-difference or meta-differential, for either the philosopher and their fellow disciplinarians, for both the existential secularist and the earnest religionists? Then, how is such value to be realized in the secular world if not through non-economic forms of philosophical non-difference enacted as its distinctive disciplinary differential? So, how then does the philosopher set in motion these productive patterns of non-economic re-directedness of intent? (85)

Through the exercising of well-informed and well-conducted (extensive) suspensions. Provoking the non-economic to do the rest of the work through the relatively forceful resolution of de-suspensions. In the process setting up patterns of existentialization in

---

301 The other three trans-cognitive orders consist of a first trans-cognitive order of phenomenal-phenomenological semantic e/valuation, a fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutical possibility, and a sixth trans-cognitive order of ontical, or factual, e/valuation.

302 Also arguing that, in its own way, the pragmatical also observes various forms of deontological-like structuring just as, e.g., 'being economical' can be read as an 'imperative to be economical', etc. Or, in aesthetical terms, that 'being economical' is also observing a certain 'style' that is being 'economical-like', etc.

which trajectories are productively re-directed in both the positive, incremental augmentation and the positive, non-incremental chaotic enhancement of our relationships. Primarily promoting those relationships in which we find closer forms of proximity to others, where our trans-relational subjectivity, etc., refines the nature of our 'standing' in this world at large... (86)

In effect, progressively disestablishing all forms of a negative nihilism, as entailed in impossible ideologically promoted forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism and relativism, etc., and, in the process, automatically revealing all positive forms of nihilism as that residue which pragmatically works, i.e., in effect, that which expresses an existential-pragmatism as a pragmatic-existentialism, and v.v. (87)

An anti-representationalism effortlessly expressed through enacting extensive suspensions... (88)

Successfully provoking suitable forms of truth determination that are phenomenologically proper, hermeneutically appropriate, and existentially apposite. (89)

And, how do we know we are making relatively successful degrees of progress in these forms of research detailing our phenomenological analyses, hermeneutical investigations, and existential examinations? By noting the relative creation, preservation, and conservation of both the existential richness and enrichment of our more primary relationships (unless responsible patterns of relational de-conservation, de-preservation and/or de-creation are apparently being called for). Engaging an intensification of our existential sentiments as indicators[303] of such differential forms of successfulness even though this variety of sentiment is to be understood as only arising thought the apparent diversity of its cognitive refractions. (90)

Where subtle forms of de-suspension give rise to ordered forms of behavioural e/valuation upon which all forms of viable disciplinary profession have their ordered basis either directly or through forms of reduplication. The six trans-cognitive orders of the phenomenological; aesthetical; deontological; pragmatical; hermeneutical; and, ontical giving rise, respectively, to the semantic-phenomenologist; the aesthetician and artists; the existential-pragmatist, the expedient-pragmatist; the hermeneut and hermeneuticist; and, factologists. (91)

Where through inter-ordered reduplication, respectively, we are presented, e.g., through the semantics of semantics with a 'narrow' version of the categorically inclined metaphysician; psychologists and sociologists, etc; either religiously motivated and/or existentially oriented disciplinarians and secularists, etc; political-economists; scientists; and historians.[304] (92)

---

303 Current existential indicators acting as existential hallmarks (paralleling past existential indicators and future existential predictors)

304 Here, hopefully, I am proffering a tantalizing glimpse of the next book, *Book* 9, which will deal with a repurposing of the concept of the 'metaphysical' (as complex symmetrical inter-ordered phenomenon), and, how all disciplines have a basis in either an ordered philosophy or in the form of either a symmetrical or an asymmetrical inter-ordered phenomenon. So. e.g., first, a 'categorical metaphysics (in its

That, as science is the reduplicated possibility of possibilities, and, history is the reduplicated facts of facts, there is also opened up the transformational pathways for asymmetrical forms of reduplication as in 'the history of science' and its non-equivalence with 'the science of history', and so on and so forth. (93)

Where, if truth be told, 'philosophy' is 'the working interaction between the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenological; the fifth trans-cognitive order of the hermeneutical; and, the third trans-cognitive order of the existential (as pragmatically centered, primarily, in deontological forms of e/valuational formation non-exclusively inseparable from its aesthetical and pragmatical adjuncts). (94)

Where, through the non-economic, the philosopher, as a non-philosopher, sets out like all earnest disciplinarians acting within viable disciplines, to serve all secularists through the differential articulation of enriched forms of truth determination along with all ensuing patterns of existential richness and enrichment. (95)

Establishing positive forms of e/valuational formation through suitable forms of suspension… (96)

Revealing through facts the nature of events, and, through the nature of facts the experience of events... (97)

Thence the possibility of pursuing an existential fruitfulness in all our primary relationships... (98)

Augmenting and enhancing our experience of freedom, in general terms, through arbitration...[305] (99)

Where, through the suspension of our reflections we recognize, encounter, and engage[306] trans-relational subjectivity, etc.,[307] as realized through the non-economic uni-

---

narrow definition)' as 'the phenomenological-semantics of a phenomenological semantics'. Second, as 'a broad definition of the metaphysical' as 'the meta-philosophical/non-philosophical resultant of the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' (where by 'philosophical' is meant 'the systematic or global integration of hermeneutical, phenomenological and existential inputs'). Third, in the form of an 'existential definition of the metaphysical' as 'that overall alignment dynamically engineered between the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic spheres of influence in the coursing of trans-relational subjectivity, etc.', (and where by 'etc.' is also implied objectivity, interobjectivity, intersubjectivity and the open (non-closed) possibility of their extension, say, into both traditional and radical forms of theological treatment, spirituality, religiosity, etc.).

305 Where 'augmentation' is defined as 'the addition or subtraction of incremental and non-chaotic, positive inputs in orientation', and, 'enhancement' is 'the non-incremental and chaotic realization of positive outputs in orientation'.

306 If our reflections are duly suspended then their suspension, through de-suspension, existentially shapes the ensuing form of our engagement along with the inescapable nature of our interventions enacted both therein and thereafter.

307 Refer to footnotes 291 (16) and 304 (29).

lateral re-directedness of our inescapable shaping of our existential interventions in the light of their hyper-economic appreciation..!! (100)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 19.9.23.

In advertising a presentation of this essay, the following was noted:

> A series of themes in this essay will be explored such as, e.g., the nature of relational experience; in what manner existential sentiments like, e.g., optimism, courage, honesty, heartfelt affection, etc., should not be confused with affective emotions; the nature of the philosophical discipline as a preoccupation with truth determination; an attempt to understand just what type of contribution the philosopher, as a disciplinarian, can make for the secularist; along with an appreciation of the existential uniqueness of the secular world itself... (101)

In a second advertisement, the following was noted:

> Will be looking at an expansion of the contrast with the traditional idea of the secular with the addition of disciplines including what makes a discipline distinctive for religionists, philosophers, etc.
>
> Then, in that context asking what value the philosophical discipline brings to the secular world?
>
> Extending this discussion to include non-economical/non-philosophical ideas, the nature of the existential, how existential sentiments like, e.g., optimism, integrity, honesty, courage, etc., should not be confused with affective emotions… how a negative nihilism needs t be deconstructed but how a residual positive nihilism should be promoted…
>
> My approach will be to explore the entailed arguments in a more leisurely manner since to some extent they holistically mirror each other… where a few details looked at closely should do most of the philosophical work for us (which could sell be just another definition of a misguide optimism, lol). (102)

An additional comment re this holistic approach

> If the primary conclusion of these reflections is ‘that we need to deconstruct all impossible forms of a negative nihilism and re(-)construct the remaining residue of a positive nihilism’ then a holistic approach would appear to be quite applicable! (103) N.T, 25.9.23.

12U. *On Reflection*:
A Random Review - A Re-Construction of Key Ideas by the 'Reviewer':
A Skeletal Commentary

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2023

12U. *On Reflection*: A Random Review - A Re-Construction of Key Ideas by the 'Reviewer': A Skeletal Commentary*

Deconstructing the negative and re(-)constructing the positive…

In this rather unorthodox review, I would like to set up the reader in such a way so as to assist them to make a series of important key decisions, hopefully, help them to arrive in similar directions as followed in these twelve essays.[308] Well, at least, that is both my aspiration and optimistic hope. In this implicit process, if not always fully explicated, let me briefly review these reflections by noting some key points and, contributing a few, occasional, short comments along with a skeletal articulation of some of my more important arguments…[309] Therefore, we might perceive this 'review' as more the 'review of the reader', where this person becomes the 'reading-reviewer' (despite my itemizing these arguments, etc., as the 'writing-reviewer'). In effect, by paring things done to the bare bones, so to speak, I am articulating a 'skeletal commentary' from which the reading-reviewer can then re-assemble these arguments in an accordance with their own affirmations or alterations in reasoning, be that in an alignment with this essay or otherwise. As stated on a number of occasions, I seek understanding and neither a positive affirmation nor any form of approbation. (0).

Ostensively, we have twelve sets of reflections on miscellaneous topics that might appear to have little in common. However, various themes will be continually reworked with some interesting shifts in positioning. In their order of appearance, these topics are travel (i.e., as a metaphor for shifts in my philosophical thinking, primarily concerned with the recognition of the non-economic, etc.); discerning the advent of a Contemporary era through invoking a meta-modern, hyper-real approach to the re-qualification of existential sentiments, etc; re-examining notions concerning authenticity; optimism as a prime example of an 'existential sentiment'; exploring the contours of a positive nihilism; scrutinizing transcendental suspensions; a review of miscellaneous themes already introduced; one positive way of dealing with pseudo-psychotic narratives invoking, say, conspiracies, or dogmatic positions, etc: a phenomenological exploration of subjectivity; the hermeneutics of intersubjectivity; the positive nihilism of the existential attitude; and the secularity of the secular world. (1)

1, etc. In the first set of reflections, I use the metaphor of 'travel' to suggest recent shifts in the direction of my philosophical thinking.[310] The most prominent of which is the taking on board some of the ideas of the French philosopher François Laruelle, primarily, that we have to accept the fact of our existence that things just do not go round and round in mere circulations of value, but, must also include the fact that events on many occa-

---

* A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

308 Hence treating the 'reader' (or 'audience') as the 'reading-reviewer' (in contrast to the author as the 'writing-reviewer').

309 Note key 'skeletal' arguments will be in bold.

310 The numeral in bold is merely indicating in which set of reflections we are primarily involved.

sions, sometimes expected and sometimes totally unexpected, will head off in directions that cannot be described as 'circular'**. Indeed, as invoking a unilateral sense and semblance of a re-directedness of events in which the causal consequences of our enactions, the enactions of others, and the willful ways of the world just cannot be explicated in and through the format of a pure economics alone!** Given this observation, e.g., how do we account for reports of 'spontaneity' so beloved by the existentialist in a system that, otherwise, would be no more than the constant recycling of endless inputs and outputs within the tight constraints of the overall vision of an all-embracing economy? I have confronted this dilemma numerous times[311] and, hitherto, had proposed that the third moment of the economy, namely, resolution, could resolve this conundrum. However, the problem then becomes how do we differentiate the merely virtual from the causal directedness of the non-virtual that, admittedly, no longer goes 'round and round' so to speak. Hence the necessary importation of the concept of the 'non-economic' (paralleling the notions of the 'non-philosophical' or 'non-standard' as adopted by Laruelle) in order to account for the irruptive nature of the event (as has been explored in the last two essays of this series). In the penultimate essay, I reasoned that the distinctive nature of facts is born in events because the character of the world (as the 'whirled') takes a stance, indeed, takes a stand that is then fixed and frozen in time unlike our experience of the event which needs to be engaged, and, thereafter, re(-)engaged, as an 'eventful experience'. But, then, how are we to understand the continual instantiation of the apparent existential demand for an 'ongoing process of re(-)engagement (as the unilateral re-directedness of the first moment as distinct from the unilateral re-directedness of the last moment)'? By what metaphorical mean might this insistence on the 'persistence' of a(n extensive) suspension be expedited? Indeed, one more problem in a series of problems that will need to be addressed…[312] (2)

But, first, let me explore reasons for my insistence on the necessary perception of the trimodal constitution of the economic in order to suitably approach any topic in a respectable philosophical or disciplinary light. Of course, it is my hope that you will come around to agreeing with me on this elementary point. However, as stated previously, I do not seek your approbation of these ideas, but, rather their understanding. Your inevitable agreement with me is only a matter of time, which I will graciously extend to yourself as long as it takes. But, be rest assured that when you do find yourselves in an agreement with 'myself' that, more than likely, I might have moved on and will now no longer be in a full agreement with these former 'positions' or 'opinions'. Hopefully, as ever 'a work in progress...' (3)

My first argument in this 'Book Review' runs as follows. In our argument for adopting and adapting either certain philosophical and/or disciplinary approaches as to how we are to interpret the secularity of the secular world, this world of the everyday, but even more of the ever-mysterious given that we can never know everything, we should be able to observe that we are at the prevailing mercy of both our metaphors and their rheto-

311 I must confess 'numerous times' is a 'gross understatement'.

312 Refer to paragraph 27. I invoke the analogy of 'the lingering of a perfume' in order to explain how the radical effects of a certain transformational-transition of an event can be also 'linger and persist' after the actual process of transformation, ostensively, has ceased.

ric, along with both possible facts and facts assumed to be forever true, so as to think we have some modicum of useful knowledge in order to assist us in our passage through this world at large. Put these observations together and we should be able to soon note that our representative vision of world is cobbled together through an overlapping set of semantic maps whose distinctive layers, both individually and collectively, form a miscellany of both overt and covert economies within some open, somewhat nebulous overarching sense of a universal economy that we hope could be shared, at least in principle, by us with our past ancestors and with those envisioned descendants who, as yet, have not emerged, or, indeed, a semblance of significance that could be understood by all Earthlings and Aliens alike. Now, whether the overall context of this argument is valid or invalid is not the point because the primary observation under focus here is to ask the following types of question: **"Do such economies exist?" "Just what common form can we assume these miscellaneous economies might exhibit, if at all?" "Are they mutually commensurable?" And, "What form of an overarching accommodation encompassing these economies might also be in play?"** (4)

Do such economies exist? The world seems to be full of events, facts, subjects, objects, intentional objectives, interobjective spaces, intersubjective communities, and so on and so forth (where the current list is not mean to be exhaustive). For such categories to non-controversially be present in an open list, indeed, for any two categories to be on the same list, along with a recognition of the human need for e/valuational formation, preferably through our interactions with others, it follows that such categories must be interacting in a way so as to create various forms of value, and so on. In other words, various economies must already be present… with various forms of value following on in their wake..! (5)

Does the reading-viewer of this essay consent to the existence, more or less, of this type of positioning?[313] If not, could they please kindly exit this room (until they exercise a more insightful understanding that the world cannot be just about facts but also, in its own way, must consist of our appreciation of values, different senses of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, trans-relational subjectivity, and so on! (6)

Now, how are we to interpret this double conjecture on 'the economic existence of relationships', and, that 'our evaluation of our own self-worth and the self-worth of others, indeed, the world itself, could very well rise and fall on such optimistic dynamics?' Obviously, value-judgments are discerned, and, they concern the constitution of our relationships and so we might safely assume that the 'economic' tenor of such epistemological processes is proceeding in an accordance with this 'outline'? (7)

So, as things apparently stand, economies must exist and miscellaneous forms of values are mediated through the imputed existence of such representative constructs. But, then, the question to be asked is, **"Just what common form or format can we assume these miscellaneous economies might exhibit, if at all (in order to be referred to under this simple expression as 'economic')?"** (8)

---

313 The 'writing-reviewer' is the 'author of this essay'.

On numerous occasions, I have pointed out that economies, as a bare minimum, must be trimodal in their constitution. I have argued for this, e.g., first, on the grounds of observation. Just look and you will see and find that all economic-like frames of reference are at least trimodally configured and that such a configuration has a certain deconstructive stability that is definitely not afforded to all defective unimodal and bimodal formulations. E.g., the temporal economy can be viewed as consisting of 'past, present, and future'. Or, e.g., that in arriving at a transformation through motion we can only provide either 'translation, rotation and/or reflection (say observing ourselves moving in front of a mirror)'. Or, e.g., in the manipulation of the volume of an object we can note only diminishment, enlargement, and neither diminishment nor enlargement through a non-transformation in volume. Or, e.g., where I have defined 'philosophy' as 'encompassing phenomenological 'descriptions', the functioning of hermeneutical 'prescriptions', and existential 'proscriptions'.' At this point, inviting the reader to even conjecture a viable counter-instance to the impossible existence of either a unimodal economy or a bimodal economy. Where, e.g., a single point can have no significance if it were to have no dialectical-like relations to what it is not, etc. Where, e.g., the bimodal pair of expressions 'cause and effect' can have little meaning, other than as relatively defective metaphors, given that if a so-called cause is coincident with its so-called effect, then there can be no causation. Or, if a so-called cause and its so-called effect were not related in the same moment of time then, again, there could be no causation! (9)

Now, I would like to remark that once we have seen one economy, we are soon on our way to view a plethora of such overlapping economic frames of reference. In this regard, second, I would also like to conjecture that all economies have the same archetypal isomorphism, namely, a consonant semblance of 'field', a dissonant semblance of a foregrounded focus, and a co-associated semblance of subjectivity being harmoniously expressed through the resolution realized within the current subjective frame of reference. That, all economies possess a similar structural set of functions, etc. (as argued for in my concepts of 'economic complexification' and 'parallel dictionaries', etc.[314]). (10)

Are they mutually commensurable? Yes, to a certain degree. E.g., as entertained through my concept of 'economic complexification'. E.g., consider the possibility of the potential parallel of the following:

Temporal Economy:	Past	Future	Present
Treatment Economy:	Analytical	Synthetical	Nominative
Philosophical Econ:	Phenomenological	Hermeneutical	Existential

(11)

And, what form of an overarching accommodation encompassing these economies might also be in play? As a provisional answer, we could reply by providing the observation through imputation that the form of our experience of 'world' is seen as 'this

[314] E.g., by arguing that in treatment we can only envisage three forms of research, namely, 'analytical, synthetical and nominative'. Where, e.g., 'analysis' is 'that which has been broken up or is ready to be broken up'. Just as 'description' describe what has already been descriptively analysed, reduced as such, and so on...

world', 'this same sense of a world' that we assume can both be individually and collectively taken for granted in our communications with others, etc. (12)

Archetypally, through invoking a gestalt lens (on visual perception, etc.), we can envisage a dynamic amalgam of a set of backgrounded fields, an apparent point of focus within that field/those field all (transcendentally) integrated in a composite sense of subjectivity reflecting those overlapping gestalt fields (as, e.g., as the embodied person, the perceiver, thinking, judger, the person who remembers, the social person embedded in a nest of relationships and their co-associated specificity of their situatedness, etc.). (13)

However, we will eventually be confronted by a profound problem that, although we can translate every situation through some applicable form of economic interpretation, still, we just cannot account, as things currently stand, for the non-virtual implication of a unilateral re-directedness of causal intervention and involvement. The arrow of time is not circular, certainly not in any obvious sense. Yes, we do have cyclic semblance of time in the flowering and fruiting of plants, the revolving of the planets, and in the passage of time moving between day and night, and so on. However, the formation of specific facts through the uniqueness of the event belies their formation through economies given the distinctive exclusivity of this undeniable aspect of reality that each and every moment at each every point in space as well in the tracing of the trajectories of our own thinking and thoughts are something that is never repeated and, therefore, cannot be treated as something that is purely economic involving mere circulations of e/valuational formations, or similar! (14)

How do we resolve this philosophical conundrum given that in lived-reality we can find no such problem to begin with? (15)

Quite simply through demanding that the moment of resolution in each and every lived-economy (and in the non-lived reality of all other imputed economies) there must also arise, from time to time, the irruption of a relatively radical moment of impetus that invokes a causal alignment to the extent that the virtual outline of our intentions can find some degree of an alignment with the non-virtual intent of those same intentions, and v.v. So, e.g., I could look at an apple in the fruit bowl and imagine myself eating it but merely staring at it will not achieve this non-virtual form of intent. On the other hand, it is true that in my representative perception of that apple it could be argued that the specificity of this object plays a larger part in my perception of it. So, e.g., in the dining room I can see a wax apple, but, will see it as a 'wax apple', whereas, in a fortunate contrast, in the kitchen I can observe one of these apples in the fruit bowl as both an 'apple' and as an 'edible apple'. The implication being that the edible apple has me seeing it as an 'edible apple' unlike the wax apple. On the other hand, what must I do to eat this apple given that merely thinking about eating this apple will not convert this virtual form of ideation into its non-virtual enaction? Indeed, what motivates me to move beyond my virtual ideation to successfully enact these intentions that so obviously have an intended non-virtual aspect to its an intentional objectivity? (16)

In this economic moment of 'resolution', suitably charged through the requisite degree of motivation, I invoke an existential excess, an existential surplus of e/valuational formation that is capable of provoking a non-economic form of an irruption that finds me successfully moving beyond my mere passive enactment of that virtual pattern of intentional objectivity. In this transformational-transition, between the passive and active forms of intentional enactment, we can impute an alignment between emotional motivation, say, my experience of some degree of hunger or desire not to be hungry at a later period of time; the cognitive form of the motivation as an intentional objective (albeit in a virtual format); and judgmental forms of permission we might also grant to ourselves in order to actively enact this pattern of intentional behaviour. In the latter instance, we might find ourselves reviewing the prospect of stealing that apple we would like to eat. That, in overcoming that sense of a psychic impediment, we might then set about stealing that apple in order to eat it, say, in our scrumping from an orchard as we were passing it on a very long hike across the countryside, say, on a hot summer's day, after having already eaten our meagre provisions. These additional considerations, this possibility of also needing to make ethical decisions, and similar, suggests to myself that so-called existential sentiments (as transcendental emotions) must also play a considerable role in the overall motivation needed to perform this transformational-transition from its virtual enaction to the non-virtual realization of our intentions. (17)

Hence this concept of the non-economic as an irruption, or discharge of enaction, actively entered into through the economic moment of resolution, but, extending now into a non-economic sphere of consideration. So, let me ask my book reviewer, as the reading-reviewer of this solution to this conundrum, what they might think of this tentative solution, namely, that resolution can provoke a process of intentional activity that deposits a certain re-arrangement upon the surface of the world instigated through the active realization of such intent? (18)

Now, tentatively, I would like to equate the characterization of the 'existential' with this 'non-economic' irruption of e/valuational formation and rebadge the same as 'radical' as opposed to either the 'critical' or the 'non-critical'.[315] However, if this 'radical experience' were to be 'radically-radical' we would then not be equipped to understand what was meant to be understood if its intentional significance was something that could not be imparted and appropriated as such. So, taking an incremental model of appreciation, i.e., that, metaphorically, we move in a forward direction by one small step at a time, we would then need to propose our reception of the relatively-radical and not the radically-radical since the latter could not be comprehended, just as it becomes too difficult to eat if we were to take a huge mouthful of food all in one go. Or, in other words, we need to eat what is to hand in one reasonably sized bite after another and certainly not as ingested all at once. That, without a doubt, innovations are arrived at in one small step for mankind at a time.[316] (19)

---

[315] In an implicit order of the relatively non-critical (as the pre-critical), critical treatment, the advent of the event of the relatively radical and then, its re(-)appropriated re(-)contextualization, preferably through a critical form of treatment (that has already re-written the pre-critical). In effect, entertaining a higher order of transformational retreatment.

[316] Here I have supplied the innovation of 'sliced bread'. The corner shop or nearby convenience store would once slice the loaf of bread if requested. However, should the baker wish to do the same then, for a

So, the question now becomes, how do we appropriate the relatively-radical and not the radically-radical? Or, in other words, what is required is a contextualization of the event of the relatively-radical that, thereby, we could incrementally re(-)appropriate the relatively-radical nature of the unilateral re-directedness[317] of the event in question. Hopefully, I might add, in a critical manner that does reasonable justice to such departures from what could not be other than the merely conventional nature of such reiterated experiences. To answer this puzzle, I propose the 'realm of the hyper-economic' in which seemingly anomalous experiences are suitably rendered in a relatively non-anomalous format and form… (20)

Of course, such a series of solutions, albeit following an internal logical, are very good and well if merely perceived in speculative terms. So, how might we proffer a mechanism for this imputed semblance of an irruption, or eruption, of the relatively-radical that might better lend some imprint of reality to these proceedings? (21)

Here I propose the working concept of the 'de-suspension'. I.e., 'that every suspension in lived-reality is automatically and immediately de-suspended lest we find ourselves trapped in the paralysis of the suspension forever after. (22)

That the net result of such machinations is the juxtaposition of a horizontal economy of the three archetypal moments of a 'field, focus, and framing', the moment of framing also being read through a harmonic lens as the moment of resolution with a vertical economy of the economic, the non-economic and the hyper-economic sub-economies. However, in this instance treating these three economic moments, respectively, as focus, framing, and field. Noting, furthermore, that we need to circulate the interactions of the latter economy in either direction even though it is also true to say, as a metaphorical comparison, e.g., that people going to a restaurant come and go even though the management of that establishment will produce the same dishes, day after day, in keeping with their menu. I.e., that those meals are 'facts' expressed by that menu even though the specific eating of an individually ordered meal, hopefully, is a pleasant event (and does not become merely remembered as an unpleasant fact). (23)

However, in rebadging this irruption of the relatively-radical as 'existential' it should also be obvious that we have overplayed our hand so to speak. Surely, my needless stealing of an apple should not be deemed 'existential' merely because it has become an activated form of an intentionally realized pattern of enaction. So, the question now becomes, should we assume the existence of the existential dimension (primarily centered in a deontological sphere of influence and conducted without the impossible invocation

---

number of obvious reasons, they would need to wrap the bread for sale. Then those wrappings can be exercises in brand recognition. Later the government might insist on the baker informing the public as to what that loaf of sliced bread was made form, where it was made, its nutritional properties, and so on.

317 Given in the advent of the event there is no mere reiteration of directedness, from chaotic process of re-direction, then this unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment (be that redefined as 'last' in its non-existential orientation, existentially oriented 'first', or possibly next, preferably with an existential complexion) should be treated as a chaotic process of 're-direction'. Hence 'the unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment, etc.'

of so-called Principles in any form whatsoever), how are we to differentiate existentially oriented patterns of a pre-relational 'engagement' from the mere instantiation of a non-existentially oriented form of activity? Recognizing, at the same time, that these two orientations cannot be mutually exclusive given that the 'existential' is viewed as 'the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential', and v.v? (24)

Taking a page from Laruelle, and without doubt misappropriating what might be written there, let me re-define 'the active moment of intentional deposition', discharged through a moment of resolution, as a pattern of intentionally directed behaviour that could be reviewed as 'a unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment'. The unilateral aspect implying the co-option of a causal dimension (as delivered through the moments of de-suspension as explicated in my complex concept of an 'extensive suspension'). So, this question now becomes how do we differentiate such unilateralism? (25)

Given the existential process is all too often reviewed as 'ongoing' then I would like to differentiate these moments of de-suspended unilateral re-directedness as either 'of the last instance' or 'of the first instance'. 'Last' is suggestive of a reiterative moment that is merely copying what has gone before it with the ongoing loss of any existential impetus it may have originally possessed through its mere replication. On the other hand, 'first' is suggestive of a renewed chain of causal re-directions that is not merely being reiterated but rather, instead, being re-iterated in the trans-relational 'light' of current exigencies. (26)

Now, the perceptive book-reviewer, as a reading-reviewer, may well apperceive the next philosophical problem, namely, how can the existentialistically minded person continually enact an ongoing process of existentialization? E.g., as an analogy, if we were to light a fire and it is burning successfully, we do not need to keep lighting that same fire. The effective impetus of having lit that fire appears to be continuing without needing to continually foster that process of combustion. Another metaphor that appears to offer some resolution of this latest conundrum is that of the scented presence of a person wearing perfume can continue to pervade a room long after that person had passed through it.[318] Can such metaphors be of an assistance in proffering a solution here? (27)

I believe that to be the case. That this form of philosophical resolution allows us to not treat the unilateral re-directedness of the first instance as merely continuing to supply the necessary impetus in overseeing an existentially oriented pattern of pro-relational intervention and relational involvement therein. That, a pro-relational pattern of involvement is an engaged pattern of enaction that is not just active but is also mindful of the better trajectories that could be exercised in the relational enrichment of that same relationship (should our involvement be for the overall benefit of that same relationship). In this regard we could also refer to the 'unilateral re-directedness of the first instance' as also implying an 'existentially oriented unilateral re-directedness of the next instance or some other future moment' assuming the impetus already engaged, and duly enacted, suitably befits and benefits the situatedness of that relationship in question. (28)

---

318 *Pursuit*, III.12S.144.

Thence, by this dialectical set of philosophical interventions, hopefully, I have carved out a more aligned form of modelling that insightfully informs us as to what is at stake in this process of existentially oriented intervention and the ensuing engagement of our pro-relationally oriented process of interactive involvement, and so on (in order to better apperceive a representative understanding of our relevant trans-relational involvement in that same regard, etc.). (29)

2, etc. In the second set of reflections, I introduced the idea of an 'existential sentiment' (as a 'transcendental', trans-intentional emotion[319]) and continued to explore this evolving concept in later sets of these various reflections. In this regard, I particularly focused on 'optimism' and 'authenticity'.[320] (30)

In reviewing the concept of courage as an 'existential sentiment' we are somewhat forced to first see it, primarily, as an 'intersubjectively oriented experience'. Just how can we be courageous if there is no one to see 'us' being courageous both for-others and before-others? In this regard, treating all existential sentiments as intersubjectively oriented and primarily occurring in the public sphere. In many ways, this trans-location from the subjective dimension actually supplies a mechanism for the Sartrean 'look of the other' and how this perceived and apperceived discernment of others can considerably affect the trajectories of our more communally oriented behaviours. This point is well worth exploring. However, in what manner might we critique such a notion? (31)

I noted that 'stealing' is one thing but 'being seen stealing' could be a much more disconcerting experience for the thief (should they possess some semblance or remnant of a conscience or, at least, some fear of legal or more immediate retribution, etc.). In a similar vein, I noted that 'murder' is one thing but a 'murder being seen to be enacted' might well have repercussion for the audience of such a dastard deed.[321] Obviously, we can impute a certain difference or set of differences between either the commission or omission of a certain public act and its reception by part of the public when the act in question is considered to be socially questionable. (32)

However, this imputed intersubjective primacy of such existential sentiments, or their relative absence in acts that might be deemed to be relatively less authentic, to my mind is quite premature. That if we can give or abstain from giving ourselves permission, either in our permitting permissible acts and abstain from the commission of relative impermissible acts, then before 'whom' are we primarily relating? (33)

That my solution to this conundrum is to invoke a 'trans-relational sense of subjectivity' as the 'primary actor in the relational situatedness involved in a certain relationship with a certain set of relational participants'. Are we allowed to invoke this sense and semblance of subjectivity? With what reasons might we argue for this surprising turn of events? I.e., that existential sentiments (like, e.g., optimism, authenticity, courage, hones-

---

319 Defining 'transcendental' as 'trans-intentional/trans-cognitive', as an 'act of judgment'. *Pursuit,* III.12J.16.

320 E.g., respectively, *Pursuit,* III.12J/12L/12M, and, *Pursuit,* III.12k, etc.

321 *Pursuit,* III.12Q.24.

ty, devoted affection, and so on) are the primary preserve of a trans-relational subjectivity and not so much either our own private, subjective sphere of influence or the public, intersubjective sphere of influence.[322] (34)

It is a phenomenological axiom that with every intentional field there is a co-associated (economically correlative) sense and semblance of subjectivity. So, e.g., the person visually seeing is the 'person seeing'. That, similarly, thinking implies a co-associated 'thinker', and so on. Therefore, it stands to reason, on an appreciation of intentional grounds, that if we can experience a trans-relational subjectivity, we must be experiencing intentional content of a trans-relational nature and with a corresponding trans-relational status, and v.v. Can we account for this trans-relationally oriented intentional content? And, by extension, that that type of judgment can also be entered into both trans-intentionally and non-economically? I believe so. If we can appreciate the simulated existence of relationships, and we can, then it follows that we must also have a sense of subjectivity in keeping with the nature of that type of intentional (and trans-intentional) field. I.e., the simulation of the trans-relational orientation demands this same trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity (without mistreating any form of subjectivity to a reification of either its form or format). (35)

By extension we could also amalgamate this trans-relational subjectivity with the co-associated senses of subjectivity to be imputed in our (metaphysical-like) recognition, etc., of the (intentionally) objective, interobjective (like space and time, etc.), and intersubjectivity itself. That, therefore, we possess not only a private sense of subjectivity, but, also, a public sense of intersubjectivity as well. Adding to this enriched sense and semblance of a trans-relational subjectivity its co-association with the dimension of arbitration in which we more closely expedite all manner of freedoms impelling me to also impute the experience of an arbitrated experience which could also be designated as supplying an existential sense of subjectivity (given my closer association of the existential with this dimension of arbitration). Such arguments granted, is it the case, therefore, that we can now impute the experiential existence of a potentially enriched, existential sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity? Such considerations understood, what ramifications might follow from this relative-radical re-interpretation of our multi-various forms of subjectivity within a relatively integrated, overall range of subjectively oriented experiences? (36)

One ramification, I would like to seriously consider, is that just as existential sentiments appear to be refracted through our (trans-)relationally represented experience might it not be the case that we only have just one type of existential experience, albeit both with varying intensities and as cognitively refracted through the apparent conventional variety of our representative simulations of our relationships? So, therefore, why invoke a near-endless plethora of existential sentiments when we could invoke just one format, albeit with many formations as refracted through the specific exigencies of the

[322] Arguing a little later on that these existential sentiments are actually 'one overall sense and semblance of a transcendental emotion', albeit as cognitively refracted through our representative understanding of the relationship in question, preferably enacted, of course, in an existentially oriented form of appreciation.

situation in question. So, e.g., in a situation calling for courage, we could ask ourselves, 'could I and should I consider myself being courageous', given such circumstances apparently calling for this conventional type of response, acting, of course, in 'consultation' with this existentially oriented sense and semblance of this seeking, as an imperative, for an enriched trans-relational subjectivity? Hoping, at the same time, on one hand, that I do my duty or fulfill all relevant obligations, etc., and, on the other hand, that by permitting myself to be 'courageous' I will not come to some form of harm or meet with some fatal conclusion to the enaction of such patterns of deontologically driven 'responsibleness'? But, having implicitly deferred to such trans-relational subjectivity, and now explicitly exercising that option, how otherwise are we to view all forms of public engagement as not also being exercised in the apparent novelty of such a dimension? Or, did our intuitions have this type of intuitive understanding already before us, albeit in a rather inchoate form masquerading as the performance of our responsibilities, and, as well, somewhat enforced, either rightly or wrongly, by various social strategies and mechanisms, and so on? (37)

That, in deference to 'the trans-relationally subjective' should we now rebadge such an ethics as not so much as a 'relational ethics' but, rather, as a 'trans-relational ethics'? (38)

Now, admittedly, under the relatively calm surface of these reflections, for how else could we view what might be reflected, say, in the waters of a pond or river, we will find, however, an assortment of arguments that might not be so seemingly relaxed and settled. Continuing this sort of 'do it yourself style' of a book review, where we I ask of the reading-reviewer how that might resolve the various anomalies and conundrums that provoke these somewhat more turbulent forms of argumentation, let me address some further potentially disturbing issues floating under the surface so to speak. (39)

2. In seeking to thematize the imputed nature of the Contemporary era, as the next era occurring after the Postmodern, what observations and arguments are being utilized in order to promote this evolving thematization of such an understanding? (40)

'Eras' can be defined in terms of either a changed emphasis in style (say the linear reaction of the Art Deco to the hitherto inescapable curves of the Art Nouveau) **and/or as either a discontinuity or as an innovative non-continuity in philosophical style** (say, between the Modern and the Postmodern). (41)

That, although shifts in stylistic habits might differentiate one period in time from another, why we use such selective differentiations should be clearly noted. (42)

Although it is true 'that there is nothing new under the sun' still the advent of the stylistic innovations of forerunners has such innovators remaining as only 'forerunners' should such innovative trajectories not be further advanced by other artists, etc., in that same culture or in a similar allied culture. On the other hand, the incrementally taking up of such innovations should eventually reach a chaotic

point of some relatively non-obstructed uptake whose re-occurring distinctly differential descriptions would then be indicative of that transformational-transition to a new epoch. (43)

But in the advent of a new epoch, delineating such features is difficult task for a number of reasons. (44)

One set of features I have chosen, that to my mind I can envisage as characteristic of the Contemporary era, is to invoke certain conceptual understandings around the topic of either the hyper-real and/or meta-modern. I.e., entertaining either oscillations between and/or blurrings of real and surreal interpretations of lived-reality along with the intensive re-investment in certain existential sentiments that are now heavily qualified through a more Contemporary lens (rather than the seemingly unqualified Modernistic lens or the potential denigration of a Postmodernistic lens)… (45)

Innovations that might have once been reviewed as forerunners, or outliers, or as gimmicks will now take a more central stage. The incremental reiteration of such events having either intended, mis-intended, and/or unintended consequences, etc. (46)

In getting used to such strategies that, effectively, are somewhat behaving as contra-traditional narratives or as non-traditional styles in narration, they are then more than likely to come to the fore in such a scenario… and, generally, over time, be found less annoying… as more and more, artists, etc., take up such prominent innovations; and when the public become receptive to these apparent disruptions in narrative, style, content, the potential for re-messaging, etc. (47)

But, although difficult to see at first, once seen, they may well then be seen everywhere... although not necessarily at the expense of the persistence of previous genres even though our perception of the latter may well be altered. (48)

3. 'Authenticity' is once more reviewed. **But, it is not who we are now, but, more what we can become in the 'here and now' (*hic et nunc*) that better augments and enhances the implementation of this existential sense of identification.** (49)

That the metaphorical 'door' for such an existentially oriented transformational-transition is the use of suspensions, or, more correctly, in the forceful consequences imparted through de-suspensions. (50)

Unfortunately, or fortunately for others, we cannot be perfect, cannot be perfectly-perfected, and ultimately, we are doomed to fail. **Therefore, failure must be part of what being authentic entails! But, despite this qualification, this should not stop us from striving to instigate and instantiate an existential re(-)orientation through a pro-relational perspective on our trans-relational subjectivity, etc.** (51)

The primary purpose of the existential re(-)orientation is to better augment and enhance[323] our more important relationships, etc., in positive, differential terms. I.e., follow through on those strategies and processes that create, preserve, and conserve relational richness and enrichment in e/valuational formations. (52)

4. Optimism, as an example of an existential sentiment is then explored. (53)

The argument is also made that in motivation we need the aligned confluence of affective emotions, etc; cognitively oriented intentional directedness; and, trans-intentional re-directedness plus existential sentiment preferably supporting the overall intent of such relatively integrated motivation. (54)

5. Now, the next set of reflections reviews the necessary viability of a positive nihilism versus the unviability of a negative nihilism (when either defective unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical and/or relativistical positions are misguidedly exercised as if both non-defective in construction and validly ascertained in their truth determination). (55)

Basically, to treat imputation as non-imputatively constructed and utilized is to invite a negative nihilism, when and where all else must be positively promoted! (56)

That, without such impossible metaphysical-like categories of thinking being superimposed upon all imputations we then have a viable basis with which to work with, albeit as a provisional work in progress that also exemplifies that residual, positive form of nihilism. (57)

6. So-called 'transcendental suspensions' are first explored historically, and then philosophically, in the process, travelling far beyond their Husserlian origins. (58)

The complex argument is constructed that 'suspensions' need to be economically treated as 'extensive suspensions' in order to take into account, first, the interrogative economy (as exemplifying an economy *qua* economy); second, the overlooked role of the de-suspension; and, third, the need to causally align the virtual with the non-virtual, and v.v. (in order to account for the intentional appreciation of enacted patterns of involvement and perception, etc.). (59)

7. In a *Review*, as stated, ten themes are looked at both individually and, when and where relevant, collectively. Those ten themes being: why reflection and visual metaphors have such a bad press; the centrality of the suspension, etc., in all forms of reflection, etc; entering the suspension, etc; the economic *versus* non-economic dialectic; the de-suspensional economy; accounting for a causal implication; reduplication (where the *x*

---

[323] Incremental, non-chaotic augmentation *versus* non-incremental, chaotically oriented enhancement where both processes must work together and take a 'positive' complexion through 'promoting suitable forms of relational richness and enrichment'.

of *x* is non-*x*, etc.); the characteristic nature of the Contemporary; existential sentiments; and, the integration of this topic through suspensions, etc.[324] (60)

8. It was noted that if we should change our minds then we should change our minds… But, for some people, that is very difficult. Especially for those who have over-invested themselves ideologically in defective philosophical positions, in conspiratorial thinking, and in all other forms of either epistemological and/or ontological over-commitment/s. (61)

In effect, exhibiting either pseudo-psychotic or psychotic thinking. (62)

Because a philosophical style of argumentative interaction is almost always counter-productive, if not a recipe for possible violence, another approach is suggested, namely, 'walking in the opposite direction'. **I.e., honestly engaging in an auto-narration where it is to be hope the ideologically over-committed party (or under-committed party as a relativist) can through the self-perception of a process of consequential analysis come to eventually view, in their own time, what is defective as 'defective' and what is non-defective as 'non-defective', etc.** (63)

The underlying presupposition are that people can change their minds; that conducting a non-judgmental process of consequential analysis might eventually provoke forms of insightfulness; that insight is never entirely absent, just relatively disconnected and not focused on for whatever reason or reasons… (64)

9. The philosophical problem here, of my own making is 'that a phenomenological approach to the nature of the intentional objectivity to hand is counter to the ascertainment of intentional subjectivity. I.e., that focusing on the archetypal moment of the Object we cannot focus on the archetypal moment of Ego. But such a position through phenomenal-phenomenological analysis, is shown to be false! That with every intentional orientation we obviously have the necessary co-association of a corresponding sense of intentional subjectivity. (65)

Now, it could be successfully argued that the reading of the so-called 'first moment' (textual deposition) enacted through reduction or analysis is to be realized through either the advertent and/or inadvertent suspension of the second and third moments with an automatically ensuing de-suspensional focus on this first moment of analytical-like focus upon the text along with its intentional presentation as a 'textual deposition'.[325] (66)

---

[324] By 'etc.', is meant 'the taking into account the economy or economies in question through the overall transcendental suspension (as exemplified by the gestalt economy, the interrogative economy, etc; the de-suspensional economy; and, its causal implication in non-virtual processes through the auspices of the non-economic and the hyper-economic (sub-)economies, etc.

[325] The linear ordering of this reading is that of textual deposition. In a harmonic reading, in the simulation of the non-textual, we invoke a first moment of the hermeneutical as meta-textual in orientation, followed by the phenomenological moment of textual deposition... which then brings us to the so-called third moment of the non-textual.

10. The hermeneutics of intersubjectivity is basically straightforward for the very reason that **the meta-textual nature of hermeneutical prescriptions is primarily inter-subjective in orientation** given its recognition of conventionally oriented functions in the formation of genres of behaviour that both write and read distinctive pattern of both social and individual performance. (67)

Now, it could be successfully argued that the reading of the so-called 'second moment' of functional reconstitution or synthesis is to be realized through either the advertent and/or inadvertent suspension of the first and third moments with an automatically ensuing de-suspensional focus on this second moment of synthesis along with its active, functional, meta-textual articulation of genres of behaviour. (68)

11. Once again, a positive nihilism is approached, however, this time, more from an existential orientation as centered in the formation of the 'event'. (69)

For a variety of reasons events and facts are both contrasted and interrelated. (70)

That, now we can account for the two flavours of the existential, namely as nominated, the 'non-systematic' and the 'systematic', being, respectively, economic with an emphasis on the third moment of resolution, and, the overall economy of the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic as mediated by the non-economic. (71)

Constructing arguments in accordance with the guidelines of eight headings, namely, representationalism (of what is to hand); suspension (and then an anti-representationalistic overlay of the former); circumscription; resolution; methodologies; objectives; possibilities, and impossibilities. (72)

Events are seen as profoundly central to experience, whereas, facts are seen as born through events but only reconstituted superficially in their transformational-transitions. (73)

Now, it could be successfully argued that the reading of the so-called 'third moment' of resolution is to be realized through either the advertent and/or inadvertent suspension of the first two moments with an automatically ensuing de-suspensional focus on this third moment of resolution along with its non-economic causal implication through the non-economic orientation. (74)

12. The distinctive existence of the secular dimension is contrasted with the realm of disciplinary interventions (whilst not forgetting its implicit secular-religious contrast). (75)

That trans-relational subjectivity cannot be reduced to mere subjectivity nor mere intersubjectivity nor just trans-relational subjectivity given its equal implication also in objectivity (through embodiment/s), interobjectivity (embankment/s), intersubjectivity

(embeddedness.es) (and that the open [non-closed] possibility of a religious dimension is also not rule out). (76)

That, despite the overlapping manipulations in the disciplinary interpretations of the secular, the secular world cannot be reduced to its mere aggregation in this same regard. (77)

In an appreciation of both motivation and our ability to supply a causal dimension to our virtually oriented representative simulations, regardless, e.g., of whether we are having an imagined coffee in some distant cafe** or merely starring at an apple and thinking about eating it,[326] what considerations might we note philosophically?[327] (78)

That the necessary 'weightiness' of our effective motivation needs to be fleshed out in affective, cognitive, and trans-cognitive terms of reference in order to instigate a transformational-transition from the relatively virtual to the relatively non-virtual. (79)

Relatively virtual because even the virtual involves the activity of brain chemistry, neuron activity, and so on. (80)

Hence the trans-intentional concept of 'permission' (enacted by a subjective sense of self). (81)

Included in this concept is the idea of 'existential sentiments' not be confused with affective emotions. (82)

Like, e.g., optimism, honesty, truthfulness, integrity, heartfelt devotion, faithfulness, integrity, courage, and so on... (83)

As articulated by individual cultures and accorded certain characteristic forms of preferencing or de-preferencing. So, e.g., a warrior culture would preference courage, disciplined behaviour, group solidarity, etc. (84)

Negative existential sentiments being arrived at through privation, i.e., through the relative absence of a certain expected existential sentiment. Just as, 'dishonesty', e.g., is expressed as dis-honesty', as an absence of honesty. (85)

Now, on closer observation, one might conclude that existential sentiments are relatively intersubjective in their apparent orientation. Just as it is difficult to imagine a courageous act being performed without an audience? However, such an intuitive idea is countermanded by recognizing that we can be honest with ourselves as well as being dishonest. (86)

---

[326] Imagining ourselves elsewhere is more virtual in orientation than our merely starring at an apple and thinking about eating it where only 'the thinking about our eating it', correctly, is virtual in this instance at the moment or period in time.

[327] Paragraphs 78-89 attempt to sum up the complex arguments raised over this set of twelve series of reflections as discussed more definitively in the the twelfth series of reflections. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.12T.29, 64-83, etc.

But self-honesty, or being dishonest, through the relative absence of honesty, cannot be a merely subjective experience for how could we tell the relative instantiation or relative absence of such a trans-intentional judgment, as an existentially oriented virtue, if we were being merely subjectively honest or dishonest with ourselves (as a possible contradiction in terms?)? (87)

Hence the necessary invocation of a relative sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity[328] **in which we can pro-relationally identify with our relationships in their apparent relational situatedness. Hence the evolution of our understanding that existential sentiments arise in an economy that is trans-relational that is also both subjective and intersubjective in orientation!** (88)

But, if this refinement in positioning is granted, then it could follow that the intensity of the existential sentiment reflects the facticity of that simulated relationship in question; that this plethora of sentiments could be reduced to just this degree of relational facticity, reflecting the qualified ongoing resolution of that relationship, albeit as culturally refracted through a cognitive form of framing calling forth for that type of expectation. Furthermore, this weak thesis of one existential intensity reflected through a multiplicity of cultural forms of expression is not necessary to the running of this argument, namely, that existential sentiments can permit or inhibit co-associated patterns of non-virtual activity (as the necessary third factor in the requisite 'weighting' of our overall e-motional motivation)'. (89)

That all disciplines have their unification upon either an ordered basis, such as, e.g., the phenomenological preoccupations of the semantic researcher within both the first trans-cognitive and cognitive orders, or, the scientist whose preoccupations are the result of an inter-ordered symmetrical reduplication of both the fifth trans-cognitive and cognitive order, i.e., through entertaining 'the possibility of possibilities' the world of science is duly explicated, etc.[329] (90)

Where, 'philosophy' is defined as 'the working interaction between the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenological; the fifth trans-cognitive order of the hermeneutical; and, the third trans-cognitive order of the existential (as pragmatically centered, primarily, in deontological forms of e/valuational formation non-exclusively inseparable from its aesthetical and pragmatical adjuncts). (91)

---

328 Just as we have a co-associated sense of a visual perceiver in an act of visual perception, a thinker in an act of thinking, etc., along the same lines we can invoke a co-associated form of trans-intentional subjectivity in tune with pro-relational thinking. 'Trans-relational' being 'trans-relational to the mere 'cataloguing' of relational parts and participants, etc.'

329 Similarly, the discipline of the historian can be treated as arising through the symmetrical reduplication of both the sixth trans-cognitive and cognitive orders. Whereas the discipline of the historian of science could be treated as the inter-ordered asymmetrical reduplication of the duplications of the sixth order and the fifth order, respectively, as integrated in their non-communicative, associative sense of a linear ordering.

Where, through the non-economic, the philosopher, as a non-philosopher, sets out like all earnest disciplinarians acting within viable disciplines, to serve all secularists through the differential articulation of enriched forms of truth determination along with all ensuing patterns of existential richness and enrichment. **Hence the experiential importance of this existential test, namely, the discernment of a positive differential enrichment of the relationship in question (along with its corresponding enrichment of its co-associated sense and semblance of trans-relational subjectivity, etc.)!** (92)

Establishing positive forms of e/valuational formation through suitable forms of suspension. Where extensive suspensions, etc., are both the 'door' and 'exit' to this imputation and experience of an existential dimension… (93)

Revealing through facts the nature of events, and, through the nature of facts the experience of events... and hence this distinction and the implied importance of the 'event' as our metaphysical-like 'portal' to the trans-relational supervision of an existentialization of relatively non-existential experience through the automatic invocation of de-suspensions, the non-economic, hyper-economic re(-)contextualization, the duly observed, productive harmonization of interactive processes, etc.. (94)

Thence our ability to pursue the ensuing existential fruitfulness of all our primary relationships... through the auspices of extensive suspensions, its ensuing de-suspensions, their non-economic transmutation of the relatively non-virtual through engineering positive, transformational-transitions in the causal dimension of experience, etc. (95)

Augmenting and enhancing our experience of freedom through arbitration... where all freedoms practically fall within the sphere of existential arbitration as non-economically expedited… (96)

But, in answering the refrain, 'show me the evidence', how should I reply?[330] (97)

Yes, by all means work with what is established as 'evidential'! But, recognize that the quality of our arguments assists us in this task, and, therefore, the strategies we adopt and adapt can only be referred to indirectly as assisting us in this evidence-gathering, assessment and their overall appreciation whilst being conducted within and refracted through the exposition/s of our narratives to the extent, comparatively, that they can be made to make 'a better sense of this world as lived...' (98)

Dialectically recognizing that 'economies have contexts' (such as, e.g., the hyper-economic, etc.) and that even 'contexts can and should be re-contextually situated when and where relevant, or thought necessary, in and through either an apposite series and/or set/s of such undertakings. (99)

Where, through the suspension of our reflections we recognize, encounter, and engage trans-relational subjectivity, etc., as realized through the non-economic unilateral re-directedness of our inescapable shaping of our existential interventions. Because inter-

330 Echoing the refrain 'show me the money!"

vention is impossible to escape regardless of whether enaction is passive, active or engaged, or, whether entertained through activity, non-activity, or the inactivity of either postponement or permanent deferral. Thence the manner of our being in this world at large, this overall world-of-life, be that with(-)others, before(-)others, or engaged through(-)others..[331] **Ultimately deconstructing all forms of a negative nihilism, and, re(-)constructing the residue of a positive nihilism..!!**[332] (100)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 19.9.23.

A Reply to the Criticisms Raised Concerning Certain Themes in these Reflections

As for my asked for 'rebuttal', I dare not start... I said, 'I had a hedge to cut'. But, that hedge has not yet been trimmed, and can wait a few more days... (101)

So, why reanimate the corpse of a dead metaphysics? Should this middle path of a conservative-radicalism, or radical-conservatism, just drop the conservatism and get on with the pragmatic business of being radical..? Well, what is impossible cannot be reanimated like the impossible 'resurrection' of a disembodied ghost or spectre. On the other hand, what has never died can be resuscitated..! (102)

But, you should also know that a clean break is impossible since we forever have to work with what is to hand. We can only start with our 'prejudices' as 'prejudgments' and then proceed.[333] Of course, how we do that will be judged, hopefully through well-informed forms of consensus, to have been conducted in either a non-critical and a non-radical mode, or in a critical fashion, or even in a radical attitude… where we must understand that the sphere of the innovative can only be approached through small incremental steps and, therein and thereafter, appreciated in and through such small increments. (103)

I have recently argued that philosophers are even worse than physicists and that ninety-nine percent of philosophy, as currently practised, is bankrupt, performed in an impossible manner, as little more than sophisticated nonsense with little insight enacted by either the performers or their mesmerized audiences... but, that does not mean I will dismiss philosophy as completely worthless... but will take from it what I believe works and go from there, indeed, demonstrate the very definition of being 'pragmatic'... (104)

Practically no disciplinarians have any idea of how beholden we are to 'economic' constraints (where we must forgo all impossible forms of either a uni-modalism or bi-modalism, and so on) ... let alone ideas of the non-economic (and its unilateral re-

---

331 In the sub-economy of ourselves being with(-)others we entertain a passive involvement in this world at large. Whereas our involvement before(-)others is relatively active, and, existentially engaged in the ensuing freedom/s to be found only through(-)others from a trans-relational sense of perspective.

332 This final observation, to be observed by the philosopher, optimistically earmarking their primary contribution as a 'gift' or 'promise' to the secular world. In effect, defining a 'pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism'.

333 As per both Edmund Husserl and Georg Gadamer. Of course, that does not mean we have to stick with those pre-judged issues in the same manner of their presentation/representation.

directedness) where we can escape endless circulations of value that go nowhere...or even the necessity of the hyper-economic sphere of a contextual re(-)appropriation where we attempt to make sense of the relatively-radical and never the radically-radical. Because making sense of the latter is like stuffing our mouths so full that we can neither chew, let alone swallow nor digest, what has been over-appropriated… (105)

That at the centre of this type of philosophical prospect, with its shorter-term projects and longer-term programs, is my very broad concept of the suspension (somewhat like the role played by the Buddhist concept of 'emptiness'[334])... where business cannot be how the other ninety-nine percent unwittingly misconduct their affairs, unfortunately, all too often, on our behalf. (106)

Where the de-suspension impels us back to a lived-landscape that is not 'flat' (as is relativistically flattened within the exercise of the suspension) (and turning around an idea in cosmology... at least pointing out that the 'local' is not 'flat). That, in effect, the unwound, unwinding force of the 'de-suspension' can take us to places that are still non-critical and not radical as well as places that are quite critical, if not radical, in both tenor and temper. (107)

The truism that 'experience is constituted by us' need not be taken beyond the limitations of that context (into the defective realm of some form of idealistically contrived ideologically nonsense) just as a hot cup of tea just made will not let me drink it until it has cooled! So, yes, this presentation and representation is consciously constituted and constructed by me, but, this experience is also re-presented by the specificity of that experience as experienced in my ongoing relational partnership with that same hot cup of tea... (108)

In this *Book* 8 I am continually addressing these points of criticism. E.g., the need to resuscitate a positive, existential metaphysics; that visual metaphors, when useful, can be adopted and adapted to the philosophical and pragmatic points being made; that the metaphorical is an essential moment in the economics of any economy from the asking of a simple question to the comparing of one form of resolution with some other solution... (109)

---

[334] E.g., in the field of studies dealing with the Yogacara and its reiterated transmissions to China I am sure the monk Xuanzang was perfectly cognizant with the work of Asanga and Vasubandhu (through commentators like Sthiramati, and others) but elected to head in an 'idealistic; direction of the Tathagata-garbha and its innovation because such efforts and modes of expressions were still suspended by the underlying force of the concept of 'emptiness'. So, even idealistic metaphors are 'empty' and with the reception of living-experience as devoid of negative forms of superimposed imputations it could all be deemed to be 'pure, and uncontaminated' by 'the proliferations of thought' without having to reify such metaphors along substantialistic lines. In effect, blunting the misdirected criticisms of such religious innovations by both the Madhyamaka and exponents of earlier forms of Yogacara practice. The point of this aside being to note that the role of metaphor has a crucial part to play in the meaningful formation of any form of discourse and cannot be dismissed and dispensed with, but, needs to be respectfully treated in such a manner where those metaphorical 'images' are not read beyond the terms and conditions of their rightful, but circumscribed, employment.

Visual metaphors deserve to be pragmatically rehabilitated... because one third of the economic, refracted, say, through an economy of interrogation, must use the metaphorical... and there can be no philosophy, and anything else, without asking questions. (110)

Hence, I confess, my provocative title re ‘reflections on reflections...' (111)

The title of the seventh set has this in mind when its title is: *Review*: *On Reflection... An Overview*. (112)

Thoughtfully ask yourself, ‘to what extent does an extreme form of ideological positioning actually contribute to your philosophical or metaphysical research, actually contribute to the pursuit of your discipline, or how you proceed through the secular world in our fruitful and productive relations with others? Honestly, it says more about yourself and how you wish to distort your sense of perspective in order to enshrine your own set of personal preferences. Of course, we must start somewhere, but, doing so through the auspices of the extensive suspension. That, we should not expect to end up where we started. The existential richness of lived-reality should be welcomed regardless of whether it confirms our ways of seeing the world or instructs us to see it anew, with fresh eyes. Just as, I am sure, in the immediate exigency of needing to make an urgent moral decision we do not have the time to consult some sophisticated list of so-called First Principles, or Last Principles, or Middling Principles... or any other form of *a priori* rulings… (113)

Then, once we have removed such non-subtle prejudices we can move on to deal with the fruitful machinations of more subtle ones... that allow us to experience ordered phenomena, and from there, inter-order phenomena, and thence to their more systematic couplings in the form of systems along with their intra-inter-order interactions and extra-inter-ordered relationships...[335] (114)

Of course, in re-investing in a positive metaphysics we cannot return to the way things were once done when that tradition, on balance, is so ably demonstrated to have been both deficiently and defectively expedited. But, yes, it does behoove me to demonstrate why, after fifty years, I now feel the need to resuscitate metaphysics, rehabilitate this discipline, namely, come to value the articulation of an existentially-oriented world of value-formation sorely lacking in a polarised world either falling back on old ways or revelling in the destruction of what remains that, pragmatically, is still working... (115)

Put a negative nihilism together with a positive nihilism and you get the motto 'deconstruct the negative and re(-)construct the positive’. Or de-substitute 're(-)construct' with 'engage' in order to contrast it with either passive or active forms of response that are not so cognizant of a pro-relational, trans-relational attitude and approach to our relationships. ‘Pro-relational’ to the extent that ‘the relationship should be preferenced beyond the mere listing of its relational participants and parts (given, existentially, that the rela-

[335] Along with an exploration of this systematic differences, meta-differences, and non-differences, etc.

tional is greater than the mere sum of its participants and parts)'.[336] 'Trans-relational' in the sense that 'in relation to our relational experiences we automatically also experience a trans-relational sense of subjectivity reflecting just that form of intentional and trans-intentional engagement in this world at large.[337] (116)

I would like to respectfully suggest that my 'broad use of the suspension' (under the appellation of the 'extensive suspension') is quite radical, certainly, traveling far beyond its use as articulated by Husserl. In the sixth set of reflections I first attempt to understand its utilization by invoking a bi-modal reading, or, rather, a parallel reading-counter reading of how it might be first performed, somewhat along the lines envisaged by Husserl. For whatever intentional content or functions that is being proposed imagine either the contra-reading of such intentional content and/or the counter-reading of such intentional functions. One way of doing this is by being skeptical, or by just asking a question and immediately putting the enquestioned into the form of a dis-conjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'. (117)

However, Husserl is seemingly thematizing the idea of the 'transcendental suspension' as if it were distinctively apart from the analytical nature of the reduction and, so it seems, there is a trajectory here that is next heading towards the invocation of some form of synthesis, and reconstitution, which then would complete a more dynamic, tri-modal, economic approach to the nature of the suspension... which I then run with. (118)

But, this path is neither smooth nor just circular (although the hyper-economic can be envisaged as returning the non-economic unilateral re-directedness of the ensuing moment back within the inevitable embrace of the hyper-economic through a process of re(-)contextualization entertained through a form of economic re(-)appropriation). First, I propose the automatic and immediate invocation of the de-suspension as a force that removes us form being trapped within the suspension. That force is, or can be, 'non-economic' in orientation, alluding to ideas explored by François Laurelle.[338] (119)

Then, I use this same set of ideas to argue that the de-suspension can take us from the virtual nature of intentional thought to the non-virtual nature of intent along with its ensuing causal implications. But, then the philosophical problem for me, and hopefully my audience or reader, is to then ask, 'how can an existentialization of such seemingly non-existential activity be achieved?' The tentative solution I propose being, 'that if the hyper-economy of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic were to be exercised in a dynamically balanced manner that this transformation, or transmutation, of ordinary behaviour could take its place on the stage of human endeavour in an extraordi-

---

336 I.e., that our treatment of relationships *qua* relationships cannot be just reductively entertained. That even their qualified reductive analysis needs to be re(-)contextualized from an emergent perspective.

337 Thereby giving us the subjective means to engage the relational *qua* relational from that trans-relational sense of perspective.

338 The non-systematic moment of the existential is essentially a form of resolution which could just pertain to that circulation within the economy in question without necessarily irrupting beyond the confines of that economy in the form of a non-economic, causally implicated expression of a non-virtual sense and semblance of resolution reflecting the current exigencies of that relationship under such focus. The difference between 'staring at an apple' and then 'reaching out to eat it'.

nary manner in a form both able and capable of enriching the e/valuational formation of our relationships in question'. (120)

But, why propose this additional complication of the 'hyper-economic'? In order to comprehend the impetus of the non-economic - be it non-critical and non-radical in tenor or critical, if not radical, in complexion. In other words, its philosophical and metaphysical 'work' is to explicate how an existential pattern of responses in being enacted either is or is not more in keeping with the understood richness and potential enrichment of the relational nature of the situatedness being placed under the simulation of such scrutiny. (121)

That with the continual invocation of the extensive suspension we can successfully resuscitate a positive, existentially engaged, pragmatically disposed metaphysics that is anti-representational both in spirit and in practice within this inter-ordered domain of 'the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical landscape', albeit as exercised in a 'positive manner' through a rejection of 'all defective, impossible forms of ideological nonsense masquerading as a respectable discipline' when suitably performed by the insightfully 'prescient' philosopher... (122)

Interestingly, this rehabilitation, or resuscitation, of a positive metaphysics might be better thought of as 'post-metaphysical' or as a 'weak metaphysics' (as refracted, e.g., through the work of the radical theologian John D. Caputo[339]). Then, we could ask, 'just what do or should positive metaphysicians talk about among themselves?' Everything, and much more, indeed, all that which a traditional metaphysician might wish to deal with. However, now no longer conducted through impossible lenses and, instead, through more humble glasses that allow us to take a more useful, pragmatic view of what is to be found to hand especially that found in the world of our relationships. Be that under the rubric of our embodiment, our embeddedness in both a secular and disciplinary sense of world along with our embankment in this world at large but not necessarily excluding, for those of a religious persuasion, some form of a theology or spirituality, be that either traditional and/or radical in tenor.[340] Of course, the rules have changed, things will be done differently, extensive suspensions will be *de rigueur*, outcomes cannot be but different, perhaps in subtle details and at other times in non-subtle ways especially in the advent of those events characterized as either chaotic moments of re-direction or in those occasions where and when we have to witness the disruptions of radical shifts in paradigm be they political or otherwise. Moreover, approaches will be both pro-relational and trans-relational in orientation, i.e., existential in theory, in practice and as a critique, with critiques being both critically-radical and radically-critical as well as ruling along more traditional lines, which, I well suspect, would take up much more of our time. Once again topics like space and time, identity, personhood, truth determination, moral considerations, existential sentiments, the existential consequences of our relatively existential and

339 Both suggestions are welcomed. E.g., John D. Caputo: *The Weakness of God*: *A Theology of the Event;* Indiana University Press, 2006.

340 Here, I am neither arguing for nor against religious readings of this type of open and continually suspended positioning (akin to the observational fact that existential approaches are both adopted and adapted by both the religious and non-religious alike).

relatively non-existential interventions will need to be re-explored, albeit through a positive lens where we are now no longer beholden to the polarizing consequences of extremist forms of defective ideological nonsense exerting unhealthy forms of disciplinary hegemony over vast sectors of society... and, where, at long last, we can let things metaphorically 'speak for themselves', letting our relationships, themselves, unfold in ways that extensively and expansively enrich us both individually and collectively. If truth be told, allow us to think thoughts that had not been thought before in ways that might amaze us given our audacity to think what once would have been impossible... (123)

Once the idea of 'inter-ordered phenomena' is understood this phenomenal-phenomenological way of seeing the word will be seen everywhere. Almost as a theme with memetic power to imprint upon us just how that system of thinking appears to work. No discipline is an absolute island and certain disciplines will be organized (and both non-chaotically self-organized and chaotically re-self-organized) within various systems, such as, e.g., the rarefied realm of academia, the political-economy, the legal fraternity, the more secular spheres of entertainment, the various worlds of social media, and so on. Then, it is but a short step to further proceed and recognize inter-ordered systems each with their intra-(inter-)ordered and extra-(inter-)ordered modes of interaction... on occasions forming forms of accommodation and at other times forming modes of dissolution, and so on and so forth. Operating with their own 'codes' as disseminated meta-textually within their distinctive genres of behaviour... all undergoing their own forms of an evolvement whilst being subjected to negative forms of institutionalization, proliferation of routines and rituals, endless other distractions through both necessary and unnecessary forms of meta-work, along with modes of digression that will attempt to override both forms of personal responsibility and the social accountability of organizations, etc. However, such inauthenticity of being needs to be both addressed and redressed and, here, the positively philosophical metaphysician has an important role to reflect upon the way things are and, increment by increment, step by step, person by person, disseminate a clarity of re-positioning as a clarion call to be heard by those who need to hear, and, who, hopefully, have the ears to hear... and a voice that will also, in time, be timely heard.!! (124)

But let me leave such details to scrutinize in the next book, *Book* 9, where inter-ordered phenomena will be explored; where a possible, complex, positive metaphysics could be resuscitated; and, where such inter-ordered systems of social interaction can also be better understood from an existential sense of perspective... (125)

I hate cutting hedges but have ended up with two... and one is running faster than I can walk... so reality calls. Although once cut, such handiwork once again can be either enjoyed or forgotten. I am hoping that this simple set of replies suitably defuses these demands for either a more traditional style of resolution or a less traditional, radical approach to such concerns, and, in the process, render this overall prospect a lot less controversial than my somewhat ironic portrayal that downplays this topic of the post-metaphysical as standing outside the relatively controversial...?[341] (126) N.T., 9.10.23.

[341] Which, I confess, is where I am being very controversial. That a metaphysical enquiry, once understood as occupying a complex, inter-ordered 'space, as both meta-philosophical and non-philosophical

in tenor, and as standing self-evidently there before us, without a doubt is an approach*h that must invite endless debate where, as an optimist, I must hope that through a more 'engaged' process, utilizing extensive suspensions, there will be found more 'light than heat'. Unfortunately, consensus cannot be instantaneously arrived at, or, hopefully, not so unreflectively realized. It is a truism to say 'we observe the world' and it is my hope that we can observe 'both an existential need and a place for the metaphysical discipline in the positive (and weak) form' as intimated. In defense, let me state that all this is just a heuristic device and the pragmatist merely has to appreciate whether it works or not, and whether it works better than some other philosophical or disciplinary perspective, or a more systematic set of such inter-ordered perspectives...