On Conjectures:

The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures:
A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution
To Truth Determination

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark…
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts…
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness….

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Foreword

In the writing of *Book* 9, towards the end of those essays, the theme of 'conjectures' came to the fore and although given some space, there, to explore, a continuation of this exploration has spilt over into the formation of these essays.[1] (i)

The concept of 'conjectures' has appeared as if a versatile piece of one puzzle that is also capable of slotting into a number of other problematic scenarios that, both collectively and progressively, enrich an evolving understanding of this specific topic. E.g., decades ago, in working on my thesis, in both versions, I reworked a bimodal hermeneutic circle into a trimodal economic format (thereafter referred to by myself as 'the hermeneutic circle of comprehension'). But, with the so-called third moment, as a third economic correlative, I was only able to post it under the open rubric of 'whole/s-and-parts' without being able to do much more with that concept (other than equate it with an 'overall transcendental suspension' also trimodally constituted). Now, years later, I would treat it as 'operating under a conjectural light', as 'operating through the dynamic form of propositional-statements that, when initiated, through questioning, automatically trace out the thematization of a series of trajectories where definitive decisions are narrowed down to perhaps just the outline of which path would most likely be taken up in the provisional exercise of a definitive-like process of truth determination'. (ii)

That, despite the bad press such a concept has accumulated over time, rather than proffering a generalization of the state of play, instead, a process of specification is entered into that can also open up an existential dimension. Basically, we can perceive conjectures as 'mediating' both analytical propositions and synthetical statements through an emergent suspension of the latter without being able to be reduced to the former. That, then, in the 'suspension' of all three economic correlativities, namely, of the analytical, the synthetical, and the conjectural, we can then experience an emergent existentialization of the relatively non-existential in and through a pro-relational 'turning around' of intentional emphasis from the subjective participants and objective parts in a relationship to the relationship itself *per se*, or, at least to the extent the relationship emerges above and beyond the former and is relationally 'intermediated' by its placement in an overall world of the relational. But, rather than my now commencing a new essay, let the essays in this *Book* 11 continue this discussion in a more comprehensive process where an exploration of this conjectural dimension can be carefully unfolded and, therein, more deeply explored.... (iii)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 8.3.24.

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[1] To reference definitions, refer to *A Third Digest*, Section 1 (XIR.1).

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XIA. The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures: An Introduction: A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution To Truth Determination*[2]

Philosophy should be a self-correcting enterprise
Well-exercised through 'reflected upon consensus'...

No discipline functions without conjectures,
No conjectures without questions being asked...

0. Preamble

In this *Book* 11 the primary topic will be a close exploration and scrutiny of this expression 'conjectures' in the belief that no discipline can function without the same and that they have a crucial role to play, along with analytical-like propositions and synthetical-like propositions, in the exercising of judgmental acts of truth determination among a number of other roles. Moreover, I will argue that through a dynamically balanced suspension of the analytical orientation and the synthetical orientation there emerges a conjectural orientations that cannot be reduced to either of the former, or v.v. In treating these three aspects as economically co-associated,[3] as cooperating in an economy of truth determination, we can no longer countenance the arrogance that believes we can entertain so-called 'pure analytical propositions' as expressing so-called 'necessary truths' or entertain 'pure synthetical propositions', as so-called 'sense data' that miraculously form statements capable of expressing incontrovertible facts, and so on. Where, in the latter instance, it is as if that tedious buzzing of sense data and an inert sensorium could together interpret the world as if through a transparent window permitting us to look out upon a so-called 'external world' in all its glorious self-presented detail. 'External worlds' and 'internal world' are impossible notions, hyperbolical fantasies, whereas such notions in ordinary parlance are more rhetorically abused 'metaphors' that should be returned to both the poets and romantics, but, completely avoided by professional philosophers... or, then again, left with those pseudo-philosophers who might wish to toy with such impossible magical-like pronouncements and in the process ever-relegate themselves to a second bench, or, indeed, even a third downward tier should they wish to interminably iterate such philosophical nonsense... (0)

In the writing of Book 9 the idea of conjectures came to the surface and then kept reoccurring. E.g., just what status has the 'economic conjecture' that notes 'that all economies are trimodal in constitution. On one hand, it seems to be analytical, i.e., an 'economy', by definition, is 'that field of circulation in e/valuational formation that is trimodal in its constitution'. On the other hand, we can observe this as some sort of conjectural 'fact'. We look at 'time' and 'the temporal economy' consists of 'past, present, and fu-

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[2] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[3] My use of the expression 'economic' is in the philosophical sense of a 'distinctive circulation of value (e/valuational formation)'. On a number of grounds, I argue that it is trimodally constituted. You could also argue, if needed, that a financial sense of economics narrowly co-opts the same definition but in regard to a financial field of some kind or other.

ture'. Could we conceive of temporal experience in unimodal or bimodal terms of reference? I suspect if it were to appear that we could then we are merely suppressing one or two of these apparent economic correlativities of the 'past' or the 'present' or the 'future'. Correlative moments given that the joint negation of any two moments will define and introduce the remaining correlative. E.g., 'the past' is 'not the present and not the future', and v.v., etc. Implying, through reiterated extrapolation, in each and every economy, that no economic notion can be introduced and entertained in its own right, in its own isolated terms of reference. Significance is relationally generated - period! Without relations(hips) - no significance! Without the differential entertainment of significance there would be no relations! Without significant relations there would be no significant relationships, there could be no significant relationships! Thankfully, we do live in a world of significance... an economic realm of significance that is generated both non-existentially and existentially (and where the latter will be addressed under the important concept of 'intermediation'). (1)

Very early on in my formal philosophical education I thought it quite odd to insist on the position that analytical propositions were completely different from synthetical proposition, and v.v. How could you even entertain an analytical proposition without also visualizing tis synthetic-like content. E.g., 'the cow either gives an adequate quantity of milk or does not give an adequate quantity of milk' is tautologically true. But, how can we think such a proposition without also entertaining 'cows', the concept of 'adequacy', and 'milk'? Or, in contrast, how could we entertain the synthetic statement, declared as 'true', 'that this cow has given an adequate supply of milk for this household'. Don't we also need to know what these expressions define and are defined by, and, 'is that not 'analytical'?' if not technically, at least in spirit. A philosophical mentor at that time informed me I was not alone but confess my first encounter with Quine's '*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*' did not seem to be quite saying what I was thinking at the time given my intuitive but inchoate reasoning was heavily pro-relational and embryonic economic and was taking a more parallel type of tack that barely intersected with Quine's pronouncements that more argued that a analytical-synthetical distinction, promoted by Kant, cannot be entertained and that a reduction to sense data was just impossible and just as equally 'pointless'.[4] (2)

In working on my thesis, in both versions, I came across a similar problem to the extent that the hermeneutic circle could not be entertained as some dialectical engagement between a mere whole and sheer parts and at the same time operate on a number of levels simultaneously. So, we see letters in the totality of a spelt word, words in a sentence, sentences in a paragraph, paragraphs in a chapter, chapters in a book, a book perhaps as one volume in a series and certainly informed by a world of books and literature as but one literature in a literary world with many literatures, and so on. Where the language we speak was already spoken by people before you... and where the genres of our thinking fall back upon such a rich domain of culturally-interculturally predetermined

[4] More literally, a reduction to a mere point can have no significance generation whatsoever. Indeed, such a reduction would be the very death of that relationship, the death of such judgment... what predicates, what relations could a point possess as a mere point *qua* point? Would you even bother to name such a non-entity, such a non-apparent entity?

e/valuational formation. Although, from time to time we do think novel thoughts, but, then, we merely tweak small increments in change and find a non-reductive, chaotic-like response no longer in proportion to the incremental advancement that initiated a sudden surplus of evaluational formation somewhat greater than the investment input initially incurred. Indeed, somewhat akin to conjectures given their chaotic-like emergence and this argued position that conjectures cannot be merely reduced to their basis in the joint suspension (or negation) of both analytical-like and synthetical-like strands of significance. (3)

In refusing to engage in a bimodal dialectic I simply settled for a third party signified by the hyphenated agglomeration of 'whole/s-and-parts'. 'Whole/s' because in this economic dialectic, equally, we cannot likewise isolate a mere economy and where any shift in contextualization merely gets us to express another epistemological level in our economic thinking... just as 'we see letters in the totality of a spelt word, words in a sentence, sentences in a paragraph', and so on and so forth. (4)

Now in hindsight, this so-called 'third moment' of 'whole/s-and-parts' (through economic complexification) can have any number of characteristics as long as they are aligned with the archetypal moment they appear to represent in that type of an economy under current considerations. Indeed, after decades of such persistent reflections on this type of topic, the careful ascription of such aligned characteristics is a thing made much easier to delineate given we can all now appeal to the pre-construction of a parallel dictionary where a succession of closely aligned epithets can be unleashed on the course of those proceedings, hopefully, in a suitable manner that delivers the requisite degree of information required to continue to advance the relevance of such research. (5)

E.g., in an economy of time, the moment of the 'present' aligns with this so-called third moment', and, in an economy of 'generalizations, particularities, and specifics', the third moment is that of 'specifics'. Now, as this third moment can be equally viewed as 'conjectural' we can now conduct the following succession of epithets, namely, that this hermeneutic moment of 'whole/s-and-parts' (in my reformulation of 'the hermeneutic circle of comprehension'), is conjectural by nature, and it will also be enacted in the historical present time with an emphasis on specificities, specification, and so on. And why stop there when we theoretically could characterize either whole/s-and-parts' or 'conjectures' with a raft of aligned meanings whose collective significance, in turn, would also be greater than the mere sum of its parts... (6)

Definitions and equations can only define the word 'reality', and little more! Facts by themselves are inert, and, by themselves, do not ask questions. The extremist and unfriendly, interminable tennis matches between empiricists or realists, on one hand, and, rationalists or idealists, on the other, is just impossible to contemplate in experiential terms. That what passes for the semblance of an earnest debate is nothing more than a sham… their beholding themselves as nothing more than unpaid and unwitting actors on an unseen stage thinking that their ideologically driven performances unfold exactly as they declared them to be had in experience. But, they cannot do what they say they do, and, they do not say what they think can be done since their words and their actions do

not and cannot meet and match. A critical appreciation of the (negative constitutional) conjecture that notes an ‘impossible economic correlative isolationalism’ would immediately put an end to such nonsense, such pretense, such non-aligned forms of behaviour. Just as the facts cannot be appreciated without analytical structures and definitional equations, etc., so, too, in reverse, the analytical cannot be fully appreciated without synthetically oriented content. E.g., the tautology ‘it is either raining or not raining at this moment in time at this point on the Earth’s surface’ is a different tautology, to my mind, from saying ‘that on this lawn green unicorns were either dancing or not dancing at midnight last night’. To say the latter is true can only mean one is very short-sighted. (7)

The point being made here is that this (negative) conjecture of a ‘non-isolationalism’ simple notes that the relational correlativities that constitute an economy are very much like the ‘gluons’ and ‘quarks’ in a nucleus or nucleon which can never be pulled apart and exhibited in their own right. Such correlatives can only be subtly preferenced, but, then, certainly not absolutistically isolated as if sole actors able to stride across the boards and act independently as if free agents in their own right. Therefore, this uncritical talk about analytical statements, necessary truths, raw facts, sense data, and so on, is little more that defective conjectures that are either hyperbolical or untethered in status.’ Hyperbolical’ to the extent that they announce impossible states of affairs, or, ‘untethered’ in the sense that a range of unsupported facts are appealed to in order to weave a web of deception that fools the fool who has constructed such nonsense in the first place. Although admittedly, as an observation, especially in the political sphere, such a phenomenon is more correctly co-authored by people who are either aware of such dissimulation, for whatever reason or reasons, and who have either succumbed to such forms of over-commitment or who feel they have something to gain from such feigned over-commitment be that financial or fame or some other form of recompense. (8)

Rather than just analyzing or synthesizing the formation of propositional content, an ongoing, dynamically balanced suspension integrates both non-independent styles, or strands, of literary production in such a manner that allows the conjectural to ‘shine forth’, so to speak. Conjectures emerge, and as emergent entities, can be neither reduced to analytical propositions nor synthetical statements purporting to be facts, be the latter correctly or incorrectly ascribed as such. In effect, a conjectural economy is manifested from the interactions within and between such economies (as enveloped in their respective social systems). Almost as ‘forms of life’ inspired by the questions that animate and propel the intentional course of their psychological directedness. Of course, at the same time, conjectures cannot be merely written off as just ‘fantastic conjectures’ since they need to be tethered to lived-reality in order to prosper and do real work, proffer a pragmatic pathway for disciplinarians and secularist alike! (9)

Look around and we find conjectures everywhere. In the next essay I delineate eight varieties from the constitutional to the defective, from the perceptive to the apperceptive. However, taking a few steps backwards, let me ask myself just how did I come to this realization that conjectural economies better account for how processes of truth determination, etc., are more correctly undertaken rather than the amorphous floating of a series of argued propositions and statements in a linear set of sequences undergoing vari-

ous forms of transformation despite the epistemological fact that the economic is more correctly dialectical, more non-linear and chaotic, in the unilaterally definitive manner of its engendered productivity… (10)

Overtime, a number of the pieces of this puzzle have come together. I have already mentioned my very earliest reflections on the nature of the hermeneutic circle and for various (economic) reasons deciding that its dialectical functions could only be basically conceived of as operating through a trimodal lens. However, as noted, I had overlooked the possibility that the imputed third moment of 'whole/s-and-parts' could be conjectural, as one aligned possibility among an infinite list of suitable options, indeed, something that specifies the concrete and historical nature of our engaged involvement in this world at large, and so on… (11)

E.g., from taking a rather passive stance to the entertaining of a more dynamic form of engagement (enlivened, no doubt, from the asking of suitable questions)… (12)

E.g., the shift from seeing conjectures as generalizations to (non-systematic) existentially oriented specifications. As a process of specification in the overall economy of generalizations-particularizations-specifications. Without, at the same time, invoking an impossible absolutistically definitive form of specification. Entertaining the probabilistic and not the ascertainment of so-called 'indubitable knowledge' which, we should well note, is neither necessary nor possible… (13)

E.g., treating conjectures as emergent mediations of analytically and synthetically oriented truth-determinations to form vibrant economies. Placing the former in an economy with the conjectural. The suspension of all three correlatives then introducing us to an existential orientation through a process I have termed 'intermediation'... (14)

E.g., notions of the dialectical destroy the fixed ideas that there can be both purely synthetic and purely analytic propositions... the later, as purely constructed language games, cannot do the disciplinary work all too often imposed upon the same. In contrast, the synthetic (as direct observations and indirect testimonies and inferences) cannot be reduced to the so-called 'purely constructed proposition-statements, etc... (15)

E.g., that there is the implying of a set of economies in economically arranged patterns of complexified parallelism able and capable of doing relatively valid pragmatic work, etc. Whereas the mere linear evolution of an argument, in contrast, leaves much to be desired (although it is also true that we cannot escape the sequentially linear nature of languages, still, in moments of insightful-like judgment, as a holistic type of unilateral experience, which, in being 'spontaneously' entertained, more moves one to argue that the conjectural has much in parallel with the nature of the relational)... (16)

E.g., in economies of truth-determination, etc., between relevantly aligned economic correlativities, we can appropriate, say, from a parallel dictionary, a rich plethora of expressions with the same semantic mapping co-associating these aspects paralleling

this imputation of an archetypal economy, etc.[5] In other words, ‘conjectures’ or ‘whole/s-and-parts’, etc., can all have their identities enriched through invoking relevant attributes when equally ascribed to this so-called ‘third-moment’ (in the archetypal economy and in all subsequent economies)... (17)

E.g., in recognizing the mistreatment of the analytical-synthetical distinction through having those distinctions being severed along absolutistical lines. I.e., recognizing a need for analytical-like definitions in the act of a synthetically oriented process of reading, and, conversely, recognizing an equal need for a synthetic appreciation of analytical content. E.g., it is tautologically true to say ‘it is either raining or not raining (without quibbling over the cut off point for rain to be or not to be rain) (which, even as a tautology, is still telling us something about this would, namely, that ‘in this world it can both rain and not rain’. On the other hand, that even if tautologically true, that ‘green unicorns were either dancing on this lawn or were not dancing on this lawn’, from a synthetic perspective this type of proposition can only impute a possible existence (as recognized in the fifth cognitive and trans-cognitive orders under, e.g., mythical or virtual, as a possibility, a probability, and, on rare occasions, as a certain inevitable potency, and so forth.)... (18)

E.g., in just taking an economic approach and searching for these so-called third moments, a task immensely simplified through the use of a well-constructed parallel dictionary... (19)

E.g., in never forgetting to ask questions. Where by articulating a question, either seeking the problematic or problematizing the currently non-problematic, we then ascribe to our tentative understanding of the economy in question the requisite degree and form of questioning thought to be required that will further the seeking of the necessary degree of motivation that might eventually empower us to reach a definitive resolution of that problematicity. Perhaps a state of affairs arrived at through ‘observing the actual coursing of these ‘charged’ conjectures as they metaphorically ‘unwind’, find themselves ‘re-wound’,’ and so on. Where, of course, we need to understand that the outline of a few sequential acts could never expertly describe what truly happened within the dialectical world actually entailed in seeking non-economic moments of a relatively radical irruption, resolution, resolve, opening us up to more systematic forms of an existential enrichment of our relationships, and so on... (20)

Now, a moment’s reflection should reveal that in our reading (and writing) of an (inscribed) text, if sufficiently well-understood in the language utilized (and its meta-textual conventions are also well-understood) that, basically, this type of experience is quite passive, inert, merely productive of what is being read (or what is being written). Indeed, what you read (or write) is exactly what you read (or what you find you have written). That this type of experience is not going to do much work for us whether we approach that text as a disciplinarian or as a secularist. However, in questioning that text, discerning what might be problematic or subjecting it to some form of problematization,

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[5] A parallel dictionary can be found in Appendix A in the second essay in this series. I.e., *Pursuit*, III.XIB.A.

we then find that text then ‘metaphorically’ comes to life as a series of conjectures. Let me explore this through the following analogies. (21)

Sometimes, when waiting for a bus, I need to put my glasses on in order to read the number of the oncoming bus in the far-distance. Being short-sighted, I find that when I put my glasses on the world takes on a greater clarity that in this increased degree of specification, I am now able to more quickly determine the number of the route being followed by the distant bus with enough time to hail it if required. It is not as if I am suddenly seeing the world as if new, but, merely with more detail. I am clarifying what has already been seen. I am re-seeing what has already been seen. But, we all know that the past cannot be seen having already been and gone. So, therefore, it must be a ‘representation’ of this world and not the world *per se*. A construction, still, one that is not just constructed by me, alone, but also by this world itself. The number of that oncoming bus reveals itself to me, and, cannot be something merely constructed by myself. I remember there have been a couple of occasions, at the bottom of Oxford St, where I have misread a last digit ‘3’ as ‘8’ and find my bus swerving unexpectedly to the right at Taylors Square. Fortunately, I can get off there and cross over Oxford St to catch another bus to resume my intended itinerary. In this regard the conjecture that I am on the right bus has to be emended. Yes, I am on a bus, but, now realize I have caught the wrong bus. That in this regard, conjectures are written and read, rewritten and re-read, and so on. Obviously, something more dynamic than merely reviewing propositional-statements as either analytical propositions or synthetical statements. All this also reminds me of going on to Google maps to view a satellite photo of my childhood home. I was surprised to see that an outbuilding, in which I had my laboratory and my first library, was still standing. I would have thought that that wooden building would have a long time ago been demolished and asked myself whether it had been either well-maintained or simply replaced. So, to answer that question I homed in on that property but found the detail was too fuzzy to actually answer that question. That, as an analogy, conjectures played a similar role – that with an adequate degree of specification such questions could be answered. Moreover, it is also obvious that such questioning is conducted from a certain sense of perspective. With an oncoming bus I need to quickly know its number not ask myself, e.g., whether that bus is powered by diesel, gas, or electricity or a hybrid combination of the former, etc. That in this regard, conjectures are situated in a perspective or set of perspectives, that the degree of specificity required is that which normally answers our questions, and that, on further reflection, we can easily imagine an infinity of perspectives could be entered into, but, thankfully, we usually coast along on what we already know, on the basis of what we need to know, more or less. That, if we were to reflect upon the nature of this dynamic conjectural dimension, in our appreciation of lived-experience, we would find that even though these conjectural perspectives are chosen by us, still, in situating ourselves therein they also have the power to re-situate us – just as when the bus approaches it definitively revealed the number of its route to myself and not the other way round! (22)

In what manner are conjectures instrumental in the overall performance of truth determination? (23)

Taking a series of ideas presented in the next essay (written just before this current essay) I argued there that those conjectures that are defective could be described as either hyperbolical (and/or misrepresentative) or untethered (and/or misrepresented). I.e., first, those semblances of a conjecture that are fundamentally impossible to contemplate but in claims that 'such can be thought' that what is being thought is obviously not in accord with 'what could not be thought'. Hence that discrepancy between 'what they say they are doing' and 'what they are actually doing, which, on balance, cannot be other than 'misrepresentative' (although by sheer luck they could be in an accord with lived-reality but that the mis-reasoned likelihood is such that in all probability such choices will mis-place them elsewhere. I.e., second, by being relatively untethered they could be lucky in their mis-placed guessing, but, no one is permanently lucky since the generation of that unlikely probability is contrary to the reiteration of probabilistically determined outcomes. Such relative untethering could be relatively neutral in its effective probability or, more likely, less productive if not counter-productive if such misbegotten beliefs were to be acted upon (much like the US rioters and insurrectionists on January 6 in 2020 operating on the basis of the 'Great Lie'[6]). I note 'relative untethering' since we can be neither completely untethered nor completely tethered in a perfectly consistent manner with living-reality since our relationship with lived-reality is through lived-interpretations which can be neither absolutistically absent nor absolutistically present (and guaranteed). That this degree of 'tethering' is an indication of relative self-consistency and coherence with the relevant information supplied, but, primarily, is more a reflection of the integrity and pragmatic effectiveness and efficaciousness of our enacting patterns of behaviour that meet the degree of realization apparently intended. Acting upon our beliefs being either relatively non-productive or unproductive, productive, or counter-productive, whereas, the intentional objectivity entailed is either adequately realized as intended, more or less, or meets with mis-intended ramifications or unintended ramifications or through happenstance encounters not intended ramification (the latter situation being met through the introduction of an entirely not related set of inputs with a different set of ramifications, etc., to those as initially envisaged).[7] E.g., in the previous anecdote about catching the bus up Oxford St and inadvertently taking the wrong bus through misreading the actual route it was taking we could note the following as illustrative of the above. Say, I had intended to go shopping at Bondi Junction, but once I realized I had taken the wrong bus I could have said, I will go shopping in Randwick instead. On the other hand, if I were to meet someone at Bondi Junction for a coffee then this wrong bus would definitely be the 'wrong bus' and if I were to continue to sit on this bus I would not get to this appointment on time. In the first instance, this wrong conjecture had little consequential

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[6] I.e., that the elections were 'stolen' when the actually 'stealing' was being covertly enacted on the behalf of Trump at the apparent instigation of Trump himself. That if this were to be the case then undoubtedly his various indictments in this regard when explicated in a proper court of law would be problematic for Trump himself over the course of having to defend himself from such related criminal charges. I am sure that if this were to actually get to trial, either way, it would make for some of the most riveting television for quite some years. One of the points I am making here is that relatively untethered beliefs when acted upon could well be counter-productive when the very *raison d'être* of conjectures is to oversee productive outcomes. Noting, of course, that such 'tethering' is neither completely absent nor completely guaranteed.

[7] Refer to my essay: *Our Simple Actions in a Complex World Are Undermined through Unintended Consequences*! (26.1.09).

impact, whereas, in the second instance, I would not have been able to fulfill the obligations already agreed upon. Let me following this analogy of the series of conjectures involved in the simple catching of a bus a little further... (24)

It would appear that conjectures have trajectories by virtue of their intentional thematization. Moreover, in discharging those trajectories the truth determinations at each juncture would need to be suitably observed. If I wish to catch a bus from point A to point B along bus routes X, Y, and Z then I need to catch a bus at point A that observes routes X or Y or Z that then allows me to get to point B. Moreover, it also follows that in order to get to point B from point A along one of these routes X, etc., it follows that all 'stops' or 'points of passage' along that specific route will also need to be observed. More generously, we would also need to accept the lived-reality of our situatedness that an entire army of supporting conjectures will also need to be accepted or, at least, not rejected, namely, buses travel along roads, locations are fixed in our representative mapping of the same, that the bus driver is not a maniac and will get us safely to our destination, hoping that traffic congestion will not obstruct our getting to the destination in time, etc. Then, metaphorically, underneath or behind this mass of supporting conjectures we run a huge number of other worldly conjectures that note buses move, can only move in one direction, can only occupy the space of the bus itself and not interpenetrate safely another bus, car, wall or building, etc., etc. That we are embodied and capable of movement of various kinds, think certain thoughts, entertain various aspirations that have to be prioritized in our arbitration of the same with others, and so on. Indeed, so much computation that it is amazing that we can actually get past our own front-doors which should get us to understand that much of what is needed is already pre-negotiated in the form of conventions, and so on, that become habitually recognized and enacted without too much thought since these routines can be enlisted to do much of this subliminal thinking for us through the habitual force of such reiterated behviours. As an analogy much like learning to ride a bike or mastering a new dance routine. Once we have learnt to ride, we then concentrate on more pressing matters like the path we need to take, why we are biking, etc. Or, similarly, if a dance routine is not yet perfected, sometimes, actually more often than not, in trying to think which steps would follow which steps has the ability to undo the integrity of our performance of those sequences… until that time we have properly mastered the routine itself and need no longer have to think about it on a level of its micro-planning and organization, and, instead, can now concentrate on polishing the overall performance instead. Something we might call adding 'nuance', 'demonstrating integrity' and even 'expressing authenticity', or, 'letting authenticity speak for itself', and so on and so forth. (25)

In all of this 'evidence' must evidently play its role given that the relatively untethered (including the hyperbolical) is not the sort of position that we would want to refer to as 'pragmatic' (let along 'pragmatical', or, 'effective' or 'efficient' or efficacious, etc.[8]). As previously noted, intentionally directed behaviour can also invite both suitable forms of arbitrated realization of our intentional objectives along with their mis-intended delivery, or even the unintended consequences or even permit ramifications that were not

[8] Implying the absence of even positive fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical e/valuational formation.

envisaged in the first place (although in some situations this not intended dimension, more often than not, should it occur, might well be truly beyond our ability to control the ensuing narratives as when, e.g., the world intervenes in less than advantageous circumstances to be experienced as in earthquakes, shootings, in our becoming sick or incapacitated, or in our having adverse accidents, or just forgetting our having made prior appointments and the obligations entailed in such engagements, etc. (26)

In effect, conjectures must basically reflect the virtual trajectories of our arbitrated-aspirations in a sequential manner in which we hopefully find ourselves successfully encountering the requisitely necessary, i.e., apposite and cogent, non-virtually aligned sequences needed to be enacted in order to fulfill the course of those expressed intentions. Just as in the cited analogy, e.g., in order to get from point A to point B by bus routes X, or Y, or Z, I need to be at point A in order to catch the required bus within the right period of time and all that that entails, etc. No doubt our need to oversee and resolve various competing conjectures along with their selectively merging and melding into those pathways that successfully deliver aspirationally-arbitrated outcomes, more or less, in line with our intentional objectives. Where forms of virtual-intentional conjectures must also merge and meld, find a harmonic resolution and realization with their non-virtual-causal correlates in a manner that oversees the relatively successful discharge of such motivated-aspirations as refracted through those requisite forms of subjective-intersubjective arbitration. Or, put more simply, we do not get there by thought along but by putting such ideation into practice, a process that must entail our being able to enter into definitive decisions of ‘the last instance’, and, perhaps, also of ‘the first instance’ and of ‘the next instance’, etc., i.e., overseeing the requirement of non-existentially oriented patterns of enaction through observing unilateral decisions of the last instance along with the recognition of existentially oriented nuances that ‘first’ present themselves and when we permit ourselves to surrender to their ‘next’ unilateral instantiation on the behalf of those relationships configured in those unilateral decisions of last, first and next instances. The latter being observed when we are both perceptive and apperceptive enough to intuitively recognize these potential, unilateral decisions of the first instance and, therein and thereafter, realize the unilateral decision to follow this up with the ‘next’ unilateral, re-directed implementation of such pro-relational forms of existentially oriented implementation. The type of phenomenon that falls also under my concept of ‘intermediation’ In effect both ‘becoming empowered’ (passively) and (actively) ‘being empowered’ by our relationships by being ‘more directly engaged’ with our ‘representative understanding of that relationship in question from the living-perspective of that relationship itself’. (27)

Obviously, there is a profound need for positive forms of truth determination all the way down and all the way up. Where, in the impossible execution of hyperbolical conjectures, we end up doing something that could not be possibly aligned with the impossible. Where, in between the non-relatively hyperbolical and the relatively fulfilled, we find various degrees of ‘evidential tethering’, hopefully, with enough integrity to oversee the success discharge of the objectives of those same intentions... Thence the importance of truth determination in the overseeing the relatively successful fulfillment of our intentional objectives... (28)

That given this dynamic nature of conjectures we can now come to understand their import in delivering the relatively successful fulfillment of their collective intent once such aspirations are suitably prioritized and effectively arbitrated in this world with others, preferably, being conducted in an existential manner for the direct benefit of those relationships themselves, and, thence, indirectly, for the overall benefit of the subjective participants and objective part(ie)s to be found within those primary relationships.[9] (29)

What else should we need to note? That no economy is just economic; that no truth determinations are ever conducted on their own; and, that 'adequate' is more often than not quite 'sufficient' to oversee and fulfill the successful discharge of such arbitrated-intent. Let me clarify these three further observations before bringing this basic introduction to conjectures to a close. (30)

If economies were 'endless circulations of e/valuational formation' they would not be able to deliver such e/valuational formation as thematized through processes of harmonic resolution, etc. Hence my allusion to the French 'non-philosopher', or, who is now more self-referred to as a 'non-standard philosopher', namely, François Laruelle along with his concept/s of the decisive nature of the unilateral decision of the last instance, etc. Hence my need to articulate an overall economy of the economic predicated on the economic, along with the irruption from the same in the form of the relatively non-economic, and 'then' its re-appropriation within the now hyper-economic articulation of this overall economy. Admittedly breaking free from the economic through the non-economic, but, at the same time, re-entering into continual process of ongoing economic-like re(-)appropriation on a more broad level of the hyper-economic as understood through this evolving appreciation of the economy of 'the overall economy of the economic'. In other words, we metaphorically 'break free' from just a virtual sphere of engagement to enter the causally implicated dimension of the relatively non-virtual... (31)

An act of truth determination is not an isolated event since the overall relative truthfulness of what we are already working with needs to be ascertained prior to the appreciation of an evolving specificity to be realized in the pronouncement of all future judgments. No point saying it is a true statement that 'Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon', in defiance of his orders to stay in Gaul, etc., if there were no river called the 'Rubicon', or, if the very person 'Caesar' were only an historical myth and not an historical personage. In this regard, we have the requisite frame of reference to re-introduce my twin concepts of 'insurance and assurance' to be ever found in all processes of positive truth determination. Let me explain. By 'insurance' we note that in our sequential discernment of truth values we can always return, either hypothetically or theoretically, to an earlier point in this process of truth determination with a greater semblance of truthfulness, and, thence, through finding such 'assurance', restart our passage thorough this world at large, hopefully, now operating in a more profitable direction truth-wise. (32)

In my anecdote about seeing my childhood home and wondering about whether the outbuilding imprecisely observed in a Google satellite photo was the same building I was able to definitively decide this issue, on another occasion, by noting in photos at-

[9] Alluding to things like, e.g., communal advancement, ecological value, etc.

tached to an Internet real estate site that it was a radical renovation of this former building, preserving the same large window but also extended and obviously fitted out with a stove given a chimney rising above the roof of this makeover suggesting a granny flat, or similar. The point of this anecdote noting that although I was not able to use the fuzzy information from the satellite photo, later photos with a greater degree of informational specificity, did allow me to make this determination, namely, that a renovation had occurred. Of course, I could still be wrong. However, the same point still holds, because in order to disprove that last determination I would need to be privy to an even greater specificity of information with a degree of specificity that would allow me to revise this 'reading' that a 'quite a radical renovation had occurred'. That truth determinations are not isolated from each other and that processes of revision are always possible, at least theoretically, if not practically. (33)

1. A Provisional Conclusion to this Introductory Explorations of Conjectures

By default, I have actually argued that it is impossible to make truth determinations of either isolated analytical propositions or isolated synthetical statements apart from an economy of truth determination entailing an economy of both the former along with the re-purposing of dynamic conjectures. Only in and through the economics of such trimodal considerations, as outlined, can such determinations be made. From the perspective of an economy of truth determination can a provisionally articulated proposition be treated as either analytically 'true' or 'false' or can a provisionally articulated statement be treated as either synthetically 'true' or 'false'... and whether the relevant conjectures are either 'pragmatically useful' or 'not pragmatically useful', etc... all being conducted without the need to impossibly invoke any form of an extremist ideological nonsense as entailed under the rubric of a non-weak form of realism or empiricism or a non-weak form of idealism or rationalism, etc.[10] Then, in the same trimodal frame of reference, we can articulate the relevant conjectures entering into a certain situated argument, be they exercised and entertained in a disciplinary world or in a secular world. Where the determination of their conjectural 'sufficiency of a positive truth determination' or 'their sufficiency of negative determination of a non-truth' is not and can never be articulated in a so-called 'accord' between the isolated ideation of a so-called 'internal world' with a so-called 'objective reality' of a so-called 'external world'." Indeed, our representational alignments are entertained in various economic aspects of experience of 'lived-reality' in 'the midst of a living-reality', and, not in that which cannot be experienced whatsoever, i.e., in some form of unlived-reality'! (34)

Now, all that granted, we can delineate the nature of conjectures under numerous headings, indeed, given their archetypal alignment with the so-called third moment of 'intentional subjectivity' in the archetypal economy (Ego) we can quite easily invoke, from a pre-delineated parallel dictionary, a plethora of terms that also characterize and enrich our overall appreciation of the conceptual significance behind the necessary co-

[10] I.e., discounting all extremely over-promoted forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism and relativis,.and whatever else can be completely deconstructed epistemologically or ontologically, either logically or dialectically, etc.

gency of a conjectural dimension. To this end, to conclude, let me merely list some of those features already introduced over the course of this current essay. That conjectures are dynamic; specifying (rather than generalizing or particularizing); established on an intuitively subjective appreciation of forms of alignments being entertained between the relatively virtual nature of intentions, etc., and the causally oriented nature of the relatively non-virtual, etc; forms of non-existential and existential engagement being entailed through the harmonic interactions being entertained between apparent propositions, statements and propositional-statements, etc; as initiated through questions that either question the problematic or problematized the hitherto non-problematic; as ever-present in both disciplinary worlds and the world of the secular; must appeal to an observable dimension in some form or other given their economic appropriation of *bone fide* synthetic statements (that can never be entirely untethered and totally untrue); as well as being primarily centered on the present moment of the temporal economy; have an intimate and central role to play in the hermeneutic circle of comprehension (by characterizing 'whole/s-and-parts'), where through conjectural processes of economic resolution non-economic forms of resolution momentarily irrupt within the overall economy of the economic, implicating the existential potential of the present moment, and so on and so forth..!! (35)

Pragmatically, all philosophy should be a self-correcting enterprise, but, one well-foundered on 'reflected upon consensus'. A 'consensus' born in and through 'an economy of well-formed and well-informed conjectures'. An inescapable fact of our philosophical existences, given that without the asking of suitable questions there could be no philosophical practice or, indeed, no practice of any kind. A fact that is all too often overlooked by those disciplinarians that should know better, but, who might well be forgiven since all too often we do not see what is actually 'blocking the view' and will wander about trying to see around such unrecognized corners, and where, I, myself, like everyone else, can be just as guilty in this same respect..!![11] (36)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 8.3.24.

[11] E.g., in taking forty years or so to understand that the so-called third moment of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension, namely, 'whole/s-and-parts', was' conjectural' by nature, etc. 'So-called' by virtue of the fact any one of the three economic moments or correlativies could be a 'third-moment' according to which moments we conventionally assign as 'first', 'second', etc. The usual progression taken is nominated as 'harmonic' given it follows the harmonic ordering of 'World (consonance)-Object (dissonance)-Ego (resolution)' (mirroring the musical formula of 'preparation, dissonance, and resolution).

XIB. The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures:
An Introductory Exploration:
A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution
To Truth Determination

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIB. The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures: An Introductory Exploration: A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution To Truth Determination*[12]

0. Preamble

This book deals with a 'doubly radical' exposition, i.e., in effect, acting as a 'revolutionary' discourse in the sense that it is 'both radical in the format of its content, and, in its ramifications, i.e., implications and consequences ensuing from such unconventional re-positioning.[13] Basically, an inescapable conjectural dimension, as an economic correlativity, is added to both analytical and synthetical contributions in the envisaged operation of an economy of overall truth determination. **Where conjectures mediate both the analytical and synthetical contributions in a process of 'mediation', but, through emergence, cannot be reduced to the former, and, furthermore, add on an ongoing process of progressive specification to its semantic deliberations, i.e., in continually thematizing the output of its truth determinations** (whilst adhering to a Tarskian frame of reference in overseeing the transformational realization of this type of judgmental deliberation). Where, furthermore, the dynamically balanced suspension of all three economic correlativities then oversees the emergent 'intermediation' of an existentially oriented dimension to lived-experience. Or, put more simply, **a conjectural dimension is overlooked in a simplistic analytical-synthetical divide** (where these three economic correlativities, equally, cannot be purely isolated apart from this economy of truth determination rendering the imagined isolation[14] of so-called necessary truths as necessarily impossible and, therein and thereby, putting a definitive end to many forms of traditional metaphysical speculation). (0)

1. Introductory Explorations

The *raison d'être* of this essay is to both introduce and demonstrate the pragmatic cogency of this radical understanding of the economy of truth determination that recognizes the crucial role being played by the centrality of conjectural contributions. (1)

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[12] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[13] 'Ramifications' include 'present implications and future consequences (along with past forms of re-interpretation provoked by the re-readings of such re(-)positioning/s).

[14] In a conceptual and constitutional conjecture that insists on our not being able to pursue an impossible economic correlative isolationalism. Where, e.g., the purely analytical cannot be isolated from both the synthetical and the conjectural except in a contrived and artificial manner in which a propositional-statement is declared to be either analytical or otherwise. So, e.g., 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' is treated as analytical as a choice since it could also be read as a synthetical observation, or, even as a conjecture when posed as a clarification of semantic meaning, i.e., it is seemingly true, linguistically, that this person is spoken of as a 'bachelor' given that they are 'unmarried', and v.v.

2. Genesis

In the previous essay a number of historical reasons were given for my eventual acceptance of a central need to invoke conjectures as supplying a crucial mechanism to suitably appreciate the role played by truth determination in our appreciation of lived-experience. In this essay let me recap some of those 'insights' that would assist us in co-gently enacting an overall demonstration of this conjectural contribution. (2)

I will do this under the following headings, namely, Recognition, Observation, Reiterability, Non-Isolationalism, Hermeneutic Circle of Comprehension, Interrogative Economy, Existential Specification, Economic, etc. (3)

1. Recognition

Even the most cursory glance over any discipline we might wish to choose we will inevitably find a plethora of conjectures, i.e., propositional-like-statements purporting, hypothetically or otherwise, as to how the terrain of that discipline is being currently informed, formed, and exercised, and should be exercised, albeit as contained within a coded format refracted by the discipline in question, hopefully, in a manner in keeping with its co-associated placement within its corresponding social system. So, e.g., in the discipline of the historian we find historical conjectures, and, in the scientific domain we get scientifically oriented propositional-statements, etc., and, I daresay, without exceptions (to the extent that all disciplines operate with an abundance of conjectures in keeping, normally, with the inter-ordered and specified nature of their various discourses). (4)

Obviously, with such 'propositional-statements', in their inescapable abundance, seemingly, that are treated as 'more than just propositions, and, which may or may not arise to the status of 'statements' as 'validly accepted propositions',' it behooves us to recognize both their existence and account for the role or roles played by the same in processes of truth determination. (5)

2. Observation

Many of these conjectures defer somewhat to observations having been made in in some form or other even if the actual conjecture in itself, in most instances, cannot be observed. So, e.g., we entertain perceptual conjectures, like, e.g., 'that there is this fruit bowl filled with apples'. But, most conjectures are not directly observable even though a set of observables dimensions must be postulated in order to account for those current conjectures as presented to hand. So, e.g., the historian of the past cannot directly engage with the historical events in question, but, can engage directly with the apparent evidence being brought to hand in that same regard. Just as, e.g., these recently eaten apple cores implies that, most likely, there were more apples in this same fruit bowl only a short time ago. Or, e.g., in comparing conjectures about, say, atoms, and, say, Homeric gods, we could easily argue that there is a mass of supporting observable evidence for this conjectured interpretation of 'atoms' in comparison to those observations that were probably utilized in (no doubt in a more circular-like) support for divine beings on the imputed

strength of thunder bolts, omens, the apparently 'successful' discharging of petitionary prayers, and so on and so forth. The point being made is that some form of observation is imputed as a basis for running a conjecture whether it is perceptual (as in the seeing of a bowl of apples) or apperceptive (as in formulating an historical reading of certain past events that might possibly be able to find consensual agreement) or theoretical (as in science) or speculative (as in many forms of discourse, like e.g., gossip, or entertaining our aspirations before their desired realization, etc.), etc.[15] (6)

3. Reiterability

Conjectures need to be both reiterable and intersubjectively discernable (through apposite forms of disseminated discourse, etc., i.e., expositions). Moreover, conjectures cannot be absent from a 'respectable' process of truth determination and, furthermore, should be both well-formed (for re-iteration) and well-informed (given this need for an observable dimension to also be both directly or indirectly present and reality based in lived-experience). (7)

4. Non-Isolationalism

The contention is held that analytical and synthetical propositions cannot be purely isolated from each other (in an agreement with Quine,[16] *et al*), and, that furthermore, conjectural propositions cannot be purely isolated from the former. However, given their imputed genesis is arrived at through the balanced suspension of the joint entertainment of the analytical and the synthetical it is argued that this oversees the emergence of the conjectural with the implication, moreover, that conjectures cannot be reductively mistreated as just merely possessing either an analytical and/or synthetical complexion! (8)

An appreciation of this subtle, dialectical positioning means that truth determination is the productive result of the economic engagement of all three economic correlativities, namely, the synthetical, the analytical, and the conjectural. That, with the impossible absence of any one of these three parties, either explicitly or implicitly, nothing other than the defective can be comprehended and appreciated as such.[17] (9)

5. The Hermeneutic Circle of Comprehension

In a trimodal interpretation of the hermeneutic circle[18] as interactions entertained between 'whole', and 'parts', and 'whole/s-and-parts'... the latter correlativity of 'whole/s-and-parts' can now be read as 'conjectural' (through economic complexification where we can pair 'whole/s' with the 'synthetical orientation', 'parts' with the 'analytical orientation', etc.). (10)

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15 A provisional taxonomy of conjectures is supplied in section 3 from paragraph 20, etc.

16 Referencing, e.g., Quine's *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* (1951), etc.

17 Refer to paragraph 42.

18 E.g., as initially explored in both versions of my *Thesis.*

6. The Interrogative Economy

No process of truth determination can be suitably initiated without the explicit or implicit asking of a question as the conditional context for the ensuing process of truth appreciation! (11)

In my previous explications of the interrogative economy the apparitional moment or correlativity can now be seen to coincide with the conjectural orientation (through economic complexification given the coincidence of the synthetical with the hermeneutical role of the rhetorical, and, the analytical role of the phenomenological and metaphorical aspects, etc. The implication also follows that the conjectural is at the very least non-systematically existential in orientation). (12)

7. Existential Specification

Elsewhere, I have argued that in an economy of (hermeneutical) generalizations, (phenomenal-phenomenological) particularities, the 'third-party' deals with (non-systematic) existential 'specifications'. Therefore, (through economic complexification), the conjectural dimension must be specifically oriented (but not in any absolutistical sense). Hence one role of conjectures is to emphasize the specificational role of conjectures (contrary to any generalizational bias that might have been previously extended to this type of functioning concept). (13)

8. Economic

The 'economic conjecture' demands 'that all economies be trimodal in their constitution' implying a need to supply a third party in any discussion of the role played by either analytical and synthetical contributions to an overall process of truth determination. Therefore, in my opinion, the conjectural dimension is the necessary third party to accept as co-present in any and all processes of truth determination.[19] (14)

9. Etc...

'Etc.' also has a complex role to play. By going to a parallel dictionary[20] we can supply any number of alternative characteristics in order to understand a more enriched, complementary vision of the nature of conjectures, e.g., the appellation of 'radical' rather than 'critical', intentional subjectivity, non-textual in orientation, acting as proscriptions, etc., etc. (15)

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[19] That if some other party is brought to our attention it, too, deserves to be considered seriously. However, I would also argue that we could account for the same through economic complexification. E.g., invoke an alignment with one of the economic correlativities in question. By such means ruling out a tetramodalism, but, ruling in economic complexified forms of parallelism (when two or more economies are suitably juxtaposed and where parallel correlatives effectively comment on and complement those corresponding correlatives. Just as, e.g., 'analysis' is 'retrospectively aligned' in its economic schematization (as based on an archetypal-gestalt modeling of 'background' [World], 'foreground' (Object) and 'subjectivity' [Ego]) .

[20] First noted in *The Seventh Book... Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A (Appendix A), etc.

To sum up (the imputed characteristics of this emergent conjectural dimension in its contributing to overall forms of truth determination) let me briefly note that conjectures are to be recognized as playing a central role in all disciplines; need to have some basis in observations be that either directly and/or indirectly; need to be reiterable, inter-subjectively appreciated, need to be well-formed and well-informed; accept that synthetical and analytical contributions can be neither disentangled from each other nor co-associated conjectures; interact through the trimodal constitution of a hermeneutic circle of comprehension; involve either the explicit and/or implicit asking of a suitable question, and all that that entails (in an interrogative economy); effectively institutes processes of an existential-like specification of our interpretations of living-experience (as our lived-experience of a lived-reality); whose trimodal constitution conjecturally demands three forms of economic correlativity in the pursuit of truth determination (where conjectures can also be characterized as possessing through economic complexity a tranche of recognizable features like a contemporary time orientation (in the living-present), a non-textual orientation, the simulation of an apparitional-like complexion), etc., along with the reiterable, potentially radical pragmatic cogency that enriches our passage through this world at large both individually and collectively. (16)

More succinctly, I will here define 'conjectures' as 'emergent propositional-statements that facilitate the formation and resolution of expositions whose dissemination are expressed as inter-subjective discourses preferably expressed with either a suitably augmented and/or enhanced degree of pragmatic cogency. (17)

3. Exploration through Demonstrations

Now we come to the more important section of this essay where I set out to demonstrate this conjectural dimension... (18)

This set of demonstrations, as virtual thought-experiments, will be conducted[21] under the following headings, namely, Economic Investigations, and Applications. (19)

Under the heading of Economic Investigation, first, I will explore the Economic Trimodalism of a number of economies in order to demonstrate the requisite trimodal constitution of the 'economic conjecture' arguing for the observable facts of that apparent economies, indeed, are trimodal in their constitution, namely, e.g., the temporal economy, the spatial economy, the translation of an object with a fixed shape through motion within a defined space, the intentional economy, etc. Then, second, I will provisionally explore the proposed range of conjectures under eight *ad hoc* headings, namely, the Constitutional, Perceptive, Apperceptive, Theoretical, Inferential, Speculative, Mythical, and Defective. (20)

[21] A certain necessity on the imputed grounds that that is the way we think in gestalt-like terms of reference, i.e., through the economic correlativity of intentional objectivity (phenomenological foreground), intentional motivation hermeneutic background), and intentional subjectivity (existential subjectivity).

Under the heading of (Economic) Applications (to truth determination), I will further explore this Phenomenon (of conjectures), possible co-associated metaphysics (involved in reading these conjectural forms of appreciation), and the more important identifiable Ramifications (of this type of disciplinary re(-)positioning). (21)

A. Economic Investigations

I read recently, in The New Scientist magazine, that in particle physics they note the repetitive reiteration of sets of three particles (e.g., in terms of charge that is either positive, negative, or neutral) which they categorize as generations (e.g., electrons, muons, and pions, etc.)... (22)

Let us look around ourselves and explore distinctive fields of experience in order to ascertain this all-pervasive property of an economic trimodalism. Like e.g., the three operations at the center of Boolean algebra. Like e.g., how languages seem to have, primarily, subjects, objects, and verbs, and where all else seems to qualify these elements of the former? Like, e.g., the formation of an argument consisting of premises, arguments and conclusions, etc.[22] (23)

Let me demonstrate the (necessary) ubiquity of this propensity for economic trimodalism... (24)

1. Demonstrating an Economic Trimodalism

Imagine an economic space, with an imputed circulation of e/valuational formation, in a certain aspect of experience and imaginatively envisage a set of three economic correlatives in keeping with that epistemological or psychological or experiential aspect being placed under that form of review. With this mission in mind let us review the following... (25)

i. The Temporal Economy

Time comes conveniently packaged, from our perspective (of duration) in the present, under the headings of ‘past, present, and future’. There is no fourth dimension of time (ok, I am being mischievous here, but, the point of that humorous contradiction is that time is either ‘past’ or ‘present’ or ‘future’ [without going into compound tenses, or similar]). Yes, we could perhaps talk about the ‘pre-temporal’ (as in speculations about what might have existed before the so-called ‘big bang’), or the ahistorical or the trans-historical but then we are no longer dealing with historical dimensions and experiences of time. There is just no fourth way of talking about historical time - period! Hence the apparent necessity for a trimodal economic approach in order to comprehend our lived-experience of lived-time. (26)

[22] The type of explorations conducted in the next section, paragraphs 25-31.

ii. The Spatial Economy

Similarly, in a spatial world of three dimensions we need three pieces of information in order to successfully locate ourselves in this three-dimensional realm of the spatial. This realm of the spatial is not called three-dimensional or 3D for no reason whatsoever. I vividly remember flying in my Lear jet out to one of the islands off the Californian coast and had assumed that the airport there would have been at sea-level, but, to my shock horror quickly discovered it was quite elevated.[23] Space, indeed, is 3D and not 2D (although some physicists have good reasons to believe that the three dimensions we think we dealing with are more the projection of a 2D hologram, certainly in terms of the information entailed).[24] (27)

iii. The translational economy

Next envisage an object with a fixed shape and volume[25] moving through (Euclidean) space - how many ways can this translation be put into effect. By only three ways, namely, translation in a certain direction or set of directions, rotation, and through (invoking a process of) reflection. There are no exceptions to this rule. (28)

By invoking these examples, and many others, we can formulate an economic conjecture that each and every economy is and must be trimodal in its complexion. E.g., the intentional economy (as referenced in footnote no 8) where I imply 'that we think in gestalt-like terms of reference, i.e., through the economic correlativity of intentional objectivity (phenomenological foreground [Object]), intentional motivation (hermeneutic background [World]), and intentional subjectivity (existential subjectivity [Ego])'. That, given the ubiquity of this archetypal economic structuralization we can invoke an economic complexification when two different economies become merely compared or actually aligned by virtue of invoking such alignments. By such means we can parallel, e.g., the analytical orientation with phenomenological orientation, forms of reduction with a retroactive temporal orientation, etc. In a weak, non-ideological sense we can align the intentional foreground with the metaphors associated with a weak, non-impossibly constituted realism focusing on a co-associated intentional objectivity; the background rhetoric of motivational awareness with a weak, non-impossibly constituted idealism, and the mediation[26] of the former with a potential, existentially oriented pragmatism.[27] Let me depict this diagrammatically as follows:

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23 Using a very primitive flight simulator.

24 In cosmological terms space-time can also be thought of as flat in a Minkowski universe, curved in a de-Sitter space-time or hyperbolically structured in an anti-de-Sitter space-time.

25 If non-fixed, again, we have three possibilities, namely, either expansion or contraction, or neither.

26 'Mediation' being argued as 'the dynamically balanced suspension of the analytical and synthetical aspects', and, where 'the dynamically balanced suspension of all three economic moments' gives us the intermediation of the overall economy and our ensuing entrance to an existentially oriented experience of our represented primary relationships (hopefully through conjectures that are both well-formed and well-informed).

27 Whether you prefer to think of yourself or someone else as motivated by an existential-pragmatism or a pragmatic-existentialism,

Weak Idealism
Intentional Background
Synthetical Propositions

Weak Realism
Intentional Foreground
Analytical Propositions

Conjectural Mediation

Non-Ideological Pragmatism
Conjectural Propositions
(Pragmatic Cogency) (29)

Of course, should we even attempt to disconnect and isolate these economic correlativities then we move into the increasing nonsense of an ideological world mistreating the economics of these relationships instrumental in the formation, formulation, and circulation of viable forms of e/valuational formation including the delivery of overall processes of truth-determination. (30)

Now, given that this economic conjecture states 'that all economies are trimodal in their constitution', that granted, we can reverse engineer an economy on the apparent cogency of this propositional-statement. So, if we were to apperceive that the philosophical economy were to be constructed as one-part 'phenomenological', one-part 'hermeneutical', and one-part 'existential' (in its non-systematic sense[28]), and, if the phenomenological aspect, as per Husserl, is 'descriptive', and the hermeneutical dimension is 'prescriptive' (of which genres of behaviour are appropriate in a certain disciplinary field), then, how might we succinctly ascribe existentially oriented forms of specification? Can we creatively come up with an apposite ascription in this regard? I have placed my solution in the footnotes.[29] (31)

Or, similarly, in organizing a representative economy we might hypothetically propose, say, hermeneutical representation, phenomenological presentation, and existential (hyphenated) re-presentation (on the imputed grounds that re-direction is indicative of chaotic processes of potentially radical re-direction), etc. Hence the provisional proposal of a (hermeneutical) representation, phenomenal-phenomenological presentation, and (non-systematic) existential re-presentation. Or, i.e., an ongoing economy of presenta-

[28] Noting that the 'non-systematic existential moment' is the so-called 'third moment', whereas, the 'systematic existential is a more an 'integrated form of existential experience realized through intermediation, etc.

[29] 'Proscriptive'. Interestingly, if this is adopted, then it implies an existential dimension that is more interested in proscribing behaviour. So, e.g., in the situation of a hungry person, who will die if not fed, if it is in our powers to offer sustenance to that person then we should do so on the grounds that it's 'existentially immoral to let a hungry person die'. I.e., you should not let a hungry person die from hunger which need not be translated in practice as your directly feeding that person since you could organize this event indirectly. That this proscriptive angle gives an existential depth to such inter-relational considerations. Interestingly, in terms of a philosophy of transformational retreatment there are only three forms of treatment, namely, analysis (predicates), synthesis (relations), and nominatives (names). In workshopping this third economic aspect 'conscription' and 'subscription' were also added to 'proscription'. The narrative taking the form of either 'subscribing to a relationship' and/or 'being conscripted by the relationship in question'.

tion/representation/re-presentation as indicated by the nomenclature '(-)' as in the expression (of the ongoing economy of) 're(-)presentation'. (32)

I would like argue that as all economies harness natural language, as economies in their own right, we should be able to find to hand suitable ascriptions in that natural language itself (before we would ever need to produce a technical expression out of thin air so to speak). Therefore, the reader or audience might like to explore this linguistic phenomenon where the economy in question will naturally express itself in language be that either overtly or covertly in orientation. E.g., in the temporal economy we find the existence already of the requisitely required language in expressions like, e.g., 'past', etc. (33)

2. The Range of Conjectures

Under eight *ad hoc* categories we could divide conjectural proposition(al-statement)s under eight headings, namely, Constitutional, Perceptive, Apperceptive, Theoretical, Inferential, Speculative, Mythical, and Defective. (34)

1. Constitutional

Those propositional-statements that appear to possess a certain necessity or pragmatic cogency, like, e.g., the economic conjecture (of a necessary trimodalism) or the conjecture that declaims the impossibility of an economic correlative isolationalism. This type of conjecture has an important role to play in a repurposed metaphysics (which will be explored in the next essay). (35)

2. Perceptive

As the heading suggests, our being perceptive of a certain situation, say, that fruit bowl filled with delectable apples. (36)

3. Apperceptive

Where from perceptual evidence or evidence of some other form we directly derive a supposition capable of being confirmed (in real time) or (later) verified. (37)

4. Theoretical

Those theoretical conjectures along their requisite observational reports that have a respectable place in a respectable discipline, say, as in the disciplines of either science or history, or in the legal profession or a repurposed metaphysics, etc. (38)

5. Inferential

I see a wave breaking on the sandy shore, I see another wave coming and will infer it too will break on this same sandy shore. From a trivial sense of the logical to much more sophisticated systems of thought, like social systems, e.g., etc. (39)

6. Speculative

Arguing that a certain stock market will continue to rise or fall this year, or next year, etc. (40)

7. Mythical

E.g., where is Father Xmas?[30] (41)

8. Defective

The defective can be treated to further fall under the non-well-formed hyperbolical or misrepresentative, and, the not well-informed misrepresented and the untethered (to relatively valid premises, arguments, conclusions; and as not suitably connected with valid facts, viable narratives, radical critiques, etc.). Respectively, a unimodal or bimodal propositional construct that is ideologically mistreated (through a mistreatment of its resident metaphors and/or rhetoric), etc., a discourse that in its dissemination is distorted or obstructed, etc., a discourse that is poorly based on a factual basis, etc., and deliberate processes of misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, along with all other forms of dissimulation and deception, etc. (42)

As noted, constitutional conjectures deserve to be further explored.[31] [32] (43)

B. Economic Applications

1. Economic Phenomena

In a broad review of economic phenomena, i.e., various delineated aspects associated with economic considerations, such as, e.g., the harmonic nature of circulation resulting in forms of resolution, the expression of such resolution in definitive non-economic terms of reference along with hyper-economic appropriation plus considerations of the relatively non-critical, the relatively critical, and the relatively radical. The contestment between the relatively non-innovative and the innovative, etc. (44)

2. Ramifications

Ramifications can be viewed both negatively and positively. Negatively, we would oversee the massive deconstruction of economically mistreated forms of positioning in all disciplines, and, positively, reap the pragmatic rewards in this advent of a wide range of disciplinary clarifications, etc. (45)

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30 As explored in *Pursuit,* II.

31 A constitutional conjecture appears to be balanced mix of all three dimensions and not able to be reduced to any one of these three economic correlativities of the analytical, synthetical, and conjectural.

32 Another classificational system would be to invoke inter-ordered phenomena as explored in *Book* 9. E.g., historical conjectures, scientific conjectures, metaphysical conjectures, etc. This approach will be explored in the next essay.

5. Provisional Conclusions: Forming an Overview of the Conjectural Contribution

In historical discussions over the nature of the analytical-synthetical distinction (as promoted by Kant, *et al*) staring us in the face is a dimension of the conjectural that is either overlooked and/or much maligned. But, look around and we see disciplines definitively enlisting certain types of conjectures over other types of conjectures in the pursuit of the work performed by those professions. That this definitive enlistment is the hallmark of coded formats that distinctively differentiate one distinctive discipline from another. As argued in Book 9, I would contend that an inter-ordered perspective along with certain historical decisions as to how to exercise such information would assist us in forming a better comprehension of such disciplines as they historically fall within certain social systems... (46)

A number of quite radical proposals are being put forward. In no particular order let me list them... (47)

1. Conjectures co-occur with analytically and synthetically oriented propositional-statements and no one economic correlative party can be completely disentangled from any other except provisionally, and, then, only in a limited manner of non-absolutistically enacted emphasis or preference. (48)

2. Conjectures emerge through a balanced suspension of the analytical and the synthetical orientations and, therefore, the emergence of these types of propositional-statements, but, where conjectures cannot be reductively reduced to either of the former parties. (49)

3. Conjectures (through economic complexification) in coinciding with the so-called third moment in the dialectical economy of the overall economy of the economic (and archetypal economy) automatically supply a number of distinctive economic contributions (that can be assessed through invoking a parallel dictionary), such as, e.g., specification, intentional subjectivity, access to an existential orientation (further expedited through intermediation, etc.), etc. (50)

4. That all conjectures must reference, either directly and/or indirectly, the observations and observational reports entailed in a synthetic dimension. That even in religiously speculative conjectures or mythical conjectures a reference to the world at large cannot be escaped. Thence the demand that all conjectures be well-informed as well as well-formed lest they be hyperbolical, misrepresentative, misrepresented, or just untethered (in a world of factoids, conspiracies, dissimulations, deceptions, distortions, and processes of communicative obstruction, etc., etc.). (51)

5. As participating overtly or covertly in processes of overall truth determination conjected propositional-statements can become more statement-like and will do so in a manner I would deem to be ‘pragmatically cogent’ (rather than invoking conjectural necessity lest it be mistaken for impossible notions of a purified analytical necessity in the

formation of so-called ‘necessary truths’, and other forms of misguided metaphysical nonsense). (52)

6. (Although not discussed in the context of this essay) truth determinations would also invoke economic, hyper-economic, and non-economic processes of specification through transformational retreatment[33] and re(-)alignment whilst remaining within a Tarskian[34] frame of reference (where appellations of truth determination would apply to those provisionally conjectured propositional-statements themselves and not the participants and parts representatively entailed therein without isolating such conjectures from their economic contexts... (53)

Conjectures have had a poor press that on occasions has been well-deserved. However like mistreated concepts of the economical, metaphysical, the representational, etc., there is no reason why their suitable reforms cannot be conducted if either critically and/or radically attuned to the phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and existential nature of the events being scrutinized and placed under auspices of such relatively critical considerations and potentially relatively radical re(-)considerations. (54)

6. The Pragmatic Dimension of Well-Formed and Well-Informed Conjectures

Last, but not least, I would like to stress that this type of philosophical-disciplinary re(-)positioning occupies an anti-representational, positively nihilistic, existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism. However, I also believe that a critical philosophical appreciation, tantamount to a repurposed form of metaphysical scrutiny, can be especially applied to constitutional conjectures. E.g., the conjecture that states ‘that all economies are trimodal in complexion’ being a notable case to explore in this instance. Where this type of propositional-statement can be neither written off as either merely analytical nor just as a synthetical observation about the world, namely, that all economies seem to be trimodal in their constitution (just as when the temporal economy was looked at, etc.). (55)

If I am allowed to sum up, what has been but merely commenced, on reflection, is the ‘apperceptive observation’ **that conjectures ‘mediate’ both analytical and synthetical propositional-statements, and, that the balanced suspension of all economic correlatives ‘intermediates’ an existential dimension coincident with the representation of our relationships...** in a discourse barely begun..!![35] (56)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 4.3.24.

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33 This topic is dealt with in detail in *The Seventh Book*… and in *Book* 9.

34 On the simple template that the meta-proposition is true if the proposition is evident(ly true). Or, i.e., *P*’ is T iff *p*. The problem remains, however, as to how evidence is to be understood. But that is another type of economic matter. Furthermore, the meta-proposition is true if the proposition in question is evident, or, the proposition is true if the (relational) participants or parts in that proposition are evident.

35 To be continued in the next essay.

7. Major Points Inviting Discussion in this Essay

Conjectures are an overlooked third aspect in the context of the writing and reading of analytical-synthetical propositional-statements. (57)

Where conjectures mediate both the analytical and synthetical contributions in a process of 'mediation', but, through emergence, cannot be reduced to the former, and, furthermore, add on an ongoing process of progressive specification to its semantic deliberations, i.e., in continually thematizing the output of its truth determinations… Or, put more simply, **a conjectural dimension is overlooked in a simplistic analytical-synthetical divide** (where these three economic correlativities, equally, cannot be purely isolated apart from this economy of truth determination rendering the imagined isolation[36] of so-called necessary truths as necessarily impossible and, therein and thereby, putting a definitive end to many forms of traditional metaphysical speculation). [0] (58)

The *raison d'être* of this essay is to both introduce and demonstrate the pragmatic cogency of this radical understanding of the economy of truth determination that recognizes the crucial role being played by the centrality of conjectural contributions. [1] (59)

I came to this recent understanding from the coincidence of a number of different directions, namely… Recognition, Observation, Reiterability, Non-Isolationalism, Hermeneutic Circle of Comprehension, Interrogative Economy, Existential Specification, Economic, etc. [3] (60)

Briefly:

We find conjectures in every discipline.
All conjectures appeal to some form of observational (synthetical) dimension.
Conjectures are reiterable and intersubjective.
Their economic correlativities, like all correlativities, cannot be purely isolated![37]
Contribute a so-called third moment in the hermeneutic circle of comprehension.
Conjectures, like truth determination, imply the exercise of a question.
Conjectures are much more specifying than generalizing.
Trimodally constituted from analytical, synthetical, and conjectural contributions.
(61)

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[36] In a conceptual and constitutional conjecture that insists on our not being able to pursue an impossible economic correlative isolationalism. Where, e.g., the purely analytical cannot be isolated from both the synthetical and the conjectural except in a contrived and artificial manner in which a propositional-statement is declared to be either analytical or otherwise. So, e.g., 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' is treated as analytical as a choice since it could also be read as a synthetical observation, or, even as a conjecture when posed as a clarification of semantic meaning, i.e., it is seemingly true, linguistically, that this person is spoken of as a 'bachelor' given that they are 'unmarried', and v.v.

[37] Ruling out much of a traditional metaphysics built on unproductive language games centered on so-called 'necessary truths'.

In order to demonstrate the trimodal nature of the economic (as a conjecture) I suggested three economies, namely, the temporal (past, present, and future), the spatial (and its need for three units of information in order to locate something in space), and the translation of an object with a fixed shape and volume traveling through space (where the only options are translational, rotational and reflective symmetries). (62)

A further economy for this form of exploration was proposed, namely, that which is phenomenologically 'descriptive', hermeneutically 'prescriptive', and existentially 'proscriptive'. (63)

> Under eight *ad hoc* categories we could divide conjectural proposition(al-statement)s under eight headings, namely, Constitutional, Perceptive, Apperceptive, Theoretical, Inferential, Speculative, Mythical, and Defective. [34] (64)

Constitutional conjectures deserve to be scrutinized under a repurposed metaphysics… as seemingly supplying a form of necessity I would rather refer to as 'pragmatic cogency'. (65)

Examples of constitutional conjectures would be the economic conjecture of trimodalism; the impossibility of an economic correlative isolationalism,[38] that solid objects can be coloured, but, cannot possess two different colours at the same time unless those colours are blended, etc.[39] (66)

> A number of quite radical proposals are being put forward. In no particular order let me list them... [47]
>
> 1. Conjectures co-occur with analytical and synthetically oriented propositional-statements and no one economic correlative party can be completely disentangle from any other except provisionally, and, then, only in a limited manner of non-absolutistical emphasis or preference. [48]
>
> 2. Conjectures emerge through a suspension of the analytical and the synthetical orientations and, therefore, such types of propositional-statements, but, where conjectures cannot be reductively reduced to either of the former parties. [49]
>
> 3. Conjectures (through economic complexification) in coinciding with the so-called third moment in the dialectical economy of the overall economy of the economic (and archetypal economy) automatically supply a number of distinctive economic contributions (that can be assessed through invoking a parallel diction-

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[38] We have here two examples of a constitutional conjecture, namely, the 'economic insistence of a trimodalism' and the 'non-isolationalism of economic correlatives'. The first is 'positive' and the second is 'negative'. I would contend that all conjectures are either positive or negative (except defective conjectures where a negative defective conjecture establishes, by default, either the well-formed or at least a not un-well-formed exemplar. E.g., in the perceptive variety we could perceive the absence of apples in a fruit bowl, or, in apperceptive terms, the solastalgia induced when commercial greed subverts the natural beauty of a landscape identified with as 'home' or as a place 'for-us' rather than for 'them' who have subverted it.

[39] Refer to *Pursuit,* III.IX.12ZZ (*Book* 9)

ary), such as, e.g., specification, intentional subjectivity, access to an existential orientation (further expedited through intermediation, etc. [50]

4. That all conjectures must reference, either directly and/or indirectly, the observations and observational reports entailed in a synthetic dimension. That even in religiously speculative conjectures or mythical conjectures a reference to the world at large cannot be escaped. Thence the demand that all conjectures be well-informed as well as well-formed lest they be hyperbolical, misrepresentative, misrepresented, or just untethered (in a world of factoids, conspiracies, dissimulations, deceptions, distortions, and processes of communicative obstruction, etc., etc.). [51]

5. As participating overtly or covertly in processes of overall truth determination conjected propositional-statements can become more statement-like and will do so in a manner I would deem to be 'pragmatically cogent' (rather than invoking conjectural necessity lest it be mistaken for impossible notions of a purified analytical necessity in the formation of so-called 'necessary truths', and other forms of misguided metaphysical nonsense). [52] (67)

If I am allowed to sum up, what has been but merely commenced, on reflection, is the 'apperceptive observation' **that conjectures 'mediate' both analytical and synthetical propositional-statements, and, that the balanced suspension of all economic correlatives 'intermediates' an existential dimension coincident with the representation of our relationships...** in a discourse barely begun..!![40] [56] (68)

N.T., 4.3.24.

[40] I have appended in Appendix A an example of a 'parallel dictionary' as noted in this essay.

A: Appendix A: A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities[41]

Type of Economy:	Archetypal World	Archetypal Object	Archetypal Ego
Philosophical:	Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism
Temporal:	Future	Past	Present
Herm. Circle:	Whole	Parts	Whole-and-Parts
Criticality:	Pre-Critical	Critical	Pot. Radical
Harmonic:	Consonance Theory	Dissonance Practice	Resolution Critique
Descriptive:	Prescriptive Relations	Descriptive Predicates	Proscriptive Nominations
Directedness:	Redirected	Directed	Re-Directed
Mod. of Error:	Mitigation	Correction	Align. with Relatively Non-Erroneous
Iterations:	Reiteration	Iteration	Re-Iteration.
Representation:	Representing	Presenting	Re-Presenting/ Anti-Representational
Retreatment:	Pretreatment	Treatment	Retreatment/ Posttreatment
Textual:	Meta-Textual	Textual	Non-Textual
Continuities	Continuities	Discontinuities	Non-Continuities
Philosophical Tools:	Rectification	Deconstruction	Re(-)Normalization
Interrogative Eco.	Rhetorical Dis-Conjunctive Sus.	Metaphorical Conjunctive Sus.	Apparitional Dynamic Bal…
(Imputational:[42]**)**	Non-Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Non-Extrapolation...
(Imp.Eco read as:)	(Global Suspensions)	(Local Suspensions)	(Trans-Rel. Sus.)
[Overall Eco. of Eco:	Hyper-Economic	Economic	Non-Economic] (69)

[41] Originally posted as Appendix A: *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A(ppendix A) and Appendix B in *Book* 9.

[42] The imputational economy is discussed in *The Seventh Book*… modules 406, 407, 901.

XIC. The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures:
A Commentary on 'An Introductory Exploration:
A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution
To Truth Determination'

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIC. The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures: A Commentary on 'An Introductory Exploration: A Demonstration of the Conjectural Contribution To Truth Determination'*[43]

0. Preamble

The following essay, in the form of a complex commentary on the previous essay, in effect, is a detailed demonstration of the inescapable viability of this contribution of the conjectural to philosophical, metaphysical, and disciplinary pursuits as exercised from the cogency of pragmatically oriented processes of ongoing re(-)positioning as arrived at through the critical and radical exercise of conjectural forms of positioning whose ensuing ramification oversee such re(-)positioning.(0)

1. Introduction

This commentary, first, will be expansive and exploratory; second, focused on or specializing in a clarification of certain points; and, third, will be conjectural and technical with either the current use of conjectures being noted or where certain constitutional conjectures could be supplied in order to better elucidate the exposition of those ideas in question. Commentaries on footnotes, observations, and digressions will also be made. (1)

2. Mapping of XIB

O. (0)
1. (1)
2. (2-3)
  2.1 – 2.9 (4-1)
3. (18-21)
  3.A (22-24)
    3.A.1 (25)
      3.A.1.i-iii (26-33)
    3.A.2 (34)
      3.A.2.1-9 (35-43)
    3.B.1-2 (44-45)
5. (46-47)
  5.1-6 (48-54)
6. (55-56)
7. (57-68)
  Conclusion (68)
A. (69) (2)

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[43] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

Contextual Situating of XIB

XIA was subtitled as *An Introduction*. XIB was subtitled as *An Introductory Exploration*. XIC, in contrast, is subtitled *An Exploration* (as meant conducted in depth, and, in this instance through various forms of commentary). (3)

In my *Preamble* I noted that "this book deals with a 'doubly radical' exposition". I was at first reluctant to say 'revolutionary', but, that is what was intended, indeed, in two senses, namely, content-wise and ramifications. The economic re-purposing of conjectures as a somewhat necessary third party to how we could read analytic propositions, synthetic statements, and even find ourselves being able to entertain an analytic-synthetic distinction, on one hand, and, on the other hand, in terms of the ramifications of this repurposing of conjectures. Now, I have defined ramifications elsewhere as 'present implications' and 'future consequences'. But, recently, have also added a past dimension in the form of the ensuing potentially radically re-interpretation of past interpretations… (4)

The overall concept of the 'radical' has also been explored under the headings of the 'radically-radical' and the 'relatively-radical' on the understanding that the innovations of the radical can only be appropriated, and 'digested', in 'small bite sized chunks' metaphorically. Where, the radically-radical, unless incrementally appropriated in critical terms of reference in small 'quanta' will just not be interacted with. I.e., will neither be hermeneutically recognized, nor phenomenologically encountered, nor (non-systematically) engaged existentially without the economic co-association of these three aspects presented in an incremental form for appropriation on a basis of small, discrete step by step. That, in terms of the radical ramifications of this repurposing I am suggesting that radical forms of accommodation will only be entered into through a process of small sequential steps able to be critically re-appropriated as such. (5)

A metaphorical comparison, I have previously made in this regard, is like the consequences that following on in the wake of the innovation of 'sliced bread', e.g. I.e., wrapping, advertising, branding, notification of nutritional contents, the applied presence of other messages, etc. (6)

Hence the potential for the radical-like re-interpretation of past interpretations, the possible radical-like reconfiguration of current implications for philosophical explorations, etc., and, the ensuing consequences stemming from such probable ramifications reflecting such radical-like re-positionings… But, over the course of this commentary, let me demonstrate that the ramifications of the reconfigured contents of this repurposing, indeed, are quite radical. (7)

In bold I quickly note the following:

> …**Where conjectures mediate both the analytical and synthetical contributions in a process of 'mediation', but, through emergence, cannot be reduced to the former, and, furthermore, add on an ongoing process of progressive**

> **specification to its semantic deliberations, i.e., in continually thematizing the output of its truth determinations**…[44] (8)

Alluding to the expression mediation in both the title of this Book 11 as also re-stated in each of these essays. (9)

Then, making a first allusion to 'intermediation' also in the title…along with the key 'observation' that neither analytical propositions nor synthetical statements nor any attention to the analytical-synthetical distinction could be entertained without this third element of the conjectural (or its practical equivalent [through economic complexification[45]]):

> Where, furthermore, the dynamically balanced suspension of all three economic correlativities then oversees the emergent 'intermediation' of an existentially oriented dimension to lived-experience. Or, put more simply, **a conjectural dimension is overlooked in a simplistic analytical-synthetical divide** (where these three economic correlativities, equally, cannot be purely isolated apart from this economy of truth determination rendering the imagined isolation[46] of so-called necessary truths as necessarily impossible and, therein and thereby, putting a definitive end to many forms of traditional metaphysical speculation).[47] [0] (9)

Also stressing that previous interpretations of 'necessary truths' along traditional lines are metaphysically fraudulent! On the other hand, not automatically implying the total deconstruction of metaphysics *per se* given its viable reconstruction and repurposing in *Book* 9. (10)

What aspirations do I apparently wish to entertain (in writing *Book* XI)? At various points the reasoning behind a promotion and re-writing of conjectures is expressed by

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44 *Pursuit*, III.XIB.0.

45 A working concept that argues that through the archetypal nature of the economic the three senses of the intentional, e.g., are mirrored in all similar economic moments coinciding archetypally. Those three senses being intentional objectivity (where the archetypal moment is nominated as 'Object') (and as paralleling the Husserlian expression 'noematic'); intentional motivation (as paralleling the Husserlian expression 'noetic') ('World'); and, intentional subjectivity (paralleling, more or less, the Husserlian expression 'transcendental subjectivity') ('Ego'). On this basis a parallel dictionary can be formulated to assist in this process of providing a more complex reading of a certain economic moment or correlative. The idea of 'correlatives' being derived from Husserl's concept of 'noetic-noematic correlativity', but, in my appropriation of this concept between all three economic correlatives we find three parallel forms of correlativity, namely, Object-Ego, Ego-World, and World-Object. Moreover, the World-Object-Ego reading of this complex process of correlation can also be read as operating along 'harmonic' lines (of economic resolution, albeit in a manner that will be seen as being expressed 'non-economically' channelling Laruelle).

46 In a conceptual and constitutional conjecture that insists on our not being able to pursue an impossible economic correlative isolationalism. Where, e.g., the purely analytical cannot be isolated from both the synthetical and the conjectural except in a contrived and artificial manner in which a propositional-statement is declared to be either analytical or otherwise. So, e.g., 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' is treated as analytical as a choice since it could also be read as a synthetical observation, or, even as a conjecture when posed as a clarification of semantic meaning, i.e., it is seemingly true, linguistically, that this person is spoken of as a 'bachelor' given that they are 'unmarried', and v.v.

47 *Ibid*., 0.

myself. E.g., in the *Foreword* I note this complex, repurposed concept of ‘conjectures’ is a bit like a piece of a puzzle that could fit in more than one puzzle:

> The concept of ‘conjectures’ has appeared as if a versatile piece of one puzzle that is also capable of slotting into a number of other problematic scenarios that, both collectively and progressively, enrich an evolving understanding of this specific topic. E.g., decades ago, in working on my thesis, in both versions, I reworked a bimodal hermeneutic circle into a trimodal economic format (thereafter referred to by myself as ‘the hermeneutic circle of comprehension’). But, with the so-called third moment, as a third economic correlative, I was only able to post it under the open rubric of ‘whole/s-and-parts’ without being able to do much more with that concept (other than equate it with an ‘overall transcendental suspension’ also tri-modally constituted)…[48] (11)

We could imagine we have two jigsaw sets, say, made by the same company, with a piece of blue sky missing in one that could use a piece of the blue sky from another jigsaw puzzle. Or, less ‘puzzling’ we might speculate that the *modus operandi* of a certain ‘cat burglar’ or ‘cat burglars’ is such that they climb the walls of high apartment buildings with locked doors at nighttime, whose occupants are on their holidays, who enter through open windows and steal money, jewelry, and other small items of value only. That such a supposition, as a conjecture, is proposed to explain that there is a non-coincidental link between a number of recent burglaries that appear to conform to a similar pattern, namely, thefts occurring from high-rise apartment buildings whose occupants are on holiday, which all had locked doors, open windows, and where only small items were stolen. Either there is one skillful cat burglar or more than one, perhaps working together? In other words, this metaphor suggests a missing piece to a puzzle that can explain a number of puzzling phenomena. In the quotation cited, I noted that the concept of conjectures, albeit repurposed, can act as ‘a versatile piece of one puzzle’ that ‘is also capable of slotting into a number of other problematic scenarios…’ (12)

Just what ‘scenarios’ are noted here and elsewhere later in this essay? (13)

Two scenarios are noted in this passage (although the second of ‘the overall transcendental suspension’ is not explored and scrutinized in detail). (14)

In economically translating a bimodal hermeneutic circle into a trimodal ‘hermeneutic circle of comprehension’ the formula is noted “‘whole/s’, ‘parts’, and ‘whole/s-and-parts’”. By ‘whole/s’ I am simply alluding to the fact that a ‘whole’ in one context could be a ‘part’ in some other context just as, e.g., the totality of a propositional sentence is a ‘whole’ in that context and a ‘part’ when we find that sentence in question being embedded within a paragraph, etc. I.e., what defines a ‘whole’ *versus* a ‘part’ is context dependent. Or, by extrapolation, in an economy of economic correlatives ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ the

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48 *Pursuit,* III.XIA.(Foreword).ii.

third corelative (the so-called 'third moment'[49]) can be defined as '*a* + *b*' (i.e., in words as '*a*-and-*b*'). (15)

In passing I note its equation with the trimodal translation of the overall transcendental suspension conceived of as the balance suspension of all three moments simultaneously, and, where the third moment itself is the balanced suspension of the first two moments. In effect, paralleling my recent concepts, respectively, of 'intermediation' and 'mediation'. Where 'intermediation' is the 'trimodal suspension of the economy enacted through a state of dynamic balance', and, where 'mediation' is the 'balanced suspension of the first two moments (as economic correlatives, polarities, etc.)'. Where, in the exploration of the analytical-synthetical distinction, e.g., we find the conjectural nature of mediation 'mediates' both the analytical and the synthetical, but, through emergence cannot be reduced to the former. (16)

That, throughout this essay, this '*a* + *b*' motif find various forms of translation. For convenience let me list them in their order of introduction. (17)

E.g., I allude to the interrogative economy, i.e., the asking of a question (as the conjectural force or disciplinary impetus at work in any economy):

> In my previous explications of the interrogative economy the apparitional moment or correlativity can now be seen to coincide with the conjectural orientation (through economic complexification given the coincidence of the synthetical with the hermeneutical role of the rhetorical, and, the analytical role of the phenomenological and metaphorical aspects, etc. The implication also follows that the conjectural is at the very least non-systematically existential in orientation).
>
> [12] (18)

That by such a comparative manoeuvre (through an invocation of economic complexification) we have also equated 'conjecture/s' as coinciding with 'the non-systematic existential moment (in the philosophical economy)'. (19)

So, many years ago, e.g., when working on my *Thesis*, I merely had this simple formula in order to note the difference between these economic moments of 'whole/s', 'parts', and 'whole/s-and-parts' (along with these embryonic ideas of the 'extensive suspension'). But, now, much water has flowed beneath this specific bridge and by invoking a repurposing of 'conjectures' a rich, complex set of ideas can now be bound together under this rubric of this so-called 'third moment (of the 'conjectural')'. (20)

Hence:

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[49] The 'third moment' being defined by a conventional sense of order, but, where we can start with any of the three economic correlatives to then define the second moment and, thence, by default, our automatic defining of the so-called 'third moment'. I.e., in an economy with *x* and *y* correlatives we can define the third as '*x* + *y*'. of course, how we define '+' is another matter (since we have a number of ways of doing so through the application of the concept, e.g., of 'economic complexification').

> In a trimodal interpretation of the hermeneutic circle[50] as interactions entertained between 'whole', and 'parts', and 'whole/s-and-parts'... the latter correlativity of 'whole/s-and-parts' can now be read as 'conjectural' (through economic complexification where we can pair 'whole/s' with the 'synthetical orientation', 'parts' with the 'analytical orientation', etc.). [10] (21)

Then, in repurposing the idea of the conjectural, I noted (in its apposition with the specificational orientation of the non-systematic existential moment) that conjectures are focused primarily upon the relatively specific nature of the apparent economics of what is to be found to hand. Hence"

> Elsewhere, I have argued that in an economy of (hermeneutical) generalizations, (phenomenal-phenomenological) particularities, the 'third-party' deals with (non-systematic) existential 'specifications'. Therefore, (through economic complexification), the conjectural dimension must be specifically oriented (but not in any absolutistical sense). Hence one role of conjectures is to emphasize the specificational role of conjectures (contrary to any generalizational bias that might have been previously extended to this type of functioning concept). [13] (22)

Then, the inference is drawn, that in an economy of truth determination that the third moment in this economy must be 'conjectural' in addition to 'synthetical' and 'analytical' aspects of this trimodal economy.[51] (23)

Moreover, under the sub-heading of 'Etc.', I then explicitly note the easier path of just invoking a parallel dictionary in order to supply relevant characteristics in a complexification of this so-called 'third moment' of the 'conjectural'.[52] (24)

I then proffer a working summary of this working concept of the 'conjectural':

> To sum up (the imputed characteristics of this emergent conjectural dimension in its contributing to overall forms of truth determination) let me briefly note that conjectures are to be recognized as playing a central role in all disciplines; need to have some basis in observations be that either directly and/or indirectly; need to be reiterable, intersubjectively appreciated, need to be well-formed and well-informed; accept that synthetical and analytical contributions can be neither disentangled from each other nor co-associated conjectures; interact through the trimodal constitution of a hermeneutic circle of comprehension; involve either the explicit and/or implicit asking of a suitable question, and all that that entails (in an interrogative economy); effectively institutes processes of an existential-like specification of our interpretations of living-experience (as our lived-experience of a lived-reality); whose trimodal constitution conjecturally demands three forms of economic correlativity in the pursuit of truth determination (where conjectures can also be characterized as possessing through economic complexity a tranche of

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50 E.g., as initially explored in both versions of my *Thesis.*

51 *Pursuit*, III.XI, XIB.14.

52 *Ibid*., 15.

> recognizable features like a contemporary time orientation (in the living-present), a non-textual orientation, the simulation of an apparitional-like complexion), etc., along with the reiterable, potentially radical pragmatic cogency that enriches our passage through this world at large both individually and collectively. [16]
>
> More succinctly, I will here define 'conjectures' as 'emergent propositional-statements that facilitate the formation and resolution of expositions whose dissemination are expressed as inter-subjective discourses preferably expressed with either a suitably augmented and/or enhanced degree of pragmatic cogency.
>
> [17] (24)

I then attempt to demonstrate the trimodal nature of the economic through exploring three examples, namely, the 'temporal', 'spatial' and 'translational economies'. However, numerous other examples are also scattered throughout this text, e.g., Boolean Algebra,[53] the expansion/contraction of the volume of an object,[54] cosmological space,[55] etc. The trimodal nature of both languages and argumentation.[56] (25)

Besides these manoeuvres just noted, what other methods does this text suggest as a method for articulating the nature of the third economic moment coincident with the conjectural. Such triplicities can be already packaged like 'past, present, and future'. Or, through the use of rhyme as in my examples of descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions',[57] or, 'presentation, representation, and re-presentation'.[58] With the general injunction being implicitly maintained that if an economy is distinctively present(ed) then we should be able to articulate its 'three primary economic correlatives' or 'correlativities' upon its closer exploration and scrutiny.[59] (26)

Thence these historical travels of mine from a simple '*a*-and-*b*' to our more simply inspecting a well-constructed parallel dictionary (already delineating such archetypal parallels). (27)

Now, under the slow historical Genesis of this imputation of conjectures, as coincident with the third-moment, I articulate how this important third party can no longer be overlooked. First, I note various characteristics of this imputation of conjectures under the headings of Recognition, etc. Then, second, a little later, under an *ad hoc* set of eight headings,[60] I proffer a provisional classification of conjectures under the categories of the Constitutional, etc. Implicitly, and only alluded to in this text, is a more formal inter-

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53 *Ibid*., 23.

54 *Ibid*., footnote 14.

55 *Ibid*., footnote 13.

56 *Ibid*., 23.

57 *Ibid*., 31.

58 *Ibid*., 32.

59 Note I am using technical language here. Broadly, 'research' is 'exploratory' and obtained through 'scrutiny'. Whereas 'hermeneutic generalities' are 'investigated' (counter-reductively); 'phenomenological particularities' are 'analysed' (reductively); and, both 'non-systematic and systematic existential 'specificities' are (emergently) 'examined'.

60 Note the eighth category of Defective Conjectures is a non-category by noting that even defective conjectures will appear to 'operate' in the disciplinary field in question.

ordered approach where the previous classification can be put on a more formal basis.[61] However, before we move in that direction of relative formality let me summarize and de-conflict this aspect of mediation that appears to delineate the economic characteristics of this third moment of the conjectural, etc. (28)

On one hand, we can mutually define any 'one economic correlative' through 'the joint negation of the other two moments'. So, in a conjectural economy (of conjectural propositional-statements, analytical propositions, and synthetical statements) 'conjectures' can be defined as 'both not propositions and not statements' and, thence, as 'propositional-statements'. But, on the other hand, in proposing the third correlative aspect of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension it was noted as 'whole/s-and-parts' which, in terms of its logical form, would appear to contradict this prior definition of a joint negation given its logical status as an apparent joint addition? But, to account for 'emergent form' we could suggest a more analogical route on the grounds that an 'identity', a 'negated identity', and a 'doubly negated identity' all still share an isomorphic core relationship to the 'non-negated states of identity' as long as we see a non-relative form of identification and accept a provisional approximation of this more central region in such identification. Because emergent identity cannot be reductively treated as completely coincident with its pre-relational constitution, we would need to make distinctions that are more or less relatively superficial to such forms of emergence. So, e.g., in 'overlooking' forms of either 'negation' and/or 'joint negation and/or 'double non-negation and/or 'joint double negation', etc., we might respectfully suggest that in less relative terms (but not non-relative terms) that the persisting form is more 'a+b' regardless of how we treat this emergent compound and its constituent elements either collectively or individually. In effect, defining mediation as being combined but not able to be reductively treated to the mere sum of its constituent elements. This non-reductive 'overlooking' perhaps going some way to perhaps resolve my previous attempts to more fully understanding the third economic moment of the 'apparitional' as conjectured to exist in the interrogative economy as somewhat akin to a continual formation along provisional lines of the 'as-if, as-if, as-if…', which in subjecting it to the parallel treatment of an economically complexified co-association with Boolean Algebra suggested its alliance with the third operation of 'negation' but which I then reinterpreted as a more a process of 'double negation'. I.e., in further invoking the third correlative aspect of the simulational (aspect of the non-textual economy in the textual economy) we could simulate identity in question as 'if it were that identity being identified' through a process of double negation. So, e.g., the proverbial 'cow' is 'not a non-cow'. By such means linking the 'as-if…' with (Boolean) 'negation' through a 'double negation', and so on. Or, where such equivocation appears to be somewhat necessary when we are more directly dealing with non-reductive forms of emergence. That, in effect, such logical approximations more hint at the ramifications of emergence rather than being able to non-transformationally articulate its final productivity merely in terms of its initial pre-treatment product(ity). That, a residue of emergent difference cannot be articulated in such relatively non-commensurate terms and needs to be merely re-identified as such rather than attempt to fruitlessly render, definitively, its relative final states through reductively oriented equations and formulae. A bit like baking a cake. Yes, it is still 'flour and water, and all the other ingredients', yet, the 'experi-

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61 *Ibid*., 4, 46, footnote 21.

ential ‘cake-ness’ of the cake is the final product and its baked emergence cannot obviously be reduced to its mere constituents as we do not really ‘slice’ a pile of flour and water before its being baked even though our knife can seem to ‘cut’ through the mixture before its being baked. Just such apparent ‘cutting’ misses the point of what it more correctly means to ‘cut a piece of cake’ and render that cake as being ‘cut into two parts’ since in cutting the cake batter or paste it does not remain as separate portions or ‘parts’ unless also pulled apart. That, at the end of the metaphorical ‘day’ we point to the finished product of the cake and call it a ‘cake’ and no longer as a (pre-baked) portion of ‘dough’ or ‘batter’ or ‘paste’, and so on. Suffice to say, in the light of the moral of this comparison that emergent identity is somewhat a dialectical-like mixture of couplings and negations that cannot be pinned down in such analogical terms. Just as the emergent ‘cake’ is both the addition of its constituents along with their negations both individually and collectively (as a mere mixture), etc. Or, as ‘directed indications’ if not, more correctly, as ‘re-directed analogies’ that will need to be ‘re-identified accordingly…’ (29)

Again, the moral of this analogical exploration of emergence is that this type of process cannot and should not be mistreated in a reductive frame of reference unless suitably qualified that our intent is more focused upon its ‘origins’ rather than its ‘ends’. (30)

Hence my cautionary advice in this regard that emergence as topic is better reviewed through the lens of a ‘transformational philosophy of retreatment’ as explored elsewhere.[62] (31)

This ‘analogical representation of emergence’ is entailed in the concepts of ‘mediation’ and ‘intermediation’. The mechanism in both instances is ‘seen’ as a ‘dynamically balanced suspension with the parties held in some form of apposition’. But even the order of my introduction of these two concepts is conventional and artificial given the dialectical spontaneity of both co-associated processes. If anything, ‘mediation’ is predicated on ‘intermediation’ and not v.v. But, then, it would be more truthful to say that even intermediation is only possible given the relational reciprocity of its relevant placement within a relational sense of world through an economy of contextualization. I.e., in an economy of re(-)contextualization. Just as our focus on the bimodalism of a process of mediation must find its pre-conditional basis in an economy of intermediation, which, in turn, has the same type of pre-conditional requirement met in the placement of intermediation within an economy of re(-)contextualization. (32)

As a convention, I introduce this overall topic through the mediation, i.e., bimodal suspension of World and Object in the so-called ‘third moment’ of the ‘non-systematic existential’ (Ego). Then, through intermediation, through a dynamic trimodal suspension of World, Object, and Ego we arrive at a relatively more systematic version of the existential through its implicit relational re(-)contextualization, and so on. However, adopting another set of conventions we could equally arrive at two other forms of the so-called ‘third moment’ by choosing a different bimodal set of moments in the first place. Hence the necessity for these dialectical qualifications of our needing to note the actual linear method or methods being chosen. That, at the end of the delineation of the imputed dia-

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62 E.g., in *The Seventh Book*… under the relevant modules dealing with this complex topic.

lectical process actually adopted and adapted we need to be mindful that such linear steps undertaken both represent and misrepresent that same sense and semblance of a dialectical process in question. Hoping, of course, that such limited manoeuvres produce and represent more value than that also lost through its co-associated misrepresentation (recognizing that the recognition of such misrepresentation is an additional step in this same dialectical process of de-mis-representation, etc. Hence the presentation and qualification of these two central concepts of mediation and intermediation that collectively asssist us in our coming to also understand how we move from an inchoate sense of the existential in the relatively non-systematic existential moment of Ego and its dialectical-like clarification through both 'intermediation' and 'relational re(-)contextualization'. (33)

Now, to remedy our oversight over the importance and necessity of the conjectural dimension in any discussion of the analytical-synthetical distinction, etc., in the section titled *Genesis* I addressed a number of approaches as to how we might rectify this oversight. For a start, it is obvious that we can surmise that all disciplines are replete with conjectures all ostensively out seeking various forms of truth determination be that conjectural, factual, finding forms of e/valuational formation in keeping with the disciplinary tenor of those conjectures, etc. So, e.g., in historically oriented conjectures, the emphasis is on telling a story, in the form of a coherent narrative, that 'illuminates' the 'history' being recounted, and so on. Hence this experiential concept of 'recognition', that conjectural aspect of the conjectural economy (which could equally be seen as an 'analytical economy' or a 'synthetical economy' depending upon the oriented nature of our qualified processes of preferential treatment) can and should be recognized when this economic aspect is suitably pointed out. So, we would expect, that once this dimension is pointed out as a prominent feature, apparently of each and every discipline, we should at least ask ourselves just what role the propositional-statements of a conjectural dimension might play in all our future proceedings. (34)

Then, under the heading of *Observation* I noted the role 'observation' must either directly and/or indirectly play in this pursuit of such considerations. That even when we discuss a theoretical scientific concept like 'atoms', an enormous quantity of observations has led us to this conjected point of view even though atoms *per se* are not directly seen. This type of consideration is not to be seen as some form of empiricism, realism, or logical positivism, or similar. Rather, it merely notes that a certain 'type' and 'density' of observations are necessary, in accordance with the 'existential' nature of the topic in question, in terms of its distinctive specification, in order to establish the apparent legitimacy of the ensuing truth determinations to be made in that disciplinary field in question. So, e.g., the truth determinations enacted by scientists in a field of science are somewhat different to those demanded by a cohort of historians, and v.v. Similarly, as a test case in this regard, we might enquire just what observations should a theologian articulate in order to establish the ensuing legitimacy of their discipline? That in this regard, there is no difference other than in the type and density of observational reports needed to develop their disciplinary forms of treatment, etc., as subjected to the transformation rules established by that type of disciplinarian. So, the theologian might discuss their concepts of human nature, various problems to be found in their observations regarding such a topic, the various formulation of conjectured remedies in the theological light of their theologi-

cal formations, etc., etc. Hopefully, being aware of the dictum that ‘what is not there for us cannot not be there for us, and v.v.’, and, if that were to be the case, ‘then we need not be there for it!’ That, therefore, the theologian is bound by a central relationship between the numinous nature of their conjectured theological or theological-like domain and the domain of the secular (as previous discussed under the concept of a non-disciplinary difference or non-disciplinary differential’, etc., as must pertain to all disciplines seeking to be relevant, and find relevance, in the lives of its disciplinarians and their audiences or congregations, etc.). (35)

Hence the importance of this concept of observations (of the world at large, etc.), in order to somewhat ‘reality-base’, in experience, the conjectural dimension of that approach being researched. In other words, conjectures that are merely conjectured in hypothetical terms of reference can only find an apparent relevance in those theoretical terms of reference to the extent that they also impinge on our readings and writings concerning our very being in this world at large, etc. That, in effect, the type and density of observational reports will influence the apparent existential relevance of the scrutiny being apparently exercised within such explorations. Thence this ‘observation’ that the relevance of our conjectures is a measure of the extent they are not merely proposed and treated as mere conjectures (which, to be quite honest, is somewhat antithetical to the nature of the conjectural dimension when we understand its penchant for existential specification of the topic in question… in this imputed psychic movement from generalization to particularity to specification… without implying non-provisional forms of arriving at an impossible indubitability of engineered end-points when specifications that are good enough are more often than not ‘good enough’ to take up and appropriate… in the light of those current tasks to hand, be they either more disciplinary or secular in the nature of their aspirational intent). (36)

The next requirement in our characterization of conjectures was the importance to be placed on their ‘iterability’. A conjecture that could not be reiterated was not and cannot be a conjecture as here understood. In this regard I also noted:

> Moreover, conjectures cannot be absent from a ‘respectable’ process of truth determination and, furthermore, should be both well-formed (for re-iteration) and well-informed (given this need for an observable dimension to also be both directly or indirectly present and reality based in lived-experience). [7] (37)

That closely associated with this iterability was the need for a conjectural propositional-statement or a set of such propositional-statements, etc., to be both ‘well-formed’ and ‘well-informed’. The latter aspect referencing this previous requirement for an observational basis in lived-experience. That there should be an ‘insatiable appetite’ for facts rather that factoids, or similar, in order to not render such conjectures as defective conjectures that only appear to proffer positively affirmed forms of truth determination in keeping with the nature of the relevant semantic fields in question. Where possible, at all times, ‘we need to walk on both legs’ and it would be inconceivable to insist that we should ‘break one or both legs’. In other words, as respectable philosophers, as respecta-

ble disciplinarians and secularists, we need to insist that our current conjectures be both ‘well-formed’ and ‘well-informed’! (38)

The next heading of a *Non-Isolationalism* references the conjecture that no economic correlativity (correlative) can be extracted and isolated from its respective economy. That to do so is defined as both ‘extremist’ and ‘ideologically oriented’. Indeed, as impossible to execute to the extent such isolationalism is being proposed and over-preferentially (mis)treated. Now, this conjecture can be formulated in both positively affirmative and negatively dis-conformative formats. I.e., that there exists no possibility for the ideological isolation of the parties, i.e., both participants and parts, of any economy to be purely isolated and treated in their own right as if for themselves alone, or purely from themselves or to be found purely in and through themselves, and so on. This applies both unimodally and bimodally. So, in the conjectural economy there can be no pure analytical propositions, no pure synthetical statements (rightly or wrongly treated as such) and no pure conjectural propositional-statements. Similarly, the analytical-synthetic distinction ‘itself’ likewise cannot be treated in own right other than in reference to the trimodal constitution of the conjectural economy itself (albeit, at the same time, without the non-relative (absolutistical) de-contextualizing its relational emplacement in this world at large, etc.). So, this conjecture could be either affirmatively written as ‘there exists no forms of economic isolationalism’, or, formed in a dis-conformative sense that ‘there cannot exist forms of economic isolationalism’. On the other hand, given its use of negation we should more correctly treat it as a ‘negative conjecture’ in that same regard (in contrast to the central and crucial ‘positive conjecture’ that states ‘all economies are trimodally constituted’). Where, it should also be added, both types of conjecture can be ‘observed’ as either being apparently ‘present’ or ‘absent’ in our lived-experience and over the course of our ‘lived-interpretations’ of this world at large, etc.[63] (39)

Hence my comment:

> An appreciation of this subtle, dialectical positioning means that truth determination is the productive result of the economic engagement of all three economic correlativities, namely, the synthetical, the analytical, and the conjectural. That, with the impossible absence of any one of these three parties, either explicitly or implicitly, nothing other than the defective can be comprehended and appreciated as such. [9] (40)

The next heading of *The Hermeneutic Circle of Comprehension* notes my first unwittingly encounter, as previously related, with the conjectural dimension through my trimodal treatment of the hitherto bimodal treatment of the hermeneutic circle of this imputation of ‘whole/s-and-parts’. In the process noting the following identifications:

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[63] My technical use of ‘apparently’ indicating the implication of a ‘phenomenal-phenomenological orientation’.

> …the latter correlativity of 'whole/s-and-parts' can now be read as 'conjectural' (through economic complexification where we can pair 'whole/s' with the 'synthetical orientation', 'parts' with the 'analytical orientation', etc.). [10] (41)

By introducing my explorations of the Interrogative Economy, I wish to make various connections through economic complexification as to how we might further characterize this third economic aspect, i.e., this correlative that archetypally matches the 'third moment' of the conjectural.[64] Let me explain. (42)

This economic reading assumes the first asking of a question which in suspensional terms of reference is a dis-conjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'. As a first reply I envisage the supplying of a relevant metaphor. Now, a metaphor is a conjunctive suspension of the 'both like and not like'. But in the usual asking of a question, we would not be satisfied if we were only supplied with a metaphorical allusion. Even if we were to ask the question 'does the moon look like a big blue cheese?' the affirmation is more than just like a big blue cheese being it is like a big blue cheese (which is not just metaphorical given its expression as also an affirmation of this identification). Hence the third moment takes on a literal appearance which I have treated as 'apparitional'. As if it is the case that … this is as if this is the case that… as if this is the case that… Implying through this recursive reiteration that the 'final' truth determination is actually forever 'provisional'. But with some equivocation on my part since I also borrow from Boolean Algebra the idea that this so-called (and conventional assigned) 'third moment' has a negative persona in some form or other, namely, in this instance, as a double negation of the initial identification. I.e., as 'not not *x*' (where *x* is the metaphorical first reply). So, e.g., does the moon look like a big blue cheese? 'Yes, it is not not like a metaphorical big blue cheese', i.e., 'it, indeed, does look like a big blue cheese'. Hence my reading of the interrogative economy… as following these rhetorical, metaphorical and apparitional moments. (43)

The point of this non-digression (into the reading of an interrogative economy) is to make the comparison of the so-called 'third moment of the conjectural' as effectively also paralleling the 'apparitional moment' in its apparent but provisional simulation of the expression of the ensuing truth conditional propositional-statement in its manifested semblance. I.e., that the conjectural moment is 'apparitional' or 'simulated', is a 'provisional affirmation' being arrived at through a 'double negation' rather than a mere affirmation *per se*, is something that seems to be 'demonstrated' or 'self-demonstratable'. In finessing this form of economic complexification, a number of other qualifications can also arise (along with all other relevant allusions arising from this creative supplying and applying of any other infinite number of complexified possibilities). (44)

At this point let me reintroduce my two interrelated concepts of 'mediation and intermediation'. As the 'third moment' the dynamically balanced suspension of the first two moments 'mediates' the imputed interactions of the former. So, in a conjectural economy we can say that conjectures mediates both 'the necessity of analytical propositions' and 'the contingency of synthetical propositions', along with the analytic-synthetic

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[64] Which will be the 'third moment' if we take a conventional, linear, harmonic ordering of 'World-Object-Ego'.

distinction itself between these two former moments through 'the imputed cogency of conjectural propositional-statements', and, that through a dynamically balance of all three moments we arrive at the intermediation of this economy where the relatively non-systematic expression of the existential is now expressed along more systematic existential lines of expression. Now, that just as the emergence of the mediation of conjectures cannot be reductive treated on par with either the analytical or the synthetical or their mere combination, so, too, intermediation implies that the ensuing productivity of the overall conjectural economy cannot be reduced to either pre-mediated or the post-mediated. I.e., that the intermediated sense and semblance of an existential complexion can no longer be merely viewed as non-systematically existential but as being able to manifest or simulate a more systematic sense and semblance of existential expressivity. Moreover, by such means the 'weak' pragmatic nature of the 'third' conjectural moment can now take on a more overt existential expression where the manifested existential in its more systematic sense and semblance becomes equated with its direct paralleling of the pragmatic in its now non-ideologically oriented affirmational sense and semblance of its ensuing expression as both jointly systematically existential and pragmatically affirmative. Hence my reasoning for noting a co-associated pairing of the systematic existential with a non-weak sense and semblance of pragmatic affirmation (whilst being mindful of my distinction between the overall pragmatic in its existential manifestation and the fourth trans-cognitively ordered sense and semblance of a not unrelated appreciation of the pragmatical viewed under a lens that is perceived as merely effective and/or efficient and/or efficacious, and so on. Not that the systematic existential expression of the non-weakly pragmatic is not effective, etc., but, rather is primarily filtered through a third trans-cognitively ordered deontological-existential lens and, then, secondarily, through its adjuncts of the aesthetical and the pragmatical [to then be, thirdly, filtered through its tertiary adjuncts of a fifth trans-cognitively order hermeneutic possibility, a sixth trans-cognitively ordered ontical factuality, and a first trans-cognitively phenomenal-phenomenological process of semantic mapping/s]). (45)

In light of the above we can then make the following distinctions in regard to the instantiation of a pragmatic form of expression (and not so much the pragmatical), namely, an ideologically 'strong' pragmatism, that is best avoided as either distorted in its least expression or as totally misconstrued through an over-promoted version which must become practically impossible to either recognize, encounter and/or engage; as a 'weak' non-promoted form of pragmatism (in cooperation with weak forms of realism and idealism as would be utilized in an aspirational economy); and, under a relatively systematic existential transformation, as giving rise to a more practical and fruitful form of a 'non-weak' pragmatism more in tune, i.e., attuned, with its relational situatedness. Indeed, under the tenor of those circumstances can then be perceived as operating from a now both pro-relational and trans-relational sense and semblance of a living-perspective wherein nothing other than a situated relational ethics is effectively operating in and through the expression of the primary relationship itself, albeit as its perceives its own relational situatedness, which, in turn, is to be found within the dynamics its arising through the ensuing empowerment of the relationship itself as it finds itself both 'speaking and acting' within and from this overall world of the relational. Hence these three distinctions of the

pragmatic, namely, the (ideologically) ‘strong’, the (mediated) ‘weak’, and the (intermediated) ‘non-weak’. (46)

In a similar manner, we can view the existential status of the apparent expression of a certain primary relationship, namely, as either ideologically ‘strong’ and, therein and thereby, non-existentially oriented; as ‘weak’ and only non-systematically oriented in its potential existential terms of reference; and, as ‘non-weak’ to the extent it is observing an intermediated sense and semblance of a pro-relational and trans-relational identification with its apparent relational situatedness within the world of the relational *per se*, i.e., from the perspective of the world of the relational itself. Ideally, of course, it would be nice if everyone were to pursue their relationships from a ‘committed’ perspective whilst pursing neither (an absolutistically) over-committed nor (a relativistically) un(der)-committed point of view. In effect, making this important distinction between an ideologically over-committed point of view and a non-ideologically committed existentially oriented point of view whilst, equally, having no truck whatsoever with any form of either an uncommitted perspective or under-committed perspective. (47)

That, in our passages through this world, both individually and collectively, we are being called upon ‘to make a stand’, when and where this is existentially being ‘called for’, but, at the same time to avoid all forms of either over-commitment or under-commitment. Thence this to be preferred preference for the ‘non-weak’ rather than the ideologically ‘strong’ or the simple potentiality of the merely ‘weak’. That, in this regard, it would be natural to ask ‘just how is such a committed position to be arrived at?’ Quite simply ‘through the imposition of transcendental suspensions’, but, such simplicity belies the complexity of what is to be non-intuitively appreciated under such rubric. To this end, the rest of this book will endeavour to detail just how the conjectural economy can be operated in both a pragmatic and existential attitude that is more likely to observe the orchestrated and enhanced enrichment of our relationships (more from a pragmatic perspective and not so much from a mere utilitarian, pragmatical point of view). (48)

That the point of introducing the interrogative economy is to make the connection through economic complexification that the conjectural economy can invoke an allusion between ‘conjectures’ and ‘the non-systematic existential’ with the further implication that a ‘weak pragmatism’ is co-extensive with the ‘existential’ in its systematic sense through intermediation. That, by such means, that the existential transformation of this weak pragmatism can then be viewed as a ‘non-weak pragmatism’ with a concomitant sense of commitment that cannot be dismissed as either over-committed or under-committed or non-committed (with the latter being arrived at through some non-involved form of deferment, etc.). That, ‘the implication also follows that the conjectural is at the very least non-systematically existential in complexion (along with the potential possibility of its existential transformation along more systematic lines via the mechanism of intermediation[65]). (49)

This aspect of the conjectural, corresponding with the existential, whether expressed from either a non-systematic orientation or to a more explicit systematic orienta-

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65 *Pursuit*, III.XIB.23.

tion, is also coincident with this sub-orientation of 'specification' as its location in an economy of dealing with 'generalization, particularity, and specification of experiential detail'. In other words, contrary to first impressions, conjectures are not generalizations, but, rather, a process of increasing specification. So, e.g., in a perceptual situation, conjectures entered into have this role of honing into an increased appreciation of the perceptual detail being scrutinized from that perceptual sense of interaction. Say, I see a bowl of six apples, which, on closer inspection, I would then be in a better position to choose one of those pieces of fruit as a better example to eat on the basis of my past knowledge derived from previously having eaten apples. Indeed, one of those apples has started to rot a little on one side so my first thoughts are to choose one of those other apples which, I have to confess, all look very edible and delicious. However, I have second thoughts. I take the apple with its blemishes as noted and with a knife cut out the small, defective section of that apple and find my eating of the rest of that apple to have been a good choice. Now, at each stage in this series of conjectures, paralleling the various patterns of my behaviour entered into have, in effect, involved myself in a process of increasing specification. That this is exactly in line with my understanding of existential experience in which the relational situation in question is subjected to an increasing degree of detailed appreciation… until that time we wish to alter our experiential focus be that from our now no longer finding a certain richness of detail and a subsequent loss of interest in that situation to a re-direction of our current intent for whatever reason or reasons. That, effectively, the natural role of conjectural scrutiny is to finesse the interactive detail of that experiential relationship as realized through such forms of appreciation. So, contrary to a misplaced conventional wisdom, that might suggest conjectures are vast processes of generalizations, in lived-reality we find the opposite to be the case, namely, a tendency to fine-tune the forms of appreciation being entered into… along with the forms of truth determination concomitant with this same increasing appreciation of detail. (50)

Of course, it must go without my having once again to note that conjectural economies dealing with propositional-statements (or the same economy focusing, instead, more on analytical propositions or synthetical statements) cannot be other than trimodally constituted as is the conjectured nature of all economies (as typified by the archetypal economy and its gestalt modelling and interpretation).[66] That to understand this reading of the economic requires a hypothetical acceptance of this constitutional conjecture, However, on the other hand, such a pre-conditional acceptance does not demand any form of philosophical acceptance in that same regard. Such a positional attitude deserves to be well-thought through first, but, am confident such a shift would be taken up after due diligence has been first performed… (51)

In regard to 'Etc.' I am directly referring to the use of a parallel dictionary, compiled through past considerations of economic complexification, or, to the exercising of current processes of economic complexification in order to enrich the significance of a certain economic correlative. In this instance, concentrating our attention on the so-called 'third moment' of the 'conjectural' (and hence its co-association with the non-systematic existential, present temporal experience, specification, etc.[67]). (52)

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66 Commenting on paragraph 14. *Ibid*., 14.

67 As re-noted in paragraph 16.

Refining a definition of the conjectural as:

> …'emergent propositional-statements that facilitate the formation and resolution of expositions whose dissemination are expressed as inter-subjective discourses preferably expressed with either a suitably augmented and/or enhanced degree of pragmatic cogency. [17] (53)

Introducing the triple apposition of 'analytical necessity', 'synthetic contingency', and 'conjectural cogency'… with the understanding that none of these aspects, either individually or paired, can be economically isolated from the remainder of their respective economy. (54)

Taking on board the idea that conjectures can be 'observed', i.e., when both entertained as a possible interpretation and as a conjectured situation that must be able to be interacted with in some form or other then its stands to reason that its ordered status should be discernible to that same extent and that all reports re the same must duly reflect this observable constitution to that extent it can be conjecturally ascertained and correspondingly specified as such. So, if I were to imagine 'a fruit bowl with six apples' and if I were to see 'a similar bowl with six apples' the differently and distinctively expressed nature of my reports with respect to these two different types of experiences should be reflected accordingly, i.e., as differently and distinctively expressed. 'Imagining' is one thing and 'perceiving' is a different kind of visualization. Both types of experience can be treated as forms of 'visualization' but these two kinds of experience are phenomenologically quite distinctly different (otherwise no distinction could be entertained between 'imagining' and 'perceiving'). Suffice to say that these two different types of experience are always observed differently even if still treated as forms of 'visualization'. Imaginative images are understood as constructed by our own sense/s of self, whereas, in a stark contrast, perceptual states do seem to be more dictated by what is being seen even if such 'perceptions' are also to be observed as being engineered by our own sense/s of self. That, in effect, imaginative imagery has a differently ordered status from perceptually understood forms of imagery (i.e., a fifth cognitively ordered status as distinct from a six cognitively ordered status)… (55)

But the point of this digression on the observation of conjectures, and the observations entailed within conjectures, is to note this relatively inescapable aspect of 'observation' in our experience of the apparent cogency of the conjectural dimension. An experience of cogency to the extent that it would seem to be more apposite to go along with the cogent force of the conjectural use of its propositional-statements rather than to nullify and erect an opposite form of thesis. When looking at a bowl of ripe and delicious looking apples it is quite possible for me to say to myself that 'I am not looking at a bowl of apples' but the insistent intensity of my affirmation of this counter-observation will no doubt be somewhat weakened should I be hungry and then form the counter-counter-position of wondering what it might be like to eat one of these delicious looking apples. In other words, the world is not 'flat' (unlike the imputed terrain of the transcendental suspension) and in a world of observation a definitively formed thesis is not the equal of

definitively contrasted counter-thesis, and so on. One or other will find itself taking some form of relative preferential treatment and, in that regard, we should soon discover our conjectures will follow accordingly. I see a bowl of 'non-virtual apples' and will act accordingly. Now, if those 'non-virtual apples' are 'wax copies' then I might merely admire them or ignore them, but, if I were to consider eating one of those non-virtual apples in that fruit bowl for 'real' pieces of fruit then my non-virtual process of interaction will be observed quite differently. That with such observations granted, let me now explore how economies take a trimodal format, and, that this trimodal complexion can be inevitably observed as possessing that type of trimodal format in keeping with the professed nature of that economy. I.e., that this economic trimodalism can be duly observed (e.g., under a range of headings as noted, e.g., in paragraph 26). (56)

That to demonstrate this trimodal nature of the economic I introduce, for our further reflections, three economies, namely, the temporal, spatial, and the translational for such considerations. Hence the packaging of 'past, present, and future'; the need for three units of information to establish a circumscribed point in (non-cosmological) space; and, that in translational motion we only have either a linear progression (that goes only in one direction in each moment of time), rotation, and/or reflection… with no exceptions.[68] Each economy expressing three possibilities within its economic terms of reference. (57)

But, if the truth be known, we have trimodal economies everywhere. That this constitutionally conjectured 'fact' is further in evidence throughout this text in the invocation of numerous other examples of the trimodalism of other economies. E.g., where cosmological space is divided up, as per footnote 13, between the curvature of a de-Sitter space, the flatness of a Minkowski universe, and the hyperbolic nature of an anti-de-Sitter space (as implicated in the AdS/CFT duality as pointed out by Juan Malcena). The diligent reviewer of this previous essay would no doubt find I have referenced numerous other examples. (58)

In paragraph 30 we come to a diagram worth its weight in a welter of words. Unfortunately, in deciphering its full intent this diagram can only reduce some of that necessarily ensuing verbiage. (59)

Harking back to my question, 'Where is Father Xmas (Pere Noël)?' I am making a case for the necessity of a 'weak economy' that recognizes 'weak idealistic', 'weak realistic', and 'weak pragmatic' inputs. So, e.g., non-ideological ideas on the topic of intentional objectivity (Object) to my mind are resonant with a 'weak realism', etc. Now, a weak idealism can be seen to coincide with either the consonance of a background field (World) and/or the necessary co-association with intentional subjectivity and for the sake of consistency let me assign the former to a 'weak idealism' in order then to assign a

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[68] Assuming the translated item maintains its shape and volume. But, even if the translated party could change its volume without changing its shape that form of an economy still has only three possibilities, namely, expansion, contraction, and neither expansion nor contraction, the latter through a maintenance of its shape and volume. Interestingly, whilst a translated party could be translated in a certain direction, rotate at the same time and do so in a reflected form, in non-invariant volume and invariant shape economy expansion cannot occur at the same time as a contraction (just as 'direction' is also unimodal in its expression)

'weak pragmatism' with an intentional subjectivity (Ego) that also coincides with a conjectural orientation, a non-systematic existential moment, etc. That, this re-assignment completed implies that my previous interpretation of the aspirational economy (as incorporated and supervised by an overarching arbitrational economy) needs to be suitably amended accordingly. I.e., whereas I assigned an idealistic 'why' to the existential moment (of the non-systematic existential) I must now re-assign a pragmatic orientation of 'how' to this moment instead. By such means echoing this previous diagram through the following emendations to be noted along the following lines:

Weak Idealism-Hermen. 'Why' — **Weak Realism-Phenom. 'What/Where'**
Intentional Background — Intentional Foreground
Synthetical Propositions — Analytical Propositions

Conjectural Mediation

Non-Ideological Pragmatism-Existential 'How'
Conjectural Propositions
(Pragmatic Cogency) [29] (60)

By such means assigning a more forceful sense and semblance to the non-systematic existential moment along with its inevitable non-economic irruption into the hyper-economic wherein the virtually intentional, through instantiated patterns of resolution, then becomes expressed in non-virtual terms of reference. Hence the implied forcefulness of the conjectural aspect imparting a certain definitive or specific 'cogency' to such proceedings on par with analytical 'necessity' and synthetic 'contingency'. (61)

Where the personal nature of the aspirational economy (albeit as forever subservient to the intersubjective orientation of the arbitrational economy) is now a dialectical contest between a hermeneutic 'why', a phenomenal-phenomenological what (and where it is semantically being mapped in our open atlas of the world) and a weak pragmatic sense of 'how' that cannot and should not be reduced to the merely pragmatical (as might be mistakenly arrived at through some misguided form of mere utilitarian calculus, etc.). That, therein and thereby, through some form of apposite existentialization the weakly pragmatic can then inspire the existential to express a non-strong/non-weak form of response that is both responsive, before its participants, and, responsible, before the integrity of the relational situation itself, as it finds itself in its co-associated relational setting. That one role of conjectures is to representatively mirror the important, i.e., relevant, aspects of a relationship as it is to be found in its respective relational setting with a view to expressing all forms of existential intervention correspondingly called for by the apparent expressivity of that relationship itself as it finds itself within its more relevant senses of its being situated in this overall world-of-life, this life-world to be found in this world at large. (62)

This idea of the ‘weak’ is borrowed from John D. Caputo in his re-envisioning of a ‘radical’ theology… where weak is not a sign of true weakness but a profound sign of strength arrived, say, at through reiteration, collective enactment, cooperation with others in a world of arbitration, that positive and definitive sense, e.g., of a history, that arises through an endless conversation that embraces diversity, the natural inequality to be found between all forms of contributing, and so on, and so forth. Just as it is the weakness of water that sculpts the final semblance of the landscape and neither earthquakes nor volcanoes, neither winds nor sunlight, neither the drifting of continental plates nor the arrival of devasting asteroids and comets, etc. That this vision of the ‘radical’ is then extended to my ideas on the dual need for a critical ‘redirection’ of the philosophical discipline and its timely need, from time to time, for its radical ‘re-direction’ when called upon to appositely innovate, to head off in new directions that, hitherto, had not even been able to have been thought of and thought through… where ‘critical redirection’ is a preconditional prerequisite for the emergent advent of the radical event to express itself with a metaphorical ‘voice’ not hitherto heard. That without the critical clarification of our thinking we would not arrive at a position of then recognizing how we must non-economically break free from previous patterns of response, responsiveness, and responsibility in order to take the sense and semblance of re-direction being called for in ensuing patterns of an existential interventionalism. Where the definitive nature of the ‘last moment’ becomes the call of the ‘next moment’ that, through our enacted permission, then becomes the definitive ‘first moment’ of an existentially oriented response, responsiveness, and responsibility. Where, through the apposite running of relevant conjectures, events are construed along more systematic existential lines, i.e., in an alignment with the more integrated trajectories of our relationships, in their relational expression, through which we then find the overall, progressive enrichment of our relationships. These ideas on the ‘radical’, in turn, setting up a revision of the idea of what might be better meant in pursuing a philosophical performance that is both critical and radical over the course of disciplinary enaction. At this point let me note this commentarial ‘digression’ that more correctly is at the very ‘center’ of the philosophical enterprise. (63)

As all disciplines need to invoke ‘successful forms of truth determination’ it is obvious that this distinctive aspect cannot serve as a differentiation of the philosophical discipline from all other worthwhile disciplines. However, let me provide this tentative working definition that attempts to work towards this end, namely, that ‘the philosophical discipline’, can be provisionally defined as ‘that disciplinary approach that embraces a wide variety of sub-philosophical disciplines, is enacted through the critical operation of conjectures, both constitutional and non-constitutional in orientation, in order to supervise an existential interventionalism that oversees the apposite, relevant, enrichment of our relationships through their instantiation, through their truth determination, and through a meta-philosophical appreciation (in a re-purposed metaphysics) of such determinations in order to better supervise this process of instigation that is then to be enacted along such critical and radical lines of emergent uptake’. (64)

More simply, such a definition has the following four moving parts, namely, ‘the critical operation of representative conjectures (representative of the relational situatedness in question)’, both their ‘truth determination’ and ‘meta-truth appreciation’, and

their ensuing ‘relevant enactment of such pragmatically and existentially oriented overall relational enrichment’. Or, more succinctly, ‘**conjectures**’, ‘**truth determination**’, ‘**meta-appreciation**’, and ‘(an existentially-pragmatic process of) **enactment** (along with our needing to be effectively cognizant of its most probable ramifications)’. However, let me look further into this defining of possible philosophical progress in both pragmatic and existential terms of reference later in this book focusing on the economic import of the conjectural dimension. (65)

In effect, the diagram just noted (in paragraph 29) implies, or attempts to depict, the economic position that states that the emergent nature of conjectures basically mediates both analytical and synthetical inputs. Indeed, contributes the third moment to the overall economy of the conjectural (and equally the analytical and the synthetical) as long as we do not economically isolate such correlatives from their interactions with each other within the overall economy of correlation (or analytical focusing or synthetical backgrounding of contextual field, etc.), etc. hence the following comment:

> Of course, should we even attempt to disconnect and isolate these economic correlativities then we move into the increasing nonsense of an ideological world mistreating the economics of these relationships instrumental in the formation, formulation, and circulation of viable forms of e/valuational formation including the delivery of overall processes of truth-determination. [30] (66)

Now, we have this interesting dialectical tension between accepting this economic conjecture that each and every economy is trimodally constituted, and, at the same time, that we cannot absolutistically isolate any one correlativity (from its continuing gestation within that overall economy in question). That we can relatively focus our attention on an economic correlative, yes, but, completely and non-relatively focus our entire attention, no! That to the extent we attempt such an impossible feat is to that same extent we must fail and end up only contemplating the inevitable deconstruction of such a defective conjecture. However, our observation of such defective behaviour does not note any ostensive or stated experience of this expected process of deconstruction, but, instead, the seemingly opposite with rigid forms of over-commitment to such positioning along with the pseudo-psychotic localization expressed through an over-affirmation of such co-associated beliefs, etc. Indeed, this opposite is to be found, namely, an intense counter-reaffirmation of such positioning indicative of this psychotic type of psychological complexion. Rather than falling apart we get this metaphorical ‘digging in’ that can take on quite vigorously asserted expressions of belief if not aggressive or potentially violent forms of expression. So, how might we better explain this observation of an intense reaction to what could otherwise have been experienced as a possible self-deconstruction in personal beliefs and the ensuing collapse of such co-associated forms of over-commitment concomitant with such central positioning? For a start, we might note a pervasive reluctance to perform any form of a suspension. The simple asking of a question pertaining to such central beliefs immediately seems to trigger an equally strong counter-reaction. Whereas, to merely invite the person to consider a range of other possibilities would seem to endlessly solicit a set of reiterated denials, as opportunities to reassert their core beliefs on such matters. So, e.g., from the fact ‘that vaccines can have unin-

tended side effects' to the position 'that all vaccines are dangerous', and, that to assert vaccines mandates, regardless of our beliefs about vaccines, is to then abrogate personal freedom even if such mandates are actually predicated on the basis of the individual giving up some degree of their personal freedom for the overall good of society wherein more people, especially the more vulnerable, can enjoy the freedom to live without the greater likelihood of their become ill and more probable death in that period of an epidemic. Of course, all associated issues here are problematic but can only be compounded through demonstrated forms of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information. Hence the following motto that in a conjectural sphere we need conjectured arguments that are 'well-informed, well-formed, and well-expressed'. That if our representative conjectures simulating a certain specified form of situatedness were suitably marshalled then we might well be in a better position to oversee their relatively well-expressed expression through the ensuing formation of apposite personal and social forms of responsibility along with their requisite expression in a manner in conformity with such an existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism. What implicit lessons might we draw from a position of a better-informed, less heated sense of hindsight? Perhaps in a dangerous epidemic where the disease vector is not (yet) too infectious a period of isolation of a nominated population and quarantine of infected individuals (and families) might be deemed pragmatically preferable. On the other hand, when and where the disease vector is highly infectious, such patterns of behaviour, namely, isolation and quarantine, would and should prove to be relatively pointless and either no longer insisted upon or not insisted upon in the first place. That, in the latter instance, the self-isolation of the more vulnerable might be a better strategy and where their ensuing care would be appropriately overseen. Then, in regard to mandates, other strategies for the apparent advancement of the so-called 'social good' might more wisely be instituted (and not need to be undone by the legal system at a later date or, therein and thereby, at some future date). Perhaps the promotion of a sense of social responsibility might be better instituted and instead of negative costs in non-compliance proffer positive rewards for those that are seen to visibly comply, say, by moving them up one degree on the salary scale, or similar? Now, I am not suggesting that these suggestions should be taken up or dismissed, but, rather, if our conjectures in the first place were to be well-formed, etc., we should then, hopefully, find ourselves in a better position to somewhat 'square what might seem to be a circular position'. That should our conjectured arguments be well-informed and well-formed then we might well find our ensuing judgments to be well-expressed, and v.v. Hence the point of this digression that to the best of our abilities our conjectures, collectively, need to be well-informed, well-formed, and well-expressed… (67)

That part of this becoming well-informed, etc., is to reconstitute our conjectured arguments in an economic format suitably representative of the situatedness in question in order for us to more productively explore the apparent ramifications of the specificity of that relational situation within the context of its relational situatedness. To this end, I note how these economic correlatives cohere in their respective economies and by what strategies we can discern such correlativities. Obviously, by naming the economy in question we have already made start by noting one of the main correlativities in that economy. So, in the conjectural economy, conjectures would be one of our three required correlatives. As I have argued that conjectural propositional-statements mediate both ana-

lytical propositions and synthetic statements then the other two economic correlatives have already been identified, namely, the 'analytical' and the 'synthetical'. Other strategies noted are taking the pre-packaged at face value. E.g., the conventional temporal combination of 'past present, and future'. Or, the English language has a habit of using rhyme to the extent a verbal root is being used with different prefixes. Hence my invitation to find a further rhyme accompanying the phenomenologically descriptive and the hermeneutically prescriptive. Where I proposed the existentially 'proscriptive' and where others (also) suggested 'conscriptive' or 'subscriptive' in the sense 'that a relationship conscripts us to oversee the enrichment of that relationship', or, similarly, where 'we subscribe to a relationship in order to share in its forms of relational richness and possible enrichment (through ongoing re(-)enrichment, etc.)'. Or, in a similar vein, we can invoke the model centered on the nomenclature of '(-)' as in an economy that relatively focuses, say, presentation, representation or (a more chaotically oriented and potentially radical) 're-presentation'.[69] (68)

That, on a constitutional level the argument is proposed that given the trimodal constitution of each and every economy we should be able to articulate three relevant correlatives clearly able to pertain to that same economy being explored as well as illuminate the type of e/valuational formation that would arise through the interactions of such circumstances. Moreover, in the light of this positive constitutional 'economic conjecture' we can also run the relatively negative conjecture of a 'non-isolationalism' of economic correlativities wherein defective forms of ideological preference and over-commitment appear to firmly cement the advent of the non-collapse of psychological forms of belief that, otherwise, would naturally and inevitably lead to a deconstruction of such unwisely held, over-affirmationally attested forms of positioning. That given such literal 'over-affirmationally attested forms of positioning' we might hazard the guess that an inherent fear in a losing that potentially could be lost sense of personal identity might explain both the apparent persistence and resistance, and the observable stability, to be found in such misplaced beliefs that otherwise would appear to be constituted in such a manner that through lived-contradictions, we could be easily led to believe, would naturally deconstruct. But, all that granted, we will now consider the relative non-status of defective conjectures along with an ad hoc list of other possible types of conjecture, that for convenience, all seem to fall under the headings of either the relatively constitutional or the relatively non-constitutional in status, and, as such, being expressed in either relatively positive and/or negative formats. So, e.g., the 'economic conjecture' states 'that all economies are trimodally constituted (in line with the archetypal economy and its gestalt explication)' can be either affirmed or doubly negated. Just as the equally constitutional conjecture of 'non-isolationalism' that 'it is not possible to non-relatively articulate economic correlatities' can just as equally be rendered in a more positive format, namely, 'it is the case that the non-relative focus on economic correlatives is not possible', or, 'that is only possible to focus relatively on economic correlativities be that either individually, comparatively or collectively'. As an example of a non-constitutional conjecture, we can note perceptive conjectures that are not operating in an ideologically oriented format. As well noting that a direct or indirect observational component must also be present in some form or other. So, with this introduction to a certain 'range of conjectures' let me explore

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69 As noted in *ibid*., 32, etc.

this *ad hoc* list of types of conjecture that are either relatively viable or defective (and then, by taking note of the promise in footnote 21, more formally translate the same within an inter-ordered scheme as explored in *Book* 9). (69)

The seven relatively viable conjecture types noted, as headings, are 1. Constitutional, 2. Perceptive, 3. Apperceptive, 4. Theoretical, 5. Inferential, 6. Speculative, 7. Mythical, and, 8. Defective. (70)

To exemplify the above, we could tender the following. The economic conjecture (along with the conjecture of non-isolationalism); seeing a bowl of apples; recognizing the absence of a certain number of apples in that previous bowl, etc; say, the underpinning of the Standard Model in particle physics; say, running inferences on the strength of previous observations, etc; speculating, say, about a certain stock market; noting how Father Xmas is 'observed' in certain Western cultures; and, running the argument that defective conjectures are either ideologically self-deconstructing or poorly argued, etc. That with respect to defective arguments, that either appear and/or are presented as 'reasonable arguments to entertain' I noted the following sub-headings:

> The defective can be treated to further fall under the non-well-formed hyperbolical or misrepresentative, and, the not well-informed misrepresented and the untethered (to relatively valid premises, arguments, conclusions; and as not suitably connected with valid facts, viable narratives, radical critiques, etc.). Respectively, a unimodal or bimodal propositional construct that is ideologically mistreated (through a mistreatment of its resident metaphors and/or rhetoric), etc., a discourse that in its dissemination is distorted or obstructed, etc., a discourse that is poorly based on a factual basis, etc., and deliberate processes of misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, along with all other forms of dissimulation and deception, etc. [42] (71)

By implication, or inference, the argument is qualified that defective arguments can only be relatively entertained and not non-relatively in their strict, ideological sense given the impossibility of running and representing such operations in that absolutistical mode. In other words, defective arguments are doubly defective in the sense that, strictly, they cannot be operated, but, in being relatively operated they could well appear to make sense, etc., despite their proclivity to an inevitable process of self-deconstruction if successfully leaned upon to the correct degree and in the correct manner. I.e., impressed upon to operate as overtly signalled, but, where they cannot perform in that expected manner when more closely scrutinized. A bit like saying we can imagine a massive object travelling at the speed of light, but, where in physical reality, the utilization of the energy budget of the entire cosmos could not quite accelerate that same massive object to the exact speed of light as an object with mass (whereas, in contrast, light, as a wave, can effortlessly perform this exact speed, albeit as directly determined by the propagational medium of its current translation… (72)

Then, this essay cryptically notes a need for the further exploration of conjectural conjectures (etc.) and in the co-associated footnote the absence of an inter-ordered ap-

proach as explored in *Book* 9.[70] The apparent truncation of such further research being enacted in order to avoid the presentation of further complications in what is already a complex and dense text (and hence the necessity for some form of a commentary on this topic given its relatively terse introduction in these first two essays) and to commence an ending to this same essay… in the form of a set of both the provisional conclusions adopted and the summary of major points supplied in order to set up a more broad spectrum discussion of this topic of conjectures. Therefore, at this point let me now rectify these omissions by exploring conjectures in the light of an inter-ordered scheme in order to ascertain how we could understand the constitutional nature of those conjectures that could be deemed to be constitutional in and through the light of this previously developed inter-ordered schematism, etc. (73)

In this inter-ordered scheme 'philosophy' was given a 'non-local, global sense of positioning', i.e., as 'encompassing the full sway of the judgmental types of discernment exercised by the trans-cognitive orders (over the cognitively ordered field of intentional dispositions)' (being pre-defined as 'one-part hermeneutical, one-part phenomenological, and on-part non-systematically existential'). Thence this philosophical argument that what pertains to the philosophical must pertain to the economic(s of ordered phenomena), and v.v. (74)

But, that granted, how do we translate the other provisional categories through an ordered lens, or, in reverse (translate all inter-ordered possibilities through this *ad hoc* scheme)? By running the following forms of translation in these two directions… (75)

Where by 'constitutional' we read both 'global' along with the full implications of the economic construction of all inter-ordered phenomena (including both the trans-cognitively and cognitively ordered, etc., the inter-ordered, hyper-ordered, etc., along with co-associated mechanisms of transformational retreatment; duplication, re-duplication, de-duplication, and de-reduplication; etc.[71]). (76)

Where the 'constitutional' is the recognition of nothing other than 'the parallel philosophical treatment of the economic (as well the implication of the non-economic and hyper-economic)'. (77)

Where the Perceptive has a primary focus in the fourth cognitive order of the Perceptual with its related intentional content referenced through the other five cognitive orders as expressed through their corresponding trans-cognitive forms of judgment. Just as tables with square-circular tops cannot be entertained but where table tops with a discernible sense of colour can be articulated through the forms of propositions, etc. (78)

Where the Apperceptive references directly the logic of identification, etc., and, indirectly, nominated forms of identity that have some connection to lived reality. E.g., I

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70 *Ibid*., 43.

71 Economically treating both de-duplication and de-reduplication as the same type of negational/suspensional mechanism (with the effective preferencing, i.e., subtle privileging, etc., of all remaining parties)

now see only five apples in this fruit bowl and assume one of them must have been taken and, in all probability, has already been eaten, etc. (79)

In a Theoretical mode we assume the presentation of a more or less settled set of theoretical inferences, deductions, inductions, provisional principles, guiding axioms, etc., etc. Where such systematized semantic mapping is more or less contained in an atlas of models that can never be completely systematized given the inability to exhaust any one perspective and that there are infinite number of potential perspectives to contend with in the first place (and where, on the whole, a certain percentage of those perspectives have some degree of a pragmatic framing embedded in their very formatting). (80)

In an inferential conjecture the emphasis is on the logic of the propositional demonstration, articulating pre-conditional premises, conditional arguments, and post-conditional conclusions, etc., and, where it is presented through some form of either a covert or overt narrative based on the selection of so-called narrational facts, narrational modes, and critical narrational objectives (that either deserve to be fully realized at some point in time or to be continually engaged without any form of a fully resolved process of resolution). The example tendered was the observation of a falling ocean wave in the surf and that the next wave, too, will break upon the edge of the beach… (81)

Under the Speculative heading we run certain sets of conjectures along possible lines of functioning that are then probabilistically re-assessed in terms of their viability, profitability, fruitfulness in terms of their potential for inducing novel processes of innovative re-direction, etc. The example given was that of stock market speculations. (82)

The seventh, and penultimate category was that of the Mythical. E.g., Where is Father Xmas? ‘A mythical person imagined as existing in a certain cultural world that is ‘talked about’ or mentioned around the time of Xmas, and so on’. (83)

Under the heading of the Defective we contend with the dialectical fact that defective conjectures are conjectures that are failing for whatever reason or reasons. That a completely defective conjecture is a contradiction in terms to the extent it cannot function as a conjecture. Similarly, a purely affirmed or disconfirmed form of ideological speculation is a contradiction in terms for similar reasons. The impossible cannot be thought. A pure form of ideological speculation just cannot be entertained. On the other hand, to that same extent we are being ideologically over-committed then to that same extent we are failing to suitably think properly (phenomenologically), appropriately (hermeneutically), and appositely (existentially). Thence the necessity of invoking set/s of suspensions in some form or other in order to realize that a viable, profitable and fruitfully pragmatically and existentially oriented openness is central to our individually and collectively approached, ongoing dialectical processes embedded in our evolving re(-)interpretations of lived-experience. Otherwise, we sabotage the richness and potential enrichment of our being in the world both individually and collectively. Under this heading four varieties were provisionally suggested, namely, non-well-formed hyperbolical or the non-well-informed misrepresentative, and, the poorly informed misrepresented and the ‘totally’ untethered to ‘relatively valid premises, arguments, conclusions; and as not suitably con-

nected with valid facts, viable narratives, radical critiques, etc.'[72] (in an obvious reference to how conspiracies are seemingly tethered to prominently mistreated 'factoids' rather than culturally accepted 'facts'). (84)

At this point the text notes the footnote that alludes to inter-ordered phenomena as explored, e.g., in *Book* 9. As well a need to further explore constitutional conjectures, etc. Rather than complicate the previous text, already quite complex, I now need to introduce a more rich, more formal approach as to how we can go about reviewing conjectures as viewed through the conjectural economy. (85)

Now, we can re-think of these previous *ad hoc* categories as being somewhat rather superficial. I.e., e.g., this conjecture makes an economic point and appears to be primarily Constitutional in orientation, whereas, this other conjecture appears to make a series of perceptual points and would seem to primarily fall under the Perceptive heading. But, would it not be the case that these two headings, in our ongoing re(-)interpretation of lived-experience could not be separated. Without this economic basis there could be no perceptual interpretations of perceptual experience (and v.v.). That metaphorically taken vertically, rather than horizontally or superficially, we could surmise that all the first seven ad hoc headings could well be co-associated and co-extensive with each other and that forms of disciplinary progress, say, philosophical progress, may well reside in an ongoing clarification and rectification of all relatively defective conjectures across the board of these first seven headings. By such means, looking far more positively upon this eighth category of defective conjectures in a dialectical recognition of the fact that we can neither absolutistically do indubitable truth nor equally absolutistically do non-indubitable truth and that, in living-reality experienced as lived-reality, we have to ever wander the extensive no-man's-land (no-person's-land) in between these two impossible to experience extreme regions of lived-experience (between the over-affirmative and over-committed 'yea' or 'nay' [and where the latter can be (mis)treated the non-affirmed and under-committed region of a full relativistic non-committal to any interpretations of lived-experience despite the impossibility of enacting such an equally impossible attitude and program). But in arguing for the co-extensive occurrence of all levels of conjectural possibility co-occurring at the same time, and as relatively foundered on the constitutional, etc., should we delete the Mythical category as not applicable to this form of conjectural revisionism? No, as I am quite happy to expect a certain level of the mythological is already pre-ingrained in our cultural ways of seeing and doing things without necessarily viewing it as ideological on pragmatic grounds. E.g., when reviewing the course of Australian history, we will find, on numerous occasions, that a certain reluctance if not overt resistance to how other historians might wish to re-do things differently. Say, the reluctance of conservative historians to also include Indigenous song-lines and stories even when such narratives have found archaeological evidence to support certain elements of such 'oral histories'. Or, we could imagine, e.g., after the collapse of human civilization as we currently know it, where, in some future point of time, the persistence of a certain narrative that recounts 'people once walked on the surface of the Moon' and where this narrative might be thought of and dismissed as merely 'mythological'. That, sadly, we do not have to envisage the collapse of civilization to find people who already conspiratoral-

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72 *Ibid*., 42.

ly (mis)treat such events as ‘mythological’ as ‘merely simulated in some studio in Hollywood or elsewhere, etc.’ That the fully professional philosopher, or disciplinarian, never absolutistically dismisses nor affirms any thesis whatsoever and will engage its apparent merit or lack of merit through the auspices of a suspension, etc. And, whereby ‘etc.’, is also meant, by myself, the automatic invocation of ‘the de-suspension of the suspension, etc.’ in which we must also pragmatically and existentially engage a world that is not ‘flat’ and equally divided up between equal sets of possibilities and counter-possibilities. That the lived-world equally resists such senseless ‘equality’ and must be cognizant of the lived-fact of experience that not all narratives have an equal value, and that the world, although constructed through our re(-)interpretations of lived experience, is also dictated to by this same sense and semblance of a living-world! Indeed, drink a very hot cup of coffee… and find that this fact of our cooperation with the world and the world of others must also be attested to as a necessary given in our lived sense and semblance of world that is not merely dreamed up in some private, solipsistic realm of a Cartesian-like impossibility! Therefore, on these grounds I am of the view that the mythical dimension in conjectural categorization might still have a role to play in our ‘vertical’ appreciation of the conjectural dimension in a conjectural economy. (86)

Just what is meant by ‘vertical’? That our relatively viable conjectures, etc, are primarily founded on a working economic basis, and, thence, their forming a relative constitutional basis for the articulation of those conjectures in their relative non-constitutional identities as would then be brought forward for discussion, emendation, etc., upon this necessary basis for further interaction, dialogue, emendation, dissemination, etc. Recognizing ‘then’ the cooperation between the Perceptive and Apperceptive along with the reconfiguration of details arrived at through Theoretical, Inferential, Speculative, and an overlooked dimension of the Mythical (through its cultural constitution of lived-experience as inadvertently conforming to certain cultural themes, memes, tropes, etc., that may well not be as factually based as we are led to believe, but, where a dialectical sense of a counter-cultural reality must also be lived with to some extent or other regardless of whether this is done either advertently and/or inadvertently). (87)

But, given this revision of lived-reality as announced, in what way would inter-ordered phenomena also enter into its further reconfiguration? (88)

As inter-ordered phenomena are economically based then we could surmise, first, the relativity of an economic basis upon which, second, we have inter-ordered phenomena, starting with orders, both cognitive and trans-cognitive in orientation (along with the possible delineation of affective orders, etc.), and, third, given that all disciplines are embedded in a variety of social systems it follows that various genres of behaviour will impose certain restrictions on how disciplinary codes will be both proposed and expressed, both promoted and de-moted, and how they will define (and re(-)define) how various forms of dissemination will be culturally-interculturally appreciated, etc. (89)

What are the ramifications of this pragmatically circumscribed formalism? That, to a greater extent, a qualified formalism can extend from the archetypally economic to delineating the distinctive nature of all inter-ordered phenomena as to how they have

been and are culturally-interculturally expressed in coded historical terms of reference. How, e.g., from the fact that the caning of pupils in a school was acceptable in my day and now is not, to how slavery was once a simple division in property law and is now justifiably deontologically unacceptable period! That, from a systems perspective, historical research is disseminated from either a relatively orthodox sense of a systematized location in the work of both professionals (and professionally observant amateurs), both as either scholars attached to an educational institution and those professional scholars that regard themselves as currently independent from any such institution, to those relatively less orthodox researchers who may well include histories of either the past, the present, and/or the future (as discussed in previous essays), to those unorthodox 'historians' that are relatively far less observant of the conventional rules of academia relating to the dissemination of historical forms of research, etc. Not that any one individual is merely slotted into one of these relative divisions and one of these divisions alone. E.g., in this regard we could imagine an historian with a considerable reputation as a formidable scholar also holding, say, the unorthodox belief that a person adept in psychometry could also do historical research by merely touching an object and, therein and thereby, find themselves able to recall the history of that object as 'impressed' upon that object over the 'life' of that object. We could imagine what harm would be done to this scholar's reputation if their research also included this avenue of research. But, more correctly, the professional disciplinarian, say, the philosopher, should be agnostic on such matters. Subject everything to a suitable suspension. Evaluate what evidence, if any, attaches to such methods regardless of whether they be relatively orthodox, less orthodox, or unorthodox, whether be they non-critical, critical or radical in their disseminated forms of expression. Indeed, should some proponent or exponent of psychometry insist upon such 'methods' then subject such a methodology to empirically oriented tests to determine, one way or the other, if such a method has any useful form of value to add to this practice of historical research. In this regard, we could imagine, in their respective plastic specimen bags, a scarf belonging to a person murdered with that scarf; the scarf of a person who was successfully charged with having committed an act of murder; the scarf of a woman who knitted such an item to raise funds for their local charities; and, a scarf never touched by human hands and which was never ever worn whatsoever. Then, blindfolded, let the exponent of such a method deliver their 'findings' and be judged accordingly. That this contrived anecdote also has another moral to contemplate, namely, in the advent of a negative empirical finding such a finding does not mean that this seemingly coherent possibility has been totally disproven through the negative findings of one or more such experiments (along with, I should add, the successful reiteration of that type of an experiment). Even an interminable series of such experiments with negative findings cannot indubitably rule out such a possibility, but, however, where all forms of positive findings should be utilized along pragmatic lines by arguing that such 'evidence' either reinforces or de-reinforces current attitudes as to what is relatively orthodox, less orthodox and not orthodox. Whereas any thesis that is severely compromised with incoherent contradictions, etc., needs to retendered in workable format, on the other hand, those positions that are coherent, and are either non-self-contradictory and/or not-other-contradictory, do need to be approach differently, preferably in and through both a relatively pragmatic and existential attitude given that possibility is not a guarantee of the non-virtual (actuality), and, where the absence of evidence is not necessarily a guarantee or guarantor that a cer-

tain method is necessarily bankrupt, fraudulent, fantastical, misguided, etc. It is the case, quite often, that something that can be first judged as possible can be then found to possess a non-virtual state of factual instantiation. On the other hand, the mere fact of our apparently being able to imagine a certain scenario is enough for us to then envisage the actualized reality of such imaginings. The two following cases should illustrate this point. We could imagine, e.g., some object going faster than the speed of light, perhaps even at the square of the speed of light. Unfortunately, science would argue that a massive object could not even reach the full speed of light even if we were to enlist the entire energy budget of the cosmos itself in a vain attempt to do so. In a second case, we could imagine, e.g., an aspiration to walk on the surface of the Moon in just our birthday suit. Unfortunately, science again tells us that for a number of fatal reasons this type of event could never be observed in those limited terms of reference. An astronaut in the requisite confines of their working space suit could perform this type of feat, as they have doen in the past, but certainly not in just their birthday suit. In both cases we can imagine what we think is possible, but, as a matter of fact cannot be performed as initially stated. Indeed, what is needed is a set of conjectures that will allow us to then make this transformational-transition from the relatively virtual to the relatively non-virtual. I.e., in ordered terminology, allow us to make that transition from the fifth cognitive or trans-cognitive order to the ontical or factual domain of the sixth cognitive or trans-cognitive order. A set of conjectures that inevitably needs to be grounded in the successful reiteration of the observation of positively confirmable and/or verifiable evidence whose conformable truth status then permits us to make just such an ordered transformational-transition. (90)

On this prerequisite of the relativity of this economic basis ordered phenomena would include the semantic in its first ordered atomistic phenomenological identification (denoted as either 1^0 or1^1); the aesthetical integration of such semantic information (2^0); the cognitive realm of intentional ideation and the parallel trans-cognitively, deontologically constituted pragmatically and existentially oriented forms of judgmental experience (3^0); the perceptual domain of experience in parallel with the sphere of the pragmatical (as further defined under the headings of the Effective, Expeditious, Efficient, etc.) (4^0); the realm of the potential under the headings of the Possible, Probable, and the Potent) (5^0); and, the ontical realm of 'actual' (non-indubitable) facts supported through a reasonable degree of evidence (6^0). Thence, accordingly, the distinctive assignment of the following types of judgments (and co-associated disciplines), namely, phenomenological/semantic; semantically integrated/aesthetics; deontological/existential/pragmatical/ non-utilitarian ethics; pragmatical/utilitarian ethics; hermeneutics/virtual/potentiality; and, non-virtual/qualified actuality. Hence a range of disciplinarians from phenomenologists to factologists.[73] (91)

Then, through symmetrical forms of reduplication we find an extended sphere of inter-ordered phenomena, namely, descriptive metaphysical appreciation; psychology/sociology/political science; (constitutional) metaphysics/political-economy; pragmaticism (with pragmaticists as defined by the 4^2 nature of this reduplicated category); scientists; and, historians.[74] (92)

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73 Refer to, e.g., *Pursuit*, III.IX.V.43.

74 Refer to, e.g., *ibid*., 48.

That, from a political-economic perspective, we can then define the systematic divisions of the overall life-world according to its 3 x 3 divisions and co-associated disciplinarians and specialists, etc. Starting with legislative politicians and ending with the political executive (or front bench in a more parliamentary system) and their associated ministries or departments, etc. (92)

That, in these three levels of constitutional organization the observant person would note symmetries based respectively on the trimodal, hexamodal, and the nonamodal configurations of the World, Object and Ego moments as pertain to the archetypal economy. I. e., respectively, symmetries based on 3 x 1, 3 x 2, and 3 x 3. However, given this form of configuration, despite transformational rules that allow us to move from one constitutional level to another, still, more useful and pragmatic transformation rules will need to be more closely observed within these respective levels of constitutional construction. So, e.g., in the matters of legal code we note the now important central role played by political legislatures in the writing of such codes even though the intended use of such codes is meant to be exercised by the legal profession alone. (93)

That, in the light of such systematic organization of the political-economy, it has been previously noted that problematic social issues are best located either within and/or between these systematic spheres or sectors of influence as historically delegated within the representative articulation of this broad concept of the political-economy as differentially registered in different countries, etc. Hence my explorations in *Book* 9 of the classical examples of what might be fuelling the so-called 'obesity epidemic', and, how a degradation of Traditional Social-Media and the continuing emergence of Social-Media is implicated in reorganizing the current political landscape, etc. (94)

Let me translate these constitutional ideas along more specific lines of enquiry. Say, with respect to the disciplines of history and science within the Academic Social System, and, with respect to the pursuit of business ventures and critical-radical forms of cultural commentary exercised within respectively the Business Social System and the Overall Media Social System.[75] (95)

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[75] Academia (Social System, capitalized as 'Academia') is seen as occupying the First Sector of the Overall Political-Economic World/Social System, i.e., Political-Economy where the two sides of the 3 x 3 matrix results from the reduplication (and duplication) respectively of Theoretical/Hermeneutic/Hyper-Economic *versus* Practical/Phenomenological/Economic *versus* Critical-Radical/Existential/Non-Economic orientations (reflecting an economic complexificational paralleling of the archetypal economy of World, Object and Ego respectively). For diagrammatical mappings of the Political-Economy refer to (*Book* 9) *Pursuit*, III.IX.V.17-24. As an inter-ordered phenomenon, the professional nature of the business world falls under the fourth trans-cognitive pragmatical category (arising from the de-suspended preferencing of the moments of Ego and World along with the suspended moment of Object, whereas, as a Social System, Business falls under the intersection of the Economic/Economic within the 3 x 3 matrix of the Political-Economy). That we can contemplate the fact that there is a certain incommensurability between these levels in constitutional organization although not in any absolutistical sense (given that Business is the reduplication of the Object moment, whereas, the obvious pragmatical nature of that profession is the symmetrical duplication/de-suspensional preferentialization of the moments of Ego and World albeit on an ordered level of explication). Note that Academia falls within the First Sector of the Political-Economy (along with the Political Legislature); Business falls within the Fifth Sector (along with Legal Fraternity [but not judg-

As an academic discipline, as an inter-ordered phenomenon (or set of closely related phenomena) 'history' is viewed as 'the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (concerned with the truth determination of possible facts and their ensuing transformational treatment as conformal facts in either a positive or negative format, albeit as reduplicated[76]). On the other hand, in conducting, say, a history of science we find the duplication of the latter by the former since the domination of history here is productive still of a history (and not some form of science). Then as a social system, Academia is seen as occupying the First Sector of the Political-Economy (on the envisaged grounds of its theoretical approach to theoretical issue[77]). With these distinctions now understood, how do procced on constitutional grounds? (96)

First, all economic considerations need to be regularized along economic lines, namely, through an overt articulation of the economic correlatives to be invoked in that form of research (through instantiating the economic conjecture). Then, all forms of economic isolationalism need to be noted and supressed (through invoking the conjecture of a non-economic isolationalism). (97)

Second, on an inter-ordered basis we note that the discipline of history arises (theoretically or hypothetically) through the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive (and cognitive) order(s), i.e., notated as '6^{2}'.[78] That this establishes the basic code of historical propositions. Whereas, in contrast, the applied code is supplied on the level of its Social System, i.e., from an Academic perspective. (98)

Third, in articulating the applied code (in reference to the academic treatment of historically oriented propositions and statements) we appeal to current best practices in that same regard as inductively instituted by the world of Academia and as taken up by its orthodox exponents, etc. 'Inductively' in the sense that this Social System in question has the power to implement its rules for realizing its objectives and where disciplinarians who seek to be judged by its institutional standards would be more inclined to comply accordingly to that same degree. (99)

That, in order to realize either a non-existential and/or existential specification of our topic we need to note in what manner logical subjects, etc., are invoked within its conjectured structures through the supplying of non-constitutional conjectures. (100)

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es], and the business of Political Parties [in raising funds, etc.]). I perceive Media as falling within the Third Sector (on the basis of its dissemination of non-critical, critical, and radical commentaries on society from a relatively theoretical perspective).

[76] E.g., it is true 'Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon' but, it is not true, on the best evidence, that 'he sailed down the coast in order to engage Rome in battle in that civil war instigated by himself'.

[77] Where the Theoretical/Hermeneutical/Hyper-Economic is basically (self-)reduplicated in (inter-ordered terms of reference).

[78] Treating the cognitive orders as either the content and/or content-processes of trans-cognitive judgments. Where processes of reduplication, duplication, etc, are entertained primarily in trans-cognitive terms of reference.

By relatively ‘non-existential’ is the expression of those forms of e/valuational formation that arise primarily through mediation, and, by relatively ‘existential’ is meant those forms of e/valuational formation that arise primarily through intermediation. Please note ‘non-existential’ does not mean ‘not existential’ in a pejorative sense, but, rather, those forms of value that neither directly impact nor non-impact upon existentially oriented forms of e/valuation. E.g., through the course of their work a person might earn a wage. That form of e/valuation formation can be seen agnostically, as neither positively existential nor negatively non-existential in orientation. On the other hand, a donation of money by that same person, say, to a food bank, could be construed as an existentially oriented act (given its potential to enrich the qualitative enhancement of our relationships with others. Conversely, the non-donation, say, to a very hungry friend very much in need of such assistance would be viewed, both pro-relationally and trans-relationally, as ‘negatively non-existential’ in its more pejorative sense). (101)

Then, in the addition of non-constitutional conjectures it is hoped that a process of productive resolution would be arrived at that contributes to both a positive, incremental, non-chaotic augmentation and a positive, non-incremental, chaotic enhancement of the relational richness of the primary relationship in question. It is with a view to realizing such positive outcomes that under the heading of ‘B. Economic Applications’, and its subheading of ‘1. Economic Phenomena’ that we note the import of the overall economy of the economic and its three moments of the hyper-economic, economic and the non-economic… in order to more fully understand that economic conjectures cannot be successfully comprehended, nor applied, without reference to the ‘non-economic’, etc. Hence it is noted:

> In a broad review of economic phenomena, i.e., various delineated aspects associated with economic considerations, such as, e.g., the harmonic nature of circulation resulting in forms of resolution, the expression of such resolution in definitive non-economic terms of reference along with hyper-economic appropriation plus considerations of the relatively non-critical, the relatively critical, and the relatively radical. The contestment between the relatively non-innovative and the innovative, etc. [44] (102)

Then, under the subheading of ‘2. Ramifications’ the probable results of such an approach can then be entertained in order to maximize the present pragmatic implications and future pragmatic consequences (but not necessarily the pragmatical ramifications given this aspiration for an existential complexion to augment and enhance our primary relationships, etc.). Hence the following instructions are voiced echoing an important point expressed in The Seventh Book…, namely, the role of the philosopher, *et al*, is ‘to deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the effective, etc!’[79] Hence:

> Ramifications can be viewed both negatively and positively. Negatively, we would oversee the massive deconstruction of economically mistreated forms of positioning in all disciplines, and, positively, reap the pragmatic rewards in this advent of a wide range of disciplinary clarifications, etc. [45] (103)

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79 *Pursuit*, III.VII.11, etc.

With respect to the world of the scientist, we note their inter-ordered constitution through the symmetrical reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order, with its notation as '5^2'. This determines the basic code for the circumscription of scientific propositions, statements, and conjectures. Then, from the realm of Academia, orthodox forms of professionalism then determine the format, form, and formation of scientific texts and their academic modes of dissemination, etc. By 'etc.' we can also include business partnerships, the awarding of research grants, the eventual legal ramifications of novel forms of research, legislative changes that either circumscribe and/or promote scientific research, etc., etc. Given that 'no discipline is an island unto itself' (especially given the fact that academic disciplines already fall within the Social System of Academia, etc.). (104)

As for the Business World, it would appear to be constituted as an inter-ordered phenomenon within the fourth order of the sphere of the pragmatical along with its diverse drivers (as pragmatical imperatives) such as, e.g., the effective, efficient, efficacious, etc. Moreover, given its primary objective of survival through the making of a profit or through the not making of a loss, or, finding permanent financial support through government or some other institution or organization, we may surmise that the World of Business is in the business of potentially creating an economic surplus in some form or other, to some degree or other. Given its relatively non-existential, pragmatical orientation and its relatively non-pragmatic orientation along existential lines we might also surmise that business professionals, from time to time, may well overlook such considerations as the existentially oriented value of such aspects like, e.g., goodwill, reputational advantage and reputational harm, doing the right thing, having a social conscience, suitably paying their taxes, looking after the welfare of their workers, supporting local communities (even if located nationally or transnationally), and so on. (105)

As for the World of Media, entailing both Traditional-Media and a relatively non-traditional Social-Media, I envisage its location in the Political-Economy in Sector 3, at the intersection of the Hyper-Economic and the Non-Economic (and where this also corresponds with the Theoretical-Critical/Radical intersection, the Hermeneutical-Existential intersection, etc.[80]). Hence its basic code is supplied through its inter-ordered status, and, its social codes are supplied through the regulations that apply relatively unequally to Traditional-Media and Social-Media (although it should also be noted, e.g., that in the formation of histories of either the past, present, and/or the future, the adherence to a certain professionalism is one positive avenue for the existentially oriented advancement of a reputation along with its translation into the building of viewership that could also have considerable commercial ramifications). However, despite these differential inequalities between Traditional-Media and Social-Media, along with an ongoing loss of power, prestige and finances associated with the former, and not necessarily applying to the latter, we must also note the rampant non-professionalism that is present in both camps. Where, unfortunately, e.g., many exponents of Traditional-Media never had, or already have lost, or perhaps will never have, a firm grip on a maintenance of professional expectations in

[80] As could be supplied through economic complexification (in which we can more easily refer to through the use of a parallel dictionary as was supplied in paragraph 69).

this field of dissemination. E.g., the employing of anchors that demonstrate no commitment whatsoever to norms in truth-telling, etc. Or, e.g., the mere echoing of what other news outlets deem to be newsworthy regardless of whether such reporting is actually worthwhile, is actually accurate or inaccurate, without consideration for the social and political impacts of making of those types of decisions, etc. Or, e.g., in the misleadingly imperative that seeks a so-called 'balanced presentation of opinions' when, existentially, balance is just not called for, is inappropriate, especially when forms of consensus are already being well-established (not that an adherence to the party-line should also be blindly promulgated, etc.), or, when balance is just not appropriate, say, giving both rape victims and unapologetic rapists equal time to discuss their 'situatedness' in such events). Then, the relative wild west of Social-Media also needs to be duly observed, given, e.g., the advent of diverse, adverse phenomena like so-called 'trolls' and 'bots', cyber-bullying, the phenomena of disseminational silos, dark webs, the promotion of despicable communities with an airing of their anti-social voices all too often attempting to silence the voices of those minorities once traditionally silenced by conservative social voices from traditional positions of established political power, and so on. Hopefully, right-minded individuals and organizations will pressure both forms of media to institute the requisite reforms required in order to rectify and regularize these influential aspects of Contemporary society in the advent of this Contemporary era. (106)

But, as already implied, we cannot 'theoretically live by economic bread alone' given a need to also recognize 'the non-economic and hyper-economic spheres of enaction'... (107)

As a provisional conclusion I noted the argument that the Kantian distinctions of the 'analytical' and the 'synthetical' can be neither entertained in their isolation nor as the mere presentation of such a bimodal distinction if (carelessly) isolated from its economic context of a conjectural economy (or, for that matter, any other economy that would suitably distinguish, accommodate, and transform such distinctions in a productively informative manner, etc.). To this similar end, it was a\noted that we also needed to note the roles played by both inter-ordered phenomena and the envelopment of all disciplines within their historically assigned Social Systems. To this end a number of radical proposals were put forward. In no particular order these six 'radical proposals' will now be discussed in accordance with their order of reintroduction. (108)

That, given this conjectural economy, despite our ability to seemingly manipulate individual analytical propositions and synthetical statements (along with conjectural propositional-statements) we would be quite wrong to assume that this actually is what exactly happens in lived-experience. That such apparent manipulations can only occur given the pre-existence of a conjectural economy. An economy, in accordance with the preferential treatment of its resident parties, could also be nominated as an analytical economy or as a synthetic economy (as along as we recognize the necessary coming together, in the economy in question, of all relevant economic parties as 'economic correlatives').[81] (109)

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81 *Pursuit*, III.IX.IXC.48.

The following model is proposed for 'explaining' how conjectures emerge in the conjectural economy, namely, through a balanced suspension of the other two correlatives in a process I have nominated as 'mediation'. By 'balanced' is meant 'being given an equal weight in intentional consciousness' and by such means setting up a suspension in this sense. In invoking the interrogative economy, the hermeneutically oriented moment of World is already a dis-conjunctive suspension, and, the phenomenologically oriented moment of Object is is already a conjunctive suspension of the metaphorical 'like'. Therefore, the Ego moment of the conjectural economy is a dynamic balance of these two types of suspension just noted. The concept of 'mediation' being invoked where, e.g., 'conjectural propositional-statements mediate both synthetical statements and analytical propositions. Through emergence, it follows that conjectures cannot be reduced to either analytical propositions or synthetical statements. (110)

We should also note that this emergence of the so-called 'third moment' is dialectical and is already a 'given' to the extent that all three economic parties are already correlatives that cannot be economically isolated in and through or for themselves, etc. That as correlatives they mutually define each other though their joint negations. The implication following that the so-called third moment could be any moment depending on which of these three correlativities, first, is chosen as a first party, and, second, is chosen as a second party. (111)

As a third point, in this provisional set of conclusions, is next noted that conjectures coincide with the 'third moment' and that through economic complexification, say, as exercised through the use of a parallel dictionary as supplied[82] we can infer that conjectures parallel the specification of existential preoccupations and preferences, intentional subjectivity, where a more systematic sense of the existential can be induced through a process of intermediation, i.e., a dynamically balanced suspension of all three moment of the conjectural economy, or whatever other economy or set of economies is being aspirationally focused upon (and subjected to the further intermediation of arbitration in order to relationally prioritize the obtainment of certain 'mutual' objectives. 'Mutual' to some extent despite the ever-present fact of eternally shifting imbalances in power relations between all parties). (112)

The next point that is being made is being made as an complex observation in the double sense that all observations, either directly or indirectly, must be observed in the performance of all conjectures, and, that we need to actively observe this same conjecture since conjectures that appear to mirror the overall life-world are more likely to find a validly conformable truth determination that is either pragmatically-existential or existentially-pragmatic (although little distance separates these two appellations and that from a pro-relational, trans-relational perspective there is no difference other than a matter of emphasis on an intentional level of cognitive appreciation. Hence it follows that the process of conformation is advanced if the conjectures in question are coherent, non-contradictory, etc, and, therefore, be well-formed. Moreover, from the perspective observation/s (be that either passive, active, and/or engaged) our conjectures also need to be well-informed (in order to deconstruct these conjectures that area conspiratorial, fraudu-

[82] Appendix A. Paragraph 69.

lent, deceptive, defective, nonsensical, etc. To this list we can also add the well-expressed to the extent the pragmatically-existential/existential-pragmatism is neither distorted nor obstructed. (113)

Thence the evolution of this formula: 'that conjectures should be well-formed, well-informed, and able to well-expressed'. (114)

Conjectures, as situated in a conjectural economy, are participants in a process of truth determination. I note that conjectures exercised in an economy that is well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed are more amenable to such processes of truth appreciation. Hence my concept of conjectural 'cogency'. However, a pure form of cogency cannot be obtained (through economic isolation) just as pure analytical necessity and pure synthetical contingency are also equally impossible to obtain. Therefore, we can dismiss all claims of indubitable knowledge and all equally fraudulent notions of analytical necessity that might be misused, say, in some defective form of metaphysical argumentation. (115)

The last of these six points notes a series of considerations that are vital for the well-expressed performance of philosophical and meta-philosophical forms of truth determination and truth appreciation, namely, the broader invocation of the non-economic, etc; transformational retreatment; representative alignment through processes of ongoing re(-)alignment; the utilization of a Tarskian frame of reference… where cogent truth determinations will apply to propositions, statements and/or propositional-statements but not directly to the parties represented in and through such linguistic representations, i.e., as either subjective participants and/or objective parts.[83] (116)

Conjectures 'have had a poor press', but, without conjectures, the world would not run. Without questioning, requestioning, etc., we could hardly make a claim to be 'sentient beings' and would merely remain as 'featherless bipeds'. Thence the need to rehabilitate such a notion (in the same manner that the overlooked dimension of the 'economical is misunderstood', and where traditional concepts of 'representations', 'metaphysics', and other ideas can be both critically and radically resuscitated, hopefully, without resorting, once again, to mistaken traditional forms of (mis)treatment). (117)

To stress the philosophical context being proposed by these essays I note my position as one that supports 'an anti-representational, positively nihilistic, existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism'. Although some of these aspects are not discussed in this specific series of essays, they are implied (and are most certainly argued for elsewhere). (118)

I also note the need to further explore the meta-philosophical or metaphysical ramifications of constitutional conjectures and to some extent in this essay that process has been commenced. Indeed, an approach to this topic saw me distinguishing the consti-

[83] Note a party in a proposition, etc., can be both a subjective participant and an objective part just as, e.g., when a certain person is being referred to as either a(n embodied) person and/or a physical body (or corpse).

tution of disciplinary behaviours under the headings of the economic, inter-ordered phenomena, and their historical envelopment in a distinctively assigned social system. (119)

To the formula that conjectural-economics needs to be both 'well-formed' and 'well-informed' we can add a third leg to this topic stool of it also needing to be 'well-expressed'![84] (120)

Concluding with the overarching idea of this (series of) essay(s) that…

> …what has been but merely commenced, on reflection, is the 'apperceptive observation' **that conjectures 'mediate' both analytical and synthetical propositional-statements,[85] and, that the balanced suspension of all economic correlatives 'intermediates' an existential dimension coincident with the representation of our relationships...** in a discourse barely begun..!! [56] (121)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 31.3.24.

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[84] I.e., well expressed in a disciplinary sense, be that philosophically or meta-philosophically (in a repurposed metaphysics), and, well-expressed both pragmatically and existentially, without being reduced to the merely pragmatical or the merely deontological, etc. (whilst also recognizing that the 'relatively' existential, as an existential 'orientation', is arrived at through the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential and not at the expense of the relatively non-existential since to do so would be to deconstruct both orientations).

[85] That synthetic propositions become 'statements' when either confirmed or verified. That analytical proposition, even if true, tautologically or otherwise, cannot become statements. Just as it might be tautologically true 'that either green unicorns are dancing at the bottom of my garden or are not dancing at the bottom of my garden could not be synthetically true, as things stand, in this world (but could be conceived of as true in a possible world where 'green unicorns can be seen to dance'. That such a complex molecular image cannot be ruled out on the grounds of being 'incoherent' or 'self-contradictory', etc.).

XID. The Philosophers Are In:
Pursuing a Practical Non-Ideological Approach to
Philosophical Problem Solving…

BOOK 10

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XID. The Philosophers Are In:
Pursuing a Practical Non-Ideological Approach to
Philosophical Problem Solving…*[86]

1. Introduction to an Open Forum

The ideas behind this open forum, first, are to practically demonstrate, hopefully, the positive observational conjecture[87] that in the pursuit of philosophical problem solving (weak) pragmatic considerations, either advertently or inadvertently, overrule ideological preoccupations, and, second, from a meta-philosophical point of view, philosophers, like disciplinarians in general, all too often say one thing, but, do something else that in its apparent effectiveness demonstrates an underlying pragmatic disposition in consensus building should such forms of consensus be arrived at on this less ideologically oriented level of discursive interaction..? (0)

In terms of ideological preoccupations, we can either note an unhealthy adherence to so-call 'moral principles', be they either so-called 'First Principles', 'Last Principles', or 'Middling Principles', or, a non-philosophically oriented over-commitment to ideological positions through a rhetorical abuse of metaphors, and similar such as in misguided forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, such as, e.g., non-weak forms of realism, idealism, dualism, materialism (and all other forms of over-zealous reductionism, etc.), (and, as well, an under-commitment in over-promoted forms of relativism), etc. (1)

As an example of the first variety, let me proffer the following series of arguments, as a prototypical conversation, in order to demonstrate the possible types of contradictions that can arise through the illogical holding of a set of extremist positions.[88] (2)

A: You have stated that 'you are pro-life'. Is that correct?
B: Yes, that is correct.
A: Would you agree with the statement 'that potentially viable embryos are human beings?'
B: Yes.
A: So, that being the case, you would agree with the statement 'that an act of abortion is an act of murder?"
B: Yes.
A: Should an act of murder be punished?
B: Yes. Indeed, with the death penalty (applying the principle of 'an eye for an eye').
A: Now, one of the potential candidates of your political party[89] has admitted to initiating and paying for an abortion of one of his previous girlfriends. Should you vote for such a person, and, should both the person paying for this abortion and the mother who permit-

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86 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

87 Refer to my classification of types of conjectures that can be entertained. *Pursuit*, III.XIB.34-43.

88 I am paraphrasing a conversion observed on a YouTube video when an ardent pro-life supporter was asked a similar set of questions.

89 An allusion to the Republican Herschel Walker (with possibly a similar second allegation?).

ted its occurrence suffer the full weight of the legal system, as envisaged by yourself, i.e., be subjected to the death penalty?
B: Well, yes and no, perhaps, it depends on the circumstances…
A: But, if you insist on the death penalty for an intentional act of murder (where the enaction of that occurrence clearly demonstrates obvious intent to oversee that 'death' as 'an act of murder of the first degree') then how do you square your being 'pro-life' with your equal insistence on the observance of the death penalty in an act of murder (committed in the first degree)? (3)

Ok, 'squaring the circle' (without either the marking up or discounting of your 'principles') is impossible under those circumstances. The point being that over-commitment to a series of non-relatively entertained so-called 'principles', or similar, inevitably leads to moral contradictions, conundrums, impossible aporias, and similar. (4)

I would also like to argue that when attempting to practically resolve either philosophical or non-philosophical problems ideological positions are all too often obstructions standing in the way of forming viable forms of consensus. But, let us see if this complex observational conjecture actually holds over the course of these proceedings. (5)

Now, in the light of the above, we could say that both 'the philosophers are in', and ready to seek forms of philosophical consensus, along with, in this instance, that 'the meta-philosophers[90] are also in', perhaps hopeful that they can confirm these observational speculations that weak forms of pragmatic argumentation and resolution will proffer more productive forms of resolution over the non-subtle insistence of over-committed forms of ideological positioning, that, I would like to suggest, might be metaphorically compared to something like the 'forceful insertion of square rivets into round holes'. I, for one, would not wish to travel on any vehicle built in that non-expert-like manner, be it an automobile, a ship, or an aeroplane… (6)

So, let these games proceed! Our panel of philosophers are in, but, for a certain period of time, let us forget that they also will be wearing 'two hats'…. (7)

Wentworth Falls, Noël Tointon, 14.3.24.

2. Advertised Blurb:

In this open forum 'the resident philosophers are in' and 'waiting to resolve your current philosophical problems'. The positive observational conjecture is noted that in the formation of philosophical consensus strong ideological forms of positioning get in the way of forming weak, pragmatically oriented forms of resolution. Hence this contention that should consensus be arrived at it is most likely not courtesy of those who adopt and adapt strong, ideological forms of positioning. That in this regard, meta-philosophers will also be present with an eye on establishing the apparent truth of this same observation. (8)

[90] Assuming what I perceive to be a repurposed metaphysical-like disciplinary approach as discussed, say, in *Book* 9.

3. How Might We Philosophically Explain this Positive Pragmatic Observation?

This ‘positive pragmatic observation’ is ‘the observation in the affirmative that notes consensus in any discipline, including philosophy, is arrived at through a ‘weak, non-ideological pragmatism’ (and not through any form of ideologically oriented argumentation)’. Of course, this observation is to be confirmed, which is the primary, covert purpose of this experiment in philosophical problem solving. (9)

Basically, this observational position could be argued for, on theoretical grounds, through collectively running the following along economic lines…

All economies are trimodal in their constitution. (A)
If an economy is observed or imputed then it must be operating trimodally. (B)
No economic-correlativity can be reductively isolated ideologically. (C)
Strong ideologically oriented argumentation is non-productive. (D)
If argumentation is productive of consensus, then it cannot be ideologically oriented. (E)
Non-ideologically oriented argumentation permits weakly preferential treatment. (F)
Such preferentialism will include the weakly realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic. (G)
A weak preferentialism cannot exempt a weak pragmatism. (H)
In virtue of this co-associated weak pragmatism, consensus building is fostered. (I)
Hence a weak, pragmatic inclusion in consensus building, etc. (J)
Thence consensus building in productive argumentation, and v.v. (K)
Therefore, the affirmation of this ‘weak’ pragmatic observational conjecture. (L) (10)

Restating this argument in less theoretical terms, no doubt cutting a few conceptual corners, we might more briefly argue along the following lines: All significance is economically generated, i.e., trimodally. To over-concentrate our attention on one or two correlatives is to pursue a misguided form of ideological reductionism. But, through suspensions of various forms, should we pursue a more overall interactive approach then a ‘weak’, non-ideologically oriented pragmatism could find itself being fostered through either critical reorganization and/or radical re-organization. Thence the potentially productive generation of significance and the further building of consensus formation over the course of such reflections. Therefore, consensus building is entered into without recourse to ideologically manipulated and driven forms of argumentation. Does this imputed observation deserve to be affirmed? Let us see if this is a reasonable conjecture to entertain through reflecting upon the perceived productivity of our own trajectories as proposed for the resolution of such philosophical problems? By such means, putting ‘flesh’, e.g., on Richard Rorty’s aspiration for ‘social solidarity’ through consensus building. (11)

Now, the lived-world is awash with problematic concerns… let me make some practical suggestions in this regard in order to start this process of collective problem-solving. E.g., should governance be rendered more or less democratic; should the user of a government service pay the true cost of that service; should businesses be socially responsible; should politicians be more ‘proactive’ rather than ‘reactive’ and how might this re-direction in emphasis be orchestrated, and so on???? What philosophically oriented problems might you propose? (12) N.T., Penrith, 16.3.24.

XIE. A Commentary on 'The Philosophers Are In: Pursuing a Practical Non-Ideological Approach to Philosophical Problem Solving…'

BOOK 11

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A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

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1. Introduction to an Open Forum

The ideas behind this open forum, first, are to practically demonstrate, hopefully, the positive observational conjecture[92] that in the pursuit of philosophical problem solving (weak) pragmatic considerations, either advertently or inadvertently, overrule ideological preoccupations, and, second, from a meta-philosophical point of view, philosophers, like disciplinarians in general, all too often say one thing, but, do something else that in its apparent effectiveness demonstrates an underlying pragmatic disposition in consensus building should such forms of consensus be arrived at on this less ideologically oriented level of discursive interaction..? (0)

This sensible set of suggestions is actually quite radical in that it is arguing that we cannot hold untenable positions and if we do seem to be holding such impossible positions it is because we are not correctly holding an exact representation of what ourselves, as ideologues, are saying we are actually doing. Therefore, whenever we are being ideological extreme there must be discrepancies between 'what we say' and 'what we are apparently doing' contrary to such misapplied self-descriptions. (0.1)

The reasons behind this meta-philosophical appreciation of philosophical positioning (in what I have renominated to be a repurposed metaphysics), as explained later in this essay, is that ideologues isolate and amplify one or two economic correlatives at the expense of the actual running of that economy just as if, metaphorically and literally, we were to chop of one or two legs off a three-legged stool we would immediately fall over if we were sitting on it or attempted to sit on it. (0.11)

But we cannot be ideological all the time since we do perform valid arguments, and enact successful performances in the light of such conjectures. So, therefore, there must exist a viable alternative to such a false blanket supposition that we are and must be ideological at all times, all the time, for ever and a day, and so on… (0.111)

Therefore, we must ask 'given that we can only be part-time ideologues, just how do we and should we operate in our passages through this world at large when we are not being a part-time ideologues?' (0.2)

It is true that we do see the world through miscellaneous sets of perspectives, never completely integrated nor wholly disparate and incommensurable with respect to each other, given it is 'our' migration between such cultural-intercultural frames of reference, and, that they are set up for us to select certain forms of an almost pre-notified focus and in-

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91 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

92 Refer to my classification of types of conjectures that can be entertained. *Pursuit,* III.XIB.34-43.

terest, etc., otherwise if too radically disparate they would not be noticed or the potential significance of the same would not comprehended, etc. So, that granted, it should also be pointed out that we cannot be ideologically extremist the moment we ask a relevant question since to do so is to initiate a process of suspension where the potentially ideological framing is itself balanced in an attitude of a counter-process with contra-content. So, e.g., in questioning either the relative position or counter-position 'that people have walked upon the surface of the Moon' or 'the seemingly conspiratorial position that no one has walked on the surface of the Moon' we counter either of these primary propositions with its secondary counter-proposition both as a counter process with contra-content. Indeed, should the non-conspiratorialist and the conspiratorialist equally enter into a rhetorical suspension of the 'either/or' through the simple questioning of their positions they must actually meet in the center of this propositional-counter-propositional process of questioning. However, through over-commitment, in contrast to a sensible commitment to a reasonable form of questioning, and pseudo-psychotic like phenomena attendant upon such over-commitment, where the over-committed person over-identifies with their adamant sense of positioning, they may well find it impossible for them to suitably question what for them has already be validated, or self-validated, and should remain beyond any process of questioning. Since to enter into a form of questioning can also introduce an element of doubt, if not potential skepticism, which for the over-committed person is an anathema to their intensive sense of personal identity and group-identification (since identity is not just held personally but also, in all likelihood, in an identification with a group of like-minded individuals that that person might also feel a duty to represented in their already pre-decided overcommitment[93]*).* (0.21)

So, it must also follow that we cannot be full-time ideologues should we be able to suitably suspend our positioning. be it relatively ideological or relatively non-ideological in tenor. (0.22)

Therefore, in the light of the above, let me provisionally define ideologically oriented 'ideologue' as an economic extremist who attempts to impossibly isolate one or two economic correlatives at the expense of maintaining the economy in question wherein those economic correlatives have their apparent, mutual interdependence vis-à-vis the entirety of that 'situated economy in question' (since no economy, likewise, can be economically isolated from our lived-experience of its experientially represented 'world of its relational situatedness'). 'Ideologically oriented' ideologue because, as already noted, such extremism in extremis is experientially impossible hence the adoption and adaptation of an 'orientation' entered into towards such impossible positioning… (0.23)

Just as in the conjectural economy I have argued we can entertain neither pure analytical propositions (along with any impossible notions of pure necessity) nor pure synthetical statements (along with any impossible notions of pure contingency) nor pure conjectures (along with any impossible notions of pure cogency)! Likewise, we cannot entertain the pure bimodal relationships between any two parties in an economy and, therefore, the 'mere' presentation of an analytical-synthetical distinction is likewise impossible to en-

[93] In a sense moving from 'over-commitment' to just 'overcommitment' in a more integrated and hegemonic political sense through the loss of that hyphen?

tertain! On the other hand, what can be entertained are non-absolutistical preferences for one or more parties in any economy with the immediate implication that this distinction, just cited, can only be understood within a relatively constituted conjectural economy (that could just as well be nominated as either a relatively constituted analytical economy or a relatively constituted synthetical economy in line with our current non-absolutistically entertained preferences[94]*).* (0.24)

Now, I observe, and later argue, that what allows us to reach satisfactory processes of consensus is not our use of ideologically-oriented positionings, but, when we forget or have dispensed with or suspend all ideologically oriented forms of positioning and, instead, pursue forms of a weak pragmatism (that I would also argue can take on an existential and pragmatic non-weakness/non-strong definiteness). The appellation here of weak is definitely not meant in a derogatory sense (but form channelling the likes of John D. Caputo, et al). That, in essence, ideological positioning is 'obstructive', and, that consensus is reach through our taking relatively non-ideological positions (through suspensions etc.) (in what I have tentatively terms a weak pragmatism that equally is not divorced from non-ideologically oriented weak forms of realism and weak forms of idealism, etc.[95]*).* (0.24)

By 'observational conjecture' I mean 'observation' in two senses, namely, 'as a constitutional conjecture and as a non-constitutional conjecture'. I.e., first, through philosophical and disciplinary reflections we should see the persistent merit in, say, the economic conjecture or, indeed, this conjecture wherein we cannot, on economic grounds, be a successful ideological extremist and that when we attempt to do as such we unproductively obstruct the successful performance of consensus building and its subsequent and consequent formation of a positive process of augmenting and enhancing our overall social solidarity as per the expressed aspirations of Richard Rorty. In other words, ideologically we will hit our metaphorical 'heads against a brick wall', and, that deep(er) forms of consensus building can only arise when we either advertently or inadvertently cease to be such impossible ideologues. I.e., second, that through our reflections on philosophical debates, etc., that we will come to observe the provisional truth of this observation(al conjecture) that through forms of weak pragmatic engagement we may well come to forms of a non-weak/non-strong pragmatic re(-)assessment of our positioning in such a form that may well prove to be more productive for the richness and potential enrichment of our relationships which, as an objective, should be at the core of our philosophical concern and care for both self and others… (0.3)

So, in the light of the above, what might we take from this commentary? That ideological positioning is both (economically) 'extreme' (through 'economic isolationalism') and actually 'impossible', but, that when we 'forget', through whatever reason or reasons to be ideologues, we might well enter into a 'deeper' more productive process of consensus building, etc. Where by 'deeper' is meant 'consensus not arrived at either through mere consent or the imposed obligation to give mere consent'. (0.4)

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94 Note, technically, I define 'preferences' as a 'tenseless expression for either past prioritizations, present privilegings, and/or future promotions'.

95 As argued in my rhetorical question 'Where is Father Xmas?' (*Pursuit*, II).

In terms of ideological preoccupations, we can either note an unhealthy adherence to so-call 'moral principles', be they either so-called 'First Principles', 'Last Principles', or 'Middling Principles', or, a non-philosophically oriented over-commitment to 'ideological positions' through a rhetorical abuse of metaphors, and similar such as in misguided forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, such as, e.g., non-weak forms of realism, idealism, dualism, materialism (and all other forms of over-zealous reductionism, etc.), (and, as well, an under-commitment in over-promoted forms of relativism), etc. (1)

For convenience I divide, in an ad hoc manner styles of 'ideological positioning', under the headings of 'moral principles' and 'ideological positions'. These are positions that observe an over-commitment on the part of their ideologues. Also noted is the qualification of an over-promotion of a relativistic position and its ensuing under-commitment which is also to be regards as a form of unhealthy extremism. (1.1)

To these two kinds or styles of ideological over-commitment we should also add the pseudo-psychotic over-attachment to certain topical issues that do not neatly fall under some conventional 'ism' and where a pro-position or a contra-position is rigidly adopted towards the same… along with behaviour that takes on a psychotic-like stance especially in the equal degree of resistance experienced, by both parties, when those over-attached-ideas, to the same extent, are being contested. (1.11)

Moral Principles are (satirically) divided into First Principles. Last Principles, and (humorously) Middling Principles. This domain of a traditional metaphysics would be criticized by myself as attempting to do the impossible and should be rightly dismissed accordingly. On the other hand, there is no reason not to invoke moral principles if they were to be constructed and used as only 'guidelines', as vehicles of cultural and intercultural wisdom in such matters, as reflections of the current legal codes, and v.v. In effect, as a possible place to start in our dealings with the ethical complexities of a certain specific situation, but, not where we should end in such matters, and, therein and thereby, further consolidate their misplaced importance in their misplaced ability to be useful in interpreting lived-experience and in their pre-determining optimal responses that, thereby, could not be deemed to 'responsible' if 'our to be responsible' is abdicated from and outsourced to mere cultural conventions that simply dictate the course of our behaviours in such matters. Where, in my opinion, we should be more responsive to the primary relationship in question as we 'represent it' and find it situated within the total world of the relational… to that extent our patterns of interventions basically augment and enhance, i.e., amplify the relational richness of overall interactions, etc.[96] (1.111)

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[96] In my use of a pre-defined technical language 'augment' is meant in the sense of experiencing either 'an incremental, non-chaotic addition of positive contributions to a relationship and/or the subtraction of negative inputs to that same relationship', and, 'enhance' is meant in the sense of 'the making of a positive, chaotic, non-incremental contribution to the relationship in question and/or the absenting of a negative, chaotic, non-incremental input to the same relationship'. Where 'amplify' covers 'both of these two senses divided between the relatively non-chaotic and the relatively chaotic'.

Among the variety of valid criticisms of ideological over-positioning is the imputed abuse of the metaphorical where a metaphorical 'like' is improperly mistreated as a literal 'is'. So, although 'the Moon may look like a large blue cheese', except in nursery rhymes, 'we do not treat is if it were a big blue cheese'. On the other hand, there are occasions when this type of a manoeuvre is legitimate. E.g., when, say, 'that person over there looks like our friend John', and, on closer inspection, this proves to be the case. But, on a closer inspection of the Moon, scientists do not see 'a big blue cheese' (and neither is 'the Milky Way' seen as a 'milky way'). On the other hand, should we wish to be 'child-like' or 'poetical', or 'creatively imaginative', such (potentially radical) comparisons can have their own form of value beyond the merely ideological or naturalistic, etc. (1.2)

Under the heading of 'ideological positions', I note: misguided forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, such as, e.g., non-weak, i.e., strong, forms of realism, idealism, dualism, materialism (and all other forms of over-zealous reductionism, etc.). (1.21)

Why do I discern ideological principles and positions, say, as (at best) philosophical distractions? Because, experientially they are impossible to fully realize; act as distortions; and can oversee our being unsuitably misaligned with what we say about our being in this world at large and our current being in this same world at large. That, in our philosophical and non-philosophical reflections and practices, to aspirationally succeed in both our socially determined objectives and in our own personal ambitions, as arbitrated socially, we need to find that degree of alignment with this world at large that would allow us to better prosper in the pursuit of such matters. (1.3)

That, as a general observation, less authentic modes of being in this world, when 'leaned upon', are more inclined to self-deconstruct… E.g., the following anecdote about to be recounted… (1.31)

As an example of the first variety, let me proffer the following series of arguments, as a prototypical conversation, in order to demonstrate the possible types of contradictions that can arise through the illogical holding of a set of extremist positions.[97] (2)

As noted in the footnotes, this is a paraphrase of an actual interview. It may seem contrived, but, appears to be a common occurrence when people ideologically addicted to so-called 'principles' are found to have problems in applying such impossible measures, especially in light of the fact that certain principles are selected, and promoted, and other seemingly equally valid principles will be demoted, and overlooked, and, where the remaining principles will inevitably conflict when co-invoked in order to interpreted ethical situations and just what responses, therein and thereby, are to be automatically imposed or discarded, and so on. (2.1)

A: You have stated that 'you are pro-life'. Is that correct?
B: Yes, that is correct.

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[97] I am paraphrasing a conversion observed on a YouTube video when an ardent pro-life supporter was asked a similar set of questions.

A: Would you agree with the statement 'that potentially viable embryos are human beings?'
B: Yes.
A: So, that being the case, you would agree with the statement 'that an act of abortion is an act of murder?"
B: Yes.
A: Should an act of murder be punished?
B: Yes. Indeed, with the death penalty (applying the principle of 'an eye for an eye').
A: Now, one of the potential candidates of your political party[98] has admitted to initiating and paying for an abortion of one of his previous girlfriends. Should you vote for such a person, and, should both the person paying for this abortion and the mother who permitted its occurrence suffer the full weight of the legal system, as envisaged by yourself, i.e., be subjected to the death penalty?
B: Well, yes and no, perhaps, it depends on the circumstances…
A: But, if you insist on the death penalty for an intentional act of murder (where the enaction of that occurrence clearly demonstrates obvious intent to oversee that 'death' as 'an act of murder of the first degree') then how do you square your being 'pro-life' with your equal insistence on the observance of the death penalty in an act of murder (committed in the first degree)? (3)

To a certain extent, this could always be demonstrated with enough detail and careful argumentation, that the over-adherence to a select set of Moral Principles is an inevitable recipe for moral mayhem… (3.1)

If pushed far enough any set of 'Principles' would overlap and enter into a form of non-mutual conflict with the requisite apparatus for their mediation and intermediation (when these terms are not used in my technical sense of a bimodal suspension and trimodal suspension respectively). If used as guidelines, as starting points for a serious form of engagement these problems should not arise, However, through an over-insistence on the total regulation of the world falling under the purview of such devices it is inevitable that such a form of over-commitment becomes more problematic than the worth of such 'guidelines' as forms of moral instruction. As a case in point, controversies are interminably controversial for good reasons as in the positional dances entered into around the topic of abortion as noted in the anecdote above. If we afford rights to the unborn child, then the mother, then the father then to doctors in general (to the extent they are afforded the option of not performing this medical procedure as a matter of conscience, etc.), and then to the state or nation (to make whatever legal rulings it enters into) we have an explosive mixture of competing so-called 'rights' (somewhat arbitrarily assigned) that cannot be absolutistically resolved other than through the exercise of a relatively oriented situational ethics where the main actors themselves make their decisions for themselves and/or where such ethical absolutes are legally dispensed with altogether and left to act as mere ethical observations and guidelines in their resident cultures as they would have been originally developed and disseminated (given that ethical announcements in the form of Principles, divinely pronounced or otherwise, do not come out of 'thin air' meta-

98 An allusion to the Republican Herschel Walker (with possibly a similar second allegation?).

phorically but can only be understood in a culture that was already moving in those ethical directions in the first place?). (3.11)

But, an acceptance of this fact does not mean the person should have no ''moral principles' or 'morals' whatsoever, just not be the misguided type of person who oversees the over-zealous authorization of a few, select tenets at the expense of being a truly moral person who responsibly responds to the relational situation more on its own terms and not those that are self-imposed by us. An imposition imposed that should act as a mould into which all behaviours should be poured as if, by doing so, they then would be rendered as 'fit' for all similar situations. Whether imposed by either ourselves or others, for reason or reasons known or unknown, since we may well not quite comprehend or be privy to the motivations behind their original dissemination (given that much printed ink and conversation, and tea or coffee, and beer or wine, has been spilt over how 'elites all too often impose moralities on the non-elites', as if perceived as 'moral beacons', but, who rarely set out to live up to such 'imposed' moralities themselves. And, where we, as social 'moths', could well find ourselves 'burnt' by imitating these 'noble' behaviours of the so-called 'good and few'..?). (3.111)

Ok, 'squaring the circle' (without either the marking up or discounting of your 'principles') is impossible under those circumstances. The point being that over-commitment to a series of non-relatively entertained so-called 'principles', or similar, inevitably leads to moral contradictions, conundrums, impossible aporias, and similar. (4)

Especially when ideologically constructed through misguided forms of economic isolationalism, etc. An observation whose veracity should be explored and tested for ourselves… (4.1)

To summarize we could well argue that ethical principles are naturally prone to 'mutually' deconstruct; ideologies through economic isolationalism are impossible to entertain and only incoherent approximations would be run with; and, where all other forms of pseudo-psychotic over-commitment also self-demonstrate their philosophical and disciplinary unworthiness through the forms of distortions and obstruction they proffer to the pursuit of both conjectural cogency, consensus building and an ensuing social solidarity necessary for the creation, preservation, and conservational expansion of democratic expectations and practices. That in this same vein, an under-commitment stemming from an over-commitment to relativistic notions is also destructive of democratic norms given the ensuing amotivation to continuing to oversee the augmentations and enhancements of such democratic norms and where non-democratic forces will attempt to de-democratize their social and political institutions at the inevitable expense of most people for the benefits of their replacement nomenclatural elites whose sole motivation, on the whole, is to benefit in this unequal redistribution of social wealth already formed.[99] (4.2)

[99] It could also be argued that as the disseminated presentation of an array of dominant discourses across the political spectrum, both inside a nation and outside a nation, will inevitably find their fanatical adherents we should also note that those individuals who promote such forms of ideological inauthenticity will more than likely not be financially motivated to disseminate such ideologies, but, nevertheless, may well be financially rewarded for their contribution to those causes they vehemently profess, rightly or wrongly. However, as such over-commitment is equally inductive of a pseudo-psychotic complexion such

I would also like to argue that when attempting to practically resolve either philosophical or non-philosophical problems ideological positions are all too often obstructions standing in the way of forming viable forms of consensus. But, let us see if this complex observational conjecture actually holds over the course of these proceedings. (5)

Ok, let us put this observation into practice by observing the experiential semblance of an 'obstruction' when argumentation becomes too ideologically 'hot' and 'distorted', or, instead, when and where we find forms of a weak pragmatic consensus building if the marketplace of ideas is found expressed in and through an interactive environment that is relatively 'cool' and less distorting of positions and facts. In essence where our interactions become what I would like to term 'well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed'… (5.1)

Now, in the light of the above, we could say that both 'the philosophers are in', and ready to seek forms of philosophical consensus, along with, in this instance, that 'the meta-philosophers[100] are also in', perhaps hopeful that they can confirm these observational speculations that weak forms of pragmatic argumentation and resolution will proffer more productive forms of resolution over the non-subtle insistence of over-committed forms of ideological positioning, that, I would like to suggest, might be metaphorically compared to something like the 'forceful insertion of square rivets into round holes'. I, for one, would not wish to travel on any vehicle built in that non-expert-like manner, be it an automobile, a ship, or an aeroplane… (6)

So, the revelation is made that not only 'the philosophers are in and ready to practice their discipline' but that they will also be wearing 'two hats' as 'meta-philosophers' (in a form of meta-philosophical practice I would like to reperceive as a form of working metaphysics in which forms of philosophical conformation in truth determinations, in turn, is subjected to forms of philosophical appreciation, namely, meta-philosophical or metaphysical appreciation. Where by such means such disciplinarians carefully discern, first, the non-critical from the critical (as philosophers), and, second, the potentially radical from the critical (as meta-philosophers), and, third, how the worked-for-cogency of our conjectures can assist both the pragmatic and existential trans-valuation of our work in

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individuals may well conclude that such individuals may not be able to properly to observe the moral tenor of such a landscape given the concomitant distortions and obstructions attendant upon such ideological over-positioning. In this regard, without wanting to name names, we have an array of American spokespeople, and people of other nationalities, arguing for the right of the Russian regime of President Putin to initiate and prosecute an illegal war in Ukraine without, as well, criticizing how that 'special military operation' is being prosecuted given the commission of demonstrable war crimes, etc. That given the broad, moral blindness blanketing such 'gentlemen', more often men but not always, we can only assume they are in the grips of a pseudo-psychosis induced through an initial attraction to such ideologies that thenceforth they have been self-subjected to a process of over-commitment and where such personal over-identification would seem to now exert a certain negative cost for such people should they even begin to think about extricating themselves, through some form of a 'psychological' retreat, from the true travesty of their doctrinaire, cult-like forms of promulgation disseminated on the behalf of such populists, authoritarian autocrats, dictators, and other political and ideological misfits.

[100] Assuming what I perceive to be a repurposed metaphysical-like disciplinary approach as discussed, say, in *Book* 9.

the world, in so far as the disciplinarian (as pragmatic-existentialists/existential-pragmatists) can find themselves working on the behalf of others in the pursuit of the richness and enrichment of our relationships… (6.1)

So, let these games proceed! Our panel of philosophers are in, but, for a certain period of time, let us forget that they also will be wearing 'two hats'…. (7)

Wentworth Falls, Noël Tointon, 14.3.24.

2. Advertised Blurb:

In this open forum 'the resident philosophers are in' and 'waiting to resolve your current philosophical problems'. The positive observational conjecture is noted that in the formation of philosophical consensus strong ideological forms of positioning get in the way of forming weak, pragmatically oriented forms of resolution. Hence this contention that should consensus be arrived at it is most likely not courtesy of those who adopt and adapt strong, ideological forms of positioning. That in this regard, meta-philosophers will also be present with an eye on establishing the apparent truth of this same observation. (8)

In this regard, all people directly entering into this type of thought-experiment, philosophers and non-philosophes alike, are metaphorical 'guinea pigs', and, it is hoped that their fully informed consent will be duly registered (given that the primary intent of this thought-experiment is to demonstrate that ideologically oriented conduct acts as a distortion or obstruction to productive forms of consensus building, and. where productive forms of consensus building demonstrate [perhaps optimistically] the relative absence of such forms of ideological distortion and obstruction, and so on). (8.1)

3. How Might We Philosophically Explain this Positive Pragmatic Observation?

This 'positive pragmatic observation' is 'the observation in the affirmative that notes consensus in any discipline, including philosophy, is arrived at through a 'weak, non-ideological pragmatism' (and not through any form of ideologically oriented argumentation)'. Of course, this observation is to be confirmed, which is the primary, covert purpose of this experiment in philosophical problem solving. (9)

So, on one hand, we set about attempting to pursue a philosophical approach to the contentious topics proposed for such scrutiny, and, on the other hand, we will observe to what extent such forms of resolution were judged to be philosophically productive in the light of the imputed presence or absence of ideological distortions and obstructions. Seeking, in the latter instance to observe 'well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed' forms of argumentation that cogently indicate the utility of a 'weak pragmatism' (that I would also like to think that through pragmatic and existential approaches could well take on 'non-weak', or 'non-strong', forms of productive argumentation that would surpass a merely weak form of pragmatic development should the cogency of such argumentation attain the apparent level of a more augmented and enhanced degree of

disquisition. Where such 'discernment; would be the province and purview of those who participated in such developments and where through social consensus on such matter they came to the conclusion that their deliberations did appear to positively take such a 'more productive turn'. (9.1)

Basically, this observational position could be argued for, on theoretical grounds, through collectively running the following along economic lines…

All economies are trimodal in their constitution. (A)
If an economy is observed or imputed then it must be operating trimodally. (B)
No economic-correlativity can be reductively isolated ideologically. (C)
Strong ideologically oriented argumentation is non-productive. (D)
If argumentation is productive of consensus, then it cannot be ideologically oriented. (E)
Non-ideologically oriented argumentation permits weakly preferential treatment. (F)
Such preferentialism will include the weakly realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic. (G)
A weak preferentialism cannot exempt a weak pragmatism. (H)
In virtue of this co-associated weak pragmatism, consensus building is fostered. (I)
Hence a weak, pragmatic inclusion in consensus building, etc. (J)
Thence consensus building in productive argumentation, and v.v. (K)
Therefore, the affirmation of this 'weak' pragmatic observational conjecture. (L) (10)

On one hand, this overall argument is quite simple and already basically expressed in the stated aspirations of this essay, but, on the other hand, in an in-depth form of argumentation involves a series of small steps that each need to be duly recognized. Then, to compound the problem, I run two parallel arguments that might be better integrated? But, then again, the overall argument viewing (and treating) ideological distortion and obstruction might be better advanced through proposing many small arguments that all arrive at the same type of conclusion?[101] (10.1)

The first form of this overall argument involves twelve propositions. If we were to cut as many corners as possible it might be rendered, more simply, in the 'observation' that conducting an ideologically oriented argument is non-productive of 'deep' philosophical forms of resolution, and, conducting a non-ideologically oriented argument has a better chance of discovering and demonstrating 'deep' philosophical forms of resolution. (10.2)

By 'philosophical problem' is meant either the finding of a philosophical problem or the problematizing of a philosophical situation in a form that becomes problematic'. (10.3)

By 'resolution' is meant 'the proffering of a mode of argued translation, and transformation, that appears to reduce the perceived problematicity of the philosophical problem as reviewed in its initial reception'. (10.4)

[101] Of course, as a first step, ideological positions are 'treated' through the auspices of a 'transcendental suspension', and, the successfulness of such treatment is dependent upon how well this process of suspension is enacted and prosecuted.

By 'deep' is implied 'the articulation of a form of resolution that is not analytically entailed in the well-formed propositions proposed nor is merely indicated through the contingency of the well-informed statements supplied, and, that a certain level of sophistication in argumentation is required in order to articulate the requisite degree of conjectural cogency found to be suitably relevant in the context of that philosophical problematicity in question'. (10.5)

All economies are trimodal in their constitution (*as per the positive constitutional conjecture of the economic*). (A)
If an economy is observed or imputed then it must be operating trimodally (*as this follows from the application of an economic constitution*). (B)
No economic-correlativity can be reductively isolated ideologically (*as per the negative constitutional conjecture of economic isolationalism*). (C)
Strong ideologically oriented argumentation is non-productive (*because ideological positioning is coincident with improperly isolated economic correlatives either unimodally or bimodally in form*). (D)
If argumentation is productive of consensus, then it cannot be ideologically oriented (*because ideological intervention is perceived and conceived of as either distorting if not obstructing the formation of a suitable process of resolution*). (E)
Non-ideologically oriented argumentation permits weakly preferential treatment (*if strong forms of ideological distortion and obstruction are absent then the ensuing non-strong, weak form of argumentation can procced*). (F)
Such preferentialism (*without ideological bias*) will include the weakly realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic (*comments and contributions on the problematic or problematized* [*philosophically approached*] *situation to hand in its idealized representation, hopefully, in a format, formation and form that is 'well-formed, etc.'*). (G)
A weak preferentialism cannot exempt a weak pragmatism (*because we are not exercising any form ideological interventional, and form of distortion or obstruction*). (H)
In virtue of this co-associated weak pragmatism, consensus building is fostered (*should conjectures be optimistically entertained and diligently pursued as 'well-formed, etc.' and processes of resolution are not discerned as impossible to realize, i.e., apparently invite progressive forms of a sufficiently realized degree of resolution given that solutions are already, in all probability, partially entailed in acts of interrogation that are well-formed, etc.'*). (I)
Hence a weak, pragmatic inclusion in consensus building, etc. (*able to demonstrate this observational conjecture that ideological over-commitment either distorts and/or obstructs reasonable forms of problematic resolution*). (J)
Thence consensus building in productive argumentation, and v.v. (*given forms of conjectural argumentation that are well-formed, etc.'*). (K)
Therefore, the affirmation of this 'weak' pragmatic observational conjecture (*which through the application of suitable pragmatic and existential forms of transformation retreatment may well rise to the status of the non-weak, or non-strong level in provisional acceptability*). (L) (10.6)

Restating this argument in less theoretical terms, no doubt cutting a few conceptual corners, we might more briefly argue along the following lines: All significance is

economically generated, i.e., trimodally (*in an appeal to the positive constitutional conjecture of economic trimodalism*). To over-concentrate our attention on one or two correlatives is to pursue a misguided form of ideological reductionism (*through an appeal to the negative constitutional conjecture of economic isolationalism*). But, through suspensions of various forms, should we pursue a more overall interactive approach then a 'weak', non-ideologically oriented pragmatism could find itself being fostered through either critical reorganization and/or radical re-organization.[102] Thence the potentially productive generation of significance and the further building of consensus formation over the course of such reflections. Therefore, consensus building is entered into without recourse to ideologically manipulated and driven forms of argumentation (*whilst accepting the necessary position that ideologically and non-ideologically oriented materials are needed to be suspended in the first place as per Gadamer, etc., in order to both enact and conduct those productive forms of suspension, etc.*). Does this imputed observation deserve to be affirmed? (*Yes, on constitutional grounds, and, on the grounds of non-constitutional conjectures where it is obvious that forms of consensus building are both desired and can be delivered*). Let us see if this is a reasonable conjecture to entertain through reflecting upon the perceived productivity of our own trajectories as proposed for the resolution of such philosophical problems? By such means, putting 'flesh', e.g., on Richard Rorty's aspiration for 'social solidarity' through consensus building. (11/11.1)

Now, the lived-world is awash with problematic concerns… let me make some practical suggestions in this regard in order to start this process of collective problem-solving. E.g., should governance be rendered more or less democratic; should the user of a government service pay the true cost of that service; should businesses be socially responsible; should politicians be more 'proactive' rather than 'reactive' and how might this re-direction in emphasis be orchestrated, and so on???? What philosophically oriented problems might you propose? (12) N.T., Penrith, 16.3.24.

That the world is awash… is an understatement. Better, therefore, to spend our time and intellectual resources on a resolution of the same rather than over-concern ourselves with the incestuous over-concern with philosophical problems impossibly referred to as having identity or significance impossibly arising through the 'in and of itself, or through themselves, and so on! (12.1)

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102 'Radical re-organization' can also be treated as 'chaotically re(-)self-organized'. That through the suitably apposite invocation of such chaotic re-organization any discipline, say, philosophy, should well be viewed as self-re-organizing enterprising especially if the disciplinarian can correctly distinguish between the relatively non-critical, the critical and the potentially radical. Where philosophy, e.g., should be a self-correcting enterprise because it should be one foundered on 'reflected upon consensus'. Just as, e.g., the Earth can be only 'the center of our solar system' through unfounded, unsupported, and non-contested agreement. I.e., making a distinction between 'imposed consensus' and 'well-informed consensus' that is properly deliberated upon, etc. Where, in this process, conjectures mediate both analytical and synthetical orientations in truth determination, and, where the suspension of all three economically corelative orientations opens us, through such intermediation, to a self-correcting vista of what effectively becomes relatively more viable in both pragmatically and existentially oriented terms of reference.

In the advent of a disastrous fire, we do not sit down to have a 'mere cup of tea', or a simple conversation or a vexatious argument; in the realization of an existential emergency, we should be ready to be of assistance in the 'here and now' (hic et nunc). (12.2)

In summary, what is best said and what is best left unsaid? Chasing ideological forms of positioning and over-commitment is not the direction the open-minded disciplinarian should head given that, demonstrably, ideological positions, correctly, are both distorted and distorting, and, are both obstructing and obstructed. That our ability to apply suitable 'suspensions', etc., is both natural and required, with the implication that we cannot be bound to ideological restraints at all times given that we can avail ourselves of this degree of freedom. Furthermore, through well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectures it is possible for forms of weak pragmatism to be delineated and which may well rise to the status of the critical, if not the potentially radical, over the carefully enacted course of such apparent deliberations seemingly productive of such re(-)self-organized 'insightfulness'..!! (12.3)

N.T, 1.4.24.

XIF. Is the Philosophical Notion of the 'Ideological'
Either Over-Thought or Under-Thought?

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIF. Is the Philosophical Notion of the 'Ideological' Either Over-Thought or Under-Thought?*[103]

1. Introduction to an Open Forum

In these notes for an open forum, various ideas about the notion of the 'ideological' will be explored. To very quickly answer the question posed in the title of this essay let me say both 'Yes and 'No'. 'Yes', the idea that we are forever beholden to the ideological can be dispensed with if we accept the observation that suitably enacted suspensions afford us a certain relative degree of freedom from the otherwise all-pervasive influence of the ideological. 'No', if we also admit to the experiential fact that, e.g., weak forms of realism, idealism, and/or pragmatism seemingly pervade, at the very least, the 'natural attitude' and that to ignore such conventional influences will also render our non-observant forms of philosophical argumentation as equally defective.[104] So, we need not be beholden to the idea that we are forever in the total grip of a set of ideologies that have been either advertently preferenced by us, or, at the same time, that we are also inadvertently influenced by those ideological preferences that we are not so cognizant of. However, we should also be aware that even though we can suspend both the natural attitude and ideological over-interpretations of the same, still, we cannot totally escape the integral influence of the natural attitude as to how we will see ourselves in a world constructed both by us and by others and by this semblance of a 'world at large' itself. Now, in this overall regard, that it is to be hoped that the suspension of our pro-analytical, constitutional conjectures will rend their arguments as relatively 'well-formed', that the suspension of our pro-synthetical, non-constitutional conjectures will render them as 'well-informed', and that the suspension of our more cogent conjectures, as a mediation of the former, will ensure such argumentation is 'well-expressed'. That, then, a suitably conducted overall suspension of the above, through such intermediation, may well institute a process of re-self-organization wherein the disciplinary exercise, say, in and through its critical philosophical approaches, effectively becomes a 'self-righting enterprise'. That, through such a dialectic, we move from the relatively non-critical to the relatively critical, and, then, from the relatively critical to the potentially radical along with its demands for new vocabularies, definitive histories, novel innovations, and other ironically treated devices in which what was once thought to be 'impossible', i.e., 'not even able to be thought', can now be progressively engaged, albeit small increment by small increment (since we could not comprehend the 'radically-radical' even if it were to metaphorically 'drop upon us like the malformed aspiration for the literal delivery of a gold brick'[105]).

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[103] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

[104] Invoking, here, the Husserlian idea of the natural attitude that can then be transcendentally bracketed, suspended, subjected to an *epoché*, etc. However, I treat the 'transcendental' as 'trans-cognitive'/'trans-intentional', that as arrived at through processes of judgment, and, that this definition of the 'suspension' is then a method for revealing the types of judgments, and their productivity, along with all emendations that are or could be in play, etc.

[105] Thence my reference to the 'relatively-radical' (and the critical need to re-appropriate this aspect of the 'non-economic' through the lens of the 'hyper-economical aspect' of 'the overall economy of the economic'). That, if you were to pray for 'the delivery of a gold brick' then it would be advisable that it land beside you, with no one else about who might more successfully claim it, and, most definitely, that it land will not on you since 'you want to enjoy the value of what that gold brick could mean for you'.

2. Introduction: Outline of these Explorations within this Open Forum

Philosophers might like to see themselves as 'truth-seekers', but, it can be well-argued that even non-philosophers may be similarly dispositioned. For philosophers to claim a distinctive sense of a discipline I would like to provisionally argue their allegiance, more or less, to the following five 'moving parts', namely, first, that they possess an overall working view on the nature of certain sets of viable conjectures; second, an appreciation of their argued for truth determinations; third, a critical appreciation of such truth determinations; fourth, a potentially radical appreciation of the ramifications of such transformations arrived at in their ensuing world-views; whilst, fifth, that they are also cognizant that their ideological preferencing of the same can be tempered and maintained in a relatively non-ideological sense of stance, with a concomitant sense of 'commitment', through the suitable exercise of apposite suspensions. Against this philosophical backdrop, I would like to clarify how I would like to tentatively view the distinctive psychological nature of 'ideological thinking', by making a distinction between 'relatively non-ideologically oriented argumentation' and 'relatively ideologically oriented argumentation' in which that latter type of person is adopting some form of philosophical extremism, adamantly over-preferences truth determinations from their sense of perspective, evidentially demonstrates observable forms of 'over-commitment' that are indicative of what I term to be a 'pseudo-psychotic complexion', etc. In contrast, a relatively non-overcommitted person, who still evinces an argued form of commitment, is engaged with as a person with whom we can enter into a dialogue, rather, than a one-sided ideological monologue. That, in a process of argumentation, these two types of engagement are quite distinctively different, and, if we wish to enter into a profitable form of a debate, debating the ideologue is best avoided (for reasons as explored in the previous two essays). Then, to conclude the framing of this disquisition on 'ideological thinking' let me explore to what extent there are or that there are not resident contradictions hidden or not so hidden in ideological thinking, and so on. (1)

Using this disquisition to then segue into an open (forum) discussion of Slavoj Zizek's apparent views or attitudes towards the nature of ideological thinking as per the podcast #196, #197, and #198 as presented by Stephen West in his podcast *Philosophize This*.[106] To facilitate this open forum, I note an introductory summary of some of the ideas in those podcast (which can be listened to or read as per the transcripts supplied). (2)

Then, to conclude, let me briefly comment on this working take on Zizek from my views on ideological thinking as outlined in the introduction to this open forum, and, where, no doubt, I will also have to take on board the ideas as were explored in this open forum. Indeed, in amending my ideas on this topic, such emendations and qualifications, etc., will be duly appended as a *Postscript* to this essay and, therefore, let me take this opportunity to sincerely thank you for your contributions in this regard. (3)

3. A Brief Summary of My Views on Ideologically Oriented Thinking.

[106] The three links to those podcasts:
https://www.philosophizethis.org/podcast/anarchism-part-one-26l4k-pj5c2-yehbw
https://www.philosophizethis.org/podcast/anarchism-part-one-26l4k-pj5c2-yehbw-jebes-cwz68
https://www.philosophizethis.org/podcast/anarchism-part-one-26l4k-pj5c2-yehbw-jebes-cwz68-y6cd4

In the light of my introductions to this topic let me proffer this summary:
1. The linguistically referred to idea of a 'world' is both ideologically driven and riven…
2. But, we can find a certain degree of freedom from the ideological through focusing upon its more apparent features and 'bracketing' or 'suspending' the same.
3. That granted, 'ideologues' are 'people', in contrast, 'who are over-committed to a certain ideology or set of ideologies (and who do not sufficiently entertain suspensions of both their own views and their own over-commitments)'.
4. 'Over-commitment' is psychologically quite different from either 'commitment' or 'non-commitment' or 'under-commitment'.
5. Over-commitment induces, to the same degree, a pseudo-psychotic complexion.
6. Debating with ideologues over their ideological predilections is usually an unproductive process (even if you agree with their positioning) because their positioning is monologically presented and not, potentially, in the form of a fruitfully productive dialogue that could be mutually and beneficially informative for either both or all parties.
7. An ideologue is an 'ideologue' in proportion to 'the extent they resist, in a psychotic-like manner, the experience of a contestment of their own over-committed positionings'.
8. Thence an 'ideologue', to that same extent, is an 'extremist'.[107]
9. Whereas non-over-committed people are 'not ideologues', but, are still heavily influenced by cultural-intercultural forms of ideological thinking as per the 'natural attitude'.
10. But that, at the very least, a natural positioning is necessary as a starting point for any conversation or debate from the necessity of having something to suspend and question.
11. That such a conversation or debate takes on a critical complexion should suitable suspensions arise, say, through the asking of suitable questions; maintaining a healthy skepticism; being well-informed'; running non-fallacious arguments'; running well-formed arguments; deriving valid conclusions; in being able to both test and contest such apparent conclusions; in proffering well-expressed conclusions that do not claim to be indubitable and anything other than as provisional, as works in progress, as our best efforts, etc.
12. Ideologies divide into those that are either religious or non-religious in orientation, and, where both can be further subdivided under the headings of (an over-commitment to) Moral Principles, Philosophical Positions, and Controversial Issues.[108]
13. Ideologies simplify, invite psychological acceptance, proffer truths and commitments.
14. That all ideological positioning will meet forms of contradiction, either hidden or not so hidden, through over-preferential forms of treatment arrived at through attempting to impossibly focus on isolated forms of economic interaction, the very making of a decision to over-prefer a certain type of position over its opposition or some other, etc.
15. Where non-ideologues, through non-over-commitment to their current commitment to a certain stance in the world, cannot be misconstrued as 'ideologues' despite the ideological nature of all forms of positioning since non-ideologues demonstrate that we cannot and should not conflate 'all thinking' as 'just ideologically driven and riven…' (4)

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[107] Exercising an over-preferential treatment for a certain set of ideas that involves an impossible form of economic isolationalism as discussed and explored in the two previous essays (XID and XIE).

[108] As noted in the previous essay. *Pursuit*, III.XID.1.11. E.g., killing a person is wrong (and, therefore, abortion is wrong); realism or idealism, etc; controversies surrounding, say, vaccines, vaccination mandates, various ideas expressed about the nature and origins of Covid, etc.

4. Is Slavoj Zizek a 'Philosophical Charlatan' or a 'Philosophical Hero'?

Now, I admit this sub-title is meant to be thought-provoking, but, in order to demonstrate the more positive, yet, also the ironically intended appellation of the 'heroic', I need to somewhat deconstruct the former charge (namely, that this person is no more than a mere charlatan). I.e., that a superficial view could quite easily be formed that this person, who is often interviewed on social media, and, who is always provocative in that arena, is just a 'performer' merely seeking attention on social media. However, that to my mind is far from the reality of what he appears to be doing despite the idiosyncrasies of his philosophical style. Indeed, Stephen West in his podcast titled *Philosophize This* has, as a take away, that 'Zizek's provocative style is not mere trolling but aims to disorient and awaken people from ideological complacency'.[109](5)

As examples of his provocative statements, he has been reported to have said:

> Gandhi was more violent than Hitler.
>
> Joseph Stalin was an honest man.
>
> Heidegger was not a great philosopher in spite of his time as a Nazi…he was great because he was a Nazi.[110] (6)

Of course, people are welcome to add their own favourite 'provocative' quotations to this list should they wish... (7)

Now, for those who are not acquainted with this Slovenian philosopher, who writes in English, Zizek has published many titles. He is very erudite, will often cite a wide-ranging variety of sources. Stephen West tells us:

> Zizek's philosophical framework is deeply influenced by Hegel, Marx, and Lacan.[111] This combination allows Zizek to offer unique interpretations of culture and society, particularly in critiquing global capitalism and exploring human subjectivity… Zizek argues that everyone is influenced by ideology, and it's crucial to be aware of this in our pursuit of truth. This perspective challenges the simplistic view of ideology as something only others possess, highlighting its universal impact on human subjectivity… He often starts with a progressive position, makes it appealing and then flips it to show its contradictions. This disorienting style is intentional, designed to reveal the limitations of ideology and encourage deeper critical thinking.[112] (8)

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109 Podcast #196.

110 *Ibid.*

111 Later, he argues that he is very much a Hegelian, Hegelian, Hegelian… that Lacan very much assisted him in his coming to better appreciate the work of Hegel.

112 *Ibid.*

In this regard, a comparison to Socrates has been voiced. Where Zizek practices a form of Socratic dialogue that, rather than demonstrates what we know, is more inclined to demonstrate what we don't know, or should have difficulty in coming to know, etc. But, this is not done in a process with little or no value, but, where the process itself could have very much to offer. Say, in clarifying where we seem to stand. Or, why such a stance is one we would be better to withdraw from, or, where might we head in order to resolve these contradictions as currently pointed out to us. So should we take these contradictions at face value, or, by what other routes should we metaphorically 'travel', indeed, face and confront what to date had been hitherto thought to be impossible, indeed, enjoy and savour those innovations that now seem to have been dangled in front of us.., and so on? Or, where simulating a dialectical process is, in some way, an expression of its truth… so, e.g., parents once thought they had a right to physically punish their miscreant children, just as school once thought they could cane their wayward students… now all that is frowned upon… that to understand these shifts in attitudes towards corporal punishment is to better understand the current 'truth' of our current situatedness in this world of change in that same regard… (9)

According to Wikipedia, for Zizek ideology is made up of fictions that structure political life… He also thinks ideology has been frequently misinterpreted as dualistic and, according to him, this misinterpreted dualism posits that there is a real world of material relations and objects outside oneself, which is accessible to reason. (10)

However, in taking a non-dualistic approach, ideology constructs our world, proffers short cuts, sums it up for us… and becomes our 'reality' which is overlooked as simplified by us. However, with such 'simplification' also comes a problematic absenting of ourselves from other worthwhile ways of also seeing this experience of a world… that by looking more deeply we might find ourselves in a more insightful way of dealing with both the problematic and the non-problematic. E.g., by seeing both political Left and Right as but the two sides of the same coin of a global capitalism, and as somewhat superficial, we might then find ourselves in a better position to more deeply understand both the nature of those debates and just what is actually more problematic for us to deal with… say, the capitalistic drivers of an ensuing environmental collapse, or, how the overall political system has us quibbling over superficial social concerns like a so-called woke-ism, etc. That, if thought through more deeply, we would then find that our political energy and resources should be dealing with more pressing issues, say, the exploitation of workers through the overall political system depressing the ability for the relatively more exploited to truly earn a living wage, or, the deeper reasons why we have excessive rents, inadequate stocks of housing, homelessness, and all other allied issues. (11)

What is called for is a 'dialectic', a more dialectical-like appreciation of lived-reality. Where through both either commitment or over-commitment we define ourselves through the negation of what we oppose. Just as, e.g., the 'atheist' defines themselves as someone who is 'not a theist'. Or, with respect to cultural institutions and concepts, we might find ourselves defining 'laws' in a juxtaposition with the concept of 'transgressions', and v.v. Registering and recognizing how laws change in regard to our shifting ideas on the nature of transgression, and v.v. But, also understanding that a dialectic is

not just bipolar (and not just economically tripolar) and is also potentially multi-polar (in intersection with an array of overlapping and hierarchically mapped multi-economic configurations). So, e.g., laws in a legal system can also be viewed in relation to ideas and realities of what it means to be governed, the freedom of the individual, the role of punishment, the institution of imprisonment, justice and fairness, and so on and so forth. (12)

Now, from this series of podcasts, let us explore these and other ideas in this open forum… mixing and melding ideas from Zizek, myself, and your very own thoughts and reflections on this very complex, and potentially perplexing, topic…. (13)

5. A Personal Critique (of Zizek, *et al*)

In just a short acquaintance with the complex ideas and dialectical strategies of Zizek I admit I am not in a position to be able to proffer an in-depth critique of this philosopher. Obviously, I am going to first approach the complexity of his work from how I have already approached this rich topic of the 'ideological' as summarized, e.g., under those fifteen points. Noting how an acceptance of suspensions does give us some relief from the all-pervasive nature of the ideological. Yet, at the same time, how the all-pervasive nature of the natural attitude will constitute our very ability to see this world, but, again, suspensions will be needed to correctly initiate our conversations and debates. At the same time stressing the psychological differences between an 'ideologue' and a 'non-ideologue', i.e., the person who is over-committed *versus* the person who, hopefully, is existentially committed to the taking of a series of worthwhile positions on 'their-being-in-this-world-with-others'. That questioning, itself, is one form of a suspension, and, I would also further contend that if one trimodal aspect, e.g., of the economy of interrogation, is suitably suspended in-depth then, through the holistic nature of an overall economic correlativity, that a more thorough overall sense and semblance of a(n extensive) suspension would ensue where through the automatic force of the de-suspension we would be directed in more productive, insightful forms of 're-direction' that would effectively oversee each and every discipline more as a 'self-correcting enterprise'… admittedly, this is a very optimistic appreciation of the role of a(n economic) dialectic… but, I do not expect people to be as optimistic here as I must appear when, I should also add, an element of pessimism to the extent that we are all bound by all manner of limitations, still, 'all well-formed questions have the possible seeds of their own resolution...' That in a sense, through suspensions, 'closer' scrutiny of our ideological thinking could be quite revelatory in that regard… but, also revealing our limitations as a 'finite, fragile person' intersecting the infinite perspectives of this same sense and semblance of a social, politically defined, non-dualistic world (with myself being in a strong agreement on that last point, with Zizek?). (14)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 3.4.24.

6. A Future Postscript... As Now Written….

As envisaged in the ensuing open forum, devoted to this topic of ideology, I fully expected to meet a 'philosophical tension' between, say, on one hand, 'the relative necessity of engaging either ideological commitments or undecided non-commitments in the formation of our positional commencement in order to start our philosophical explorations and enact suitable suspensions of such content, therein, as would stem from the natural attitude, etc.', and, on the other hand, 'the ideological over-commitments of ardent ideologues which, more than likely, would be presented with a pseudo-psychotic-like type of complexion directly reflecting the intensity of those relatively incontestable forms of ideological over-commitment'. That, such a pre-configured understanding meant that in order to negotiate this spectrum between relative commitment (along with non-commitment and under-commitment) and relative over-commitment both the contemplated continuities and discontinuities of this metaphorical landscape of the ideological had to be negotiated in order to philosophically refine our use of conventional language in this same regard. Hence the use of such expressions like, e.g., the natural attitude, conventional positioning; commitments *versus* over-commitments, etc; ideologues, and ideological extremism, etc. (15)

One important qualification noted in these discussions was the recognition that ideologues, as people, could, potentially, be profitably debated and mutually engaged on non-ideologically oriented types of terrain although the observation was also noted that people beholden to conspiratorial modes of thinking were quite often more prone to entertaining a variety of other topical conspiracies. That, furthermore, that it was not impossible for people holding such over-committed forms of ideation to either modify, reconstruct, and/or deconstruct such forms of over-commitment. Another distinction that was discussed in this open forum was that in terms of religious ideology it was quite possible for adherents of that type of belief-system to be committed to such tenets without taking on board the pseudo-psychotic-like complexion concomitant with an over-commitment to such ideological content. (ii)

In the midst of these explorations a certain meme, articulating a set of strong neoliberal attitudes, originally posted on the Internet, was explored in terms of its ideological content. Surprisingly, that set of propositions that misconstrued the democratic ideal of an 'equality of opportunity' as literally 'all people were equal', along with a valid contestment of the latter equation, demonstrated, advertently or inadvertently, a very confused mixture of fallacies, malformed premises, conclusions neither supported through well-formed arguments and/or well-informed facts that, collectively, demonstrated the relative inauthenticity and philosophical short-sightedness of this individual who was either seriously or satirically parroting a wide variety of social myths and half-truths that, when suitably leant upon, would quite easily deconstruct without our even needing to apply a critically concerted form of ideological scrutiny. That such half-baked ideas, in this instance, more reflected a poorly digested, default-like acceptance of the socially expected ideological forms of commitment or over-commitment in an non-reflected upon alignment with the current hegemony of major discourses, ruling paradigms, 'official' or 'orthodox' modes-of-life, etc. (iii)

Although divided on the authenticity of Zizek's Socratic style, in fairness to Zizek, if we were to have seen him in action, and find him successfully defend his provocative statements, we might well have taken on board the philosophical 'seriousness' of, sometimes, his humorous approaches as exercised through his dialectically driven sense of method (which I would personally contend is both productively radical and constructively valid[113]). In that regard, not mistaking his 'means' for his intended 'ends' even if the process invites the observation that this philosopher is also both a 'social performer' and a 'social influencer' (in furthering the marketing of his many books?). (iv)

The non-dualism of this philosopher was also noted, and, how this needed to modify our reception of his views on ideology as something more akin to a way of simplifying a direct vision of 'our' lived-sense of the world that, more often than not, also needed to be radically re-seen, indeed, re-thought, in order to more insightfully inform the social commitments of the concerned citizen given the plethora of adverse phenomena approaching over the cultural-intercultural horizons of our world at large and before which our politician seem only capable of reacting (when not over-reacting) and not being proactive in a more timely manner in that same regard. (v)

A very interesting observation was also noted that in a world of increasing stress and anxiety, often promoted by the adverse consequences of neo-liberal policies, as in, e.g., our heading towards non-living wages for those at the lower end of the pay-scale, relatively excessive rents, excessive demands being placed upon workers, etc., could well promote ideological forms of response. That through an over-self-identification with such understandings and misunderstandings uncritically thought-through ideological responses could well be the result of such increasing social pressures? Perhaps, and I am speculating here, given the relative dearth of religious ideologies, people may well be more prone to taking on board and self-identifying with more conspiratorially-oriented modes of dissemination, be that either individually arrived at or through the social pressures of a conspiratorially motivated group (in all probability where those individuals each will entertaining a varied mix of such forms of unsubstantiated or poorly substantiated ideation, along with behaviours concomitant upon such positionings along with the expression of such co-associated political postures, etc?[114])? (vi)

Again, I would like to thank the initial authors of these comments as noted above along with the other contributions shared over the course of this open forum. (vii)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 15.4.24.

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[113] In line with the overall attitude 'that being critical should be both deconstructive and reconstructive', and, 'that a persistent critical attitude can broach the relatively-radical in our incrementally experienced recognition, encountering and engagement with the non-radically-radical'.

[114] Individuals may be more reticent to publicly express their conspiratorial ideation, whereas, on the other hand, a group of such individuals would more likely express such commitments, be that through either politically oriented or non-politically oriented forms of expression.

XIG. An Integrated Set of Arguments for the Operation of
The Conjectural Economy:
The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

A Preamble to 'An Integrated Set of Arguments for the… Conjectural Economy'

As this conjecture of 'the relative necessity for the imputation of conjectures in order to begin to appreciate the analytic-synthetic distinction, etc.',[115] is framed as a response to my critical-radical re-reading of Quine's seminal paper *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* I feel it advisable to proffer a selective summary of that presentation in order to philosophically situate the following essay *An Integrated Set of Arguments for the Operation of the Conjectural Economy*: *The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures*. In the *Preamble* I will also add that a *Third Dogma*, namely, *The Non-Recognition of a Conjectural Cogency* will need to be considered (along with the intimation of a *Fourth Dogma*, namely, the unnecessary invocation of an *External World, etc.*, that will also be further explored in a later essay). For convenience we could nominate the first two dogmas critiqued by Quine, namely, as *Analytical Circularity*, and, *Reductionism* (of conceptual materials treated as transparently 'given' through sense data, or similar, etc.). (i)

According to Wikipedia (15.4.24):

> "**Two Dogmas of Empiricism**" is a paper by analytic philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951.[116] According to University of Sydney professor of philosophy Peter Godfrey-Smith, this "paper [is] sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy".[117] The paper is an attack on two central aspects of the logical positivists' philosophy: the first being the analytic–synthetic distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, explained by Quine as truths grounded only in meanings and independent of facts, and truths grounded in facts; the other being reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms that refer exclusively to immediate experience.
>
> "Two Dogmas" has six sections. The first four focus on analyticity, the last two on reductionism. There, Quine turns the focus to the logical positivists' theory of meaning. He also presents his own holistic theory of meaning. (ii)

Basically, in the first four sections, he argues that, through circularity, that different explanations of the concept of the analytical are all circular and that, therefore, this aspect of the analytic-synthetic-distinction cannot be maintained. In other words, a pure analyticity cannot exist as things stands if either treated apart or non-separately from the synthetic aspect of this distinction. (iii)

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115 In our attempt to appreciate either the analytic, the synthetic, and/or the analytic-synthetic distinction.

116 This paper was also emended by Quine when reprinted in 1953, *From a Logical Point of View*, Harvard University Press) without radically altering the original essay(?). There is also a second, revised edition in 1961 He has also written *Two Dogmas in Retrospect*; Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September, 1991), pp. 265-274.

117 Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality*, 2003, University of Chicago, ISBN 0-226-30062-5, pages 30-33 (section 2.4 "*Problems and Changes*").

Here, I would argue, on economic grounds (in the context of the constitutional conjecture of the 'economic' as trimodal) a pure, self-standing definition of the 'analytic', and, likewise, both the 'synthetic' and the 'conjectural', cannot be meaningfully enunciated as if stand-alone terms givens their co-associated mutual, correlative processes of economic co-definition. Where such co-associated definitions need to be co-defined through the joint negation of the other two economic correlatives. So, if we want to relatively define the sense and semblance of the 'analytical' we must also invoke, either explicitly and/or implicitly, the 'joint negation of both the synthetical and the conjectural'. I.e:

Analytical = Negation of both the Synthetical and the Conjectural. (iv)

Where all three correlative parties are mutually co-defined through the joint negations of their economic correlatives. Hence the implication that analyticity, etc., cannot be defined non-correlatively. (v)

Quine achieves a similar outcome through demonstrating that a variety of definitions of the 'analytical' all fail this test of a 'seeking for a non-circular definition of the analytical'. (vi)

Abbreviating Quine's series of argument he notes that there are two types of analytical propositions (basically the implicitly tautological-like and the seemingly non-tautological-like). So, e.g., as a statement of the first type he proffers, 'No unmarried man is married'. Explicating its tautological basis, I would add, 'that it is either the case a man is married or not married', and, 'that it is the case either an unmarried man is not married or a married man is married'. As an example of the second variety he proffers, 'No bachelor is married'. Where he notes the second variety can become members of the first variety of analytical propositions by noting the synonymity of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'. In other words, these expressions can be substituted for each other. So, a 'bachelor is a both a 'bachelor' and 'unmarried', and, where 'an unmarried man (bachelor) is a man who is not married (bachelor)". (vii)

In bleeding dry the same vein, Quine continues to demonstrate that we cannot appeal to 'synonymity' or 'necessity' or 'interchangeability' in order to account for the concept of the 'analytic', and v.v. (viii)

According to this same Wikipedia article on 'The Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (15.4.24):

> …that in order for us to distinguish between analytic and synthetic we must appeal to synonymy; at the same time, we should also understand synonymy with interchangeability *salva veritate*. However, such a condition to understand synonymy is not enough so we not only argue that the terms should be interchangeable, but necessarily so. And to explain this logical necessity we must appeal to analyticity once again. Thus, the argument is circular, and fails.

Ultimately, Quine reaches the conclusion about analyticity the paper is famous for:

> **"It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact... Hence the temptation to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its *a priori* reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith."** (ix)

In other words, we have a relatively complex argument that states, in effect, that the analytically treated propositions need to be also comprehended in synthetical-like terms of reference, and, v.v. (where, in converse, the synthetical needs to be understood through the analytical concatenation of items of informative information). (x)

The last two sections of that paper deal with the myth of the so-called 'given', where, in distinction to this second dogma of empiricism it is argued 'that it is not possible to reduce experience to the wrongly imputed sheer, untranslated, non-mediated immediacy of sense-oriented experience'. In order to arrive at this conclusion, Quine argues (as per this same Wikipedia article on The Two Dogmas of Empiricism) that:

> Analyticity would be acceptable if we allowed for the verification theory of meaning: an analytic statement would be one synonymous with a logical truth, which would be an extreme case of meaning where empirical verification is not needed, because it is "confirmed no matter what". "So, if the verification theory can be accepted as an adequate account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is saved after all."
>
> The problem that naturally follows is how statements are to be verified. An empiricist would say that it can only be done using empirical evidence. So some form of reductionism - "the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" - must be assumed in order for an empiricist to 'save' the notion of analyticity. Such reductionism, says Quine, presents just as intractable a problem as did analyticity.
>
> In order to prove that all meaningful statements can be translated into a sense-datum language, a reductionist would surely have to confront "the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it." To illustrate the difficulty of doing so, Quine describes Rudolf Carnap's attempt in his book *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*.

> Quine first observes that Carnap's starting point was not the strictest possible, as his "sense-datum language" included not only sense-events but also "the notations of logic, up through higher set theory... Empiricists there are who would boggle at such prodigality." Nonetheless, says Quine, Carnap showed great ingenuity in defining sensory concepts "which, but for his constructions, one would not have dreamed were definable on so slender a basis." However, even such admirable efforts left Carnap, by his own admission, far short of completing the whole project. Finally, Quine objects in principle to Carnap's proposed translation of statements like "quality q is at point-instant x;y;z;t" into his sense-datum language, because he does not define the connective "is at". Without statements of this kind, it is difficult to see, even in principle, how Carnap's project could have been completed.
>
> The difficulty that Carnap encountered shows **that reductionism is, at best, unproven and very difficult to prove. Until a reductionist can produce an acceptable proof, Quine maintains that reductionism is another "metaphysical article of faith".** (xi)

In other words, a naïve realistic-like reduction to the unmediated immediacy of sense-date is a nonsense. That there exists an ultimate reduction to the immediacy of the unmediated should be regarded as something that would be impossible to either recognize, encounter, and/or engage. (xii)

Or, as I would like to put it, the individual truth determination, alone, of either the necessity of the analytical, the contingency of the synthetical, or the cogency of the conjecture, or, indeed, any pair of such distinctions in their own right,[118] is not economically possible. On the other hand, we can relatively focus on the partial isolation of the relatively analytical, etc., or (the mediation of) the analytical-synthetical distinction, etc., from the (intermediated) integrity of the overall economy when we realize that the processes of truth-determination, and the (repurposed metaphysical-like) appreciation of such truth determination necessitates the requisite alignment[119] between all three economic correlatives of the analytic, etc. (xiii)

The upshot of this admirably orchestrated process of deconstruction of the ostensive program of the dogmatic empiricist, e.g., as exemplified by naïve realists, logical

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[118] Namely, the three distinctions of the ‘analytical-synthetical’, ‘the synthetical-conjectural’, and ‘the conjectural-analytical’.

[119] I.e., the requisite preservation of the relative transformational isomorphic invariance required through intermediation in order to establish a delineation of such relative determinations of either the partial isolation of a correlative, the mediation of a set of two correlatives, and/or the intermediation of the entire economy, albeit as it finds itself apparently situated within its relational sense and semblance of place in this overall world of life, this world at large, etc. I will explore this topic of truth determination in a later essay in this set of essays as entailed in this *Book* XI. Where, furthermore, alignment is realized through the ongoing processes of re(-)alignment as established through the rectification of hermeneutic reiteration, the deconstruction/reconstruction of phenomenological iteration, and the re(-)normalization of chaotically oriented re-iteration (within this overall ‘economy of iteration’).

positivists, *et al*, is to head towards recognizing some form of either an overt or covert partnership between an empirical holism[120] and a non-dogmatic pragmatism. (xiv)

The missing part in all of this is the require recognition of a conjectural dimension in these proceedings. It is all very well to say, first, in an analytical orientation, e.g., 'that (on the surface of Planet Earth) it is either raining or not raining', and 'when it rains (and you standing in the rain) you get wet (because 'rain' consists of 'water falling from the sky' and when you are 'showered' by such you will get 'wet')', and, second, in a synthetical orientation when we note the contingent fact, as a statement, 'that it is currently raining', that, third, if a conjectural dimension is absent that we will not be able to mediate these two types of proposition with the conjecture that 'if one goes out into the rain they will get wet (in a more full specification of their situatedness under the advent of such circumstances)'. That the full appreciation of the truth determination of this conjectural propositional-statement of their 'getting wet by going out into the rain (without shelter, say, from an umbrella, etc.)' necessitates an appreciation of the intermediation of all three correlative dimensions (in our appreciation of the 'economy of rain') of, namely, the analytical, the synthetical, and the conjectural. (xv)

Interestingly, in further promoting these concepts of the economic treatment of events (through, e.g., the lens of both mediation and intermediation, etc.) I would also like to note two more interesting and apposite theoretical-observations, namely, the Duhem-Quine Thesis, and, the Paradox of Analysis. (xvi)

Wikipedia under the entry Duhem-Quine Thesis (15.4.24) notes:

> In philosophy of science, the **Duhem–Quine thesis**, also called the **Duhem–Quine problem**, posits that it is impossible to experimentally test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, because an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions (also called *auxiliary assumptions* or *auxiliary hypotheses*): the thesis says that unambiguous scientific falsifications are impossible.[1] It is named after French theoretical physicist Pierre Duhem and American logician Willard Van Orman Quine, who wrote about similar concepts.
>
> In recent decades, the set of associated assumptions supporting a thesis sometimes is called a *bundle of hypotheses*. Although a bundle of hypotheses (i.e. a hypothesis and its background assumptions) *as a whole* can be tested against the empirical world and be falsified if it fails the test, the Duhem–Quine thesis says it is impos-

120 Instead of reductionism, Quine proposes that it is the whole field of science, and not single statements, that are verified. All scientific statements are interconnected. Logical laws give the relation between different statements, while they also are statements of the system. This makes talk about the empirical content of a single statement misleading. It also becomes impossible to draw a line between synthetic statements, which depend on experience, and analytic statements, that hold come what may. Any statement can be held as necessarily true according to Quine, if the right changes are made somewhere else in the system. In the same way, no statements are immune to revision. As per Wikipedia's *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, 15.4.24.)

> sible to isolate a single hypothesis in the bundle, a viewpoint called confirmation holism.
>
> …it therefore is necessary to study the defensibility of the auxiliary assumptions, together with the primary hypothesis, to arrive at the most viable working hypothesis. (xvii)

In other words, the isolation of either an analytical proposition or a synthetical statement (or a conjectural propositional-statement) or any bimodal distinction (between the former) cannot be ascertained non-contextually, i.e., when attempted to be understood and appreciated outside the relevant economy in question. (xviii)

Or, in economic-speak, (both significance-generation and) truth determination necessitate the exercise of the correlative parties of a gestalt focus, a co-associated background, and the co-association of a sense and semblance of intentional subjectivity able to discern (the mediation of) the former within the (intermediated) appreciation of the totality of the entire gestalt economy in question. (xix)

Now, it could be argued that another philosophical problem highlights this need for economic interconnectivity, namely, the Paradox of Analysis. (xx)

As per Wikipedia, under this heading of the *Paradox of analysis* (15.4.24), notes:

> The **paradox of analysis** (or **Langford–Moore paradox**)[1] is **a paradox that concerns how an analysis can be both correct and informative.** The problem was formulated by philosopher G. E. Moore in his book *Principia Ethica*, and first named by C. H. Langford in his article "The Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy" (in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, Northwestern University, 1942, pp. 319–342).
>
> A conceptual analysis is something like the definition of a word. However, unlike a standard dictionary definition (which may list examples or talk about related terms as well), a completely correct analysis of a concept in terms of others seems like it should have exactly the same meaning as the original concept. Thus, in order to be correct, the analysis should be able to be used in any context where the original concept is used, without changing the meaning of the discussion in context. Conceptual analyses of this sort are a major goal of analytic philosophy.
>
> However, if such an analysis is to be useful, it should be informative. That is, it should tell us something we don't already know (or at least, something one can imagine someone might not already know). But it seems that no conceptual analysis can both meet the requirement of correctness and of informativeness, on these understandings of the requirements.
>
> To see why, consider a potential simple analysis:

(1) For all x (any given member of a class or set), x is a brother if and only if x is a male sibling.

One can say that (1) is correct because the expression "brother" represents the same concept as the expression "male sibling," and (1) seems to be informative because the two expressions are not identical. And if (1) is truly correct, then "brother" and "male sibling" must be interchangeable:

(2) For all x, x is a brother if and only if x is a brother

Yet (2) is not informative, so either (1) is not informative, or the two expressions used in (1) are not interchangeable (because they change an informative analysis into an uninformative one) so (1) is not actually correct. In other words, if the analysis is correct and informative, then (1) and (2) must be essentially equal, but this is not true because (2) is not informative. Therefore, it seems an analysis cannot be both correct and informative at the same time.

Proposed resolutions

One way to resolve this paradox is to redefine what is an analysis (?) In explaining the paradox, a potential analysis is assumed to be a relation between concepts rather than the verbal expressions used to illustrate them. If the verbal expression is part of the analysis, then we shouldn't expect complete intersubstitutivity even in cases of correct analyses. However, this response seems to move the notion of analysis into mere linguistic definition, rather than doing interesting work with concepts.

Another response is to bite the bullet and just say that correct analyses are uninformative — which then raises the question of what positive cognitive notion should be used instead of this one, if any.

One further response would be to take Willard Van Orman Quine's position and reject the notion of conceptual analysis altogether. This is a natural response to the rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction. (xxi)

The way I would prefer to resolve this dilemma is to argue that, as economic correlatives, our provisional delineation of either analytical propositions, synthetical statements, and/or conjectural propositional-statements cannot and should not be economically isolated from the overall context of their contextually situated economies. So, it follows, that we cannot expect any aspects of an economic system to be purely analytical, purely synthetical, and/or purely conjectural in our interactions with the same, be that through (hermeneutical) recognition, (phenomenological) encountering, and/or (existential) engagement. Moreover, we could surmise, e.g., that the more analytical we would like our approach to be, in an inverse proportion, the less synthetically and conjecturally oriented would an ensuing overall appreciation be realized in lived-experience, and v.v. Moreover, as a result, the overall appreciation of the represented-system in question

would, at a certain point, also suffer given the necessary correlativity of the relational richness of all (mediated) economic parties in order to establish the emergent overall richness of the information being expressed (through intermediation) within that simulated-system (in what very much parallels, as an analogy, a trimodal rereading of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle[121]). (xxii)

Or, in simple language, any focus on one economic correlative is at the expense of the other two economic correlatives. So, e.g., if we over-focus on analysis we do so at the expense of both contingent informativeness and, I would add, our ability to cogently co-opt the specificational possibilities that might be able to be engendered through the adoption and adaptation of an apposite set of conjectural functions. (xxiii)

At the end of the day, the primary conclusion I would like to advance is that comprehension in all its forms is economically engendered, regardless of whether we are aware or not aware of the epistemological hegemony of the economic, and, where, consequently and subsequently, our improper treatment of the economic constitution of this epistemological domain can only be problematic on all levels of epistemological functioning regardless of whether we are aware or not aware of these naturally imposed forms of economic circumscription. That, in regard to the apparent linguistic domains of analytical 'propositions' and synthetical 'statements' on the trimodal grounds of an economic constitution it is my contention that we need to find a third economic-correlative and, to that end, I have proposed the use of conjectural 'propositional-statements'. That to suitably explore the 'necessity' of the analytical and the 'contingency' of the synthetical we need to add the 'cogency' of the conjectural. But economic circumscription also implies that through the impossibility of an economic isolationalism there can be no recognition, no encountering and no engagement with the impossible isolation of the purely analytical, the purely synthetical, and, by extension, likewise, any form of a pure analytic-synthetic distinction. Similarly, the proposal of pure conjectures will also be an epistemological impossibility and, likewise, only result in contradictions, aporias, incoherencies, paradoxes, and other forms of economic nonsense be that in a philosophical or a metaphysical discourse, or, in either a disciplinary or a secular sphere of influence. The inevitable deconstruction and ineffective reconstruction of great 'philosophical monuments' is an ongoing testament to our disciplinary non-inattentiveness to both economic possibilities and impossibilities. It is my hope that by working upon a better and more effectively comprehended philosophical landscape that through such an existential-pragmatism, or a pragmatic-existentialism, all forms of disciplinary practice can be progressively advanced one small step by one small step…[122] (xxiv) N.T., 17.4.24.

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[121] I.e., the more able we find ourselves concentrating on any one or two economic correlative the less able we are to concentrate on the other two correlatives or the remaining correlative. Moreover, excessive attention to any one or two correlatives will also mean a corresponding decrease in the overall richness of that type of economic experience.

[122] In the essay XIH, I will argue that from a 'transcendental perspective', to be read as a 'judgmental, trans-intentional/trans-cognitive orientation, that both an existential re-directedness and a pragmatic-responsiveness effectively coincide in the advancement of an observable existential enrichment of that primary relationship in question, etc..

A Retrospective Reading:

> Paul Grice and P. F. Strawson criticized *Two Dogmas* in their (1956) article *In Defense of a Dogma*. Among other things, they argue that Quine's skepticism about synonyms leads to a skepticism about meaning. If statements can have meanings, then it would make sense to ask "What does it mean?". If it makes sense to ask "What does it mean?", then synonymy can be defined as follows: Two sentences are synonymous if and only if the true answer of the question "What does it mean?" asked of one of them is the true answer to the same question asked of the other. They also draw the conclusion that discussion about correct or incorrect translations would be impossible given Quine's argument. Four years after Grice and Strawson published their paper, Quine's book *Word and Object* was released. In the book Quine presented his theory of indeterminacy of translation.[123] (xxv)

In a very meticulous reply these two authors correctly argue that we can understand this distinction given its meaning has been well understood for the last couple of hundred years. That in effect, its significance can and has been reiterated, re-performed, etc. But, they miss the point of Quine's critique. He is arguing that analyticity (as invoked by traditional metaphysicians) cannot be discerned in an absolutistically reductive manner implying that a purely separate synthetic distinction likewise cannot be drawn. Thereby completely deconstructing the *raison d'être* of the logical positivists. Furthermore, Quine is also pointing the way forward for a pragmatic holism (although, in hindsight, the associated behaviourist and naturalist approach might be better overlooked or further refined?). (xxvi)

A Prospective Reading:

Obviously we understand what is superficially meant by an analytical-synthetical distinction... but, it cannot be done non-economically[124] nor absolutistically. Hence the need for a trimodal relative economic reading as outlined by myself. Hence the introduction of and arguments for a conjectural dimension. (xxvii)

In the next essay I will outline in detail the functions and import of this conjectural dimension covertly present but considerably overlooked in our appreciation of these distinctions of the analytic, and synthetic, along with an appreciation of this analytic-synthetic distinction itself, etc. Presently, in the remainder of this essay, let me further this argument for a conjectural dimension (beyond just constitutional economic lines of delineation)…. (xxviii)

N.T., 20.4.24.

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123 As per Wikipedia Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism (15.4.24)

124 'Non-economic' in the double sense of this expression as doubly defined by myself, namely, 'in an impossible or dis-functional sense economically', and, 'being unable to proffer modes of resolution along non-economical lines as treated in a Laruellian sense'.

XIG. An Integrated Set of Arguments for the Operation of The Conjectural Economy: The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures*[125]

That each and every discipline that is credible
Should be self-up-righting...
Philosophy, as a credible discipline,
Should be a self-correcting enterprise...
Because 'the lived-reality of lived-reality'
Should self-demonstrate, comparatively,
That which is neither 'living' nor 'reality'...
Through re(-)normalization, quite naturally,
One dispenses with that which is less credible..![126]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

As a 'first conjecture' we might argue that in order to understand any economy of either analytic propositions, synthetic statements, and/or the comprehension, likewise, of the analytic-synthetic distinction, we must invoke a suitable third party given that all economies are trimodal in their constitution and that the former could not be comprehended on those bimodal terms alone, hence this 'first conjecture' (even though also predicated on the 'constitutional conjecture of the economic' in all its comprehensiveness[127]). Therefore, in an approving comment addressed to Quines' paper on *The Two Doctrines of Empiricism* I would like to add a *Third Doctrine*, namely, the overlooking of the economic dimension of the *Conjectural* (in order to make any working sense whatsoever of the 'analytical', the 'synthetical', and any sense and semblance of a 'distinction between the former, etc.). Thence this exploration of the 'conjectural dimension', etc. (0)

This essay is divided into eight more sections, namely, 1. That the world equally participates with 'us' in our ongoing re(-)construction of it through the entertainment of conjectures, etc; 2. Tautologies, etc., cannot be fully appreciated in analytical terms alone; 3. That we have acquired the ability to discern the artefacts of the intentional world even though written upon the non-intentional fabric of this world at large; 4. That through the use of conjectures we can discern the apparent objectivity, etc., of this living world, etc; 5. But, equally, we can do this from an evolving appreciation of the apparent integrity of the living-world; 6. Hence the philosophical ramifications of conjectures; 7. Then, the meta-philosophical ramifications, i.e., the repurposed metaphysical ramifications, of such a conjectural understanding, etc; 8. With the outline of a set of provisional conclusions, etc. (1)

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125 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

126 Ideas pre-echoed in the previous essay: *Pursuit*, III.XIF.0,13.

127 I.e., noting the overall constitution of the economic and its inclusion of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic, and, the parallelism of the latter with conjectures *per se* (to that extent they can be preferenced in our appreciation without being impossibly isolated economically).

1. ‘Listening’ to a Hot Cup of Coffee

Sadly, indoctrinated with the ideological nonsense of a so-called ‘external world’, etc., many philosophers give you the impression that they act as if they lived within the very confines of their very own heads, all very lonely and totally alone. But, acting like social butterflied ever-ready to break out and burst forth upon the stage of this living-world of experience they so wisely suspect... is out there somewhere, can be experienced somehow..? (2)

Yes, we could start from the delineation of a living-world to be pre-found in living-experience (in Section 5)... but for the sake of this miscreant majority of philosophical disciplinarians let us start from the ground up so to speak... (3)

Now, it is all very well for either naïve or non-naïve realists to think that they truly ‘see’ objects in an external world, by perverting the use of such metaphors in their literal mistreatment of the same or similar, or, just as unwisely, for the sophisticated idealists to merely think that ‘because they construe all experience as constructed by their very own consciousnesses’ that that is the end of their story. Hence the moral of the following observation. (4)

If I were to make you a very hot cup of coffee from my coffee machine, I would hope that you understand that you will need to wait a few minutes before drinking it. That, hopefully, I would not need to tell you that. Instead, if you were to try drinking it, as hot as it is, straight from the machine, then you will burn your tongue and mouth, and you will find that you just cannot drink it. For a short period, it is a cup of coffee that cannot be drunk... until it has sufficiently cooled. (5)

Now, as an objection to the claims made by those types of ideologues, as just referenced, a cup of coffee is not just passively seen, as might be envisaged by realists nor merely constructed purely in your own consciousness as might be claimed by idealists... that, in our negotiations within all such discussions, the cup also duly deserves to be ‘metaphorically’ listened to... treated as another party in our relational world of experience... as if in a dialogical encounter with us within this living-world of relational experience. (6)

In other words, objects, in their intentionally experienced objectivity, are not just passively viewed nor are they just actively constructed in the seemingly pure isolation of our own minds. In other words, contingency is not just passively encountered nor actively recognized, but, also engaged, somewhat, almost as an equal party. That we may intentionally inscribe our presence upon the world as an agent but the world also inscribed itself upon us without having to conjecture much more than the mere causal agency of the world itself... (7)

And, of course, why stop with just ‘seeing’ and ‘listening’ when the world ‘speaks to us’ through all our sense modalities, and so on. But, then, the moral, too, is not to read too much more into our metaphors, rhetorical devices, and similar. (8)

2. ‘Heavy Rain’ and ‘Green Unicorns’

Effectively, contingency cannot be engaged other than through conjectures in an economy of the conjectural that must also entail analytical propositions and synthetical statements. We just do not find ‘cups of hot coffee’ well-represented in either analytical or synthetical modalities. Yes, analytically, ‘a cup of hot coffee that is too hot to drink is a cup of coffee that is too hot to drink’. And, yes, ‘this is a cup of hot coffee that is too hot to drink’. But, it is also sensibly obvious, that I need to entertain the conjecture that ‘because this is a cup of hot coffee’, and ‘it is too hot to presently drink’, that ‘I must not presently drink it’, but, then also entertain another conjecture, namely, that as ‘hot liquids in a cooler environment will also cool down’, that ‘when it has suitably cooled that then, and only then, can I comfortably drink a liquid that is suitable for drinking’. That when the coffee is too hot to drink that, no, I do not go ahead and drink it, but, first, wait a few moments, and then drink it! (9)

In effect, the ‘conjectural dimension’, i.e., as a ‘correlative economic aspect’ needs to be ‘felt’, expected and then immediately anticipated as prompting us to consider or not to consider a certain course of action or non-action, or even inaction if a deferral or postponement of a decision is called for. In the process, further specifying the concreteness of our situation, perhaps giving us permission to proceed or not to proceed, maybe, in an existential sense, both prompting and permitting us to proceed on a more optimum course for(-)us in pro-relational and trans-relational terms of reference.to do as if ‘called’; as if deontologically, existentially, and pragmatically ‘commanded’..? (10)

That conjectural dimension, as noted elsewhere, has these parallel features in living-experience of specification, engagement, permission, as acting as an injunctive or imperative, and so on. (11)

Similarly, the analytical cannot be appreciated in either just analytical terms of reference or in just synthetical terms of reference or in merely entertaining a distinction between the former. Let me demonstrate this negative conjecture through noting my use of the following two tautologies. (12)

It is my suggestion that we should not treat all tautologies as if they were the same even if the underlying logic is exactly the same. E.g., in comparison to the tautology ‘It is either raining or it is not raining’ the following tautology, namely, that ‘Green unicorns are either dancing on my lawn or are not dancing on my lawn’, does not quite have the same representative respectability about it. Then, on the conjectural supposition that we cannot comprehend either one economic correlative or the relations between two economic correlatives on their own terms of reference, without invoking, either explicitly and/or implicitly, the operations of an economy, in this instance, say, a conjectural economy, then it follows that, correctly, even tautologies cannot be entertained merely in either analytical terms nor in synthetical terms, nor for that matter as just a simple relationship between the former, That, that granted, our reading of a tautology must also include some reference to both the synthetical and the conjectural even if these latter aspects will be suppressed in our attempting to review the former. Therefore, we should quite rightly

reject any mere logical equivalence between tautologies knowing that the economic nature of our suppositions must be conducted in a conjectural economy where all three parties of the analytical, the synthetical, and the conjectural can be neither over-thought nor over-preferenced, nor, under-though or under-preferenced. Thence our suspicions, in this comparative instance, can now be duly recognized. Whereas tautologies about 'rain' still seem to tell us something about the world, through their polarizing division of this world-as-lived, on the other hand, tautologies about 'unicorns', green or otherwise, quite rightly misinform us, or, indeed, somewhat deceive us into thinking we also have to account for unicorn in the non-unusual furniture of this world as well.[128] (13)

Now, although some people might say unicorns are green, and we could add, are very, very small and that that is the reason why we do not usually see them, along with elves and pixies, and other so-called mythological creatures, similarly camouflaged, still, lest people camp outside my house in order to catch a glimpse of these elusive beasties I must inform you that I do not have a lawn.[129] So, in that regard, this tautology is doubly suspect. Indeed, not much better than saying 'Father Xmas either wears a beard or does not wear a beard' even though everyone knows, more or less, that he has a 'beard' whilst, at the same time, we also know he has no existence as commonly understood, has never existed nor will exist in the everyday understanding of a commonly shared vision of a world-around-them, in this world-around-us. (14)

Because the analytical cannot be understood and appreciated on just sheer analytical terms alone it follows that a full appreciation of the internal necessity of such propositions needs to be contested both in terms of the contingency of synthetical propositions (both positive and negative in form[130]) and the imparted cogency of the conjectural. The ramifications of such an understanding are quite profound both philosophically and metaphysically (in and through its repurposed format), both for each and every discipline and in the aligned expressions of a secular world. No longer can we fabricate metaphysics on strung together notions of pure necessity. Then, too, the very idea of pure facts is also realized to be not much more than excessive verbiage although to render it as pure nonsense is to commit the same impossible type of an exclusive form of economic isolationism. Where, as well, cogency must sensibly walk the broad territory of a no-man's-land (the land absolutistically belonging to no-person) between either the impossibilities of the indubitably true or the indubitably false. (15)

On the other hand, relative discrimination is possible, albeit of relatively valid and invalid formats, forms and formations; permitting us to suitably discriminate between the relatively intentional and the relatively non-intentional in origination. (16)

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128 Which we do under various heading, say, as either commonplace, or mythological, or as art objects or items of a certain type of collection, or as useful or useless items, etc. In Volume II of my *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline* I suggest we can approach the mythological dimension only through, collectively, weak forms of realism, idealism and pragmatism. That, equally, we cannot do so through strong ideological counterparts as well.

129 As a child, having had to deal on many occasions with lawns, coal fires, and hedges I am glad to say I am now rid of the first two of these three bugbears of mine.

130 E.g., it is true Father Xmas is depicted wearing a bead. It is a fact that Father Xmas does not exist.

3. Discerning the Intentionally Inscribed from the Non-Intentionally Non-Inscribed

How do we learn to relatively discriminate between 'intentionally deposited textual depositions upon the metaphorical 'face' of the world' and those 'patterns and designs of the natural world that cannot be convincingly assigned to some form of intentional agency (on par with naturally perceived expressions of human agency)? (17)

I.e., apparent 'agency' in terms of 'intentionally recognized decision-making' and 'the relatively persistent and/or re-occurring, non-random-like nature of the same'. (18)

The apparent intersection of this two-pronged definition is provisionally posed as a starting point for an attempt to try to understand 'human agency' (and 'human-like agency', where, with respect to the latter, we might like to extend to animals, and, for those of a religious persuasion, that such agency has been extended to us over time through evolution or spontaneously at a certain improbably 'created' point in time. But, for this exploratory discussion, let us overlook and ignore the potential possibilities of both the para-intentional nature of animals and the super-intentional possibilities of either emergent structures and/or quazi-divine-like entities). (19)

Let me relate the following descriptions of my garden in the Blue Mountains to illustrate this type of relative distinction. In the upper part of my garden, composed mainly of non-native plant species, I have a small grove of pines and fir trees. Now, it would be quite conceivable to imagine that one or two seeds may have randomly taken root there, but, that probability is most unlikely when you add the obviously well-planted azaleas, camellias, rhododendrons, and so on. On the other hand, each year I welcome the bursting forth of a small, native orchid of no decorative charm whatsoever. These little spires of the potato orchid, also known as a cinnamon bell orchid, shoot up randomly, usually in places of shade and ample leaf litter.[131] They pop up under my non-native trees and even on the paths running though my garden and, this random-like placement of their distribution, easily leads me to believe that they were not intentionally planted, that, in all actuality, grew here well before this garden was planted out, indeed, before people, both non-Indigenous and Indigenous even settled in Australia. (20)

Hence the relative merit of this two-pronged distinction, namely, intentional behaviour is usually 'true to types of behaviour already judged to be intentionally deposited', and, the 'relatively non-random nature of such intentional directedness in deposition'. E.g., would it be possible for a person to walk along a beach without 'the intention to walk along that beach in some form or other'. Even people with dementia have this residual form of intent... and notoriously escape when they suddenly decide to leave the safety of their unlocked residences. Even the counter-example of a robot still demonstrates intent behinds its pre-programming. That, intent is not randomly discharged. (21)

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131 These orchids have no green leaves and work completely in cooperation with fungi in the soil. Because they are also edible, I believe, possessing a small potato-like tuber, I cannot rule out the possibility they may have been planted by Indigenous hunters and gatherers but this partially inconvenient fact could have been remedied by being pulled out of those areas like paths by a previous gardener who, I must suppose, would also have welcomed or tolerated or overlooked the return of these short-lived, yearly friends?

4. Discerning Objectivity, Inter-Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Inter-Subjectivity

Now, in our being able to relatively delineate representations of intentional behaviour from depictions of non-intentional non-behaviour (of the natural world) we are in a position to delineate objectivity, inter-objectivity, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity whilst also recognizing that through our embodiment we have left, metaphorically, both a scarred and an augmented 'face' upon the thin surface of our fragile world where these distinctions cannot be absolutistically maintained, i.e., which cannot be non-relatively recognized, encountered and engaged. That, in effect, such distinctions are relative, arbitrary, but, will also serve the purposes of their being proposed, hopefully, in both an existential and pragmatic manner, which, in our being 'all too human', can never be guaranteed. Where objectivity is either the embodiment of our own overall sense/s of self or the embodiment of others, along with all other objects in the natural world (although intentional objectivity will also include all forms of the focalized from intentional objectives (expressing intentional motivation) to objects, object-states, etc., in the natural world (which must also include us in and through our forms of embodiment and being also inclusive of the pro-relational and its trans-relational sense/s of subjectivity). Where inter-objectivity is the perceived or apperceived sense and semblance of a relatively non-metaphorical 'space' between such intentional objectives, etc. That 'subjectivity' appears self-evident, to both us and others, through types of intentional behaviour that typify intentional behaviours and the relatively non-random nature of their execution (even if such responses appear to be seemingly initiated in a random-like manner in terms of their apparent timing or mistiming). That the intersubjectivity, similarly, is that metaphorical 'space' entertained between intentional subjects and/or communities, both within and between relationships, organization, institutions, nations, etc. (22)

Thence our ability, in general, to discern between the relatively objective, inter-objective, the subjective, and the inter-objective whilst also being well-aware that such distinctions cannot be over-preferenced, etc. I.e., either over-prioritized, over-privileged, and/or over-promoted with respect to past, present, and future orientations in time. (23)

By such means, discerning such distinctions, their accommodations, and their transformations, etc., along with their interrelations in terms of consilience, salience, and propinquity (i.e., its proximity or standing in a certain relationship, etc.). (24)

I.e., e.g., the distinction of 'two persons' who regard each other as 'friends' in a relationship of 'friendship' that has developed over time to the mutual enrichment of both parties. In the reconciliation of a world of different relationships productive of an overall mutual enrichment; that has a certain force for different people in different situations, etc; and, where those relationships that are 'closer' are generally better cultivated (to use a gardening metaphor). (25)

Thence the delineation of this world-of-significance for-us... Where certain ideological forces will shape our vision of a world in terms of both its relatively natural and relatively trans-natural manifestations and expressions, and where the application of suitable suspensions will distinguish ideologues from non-ideologues, and v.v. (26)

5. Just Discerning the Overall Conjecture of a Living-World...

Now, we could have saved ourselves some time by just proffering 'the overall conjecture of a living-world', through whose living-experience, we have already formed the recollections of our ongoing appreciation of lived-experience. Understanding and differentiating types of intentional experience from random expressions of non-intentionally oriented forms of change as experienced in our conjecture of this 'natural world as modified by human agency'. (27)

Now, without forcing these distinctions, we make our progress, our path through this world at large with others both individually and collectively. As much as we might aspire to attain and obtain the full appropriation of certain intentional objectives, still, without this world of cooperation with others very few, if any of those intentional objectives could be individually realized without such forms of relatively mutual arbitration. Yes, we might get ourselves out of bed in the morning, make our own breakfasts, and head out for the day with whatever intentions for how that day will be spent. Still, few of us actually make our own beds, as items of furniture; then practically no one entirely grows their own food; and, then, both the inside and outside of our residences we live in a world being fashioned by armies of people we will never even meet of which, in some form of other, we will also have ourselves living among their working ranks proffering various forms of contribution in a manner in keeping with our current being in this world with(-)others, before(-)others, and finding our fragile sense and semblance of a relative freedom primarily through(-)others. (28)

That without the relatively cogent force of our conjectures, in a world of the conjectural, we would be unable to operate in this overall world-of-life, this life-world both fashioned by(-)us, and, too, more fashioned for(-)us, in which we find, through such arbitration, whatever sense and semblance of an overall freedom duly afforded to us in and through the situatedness in this world at large in which we find ourselves immersed. A conjecturally envisaged sense and semblance of a world in which we find conjectures proffer forms of further specificational detail, the possibility of various probable pathways for intentional performance along with a comparative appreciation of their either apparently expected and/or anticipated relational merit; a sense of permission to entertain certain intentional objectives over others; and an existential and pragmatical refinement of such permission should we orientate ourselves towards both a pro-relational and trans-relational experience of relational re-enrichment that form from an appreciation of probable patterns of e/valuational formation both expected and anticipated through the adoption and adaptation of such relational forms of existential expediency in our then acting of the behalf of such relationships within this overall world of the relational, in this world at large. (29)

That without the economics of this conjectural aspect there could be no intentional lives lived in this world at large. That, equally, there could be no pure necessity, no pure facts, and no pure conjectures in a world of mere probability alone, since the enactment of our intentions demands their relatively delineated, definitive discharge in and through the non-economic determinations of the last instance, etc. (30)

6. The Philosophical Ramifications of a Conjectural Economy

As noted, there can be no pure necessity, no pure facts, and, no pure conjectures that have nothing to say or do in this world at large, this overall world-of-life. Moreover, through processes of resolution, the enactment of our intentions, both aspirationally formed and re-informed through arbitration, could not be conceived of without the non-economic cogency of our conjectures... as they further specify relevant forms of detail, shed light on their probable consequences should their enactment be performed, and permit us to proceed in the light of such expectations and anticipations. Thence some of the philosophical ramifications of a conjectural economy that also witnesses the roles played by both analytical propositions and synthetical statements in the potentially beneficial exercise in the formation and realization of conjectural propositional-statements whose individual performance affords and contributes, hopefully, to a mutual enrichment of our relationships to some discernible degree or other. (31)

Let me further unpack the outlined ramifications of this paragraph... (32)

First, there can be no so-called ‘pure necessity’. Such an impossible fiction could neither be recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged. Any form of metaphysics built upon such an impossible edifice is just as impossible to contemplate and most certainly cannot be willed into existence through mere incantations of such nonsense. On the other hand, a repurposed form of metaphysics is there for us to contemplate through an appreciation of how the philosophical disciplinarian either navigates, negotiates and/or arbitrates all forms of truth determination. (33)

Second, the notion of so-called ‘pure facts’ is another form of veritable nonsense. We do not have nor need full access to indubitable knowledge, but, equally, we have no form of interaction whatsoever with the absolutistically non-indubitable. On occasions, we can be wrong but never absolutistically wrong! On other occasions, we can be right but never absolutistically certain... but since when does a lack of certainty stop us from placing conjectural bets about the apparent lie of the land, the lived-reality of relationally oriented experience... that when reviewed from a pro-relational orientation can takes on an even deeper appreciation of its potentially able to be constituted sense and semblance of an existential complexion..? (34)

Third, any thought of so-called ‘pure conjectures’, without anything to metaphorically ‘say’ to us about where we are in this world at large, is also an utter nonsense. Moreover, as no one conjecture is equal to any other, and, as the world is not metaphorically ‘flat’, except momentarily in the life of the (extensive) suspension, our conjectural appreciation of this world of lived-experience, similarly, cannot be equally weighted. Indeed, properly balanced in the (extensive) suspension, through the imbalance of the de-suspension, a world of resolution then inevitably awaits our permission to enact processes of transformation more in keeping with the seemingly beneficial trajectories of our closer, more important relationships... should we also be able to suspend relatively defective, egotistical forms of mis-directed engagement. Furthermore, when an appreciation of our relational standing in this world is better simulated then the living-representation of our

relationships permit us to act in accordance, in an alignment with a more beneficial refinement of those trajectories... A process of re(-)alignment enacted through a product of a refinement of their mere realignment, through the error correction of a process of re-demis-alignment, and through chaotically oriented forms of suitably innovative realignment with the latter introducing an apposite element of the potentially radical. All initiated and maintained non-economically... (35)

If e/valuational formation were merely circulated, in an endless recycling of valuation, then definitive forms of response, responsiveness, and responsibility could never be initiated let alone maintained nor, for that matter, definitively discharged in a suitable and limited manner. Hence the inescapable non-economic dimension when economic resolution escapes the confines of its initial economy But, such potentially radical inputs, be the either positive or negative in their impact and potential ability to contribute to the relational richness and enrichment of our relationships, could not be comprehended without their immediate re(-)appropriation with the relatively expansion of the necessary imputation of this hyper-economic aspect within the overall economy of the economic. Given the potentially innovative nature of the non-economic, its sequential re-appropriation within the hyper-economic aspect must be micro-incremental, incrementally sequential, and with the potential to transform our current appreciation of the overall economy of the economic... along with both relatively non-existential patterns of augmentation and relatively existential lines of enhancement in the overall richness and enrichment of the primary relationship in question. Such refinement in our standing in this world a large when and where we are with(-)others, etc., being tempered by the fact that, as finite agents, the full impact of our agency can never be completely predicted given the chaotically oriented nature of this world at large, our inability to fully determine what is relevant and irrelevant to our situatedness, the natural imperfections of our embodiment, and the fact that our understanding of our own situatedness is ever enacted as a work in progress... (36)

Thence some of the philosophical ramifications of an inescapable conjectural economy that also witnesses the roles collectively played by processes of truth determination as jointly exercised by the necessity of analytical propositions, the contingency of synthetical statements, and the conjectural cogency of propositional-statements in the potentially beneficial exercise involved in the utilization of conjectural positions whose individual performances, through permission, affords and contributes, hopefully, to a mutual enrichment of our relationships to some discernible degree or other. That, effectively, through an ongoing, overall suspension of the entire economy of the conjectural, through a process of intermediation, a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential can be better fostered to both the overall non-detriment of our relationships if not, also, to their mutual augmentation and enhancement... Indeed, by such means, through this pro-relational re(-)orientation of subjectivity, a relatively trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity can find itself in a position to better appreciate the ramifications of this ‘existential turn’. Hence our introduction to a metaphysical dimension in experience, albeit as presented through this transformed form of a ‘repurposed metaphysics’ that is both ‘pragmatically and existentially open to these self-correcting claims of mutual, potentially innovative modes of re(-)evaluation...’ (37)

7. The Meta-Philosophical/Metaphysical Ramifications of Conjectures

Without conjectures, I would claim there can be no experiential ‘mediation’ throughs forms of suspension and appreciation, of either the imputation of the analytical or the synthetical, or, equally, with the ‘naked’ analytical-synthetical distinction itself. Then, only through intermediation, through an overall suspension of the conjectural economy, can we find ourselves in a position to exercise a full pragmatic-existentialism as an existential-pragmatism, and v.v. (38)

Just how is this ‘metaphysical turn (this ‘meta-philosophical turn’) to be experienced, i.e., both initiated and maintained in experience? (39)

In experience, as an agent, subjectivity reflects the very nature of our apparent intentional objectivity. So, in seeing a visually perceived object we automatically become a ‘visual perceiver’, then, in thinking about the same we become ‘thinkers thinking about what was just seen’, and so on... Nothing mystical to see here... move on... just an observable fact to find forever confirmed in our appreciation of the overall nature of intentional experience (that a co-associated form of subjectivity is ever-presented). (40)

In an intentionally oriented phenomenology, the following conjecture of the co-associated observation of an automatic intentional subjectivity in keeping with the nature of that current form of intentional experience is practically constitutional in tenor. Therefore, it follows that in our being able to pro-relationally orientate our sense and semblance of subjective positioning upon the very experiential nature of the relationship, itself, as being focused upon, it must follow, therefore, as a conjecture, that we must then be able to review the same in a trans-relational sense and semblance of experience in keeping directly, and coincidentally, with that form of a pro-relational re(-)orientation as being currently entertained. What are the ramifications of this pro-relational - trans-relational conjecture? (41)

For a start, given a philosophical appreciation of truth determinations it would follow that we should be able to fully appreciate this philosophical appreciation of truth determinations through the experiential lens of the meta-philosophical, i.e., in the repurposed version of the ‘metaphysical’ as ‘meta-philosophical’, and v.v. (42)

In effect, opening us up to an experiential appreciation of the meta-philosophical, i.e, the metaphysical, as here both critically and radically repurposed. Where, through such a reorientation, this ‘metaphysical turn’, we can also experience a ‘pragmatic turn’ and an ‘existential turn’ as totally synonymous. Albeit as would arise only through subtle differences in such philosophical re(-)positionings. I.e., treating the meta-philosophical as metaphysically repurposed, or treating the existential as existentially re(-)oriented, or treating the pragmatically as pragmatically re(-)oriented, and so on. (43)

Providing, optimistically, the possibility that all disciplines, when suitably treated through mediation and intermediation, i.e., through the apposite application of suitable suspensions, we can directly experience processes of semantic conformation... (44)

8. Provisional Conclusions, Comments, and Observations...

Now, by 'semantic conformation' is meant 'the ability for a reputable discipline, say, a properly constituted philosophy or metaphysics or history or science, and so on, to experience forms of self-correction, processes of up-righting, indeed, self-up-righting[132] should the pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions find the requisite degree of an alignment in this same regard'! Let me explain. (45)

Of course, you would be right to point out that I am being optimistic, still, on some occasions, we would hope to be correct in this intuitive stance if we could suitably apply a correct appreciation of those required pre-conditions, etc., that are relevant to an apposite reading of that relational situation to hand. In this regard let me provisionally put forward the following conjectures, observations, and comments. (46)

What is constitutionally required is the adoption and adaptation of an overall economic perspective where what is deemed to be constitutionally necessary to our endeavour is duly observed. I.e., some conformity to an analytically oriented degree of necessity in all matters deemed to be constitutional. I.e., a properly well-formed adherence to all relevant economic tenets, all inter-ordered phenomenological inputs, and all systematic conventions (as outlined in all previous and future essays). (47)

Next, in terms of the appropriate use of all relevant contingent synthetical statements we should seek to exercise a relatively well-informed stance on the subject matter of our enquiries. (48)

Then, in preparation for the apposite utilization of an integrated-detailization of all relevant conjectures, we duly need to observe their mediation and intermediation through suitable exercises of a(n extensive) suspension, etc.., in the hope of realizing this degree of well-expressed de-suspended cogency in the ensuing de-suspended process of the re(-)representation of such simulated materials (49)

Or, reviewed through the theoretical lens of a narrative, we could and should argue for well-informed, narratively relevant sets of facts; the use of well-formed arguments in the hope of preparing the metaphorical 'ground' for suitably well-expressed forms of conjectural appositeness able to both correct, and, if necessary, re-correct whenever required, the course of our re(-)simulated passage/s thorough this world at large. That, in taking this non-dualistic approach, we could well-argue that our ideologically pre-invested vision of reality, through suitable suspensions, is then rendered more able to reconstitute the reality of our ensuing 'vision'... in the sense and semblance of a life-world in which reality-is-lived and life-is-realized through the lived-reality of it having been experienced as 'living-experience'... in 'a form of self-correction arrived at through being suitably re(-)lived... in an aligned accordance with its own devolving patterns of re(-)self-expression..!!' (50)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 8.4.24.

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132 Or, self-re-righting/re-writing. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7V.

XIH. On the Operation of a Relevant and Viable Conjectural Economy:
The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIH. On the Operation of a Relevant and Viable Conjectural Economy: The Mediation and Intermediation of Conjectures:*[133]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

How might we better understand the need for a conjectural aspect in our appreciation of the analytical, etc? E.g., consider the following. Let us say, analytically, we have the tautology 'It is either raining or it is not raining' and, as a relative non-tautology 'When it rains, without suitable shelter, you get wet'. Say, synthetically, we note 'That it is currently raining', and 'That under the falling rain, as a recent observation, you got wet'. Now, all that granted, we can note the future expectation, as a conjecture, 'That should I go out into the rain, without suitable shelter, I will get wet'. However, without the cogency of such conjectures, our mix of analytical propositions and synthetic statements are practically useless, and, by themselves, do no real work for us in this world at large. Moreover, in an alignment with this observation, we have the immediate anticipation, through this same conjecture, 'That should I go out into the rain now I will be getting wet'. As things stood, a consequential appreciation of current conditions and observations, etc., neither the analytical nor the synthetical, nor their conjunction, had the conjectural force that would allow us to infer either the expected or (immediately) anticipated consequences stemming from the performance of certain behaviours, etc., as might be enacted in the light of such 'equations' and 'facts', and, that only when these disparate facets were put together were we then in a position to understand, indeed, start to understand, through sets of conjectures, the full ramifications of our situatedness given such inputs, etc. In other words, analytical propositions and synthetical statements, either by themselves or together, are of no use in our coming to comprehend the possibilities resident in our representative understanding/s of our situatedness. In the essay, let me review my thoughts on how conjectures, in a conjectural economy, render our world meaningful and also deliver the sense and semblance of a potential meaningfulness, and, on occasions, deeply express an existential significance that could not be arrived at by any other means. (0)

So, in asking the rhetorical question 'Why conjectures?' we can now answer, 'That without the cogency of this third dimension we could not appreciate the lived-nature of our current situatedness in this world at large!' (1)

Just as contemplating the contingent fact 'that it is currently raining' and even knowing 'that under falling rain you get wet' we cannot derive the simple conjecture 'that if we were to go out into the rain now, without either an umbrella and/or adequate wet-weather gear, we will then get wet'. In other words, without conjectures we would be no better than random robots or shop manikins on a balcony just starring at the rain without blinking…' (2)

But, we do engage with this world at large, and, therefore, we must be engaging with it through the medium of conjectures! So, now, the natural question to ask is, 'Just how do conjectures operate (in an analytical-synthetical-conjectural economy)? (3)

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133 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

Philosophically, etc., I will also be arguing that without either the overt or covert use of conjectures the very notions of the analytic, etc., could not be suitably contemplated, etc.[134] (4)

For convenience let me do this explication under the following set of twelve headings, namely, Introduction, Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Considerations, Identification, Truth Determination, Transformational Retreatment, Alignments, Cogency as a Non-Existential Force, and Cogency as an Existential Force, Pragmatic Holism, Equivalence of the Existential and the Pragmatic, and, Provisional Conclusions, etc. (5)

1. Introduction

How might we define this third economic dimension of the conjectural? (6)

In provisional terms let me define 'conjectures' as this 'third economic dimension of the simulated enactment of either virtual and/or non-virtual patterns of functional activity reviewed either with and/or without some form of agental influence, and, with and/or without the non-simulated influence of that implicated form of agency'. Or, put in another form, as 'forms of functional activity that as patterns of transformation could (through intentional simulations) be applied to physical systems from the micro-physical (world of quantum physics) to the physical (realm of this world at large) to the macro-physical (world of the cosmological time and space)' with or without the implication of some form of intentional involvement'. I.e., treatment of objectivity, subjectivity, etc. (7)

Now, intimately involved in such conjectures is the transformational dimension concerned with the delineation of truth determination (treated in Tarskian terms of reference) (as contextually situated in terms of its transformational retreatment as previously explicated elsewhere[135]). (8)

Then, through economic complexification (in its paralleling the so-called 'third moment') we note that 'conjectures' can be recharacterized as 'specifications', as implicating a 'potential existential-pragmatic dimension', as primarily referring to the apparent present immediacy of possible experience, etc. (9)

Then, furthermore, in paralleling the interrogative economy, in logical terms we can think of 'conjectures' as 'provisional as-if's', as 'Boolean double negations', as 'non-textually simulated, apparitional forms of literal (re)treatment', etc. (10)

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134 By these two 'etcs.' is meant, first, philosophically, or metaphysically (in a repurposed metaphysics/meta-philosophical appreciation), or in a disciplinary sense, or in the secularly of the world at large…, and, second, hermeneutically recognized, phenomenologically encountered, and existentially engaged (in both its non-systematic and systematic senses).

135 E.g., as explored at length in *The Seventh Boo*k....

2. Constitutional Considerations

As noted in previous essays, conjectures can be divided between the relatively constitutionally oriented and the relatively non-constitutionally oriented. Where the former can be sub-divided between the economic, the hyper-ordered, and the systematic (in terms of their placement in specific social systems) (and, as further systematized within the Political-Economy through forms of either intra-systematic and/or extra-systematic interactions, etc.). The 'relatively non-constitutionally oriented' involves the partial specification of the former in terms of either its general, particular, and/or specific configurations (as contained within its previous definition of an envisaged simulated enactment implicating either non-agency and/or agency with and/or without enactment by some form of agency). (11)

Obviously, it is to be understood that relatively non-constitutionally oriented forms of specification are dependent, as if by default, upon the prior overt and/or covert specification of the constitutionally oriented. (12)

So, e.g., 'conjectures' are constitutionally dependent upon a trimodal economy of analytical propositions, synthetic statements, and conjectural propositional-statements within the specification of an inter-ordered topic as defined directly and/or indirectly by reference to a Social System/s (along with its placement within the Political-Economy at large). (13)

So, e.g., an 'historical conjecture' is created/re(-)created within a conjectural economy primarily translated in terms of its sixth trans-cognitively ordered (symmetrical) reduplication as either directly and/or indirectly defined by the social system of History as defined by the perceived and received practices as exercised within the hallowed halls of Academia, etc. (14)

Or, e.g., a physical conjecture, say, of planetary motion, can be treated as a conjectural economy concerning the extrapolated extension of perceptual space as found within a fourth cognitive order as further defined in terms of a mix of objective, interobjective, subjective, and intersubjective forms of identification... as treated in accordance with the circumscription of the scientific discipline, itself, being an inter-ordered topic founded upon a fifth trans-cognitively oriented symmetrical reduplication as generally co-defined by the scientific discipline as practised in Academia. (15)

Where approaches to a delineation of truth determination are realized in relationship to the intra-mediation of economic moments, the mediation of correlatively treated economic moments, and/or the intermediation of the entire economy in question. Correctly, truth determination is depended upon conformal attitudes adopted in either (economically correlative) intra-mediation, (bimodal) mediation, and/or (trimodal) intermediation, but, more correctly, is to be understood as being realized through the overall interactions of the former without making a non-relative distinction between these aspects of the economic whilst also recognizing that conjectural productivity is realized non-economically in the context of the overall economy of the economic! (16)

3. Non-Constitutional Considerations

The prerequisites for non-constitutional consideration are constitutionally established. (17)

Usually, forms of overt attention placed upon the extent of the relatively non-constitutional is conducted at the expense of pre-required covert forms of constitutional consideration. (18)

So, e.g., in relative, non-absolutistical terms of reference we can think and speak about analytical propositions and synthetical statements, and this distinction itself, without direct reference to the conjectural dimension even though it can be shown that the conjectural dimension must at least be covertly present, etc. (in order for a more functional understanding of the overall, collective nature of how such linguistic elements are more broadly utilized). Because without a conjectural dimension we would neither be able to constitutionally explore either analytical propositions or synthetical statements, etc., nor be in a position to enact conjectured patterns of behaviour. Just as, e.g., knowing that 'rain' as 'falling water from the sky' is 'wet', and, that 'when it is raining', is 'currently a fact', and, importantly, 'that our going out into the rain would now find, if without suitable protection from that rain, ourselves getting wet, and therein and thereby, 'finding an experiential alignment in our observations of the world as recalled, as expected, and, now, as immediately anticipated'. Thence this important functional role played by conjectures. In other words, non-constitutional considerations are simulated upon the necessary prerequisites of constitutional requirements (19)

Non-constitutional determinations can be supplied by the nature of the intentional nature of the perspective or perspectives invoked in such considerations. Thence an appeal can be made to the economics of objective and/or subjective aspects within either interobjective and/or intersubjective forms of interaction. (20)

So, e.g., the double economy of personal embodiment as experienced in its paralleling of a certain object or a series of objects and/or set/s of objects in an object situation of our embodiment as either recognized, encountered, and/or engaged *versus* some other object-situation *vis-a-vis* either the intentional recognition, encountering, and/or engagement of some other object-situation (be that another body of another person or some other object or object-situation, etc.) (as appreciated either interobjectively and/or intersubjectively). (21)

For convenience, we usually concentrate on noting only the overtly relevant factors involved in either such recognition, encountering, and/or engagement. Either implicitly and/or explicitly noting the role played by our 'double embodiment' with both 'a physical sense of personal embodiment' and as the psychic, subjective center of our perspectival appreciation of the world at large. (22)

That, within such conjectural frames of reference, we note the relevant identities, patterns of transformational retreatment, and, co-associated truth determinations. (23)

4. Identification

In truth determination something, some situation, is identified as true in the situated context of that truth determination. And, by extension, our appreciation of that overall relational situatedness in question. E.g., this specific tree in this specific forest, as a true fact, appears to be dying, if not already dead, given that these other trees have their springtime leaves and this dead tree has, as yet, none whatsoever. (24)

Now, identification can be understood in intentional terms of reference, and, in a process of judgment would be appreciated in trans-intentional terms of reference. E.g., 'this tree has no leaves and stands in a stark relationship within this now very green-looking forest' and hence the apparently true judgment that 'this is a dead tree'. (25)

That in an (inter-)ordered appreciation we would relate the 'objective' intentional content of a cognitive order to a trans-cognitive form of judgmental appreciation either with or without either motivational considerations (as realized through arbitrated-aspirations) and/or subjective considerations (by reference to first person, second person, and/or third person in either singular or plural forms, etc.). So, e.g., 'this dead-looking tree' is a fourth cognitively ordered perception that in a process of judgmental appreciation has established the sixth trans-cognitively ordered ontical fact that 'this tree, in all probability, is dead'. (26)

In less technical language, the cited example can be read as, 'the perception of a dead-looking tree' is ascertained to be, in all probability, 'not just a possibly dead tree', but, 'as a tree that is dead' (unless we find later reasons to then believe otherwise).[136] (27)

The primary point to be made here is that truth determination needs to identify something, in the form of a propositional complex, in order to suitably apply, hopefully, its correctly delineated truth determination. Hence these pre-conditional considerations of identification. (28)

That, once this process of identification is discerned as pre-conditional, the question to be then asked with what conditions need to be present in order for us to suitably apply an appositely correct truth determination. Or, with what conditional 'evidence' are we then allowed to further proceed in this process of truth determination? (29)

Here we need to note the nature of the truth determination to be enacted. Is it to be, through intra-mediation, either well-formed analytically, or well-informed synthetically, or well-expressed in conjectural terms of reference, or, through mediation to be contrasted as emerging beyond the dual possibilities of the analytic-synthetic, etc., more usually, and more correctly, an inescapable product of all three intermediated possibilities (given that more focused forms of truth determination are dependent upon the overall constitution of an economy of truth determination in the first place, itself, dependent upon both an economy of the conjectural and the overall economy of economic, etc.). (30)

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[136] Where 'the (fifth trans-cognitively ordered) possibility of the dead-looking tree may not be dead' is discounted through negation

5. Truth Determination

Identification granted, because truth determination must determine 'something' as true (in accordance with the established rules of that process of determination). So, what factors in that process of truth determination would allow such a process to be determined in the affirmative or in the non-affirmative, or, currently, that the process in question cannot be definitively delineated and, therein and thereby, determined one way or the other? (31)

Truth is to be defined in Tarskian terms of reference. I.e., that a meta-conceptual arrangement A' is true (T) if and only if (iff) we have 9conformal) evidence for (the confirmed or verified ascertainment of) A:

A' is T iff A. (32)

Because the appellation of the truth (T) is only appended to A' means that 'it is not that A is true' but only that 'A exists' in the context of the truth determination of A'. Therefore, in the light of this state of affairs, as outlined by this definition formulated by Tarski, we might conclude that truth is appended, say, to a name (of the logical object or logical subject being named), or, say, a conceptual set whose membership entails A, or, say, the relevant relationship that contains A as a relational participant in that nominated or denominated relationship that represents that entailed A in its relational situatedness… and, therefore, not A *per se*! (33)

Traditionally, contingent truth determinations are realized through textual depositions realized to record either direct observations, the non-fraudulent documentation of creditable forms of testimony, and/or valid forms of inference, etc. (34)

Previously, I have defined such processes as validly 'confirmed' when conducted in so-called 'real-time', and, as validly 'verified' when conducted in whole or in part outside so-called 'real-time'. Moreover, I have defined truth determination as a process of 'conformation' when re-confirmed or re-verified, etc., i.e., through the symmetrical reduplicated processes of confirmation or reduplicated verification, and/or, through either duplicated confirmation or verification.[137] (35)

That, at the end of the day, a valid truth determination 'represents' the way 'a set of factors are presented in relation to each other within the represented relational situatedness in question', and, as such, has nothing whatsoever to do with either so-called ex-

[137] I.e., the symmetrical reduplication of the confirmation of confirmation or the verification of verification, or, duplications of the confirmation of a prior process of verification or the verification of a prior process of confirmation. However, I will further contend that conformation can be arrived at through a confluence of separate narratives, forms of scientifically oriented re-iteration, conformal process of economic alignment arrived at through realignment, error correction entertained through re-de-mis-alignment, and, chaotically oriented forms of intervention instrumental in engineering re-alignment, etc. Where an appreciation of such features will be further advanced through discerning overlapping forms of alignment that reinforce the topical narrative in question, etc.

ternal worlds or so-called internal worlds. But, such relative modes of logical representation, understandably, are naturally extrapolated beyond such terms of reference. (36)

Thence the need for both philosophical and meta-philosophical resistance in such natural forms of representative extrapolation, etc. (37)

Furthermore, truth determination needs to be understood as a collective enterprise building on the mass of truth determinations already to hand both culturally and interculturally. (38)

Since, although the world and its accumulated truth determinations can be globally suspended both the working world and its working truth determinations cannot be so eliminated from lived-experience. (39)

Because to argue that ‘A’ is either true or false’ needs to make the presuppositional claim that the lived-context that situates A (C) cannot be other than as pre-accepted as the pretreatment basis for that transformational assessment within the confines of a process of transformational retreatment). (40)

Hence C’ is T iff C. (41)

Thence this prerequisite pretreatment in order to ascertain the truth status of A, and all other identifications that could be both relevantly and viably exercised within that context C, etc. (42)

Because it is on the balance of relevant-viability that the tendentious counterclaims of skeptics need to both addressed and dismissed, or, rather, ignored within a productive process of consensus building engineered through suitably conducted conjectural economies, etc., given the absolutistical, non-relative failure of both mathematical and scientific forms of axiomatization, etc. (43)

Or, treated as material to be duly suspended, and automatically de-suspended, given the provisional nature of the pronouncements of each and every viable disciplinary enterprise. (44)

Where no one pronouncement has exactly the same truth status as any other, but, where the presuppositionally validated is to be given relatively more credence, albeit provisionally. (45)

To be comparatively measured in terms of their creation, preservation, and/or conservation of both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented e/valuational formations. (46)

Thence their reflection on what is to be regarded as both relevant and viable. (47)

6. Transformational Retreatment

Truth determination, as a transformational process, invites it (linear translation and) re-appreciation in terms of ‘transformational retreatment’ predicated on a recognition of the relative preservation of a transformational isomorphic invariance in the truthful determination of the identification in question. (48)

I.e., through a transformational process of alignment as realized through a process of iterated re(-)alignment consisting of the articulation and rectification of its hermeneutically oriented process of pretreatment; its phenomenal-phenomenologically deconstructive-reconstructive forms of error correction arrived at through re-de-mis-alignment; and, its existentially oriented forms of re(-)normalization arrived at through retreatment and its ensuing re-alignment (and its posttreatment emendation of pre-treatment, etc.) whilst observing the overall, requisite forms of alignment that establish and reinforce the form of that truth determination co-associated with such transformational appreciation. The conjectural dimension of retreatment further driving the ensuing process of truth determination in question. (49)

E.g., in the coffee shop I asked for ‘a long black cup of coffee’ and duly paid for it. In this aspect of the pretreatment phase I conform to the genre expectations had by both the vendor and myself as’ the purchaser of that cup of coffee’. I expect a very hot cup of coffee to be brought to my table. Such constructive expectations are not deconstructed in the delivery of a hot cup of coffee.[138] In the immediacy of my contact with that cup of coffee I expect it to be too hot to drink, but, through enacting a process of ongoing re(-)normalization, in my taking small sips from that cup, in order to test how hot that coffee is, I soon arrive at a point in time that then allows me to comfortably drink from that cup. (50)

Through this experience of my first sipping, and then drinking that hot coffee, the relatively invariant feature of this experience is the fact of ‘my being able to drink that coffee in that cup’ – until such a time, of course, it has been drunk and this form of the coffee-drinking experience no longer remains invariant (despite the persistence of the cup, my presently sitting in that café, etc.). (51)

A process of transformational retreatment is predicated on engaging the relative preservation of a ‘transformational isomorphic invariance’. So, e.g., the water is heated, pervaded with coffee, the coffee in the cup cools, and is drunk until the presence of that coffee is no longer present in that cup at which point, obviously, I can drink no longer from that cup. Hence the relative preservation of these transformational isomorphically invariant features of the ‘cup’, the ‘water’, its ‘perfusion with coffee’, the ‘heat’… until such a time one or more of those elements is or are no longer present. (52)

Through economic complexification, retreatment is conjectured as in a dynamic format, formation, and form. Thence ‘dynamic economic complexification’. (53)

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[138] As an example of a process of deconstruction I could mention the fact that a few days ago I asked for a long black coffee but was delivered, instead, a café latte and had to return it to the barista.

So, treatment of truth determination as a type of transformational process, therefore, its candidacy for transformational retreatment. (54)

The *raison d'être* for retreatment being that relational forms of treatment elevate, through processes of suspensions, the meta-status of that being scrutinized by one degree, but, through the automatic de-suspension we are returned to the original meta-status of that being transformationally simulated through its de-elevation by one degree. (55)

Hence it linear treatment, in time, through pretreatment, treatment (through elevation in meta-status), and retreatment (through de-elevation in meta-status) even though, dialectically, there is, effectively, a simultaneity of process within this apparent process of its eventual progression expressed one small increment by increment (given that it could not be hyper-economically appreciated otherwise). (56)

Where overall treatment, respectively, is through rectification, deconstruction-reconstruction, and re(-)normalization. (57)

Where, economically, treatment is either synthetic in a pretreatment orientation, analytic in a treatment orientation, and/or conjectural in a retreatment/posttreatment orientation. (58)

Where treatment can only be either analytic, synthetic and/or conjectural in orientation against a background that dialectically expresses all three orientational options, which, in turn, can be seen to parallel hermeneutical 'wholes, parts and whole/s-and-parts' whilst also paralleling, respectively, relations, predicates and nominatives as argued for on grounds of economic complexification. (59)

That the dynamic reading of economic complexification, entailing the entire economy in question, can then give us a dynamic transformation reading of truth determination, etc. (60)

Hence, we can account for the Tarskian utilization of the conformation of its meta-status identification given that x' is T iff x. (61)

Or, read through the lens of transformational retreatment we could argue that there in an affirmation of a positive truth determination when there is the preservation of the required isomorphic invariance that would establish that form of validation. (62)

Supporting validation, as a form of evidence, being supplied through the overlapping of requisite forms of alignment established through re(-)alignment. (63)

7. Alignments as Informing the Validation of a Systematized Context

Alignment is predicated on the relative persistence of a transformational isomorphic invariance. E.g., the persistence of the cup, a hot coffee cooling, the coffee remaining in the cup until drunk, and so on. (64)

I.e., preservation needs to be observed between at least two phases in this linear unravelling of transformational retreatment. (65)

E.g., the complete preservation of the pottery coffee cup or the plastic coffee cup; the infusion of the coffee in a process of treatment; the discontinuation of the process of drinking that coffee when drunk, and so on. (66)

Through economic complexification we can note, with respect to ‘conjectures’ (in our experience of conjectural economy) with the alignment of the ‘present time status’, ‘specification’, ‘(non-economically expressed) processes of resolution’, and, the ‘ensuing productivity of the phase of transformational retreatment’ itself. Hence the additional appellation of ‘dynamic’ (given the expression of resolution in the currency of the immediate present. (67)

With respect to a process of dynamic economic complexification we note the transformations realized through such retreatment along with the overlapping of such economic modes of comparison in the ongoing formation of a rich nexus of overlapping re(-)alignments. (68)

Trimodal economic alignment as preparatory for hexamodal ordering, in turn, as preparatory material for the heuristic of a nine-fold treatment of social systematization in the Political-Economy. (69)

Along with dynamic co-associated readings of the extensive suspension and the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension in which both economies can also be seen as paralleling the linear formulation of transformational retreatment, and v.v. (70)

Dynamic in the sense that through resolution in the (sub-)economy of the economic, within the overall economy of the economic, and through its complexified coincidence with the irruption of the sub-economy of the non-economic in the overall economy of the economic. (71)

Now, as argued elsewhere, the practical realization of alignment is realized through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment, namely hermeneutically oriented pretreatment refined through a rectification of the mix of appropriate genres being exercised, i.e., ‘realignment’; phenomenal-phenomenologically treatment through both deconstruction and reconstruction as a form of error correction, i.e., re-de-mis-alignment; and, (both non-systematic and systematic) existentially oriented re(-)normalization that is both critically and, when and where apposite, radically innovative in the re-direction of processes of re-formation, i.e., chaotically re-directed re-alignment. (72)

Where through cross-related processes of relative intra-mediation, mediation, and intermediation truth determinations progressively evolve and meld within a relational world of ongoing re(-)e/valuational formation. (73)

Where the articulation of relative transformational isomorphic invariance is reinforced through refinement of meta-textual genres; textual deconstruction and reconstruction through various forms of error correction, and is critically and radically re-directed various critical and radical imperative that both augment and enhance the overall formation of positive forms of e/valuational enrichment. (74)

Where overall patterns of e/valuation are established, and re(-)established, through either overt or covert forms of passive, active and/or engaged economic complexification operating in either relatively static and/or dynamic modes of expositional expression. (75)

So, e.g., ‘drinking coffee’ can be co-related and extended as a special form involved in the ‘drinking of a hot liquid’ with all that that entails in lived-experience. (76)

That in drinking from a container to be drunk from we reed to actively drink from that container, and, thence the persistence of that container in phases deemed to be representatively present in pretreatment, treatment and retreatment (and in our posttreatment drinking from that same filled vessel till it has been drunk from). (77)

As trivially as this must seem, all processes of transformation, albeit in linear terms, are outlined through pretreatment, etc. (78)

Where the persistence of isomorphic invariance identifies that subjected to such a processes of transformation along with all co-associate alterations in truth determination, etc. (79)

Where all such readings are mutually co-validated and reinforced through all forms of economic complexification, error correction, apperception of positive value enhancement, the perceptions of isomorphic invariance, etc. (80)

As exemplified in the drinking of coffee; as a genre of behaviour that insists on the persistence of the nominated container; the ‘deconstruction’ of the ground coffee and its ‘reconstruction’ as an effusion of coffee; and the cooling of the finished product when we find the correct time for it to be drunk given our need to first test both the expected and anticipated cooling of that coffee. (81)

With an infinitude of potentially overlapping economic correlatives in a variety of aligned and not-so-aligned forms of economic treatment where such aspirations, for the main part, will be socially arbitrated in terms that are both relevant and viable. (82)

8. Cogency as a Non-Existential Force

All modes of performance, and their appreciation, are suitably supervised and both directed and re(-)directed through the observed cogency of conjectural considerations as an intentional force in the motivation of behaviour. (83)

Because analytical propositions and contingent statements, either by themselves or collectively, have no ostensive conjectural force whatsoever. (84)

Where cogency leads in either parallel and/or counter-parallel forms of relatively non-existential e/valuation and relatively existential e/valuation. (85)

Truly confronted by a hungry person, a vendor of food could either sell them a meal and/or donate that same meal either in part or in whole, or have a customer either directly or indirectly pay for that same meal... (86)

Because the vendor of food has a livelihood predicated on earning their living by doing as such, and, the person has the existential right to be fed, find sustenance. (87)

Where all transactions should be observed as both possessing non-existential readings and an existential readings, and, where both readings can never be equally weighted. (88)

Understanding that ‘existential e/valuation’ is simulated and realized through ‘the existentialization of the relatively non-existential’... with the implication that a dialectical dance between the existential and the non-existential cannot be not contemplated. (89)

That conjectures support a process of overall e/valuation through both mediation and intermediation, thence, respectively, the origination of their non-existential e/valuation and their existential evaluation.... and, hence, their inability to be exclusively separated and isolated. (90)

So, suspension of the analytical and the synthetical gives, through de-suspension, a conjectured voice to a non-existential orientation. (91)

Whilst, a dynamic suspension of the trimodal economy of the conjectural gives, through overall de-suspension, a parallel voice to the existential dimension. (92)

Where cogency can proffer a mapped outline for suitable forms of relational intervention, hopefully, with an existential complexion. (93)

Thence the potential for an existential cogency can and should be discerned in all forms of conjectural appreciation. (94)

9. Cogency as an Existential Force

But, then, how do conjectures also inescapably proffer an existential commentary on the course of our behaviour, acting, as we must, as agents, both individually and collectively? (95)

Through the inescapable nature of economic intermediation. (96)

Because through intermediation the entirety of the economy operates within the situated context of its relational situatedness. (97)

Whose appreciation is and must also be both pro-relational in orientation and trans-relational in subjective experience. (98)

Because all intentional experience and its trans-intentional judgment must be objective, interobjective/intersubjective, and subjective in a manner suitably in keeping with the nature of both its perceived and apperceived e/valuational formation/s.[139] (99)

With the overall situatedness of the economy, in its living-experience, being holistically intermediated over the course of its lived-experience. (100)

Hence its parallel cogency in existential terms when permitted to function in that form of intervention, given that intervention is both inevitable and inescapable, and, indeed, metaphorically, should be received as aptly 'called for'. (101)

Where the emergent representation of our relationships has the conjectural force to enable us to act either existentially and/or non-existentially, but, preferably, through existential openness, to harmonically act in a parallel disposition that overlooks neither of these two dimensions. (102)

Such double appreciation being arrived at through the suitable exercise of a appositely discharged extensive suspension,[140] and, where the relational nature of such intermediation taking on the holistic nature of all relational experience *qua* 'relational experience'. (103)

Just as appreciated in phenomenal-phenomenological experience when we discern the definitively distinctive nature of some distinctive aspect of phenomenological experience, as met, e.g., in our experiences of saltiness and sweetness, etc. (104)

Where we are just as definitively called upon to 'permit' such enaction. (105)

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139 In effect, articulating the trimodal nature of the intentional economy, etc., i.e., as inescapably objective, motivational, and subjective. Where 'motivation' can be seen to be 'subjectively oriented towards both interobjective and intersubjective forms of influence, etc.'

140 As delineated in Volume II of the *Pursuit*. Where the Overall Transcendental Suspension (as mirrored, .e.g., in the interrogative economy, etc., is enveloped by an economy of de-suspension (as an Extended Suspension) which, in turn is both enveloped and/or centralized by the implication of a causal dimension. Thence the more full encompassment of the Extensive Suspension

10. Pragmatic Holism

Because truth determination is representationally situated both culturally and interculturally in the relational context of the overall life-world thence the recognition, encountering and engagement within the working-world with a pragmatic holism. (106)

Where ‘representations’ are enacted within the trimodal economy of an ‘economic’ treatment of ‘re(-)presentation’; utilized as provisional imputations of overall processes of identification and truth assessment permanently exercised as working determinations within our ongoing suspended experience of the working-world devoid of all impossible notions like so-called ‘external worlds’, and ‘internal worlds’, etc. (107)

Where we continually work with what is to hand, namely, our appreciation of relevant texts, treated not only individually but also collectively. (108)

By such means working through the refinement of a pragmatic holism expressed through viable forms of socially and individually reflected upon consensus. (109)

As already pre-established through the overt and covert rules of arbitration. (110)

Where we are ‘mutually’ forced to markup or discount our personal aspirations in order to ensure their eventually realized cooperative expedition, albeit in part and never in whole (even in regard, e.g., to the demands of an absolute monarch). (111)

Thence the cultural-intercultural basis for the progressive refinement of a social consensus-building and the co-associated creation, preservation, and conservation of a social solidarity, hopefully to that extent that permits the requisite degree for personal and social expressions of authenticity to be both exhibited and disseminated. (112)

Making no clear distinctions between local cultures and more global intercultural influences given that they mutually define each other through forms of contrast, resonance, competition, and so on.[141] (113)

That debates over differing sets of conjectures within the relative integrity of the working-world forms a relevant and viable basis for the formation of both social consensus-building and social solidarity (as per Rorty), and hence the crucial need for well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectural considerations. (114)

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[141] In looking at instances of religious change between cultures, I formulated a concept of a ‘cognitive rift’ when one cultures reflects on the innovations of another culture with an ensuing response of either appropriation in some mediated form, relative neutrality, and/or rejection. Normally, the complex response is a complex mix of the above plus the manner of its refraction through the local culture itself (with or without an eventual rectification of such appropriations in and through the lens of the imported ideologies surrounding the original importations. So, e.g., Pagan peoples would, initially, naturally mis-appropriate a Pagan Christianity, that, in time, would be further re(-)aligned with more orthodox formations and formulations of Christian dogma, practice, etc. Hence some of the historical ground that would be covered by Reformations, Counter-Reformations, those periods of anomalous cultural behviours in which such potentially contentious issues would be debated, and so on.

11. Equivalence of the Pragmatic and Existential

But, such understandings granted, how do we optimistically account for the equation between a '(pragmatic-)existentialism' and a(n 'existential-)pragmatism'? (115)

Albeit as viewed from the 'transcendental' trans-intentional perspective of trans-cognitive judgment. (116)

Albeit as refracted through a trans-cognitively ordered appreciation of the role played by the third trans-cognitively ordered order of the deontologically-existential and the existential openness of its 'pragmatic' implications *versus* the more expedient circumscriptions of the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the 'pragmatical'. (117)

Where the pragmatic includes, as a secondary adjunct, and does not exclude, nor is entirely beholden to, the expediency of the four trans-cognitive order of the prgamatical. (118)

Where through such openness to its adjuncts (of both the fourth ordered pragmatical and the second ordered aesthetical) we can insist that the deontologically-existential cannot be reduced purely to deontological imperatives *per se* as might be thought to be solely entailed within this fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the deontological-existential. (119)

Thence this accounting for the open richness of an existential response enacted on the pro-relational behalf of the situated relationship in question by some or all of its resident participants. (120)

When and where such deontological and non-deontological imperatives are experienced with an existential complexion of a fully situated existential pattern of responsive, responsiveness, and responsibility. (121)

Where undoubtedly, an eidetic-like variation of potent conjectural possibilities and their intuitive appreciation assists us in establishing both a relevant and viable pathway as such a response, etc. (122)

Once envisaged, we then need to permit such existentially oriented enactment whilst also understanding its close association with its co-associated relatively non-existentially oriented parallel forms of enactment... given that the existential orientation arises through the necessary existentialization of relatively non-existential factors, and v.v., etc. (123)

Where the deontologically-existential primarily arises under the economic correlative moment of Ego along with its harmonized senses and semblances of resolution as permitted to be expressed non-economically and re-appropriated hyper-economically (within the overall economy of the economic). (124)

12. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Thence our trans-cognitive appreciation of this equivalence between the ‘existentially-pragmatic’ and the ‘pragmatically-existential’. (125)

Therefore, this somewhat subtle distinction between the ‘pragmatic’ (primarily centered within the third trans-cognitive order) and the.pragmatical’ (solely centered within the fourth trans-cognitive order). (126)

Where the pragmatic aspect ensures an effective and efficacious utilization, etc., of resources to that extent possible, and, the existential oversees the richness and ongoing re(-)enrichment of our more important relationships. (127)

Where relevant conjectural variations have an important role to play in the viability of such arbitrated proceedings. (128)

Thence the sense and significance of a well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectural economy. (129)

Where the existential sense-and-the-significance of a well-represented conjectural economy is able to suitably supervise the permissions required in interventions of such pro-relationally orchestrated and enhanced oversight. (130)

Allowing us to effectively and more expertly move from the relatively non-critical to the critical, and, thence, to the relatively-radical. (131)

Given that innovations are quantum-like jumps that can collectively chart a novel course of insight and need first to be hyper-economically assimilated, small incremental step by small incremental step. (132)

Relatively differentiating the cultural and the intercultural; non-existential and existential; the pragmatical and the pragmatic; the well-formed and the well-informed through the well-expressed, etc. (133)

Therefore, we need to acknowledge the behavioural forcefulness of the conjectural economy, etc. (134)

Where, through embodiment, we both riven and enjoined both objectively and subjectively. (135)

Where identification is necessary in transformational appreciation of truth determination and in a meta-appreciation of the same given the further specification of individual truth determinations. (136)

Just as A’ is T iff A, so too, C’ is T iff C (as a set of A, etc.). (137)

Where, through isomorphic preservation, paradoxically, a transformation is arrived at if pretreated x' then treated x, or, if treated x' then retreated x, or, if retreated/posttreated x' then pretreated x, or, if dialectically conducted in reverse. (138)

Where, as well, the overall retreated economy x', through intermediation, is productive of x, etc. (139)

Where transformational retreatment mirrors the operations of the conjectural economy through the need for a well-informed synthetical pre-treatment; the need for a well-formed processes of treatment through both deconstruction and reconstruction ; along with the ensuing need for well-expressed forms of retreated, potentially well-conceived expeditions of apposite transformational pathways. (140)

Where transformation is predicated on the preservation of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance along with the transformational-transitions causally induced to manifest both therein and thereafter... (141)

Arguing, in effect, for alignment as realized through ongoing re(-)alignment, i.e., realignment, re-de-mis-alignment, and re(-)alignment. (142)

Affirmational possibilities being further enriched and conformally revalidated through the overlapping of both expected and anticipated forms of economically complexified patterns of economic alignment. (143)

Thence the model of the persistent coffee container, the deconstruction of the ground coffee and its reconstruction in a drinkable form, and, the realization of a cooling cup of coffee.as a consequence of such sequentialization of behaviours and its overall, holistic, non-sequential appreciation. (144)

Such overlapping of relevant and viable economic commentaries reinforces both the cogency of both non-existentially oriented conjectures and existentially oriented conjectures. (145)

Given that relative existentialization arises through the progressive existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, de-existentialization arises through the de-progressive de-existentialization of the relatively existential. (146)

Hence the basis for a pragmatic holism along with its consensus building and social solidarity... critically conducted increment by increment... (147)

In an equivalence between the 'pragmatic' and the 'existential' under the auspices of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontologically-existential and the expression of such resolution through the moment of the relatively non-economic. (148)

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Wherein, the working-economy, within the working-world, arises through the imputed contributions of intra-mediation and mediation as supervised through intermediation. (149)

Thence this explication of the nature and manner of the overall operations of the conjectural economy..!! (150)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 25.4.24.

XII. An Appreciation of the Conjectural Economy, etc.,
Through the Lens of Transformational Retreatment, and v.v.

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XII. An Appreciation of the Conjectural Economy, etc., Through the Lens of Transformational Retreatment, and v.v.*[142]

As one more provisional definition of the discipline of philosophy:

The conjectural exploration of a field of concern
Conducted both from a pragmatic perspective with an existential complexion
And from an existential point of view with a pragmatic outcome...

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

Given the successful deconstruction of absolutistically envisaged axiomatization in both science and mathematics it is quite natural to look askance at all varieties of such formalism. Witness the impact of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, and, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems in mathematics, and so on. In a similar vein, Quine, and others, soon added one more rather large nail to the coffin-lid of logical positivism and other allied misplaced forms of dogmatically misinformed instances of traditionally inspired and motivated philosophical faith that believed all reasonable questions can be reasonably answered… definitively. That the day has finally come when science and mathematics, and all other disciplines, need no longer succumb to the Western predilection that all forms of information need, indeed, demand to be neatly wrapped up in metaphorical parcels without any ensuing surprises when unwrapped… In this essay let me reconsider forms of relative axiomatization, or similar, without transgressing the provisional nature and natural boundaries of all such formats for informational presentation, representation, pre-presentation, as expressed in and through a limited economy suitably constituted as a working-process of 're(-)presentation'. (0)

In the following essay let me present a number of ideas that further a working-understanding of the ramifications of a conjectural economy especially in terms of our arriving at a coincidence between the pragmatic and the existential from the transcendental trans-cognitive perspective of judgment… (1)

1. Exposition…

I have noted that the metaphorical 'engine room' of the philosophical discipline, and by extension all disciplines, is 'the exercise and appreciation of a conjectural economy'. This can be simply analogue by explicating the lived-significance of rain from analytical, synthetical and conjectural points of view. As a(n analytical) tautology 'it is either raining or not raining', and, as a(n analytical) non-tautology 'when it is raining, and you stand in the rain, you will get wet (because 'rain' is 'water', and 'water will wet you if you are in contact with the same')'. As a synthetic contingency we could note 'that is currently raining outside'. However, with a conjectural dimension we cannot connect the former to the expectational fact that if I stand outside now, without shelter, I will get wet

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142 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

because it is raining'. Then, it could also be pointed out that without co-associated analytical and synthetical inputs conjectures, themselves, could not be entertained. But that is a it should be since the conjectural economy, like all trimodal economies, cannot operate in either pure unimodal orientation or a pure bimodal orientation. That, in effect, the trimodal parties of an economy, any economy, indeed, all economies, are also 'economic correlatives', which, as 'correlativities', cannot be entertained apart from their economic situations, and by extension, the situatedness of those same economies within a world of lived-experience and its co-associated plethora of lived-interpretations. That when we take up the perspective from a relational perspective our point of view then takes on a pro-relational perspective with a trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity. (2)

Because we can neither attain nor obtain, i.e., appropriate, a purely self-contained sense of an economic correlative we must dismiss all pretence at formulating a non-impossible unimodalism. Similarly, entertaining a relationship between two impossible unimodal distinctions is equally impossible, whereas, three co-associated economic correlatives is perfectly acceptable as long as we remain within the requisite economic terms of reference. Hence the necessity of this use of a dialectical language that refers to a 'relative distinction' or an 'orientation', and so on (as ways of reminding the reader or audience that we are dealing with expressions that cannot and should not be treated in either unimodal or bimodal formats explicated in purely presented self-referential terms of reference. Just as a comprehensive critique of the analytical-synthetical distinction so clearly demonstrates. On the other hand, our apparent 'understanding' of this distinction is easily explained by invoking conjectures, and where all three economic parties, i.e., as correlatives, are 'mutually' co-entertained economically. Moreover, because no economy is an island unto itself it also follows that economies can be interlocked and overlapped through suitable forms of economic complexification when these correlatives find forms of corresponding alignment in terms of their archetypal constitution (as previously explored and explained in gestalt terms[143]). (3)

Now I would like to explore this broad concept of 'alignment', e.g., as a 'mode of conformation in semantic truth determination' when we reinforce a specific truth determination with its supporting forms of conformation as discerned through alignment as realized through the iterations of re(-)alignment (as previously explored under the headings of phenomenological presentation through the error correction of a deconstructive-reconstructive textual process of 're-de-mis-alignment', hermeneutic representation through the meta-textual rectification of 'realignment', and re-presentation through chaotic forms of non-textually re-directed 're-alignment', etc.). Extending this work, as indicated in its brief summary (as just noted within those just previously extended brackets) let me now propose 'alignment' as a process conducted and enacted on the level of analytical-like 'interlocking' of propositional complexes, a synthetical 'overlapping' of contingent statements (as provisional 'facts'), and, the collectively affirmative cogency of propositional-statements of the underwriting of articulated conjectural complexes. (4)

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[143] As explicated in the formula of '(foreground) focus, (background) field and (subjective) frame (or framing)'. In terms of the philosophical economy, we note the relative sub-economies, respectively, of the phenomenal-phenomenological, hermeneutical, and the (non-systematic) existential.

That collectively, we can now extend a process of conformation in truth determination beyond an individual 'sentence' (composed of propositions, statements, and propositional-statements) by invoking an 'interlocking', 'overlapping' and 'underwriting' of what could be defined as 'sentential paragraphs', i.e., 'sets of propositions, etc., forming sentences within a sentential paragraph' that, collectively, are conceived of as contributing to the overall truth determination of what is being referenced by that sentential paragraph or paragraphs. Let me demonstrate the interweaving of these imputed forms of connection that collectively contribute to processes of alignment whose powers of economic re(-)presentation, through emergence, cannot be itemized through mere processes of reduction (equally dismissing both processes of mere reduction and all forms of reduction to the mere process of emergence as if emergences can then be isolated apart from its emergent basis[144]). (5)

Let me exemplified these three forms of alignment. (6)

In 'interlocking' we find 'systems of analytical connectedness arrived at through various forms of equation'. E.g., if we note the analytical truthfulness of 'the proposition that when it rains, and you are standing in the rain, you get wet because rain is falling water from the sky…' Or, 'a bachelor is an unmarried male as a person who has not entered into the union of marriage…' In other words, chains of closely connected items linked in and through forms of equation. Then, from these islands of connectedness we can form interconnections when analytically applicable and convenient. I.e., e.g., this unmarried male person A(-M) is called X, lives in city Y in the nation Z, etc. This formulation, e.g., then taking on a contingently oriented truth value if deemed to be factually confirmed, i..e, deserves to expressed in the form of a statement (of actual factualness). I.e., analytical interlocking can be then be transformed into synthetically contingent forms of overlapping, and v.v. I.e., this person A described as not married (-M) who lives in X in the nation Y is true if and only if (iff) A(-M), X, Y, Z are contingently true collectively. Then, through a process of conjectural 'underwriting' we can creatively explore through various conjectures of that which has been merely interlocked and overlapped. E.g., person A is now married (M) and lives in city C in the nation D, etc. (7)

Through the application of nominatives, predicates, and relations various situations can be simulated in conjectural terms of reference. Thereby underwriting various conjectural scenarios, etc. Whereby, obviously, an appreciation of nominatives, etc., cannot be determined primarily in the terms of nominatives, etc. (8)

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[144] Yes, we can treat the images on a computer screen, e.g., as emergent entities, but, even though we may refer to such entities as if in their own right their origination has been obtained from their emergent basis and correctly cannot be understood apart from their form of origination. Turn the power of, and those images are gone. Again, we can still refer to them, their sense and semblance, their collective economic sense-and-semblance, still, what we are then referring to is no longer those images per se but to their semantic mapping in memory, etc. I.e., no longer those perceived images per se since we are now referring to them in the semantic mapping of their imagined reconstruction, etc. Where such 'idealities' only exist within those forms of mapping and the dissemination of those same maps as re(-)constructed through the use of language/s, genres of behaviour, education, conversations, discursive practices, etc.

In a parallel economy of treatment, we have three and only three forms of treatment, namely, ‘nominations, predications, and relations’. Moreover, through economic complexification, we can parallel ‘nominations’ with ‘conjectures’, ‘predications’ with ‘analyses’, and, ‘relations’ with ‘syntheses’. (9)

Moreover, in processes of overall truth determination the apparent totality of sentential elements can only be ascertained through the appreciation of economies in their entirety. Hence the relative contributions of interlocking, overlapping, and underwriting to the collective ascertainment of a conformable delineation of validly established truth determinations. (10)

Just as, e.g., in our dealing with a hot cup of coffee we find the overlapping inputs of being told that this cup of coffee is ‘hot’, seeing steam rising from the surface of the coffee (on this very cold morning), feeling the heat of the pottery cup with the tip of our finger, testing the temperature with our tongue, finding ourselves finally able to drink that cup of coffee… all overlap in our truth assessment of the current conjecture rhetorically asking ‘as to when can I drink that same cup of coffee?’ (and its being answered in the affirmative at that time it is judged that ‘I can now drink this hot cup of coffee that has cooled sufficiently that I am now able to drink it’). (11)

Now, through economic correlativity we can also transformationally move from a relative analytical reading to a relative synthetical reading to a relative conjectural reading whilst understanding that all such modes of reading must be enabled within the requisite conjectural economy (that more correctly should be designated an analytical-synthetical-conjectural economy and where our relative focus of these three aspects then allows us to speak of an analytical economy, etc., albeit within the totality of the overall economy in question. An over sense of an economy further reinforced through static and dynamic inputs acquired through economic complexification be that either arrived at covertly or overtly, be that arrived either inadvertently or advertently, etc. (12)

Such transformational-transitions being able to be successfully conducted on the basis of ‘the relative transformational preservation of an isomorphic invariance’. E.g., analytically, ‘this apple looked like an edible apple’; synthetically, ‘this apple, as an expectation, is looking like an edible apple’; and, conjecturally, ‘this apple looks like an edible apple’ that in biting into it ‘is found to be crisp, juicy and delicious to taste…’ Now, the more perceptive person will note that these three sentential forms are written, respectively, in the past, future and present. Furthermore, in terms of a philosophy of transformational retreatment, in this order they represent treatment, pretreatment, and retreatment/posttreatment. (13)

In effect, I am also arguing that given a transformational pathway between these three modes of sentential representation that an overall conjectural economy registered in the affirmative implies an alignment between all three modes in terms of this imputed relative transformational isomorphic invariance. Or, in the case of my eating ‘this delicious apple’, apple-ness is collectively preserved through the suitable integration of processes of interlocking, overlapping, and underwriting. That, at the end of the day, my

finding this apple to be ‘crisp, juicy, and delicious’ further adds to its sematic validation in terms of its overall truth determination. Recognizing in the process that truth determination usually apples to the sentential complex and not so much to individual sentential components, although, the discovery of non-cohering, non-integrated sentential elements could cast doubt on the overall process of truth conformation enacted to date. So, e.g., even though this ‘apple’ looks very realistic I know it to be a ‘wax apple’ and as a realistic conjecture I will not be biting into it under any circumstances. Similarly, I know, from an appreciation of experience, that remember apples, imagined apples, apples talked about in other people’s conversations, dream apples just do not live up to my modal expectations I expect to accompany a non-virtual apple experience. That this phenomenologically oriented understanding puts an end to the hypothetical nonsense perpetrated by ideological Cartesian, *et al*. Every particular type of phenomenological experience has its own distinctive set of modalities. However, only non-virtual apples normally meet our meeting a full complement of modal expectations as conjectured to apply to only our phenomenal-phenomenological experience of non-virtual apples. (14)

Now, the ‘fruits’ of an overall conjectural economy can be entertained instantaneously once sequentially programmed. Conjectures have this ability once properly sequenced. I now instantaneously know that ‘the apples in the fruit bowl in the kitchen are edible’, and, I now instantaneously know that ‘the ornamental wax apples on the tazza in the dining room’ are not edible’. Such items in my world are semantically mapped accordingly. In my recollections of the dining room ‘I immediately know the ornamental fruit are not edible’, whereas, in the kitchen, ‘I immediately know that the fruit bowl has edible apples’. In effect, all economies have this dual presentation as judgments made in the spontaneity of judgment once delivered, and, as judgments delivered in and through sequences of conjectured processes, etc. Obviously, improperly sequenced conjectures would distort our processes of judgment, and, conversely, properly sequenced conjectures establish this relative invariance of transformational isomorphic invariance that allows us to consider our semantic mapping of this world at large to have a rather immutable appearance since it is only at the edges of such a world that we need to emend our conjectural formations, etc. (15)

Interestingly, once conjectures are semantically determined their order of ‘presentation’ or an articulation of ‘their mapped representation’ is not so important (except at that level of its syntactic translation in the language in question in accordance with the grammatical rules of that language). So, I could say that this apple just bitten into is either ‘delicious, juicy and crisp’ or ‘delicious, crisp and juicy’, etc., etc. On the other hand, in programming our conjectures they need to be properly sequenced without making sequential mistakes. (16)

Now, let me revisit this notion of ‘sequential mistakes’. An economy of sequentialization can be deemed to be incorrectly sequenced if we commit mistakes that can be nominated as falling under the following defective processes, namely, de-sequentialization, dis-sequentialization, and contra-sequentialization, i.e., as mistakes in the ordering of a genre-determined set of sequences; as mistakenly performed processes at the right moment in a sequence; and, when distinctively different genre-determined

sequences are confused. Let me exemplify these three types of mistakes, respectively, I am making my breakfast and push the toaster bar down without putting the toast into the popup toaster; my wet fingers slip on the toaster bar when I push the bar down (with the toast already in the toaster); and, my absent-minded putting he teabag in the toaster whilst simultaneously making toast and a making a cup of tea (as actually recounted by a friend of mine). Now, if we were to were to incorrectly perform a certain event in a sequence that is also out of sequence, we could call that complex error as occurring in a process of 'mis-sequentialization'. Hence these respective errors of 'de-sequencing', 'dis-sequencing', 'contra-sequencing' (and, for the sake of completeness, 'mis-sequencing'). But, let us assume that we conform to genre expectations and conduct such sequences in the requisite manner as determined by our understanding of those meta-textual genres (in the form of future expectations). (17)

That these processes, collectively, of interlocking, overlapping and underwriting reinforce our integrated processes of semantic mapping along with their corresponding forms of semantic truth determination. That, given this degree of a mutual reinforcement, it is understandable that future processes of truth determination will happen around the 'edges' of these cultural-intercultural maps that might be better thought of as a 'semantic atlas', and where maps will individually disagree with each other depending on their order of acquisition, their intentional perspectives, their objective senses of purpose, their relatively 'defective status', in part, as working maps, etc. We could imagine that the semantic map or atlas of a certain scientist who is also a theist could well be quite different in certain 'pages' in comparison to a scientist who is an avowed atheist, and so on. (18)

This is also an opportune moment for the re-introduction of the twin concepts of 'insurance and assurance'. If we believe we have a made a set of sequential mistakes we have the 'insurance' of being ever able returning, at least hypothetically, to a point in our research that was less problematic in that same regard, and, then, find the 'assurance' to recontinue in the hope of getting it more correct this time round. That, in effect, the emendation of truth determinations must be a relatively peripheral affair and that this gives us a certain degree of faith that non-ideologically oriented people might progressively find more common ground in forging closer ties between each other through this ongoing clarification of certain contentious 'pages' in these 'semantic atlases'. (19)

Now, we could also imagine that this imputation of a transformational isomorphic invariance should also allow us to forge more integrated forms of social consensus building along with the co-associated sense and semblance of social solidarity these processes might also inspire by extending these forms of alignment economically, through economic complexification and, therein and thereafter, furthermore, into the imputed 'overall economy of the economic itself'.[145] Let me explore what is entailed in the extension of this overall process of alignment (through re(-)alignment). (20)

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[145] Outlining how these processes might contribute to an overseeing of these aspirations of Richard Rorty for the ongoing building of a social consensus along with its concomitant expressions of a social solidarity preferably as enacted within both a democratically oriented *demos* (countryside) and *polis* (cityscape), etc.

Basically, I am arguing that various forms of alignment are experienced that collectively reinforce the relative stability of our semantic atlas (despite the fact that discordance between pages would inevitably manifest themselves should we seek to entertain to what extent there is certain necessary degree of 'inter-mapping concordance' along without noting those elements that could be discerned to also be relatively discordant). In this regard, I remember buying a Chinese painting of a landscape, in the form of a hanging scroll. Now, it took me a few months to pay it off and, when I got it home, I was 'disappointed' to find that this landscape had no 'bridge' in its panorama whatsoever despite my imagination 'remembering' that such feature was present in this exact painting. For a variety of reasons, as a reflection of our finiteness and our obvious limitations, we do not entertain a perfect process of recollection. However, fortunately, incorrectly performed processes of recollection can be suitably emended if the situation in question allows us to do just that. In this instance, just cited, I only had to look closely at this scroll to realize I must have been mistaken. Unfortunately, many or our errors in comprehension are not so easily righted, yet, on the other hand, this relatively invariant core at the center of our semantic atlas is to be welcomed as proffering some basis for our thinking we have some understanding of this world at large whose representation, through such semantic mapping, is also shared with others. That, upon the relative stability of this basis, we can forge greater degrees of consensus building, and, from time to time, through a recognition of relatively-radical innovations in perspective, etc., we can also entertain the addition of the discovery of relatively novel features, such as 'final' vocabularies, 'definitive' histories, definite conjectural affirmation, and so on. (21)

As intimated, in a transformational philosophy of 'retreatment' this isomorphic invariance is preserved between pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment. Now, as these three stages in a process of transformation, respectively, are hermeneutical, phenomenological, and (non-systematically) existential it follows that these three subdisciplines, in the overall economy of the philosophical can also be mustered to comment, or commentate, upon the findings of each other. That this inter-concordant process can be further co-opted to reinforce these processes of alignment and their appreciation, and, therein and thereby, proffer the means for the further consolidation of these processes involved in our semantic mappings, etc., be they advertently recognized or inadvertently noted merely in passing. (22)

Similarly, on an ordered basis, we can also note this transformational isomorphism is also extended to the entirety of our judgments as we proceed through these sets of six orders either in a linear manner or in a non-linear form involved in the relative immediacy of recognition, encountering and engagement, etc., as we representatively map out the course of out relational-interactions, etc. That, furthermore, this can also permit us to entertain forms of a pro-relational orientation with an existential complexion to be discerned in and through a co-associated sense and semblance of a trans-relational subjectivity. Where through all such forms of interlocking, overlapping, underwriting and all other processes of a co-associated alignment through re(-)alignment, we can further refine the current mappings of our semantic atlases, etc., and by such relative progress discover to what degree such understanding conformally find the requisite degree of a mutual, evolving process of semantic consolidation. (23)

That upon such conformal grounds, despite their limitations and defects, we are not confounded by ideologues ever insisting that we are only privy to appearances and, instead, through ongoing working-process of de-distortion, through suitable forms of sequentialization, we can continue to make limited degrees of progress through such process of sequentially enacted forms of de-distortion. (24)

On such relatively mutual grounds of provisionally treated stability suitable forms of limited axiomatization can be constructed if only as an aid to the ongoing clarification of our disciplinary research programs. Without being systematic and attempting a reasonable degree of completeness, how might we conduct such conjectural representation? (25)

E.g., we might wish to better represent a certain situation by noting its primary relational parties, i.e., it relational parts and relational participants. To this we can recognize the relational situation in question and the nature of its relational contextualization to the rest of this world at large. Noting both the constitutional and the non-constitutional conject comprising either a relationally oriented 'space' or a pro-relationally oriented 'space'. Then, we would articulate intra-mediational, mediational and inter-mediational aspects of these spaces whilst attempting to discern, when and where possible, non-existential cogency and existential cogency in the latter. Either doing this through some form of relatively systematic axiomatization or far less formally though operating only on what we might need-to-know basis. (26)

Now, let me move these explorations to how forms of alignment might be understood as being realized within an overall economy of the economic (as explicated in the next essay)? (27)

2. Provisional Conclusions, Observations, and Comments

That, in an acceptance of these relatively stable grounds, as semantically mapped, and subjected to conjectural forms of conformal extension, we can make some degree of 'progress' even if a collective expression of such progress is not necessarily guaranteed on a more communally oriented basis should the pre-conditions and conditions not be conducive for such intersubjectively organized forms of consolidation. Hence by cautious optimism and a simultaneous recognition that a pessimism should also not be completely absent. By what we move forwards through an absence of such preconditions we could also find ourselves moving backwards. As happens all to often, in the exercise of a discipline, *cul de sacs*, rabbit holes, mirages, conspiracies, ideological mythologies… are ever scattered along such a path and, like beguiling sirens, are ever-ready to mesmerize us with their impotent muddling of a shared reality that, as if by default, the opportunists can seize their chances to acquire things more tangible like power, prestige, property, possession, and so on and so forth… at the expense of a sell-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed *polis*..!! (28)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 2.5.24.

XIJ. 'Non-Economic' Ramifications of the Conjectural Economy, etc.

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIJ. 'Non-Economic' Ramifications of the Conjectural Economy, etc.*[146]

'Breaking free' means 'being rescued..?'[147]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

The irruptive concept of the 'non-economic'[148] is designed to explain how we can escape the endless deferral of 'our needing to exercise a definitive sense of resolution' when that is to be observed as a distinctive phenomenological characteristic of the intentional life of the person? If economic circulation were to occur only within the psychological extent of an economy, how could that economy influence the course of our being in this world at large beyond the mere limitations precisely entailed in that very same economy? (0)

In addressing the non-economic ramifications of the conjectural economy, as representative of all economies, let me first address the reasons why such a concept needs to be invoked. Then, let me introduce the 'overall economy of the economic' with an in-depth exploration of its sub-economies, respectively, of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic in that order. Ending with the usual provisional set of conclusions, etc., where the ramifications of this concept will be further explored. (1)

1. The Problem of the Economic and its Resolution through the 'Non-Economic'

The *raison d'être* of the irruptive concept of the 'non-economic' is put forward as a solution to the problem 'how do we escape endless cycles of circulation involved within the imputed functioning of any economy when it is obvious, under normal circumstances, that we can do exactly that, namely, in a certain situation we entertain the possible exercise of various decisions and, then, for the most part, duly discharge those decisions we prefer for whatever reason or reasons. (2)

This necessity for an escape from the endless deferral of internal circulation was brought home to me in the work of François Laurelle[149] and modelled on 'non-philosophy' (later rebadged as a 'non-standard philosophy') I have chosen to nominate this 'irruption from endless circulation' as 'non-economic' which, as a concept, is not to

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146 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

147 Somewhat cryptic, but could be cashed out as follows: being within an endless circulation of value could be interpreted as 'being trapped'… where 'breaking free' could mean 'being rescued by either our own sense of self and/or by another..? The allusion being made here is to the otherwise endless circulation of value of any economic being freed through the irruptions of the non-economic that, in turn are rescued by the overall economy of the economic, i.e., primarily through hyper-economic appropriation of the relatively-radical, etc.

148 My expression 'non-economic' is ambiguous. In a positive sense it refers to this irruptive reading *versus* a negative sense referring to that which is economically impossible to either recognize, encounter and/or engage both virtually and non-virtually (as explored in *The Seventh Book*…).

149 François Laurelle; *A Biography of the Ordinary Man*: *On Authorities and Minorities*; Translated by Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet; Polity Press, 2018.

be confused with those attempts to be ‘philosophical’ or ‘disciplinary in a manner that is just not economic, not economically possible. This other concept of the ‘not being economically possible’ being made to apply to all strong ideological forms involved in proposed styles of philosophical positioning pertaining to all impossible forms of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism and relativism. Included in this prohibition, as caught in this net of the economically impossible, we can cite *ad nauseum* all strong(ly overcommitted) ideological forms of realism (and anti-realism), empiricism, idealism, rationalism, dualism, and so on and so forth. (3)

On balance, phenomenologically, we see a densely intersecting world of non-circulating value, or at least instances of value formation that could be circulated but certainly issuing forth in a definite sense that indicates no intent to circulate. A bit like tossing a coin into a sacred well or river, making a wish, and not expecting that coin will be ever circulated again. In a stark contrast, metaphorically, circulating value is not so much directly perceived since in being recycled behind the scene, so to speak, it does not bring itself to our attention. We are more inclined to see the exhibition of intentional behaviour through sudden shifts or distinctive alterations in behaviour and not so much through the mere reiteration of some pattern of activity. As annoying as a wayward car alarm can be, still, if it is in the distance and does not stop for a lengthy period of time it is as if we cease to hear it, especially if we are engrossed in tasks that demands our full attention. (4)

These non-iterated, linear-like, non-circular irruptions of behaviour can be thought of as ‘definitive responses’ or ‘distinctive respondings’. Since they come to our attention through alterations of our lived-landscapes then to that extent they can then be referred to as ‘definitive responses of the last instant’, citing that moment they were either noticed or were imputed to have arisen. In previous essays I have also expanded this terminology to also include ‘definitive responses of next instance’ and ‘definitive responses of the first instance’ in order to distinguish in conjectural terms, respectively, ‘the irruption of a non-existential cogency (that could have also have an overlooked co-associated existential complexion)’, the irruption of a relative existential cogency seeking permission for us to respond in the next instance, and, where we have existentially responded to that call by setting forth a series of existential responses whose consequences and ramifications now obviously take on an existential complexion regardless of whether some other witness of such a response is sufficiently attuned to either recognize, encounter and/or engage with an existentially oriented form of response that they, too, would deem to be relatively existential in orientation. To illustrate the difference between these three expressions, imagine, a friend drops by our residence and we just automatically make them a cup of tea or a cup of coffee – an action we might deem to be not much more than a conventional-like response of the last instance. However, on this occasion we understand they have been travelling all day and no doubt will be very hungry, where this understanding of ours could be perceived to be an intuitive perception or response of the next instance. So, without asking, we make them a substantial sandwich which we might think of as a response of the first instance (to the extent the ‘next’ invitation to respond accordingly is taken up and duly acted upon), and, where we see a spontaneous voicing of gratitude at our having enacted our interaction with them with such due concern and care. But, with the solving of this problem another problem now appears… (5)

2. The Overall Economy of the Economic

The invocation of this concept of a non-economic irruption that escapes a period of mere circulation in the exhibition of a moment of e/valuational formation (i.e., in the expression of a definitive resolution in the non-calculative emission of a trans-intentional judgmental evaluation and its intentional delivery of a one-off, unique cognitively understood form of valuation)… now begs the question 'as to how it will be comprehended, if at all, should it completely escape from all forms of economic comprehension?' A bit like an actor on the stage with their back to us whilst just whispering their lines. For this actor to be heard, they need to turn around and face their audience and merely simulate the whispering of a conversation rather than set out to actually whisper as if to themselves alone. So, metaphorically, an 'audience is needed', a process of reception that can make sense of the seeming uniqueness of such an utterance. Hence the additional invocation of the 'hyper-economic (sub-economy) in which the relatively-radical nature of that utterance, that response of the last instance, can be duly appropriated. I note here 'relatively-radical' and not a 'radically-radical' response of the last instance. (6)

We could recycle, and repurpose, the dictum – 'that it is the economy stupid!' by now arguing that the non-economic irruption from within the economic sub-economy and now expressed through the non-economic subeconomy is, then, immediately, or momentarily, re-appropriated within the hyper-economic sub-economy, and, therein and thereby, find our faith in the world of the economic restored through a trimodal economy of economies. Thence this third, additional conjecture of an 'overall economy of the economic' consisting of these three (trimodally constituted) sub-economies of 'the hyper-economic, economic and non-economic' (with each sub-economy being trimodally constituted in their own right). (7)

Let me diagrammatically represent this scheme of 'the overall economy of the economic':

<u>Overall Economy of the Economic</u>

Non-Economic Sub-Economy

Economic Sub-Economy

Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy (8)

With respect to this diagram above, imagine a dialectically promoted process of resolution is entertained within the economic sub-economy that then provokes the non-economic sub-economy to momentarily irrupt non-economically that is then immediately absorbed and re-appropriated within the embrace of the hyper-economic sub-economy. Therefore, metaphorically, resolution in the economic sub-economy is non-economically expressed and momentarily re-appropriated within in the hyper-economic sub-economy. All quite simple, really, and a solving three problems all at the same time, namely, the

escape from economic circulation in the economic sub-economy, its manifestation as an irruption within the non-economic sub-economy, and its instantaneous re-absorption, or re-appropriation, within the hyper-economic sub-economy, and, where, by such a process, the overall economy of the economic is made whole once again. (9)

But, if the non-economic irruption appears only in the blink of an eye, how would we register the irruption of the non-economic? Through its representative trace or manifested entracement, much like particle trails seen in a cloud chamber where those particles, themselves, are not actually seen, only their imputed ramifications. Moreover, through iteration we can could establish and reinforce this trace, this entracement,[150] to that extent it could persist long enough to rise p and be registered before our intentional awareness… where this iteration of irruptions, in turn, would need to be continually re-appropriated and hence its ongoing reiteration through this process of re(-)iteration. Thus, at last, the complex problematicity of this explanation can be suitably accommodated by the integrated nature of this scheme. (10)

Schematically we could depict this overall process as:

circulation/resolution–iterated irruption–iterated re(-)appropriation = entracement. (11)

Where, by such dialectically constituted means, a virtual process of resolution can be given a relatively less virtual complexion, if not a non-virtual complexion, that can be registered as a response that may or may not elicit a co-associated sense of an existentially oriented responsiveness. (12)

Where this tripartite scheme, to a considerable extent, echoes the tripartite character of my ‘extensive suspension’ (as a relative systematic reading of the transcendental suspension as first systematically explicated in the form of the overall transcendental suspension as modelled on the interrogative economy (and its three economic moments of the rhetorical, metaphorical and the apparitional).[151] Once we understand, first, a need to take into account the role of the automatic invocation of the de-suspension, given the invocation of the suspension (as explicated in the ‘extended suspension’), and, second, the necessary implication of a co-associated causal implications (as then fully encompassed within the explication of the ‘extensive suspension’). Side by side, we could diagrammatically compare these two schemes:

Overall Econ. of the Economic	**Extensive Suspension**
Non-Economic Sub-Economy	Extensive Suspension (Causal Implication)
Economic Sub-Economy	The Overall Transcendental Suspension
Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy	Extended Suspension (De-Suspension) (13)

150 As realized through an ionization of that gaseous medium.

151 As explored at length in Volume II of the Pursuit. Note in this diagram above that I have paralleled the Economic Sub-Economy with The Overall Transcendental Suspension, etc.

3. The Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy

In the previous diagram, I am basically invoking a form of 'hyper-economic complexification' by paralleling the three sub-economies of the extensive suspension with the three sub-economies of the overall economy of the economic. At the same time, this process can be treated as open-ended, E.g., the hyper-economic sub-economy can be seen as paralleling the hermeneutic sub-economy (within the overall economy of the philosophical); the phenomenological sub-economy as paralleling the economic sub-economy; and, the non-economic sub-economy can be seen as paralleling the (non-systematic) existential sub-economy. With these forms of complexificational identification to hand, we can now extend this process of hyper-economic complexification by merely referring to other forms of economic complexification (as tabulated, e.g., in the comprehensive dictionary of complexification as presented in *The Seventh Book*…, and *Book Nine*). (14)

Let me now continue and explore, in closer detail, how I envisage these three sub-economies of the overall economy of the economic might function within this same scheme. (15)

I have already indicated that this incremental process of re(-)appropriation within the hyper-economic sub-economy can only deal with the 'relatively-radical' and not the 'radically-radical'. Let me explain. (16)

Basically, innovations are arrived at through micro-incremental shifts in the construction of the apposite hermeneutically appreciated meta-textual genres of behaviour and given that they are directly involved in the parallel performance of both writing and reading. Therefore, for either the creation and/or reception of a certain innovation the co-associated genre needs to be adjusted accordingly, and in its wake, everything else that would need to be similarly rearranged. Thence the possibility for both the creation and reception of an innovation needs to be 'relatively-radical' and not 'radically-radical' since the latter could be neither hermeneutically recognized, phenomenologically encountered, and/nor (non-systematically/systematically) be existentially engaged (from a relatively pro-relational sense of positional appreciation). To illustrate this understanding let me invoke the innovation of sliced bread. Obviously, we must be referring to the genre of bread-making in a commercial setting. However, rather than just making a loaf of bread we also intend to machine slice that same loaf of bread after that loaf has been made but before it is put out for sale to the public. Quite simply, we might think, that the next step is just the addition of a slicing process. However, in order to sell to the public, such sliced bread then needs the additional innovation of being suitably wrapped. But why stop there? Such wrapping can be labelled; and that labelling can then be deployed as an exercise in branding; and governments can step in to insist that the contents and country of origin, etc., also be duly announced, and so on. In other words, with the simple innovation of the additional increment of a slicing of the bread, for the convenience of the public, at the relative inconvenience of the baker, additional value has been added to that product that the public will no doubt be successfully charged for that will then provide an additional profit to that baker in order to well compensate them for the inconvenience of their needing to buy machines for this process of both slicing and packaging, etc. To a

considerable extent a series of innovations that could be judged to be a win-win for both the baker and their customers. (17)

Now, the point of this illustration is that innovations are usually micro-incremental in dimension, often occur in a sequence, and to fully appreciate the often quite radical impact of such micro-innovations they need to be also sequentially appreciated, and thereby collectively understood, as well as contextually re-evaluated since this specific innovation meant bread-making could become a major commercial enterprise at the expense of small traditional bakers (and that it has taken a couple of generations for traditional bakers to re-establish a lucrative niche once more in this type of market through the marketing of so-called 'artisan breads', etc.). (18)

But, on a deeper level, the philosophical point of this anecdote is to transmit the understanding that innovations re-construct genres of behaviour more on a micro-level of reconstruction, often in a sequence of micro-alterations whose reconstructed instructions inform both the parallel 'writing' and 'reading' of such co-associated patterns of behaviour, and, where these patterns will often involve a series of micro-sequences that also need to be comprehended, and, where these micros-shifts in performance can initiate consequential macro-shifts in behaviour sometimes out of all proportion to the extent of the innovation or innovations enacted in the first place. That, moreover, this dimension of innovation is primarily hermeneutic in orientation given this attention required to comprehend this process of meta-textual re-construction involved in the re-writing/re-reading of such genres of behaviour. That, under these conditions as spelt out, it is now obvious that the radically-radical could not be appropriated as it stands given that that its radical reconstruction of genre performance would invite either an act of non-reading or misreading. On the other hand, if the radically-radical innovation were to be broken down into a readable sequence of minor innovations and that sequence could be appropriately followed then the radically-radical could then be re-appropriated as a series of relatively-radical innovations, and so on. (19)

Therefore, in the light of this metaphorical modelling, the irruption of the non-economic needs to take on board a relatively-radical complexion and not the impossible or difficult to read presentation of the radically-radical. That its re-appropriation would need to be micro-sequentially appreciated, and, therein, correctly re-sequenced in accordance with the general rules as already outlined.[152] (20)

Also implied is an element of the chaotic. The economic can be read through a harmonic lens. Harmonic resolution is viewed as a potentially chaotically oriented process with a 'resolute' sense of re-direction being taken up rather than the mere reiteration of a result more in sympathy with the reiteration of the consonant background. A reiteration, more or less, of the same results in a semblance of a consonant background. On the other hand, the introduction of the radically different is not going to be registered against this psychic background whereas something that is similar, neither the same nor radically different, will be registered as an experience of dissonance that is consequently foregrounded through its relative, non-radical semblance of difference… where its re-

[152] Paragraphs 16-19.

appropriation, thereby, is therein harmonically engendered as a consequence. Thence this linear, harmonic reading of the gestalt interactions between a consonant sense of a reiterated background, a relatively dissonant iteration, and the harmonization of the dynamic relationship between the former through a process of re-iteration that is also co-associated with a sense and semblance of subjectivity reflecting the intentional nature of that harmonic field. (21)

Now, having a fine theory of economic resolution is one thing, but, witnessing no intentional resolution in this non-virtual world at large would be quite something else altogether. However, we do 'see', if nothing else, these choices exercised through these definitive responses of the last instance, etc. So, therefore, we must assume that between economic resolution and the world at large that processes of resolution can be irrupted out into this world beyond the confines of the economic, in what must be this 'non-economic' form of a transformation, now no longer merely confined within the virtual embrace of that which was just economic in this obviously a very primitive form of conceptualization. But, no one should 'throw out the baby with the bathwater', neither literally nor metaphorically. Rather, we should be called to continue to work with that which still seems to work and build upon that core of resilience that which might become even more resilient. This is how the world works in an epistemological sense – not through an accumulation of individual statements but through the formation of a body of statements within a deeper body of statements, and so on. Finding evidential conformation through a broad sense of the pragmatic that is open to the diversity of judgmental-types that collectively constitutes our ongoing appreciation of this world at large, this world to hand, equally this world of tools that will also equally reflect and represent just what type of a world we live within… (22)

Our tools will also reflect the world they are used within through how they are both used and not to be used within their appropriately utilized aspect of this world as lived. So, a spade presents a world that is 'spadable', when, e.g., I dig the garden, but, also, a world that is 'not spadable' when I hit a bedrock that is just rock that cannot be dug up with this simple spade. Still, the world as a whole is more than just the sum of such limited picture-tools. The world as lived is not lived within just one perspective. Nor could that same limited sense of a world be exhausted by that single perspective, indeed, given an infinity of perspectives each of which, in turn, could never be exhausted. That, given this infinity of opportunities, it behooves us to choose those more relevant frames of reference than deliver a greater degree of significant valuation rather than go down, e.g., those bottomless rabbit-holes whose value, being conspiratorially created, can only recreate a conspiratorial sense of containment along with the shallow and bitter enticement of their beaconing entrapment. Hopefully, with enough reflection, and self-reflection, we can inoculate ourselves against such relative impoverishment… given that we have the entire world of experience to appreciate in all its existential richness and enrichment. (23)

As I have argued at length, this 'variety of judgments', from an ordered perspective, takes six and only six types of basic expression, but, from which, the immense perplexity of a diverse world of complexity devolves and can, through quite small, relative-

ly-radical increments, be sensibly appropriated in and through an ongoing enlargement of our body of knowledge as intersubjectively embedded and shred through our genres of involvement, semantic mapping, along with an open pragmatic and existential awareness, that then allows us to proceed through this shared semblance of a world, step by step, admittedly, on a basis of our only needing to know just what currently needs to be known should we be able to avail ourselves of those tools, already formed, that are recognized as 'already there to hand…' (24)

Now, in order to better model this concept of the non-economic, as economically operating with this overall economy of the economic, let me briefly introduce these six orders just alluded to; demonstrate how through processes of preferential suspensions and de-suspensions we arrived at specifically ordered phenomena; and, then, simplify this scheme under the headings of Intra-Mediation, Mediation and Inter-Mediation along with the conjectural supposition that through the latter, as a process of resolution, we might finally understand the role played by such resolution in the formation of intentional ideation and motivational intent. Such intent being those intentions that are conducive to a non-virtual, causal, non-economic transformation in an irruptive expression of such resolutely re-directed intent that allows us, and not otherwise, to make our passage through this overall world-of-life. Where such irruption theoretically breaks the economic conjecture of a trimodal economy, albeit for the briefest fraction of a moment, before being reinstated within the broader economic terms of this overall economy of the economic. Much like the idea in quantum physics where certain rules of engagement can be broken but must be completely repaired, i.e., restored, with the time span of the Planck moment itself. (25)

This harmonic reading of the economic, namely, 'consonance, dissonance and resolution' mirrors a subtle process of epistemological or psychological or intentional-like preferencing being sequentially placed upon, respectively, a background sense of a field or World, a foreground sense of an apparent pointedness of focus or Object, and the resolution of the same experienced through a form of perspectival framing or Ego. From a philosophical perspective I have defined the 'philosophical economy as superimposing on these three economic correlativities the corresponding sub-disciplines of hermeneutics, phenomenology and a non-systematic version of the existential'. Thence, in an accordance with this scheme, our attention directed towards, say. a hermeneutical approach would arise from the subtle preferencing of the moment of World, i.e., when we basically direct attention towards the background nature of the gestalt field in which we are currently operating. Likewise, in their own manner, the other two sub-disciplines. (26)

I refer to this subtle process of directing the balance of our attention towards one of these economic correlativities, basically, as a process of 'intra-mediation' in which directedness is facilitated by enacting a form of suspension that is suitable to establishing this balance of our attention on that co-associated economic correlative. This expression 'balance of our attention' is used to indicate that no correlative, no pair of correlatives, nor an entire economy of correlatives can ever be either absolutistically attained and obtained, i.e., appropriated in itself, through itself, from itself, and so on. Thence this use of the expression 'subtle' because any use of a non-subtle approach, in all probability,

would oversee the effective deconstruction of that same approach given the dialectical and relational nature of its engendering. In economic terms, all three correlatives must be taken into account, in some form or other, lest we economically deconstruct and destroy the ensuing economy through attempting to entertain its impossible representation through such economic mistreatment. (27)

'Orders', I am going to argue 'arise through the subtle preferencing of a qualified form of relative preferencing or relative de-preferencing or one or two of these economic correlatives (as signified by these terms of World, Object, and Ego)'. That when one of these three correlatives is being relatively preferenced, through this balance of our attention, then the other two correlatives, effectively, are being relatively de-preferenced, and v.v. That when one corelative is being preferenced, we have a process of mediation reflecting the type of correlativity being overtly preferenced, through its de-suspended preferencing, as a result of the covert suppression or suspension of its two other correlatives. In contrast, we have a process of 'mediation' when two correlatives are being preferenced simultaneously through the imputed force of a de-suspension of the remaining economic correlative being subjected to a process of suspension. That, here, for theoretical completeness, I would argue that a simultaneous suspension/de-suspension of all three moments would realize a relative process of intermediation along with its apparent revelation of a pragmatic-existential dimension should we be receptive enough to appreciate the distinctive form of this type of occurrence which will be looked at more closely later in this essay. (28)

Now, each correlative is suspended in accordance with its own type of suspension, and, where the mapping of these three types of suspension forms the heuristic device of the overall transcendental suspension. Early on in my evaluation of the inspiring work of Edmund Husserl I soon realized that the concept of the transcendental suspension effectively takes a variety of different forms. 'Transcendental' being reinterpreted as 'trans-intentional' and as falling within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect in our mapping of the 'epistemological hierarchy' or 'psyche' of the person., i.e., on the level of judgment (which being about concepts also had to be trans-conceptual in orientation, etc., although the judgment once delivered would be intentionally delivered in a conceptual format, etc.). Hence my formulaic expression 'e/valuational formation' where the 'value' of the judgment would be delivered in a form of cognitive valuation. Where the e/valuational formation of the 'transcendental', trans-intentional judgment delivers a certain intention or intentional complex in a cognitive form of valuation.[153] (29)

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[153] Generally using the expression 'transcendental' in this 'trans-intentional, trans-conceptual epistemological level as enacted within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect' of this epistemological hierarchy. The six orders deliver six distinctive kinds of valuation, but, technically, refer to value as either second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical value, third trans-cognitively ordered deontological value, and fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical value (where I refer to the 'deontological' as 'those apparent existential-pragmatic/pragmatic-existential imperatives as thematized, refined and defined by the emergent totality of the relational situation in question as situated in its relational setting or relational world without any reference whatsoever to so-called deontological Principles as might be discerned through the exercise of either a covert and/or overt extensive suspension! Please note that this re-purposed definition of the 'deontological' is 'not be confused with tradition notions of deontological principles, etc.'

As a model, the overall transcendental suspension analogues the economic sphere as entailed specifically within the overall economy of the economic and, in more general terms, the hypothetical functions of any economy. Invoking the interrogative economy, the rhetorical moment of World invokes a dis-conjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'. The metaphorical first reply is construed as a conjunctive suspension based on 'like' (as 'both like and not like'). Then, with respect to the so called 'third moment of the apparitional' I invoke a mediation of the former as a balanced suspensions as pertains to a dynamic balance of these moments of World and Object. Then, treating the ensuing complex suspension as an intra-mediational candidate (despite its mediational origination). Putting all three suspensions together then gives us, as an inter-mediational candidate, namely, the overall transcendental suspension. Subjecting this complex suspension to the overlay or undelay of de-suspensional economy gives us the extended suspension, and, subjecting this virtual domain to a non-virtual sphere of influence then converts this more complex sense of a suspension into an 'extensive suspension'. As noted, I have already compared this tripartite structure of 'the overall transcendental suspension, its de-supensional treatment, and its causal implications', under the rubric of the 'extensive suspension'. (30)

Now, through various combinations of de-suspending one or two corelative moments, as a form of subtle preferencing, we automatically de-preference the other parties through their distinctive forms through their single or double suspensions, and, as a result, we have defined the six orders (be that in an intentional Cognitive Aspect or in a tans-intentional Trans-Cognitive Aspect). In earlier essays I have charted this 3 x 2 matrix with its six ordered possibilities. (31)

However, by another route, we can obtain the same result through the use of these concepts of intra-mediation and mediation. (32)

In an act of intra-mediation on the moments of Object, Ego, and World, respectively, on a trans-intentional level of judgment, we get the first order of phenomenological (and semantic) evaluation; the third order of deontological evaluation (as refracted through a pragmatic-existential lens); and, the fifth order of hermeneutical evaluation. Alternatively on a mediation of Object-Ego, Ego-World, and World-Object, respectively, we get the second order of aesthetical evaluation; the fourth order of pragmatical evaluation; and, the sixth order of ontical or factual evaluation. The implicated suspensions being those that solely apply to Object, Ego, and World moments, respectively, a conjunctive suspension; a dynamic mediation conjunctive and dis-conjunctive suspensions; and, a dis-conjunctive suspension. (33)

By such measure of mediation and intermediation I have, in effect, outlined the murky dimensions of the hyper-economic sphere of influence with its pre-occupations on these six types of functions able to deliver these six distinctively ordered forms of e/valuational formation, namely the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic; aesthetical; deontological (as viewed both pragmatically and existentially); pragmatic expediency; hermeneutic potentiality; and ontical factuality. Where in this domain of the hyper-economic, a hermeneutic orientation is more presupposed. (34)

4. The Economic Sub-Economy

In a revisiting the economic sphere of influence, we basically return to Economics 101 (albeit as understood in its philosophical sense as constituted under the economic conjecture of a trimodal economy whose correlatives, as correlativities, can be neither attained, nor obtained, nor appropriated, etc.). (35)

In effect typified by the archetypal economy (based on a gestalt reading of that economy), the interrogative economy, the functions as entailed within the overall tran-scendental suspension, etc. (36)

Let me diagrammatically represent this ordered sphere of the economic:

3^0

E

Conjunctive + Dis-Conjunctive Sus.

2^0 4^0

*

Conjunctive Suspension Dis-Conjunctive Suspension

O **W**

1^0 5^0

6^0

Orders		**Trans-Cognitive**	**Cogntive**
1^0	=	Phenomenological (Semantic)	Phenomenological (Semantic)
2^0	=	Aesthetical	Essential Integration
3^0	=	Deontological (Existential-Pragmatic)	Conceptual
4^0	=	Pragmatical (Expedience, etc.)	Perceptual
5^0	=	Hermeneutical (Potentiality)	Hermeneutical (Potentiality)
6^0	=	Ontical (Factual Determination)	Ontical (Factual Determ.) (37)

5. The Non-Economic Sub-Economy

In examining the non-economic sphere of influence, we are basically exploring the economic process of harmonic resolution. (38)

That, in this regard, the irruption of the non-economic is indicative of a prior process of resolution that has set up the expression of that definitively distinctive type of occurrence. (39)

Although, we can assume a process of resolution behind the expression of a definitive response of the last instance, etc., we cannot assume that that response was either inauthentic, neutral, or authentic; that such a response was either suitably proper, appropriate, or apposite), etc., without some form of a suitably contextualized conformal form of appreciation. (40)

That no form of appreciation is possible without running a suitable conjectural economy. (41)

Thence the necessity for well-formed propositions, well-informed statements, and well-expressed propositional-statement as conjectures. (42)

Where we might presuppose a process of hyper-economic and economic alignment in terms of an immanent resolution could set the stage for the definitive irruption of a non-economic form of an appreciated expression. (43)

Indeed, where an intuitive form of overall economic intermediation might allow us to travel from relative non-existential cogency to existential cogency? (44)

By such means, moving the non-critical to the critical, and, thence, to the relatively radical. (45)

Progressively rendering the definitive response of the last instance towards the existential ‘call’ of the definitive response of the next instance. (46)

Where through the assent of existential permission we then invite the performance of the definitive response of the first instance… given this unique moment of existential re-directedness. (47)

Opening ourselves up to initiating, from a pro-relational perspective, with a simulated sense and semblance of a trans-relational subjectivity, the ensuing mutual expedition involved in the fostering of the richness and enrichment of our relationships. (48)

By such means, through such existentially oriented intervention, in a refined attunement with our relationships, it is hoped that this non-economical dimension allows us to act on the behalf of our relationship/s in a most skilful and productive manner despite the limitations of our natural finiteness. (49)

6. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

To the best of our abilities, how might we better understand and appreciate the theoretical, practical, and critical-radical ramifications of this non-economic dimension in the delivery of both non-existentially oriented valuation and existentially oriented valuation?[154] (50)

As already noted, non-existential valuation is necessary for a process of existentialization. Because relative existentialization is realized through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential. Moreover, we could surmise that the non-existential exists on a spectrum between the relatively inauthentic to the neutral to, perhaps, the relatively authentic at least in an embryonic sense. On the other hand, given the distinctive nature of the difference between responses of the last and first instances we would need to also assume some degree of a discontinuity between non-existential valuation in general and the re-directed presentation that is apparently existential *per se*. I.e., in a relatively existential sense of orientation, in a process possessing the characteristic of an 'existential turn'… (51)

To mix two sayings together it could be argued that 'we do not live by cake alone'. A life led pursing the purely existential is as bankrupt an existence as one that only pursues an inauthenticity in our relationships or merely just the non-existential anywhere on that spectrum as just outlined. (52)

In a contrast, if we were to meet a truly hungry person, regardless of who they are, and we know this state of affairs to be in all probability true, or even if we were to just suspected that that was the case, then, to the best of our abilities and resources, we should feel impelled to do something about that state of affairs. I.e., act on the behalf of that person in order to oversee, effectively, that they become suitably fed. Here there are no half-measures. Either we are concerned or we are not concerned… just as much as a pregnant animal or person is either pregnant or not pregnant, but, never half-pregnant as such a 'possibility' could never actually be even contemplated. Welcome to the seemingly black and white world of the relatively existential. Where, despite the dialectical nature of engagement the end product of such engagement takes on a relatively non-dialectical-like complexion and tenor. Just as, e.g., if we wanted to walk for some time upon a narrow beach, we either go 'up' that beach or 'down' that beach… (53)

On the other hand, once a decisive existential decision is made as to 'if a certain decision is to be made, should be made', then we are once more returned to the lands of the dialectical although it is to be hoped, again, that an apposite form of relational awareness of an infinitude of possible responses will see us, again, seek to triage this landscape of opportunities through both an existential and pragmatic lens. Still, to the hunger of a hungry person, whether they are given a well-made sandwich or a nutritious bowl of soup

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154 A 'better' appreciation, as ever a work in progress, on the understanding that we operate within this all-person's-land (no-man's-land) between the impossibility of the absolutistically indubitable and the equally impossible relativistically non-indubitable.

what they eat under those circumstances is neither here nor there as long as it is appropriate for them to eat that type of food under those circumstances.[155] (54)

The third trans-cognitively ordered order of the deontological is considerably different from the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the pragmatical, and v.v. When applied to moral or ethical considerations they are a bit like chalk and cheese, or, perhaps, a bit more like apples and oranges. At least the latter are fruits, whose desired sweetness could be seen as something in common, and where both fruits could be easily combined in the preparation of some form of a dessert. Under the heading of the Pragmatical a number of epithets could be evoked, say, 'expedience, effectiveness, efficiency, economical-ness (or parsimony), efficaciousness, expeditiousness', and so on. On the other hand, under the heading of the Deontological what variety, if at all, might be found? Here as previously intimated, the 'deontological' is not to be seen as some set of traditional principles, perhaps fabricated in some account of a so-called set of First Principles, etc. Rather, I am more referring to a compactual realm, in distinction to a contractual realm, where, in the former, power relations are basically horizontal or flat, and, in the latter, power relations are never equal. Under a Compactual set of headings we could note promises, honouring of reasonable obligations, the treatment of others as equals, doing those forms of duty that are appositely expected of us, and so on. From a more traditional deontology it does preserve the notion of imperatives, but, imperatives whose force is relationally dependent and originating from the emergent representations of the relationship being simulated through such representational characterizations. Being pro-relational, and having a representative appreciation of the relationship itself, albeit in its perceived relational situatedness, we must understand such an attitude need have nothing to do with traditional notions of the deontological, such as, e.g., ethical principles, laws, merely following traditional or conventional forms of duty, idolization of a leader, and anything else that is even remotely related to any ideological form of overcommitment whatsoever, etc. (55)

As judgment issues from a 'transcendental', trans-intentional perspective through the auspices of an extensive suspension then this relational appreciation of the relationship in its relational situatedness means we are moving further away from both the pre-relational (worlds of the mythical and the irrational) and the relational domain (of all relational parties[156] and their expectations of just conventional patterns of behaviour) to the emergent and emerging world of the existential in which our relationships are metaphorically 'seen' to have a metaphorical 'life of their own'.[157] A sense of the emergent that is highly dependent upon the nature of its origination without being impossibly reduced merely to the same or in a form that is totally independent from its own evolving process

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155 A starving person, as paradoxical as this may seem, should not be given, at first, too large a meal to eat.

156 Where by 'parties' is meant either or both relational participants and/or relational parts. I.e., the relational furniture of an intersubjective and inter-objective relational space as categorized under Subjective and Objective headings.

157 To a certain extent reflecting the 'facticity' of those relationships, i.e., to what extent the relationship apparently emerges beyond its mere material instantiation; i.e., to that extent it cannot be reduced to that material embodiment (where embodiment, to various degrees, has the dual face of being both material and trans-material in line with the non-entropic degree of its epistemological organization.

of emergence. That granted, we can impute an existential dimension possessing a dialectical relationship with the relative non-existential. Similarly, we could suppose a pragmatical sphere of influence where the exercise of our tools in a non-existential orientation is not absolutistically different from an existential orientation given the necessity for a similar degree of interdependent cooperation where the fruits of our operation in the world can be neither bound up in just our tools nor completely indifferent to the manner of their utilization. We have to hand what we have to hand, be it a stolen apple or an apple given to a very hungry person rather than, in not seeing this hungry person, and in overlooking them, we merely set out to eat that apple ourselves. (56)

However, the point I wish to arrive at is an understanding that from an existential awareness of the relational situation to hand that awareness of a 'transcendental' trans-intentional perspective of judgment should have an essential, holistic like appreciation of its own relational situatedness and its own functional responsiveness to the extent that we cannot make nor need to make a clear separation between the relatively existential and the relatively pragmatic, and, where this inseparable conjunction of perspectives is more likely to find for us those critical and radical innovations needed to further enrich the ongoing enrichment of our relationships through further engaging all suitable process of an ongoing re(-)enrichment.[158] (57)

Hence the implicit wealth of ideation embedded in these notions of intermediation, mediation, and intra-mediation, etc. (58)

Now, as these irruptions of non-economic e/valuational formation are theoretically indicative of points of resolution, in varying degrees of a mutual alignment within the overall economy of the economic, we might further surmise that these responses of the last instance, etc., directly or indirectly tell us something more profound about the very nature of our relationships, their existential re(-)directedness, the mutable strengths and vulnerabilities of our relationships… perhaps as even points of leverage or catalytic promise where with less effort our existential interventions could become even more profitable in an existential sense, i.e., in furthering the richness and ongoing enrichment of those relationships through ongoing re(-)enrichment in a manner on par with our theoretical understanding of alignment as realized through ongoing re(-)alignment. I.e., in a manner that co-opts the reiterated rectification of hermeneutical genres of behaviour; pursues informative patterns of deconstruction and reconstruction through the re-de-mis-alignment of productive patterns of error correction; and, is open to an existential insightfulness through re-iterative process of re(-)normalization where we continually engage a skilful attunement to radical forms of innovation in the formation of an existential-pragmatism and a pragmatic-existentialism where, step by step, through insurance and assurance, through processes of conformation, we deftly adjust the manner of our interventions in this world neither acting on the behalf of our own senses of self nor on the behalf of other relational participants, but, on the behalf only of those primary relationships themselves… (59)

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158 Implied, and later explicated, where 're(-)enrichment' is to be treated on a par with (alignment through) 're(-)alignment'. Refer to paragraph 59.

But, to what end? That through such refined processes of resolution we might be able to leave this world a better place than we found it. However, through the mutual co-option of others, admittedly through trial and error, we might collectively be able to leave this world an even better place given our aspirations, both social and personal, can only be realized, at the end of the day, through processes of arbitration be that with(-)others in a passive sense, actively before(-)others and where through(-)others, through relationally oriented engagement, do we find augmented and enhanced forms of freedom to be in this world-of-life, this life-world with an existential richness that will ever surprise us… (60)

Now, at the start of this essay, I noted that this expression of mine, the 'non-economic', although context-dependent, could have its negative sense confused with its positive sense, or v.v. However, rather than seeing this as a technical defect or liability let me profit from this potential confusion by proposing a new philosophical tool, namely, a 'non-economical fork'. Quite simply, in our philosophical or disciplinary work let us rule a line through all constructions, either ours or those of others, that are demonstrably non-economic in complexion or tenor, i.e., impossible to recognize, encounter, or engage be that in either virtual or non-virtual forms of positioning. Where, through misguided forms disciplinary practice, we either advertently and/or inadvertently invoke ideologically over-committed forms of either a unimodal, bimodal, absolutist or relativist complexion or tenor as these mistaken souls walk forlorn, following in the historical footprints of a long line of such miscreants who have actually allowed themselves to think that they could actually be practising 'realists', or 'idealists', 'dualists', or other extremists of a similar ilk and who have persuaded themselves to think in such a 'strong' and fruitless fashion, when, only in 'weak(er)', non-over-committed forms of thinking can they possible do a small fraction of what they might claim they can do and have yet to be persuaded to leave a less fruitless legacy. (61)

On a more positive note, we can also invoke the other sense of the non-economic that is indicative of an irruption of e/valuational formation, from the relatively non-existential to the relative existential in both complexion and tenor.[159] Where in instances of the last moment we might existentially discern definitive responses of the next instance which, if duly taken up, would become definitive existential responses of the first instance. Where through such a 'pro-relational turn' we take on board a relational perspective on our relationships from the perspective of our relationships themselves, tune into their existential surpluses and, therein, harness an emergent and emerging power from within the representation of our relationships in and through a direct simulation of their relational situatedness in such a manner that is capable of enacting for us the uptake of more beneficial trajectories to instantiate on the very behalf of our relationships. That these patterns of relatively augmented and enhanced insightfulness are also indictive of these co-associated points of resolution that, in their very own way, may reveal to us the very strengths and weaknesses of our relationships, and, consequently and subsequently, intimate how we might be able to enter into a more therapeutic attitude as to how we might better position ourselves within this overall sphere of the relational? (62)

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159 I.e., in both character (complexion) and in intent (tenor).

Tentatively, it is my argument that, from the perspective of judgment *per se*, both the existential and pragmatic coincide. That, in this paradoxical cultivation of the non-economic, we can practically open ourselves up to new forms of innovation, new and 'final' vocabularies, definitive histories, novel forms of consensus, social solidarity, and more resonant and resolute forms of 'resolution'. Thence the potential fruitfulness of this non-economical fork should we avail ourselves of its ability both to rule out the impossible and to rule in the 'impossible'..?[160] (63)

But, as to whether the existential 'lie of the land' takes this form or some other form is a judgment I would much prefer to leave to others more qualified than myself to both make and appreciate as to the existence or non-existence of such subtle distinctions… suffice to say to that, thankfully, we do not always merely go around in endless circles and, from time to time, can break free to enjoy a sense of freedom in the perception of a wider range of possibilities..!! (64)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 4.5.24.

[160] Given that the relative-radical nature of innovation moves us towards a territory once thought impossible or even impossible to have thought about, and so on,

**XIK. On Exercising a Non-Ideological, Conjectural Reading
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How Can We and How Should We Read the Current 'War' in Gaza?
Notes for an Open Forum**

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

**How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…**

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIK. On Exercising a Non-Ideological, Conjectural Reading Of Philosophically Complex and Controversial Situations? How Can We and How Should we Read the Current 'War' in Gaza? Notes for an Open Forum*[161]

Traipsing in the shadow of angels is not recommended as a career...[162]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

The horrendous conflict in Gaza calls out, indeed, cries out for conjectural clarification! Perhaps that one observation is the one and only propositional-statement that all thoughtful and all well-meaning people might actually agree on? So, muddied have the metaphorical 'waters' of this debate become, both outside and inside this arena, that one must wonder if it is at all possible to outline an objective-like conjectural reading of this situation that might then allow us to thematize a set of working, workable responses on the behalf of the concerned citizens of this working-world, that are both duly responsive and responsible? With a thicket of claims and counter-claims of antisemitism, islamophobia; pro-Palestinian, anti-Palestinian, pro-Israeli, anti-Israeli 'accusations', and so on, one must wonder if the so-called hypothetical witness of the 'reasonable person' could successfully insert themselves into this 'deadly' debate and steer a middle course that accurately outlines and weighs the continuing horrors of this dreadful conflict? Furthermore, find measures that a majority of governments around the world should insist upon, to both cease and resolve this disastrous conflict whose ramifications will travel well beyond the borders of these primary protagonists..![163] (0)

Against this backdrop, in this open forum, we have here an urgent philosophical workshop for doing 'real' disciplined work in the world by directly addressing this issue and the indirect issues that will undoubtedly follow on in the wake of its conjectural articulation. So, what problematic areas of concern should we contemplate? Let me tabulate some of the philosophical issues that, I suspect, will more than likely come to our attention, be that either overtly and advertently, or, covertly and inadvertently:

1. Can we articulate an objective-like assembly of relevant facts and from such information then articulate reasonable conjectures that representatively and fairly describe the overall situation to date?
2. That from such conjectural descriptions can we then further conjecture a raft of reasonable responses in the form of suitable prescriptions and (existential) proscriptions?
3. Then, from the conjectural articulation of such responses, can we then proceed to articulate and respond to a set of negative and positive ramifications, in the form of future conjectured trajectories, that would seem to have a high probabilistic chance of being duly observed if we believed such expectations might well be inevitably realized..? (1)

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161 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

162 A number of academic in the US, e.g., have been considerably sanctioned, rightly or wrongly, for exercising their so-called First Amendment Rights so seemingly and successfully undermined by those institutions that, ostensively, also argue that they support such 'freedoms of speech' (except, of course, when political pressures are brought to bear in a manner that does not appear to be even-handed?)?

163 It's conjectured that this conflict will influence the 2024 US Presidential Election to the extent that ambiguous state policies of the Biden administration, e.g., will discourage younger Democrats to vote?

That, with these three considerations in mind, namely, exercising the possibility of a 'neutrally' articulated conjectural representation through **descriptions**; then correctly entertaining both conjectural (non-existentially oriented) **prescriptions** and (existentially oriented) **proscriptions**; and, last, our perceiving the need to responsibly respond, proactively, to such ensuing conjectural **expectations**, let me briefly explore these three contentious areas of research (under their four headings as noted in bold) before adopting and adapting such ideas in order to effectively map the conjectural contours of this 'historical' conflict in terms of its past, present, and probable future if there were to be either no resolution of this form of contestation or in the advent of some viable form of resolution. Along the way let us also note all relevant observations and comments that we might find pertinent to a better appreciation of the horrendous nature of this form of asymmetrically conducted warfare. Where, hopefully, this philosophically oriented form of scrutiny will attempt, first, to not be uncritical, second, exercise some reasonable sense and semblance of the critical, and, third, interject, when and where necessary, what might turn out to be quite radical in our voicing a re(-)expression of a 'final formulation' of this same debate…[164] (2)

As we can perceive, the expression of my motivation behind this open forum is quite complex, but, in more practical terms, it can be more simply rendered along the following lines. If we understand that 'certain things about certain situations' are not 'right', are found to be 'deeply troubling', just what can we do about it, not just as a mere individual and bystander, but, through aligning our behaviour with organized forms of protest with other similar thinking and feeling individuals also asking 'just what can be done, just what should be done?'! As the proverbial motto so presciently highlights, '**don't get angry, get organized!**' That, indeed, if we truly feel we need to protest just how should we go about that type of a process? (3)

In this open forum, this is the central issue that needs to be addressed. In any problematic situation, be that either personal and/or social in complexion, by what steps should we consider as those that might need to be undertaken, both individually and collectively, in order to move towards the enabling of some form of resolution of that which is felt to be both disturbing and demanding of some form of a resolution, any form of resolution, regardless of whether that problem is either local or global? Obviously, not merely protesting for the sake of protesting, i.e., finding some enjoyment in experiencing a relatively superficial semblance of social solidarity, but, in a seeking of those preconditions and conditions more conducive to the accelerated evolution of an apposite form of resolution of that which is deemed to be so problematic. (4)

If I were to clearly read this situation, say, through the clarification of a conjectural philosophy, as a concerned citizen, and denizen of this world, we could well ask 'what could I do, what should I do, and, more importantly, what would I do, however insignificant my contribution that might be made in my engagement with my directly

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[164] A so-called 'final resolution' is more than a passing reference to Richard Rorty's pragmatic articulated of ironically named 'final vocabularies' to be formed in a continual quest for consensus building and the creation, preservation, and conservation of a much needed social solidarity preferably exercised within a democratic domain.

addressing this controversial issue?' Because, all too often, the metaphorical 'waters' of a controversy are usually so muddied, indeed, rendered more controversial through misinformation, misinterpretation, disinformation and mal-information, etc., given that these events become so mistreated and overlaid with a litany of accusations and counter-accusations from over-committed, ideologically driven representatives of all parties, it follows that the form and effectiveness of such ensuing social protests has been considerably weakened and diluted accordingly. But, given some conjectural clarification, how might this be remedied, and, therein and thereby, where ensuing responses could be delivered in both a responsible and effective form? Or, even more simply, the untrammeled right to demonstrate our protestations in public at the inequitable treatment of others by others in a democracy should be a political given without our needing to invoke those distractions that seek to identify another protesting person's political persuasion, educational status and vocation, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and so on? (5)

In formulating a first, brief conjectural snapshot of this controversial war between the government of Israel and the Palestinian people of Gaza, as enacted through this military intervention, I proffer the listing of a short set of relatively uncontested facts to date:[165]

1. On 7 October 2024 up to 3000 Hamas fighters invaded Israel through the security wall that completely surrounds the enclave of Gaza.
2. Israeli dead numbered about 1200 and 133 hostages remain in captivity. About 34 have died (under a variety of circumstances). About 112 have so far been released in a prisoner swap, 4 released unilaterally, and 3 rescued. The estimated number of Hamas fighters killed in this current conflict being cited as about 9000 (in an army estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000). The number of Israeli soldiers killed being about 606 with approximately 3,310 soldiers being injured.
3. The Israeli military response has seen 34,500 civilian deaths along with 77,600 people injured.
4. About 97 journalists and media workers have been confirmed as killed. This tally includes 9 Palestinian, 2 Israeli and 3 Lebanese. 16 journalists have been reported as injured and 4 journalists are reported as missing.
5. Currently 70% of Gazan infrastructure, including 70,000 plus home units being destroyed and about 290,000 housing units being damaged, primarily through bombing by the Israeli government, still a daily occurrence. Seven months later this has pushed about 85% of the enclave's population, about 1.7 million people, into internal displacement amid a crippling blockade of food, clean water, and medicine according to the UN. About 500,000 have no home to return to.
6. Israel has re-occupied, currently, about 50% of the enclave of Gaza.
7. Between 500-600 trucks are needed daily to bring in food, etc., for the population in Gaza. On some occasions that has been reduced to about 50. Currently, only about a quarter of the food distribution, etc., is being allowed to enter. In March that was about 150 trucks per day.
8. Electricity has been disrupted for a number of reasons, also disrupting the circulation of clean water, etc. (6)

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[165] Precise numbers are always difficult to ascertain, but, I believe the following 'facts' at least certainly indicate the apparent accuracy of the relatively comparative quanta of such data as here tabulated.

1. Conjectural Descriptions

Can we present a relevant, viable, representatively fair assessment of any controversial situation? Or any situation for that matter? As an optimist we would answer, "Yes, that is possible." Moreover, through the imposition of relevant questions, apposite suspensions, suitable forms of conjectural appreciation a degree of conjectural balance should be both established and conformally further re(-)established. (7)

First arguing that neither an analysis nor a synthesis is comprehensive enough in the light of the demands presented by such controversial research. Hence this need for both conjectures and the suitable appreciation of the entailed conjectural economies in question. (8)

Recognizing the crucial role of conjectures. That conjectures are 'the engine room of the philosophical discipline', and, indeed, all other disciplines! Although, more importantly, it is in our ability to 'suitably appreciate such conjectures' that marks out our ability to articulate a 'cogent philosophy (or discipline)'. (9)

That in formulating a comprehensive, relevant, viable, and representatively fair conjectural mapping of a controversial situation we need to suitably account for 'all essentially relevant materials'. Given that what is relatively defined as 'essential' is 'that here there is the relative presence versus the relative absence of a certain input of information that that relative presence or absence then would distinctly alter the ensuing thematization, and overall cogency, i.e., conformation, of our ensuing interpretation'.[166] Thence our need to be duly attentive in this regard. Testing what is relevant by noting if its relative presence or absence makes a distinctive difference to our 'final' positioning in our pursuit of that specific research program. (10)

In a thematization of such relevant details, discerning their conjectural representation, and ascertaining the 'final' impact of their assessment let me entertain the following digressions that, hopefully, will cast some light on this process of ascertainment. (11)

Here I would like to introduce two brief discussions on, first, the conceptual approach that perceives an appreciation of our being in the world arises through a process of de-distortion (of what we apparently know, more or less, on the basis of our only needing to know what needs to be known), and, second, where I would like to introduce the philosophical tool of the 'non-economical fork' using the ambiguity of this technical term

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166 'Conformation' being the ability to reiteratively reinforce a conjectural reading through co-associated forms of overlapping alignments through processes of re(-)alignment (as explored elsewhere). In an ongoing economy of re(-)conformation we can start with a confirmation or verification of a process of confirmation or verification, etc. By 'etc.' is meant further reinforcing of semantic mapping through 'insurance and assurance', etc., as outlined elsewhere. Or, further, the accumulation of 'conjectural evidence' by means of hermeneutical rectification, phenomenal-phenomenological deconstruction-reconstruction, and existential re(-)normalization (wherein we further establish the current viability of what we already find we need to know (on the basis of what we currently need to know only) through processes of iterative re-assessment as per 'insurance and assurance', and so on').

of the ‘non-economic’ as both a negative and a positive tool in our philosophical (and disciplinary) researches. (12)

In a previous essay, I argued that we needed, metaphorically, ‘to listen to a hot cup of coffee’[167] as a rejoinder to the fraternity of ideologues besotted by the so-called ‘appearance-reality distinction’.[168] Where a thematization of our situatedness in this world at large is primarily conducted through an ‘ongoing process of de-distortion’ and this ‘position’ directly counters the ideological nonsense perpetuated through the so-called ‘appearance-reality’ distinction’. Rather than encountering a so-called ‘world of Reality’ forever distorted by appearances what we really find is a world ever able to be de-distorted through our critical engagement with the same. In my making for someone a hot cup of coffee I might feel it necessary to inform them that it is very hot. But, then, they may well see that for themselves in noting the steam arising from the cup. If a pottery cup, they might tentatively touch it with one of their fingers to feel how hot the cup is. Or, with the tip of their tongue, a few minutes later, they might gingerly test how less hot that coffee must now have cooled. Taking a first hesitant sip to see if that cup of coffee can now be drunk. Finding through this coherent raft of manoeuvres a more accurate assessment of how hot that coffee is and to what extent it should not be drunk or can now be drunk. Rather than a world of reality forever concealed from us, instead, we are exposed to a world that ever reveals itself to us on an ‘as per needed basis’. Rather than being forever hidden, instead, the world seemingly reveals itself without too much effort in a form of an alignment, through ongoing re(-)alignment, realized through a series of overlapping interpretations that give us, at the end of the day, little room to be fooled by so-called ‘mere appearances’. That, on some occasions, when we find ourselves to be mistaken, this is more the exception to the rule and merely highlights this experiential fact that the world is there for us to more clearly perceive, and then apperceive, i.e., appreciate through re-entertaining its iterative re(-)presentation. I.e., e.g., through the ongoing reiteration, and ‘rectification’, of applying the meta-textual, genre-expectations that a reasonable series of similar approaches should directly clarify and re(-)validate how that apparent situatedness of this situation continues to be found, for the most part, is and remains still currently to hand. Indeed, reinforcing all of this by invoking an alignment between past patterns of recall, present moments of anticipation, and future moments of expectations (no doubt duly cast in terms of our past and present recollections and finding or not finding a definitive test in the arrival of moments of presently presented anticipations). Applied to a conjectural philosophy, we expect matters to be no different. That, in effect, our conjectures, acting as sets of expectations, etc., can be ever refined to that extent required, on the reasonable basis of current needs, should the subject matter of our enquiries, be that either in a form that can be so approached in experiential terms or, at the very least, where we can devise instruments of measurement to continue to assist us in the furthering of such endeavours. (13)

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167 *Pursuit*, III.XIG.2-8.

168 Where we might better refer to this difference perhaps more as a ‘Reality/appearance distinction’. As a retort that applies more to the idealist or rationalist who mentally constructs that ‘cup of coffee’ in the subjectivity of their own mental space. But, then, it can also be seen to apply to the realist or empiricist in so far as they must co-opt the ongoing revision of their interpretations of the world at large when mistaken, etc. That the world is not so much just simply ‘seen’ as that which has to be engaged in ‘an ongoing process of being re-seen’.

This second digression, ‘the economical fork’, utilizes the ambiguity of this technical expression of mine of the ‘non-economical’ by differentially using its negative and positive senses. In its negative sense, in our inability to operate in the circulation of an economy that is impossible to experience in either a non-virtual domain let alone be merely simulated in virtual terms of reference we can quite easily dismiss as impossible to contemplate given its falling under the impossible categories of either a unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism or relativism, including along the way all ideological overcommitted forms of realism, idealism, dualism, logical positivism, etc., as falling under the former headings. On the other hand, taking ‘non-economic’ in a positive sense, in an allusion to the work of the French philosopher François Laurelle, we have the crystallized expression of that which is resolved or continuing to be resolved and where it finds itself being expressed non-economically within the overall economy of the economic through an irruption of e/valuational formation, hopefully, in a form that is found to be engineered in a relatively beneficial manner whose disposition has positive ramifications for the relational parties concerned. The first sense, as a negative, rules a line through such wayward artifacts of our misplaced thinking, and, second, in a positive light indicates the satisfactory resolution that allows for this emission of that which has some form of judgmental evaluation and subsequent valuation, hopefully with a positive complexion and disposition. Applied in a conjectural economy, we hope that such non-economic irruptions of resolution will mark themselves out accordingly and be duly noted by the disciplinarian in question. (14)

This non-economical fork ruling out, first, what is correctly impossible to entertain and should be treated as nonsense, and, second, ruling in that which appears to be proffering forms of valuation arrived at through relatively definitive processes of economic resolution. (15)

Applied to a conjectural mapping of this current Israel-Gaza Conflict we would hope, through the application of this fork, to find ourselves in a position where we can dismiss that which is conjectural nonsense, and, then, focus in on what appears to proffer forms of resolution in our current research program, namely, in this instance, the ongoing clarification of this re(-)presented conflict (as currently mapped out in and through a network of conjectural propositional-statements some of which will be conformally valid in relative terms of reference and where other conjectural proposition-statements will need to fall either by the wayside or find forms of acceptable emendation.[169] (16)

As a global phenomenon, the reception of this conflict has been presented, represented, and re-presented as a simulated vortex of accusations and counter-accusations where the stark clarity of its potential illegality and inhumanity has been muddied by various parties accusing all other others parties with unhelpful, and not necessarily accurate, epithets of ‘antisemitism’, ‘islamophobia’, ‘anti-Israeli’, ‘anti-Palestinian’, ‘pro-Israeli’,

[169] Conjectures being expressed through ‘propositional-statements’, in distinction to analytical ‘propositions’ and synthetical ‘statements’, and, where we progressively realize apparent ‘statements of fact’ (in the sixth cognitive/trans-cognitive orders) but, effectively, treat the same as ‘provisional’ from reiterated processes of ongoing suspension, continual conformation, etc.

pro-Palestinian', and so on.[170] No doubt further confusing the parameters of this type of debate by deeming the other parties to be unpatriotic, misguided, extremists, 'agents of chaos', (, e.g., on university campuses, etc.), as 'breakers of state or federal law/s', as 'defiant of university regulations', as 'not complying with council bylaws', as 'conducting illegal marches and other forms of protest', and so forth. Obviously, to bring some conjectural clarity to this onslaught of verbal name-calling, rightly or wrongly ascribed, we need to proffer more in the form of descriptions that appear to be relevant, viable, conforming to the primary phenomenon to hand, namely, i.e., valid inputs that appear to more accurately represent (through an economy of re(-)presentation) the nature and horrors of this horrendous conflict taking place between the peoples of Israel and the peoples of Gaza (and by extension the peoples of the West Bank, Lebanon, the Middle East, along with a rippling overflow into this lived-world at large…[171]). (17)

In the light of the above, this additional phenomenon of a 'muddling of controversial issues' by over-invested parties just how should we go about this process of a conjectural mapping and conjectural appreciation of the re(-)presentation of this Israel-Gaza Conflict? In other words, how can such conjectural mapping be enacted in terms of seemingly coherent and non-contradictory set/s of 'objective' descriptions without the distortion of connotationally oriented influences emanating from ideological influences? (18)

In any dialogical interaction demonstrating some degree of the prominent parties actually complying with the hermeneutic conventions of that type of interaction, it could be argued that they can do so, despite the presence of some form of an overt debate or contestment, actually implies that non-contested, intersubjective grounds must already exist for these parties to conduct such difference of opinion and positioning. It stands to reason, therefore, that upon the necessary pre-existing basis of this island or these islands of non-contestment an 'objective' mapping of this conjectural territory can proceed. 'Objective' in the sense that we have, first, an area of non-contested agreements, and, second, through a process of de-distortion, we can build upon and enlarge this territory of relative non-contestment, and, third, hopefully, but not necessarily, seek forms of extended agreements on an acceptance of such additional inputs. That, inevitably, such conjectural mappings can and will be found to be further enlarged, upon such relative objectivity, should the right attention and care be extended to this process of conjectural extension, i.e., e.g., through forms of evidential conformation, suspensions, the application of appropriate questions, and so on. Or, more simply, this optimistically driven formation of consensus building and the 'return', and re-establishment, of an apposite sense of social solidarity reflecting the recognition and enlargement of those points of resolution that reveal definitively themselves through the positivity of co-associated non-economic phenomena, i.e., these ostensive moments of resolution. (19)

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[170] The lines of demarcation between these epithets being further undercut, e.g., by Jewish people identifying with the Palestinian cause; where various parties hijack certain positions for the furtherance of their own political objectives, etc.

[171] We now live in a world where local conflicts have global ramifications. E.g., we see relatives of the people in Gaza or Israel being interviewed on television in Australia; we see prominent politicians in the US, e.g., feeling the need to adopt positions in this conflict; where the news cycles over-focuses on certain conflicts at the expense of reporting other conflicts, and so on.

2. Conjectural Prescriptions and Proscriptions

That granted, if only hypothetically, these ‘points of resolution’ can be identified and subjected to further processes of conformation arising from the inter-locking and overlapping iteration of processes of alignment found to be further reinforced through the conformation of re(-)alignment, and so on and so forth. (20)

But the apparent philosophical problem remains, just how should we migrate from conjecturally depicted ‘descriptions’ to a discernment of either conjecturally oriented non-existential ‘prescriptions’ and/or conjecturally oriented existential ‘proscriptions’? Non-existential concerns being with matters of value in terms more of the expedient nature of the pragmatical rather than pro-relational concerns pertaining more to the lived-qualities of that relationship itself and in that regard more concerned with existential parameters of the (third trans-cognitive order of the) deontological, (the second trans-cognitive order of the) aesthetical without completely absenting (fourth trans-cognitive orders of) pragmatical-like features of the efficient, the economical, the efficacious, etc. Still, just how do entertain this type of a transformational-transition? Already, in philosophical terms of reference we have the prohibition of travelling from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ as framed by (the philosophical hegemony of) the naturalistic fallacy. (21)

However, in my re-visiting the analytical-synthetical distinction, conjectures, through an economic suspension of the former, is an emergent composite of both necessity and contingency. Hence my recognition of this through treating conjectures with the use of the appellation of ‘propositional-statements’. I.e., as an emergent composite, in effect, with the status as an apparent ‘proposition-and-statement’, i.e., ‘propositional-statement’. Furthermore, in my treating synthetic statements as conforming more to meta-textual hermeneutic considerations of genre ‘prescriptions’, and, analytical propositions as conforming more to the reiterated presentation of textual existential ‘proscriptions’ then it would appear, albeit in the confines of this definitional context, that conjectures have already this dual countenance of being somewhat ‘descriptive’ and somewhat ‘prescriptive’ manifesting as a process of existentially oriented ‘proscriptions’ with a certain degree of re-presenting, somewhat, as a non-textual simulation. Therefore, unless demonstrated as specifically fallacious in a specific situation, and not factually in conformity with reasonable intersubjective assessments of that situation, then, we can go ahead and treat conjectures as already possessing a proscriptive orientation, or, at least, as if inherently proscriptive in orientation. Whereby, through such a strategy, we can see that this distinction of a descriptive ‘is’ and prescriptive ought ‘is’ being superseded by this economic element of the conjectural, where as an economic correlative, cannot be definitively locked into just a proscriptive characterization, nor, for that matter, as if completely locked out of such a characterization. That this can be demonstrated is possibly illustrated in the following anecdote or philosophical thought experiment. (22)

Are we allowed to move from conjectural descriptions to either conjectural prescriptions and/or conjectural proscriptions? In the following let me explore where the boundaries of the ‘is-ought problem’ cease to be problematic and can be circumvented, superseded, etc? Although, in breaking a prohibitive ‘ought’ this is facilitated... (23)

Let me outline the following thought experiment concerning the ‘mythical’ serial killer ‘Friday Fred’ or ’Friday Frederika’: Recently, in a certain city, on every Friday night a woman gets murdered. The serial killer has been nicknamed ‘Friday Fred’ or ‘Friday Frederika’ as the assigned or self-assigned gender of the killer or killers is currently unknown. Are we allowed to conjecture that another woman will be murdered this Friday night? And are we allowed, from the obvious description of this person or persons as a killer or killers, to claim that they ought to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law? In what manner are we allowed to migrate from ‘descriptions’ to ‘non-existentially oriented prescriptions’ and ‘existentially oriented proscriptions’?? (24)

Parallels in conjectural depictions. To what extent are we allowed to migrate from ‘descriptions’ to ‘prescriptions/proscriptions’ (given that that is what we will obviously do?)? Philosophically, even though, recently, one woman has been murdered, in a certain manner every Friday, say, for six weeks in a row this does not mean that a seventh killing ought to happen on the next Friday night. On the other hand, in this town, if a were a woman, or just a concerned citizen, if I had to go out that night I would most certainly want to travel in the middle of the company of some burly folk. So, even though we cannot insist here on an ‘ought’ (to take place), still, we act as if that were a very reasonable conjecture to entertain and comply with. (25)

Then, in a similar counter-example, if this party of person or persons is apparently responsible for this set of serial murders were to be apprehended, and duly judged in a properly constituted court of law to be guilty of these offenses, and then deemed to be the correct candidate for either capital punishment or life-long imprisonment are we simply allowed to migrate from ‘this party are the perpetrators of these series of criminal acts’ to ‘they ought to suffer the full extent of the law, be that capital punishment or life-long punishment’? In other words, given a relevant frame of reference we can, indeed, migrate from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ in a manner concordant with the conventional rules appertaining to that appropriate genre of behaviour. Say, however, in order to confirm this expected execution of the relevant legal genre/s in question, if it were the case that the true participants of this series of serial murders were to successfully incriminate a certain innocent party, who takes the rap for this series of crimes, would we still hold this principle knowing that, in this instance, this court of law actually got their judgments wrong? Here, I am sure we would still hold the legal process of the ‘ought’ as relatively unquestioned, but, that in this instance the process would have been understood to have been incorrectly handled and where a wrong series of judgments were issued accordingly. (26)

Hence, I believe, that a frame of reference can be conceived where, correctly, it is quite possible to successfully travel from a descriptive ‘is’ to either a prescriptive ‘ought’ and/or a proscriptive ‘not-ought’. Let me reinforce both the nature and ramifications of this conjecture. (27)

The contingency of a statement also reveals its hermeneutic mapping in terms of the invocation of a corresponding meta-textual set of genres of explication. So, e.g., if I were to say ‘this is an apple’, in my pointing out a rather delicious looking apple in a

bowl of various fruits, it would probably be safe to say the genre of behaviour being immediately referenced, in all probability, is that of an act of perception. Moreover, we can refine this appellation by further noting it is also a 'pointing out' and 'naming' of that being focused upon. Hence perception, designation, identification and nomination. But, if we were to inquire more deeply, we might well ask 'what is the motivation, apparent or otherwise, behind these acts of perception, designation, etc?' Asking ourselves, 'why is this person concerned with identifying this apple in that fruit bowl?' Here we might argue that this person is perhaps hungry, or feels some hunger or the simple desire of wanting to eat that apple being referred to… along with an infinite number of other intentional possibilities. In this regard we could listen to what else that person pointing out that apple might want to say, or, we could interrogate them by simply asking 'why are they pointing out this apple in that fruit bowl?' In this murky world of motivation what others say might also need to be taken with a metaphorical 'grain of salt'. However, let us say between trusted friend the other party merely declares their desire to eat the apple being pointed out, but, as this bowl of fruit does not belong to them, they are seeking permission to pick this apple up and thereupon eat it. In effect, they are seeking to undo the proscriptive force of the fact that that apple does not belong to them that, therefore, they should not purloin the said object, but, that they are hopeful permission will be granted that would then allow them to eat this same apple being pointed out. In other words, prescriptions are prescriptive (as the genre rules involved in the execution of a certain type of action, etc.) and proscriptions are the prohibition of certain behaviours unless countermanded for whatever reason or reasons judged under the specificity of those circumstances as apposite. (28)

How does this recalibrate our ideas of what is entailed in the utilization of conjectures in a conjectural economy? (29)

That although conjectures can obviously concentrate on descriptions and prescriptions, at their heart, as propositional-statements, they are already an emergent-composite of both prescriptions and descriptions, and, hence, more correctly, proscriptive in orientation. In effect, ruling out what is not suitable, and, thereby and therein, by default ruling in what was relatively more acceptable in terms of the attitudes and positions to be adopted and adapted thereafter. Such a process of ongoing conformation (as an ongoing process of re(-)normalization), somewhat weeding out and ruling in acceptable conjectural propositional-statements where the ramifications of this type of process implies, when correctly exercised, an ongoing process of de-distortion as we clarify, purely on a 'need to know basis', i.e., just what we need to know in that same regard. Hoping, of course, that sensible questions are being asked that do not travel too far from their ability to be answered on this 'need to know basis', and, in this process, proffering the relevant degree of de-distortion being sought through such enquiries. Or, effectively, seeking to both augment and enhance the cogency being exhibited in and through this process of de-distortion; conformation; rectification, deconstruction-reconstruction, re(-)normalization; harmonization, resolution; discarding the non-critical, ruling in the critical, being open to the relatively-radical, seeking and finding so-called 'definite formulation', 'definitive histories, 'final' vocabularies, etc., etc. (30)

3. Probable Conjectural Ramifications (as Expressed through 'Expectations')

To what extent are we allowed to conjecturally entertain present implications and future consequences? Just what can we expect to follow in the careful exercising of conjectures in a conjectural economy? (31)

4. A Conjectural Mapping of this 'War' in Gaza

i. Historical Background to this Conflict

Noting that, in the limbo-land of endlessly unsuccessful negotiations, Gaza and the West Bank are seemingly designed to be a failed state(s), being generally unrecognized both locally and globally, and not accorded the full status of a nation in the United Nations (?). That their citizens are consequently not deemed, either *de jure* or *de facto*, to have the full rights of citizenship under such conventions for people that are stateless? Still, as a force of occupation it is also the responsibility of the Israeli government to afford their obligation of a full set of protections as provided for under the United Nations Charter, etc. (32)

That in this in-between world of nationhood some parallels with the Holocaust and the Holodomor (the Soviet state instituted famine of the Ukraine between 1932-1933) might well be apposite to entertain through their being tested in a set of relevant conjectural arguments? By various historians, stateless citizen in the first half of the 20th century were seemingly mistreated more as 'organisms' rather than as persons with a full complement of rights automatically extended to them, theoretically, by their respective states. The historian, Timothy Snyder, e.g., tells us not to treat 'the Holocaust as if behind plexiglass', i.e., as if a unique occurrence that happens as if out of time, as if an historical observation that could never reoccur when, it is obvious that more deaths in that period of time occurred as a matter of state policy as to how scarce resources would be distributed more to 'citizens' and less to 'non-citizens' and, where as a result, more people died from starvation as a consequence of such other state policies than directly killed people either *in situ* or in localized in the confines of extermination camps.[172] Do we see a similar parallel here? E.g., with the transporting, e.g., of food, etc., into Gaza by, say, 50 trucks per day, when before the conflict, the total may well have been more that say, 500. That even to merely let in about 150 such trucks a day is a recipe for organizing an imminent famine, that could well be perceived and re-interpreted as a state-sanctioned war crime? Also, as a 'collective form of punishment' that is equally regarded as a war crime? Interestingly, such issues are already before the United Nations. In this regard the UN Human Rights Council has identified 'clear evidence' of war crimes by both Israel Defense Forces and Hamas. That, e.g., the avoidable targeting of civilians is a violation of international law and that a process of accountability needs to be instituted. On 27 October, e.g., a spokesperson for the OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) called for an independent court to review potential war crimes committed

[172] These historical observations of Timothy Snyder can be found in his many publications. E.g., *Bloodlands*: *Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*; Basic Books 2010.

by both sides. Moreover, the International Criminal Court confirmed that its mandate to investigate alleged war crimes committed since June 2014 in the State of Palestine extends to the current conflict.[173] (33)

Given confinement to the Gaza strip (and, by extension, within the confines of the West Bank, should we view such people as 'prisoners' under the supervision and responsibility of the Israeli government (otherwise the enclave can be regarded as effectively self-governing)? We may well ask, to what extent has such decades long confinement a major influence that has created the environment for extremist political forces to thrive? Evident is the fact that Hamas completely took over this enclave in 2006 by defeating its political rival Fatah, still functioning on the West Bank, and then excluding them from this enclave. (34)

We can also note the regular recurrence of overt periods of violence between these two parties in a manner where Hamas has increasingly escalated the intensity of such conflicts and where Israel, in turn, then matches and exceeds the manner of its overall response. Witness the killing of 1200 people in Israel along with the taking of hostages *versus* the deaths of 34,500 civilians to date. (35)

Previous periods of violence occurred in 2008-9, 2012, 2014, and 2021.[174] Or, witness, e.g., in 2014 where 4.594 rockets and mortars were launched from Gaza, and, where in 2023-24, 11,000 rockets plus were launched in this more recent conflict. We only have to draw the dotted lines to see that the probable future of such reoccurring conflicts is only becoming more and more obvious, and, where processes of resolution are urgently called for, that, in the process, will also need to address the political status of the state of Palestine whose impasse many would argue contributes to these cycles involving an escalation of violence? Hamas has repeatedly stated that it is firing such projectiles because these political issues over statehood, and allied concerns, have not been resolved leaving Gaza in a state of limbo where some have described the people of Gaza as having to live in the biggest 'prison camp' on this planet.[175] (36)

ii. Recent History of this Conflict

Hamas invaded Israel on the 7 October… (37)

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173 Information in this paragraph as per Wikipedia (1.5.24).

174 Rockets were also launched in 2001, and in every period of heightened conflict since then.

175 Tourism to Gaza and the West Bank is not impossible as long as you have a valid international passport. However, it may involve lengthy interrogations and denial of entry if you are perceived to belong to certain Islamic organizations, or similar. Egypt also has control of entry to Gaza from its territory. As for exiting from Gaza, this is technically possible but is rendered difficult especially in times of violent conflict. Periodically, the borders are closed. Otherwise, both Israel and Egypt have control, through the use of permits, passports, etc., as to just who can travel where and when, etc. Obviously, if you are a member of Hamas, or perceived to be a possible member of Hamas, your chances of a making a successful exit or entry might well be judged, or self-judged, to be non-existent. Where any attempt to make such a transit could well find that person judged to be either a pro-Hamas sympathizer or a member of Hamas finding imprisonment both in Israel and Egypt (where Hamas is also regarded to be an extremist organization).

Israel replied in kind, and has subjected the enclave of Gaza to a devasting degree of bombardment as per the information outlined in section 6. (38)

The overflow or ramifications of this 'local' conflict has also been quite extensive and have taking a variety of 'global' manifestations. E.g., an escalation of violence on the West Bank; rockets fired from southern Lebanon, etc; an escalation of overt conflict between Israel and Iran; the attacks by the Iran backed Houthi rebels in Yemen against international sipping using the Red Sea and the Suez Canal; ambiguous displays of support along with possible decreasing support for Israel by a variety of governments; protests and forms of civil disruption by groups of people either supporting Israel or the Palestinian cause, etc. It also appears that Traditional Media, in general, can only deal with one major issue at a time and that this conflict has often relegated the dissemination of news about other equally concerning conflicts and topics. (39)

This war could also be described as relatively asymmetric to the extent Israel, as well-armed state, has the resources to punish, if not over-punish, the embryonic state of Palestine, and more specifically Gaza, if it should be the case that the West Bank were to formally cement their apparent divorce (in what could then be called a 'three-state solution'). (40)

Obviously, the non-commensurate death toll of civilians in Gaza, the massive destruction of infrastructure and hospital there, etc., will psychically leave its mark forcing us to conjecture 'just what future is there for this enclave of Gaza, just what future is there for the West Bank, a Palestinian State, a so-called two state solution (or a three-state solution), and, even the state of Israel itself?'[176] (41)

iii. Future Ramifications of this Conflict?

It is more than tempting to connect the dots of past conflicts in this region to imagine a long period of historical escalation. With the sending of an increasing number of missiles by Hamas in each more visible period of conflict one must surmise that this conflict is and will remain on an historical trajectory of escalation unless some form of a short-circuit and resolution be brought to bear? Then, taking a metaphorical 'page' from the accelerated development of drone warfare in the Ukraine, e.g., surely it behooves these belligerent parties to soon resolve their political differences lest an even greater toll of death and destruction is unleashed on both sides. What might successfully short-circuit these cycles of violence and put history on a course that it must inevitably take given that all wars and all periods of conflict eventually find some semblance of a cessation of hostilities in some form or other? (42)

[176] As the authorization and prosecution of this war between Israel and Hamas ultimately resided in the hands of Prime Minister Netanyahu we must ask 'just what future lies in store for this very unpopular political figure?' No doubt a number of conjectured futures could be elaborated, but, we must wait to see how history records the aftermath of those decisions initiated by both himself and his Cabinet?

4. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Just what can our use of conjectures do and not do in our reading/s of these types of situation, etc? (43)

Obviously, a conjectural mapping of descriptions could be rendered as less problematic through ongoing forms of consensus and subsequent emendation. No one is going to contest the fact that from October in 2023 a period of conflict recommenced between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. However, what does become more complicated and potentially controversial, is just how are we going to interpret these events from both a more prescriptive and a more proscriptive point of view? Yet, even here, both the expected and anticipated cogency of conjectures can be demonstrated and where, again, consensus and an emendation of interpretations can be allowed to follow suit… (44)

People are no doubt asking themselves, from the rubble in Gaza to the offices of the United Nations, is the Palestinian toll of 33,500 dead and more than 77,000 injured, including the death of 9000 Hamas fighters commensurate with those Israeli civilians, and those of other nationalities, and members of the military who were either killed, injured, or those individuals taken as hostages when the latter were captured in Israel at the beginning of this recent conflict? Of course, if we believe that even one death, or one injury, is not acceptable then how are we to reasonably compute and appreciate the disproportionate use of violence exerted by Israel upon the people of Gaza? Then, these considerations granted, what conjectures can we formulate with an eye on the future. Should we suspect a continuation of this 'eye for an eye', and a few more besides, or, an 'all-perceiving eye' that only sees the deeper humanity of the person and how, at the end of the day, most people only wish to lead a happy life, have good health, find a good education for their children, be able to lead a time of retirement in relative contentment, and so on? That in terms of the latter, we can only hope that lessons of history will instruct enough people to collectively follow a more resolute form of a humane resolution that restores both dignity and security to these two Semitic peoples of the Levant..?! (45)

From the perspective of a conjectural economy, it is my belief that we can demonstrate the cogency of this type of philosophy. As previously suggested, the use of conjectures, and their conformal appreciation, is 'the engine room of the philosophical discipline, and, indeed, all reputable disciplines'. I would argue that in a conjectural economy, conjectures, as propositional-statements, can be neither reduced to analytical propositions nor synthetical statements. Although even overlooked, this aspect of the research program manifests in either a *de facto* or covert sense or in a virtual semblance whose functioning allows us to then think that we can automatically appreciate necessary propositions and contingent statements, along with the distinction between the same, when in lived-reality we must entertain a conjectural dimension in order to make any sense whatsoever of this overall life-world, this world-of-life, this world at large. In what manner, therefore, are conjectures this missing link, this overlooked dimension that glues together the exercise of the philosophical discipline, indeed, each and every reputable disciplines? (46)

As propositional-statements, as just noted, they can be reduced to neither propositions nor statements. From an economic perspective (through the lens of an economic complexification) I have noted that conjectures collectively function through the reiteration of the conjectured 'as-if' (as outlined as the third moment in the interrogative economy when attempting a literal reply along apparitional lines); as hypothetical 'what-ifs' more along the lines of counterfactuals; as focusing on a 'specification of process' (rather than a generalization or particularization of process); through exercising either virtually and/or non-virtually a relative 'existentialization of process' (through the identification of a pro-relational attitude from the perspective of a co-associated sense of trans-relational subjectivity); and so on and so forth. That this thematization of a more overt semblance of an existential orientation is also accompanied by a more overt sense of the pragmatic, and v.v. An experience of the pragmatic that cannot be reduced to the mere expediency of (the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of) the pragmatical although, at the same time, neither being devoid of nor avoiding such aspects of the pragmatical that might include, say, considerations of effectiveness, economical-ness, efficaciousness, expedience when duly called for, etc. Now, I do not expect a thorough understanding of where I am coming from and where I might be heading, since this philosophical approach, even for myself, is very much a continual work in progress, but, do hope for some glimmer of comprehension that conjectures have a role to play in philosophical explorations and that this might be entertained if only to the extent that we can see that the mere use of analytical propositions and synthetical statements, either by themselves or together, just cannot do the work envisaged in the critical, and radical, pursuit of the philosophical discipline, or, indeed, in the exercise of any viable discipline. (47)

In the course of this essay, I also introduced the philosophical tool of a 'non-economical fork' where I used the negative and positive ambiguities of this expression, respectively, to either dismiss that which does not work (in trimodal economic terms of reference) and to promote that which appears to have the blessing of the non-economic irruption of value arising from the relatively successful resolution of the internal workings of that current economy in question.[177] In effect, I would like to argue that the latter function is responsible for the cogency of apparently well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectural considerations, and, under suitable circumstance, might well render viable functions of a 'weak philosophy'[178] or a 'weak discipline' along the lines of a 'non-weak'/'non-strong' philosophy or discipline rather than entertaining a 'strong philosophy' or 'strong discipline' through being neither called for nor needed as forms of over-commitment indicative of an ideological extremism as expounded and demanded by ideologues.[179] But, for the moment, let me leave such a conjecture for a later in-depth exploration and scrutiny lest I return to this notion of the conjectural its previous connotation of being, somewhat, only a device that is merely speculative and not deserving of the respect it so surely deserves..!! (48)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.5.24.

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177 I am making an oblique suggestion here that a study of such definitive irruptions of e/valuational formation may well mark out potential forms of resolution that could be identified and utilized, say, in conflict resolution, solving philosophical problems, defusing controversies, discerning the existential, etc.

178 Channelling the work of the radical theologian John D. Caputo. The appellation of 'weak', more correctly, subverts the appellation of 'weakness' through a thorough deconstruction of 'strong ideologies'.

179 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIG, e.g.

A: Appendix A:

A Proposal for a Resolution of the Current Political Situation Between Israel and Palestine 'On the basis of a *Quid Pro Quo*'

Given that, in **general**, as most people want to lead a happy life, enjoy their relationships with loved ones and friends, have access to suitable shelter, be well fed, have the opportunities to receive a good education, find employment that pays a 'living wage', be healthy but receive the best in health care when needed… why not set out to settle our national and political differences on this basis of this already understood consensus. (1)

Then, in **particular**, given this pre-understood consensus, let all national parties negotiate their various claims on the grounds of a *quid pro quo* given that, collectively, each party will have similar aspirations. (2)

However, in a **specificity** of detail, let nation-states themselves negotiate and arbitrate the specific needs and aspirations of its own citizens both individually and communally. (3)

Thence this pre-understood basis from which a consolidation of consensus must further proceed on the grounds of a mutual respect for the existence, security, safety, and desired prosperity of and for all other parties.

To institutionalize such objectives why not accept a Joint Israel-Palestine Authority (JIPA), even if only on a ceremonial level, with the long-term goals of mutual cooperation, an eventual dismantling of artificial boundaries, free travel and domicile within this Authority of and for all parties, by all relevant parties.

To this end, in order to practically utilize this mutual concept of a *quid pro quo* let this be done under the following six headings (meant only as an initial set of guidelines):
1. The signing of a **proclamation** that respectfully recognizes the 'mutual existence, security, safety, and a desired prosperity of and for all parties'.
2. **Re-negotiation** over capitals. One possible compromise being the siting of the capital or headquarters of JIPA in East Jerusalem in lieu of shifting Ramallah back to East Jerusalem?
3. A reasonable degree of **compensation** to be either paid or received in kind to all relevant parties by the relevant parties concerned (from the advent of the state of Israel and on up to including the recent Israel-Hamas conflicts, settler occupations, people murdered by military forces responsible for those occurrences, those people taken hostage, etc.).
4. All parties affected by any decisions to be made are to be i**ncorporated** within those same decision-making processes through the direct participation of their duly elected representatives.
5. An independent commission of inquiry for the **adjudication** of possible past injustices.
6. A separate commission of inquiry for the **arbitration** of all future disputes… (7)

N.T., 3.5.24.

The Postscript of a 'Summary as Yet Not Finished…'

Without a doubt we can consider this Israel-Hamas 'War' as asymmetrical in both tenor and execution. (1)

Although initiated as a response to the Hamas Invasion of Israel on 7 October it need not have been prosecuted in the non-commensurate manner that we have witnessed to date. (2)

With 33,500 civilian deaths and more than 77,000 people injured, as a total of approximately 100,000 people, this represents out of a population of around 2.2 million the disturbing statistic that approximately 1 person in 22 has been either killed or injured! (3)

The destruction of infrastructure has left 500,000 with no home to return to and has internally displaced about 1.7 million people within the enclave of Gaza. (4)

It would appear that with only about 50% of this territory under the direct control of the Israeli Defense Force they have currently not succeeded in their objective of eliminating Hamas (which, on reflection, one would have thought to have been impossible given the natural recruitment this re-occupation, in all probability, would have been inspired among members of this community given also the geographical restrictions imposed indefinitely upon the same?). (5)

With the presentation of such descriptive facts, how is possible to not be disgusted by such barbarity, demonstrated by both belligerent parties, but excessively inflicted by the state of Israel on the citizens of Gaza, whose citizenry are unable to escape such a conflict, and where an end to this conflict should be urgently insisted upon… along with genuine negotiations between equal parties as to how the future co-existence between Israel and Palestine is to be securely implemented..!! (6)

N.T., 3.5.24.

Additions Posted Post-Open Forum

One idea mentioned, but not explored in depth, is the concept of 'counter-mapping'. It could be argued that the dominant semantic mapping of a certain situation, be it controversial or otherwise, would reflect the major discourse/s in play. However, in concerted forms of re-thinking of certain issues, especially in moments of either radical change and/or crisis, we might well observe various processes of counter-mapping being entertained from the perspective of less dominant parties. As a consequence of such shifts in the semantic mapping of either problematic or problematized regions we might find shifts in these prior forms of mapping especially by more progressive parties in contrast with those of a more conservative nature wishing to preserve the previous *status quo*. Consequently, and subsequently, contestment as to how to map such difficult regions, as involved in either serious disagreements and/or actual conflicts, would be expected and, therein and thereby, further contribute to a process of diminishing consensus building as to how to generally respond responsibly to such issues. (7)

One possible strategy that was explored was to argue that this dispute was not your dispute and, therefore, we could and should sideline ourselves as innocent bystanders. However, the ensuing consensus was that this world is metaphorically ‘shrinking’ and that such detachment was not a viable option even if it we were to allow it to function as a default position. For a start, the controversial nature of this dispute is spilling over into more local forms of politics. Many governments are complicit in either funding and/or supporting the militaristic actions of this current Israeli government. That in allowing our governments to not remonstrate with the Israeli government we become more directly complicit in such forms of non-accountability. Where such actions and/or inactions could well influence the outcome of the 2024 Presidential Elections in the US; where the targeting of the maritime trade in the Red Sea, in a support of solidarity for Palestine, could further exacerbate supply chain problems with their impact adding either to the level of inflation and/or countering measures to bring that level of inflation downward towards a more manageable level... (8)

But, in line with expectations that this dispute, if left unresolved, will mutate in an even more horrendous direction, it behooves us to collectively organize and signal that such non-proportional mal-treatment of the Palestinian population has to cease immediately and that the necessary political reforms needed to resolve the underlying political issues also need to be duly instigated forthwith and not be allowed to be undermined by those parties with vested interests and ideological differences.

Undoubtedly, there is a need for suitable leadership, and, if this cannot arise within parties internal to these issues then, perhaps, it is time for it to be imposed by a neutral third party, say, the United Nations? (9)

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Media should also be called out for not addressing this overall situation in a responsible manner, by being partisan, by being superficial in its reporting, by not creating a space for nuance through the lazy reiteration of ideological differences, and, as a result, perpetuating the confusion surrounding these issues that more supports the ideologues and the pursuit of their ideologically extremist agenda. (10)

N.T., 13.5.24.

XIL. Conformance: Conjectural Assurance through Intermediation…

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIL. Conformance: Conjectural Assurance through Intermediation…*[180]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

The title alludes to four technical terms. Let me briefly define these expressions and set the stage for the 'complexion and tenor' of this essay, i.e., 'its distinctive location in our mapping of the world as lived and the apparent end-point/s seemingly desired as to the conclusive intent of the overall trajectory or trajectories of the entailed arguments should it prove to be effectively coherent and pragmatically able to demonstrate such a provisional termination'. By 'conformance' is meant 'a region of reiterable truth determinations but where emendations, should they be implemented, are such that they are partial and never completely displace the central understandings arrived at to date although our co-associated attitudes towards the integrity of that region can, subsequently, be either critically reassessed and/or radically re-assessed'. By 'conjectural' is meant 'economic activity focusing on conjectures and their co-associated economic correlatives'. By 'assurance' is meant our confidence in the apparent stability of the conformal sphere of conformance in question' given our 'insurance' is such 'that we can retrace our disciplinary presuppositions, suppositions, and post-suppositions, etc., and, in reaching a point of greater conformance, we can then re-proceed in a direction able, in theory, of maintaining either the same level of conformance or a positive amplification[181] of the same'.[182] By 'intermediation…' is meant the application of the 'shorthand for an understanding' that means 'our ability to apply extensive suspensions to the representative integrity of such conformally regarded regions of conformance along with the general re-establishment of their continuingly re-assured conformance'. Hence the 'tenor' of this essay is 'to demonstrate the means we have to hand that allows us to experience this degree of representative integrity in this region of concern (whose basic topicality is pre-established on an inter-ordered basis and categorised in accordance with its socially organized schematization[183])'. The subtext to the tenor is the dismissal of an 'external world' and its realist interpretations, etc. The complexion, or characteristics, of the overall arguments of this essay will center on the role played by alignments as explicated through a philosophy of transformational retreatment using concepts of relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc., in a critical setting that does away with all forms of uni-modalism, etc. (0)

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180 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

181 'Amplification' arises through 'either positive non-chaotically oriented incremental augmentation and/or positive chaotically oriented non-incremental enhancement'.

182 By 'positive' is meant both in a state of conformity and not in a state of non-conformity. E.g., in a court of law, a witness could be said to be honest re statement S but to be deemed honest, in general terms, all statements voiced by that witness need to be both honest and not-dishonest since it would be possible to voice statements that are not-dishonest but not necessarily honest at the same time. E.g., asked, "if they took money from the collection box in a certain church" they truthfully could answer, "no' without mentioning that their accomplice gave them the stolen money. So, technically they did not take it from the collection box, but, that they did technically 'receive' that same money from someone else who did take it. So, in this instance the prosecution also needs to prove that those same monies were received. Furthermore, in supplying an adequately 'water-tight' proof we would need to prove or demonstrate both positive conformance and non-disconformance.

183 As explored in *Book* 9. E.g., if the tenor of a topic, say, is 'historical' then it is assumed this is carved out through a 'reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order as socially schematized under the influential rubric of 'Academia'.'

1. Pre-Exposition

In effect the title can be (mis)translated as ‘stability in truth determinations through (working) suspensions, etc.’ (1)

Now, given this prohibition of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, and relativism, along with all forms of ideological extremism in conjunction with a compete avoidance of unproductive metaphors associated with the former, like, e.g., so-called ‘external worlds’, ‘internal worlds’, and so on, and, coupled with a desire to avoid all other forms of malformed philosophical nonsense as falling under the mistaken attraction for ‘strong’ versions of any of the following such as, e.g., realism, anti-realism, quazi-realism, empiricism, idealism, rationalism, pragmatism, dualism, psychologism, logicalism, *et al*, it now behooves the critical-radical philosopher, i.e., the pragmatic-existentialist, to demonstrate a ‘weak’ philosophy able to counter the nonsense perpetrated by the former, and, through the requisite degree of assurance, further proceed as a relatively ‘non-weak’/’non-strong’ form of philosophical practice in sympathy with all forms of disciplinary practice treated in a similar manner. Thence the negative and positive ambitions of this essay, namely, on one hand, to steer clear of all philosophical nonsense, and, on the other hand, proceed in a manner that is capable of resolving philosophical issues, etc., as come to hand.[184] (2)

In effect, this ambition can be (mis)translated to mean ‘that given this prohibition of unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, and relativism, etc., it falls on the metaphorical ‘shoulders’ of a serious philosopher to demonstrate a form of philosophical practice not beholden to such ideological nonsense’. (3)

To advance this neutral program let me first discuss why the thesis for the so-called ‘external world’ is philosophically bankrupt, and, then, let me follow up a number of leads that will attempt to further reinforce the positivity of this neutral reading… (4)

The very notion of an ‘external world’ is a metaphor. It is as if we see ‘the world outside or beyond the limits of our embodiment’, as if ‘looking through a window’. But such a metaphor cannot be treated literally. Such an image can be used poetically, as an analogy, yes, but, philosophically, no. Treated literally, we would need to invoke a viewer viewing the world through those eyes looking at this world, repeated infinitely, *ad nauseum*. Not treated in a literal manner, means we can discard a literal reading of the so-called ‘external world’ *qua* external world. Suitably deconstructed, means we must also dismantle the spurious notion of a so-called ‘internal world’. Then, all that understood, what are the ramifications of this clarified form of positioning that also attempts to avoid all ideological forms of ‘strong’ realism, etc? (5)

Admittedly, natural language is redolent with realistic language whilst considerations of personal identity can also take an excessive idealistic tack at the same time. In order to proceed on a middle path, in a passage through this living-world at large, that steers a neutral course, the positioning that needs to be adopted and adapted is a ‘one world orientation’ that understands the perspectival nature of perception whilst also rec-

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184 In effect, operating a ‘non-economic fork’ as introduced in *Pursuit*, III.XIJ,61-62; III.XIK.14-16.

ognizing that all relations are directly enacted in and through the potentiated possibilities of such perspectives along with their integrated field of modal possibilities. I.e., that in order, e.g., to compare different types of apple experiences as *qua* types of apple-like experience we need to note the range of modalities that could be invoked and the manner different types of phenomenological apples are presented in regard to such an overall modal spectrum, and, in what manner different types of apple experiences are distinctively constituted within that same open spectrum of possibilities. So, we have apples currently to hand, ornamental apples, dream apples, remembered apples, imagined apples, apples to be seen in photos or on computer screens, and so on. To be experienced as a phenomenologically different type of apple we must discern to what extent it conforms to the type of phenomenon it appears to most likely resemble in terms of a distinctive modal spectrum associated in our expectations as associated with that distinctive sense of type. So, e.g., an apple that looks ripe may well prove to be satisfyingly edible. Whereas, in contrast, an ornamental wax or plastic apple is not found to be edible, and, where a dream apple is found to not sate physiological pangs of hunger. Where a remembered apple might sate remembered pangs of hunger but not sate current pangs of hunger, and so on. As a rule of thumb, we might accept the observation that the phenomenological type of experience that ticks most of the boxes in terms of it perceived modalities might well be judged to be the better, if not the best, non-virtual exemplar of that overall set of typological classifications being found within this overall domain of 'apple-likeness'. Moreover, this relatively greater quanta of density of specific modalities, as found with that regarded to be an exemplar of its type, also being more than likely matched with an amplified modal intensity in our individual discernment of distinctive modalities found within that expectational spectrum of modalities both associated with and regarded as an exemplar of that type of phenomenon in question. So, undoubtedly, in this instance, the best exemplar of an apple-like experience is a non-virtual apple. Where, as a general observation, as a conjectural proposition, the best exemplar of a certain type of phenomenon is that example that not only modally overlaps with modal expectations but basically also coincides with the same. (6)

That, in such research to date, it is obvious that we have needed neither recourse to either an 'external world' nor an 'internal world' nor any form of recourse that demands access to the impossibility of such imputed domains. Rather, we have been getting on with the simulated nature of those enquiries given that thematization, through direct engagement, is also a process that occurs in time even if all too often seemingly registered in the 'blink of an eye'. I.e., that all relational interactions are directly engaged, but, such engagement, as a process, is conducted in time (notwithstanding the seeming spontaneity of our recognition of all things that are found to be more obviously familiar). (7)

Now, these directives understood and accepted, if only hypothetically, let me now explore the ramifications of such re-positioning, i.e., this declaration that all relations are directly engaged within living-experience in this same world at large even if simulated through representational forms of interpretation, etc., and able to be partially emended from time to time, and where our attitudes towards the same need not be beholden to the same intentional objectives, etc. (8)

To further this demonstration of a neutral philosophy (as a viable exemplar of a neutral discipline in general) let me first explore a non-realist interpretation of the trends and ramifications of modern finance, and, then, explore a non-idealist interpretation of subjective embodiment. Where by 'neutral philosopher; is meant 'a critical-radical philosopher acting as an existential-pragmatist and pragmatic-existentialist, etc.' (9)

The misguided education of a realist often starts with 'taking things as seen under their nose' naïvely as 'objects' which, in those primitive terms of reference, would be hard to dispute. Then, from this sense of 'realistic' positioning they eventually need to contend with anomalous objects like mathematical objects, ethical judgments, and all other forms of value (under the headings of 'evaluation' and 'valuation', etc.). No doubt, with a certain degree of unnecessary and excessive contortion. The idealist, on the other hand, is obsessed with 'experience' and cannot see past their own noses, so to speak, going so far to see this constitution of experience as just their constitution of experience which is so far from the truth, given that the pitiful fruits of their education by others has them now coming to this fraudulent notion that everything is just constituted by them and themselves alone. But, there comes a time when all such childish things should be put to the side and where the educated person should take up the responsibilities and obligations of more fully being a 'person' in this world at large, be that passively with(-)others, actively before(-) others, and finding and amplifying a freedom only to be found in our arbitrated-cooperation through(-)others… (10)

To deconstruct strong ideological forms of realism let me explore the non-realistic implications of finance and banking as an analogy, and, to reconstruct the experiential significance of our subjective being in the world let me reconstruct the ramifications of a neutral appreciation of viable conjectures concerning our being embodied in this world at large. (11)

Now, as I would argue we cannot live in a world without metaphors, as the necessary residents in an interrogative economy,[185] without whose presence we could answer no questions, it follows that I am neither deconstructing weak forms of realism nor weak forms of idealism, but, only turning our precious attention to a dismissal of their overrated ideological cousins. Indeed, through the stability of conformal assurance we could even find a stable for their non-weak or non-strong formats, but, given such rampant confusion and partisan polarization let us be more interested in pursuing this middle path of a neutral exposition interested only in demonstrating, in accordance with their own experiential natures, that all relations are directly engaged (otherwise they are not relational in experience), that all relations are contextually dependent upon a world of relational-experience in order for us to compare these simulated experiences of the relational as the relationships to be entertained between such relations, such relational experiences, and so on… (12)

But, before we merely rehash our current objections to this 'neutral philosophy' (of a transcendentally necessary conjecture of a 'one world of direct engagement, etc.'), let me first establish the contours of my overall argument. (13)

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185 Whose economic correlatives are the rhetorical, a first metaphorical reply, then, the apparitional.

2. Exposition

One thing that annoys me no end is being told the price of a certain object or service and then being forced to pay without cash, and then being charged an additional cost for the convenience of the vendor to insist on their style of how that transaction will operate. Another form of annoyance, along the same lines, are the 'excessive' charges associated with booking fees. Online you do most of the work, choosing seats, dates, times, applying concessions, etc., and in the duration of a few nano-seconds you will be also charged a fee that would make a full-time prostitute green with envy, indeed, no doubt, they could think that after one full day's 'work' that they then could comfortably retire for the rest of their life on the proceeds of such ill-gotten gains. (14)

Of course, there are those other venues that insist on 'payment in cash only', that I don't mind so much, but must be annoying for those people who are quite content to operate in a cashless environment. (15)

Now, given the vagaries of weather, like flooding, e.g., and the hacking of the Internet, along with random glitches and bugs in the complex workings of this electronic netherworld it is advisable to continue to operate in both systems in the performance of a future financial transaction. (16)

Most people now seem resigned to the fact that financial transactions will inevitably be electronic and virtual. 'Virtual' to extent 'you will no longer see notes and coins'. 'Money' will only be represented on a screen as a set of figures that you will also trust, if not spent, will still be there tomorrow, and, hopefully, the day after tomorrow, and so on. However, one problem I perceive will arise in the financial education of children. In all probability teachers will need to return to a physical form of cash in some manner or other, be that simulated or real, in order to instil notions of 'amount', 'cost comparisons', 'costs incurred', 'monies remaining', and similar. (17)

Once we fully embrace the 'cashless society' the very presence, or presentation of money, will take on an almost abstract, mathematical-like nature. In one sense, it will be there on our phones or computers, but, in another sense, such devices will not be ATM's even if able to substitute to a considerable extent for such contemporary points of banking contact. Or, if we think our money physically is in a bank we also have to think again. In a completely cashless world, there can be no physical money deposited in a bank in the traditional sense. (18)

Here I would like to mention the following anecdote. A saying of my mother's was 'that she was a Bolshevik until she made her first million'. Needless to say, like most people of her generation, and many after her, she died a 'Bolshevik', although I might add, not a very revolutionary one. At some stage, very early on, I took on this notion of wanting to be a 'millionaire'. However, much like the plotline of the movie *Bedazzled* you need to spell out, without loopholes, the nature of our aspirations. In this cited movie the Devil, Peter Cook, gives the protagonist, Dudley Moore, three wishes which, with great comic effect, were duly subverted by the Devil. As fortune, or misfortune, would

have in the late 1960's I became a 'millionaire'. In the central branch of my local bank the teller inadvertently had the IMB typewriter type into my banking passbook the figure of just over NZ$1,142,000 which I suspect, in hindsight, was the running total of the money deposited in this bank at that point in time. To my great shock, in checking my bankbook, I discovered I was now, on paper at least, a millionaire… alas, if only for a few minutes… until the very embarrassed teller undid their magnificent handiwork. (19)

So, if anything, it should be no surprise to now learn there is 'virtual' and 'virtual'. I.e., 'virtually ineffective' and 'virtually effective'. We may no longer see coins and paper notes, but, we do expect our bank balances, under normal circumstances, to be maintained should they be neither added to nor subtracted from by ourselves. (20)

Once a cashless sphere is contemplated how could a seriously respectable realist interpretation of finance be put forward? They can no longer, metaphorically, make a reduction to the physical presence of money. They can no longer say cash is now in a bank, or in a banking system, when the notion of money has a virtual complexion. Given that banks in Australia bank with the Reserve Bank of Australia and lend money to borrowers of all descriptions, even if they were to operate with just cash most of that cash would be placed beyond the walls of that bank, beyond the walls of all its branches. In effect, translating its deposits into virtual-like obligations between a variety of people and institutions. Then, this raises the following problem for the reductive realist who wants to translate everything into realist-like terms of reference, if a person were to have, say, ten thousand dollars in one account but owe the bank fifteen thousand in another, then, in an overall balance, that person owes that bank five thousand dollars. Just what is the ontological status of that money owing? Does negative money exist? Obviously, the bank is keen to be paid, at least eventually, and, the borrower should be well aware of their obligations in this same matter. But, as banks deal in both deposits and borrowings, deal with customers and other banks, even overseas banks, the reductive-like entracement of those monies to physical alterations in computes within the virtual world of the Internet as encompassed within the confines of certain banking systems to my mind does not allow the realist to run a realistic-like thesis in regard to banking finance, and, by extension, to the world of lived-experience in its entirety? It they cannot argue satisfactorily for a realist-like basis for finance then why trust them to argue what they would like to do in regard to how they might re-envisage mathematical entities, ethical considerations, judgments of value, the nature of personal identity, and so on and so forth?! (21)

Put quite bluntly, a non-functional reduction to 'electronic inputs and outputs' just does not capture, realistically, the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of 'money' as manifested in lived-experience! (22)

Now, the 'strong' ideological idealist has, somewhat, an opposite set of problems, namely, how could they argue for the sole exclusivity of personal experience? Of course, my experience is 'my experience', still, my experience cannot meaningfully be just of my experience alone. For such an understanding to be entertained, with any degree of significance, we would also need to know just what contrasts personal experience from that which is 'not personal', just what does 'non-experience' mean if this is not able to be

experienced as such? Again, what does it mean to be a ‘person’ and an ‘embodied person’ if suitable forms of contrast cannot be conveniently found to hand..? (23)

Although the realist cannot credibly harness in a materialistic language the electrical signals in electronic chips, and in their inter-wiring, and in the same transfer of information as found passing through the air, in a realistic and convincing form of a narrative, still, the residual presence in the world, however non-realistically residual, is a powerful counter-weight to the idealist since the very foil of a set of realistically oriented ‘ideas’ is necessary for them to even make the barest sense of such idealistically over-treated notions of ‘self’, of ‘mind’, of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘personal identity’, etc. Since such a necessary contrast to ideation is non-idealistically oriented it follows that any possibility of a pure unimodally constituted idealism should quickly fall by the wayside… should the system be infected with computer viruses or malfunction or should the power fail or be switched off... and be disposed of as no more than just another instance of ‘ideological trash’ that should be promptly discarded and conveniently forgotten. (24)

So, that granted, what are we left with? A world of living-experience, textually treated as lived-experience, where all relations are directly engaged, where experience is embodied and where such experience cannot be reduced to unimodal narratives of either a strong, ideological realism or a strong ideological idealism, or, for that matter, any form of a strong ideological narration be it cast in any type of either an impossible unimodal, bimodal, absolutistic or relativistic type of format. (25)

So, (as if carefully applying the philosophical tool of a ‘non-economic fork) in having to dispose of that which needs to be radically negated, let me now turn my attention to a positive side of the equation wherein we can operate a neutral schematization of experience through the positive use of relatively non-realistic and non-idealistic languages languages (along with the dismissal of all other ‘strong’ forms of over-committed ideological nonsense), suitably exercise working suspensions, invoking forms of conjectural cogency through evidence, alignments, the demonstration of the requisite degree of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc. (26)

How might this philosophical ambition for a relatively neutral language be performed? Through the use of conjectures in a conjectural economy subjected to ‘working suspensions’, i.e., processes of intermediation, etc. Hopefully, therein, to meet the requisite degree of conformal stability and assurance in accord with the nature of our enquiries. (27)

The hyphen, say, in ‘living-experience’, and its textualization in ‘lived-experience’, or, in the use of the expression ‘life-world’, or its equivalent ‘world-of-life’, is indicative of this relational engagement between the relatively realistic and the relatively idealistic as well, I might add, our ability to engage a relative transformational isomorphic invariance as clearly functioning for(-)us between various economic correlativities. Just as in banking, a set of relatively invariant isomorphisms are set up between cash, should it have been present, bank balances, debt obligations, electronic transfers, payments for goods and services, etc. Or, in more general terms, as will be found between

conjectural descriptions, (non-existentially oriented) conjectural prescriptions, and (existentially oriented) conjectural proscriptions, etc. Or, indeed, within and between 'weak' realistic notions of relational identity and 'weak' idealistic notions of embodiment, etc. Or, again, as found within and between objects and persons, communities and institutions, and so on. (28)

Or, once more, between the pre-relational, the relational, and the (existential) pro-relational (and its co-associated existential subjectivity of trans-relational subjectivity). Let me elaborate on what is isomorphically entailed between these levels in epistemological organization)? (29)

But, before following up on more technical details of this nest of conjectures let me briefly sum up the overall import of these arguments to date. (30)

In my opinion, a relatively radical realistic reductionism progressively fails to construct a useful and effective narrative concerning a sensible exposition of lived-experience. That, furthermore, in progressively moving away from sense-experience to mathematical concepts, from (non-existential) value judgments to pragmatic and existential forms of discernment, and so on, it appears to increasingly take on a non-economic complexion and tenor in the negative sense of this expression. In my analogical argument over virtual money, it fails to proffer a realistic appreciation of this type of phenomenon. At the same time, this residual realist reduction to computer chips, electrical wiring, various manifestations of the Internet, etc., is more than enough to seriously deflate or evaporate, i.e., thoroughly deconstruct the impossible pretensions of the relatively radical emergent idealist since with the presence of computer bugs and flaws, corruption of computer codes, or just a power failure, such events are enough to completely disable computer banking, etc. The idea of 'virtual money in a cashless society' will persist, but, because it remains 'virtual', when dis-embodied from its realistic substrate, when the system is corrupted or completely disrupted, and no longer 'embodied' in the world at large, then the 'absence' of the non-virtual expression of this banking system will be experienced as an 'absence of functioning', a state of affairs without pragmatic utility should this systematic substrate remain disabled and, therein and thereby, remain 'dis-embodied'. That, all 'economic isolates', be they realistic or idealistic or pragmatic in complexion and tenor; be they unimodal, bimodal, absolutistic or relativistic in construction, in being removed from their economies of origination, cannot function given the impossible nature of their imputed non-economic construction. Moreover, that granted, then we need look no further in the hope of finding a positive form of non-economic resolution since the pre-conditions for such economic fruitfulness and productivity would have been ruled out by the negational aspect of this non-economic fork. On the positive side of this ledger, ruled over by this non-economic fork, through the affirmation of the apparent cogency of various conjectural strategies we can re-cast philosophical and disciplinary positions as relatively 'non-weak' or 'non-strong' from their initial status as possessing positions that are 'weak' without having to subscribe to the impossibility of 'strong forms' of an impossible ideological over-commitment, etc. Where it is envisaged that such cogent conjectural strategies would include the skilful exercise of ongoing working suspensions, the establishment of relevant forms of alignment through various

forms of re(-)alignment, evidential conformation (in truth determination), the apparent stability of reiterable processes in conjectural argumentation, the demonstration of the requisite degrees of relative transformational isomorphic invariance, the exhibition of a sufficient surplus in e/valuational formation, the acceptable formation and dissemination of a progressively expanded form of a pragmatically well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed degree of a social consensus, and so on and so forth… (31)

Now, having laid out various suggestions for amplifying this positive dimension of non-economic resolution, in and through the imputed irruption of a definitive series of responses of the last (next, and first) instance(s)[186] (in a contrasting distinction to the endless circularity of economic circulation) as pointed out by the French philosopher François Laruelle, let me continue this exploration by noting how various forms of conjectural cogency can be utilized as potential explanations of how we can run viable interpretations of this world of lived-experience and where, hopefully, such pragmatic representations can eventually and inevitably find an acceptable degree of social consensus instrumental in consolidating a degree of social solidarity able to counteract anti-democratic forces; rectify processes of misinterpretation, mis-information, disinformation, and mal-information; disrupt the empowerment and oversee the dis-empowerment of political populists along with their authoritarian influences, tendencies, aspirations, etc. (32)

In mapping the positive nature of this non-economic fork, for convenience, let me do so under the following headings, namely, working suspensions; conjectural cogency; evidential conformation; alignment through re(-)alignment; stability of reiteration; isomorphic invariance, existential surpluses; a pragmatic-existentialism and an existential-pragmatism… (33)

All economies operate through a collection of different types of suspension aggregated under the rubric of an ‘extensive suspension’. In intra-mediation there is a focus on individual economic correlatives without treating them as ‘economic isolates’. Hence the background correspondence with the hermeneutic use of the rhetorical suspension of the ‘either/or’; the foreground phenomenological focus on the metaphorical suspension of ‘like’ (as ‘both like and not-like’); and, the non-systematic existential suspension through the mediation of the former, i.e., in a dynamic balance of both background and foreground, etc. Collectively, these three suspensions form the overall transcendental suspension at the center of economic performance. In an extended suspension, counter-processes of de-suspension, in part, create an economy of de-suspension instrumental in

[186] A ‘definitive response of the last instance’ is ‘the exercise of a form of choice along more conventional lines’. However, should we also be presented with an existentially oriented sense and semblance of choice it then manifests as being of ‘the next instance’, but, in ‘our permitting its irruption’ it then becomes ‘the definitive instance of the first instance’ given that its existential impact now follows on from that distinctive form of intervention which will involve the existential ramifications that will issue from that pro-relational, trans-relationally experienced sense of choice in our seemingly acting on the behalf of that primary relationship in question. This nomenclature is my way of discerning a difference between, say, our movement from descriptions to relatively non-existential prescriptions (involved in genres of behaviour) and our then choosing or not choosing to exercise those definitive existential responses of the first instance as ‘definitive responses of the first instance’.

the irruption of the non-economic. In an extensive suspension, the implication of a causal dimension is exercised through the interfacing of the virtual with the non-virtual, etc., via the re-direction of the apposite use of a de-suspension, etc. (34)

In the invocation of 'working suspensions' we supervise the balanced interactions of intra-mediation of economic correlatives, mediation between economic correlatives, and the intermediation of the entire economy both within an economic sphere and the overall extensive suspension of the super-economic… (35)

In using the interrogative economy as an archetypal exposition of the archetypal; economy, itself in turn given an exposition in gestalt terms of reference, we have hermeneutically oriented backgrounds, phenomenological foregrounds, and the existential mediation of the former (with the intermediation of the same on both an economic level [of conformance] and within a super-economic sphere [of super-conformance] wherein the non-economic is hyper-economically re-appropriated, etc.). (36)

In 'working suspensions' we merely 'suspend all relevant information on a needs to know basis only…' (37)

In a process of conjectural cogency, we explore the logical and dialectical operations needing to be invoked in a manner that is pragmatic useful, is sufficiently found to be logically coherent, non-contradictory, etc., where the presented conjectures of the 'as-if' or the 'what-if', etc., are well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed, etc. (38)

In evidential conformation, truth determinations are cited as being well-informed, etc., and, where such the apparent stability of the truth determinations being made can be re-presented through re-iteration. Where, 'alignment' as a process, is conducted and enacted on the level of analytical-like 'interlocking' of propositional complexes, a synthetical 'overlapping' of contingent statements (as provisional 'facts'), and, the collectively affirmative cogency of propositional-statements involved in the underwriting of articulated conjectural complexes.[187] Furthermore, alignment through re(-)alignment through respectively, re-de-mis-alignment in analytically oriented error correction(involved in a process of deconstruction-reconstruction), merely reiterative realignment of the evidential, and existentially oriented processes of relatively-radical re-alignment. (39)

Thence the demonstration of the apparent overall stability of reiteration as a basis for empirically oriented evidence-formation, etc. (40)

Then, in a process of relative transformational isomorphic invariance we can demonstrate, from a transformational perspective, in what manner a stability of iteration has been preserved. In this regard we utilize concepts as developed in a philosophy of transformational retreatment (as explored elsewhere. Where, in this scheme, we invoke rectification of pretreatment through posttreatment; emendation through deconstruction-and-reconstruction, and, ongoing re(-)normalization through retreatment). (41)

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187 *Pursuit,* III.XII.4.

In the recognition of an existential surplus, we are more interested in determining the comparative extent of such an excess in e/valuational formation. (42)

Then, in a pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism we note in a pro-relational perspective, as experienced trans-relationally, how different forms of existential intervention would be more productive of an existential surplus in e/valuational formation, etc. (43)

Hence the brief noting of a number of conjectural strategies that could establish and consolidate these accumulative forms of conformational affirmation in overall truth determination. (44)

Now, let me discuss the progression of a 'weak positioning' to a 'position of non-weakness/non-strength' without transgressing an ideologically over-committed form masquerading in a so-called 'strong form of positioning' when, more correctly, in applying the non-economic fork, we are more presented with the shell of a position that has no lived-reality in lived-experience but, illusively, is either presented and/or self-presented as having an evidential impact when, as an impossibly economic isolate, its conjectural status is self-negated, but, through the connotational aura of having an existence is imputed to have an existence albeit, correctly, without any valid form of conformational assurance. Where this aura appears to demonstrate the opposite by virtue of the conjecture following a more pragmatic formation. So, e.g., 'I must absolutely exist' because 'I already have a relative form of existence by virtue of my embodiment' overlooking the fact that this inferred progression from the relative to the absolute is a forbidden transgression in logical terms of reference, etc. Where, indeed, relative existence, is more than sufficient for the operation of a conjecture concerning nominative identification, but, its absolutization is neither necessary nor possible. So, this absolute pronouncement is impossible but its illusion of an imputed reality along those lines is able to be made through mistaking a relative nomination as an absolute nomination. In this regard, we can rule out this radically emergent idealization of subjectivity because to do so would be to disembody its relative origination in this world of lived-experience. Thence this relative conjecture of nominative identification and existence, but, that we should reject its impossible absolutization, etc. (45)

Now, let me argue the difficult conjecture that either a 'weak realism', 'weak idealism', and/or a 'weak pragmatism' are perfectly acceptable as long as we do not literalize resident metaphors utilized to run such weak economies, and, where we do not transgress the inherent rules of a conjectural economy by proposing impossible economic isolates, etc. (46)

In the morning, each day, I am faced by the realistic type of choice of choosing either the large coffee mug to accompany my choice of a large croissant or a small coffee cup to accompany my choice of a small croissant, or, drinking a quick glass of water if I have no time to enjoy the previous kinds of breakfast I usually like to eat as just outlined. Here a realistic type of language is acceptable as long as I do not transgress the economic rules of conjectural construction and appreciation. (47)

Then, in making a relaxed decision as to what type of croissant and coffee I wish to partake we could conjecture that I take a somewhat idealistic-like appreciation of what I would rather prefer each morning. If I feel I need to eat something more substantial than a small croissant then I would choose a large croissant, or, conversely, if thinking I need to persevere with my diet, I might choose to eat only a small croissant instead. In this appreciation of my current apperception of my embodiment I do not run a disembodied economy. Everything is wrapped up in the relativity of my feelings, judgments, needs, and the conjectural ascertainment of the same, and so on. (48)

Or, if I need to be more pragmatic, I could consider it to be more pertinent to my current position to just forget breakfast, grab a quick glass of water, and rush off to wherever I was intending to go given that I do not have enough time that morning to have a relaxed breakfast as enjoyed in the usual manner in the light of what would be otherwise my currently perceived desires, and so on. (49)

Therefore, as just noted, weak forms of a realistic positioning, etc., are possible as long as they are not rendered economically non-viable and fully satisfy a non-economically productive sense of resolution, and so forth. (50)

Although the word ‘weak’ here has negative connotations, in a denotational sense, in subverting such connotations, it is far from being purely passive, defenceless, and so on. In a dialectical-like fashion I am channelling the work of John D. Caputo’s ideas on what constitutes for him the presentation of a ‘radical theology’, and, in this regard, what constitutes for me the presentation of a ‘weak philosophy’ (also as a stand in for any ‘weak discipline’). Echoing, as well, the Taoist observation that the weakest thing, namely, water, gets to carve the distinctive contours of the landscape. In a same vein, suggesting that dogmatically presented positions, as ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ forms of ideological extremism, are entirely unsuited for the delicate dialectical work such a discipline needs to subtly engage in in economic terms of reference, etc. Arguing, at the same time, that ‘they cannot do what they say they are doing’ and can only be indirectly productive by ‘not doing what they say they think they are doing’. Metaphors, e.g., as an inescapable economic participant in the interrogative economy, still have work to do even if mistreated and, it is in their shadows, that unimodalist proponents, etc., think that they are performing perfectly sound complex conjectural feats of logical thinking when, in lived-reality, they merely see themselves playing games in mental mirrors where only the mere format of such productivity is being invoked and not any viable formation of a productive form of conformance, i.e., operating processes that clearly lack the integrity, from the perspective of a dialectician, of both re-iterable and integrated truth determinations. (51)

But, although our starting position is in the presentation of a ‘weak’ philosophy, in running a cogent conjectural economy, in cooperation with aligned forms of necessity and contingency, there is produced through ‘intermediation’, as ‘the ongoing working suspension of that economy as situated within its economic context’, the progressive refinement of ‘non-weak’ and ‘non-strong’ processes of disciplinary conformance… (52)

3. Post-Exposition

It was pointed out to me that my attempts to align, say, 'conjectural descriptions' with 'conjectural prescriptions' and 'conjectural proscriptions' (through the auspices, e.g., of a philosophy of transformational retreatment), as discussed in the previous essay, that I was seeking, in effect, a certain degree and form of 'objectivity'. However, this world 'objectivity' could be somewhat misleading since, although we cannot nor should not attempt to escape from forms of relatively viable representationalism, still, from an anti-representationalistic position a traditional approach to 'objectivity' is not the goal so much as conjectural cogency, conformance in overall truth determination through various forms of pre-conditionally required alignments whose re-iterational stability contributes to the requisite degree of conformance and its co-associated semblance of assurance (as intimated in the title to this essay). To work towards a provisional conclusion of this essay, let me explore just what is involved in an in-depth understanding of these interconnected concepts of 'alignment', 'truth determination', 'cogency', 'conformance', and 'assurance', and all other related concepts and terminology… (53)

Through the critical 'eyes' of a radical philosopher much of traditional philosophy deserves to be duly discarded given that such short-sighted disciplinarians are forever attempting to conjugate the impossible, i.e., conjure up, from the impossibility of such infertile nonsense, the definitive resolution of a controversial raft of interminable metaphysical questions that, as they stand, if truth be told, just cannot even be asked… Then, with a so-called 'reputable disciplinarian', they continue, with such a lack of insight to ask of the transcendental phenomenologist, e.g., 'that without a realistic perspective, how could they possibly talk, even mention in a merest whisper, that there could be a difference between, say, 'dream ideation', 'ideation on awakening', 'the memory of a dream', 'speculative imagination', and so on, given that all of the above, apparently, are merely constituted in the personal consciousness of an individual alone? But, as noted earlier in this essay, different types of experience dealing with a similar topic or the general form of a type of intentional objectivity, say, e.g., an apple re(-)presentation', present themselves with a different type of modal spectrum despite overlapping with other types of experience possessing the same or similar intentional objectivity. A 'dream apple' does not satiate physiological hunger but a non-virtual apple will.[188] Or, 'the memory of a memorable apple experience' can be remembered as 'a pleasant experience that also satiated our then physiological hunger, but, now, merely awakens my desire to eat another equally mouth-wateringly delicious apple, and so on and so forth. (54)

So, despite this pseudo-objection that, e.g., for the transcendental phenomenologist that all things are constituted within the personal consciousness of the individual subject and, therefore, cannot be differentiated apart from such a subjective constitution, still, it is obvious that not all experiences are the same, indeed, no experiences are ever exactly the same! Moreover, that they fall under various types of experience, and, that those 'types of experience' are distinctively constituted in terms of their density of those distinctly discernible modalities co-associated with that type of experience along with certain intensities of modal expression all relatively in line with co-associated distinctive

188 Refer to paragraph 6.

types of phenomenological expectation, and so on. That a realistic ornamental apple might look edible and delicious, but, once we know or discover it is not a non-virtual apple then we no longer look upon it as a non-virtual apple but merely as an inedible copy that renders it as only apple-like and not a 'real' apple… given this demonstrable deficiency of modalities we would expect to find in our comparative engagement with a non-virtual example, where the latter acts, once more, as an prime exemplar in terms, collectively, that are already discerned in general, particular and specific terms of reference. Or, more pointedly, that a non-virtual apple, furthermore, must also fully behave and act as an apple-like representation in specific terms of reference (besides conforming to the dictation of general and particular requirements).[189] (55)

In effect, these expressions like 'conformance', 'alignment', 'assurance', etc., all portray a type of 'objectivity of process' that has nothing whatsoever to do with traditional views on a representational philosophy, but, rather, with the iterability of an economic connectedness that arises through these metaphorical forms of an analytical-like 'interlocking' of propositional complexes, a synthetical 'overlapping' of contingent statements (as provisional 'facts'), and, the collectively affirmative cogency of propositional-statements involved in the underwriting of articulated conjectural complexes.[190] Or, put another way, their integrated complex forms of iteration also possesses a distinctive range of coinciding possibilities from the mere reiteration of genres of behaviour (once subjected to rectification) given our expectations as to the type of behaviours in question; forms of error correction (once we analyse the phenomenological nature of the presentation to hand); and, either the critical and/or the potentially radically re-directed reiterations of the either the non-existential and/or existential natures of conjectures (should the latter be conducted in the specificity of a pro-relationally treated sense of context). Let me illustrate these types of iteration.[191] Meta-textual genres of behaviour are usually exercised through repeated patterns of mere repetition, i.e., doing the same thing, more or less, in line with social and cultural-intercultural conventions and expectations. When we write a letter, e.g., we usually invoke an addressee, supply an address, proceed with an address in line with our intentional objectives for writing that letter, and, then sign the same. Thence our ability to badge 'emails' as 'e-letters', and so forth. However, in the adding of content to that specific letter we usually represent a discussion that introduces new materials, and, hence the relatively dissonant-like introduction of sheer forms of repetition (when repetition is no longer merely just repetitive). Furthermore, through analytical 'deconstruction and reconstruction' we might wish to emend that same letter or disseminate our emendations in the next letter. Where emendations are arrived at through processes of re-de-mis-alignment, refining our alignments though the tweaking of details without emending the overall totality and integrity of that same set of details. E.g., if I am told the name of the person in question is 'Stewart James Nobody' but in writing this name down I am then told that 'Stewart', in this instance, is spelt 'Stuart', then, through being told the correction of this small detail, my understanding of the name of this person is suitably emend-

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189 An 'apple like representation' as a representation *qua* relative representation is only being referred to in its conventionally understood usage and not in any impossible philosophical sense as that which is (mis-)treated in either some transcendent and/or immanent manner far beyond the simple linguistic pretensions pertaining to its mere conventional use.

190 Refer to paragraph 39.

191 Refer to the set of four essays titled: *From Mere Repetition to Sheer Iteration*..? (2014)

ed, indeed, more aligned in this age of computers and their need for a precision of input, etc. Last, often from a radical point of view, we experience sudden processes of re-direction that have us heading in relatively new directions. On a couple of occasions have met very charming people who then very soon inform me, either directly or indirectly, that they are merely 'seeking religious converts to some denomination, religion, or cult'. Then, on other occasions have met very nice people, joy of joy, who are truly nice people, who are not interested in 'saving souls' and are a real pleasure to meet and have no ulterior motives behind their enjoying the course of such open, engaging, and non-contrived forms of interactions. With the first type we find good reason to be wary of their deeper motives and quickly change our minds when we discern their true intent, whereas, with the latter, any suspicions are allayed and not suddenly re-directed in some other direction when we discern that they present with no ulterior motives whatsoever. Indeed, the opposite happens, namely, at some point in time, we are clearly re-directed to the fact that these 'people' are 'good people' and where this evaluation is then merely reinforced over the course of time. 'Re-direction', as a chaotically oriented process of judgment, occurs when we suddenly override a previous evaluation by a new evaluation that appears to be much more creditable (or, as slow as we can be, in our being all too human, discover that we have actually already overridden some previous doubt or misconception or formed some new idea or insight not hitherto recognized as having already arisen as that which is now fully fledged, etc.). Often, this change of mind can be quite sudden, and sometimes 'shocking', but, at other times, it might take longer for us to both realize and register the full impact of such forms of re-evaluation. Hence a relatively *ad hoc* distinction can be made between the 'relatively-critical' (realized through entering a conformity with conventional expectations) and the 'relatively-radical' (where expectations themselves could be radically re-constituted). Hence my recommendation for our being open to the relatively-radical if only to discern whether it more likely portends either relatively negative possibilities and/or relatively positive possibilities along with the consequences that would be incurred in and through the adoption of the same, etc. Hence also the understanding that we cannot comprehend the radical-radical if it is too radical to even be constituted in a form that could be registered by ourselves, but, where through incremental shifts we might be able to eventually recognize and register the overall import of the same. Obtaining such 'final' recognition should we be so skilfully instructed or self-instructed, etc., in order, thereby, to manage this grand leap of the intellect should we be able, first, to make the requisitely required small steps involved in its eventually registered overall comprehension and appreciation. Hence 'new' and 'novel' technical languages, 'final' vocabularies, 'definitive' histories, 'definite' interpretations of the last instance, etc,[192] and so on. That without having made such incrementally orchestrated leaps of faith we would still be living in caves and lighting fires by rubbing sticks together if we were imaginative enough to even entertain our performing these simple elementary tasks that would eventually contribute, to our lives-as-lived-together, that thin veneer of civilization that we should so appreciate and wish to build upon... (56)

Thence these forms of mere repetition or reiteration (forming the relatively consonant), sheer repetition or iteration (forming the relatively dissonant), and, bare repetitions (producing through the insightful-like re-iteration of tropes, themes, memes, etc.,

192 In regard to the 'last instance', refer to the next footnote.

the sense and semblance of a state of harmonic-like resolution). Where the interaction between these types of repetition, as forms of iteration, in this trimodal economy of re(-)iteration, has a harmonic basis with the definitive irruption or release of intentional intent in certain re-directed directions repeatedly 'pointed out' (through the repetitive re-iteration (of such co-associated memes, themes, tropes, etc.) by the net force of such dialectical state of interaction whereby definitive forms of resolution can break free from the confines of the simply economic, become non-economically discharged and then suitably and immediately re(-)appropriated within the 'super economy' of 'the overall economy of the economic' (consisting of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic). Where the conjectured imputation of this modelling is made in order to account for the economic, the irruptions of definitive responses of the last instance, etc.,[193] our abilities to only incrementally appreciate the relative-radical one small bite at a time, just as a distant journey begins underfoot, one small step at a time…one after another… Where the imputation of the hyper-economic then establishes a trimodal state of affairs as the 'economic' state for this vision of the super-economic whose simulated overall suspension can be referred to as 'super-intermediations'. Where, in the simple economy of the merely economic its overall suspension, in the form of working suspensions, can be referred to as inter-mediations. (57)

In the title of this essay, I refer to 'conformance' as 'the conjectural assurance of intermediation…' By '…' is implied the addition of mediations and intra-mediations. 'Mediations' concern 'the dynamically balanced suspension of two economic correlativities'. 'Mediational' in the sense that a third economic moment or correlative emerges from the dynamic suspension of such bimodal suspensions. So, e.g., from the suspension of hermeneutic meta-textual genres and phenomenological textual depositions we arrive at the metaphorical advent of the existential and its simulations of the relatively non-textual. Or, through economic complexification, we could argue that through the bimodal suspension, i.e., the dynamic suspension of both syntheses and analyses we find the emergence of conjectures, and v.v. Then, intra-mediations, solely focused, non-absolutistically, on an economic correlativity, can be considered to arise through the automatic de-suspension of the suspension that focuses on the other two economic correlatives.[194] (58)

Understanding, that through the imputation of the super-economic we can define 'super-conformance' as the result of the emergence of the integrity of the super-economic as enacted through intermediation'. Or, more simply, 'the conformance of truth determination arises, basically, through the overall working suspension of the economy in question', i.e., in and through its intermediation. That super-conformance arises through the

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193 I.e., non-economically oriented definitive responses of the last, next, and first instances as explored elsewhere. 'Last instance' referring to 'the non-economic irruption of a relatively non-existential e/valuational formation'; 'next instance' as referring to 'possible existentially oriented modes of intervention'; and, that when the latter are taken up automatically become 'instances of the first moment through the non-economic irruption of a relatively existential form of e/valuational formation.

194 In a similar vein,' mediations' could also be conceived of as 'the economic focusing and suspension of the relevantly required form of intra-mediation within the overall economy in question'. So, e.g., the suspension, and ensuing de-suspension, of the Ego moment would give rise to the inter-ordered phenomenon of factual determination in the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical.

super-intermediation of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic. That it is on the level of the pro-relational, experienced trans-relationally, that we experience the format, formation, and form of the relatively existential *versus* the relatively non-existential… and, from there, the overall conjectural assurance of such resolutions as entertained (and re(-)entertained). (59)

Now, an in-depth appreciation of intra-mediation, etc., would involve our venturing off into the field of inter-ordered phenomena (which will be re-visited shortly). However, at this point in these discussions, let me focus on the nature of 'alignments' and how they have the potential of thematizing an amplification in the general confidence almost inevitably extended to our processes of conjectural appreciation and assurance. (60)

The conception and observation of alignments is predicated on the postulation of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance between economic correlativities either internal to an economy or between economies (through, e.g., economic complexification) (or through either reduplication or duplication in the sphere of inter-ordered phenomena). Let me explain using a conjectural approach to the implication of what is implied in our experiencing wet weather in the form of rain. (61)

In the following conjectural economy, concerning the phenomenon of rain, consisting of analytical propositions, synthetical statements, and conjectures in the form of propositional-statements, we observe the relative invariance of a set of intentional objectives, namely, at a minimum, one subject, one unsheltered locational context situated outdoors, and the phenomenon of rain. Now, the overall economy could be charted or mapped as follows: as a tautological proposition we are informed, 'it is either raining or not raining', and, as a non-tautological proposition, 'when it rains, under the rain, without shelter or protection, you will get wet'; then, as a statement of fact we are told, 'it is raining'; so, as a conjecture we should reason that if we were to go out into the rain, without shelter or protection, we should get wet'. To operate this economy, we could invoke a philosophy of transformational retreatment. I.e., observing the new fact that we will get wet if we were to now go outside into the rain without either shelter or protection, say in the form of either a raincoat and wet-weather hat and/or an umbrella. Across this process of transformation, we observe the relative persistence of that subject, the fact it is currently raining, and that that person would be getting wet. Across this conjectural economy we can see, linguistically, the presence of the designation of 'rain' in each linguistic utterance (in the form of a proposition, etc). Moreover, from a temporal economy of past, future, and present we find a similar set of designations of rain, etc. So, when it rained sometime in the past, we observed either ourselves or someone else getting wet; that we expect the same will occur in the future given the same type of circumstances; and, the immediate anticipation that if we were to go out into the rain right now, we will inevitably get wet. Or, e.g., in an economy of descriptions, etc., we could easily note that if it is currently raining; that the general genre of our going out into the rain will mean our getting wet if we do so without protection from the rain; and, as a general proscription, it is not advisable to go out into the rain because we will get wet, could find it to be uncomfortable, and could catch a cold from not being suitably clothed, etc., etc. That, in a process of economic exemplification within these three economies, and, in a process of eco-

nomic complexification between these three economies, we find the transformational invariance of ‘rain’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘getting wet’, and so on. In other words, we find stable forms of alignment to persist across these three economies of the conjectural, the temporal, and the descriptive that individually augment the apposite degree of conjectural assurance that then also collectively enhances, through emergence, the net import of the appreciation of our experiences of this phenomenon of rain. That through the mutual conjunction of these three economies, e.g., we find the conjectural assurance ‘that when it rains, we will in all probability get wet’ if we do so without adequate protection from such inclement weather. (62)

In transformational terms, we note the person getting wet when it rains. Through the lens of transformational retreatment, we note the following. First, from the perspective of hermeneutic pre-treatment, invoking the genre of ‘going out into the rain’, we note it is raining but that we have not yet stepped outside but expect to get wet if we were to do so. Second, from the perspective of phenomenological treatment, we note we have got wet when we have previously gone out into the rain. Third, when we step out into the rain, we notice our getting wet and take on board that process of retreatment in our ‘getting wet’ in the ‘here and now’. That such an observation implies that we do not need to rectify our current understanding of this genre of ‘going out into the rain’ through a process of posttreatment since our current understanding is both conjecturally assured and stable. (63)

I would contend that this simple conjectural model of ‘our getting wet when it rains’ can be applied to all forms of transformation be they as simple as this example or as complex as they could be in the intricacy of their representative mapping. (64)

Through inter-locking, overlapping, and underwriting of a variety of various forms of alignment, individually and collectively, these positive contributions add to our evolving confidence in the ensuing overall process of conjectural assurance. Another form of contributing assurance can be found in the functioning of both ordered and inter-ordered phenomena. Let me outline what is entailed. (65)

The concept of orders, etc., is predicated, in part, on an ability to psychologically migrate from one order to another adjacent order through the intuitive application of certain rules that allow for such distinctive transitional forms of transformation. In a linear format, on a cognitive level of intentional formation, we could start with atomically structured thoughts; molecularly structured thoughts; then, their being entertained as conceptual ideas; and, then, their perceptual-like imaginings if that type of transition is permissible; followed by the extraction of the intentional content of such perceptual-like states treated, first, as possible states of affairs; and, second, as actual states of affairs (albeit as qualified as ‘provisionally factual’ given the non-subscription to so-called ‘indubitable ideation’ regardless of the degree of conformance and co-associated conjectural assurance being tentatively claimed). In a circular format, the two ends of this linear approach are merely joined. On a trans-cognitive level of judgment, the following types of judgment are proposed, respectively, semantical (and phenomenological); aesthetical; deontological (and existential); pragmatical; potential (and hermeneutical); and, ontical (or fac-

tual). So, e.g., in such a scheme, 'square circles' cannot exist (as integrated 'square-circles') in either a second cognitive order or a second trans-cognitively ordered judgment); Father Xmas has a fifth cognitively ordered status or a positive status in a fifth trans-cognitively ordered judgment, but, cannot migrate to a sixth ordered status although the widespread existence of the 'myth of Father Xmas', as a cultural fact can do so. (66)

Again, invoking the conceptual machinery of a philosophy of transformational retreatment, we can impute the relative transformational isomorphic invariance of certain elements in conjectures attached to these ordered states. So, e.g., in establishing the possibility of a mythical person called 'Father Xmas' the overall notion of such a mythical person can be entertained as far as the fifth order (in both cognitive and trans-cognitive formats).[195] (67)

In an inter-ordered scheme, through the invocation of reduplication and duplication of ordered phenomena I am making the same claim, namely, transformational stability is at the basis of conjectural stability and its co-associated sense and semblance of assurance, etc.[196] (68)

Now, part of this conjectural stability is the ensuing stability in truth determination, i.e., 'conformance' given the ability for truth claims to be successfully reiterated, i.e., as able to be subjected to such 'conformation'. (69)

Therefore, from the successfully reiterated process of conformance, when it could be demonstrated to occur, we can then advance the claim that our weak positioning is strengthened through the apparent viability of such conformation. In other words, through the demonstration of apparent conjectural stability and its co-associated sense and semblance of conjectural assurance we can transmute our 'weak claims' into relatively 'non-weak/non-strong' claims. That, then, collectively, such 'non-weak/non-strong claims' present a relatively 'non-weak/non-strong sense and semblance of positioning' where it is natural to find a certain degree of proportionate commitment without bordering anywhere near pseudo-psychotic-like forms of extremist, ideological over-commitment. Thence the significance of the title of this essay, namely, *Conformance*: *Conjectural Assurance through Intermediation*... (70)

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195 By invoking 'Father Xmas' I am also alluding to the observation noted in Volume II (Book II) that we need a collective approach that is part realistic, part idealistic, and part pragmatic in order to better comprehend the mythical-like existence of such a mythical character. That this same point, or moral, is being reproposed in this essay, albeit as a co-operative combination of a 'weak realism', a 'weak idealism', and a 'weak pragmatism'.

196 The reader can refer to *The Seventh Book*..., and *Book* 9 for detailed expositions on inter-ordered phenomena. By 'reduplication' is meant the symmetrical domination of one order over the same order, e.g., the fifth ordered treatment of the fifth order in asking 'what is the possibility of possibility?' and recognizing that this as the archetypal nature of scientific enquiry, or, e.g., the sixth ordered dominance of the sixth order of that deemed to be actual facts and recognizing that this is the archetypal nature of historical enquiry. 'Duplication' is 'the dominance of one order over some other order', e.g., enquiring as to nature of 'the history of science' (which, as a topic, is 'history' and 'not science').

4. Provisional Conclusions…

Having linked ‘conformance’ with ‘conjectural assurance’, let me now link ‘conjectural assurance’ with ‘intermediation...’. (71)

‘Intermediation...’ is a shorthand term for ‘the overall extensive suspension of that represented state of affairs’ being subjected to such a ‘working suspension’. (72)

A representative sketch of a certain state of affairs is formulated through a conjectural economy that is well-formed (analytically), well-informed (synthetically), and well-expressed (conjecturally), and, where the cogency of that overall, well-expressed expression then collectively contributes to the conformance, conjectural stability, conjectural assurance, etc., observed to be functioning in that specific economy in question. (73)

As intimated, ‘conjectures are the engine room of all disciplines (etc.)’, and, it is ‘only through the suitable exercise of working suspensions that conjectural economies, indeed, any economy, is able to function economically, and, furthermore, productively, in a non-economic sense’! (74)

Just how do suitable suspensions convert apparent conjectural cogency into ‘actual’ conjectural assurance? Through the reiterable nature of truth determination, i.e., conformance. Then, how is conformance to be established? Through the suitable exercise of working suspensions which then immediately gets us to further ask, ‘just how do working suspensions, i.e., intermediations, etc., perform that degree of conformance?[197] (75)

Imaginatively, we can visualize, as follows, the modelling of the extensive suspension like an onion with three skins with the inner skin being The Overall Transcendental Suspension (modelled on the Interrogative Economy); enveloped by The Economy of the De-Suspension; to be, in turn, enveloped by The Causal Economy (mirroring The Super-Economy through the non-economic and its appropriation hyper-economically where, effectively, the sense of the virtual is transmuted into a non-virtual semblance of enactment through a definitive response of the last instance, etc.). Or, we might find it more apposite to reverse this modelling with processes of non-economic irruption, with causal implications, occurring at the apparent center of such a heuristic edifice. (76)

In the discipline of philosophy, not only are suspensions overlooked, but, even more so the fact that suspensions must invite processes of de-suspension lest we be eternally trapped within the psychotic-like confines of the otherwise non-working suspension. Let me briefly outline what is entailed in this imputed Economy of the De-Suspension? (77)

The productivity of The Overall Transcendental Suspension having been performed is then automatically de-suspended with the mediation of the former then result-

[197] The quick answer is through both the evidential present of evidence (in a Tarskian framework) and in the reinforcement that arises through various forms of overlapping of alignment, etc., for the reiteration of such ‘evidence’.

ing in the intra-mediation of the de-suspension output where these three parties then inform the overall expression of this Economy of the De-Suspension. Then, the output of this economy can be envisaged through the intermediation of these three parties, namely, the dynamic balance of all three economic correlatives. This output then forming the input for the Causal Economy (and its enactment through its casual conversion of the virtual into its corresponding non-virtually inform pattern of behaviour). (78)

Then, through intermediation in The Economy of the Overall Transcendental Suspension and The Economy of the De-Suspension we can then envisage the function of the Causal Economy through a similar process of intermediation on that more complex level of performance. But, given, the imputation of the induction of causal productivity through the irruptions of the non-economic we could surmise that the latter, to differentiate it from the former economies, could well be referred to as a process of super-conformance, as realized through conjectural assurance arising from super-intermediation, as will be explored in the next essay. (79)

Now, given this automatic invocation of the de-suspension arising from the wake of the promotion of a suspension how should we account for the ensuing consequences of this form of a reactive response? (80)

A rationalization of the ordered process was instigated through the imputation of this process of the de-suspension. Previously, a subtle preferencing/de-preferencing of the economic correlatives of the Archetypal Economy (of World, Object, and Ego) was invoked as the primary mechanism for the emerging of these six orders (within a specific aspect of the epistemological hierarchy of the psyche, say, the Aspects of the Affective, or Cognitive, or Trans-Cognitive levels of epistemological functioning). Then, later, indeed, more recently, this mechanism of a subtle preferencing/de-preferencing was given an explanation through invoking the imputed observation that a balanced suspension impels an opposite de-suspension along with the relative preferencing incurred in its subtle preferencing of that form of either intra-mediation or mediation singled out by such means. So, e.g., in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of (trans-intentional) judgment the suspension of Ego would subtly de-suspensionally preference the Object-World orientation of the sixth order of ontical judgment of facts. Or, where the mediation of both Object and World moments then subtly de-suspensionally preferences the intra-mediation of Ego as the third order of deontological judgment (along with its existential ramifications) as pertain to the third trans-cognitive order and its formation of deontologically oriented forms of judgment. That, by such simple means all six orders can then be more economically charted. (81)

As noted, in the next essay, let me look more closely at this imputation of super-conformance arising through conjectural assurance issuing from processes of super-intermediation as the medium for the non-economic enaction of a transformational conversion of the relatively virtual to the causally oriented instantiation of the causal status of the non-virtual.... (82)

In summary we might conjecture that the ‘identification of de-suspensions’ could well act as the mechanism for revealing, and exercising, the re-direction of resolutions as revealed non-economically. (83)

That conjectures act as an ideal vehicle for the formation of a neutral language given the working suspension of propositional-statements, etc. (84)

That suspensions, and their automatic invocation of de-suspensions, can be viewed as the metaphorical ‘doorway’ to and from the systematic sense and semblance of the existential through its instantiation of a pro-existential attitude as experienced trans-relationally. (85)

That as a working conclusion we could well conjecture, e.g., that a strong reductive realism must fail through an inability to focus on a significant basis for realistically oriented arguments, and, that a strong emergent idealism must also fail because the basis of an embodiment in this world as lived cannot be economically escaped. That what are we left with, hopefully, are suitably constructed weak forms of both realistic and idealistic forms of positioning, when and where relevant, along with the complementary accompaniment of weak pragmatic readings as well... (86)

However, in a well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectural economy we must also recognize, through the evolution of a stability of conjectural assurance, the inevitably movement towards forms of disciplinary positioning that are relatively non-weak/non-strong without bordering anywhere near the ideological extremist over-commitment of strong impossible forms of positioning that should be entirely discarded through the utilization of the negative implications of the non-economic fork. (87)

Furthermore, we should also recognize that the non-economic irruption of e/valuational formation is productive of both non-derogatory, non-existential forms of e/valuation and existential forms of e/valuation given that the latter is established through the relative existentialization of the former, and v.v. That the latter is to be preferred should be a given, but, never at the expense of the former. As a metaphorical comparison, with some limitations like all analogies, we could opine that an unleavened bread is considerably ‘improved’ with the addition of the right quantity of yeast, but, that we would neither desire mere mouthfuls of either flour or yeast in our desire to be fed. That in the formation of a non-weak/non-strong form of pragmatism coupled with the recognition for a subtle preferencing of the existential we might deem this type of positioning to be both an existential-pragmatism and a pragmatic-existentialism with no desire to treat conventional forms of representation to a non-anti-representationalism. Where through the evolution of a conjectural assurance we should be able to assist in an evolution of social consensus and a co-associated sense and semblance of an authenticity in the building of a working social solidarity through an openness to the non-economic irruptions of the critically-radical and radically-critical along with the advent of those ‘new and novel’ ways of seeing this world at large, this world as lived..!! (88)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 19.5.24.

Appendix A: Notes for an Open Forum: Operating a Non-Economic Fork: The Viability of Weak Forms of Realism, Idealism, and Pragmatism *versus* The Non-Viability of Strong Forms of Realism, Idealism, or Pragmatism

The objective of this open forum is to explore the viability or non-viability of either weak or strong forms of realism, idealism, or pragmatism. To set the stage for this process of either preferencing or de-preferencing these forms of unimodal philosophical positioning I am going to outline the philosophical tool of a 'non-economic fork' and explore both the negative and positive sides of this 'disciplinary implement'. On the negative side, I am going to summarize arguments being explicated in this essay in order to completely deconstruct both a radically reductive realism and a radically emergent idealism through the inability of either party to adequately deal with the contemporary treatment of the financial phenomenon of money within a system of banking, etc. On the positive side of this equation, I will argue for the needed degree of conjectural cogency through the requisite removal of all forms of strong unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism and relativism in the pursuit of a conjecturally organized philosophy that is able to productively engineer a 'neutral exposition' through the additional imposition of 'working suspensions' (and de-suspensions) along with the re-iteration of relevant forms of evidential inputs in conjunction with pragmatically oriented consequential outcomes, etc., capable of appreciating a well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed use of conjectures able, therein and thereby, of contributing to a positive, pragmatic, existential process of consensus building... (0)

To my continual consternation, in pursuing a drive for technical precision, I found I had one expression with diametrically opposed meanings that context, alone, should easily disentangle as to which distinctive sense was being focused on. But, then, to my great relief, I found I could harness this ambivalence by co-opting both meanings within a 'non-economic fork'. In a 'negative aspect', the expression 'non-economical' means 'an inability to operate in the required trimodal terms of reference needed to be present within a certain philosophical or disciplinary economy'. So, e.g., in an economy of analytical propositions, synthetical statements, and conjectural propositional-statements, treating these as economic correlatives, means that in treating any one or two of these parties as an' economic isolate' immediately renders such treatment as impossible to engender... just as Quine so ably demonstrated through 'the mere circularity of the analytical' and 'the impossibility of a reductive and non-given nature of the contingent'. Where I have also argued that the analytic-synthetic distinction by itself cannot function unless inserted within a working economy of the conjectural (or the apposite functioning of some other suitable economy). In contrast, a positive aspect argues that, through economic resolution, judgmental decision making has an irruptive, linear-like nature quite distinctively different from the otherwise endlessly circular nature of economic circulation. Hence its characterization as 'non-economic' in the positive second sense of this expression. But, this chaotic-like process of re-direction needs to be re-accommodated in economic terms and hence my 'overall economy of the economic' or 'super(-economic) economy' in which the economic and the hyper-economic along with the irruptive presence of the non-economic oversees an imputed re-appropriation of the latter within the

collective functioning of this super-economy... further arguing that such re-appropriation needs to be micro-incremental in the re-envelopment of the non-economic through registering a form that is relatively-radical and not radically-radical in its degree of resonance to be experienced within this expanded sense of the super-economic. (1)

Now, I would like to argue that, in the pursuit of a neutral exposition, it would be impossible to purge language of all forms of realistic, idealist and pragmatic denotations and connotations, but, that we can certainly remove all over-committed, extreme ideological forms of such language through the negative use of this philosophical fork and subject the rest to ongoing working suspensions, supplying evidential credence and conjectural cogency to this mix in order to produce material for reasonable forms of consensus building that is also amenable to forms of emendation that further the existential and pragmatic re(-)constitution of such a (short-term) project or a (long-term) program. (2)

That to reject the use of strong forms of either realism or idealism I would like to propose the following argument/s. I would like to demonstrate the relative failure of both a radically reductive realism and a radically emergent idealism of being able to suitably produce a relevant, viable, effective, apposite and comprehensive interpretation of the contemporary functions of money within the overall world of finance given the diminishing use of cash within the financial economy as supported within the current configuration of its co-associated banking system, etc. (3)

> …We may no longer see coins and paper notes, but, we do expect our bank balances, under normal circumstances, to be maintained should they be neither added to nor subtracted from by ourselves. [20]
>
> Once a cashless sphere is contemplated how could a seriously respectable realist interpretation of finance be put forward? They can no longer, metaphorically, make a reduction to the physical presence of money. They can no longer say cash is now in a bank, or in a banking system, when the notion of money has a virtual complexion. Given that banks in Australia bank with the Reserve Bank of Australia and lend money to borrowers of all descriptions, even if they were to operate with just cash most of that cash would be placed beyond the walls of that bank, beyond the walls of all its branches. In effect, translating its deposits into virtual-like obligations between a variety of people and institutions. Then, this raises the following problem for the reductive realist who wants to translate everything into realist-like terms of reference, if a person were to have, say, ten thousand dollars in one account but owe the bank fifteen thousand in another, then, in an overall balance, that person owes that bank five thousand dollars. Just what is the ontological status of that money owing? Does negative money exist? Obviously, the bank is keen to be paid, at least eventually, and, the borrower should be well aware of their obligations in this same matter. But, as banks deal in both deposits and borrowings, deal with customers and other banks, even overseas banks, the reductive-like entracement of those monies to physical alterations in computes within the virtual world of the Internet as encompassed within the confines of certain bank-

ing systems to my mind does not allow the realist to run a realistic-like thesis in regard to banking finance, and, by extension, to the world of lived-experience in its entirety? It they cannot argue satisfactorily for a realist-like basis for finance then why trust them to argue what they would like to do in regard to how they might re-envisage mathematical entities, ethical considerations, judgments of value, the nature of personal identity, and so on and so forth?! [21]

Put quite bluntly, a non-functional reduction to 'electronic inputs and outputs' just does not capture, realistically, the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of 'money' as manifested in lived-experience! [22]

Now, the 'strong' ideological idealist has, somewhat, an opposite set of problems, namely, how could they argue for the sole exclusivity of personal experience? Of course, my experience is 'my experience', still, my experience cannot meaningfully be just of my experience alone. For such an understanding to be entertained, with any degree of significance, we would also need to know just what contrasts personal experience from that which is 'not personal', just what does 'non-experience' mean if this is not able to be experienced as such? Again, what does it mean to be a 'person' and an 'embodied person' if suitable forms of contrast cannot be conveniently found to hand..? [23]

Although the realist cannot credibly harness in a materialistic language the electrical signals in electronic chips, and in their inter-wiring, and in the same transfer of information as found passing through the air, in a realistic and convincing form of a narrative, still, the residual presence in the world, however non-realistically residual, is a powerful counter-weight to the idealist since the very foil of a set of realistically oriented 'ideas' is necessary for them to even make the barest sense of such idealistically over-treated notions of 'self', of 'mind', of 'subjectivity' and 'personal identity', etc. Since such a necessary contrast to ideation is non-idealistically oriented it follows that any possibility of a pure unimodally constituted idealism should quickly fall by the wayside… should the system be infected with computer viruses or malfunction or should the power fail or be switched off... and be disposed of as no more than just another instance of 'ideological trash' that should be promptly discarded and conveniently forgotten. [24]

So, that granted, what are we left with? A world of living-experience, textually treated as lived-experience, where all relations are directly engaged, where experience is embodied and where such experience cannot be reduced to unimodal narratives of either a strong, ideological realism or a strong ideological idealism, or, for that matter, any form of a strong ideological narration be it cast in any type of either an impossible unimodal, bimodal, absolutistic or relativistic type of format. [25]

So, (as if carefully applying the philosophical tool of a 'non-economic fork) in having to dispose of that which needs to be radically negated, let me now turn my attention to a positive side of the equation wherein we can operate a neu-

tral schematization of experience through the positive use of relatively non-realistic and non-idealistic languages (along with the dismissal of all other 'strong' forms of over-committed ideological nonsense), suitably exercise working suspensions, invoking forms of conjectural cogency through evidence, alignments, the demonstration of the requisite degree of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc. [26]

How might this philosophical ambition for a relatively neutral language be performed? Through the use of conjectures in a conjectural economy subjected to 'working suspensions', i.e., processes of intermediation, etc. Hopefully, therein, to meet the requisite degree of conformal stability and assurance in accord with the nature of our enquiries. [27]

The hyphen, say, in 'living-experience', and its textualization in 'lived-experience', or, in the use of the expression 'life-world', or its equivalent 'world-of-life', is indicative of this relational engagement between the relatively realistic and the relatively idealistic as well, I might add, our ability to engage a relative transformational isomorphic invariance as clearly functioning for(-)us between various economic correlativities. Just as in banking, a set of relatively invariant isomorphisms are set up between cash, should it have been present, bank balances, debt obligations, electronic transfers, payments for goods and services, etc. Or, in more general terms, as will be found between conjectural descriptions, (non-existentially oriented) conjectural prescriptions, and (existentially oriented) conjectural proscriptions, etc. Or, indeed, within and between 'weak' realistic notions of relational identity and 'weak' idealistic notions of embodiment, etc. Or, again, as found within and between objects and persons, communities and institutions, and so on. [28]

Or, once more, between the pre-relational, the relational, and the (existential) pro-relational (and its co-associated existential subjectivity of trans-relational subjectivity). Let me elaborate on what is isomorphically entailed between these levels in epistemological organization)? [29]

But, before following up on more technical details of this nest of conjectures let me briefly sum up the overall import of these arguments to date. [30]

In my opinion, a relatively radical realistic reductionism progressively fails to construct a useful and effective narrative concerning a sensible exposition of lived-experience. That, furthermore, in progressively moving away from sense-experience to mathematical concepts, from (non-existential) value judgments to pragmatic and existential forms of discernment, and so on, it appears to increasingly take on a non-economic complexion and tenor in the negative sense of this expression. In my analogical argument over virtual money, it fails to proffer a realistic appreciation of this type of phenomenon. At the same time, this residual realist reduction to computer chips, electrical wiring, various manifestations of the Internet, etc., is more than enough to seriously deflate or evaporate, i.e., thorough-

> ly deconstruct the impossible pretensions of the relatively radical emergent idealist since with the presence of computer bugs and flaws, corruption of computer codes, or just a power failure, such events are enough to completely disable computer banking, etc. The idea of 'virtual money in a cashless society' will persist, but, because it remains 'virtual', when dis-embodied from its realistic substrate, when the system is corrupted or completely disrupted, and no longer 'embodied' in the world at large, then the 'absence' of the non-virtual expression of this banking system will be experienced as an 'absence of functioning', a state of affairs without pragmatic utility should this systematic substrate remain disabled and, therein and thereby, remain 'dis-embodied'. That, all 'economic isolates', be they realistic or idealistic or pragmatic in complexion and tenor; be they unimodal, bimodal, absolutistic or relativistic in construction, in being removed from their economies of origination, cannot function given the impossible nature of their imputed non-economic construction. Moreover, that granted, then we need look no further in the hope of finding a positive form of non-economic resolution since the pre-conditions for such economic fruitfulness and productivity would have been ruled out by the negational aspect of this non-economic fork. On the positive side of this ledger, ruled over by this non-economic fork, through the affirmation of the apparent cogency of various conjectural strategies we can re-cast philosophical and disciplinary positions as relatively 'non-weak' or 'non-strong' from their initial status as possessing positions that are 'weak' without having to subscribe to the impossibility of 'strong forms' of an impossible ideological over-commitment, etc. Where it is envisaged that such cogent conjectural strategies would include the skilful exercise of ongoing working suspensions, the establishment of relevant forms of alignment through various forms of re(-)alignment, evidential conformation (in truth determination), the apparent stability of reiterable processes in conjectural argumentation, the demonstration of the requisite degrees of relative transformational isomorphic invariance, the exhibition of a sufficient surplus in e/valuational formation, the acceptable formation and dissemination of a progressively expanded form of a pragmatically well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed degree of a social consensus, and so on and so forth… [31] (4)

In summary, the overall argument, in the form of an analogy, could be restated as follows: a realist approach cannot do justice to the virtual nature of finance, whereas, in contrast, a radically emergent idealism, like the banking system, could not operate should the computer codes be totally hacked and infected with computer viruses, or, more simply, should the power fail to be supplied. In effect, a reductive realism focuses too narrowly on parts of the system and, therein and thereby, misses their contextually generated significance, whereas, a radically emergent idealism must remain embodied in the world to some extent since when those computers are no longer linked or the system crashes for whatever reason, then that emergent phenomenon simply evaporates. As for the non-economic in its positive sense, we can view its points of emission, or irruption, as indicative of processes of economic resolution that might well furnish additional insights into how the pragmatic and existential functionings of this world as lived might be further amplified (through either non-chaotic, incremental augmentation and chaotic, non-incremental enhancement of such relational forms of interaction should such interven-

tions prove to positively enrich such proceedings, i.e., contribute forms of e/valuational formation that assists us in the making of our passages through this world at large both individually and collectively). (5)

Keeping this analogy of 'the virtual nature of a cashless system of finance' in mind, let us now explore the viability of other versions of philosophical positioning using realistic, idealistic, or pragmatic metaphors in either the potential cogency of weak forms of articulation or in the more than likely non-cogency of strong forms of articulation. 'Weak forms' being seen as 'harnessing the non-literal nature of their resident metaphors', and, strong forms being rightly seen as 'improperly harnessing the literal nature of their resident metaphors, and, in the process, thinking the truly impossible and only making some modicum of sense when they overlook such nonsense and actually disregard their own impossible forms of positioning'. Strong forms of positioning being evident through evidence of a pseudo-psychotic style of over-commitment (rather than reasonable forms of conviction that would be found attendant upon reasonable forms of commitment which would invite a dialogical style of interaction rather than monological forms of dissemination). In addition, we can note a general, non-circularity of argumentation, conjectural cogency, relative coherency and non-contradiction in the presentation of such open processes of positioning capable of being amenable to emendation when duly called for. Since comprehension demands a transformation of understanding not its perfection. (6)

That, in this open forum, our prime consideration is to make an informed assessment of the economic viability of those types of philosophical or disciplinary position being set forth for such discernment..?! (7)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 13.5.24.

Working Summation of Key Ideas Informing this Open Forum

The complex position that was being put forward by myself was that in using the 'non-economic fork' we should reject over-committed, ideologically extreme forms of strong positioning, regardless of whether that is a 'strong realism', a 'strong idealism', and/or a 'strong pragmatism', etc., on the negative grounds of their economic impossibility to be either recognized, encountered, and/or engaged, and, instead, focus on viable positions of either a 'weak realism', 'weak idealism', or a 'weak pragmatism', or, preferably, a responsive and responsible combination of all three orientations, where through a viable process of conjectural consideration the 'final' positioning takes on a more assured format, formation, and form through the taking up of a 'non-weak'/'non-strong' sense and semblance of re(-)positioning.[198] That the key arguments behind this 'final' positioning are here summarized. (8)

[198] 'Final' positioning is an obvious allusion to to the 'final' vocabularies of Richard Rorty. By the concept of 're(-)positioning' is meant 'an ongoing trimodal economy, say, with the three moments or economic correlatives of (phenomenological) positioning, (hermeneutical) repositioning, and (non-systematic) existential re-positioning'.

Now first, I would like to note that ‘e/valuational formation’ takes on two potentially mutual orientations, namely, ‘non-existential’ in a ‘neutral, non-derogatory sense of the judgmental evaluations and their entailed valuations of the everyday’ *versus* ‘those forms of e/valuational formations that more considerably contribute to the richness and enrichment of the relationships in question but where its relative absence or absenting contributes to a corresponding degree of lived-inauthenticity through the de-enrichment of those affected relationships’. (9)

1a. (Non-Existentially Oriented) Negative Treatment via the Non-Economic Fork

The analogy of a cashless financial system was invoked in order to demonstrate that the radically reductive realist had nothing to substantially focus their attention on as fully representative of the functioning of our finances since, e.g., the binary codes at the basis of the representation of our finances on, say, a computer screen, do not exclusively belong to financial transactions, etc., given that such a basis is also utilized in social media, the dissemination of emails, the workings of our mobile phones, and so on. (10)

But, this same vestigial residue, that denied a viable realist reduction, was more than enough to deconstruct the radically emergent idealist since without such ‘embodiment’ in this financial system the financial world of banking, etc., would collapse as when computer bugs and flaws, or malevolent instances of computer hacking, or the simple failure of the power supply, would subsequently render such a system as unable to function. That the dis-embodied idea of virtual banking, itself, could not function as a basis for banking, etc., being just as ridiculous as the idea that a president thinking and saying that ‘they could de-classify confidential documents by a mere act of their imaginative willpower’ (since, if that were the case, then I am sure they could equally order a fast-food lunch in a similar [impossible] manner). (11)

Now, it behooves a respectable and reputable pragmatist to equally dismiss both of these previous alternatives, but, at the same time, not to promote any other ideologically over-committed form of positioning since ‘conjectures are the engine room of disciplinary behaviour’, and, then, it is only through the exercising of working suspensions that the same, as a necessary precondition, must be present before such an approach can be co-opted to function effectively in the positive sense of the productive irruption of the non-economic (through invaluable points of conjectural resolution capable of clarifying both the richness and enrichment of our relationships in the mutual co-existence of both non-existential and existential orientations). The implication being that the utilization of working suspensions is antithetical to any form of extremist, ideological over-commitment whilst also observing the condition that a working philosopher or disciplinarian or secularist should also find a certain degree of commitment, from conjectural assurance, arising through the suitable conducting of their critical, and potentially radical, operations entailed in the reasonable articulation of their conjectural economies. (12)

That such a highly pragmatic approach would also recognize, etc., the viability and invaluable contributions to be made by the collective uptake, when and where relevant, of weak forms of realism, idealism, and/or pragmatism, etc. That, through the skill-

ful operation of our conjectural economies, we can then proceed (through such conformance in truth determinations and co-associated conjectural alignments) to shift from a relatively weak sense and semblance of positioning to a more assured sense and semblance of a 'non-weak/non-strong form of ongoing provisional re(-)positioning'. (13)

1b. (Non-Existentially Oriented) Positive Treatment via the Non-Economic Fork

Now, furthermore, through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, instigated through the suitable exercise of our working suspensions, we also arrive at the relative existentialization of process in which we can discern, through existential modes of intervention, the relative enrichment of our relationships. In this regard, I would like to add that through such progressive forms of mutual enrichment that we take on a pro-relational sense and semblance of a trans-relational subjectivity that holistically informs, to that extent they can be recognized, the better trajectories to be adopted and adapted in our relations with others...[199] (14)

2a. (Existentially Oriented) Positive Treatment via the Non-Economic Fork

That, when a pro-relational identification with our primary relationships is entered into, through representative suspensions and the automatic de-suspensions of our working representations, then we can open ourselves up to the coincidental and mutual paralleling of the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential. (15)

2b. (Existentially Oriented) Negative Treatment via the Non-Economic Fork

However, when the contrary is more observed we remove ourselves from such trans-relational identification with our relationships then taking on more transactional modes of intervention to the relative detriment of our relationships through the relative inauthenticity of such re-positioning. (16)

As tantamount to the devaluation or dis-valuation, and, ultimately, the disestablishment, of relational richness and integrity, and, therefore and thereby, the initiation and dissemination of relative inauthenticity, and, as such, that which is to be avoided! (17)

Thence this tentative set of working proposals, namely, to disregard what is to be dismissed through the application of the negative aspects of the non-economic fork, and, to accept and promote the positive implications of this same non-economic fork when such re(-)positioning can be demonstrated to contribute to either the non-existential and/or existential enrichment of our relationships. That, in pursuit of this overall objective, we dismiss all strong forms of positioning and, instead, work with weak forms of positioning in the aspiration of developing non-weak/non-strong forms of re(-)positioning more capable of enriching our relationships both non-existentially and existentially..!! (18)

N.T., 18.5.24.

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[199] To a great extent our genres of behaviour set the critical parameters for such questions, but, that the import of the relatively-radical can either negatively and/or positively emend their ensuing profile...

XIM. Super-Conformance: Conjectural Assurance Through Super-Intermediation…

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIM. Super-Conformance: Conjectural Assurance Through Super-Intermediation…*[200]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

In this essay, I will first revisit additional arguments *contra* a strong pragmatism before segueing towards an understanding of what might also be implied in forms of either a weak realism or a weak idealism, and, moreover, what might be implied in a philosophy that entails the integrated working together of all three options. Then, the concept of 'conformance' will be explored in terms of an interlocking, overlapping, and underwriting of different aspects of the conjectural economy before exploring the non-economic implications of the 'super economy', 'the overall economy of the economic', and its imputations for a concept of 'super-conformance; through 'super-intermediation', etc. The ramifications of this understanding will then be unpacked in terms of the meta-philosophical appreciation of the same, to be explored in the next essay,[201] and the how an appreciation of the existential dimension implicates a 'non pragmatic-pragmatical fork',[202] i.e.., 'the non-required making of an exclusive differentiation between the deontological and the pragmatical in both non-moral and moral forms of judgment' (as an introduction to a 'pro-relational ethics' to be explored in a latter essay[203]). (0)

That introduction, as just outlined, is predicated on the dialectical understanding that the economic cannot be just economic, and, the non-economic irruptions of resolution involved in the determination of an instantiated motivation cannot remain purely in a non-economic form(at, formation, and form) and thence the imputation of the hyper-economic, etc., along with the imputation of super-conformance, etc. In effect, the ramifications for an integrated appreciation of truth determination must travel far beyond the mere confines of a conjectural economy without divorcing itself from such processes. (1)

As a quick guide to the technical terminology used in this essay, as already introduced, let me re-define the following. 'Conformance' is 'the imputation that truth determination finds a validation through reiteration that, at its most basic, is either apparent confirmation in real time or verification inferred beyond the time limits of the former'. Moreover, truth functions cannot be performed merely in terms of individual truth determinations given that a hierarchical body of truth determinations is already implicated as a perquisite for the delivery of such forms of appreciation. Furthermore, through various forms of alignment, in an economy of re(-)alignment, conformation either is reinforced or suitably emended, albeit, technically, with a permanent provisional status. The super-economic reiteration of this process being treated through a non-economic lens. Both 'intermediation' and 'super-mediation' being treated as 'processes of suspension, etc.' (2)

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200 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

201 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIN.

202 This fork can also be understood as a 'non-existential fork', i.e., 'the non-required making of an exclusive differentiation between the existential (centered in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological) and the non-existential (as manifested primarily through the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical) in both non-moral and moral forms of judgmental appreciation of 'our' current situatedness in this world at large.

203 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIO.

1. Exposition

In the previous essay a strong pragmatism was declared to be economically unviable on the grounds of the necessity of our having to perform suspensions, etc., in order to operate any economy, and, in our necessarily having to perform suspensions in order to operate economically it follows that we cannot take any form of an extremist, ideologically over-committed type of positioning given the suspension of such positioning. However, it could possibly be argued that once suspensions, and their automatic invocation of de-suspensions have occurred, in the formation of an ensuing position, albeit, technically, as provisional in status, an extremist philosophy could then be enunciated? But, should a pragmatic economy be hypothetically referred to as an 'economic sub-economy' within a broader sense of the economic that also included forms, say, of a weak realism and a weak idealism then its treatment as an 'economic isolate' must also be treated as forbidden, at least hypothetically. But, the hypothetical scoping of this qualification, as an objection, can be countered and dispensed with given the understanding that there can exist no economy that can operate purely on its own self-referential terms of reference and, therefore, there can exist no form of an economic isolationism with the direct implication that all strongly articulated disciplines must be regarded as self-rendering themselves as economically non-viable despite all protestations to the contrary. Let me explore this more broadly based critique of a so-called 'strong pragmatism' and all other forms a discipline that seeks to disseminate any other form of an impossible so-called 'strong mode of disciplinary dissemination'. (3)

Now, it could be argued that the apparent strength of the pragmatic approach resides in the declaration that the comparative utility or non-utility of certain arguments in a certain set of seemingly cogent arguments should be the sole decider of that which deserves to be nominated as either 'pragmatically useful' or 'not pragmatically useful', i.e., that which, respectively, can be rendered as a construction that is either 'pragmatic' or 'not pragmatic' in effect. Superficially, this approach seems to deserve our respect, but, should not be merely countenanced on the following three grounds of concern, namely, that there exists various grounds for determining utility; that utility cannot be determined purely in functional terms of reference alone; and, as the collective functioning of truth determination (i.e., conformance, and by extension, super-conformance) is not an isolated affair, and, so, therefore, for these reasons, and others, no strong form of pragmatism can be nor should be preferenced, i.e., neither prioritized, nor privileged, nor promoted on the grounds of its economic non-viability.[204] On the other hand, in a weak form, pragmatism through conjectural assurance, etc., can suitably migrate towards a status that is both non-weak and non-strong and which duly deserves both our philosophical attention and existential commitment whilst having no truck whatsoever with any extremist, ideological form of a pseudo-psychotic-like over-commitment. (4)

Judgments of a pragmatical disposition (of a fourth trans-cognitively ordered character) (to be differentiated from a much broader concept of the 'pragmatic' that will include aesthetical, deontological and existential considerations beyond considerations of a mere expediency of the merely 'pragmatical'), i.e., relative expediency can be catego-

[204] I.e., cannot be established across the three times of past, present and future.

rized under a number of headings, e.g., mere expediency, effectiveness, efficiency, economical-ness (or parsimony), expeditiousness, efficaciousness, etc. Just as one medication, e.g., could effectively treat the symptoms of a medical condition without addressing the root cause of that medical phenomenon whilst another medication could be more efficacious in this latter regard.[205] So, how are we to choose between the effective and the efficacious? Do we need to choose? (5)

In answering that rhetorical question, we could well just fall back on taking a 'pragmatic stance'. On an individual situation by situation basis, what is the more useful course of action to follow? And do we have to be exclusive? Why not adopt and adapt both an effective response and an efficacious response if not contraindicated?[206] (6)

However, let me return to my banking analogy to explore what possible ramifications it might also have for the exercising of a pragmatic sense of positioning? (7)

Now, the successfulness of the banking system and its current trajectory towards a cashless economy is completely dependent upon the enaction of the sequential operation of transitional-transformations, in the form of money transfers, between different parties whilst, at the same time, being able to aggregate the overall consequences of such carefully controlled forms of micro-management within a certain company all within the interconnectedness of a certain system among nations, etc. In other words, in pragmatic terms, we might draw the conclusion that the successfulness of the financial system is dependent upon both realistic-like forms of focus and idealistic-like systematic forms of aggregation with both orientations being entertained in parallel. That in a similar manner, the pragmatic disposition, with its emphasis upon 'functional utility', is equally beholden to these two preconditions that require these realistic-like and idealistic-like inputs and outputs for the very existence of a pragmatically oriented sense and semblance of an overall output capable of exhibiting such functioning able to demonstrate such 'utility' (in some mode or other be that pragmatical in orientation or otherwise). Or, to spell this out more simply, parts and wholes must effectively cooperate in order to exhibit any sense and semblance of the pragmatic. That to invoke a pragmatic dimension we must do so with at least some attention, be it either overt or covert in character, to the parallel cooperation of a realistic-like and idealistic-like set of inputs and a set of outputs, where some of which could then be deemed to be 'pragmatic' in orientation in a broad sense if not 'pragmatical' in orientation in a narrow sense (when and where the latter is more focused on some semblance of expediency in all its many forms[207]). In other words, as a

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[205] As in the treatment of ulcers, e.g., with symptomatic relief in the form of the use of an antacid, but, where the root cause of that ulcer, in the form of a more rampant bacterial infection, is efficaciously treated with the now requisite use of a triple antibiotic.

[206] Again referencing, obliquely, the previously footnote as an example. If in gastric pain the use of an antacid might be the first option over the short-term, but, over the longer term, the use of an antibiotic might be called for. Antacids do have some role in reducing the efficacious nature of some antibiotics, e.g., amoxicillin. However, this triple antibiotic, as a mix of amoxicillin (or the substitute of metronidazole if allergic to the former) and clarithromycin, along with a proton pump inhibitor where the latter has properties with effects very similar to an antacid in overseeing the reduction in acid formation within the stomach.

[207] As referenced, e.g., in my *ad hoc* list of pragmatical characteristic beginning with the letter 'e', such as expediency, effectiveness, efficiency, etc.

logical consequence of this argument, if the pragmatic cannot be meaningfully separated from both qualified realistic and idealistic inputs, etc., then it would appear that we should entertain all three forms of weak philosophizing as economic participants under the umbrella of the same economy? I.e., as mutually co-defining economic correlatives given this apparent inability to entertain such economic isolates apart from their overall economy of the realist-idealist-pragmatic, where, I should add, such economic correlatives co-define each themselves through the joint negation of the other two parties. (8)

Now, this economy granted, at least hypothetically, just what can we say, both individually and collectively, about such putative economic correlatives? That a 'weak realism' is none other than the exercising of a 'weak phenomenology'. That a 'weak idealism' is none other than a 'weak hermeneutics', and, a weak pragmatism is none other than a weak 'existentialism'. And, surprise of surprise, collectively, this is none other than a 'weak philosophy' given my previous definition of the 'philosophical economy' as 'one-part phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one-part (non-systematic) existentialism!' (9)

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By 'phenomenology' is meant a 'transcendental phenomenology' dealing with the 'phenomenal-phenomenological along with its focus on intentional objectivity as observed through the auspices of the transcendental suspension'. But, by the expression 'transcendental' what I usually mean is 'the trans-intentional nature of judgment operating within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the epistemological hierarchy (psyche)'. And by 'suspension' is meant an 'extensive suspension' which can be simplified as '(overall) working suspension' where a 'dynamic balance is entertained between and within correlatives, intentional processes and content, the representation of specific relationships as situated in their relational situatedness within this open world at large' (and where each correlative invokes a distinctive type of suspension as exemplified in the articulation of the interrogative economy[208]). (10)

So, in this regard, the 'philosophical economy', as defined by myself, can be seen as 'one-part phenomenology, one-part hermeneutics, and one-part existentialism (in its non-systematic sense[209])', and, where this same economy, in its non-ideological weakness, can be seen to parallel a weak 'realism-idealism-pragmatism'. Moreover, an 'appre-

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[208] I.e., a rhetorical first moment centered on a dis-conjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'; the metaphorical first reply centered on the conjunctive suspension of like (cashed out as both 'like and not like'); and, the second reply in the form of an apparitional reading citing a more literal form of interpretation realized through the ongoing dynamic balance of the former. These three economic correlatives form what I designate as an 'overall transcendental economy'. Then, we need to take into some form of an account the role of the de-suspension and where this aspect then has the function of inducing a causal dimension and, by such putative means, giving a 'voice' to the pragmatic/existential dimension.

[209] That an overall suspension of this economy, through a dynamic balance of its three economic correlativities, is then instrumental in shifting a relatively non-systematic existential state of affairs to a more systematic existential orientation, i.e., shifting its existential complexion more towards an intersubjectively oriented sense and semblance of an interactiveness (and, at the same time, towards a more prorelational form of a pragmatic appreciation, etc., i.e., one that is more capable of taking on a non-weak/non-strong form of commitment, etc. [and, therein and thereby, bypassing the non-pragmatic(al fork)]).

ciation of a weak philosophical economy' realizes a 'meta-philosophical economy', i.e., a 'weak metaphysical economy' in these qualified terms of reference as just supplied.[210]

(11)

Now, the ground work has been laid for an economic appreciation of conformance. I.e., a more systematic appreciation of the phenomenon of truth determination as exercised within a certain discipline. (12)

To begin with we need to understand that the psychological productivity of intentional consciousness and trans-intentional judgment (along with an appreciation of the sensory-motor and impressional-affective (mood) within the Affective Aspect) are all experientially realized more as fully-formed end-products rather than as a complex set of parallel functions sequentially entertained on a more itemized basis. As a partial *fait accompli*, where we appear to have some input in the final finishing of such productivity, but, then, also in a retrospective sense where we seek to more rationalize the apparent processing of such a formation of content. In effect, invoking the Duhem-Quine thesis that truth determination is not and cannot be a simple set of sequential steps but the cooperative operation of a body of truth determinations where the evaluation of a certain truth declaration or the certain re-evaluation of a previous determination is more a peripheral affair rather than some more naked, sequential appreciation of a single strand of propositions, statements, propositional-statements, etc. E.g., consider the truth determination of the following proposition – 'That Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon (and by doing so signalled the start of a civil war)'. As an expression we understand what is meant by 'crossing the Rubicon', i.e., 'making a radical decision that cannot be undone, etc.' However, for an historian to re-determine the truth of such a statement a well-understood body of knowledge is needed in order to comprehend the pre-conditions, the conditions, and post-conditions; along with the ramifications of this set of intentions demonstrating obvious Caesar's intent to initiate a civil war in 49 BCE. Obviously understood by the powers that were in the capital Rome (with Pompey and his fellow senators fleeing across the Adriatic Sea to Dyrrhachium and finally losing to Caesar in the battle at Pharsalus in 48 BCE). Now, to envisage the counterfactual of 'Caesar not crossing the Rubicon, etc.' the historian would have to be 'more than creative' in order to account for the sequence of events that followed on in the wake of this single step in this same sequence of events. Of course, in this instance, to be 'more than creative' is practically impossible. Counterfactuals can be contemplated, but, their exercise in this instance is not a productive way of doing history as the asymmetry between the received set of facts, as more or less recorded, and their counterfactuals reconsideration is far too heavily weighted towards the former. Now the moral of this historical analogy is that truth determination, as a process, is not and cannot be a simple set of sequences where we evaluate the truth status of each of those individual steps and then come to some form of an overall collective truth determination. We could attempt something like that retrospectively, but, most certainly not prospectively except in the most simplest of circumstances. Now, admittedly, some moral decisions could be conducted along those lines. E.g., if I were to go scrumping for some fruit in an orchard I did not have permission both to enter and pick fruit there then such

[210] I.e., where the metaphysical economy results from the reduplication of the philosophical economy as tentatively explored in *Book* 9. This topic will be further explored in the next essay.

actions could quite rightly be seen as ‘stealing’. However, to determine the truth status of certain aspects of a complex historical situation a lot more information usually needs to collectively organized, which, fortunately, might well be found in the work of historians who have previously addressed that same set of circumstances. I.e., pointing out this same understanding that need to be addressed, namely, that truth evaluation is process where a body of truth determinations needs to have been already formed and where forms of re-evaluation will be more peripheral to that body of knowledge than those considerations that, with a much greater degree of difficulty, attempt to take up a more central set of concerns. In the same manner, this concept of conformance is to be understood along similar lines. In effect, operating more top-down and never with an atomistically treated set of facts to be operated form the bottom-up, etc. Yes, I introduced ‘conformation’ as ‘an iterated process of truth determination, i.e., as confirmation or verification of a prior confirmation or verification, etc.’ However, ‘conformance’, whilst recognizing an important role for the iteration of truth determinations, will oversee individual acts of conformation through this prerequisite of a body of truth determinations that has already formed and whose overall impact then informs any seemingly isolated peripheral act of truth determination. Therefore, in this light, we can see individual acts of truth determination, dealing with lived-experience (and not some artificial and simplistic logical system dealing with a small set of propositions, etc.), as functioning within such a system and as such either merely reestablishing the truth determinations already made to date or subjecting the same to relatively superficial forms of emendation. However, we should also note that, from time to time, small emendations can have chaotic ramifications not proportional to the actual quanta of the shifts in truth determination being realized through such micro-incremental emendation. Where, indeed, such radical outcomes can initiate processes of innovation instrumental in processes of considerable re-direction along with the creation of ‘new and novel’ approaches, ‘final’ vocabularies, ‘definitive’ histories, and so on. That the upshot of this type of understanding is that a pragmatic openness to innovation, and its radical ramifications, is a hallmark of the existential dimension and hence my identification of the ‘radically pragmatic’ with this ‘spirit of the existential’ to both invite and invest in the potential fruitfulness that could possibly flow on from the careful uptake of such positive shifts in re-direction. (13)

Such an inherently systematic approach understood, it also follows that the truth status of both propositions and statements, and as well conjectures, could never occur from a mere inspection of a simple set of propositions, or statements, or conjectures. That only as a simplified economic representation of the objectives of a certain enquiry could such scrutiny be exercised should its terms of reference be well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed. Or, more simply, only in and through a well-constructed, ‘cogent’ conjectural economy could such processes of conformation be sequentially enacted within the prerequisites, etc., of an overall process of conformance where, obviously, the latter cannot be systematically represented other than symbolically although observing the spirt of such conformation through an observance of the well-formed, etc., that relevantly pertain to the intentional objectives of that specific enquiry. That, in that regard, we might designate such attention to the relevant, etc., as being ‘well-observed’, and, where the cogently exercised conjectural economy, as representative of the overall circumstances under such scrutiny, might also be deemed to be decidedly ‘con-fluential’ in that same

regard. I.e., where the net confluence of propositional necessity, statement contingency, conjectural cogency both creates and recreates (and thence re(-)creates) this (neologism) of the ‘confluential’, i.e., that which is influential in the conformation of the overall truth status of a certain relational situation as representatively represented in and through the demonstrated cogency of that conjectural economy in question. That, optimistically, by being able to attend to the relevant in such simulated representations a process of conformance can be successfully delineated in such a manner that it can also be reiterated without too much additional emendation occurring thereafter. (14)

Now, what grounds do we have that such optimism can be well-observed? (15)

‘Conjectures can be viewed as the engine room of disciplines’, like, e.g., philosophy, etc., and, ‘suspensions can be viewed as the primary mechanism for the operation of all such disciplines’. That granted, it also follows ‘that well-exercised suspensions can lead to the well-performed functioning of their respective disciplines’. Let me explore these ‘reflections’ and review the possible validation of such ideas. (16)

Previously, on a number of occasions I have noted that no mere inspection of either propositions or statements, either individually or collectively, is going to inform any form of a conjectural cogency of the apparent situatedness of that situation being represented through that selected set of statements assuming they are well-informed factually. Only in and through the confluence of a confluentially constructed conjectural economy can processes of conformation occur under the auspices of that same conjectural economy. Central to such forms of judgmental appreciation is the well-performed functioning of extensive suspensions, i.e., working suspensions apposite to the realization of the objectives entailed in such enquiries. That granted, let me demonstrate how such suitably observed working suspensions assist in overseeing such processes of conformation. (17)

Now, dialectically, the formation of a representative appreciation of a certain situation could well lead to our asking questions about that the phenomenological nature of that relational situation in its relational situatedness, but, then, equally, the asking of certain questions could further thematize the nature of that same situatedness, etc. Similarly, such questions could be arrived at either through a problematization of what is already to hand, or, finding certain problems are already to hand that invite a deeper thematization of that situatedness in question. But, then, given no representative appreciation of a certain situation ‘suddenly drops from the heavens’, so to speak, it follows that this gestation of question-and-answer is more a holistic process that occurs over time. Furthermore, that the quality and detail of either a question or an answer will also reflect this holistic richness of detail already in place before the scrutiny of such explorations, in effect, re-begins and ‘re-continues’. Such is the nature of a gestalt appreciation of that which is being brought to hand. Now, given, that processes of re-direction will occur, from time to time, if not moment to moment, over the course of our intentional lives it is an obvious question to ask, ‘just how are such chaotic processes, be they positive, neutral or negative in their consequences, to be either enacted virtually or acted upon in non-virtual terms of reference should they come before our conscious attention? That such responses, in an economy of re(-)direction, will be refracted through the medium of these working sus-

pensions as hitherto referenced. Let me explain, if only analogically, this aspect of the economy of the extensive suspension at the metaphorical 'center' of all processes of judgment, etc. (18)

At great lengths I have explained that the extensive suspension, by implication, has much work to do that that envisaged by Edmund Husserl. Completely overlooked is the role to the de-suspension (that takes us metaphorically out of our being 'trapped' in the suspension. Also somewhat overlooked is the causal role of the transcendental suspension since it has 'work to do'. Hence my abbreviation of the 'extensive suspension' under the appellation of 'working suspensions'. Otherwise, why invoke suspensions if they did nothing for the transcendental phenomenologist, the philosopher, the disciplinarian, and the secularist? (19)

At this point let me 'bite the bullet' so to speak and share with the reader, or audience, of this evolving set of essays how I am attempting to make sense, for myself, analogically, the metaphorical roles played by the suspension, the de-suspension, the non-economic, the necessitated re-absorption or re(-)appropriation of the non-economic within the super-economic, and so on. Hence the metaphorical, and tentative hypothetical treatment of the following, that, hopefully, will eventually rise to the status of the 'theoretical'..? (20)

Up to this moment in time I have talked about 'the force of the de-suspension' to create the preconditions for the condition of the 'emission' or 'irruption' of the non-economic, and, therein, initiate a chaotic-like causal process provoking the relative re-direction of intent in a definitive manner described as a distinctive determination of the last instant, etc.[211] In this metaphorical world of action and reaction I feel it would be more accurate to say, metaphorically, that the de-suspension counteracts the suspension but that a certain residue of difference remains able to either permit and/or initiate a distinctive response on the analogical grounds that the suspension and the de-suspension cannot be equally opposite to each other just as I would maintain that there also cannot be an absolutistical equality between identities (and that this intuitive observation applies to the application of all forms of self-identity as well[212]). Therefore, that granted, we might surmise that a certain suspension-de-suspension difference is realized through the counteraction of the suspension by the de-suspension, and, that when this is effectively minimal in extent that this then leaves things as they currently 'stand', but, with a greater degree of difference things take on a characteristic difference in how they are now viewed as 'standing'. That in such 'positioning', in an economy established through ongoing processes of re(-)positioning, that if there is little 'economic difference' arising through a minimal 'suspensional-de-suspensional difference', then positioning is merely repositioned, more or less, in the same manner as things stood and now still stand, but with a greater degree of economic difference the ensuing positioning might then be more differently re-positioned and where we now 'make a stand' in a manner where we had not pre-

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211 Including determinations of the last instance, next instance, and the first instance (of the relatively existential in orientation.

212 I.e., all forms of identification falling under the categories of the objective, inter-objective, subjective, and inter-subjective.

viously stood, at least immediately prior to such a re-adjustment in this process of re-positioning. That, in effect, the non-economic moment of emission or irruption reflects this 'economic difference' postulated as 'the difference that ensues after the de-suspensional force counteracts the force of the suspension', and, where noting can be either equal or equally opposite some degree of difference must ensue. (21)

Now, let us suppose that this economic difference, now as a relatively semi-independent force in its own right, induces the irruption of the non-economic and that this principle that there can be no absolutistical form of equality continues to apply we must assume then that a difference between the economic difference and this non-economic force must also apply. Thence this issuing of the non-economic difference as the effective force of the non-economic. In this regard we could assume, as well, that a certain degree of resistance to this process of emission must be first overcome, in order to re(-)present this force of the non-economic difference (as a potential within the super-economic sphere) and, that the outcome of this process of irruption, reflecting a certain degree of economic resolution, might have three possible type of interactive outcomes, namely, a relatively non-critical process of non-emendation, a relatively critical process of emendation, and a relatively radical process of ongoing re(-)emendation (in the sense of needing to expand the current terms of reference in order to better appreciate the significance of such innovation). Thence the sub-economy of the economic, which through some form of harmonic resolution, then expresses an economic difference that then crosses over into the non-economic sub-economy and, as a non-economic difference, is then progressively, increment by increment, re(-)appropriated, as a hyper-economic difference, within the hyper-economic sub-economy with its own differential form of impact under those three headings as just supplied that then falls under the more expansive, causal horizons of the super-economic (as the overall economy of the economic with its three economic correlatives of the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic). Now, as complicated as this must first seem it does somewhat explain in simple terms the need for a virtual economy, the non-economic escape from both suspensions and endless economic forms of circulation, the co-option of a causal dimension in the transformation of a virtual economy into a non-virtual form of enaction, and so on. Also explained is the (interpreted) observation that innovations are micro-managed, incrementally engineered forms of chaotically oriented re(-)direction where more complex forms of innovation have to be sequentially appropriated in a form amenable to the processes required for the re(-)construction and dissemination of such definitively evolving modes of appreciation. Appreciation is ever a process but the apparent spontaneity of forms of insightful re-direction, as marks the nature of their occurrence, can obscure this previous observation that our intentional lives must also have a temporal gestation in historical time. A sense and semblance of time constituted between the temporal nature of pre-treatment, the atemporal nature of treatment, and, the trans-temporal nature of trans-intentional judgment *qua* judgment as specifically formed and informed through modes of relational appreciation be that either in and through a relatively non-existential format, dealing with relational participants, or, a relatively existential format, dealing with a pro-relational orientation, etc. (22)

This evolving vision of the super-economic is also better able to accommodate processes of innovation. An appreciation of the economic sub-economy from the perspec-

tive of this sub-economy of the economic is just not possible just as, analogically, a flightless bird is not capable of more fully appreciating the domain in which non-flightless birds operate. With the moral, that all forms of appreciation demand higher meta-terms of reference even if after such a 'flight' we were to return from whence we came… (23)

Now, given this metaphorical explanation, if only accepted hypothetically, and, admittedly, yet to be accepted theoretically, what implications would such a scheme have for the concept of conformance (and, by extension, the allied concept of super-conformance?)? (24)

Borrowing from my ideas on a philosophy of transformational retreatment, economic and harmonic theory, an integrated account of truth determination in terms of hermeneutic rectification, phenomenological deconstruction and reconstruction, and existential-pragmatic re(-)normalization let me proffer the following narrative… (25)

Between the suspension and its automatic de-suspension, I have just argued for a certain economic difference, realized in and through a process of resolution, that through non-economic irruption issues as a form of non-economic difference (given its relativistical equality but abolutistical non-equality with its generation stemming from its initiating resolution in the form of an economic difference). In an ordered philosophy any one archetypal economic moment (or correlativity) or two archetypal economic moments (as correlatives) in being suspended (through being questioning, etc.) then induces the corresponding de-suspension of either the two opposing or the one opposing economic moments in apposition with the former. That by such means we then arrive at the presentation of the type of ordered phenomenon in keeping with its de-suspended articulation. So, e.g., the suspension of the Ego moment and the World moment induces the first (cognitive or trans-cognitive) order dealing with the semantic atomization of phenomenal-phenomenological content in subsistant[213] ideational terms of reference (as thoughts, reviewed respectively as either cognitive judgmental content or trans-cognitive judgmental processes involved in an act of overall judgment). At the same time, the entire economy in question is also functioning by virtue of an extensive suspension in which all three economic moments are being suspended, i.e., dynamically balance with respect to each other and inducing through that form of a collective suspension a more nuanced form of truth determination overall. Simplifying these (dialectically oriented) ideas by merely recognizing the implied differentiation and integration of both partial bimodal suspensions within an overall trimodal suspension. Where these partial suspensions dictate (inter-)ordered phenomena within the auspice of a general process of 'overall truth determination', i.e.,' conformance'. (26)

Now, 'overall truth determination', as a 'process of conformance', is not just a sequentially, atomistically conducted affair as if inspecting the contents of each proposition one proposition at a time, but, rather, a collective enterprise where truth is appreciated at the edges of a subjective-intersubjective edifice of cultural-intercby by, e.g., the

[213] My preferred spelling with 'subsistant' content (extracted in the first, second, fifth, and sixth cognitive orders) *versus* existent processes (in the third and fourth cognitive orders).

cultural knowledge on the metaphorical 'periphery' of such a working 'body of knowledge' (as already implied in an acceptance of the Duhem-Quine thesis as previously reviewed[214]). A similar observation was noted earlier in this essay when exploring what would be involved in ascertaining the truth value of the historical statement 'Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon' (in order to initiate, and win, a civil war within the Roman empire as had developed by that date on January 10, 49 BCE).[215] Effectively, the overall process of truth determination needs to find an essential degree of coherence with this same conventional body of knowledge operating as working basis for the continuance of this form of appreciation. This pre-condition is viewed by myself as hermeneutically oriented, concerning the meta-textual instructions that inform the application of a series of contingently recognized statements that must relevantly and coherently 'comment' on those presented propositions (in a process of rectification), in this state of pretreatment, about to be economically appreciated in higher meta-terms of reference in economic treatment (and later to be hopefully reinforced through super-economic appreciation). Treatment is phenomenologically oriented, and is either analytical, synthetical or nominative in orientation or a mix of the former, and being 'about that which is being treated' is elevated by one meta-degree. Then, under the overall suspension of this economy in question the de-suspension is issued in terms of its ensuing retreatment with a return to the initial meta-status of the pretreatment. Effectively, the de-suspended force of this retreatment, through a(n ongoing) harmonic process of resolution, is realized as the provisional determination of the truth value of that being (en)questioned in this dynamic manner (along with the further rectification of the pretreatment and the additional deconstruction of the treated state should that be judged necessary). That from a working suspension the de-suspension may well be capable of inducing a pragmatically and existentially oriented delineation of a suitable form of responsiveness in tune with the appreciation of the trajectories of that represented situation being scrutinized as such. Moreover, the value of this appreciation, hopefully, is further amplified and potentially reinforced through the non-economic irruption and its ensuing hyper-economic appropriation with in the super economy of the overall economy of the sub-economies of the economic non-economic and the hyper-economic. Where causal contributions are evaluated in terms of the ramifications of their pragmatic-and-existential impact/s. (27)

Implied here are the relatively internal scrutiny of represented relationships in terms of their hermeneutical coherency, their phenomenal-phenomenological non-contradiction (and effective reconstruction), and their pragmatic utility/existential harmonization through re(-)normalization with the latter as arrived at through processes of conjectural cogency, and, relatively external scrutiny of the represented relationship in its relational environment from a pro-relational, trans-relational sense of subjectivity as enacted from a super-economic sense of perspective. I.e., as forms of appreciation arrived at, respectively, through conformance and super-conformance. Or, to rephrase this scheme, where the relatively internal form of appreciation is arrived at through conformance and the relatively external form of appreciation is arrived at through super-conformance, and, where an integrity of truth determination can be more clearly ascertained, and reinforced, through an intuitive paralleling of both its economic appreciation

214 *Pursuit*, III.XIG.xvi-xvii.

215 Refer to paragraph 13.

of its apparent conformance with the super-economic paralleling of its super-economic super-conformance within the imputation of that super-economy.[216] Or, put another way, through well-informed propositions, well-informed statements, and well-expressed propositional-statements we hope these same relationships are either maintained or suitably emended in super-conformal terms of reference. Or, again, where the non-critical (and non-radical) nature of pretreatment, the critical nature of treatment, and the potentially radical nature of retreatment (and posttreatment) are capable of suitable forms of harmonic reinforcement and/or emendation of the truth determinations to be established and reiterated through the performance of such differentiated and integrated forms of appreciation, etc., on these two level of epistemological organization, respectively of the economic (and conformance) and the super-economic (and super-conformance), and so on. (28)

Such a scheme also invokes a double Tarskian approach through the elevated meta-status exercised in the appreciation of treatment, and the performance of the non-economic along with their respective de-elevation in meta-status through the de-suspension and specification of retreatment and the overall process of appropriation arrived at through the hermeneutic orientation of the hyper-economic sub-economy within the overall economy of the economic, i.e., super-economic terms of reference. (29)

Now, I am the first to admit that the complex nature of this schematization is not non-problematic, indeed, remains a continual work in progress, but, as a heuristic device my defense would be 'can we do any better?' Since these speculative and integrated conjectures both address and redress a certain number of philosophical problems it would be my contention that such a complex sense of positioning might well be a better place to begin such enquiries if not end within its conjectural edification. (30)

In the light of this defense, let me first note the more important problems being addressed in this non-philosophy of the non-economic and then diagrammatically map its overall schematization as a way of articulating the relations between the economic, non-economic, and the hyper-economic within the super-economy of the overall economic whilst also noting how we metaphorically 'map' is reflective of how we might interpret such relations. (31)

The first problem to address is the observational-fact non-fact that we witness endless processes of circulation without being able to make definitive decisions of the last instance, etc. Indeed, quite the opposite. So, from a perspective of economic circulation, how might we account for this obvious theoretical need to account for such a definitive difference in process? As the third economic moment, in a harmonic progression, is the moment of resolution it would be sensible to assume that should a sufficient of resolution be realized that its resolution would take the form of a chaotically oriented, definitive, linear-like irruption of intentional re-directedness. Thence the conjecture of a non-economic moment of irruption. Thence the necessity for its suitable economic re-

[216] Where, if I am allowed to paraphrase a certain type of saying, 'we cannot live by the simple presentation of an economy alone' given that we could not escape from the confines of the economic if it were to be impossibly defined purely in economic terms of reference, and not also in non-economic terms as well, etc.).

appropriation in order to account for its comprehension. That through economic complexification with the archetypal economy we might assign the non-economic moments as relatively existential in both tenor and complexion, leaving the economic as phenomenologically economic with the further implication that its hyper-economic re-appropriation must be hermeneutical in orientation. Moreover, from an appreciation of the phenomenon of innovative gestation and comprehension it would also follow that this process of appropriation would have to be both micro-incremental and sequentially organized in the ensuing evolution of this process of appropriation, in this economy of hermeneutically oriented re(-)appropriation. Thence this outlining of these problems as noted and the solutions as proposed. (32)

Almost as a motto I have noted, 'that conjectures are the engine room at the center of all disciplines', and, in parallel to the same, we should also note, 'that all economies successfully function through successfully conducted processes of truth determination'. Thence this central role for 'conformance', i.e., 'the iterative stability in truth appreciation', i.e., 'conformation'. Now, given this concept of conformance is central to the economic sub-economy, that, through extension or extrapolation, we might surmise that super-conformance on a super-economic level of enaction would need to be distinguished from conformance on an economic level (of theoretical deployment, practical (and critical) employment, and critical (and radical) re-deployment[217]). Thence the conjecture for a process of super-conformance operating at the level of the super-economic. By such means metaphorically 'having an entire cake to eat whilst also eating portions of the same', namely, dialectically demanding 'room be made within the economic sphere for the non-economic and then insisting on its re(-)appropriation along micro-incremental, sequential lines of an economic uptake'. In effect, restoring the re-interpreted maxim, 'it's all economic, stupid!' (or, 'it's the economy, stupid)![218] (33)

All of which is problematic and whose resolutions must also be considered in the same light. However, as indicated, 'can we do better?' As a 'work in progress' this is also implied. Now, if these philosophical problems with their provisional resolutions is one thing, how to metaphorically map the same is also quite another problem which will be demonstrated as follows. At some stage it is natural to form a preference or set of preferences for which type of modelling seems to better fit the contours of your research. In this instance I will rather leave it to the reader to decide should they wish to. In modelling the relationship of the sub-economy of the economic within the super-economy of the super-economic we are spoilt for choice. Modelling could 'metaphorically' be mediational, where the non-economic is 'mediating' the economic and the hyper-economic; in line with epistemological organization, with a transcendent-like modelling on the assumption that the non-economic sub-economy, as archetypally mirroring judgment, must automati-

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[217] Noting my re-consideration of the threefold (economic) classification of 'theory, practice, and critique' being re-qualified as noted. I.e., where the 'practical' is critically conducted (through conjectural deconstruction and reconstruction), and, where the critique is potentially left open to radical forms of conjectural innovation, etc. (as existentially supplied, pragmatically applied, etc.).

[218] Obviously, here meant in its philosophical sense.

cally take a 'higher' sense of positioning;[219] assume a relatively immanent sense of modelling given that the causal transformation of the relatively virtual implies a deeper sense of an embodied positioning in regard to lived-reality, etc… without even starting to analogue a pro-relational, existential, pragmatic dimension vis-à-vis the relational dimension of relational participants interpreted along objective, inter-objective, subjective and inter-subjective forms of temporal orientation when these same distinctions are effectively merged and lost on a pro-relational level of deployment, etc. But, let me demonstrate the analogical form of such differences in modelling:

i. Mediational Model

a. !Economic Sub-Economy!–b. Non-Economic Sub-Eco.–c. !Hyper-Economic Sub-Eco!

ii. Transcendent Model (In Terms of the Level of Epistemological Organization)

a. Non-Economic Sub-Economy

!

b. Economic Sub-Economy

!

c. Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy[220]

iii. Immanent Model (In Terms of a Causal Connectedness)

a. Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy

!

b. Economic Sub-Economy

!

c. Non-Economic Sub-Economy (34)

Modelling could also be superimposed on the scheme used for transformational-transitions invoking a modelling of transformational-retreatment:

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[219] Since judgment is 'judgment', i.e., is 'judgment of something' it must be more epistemologically organized than that something being conceptually appreciated. Thence its being given an upward transcendent style of graphical depiction.

[220] Implicating a vertical and circular sense of organization.

iv. Transformational Retreatment Model

2. Economic Sub-Economy
(Treatment)

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1. Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy
(Pretreatment)

3. No-Economic Sub-Economy
(Retreatment) (35)

Given the arbitrary nature of such analogical depictions, this fourth model of transformational retreatment could also be rendered along either mediational, transcendent or immanent forms of modelling. (36)

Now, with such a wide range of choice in modelling, I am quite content to let the reader choose their preferred mapping noting that the type of considerations involved could well decide this type issue in question. E.g., concerns with causal forms of transformation, in converting virtual intentions into non-virtual patterns of enaction might well benefit form a hybrid model of iii. and iv., where the numbered nodes (modes, moments, or economic correlatives in diagram iv. in keeping with this modelling preferred, namely, 1. – a., 2. – b., 3 –c. (37)

Granted that a distinction has been made between ‘conformance’ and ‘super-conformance’, how might we define the latter? (38)

In transformational terms, we note the apparent or potential causal effectiveness of such ideation. Moreover, given the possibility of a pro-relational treatment and trans-relational experience of the same we must also note both its pragmatical non-existential and pragmatic existential forms of enrichment along with negative and defective forms of possible treatment through such processes of relative mistreatment, etc. (39)

But, before I provisionally conclude, let me state that I will further explore super-conformance under the heading of a meta-philosophical, non-traditional metaphysics (in the next essay), and, then, explore the ramifications of an existential ethics in the essay that naturally succeeds the former. (40)

2. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

The economic sub-economy, itself, is unable to instigate causal change, but, lays the groundwork for such matters, i.e., the pragmatical-pragmatic[221] transformation from the virtual to the non-virtual, hopefully, with a complexion and tenor that is both positive and fruitful in orientation. (41)

However, it is through the virtual nature of the economic sub-economy that it is able to indirectly instigate the advent of non-economic forms of e/valuational formation through the ensuing thematization of harmonic forms of resolution. Let me explore how this might occur and what role conformance plays in such instigation, and, thence, how conjectures that are well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed could produce and disseminate valid, super-conformal forms of decisiveness of the last instance, etc? (42)

When the overall conjectural economy is well-formed, etc., it implies, I would surmise, that there exists a satisfactory degree of analytically necessary 'interlocking' of propositions, a satisfactory degree of synthetically contingent 'overlapping' of statements, and a satisfactory conjecturally cogent 'underwriting' of propositional-statements, along with an implicit transformational interconnectedness between these linguistic elements in terms of an obligatory degree of relative transformational isomorphic invariance. (43)

Let me illustrate this 'connectedness', this 'relative transformational isomorphic invariance' in the following anecdote.[222] (44)

Some time ago, when flight simulators were just 'getting off the ground' so to speak, in the middle of the night I decided to fly from San Francisco to one of the islands just off the coast from Los Angeles.[223] I was flying a Lear jet, or rather the simulation of the same. Had my onboard meal ready to eat at the halfway point of this journey. And away I went. Took off, went north up the harbour flying under the Oakland Bridge, then soon turned left and flew under the Golden Gate Bridge and out to sea to then set a course southward. Yes, I know I should not go under such bridges or even fly near them. In real life, you would be soon escorted to the nearest airfield or encounter an inconvenient air-

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221 As discussed elsewhere, the pragmatical is the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order concerned with pragmatical concerns, such as, e.g., effectiveness, efficiency, efficaciousness, etc. On the other hand, the 'pragmatic' is 'deontologically centered but not exclusively centered in that third trans-cognitively ordered order and is co-associated with a positive understanding of both non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formations. In a 'non pragmatic-pragmatical fork' we do not need to decide between one or the other since in a pro-relational, existential orientation such decisions are effectively made for us and only await our 'permission 'to enact those relatively more existential patterns of intervention and their suitably apposite mix of both pragmatic and pragmatical modes of intervention.

222 This has been explored in depth and detail under the rubric of a philosophy of 'transformational-retreatment'. Refer to *The Seventh Book*…, etc.

223 As a psychiatric nurse. I was doing a nightshift and things were very quiet. Once a course was set, the plane 'virtually' flew itself. I suspect my colleagues did not realize 'I flying down the West Coast of the USA', merely saw me doing the nursing rounds when it was my turn, using my laptop computer, reading, having a meal in the middle of the night, speaking to the occasional patient that might present at the desk, and so on.

to-air missile if such instructions were not followed. Before too long had my onboard meal, and soon prepared for landing. Unfortunately, my *a priori*-like understanding assumed the airfield on this small island would be at sea-level and to my great personal embarrassment, and perhaps the sudden sound of an unintentional expletive, I crashed into the high cliffs surrounding this island. I had forgotten to check the altitude of this airfield. From this misadventure I realized that 'possessing an *a priori* attitude can be dangerous', be that 'non-philosophical or philosophical in scope!' (45)

We should also recognize that 'there are simulations and simulations'. That simulations are not equal, indeed, on perfectly understandable *a priori* grounds, no two simulations can be exactly alike, perhaps similar, but, not coincidently equivalent. In virtual terms, we have different subjects and subjects entertaining different sets of intentional sequences at different times. In non-virtual terms, we have differences in both time and space, etc. To my mind this is all very phenomenal-phenomenologically obvious… (46)

It is at this point I expect a short-sighted realist to immediately both interject and object. 'If all were phenomenologically simulated, how could we differentiate the real from the imaginary, and so on?' 'Without access to the 'real' would we not be lost and unable to make our way through the complexities of this world?' (47)

Of course, the realist, on their own count, has no so-called 'access to the impossible imputation of the real through some impossible trans-empirical form of direct insight', but, then, at the same time, such nonsense is just not needed.[224] As I remarked, 'there are simulations and simulations'. No simulations are exactly equivalent, and, it is in their differences that we can discern the relatively non-virtual from the relatively virtual. In the light of our modal expectations, as to whether they are met or not, and how they are either being effectively met or effectively not being met, that we discern the apparent phenomenological nature of what we are actually dealing with. So, just as any non-virtual apple fulfills most of our phenomenological expectations in terms of modalities already experienced, in contrast, each in their own way, other types of 'apple experiences' will be distinctly and distinctively categorized under a variety of different headings, say, as 'remembered apple experiences', 'imagined apples', 'dream apples', 'ornamental apples', 'two-dimension images of apples' as seen in photos or on a computer screen, etc. Fortunately, on my flight simulator, any untoward events would be virtual and not non-virtual in scope and consequences. In real life, I would be appropriately educated and licensed to fly, would log into the airports as required, would ensure I have the requisite quantity of fuel onboard, conduct a set of checks on the airworthiness of the plane, and, hopefully, not entertain any unwarranted *a priori* attitudes before, during or after such mindfully conducted performances, and so on. (48)

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[224] I would also argue that the phenomenologist also has 'direct interaction with their simulations' because that is the very nature of relational interaction because, otherwise, there would be no interaction. I would also contend that our simulated representations also have the power to inform us as to the nature of their constitution since it would be an unfounded arrogance to assume everything is just constituted by yourself alone (and that this relative principle applies to all minds, Divine or otherwise).

Now, this anecdote can also act as a useful template for understanding the critical operations of the conjectural economy. In the performance of any pattern of intentionally directed activity we need to know where we are (in a 'weak realism'), where we wish to intend to go (in a 'weak idealism'), and, how we are going to get there (preferably in both a 'weak pragmatism' and a 'weak existentialism').[225] All this is somewhat mirrored, respectively, in analytical propositions, contingent statements, and conjectural propositional-statements whose collective co-alignment will eventually ensure the successfulness of such aspirations. Let me demonstrate this required degree of 'co-alignment'. (49)

First, I analytically nominate 'where I am' in the context of my operation of this flight simulator. Then, as a 'contingent fact', albeit in the context of this intentional act of 'this simulated act of the flying of a Lear jet', I ascertain where I am going. Then, we conjecture on the possibility of following a certain route between the former in order to obtain the intentional objective or objectives as formulated through the enaction of such activities. Now, these three levels of exposition also need to be extended in parallel and find the requisite degree of alignment in order to suitably realize the import of such intentional goals. The airport I am 'leaving from' is named. It has a certain location, a certain set of descriptions. Such descriptions, etc., need to be contingently valid. Similarly, the airport I intend to 'land on' is similarly described, needs to be contingently valid. Likewise, the manner of the course I set in order to fly from one airport and reach that other airport. In other words, the possible execution of my enacted conjectures also needs to be well-expressed on this basis of the well-formed (analytically) and the well-informed (synthetically). Moreover, what is essentially relevant to the enactment of such a set of conjectures also has to accord with our experience of a lived-reality, which, in my case, was overlooked in that one small detail of not taking into account the actual elevation of that airport which was to become my 'final' destination, thankfully, albeit in virtual terms only. (50)

In other words, between these different types of linguistic expression we must find the requisite degree of a mutual co-alignment in order to successfully execute our enacted conjectures, namely, in real life, the enactment of our aspirations as tempered by the constraints of an overriding arbitrational economy through which we mutually find what freedoms, and an overall sense of freedom, are to be experienced by the individual as that individual-in-society. (51)

In economic terms (from the perspective of the sub-economy of the economic) 'conformance', basically, is 'this enacted observance of these patterns of mutual co-alignment'. But, given this philosophical and experiential need for the causally well-re-directed irruption of the non-economic we can, through extrapolation, impute a process of super-conformance (from the perspective of the super-economy of the overall economic), basically, as 'this enacted overall observance of these patterns of mutual co-alignment

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[225] Moreover, through a mutual cooperation between these three weak orientations we would also hope to aspire towards a relatively non-weak/non-strong sense of re(-)positioning. This is the 'aspirational economy' (which has been re-configured from my earlier original version-swapping the idealist and pragmatic orientations, and adding a potential existentialistic orientation to the latter. The aspirational economy also has to defer to, and be included within, the intersubjectively oriented arbitrational economy).

between the economic, hyper-economic, and the non-economic sub-economies within the overall extent of the super-economy where conjectured aspirations are to be successfully obtained, to some extent or other through the observance of such co-alignments'.[226] In this regard, proposing metaphors of 'interlocking', etc. Where analytical propositions need to 'interlock', be coherent and non-contradictory, be both logically and dialectically fit for purpose. Where contingent facts both overlap these propositions and themselves and also be coherent and non-contradictory, be both logically and dialectically fit for purpose. Where, the successfulness of our conjectures needs to both suitably and successfully underwrite either virtual and/or non-virtual patterns of enaction,[227] and, likewise, be coherent and non-contradictory, be both logically and dialectically fit for purpose. And, more importantly, where all three economic correlatives need to be in a general state of both a conformal and super-conformal co-alignment able and capable of realizing the arbitrated-aspirations of our intentional objectives. How might this be achieved? Through the use of a suspension, and, in this instance through 'super-intermediation'… (52)

Or, in other words, we necessarily need to entertain this observance of conformal patterns of truth determination, performances that are able to instrumentally enable the successful realization of our arbitrated-aspirations, in order to realize such intentional objectives. Preferably, in manner that is both pragmatic and existential in scope, in a manner that is considered to be re-iterable, if only theoretically or hypothetically, and, in a manner that accords with the format, formation, and form of a general, social consensus that ideally contributes to a strengthening of a social solidarity that either leads eventually to a more democratic form of governance or the actual refinement of the exercise of a form of democratic governance already in place. Where, as an observation, it can be shown that democratic governance generally observes the advancement of most if not all of its citizens, and, where the refinement of a democratic form of governance would more than likely better advance the general welfare of its citizens and not over-emphasize the non-required welfare of those that are in no need of such largesse. A test, admittedly, that many democracies will also somewhat fail in the selective search and seeking for the votes of certain demographic sectors at the expense of other demographics, but, which, hopefully, would be rectified through the democratically oriented amplification of those measures needed to address and redress such relatively minor blemishes on the body corporate. Otherwise, democracies become fragile and frail, undemocratic, subjected to failure, and, sadly, fail..!! (53)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 5.6.24.

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[226] Where this process of 'co-alignment' is conceived of as a 'process of alignment' as conducted through an 'ongoing process of re(-)alignment' (as enacted through 'hermeneutical and contingent realignment, phenomenological re-de-mis-alignment, and existential-pragmatic/pragmatic-existential re-alignment').

[227] Correctly, this distinction is phenomenologically unnecessary since the relative fulfillment of our modalities, both in terms of their density of modal presentation and the intensity of representation of a certain modality, should establish for us whether something is more or less virtual or non-virtual (since even the non-virtual experience is being non-virtually experienced). Furthermore, we can add the observation as to what extent such iterations can be thematically re-entertained as tropes, themes, memes, as set patterns of genre expectation, etc. To this list I have also added' salience, consilience, and propinquity' (or phenomenological standing or our being in the right place at the right time, etc.).

XIN. Philosophical and Meta-Philosophical Ramifications of Super-Conformance

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIN. Philosophical and Meta-Philosophical Ramifications of Super-Conformance*[228]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

As noted in the previous essay, 'super-conformance is instigated through super-intermediation'.[229] I.e., through the invocation of a series of extensive suspensions both able and capable of instigating patterns of causally enacted activities. I.e., through economic resolution an economic difference is transmuted into a form of non-economic difference that is then up-taken through the medium of the super-economy as a form of comprehended enaction, i.e., the causally cashed out performance of our intentions in such a manner that comprehends a determination of the truth evaluation of such events, i.e., where the lived-reality of those events are correctly represented in terms of its modal complexion and the consequential tenor of the comparatively ascertained impact of such transformational re-directions in behaviour. An appreciation of such events is philosophical in scope, where, in turn, an appreciation of the philosophical is meta-philosophical in scope, i.e., as metaphysical in its non-traditionally understood format as previously explicated by myself (that has no truck with either the impossibly non-economic in its negative sense and/or the nonsense of the absolutistical misrepresentation of that which should remain only as relatively representative). In this essay let me explore both the philosophical and the meta-philosophical modes of appreciation of this concept of super-conformance (and its implications for both an existential-pragmatism and the formulation of an existential ethics as will be explored in the following essay). (0)

To this end, in conducting this exploration of the ramifications of this concept of 'super-conformance' let me first introduce an analogy in search of something to analogue, then outlining the implications, etc., of this analogy in a desire to articulate in the form of a set of provisional conclusions concerned with the discernment of a pro-relational sense of perspective capable of explicating the spectrum of e/valuational formation from the positively non-existential to the positively existential in a form that concerns both ethical considerations and those considerations that are not directly ethical in orientation. (1)

As noted, 'conformance' is a concept concerning 'the conformal delineation of truth determinations'. By 'conformal' is meant 'the ability to reiterate this process of evaluation and re-discern the same truth values and/or merely emend the same only in micro-incremental terms of reference'. As stated, 'conformance' is 'realized through tri-modal intermediation, i.e., an extensive suspension (along with relatively qualified bi-modal mediation and relatively qualified mono-modal intra-mediation as previously explored'[230]). By 'super-conformance' is meant the ascertainment of the truth determination of our a correctly represented appreciation of our enacted behaviour as instigated through the suitable use of the extensive suspension of the super-economy of the overall economic in which causally expressed enaction is to be both realized therein and therefrom'. (2)

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228 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

229 *Pursuit*, III.XIM.0, 2, 52.

230 E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIH.16, etc.

1. An Analogy in Search of Something to Analogue…

Recently came up with the following analogy that I later seem to have forgotten what it was meant to originally analogue… but, it seemed a shame to waste this sequence of ideas so at least let me use them… (3)

An acting school has had actors prepare for the performance of a Shakespearean play, say, King Henry the Fifth.[231] They assemble in their usual classroom for their first major dress rehearsal which will be on an actual stage (although not quite the type of stage that would have been utilized by Shakespeare). Then, through a backdoor to the main theatre they are led on to floor of this stage. The hall is in pitch darkness with only the near-blinding lights on the front of the stage being already turned on. Immediately, an audience is heard clapping, and then with some of the usual coughing and throat clearing to be expected by an audience settling in for a long night's performance. However, this 'audience' is only 'a few first rows of seated manikins and then mere cut-outs along with the sound effects of a canned clapping along with the usual coughing'. (4)

Having an audience was completely unexpected. The play is to be performed without a break. The actors take their places on and off stage. The sound of trumpets and drums is heard, and, then, the famous prologue is begun… O for a muse of fire… (5)

We could well ask, 'can we have actors without an audience?' Eventually, these actors will realize that they are performing to what seems to be an empty theatre although seated silently in the back row are a few invited teachers, critics, talent scouts for both theatre and television… but, they have been asked to quietly leave a few moments before the curtain comes down before that period in time reserved for the final curtain calls. (6)

Now, perhaps, we should existentially act as if we had an audience, whether this audience were either present or absent? A sort of instituting of the 'Sartrean look'. Of course, such an attitude could be overdone, sort imposing a conventional blanket over how we think others 'might think we should act' when it would be more responsible to ascertain how we should think and suitably react in such circumstances. Then, these actors in the course of their acting before each other might also be inspired by the ensuing *esprit de corps* and, therein and thereby, find an audience in each other as I would believe to be the case from my limited personal experience in theater. Or, in the same vein perhaps, somewhat perceive, or apperceive, ourselves as being our own audience in such matters, at least to that extent we can also stand back and impartially reflect upon our behaviour in real time without becoming detaching ourselves from responding in a suitably responsible manner, and so on? In using this analogy, just what might be analogued? Do our 'reflections' on such an image, in turn, cast a light, any light on the overall nature of our lived-experience before others? (7)

Should we entertain the notion that both 'audiences' and 'ourselves' are more 'fruitful fictions', i.e., 'useful ideas in a conventional sense without an ultimate basis in

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231 Formal title: *Henry V*.

any substantial sense should we so unwisely impute any semblance of a fixed and unchanging form of identity? Should we dialectically entertain, simultaneously, both a conventional sense of identity and an ultimate sense of personhood that is entirely absent of any invariant sense of an identity with both aspects merely as co-dependent economic correlatives, or, just settle for the obvious inference that there is no ultimate sense of self be that either conventional or ultimate in orientation? Or, where there is only a 'relative sense of the absolute' and an 'absolute sense of the relative', relatively dependent upon a relational context or situation, but, all without either an 'absolute-absolute' or a 'relative-relative' (given that 'the *x* of *x.* as meta-*x*, is not-*x*, or is not an *x*, or is a non-*x*'?).[232] (8)

It is possible that such an understanding would allow us to segue to and venture into the field of the 'meta-philosophical', i.e., 'metaphysical', albeit as I have interpreted it in a non-traditional sense as 'the appreciation of the philosophical' to that extent we are definitively afforded 'the measure of this complex discipline of the philosophical (and, by extension, the measure of all disciplines in general terms of reference?)'? Noting that this excursion into the meta-philosophical (or meta-disciplinary) is never conducted as an impossible mode of appreciation misdirected in its concerns with either the so-called 'in-itself' or that which is 'there-for-another', etc! (9)

Interestingly, these front rows of manikins seated in a theatre is primarily interpreted through the genre of 'attending the theatre to watch and listen to a performance upon the stage' as would appear in front of 'them' even though we also know that these seated figures can neither watch nor listen to any performance upon that stage. In other sords, from a conventional point of view this genre of behaviour is a recognized pattern of sentient activity that cannot be exhausted, even analogically, from this fact of its existence, namely, that this genre of behaviour has a recognizable form even if those entities in attendance can neither see nor hear. Or, in other words, this genre itself is a 'fact of our being with others' that cannot be dismissed as absolutistically 'empty' or 'non-existent', even if 'relatively empty' in the context of various frames of reference that would adjudge such matters along those line of an interpretation. Now, numerous frames of reference could be constructed to produce and reproduce this form or type of an interpretation. E.g., a process interpretation that avoids any dependence whatsoever on a substantial reading of personal identity, or, a reading that merely recognizes an infinitude of possible readings where, admittedly, most readings would have little value to proffer, or, a reading that simply recognizes there can be no simple definitive reading given that no reading can exhaust that chosen perspective or even be able to completely appropriate its significance in the first place, etc. In effect, given that no economic correlative can be epistemologically treated as an 'economic isolate' (as existing apart from its context of origination, its relational situatedness, and the relational situatedness of its relational situatedness-ness, and so on). The implication would follow, therefore, that neither the so-called 'conventional reading' associated with its range of comprehended usage nor the so-called 'ultimate reading' of its economic dependence and non-isolation from the overall situation of its relational situatedness can be entirely deconstructed, etc., neither individually nor collectively and, that to depend upon and place our trust in either interpretation by them-

[232] Where the self(hood) of (the) self(hood) is not a form of self(hood)… Just as the heat of heat is temperature which is neither hot nor cold.

selves is a manoeuvre that just cannot be relationally simulated, neither recognized nor encountered nor engaged… (10)

Or, as articulated previously, that we have and can contemplate three possible levels of expression, namely, a non-suspended series of imputations that are extrapolated into the misguided vision of either the so-called 'external world/s' or the so-called 'internal world/s, etc; a suspended series of imputations that remain extrapolated, etc; and, a series of imputations that are both suspended and non-extrapolated, etc; .whereas, correctly, all three possibilities can be neither mistreated nor dismissed as either merely 'conventional' or 'ultimate', be that both individually or jointly. Indeed, the joke is on u since without a 'conventional reading' there could be no 'ultimate reading', and, without an 'ultimate reading' there could be no 'conventional reading', etc. So, in truth, from the perspective of lived-experience, there can be neither a purely ultimate 'ultimate reading' nor a purely conventional 'conventional reading'! Only the indicated outline of a conventionally treated 'ultimate reading' and an ultimately treated 'conventional reading' in an informative sense and semblance of a necessary relational contrast for the very sense and semblance of meaning, itself, to 'get off the ground' metaphorically… (11)

What are the ramifications of this open reading for the role to be played by relativistically treated interpretations whilst completely discounting absolutistically (mis)treated interpretations so mistakenly beloved by a traditional metaphysics? (12)

Obviously, experiences can be represented and semantically mapped, be that either phenomenologically (through either an atomicity or molecularity of a particularity of type), hermeneutically (through a generality of genre), and/or existentially (through an engagement with a specificity of experience as realized in and through a pro-relational perspective). However, this relativity of representation cannot be rendered immune from either non-suspensions or suspensions or extrapolations or non-extrapolations but must be isolated from all absolutistical forms of intent that would normally be ruled out (through invoking the negative aspect of that non-economic fork as previously discussed[233]). That this same implication also follows from the concept of 'economic correlativity' to the extent neither economic correlatives nor any form of identification can be 'viewed' non-relationally, i.e., as something purely for-itself or something purely for-another! (13)

So, therefore, what we are left with is 'an analogy seeking what it is analoguing or analogising', and, where, both non-ultimately and ultimately, there can be nothing to ultimately analogue in the first place? Where representations, themselves, can be neither purely 'self-represented' nor purely 'other-represented, but, for all that, where representation, as a relatively dependent and circumscribed process, equally, just simply cannot be avoided once such circumscription is 'directly' accepted and understood! (14)

Now, with the resonance of this moral to hand, let me explore the ramifications of this approach being defined through this acceptance of our ability to entertain an appreciation of the philosophical (and, by extension, the measure of all disciplines, and so on), namely, this meta-philosophical discipline of the metaphysical. (15)

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233 E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIJ.61, etc.

2. The Ramifications of this Interpretation of that Analogy…

I would argue that at the center of philosophical practice (and all disciplinary practice) is a desire to establish a correctness or an iterative validity in truth determination, i.e., conformance. Where conformance can be viewed as super-conformance from the perspective of super-economic terms of reference. Now, as this approach necessitates an appreciation of such practice it follows that meta-philosophical (and meta-disciplinary) terms of reference are needed and must be available for the performance of such processes of appreciation (where, initially, such terms are raised by one meta-degree, but, through retreatment is returned to the same original meta-status of that being appreciated). Hence the inescapable necessity of the meta-philosophical, i.e., metaphysical, albeit as treated through what I have terminologically described as an 'inter-ordered reduplication'[234] of the philosophical discipline (as a philosophical economy[235]) (or any discipline along with its treatment as a disciplinary economy). What are the ramifications of the openness of this re(-)positioning (as will have to be viewed and reviewed through this lens of an inter-ordered reduplication, etc.). (15)

I first discerned the outlines of a 'categorical metaphysics' through the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order. I.e., that a phenomenological semantics of a phenomenological semantics would automatically deliver, effectively, a 'categorical metaphysics', i.e., a disciplinary form of practice ostensively concerned with traditional metaphysical-like concepts like 'space', 'time', 'identity', 'personal identity', 'world', ''transformational change', 'particular categories (like taste, colour, etc)', non-moral and moral categories as utilized in our explorations and scrutiny of lived-experience', etc. (16)

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[234] I.e., quite simply an inter-ordered 'reduplication' of the philosophical discipline (as a philosophical economy) as the 'philosophy of philosophy' and where the product of such symmetrical (re)duplication is none other than a 'meta-philosophy' or a 'non-philosophy' or is 'not a philosophy', namely,' metaphysics (as non-traditionally reinterpreted) (which through transformational retreatment can then be viewed as a separate discipline apart from or as a sub-discipline within the open field of the philosophical discipline itself without needing to separate the former discipline form the traditional body of the philosophical discipline as traditionally enveloped within the social system of Academia… although university departments will exercise different ways to incorporate this discipline of the philosophy within its overall classification of its various faculties, as, e.g., under the rubric of a 'school' of or some other classificational device, etc.).

[235] Correctly, the philosophical economy is not strictly defined within a single order being one-part phenomenological (centered in the first trans-cognitive order), one-part hermeneutical (centered in the fifth trans-cognitive order), and one-part existential (centered in the third trans-cognitive order). However, as a composite it can still be subjected to symmetrical reduplication. 'Duplication' being previously defined as a 'non-symmetrical form of duplication', e.g., as would be present in viewing, e.g., the philosophy of history (as philosophy) or the history of philosophy (as history), etc. As this non-traditional 'metaphysics' is being treated as the 'symmetrical reduplication of the philosophical economy' in my explorations of this topic I cannot avoid invoking this type of inter-ordered lens. Hopefully such technical scrutiny will deliver an existential surplus in e/valuational formation much greater than that needed to be invested in conducting this type of an exploration? As previously discussed, the six trans-cognitive (judgmental) orders are: the first order of the phenomenologically semantic; the second order of aesthetical judgment (enacted through a harmonized integration of essential-like atomic elements presented in the first order). The third order of the deontological judgment (without reference to so-called First Principles, etc., acting as the pragmatic center of existentially oriented appreciation); the fourth order of the pragmatical (concerned with functional utility, etc.); the fifth order of hermeneutic potentiality; and, the sixth order concerned with valid factual or ontical statements).

Or course, such metaphysical forms of representation do not need nor can be (mis)treated as economic isolates. Therefore, it goes without say, that obviously we can have no truck with any version of a traditional metaphysics that attempts to perform such impossible form of non-economic manoeuvring. Quite simply if we see three apples in a fruit bowl and write down three apples in a fruit bowl, we are simply comparing one phenomenologically interpreted state of affairs with another phenomenologically oriented state of affairs, namely, one set of linguistic expressions concerned with the perceptual reporting of things seen (in a fourth cognitive order) with linguistic expressions of their denotation (in a third cognitive order). Moreover, we must also assume that the economics of these linguistic descriptions, prescriptions (genre-wise) and (any existentially informed forms of) proscription is informed on a basis of a relatively transformational isomorphic invariance that is central to the representative process that, equally, is in no need for forms of impossible non-economic extrapolation, etc., in order to function since their functioning as 'representations' is guaranteed in the economics of relational terms of reference but immediately self-deconstructed when those terms of reference are transgressively exemplified as to be found in those defective behaviours resident in misguided examples of a traditional metaphysics. Such an understanding, conversely, cannot write off a traditional metaphysics when it is seen to non-transgressively operate. Hence, e.g., the rescue of metaphysical-like categories such as 'space', 'time', 'identity', 'personal' identity, etc., albeit as now quarantined within the articulation of a non-traditional metaphysics or a truly 'critical metaphysics', which, on occasions would also need to be recognized as a 'radical metaphysics' (potentially on par, say with a 'radical theology', etc.) once we recognize the potentially innovative nature expressed in such a disciplinary field by virtue of its economic openness and non-economic closure, i.e., in its being isolated from the negative sense of the non-economic. I.e., in and through a creative deconstructing of the nonsensical and reconstructing the relatively sensible, and so forth… (17)

But, why stop with a reconstructed and reconstituted metaphysics that deals only with traditional and non-traditional categories arrived at through a process of inter-ordered reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order? Why not apply this metaphysical lens to the other five orders when reduplicated? If one were to do so what would this add to a more general concept of the metaphysical, albeit as reconstituted through both the positive lens of an economic fork and through the reduplication of these orders that directly and indirectly already constitute philosophical sub-disciplines in their own right and as already situated within the overall discipline of philosophy, namely, (a phenomenological-semantics), aesthetics, deontology, pragmatics (as confined to its pragmatical sense), hermeneutics and ontics, along with their combinations in the form of an existential encompassment of the aesthetical, the deontological, and the pragmatical, and, the sense and semblance of the political-economy through the same combination of orders, but, viewed from the perspectives of power, flows of information especially through the financial expression of money, arbitrated obligations, etc? (18)

Such explorations will be more introductory and not exhaustive. E.g., I have only sketched a small number of categories that appear to inform a metaphysical level of philosophical appreciation without any scrutiny as to their apparent economic constitution and economic modes of interaction among themselves, etc. (19)

Innovations always take a certain amount of time to shake themselves into some form found to possess a reasonably definitive, non-contradictory, non-incoherent sense and semblance of shape. I.e., 'sense' in its 'conceptual sense' and 'semblance' in its 'directly or indirectly observed perceptual sense'. E.g., 'temperature' is a 'concept' that can be arrived at through the 'appreciative reduplication of the category of heat' that, obviously, can be both thought about and observed, albeit indirectly, through instruments like thermometers. So, to assist in this extension of this reconstituted sense and semblance of the metaphysical let me first map these extensions (and also note, when and where relevant, their secondary adjuncts and tertiary adjuncts[236]). Defining, e.g., a 'pragmatic-existentialism'/'existential-pragmatism' as an 'existentialism in apposition with the sense and semblance of the pragmatical that spans more than just the confines of the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical whilst also being centered in the existential heartland of the third order of the deontological along with its investment in a sense of style through the distinctive resolution of dissonance (which, itself, would be observed primarily in the first order but resolved in a third order, but, then, expressed in terms to be found in a second ordered aesthetics[237]). Then, again, to confuse such matters, the initiation and expression, and refinement of an existential orientation but be initiated through an overall establishment of an extensive suspension (i.e., intermediation/super-intermediation). Hence:

Trans-Cognitive Orders	**Reduplicated Trans-Cognitive Orders**
1. Phenomenologically semantic	1^2 . Categorical Metaphysics
2. Aesthetics	2^2. Psychological-Sociological
3. Deontology (Existential)	3^2. Political/Existential
4. Pragmatics (Pragmatical)	4^2. Process Functioning (Utility)
5. Potentiality/Hermeneutics	5^2. Science
6. Ontics	6^2. History

[236] E.g., in my explorations of the political-economy through a tripartite economic lens I proposed its division into the theoretical (and hermeneutical) aspect, the critically conducted practical (and phenomenological) aspect, and the much overlooked practise of both a critical and potentially radical (and existential) dimensions of a critique under the rubric of the 'stylistic'. Hence its alignment, respectively, with the 'fifth order of the potential (and its concerns with hermeneutic possibility)', the critical practice of the practical as centered on the phenomenological first order, and the critical and potentially radical nature of the critique as centered on the third order of the deontologically-existential paralleling, in effect, with the philosophical economy regarded as similarly constituted. Admittedly, I had previously assigned the pragmatical to the fourth order, but, would now assign it to the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic given its deconstructive-reconstructive role in the transformational stage designated as 'treatment'. Defining an 'adjunct' as 'the ability of an order to supply either primary, secondary or tertiary forms of ordered-treatment, etc.' So, in this scheme, to date, the existential would be seen to possess a primary adjunct in the third order of the deontological (without reference to impossible so-called First Principles, etc.); secondary adjuncts in a supplement of aesthetic style associated with distinctive styles of resolution and pragmatical concerns associated with functional facility, etc; and, tertiary adjuncts in the form of the remaining orders of the fifth, sixth, and first trans-cognitively ordered orders.

[237] Hence my reference to an 'existential orientation' as 'possessing its primary adjunct in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, having secondary adjuncts in the form of the aesthetic second order and the pragmatical fourth order. But such subtleties are better diagrammatically mapped as follows.

A Circular Depiction of the Trans-Cognitive Orders[238]

Existential/Deontology
3

Aesthetics
2

Pragmatic
4

Phenomenological-Semantics
1

Hermeneutics
5

Ontics
6

A Circular Depiction of the Reduplicated Trans-Cognitive Orders

Political Expression
Existential/Deontology
3^2

Psychology-Sociology
2^2

Functional Pragmatics
4^2

Categorical Metaphysics
1^2

Science
5^2

History
6^2

[238] Note the prefiguring uppercase of either 1, 2, or 3, refers, respectively, to primary, secondary, or tertiary adjuncts.

Political Economy (with political expression/primary adjunct centered in 3)

$^{1}\underline{3}$

$^{3}2$ $^{3}4$

$^{2}\underline{1}$ $^{2}\underline{5}$

$^{3}6$

Philosophical Economy (all three primary orders equally expressed)

$^{1}\underline{3}$

$^{2}2$ $^{2}4$

$^{1}\underline{1}$ $^{1}\underline{5}$

$^{2}6$

Existential-Pragmatic/Pragmatic-Existential Economy (primary adjunct in 3)

$^{1}\underline{3}$

$^{2}\underline{2}$ $^{2}\underline{4}$

$^{3}1$ $^{3}5$

$^{3}6$

Existential Expression through extensive suspension = [^{1}5, ^{1}1, 13/^{2}2, ^{2}4, ^{2}6] (20)

By diagrammatical means I have attempted to indicate, first, the six metaphysical fields of the (metaphysical) categorical field, the psychological-sociological field, the existential-deontological field (with its co-associated central expression of political power [through the irruption of the non-economic]), the pragmatical field (of utility), the scientific field, and the historical field, and, second, the various permutations that can be used to account for the political-economy (and its social expression as the Political-Economy); the philosophical economy; and, the existential economy when viewed through a primary adjunct of the deontological-existential, and its secondary adjuncts of the aesthetical and the pragmatical. Where the 'overall metaphysical economy' can be treated as the 'appreciation of the philosophical economy', i.e., as a 'reduplication of the philosophical economy along with its secondary adjuncts'. (21)

Given that the overall metaphysical field is these six metaphysical sub-fields of the categorical, etc., let me now explore and sketch out just what might be entailed in this enriched vision of the metaphysical discipline (as a retreated sub-discipline within the overall discipline of the philosophical economy). (22)

Somewhat as a surprise, it would seem that we must include pragmatical, scientifical, and historical dimensions in this enriched vision of the overall metaphysical economy (as a discipline in its own right, and. as a sub-discipline within the philosophical economy). But, then, this should not come as a complete surprise given that nature of our being in this world at large must also include an appreciation of such dimensions in a more full understanding of the nature of our relational being in the overall world-of-life, and so on. E.g., personal identity cannot be differentiated without both implicating a scientific basis in time and space, etc., and a historical dimension in our textualization of living-experience as lived-experience, personal identity, inter-personal relations, etc. (23)

1. Categorical Metaphysics

An *ad hoc* list of categories could be formed, e.g., as previously noted, namely, 'space', 'time', 'identity', 'personal identity', 'world', ''transformational change', 'particular categories (like taste, colour, etc)', non-moral and moral categories as utilized in our explorations and scrutiny of lived-experience', etc. (24)

More interesting might be how we both differentiate and connect the elements on this list? E.g., from the perspective of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle if we were to know exact where a certain identity (as a logical subject) is then we do not exactly know when that identity was there, etc., and v.v. Such an inverse relationship both epistemologically and ontologically suggests that these two parameters are intimately connected. Although such an observation can be credibly made how these elements might be connected might well involve a more comprehensive form of research including, no doubt, input from the scientific metaphysical field, etc? (25)

2. Psychological-Sociological Metaphysics

In this metaphysical field we might consider entertaining physiological, affective, cognitive, trans-cognitive (judgmental), personal, and inter-personal divisions of concern as well as noting how the psychological identity emerges phenomenologically from experience and how sociological identity emerges from psychological experience of groups of individuals, as embedded in relationships, families, communities, organizations, institutions, political parties, nations, along with the embryonic emergence of forms of international self-identification, etc. (26)

From the sociological sphere of influence, we could also surmise a form of political emergence (which as a topic in the expression of executive power, obligations, arbitrated-aspirations, etc., might well be better scrutinized in the next metaphysical field of the deontological-existential?)? (27)

3. Deontological-Existential Metaphysics

In this field we should find a credible appreciation of existentially oriented phenomena whose subject matter will be more closely explored and scrutinize in the next essay. (28)

Suffice to say, at this stage, that from a pro-relational perspective, appreciated in trans-relational terms of subjective experience, how we are embedded in this world vis-à-vis others is a crucial topic to both explore and scrutinize in detail. Noting that not only a pro-relational perspective needs to be adopted on the primary relationships in question but that we must also adopt the same attitude, in parallel, with the relational situatedness of such relational situations in turn. (29)

That the concept of the existential having its primary adjunct in the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order is precisely constructed in order to demonstrate the non-absence of a secondary pragmatical contribution (as well as stylistic contributions from secondary aesthetical considerations).[239] (30)

4. Pragmatical Metaphysics

A pragmatical metaphysics considers an appreciation of functional abilities, i.e., as expressed under the rubric of ‘utility’ whilst also recognizing the existential dimension to the extent that both a positive non-existential and positive existential forms of e/valuational formation are necessary for the satisfactory organization of the secular world, etc. (31)

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239 As noted elsewhere in the building of a bridge, we must traverse both deontological and pragmatical considerations in order to incorporate both aspects in the final design of a certain well-built bridge. Hoping, as well, that a positive aesthetical dimension will also be strongly present. Hence the primary adjunct of the deontological along with its important secondary adjuncts in the pragmatical and aesthetical dimensions, whilst, operating an existential orientation through the pro-relational enrichment that hopefully emerges from the harmonic incorporations of all three adjuncts, etc.

5. Scientific Metaphysics

Obviously, a scientifically oriented metaphysics cannot escape a categorical metaphysics, but, in this field the interrelationships between the listed elements of the former may well prove to be the major focus for its more general explorations and then its more detained forms of scrutiny (under the headings of a 'particular phenomenology' and the 'specificity of the existential dimension'). (32)

Moreover, certain scientific categories would lend themselves for critical treatment and potential radical forms of review should they also undoubtedly rise… (33)

6. Historical Metaphysics

In the light of historical research to date we must note that history, as the mediation of histories, is a topic to be conducted in the plural as well as being conducted under the headings of the 'histories of the past', 'histories of the present', and 'histories of the future' as are to be found evidenced in the world of Social-Media, etc. (34)

Now, can we actually point to this enrichment of philosophical appreciation as here articulated? (35)

There is the well-known expression 'follow the money (and, I would like to also add, follow also the debt, the obligations, the gift-giving, along with both the presence and absence of expected and unexpected forms of the relatively existential)'. (36)

By following the money, say, in Academia, we should note the arrival and inclusion of new categories of scholarly expertise along with those areas now seemingly neglected if not completely abandoned. That, by running a differential (and an integrative) calculus over such phenomena we may well find a better appreciation as to how such shifts in social expectations are being institutionally reorganized and, therein, expressed, e.g. (37)

As a case in point, we find the traditional discipline of philosophy, itself, being either amalgamated with other disciplines like, e.g., history and politics, or, competed against by a focus on cultural values, narratology, postmodern studies that have extracted themselves from more formal forms of philosophical expression (say, along the lines of logic, epistemology, aesthetics, linguistic analysis, etc?)? (38)

Hence my concerns on that type of topic and my evident ambition to defend the prosecution of philosophy, note its practicalities, and proclaim its own form of prescience as a discipline capable of instructing all other disciplines and, at the same time, learning form the pursuit of all other disciplines, be that in general, particular and/or specific terms of reference.[240] (39)

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[240] Hence these three volumes that form the passive ambit, dynamic remit, and existentially engaged composite entailed within this *Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*.

3. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

The title of this essay is *Philosophical and Meta-Philosophical Ramifications of Super-Conformance*. In other words, the philosophical and metaphysical ramifications of this concept of super-conformance as the theoretical 'location' for the overall concept of a 'stable reiteration of truth determination along conformal lines of iterability'. Just what is entailed in such a brief? (40)

On one hand, we need to differentiate the 'discipline of philosophy' from the ensuing 'discipline of philosophical appreciation', i.e., the 'discipline of metaphysics', whilst, at the same time, on the other hand, recognize that we also need to integrate both disciplines given that the transformational retreatment of the latter should bring us back to the former, and v.v! (41)

But, the dialectics of such manoeuvering and counter-manoeuvering has ramification that would extend far beyond these transformational interactions between a relatively traditional discipline of philosophy and a relatively non-traditional discipline of metaphysics as here being reconstituted. Let me explore this observation of mine. (42)

One of my intentions behind exploring this 'analogy in search of something to analogue…' was to head our enquiries in the direction of this non-traditional vison of the metaphysical. Hitherto, I had to date resisted any thought of a metaphysical approach in the context of these exercises in philosophical research, but, have had to confront the vivid appearance of such a discipline in noting the distinctive difference between 'that-to-be appreciated' and 'that-being-appreciated'. Moreover, in realizing that such 'appreciation' is none other than a 'symmetrical reduplication of that topic itself', and, so, therefore, now find myself in a position where I need to actually recognize the distinctive nature of this discipline (as a sub-discipline when retreated back into the overall economy of the philosophical discipline, albeit with dialectical consequence in doing so). (43)

To some extent we can refer to a discipline, say philosophy, as the conventional exercise of a certain sense of disciplinary behaviours as distinctively expressed through a corresponding sense of a disciplinary difference or differential, along with also noting an economically related disciplinary meta-difference or meta-differential, and, a disciplinary non-difference or non-differential.[241] In contrast, we can refer to the metaphysical-like appreciation of the philosophical discipline as a non-conventional or ultimate form of 'treatment' whose 'retreatment' returns us to the philosophical discipline plus the mergence of a certain form of e/valuational formation that cannot be directly discerned in a

[241] That what applies to any discipline, therefore, will apply also to both the philosophical discipline and the metaphysical sub-disciplines. That every discipline is predicated on having a distinctive view about the world at large. This constitutes its distinctive disciplinary difference. Then, we can next ask what value does this difference possess as viewed hermeneutically through the co-associated genre or genres invoked for the expression, dissemination and reception of such e/valuational formation? Last, we note that between the discipline in question and the secular world or the entirety of all other disciplines considered individually or collectively would also imply the supposition of a disciplinary non-difference (since if there were no relational interaction between these disparate parties then that sense and semblance of a disciplinary difference, etc., could be neither recognized nor encountered nor engaged).

simple reduction to the mere reality of the philosophical terms alone. Let me quickly note that 'ultimate' is (eventually) meant in an ironic sense as the ultimate nature of the 'ultimate' is 'not ultimate'… since we cannot detach either the metaphysical or the philosophical from the manner of their mutual co-defining of each other. Now this idea can be applied to each and every discipline and each and every sub-discipline within the encompassment of the relatively super-discipline. E.g., the ontological *versus* the epistemological; the deontological *versus* the pragmatical; the logical *versus* the dialectical; along with other contrasts like the objective *versus* the subjective; the objective *versus* the interobjective; the subjective *versus* the intersubjective, etc. Just as the distinction of the ontological cannot be comprehended apart from its contrast with the epistemological, and v.v., and so on. (44)

As a case in point, to what extent can the representation represent something more than some other representation and never that which, through extrapolation, is not represented in the first place? Now, realists have an overwhelming problem with the 'reality' of mathematical equations and identities, but, misguided representationalists have an overwhelming problem in attempting to do the equally impossible, namely, discern the lived-experience of numbers, e.g., etc., as if beyond the very experience of numbers itself. So, in this fruit bowl with six apples I now take one of those apples and place it in this empty fruit bowl. Therefore, now, the first fruit bowl has five remaining apples, and, the second fruit bowl has one apple within its confines. In representative terms of reference, we could say that the perceptual report notes 'the perception of one fruit bowl having five apples and the second fruit bowl having one apple' parallels its linguistic expression whose conceptual content is that there is "the conception of one fruit bowl having five apples and the second fruit bowl having one apple." We could say that this report mediates the perceptual process with its interpretative representation and the conceptual interpretation of the report effectively reconstructs the former, and v.v. At no point in a process of representation, between various kinds of reports supposedly reporting the same phenomenal situation, can we find any representational depiction of the numbers reported. On the other hand, the preservation of the relative transformational isomorphic invariance between reports ostensively reporting the same phenomenal situation would be totally misconstrued if misconceived as representatively reporting on that which cannot nor could not be represented, namely, the so-called 'phenomenal thing-in-itself' as either an 'in-itself-for-itself' or as an 'in-itself-for-another'. Such a nonsensical interpretation is extrapolated and/or projected beyond the reasonable limits of its empirical and epistemological terms of reference to such an extent that it would dialectically lose all sense and semblance given its now inability to be either recognized, encountered and/or engaged in the prior context of either its recognition, encountering, and/or engagement. Then, to compound this injury, there is no need to analogue number, e.g., or the apples themselves, or those fruit bowls, etc., since our apperception of an isomorphic invariance will do this for us either in part or in whole. So, e.g., those six apples are now seen as only five in the first fruit bowl, etc., whereas, in the overall situation of the two fruit bowls the number six, on this occasions, remains preserved without our needing to impute any reality to numbers, themselves, whatsoever other than as cyphers representing these processes that preserve, in part or in whole, various presented forms possessing a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance. That, if we do not need some pre-

representational or trans-representational sense and semblance of the numerical, then, the same must apply to apples, fruit bowls, and everything else. (45)

On the other hand, surely, to report the altered situation is such 'that one apple has been shifted to the empty bowl' should be 'seen' as being both novel and informative, and is pre-representationally or trans-representationally illuminating, is laughable since an appreciation of what is transformationally preserved and what is not transformationally preserved is all we need to know in our representation of that situation. Thence the viability of the relatively represented and non-viability of the non-relatively, absolutistically represented. Indeed, nothing more and nothing less. (46)

Furthermore, given the directness of all relational forms of interaction, in accordance with the phenomenological modality of that type of relationship, since otherwise there would be no relationship enacted in an act of relating, it follows that there is completely no need for either so-called 'external worlds' and/or so-called 'internal world' through the directness of such interaction. Hence the need for an acceptance that even if our experiences are simulated in and through our own intentional and trans-intentional activity, etc., still, that does not and should not rule out the lived-experience that relative representations of the situations being represented don't have the power to also inform the constitution of that simulation itself. Where 'simulations simulate simulations' and not the so-called 'pre-simulated' or the so-called 'trans-simulated', but, where no simulation is ever the equal of any other, and, therefore, must possess a different sense and semblance of either being relatively other-authored by ourselves alone, being relatively self-authored by themselves, and/or being relatively co-authored by others with us at the same time, etc. That, in effect, weak forms of realism, idealism, and pragmatism need to be mutually combined in order to form a viable understanding of different phenomenal-phenomenological experiences, and, that through suitable applications of working suspension viable forms of both conformance and super-conformance can be conjecturally entertained in and through non-weak/non-strong forms of the same. As a case in point, we should 'listen' to a very hot of coffee before drinking it because, correctly, we are unable to drink the same until it has sufficiently cooled – and to think that we completely and solely construct the simulation of this 'very hot of coffee' is the very heights of philosophical arrogance! (47)

So, 'can an analogy actually analogue[242] that which it is ostensively analoguing?' No, because if metaphors were treated literally, we would either be dealing with blatant contradictions or we are no longer dealing with an analogy (or, for the more literally minded, we would be no longer dealing with either a simile or with a metaphor). That, in this sense, neither the rhetorical nor the metaphorical nor the apparitional can be dissipated or separately treated as economic isolates.[243] Hence, likewise, individual or combina-

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242 I.e., either pre-representationally or trans-representationally, etc.

243 Invoking the interrogative economy (involved in the asking and answering of a question. That through economic complexion, invoking a parallel between the apparitional (as either a 'double negative' or 'the as-if…' or as 'the as-if…, etc.) and the conjectural (of double negatives, etc.) it follows that the conjectural aspect in the conjectural economy likewise cannot be treated as an economic isolate.

tions of conjectures in the conjectural economy also cannot be dissipated or separately treated as economic isolates.[244] (48)

Again, this same dialectical observation will apply to any two or more relational parties that must mutually co-define each other should they be found within the same economy. Hence the relatively existential defines the relatively non-existential, and v.v., and, the relatively deontological relatively defines the relatively pragmatical, and v.v., and so on. With this dialectical observation to hand, let me now advertise the next essay, namely, the outline of an existential philosophy that notes the relationship between relatively negative and positive forms of the non-existential and relatively positive forms of the existential. In effect, setting out to outline a pro-relational existential form of ethical theory that I believe is much overlooked, and in my opinion demonstrates the more viable theoretical candidate in the determination and evaluation of the ethical nature of our lived-interactions with others… (49)

Where, among other things, this dialectical position introduces us to a 'non pragmatical-pragmatic fork' (which, in a contrast to the non-economic fork) is such that to the extent that we effectively operate from a relatively existential perspective we do not need to make a definitive distinction between the 'non-existentially pragmatical' and the 'existentially pragmatic' in the pursuit of ethically oriented forms of determination (and forms of non-ethically oriented determination) since an appreciation of the living-representation of the relationship in question, albeit also in an essential[245] representation of its relational situatedness, should be able to do this for us should we be able to entertain a well-formed, well-informed and well-expressed conjectural economy..!! (50)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 6.6.24.

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244 'Dissipated' in the sense of economic correlatives or economic co-associates being totally extracted from their economies of presentation, etc.

245 Where 'essential' is meant in both the particularity of its distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological essentialness and in what effectively acts as essentially relevant (given either the absence or presence of such inputted information will make a distinctive difference in our interpretation of the same and/or in our 'suffering' the ramifications of its consequential outcomes, etc.). Essential does not refer to either the over-extrapolation or the over-projection of misrepresented forms of either intentional content and/or intentional processes, etc.

Postscript A: Existential-Like[246] Regulation of Candidates for Reduplication, etc.

At some point in our appreciation of a conjectural economy, i.e., e.g., as to its oversight, etc., we need to recognize just which candidates are fit and proper applicants for a process of reduplication and/or duplications and/or de-reduplication and /or de--duplication, i.e., all manner of appreciation, transformation, etc.[247] In applying the non-economic fork it is obvious that impossible or defective candidates need not apply. On the other hand, possible, non-defective candidates can apply for processes of reduplication, duplication, appreciation, truth determination, all manner of transformational treatment, etc., etc. The presentation of representative imputations in a conjectural economy is pointless if those conjectures are not cogent, etc., i.e., if the imputational economy is already rendered as non-competent (on the basis of a non-conformal conjectural economy with either the relative absence of either well-formed propositions, well-informed statements, and/or well-expressed propositional-statements). (1)

By 'conventional treatment' is meant that which is treated as 'relative', 'non-absolute', 'non-ultimate', or 'non-suspended (and, if it were to be suspended, it would then be automatically de-suspended)'. By 'non-conventional treatment' the opposite is intended. Note, by 'ultimate' is meant 'non-conventional' and only 'ironically ultimate' by being 'non-conventional' or 'trans-conventional', etc. (2)

What is permitted is the relativization of the absolute, and, the absolutization of the relative, and, preferably a mix of both, but, what is not permitted is an absolutization of the absolute or the relativization of the relative as per the existential maxim that notes the existential is the result of the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v. (with respect to the process of de-existentialization). (3)

Thus (in this simple matrix) we are left with two forms of non-candidacy, two viable candidates and one more viable preference for joint candidacy (in the form of a specific mix of those two viable candidates... in a direct reflection of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork). However, in that complex matrix we have fourteen non-candidates and only two viable positions if considered either individually, but, preferably, together... (4)

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246 'Existential-like' refers to to the maxim 'that existential orientation is arrived at through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, 'that the non-existential orientation is arrived at through the relative de-existentialization of the relatively existential'. That all candidates, inter-ordered or non-ordered, will be presented in a form that either exercises the 'conventional treatment' (as an equivalent expression to the 'relative treatment' or 'non-absolute treatment' or 'non-ultimate treatment' or 'non-suspended treatment') of the 'non-conventional treatment' (as an equivalent of the 'absolute treatment' or 'relative treatment' or 'ultimate treatment' or 'suspended treatment') and/or v.v.

247 Where symmetrical reduplication is the *x* of *x*, asymmetrical duplication is the *x* of *y*, and de-reduplication is a reversal of this process of reduplication through transformational retreatment that returns a treated product back to the original meta-status of the pretreated product, and, de-duplication is a reversal of a process of duplication through transformational retreatment, etc. These concepts have been explored in Book 9. Candidates can be either inter-ordered phenomena or non-ordered phenomena like, say, truth determination, the process of appreciation, etc.

We can depict these non-candidates and candidates in the form of a (simple or complex) matrix as depicted. Note the relativization (R) of the relative (R) is the relativistical (RR), and, the absolutization (A) of the absolute (A) is the absolutistical (AA) and where both forms of candidacy are either non-differentiating or forbidden. Equally ineffective or forbidden is the relativistical treatment (RR) of either the relative (R) or the absolute (A), and, similarly, the absolutistical treatment (AA) of either the relative (R) or the absolute (A).(5)

These potential candidates/non-candidates can be put on a spectrum:

(Relativistical)-(Relative)-(Relative + Absolute)-(Absolute)-(Absolutistical) (6)

Depicted, first, as a simple matrix (1.) of possible forms of treatment (Y) or forbidden forms of treatment (N) between the absolute (A) and relative (R), and, second, as a complex matrix (2.) between relativistical, relative, absolute and absolutstical modes.

1.	**R**	**R+A**	**A**
R	**N**		**Y**
R+A		**Y**	
A	**Y**		**N**

2.	**RR**	**R**	**R+A**	**A**	**AA**
RR	**N**	**N**		**N**	**N**
R	**N**	**N**		**Y**	**N**
R+A			**Y**		
A	**N**	**Y**		**N**	**N**
AA	**N**	**N**		**N**	**N** (7)

So, from these two matrices, we can see that only the relative treatment of the absolute, and the absolute treatment of the relative, and, preferably, a mix of the former, are viable candidates for transformational retreatment, i.e., reduplication, etc., processes of (meta-)appreciation, truth determination, etc. Because both the relativistical and the absolutistical should be ignored (being regarded as either non-operatively irrelevant and undifferentiated, respectively, from either the relativistic or the absolutistic, or, as impossible through being non-economically conceivable given their pseudo-creation of non-viable economic isolates in a relativistical form as 'valueless' or in an absolutistic form as 'dogmatically pronounced despite their non-viable conceptual thematization as a non-conceivable economic isolate'). (8)

Why? Because (in just a two-tiered system of meta-levels), e.g., the conventional treatment (R) of the conventional (R), etc., just makes no operational sense since the 'applicator (or application)' of the de-suspension (R) is to be applied to the 'patient' that is already non-suspended, i.e., (perhaps being) already the de-suspended (R) and, as such, as an operation, does nothing, and, in effect, is a non-existent operation (and where any claim to the contrary is a nonsense). Similarly, but conversely, the non-conventional treatment (as a suspension) of the non-conventional (that which is already suspended) also makes no operational sense since the 'applicator (or application)' of the suspension is to that which is already suspended, as the 'patient', does nothing, and, in effect, is a non-existent operation (and where any claim to the contrary is a nonsense). However, once we have viable candidates, in the unrestricted establishment of more than two meta-levels then inter-ordered phenomena, etc., can be duly accommodated and appreciated, both treated and retreated (and, if relevant, de-reduplicated or de-duplicated, etc.), etc. However, as enjoined processes, the suspension of the suspension is a de-suspension, and, a de-suspension of a de-suspension is a suspension, just as, in parallel, the relatively existential is the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and, the relatively de-existential is the relative de-existentialization of the relatively existential. Thence this existential-like rectification of candidates for reduplication, etc. Where by 'etc.' is meant 'all unrestricted but viable processes of transformation, etc.' (9)

Where, furthermore, in the complex matrix, any attempt to either 'relativistically' or 'absolutistically' treat anything is immediately ruled out on the grounds that such linguistic candidates do not serve a distinctively different purpose from being either 'relativizing' or 'absolutizing', or, alternatively, if reconfigured along strong ideological lines, then they can be immediately ruled out as not economically able to be conceived of (and, therein, as impossible candidates under the negative aspect of the non-economic fork, along with defective candidates, thereby, can be instantly dismissed). (10)

That when the dominant 'applicator', as an operation, applies to the submissive 'patient' the latter, thereby, is either suspended or de-suspended if it be operated upon, respectively, as a non-conventional (and suspending) process or as a conventional (and de-suspending) process. Hence, individually or jointly, as viable operations, the following two configurations are only possible, i.e., the (potentially existential-like) suspension of the non-suspended, and/or the (potentially de-existential-like) de-suspension of the sus-

pended (and, where, as operations as noted, a ‘suspension of the suspension’ equals a ‘de-suspension’, and, a ‘de-suspension of a de-suspension’ equals a ‘suspension’). (11).

Now, let me demonstrate the application of these guidelines for transformational candidacy, as ‘competent’ imputational candidates that have been suitably proposed through the well-conducted exercise of a well-formed, a well-informed, and a well-expressed conjectural economy (as realized through the requisite degree of an alignment between the necessity of phenomenal-phenomenological propositions, the contingency of hermeneutically supplied conformal facts as statements, and the cogency of propositional-statements). (12)

E.g., let me apply these protocols to my stock example of ‘if it is raining...’ (13)
.

Tautologically, we can say, ‘it is either raining or not raining’. (14)

Non-tautologically, we can say, ‘placed under the rain we get wet’. (15)

As a contingent fact we can observe, e.g., ‘it is raining now’. (16)

As a cogent conjecture, we rightly assume, ‘if I am standing under the rain, I would get wet’. (17)

‘I am now standing in the rain, and duly find ‘that I am getting wet’. (18)

Applying these protocols, we can formulate the following... (19)

As the simple representation of the situation in question, we have the conventional expression: ‘I am apparently standing in the rain and apparently getting wet’. (20)

Subjected to a full suspension we get: ‘I am either standing in the rain or not standing in the rain, and, I am either getting wet or I am not getting wet’. (21)

In a de-suspension of this suspension (that automatically follows in the wake of any suspension) we get, in this instance: I am indeed standing in the rain, and, indeed, I am getting wet [as a validly conformal appreciation of this situation given my competently performed set of imputations, as noted, were arrived at in and through a cogently conducted set of conjectures (in that conformally conducted conjectural economy)]. (22)

Now, let me apply these operations to a theoretical appreciation of the economic nature of the (correlative) concept, say, of an ‘audience’ (as contrasting, say, with ‘actors acting’ both for and before that audience). (23)

The expression ‘audience’ is conventionally used in the situation ‘where an audience, e.g., is watching an event, say, on a stage, with people performing, say, as actors, etc.’ (24)

Ostensively, we can have ‘no audience without actors, and, no actors without an audience’. (25)

However, in the anecdote as related, it was noted that these actors performed as if they had an audience, and, even continued to act as if they had an audience even when they realized they had no non-virtual audience (not realizing, however, that in fact they did have a non-virtual, actual audience with that small group of people quietly in attendance in the back row who silently left just before the moment when these actors would take their ‘simulated’ curtain call). (26)

So, these actors acted as if they had an audience which they then instinctively read as their fellow actors. These actors collectively delighting in the *esprit de corps* discerned in their wonderfully acting before each other. (27)

Then it was theoretically supposed that we also act before ourselves, alone, and that we, individually, therefore, can be our own audience. Thereby, dialectically subverting this concept of ‘actors needing an audience, and v.v.’ (28)

In a similar vein, ‘rows of manikins on the seats of the front rows before a stage’ would also be quite naturally read as invoking the genre of an ‘audience’ even though we also know that ‘manikins cannot be an actual, non-virtual audience’. (29)

However, it also follows, that, even in the stretching of conventional terms, an ‘audience’ is still ‘an audience of something being enacted’, and ‘actors cannot act as if there were no audience to behold their enacted performance’. Therefore, dialectically, ‘no acting without an audience (even if it be only your own sense of self), and, ‘no audience without the interpreted perception of something being enacted (be that perceived of as persisting as a performance, either rightly or wrongly)’. So, we can stretch terms conventionally, but, when they metaphorically ‘snap’, and effectively lose their conventional sense of meaning, then such terms have lost their meaningful sense of a reference. (30)

Applying the protocols, as proposed, it follows that correlatives function ‘correlatively’ till such a time they duly cease to act in that manner. Consequently, the economy in question must cease to function as that type of an economy when its correlatives no function as economic correlatives in *situ*. (31)

But, despite this fact, the relativizing or absolutizing of this situation either leaves it totally untouched or ideologically ‘presented’ as an untenable economic isolates, i.e., either as possessing no e/valuational formation (relativistically, in this second extreme sense) or as dogmatically possessing the impossible ascription of a definitive sense and semblance of an impossibly asserted significance (absolutistically, in this second extreme sense). Therefore, an ideological treatment of either an ‘audience auditing a performance’ or ‘actors acting’ cannot be absolutisticlly entertained in any ideologically extreme manner. I.e., economic isolates cannot be legislated either into or out of existence! (32)

Therefore, once a viable form of candidacy is established, then all manner of viable transformations can be applied through pretreatment, treatment, retreatment, post-treatment, etc. (33)

So, e.g., the second trans-cognitively ordered order of a subsistant[248] thought can viably operate, if able to viably operate, upon some other ordered or inter-ordered product, but, where, e.g., the thought of a 'square circle' cannot be entertained (as an integrated subsistant thought as a 'square-circle') and, therein and thereafter, be described in terms of its instantiated location, colour, size, etc.,[249] and, where the fifth trans-cognitively ordered fact of 'Father-Xmas' can be talked about in those terms of reference, but, in not having a sixth trans-cognitively ordered status, cannot be met at a certain time and place, say, for having afternoon tea with this mythical figure (as would be understood in the conventional genre of 'having afternoon tea with another (non-virtual) person or persons').. (34)

Thus, it also follows, in inter-ordered asymmetrical reduplication, say, in the sixth trans-cognitively ordered 'actuality' of 'actuality', in the formation of historical comprehension, that what should be representatively referred to through a competent imputational economy must be conjecturally viable candidates and not, say, those incompetent imputations that are conspiratorially constructed and disseminated in and through either the witting or unwitting formation of non-cogently operated conjectural economies, etc. (35)

Hence, we can say, that through viable candidates viable forms of transformational retreatment can be applied, and, hopefully, in an existential perspective, suspended, non-conventional treatment of the conventionally non-suspended can potentially elicit existentially oriented forms of e/valuational formation without needing to make a behavioural distinction between the pragmatically-existential (primarily in a deontological orientation [without reference to so-called 'First Principles' or 'Last Principles, etc.]) and the non-existentially-pragmatical (as per the use of the 'non pragmatic-pragmatical fork' as a 'non-fork') given that existentialization and de-existentialization are, conversely, mutually correlative and could well proffer a responsible sense and semblance of a positive response in tune with both existential and non-existential requirements[250] for suitable forms in expression in e/valuational formation, and, where a competent imputational economy can arise from a cogent conjectural economy established through the well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed functions of that well-conducted conjectural economy.[251] (36)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 11.6.24.

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248 Here I spell 'subsistant' content with an 'a' *versus* the process orientation of an existent process with an 'e' (when operating especially in cognitively ordered terms of reference).

249 Because its imputation as an integrated subsistant thought is not viable and, so, all cognitive orders thereafter are equally non-viable. So, e.g., a fourth cognitively ordered perception of a 'square circle' is not possible and neither the fact of square circle having been thought or seen, etc. Refer to *The Seventh Book*… for a detailed exposition of cognitive orders.

250 'Non-existential in its positive sense, and not in its relational.ly detrimental negative sense.

251 In a formula that summarizes this *Postscript* A.

XIO. Ethical Conjectures: Private-Public Transformations in Moral Positionings

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIO. Ethical Conjectures: Private-Public Transformations in Moral Positionings*[252]

0. Pre-Introduction & Introduction

From a philosophical perspective, most ethical philosophies are to be found somewhat lacking, yet, for all their defects and failures, society still goes about its tasks and chores without too much ado in such matters. It would be nice to claim that most people have an inherent sense of decency and respect for each other, but, again, that might be arguing too much. On *a priori* grounds we might suppose that people have some degree of a tacit access too existentially oriented insightfulness and then it only behooves us to reverse engineer the same in order to demonstrate the possibility of that fact that we must have been able to access some form of method or methods to arrive at such consensus. However, given the inevitable dialectical qualifications and counter-objections to surmount along the way it might be better, first, to clearly articulate what an existential insightfulness might be before seeking to find this 'needle and thimble' in the complexities of the 'haystack' of lived-reality in all its bewildering perplexities. A simple case in point, we all say, 'it is wrong to kill' and yet we find it is sanctioned in warfare for the defense of our vision of civilization, be that for causes both noble or ignoble in either their dissemination or dissimulation, or for judicial punishment, or for self-defence if about to be attacked, and so on. If we were to chase each one of these counter-instances and qualify this self-evident principle, and which many would rebadge as a 'Principle' with a capital 'P', could we even get properly started let along finish that type of moral exposition? Therefore, let me head towards the eventual demonstration of the existence of an existential dimension, that I conjecture we all have some degree of access to, in order to articulate a vision of the ethical that might just contribute some moral clarity over the course of our passage thorough this world at large. To this end, I wish to center my discourse between a positive take on both the 'non-economic fork' and the 'non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork', as just recently introduced, for reasons that will become apparent over the course of this disquisition on an existential ethics.[253] (0)

First, in a preamble, let me reintroduce these two forks as philosophical devices, and, what is entailed in the conjecture of an existential dimension. Second, let me explore why traditional ethics is all too often predicated on either the impossible and/or the defective. Third, then let me introduce this so-called 'existential dimension' and demonstrate the manner of its operation for the concerned, caring and responsible person, and, why the second fork, ultimately, should prove not to be a fork despite what traditional philosophers might wish to say to the contrary. Penultimately, let me focus on the central exposition of this essay. Last, I will outline a series of provisional conclusions, and so on. (1)

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252 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

253 The first fork is a 'fork' where we must choose between the impossible or the defective *versus* the possible and the possibly beneficial. The second fork is a 'non-fork' being 'not a fork' since I would argue that from a pro-relational, existential perspective we do not need to choose between the relatively deontological and the relatively expedient as the adoption and adaptation of a suitably appropriate, proper, and apposite set of responses will automatically be elicited in our responsible approach to the well-represented nature of that relational situation in its relational situatedness. By 'well-represented' is meant 'the exercise of a conjectural economy that is well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed', i.e., one that is competent, i.e., acts within an imputational economy that is judged to be 'competent'.

1. Preamble: The Existential Dimension...

Whether we are aware or not aware of this prejudicial form of a materialistic bias, a relational dimension in living-experience, as textually reported upon as 'lived-experience', is generally overlooked. All too often, lived-experience is subjected to all manner of excessive forms of reduction, or analysis, without a comparable awareness, and predilection, for modes of synthesis, such as, e.g., emergence. As far as the economics of treatment goes, there are three kinds, and only three kinds of treatment, namely, nomination, synthesis, and analysis, and to excessively favour the latter is to hobble ourselves even before we can metaphorically 'walk', let alone, 'run'. (2)

Admittedly, there are an infinite plethora of economies, however, in archetypal terms, this excessive preference for reduction, or analysis, is transferred to the corresponding economic functions[254] pertaining to other economic forms of gestalt focus conducted in their co-associated background fields associated with the variety of co-associated styles in economic performance, be it, e.g., conjectural,[255] interrogative (the simple asking of a question),[256] representative (the running of various imputations through conjectural economies),[257] intentional,[258] judgmental,[259] temporal,[260] and so on. (3)

In a pro-relational attitude, we remain open to the indications of an existential dimension emerging from a situation containing a set of relational participants (subjects) and relational parts (objects). As with all forms of intentional experience, a corresponding co-associated sense of subjectivity, in keeping with the related economy in question, is experienced, namely, in this instance, a 'trans-relational subjectivity'. And, in common with all economies, no sense and semblance of distinctive economic subjectivity is possible without the co-arising 'economic correlatives' or 'correlativities' that trimodally constitute the distinctive nature of that economy in question. So, just as when we visually perceive something we become a 'visual perceiver', in the pro-relational nature of existentially oriented experience to that same degree we will experience a corresponding co-associated trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity. Thence the parameters of trimodally constituted pro-relational experience, say, intentional objectivity, intentional

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254 Explored under the concept of 'economic complexification' where in economies archetypally parallel each other in archetypal terms of reference, namely, consonant backgrounding, dissonant foregrounding, and harmonic resolution. Refer to *The Seventh Book*...

255 Where the 'reductive' or 'analytical' is co-associated with the 'necessity of analytical propositions'.

256 In what I term to be the 'first reply' in the form of a 'metaphorical response'.

257 As exemplified in the presentational modality of the phenomenological (in its contrast to hermeneutical mode of representational reiteration and a potentially chaotic, existentially oriented process of radical re-direction.

258 'Focusing' on intentional objectivity (*versus* intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity (sometime referred to as 'transcendental subjectivity').

259 In the judgmental economy, realized through the third moment of harmonic resolution the first harmonic moment is consonance of the background field), and, the second moment is relative dissonance (paralleling [economic complexification] with the moment of reduction or analysis.

260 Where the 'reductive' is co-associated with the 'retrospective experience', in our 'historical dealing with the past'.

motivation (of the co-associated intentional background field) and trans-relational subjectivity should intentional experience assume an existential orientation. (4)

Now, let me analogically analogue existential experience in metaphorical-like terms of reference. E.g., two very good friends, once again, are having a cup of coffee. Now, these two friends like to discuss both philosophical and political topics. That they both know already, but, where their conversation this day will travel, over the course of their fruitfully creative dialogue, has to be experienced by them in the 'here and now' (*hic et nunc*) as it will be spontaneously revealed to them through the unique specificity of their mutual explorations as they engage in their two favourite types of discourse. From this 'sharing of minds' a great enjoyment will be had in these novel explorations whose content cannot be predicted, but, as a process is well-expected going on the strength of past experience. From such existentially oriented interaction we could describe this type of mutual encounter as semantically clarifying, aesthetically creative, as revealing mutual obligations both fulfilled and to be fulfilled, a pragmatical sense of the economical, effective, efficient, etc., along with the revelation of future possibilities; and, the factual appreciation of current actualities.[261] All in all, the lived-demonstration of an 'existential excess', as an 'existential surplus in e/valuational formation', i.e., 'value', i.e., the formation of 'significance, meaning, and meaningfulness'.[262] (5)

Now, a few moments of reflection, hopefully, should reveal other forms of existentially oriented experience, like, e.g., viewing a wonderful work of art; enjoying the sublime nature of a natural landscape or sunset or rising moon; admiring a wonderfully built building; being the grateful recipient of someone else's thoughtful concern and care, or v.v; or, sometimes, even just a surprising smile from either a stranger or someone we know; or, having a delightful meal with friends; or, as just recounted, having a coffee with someone we enjoy conversing with... (6)

As already intimated, existential experience is experienced in an existential 'orientation', as an orientation that is derived from a process of existentialization, i.e., turning our attention towards a pro-relational orientation and away from our more reductively oriented, materialistic attention towards the appearance of just relational actors (participants) and relational acters (parts). Hence existential experience, as an orientation, is realized through the 'relative existentialization (through a pro-relational attitude) of the relatively non-existential' (i.e., the relational elements of relational participants and parts, or, actors and acters, etc.). Where this pro-relational re-orientation will be experienced in a corresponding trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity that, to the same degree, when we are pro-relationally re-oriented. (7)

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261 The perceptive reader will note that I am echoing the six trans-cognitive orders of judgmental experience, namely, the phenomenologically-semantic; aesthetical innovations; existential-pragmatic-deontological experiences; pragmatical forms of expediency and utility; potential outcomes in terms of possibility, probability and potency; and, factual statements finding mutual assent.

262 Alluding to an economy of valuational formation, where more correctly, I would argue 'value' appertains to 'aesthetical, existential-pragmatic-deontological, and pragmatical forms of e/valuational formation' *per se* and not so much to the phenomenologically-semantic, hermeneutical possibility, and historically ascertained facts. The expression e/valuation' indicating 'trans-intentional, judgmental evaluation and intentional valuation (delivered in and from that process of judgment through 'retreatment')'.

Now, this existential observation needs to be re-emphasized. 'The existential orientation' is realized to that degree 'we existentialize the relatively non-existential', and, 'the non-existential orientation' is realized to that extent 'we de-existentialize the relatively existential'. The sense and semblance of the existential is never realized through the existentialization of the relatively existential, and, likewise, the non-existential is never realized through the de-existentialization of the relatively non-existential.[263] (8)

Furthermore, we should realize that the relatively non-existential is not necessarily evil or demonstrative of some semblance of a lack or absence of positive e/valuational formation. Now, it could be said, 'we do not live by cake (or brioche) alone'.[264] But, whereas the existential has only a positively relative denotation (and connotation) to some degree or other, the non-existential can have either a positively, neutrally, or a negatively oriented relative denotation (and connotation). In its negative sense it refers to the relatively 'lacking' or, in more extremely represented situations, to the relatively 'evil' or the outrightly 'malevolent', if not the 'potentially dangerous' then the 'actually destructive of the relationship in question...' Where, e.g., the killing of a person or persons within a certain relationship is instrumental in a loss of the relational richness and re-enrichment to be possibly had by the surviving participant or participants that could or might be experienced within that relationship in some future moment of time in a positive 'light'. On the other hand, if a certain relationship is not found to be experienced along relatively existential lines of engagement, or in the relative neutrality of non-engagement, then it would be more apposite for the party or parties to appropriately disengage from the company of each other (rather than either maim and/or murder each other, etc.). (9)

An important point of the previous observation that should be brought out is that in being in a pro-relational re-orientation towards that specific relationship *per se*, in an attempt to perceive, or rather, apperceive the relationship from the perspective of that relationship itself (*per se*), to that extent this is possible, that same lived-relationship is then duly bound to deliver a progressive re-enrichment of that relationship either through the initial creation of that relationship, or through maintaining the preservation of its current richness, and/or through the ongoing engineering of its to-be-expedited re-enrichment. That, in effect, to that extent we can 'look after' a certain relationship, through suitable forms of 'concern and care', then the relationship is then 'more than capable of looking after us', in turn, so to speak. Thence, the existential dictum, 'by what you sow, by that you shall reap', not forgetting that 'from a few seeds sown a bountiful harvest will return more seed than the quantity of seed originally invested'. Hence this concept of making an 'existential investment' in our relationships and 'the sharing in the ensuing emergence of an existential surplus as an excess of e/valuational formation'. (10)

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263 This observation is stressed by Martin Buber, in *I and Thou* (or *I and You*). As Buber puts it, more or less, the existential is experienced through an 'I-Thou-ing of the I-It' and not through an 'I-Thou-ing of the I-Thou'.

264 A complex double allusion to, first, the misreported reply of Marie Antoinette (in the midst of a wheat shortage), and, second, the Biblical saying, to the effect, 'we do not live by bread alone'. Here, in this reversed analogy, 'bread' is the 'relatively non-existential' and 'cake (or brioche)' is the 'relatively existential', and, where it is obvious 'we cannot or would not want to live by cake (or brioche) alone'.

Thus, through this short exposition on the nature of existentially oriented experience, an existential ethics is already being thematized (quite contrary, on the whole, to more traditional forms of ethical philosophy that overlook this sense (or idea) and semblance (or experiential appearance) of an existential dimension running in parallel to our more materialistically oriented experience of relational elements as either 'actors' or 'acters', and where the latter, in turn, are either passively acted upon and/or in actively acting act upon either ourselves and/or other actors or acters... (11)

Now, let me introduce my intention to explicate this discourse between the following two forks, or, more correctly, the exposition of a fork and a non-fork, namely, of 'the non-economic fork' and 'the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork' (as recently introduced in preceding essays). (12)

In the course of this exposition, in here unravelling my intentions, in the form of a very brief summary, with the negative aspect of the non-economic fork I will deconstruct traditional forms of non-existentially invested ethical philosophies, and, with the positive aspect of this same fork I wish to constructively outline a positive existential ethics, and, then, through the application of the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork indicate how a pragmatic-deontological-existentialism and a utilitarian or pragmatical, as non-exitential forms of expediency that need not be in conflict with each other in existentially informed patterns forms of intervention when we respectfully and suitably act on the behalf of our relationships. Thence the deconstruction of non-existentially invested forms of traditional ethical philosophy, and, the (re-)construction of an existential ethics, and, how we can shift from personal to inter-personal forms of moral engagement passively with(-)others, actively before(-)others, and to engage an existential sense and semblance of an overall freedom to be both found and shared through(-)others... (13)

Basically, the existential dimension is overlooked in both philosophical and non-philosophical forms of appreciation, and, yet, is 'ever bubbling up' and 'filtering down' through how we view the world, be that through an ethically oriented lens or any other type of cultural-intercultural perspective. Indeed, for the more reflective person, the difference between existentially oriented experience and non-existentially oriented experience is profound and immensely obvious once we have experientially mapped this life-world, this world as lived, as both deeply underlaid (immanently) and starkly overlaid (transcendently) in such a vivid manner once the immediacy of this aspect of experience is suitably recognized, duly encountered, and directly engaged. Such a re-orientation, be it either religiously re-interpreted or non-religiously re-interpreted, is forever evident in each and every living-era and especially found loudly resonating in their most representative texts, great examples of literature, again, whether religious or non-religious in their tenor… either demonstrating the ineluctable beauty of the existential and/or the despicable and destructive ugliness and isolation of the rampantly non-existential, not that the relatively non-existential is intrinsically evil, far from it, since most of this world as lived provides the metaphorical 'bread' of our existences… but when lived without relation to the enriching world of our relationships, will fall flat like unleavened bread left far too long upon the cold top of a plain stone bench… (14)

But, in the formulation of an ethical philosophy, why this preference for an existential orientation? Moreover, how should we recognize this claim that we can recognize, encounter, and engage this aspect of experience? Surely such a claim needs to be established before continuing on in this direction. In exercising this choice, we could 'all be simple fools merely marching towards the nearest mirage…' (15)

It is my contention that the differential experience of an existential orientation can be delineated to distinctly fall under the following headings, namely, Time, Space, Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity.[265] (16)

Under the dimension of time, we find indications of 'spontaneity', 'synchronicity', 'simultaneity', 'suddenly experienced innovative instances of originality', 'momentary flashes of an apparent insightfulness', 'vivid elements of both the ahistorical and the living-uniqueness of the eternal, ongoing moment in the existential sense of the here and now (*hic et nunc*) that translates us from the merely conventional and historical nature of time-experiences that would otherwise be more mundanely entertained…' Then, it might be shocking to say this, but, in this type of communion, say, when reading wonderfully constructed texts of a classical construction or thinking about those people we know or knew, we can even metaphorically 'talk' with such individuals, both living and dead, and even those people unmet who appear to have 'spoken directly to us' despite their having died before the advent of our own birth… (17)

In spatial terms, we meet with indications of a 'sense and semblance of the trans-geographical', 'a diminishment in spatial separation and isolation'. Much like two people absorbed in a telephone conversation who both forget that a vast distance currently separates them. Likewise, in our reading memorable texts of a historical nature, either as testimony or as commentary, there could be 'moments of forgetfulness when such distances implied are also profoundly forgotten in this experience of the relatively non-textual' (18)

Under references to our own subjectivity in an appreciation of existentially oriented experience we 'recognize, encounter, and engage a more continual stream of consciousness' rather than the usual choppiness of a fickle mind flitting from one fragile thought to the next. Indeed, as 'a train of unthought-thinking that seems to effortlessly continue to reinvest itself in that self-sustaining strain of a mental delight whose cogitation has us staring at a beautiful painting or admiring the sunset or the solemn rising of a full moon, the naturalness of a landscape that still escapes the artifice of human intervention, and even the designed brilliance of those instances of human construction that are found to so easily to impress themselves upon this more heightened sense of awareness. Much like the 'engaged reading of a wonderful novel in which we are reluctant to put down' in order to attend to the requisite rituals and routines of daily life… (19)

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[265] Those of a religious persuasion might wish to add a fifth category, namely, the Numinous. However, the addition of this fifth category neither adds to nor detracts from the exposition delineated under these first four headings. The category of the Numinous is left open as to whether it should entail some more precise formulation of either divinity and/or the spiritual in keeping with the religious beliefs and aspirations of the person concerned. The existential is experienced by religious and non-religious alike.

Under the category of intersubjectivity, I mention again the delight we take in having a wonderful 'cup of a coffee with a friend' in whose conversation we both discover ever new variations in old themes not hitherto thought of by both parties or either party. The sense of a difference that is much like that between a repetitive chore and our entertaining a novel challenge that is artfully surmounted. The sort of experience, when met in our interactions with others, that is badged as fulfilling, meaningful, and would be worth re-living although the actual uniqueness of existential experience is not something that can be relived (but, instead, where we can set up the pre-conditions for re-entertaining a series of further experiences that then revel in the apparent authority of their own uniquely provoked authenticity). Or, for example in those moments of togetherness found or seen, say, upon the sporting field where the *esprit de corps* of some or all of the participants, and even spectators, is discerned as almost 'palpable'. The difference, indeed, between attending a live performance of a brilliantly written play that is well-performed before an audience alive to the uniqueness of this unfolding event… and a play 'in need of an author' who knows 'where they might be going, how to get there, and all too often, just how to end such an affair on a high note of resolution… whose resoluteness continues to spill over the historical termination of that 'event'. (20)

It is fashionable in philosophical circles to recite this word 'event' (*événement*[266]) and I would like to contend that its use is usually indicative of this difference between an existentially oriented account of phenomenological experience and relatively non-existential processes of description. I would also like to note that the existential orientation is more 'proscriptive' rather than either 'descriptive' or 'prescriptive' in regard to more morally oriented forms of discourse. How should this distinction be observed? (21)

In the 'event of our openness to the potential predicaments of others through simulated forms of empathy' how should we existentially respond authentically and responsibly? I would argue that our responsiveness through following a pro-relationally informed appreciation of the relational situation in question not through just a description of that situation or some appeal to a set of meta-textually oriented genre-expectations, as a set pf prescriptions possibly echoing certain principles more treated as ethical guidelines,[267] but, through negative processes of proscription that automatically ordain what is not acceptable should nothing be done or what is done but is judged to be improper, or inappropriate, or inapposite, in effect, as not suitable given the nature of the situation and the requisite depth of responsiveness to be called forth in our reception of that event. (22)

In this regard, my favourite example is that of an encountering a hungry person who could be a friend of ours who, for whatever reason or reasons, is just too proud to tell us that they are literally 'starving'. If we were truly attentive to others, we should in all likelihood be able to discern this state of affairs. Now, a proscriptive demand, in its deontological constitution, is not that we should directly feed this person, but, ensure that this person is not left in a state of hunger. A subtle difference that needs to be recognized!

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266 Citing its French expression.

267 Arguing 'principles are dependent upon the deontological, but, the deontological is not existentially dependent upon a Principle or set of Principles!' Furthermore, the existential cannot be just deontological (as implied by the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork).

In this example, we could just give this person a meal, say, under the pretence that we, ourselves, were hungry; or quietly give them some money, as a 'loan', so they could buy food for themselves (and perhaps their family too); oversee some other skilful approach[268] that ensures that 'this person is not left hungry…' (23)

The key observation to be noted here is that a responsible existential response is not following the dictates of a set of so-called authorized ethical 'Principles'. or a set of cultural ethical guidelines, but a skilful reaction to the definitive specificity of the situation in question in which a gamut of viable responses can all be profitably elicited. If anything, existential discernment needs to comparatively assess which responses are viable or not viable, and, more importantly, which of those courses of to-be-chosen enaction are comparatively more viable and more fruitfully productive, indeed, are able to enrich the relationship in question, but, for all that not that there can exist or must exit one and only one set of responses that is definitively correct since, for example, how a hungry person is suitably fed is more relevant that what food that person consumes and how that nourishment was to-be-arrived-at or had-been-arrived-at![269] Indeed, the unique specificity of the situational event necessitates a specificity of a unique response, or at least, a non-predetermined response that uniquely and successfully rises to the challenge of our insightful reading of that event… (24)

Now, these phenomenological characteristics of existentially oriented experience as noted under these four heading of Time, etc., can be referred to as 'existential hallmarks'. Characteristics that appear to stamp a certain situation as an existentially oriented event… Moreover, in our reading of a certain past occasion, say, from either reflecting on our own past experiences, be they thought of as either good or bad, or, say, in the reading of a well-constructed and well-expressed novel these same characteristics can also be discerned as 'existential indicators' where whose relative presence or absence declares the accompanying set of experiences to be either existential or non-existential in orientation. Or, again, from an appreciation of the pre-conditions that more ably advance an existential appreciation of the situation to hand such factors can quite rightly be termed as 'existential expectations'. So, just what conditions appear to advance this type of re-orientation from the mundane to the relatively non-mundane? To answer that question I would briefly reply we need to be aware of this existential difference, note how it is grounded in empathy, utilizes working suspensions capable of representatively simulating the situation to hand, and how we might more authentically respond to such an event or series of events..? Hence the 'intuition' of these existential hallmarks discerned in a seemingly productive, pro-relational attitude engaged along with the trans-relational sense of a co-associated subjectivity invoked in such experience in which the representative simulation of our relationships can be evoked and found to be either existentially and/or non-existentially invested from the richness and enrichment of ongoing existential contributions to be found imparted to the specific re-direction of those proceedings. (25)

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[268] Alluding to the Buddhist concept of *upaya*, skilful behaviour. Perhaps the Christian expression 'charity' when properly explored?

[269] Of course, the word 'suitable' is important here. E.g., you do not overfeed a person who has suffered a long period of starvation. Likewise, a diabetic should not be fed a diet rich in carbohydrates unless we need to quickly reverse a hypoglycaemic crisis, etc.

2. Deconstruction of Traditional, Non-Existentially Invested Ethical Philosophies

A realistic perspective on modern morality might opine, as a friend of mine recently did, 'that whatever you agree on, I can disagree with', and, so, what consensus is there in this era of political polarization if people happily divide up between those who agree with a certain social stance and those people who diametrically disagree with such a stance given its your stance? Or, when things come to an ethical crunch, when we suddenly have to make an important moral decision, will it be not much more than an enculturated cultural habit arising more as a reflex rather than some appeal, say, to deontological principles apparently enshrined by some unknown divine entity who non-evidentially presented pronouncements are to be endlessly disseminated by bickering bands of religious professionals promoting often very bizarre religious beliefs, not much different from crazy conspiratorial memes, that, together are increasingly found to be either irrelevant or dangerous in this digital age of social media, along with the now rampant use of AI and all manner of other innovations both recognized and unrecognized… in a world, e.g., where we visibly find indications of blatant inauthenticity being expressed through a proliferation of ubiquitous scams, phishing expeditions, fraudulent avatars also out seeking your money and all manner of other valuable commodities like your personal information, and so on. Well, we might ask, in such a raw and bewildering world, how can we be moral, do the right thing, if we will meet with no consensus in such matters? (26)

But, this superficial point of view can be dismissed. On the whole, people do lead lives that are respectful of each other. In effect, most people, most of the time, are cognizant of a moral dimension even if, as limited finite individuals, we will imperfectly perform our passages upon this stage of the world, both individually and collectively. (27)

Whether we grant or dispute this observation, and conjecture, let me attempt to present an existential ethics and support my stated contention that an existential approach to this type of topic is superior to any form of a non-existential ethics. (28)

To demonstrate the conjectural viability of this potentially controversial contention, let me first non-exhaustively survey the philosophical contours of ethical discourse; then, using the non-economic fork rule out impossible and defective forms of ethical treatment, and, under the positive aegis of this same heuristic device rule in how we might construct a viable experiential approach to our existentially oriented dealings with others, and, then, invoking the non-fork of a non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork illustrate and declare how existential responsibility can deontologically respond in a fashion that is existentially pragmatic that, at the same time, need not rule out non-existentially oriented forms of input whilst also ruling out those inauthentically misdirected patterns of behavioural performance that need to be called out as such..![270] (29)

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[270] E.g., when the GOP continues to voice one of their recent talking points, issued in bad faith, that President Biden orchestrated the conviction of ex-President Trump in the so-called New York 'Hush Money' Trial, and, furthermore, that the presiding judge, Judge Merchan, convicted this same person when his conviction was arrived at by the twelve members on the jury, twelve members of the public, as his peers both screened by the members of the Defence and the Prosecution. This same judge did not convict this individual, now convicted by his court, but, will be sentencing this now convicted felon on July 11. Or again, without needing to mention certain parties and members of that party in particular, we see similar

Given my (ordered) understanding that ethical e/valuational formation is a 'value' and not a type of judgment that is not directly value-oriented for the convenience of the following scheme, as about to be devolved, let me postulate that ethical value has either a distinctive (second cognitively ordered) disposition of the aesthetical as expressed through an interest in harmony, the following of rules, style, ethical integrity, etc.); a distinctive (third cognitively ordered) disposition of the de-ontologically oriented, and/or, a distinctive (fourth cognitively ordered) disposition of the pragmatical more concerned with functional utility as might be expressed through concerns over effectiveness, efficiency, efficaciousness, expeditiousness, economically minded forms of parsimonious behaviour, and so on. But, in this enquiry let me be more concerned with both the differentiation and accommodation between the latter two categories of the deontological and the pragmatical whilst noting, that from an existential sense of a pro-relational perspective, attempting to view the relationship from the simulated perspective of the represented relationship itself, and, setting out to act on its behalf in patterns of intervention that set out to be existentially oriented, i.e., in a manner that set out to promote the psychic richness and enrichment of the primary relationship under such focus, let me note the force of the existential more often than not, would not set out to definitively fall precisely under one or more of these categories. Indeed, the pivotal power of this non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork is to realize that, from an existential perspective, there can be no 'transcendental difference', no trans-cognitive, trans-intentional differentiation in this judgmental sense and semblance of a lived-distinction between these types of ethical categorization when the existential will seek to deliver its own uniquely responsive and responsible form of a response. An ethical response, we must clearly understand, whose apparent authenticity, if called for, will cut across such philosophical distinctions that, on a philosophical level, should be maintained in order to still discern a necessary difference between such potentially distinctive styles of interpersonal resolution. But, however, when and where expressed in lived-reality, from an existential perspective, that such distinctions simulated from that metaphorical 'point of view' will not be observed, need not be observed, indeed, were never observed as such. Let me elaborate upon this point. (30)

In a famous trial, a certain car manufacturer[271] unwisely took the advice of its accountants, along with their poorly designed forms of cost-benefit analysis, and the like,

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shameless behaviour when voicing compelling arguments why the public should not vote for a certain politician, but, then, later on turn around and say they will now endorse this same miscreant as a candidate 'whom they would most definitely vote for'. What value could be placed in such people who declare that a 'certain someone obviously has an odious odour, but, also know from which direction the wind is blowing'? In the unstoppable march of time, at the end of our lives, hopefully, we will be left with our good reputation, but, most certainly, with neither the vestiges of our fortune nor the scars of our misfortune. Noting, in this same regard, that the expression 'non-existential' also runs the gamut from the required presence of those neutral materials and services needed for survival to those instances of the utterly evil whose appropriation is neither required nor should be required. On the other hand, somewhat asymmetrically, the existential runs a purely positive gamut from the mildly beneficial to the profoundly beneficial in its incorporation in the very functioning of that primary relationship in question, albeit as it is also found to be situationally related within this world at large, but, also unable to please all people equally.

[271] The manufacturer was Ford Motor Company and the truck was branded 'Pinto' and the company was judged to have engaged in forms of reckless homicide. The case is the Ford Pinto Criminal Trial conducted in 1980 and was the first case in American law where a corporation was criminally prosecuted when

as entered into by the same, and, instead of recalling these vehicles for a very cheap replacement of a dangerously defective design feature, a fuel tank prone to explode, were prepared to follow the poor advice of their accountants and do nothing other than pay out those cases for such negligent oversight estimating that it would be cheaper to follow this rather minimal course of enaction.[272] Quite rightly, when this case came to trial, the jury were duly horrified that this company knowingly did not fulfil is full duty of care to both its customers and the public at large and allowed this deadly design to malfunction at random, in line with calculated expectations, upon the roads of the American nation. Consequently, the calculations developed by the accountants were completely eclipsed by the cost of punitive damages, arising from civil cases, and subsequent to the considerable loss of goodwill from the reckless homicides associated with this product this company had to cancel the very manufacture of that type of vehicle. That the observation to be made here is that, on balance, in a court of law, e.g., but not just in a court of law, indeed, in the court of public opinion, deontological considerations will have a much heavier 'weight' attached to that type of deliberation in comparison to simple, pragmatical considerations conducted along the lines of mere expediency, utility, an economy of costs, the possibility of future profits, or similar. (31)

Now, I raise this instance of a jury's reaction to 'reckless homicide' to point out that a deontological attitude can exists in our reading of ethical situations in order that, first, it should not be ignored, and, second, be duly recognized that it can be an obviously valid aspect of moral experience. That, moreover, in its performance, it need not, indeed, cannot have any recourse to so-called 'First Principles', or 'Last Principles', or 'Middling Principles'… so beloved by some dogmatic people of a religious persuasion or clearly influenced by such attitudes. This observation of the deontological notes that 'in an ethical reading of certain legal or moral situations on occasions, in certain types of situatedness, an ideational imperative will form with an injunctive-like force that will either permit and insist on a suitably responsive type of performance of a certain distinctive pattern of behaviour or not permit and insistently call for our desisting from entering into certain other distinctive patterns of behaviour, and so on. Quite rightly, without prejudice, the fraudulent association of the deontological impetus with religiously formulated principles, mistreated as certain moral Principles with a capital 'P', can be excluded under the negative aspect of the non-economic fork as either not possible to conceive or as defectively engineered without self-evidently reproducible evidence that would be needed to validly support such dogmatic contentions. On the other hand, the phenomenological awareness of a certain deontological decisiveness of the last instance should be duly recognized, etc., if and when it should occur, and, if and when it is discerned as something that can be virtually re-simulated, and if and when it makes a relevant difference in our ethical or non-ethical assessment of a certain situation, be that either with or without directly required patterns of response, hopefully, of an existential responsiveness and responsibility, and, if and when it should appear as manifesting a relatively non-economic

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it was charged with reckless homicide. Although acquitted of these charges, damages were awarded in civil cases of over $100 million. Given the propensity for the explosion of its fuel tanks, 1.5 million vehicles were eventually recalled and the production of this brand of car was discontinued.

[272] Defining 'enaction' as 'activity (through commission)', non-activity (through omission), and/or 'deferred inactivity (through either postponement or an effective form of cancellation)'.

form of ethical e/valuation.[273] The 'non-economic' here being in its positive sense as 'an irruption of e/valuational formation indicative of this positive sense of the non-economic fork'. Illustrating, therein and thereby, 'the positive role involved if such non-economic patterns of resolution harmonically aspire to seemingly enrich the living-embodiment of the relationship or relationships in question'. (32)

Now, for convenience, as noted let me divide moral responses as falling under the three heading of the Aesthetical, the Deontological and the Pragmatical, but, also take on notice that, from an existential perspective, the sense and semblance of the pragmatic-existential, or existentially-pragmatic, can quite easily take the form of a unique delivery that, in all probability, will cut across such distinctive philosophical categories. A state of affairs illustrated in my stock example of the architect of a bridge who must navigate between and negotiate through both deontological and pragmatical aspects of their responsibility to design a bridge that, first, will not injure people and will not fall down as per their contractual brief, and, second, will also be delivered within the economically exercised confines of a reasonable budget… and, hopefully, in a third consideration all too easily sidelined, in an architectural form that would be judged as beautiful to behold or, at the very least, not as an ugly stain upon the landscape as if it were an 'ugly inkblot carelessly superimposed upon what otherwise might have been an interesting and pretty picture of a landscape or portrait…'[274] (33)

In my estimation, with respect to these three headings of the 'Aesthetical', the 'Deontological', and the 'Pragmatical', ethical patterns of behaviour can be further delineated under the additional six headings[275] of Actors (ethical instigators), Recipients (of ethically oriented enaction instigated by actors), Acts (as forms of enaction read as having ethical-like ramifications), Performances (when viewed from an assumed intentional perspective or a possible set of more probably intended perspectives), Consequences (when the ramifications of the situations in question are either virtually or non-virtually simulated and explored), and Situations (in their represented specificity along with an understanding of their potential impact other relationships more closely connected to that primary relationship, and, by extension, upon the world at large).[276] (34)

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273 When invoking the positive aspect of the non-economic fork in its irruption of a harmonically oriented form of resolution that hopefully would be judged as suitably apposite, etc.

274 Obviously referencing, as an analogy, how the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork is able to overcome such definitive philosophical distinctions like the deontological, the pragmatical, and the aesthetical in a form of an existentially-pragmatic expression of a pragmatic-existentialism where such philosophical distinctions are harmonically overcome in the non-economic irruption of the ensuing unique specificity of existential terms of reference. At least in an accordance with such theory, when the practicalities of lived-experience might render less competently this existential aspiration with a greater degree of difficulty. I am also alluding to a wonderful painting by the Chinese painter Shih Tao titled 10,000 *Ugly Inkblots*.

275 Giving us eighteen permutations that, I would like to surmise, could well cover most of the possibilities for running an ethical philosophy, albeit in non-pro-relational, non-existential terms of reference.

276 As an example of this scheme, we could follow this hypothetical example of its use. A pregnant woman, as the 'recipient' of certain ethical or unethical or non-ethical actions, as acts, instigated by a certain 'subject or subjects' who might insist that she have an abortion for whatever reason or reasons, as entertained under the aspects of 'performances', with certain anticipated consequences real or not real, virtual or non-virtual in extent as understood to occur within the confines of a certain situation whose relevant specificity will also impinge on its overall ethical or moral appreciation. E.g., if the woman in question, in this hypothetical scenario, is a person with either a strong religious conviction that abortion is morally

3. Differentiating 'Existential' from both 'Non-Existential' and 'Anti-Existential'...

Now, in the application of this scheme, either in part or in whole, it should be quite easy, relatively speaking, to argue over the imputed relevance or non-relevance of these various headings in conventional terms. Surely this is the case since we have been doing that since time immemorial. However, from the relatively unconventional nature of a pro-relational, existential approach an intuitive path is fraught, metaphorically, with *cul de sacs*; potholes; ideologically entertained preferences; habitual forms of non-critically organized thinking; conspiracies and rabbit holes, and all manner of resistance, obstructions, institutional roadblocks and obstacles, and so on. How are we to navigate around such problems, negotiate with others as to how we might proceed in such enquiries, and arbitrate outcomes that truly possess an existential complexion and tenor? (35)

The *raison d'être* of an existential approach is to either create a new relationship along with its potential positivity in e/valuational outcomes; preserve the richness and current enrichment of a relationship that already exists for us; and/or conserve the current positive 'value' of that primary relationship through an expansion of its current richness and enrichment as holistically pertain to that primary relationship and as would be equally shared by its relational participants from a non-contractual, compactual sense of perspective. Let me explain. (36)

Everyone understands what is entailed in a contract, a contractual relationship. A contract is a textual instrument of some form or other that is either verbally assented to or signed off by the concerned parties and where there is usually a considerable power differential between the parties whose negotiations are both regularized and codified by the terms of that agreement. Less well known and recognized is what I term as a 'compactual dimension' upon which that contract could not itself be conceived of as a functioning contractual instrument. Without the expectation that all the parties will honour the terms of their agreement, as codified, that agreement would cease to function. Indeed, since without the continuation of the necessary and requisite degree of goodwill required such an instrument would be quickly deemed to be both 'broken' and 'defunct', as no longer functioning as intended, and, perhaps, only continuing to operate in terms of the penalties for the party or parties that were determined as having broken that original agreement. Agreements continually need to be honoured, and without this deontological dimension of the compactual, no agreement would be or could be entered into. That, despite the differences in power relations between the parties of the contractor and the contractee, insisting on excessively unfair conditions to be placed on either party by the other party is counter-productive, is a recipe for either the non-entering into that agreement or the more

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wrong or has rather neutral non-convictions in such matters then such considerations from her perspective should enter into those same deliberations as to whether that act of abortion should or should not be put into effect. Now, in the analysis of this type of situation, the presence or absence of religious principles should be taken into account not because these principles are principles *per se*, but, how they constitute a more respectful appreciation of the overall moral situatedness of that ethical situation under the breath of this more comprehensive form of review. That this relational form of ethical appreciation in its more final deliberations is conducted from a pro-relational perspective and not just from the more limited perspective of some configuration of its relational elements, be they considered as either relational participants and/or relational parts in those non-existentially oriented, non-pro-relational terms of reference.

probable breakdown of that agreement if entered into. Now, this compactual dimension is to be seen everywhere paralleling the contractual. On some occasions, it becomes more evident, especially during crises when people quite suddenly, and existentially, come together to render assistance to each other. Under those types of circumstances, contracts are not generally entered into. People just spontaneously help each other to the best of their abilities, sometimes working miracles when acting in concert, Like, e.g., the incident at a metro train station caught on camera, and which went viral, when a passenger got their leg caught between the train and the platform and, when, almost suddenly, a row of people simultaneously self-organized to move that train away from the edge of the platform in order to free that trapped leg. And much to relief of every viewer watching that video, that person's trapped leg was successfully freed. (37)

Now, this co-dependence of a contractual dimension upon this less visible semblance of the compactual, and v.v., mirrors the correlative relationship between the relatively non-existential and the relatively existential. This relationship, when reflected upon, contributes an even more insightful appreciation as to how the world really works. Indeed, in a situation of unchecked power we inevitably witness the colonial-like expansion of the contractual dimension into the compactual domain, and, then, when the compactual dimension is able to check such excesses in power differentials we see the tide turn and swing back in the other direction with a slow rectification of such practices and a return to some renewed form of sanity. As a case in point, in our cities, public parks in Australia are just that 'public' and normally free to enter and enjoy. But, although compactually free for their citizens, still, their upkeep needs to be paid for which is usually overseen through taxes, federal grants, council rates, and so on. However, capitalizing on this fact, commercial ventures often proffer their services and if a proliferation of offers are accepted by the legal entity overseeing that park it is quite possible that little park would remain if not checked, say, by the democratic force of public opinion which could well be reinforced and translated as votes at the next election, be that form of rectification exerted on either a local level or a state level, or more widely on a national level of governance. (38)

Now, I would like to contend, overall, that existential value is always positive to some degree or other, but, that non-existential e/valuation runs the gamut from that deemed to be valuable, to that which is more neutral and perhaps less desirable, and on to that which is not desirable at all when viewed as negatively evil, destructive of relational richness, and deserving to be either shunned or actively resisted. That a working suspension of the same, within a consequential analysis, should delineate for us such relative distinctions and the uniqueness of their interrelations. That granted, this is how we differentiate the relatively existential from the non-existential orientation, and, how we might better deal with negative forms of non-existential e/valuation? Then, furthermore, this is how we ask, 'just what ethical role can this relationship between the relatively existential orientation and the relatively non-existential supply in our existential re-appreciation of a truly moral philosophy when we entertain this radical shift in emphasis from the relatively non-existential to the emergence of an existential dimension, from a reductive materialism of relational elements in the form of actors and acters to this pro-relational domain where we should metaphorically 'act on the behalf' of that relationship in question?' (39)

4. The Central Exposition of this Essay.

To explore these considerations in a more integrated fashion, let me now move to the central section of this essay. (40)

To begin, let me explore two anecdote-like analogies, one somewhat trite and non-controversial, and, the other, a lot more controversial. In the process outlining a method for the personal resolution of the latter as a type of template for how controversial issues might be better approach. Again, not proffering a definitive form of resolution, but, instead, a method where either a single person or a group of related individuals might adopt and adapt in order to find some more satisfactory form of a working resolution and consensus. (41)

In the first anecdote, I am exploring to what extent an object has some form of an intrinsic value, above and beyond its material expression, that one might be tempted to apply to that object, as if resident in that material embodiment? In the second set of explorations, I will seek to delineate in what sense this approach should not be reductively mistreated as just one more variation on what otherwise might be categorized as a 'situational ethics'… with a number of other potentially insightful reflections to be entertained along the way? (42)

A young student in their art class at school is given the following challenge by their teacher. They are to carve a small block of wood of their choice in the form of a human figure whose face must clearly delineate a distinctive emotion that would be appreciated and recognized as such by most people should that object be carefully looked at. This student in questions thinks to themselves, I would like to see myself as an artist but to date I know I have not as yet produced anything I would consider to be truly artful. Let me rise to this challenge. They settle on the emotion of 'happiness', as expressed through a 'smile', and in their preparatory research they look at a multitude of smiling faces online. Then, with a pencil and notebook in hand, set out to envisage how they might carve this small block of wood. Once a working image is settled upon, they set about carefully carving this piece of wood. By the end of that day, they find they have surprised themselves with a beautiful figure of a person with quite enigmatic and endearing features along with a most sincere and subtle of smiles. Once this object is suitably smoothed and finely tooled, with great pride they discretely sign their first artwork with their initials at the bottom of this sculpture. Then, they decide on what stain they will use. The next day, now properly dried, they give it a first coat of a varnish. Admiring each day, for a week, what they rightly feel to be their first masterpiece, indeed, going on in later life to be a well-known and well-sought-after artist able to command a lofty price on the primary art-market. After this piece is much commended by their art teacher, with some reluctance, they gift this small work of art to their mother who appreciates this object more as a 'gift' rather than as a 'work of art'. On her mantelpiece in the lounge room this beautiful figure smiles for nearly three decades. The mother dying a few months after the much-lamented death of this now very famous artist. The relatives disposing of her estate, knowing the provenance of this object, send it to auction where it fetches a good price on the secondary art-market. A collector, admiring this great artist, but without suf-

ficient funds to buy a much later work, is happy to purchase this small piece of juvenilia. Unfortunately, upon their death, this small sculpture is sent to the local op shop where the old lady with a marketing gun, forever set on five dollars mark, duly appraises it as worth the same accordingly. Moments later, an elderly pensioner then buys this small sculpture on the tertiary art-market. For a few years, they admire this small cheerful work of art, delighting in the fact that it ever cheers them up. On their death, this overlooked object is placed in a skip and sent off to the local tip where, before too long, it is incinerated with those mountains of more combustible forms of rubbish. (43)

Now, what is the point of this anecdote? Is that sculpture, with its subtle smile, and seemingly in possession of a certain *je ne sais quoi*, a work of art whose aesthetic properties are intrinsic to the same? For that sculptor, this piece marked their transition from being a mere 'craftsperson' to that of the 'artist'. This observation not being seen as a disparagement of the craftsperson since, for them, it is possible for a work of craft to be merely well-made and not particularly artistic in its pretensions, but, on the other hand, a work of art that is not well-crafted will not be embodied in this world as a wonderful work of art (despite the brilliance of its artistic conception behind its poorly instantiated crafting). In a furtherance of this idea, we might also conjecture that for a person to be really good at any particular craft or art they need to do their 10,000 hours of thoughtfully engendered practice. Maybe geniuses of this world might only have to do, say 5,000 hours. Still, although we can recognize moments of creative skill in the early works of either J. S. Bach or Wolfgang Mozart, e.g., still, their early works seem pale in insignificance before their later masterworks. So, even, great artists like Bach and Mozart have had to do their many hours of practice before taking on the mantle of a great performer in their field or fields of expertise. Moreover, I would also like to hazard a guess that to appreciate the skill of any artist, great or otherwise, we, too, likewise, need to do our many, many hours of preparatory work so to speak. Indeed, it would be the heights of arrogance to assume, first, that comprehension is and should be instantaneously received, and, second, immediately mediated without any mental work on the part of the recipient. Moreover, I do not see any point in being told what we already think we know since that seems to me to be nothing more than merely reinforcing our prejudices. If we find something difficult to comprehend then do not automatically blame the messenger. I am reminded, here, of one of my first forays into a university library whilst a high school student. I would walk in hoping nobody would notice then gravitate by habit to the sections dealing with either Scientific Topics or Eastern Religions or Westerns Philosophy. On one occasion remember starring at two large book cases filled with books by and about Immanuel Kant and, in opening one of those books, and in trying to read what was written, immediately through this was just gobbledygook. But, was immediately chastened by a second thought that most people do not waste their time, and the time of their readers, by writing books filled with nonsense, of course hoping that this generally is the case, and that the fault, in this instance, was precisely mine. That I definitely needed to go to university in order to read and understand this type of literature. Well, I can now read such topics, but, whether I understand such textual depositions, their re-disseminated translations, and interpretations is another matter… (44)

Now, some people are naturally philosophical and, both consequently and subsequently, know how to ask and deal with philosophical questions. No doubt through their reiterated passages through this world at large they will find themselves, and be found, better performing in different fields of expertise mostly likely in a manner aligned with their sympathies and, basically, in a manner in keeping with what motivates them. However, the question needs to be asked, 'do we have to do our obligatory ten thousand hours in each and every topic in order to successfully master these various disciplines?' Thankfully, I believe there is some slippage between topics that allows us to hermeneutically appropriate the innovations of different disciplines without the otherwise requisite serving of a full apprenticeship. Let me illustrate this point with an anecdote that has been mentioned on previous occasions to make a different set of points. (45)

In the basement library of one of my philosophy teachers, who was acting as a mentor, with whom I was reading from a book I had just written on the topic of epistemology, in a chapter specifically dealing with aesthetic experience, I was arguing the contention that we had to have a refined attitude in order to discern the refinement of experience supposedly presented by aesthetic experience. Well, my argument got swiftly deconstructed by one photograph from a book detailing an expedition up the Amazon where these intrepid explorers had taken an old-fashioned gramophone up the river. Seated in front of the large horn-like trumpet of this instrument sat an Amazonian native obviously in a state of ecstasy listening to this device with his eyes shut and his mouth open. The caption beneath the photo merely said something to the effect of 'Listening to the Mozart symphony titled the Great G Minor'. (46)

So, I had to instantly had to go back to the drawing board. In the light of this exposition so far, I would like re-interpret this Amazonian's ability to appreciate Western Classical Music, without presumably having ever heard the same before, down to the fact that this specific piece of music has both wonderful themes and brilliant examples of rhythmic syncopation, and that this very perceptive person had already done his ten thousand hours at his own native academy for musical and rhythmic appreciation. Taking heart in this interpretation that the development of particular skills can spill over into an accelerated appreciation of the skills pertaining to other disciplines. (47)

Now, let me return to the question as to where the psychic location might be found, should it exist, in our appreciation of the aesthetic properties of a specific work of art?[277] (48)

Here I need to invoke 'the simulation of representation as the representation of that being simulated'. Returning to the wooden sculpture with the beguiling smile from a reductive point of view it could be easily dismissed as just a pile of wood. Indeed, finally, it was merely treated as something that could be burned, removed through a process of combustion. On the other hand, the collector saw it as 'an embryonic work of a master sculptor', and, the elderly pensioner treated it as 'an ornament that would cheer her up by merely looking at this smiling figure'. By invoking this simulation… we could argue that if this 'artwork' were carefully reviewed as a 'work of art', in and through a series of

[277] Asked in paragraph 44. Basically to be found in an alignment with its re-lived-re(-)presentation.

conjectures that entertained the thought that this object was not just a piece of carved wood, then we might suppose that other people too reviewing this same 'intentional object' as an 'artwork' would similarly experience this same or similar *je ne sais quoi* through the experience of an existential surplus of e/valuational formation elicited through this re-simulated interaction between the 'object' as an 'artwork' as a 'smiling figure' falling under the 'genre of a sculpture' whose apperceptive-perception was and would be repeatedly rewarded in such a manner that this excellent example of a 'work of art' could not be reductively dismissed as just merely 'a piece of carved wood'. Of course, without its simulated representation as a 'work of art' it would be little more than a 'piece of carved wood' and then, as a consequence, deserving no more than our either using it as an ornament or as an object of status or by ignoring it or through setting out to dispose of the same. (49)

What do I mean by this expression 'the simulation of representation as the representation of that being simulated'? If we wish to continue with this ascription of the inherent aesthetic nature of the artwork then we can no longer point merely towards the intentional 'object' as a mere 'object under focus'. The said 'object' has to be invested with aesthetic possibilities, or potential, and if we discern that to be the case, then we declare it to be an 'ark work'. If we do not view this intentional object in that manner then we do not and cannot see it much beyond a 'piece of carved wood in the form of a smiling figure'. Now, what forms the representative qualities of this type of experience is not the object *per se* since it we were to see this object as just a 'piece of carved wood' it then would be little more than just a 'piece of wood'. Then, if we were to treat this piece of carved wood as an 'art work' and this investment of our interest in this manner returns a sense of aesthetic delight in a form greater than that invested then we would take heart from such reception that we were, indeed, dealing with a 'work of art' which could no longer be merely dismissed as 'just another carved piece of wood'. Furthermore, this type of alignment also occurs in the very fabric of the conjectural economy, etc. In other words, we can find a relative transformational isomorphic invariance between different states of our apperceptive-perception in terms of the well-organized and well-exercised dissemination of the conjectural economy itself. That, in effect, this isomorphic invariance needs to be co-present in and between well-formed propositions, well-informed synthetical statements, and well-expressed conjectural propositional-statements. E.g., that this 'wooden object' is indeed 'carved as a smiling figure'; as a fact seems to be well-carved; and, as a conjecture does seem to measure up to being a great example of an artwork since the 'interest' of our aesthetic investment is compounded and impresses upon our experience of this artwork that, indeed, it is a wonderful 'work of art'. Where, at no stage, is an idea of representation advanced whose thesis is that we are dealing with the 'aesthetic object *per se*' as if operating in either a so-called 'external world' and/or in some metaphorical 'Platonic realm of some form of aesthetic ideality'. Where the representativeness in question is arrived at through the apparent preservation of an isomorphic invariance of a representative-like experience and not that being represented as a projected object of the conjectured imputation *per se* (under 'representative terms of reference' that then would be outrightly impossible to entertain as a viable conjecture!). (50)

So, if we wish to continue with this metaphorical ideal of (a relative or related) 'inherence' then to the extent we can metaphorically think along those lines we must see it as 'inhering only in our carefully approached reception of a potential world of art as an actual work of art should we find this positivity of aesthetic interest being returned in our apposite review of this object as an 'artwork'.' (51)

In the same vein, the obvious experience of an intense rapture on the face of this Amazonian Indian speaks to the intensity of that experience that, for convenience, I would like to refer to as an 'absolutely definitive experience', or 'absolute experience', but, not as an 'absolutstical experience whose hallmark is an absolutistical indubitability'. I am using stronger language here because it is my belief that in the irruptive nature of non-economic experience arising through the point of its economic resolution (within the economy of the sub-economic and within the overall economy of the super-economy) this expression of resolution invests a corresponding degree of 'resoluteness' in our judgmental determinations. As much as I will qualify this discourse with the use of the expressions 'relative', 'orientation', etc., at the same time I must recognize the 'relatively definitive nature of non-economically re-directed experience'. Hence the definitive nature of the decisively expressed expression of 'decisions instantiated in the last instance' (and which might be taken upon up in an existential light as 'decisive instances of next moment' and 'permitted instances of the decisively instantiated first instance', etc.).[278] That, this same phenomenological deontological-like decisiveness in responsiveness occurs and should also occur in our ethically re-directed forms of moral experience. That, in a certain morally apperceived situation, this pattern of a definitively instantiated behavioural response is either just 'wrong' or is just 'right', or, less intensely, could be reviewed as either 'acceptable' or as just 'not acceptable', etc. However, as I do not wish this style of ethical responsiveness to be discerned as just another form of a 'situational ethics' let me now segue to my second anecdote in order to demonstrate that a lot more is involved in this type of approach, namely, our investment in a conjectural economy centered in the suitable exercise of working suspensions capable of responsibly delivering decisive judgments of the last instance that can be then taken up as existentially decisive judgments of the first and next instances in an openness of understanding that that there could well be more than one course in apposite patterns of responsible enaction…[279] (52)

In revisiting this controversial topic of abortion, I am not suggesting a universal solution but the universality of a method that goes beyond the relativistical ethics of a mere situationalist approach. (53)

Earlier in this essay, I noted six headings whose categories various ethical theories are inclined to either preference or de-preference. The last category of 'situation' in

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[278] Reading the expression 'permitted' as 'existentially proscribed' in processes of existentially re-directed intervention. The enaction of the next moment as the first moment, as the first moment in a series of distinctively different set of subsequent consequences, hopefully, with an existential complexion and tenor.

[279] Which, in light of the principle that there can be no pure equality between any form of similar identities, would imply that, ideally, there is a best solution be that recognized or not, but, in the reality of lived-experience, any solution that is effectively applicable, and resolves the problematicity in question, is pragmatically acceptable.

my mind is one that certainly does need to be taken into account given that in the conjectures of an ethical approach relevant information is that type of information whose presence or absence in all likelihood should radically alter the ethical outcomes from the perspective of those ethical subjects situated in that primary relationship in question where one or more of those relational participants are seeking the resolution of an ethical dilemma or series or set of ethical dilemmas. E.g., if the pregnant woman at the center of an enquiry seeking to answer the question 'should or should not an abortion be proceeded with?' be that enquiry instigated either by that woman and/or any other involved party or parties, is a person who happens to have, say, strong religious views that this procedure should not be undertaken, and, that her final views on this matter are in an alignment with those religious views, it would seem obvious that that for any other party or parties to insist that this procedure should go ahead are usurping the moral decisions being made by that woman in question, where, in this instance, she has insisted that this procedure should not proceed. Metaphorically, as she has the most 'skin' in these proceeding (besides that of the unborn child) it would seem inappropriate to insist otherwise. That being the case, it would be wrong of her partner or family or the family of her partner or a medical representative or representatives of the hospital or officials representing the state be allowed to insist otherwise? Now, how might this situation change? E.g., if the foetus were subject to some condition where it might well survive within the best of a modern medical setting, but, where the life of that child would also be marred by unending pain and suffering at great expense to both the finances of that mother and the state would she or should she be made to change her mind? Or, consider the converse type of situation where the woman has made a final decision to have an abortion for whatever reason or reasons. In the light of that decision, should the partner or her family or the family of her partner or a medical representative or representatives of the hospital or some representative of the state be allowed to insist otherwise? On one hand, the taking of an ideologically extremist position in any controversial topic, one way or the other, appears to simplify such decision making. No matter the circumstances, they follow the 'rule book' for such matters and act accordingly regardless of whether such decision making is in accordance with the fully informed and non-coerced consent or all the relevant parties. From a philosophical point of view, the unblinking adherence to a set of so-called Principles, be they First Principles or Last Principles or Middling Principles, is already problematic in and of itself! Who decides which Principles are to be prioritized, and, who decides which principles are to be de-prioritized. If a philosophy of 'rights and obligations', e.g., were to be (also) applied to this controversial topic then if the rights of the unborn child are proposed along with the rights of the pregnant woman, her partner, her family and the family of her partner, along with the rights of the doctors and nurses and the medical establishment, and the rights of the political establishment to insert themselves into such a situation, working either with or without the separation of church, or some other religious organization, and the state… surely we are inviting the shifting fashions of a controversial arena wherein such privileges (as self-appointed or other-appointed rights) and obligation will be either marked up or down reflecting the current state of the power-relations between these various actors and not some alignment with a non-evidentially based set of ideological guidelines unless those ideological guidelines are enforced through some form of politically inflexibly enforcement. A situation reflecting the tides of public opinion, and whether these rights and obligations of the former are actually legislated and

consistently enforced, etc. A political approach that I would well suspect to be a recipe for more 'heat than light', along with the relative wasteful use of resources of a nation mixed in with a plethora of unintended consequences.[280] How might we better approach such situations where the imputed rights of more central parties in these controversies are intruded upon if not outrightly traduced by less central considerations? (54)

To assist in the working resolution of such issues I would like to propose the outline of an existential approach to such ethical and moral conundrums.[281] I would also like to respectfully suggest that this type of a working solution, in effect, is mirroring the types of processes that would actually be involved in the formation of judgments. (55)

I have pointed out that at the center of a discipline is a distinctive use of a conjectural economy, and, at the center of the conjectural economy is the utilization of working suspensions. Therefore, in the careful application of working suspensions we have a method that converts, say, a situationally constructed ethics into an existentially oriented set of working proposals where the ongoing re-application of suspensions, especially in the light of changing conditions, can further refine the pragmatics of such a series of responses. Hence, what is needed is the suitable execution of a working approach to an ethical set of conjectures in which the well-organized and well-exercised conjectural economy oversees the suitable the utilization of well-formed propositions, well-informed statements, and well-expressed conjectural propositional-statements and where the entire economy, therein and thereafter, is subjected to ongoing processes of suspension. That through this approach, through exercising suspensions, a pro-relational treatment of representative simulations, as simulated representations of the situation to hand, is entertained whose resolution, when realized, has the power to enact processes of causal redirection expressed through non-economic (as an extra-economic process of resolution) in which the ethical options of that situated relationship are re-weighted and re-organized through the re-directed power of that resolutely arrived at process of resolution. That, in effect, a process of judgment, in an economy of judgmental appreciation, is harmonically realized through a chaotic-like process of re-self-organization in which the simulated representation of the situation is allowed to find itself re-directed through the power of the de-suspension automatically invoked in the wake of each and every act that entails the apparent resolution of that working suspension. In other words, the form of the resolution entered into economically is then expressed non-economically and, thereafter, taken up hyper-economically through acts of appropriation where the innovative responses that are meaningfully comprehended are then intentionally executed once understood and permitted. By such means entering into existential patterns of behaviour that significantly create new forms of value-formation through new and novel relationships, along with the ongoing preservational richness and conservational re-enrichment of that relationship... (56)

Now, through the application of working suspensions, along with the forceful implementation of working processes of resolution, that suitably represent in a textual

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[280] Witness in America the increasingly problematic nature of health care for pregnant women in those states currently pursuing ideologically extremist forms of legislation in this same area of concern.

[281] I am not seeking to make any great distinctions between the expressions 'ethical' and 'moral' other than in matters of linguistic usage where such relatively minor differences can be found.

form the salient features of that relationship, then it would be no surprise to understand that through such simulations and their continual re-constitution that suitable patterns of a responsible-responsiveness could be elicited where this pro-relational attitude effectively assists us to act on the beneficial behalf of that primary relationship being placed under such simulated considerations. Again, the simulation of the relationship in question is not seeking the impossible correspondence with the relationship itself but the pragmatic appreciation of the alignments and re-alignments undergone through both our inspections and suspensions of such information as they appear to be re(-)constructed under the forceful resolution and expression of the relatively non-economic. (57)

Now, such harmonically instigated forceful processes of re(-)alignment granted, would it be right to assume that non-economic processes of resolution could be entered into in such a manner that on certain occasions we would experience radical shifts in these causally induced patterns of a distinctive re-direction instrumental in the formation of distinctive responses of the last instance, etc. To explore this simulated-situatedness, imagine the following thought experiment. Say, we became disembodied ghosts, able to go through walls and capable of traveling vast distances in the blink of an eye. Imagine on one such venture we happen upon a torturer plying their horrible trade in the torturing of people for whatever misbegotten reason or reasons. Through empathy, through the inadvertent simulation of their sufferings, we 'feel' the pain of these tortured subjects. 'Inhuman, all too inhuman', can be the corrupted nature of some people. But, being disembodied, like ghosts, we find that we are powerless in such a situation to do anything. Indeed, almost as powerless as the mere individual, when, to be effective as an individual in society, we should not just be angry, but, become a group of organized individuals capable of finding a more definitive response collectively, if not the most definitive response, in our existential reading of that situation. I would imagine in this situation, from an expected experience of moral repugnance, that the nature of our response to the abhorrent features of this situation would similarly be most intense. That our reaction to a reading of this situation would issue in the form of a response imbued with an equal intensity of expression matching, more or less, the ethical disgust and revulsion that would be observed in the making of this form of an embodied response as presented in the last instance, where through permission, it is now to be treated as an existential response of the first instance where through permission, requisite patterns of an existentially oriented enaction will be entered into (that, hopefully, will also be taken up collectively). (58)

A small point, but with important ramifications, I would suggest that all ethical responses, once finalized through resolution, possess a sense of resolution, in keeping with the intensity of its origination. Moreover, although we can envisage definitive responses from time to time, when a final judgmental decision is realized, we might wish to conjecture that definitive responses of the last instant can, through existential intervention, take up, through permission, definitive responses of the next instant, and therein, through enaction, as definitive, existentially oriented responses of the first instance. Or, in other words, final decisions once made should not be reviewed as rather weak replies, but, much more as non-weak/non-strong responses that have a definitive strength about them capable of inducing causally re-directed responses. Where such intentional strength and decisiveness is necessary in the enaction of such distinctive behaviour. (59)

Another way of both presenting and representing such decisive patterns of enaction is to note that in the pursuit of suspensions we might seem to be rather non-focused, but, where in economic terms it is natural to qualify predicates, relations, and nominations, in the issuing of decisive responses of the last instance, etc., our language should reflect such a transformational-transitions. Hence my introduction of a spectrum from possibilities to impossibilities that would rule in definitive responses of the last instance as absolute or 'absolute-like' in character, but, not as impossibly absolutistical in character. Where such a distinction, through comparison, also travels beyond the comparative to the relatively-relative but never the relativistically-relative. Thence this mix of comparatives, etc., in order to delineate this spectrum in real-time. I.e., noting what non-economically does not work, and, those entries that do non-economical work.[282] (60)

Hence the application of the non-economic fork to these types of proceedings in order to differentiate out that which cannot function economically, and, to differentiate in those proceedings that do appear to be working. Where such a differential situation naturally allows me to segue to the sphere of the non-fork designated as the non-pragmatic-pragmatical. Basically, in the pro-relational treatment of these considerations we arrive at a working space in which the existential orientation mixes and melds these various categorical differentiations in a form that overcomes these actual distinctive divisions and potential divisiveness of such classifications. So, e.g., although we philosophically learn to differentiate the deontological from the utility of the pragmatical orientation, in lived-experience we should not be surprised to find them working together (just as the architect of a bridge must formally incorporate both deontological and pragmatical methods in order to arrive at the blueprint of such a proposal, hopefully, along with aesthetical inputs in the formation of the final product). Similarly, in an economy comprising phenomenological descriptions, hermeneutical prescriptions, and existential proscriptions, again, we must mix and match such superficially disparate forces when, immanently, we should question the extra-representative nature of such language and experience. I.e., where, in lived-experience, we understand both the differentiation and integration (or accommodation) of these seemingly disparate economic forces immanently linked through the instantiation of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc. (61)

It is as if in judgment such categorical distinctions do not belong, whereas, in cognitive and intentional terms of reference a disparately divided sense and semblance of a world, through the world of lived-experience, is eventually, or should be, prepared for this mixing and melding of all such distinctions. By such means transcending object and subject (through both embodiment and non-embodiment); transcending both the subjective and the inter-subjective, etc; transcending descriptions and prescriptions along with proscriptions, indeed, as well, transcending both the existentially pragmatic and the non-existentially pragmatical (as implied by the very naming of this non-fork)! (62)

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[282] This spectrum being as follows: The impossible relativistical notions of immanence *versus* the possibility of relative immanence *versus* the working neutrality at the suspended heart of the economic *versus* the possibility of the absolutely transcendent through definitively instantiated decisiveness of the last instant, etc. *versus* that which is transcendently impossible in absolutistical terms of reference.

5. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

To arrive at a 'working conclusion',[283] I would like to propose the argument that this topic of an existential ethics, and, indeed, ethics in general, can be validly thought of, somewhat, as both 'an artform and a science'. However, until we clarify the language used in this important disciplinary field of concern and care, indeed, are prepared to jettison various traditional ideas in both philosophy and metaphysics,[284] given any respectful and insightful historical appreciation of the past, I fear not much further progress will be made. But, ever the optimist, let me at least present these few steps as a method that might hopefully head us in that direction where all disciplinary activities can be viewed as both 'artforms and sciences' and where 'these two branches can re-find one trunk in lived-reality, in lived-experience of a kind whose re-interpretations of social consensus can, more or less, be successfully reiterated...[285] (63)

Now, I do not feel it necessary to go on at length in order to demonstrate how an ethical discourse should be viewed, on one hand, as an artform given the role played by economic resolution that then becomes expressed in non-economic terms of reference that then needs to be further harmonically re-appropriated hyper-economically in accord-

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283 I.e., as a provisional discipline, or sub-philosophical discipline, like any other discipline, ever subject to working suspensions, modelling through various competing heuristic means, ongoing refinements in truth determination, etc., albeit the rejection of an absolutistical indubitability along with traditional forms of metaphysical misrepresentation, and so on. In effect, working with an existentially oriented pragmatism that resists ideological formulations but accepts a process of an evolving consensus that arises through both our tested and attested forms of re(-)interpreted processes of engagement with a lived-appreciation of a lived-reality that is not just simulated in an academic setting. I.e., can do 'real work' in this world at large, can contribute to how we navigate, negotiate, and arbitrate our passage through this overall world-of-life both individually and collectively.

284 Where 'metaphysics' is viewed as the 'appreciation of philosophical topics', i.e., as 'meta-philosophy in a form that economically acts as a correlative of the overall philosophical discipline, and v.v.' (and where the third party in such an economy is the emergent relationship that arises between these two correlatives along with its extension into both the overall world of disciplines and the 'secularity' of this world at large upon which disciplines exert their expertise without, at the same time, reducing the existential *je ne sais quoi* of the latter regardless of whether it be treated either religiously and/or non-religiously. I.e., ever insisting on an open, non-ideological treatment of all topics of enquiry, and so on).

285 This experience of a successful period of resolution in social consensus can be pointed out as those moments when we move on to other difficult and controversial topics and no longer seem interested in engaging in those previous disputes. Although we should also note that what marks out a 'controversial topic', say, abortion, and similar, is this 'endless historical reoccurrence of a revisiting of such themes that do not find a more definitive historical sense of resolution'. Of course, the optimist thinks that this is still possible, and in this regard, I align with the optimist since the defects in such arguments and their non-definitive resolutions should both be able to be accounted for in a deeper, in a more critical and more radical, more metaphysically minded form of exploration that might one day be viewed, in that same regard, as the successful determination and cessation of such controversies. I am sure, from an historical perspective, this type of phenomenon of a cessation of the specifically controversial can be pointed out through a succession of exemplars. E.g., who today, metaphorically, 'wishes to count the number of angels that are able to dance on the head of a needle' although I am sure, we still present ourselves with philosophical and disciplinary problems not that far removed from the borderlines between the non-nonsensical and the non-sensical should we reflect more patiently on those types of more circular disputes (that, for whatever reason, many people will so pointlessly invest themselves in through the adoption of an extreme ideological perspective one way or the other through unnecessarily taking sides in such disputes that demonstratively lack such imputed foundation for those endless processes of adoption and adaptation?)?

ance with my vision of the super-economic. Suffice to say, in a relatively non-theoretical perspective, that ethical resolution simply demands forms of harmonic resolution in which relational tensions are transmuted into productive forms of relational resolution. Or, put more simply, an ethically oriented relationship oversees, directly or indirectly, a harmonization of the collective experience of the relational participants in a relationship, in the unique confines of that primary relationship, wherein the overall value of that relationship is enriched, be that re-e/valuation be conducted through being either created, preserved, and/or conserved (in its expansional sense). This could be put in more experiential language by noting that sense of relational relief that is to be experienced when we resolve difficult issues between our friends, family, and loved ones, and so on. I trust everyone has been subjected, actively or passively, at some time or other, to some form of an intense dispute or argument, and, that when it becomes resolved, will feel an equally intense, if not greater, sense of relief that once again we are now 'on the same page' so to speak, indeed, that we can speak with each other without the relational tension that had previously pervaded that period of relational disputation? (64)

On the other hand, should we treat such processes of resolution from a more scientific point of view? Or, are we merely 'bashing our heads against an historical wall' that will continually re-present itself should we be so unwise to proceed in a direction where others have so successfully failed? (65)

With your tolerant consent, let me set out to at least show how this form of a more scientific resolution is actually enacted every day, and how we might be able to articulate 'how this artform of ethical resolution does indeed have a more scientific prospect or semblance?'[286] (66)

I would argue that all forms of music demonstrate an internal logic as to how they will contrive to resolve the necessary presence of the relatively dissonant without whose resolution there would be no harmony, and no true sense of a musical experience. Similarly, I would argue that all processes of truth determination operate along the same lines, namely, the resolution of that which is found to be problematic or that which is rendered as problematic through being problematized. Then, philosophically or meta-philosophically (i.e., metaphysically, as an appreciation of truth determination of the philosophical or disciplinary field in question) that truth determination can be definitively shown as 'true', albeit within the terms of agreement as proposed, e.g., by Alfred Tarski.

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[286] In Book 9, 'science' is defined in 'inter-ordered symmetrical terms of reduplication, namely, of the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutical possibility. In the next essay, as an executive-like conjecture, I will run the contention that all meta-philosophical forms of appreciation are metaphysical as that expression is constituted, namely, as an inter-ordered reduplication of ordered formations within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the Epistemological Hierarchy (in latter's delineations of distinctive levels of intentional formation from the Pre-Cognitive to the Cognitive to the Judgmental nature of the Trans-Cognitive. The implication being that metaphysical appreciation, as re-constituted, is both aesthetical and scientific in complexion and tenor (as well as being also semantic phenomenologically; deontologically-existential as expressed through political forms of power; pragmatical in an economically-financial sense, as entailed in the politically-economic perspective; and, from ontical reduplication taking on, furthermore both scientific and historical complexions and tenors as well).

I.e., that the meta-proposition is true if and only if the content of the proposition is evident or self-evident in the conformation of its conjectural terms of reference).[287] (67)

Now, in a process of harmonic resolution (as expressed through the irruption of the relatively non-economic in its positive sense, although not necessarily so positive in a more productive sense[288]) we could assign a similar sense of an e/valuational formation, namely, that harmonization can be pro-scientifically ascertained when the quanta of the resolution perceived both before and after a process of interactive treatment is estimated to be either a qualitative and/or quantitative improvement of the overall net relational richness of that primary relationship in question as viewed over that period of transformational transitioning. Now, that sounds very technical, but, let me put that in more everyday terms of reference. (68)

In my existential example of 'the feeding, either directly and/or indirectly, of a starving person' who in their right mind would dispute this qualitative improvement in the relational richness of either 'the direct or indirect participation of the participants in this relationship with that starving person', and, just as importantly, that 'hitherto starving person now has as a relationship with their own overall sense of self?' (69)

So, that granted we can suppose some intuitive measure of resolution is both possible and as actualized in daily life, and, moreover, a comparative form of assessment can also be entered into (just as a hungry person is most likely able to say, 'I am starving; with some food eaten, I am still hungry; having eaten some more food, I am now much less hungry; and, now, having successfully eaten, I am now no longer hungry; etc.' (70)

Now, let me provisionally define 'artform' as a 'relatively unique product produced through the specificity of resolution' (given the unique originality of the artful process). In contrast, let me provisionally define 'science' as the 're-iterable nature of a process whose iterability is to be discerned in both subjective and intersubjective terms of reference' (just as the discipline of science functions along similar lines). However, given that both the artfulness of art and the scientific nature of science are both dependent upon the processes of resolution generative of the dynamics of relational interactiveness, and also the very basic of truth determination, it follows, less superficially, that both artfulness and a scientific re-iterability must be both complicit in the phenomenological expression of relational interaction. That, in effect we could define the 'relational economy' as 'the product of these two types of resolutional process along with the negation of the joint suspension of the same'.[289] (71)

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287 P' is true iff p.

288 E.g., we could argue that resolution of an explosive device is realized through its fulfilling its function to explode, but, where the results of that explosion could well be anything other than positive from either a non-existential, relational point of view or from an existential, pro-relational point of view.

289 Because one way of defining an economy is to articulate its three economic correlatives and the so-called 'third correlative' can be defined as 'the joint negation of the first two correlatives' (just as any correlatives in a certain economy can be defined as the joint negation of the other two correlatives in that same economy [and where this fact is a basis for economic complexion where economies can comment on the corelative constitution of some other by virtue of an archetypal correlativity at the very basic of the economic *per se*]). E.g., in particle physics a 'neutral particle' can have its 'lack of charge defined' as 'the

But, 'science' is also defined through 'the exercising of a scientific method', i.e., 'the relatively stable and aligned reproduction simulated in both subjective and intersubjective terms of reference all other things being equal (*ceteris paribus*)'.[290] (72)

But, is there evidence for a scientific method of some description and degree in the first place (before we set out to discern its prior utilization, be that exercised either wittingly or unwittingly, advertently or inadvertently). Here, the answer must be 'yes'. For how else could consensus form and be exhibited as evident both within and between cultures in those instances where such forms of alignment are indeed both evident and self-evident (when viewed respectively from a relatively external perspective and from a relatively internal perspective[291])?[292] (73)

Now, this hypothesis of some iterable sense of method granted, at least provisionally, what factors might discount this possibility? E.g., could ethical agreement be merely an indication of fashion, memetically induced either through peer group pressure or the emulation of an elite or famous member or group in society? Or, e.g., could it be an artifact of political pressure especially given the recurrent fact that in the advent of substantial cultural innovations we are ever witness to institutionalized forms of resistance to the uptake of such novelties? On the other hand, given that not all cultural settings are equal, and such innovations memetically propagate both within and between cultures at different speeds, we may well assume that should an ethical norm be established through consensus, both within and between relatively distinctively different cultures, then we might well assume that some methodological sense of discernment is operative both subjectively and intersubjectively, and both culturally and interculturally. (74)

So, from the observation of consensus formation as evidence for a scientific-like use of a method or a variety of methods in forms of ethical determination in particular, and in e/valuational formation in general, let us now ask how that indication that there exists some form of judgmental methodology might operate given such operations seen to underwrite such relative and related forms of ethical consensus, these seemingly aligned

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negation of the addition of both positive and negative particles'. I.e., in this instance, the 'relational economy' is 'that dynamic economic space generated between the artful forms of resolution and scientific forms of reiterable resolution plus the joint suspension of these first two correlatives'.

290 I recently demonstrated the use of this method to two children recently on a restaurant table with two identical bottles of water with different levels of water inside. I posed the question that if the water level in the water-bottle were dropped would the note of the bottle when struck go either up or down? As the question posed that the water level was dropped it predisposed both them to simultaneously answer "down" which as a conjecture was disproved by striking another identical water-bottle with a much lower level of water inside it and hearing a note higher in pitch.

291 E.g., in any culture chosen at random we normally expect to find prohibitions against acts of murder and where this observation within and between cultures indicates this degree of an ethical alignment in this regard (that I would argue for in existential terms of reference where and when an act of murder usually decreases the relational richness and potential for re-enrichment between those parties should one or both or all parties were not to have been murdered, etc. The minor qualification of this argument that leaves its conclusion untouched is in those relationships where there is a relational deficit in e/valuational formation and where the separation of the parties is enough to arrest this decrease in value through the relative non-de-enrichment of the same).

292 Basically, an argument invoking a form of reversed engineering.

forms of both cultural and intercultural agreement. Witness the social commentary on the release of prisoners of war in the Russo-Ukrainian War where it is regularly observed that Russian prisoners are evidently non-mistreated and non-malnourished, and this is often remarked as 'good' and 'proper', and in agreement with the international rules of warfare and the care of prisoners, but, where in contrast, it is it is all too often remarked in the release of Ukrainian prisoners, from Russian 'care', that there are often reports that they were mistreated (e.g., tortured) and obviously malnourished, and this is internationally declared to be 'not right' and 'quite improper' in the light of an expected observance of such international conventions previously agreed to by both parties. Now, I am not so much saying that such mistreatment by the Russians is always consistently the case as noted, but, that if it were the case, regardless of the fact that, on balance, this does seem to be an evident trend, should it occur by either or both parties there would be and should be a general, international condemnation of all instances of such mistreatment. Moreover, Russia is a country with more than sufficient food-stocks, given that it exports a wide variety of different types of food, then there should be no excuse for having such a large number of malnourished prisoners of war returned in such prisoner swaps if that were the case, which, unfortunately is the case as observed by myself on television and YouTube videos, and from various other forms of commentary on this illegal war. But, regardless of such claims, the basic point I am trying to establish is that if international consensus declares prisoners of war should not be mistreated, regardless of who does what to whom, then this fact demonstrates the necessary degree of consensus already arrived at in such matters as 'evidence' that, as humans, generally, we have some methodological-like form of ascertainment in at least ethical matters of judgment. Then, having made this claim it now behooves me to indicate 'how this form of discrimination could be entered into both subjectively and intersubjectively, and both culturally and interculturally?' (75)

As already intimated, such 'consensus formation' is arrived at through 'the suitable utilization of working suspensions'. Let me explain. (76)

The concept of the 'transcendental suspension', courtesy of both Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, has been reinterpreted under the expression 'extensive suspension' that is being re-presented here in a simplified format as a 'working suspension'.[293] That, 'working suspensions' are central to the formation of a 'working consensus' as arrived at through 'the workings of a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy'. That, as already noted, a successfully working conjectural economy is realized through the use of well-formed propositions, well-informed statements, and well-expressed conjectures. Now, in this context for the formation of valid arguments, in the establishment

[293] The expression 'transcendental' in its positive sense is reinterpreted by myself as 'trans-cognitive' in aspect, in its epistemological organization, and 'trans-intentional' on the grounds that as a judgment it must be trans-conceptual and, therefore, trans-intentional in its phenomenological characterization. Judgmental acts being delivered in intentional terms of reference. The negative sense of the expression 'transcendental' preserving its Kantian sense of 'transcendental possibility'. However, I utilize the expression 'suspension' in a more extensive use than that as articulated by Husserl. I note a variety of suspension gathered together that inform an economy (as exemplified by the interrogative economy and its use of disconjunctive suspensions, conjunctive suspensions, and the joint negation of the former. Then, as explored in the *Pursuit*, Volume II, I introduce and explore both the role of the de-suspension and its role in the instantiation of iterated patterns of causal enaction.

of their validly ascertain truth determinations, suspensions, of various kinds and forms, collectively play a role in this overall process of discrimination. E.g., we could argue that one way to commence a process of suspension is to merely ask a question (as a dis-conjunctive suspension[294]), or pose an analogical form of comparison (as a conjunctive suspension centered on 'like'[295]) or intimate the validation of some form of conjectural appearance.[296] Conjectures taking the form of a negation, like proscription, or, as entertained in an 'as-if, as-if…' or a 'what if…' Furthermore, I would contend that each and every act of judgment is predicated on the formation of a suitable suspension. That we do not need to know the theory of working suspensions in order to enter into a process consisting of either series and/or sets of judgments as such is already recurrent in each and every intentional moment that defines our daily passage through this world at large. (77)

Now, my contention that suspensions are central to acts of judgment granted, since we must at least ask a question to initiate such a process, I would like to further contend that it is through the suitable exercise of suspensions, either wittingly or unwittingly exercised, either advertently or inadvertently initiated through, e.g., questions (or either metaphorical comparisons or apparitional-like conjectures, etc.) that allows us to both individually and collectively arrive at conjectural possibilities that eventually find forms of positive consent on both a personal basis and as such in the social arena… and often in both cultural and intercultural terms of reference. (78)

That, on this basis, of the suitable exercise of suspensions, we have this ability to exercise processes of harmonic resolution regardless of whether they either enact the unique instantiation of an artform, of whatever description or genre and/or iterate a scientific-like process that realizes a form of consensus, be that with either our own sense/s of self and/or others, and the latter, both culturally and interculturally. (79)

Now, we can take of this what we will, but, I would further contend, that we have here a mechanism for extending our personal forms of ethical judgment to the social do-

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294 Cashed out as an 'either/or', i.e., as a dis-conjunctive suspension.

295 To be cashed out as 'both like and not like', i.e., as a conjunctive suspension,

296 As an apparitional suspension centered on the joint negation of both a dis-conjunctive suspension and a conjunctive suspension. Up till recently I had thought of the apparitional orientation as invoking a double negation. But, through my concept of economic complexification and using the economy of Boolean Algebra as a reference point I would now contend that only a negation need be invoked on par with my idea of existential proscription where existential injunctions are delivered in a negative format (e.g., on par with 'do not leave a starving person hungry', etc.). Boolean Algebra operates on a trimodal economy of just 'or', 'and', and 'not'. Ideally, we could define a suspension as the dynamically balanced apposition of all three operations. Now, as 'and' is central to the conjunctive suspension I would parallel it with the 'phenomenological nature' of the 'first trans-cognitive order' (invoking this method of economic complexion). Similarly paralleling 'or' with the 'hermeneutic orientation' of the 'fifth trans-cognitive order'; and, 'not' as aligned with the 'non-systematic existential orientation' of the 'third trans-cognitively order'. Creatively, this could be extended, I believe, to the other three remaining orders by negating these three operations in Boolean logic as follows, namely, 'nor' (as the negation of 'or') aligned with the 'second trans-cognitive order' (directly opposing the hermeneutic orientation centered in 'or'); paralleling 'nand' (as the negation of 'and') with the fourth trans-cognitively order of the pragmatical; and, 'd'not' (as the 'double negation' or 'not-not') with the sixth trans-cognitive order. Of course, a working suspension, etc., could be defined as the dynamically balanced apposition of all six operations (starting with the first trans-cognitive order and its use of 'and', then 'nor', 'not', 'nand', 'or', and 'd'not').

main, and v.v.[297] Moreover, that judgments can also be enacted from an existential perspective, in the simulation of a reiterable pro-relational attitude open to the apposite, proscriptive possibilities of judgment instrumental in the formation of ethical consensus and, indeed, all other forms of consensus. That also granted, how do account for this division between (the fourth trans-cognitive order of) the non-existentially pragmatical and the expression of the existential as primarily, but non-exclusively, centered in (this third trans-cognitive order of) the deontological… with the important observation that an existential orientation, on all occasions, will radically defy all such neat categories and collapse such well-beloved philosophical distinctions, say, between the deontological and the pragmatical or between either or both of the former and the aesthetical, etc. Hence the exposition in this essay of the non-pragmatical-fork as a non-fork in comparison to the other heuristic device of the non-economic fork which operates as a fork (between what is not economically possible and the irruptive possibilities of the non-economic in its expression of economic forms of resolution in the enactive causal transformation of virtual ideation into the non-virtual simulations of such intentions). To conclude, let me outline how these two forks, as a fork and a non-fork, encompass the epistemological extent of ideational processes involved in ethical discernment, and, by extension, all other forms of judgment, and are conducted both subjectively and intersubjectively, and, how, from an existential perspective, distinctions that might be generated under the auspices of the non-economic fork are de-distinguished from the existential perspective of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork. Therefore, to proffer the outlines of a working conclusion, let me conclude by exploring this dialectical space between these two forks... (80)

As noted, I had this embarrassing distinction of the ‘non-economic’ that had two quite different senses that would or should be able to be distinguished from the appreciation of the implications of their situated context. However, in the novel encountering of the density of a philosophical argument surrounding either type of philosophical positioning I reasoned that by combining both senses in the form of a non-economic fork I could perhaps turn this apparent disability into a productive philosophical asset. (81)

The ‘non-economic’ in its negative sense (say in the ‘left-handed reading’ of this fork) as an injunction argues that what does not work in an economic sense should be seen as such and promptly discarded. That would include whatever is not trimodally constituted in economic terms, i.e., all forms of an extremist ideological predilection for and over-commitment to all exclusive forms of an impossible unimodalism, bimodalism, and absolutism, and under-commitment to all exclusive forms of an equally impossible relativism. Furthermore, we should also rule a metaphorical line through all fallacious forms of argumentation; mis-information, dis-information, mal-information; and unsuitable forms of conjectural entertainment both non-existential in orientation and existential in orientation. Unfortunately, the exercise of all disciplines is redolent with such nonsense and the work of a critical and radical disciplinarian is cut out for them in having to de-

[297] Hence the subtitle: *Private-Public Transformations in Moral Positionings*. In this essay making no terminological distinction between ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’. Where the stability and iterability of such positionings arising through working suspensions at the center of well-organized and well-exercised conjectures, albeit as enacted from a pro-relational existential sense of perspective.

construct the same and then reconstruct what remains that is found to proffer working conjectures, etc., and more successful forms of interpretation, and so on. (82)

The ‘non-economic’ in its positive sense (say in the ‘right-handed reading’ of this fork), as an injunction, argues through harmonic processes of economic resolution that we will find the irruption of the non-economic in its productive orientation. That arising from critical pre-preparation, the ensuing sense and semblance of the radical nature of an irruption of resolution needs to be re-appropriated and re-comprehended through the imputation of the hyper-economic sub-economy within the overall economy of the economic, i.e., the super-economic. (83)

That this imputation of the ‘super-economic’ is also the locus for the irruption of the relatively existential in e/valuational formation… and whose productively is better explored through the use of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork and its inclination to transcend more mundane distinctions, like e.g., the (intentionally) Objective, Interobjective, Subjective, and Intersubjective; and, the ordered distinctions of the second-trans-cognitively ordered order of) the Aesthetical, the Deontological, and the Pragmatical, along with the other three orders of (the first trans-cognitive ordered order of) the Phenomenologically-Semantic, (the fifth trans-cognitively ordered order of) the Hermeneutical, and the Ontical (factual determination); and, the division of types of ethical philosophies that preference one or more of the following categories, namely, Actors, Recipients, Acts, Performances, Consequences, and Situations; etc.). (84)

That in the articulation of an integrated ethical philosophy and, hopefully, its suitable presentation of an apposite moral sense of positioning, we use the non-economic to deconstruct and rule out what is either economically impossible or too defective, and, rule in those viable conjectures that productively and profitably re-interpret the problematic or problematized nature of our current situatedness standing in need of such ethical or conjectural refinement. Then, using the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork we realize that from an existential perspective, instigated through the non-partially expedited use of working suspensions and the impartially exercised suspensions of all conjectural considerations, etc., it is to be hoped we can entertain this transformational-transition between relatively non-existential forms of pragmatical e/valuational formation and existentially-pragmatic e/valuational formations primarily centered in more deontologically oriented terms of reference in which the arising of the pro-relational attitude overseas an equal de-distinguishing between an existential-pragmatism and a non-existential sense and semblance of the pragmatical along with all other forms of ordered exposition beginning with the aesthetical, etc. Whereas from a relational perspective we learn to draw useful and important philosophical distinctions, say, between the deontological and the pragmatical, from an existential, pro-relational orientation such distinctions are progressively defused and absorbed in the existential transcendence of the temporal, the spatial, the subjective and the intersubjective dimensions of personal-interpersonal lived-experience… (85)

Hence the utility of these two heuristic devices of a non-economical fork and a non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork for developing a dialectical approach to this sub-philosophical discipline of the ethical, and as a provisional explanation for the im-

puted arising of an ongoing and working refinement of ethical conjectures, etc., in the open pursuit of a working consensus in both its personal and interpersonal forms of moral positioning along with the preferencing of an existentially oriented attitude through which is realized the non-economical irruption of a viable form of an existential-pragmatism as a pragmatic-existentialism..!![298] (86)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 19.6.24.

The Advertisement for the Presentation of this Essay:

23 June: Noël Tointon: Introduction and Discussion on the Allied Topics of an Existential Metaphysics and an Existential Ethics in the Context of a Critical Conjectural Philosophy

Previously, I have argued that a place can be found for a non-traditional metaphysics when the philosophical economy, itself, is suitably subjected to some critical form of appreciation from a meta-philosophical perspective. In a similar relational vein, an existential ethics can be constructed in a manner that represents the subjective-intersubjective dimension from a relational point of view, i.e., an existential perspective. Moreover, a critical approach can also be instrumental in provoking a radical re-reading of the same when confronted by the need for an innovative re-alignment with the instantiation of more fruitful trajectories in the coursing of our relationships. In this presentation, the novelty of this approach will be explored, critiqued, and opened for discussion at length. To some extent this task will be simplified by operating in the space cast by two philosophical devices, namely, a non-economic fork and non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork... Basically, an exploration of an existential ethics.[299] (87)

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[298] Where, from the perspective of the super-economic, is realized the overseeing of an existential attitude which although centered in the third cognitively ordered order of the deontological orientation is not exclusively locate in that order alone. Hence a pragmatic-existentialism non-exclusively centered in the deontological orientation, etc., and able to harmonically express pragmatical and aesthetical aspects as well.

[299] Paragraph 0.

XIP. The Conjectural Economy –A Radical Overview:
Re-Discerning the Contours of a Re-Constituted Metaphysics?

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIP. The Conjectural Economy –A Radical Overview: Re-Discerning the Contours of a Re-Constituted Metaphysics?*[300]

0. A Preamble and Introduction

Let me now take a few moments to review the direction of the overall trajectory this set of essays appears to be heading towards, in effect, outlining a sort of prospective-retrospect or retrospective-prospect? I have been arguing that a conjectural economy is central to the philosophical discipline and, by extension, all disciplines. Now, more correctly, whatever 'operates economically' is central to the disciplinary economy and for 'conjectures' we could substitute an infinite range of other 'economic possibilities', e.g., 'intentional', 'philosophical', 're(-)presentational', 'existential', certain 'ordered and inter-ordered varieties in economic focus', the 'political-economic', etc., etc. Moreover, central to the workings of any economy is its use of a suitably relevant set of working suspensions. Furthermore, even more central, is a necessary disposition to ascertain the apparent truth status of those articulated conjectures in the context of our lived-experience. But, we can live by neither conjectures nor working suspensions nor truth determinations alone since we need to be able to also appreciate the relative integrity and merits of such simulated elaborations of our apparent emplacement in this world at large as we stand with(-)others, before(-)others and find, through(-)others, the thematization of a certain sense and semblance of an overall degree of freedom. A freedom to be, to persist, and, hopefully, to thrive through this delineation of the existential dimension, an aspect all too often overlooked in the formality of those proceedings of a disciplinary nature. That this most central aspect is our ability to experience both the appreciation and ongoing emendation of our positioning within this overall life-world, and, that this can be none other than a form of philosophical meta-appreciation or metaphysical awareness as to our 'standing' in this overall world-of-life. Therefore, let me explore this dimension of the 'metaphysical', albeit as here being reconstituted in and through these reflections on the centrality of the conjectural economy, etc. Furthermore, in the light of that which is relatively positive in the non-existential orientation and the relative positivity of the existential orientation,[301] let me continue to explore the nature of ethical determinations as a possible template for this type of an enquiry, and thereby ask, 'just how is an appreciation of the process of truth determination to be suitably undertaken, and, then, how does such apparent competence contribute to the formation of a working social solidarity and its ensuing empowerment of the secular world in the wake of such political integrity?'[302] (0)

Therefore, let me re-continue this exposition on ethical matters in the hope it could be utilized as a form of a template that might further contribute to an appreciation of its metaphysical implications rather than just a thematization of our moral standing. Then, once these preparatory explorations are conducted, move into the exposition of this disquisition on a reconstituted metaphysics. Ending, with provisional conclusions, etc. (1)

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300 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

301 Alluding to the maxim 'that we cannot please everyone', and, in the light of this allusion, processes of resolution cannot benefit all overlapping relationships equally let alone successfully for all parties.

302 I.e., an appreciation of this process of truth determination, and, in what manner this metaphysical insightfulness, as an expression of the existential, finds its transformational retreatment in a more productive and beneficial re-direction of the secular domain.

1. Ascertaining the Possible Metaphysical Implications of an Existential Ethics?

If someone were to begin with this essay let me stress from the outset that numerous terminological expressions are not to be automatically read along the lines of their more traditional philosophical usage. As a case in point, the word 'metaphysics', up till recently avoided like the proverbial plague, and for well-established critical reasons, has had to be re-visited, albeit in a re-constituted sense as 'a critical, and potentially radical, form of philosophical appreciation'. Where, I must immediately add, that my concept of appreciation automatically implies higher meta-terms of reference that, then, in the context of my philosophy of 'transformational retreatment', can be returned to the original meta-terms of reference of that being explored.[303] Effectively, through working suspensions (as a simplified presentation of 'extensive suspensions'[304]), such processes of treatment,[305] as entailed under the rubric of the trimodal economy in question, are initiated through processes of suspension that, through the automatic invocation of an immediate de-suspension, contribute to this aspect of 'retreatment' (and a potential process of renormalization of that form of the exposition being explored and, hopefully, scrutinized more closely through that style of research). I.e., through suspension, we have a process of economic treatment, and v.v., and, through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension, we have a process of retreatment, and v.v. I have to introduce such a transformational perspective because in the exposition of this disquisition on this metaphysical philosophical sub-discipline, as here being re-interpreted by myself, I will argue that all forms of inter-ordered reduplication (and duplication)[306] have metaphysical implications as constituted under the equation 'that the philosophical appreciation of the philosophical discipline automatically takes on a metaphysical(-like) complexion and tenor'.[307] Again, using the world metaphysical(-like) as the form of the ensuing appreciation operative in those meta-terms of reference that are elevated by one meta degree, but, will inevitably be read in those terms of a meta-reference in keeping with the original meta-status of that thematic topic being explored. Furthermore, central to these metaphysical explorations is the understanding that such appreciation is primarily centered in an appreciation of the truth conditions of that being explored, being the very *raison d'être* of this concept of

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303 Here, I have to use such expressions like 'research', 'explorations', closer 'scrutiny' of the same as 'investigations' are reserved for more general, hermeneutical explorations; 'analyses' are reserved for more 'particular, phenomenological explorations'; and, 'examinations' are reserved for more 'specific existential explorations'.

304 As first explored in *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline*, Volume II.

305 As noted in the previous essay, an economy of 'synthesis, analysis, and/or nomination within the style of economy being I exercised, say, representative, intentional, conjectural, etc. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIO.2-3.

306 As explored in *Pursuit, Book* 9. Where 'reduplication' is 'the symmetrical operation of one ordered complex upon the same type of an ordered complex'. E.g., the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutic possibility operating on the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutic possibility gives us the inter-ordered topic of 'science', and, e.g., the sixth trans-cognitive order of ontical (factual) determination operating on the sixth trans-cognitive order of ontical determination gives us the inter-ordered topic of history. In contrast the 'history of science' is 'the asymmetrical 'duplication' of the inter-ordered topic of history operating on the inter-ordered topic of science'. Therefore, quite distinctively different to the operation of the tentative 'science of history'. I will later argue 'that all operations are bimodal and sequentially orchestrated in organization within the implicit trimodal constitution of the specific economy in question'.

307 'Complexion' and 'tenor' indicating (phenomenological) 'characteristics' and (intentional) 'trajectories'.

'appreciation' and the performative practice entailed in those 'metaphysical considerations' *per se*. (2)

In workshopping the previous essay, I encountered a certain degree of resistance to the idea 'that we should knock ethical Principles off their pedestals'. In invoking the concept of 'non-weak/non-strong conjectural positioning' I am not disputing the role such principles, with a small 'p', play as ethical guidelines in either a cultural and/or inter-cultural context. Indeed, call them 'principles' or 'guidelines' is not the point of this exercise. Rather, that in a hypostatized or reified form(at) they just cannot function through economic impossibility (and, therein and thereby, should provoke us to invoke the negative aspect of the non-economic fork). Or, again, if they seem to possess the semblance of functioning somewhat then we could argue that such functioning is then defective, but, to that degree it is apparently operationally successful then to that same degree it cannot be functioning in an impossible economic format and, thus, must be importing some other covert economy whose apparent productivity is given that impossible economy some form of disciplined legitimacy.[308] (3)

Now, with this understanding in mind, let me translate the following expressions in a manner that demonstrates why both absolutistical forms of a dogmatic absolutism and all relativistical notions of an equally impossible relativism can be and should entirely dispensed with (in line with the negative arm of the non-economic fork). For a start, we could simply and safely rule that both absolutistical and relativistical forms of extremist reasoning are economically impossible (as will be shortly explained). Furthermore, that the definitive nature of economic resolution, in the positive sense of the non-economic fork, i.e., as 'an irruption of the relatively definitive expression of the last instance', can take on a strengthened status through the adoption and adaptation of a non-weak/non-strong stance. Moreover, we might also argue that to that same degree we can entertain the delineation of a distinctive affirmation associated with the sense of the 'definitive response of the last instance, etc.', that there is in such a context now no real difference between these expressions of the 'relative' and the 'absolute' as long as we have valid grounds for running conjectures that have this corresponding status of the non-weak/non-strong.[309] I.e., where this status in truth determination can be demonstrated as possessing the requisite degree of a required conjectural viability, which, in effect, is tantamount to stating that 'the truth assessments of such determinations are positively ac-

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[308] Should we refer to political 'Principles' with a capital 'P'? So, e.g., 'Democracy' or the 'State', etc. Or, why not treat the economic welfare of people as the 'Good', or even a 'Good', etc? Going even further, why not treat the landscape as 'Landscape', or as the 'Land'. On the other hand, if we feel we need to capitalize a noun, abstract or otherwise, then in doing so does not oblige us to hypostatize or reify the same. The, again, if we are inclined to perceive certain values as having an existence apart from the intentional consciousness of the person who invokes and utilizes such concepts then we would need to locate the same. Of course, such an approach leads to more problems than solutions when accepted as either public conventions and/or aspirations, etc., then we will have no such problems whatsoever!

[309] More correctly, from the 'transcendental', trans-cognitive orientation of the judgmental act 'relative' and 'absolute' can be co-identified once a definitive response of the last instance, etc., is emitted. In a similar vein, the correlativity of an economic correlative, or any identity for that matter, cannot be definitively entertained to a degree of theoretical deployment, practical (and critical) employment, and/or (critical)/radical re-deployment that attempts to absolutistically transgress the natural limits of such discernment (being the very definition of the 'absolutistically impossible').

cepted (albeit even if forever framed in provisional terms of reference whose likelihood of a conformal failure is inversely proportional to its currently valid degree of its ascertained conformal assurance or competence')! (4)

Therefore, in the light of this approach to such conformal considerations, why should absolutistical 'Principles' not be knocked off their impossible pedestals? (5)

Because they can be neither economically comprehended nor approached in that type of an impossible epistemological (and psychological) format. Let me demonstrate this dogmatic impossibility. (6)

On the other hand, we could also argue that the very cultural-intercultural moulds that formed such over-valued ideation need not be entirely dismissed. That if such 'ethical principles' are viewed merely as 'ethical guidelines' we could well argue that an existential appreciation of such social observations could well memorialize them more along the existential lines of those institutionalized forms of social insightfulness that would more happily fall under the heading of a 'working social consensus' rather than be impossibly fossilized under the rubric of rigid Principles with impossible claims that they are self-evidently true for all time, indeed, to the very end of time itself. The added benefit of such a positive form of re-e/valuation is to now no longer any need to have to explain how so-called Principles can be invoked and then effortlessly utilized in the normal course of our ethically assessed patterns of behaviour over the course of our interactions with others. As cultural-intercultural observations, expressed through language, and able to be translated and reinterpreted, it is now becomes possible for us to understand how such ideation, in crossing such linguistic and religious and political barriers, can be seemingly seen to be shared between various cultures and where various cultures given we can recognize a certain commonality in existentially oriented experience that, to varying degrees, crosses over between cultures in their similar considerations of such matters. However, given the apparent sameness of all other conditions, or, rather, that there can exist no form of an identical identity, even with respect to this historical identity of a distinctively delineated identity itself, it must also follow that working differences must and will arise that could not be so easily accounted for if we were to persist with the impossibly reified notion of our merely appealing to so-called 'ethical Principles' *qua* 'Principles'. When, in lived-reality, all that would need to hand are these conventionalized depositions of such cultural-intercultural observations that certain described patterns of behaviour in certain kinds of situation, as approached through the prescriptive nature of genres, are existential proscribed in a certain expected manner (albeit with certain expected cultural qualifications that would also be applied to our interpretations of such matters). That, in effect, what we have to hand, are these cultural-intercultural expectations, as reasonable forms of ethical treatment, and where, in the light of such expectations and other cultural pressures, we would find people overtly being seen to generally conform to such cultural injunctions, albeit with their distinctive cultural expressions and their co-associated lists of qualifications, etc. Insurmountable problems only arising through the rigid application of the prescriptive dictates of ethical Principles given the dialectical complexities to be

found in lived-experience.[310] Indeed, an almost endless list of qualifications supporting this contention that the application of such 'guidelines' is as 'qualified guidelines' and not as the befuddled expression of invariant Principles being shoehorned into the near-infinitely possible irregularities of daily life. (7)

Now, let us identify 'relative' with the 'relatively non-existential', and, the 'abso lute' as identified with the 'relatively existential'. [311] (8)

With this apparent identification of 'relative' and 'absolute' undertaken this line of thought can be extended to also include the dismissal of the economically impossible to entertain notions of the 'relativistical' and absolutistical plus these concepts of the non-economic irruption of the definitive-like expressions of the last instance, etc., without at the same time understanding that our appreciation of this world-as-lived cannot but be both an individual and collective affair. That, at the same time, we cannot avoid viable forms of ongoing consensus formation that should also be scoped by an awareness that there can be no absolutistical guarantees that we are perfectively cognizant of our simulated re(-)presentations[312] of this same directly-engaged world-as-lived. Furthermore, it follows, therefore, that we cannot but accept that our appreciation of experience is a reasonably well-worked out re(-)presentation of the same, albeit from the perspective or perspectives being invoked should they be mindfully approached in an open manner attentive to the disclosures concomitant upon such closely observed engagements. Or, in other words, admittedly much simplified, when our conjectures successfully work for us and we are suitably working with(-)others, before(-)others, and through(-)others, and where our standing in this world is consolidated accordingly. Or, more succinctly, when we comprehend both the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential, as inputs in the intentional constitution of our experience, we then find the coincidence between

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310 Where, existentially, such apparent dictates, on an individual relationship by individual relationship basis, I would argue, are more correctly proscribed and neither prescribed nor described.

311 The reasoning behind this identification is as follows. The 'existential orientation' can be viewed as 'transcendental', albeit as usually defined by myself, namely, as 'trans-cognitive', 'trans-intentional', 'judgmental', 'trans-conceptual and trans-perceptual', etc. Then, identifying the same as relatively 'absolute', i.e., as neither the impossible absolutistical nor relativistical nor the merely relative nor the impossible relatively-relative (for reasons cited in regard to the maxim of existentialization). As the non-transcendental, is in apposition to the transcendental, then we can define it, by default, as 'relative'. But given the intersection of the relatively-absolute and the absolutely-relative, in a validly ascertained position of the non-weak/non-strong, we might as well identify 'absolute' with the 'relative' post-suspension, through the ensuing devolution of the de-suspension. Furthermore, given the definitive nature of all responses of the last instance, etc., through processes of economic resolution and hyper-economic accommodation, we might as well regard the provisional nature of the relative as both relative and absolute at the same time (albeit from the 'transcendental'/judgmental perspective once such responses are ascertained as validly non-weak/non-strong. Or, in other words, from the perspective of the 'transcendental', i.e., the trans-cognitive/trans-intentional, the relative and the absolute effectively coincide. Thence we can arrive at this eventual identification despite the apparent paradox of such an identification.

312 As used in the Pursuit the nomenclature of '(-)' indicates 'an ongoing trimodal economy'. E.g., re(-)presentations indicates an economy consisting of ongoing presentation, representation, and re-presentation.

our appreciation of 'this world as lived' and 'this lived-world as appreciated'.[313] Let me propose the following argument in support of this form of positioning as outlined… (9)

Putting aside such unnecessary and bizarre notions of the absoutistically indubitable and the relativistically non-indubitable what we find to hand are both this existentialization and de-existentialization of experience, i.e., the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential. Now, equating the non-weak/non-strong notions of the 'absolute' and the 'relative' as reflective, respectively, of 'the definitive nature of the non-economic expressions of the last instance, etc.', and, 'our ability as a possibility to ever question the former', then its follows that if we accept the maxim that 'the relatively-existential is the relatively existentization of the relatively non-existential' and never 'the relative existentialization of the relatively existential' then it automatically follows that we cannot entertain, or, rather, that we are not allowed to entertain, as a possibility, either 'the absolutization of the absolute' or 'the relativization of the relative'. Hence the impossibility of both the absolutistical and the relativistical even being able to be entertained in their own right given that the 'absolutistical', as the 'impossible absolutization of the absolute' and the 'relativistical' as the 'relativization of the relative are both impossible to entertain. Now what we are left with are two partially comprehended preferential options (of the absolutely-relative and the relatively-absolute), and one non-partially comprehended actuality (as a joint dialectical composite of the former) as engaged in lived-experience (as the corresponding textualization of living-experience), namely, the absolutely-relative (as preferentially viewed as both the relatively absolute and existential plus the relatively-absolute as the questioning of the former, and, more correctly, as a residue in the form of the dynamic composite of both absolute-and-relative as realized in and through an ongoing process of suspension-and-de-suspension. These possibilities granted, there will be revealed through that metaphorical 'found to hand' where the metaphorical 'weight' of its composite inputs will metaphorically 'speak' to the definitive nature of the entailed ongoing re(-)presentation of that relationship as that being both 'found to hand' and as metaphorically 'handled' (from the specificity of a set of perspectives). However, inauthentically oriented inputs are more productive of inauthentically oriented outputs, and, thankfully, authentically oriented inputs are more productive of authentically oriented outputs. Just as the competence of apparently viable conjectures are highly depended upon the inclusion of well-informed statements, etc.[314] Furthermore, from a perspective of transformational retreatment, we can also view this dialectical composite of both 'relatively-absolute' and 'absolutely-relative' orientations as respectively 'treatment' and 'retreatment' where 'treatment' is 'instrumental in the application of a suspension' and the 'automatic de-suspension' supplies the moment of 'retreatment' along with its relative defin-

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313 As a contragram where we could argue that lived-reality intersects and extends beyond the mere intersection and operation of these two forms of bimodal expression albeit as economically situated trimodally. Where all 'operations', etc., are 'enacted as bimodal operations, albeit as operating within their entailed trimodal economy'.

314 Along with well-formed analytical propositions and well-expressed conjectural propositional-statements in conjectures that are well-organized (contextually) and well-conducted (sequentially). Implying that conspiracies, in part, could be countered by the import of facts and subsequent suspensions that let the relationships in question more 'reveal their hand' rather than the 'imprints' of our mishandling of such processes of representation, etc. Admittedly, I am being optimistic here. That, as noted in the next essay, an affective dimension motivating such phenomena would also b\need to be both addressed and redressed.

itive exhibition of a response of the last instance, etc. Now, as argued previously, the exhibition of the last moment will also reveal its existential potential in a process of intervention that if recognized as such, as the definitive instance of the next moment (of the existential orientation being invoked in that act of intervention) becomes, when permitted, the definitive instance of the first moment (given such existentially oriented intervention is now instrumental in a new series of consequences that hopefully will reveal both their existential potentiality and existential actuality over the course of that relational situation in question). (10)

Let me sum up this rather complex argument. (11)

Both the 'absolutely-absolute' and the 'relatively-relative' cannot be thought if we equate the 'absolute' and the 'relative', respectively, as the 'relatively-existential' and the 'relatively non-existential' in orientation, and, given the maxim/s 'that relative existentialization is always of the relatively non-existential and not the relatively-existential', and, that, therefore, 'there can be no pure sense and semblance of the non-relatively-absolute (absolutistical) and the non-absolutely-relative (relativistical)'!![315] Furthermore, equating the 'relative' as 'imposing a suspension through the application of a process of questioning,[316] etc.', and, the 'absolute' as expressed through the automatic invocation of a de-suspension' then it follows that through the coupling of a de-suspension with a suspension that both absolute and relative must be co-expressed jointly and in and through an irruptive non-economic form of 'the definitive expression of the last instance, etc.' In addition, given this composite of the absolutely-relative and the relatively-absolute it follows, that from the perspective of the same, relative and absolute can be carefully equated once a definitive response of the last instance has clearly delineated, has clearly expressed the form and content of its apparent status and to what extent its existential implications are instantiated and, therein and thereafter, set in train its ensuing existential ramifications… (12)

Understood as such, it then follows that we ever have the freedom to existentially or non-existentially intervene in our interactions with others given that the enaction of a process of non-interaction is not available to us since even the non-performance of a process of ostensive non-interaction is still a form of interactiveness given our direct engagement with this world-as-lived. Therefore, it behooves us to understand that as non-interaction is not a possibility it follows, preferably, that we entertain and permit the enaction of the existential enrichment of the next moment as the definite existentially oriented response of the definitive instance of the first instance. Of course, this does not rule out processes of either non-action or inaction should our responsibly directed processes of re(-)presentative appreciation of the situation in question, itself, determine which chosen course or choice of courses of intervention act as a more viable course of enaction to

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315 On the understanding that both absolutistical and relativistical processes can only manifest the illusion of a dogmatic certainty and a dogmatic non-certainty respectively, whereas, 'beneath' such illusions these processes can be neither initiated nor persisted with nor fully realized given their non-illusory status as economically impossible expressions, i.e., as empty, substance-less, and as both null and void.

316 Understanding that working suspensions can be invoked through suitable questions, etc. In effect, echoing the economic workings of the interrogative economy (as explored elsewhere).

follow, or, perhaps proffer the most viable course of enaction. To clarify these options let me diagrammatically depict this flow from the definitive instance of the last moment, etc:

1.Definitive instance of the last moment = Uptake of non-existential e/valuation…

AND

2.Existential recognition of the definitive next moment…

THROUGH ITS EXISTENTIAL UPTAKE =

3.Existential enaction of the definitive first moment…

THENCE

4.Both existential & non-existential ramifications… (13)

Now, what are the existential and non-existential ramifications of this understanding? (14)

As noted in the previous essay, we cannot disparage the relatively non-existential unless it is either non-constructive of our relationships or, worse, destructive of the same (and, thereby, heads into the malevolent territory of that which easily could be conventionally designated as 'evil', etc.). That, in most instances of our daily lives the relatively non-existential has a value that should not be denigrated (but evaluated in such a manner that its value be seen as either positive or neutral or non-positive in orientation, whilst also recognizing that the relatively non-existential is the very material for this process of existential transformation in which we convert the same, in part or in whole, into a relatively augmented and enhanced existential orientation through such transformational amplification.[317] (15)

That, in the light of such considerations, we can tentatively argue that an existential ethics is the combination of a relative non-denigration of the existential and the suitably relevant promotion of the existential through an apposite process of existentialization. I.e., the taking up of an overall process of e/valuational formation that either suitably creates value, preserves value and/or expansively conserves value from the perspective of that primary relationship as reviewed under such considerations, albeit as qualified, if necessary, from the relational situatedness of that relationship in question. So, yes, it is right to return the property you have temporarily borrowed from someone, but, no, it

317 'Positive amplification' being the net result of the positive transformational interaction entered into between positive, non-chaotic augmentation through either incremental addition and/or subtraction in conjunction with positive, chaotic enhancement through the crossing of points of either bifurcation, emergence, and/or phase change in the status of the primary relationship under consideration. That, in regard to the latter, an argument could be entertained where in an economy of chaotic transformation there is no definitive delineation between bifurcation, etc., given that what defines these forms of chaotic expression is the perspective they are viewed under and that different perspectives could re-write a process of bifurcation as a chaotic process of emergence and/or as a chaotic process of a change in phase or state, etc.

would be wrong to return that same property, say, a firearm, if you knew that person who owned that weapon would use it to kill either yourself, other people, and/or themselves. Noting the observation, for the development of a working existential ethics, that the existential assessment of the relational situatedness has a priority over the existential assessment conducted solely of the primary relationship itself (as exemplified above). Noting, furthermore, that although the consequences of our enactions spill over into the relational fabric of this world-as-lived, still, a working existential ethics need not existentially take the relational situatedness fully into account if it can be shown that the consequences of such spillage are demonstratively negligible.[318] (16)

In this regard, through either the recognition of the problematic nature and/or the problematization of our re(-)presentational simulations of the relational situation in its relational situatedness is concerned such problematic issues have already set the stage for what perspective or which perspectives will manifest an intentionally directed awareness as to how that situation will be reviewed. In a philosophy of transformational retreatment this can be considered to be the stage of a hermeneutically oriented pretreatment in which we also oversee the refinement of the relevant genres of concern through a process of rectification. So, e.g., in looking at an apple from the perspective of wondering whether it is both ripe and edible we would need to both adopt and adapt a different set of hermeneutic genres to those that would be involved under different circumstances, say, if we were to decide whether to give it as a gift, or cook with it, or portray the object in our painting of this piece of fruit in the context of a still life, etc. (17)

Under the stage of treatment, we may now surmise the imposition of a various forms of working suspension in a process receptive to both deconstruction and reconstruction (which will be jointly referred to as a process of ‘remediation’). I.e., processes of treatment are taken up directly in keeping with the economic nature of the economy or economies being invoked. (18)

Then, almost as if a black box, the automatic invocation of the de-suspension disrupts the superficial equality being entertained in the suspension, therein and thereafter,

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318 Here we confront a temporary philosophical problem in the form that the infinite calculation of such inputs is impossible to conclude, but, need not be calculated since the de-suspension suitably deconstructs the suspension leaving us with a non-calculated residue in the form of the definitive response of the last instant along with a set of possible existentially oriented uptakes in the form of the definitive instants of the next moment whose permitted uptake then immediately become as well-expressed set of definitive responses of the first instant. The implication of such an observation is that although judgment may be prepared through calculation the definite non-economic resolution of the same is decidedly non-calculative in the spontaneity of its chaotic origination. That even if the non-existentially oriented process of e/valuational judgment and the existentially oriented process of e/valuational judgment were to be arrived at through a process of pre-calculation in comparison either formation of judgment is not calculated but expressed through a harmonically instigated process of resolution. But, that granted, how do we account for this apparent element of choice? Not so much through the active enaction of choice, but, perhaps, through the absenting of those aspects that either resist or impede the immediate instantiation of such apposite responses of the first instance. Or, in effect, we might surmise pre-calculation gives way to the non-calculation of a judgmental response when authentically delivered through this authenticity of non-deliberation once the moment of resolution gives ‘voice’ to the same? That deliberations are not judgments being either pre-judgmental and/or post-judgmental in orientation. Thence the resolution of this apparent conundrum.

to reveal what may have suitably emerged to engender the to-be-anticipated course of its co-associated narrative. I.e., where definitive expressions of the last instance deliver a certain non-existentially oriented form of e/valuational formation, and, where the recognition of the definitive instance of the next moment through permission then becomes the existentially definitive instance of the first moment with an array of closely co-associated consequences continuing on in the wake of such distinctive patterns of enacted re-direction by virtue of this existentialization of the relatively non-existential… almost as if a process of non-enaction when and where judgments are suddenly issued through those moments of resolution in the perceived, or apperceived, problematics of the processes of relational re(-)presentation that are spontaneously resolved, be they either partially and/or entirely, or, rather, expeditiously... and the latter where such conjectures are now definitely treated as definite (despite the unlikelihood of a reversal of an assessment which then could only be partially reversed[319]). (19)

Now, let me continue this ethical disquisition by more closely exploring how suspensions are entered into in a process of treatment, etc., and, how the issuing of this automatic process of a de-suspension will re-direct ensuing patterns of responsiveness, through transformational retreatment, that, through sufficient existentialization, could responsibly become existentially more attuned to the needs of the primary relationship in question? (20)

Now, from the trans-intentional perspective of judgment the 'relatively existential' can be equated with the 'absolutely-relative' and the 'relatively non-existential' can be equated with the relatively-absolute', where from a judgmental perspective their mutual coincidence allows us to also equate 'absolute' with 'relative', and v.v., and, 'existential' with 'non-existential', and v.v., etc. Or, in effect, through an overlapping of existentialization and de-existentialization we can oversee the preferential transformation of the latter proceeding in such manner so as to amplify the existential presence of the former. Such an intimation of 'presence', in an experiential sense being brough forward to an apparent state of prominence through the amplification of its existential hallmarks, etc. That this form of 'experiential presence' can be argued for through experiential recognition, encountering, and engagement, etc., and, through the philosophical fact that the emergence of an existential dimension cannot be reduced purely to its relatively non-existential basis (which equally can have no self-existent basis in its own right). Now, this granted, let us now explore how ethical forms of suitable re(-)presentation are arrived at and assessed in both non-existential and existential terms of reference, and, to what extent such forms of existentially oriented appreciation are effectively self-re(-)presented and self-determined through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension? Or, in other words, how the well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectures can produce well-organized and well-conducted processes of conjectural assurance, conformation, and

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[319] Given the implications of the Duhem-Quine thesis that, effectively, 'truth determinations are corporate affairs and not really conducted at the level of mere individual sentences, etc.', even if seemingly expressed as such. On the other hand, small alterations in non-central, peripheral truth determinations, through forms of chaotic expression, can still have differential ramifications that cannot be reduced to the quanta of the relatively minute differences being noted in the reformation of those sentences (representing those conjecturally constructed re(-)presentations). Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIG.xvi-xvii; and footnote 28.

competence (as would also be sought in the entailed metaphysical appreciation of its existential status)? (21)

In this type of an enquiry we are simply asking how our understanding of the relational situation to hand in its relational environment is able to be ethically appreciated both in its conjectural conformance and in the appositeness of its existential expression (given that the existential cannot be entirely absent just as the non-existential cannot be completely converted, and subsequently subverted, through a thorough[ly absolutistical] process of de-existential or non-existential transformation). On the other hand, in situations characterized as markedly non-existential, and inauthentic, in both complexion and tenor, we may merely surmise that the existential is only relatively absent through being effectively covert in its overlooked absence and currently not being amplified through a process of relative existentialization. (22)

Given the need to represent the contours of a certain relational situation, in order to suitably discern and appreciate both its non-existential and existential potential, just what formation, format, and form does such representative understanding undertake? Or, in other words, how do we conduct a necessary process of representation without invoking, at the same time, the impossible nonsense of wayward, traditional forms of metaphysical speculation? Or, how is representation enacted without implicating so-called 'external worlds', 'internal worlds', and other impossibilia? (23)

How do we 'map out an ethical situation', i.e., 'review a situation through an ethical lens, preferably, with an existential complexion'? In effect, 'represent that situation in and through an ethical perspective'? (24)

First, let us explore what could be meant in representing a situation in terms of its relevantly situated participant and parts? (25)

Then, second, how we might go about initially reviewing it from an ethically oriented point of view, i.e., either discerning an ethical problem or problematizing it from an ethical perspective. (26)

Third, we now set out to take an existential reading of that relational situation, basically from the perspective of the primary relationship in question, i.e., in the adoption and adaptation of an existential pro-relational sense of perspective on a textualized representation of the relationship itself *per se* in order to proffer such a reading. (27)

Fourth, if found to be necessary, let us representatively situate the relational environment of that situation if such an extension of this existential perspective is required in the further qualification of that existential reading of the ethical sense and semblance of that relationship in its relational situatedness.[320] (28)

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[320] This fourth stage would be called, for example, if a person A were to kills a mother B whose children, C and D, would then also need to be taken into the wider context of an e/valuation of the consequences of that act (in a consequential analysis of that overall relationship of A, B, C, and D, etc., that has ostensively diminished, on a first reading, both the quality and quantity of the existential richness and ongoing

The first two stages prepare an ethical reading of that situation, whereas, steps three, and the possible addition of the fourth if needed, supply an existential reading of the problematicity of either that discernment of an ethical problem and/or a discerning of its ethical problematization. (29)

That an 'existential reading' is 'pro-relationally conducted from the perspective of the relationship itself (and, if necessary, extended to its relational environment), wherein we both differentiate and integrate the apparent relational enrichment and ongoing enrichment that has been either created, preserved and/or conserved (with the latter noting an expansion of such existential terms of reference, i.e., these elements of an imputed richness and enrichment through a process of re(-)enrichment[321]).[322] (30)

Therefore, first, let us explore how we might represent a certain situation and then ethically represent that same relational situation (along with its relational situatedness if necessary) through, an exploration of what is entailed in the representation of a relational situation (and, by extension, a representing of its relational situatedness if that is also found to be necessary) and its being followed by the addition of these considerations of its ethical problematicity should such a review be found to be required. (31)

If I were to report that 'in the kitchen in the fruit bowl there are six apples ready to eat', in effect, I have 'represented' or 'mapped out that room' in regard to 'those imputed apples in that imputed fruit bowl'. I.e., there exists, namely, 'that kitchen with that fruit bowl and those six apples within its confines'. Now, 'I bought those six apples this morning', and, 'as I am standing in front of that fruit bowl, I can see that these six apples are still there in that same fruit bowl'. Now, all talk of the absolutistically indubitable and the relativistically non-indubitable is just not suitably applicable in the representation of these circumstances. Let me explain. I know, historically, that I put six apples in that fruit bowl, and, I can see, through this validly entertained act of perception, that these six apples are still there.[323] I blink, and I can still see that these six apples remain, and so on. Under these non-problematic circumstances, we do not need to countenance either a

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enrichment that had been previously either enjoyed and/or suffered by these participants, A.B, C, and D, etc.). Or, similarly, if X is married to Y, and Y is involved in an adulterous affair with Z, unbeknownst to X, then, the overt ethical consequences of this affair, from the perspective of both Y and Z do not apparently need to extend to X should this affair either continue or cease without X knowing. Or, again, if X knows about this affair, and is not concerned by this state of affairs, then given this ethical insulation of this affair the ethical propriety of such a relationship Y and Z might not need to be extended beyond the confines of this relationship being entertained between Y and Z? The test for the apparent necessity of this fourth stage being that it makes a distinctive difference to the overall ethical reading being formulated in the first three stages.

321 I.e., in and through an economy of enrichment comprising enrichment, reenrichment and chaotically re-directed re-enrichment.

322 A fourth state of a super-conservation in the ongoing enrichment in e/valuational formation could also be considered should there be a rapid expansion in this process of an existential enrichment of the primary relationship. A successful marriage could be viewed in that light. Or, the winning of a lottery, a very successful completion of a university degree, etc.

323 That I have the requisite 'standing' in this matter (propinquity), namely, that I am in this room, can see, and I am seeing these six apples that were put in that fruit bowl by myself, and, have no psychic disabilities (and no ulterior motives) that would distort the making of this representative report, etc.

weak reading of this situation or import the imputation an unnecessary strong reading when a non-weak/non-strong reading is more than sufficient within the terms of our enquiry, namely, reassessing our representation of this kitchen in regard to these six apples in that fruit bowl. (32)

Of course, problems arise if we are only in a position to report a weak reading of this imputed situation (and should prove to be wrong) or we entertain a form of strong representation that is both unnecessary and impossible (or defectively constructed through a confusion of conjectures and a transgression of their inherent limitations). (33)

Dispensing with both unsupported weak readings and impossible strong reading, along with all other defective forms of representation, let us focus instead on apparently well-supported non-weak/non-strong forms of reporting. Then, in dealing with any form of problematicity, set out to adopt and adapt a pro-relational reading that does justice to our suitably constructed reading of that relational situation (and its relational environment if needed). To successfully oversee such a pursuit just what is needed? (34)

In answering that type of question, we need to know what type of perspective is to be invoked and what are the essentially relevant features of that relational situation in line with the intentional objectives being exercised through that choice in perspective (to further refined through a thematization of the potential ethical problematicity to be delineated therein). (35)

Of use to us in this process of representation are the *ad hoc* six headings outlined in the previous essay concerning how ethical philosophies either preferentially or depreferentially treat their approaches to such situations along with aesthetical, deontological and/or pragmatical considerations. These six *ad hoc* heading being:

> **Actors** (ethical instigators), **Recipients** (of ethically oriented enaction instigated by actors), **Acts** (as forms of enaction read as having ethical-like ramifications), **Performances** (when viewed from an assumed intentional perspective or a possible set of more probably intended perspectives), **Consequences** (when the ramifications of the situations in question are either virtually or non-virtually simulated and explored), and **Situations** (in their represented specificity along with an understanding of their potential impact other relationships more closely connected to that primary relationship, and, by extension, upon the world at large).[324] (36)

As far as problematicity is concerned we either note an apparent ethical problem or set of problems, or, problematize the situation in its representation from our choosing a certain ethical perspective deemed to be problematic. (37)

The third stage of our ethical enquiry being entertained form a pro-relational perspective where we both differentiate and integrate both the apparent static existential richness and the dynamic potential for ongoing existential enrichment in order to ascertain a comparative e/valuation of the estimated existential quality of that relational situa-

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[324] *Pursuit*, III.XIO.34.

tion. Such an intuitive form of e/valuation is something we learn very early on. E.g., when we are hungry, we have a very good idea how hungry we are especially when we can recall what was previously eaten or not eaten and the time that has elapsed in making such a self-report. So, if we discern a hungry person, say, through an observational report and/or a self-reporting by that person concerned then we may well be able to form a very accurate assessment of their presenting state of hunger. So, if 'hungry person' has not been able to properly eat for one day then they may well be 'hungry', but, if they have not properly eaten for a week, we may well assume that they are 'starving'. As noted previously, the existential attitude is more proscriptive than either descriptive or prescriptive, and, our responsible-response in that situation its to ensure that that starving person is not left without the requisite food in a suitably delivered manner as is now so definitely required. The existentially appropriate fulfilment of this proscription being realized when this staring person is now no longer in a state of starvation and is suitably fed should we have the means either to directly fulfill such an obligation and/or the means to ensure it is realized by less direct pathway. Noting that in the exercise of this type of a responsible-response there need not be one solution to oversee the existential resolution of this form of need. Now, all things being equal, or, more correctly, unequal, we may assume that a best solution would exist, but, as long as any viable solution is successfully adopted and adapted then better solutions are equally viable in that same regard. Under the exigencies of the circumstances, we could say that whether that hungry person gets to eat either bread or brioche is neither here nor there in the short term… (38)

Once a situation is represented or mapped out, in terms of its essentially relevant features, say, under these headings of Actors, etc., how do we intuit the problematicity of that relational situation if we have not already discerned this central aspect of our ethical or moral enquiry? (39)

From the position of discerning a relative differential in the form of an ethical anomalization we are then inclined to perceive, or, rather apperceive, a representative state of affairs conceived of as possessing some form of an ethical problematization (be that either through finding an ethical problem and/or through a process of ethical problematization). Where the anomalization in question is viewed as standing in need of some form of ethical resolution. Philosophically, the ethical being distinctively divided between the ordered fields of the third trans-cognitively order of the deontological and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical (and where, on some occasions, people might also wish to add the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical). However, existentially, as from the perspective of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork, such distinctions are experientially overridden in the unique specificity of the ensuing resolution of the ethical anomaly in question. (40)

So, we must now ask, 'how is this process of ethical resolution of an ethical anomaly to be enacted?' (41)

Here, the simple solution is the well-organized and well-conducted utilization of working suspensions of the essentialized textual representation of that ethical situation in the hope that resolution through the de-suspension will reveal how that existential process

of resolution can be put successfully into effect. However, putting in play what is needed to existentially intervene and oversee such a responsible-response is another matter. But, we can only attempt to do our best in both artfully and scientifically engineering the suitable instantiation of such a response. To realize this process of ethical resolution let me set out how we might map such a transformational response through noting that ethical treatment can be organized under the headings of Pretreatment, Treatment, and Retreatment as a form of Posttreatment.[325] So, in invoking processes of transformational retreatment what does this transformational approach entail? (42)

As a quick approach here to a parallel question, we could well ask, 'how do we responsibly confront an ethical world?' To this end, let me note that through the sensing of the semblance of an ethical anomalization that, that in itself, is the perfect place to begin. But, to make any deep progress, we must not end where we began… (43)

On more superficial grounds, people are culturally enculturated, all too often, to experience shock at things that do not deserve to find such a response whilst overlooking those forms of behaviour that better deserve such opprobrium. It could be said that we are both taught to see certain things and not to see certain other things, so, it would be natural to enquire how we might overcome such selective habits and such habitual oversights? Just how do we morally become a better 'work in progress', a person more inclined to divine what should be done, enacted, and not someone who merely conforms to what others might think is blindly expected?! (44)

In a simply reply to this request we must begin with our prejudices, our prejudgments, but, then apply those working suspensions in such a manner that they both 'deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the effective'.[326] In working with such a dynamic sense of balance the de-suspension should and will upend all nonsense and reassert a more nuanced approach as to how we should make our passage through this world both individually and together… where we both meet and meld in the formation of a working consensus that stands the test of time by timely standing in testimony to where a stand should be made in the harmonization of such ethical and moral matters. Through such harmonization, through such resolution and attunement, the dissonance of anomalous experiences is brought back into line through the concerted efforts of our being both responsive and responsible… and here an image comes to mind, namely, the tuning of a musical instrument. (45)

Imagine, if you would, striking a tuning fork and placing it the side of one of our ears as we tune that same note on our instrument. When this note on our instrument is in tune it is as if there is but one note being sounded. When we find this apparent sounding of one note, we then know that we have tuned our instrument in that regard. The sound is no longer anomalous, and now 'speaks' with one 'voice'. A self-evident alignment that reveals the apparent 'truth' of our efforts, our intent to tune that instrument. That when

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325 Obviously alluding to a philosophy of transformational retreatment (along with its divisional orientations of the Pretreatment as invoking the hermeneutical and processes of rectification, etc.).

326 A refrain echoing this motto expressed in *The Seventh Book*…

our instrument is completely tuned then that instrument can speak with one voice, and then become a member in a choir or orchestra should that need be manifested. (46)

An analogy that can serve us well… because such harmonization is at the very basis of truth determination, and causal intervention, indeed, its existentialization through the metaphorical 'irruption' of e/valuational formation able to contribute to the positive side of that heuristic device of the non-economic fork. (47)

Now, all intentional responses can be viewed as transformational processes, ostensively, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, although, more correctly, a chaotically re-directed spontaneity, a hallmark of existential experience, is not something that is incremental but more a 'living continuity of consensus' whose evolution, and evolvement, is more of a 'body of awareness' than the mere opinion of a lonely voice heard both wavering and wandering in what cannot be a solitary wilderness… (48)

As already pointed out, our interventions in this world at large cannot be put on hold, or ignored, since to even to do nothing is itself a form of intervention. As noted, the enaction of our intent is to either act or not to act or to defer such decisions, but, whether we be passive or active, or, even better, be directly engaged, our involvement in the world is a given that should not be either discounted or dismissed. That when this is understood, then we must understand that in our working with others that a mutual de-anomalization of experience is demanded of each of us, since only through others can we find the freedom to be ourselves and that this is very *raison d'être* of why we should lead a moral life. Or more succinctly, being respectful of others, in serving others is self-serving, finds their being respectful of us, their serving our needs as we collectively and individually navigate, negotiate, and arbitrate our mutual passage through this overall world-of-life. (49)

How then does this mutual process of de-anomalization operate? Through the suitable application of working suspensions, i.e., through the setting up of such processes through appropriate preparation, proper procedures, and an apposite sense and semblance of expression. Translated through the lens of a conjectural economy we oversee the necessity of being well-informed, ensure our arguments are well-formed, and that our behaviour is well-expressed given the well-organized and well-executed running of that economy, or any other relevant economy, as the beneficial means to this emendation of a moral end… (50)

Regardless of the method chosen to oversee this endless emendation of the anomalous the end is the same, namely, our ever working with others whether we admit to that fact or not in order 'to oversee this existential richness and enrichment of our primary relationships through either their creation, preservation, and/or the conservation' as a working definition of the 'existential'. (51)

Admittedly, the concept of the 'working suspension' is the tip or apex of a metaphorical 'mountain enshrouded by mist' but once 'we turn things upside down, inside out, and back to front' so to speak, and, realize 'the need for our apperception of the rela-

tionship to be entertained from its point of view, and itself, in turn, as ensconced in a relational sense of world, and, that all significance itself is relational in its origination we can then allow, and permit, an intuitive input to emerge from such an emergent approach. This insightful openness to an existential dimension will then both effectively and productively counterbalance an all too reductive, materialistic approach, that, if anything, is reinforced through a more mundane sense of language. Sadly, such linguistic attitudes and habits all too readily eclipse an existential use of language that also runs in parallel through the very veins of our being as it courses through our lived-experience as we make our passage through this world-of-life, this world at large. Furthermore, I would contend that it is through an intuitive working with suspensions that a profound sense of balance is restored in which both existential and non-existential, both judgmental acts and the delivery of judgments, both the absolute and the relative, as the absolutely-relative and the relatively-absolute, can mutually coincide and, therein and thereafter, enrich this relational fabric of our lives since this relational enrichment is the very fabric of our lives, indeed, is the very *raison d'être* of our existence since, paradoxically, the material dimension is completely empty… (52)

Now, although working suspensions are here about to be explored, completely overlooked, philosophically, is the fact that it is de-suspensions that do all the real work! Let me explain. (53)

As intimated, intuitively, we utilize the use of suspensions whether we do so inadvertently or advertently. E.g., through the simple use of a question we invoke the suspension of the 'either/or'. Or, e.g., through the use of a comparison, either non-metaphorical or metaphorical, we invoke a conjunctive suspension of like, which, through expansion implies a reading of 'both like and not like'. Or, again, through the running of conjectures we set a up what I call an 'apparitional suspension' through invoking either an indirect 'as-if, as-if…' or a more direct 'what if...', etc., where literal identity takes on a more ghost-like sense and semblance that then allows us to entertain innovations, new ways of seeing that before such a time might not have been possible to have been thought… (54)

In the moment of pretreatment, the recurrence of some moral sense and semblance of a situated anomaly should inspire us to ask pertinent questions, seek out relevant facts… and, therein and thereby, commence a process of rectification. (55)

In the moment of treatment, in order to run non-fallacious arguments, etc., 'we should deconstruct the defective and reconstruct the effective…' and, therein and thereby, procced with this process of a constructive-deconstruction. (56)

Thence, through the intuitive use of such suspensions, the automatic invocation of inverse de-suspensions should re-write the ensuing 'landscape' in a form more in tune, more in harmony with the way things truly are, i.e., in a manner more in keeping with how things are more textually self-reported rather than how we might wish to view them through an *a priori* lens. Where, through such retreatment, such ensuing posttreatment rewrites pretreatment in a form more coincident with an in-depth appreciation of lived-

experience. Indeed, the totality of a transformational process able to progressively refine its more fruitful thematization of this world-as-lived… and, therein and thereby, continually engage a process of ongoing re(-)normalization of lived-experience. (57)

Such processes of emendation being further reinforced by the fact that all economies mirror an archetypal sense of a gestalt economy and, by such means (namely, this process of economic complexification), engender the requisite degree of resonance that is able to further reinforce such conjectural parallels against which all textualized reports will find increasing degrees of alignment, through ongoing re(-)alignment… (58)

Indeed, independent of which economies are adopted and adapted, be that advertently or inadvertently, alignment through processes of re(-)alignment ensures an evolving degree of competence arising from such reinforced forms of conformation. (59)

E.g., in pretreatment, rectification oversees an appropriate meta-textual environment through mere realignment of genres, imposed upon the distinctive types of questions being posed therein. (60)

E.g., in treatment, a constructive-deconstruction articulates and describes what, effectively, is dissonant in the anomalization of the particular type of moral experience being explored. (61)

E.g., in retreatment (and its posttreatment of pretreatment), an ongoing process of re(-)normalization is being experientially thematized through the forceful re-specification of the moral landscape being simulated and, therein and thereafter, being more effectively re-written accordingly. (62)

Where, as already noted, all economic parallels thematically find, respectively, realignment through rectification; re-de-mis-alignment through constructive-deconstruction as a distinctive form of error correction, and, potentially innovative forms of a chaotic re-alignment arising through an ongoing re-specification that is tentatively fostered through creative forms of re(-)normalization. Where, underlying such an overall process of ongoing re(-)alignment, is a conformal appreciation of the requisite degree of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance. Since an awareness of this persisting stability in overall truth determination, at the collective center of our lived-experience, implies an overall body of truth-conformation[327] whose emendation can only be relatively peripheral to such concerns and never drastically reconfigured in any fundamental, central sense.[328] (63)

Now, let us put a conjectural philosophy on an ethical basis. (64)

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[327] As advanced, e.g., through the Duhem-Quine thesis.

[328] Hence the two concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’ where, theoretically, through such insurance, we should be able to retrace our steps to find a more assured body of truth-conformation upon which we can find the assurance to confidently restart that form of research already in progress That, although all forms of research can never be completely successful, at the same time, they can never be a complete failure.

A handy paradigm for articulating the use of a conjectural economy has been my reference to wet weather rain. Stating with analytical propositions, first tautological and then non-tautological; synthetic statements of fact; invoking the co-associated conjecture; and, arguing for its apparent positive truth status. So, e.g., 'it is either raining and wet or not raining and not wet', and, when it rains you get wet; at the moment it is raining and quite wet (outside)'; 'if you were to go outside right now you would get wet!' Thence the truth status of this overall conjecture is positive or affirmative (65)

In the overall expression of this conjecture there is an unstated evaluational judgment, namely, 'that getting wet in the rain is unpleasant (and could well lead to illness and possible death)'.[329] (66)

In converting a conjecture to an ethical conjecture, preferably of an existential form(at), in simple terms we have conjectures that either negate an undesirable absence or conjectures that compound a desirable addition, or, a complex mix of the former. Furthermore, an existential complexion and tenor can be posited when the existential richness and enrichment in question is refracted through the perspective of the primary relationship and where such e/valuational formation is the result of the transformation of the relatively non-existential and is either created, preserved, and/or conserved, and, accordingly, is determined through either an integrated-differentiation and/or a differentiated-integration. (67)

E.g., the proscribed feeding of a starving person, and, e.g., the desire to mutually share fine food with a good friend. In both types of situation food is the non-existential ingredient. In the former example, the proscription oversees that the starving person get fed in a suitable manner, whereas, in the later example find food is shared with a good friend (and where we might note the existential observation 'that a sadness shared is halved and a pleasure shared is doubled). (68)

O the positive side of this spectrum we might reflect upon the following analogy or anecdote. The parents in a very poor family with one child want to give their child one very good Xmas present knowing they will have to carefully save throughout the year. They overhear this child speaking with their friends and where all these friends clearly settle on the fact that they all wish they could each have their very own smart phone. So, very early on, they know what to buy. Just before Xmas they duly buy one. The child is not expecting anything for Xmas but let their family know that a good Xmas dinner would be a wonderful gift that at least the whole family could share in. A few months before Xmas, in their art class in school, the child sets out to paint a wonderful picture of a family having a picnic beside the sea. They are very pleased with their efforts. They then find a very good picture frame in an opportunity shop and duly frame this picture and then wrap it and place it under the calendar with its wonderful picture of a Xmas tree with lots of presents to be seen placed beneath it. On Xmas day, the child is surprised to see two presents on the floor beneath the calendar and not just one present. Needless to say they are very happy to find their very first smart phone. The parents feeling very hap-

[329] Although in the initial breaking of the monsoon people may well enjoy getting wet and finding, thereby, an eventual relief from the long, increasingly hot weather prior to the advent of that type of event.

py with themselves that their gift is obviously admired. Then, these parents are very impressed to find, once unwrapped, this picture in its expensive frame and understand that buying that frame would have meant that their child had to forego the purchasing of some of their favourite comics and sweets given their meagre allowance in pocket money. The parents then get their child to promise that they will SMS them every day when they leave school, where they might be going, and when they expect to get home. (69)

This account is constructed to make some points on this type of an ethical conjecture that 'compounds a desirable addition'. Hence the other features of sacrifice, setting out to give the right gift (to the right person at the right time, etc.), mutual obligations, sharing in another person's good fortune, and so on. (70)

So, that understood, how do we set about determining the truth status of an ethical conjecture (and using that as a conformal basis for metaphysical-like appreciation)? (71)

Or, in other words, how do we determine whether the virtual and/or non-virtual enaction of a certain set of conjectures is actually ethical in practice, and, to what degree it is ethically inclined or not ethically inclined? (72)

In the negation of an undesirable state of affairs we would hope that that intention is duly observed and judged as successfully realized. Alternatively, in the compounding of a desirable addition we would hope that such anticipated positivity is equally realized. Such judgments entering into either taking the form of an integrated-differential and/or a differentiated-integration. I.e., the difference is positive and is judged to be integrated within the holistic gamut of the primary relationship in question (just as those parents, together, took a great delight in getting that one present that was so much admired by their child). Or, alternatively, where the child suggested they just have one wonderful Xmas dinner together they each person could individually enjoy. (73)

Where such differentiations are to be more comparatively evaluated rather than measured in some form of an exact quantification. (74)

Where the determination of the truth status can be intuitively quantified in comparative-like terms of reference through processes of alignment conducted on the represented basis of a simulate recognition of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance. First let me explain in theoretical terms; second, in more practical terms; and third, the potential possibility of registering for processes of a radical revisionism. (75)

In an economics of alignment we need to note three forms, namely, a pretreatment (hermeneutically oriented) mere realignment in the meta-textual formats pertaining to such genres (as we question these styles of interrogation); a process of treatment (phenomenologically oriented) dealing with both deconstruction and reconstruction exercised through the error correction of a re-de-mis-alignment; and, the specifics of an existential re-alignment, through retreatment/posttreatment, that could open the floodgates to proposals more radical than critical. (76)

Now, such alignments, as reports, in sets of sentences dealing with parallel and related economic phenomena, where the alignment of the same is directly proportional to the extent an underlying relative transformational isomorphic invariance is demonstrably imputed and conformally validated by whatever means can do justice to this recognition of that alignment within and between such individual reports. Where an existential assessment can be conducted either under the four headings of Time, and Space, etc., and/or, the obvious use of an existential-like language mediating (and intermediating) these sentential stands in such a manner where all economies are conjecturally completed and through economic complexification productively comment upon their economic parallels in the overlapping of other economic frames of reference ostensively dealing with the same relationship in question. (77)

'Sentences' being 'linguistically deposited texts, be they conjecturally presented as either propositions, statements, and/or propositional-statements (etc?)'. Furthermore, we could invoke any economic format that appears to proffer a productive series of comments and observations, etc., upon those texts simulating that relationship in question (specially, when viewed from an economically complex state of parallelism[330]). Or, e.g., through informatively and productively invoking, say, descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions; or, presentations, representations, and re-presentations; or intentional objectivities, intentional motivations, and intentional (or transcendental) subjectivity, or, histories of the past, histories of the future, and histories of the present; etc. (78)

Alignment is demonstrated, intuitively or formally, etc., through the presence of a conjectural completion in the representative economy in question that indicates the imputed existence of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance. E.g., that the propositions, statements, and propositional-statements dealing with the 'wetness of wet weather rain' as being differentially entertained within the integrity of that conjecture… (79)

Put another way, in this instance, we could say that future expectations, as prospective statements, are such that one would get wet stepping in the rain; that as retrospective propositions, rain and wetness have been already entertained in apposition through recall; and, decidedly non-weak/non-strong conjectures about going now out into the rain and anticipating becoming wet is so conjecturally sound that we do not need to then go out into the wet weather to confirm this conjecture. (80)

That, as completed economic sets, we must suppose that the requisite form of relative transformational isomorphic invariance must underly and underwrite such transformational forms of either recall, anticipation, and/or expectation, etc. (81)

In practical terms, we do not need to forever keep going out into the rain to prove, one more time, that this conjecture of 'wet rainy weather' is (ever) valid (since its truth status can be virtually entertained). Furthermore, being aware, that critical patterns of reiteration can provoke radical, innovative forms of re-directed insightfulness be that either ethical and/or non-ethical in orientation… (82)

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330 E.g., paralleling past 'time', say, with 'analysis' or 'reduction'; the 'phenomenological',' analytical propositions', treatment, etc.

2. The Tentative Exploration of an Existentially Re(-)Constituted Metaphysics

That, in the light of this ability to entertain all forms of appreciation, moral or otherwise, we can now segue to an exploration of the metaphysical ramifications of such an observation… where this exposition of moral judgment can act as a template for all forms of disciplinary and philosophically oriented conformal-truth determination. (83)

My argument for a re-constituted metaphysics is as follows. At the center of all disciplines are conjectures operating through the exercise of a conjectural economy or their economic equivalent. All economies are commensurate through the conjecture of an archetypal economy. Central to the operation of any overt or covert economy is truth determination. The reiteration of the stability in truth determination implies a generally competent basis for conformal truth assessment. An appreciation of this generally persistent stability in truth determination is the basis for meta-disciplinary forms of conformal truth appreciation. In this meta-appreciation of philosophical and disciplinary forms of conformal truth determination we find the recognition and acceptance of a re-constituted form of metaphysics. The basis for such recognition being an appreciation of the apparent persistence of such stability, both individually and collectively, of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance where all anomalous emendation is peripheral and not central to such recognition, and, where this stability can be discerned both within and between all sets of textualized reports through scrutinizing processes of alignment realized through re(-)alignment (and not as non-textually cited by fraudulent forms of a traditional metaphysics). (84)

That given our interest in e/valuational formation of the non-existential along with its existential re(-)e/valuation thence our concern with all forms of philosophical appreciation, etc. In this section, let me explore these various claims and their interlinking along with the overall ramifications of such a systematic-like approach to this area of our current focus, namely, this disquisition on an existential metaphysics. (85)

Now, what follows is basically a commentary on this prior paragraph. (86)

The incipit to this expression of intent (paragraph 84) points out the contention to use moral sentences as a template for formally exploring the conjectural nature of a re-constituted metaphysics. This reconstituted ‘metaphysics’ being that ‘sub-philosophical discipline concerned with the appreciation of the conformal truth status of conjectures and all other economic postulations’. That the general method to conduct such scrutiny is entailed in the complex argument as outlined in paragraph 85 (centered on the demonstration of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance in the alignment of various economic sets of sentences as viewed form a pro-relational perspective, etc.). Thence this following disquisition of an ‘existential metaphysics’. (87)

Implicit in this complex argument is that an economy of truth determination is dependent upon a conjectural economy, and v.v. (although given the archetypal basis of all [conjectured] economies the choice of a conjectural economic approach is more a matter of convenience). E.g., without conjectures forwarding relevant and well-expressed

propositional-statements there could be no truth determinations whatsoever in regard to either analytical propositions and/or synthetical statements.[331] Just as, e.g., without the conjecture of 'actually going out into the rain and getting wet' and 'conjecturing that we should get wet as a result' we would be in no position to make such a truth claim (in a matching of expectations and observations). Because, e.g., the tautology 'that green unicorns are either dancing on my lawn or not dancing on my lawn has no direct semblance of a lived-reality given our expected failure to encounter 'unicorns' and the fact that I have no lawn in the first place. Similarly, merely saying, 'it is raining' does not imply in and of itself that I would get wet should I venture outside in this rain. Only through conjectures and their assessment can meaningful truth statements be both proposed and assessed, and, then re(-)assessed, etc. (88)

But, given a deeper archetypal symmetry between economies, the economic value of conjectures could still be translated and reconstructed through the lens of other economies. (89)

The interrogative economic approach also appears to imply the need for an apparitional-like use of a conjectural 'as-if, as-if…' or a counterfactual 'what if…' (or a proscriptive-like use of negation in a paralleling, through economic complexification, with Boolean Algebra). (90)

Where, at its basis, truth determination is realized through the imputation of alignments within and between economic sets of statements. Because transformational retreatment is predicated on its full economic completion form pretreatment to treatment to retreatment/posttreatment. Moreover, such transformation is also predicated on the imputed existence of a distinctive relative transformational isomorphic invariance being maintained over the course of the transformation in question. Otherwise, there would be no logical subject being subjected to that specific process of transformation. Now, that granted, and invoking a Tarskian approach, the truth status of a certain set of sentences is to be established through determining the requisite alignment/s between economic representations of that set of sentences (aa, ab, ac; ba, bb, bc; ca, cb, cc…) by virtue of the requisite relative transformational isomorphic invariance (i) when demonstrated as valid (T):

(aa, ab, ac; ba, bb, bc; ca, cb, cc…)/i' is T iff i (91)

Now, that invariance granted, between a set of economic sentences describing a process of transformation, how can we use their moral equivalents in order to demonstrate this ability we naturally possess to ascertain the truth status of an ethical sentence, preferably existentially refracted through a pro-relational perspective upon the primary relationship *qua* the primary relationship being represented and, therein and thereby, being invoked? Indeed, what exactly is meant by reviewing ethical statements as possessing a truth value, and, a conformally (reiterated) truth status that through such appreciation can continually be re(-)assessed as either valid or not valid? (92)

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331 As argued in *Pursuit*, III.XIG.

As suggested, valid conjectures observe an internal alignment between various well-delineated economic sentences that suitably review that economic state of affairs and the same can also be observed between different economic formulations of the same state of affairs by virtue of economic complexification (given an economic basic in an archetypal economy). Let me demonstrate this contention. (93)

Let us return to the paradigm of wet weather by first reviewing it through a conjectural lens and, second, by reviewing it through an interrogative lens (through a process of economic complexification where economic sentences are aligned in archetypal terms of reference).

	Conjectural		Interrogative
Analytical:	Rain is wet	Metaphorical	It is as if raining
Synthetical:	It is raining now	Rhetorical	Is it raining? Yes!
Conjectural:	If raining, you get wet	Apparitional	If raining, you get wet (94)

If rain is wet (i) then i' is T iff i (95)

Or, in other words, 'if you go out into the rain, you will get wet' has a positive truth determination (that has added to and expanded 'our' body of knowledge as per the Duhem-Quine thesis, etc.). (96)

Translated to a set of moral sentences, the same approach should produce the same results. So, e.g., 'this starving person is now no longer hungry, given that they take their meals in the local soup kitchen'. Where, we might surmise that their discovering the local soup kitchen has created value for them; is now preserving a state of sufficient satiation; and, the great quality and variety of food being consumed is contributing to the sense of a conservational expansion in e/valuational formation. In moral terms, this is good news for that starving homeless person. All in all, there is a continual ongoing resolution, through practical forms of negation, of what otherwise would be an anomalous state of affairs. The truth status of such reiterated events is that 'hunger has been successfully assuaged on a recently regular basis', thence the resolution of this anomaly. Thence either the creation, preservation, and /or conservation of the required degree of a resident existential richness and enrichment. (97)

Where we could say that the situation in question through resolution in also taking a pro-relational approach to that same extent takes on an existential complexion and tenor, and, by doing so, is more expressed as an event… where its internal transformations can be read through either its differentiated-integrity and/or the integration of its differentiations. Where truth determination involves the recognition of an economic alignment between sets of economic sentences that appear to observe a relative transformational isomorphic invariance. Indeed, through such apperceived invariance, our weak readings can take on non-weak/non-strong formations where definitive-like processes of resolution can non-economically irrupt in the positive overflowing of an existential excess or surplus in the form of a definitive response of the last instant which when refracted through

a pro-relational lens, can existentially issue forth as the definitive response of the next instant, and whose permitted enaction oversees the definitive response of the first instant (initiating a series of responses with existentially enriched ramifications). Thence the metaphysical-like ramifications of this appreciation of the conformal truth status of sets of economic sentences… should co-associated conjectural economy be well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed through the utilization of a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy. Where the distinctive specificity of the non-existential and existential patterns of e/valuational formation can be described, etc., through appealing to the distinctive inputs, etc., as described under those six headings of Actors, Recipients, etc.[332] (98)

Now, as such truth assessments are of judgments and an appreciation of such assessments are meta-judgmental in their primary orientation then it follows that as judgments are ordered then their metaphysical appreciation must be inter-ordered. (99)

Let me now explore the metaphysical ramifications of this claim, namely, that metaphysics, as reconstituted, is primarily an inter-ordered phenomenon.[333] (100)

Noting through transformational retreatment that this reconstituted metaphysics has profound ramifications for the philosophical discipline, all other disciplines, and the economics of the secular world itself.[334] (100)

Again, let us revisit ‘why we could regard suitably conducted ethical pronouncements as ideal templates in matters of truth determination and their conformal appreciation when enacted in reconstituted metaphysical-like terms of reference?’ (101)

Either intuitively or through the formality of suitable arguments ethical pronouncements can be seen to articulate both non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation, plus the necessary interaction of both spheres, along with their individual and collective differentiations and integrations in ways that possibly portending their consequential impact of the various more possible and probable trajectories that could be enacted either within or between our more primary relationships (given, too, the overlapping of our relationships in the overall world-of-life). (102)

The complexity of the economic world also mirrors the intricate subtleties of this overall life-world. How, e.g., could a conjectural economy not function without an interrogative economy since the asking of a question motivates the conjectural, and v.v. Hence the way we differentiate and integrate the various sentential strands of our conjectures is already an expression of our meta-textual genres of behaviour whose rhetorical treatment sets up the range of possible conjectured outcomes, and, where the application of a certain form of a well-chosen consequential analysis can then differentiate and inte-

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332 Refer to paragraphs 36.

333 Such a claim had been tentatively presented, but, now, is being made much more forcefully through running the argument in paragraph 99.

334 Inter-ordered phenomena arise through the reduplication or duplication of ordered phenomena. Refer to *The Seventh Book*…, and *Book* 9.

grate both the non-existential and existential e/valuational formations stemming from our reflections upon the same, and so on. (103)

If we could but for a few moments put aside ‘our reductive and materialistic notions about reality’, through a simple working suspension, say, by simply questioning our attitudes, and affording an equality to both our relationships on one hand, and, on the other hand, their relational participants and parts (their actors and acters) then it may become obvious that the distinctive languages dealing with either side of this equation should mutually intersect if only through our ability to translate them, i.e., from one side to the other, and v.v.[335] Once this is understood, we can then observe in relating sentential descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions among themselves that although phenomenal-phenomenological descriptions are dealing with pro ‘relational participants, etc.’, and existential proscriptions are ‘pro-relationally relational’, still, both should be dealing with the same relational event when dealing with the same relational phenomenon or phenomena. E.g., in articulating descriptions, we are using the prescriptive nature of meta-textual genres of behaviour that distinctively allow us to both write and read those sentential texts relevant to that topic of enquiry. Similarly, in existential forms of proscription, again we must be adopting and adapting certain appropriate genres of behaviour in order to exercise and execute such behviours through those permissions that allow us to transmute definitive responses of the last instant to definitive responses of the first instant through a transmutation of those discerned definitive responses of the next instant. Or, more succinctly put, allow us ‘to do the right thing’ in accordance with the best of our abilities to discern such existentially oriented responses. I.e., those responses that either create, preserve and/or conserve (a static and passive) evaluational richness and (a dynamic and active) e/valuational enrichment in the context of an engaged process of e/valuational amplification (through both a positive incremental non-chaotic orchestration and a positive non-incremental chaotic enhancement in e/valuational formation preferably of an existentially-pragmatic/pragmatically-existential disposition in which a suitable mix of deontological, pragmatical, and aesthetical inputs and outputs are suitably engendered in a mutual manner that beneficially engineers the more advantageous trajectories of that primary relationship being placed under such a combined non-existential and existential form of focus). (104)

Indeed, an ideal template given its encapsulation of both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented inputs and outputs. (105)

Where truth determination is evaluated by reference to this creation, etc., of an existential richness and enrichment as conjecturally demonstrated within either virtually and/or non-virtually delineated terms of consequential reference to a great extent already predetermined through the rhetorical genres of potential interrogation brought to bear on our reading/writing of such a relational situation (i.e., non-existentially with respect to

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[335] More correctly, we should defer to the emergent aspect of our relationships once we understand in experiential terms that ‘the whole is experienced as greater than the sum of its parts’. Thence our recognition, e.g., of an existential surplus or excess both when and where it should present itself. That it is through such an excess in e/valuational formation, and its powers of (e)motivation, that allows us to causally intervene in this world at large in the first place.

relational participants and parts and existentially in pro-relational terms of reference to the primary relationship itself albeit as it finds itself situated in the relational encompassment of the world at large, this overall world-of-life). Where sentential reports, either advertently or inadvertently, hopefully, are set up to better re(-)present the pro-relational contours of that primary relationship, etc., as experienced in and through lived-experience (themselves as the textualization of living-experience). Where the reiterations of this ongoing economy of re(-)presentation have no truck whatsoever with any reality per se, as imputed to be entertained in, through or of itself, via some impossible absolutistical set of manoeuvres that defy rational reasoning, but, instead, simulated in processes of alignment iterated through re(-)alignment both within and between sentential reports whose net impact is to present the conjectured extrapolation of an overall set of imputations that are definitively de-distorted through the suitable application of working suspensions, etc. Where the positive aspect of the non-economic (fork) is seen to be realized through the irruptions of economic processes of resolution whose emitted dissemination are significantly re(-)appropriated and acted upon through enaction exercised through the hyper-economic aspect of this conjectured imputation of the super-economic, i.e., our ability to intervene in this world at large in a manner that is duly observant of both the non-existential and existential and, more importantly, engender a productive relationship between the same through ongoing processes of existentialization in which is engineered either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of an existential richness and existentially oriented enrichment in e/valuational formation. That it is this ability to oversee such definitive responses of the next instant and their permitted realization as definitive responses of the first instance that plainly sets out for us these evident truth determinations that suitable responses are being both aptly delineated and appositely enacted. (106)

This granted, either theoretically or hypothetically, how might we envisage this meta-philosophical appreciation of either the philosophical or the disciplinary or the secular world is to be conducted in such reconstituted meta-physical-like terms of reference? (107)

As previously intimated,[336] in none other than in inter-ordered terms of reference! Where through binary operations of reduplication or duplication, suitably cognizant of their economic terms of reference, inter-ordered forms of e/valuational formation are duly presented, etc.[337] (108)

Where relevant forms of truth determination should be critically conducted in ordered terms of reference, etc., and, where such truth assessments are realized through process of alignment conformally reinforced through iterations of an ongoing economy of re(-)alignment, and, where its appreciative assessment is conducted in the metaphysical terms of the inter-ordered (that become immediately retreated in non-metaphysical-like

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336 Refer to paragraphs 2, 99-100.

337 All operations and modes of treatment are binary, sequentially the application of a dominant orientation upon a relatively less dominant orientation (all things never being equal, etc.). The qualification is that these operations, etc., occur in trimodal economic terms of reference in a manner that should avoid all ideological forms of an extremist positioning that is isolated in either non-economically impossible unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical, and/or relativistical forms of positioning as argued in *The Seventh Book*…, etc.

terms of reference through the automatic non-economic delineations of the de-suspension. Let me explain. (109)

Here we can return to the opening paragraphs of this section (paragraphs 84-85):

> That, in the light of this ability to entertain all forms of appreciation, moral or otherwise, we can now segue to an exploration of the metaphysical ramifications of such an observation… where this exposition of moral judgment can act as a template for all forms of disciplinary and philosophically oriented conformal-truth determination. [84]
>
> My argument for a re-constituted metaphysics is as follows. At the center of all disciplines are conjectures operating through the exercise of a conjectural economy or their economic equivalent. All economies are commensurate through the conjecture of an archetypal economy. Central to the operation of any overt or covert economy is truth determination. The reiteration of the stability in truth determination implies a generally competent basis for conformal truth assessment. An appreciation of this generally persistent stability in truth determination is the basis for meta-disciplinary forms of conformal truth appreciation. In this meta-appreciation of philosophical and disciplinary forms of conformal truth determination we find the recognition and acceptance of a re-constituted form of metaphysics. The basis for such recognition being an appreciation of the apparent persistence of such stability, both individually and collectively, of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance where all anomalous emendation is peripheral and not central to such recognition, and, where this stability can be discerned both within and between all sets of textualized reports through scrutinizing processes of alignment realized through re(-)alignment (and not as non-textually cited by fraudulent forms of a traditional metaphysics).That given our interest in e/valuational formation of the non-existential along with its existential re(-)e/valuation thence our concern with all forms of philosophical appreciation, etc. In this section, let me explore these various claims and their interlinking along with the overall ramifications of such a systematic-like approach to this area of our current focus, namely, this disquisition on an existential metaphysics. [85] (110)

That moral reports can act as templates for more broad forms of metaphysical enquiry needs to be accepted first and, then, later re-evaluated in the terms of this disquisition. (111)

My argument for a re-constituted metaphysics above all recognizes the epistemological fact that a representationalistic form of representation can be completely deconstructed and replaced by anti-representationalistic reconstruction based on a representative philosophy that only deals with representative processes of alignment, within and between sentential reports, through different forms of realignment in an overall ongoing re(-)normalization of this economy of re(-)alignment.[338] That truth determination only

[338] Where re(-)alignment means an ongoing economy of realignment engineered through mere realignment (i.e., rectification in hermeneutical meta-textual terms of reference), alignment (i.e., in phenome-

operates in such terms of reference. I.e., in an alignment between the meta-sentential and the sentential (and not purely in the impossible terms of the either the meta-sentential or the sentential nominating logical subjects *per se* or denominating predicates or relations *per se*).[339] (112)

At the center of all disciplines are conjectures operating through the exercise of a conjectural economy or their economic equivalent… because through economic complexion we could translate conjectures through the so-called third moment of some other relevant and apposite economic lens (e.g., the interrogative, re(-)presentative, the intentional,[340] etc., etc.). (113)

All economies are commensurate through the conjecture of an archetypal economy. Central to the operation of any overt or covert economy is truth determination. The reiteration of the stability in truth determination implies a generally competent basis for conformal truth assessment. Economic equivalence is guaranteed through the imputation of an archetypal economy underwriting all economic processes. Truth determination is basically this ability to find sentential evidence for its meta-sentential correlate. Hence this alignment being discerned between sentential reports, especially of the same economic complexion… in order to articulate the commonality of a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance underlying that economic set of reports that should also be duly able to be demonstrated when translated through any other economic lens (through economic complexification based on the commonality of an archetypal economy). Hence this economic basis for the reiterability of truth determinations and thence their conformal status in the light of being able to be reiterated in this sense of the conformal. This sense of the reiteration also accounting for transformational forms of stability despite the minor addition or subtractions of peripheral details and various mutations through forms of fully operational connections (as is evidenced in the existentialization of the relatively existential, and, in its reverse through de-existentialization, etc.). Thence this more general concept of 'conjectural competence' given this general, overall stability of conformal truth determination. (114)

An appreciation of this generally persistent stability in truth determination is the basis for meta-disciplinary forms of conformal truth appreciation. In this meta-appreciation of philosophical and disciplinary forms of conformal truth determination we

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nological terms enacted through error correction by means of a re-de-mis-alignment involving processes of both deconstruction and reconstruction), and re-alignment (i.e., as enacted through existential processes of re(-)normalization).

339 Being the only three economically possible forms of economic treatment, namely, nomination, of logical subjects, and, denominating, respectively, of analytically oriented forms of predication and synthetically oriented forms of relation. More correctly, the Tarskian formula for the archetypal delineation of a truth determination should be of the form where "the meta-sentential report p' is T iff the sentential report p is evidently present" (i.e., can be accounted for in sentential catalogue of the world as critically reported through well-organized and well-conducted conjectures [that, themselves, need to be well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed, etc.], etc.).

340 Where the third moment of the interrogative economy, e.g., is that of the apparitional moment; where the third moment of the re(-)presentative economy, e.g., is that of chaotically re-directed re-presentation; and, where the third moment of the intentional economy, e.g., is that of intentional subjectivity...

find the recognition and acceptance of a re-constituted form of metaphysics. Such stability is demonstrated through the intercomparison through process of re(-)alignment. Thence this ability to appreciate truth determinations is expressed through the subdiscipline of a reconstituted metaphysics (within the discipline of philosophy although exercised in disciplinary oversight and the overseeing of secular activities, forms of appreciation, etc.). Thence this acceptable recognition of a reconstituted metaphysics. (115)

The basis for such recognition being an appreciation of the apparent persistence of such stability, both individually and collectively, of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance where all anomalous emendation is peripheral and not central to such recognition, and, where this stability can be discerned both within and between all sets of textualized reports through scrutinizing processes of alignment realized through re(-)alignment (and not as non-textually cited by fraudulent forms of a traditional metaphysics). What more need be said? The relative stability in well-conducted forms of truth assessment and its appreciation establishing this observation of our metaphysical-like ability to appreciate such distinctions in conformal truth delineation, as expressed through sch working concepts of truth status, a reiterable conformal truth status, their truth assessment and appreciation, along with the overall competence of a well-conducted conjectural economy, etc. (116)

That given our interest in e/valuational formation of the non-existential along with its existential re(-)e/valuation thence our concern with all forms of philosophical appreciation, etc. In this section, let me explore these various claims and their interlinking along with the overall ramifications of such a systematic-like approach to this area of our current focus, namely, this disquisition on an existential metaphysics. I.e., our explication of the inter-ordered nature of such a relatively stable conformal metaphysics as here being reconstituted (and which, under various appellations, will find its social emplacement in the system of Academia). (117)

As noted, the inter-ordered is the operation of one order or inter-ordered order operating on another order or inter-ordered order. E.g., the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth order of 'ontical facts of ontical facts' forming the basis for the operations of an historical discipline (dealing, we should also note, with both, individually and collectively, histories of the past, present and future).[341] Or, e.g., the more complex example of the asymmetrical duplication of the history of science being the reduplication by the sixth order of the reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutical potentiality.[342] (118)

Interestingly, from understanding this 'reconstituted metaphysics' as 'the metaphysical-like appreciation of conformal truth determinations' we can now put metaphorical 'flesh on these bare bones' by reviewing just what is 'entailed in an overall inter-ordered dimension of appreciation'. (119)

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341 Which could be notated as ($6^1.6^1$).

342 Which could be notated as ($6^2.5^2$).

First, we must understand, as I have envisaged it, that it is the nature of transformational retreatment to retreat all forms of treated productivity back on to their original meta-level of its initial presentation in the form of its pretreatment. This can explain why we read, say, the history of science as the 'history' of science and not its 'meta-history' (which would be correct in the first instance, but, not through normal usage which immediately retreats the same back to its original meta-terms of reference as presented through its pre-treatment, namely, as 'history'). (120)

Second, we also take the dominating party in this bimodal operation (of either symmetrical reduplication or asymmetrical duplication) as dictating the ensuing and expected terms of reference. So, in this inter-ordered example of the following duplication, namely, the history of science, here, the resulting 'history of science' is 'history' and 'not science'. (121)

In the light of this second observation, therefore, we can for convenience dispense with asymmetrical duplications and just focus our attention on the inter-ordered treatment of the trans-cognitive orders in bold as follows (as here diagrammatically represented in a circular format):

Existential-Pragmatism
(& 'Political' Power)
Deontological
3

Psychological-Sociological
Aesthetic (Semantic Integration)
2

Functional Utility
Pragmatical
4

*

1
Phenomenologically-Semantic
Categorical Semantics

5
Hermeneutical Possibility
Science

6
Ontical Facts
History (122)

Let me briefly describe these six inter-ordered orders (and offer an explanation as to how we arrive at their inter-ordered descriptions). (123)

Reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order[343] (and the first cognitive order), deals with the reduplication of the atomized phenomenological differentiation of semantic categories, like, e.g., saltiness, redness, roundness, table-likeness, etc., is productive of a listing of semantic categories and how their differentiated phenomenological features could be catalogued in, say, metaphysical dictionaries of distinctive, atomic-like categories (and where in an integrated semantics, supplied in the next, second trans-cognitive order [and cognitively order with the same number[344]] which then duly supplies the rules for either their possible semantic interaction or the denial of such interactions [albeit not necessarily in poetically conjugated terms, etc.[345]]). (124)

Reduplication of the second trans-cognitive order (and the second cognitive order), deals with the reduplication of the molecular phenomenological integration of semantic categories, like, e.g., salty-water, bright-redness, a smooth-roundness, round tabletop-likeness, etc., is productive of a listing of either observed or not observed integrated semantic categories and how their integrated phenomenological features could be catalogued in, say, metaphysical dictionaries of distinctive, molecular-like categories, or, implicitly, in a form that could dictate either the conjugation of such possibilities or impossibilities. This integration of differentiated phenomenological facets being reviewed, trans-cognitively, as an aesthetical process, and, where through reduplication, as the aesthetics of aesthetics can be interpreted as the apparent integrity on a spectrum of both an individual psychology and a more public sociology.[346] (125)

Reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order (but not the third cognitive order of conceptual ideation), deals with deontological judgment (primarily of an ethical nature, e.g., promises, obligations, acts of duty, categorical imperatives, etc.) and produces a pragmatically-existential disposition that although primarily deontological also includes aesthetical and pragmatical adjuncts (in the delivery of its imperative-like patterns of incitement that through permission will also take on a non-virtual, causal instantiation in the form of definitive responses of the first instance, etc.). This order is also the prime locus for 'political' power given its role in permitting the non-economic irruption of distinctive pattern of response, etc., arising through processes of resolution, be the latter suitably conducted or otherwise. In this regard, we can also add that the executive func-

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343 Trans-cognitive orders deal with six distinctive types of trans-intentional judgment, whereas orders deal with six distinctive types of judgmental content delivered through the retreatment of judgments in intentional terms of reference.

344 In cognitive terms, in the conceptual delivery of such expressions, the first and second orders are dealing with non-integrated and integrated thought content respectively. In a similar manner, the fifth and sixths orders, both cognitive and trans-cognitive alike, are dealing, respectively, with the possibility of factual states of affairs and their integration in an organized body of provisionally accepted actual facts (as argued for, e.g., by the Duhem-Quine thesis).

345 So, e.g., expressions like 'white-noises' are given an acceptable meaning, in denotational mapping, when, normally, the rules for such a conjugation should have been forbidden, as for, say 'red noises', magenta sounds, etc. Although, interestingly, we also find 'purple-prose' and 'a 'brilliant-speech' was delivered' go beyond a merely poetic juxtaposition of such anomalous interactions (which, I suspect, is the metaphorical-like origins for such anomalous expressions).

346 Not meaning to confuse the issue, we could also treat the reduplication of the sociological as one way of defining the 'political dimension' (in its conjunction within the political-economy as situated within its socially systematized expression as the Political-Economy).

tions of the political-economy have their metaphorical ‘center’ in this specific trans-cognitive order. (126)

Reduplication of the fourth trans-cognitive order (but not the fourth cognitive order of perception in all its intentional fields) deals with ideas of a pragmatical-like utility and functionality produces, through reduplication, that which can be viewed as pragmatically functional, as an inter-ordered form of utility. (127)

Reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order (and the fifth cognitive order of possible factual state of affairs that, theoretically, could be perceived in the real time of their occurrence), in dealing with potentiality as a hermeneutic possibility through reduplication then deals with the overall grounds for the discipline of science, as the possibility of all possibilities (given, furthermore, that ‘potentiality’ deals with ‘possibility, probabilities, and potencies’, and, science deals primarily with their delineation, etc.).[347] (128)

Reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (and the sixth cognitive order), which deals with the ontical determination of facts (provisionally) treated as actual facts (in their differentiation from possible factual states) under reduplication carves out the overall grounds for the discipline of history (which cannot treat the temporal economy purely in only past historical terms of reference nor the possibility of only through one sense of an historical perspective, and, therefore, this implies that the historian’s territory is also both that of ‘histories in the plural’ and as ‘histories of the past, present, and future’, be these implied facets treated either overly and/or covertly). (129)

Hence the enriched concept of a reconstituted inter-ordered metaphysics will also entail elements dealing with a categorical semantics; the recognition of aesthetically integrated psychologies and sociologies; an existential-pragmatism that will also entail aesthetical or stylistic features and pragmatical features along with the observation of the enactment of ‘political’ interventions (both personal and interpersonal); the economic functionality of the apparent utility or otherwise of processes; the broad discipline of science; and, the equally broad discipline of history. All in all, creating a complex sense of the interdisciplinary in the enactment of metaphysical forms of appreciation (of the conformal status of that being subjected to such forms of meta-philosophical and, by extension, the inclusion of all forms of meta-disciplinary appreciation along with the non-existential and existential appreciation of the secular world along with both its resilience in and resistance to disciplinary endeavours). (130)

Therefore, in the light of such inter-ordered reduplication, and duplication, the discipline of a reconstituted metaphysics is now ready to ‘open for business’, noting as a matter of course, that all forms of treatment are also automatically subjected to retreatment along with potentially existentially oriented patterns of intervention… (131)

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[347] Where ‘potencies’ are ‘highly probable probabilities about to be actualized in non-virtual terms of reference’.

3. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

What might be meant by this metaphor ‘open for business’. Let me explore ‘what might be entailed?’ (132)

Although I have mapped this reconstituted metaphysics, as a sub-discipline in the discipline of philosophy, as a discipline dealing with the conformal appreciation of truth determinations within the overall domain of the philosophical discipline, and by extension, within all other disciplines, still, as a discipline it will exercise a certain autonomy as is the right of any discipline (given the distinctive nature of a set of disciplinary differences, meta-differences, and non-differences as explored elsewhere), and, so, it is quite proper to ask, ‘in what way this metaphysics differs from the philosophical discipline when considered in general terms of reference?’ And, furthermore, of course, ‘in what way this reconstituted metaphysics differs from a more traditional metaphysics especially in those respects where the latter deserves to be thoroughly criticized’. (133)

For a start, this critical and radical philosophy that I am exploring in this *Pursuit*, with its inclusion of this reconstituted metaphysics, is being definitively reformulated as ‘an anti-representationalistic, positively nihilistic, pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism’. In this regard, my use, e.g., of a ‘working representationalism’ is conducted through a trimodal, ongoing economy of re(-)presentationalism that at no stage even suggests a process of representation dealing with that which cannot be represented, be it either inferred or imputed. Indeed, as just argued in this essay, truth determination is the demonstration of a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance that can be inferred as co-present in an array of economic propositions, etc., i.e., sentences, as delineated through forms of alignment, realized through re(-)alignment), without reference to the extrapolation of either any nominations of a so-called ‘external reality’ and/or any nominations of a so-called ‘internal reality’ with which we just cannot stand, economically, in some form of a meaningful relationship, indeed, in any meaningful form of a relationship. Where such a sentential array of propositions, statements and propositional-statements, etc., are merely reports where the delineation of such alignments are to be demonstrated as either within or between, but, most certainly not in any form of an extra-sentential inference or imputation. Of course, admittedly, it is natural to conjecture that such imputations have a basis in some form of an extra-sentential ‘reality’ or intra-sentential ‘reality’. But, for the critical philosopher, who is also radical, such imputations and extrapolations are only countenanced as economically impossible and unnecessary disciplinary forms of treatment that can only remain and must remain as no more than ‘improper forms of an extrapolated imputation or inference’. Therefore, an assessment of the truth status of such sentential reports is to be realized, instead, through working with those same reports by seeking to demonstrate relevant forms of alignment or non-alignment both within and between such linguistic representations as sentences whose status as ‘reports’ is to be observed as merely reporting such modes of sentential representation. No more than ‘working forms of a qualified representationalism’ that are ‘engendered by authors reporting our interactions in an entangled sense of world from either the pro-relational dimension of that metaphorical ‘entanglement’ and/or the relational world of nominated participants and their denominated parts’. Where despite their consti-

tution by us, individually, all other forms of dictation need to be respectfully registered and duly processed, and treated accordingly. In effect, such reporting cannot be reduced to a merely classical format of 'an economically isolated reporter reporting on the economic isolation of phenomena since, as I have consistently argued, there can be no forms of economic isolation, no forms of non-economic interaction (in the negative sense of the non-economic fork) since that would be a contradiction in terms.[348] Indeed, quite to the contrary, just as the perception, or, rather, the apperception, of economic correlativies as independent correlativities as self-existing in their own right is impossible to contemplate, both subsequently and consequently, economic isolation, is ruled out as non-economic, in its negative sense, so, too, we must address all relationships in a similar manner. All reporters and all that reported upon, likewise, cannot entail economically isolated forms of existence. But, once understood, does this mean, 'that all relational situations in their relational situatedness can have neither an absolutistically distinctive phenomenological form of existence nor a relativistically indistinctive form of phenomenological existence?' to which we must answer, 'yes!' Albeit with the immediate qualification, that between such impossible extremes we have a no-person's land of both non-absolutistically and non-relativistically forms of lived-reality whose weak absolute-existential and weak relative-non-existential claims, however, can rise to the status of non-weak/non-strong claims should they be properly constituted and suitably reported as such.[349] (134)

Or, re-stated more succinctly, a metaphorical 'world of lived-entanglement' awaits us should we have the eyes to see nothing else other than this 'relationally entangled form of a lived-reality'.[350] Where economic isolates can have no existence, indeed, can be neither recognized nor encountered nor engaged economically! (135)

Or, again, such ideas can be philosophically presented, i.e., reported, as those recorded alignments and non-alignments as textually re(-)presented as 'representing' that domain that exists 'between the fork of the non-economic fork and the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork'. Identifying this fork as 'philosophical' and this 'non-fork' as 'metaphysical (and meta-philosophical)' let me unpack the compact precision, or compression, of these ideas. (136)

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348 I.e., 'possibly doing the truly impossible', but, where in contrast, we might eventually come to those positions where we can now thing what once would have been impossible to ironically think before the advent of such 'final' vocabularies, 'novel' concepts, 'new ways' of doing things, 'definitive' histories, etc.

349 The reference to a 'no-person's land' is alluding to the lived-fact that all senses of selfhood are equally constituted, and re(-)constituted, in a similar manner, namely, as not economically isolated in some form of a negative non-economic reality that could not even be contemplated 'non-relationally'. On the other hand, this does not mean there can be no phenomenological senses of self, indeed, actually guarantees the same through forms of both relational nomination (as an embodied body) and subjective nomination at the same time (as a distinctive subject who is distinctive embodied as an embodied subject). In effect, when extended to both the subjective and the objective, etc., outline a positive nihilism where identities are economically thematized and not non-economically imputed through impossible forms of speculation.

350 Thanking David McDivitt for this metaphor of 'entanglement' that I interpret as 'the relational nature of lived reality that can then be either viewed non-existentially in a relational orientation and/or existentially in a holistic, pro-relational orientation where our subjective experience of the same is then to be referred to as 'trans-relational' in orientation'.

In the application of this philosophical use of the fork we completely dismiss its negative aspect as untenable. What is negatively non-economic just cannot be thought. Period! On the other hand, what remains after such thorough deconstruction is to be re-constructed philosophically. However, if we were to do just that we should soon find, if we were duly reflective of our reportings and their appreciation, etc., that the world does not conform to forms of differentiation merely in keeping with our philosophical distinctions, and so on. Hence the observations of the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-fork that a definitive existential response of the next instance need not conform to either an envisaged set of pure imperatives of a deontological orientation nor a purely pragmatical response of a pragmatical nature nor to a purely aesthetical form of an aesthetical response likewise in the overall formation of our experience of value.[351] Indeed, that the value of the value settled upon will and must ever transcend and resist a manifestation as falling precisely and solely within any one ordered form of reporting. That this observation is the *raison d'être* of this non-fork, being proposed as a heuristic device that notes that our reporting of lived-experience will never fall precisely within the neat categories of our philosophical opinions whilst noting the relevance of such categories since our lived-experiences, given the principle of non-equality in identification, will fall more in this ordered category and not so much in that ordered category and that such relative differentiation is also to be lived with just as much as the integration of judgmental experience, either non-existential or existential in complexion and tenor, will ever transcend such neat forms of categorization. That, to continue to proffer reports we must, from time to time, either overlook such distinctively unique processes of integration of lived experience and/or overlook, at other times, their distinctively unique processes of differentiation. (137)

This non-fork, therefore, offers a rectifying commentary on our philosophical forms of explication (using the non-economic fork) and that this is evident in the previous identification of the 'metaphysical', in its reconstituted format, as being 'inter-ordered' in orientation when it becomes obvious that we must also radically qualify such distinctive differentiations with the overriding of metaphysically induced, distinctively articulated, unique forms of integration as will be evidenced in our suitably appreciated and reported upon judgments as experienced in lived-experience that take on both a critical and radical appreciation of such definitive responses of the last instance, etc. Such accommodations, such integrations that cross over such distinctive differentiations, have already been pointed out in the work of the bridge architect whose brief must resolve any conflicts between the fields of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical, and, hopefully, also take on board an aesthetical form of output that pertains to the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical.[352] But, as problematic as this might seem, at least philosophically, in this overall world-of-life that architect will find the existence of those conventions already in place, in the form of

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351 Ruling out in one sweep, e.g., that art could be non-contentious and merely art for art's sake or, for that matter, as neither portending deontological imperatives nor without proffering insights of a pragmatical orientation. Or, even more subtly, where any form of representation could not be held to either directly or indirectly refer to an ordered and inter-ordered sense and semblance of a world as lived in all its holistically enshrined variety.

352 Refer to the previous essays - *Pursuit*, III.XIO.33, 61.

regulations, precedents, court rulings, etc., as to how to go about the professional resolution of such potentially conflicting demands. That, as we expect bridges should not fall down and rarely do so, and, reasonable budgets are expended in their construction, we must assume that such uniquely integrated responses of the last instance, etc., are and must be achievable. That, similarly, over the course of our lives, similar feats of accommodation will also be observed… day by day, if not moment by moment! (138)

Hence, furthermore, the overriding relevance of the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork, where, as the name suggests, we do not and need not have to make a definitive choice between specific forms of either an ordered and/or inter-ordered form of judgment. That, from a judgmental perspective, we should permit our reported re(-)presentations of the primary relationship itself, albeit in its relational embeddedness, to 'call forth' as to how we might suitably resolve such differentiated conflicts of interest. Knowing, at the same time, that our genres of questioning and our responsible dealing with such situated events is already, to a great extent, pre-formulated for us through such social conventions, both received, culturally and interculturally, through our various forms of education, be that through professional instruction or otherwise. Where, it is important to observe, existentially, that through affording our relationships a certain degree of preferential treatment over their relational participants and parts, that the existential orientation takes a certain forcefulness in the delivery of such distinctive forms of integrated expressions of behaviour as will be delivered in the form of definitive responses of the last instance, etc.[353] Where both existential and non-existential forms of responsiveness, and their necessary interactions, be duly observed, albeit preferably from a relatively responsible pro-relational sense of perspective. (139)

Now, it is my belief that this non-fork is well-evidenced in our reflections upon natural experience. If someone were to stick a 'pin' into, say, our arm, we would not be just a person experiencing the ensuing pain of this event, but, also perceiving the fact that someone has just stuck a 'pin' into our arm, entertaining various conjectures as to why and how this pin can be removed, and the probable consequences of this rather 'unusual' event along with an array of self-reported judgments and, no doubt, with loudly reported exclamations to that pin-stabbing person that this behaviour is quite unacceptable. Of course, in some other situation, say, that if 'pin' were a hypodermic syringe, and we were getting our latest Covid shots or flu shots, and this was in response to our seeking the same, then a different array of reports would occur to a physically similar set of events where, instead of being stabbed by a pin for whatever reason that was being enacted by that other person, we put ourself forward for such inoculation. Hence this observation that the human psyche is engineered for multi-tasking. Just like a person dancing on the dance floor when and where they are both acting as a 'listener' listening to the dance music and as a 'dancer' dancing to that same music. Of course, we should not review this type of a double experience as two radically distinctive forms of behaviour co-occurring. For the record, who has not experienced the situation when we inadvertently find our-

[353] The definitive nature of such responses be delivered through the 'forcefulness of the ensuing de-suspension/s', taking precise integrated, non-economic forms of articulation through non-economic irruption, etc.

selves tapping in time with either our finger and/or our feet to our hearing of a wonderfully rhythmic piece of music that has us absorbed in this type of a response? (140)

Still, the point remains, that our responses can be definitively elicited in a multimodal form and not merely executed as some form of a pure response as determined and dictated by the meta-textual prescriptions of one simple genre of behaviour. Similarly, from a philosophical point of view, we need to stand corrected that our responsibly elicited behaviour will more than likely not be expressed (and 'written') through the mere invocation of a single genre of behaviour, and, that likewise in the 'reading' of such behaviour we should not automatically review it as if it occurred in and through a sole genre of behaviour accordingly. Hence this need, to acknowledge the manner as to how we should come to expect the application of this non-fork, more often than not, indeed, as a matter of course, will 'metaphysically' overrule a more simplistic style of philosophical thinking.[354] (141)

That despite the distinctive differentiations of a critical philosophy, in radical experience we must expect a metaphysical-like overriding of such expectations. Where, e.g., an existential response might be one-part deontological and one-part pragmatical and one-part aesthetical… in its unique delivery of a suitably apposite response of the first instance… (142)

Moreover, given the ordered and inter-ordered richness of metaphysical-like appreciation of either the philosophical or the disciplinary or the secularity of the secular world we must also come to expect how uniquely enriched such complexly integrated experience will manifest itself over the course of our passages through this overall world-of-life. Especially in meeting existential experience that radically calls us to respond in ways not hither to met in either our past recall, or future expectations, or the immediacy of our current anticipations. (143)

Hence the need for this acceptance of this 'business' of the metaphysical, albeit as here reconstituted, to both non-existentially and, especially, existentially refashion the way we are inclined to habitually shape and forge our responses to this world at large, be they either philosophically differentiated or fashioned in some other disciplinary outlook or portrayed from a more secular sense of an orientation. That, in effect, we must be open to more radical ways of being in this world with(-)others given that such critical thinking might suddenly expose us to more responsible ways of being(-)before others and finding an amplified and a more radical sense and semblance of an existential freedom to be discerned through(-)the-auspices-of-others. Therefore, in posing the following question let me conclude this essay, namely, 'how does this critical, and potentially radical, experience of such metaphysical appreciation translate into a suitable re-direction of the course of natural, everyday experience? Or, 'personally, how does such lived-experience take on both a secular appearance and a social manifestation… indeed, invite and express a secular orientation given the complexity and perplexity of such a bewildering array of forms of philosophical differentiation and metaphysical integration that it now seems we need to collectively navigate, negotiate, and arbitrate?' (144)

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354 That this observation will also apply to all disciplinary thinking and all forms of secular thinking.

Retracing our steps, we might surmise, hopefully, that the positive irruption of the non-economic is supervised by metaphysically oriented forms of input and output as a result of the ongoing resolution of the economic sub-economy within the embrace of the super-economic, and where such radical and potentially disruptive irruptions have the potential to be re-harmonized within the encompassment of the super-economic. Where, in effect, the presented sense and semblance of the radical, as a potentially disruptive innovation, is somewhat deradicalized on a small increment by increment basis as we attempt to overcome the novelty of such a distinctively integrated type of a definitive response of the last instance, etc. Where in perceiving, i.e., apperceiving, its apparent radicalness, and intuitively judging it to have value, or standing, we would then attempt to re(-)appropriate such unexpected-expectedness or expected-unexpectedness in the hope of making a much better sense of such experience and its co-associated demands as they become thematized through such continual forms of re(-)appropriation (from the perspective the hyper-economic within the overall embrace of the super-economic). By such means making sense of the non-economic in its positive aspect…[355] (145)

But, much of this complex-perplexity can be obviated by the simple understanding that through the application of relevant working suspensions the devolving forcefulness of the de-suspension effectively retreats such insights and demands in a form that, again, is now on par with our initial concerns, albeit, now in a manner that might more responsibly resolve those same issues and concerns. Hence the necessity for a well-functioning re(-)presentational economy and also for a well-functioning conjectural economy open to metaphysically oriented forms of conformal truth appreciation and ongoing re(-)assessment of the status of such truth determinations. A responsiveness, at the end of the day, that can only marginally tweak the peripheral edges of such approaches to how we can and should reconstitute lived-experience in a format, form, and formation of e/valuational experience in a manner more in tune with the lived-nature of our lived-responses. Where, step by step, we are 'called' to respond with a more authentic sense of style, to the best of our abilities and resources, to an existentially impressed set of responses that both orchestrate and enhance the overall richness and enrichment of our relationships…[356] despite the fact, sadly, that, all too often, we can be… 'all too human, all too human..!!' (146)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 2.7.24.

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355 In effect, under the experiential umbrella of the integrated metaphysical ramifications of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-fork (where we read 'pragmatic' as 'existentially oriented' and the 'pragmatical' as 'non-existentially oriented').

356 That a differentiation of the relational richness and enrichment defines whether an existential orientation or a relatively non-orientation is being observed despite the fact that the existential, through the disciplinary business of the metaphysical, will also definitively integrate the responsive nature of our existentially re-directed interactions with others.

XIQ. A Holographic Appreciation of Disciplines in the Secular World

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIQ. A Holographic Appreciation of Disciplines in the Secular World*[357]

0. Preamble, Pre-Introduction, and Introduction

Having travelled, either wisely or unwisely, from a philosophical appreciation of conjectures to a working comprehension of their metaphysical impact, and v.v., let us now turn our attention to the secular world and set out to discern to what extent a disciplinary world impacts or does not impact the economic nature of this world of the secular? To this end let us explore the following 'secular conjecture', namely, *that despite the fashioning and forging of the secular world by an overlapping world of competing disciplines, still, the secular world must ultimately remain untouched given that disciplines have to fashion and forge something, and, like a rock, whether it be cut or carved, split or smashed, it will still remain a rock, or the remaining pieces of a rock, despite the exigencies imposed upon it by this world at large'*. (0)

In a world continually fashioned and forged through a competing array of disciplines before which the secular world can either successfully resist or unsuccessfully subsist, and, perhaps, be submerged under a bewildering regime of both contested authenticity and patent inauthenticity, we may wonder just what actually makes sense, and, hopefully, will make more sense than that found in our constant exposure to those blatant conspiracies pedalled to the profit of whom we know not, but, suspect must exist. That given such anxieties, and all others, just how should we navigate, negotiate and arbitrate our unique passages through this world, both individually and collectively? Just how might we thematize the true contours of 'this secular conjecture' given a perspective that finds us totally immersed, practically imprisoned, as if an embodied hostage, forever restrained by the material constraints of a mundane sense of world? Indeed, just what significance is to be had from a nihilistic sense of place given that all meaning and meaningfulness is either merely created, preserved and/or conserved by us, and, cannot be found as something with any substantial sense of an economically independent back bone? So, if we were tempted to think that that is the case, should we not ask, 'just what can philosophy, and its friendly allies, have for the besieged person, ourselves, inescapably ensconced as ephemeral subjects within the confines of this secular realm?' Still, as people in this world, our real business is to live in this secular world in a manner that is both respectful of others and mindful of its potential for existential richness and enrichment. That granted, just how should we proceed in a manner that does full justice to both the existential dimension and the non-existential dimension that, I contend, must simultaneously coincide within the secularity of this world at large? (1)

In this essay, let me explore what might be meant by a secular economy, and over the course of these explorations assess the dialectical merits of this secular conjecture as to whether the secular world either has a life or does not have a life of its own, and, perhaps is merely the playground, and a plaything, for a babbling plethora of disciplines all out to compete for both our time and money, and ever out to distract our interest and dissect our integrity as a 'secular person'. Ending this set of essays with a provisional set of conclusions, and so on. (2)

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357 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. Explorations of the Secular World

Here, I am contrasting the world of the secular as existing in some form of an unexplained relationship to the world of disciplines, and where, the latter, is a world inclusive of all disciplines both non-religious and religious in scope.[358] Now, let me be the first to admit that this secular conjecture is something that can only be resolved in dialectical-like terms of reference… if at all? That, if you were to seek a definitive resolution, one way or the other, then I suggest that you either do not read this essay or supply a series of counter-arguments in order to realize the viable form of a counter-reading. (3)

At the back of this secular contention 'that there might just actually exist a secular world, existing somewhat in its own right, and not completely subservient to this competing world of disciplines' is the contentious metaphor of a 'wilderness' and the imperative to return to such a state of affairs is be entertained as 'good', as an objective worth returning to, or, at the very least, moving back towards, to some extent or other, whilst equally recognizing the sheer impossibility and impracticability, perhaps, of such a misbegotten quest? A sort of 'secular rewilding' that some eccentric philosopher or misguided metaphysician could well be found to argue for… or against.[359] (4)

However, regardless of how we confront and resolve this issue, or simply regard it as a non-issue, let us explore what appears to be a secular dimension, and, ask, 'to what extent there might exist the semblance of an 'overall secular economy' that for convenience could be referred to as 'The Political-Economy' in which various systems like the World of Business, Agriculture, the Health Industry, Academia, a Political Domain, with the latter as subsumed within the discipline of a political-economics, etc., etc., all have their historically and conventionally mapped out distinctive sense of residence within this secular space of the overall domain of this Political-Economy (as a meta-system or hyper-system, and, as distinct from this discipline of a political-economics which would be more at home in the system of Academia[360]).[361] (5)

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358 As a background to this idea, I am alluding to the observation that all disciplines, as economies, are constituted from the dialectical interactions entailed between their distinctive economic correlatives in the imputed form of their individual disciplinary difference, disciplinary meta-difference, and their disciplinary non-difference. By extension, if we were to argue for a 'secular economy' then we could also be arguing for the secular as having its own distinctive sense of a secular difference, secular meta-difference and a secular non-difference. By such an argument it might well appear that we are steering very close towards a more positive reading of this secular conjecture? But, whether we can actually run that type of an argument has yet to be seen?

359 In various scientific evaluations of this type of project we find a mixed set of results. In some sites, rewilding has contributed to an enrichment, expansion, and a flourishing of species, whereas, in other sites we find the exact opposite in the form of a marked decrease in ecological richness.

360 I am arguing that political-economics, the discipline, would be situated in the system of Academia, and, that Academia would be found in the intersection of the Political-Political in the first section of a 3 x 3 matrix tentatively re(-)presenting the constitution of The Political-Economy. That in this regard we should note I am making a radical distinction between the capitalization of 'The Political-Economy' and the non-capitalization of the discipline of the 'political-economy', situated in the systems of Academia. Note that the hyphenation is important as, e.g., as an exploration of neo-liberal policies and their cultural-intercultural impact necessitates the conjunction of both the worlds of the political and the economic (along with a third realm of the stylistic as argued elsewhere).

In this proposal for an overall secular economy, we must ask just what trimodal polarities or poles or dialectal moments or economic correlatives (as dynamic correlativities) we might wish to envisage as present in the dialectical functions of that economy. Now, if 'The Political-Economy' were to be proposed as a nomination, etc., for this 'overall secular economy', as I have implicitly entertained in previous essays, then this question is already answered for us by my having proposed a 3 x 3 matrix engendered between the correlative moments of the theoretical (and political), the practical (and economic in the business sense), and the critical or stylistic, where, without meaning to confuse this scheme, the practical dimension can be seen to be critically operated when functioning at its best, and where the stylistic realm can be viewed as the potentially radical (and coincident with the existentially oriented irruption of the non-economic) (and where, through a similar process of economic complexion, the theoretical can also be viewed as hermeneutically oriented and hyper-economic, and, the practical moment can also be viewed as phenomenologically oriented and sub-economic in scope). Thence the complex workings of this secular economy of The Political-Economy as just outlined.[362] For convenience, let me simply depict this secular economy of The Political-Economy without locating various disciplines and systems within its ambit (with these segments or sections being numbered from 1-9:

The Tentative Economic Schematization of The Political-Economy in a 3 x 3 Matrix

	Political/Theoretical	Business/Practical	Stylistic/Critical
Stylistic/Critical	7	8	9
Business/Practical	4	5	6
Political/Theoretical	1	2	3 (6)

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361 I am alluding to ideas disseminated both by the social-philosopher Nicholas Luhman and my take on such concepts as explored in earlier essays to this set on conjectures. E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, IX.

362 However, to compound such complexities, albeit in a search for an overriding element of simplicity through resolution, I will soon be also arguing for a more 'vertical' sense of schematization by arguing that the secularity of The Political-Economy is operated upon by the philosophies of disciplines and that relationship is appreciated by the so-called third moment of the (existentially-oriented) meta-philosophical/meta-disciplinary sense of perspective, i.e., as exercised in and through a reconstituted meta-philosophy of the metaphysical. The scheme then matching the 'sub-economy of the economic' with 'the secularity of The Political-Economy', the 'sub-economy of the hyper-economic' with 'the philosophical realm of disciplines' operating upon the former, and, the non-economic sub-economy with the metaphysical sub-economy all within the overall economy of the super-economic (where, through automatic transformational retreatment (of the de-suspension), the metaphysical will resumes its status as a sub-economy within the overall philosophical discipline (as currently located in Academia where, as a convention, it will probably remain for some considerable time?).

Now what are the secular ramifications of this schematization in the form of a 3 x 3 matrix?[363] (7)

Previously, I assigned, e.g., in the first segment or section the system of Academia along with the Political Legislature; then, the World of Business I allotted to the fifth segment; and, in the ninth segment we find the Political Executive, Judges in the Judiciary (but where the 'business' of the solicitors or barristers, or their equivalent, can be found in the fifth segment, being read as a business). Given philosophy is traditionally situated in Academia we might suppose that the scrutiny of metaphysical appreciation would most likely be treated accordingly, i.e., in and through a first segment…[364] (8)

Returning to this secular conjecture, namely, 'that a secular dimension cannot but be 'written'/'read' through a set of non-secular, disciplinary lenses, etc., yet, we must also propose that even if disciplines can refashion each other, as they can, still, the world could not be reshaped if only disciplines themselves were re-fashioned, so, a non-disciplinary, secular basis to the overall world-of-life must also exist and possess some sense and semblance of significance in its own right to that extent it can resist being entirely re-written and re-read otherwise.' Or, basically, the proposal of a 'secular economy' could be viewed as one-part secular, and one-part disciplinary, i.e., e.g., philosophical, and, that a further party could be identified with the relationship between the same, and its appreciation, i.e., as a metaphysical-like appreciation of this relationship could be construed as the non-exclusive 'third party' to this economy (that under other circumstances could be quite suitably reviewed in accordance with the differences constituting the specificity of those other alternative perspectives, but, where, in these explorations, the tripartite configuration as noted above will be adopted and adapted to these ensuing dialectical explorations)'. Diagrammatically this could be presented 'vertically':

'Vertical' Schematization of Overall Secular(-Philosophical-Metaphysical) Economy

Metaphysical Appreciation

Philosophical-Disciplinary Operations

Secular Economy of The Political-Economy (9)

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363 In contrast, the simply economic presents a 1 x 3 matrix, and, an ordered approach presents a 2 x 3 Matrix.

364 For a more detailed schematization of The Political-Economy refer to *Pursuit*, III.IX.12W.20, etc.

Now, to assist in a furthering of an appreciation of these explorations we should also note that a broader sense of the 'secular' is being invoked since it is not just defined here through a contrast that pits religious disciplines (and ideologies) *versus* non-religious disciplines (and ideologies). This is convenient, because, if we were to merely dismiss all religious readings then one must wonder if the concept of the 'secular', under those circumstances, would possess any viable meaning whatsoever? Indeed, in previous work, as outlined in earlier essays, I make no difference nor need to make a difference between non-religious disciplines and religious disciplines since I have argued at length that disciplines, non-religious or otherwise, all possess a co-associated disciplinary economy with one-part disciplinary difference, one-part disciplinary meta-difference, and one-part disciplinary non-difference (without exceptions).[365] [366] (10)

How do we account for these tripartite divisions of disciplines along with this exclusively co-occurring pattern of this reiteration of difference, meta-difference, and non-difference? (11)

These ideas on the general, 'archetypal' nature of disciplinary economies were first developed in my *Theological Investigations*, *Volume* II where I argued, e.g., that theology, as a discipline, in the minds of theologians who saw the totality of the overall life-world (W) from their perspective as the secular world (S) as conventionally understood plus their vision individual and collective visions of the Divine (D) (in all its multivarious interpretations). Therefore, their vision of the world minus the secular presented a differential, namely, a theological difference. Diagrammatically this equation is:

$$W - S = D \quad (12)$$

As noted, simply argued for, I regarded each and every discipline, non-religious or otherwise, as attempts to see the world from a different sense of perspective and thence the *raison d'être* of that disciplinary perspective is that semblance of difference, etc. I.e., assuming a universal sense of the secular, without needing here to define the same, we can note that in addition to this universal sense and semblance of the secular that this discipline will contribute an additional sense and semblance of their broader sense of perspective. Hence, subtracting this universal vision of the secular from the disciplinarian's distinctive view of the world at large, as seen through their disciplinary lens, leaves this difference namely this disciplinary difference or differential. I.e., effectively, in what way that disciplinarian sees their vision of the overall view of the world minus this secular understanding. Then, we ask two more important questions of the disciplinarian, namely, what value does this disciplinary difference or differential possess, i.e., its meta difference (Meta-D), and, through the articulation of a necessary non-difference (Non-D) how does the disciplinarian then overcome the relational difference between their vision of their discipline and the universal sense of that secular view (as imputed to be generally

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365 First argued in my Theological Investigations, Volume II where this same structure was articulated as present in both theology and philosophy.

366 Then, if we were to read the secular economy on par with disciplinary economies then we might want to invoke a secular sense of the secular economy as possessing a one-part secular/non-disciplinary difference (or differential) etc.

had without, under these circumstances, needing to spell out what might be meant by a 'universal secular perspective' (S) as generally entertained by this mythical figure of the 'average person' (or 'general disciplinarian'), etc.). Altogether treated as an economy of the discipline in question, we get the following triangular/circular economic representation:

NON-D

*

D Meta-D (13)

Collectively, we can also run this in reverse by noting that the world at large (W) implies that the secular realm (S), to the extent it can be imputed directly or indirectly, can then be seen, admittedly simplistically, as the world at large minus all disciplines (Ds). Hence:

W – Ds = S (14)

Now, if we run the hypothetical economy of the secular economy (S) as consisting of one-part secular (s), one-part disciplinary (d), and one-part meta-disciplinary, i.e., metaphysical in its reconstituted sense (m), then certain ramifications of this scheme will automatically follow. E.g., that although we can focus on these three economic correlatives, still, this can be done neither dogmatically in an absolutitistical orientation nor dogmatically non-dogmatically in a relativistical orientation. Consequently, although we can conventionally refer to a certain referable sense and semblance of a secular world, we cannot talk about the secular world *per se*, but, at the same time, neither can we talk about a philosophical (or disciplinary) sense of world (d) nor a meta-philosophical/metaphysical (or meta-disciplinary) sense of world (m). On the other hand, as an orientation we can talk about and metaphorically point to, in our semantic mapping of the world at large, some semblance of a secular world (s), etc. hence this qualification of correlativity could be diagrammatically represented by using square brackets, and, where the economic is indicated by '{…}':

{S} = {[s] + [d] + [m]} (15)

Now, the philosophical economy has also been referred to as a mix of three (ordered) forms of input, namely, one-part hermeneutical (herm), one-part phenomenological (phen) and one-part existential (exist) (in its non-systematic sense as the so-called third moment of this economy). Hence:

{Phil}= {(herm) + (phen) + (exist)}(16)

Furthermore, given the three trans-cognitive orders (of the 1st, 3rd, and 5th orders) that constitute this economy we can superimpose this philosophical economy on the six-fold representation of the nature of this ordered economy on a diagrammatical representation of the trans-cognitive economy (and assume a triangle between the 1st, 3rd and 5th orders:[367]

3
Existential

2
Aesthtical

4
Pragmatical

*

Phenomenlogical
5

Hermeneutical
5

Ontical
6 (17)

That, symbolically, philosophy being a discipline, then the representation of this philosophical economy could be substituted for any nominated disciplinary economy in question. I.e., where all disciplines are equally proposed as possessing their own hermeneutics, etc. (18)

In summary, noting the 'secular economy' as equated with the 'hyper-systematic economy of The Political-Economic'. Where 'secular' is also the residue when both the philosophical and the metaphysical are separated from the proposal of an imputed world at large. Where for convenience let me now designate that the secular economy (S) as one-part secular (s),[368] one-part philosophical (i.e., disciplinary) (p) and one-part metaphysical (as meta-philosophical/meta-disciplinary) (m):

I.e., {S} = {[s] + [p] + [m]} [15] (19)

Admittedly, we now have to hand a number of ways of defining these overlapping visions of the secular, etc. But, for convenience, let us just focus primarily on the overall

[367] It would be tempting to envisage an additional economy between the 2nd, 4th, and 6th orders and possibly refer to it as a secular economy? An economy then consisting of 'secular styles, functions and facts'.

[368] Where the secular dimension (s) can also be referred to as 'The Political-Economic', etc.

secular economy as a correlative mix of secular, philosophical, and metaphysical perspectives in the representation of that which is to found 'to hand'.[369] (20)

However, given the previous essay's pronouncement that the metaphysical orientation is primarily an inter-ordered phenomenon then systematizing these various maps gives the following complex schematization of this topic:

Inter-Order Phenomena (m)

{Phil}= {(herm) + (phen) + (exist)}(p)

The Political-Economy (s) (21)

As all correlative aspects of an economy have the same archetypal understanding, namely, as correlativities, it follows that both certain possibilities and certain impossibilities automatically apply to this economy, like all economies archetypally. E.g., if we were to propose that the secular dimension (s) were purely passive, and as that which is merely operated upon, then we should be called out as mistaken since pure passivity, in an absolutistical mode, should not be able to be contemplated, and where relatively passivity, instead, should be proposed. Then, with this amendment proposed, we would then have to ask, 'in what way the relatively passive is not entirely passive?' E.g., how might it be able to also resist such disciplinary impositions? I.e., say, through (metaphorically ascribed modes of) deflection, obstruction, distortion, absorption, or, more positively, say, through self-existentialization, or, more negatively, say, through other-de-existentialization, etc?[370] With this imputed resistance almost guaranteed, to some extent or other, be that in either a major or a minor sense, just where might we go with this type of expectation? Do we have any form of a recall of this type of event, or, discern its manifestation in the immediacy of our reflections on the distinctive occurrences of 'current experiences' in this same regard? (22)

Now, granted the novelty of this approach, and the innovative nature of this perspective, let me proffer my tentative reflections on certain types of events that might offer illustrations of these phenomena such as, e.g., this imputed process of a counter-reactive sense and semblance of 'resistance', etc? Using the possibility of this imputed phenomenon as indicative of the imputed existence of a secular dimension that is not completely beholden to disciplinary tropes, memes, themes, modes of e/valuational formation not tied to the pressures of disciplinary moulds and pressures, etc? (23)

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[369] Where it must be stressed that 'representation' here is one non-isolated economic correlative aspect participating in the ongoing economy of re(-)presentation.

[370] 'Self-existentialization' wherein 'the relational situation in question takes on a more marked existential orientation'. 'Other -de-existentialization' noting how 'inauthenticity could de-existentialize the relational proceedings in question'.

Admittedly, what has commenced as an intuition in this regard I believe could well take the form of an avalanche of named attitudes and observations that just do not directly fall under the hammer of the hegemony of the 'fashioning and forging' of disciplines especially in the light of taking such a metaphor a little further, if possible, to suggest that something must be first in place that can then be 'fashioned and forged', be it an item of fashion that is seen as fashionable or a forgery of that which is to considered fashionable in the first place and, therein and thereby, deemed as desirable to forge be that merely for deception or profit. (24)

My first candidate for indicating a process of resistance, that seemingly appears to take a non-disciplinary stance, if not an anti-disciplinary stance, is that of an ideology that resists its perception of the imputed power of another counter-ideology, viewed as an ideology, rightly or wrongly, without directly engaging its perception of the other ideology in any substantive form of a disciplinarily oriented style of interaction.[371] So, e.g., certain Biblical scholars, in a specific orthodox and traditionalist mould, might outrightly reject a non-orthodox reading of Biblical texts as just not worthy of their purview without a scintilla of even a few moments of reading a mere fraction of the scholarly work presented by their perceived opposition and opponents. Here, that resistance does not seem to be fostered through the disciplines of their own discipline in question, but, rather through forms of motivated response that might be better viewed as 'affective', and under that type of a heading, might be delineated as stemming from, for whatever reason or reasons, say, fear, ignorance, tribal-like identifications, a desire to de-legitimize the opposition before they are thought or 'felt' to want to de-legitimize you, yourself, first, and so on. Sadly, this style of resistance seems to be all too well-spread and characterizing must of the right-wing reception of what they perceive, rightly or wrongly to be left wing propaganda, or similar, and v.v. Here, we might include contemporary controversies over gender, race, sexual diversity, inclusivity, migrants, which books should or should not be read in either school libraries and public libraries,[372] etc. (25)

Another possible candidate took the form of an imputed 'resilience' or 'resourcefulness', when and where disciplined phenomena can demonstrate the same qualities

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371 Judith Butler refers to this as an 'epistemic divide' when and where one side in an ostensive 'debate' refuses to conform to any of the rules that would normally characterize the usual functioning of a rational and dialogical encounter. In effect, such proponents present with the position of an 'anti-intellectualism'… where 'It is nearly impossible to bridge this epistemic divide with good arguments…' Judith Butler; *Who's Afraid of Gender*? Allen Lane, 2024; p.21. Given this epistemic chasm in which people oppose merely the ideas they have of you, rightly or wrongly, as an ideological foe, if not more as a 'phantasm' or a symbolic opponent. Obviously, the expression of such *a priori*-like attitudes should be philosophically condemned as 'negative. Still, such condemnation does not address the lived-realities that motivate such unorthodox behaviours in the first place that clearly demonstrate forms of a 'secular' resistance to the disciplinary world. Addressing such affective motivations might well be a better place to first address and redress such disruptive forms of negative resistance?

372 Which books are 'in' or 'out' seems to be a pointless controversy in this age of an ever more expansive electronic interconnectivity, Social-Media, YouTube videos, and the like. But, perhaps, that is not the point of such controversies as they seem to seek symbolic targets and, therein, emit more metaphorical 'heat' than 'light'? If the real objective was a thorough censorship, then such a campaign would need to be considerably more broad, and, thereby and thereafter, far more likely to thoroughly fail to the chagrin of the ideologist promoting such censorship.

without actually doing so in their disciplined terms of reference. When, e.g., we find ourselves engaging a certain *je ne sais quoi* that is experienced in the midst of a disciplined process of interpretation that, itself, seems to defy interpretation *per se*. Or, similarly, when we admire a refusal, by self or another, to be defeated in disciplinary terms and from the position of a *je ne sais pas* (I do not know) set out to explain why we do not currently know what we think should be known and might well be discerned through further study and from our earnest reflections upon the same (especially if others are either criticizing us and/or inspiring us to eventually reach such conclusions that to others may well appear to be self-evident but currently escape us). (26)

Optimistically, I formulated a list of such expressions like resistance, e.g. At first, I listed them from a positive perspective arranged in a hierarchy of increasing affective intensity, and, then decided to supply a similar list in a negative perspective with a decreasing affective intensity. When that was completed, it then seemed more reasonable to connect them together in a circular format. Last, it struck me that these items, collectively, would more than likely be better seen as being viewed in a mix of either positive and/or negative perspectives along with the sense and semblance of the neutral should these imputed phenomena be viewed, instead, through the auspices of a working suspension. Treating 're(-)normalization' as 'enacting a process through an ongoing emendation through trial and error where we seek a progressive alignment through re(-)alignment between texts in terms of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance' as discussed elsewhere.[373] (27)

To a great extent the listing about to be made of such forms of resistance, each in their own way, presents various forms of resistance, be it from a non-public, mentally registered 'reticence' to a very socially organized expressions of 'revolution' (whose successful instantiations are most probably the result of 'chain-like processes of chaotic self-replication arising through re-self-organization'?). (28)

Where 'resistance' (in its multi-variate forms) could be defined as 'the either advertent and/or inadvertent response or set of responses arising from an intuitive observation of a psychic rift between the epistemological aspects of the Trans-Cognitive (as Judgment), the Cognitive (as the Intentional), and Affective (as Motivating Emotions) to the experience of past discontinuities, current non-continuities, and expectations for the need of future recontinuities'.[374] (29)

Thence the following *ad hoc* list with the focus on an eventual process of ongoing re(-)normalization in intentional terms when and where relevant texts are found to be increasingly better aligned among themselves (and, thereby, better able to deliver a more conformal process of a positively reiterated orientation in truth determination. Starting from an unintentionally unrecognized moment of resolution in which intentions, therein and thereafter, are the basis for further clarification (be that along indirect, non-

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373 *Pursuit*, III.XIO.x63, 75, 77, etc.

374 I would also argue that resistance could also be viewed as a radical phenomenon. That in the same light a 'radical theology' is 'a theology that resists the positioning or standing of a non-radical theology'.

disciplinary lines of operation such as expressions of disgruntlement, solidarity, etc?):[375] [376]

re(-)normalization

re(-)evolvement reticence

resoluteness remediation[377]

rightfulness[378] rebellion

resourcefulness revolution

robustness rectification

resilience reparation

resistance re(-)adaptation

resolution (30)

Admittedly, I originally read 'revolution' through a negative lens (given that revolutions usually trade one nomenklatura with another nomenklatura along with a mass of suffering both between and afterwards, and usually with a lengthy period of rectification needed to undo the damage done as a consequence of misdirected instances of revolutionary zeal, etc.). However, there may well be occasions when the requisite incremental evolution of reforms is not instituted and the advent of a revolution might well then be called for. At the same time, radical responses, apposite or otherwise, can also take the form of dramatically discontinuous processes of adaptation, etc.[379] Where, either the ad-

[375] Where this cyclic spectrum is to be viewed as relatively discontinuous, So, e.g., in moving from a state of unintentional resolution to, say, resistance, we find ourselves distinctively crossing some form of a discontinuity rather the gradual shifts that would be experience in a more continuous spectrum. As a metaphor we might invoke 'the discrete musical notes to be heard on a keyboard instrument'.

[376] In the following scheme the three stages of rectification, remediation (deconstruction-reconstruction), and re(-)normalization map the three stages of pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment in a process of transformational retreatment.

[377] Here being used as a technical word for a 'process of deconstruction-reconstruction as utilized in the transformational process-stage of treatment'.

[378] A term in which 'the truthfulness of a viable conjecture is intuitively appreciated and where, furthermore, the rights claimed by another individual or group of individuals should be mutually recognized and honoured'.

[379] Or the distinctive historical differences that characterize temporal orientations between future reiterated continuities; a past with iterated discontinuities; and, a designated present contrasted with the radical advent of chaotically re-iterated non-continuities hitherto not witnessed before that point in time. Refer to *Pursuit*, III.7X.61, and 7Z

vent of and/or response to these continuities, discontinuities, and non-continuities may well arise without direct recourse to their instigation through disciplinary means.[380] (31)

If anything, this *ad hoc* cyclic spectrum is only to be seen as a tentative, provisional place where we might like to begin, and not necessarily end, these putative explorations of the secular dimension assuming of course that this secular conjecture even has a modicum of validity, a residue that cannot be written off as merely some form of a disciplinary artefact or by-product, and so forth. (32)

Briefly, let me define (and illustrate) these expressions of resistance that express disagreements and differences in positioning, mood, connotative aspects relating to certain forms of identification; and where such expressions are affectively driven in such a form that either subverts, redirects, and/or cancels forms of disciplinary behaviour, conventions, outcomes, etc. (33)

'Re(-)normalization; is a technical term dealing with 'the overall existential process of alignment through re-alignment primarily derived from re-direction albeit channelled through reiterative processes of approximation that seek greater and more effective degrees of a coincidence with the implied trajectories of our relationships' that, hopefully, would appear to promote an increase in an existential re-e/valuation within the confines of the primary relationship in question, albeit as it finds itself tempered in such a manner that either promotes and/or does not demote such interconnectedness in trans-relational terms of reference.[381] (34)

'Re(-)evolvement' as 'the adoption and adaptation of emergent possibilities associated with the topic or themes in question'. (35)

'Reticence' is 'the reluctance to publically express opposition to either a certain social position and/or be seen to oppose the same'. (36)

'Resoluteness' is 'an attitudinal approach that stresses perseverance'. (37)

'Remediation' is here being used as 'a technical word for a 'double process of both deconstruction and reconstruction as utilized in the transformational process-stage of treatment'. (38)

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380 When, e.g., we suddenly realize that our assumptions or conclusions are wrong or incoherent, or, the solution to a problem arises without direct course to a process of deliberative calculations, etc. (with the suggestion that processes of judgment themselves cannot be reduced merely to disciplinary manoeuvres.

381 'Trans-relational' is intentionally ambiguous as is meant to mean both the trans-relational assurance felt by the individual subject cognizant of an existential dimension and who acts accordingly in an advancement of its enrichment, etc., and, the ensuing enrichment that is either pursued beyond the primary relationship in question or in a manner that does not generally demote such inter-relational enrichment beyond the primary relationship. With respect to the latter, in conventional terms, the classic example is of a married partner having an adulterous affair wishing to insulate the potential fallout should the other partner adversely respond to the existence of this primary relationship between the adulterous partner and their non-married partner as viewed from the perspective of the adulterous party (or parties).

‘Rightfulness’ is a term in which ‘the truthfulness of a viable conjecture is intuitively appreciated and where, furthermore, the rights claimed by another individual or group of individuals should be mutually recognized and honoured’. E.g., even a child can appreciate a disconcerting difference between equitable and inequitable forms of treatment. In the expression or assertion of this observation we would be witnessing a form of right-seeking-ness (where the word ‘right’ has the double meaning of both ‘rights’ and ‘truth’). (39)

‘Rebellion’ is ‘the eventual progression towards either a process of revolution or a process of evolution without the guarantee that either objective will be successfully realized’. (40)

‘Resourcefulness’ is the demonstration of the resoluteness of the individual or group in question’. (41)

‘Revolution’ is ‘a radical form of political rebellion that inevitably replace one nomenklatura with another’. (42)

‘Robustness’ is the intensity and overall integrity of a process of resistance’. (43)

‘Rectification’ is ‘the hermeneutical process in which relevant meta-textual genres of behaviour are recalibrated in line with the intentional objectives exposed through questioning’. (44)

‘Resilience’ is ‘that persistence in intentional motivation that seeks to observe a certain set of intentional objectives’. (45)

‘Reparation’ is ‘the desire to make amends for the perception of past wrongs whether committed by oneself or by another, be that ‘other’ an individual or a set of individuals in a certain group’. (46)

‘Resistance’ is demonstrated as a process of either obstruction and/or distortion of process’. (47)

‘Re(-)adaptation’ is ‘the reiteration of a process of adaptation that is either appropriate or inappropriate in either its commission or omission’. (48)

‘Resolution’ is ‘the demonstration to proceed in such a manner that is thought to deliver the objectives seemingly sought’. (49)

Now, it must be stressed that these relatively affective orientations towards positions, expressed either personally and/or socially, and acting as forms of resistance in general, can take either positive or negative denotations and connotations, whilst their neutral expression and reception should ideally be viewed through the suitable uptake of relevant working suspensions. (50)

Such resistive emotions should give us the beginnings of a provisional vocabulary with which to more insightfully explore this type of secular phenomenon. E.g., to recapitulate, it seems quite tenable to view extreme political phenomena as wishing to oppose certain types of positional behaviour without their disciplinary (and philosophical) engagement as an example of an anti-intellectualism. One direction this takes is in opposing scientific findings, etc. Not a new phenomenon, witness the Forteans who opposed scientific certainties, advanced various forms of skepticism.[382] Similarly, the more recent divergence between Democrats and Republicans in the US.[383] (51)

It is my contention, as a provisional conjecture, that with this heuristic device of the Secular Economy in General we can better view how secular society or certain secular societies react to various political policy proposals, or more correctly, how they appear to react to perceived changes and alterations in the same. Hence these reinterpreted observations of certain types of social phenomena such as, e.g., the rise or re-occurrence of an anti-intellectualism; various conspiracies that have a degree of traction not merited on the mere basis of their content or import; viral Internet memes; changing fashions; protests against recent policies in the use of masks, etc; the possible reluctance to vote in elections versus the more recent uptick in people perhaps contemplating a necessity to vote; and so on. No doubt a number of other phenomena might be included under this novel perspective of an attempt to better understand how the secular world (in general, etc.) appears to resist the potentially conflicting demands of various ideological, philosophical, and disciplinary styles of social intervention through the exercising of certain forms of resistance taking on an affective form of motivation and intensified through doing so... (52)

Seizing upon this latter observation that such secular resistance is affectively motivated let me now run the following set of provisional conjectures, namely, that the secular aspect of the secular economy in general is primarily affective in orientation. In contrast, we can construct an alignment between a cognitive/intentional orientation with the philosophical-disciplinary aspect, and, construct an alignment between the trans-cognitive/trans-intentional orientation with the imputed aspect of the metaphysical (as conceived of as the appreciation of truth determinations enacted in both meta-philosophical and meta-disciplinary terms of reference). Refer to the next diagram. (53)

In order to explain this diagram we need to note that these three correlative aspects in the secular economy in general are being aligned in archetypal terms with economics in general, but, in particular, with economies of transformational retreatment (under the headings of Pretreatment, Treatment, and Retreatment/Posttreatment of the other two economic correlativities); the epistemological hierarchy (under the headings of the

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382 The Fortean Society was a New York based society started in the US in 1931 and ended in 1959. Revived in 1961 as the International Fortean Organization. Basically, an organization dedicated to the work of Charles Fort and his style of scepticism.

383 According to Gallup (and its polling) they noted Republican confidence in science nearly 30 points lower than in 1975; that Democrats were more confident in science than in 1975; trust in science among all Americans is slightly lower at 64% compared to 70% when Gallup last measured it nearly four decades ago. Witness the differences between Democrat and Republican responses to the global COVID-19 epidemic, etc.

Affective Aspect, Cognitive Aspect, and the judgmental concerns of the Trans-Cognitive Aspect); with the relatively internal modes of emendation under the heading, respectively, of Rectification, Remediation, and Re(-)Normalization). In between these economic correlative aspects, we find rising and falling forms of emendation above and below the '******' (54)

Diagrammatical Representation of the Secular Economy (In General)[384]

Secular Economy in General = Secular/Philosophical-Disciplinary/Metaphysical Econ.
Metaphysical Appreciation = Meta-Philosophical/Meta-Disciplinary Appreciation

METAPHYSICAL (META-DISCIPLINARY) SPHERE
(Relatively Existential/Trans-Cognitive)
Retreatment/Posttreatment/Re(-)Normalization

Re-Conjectural
****
Re-Configurational

Remonstrational
****
Revocational

PHILOSOPHICAL (DISCIPLINARY) SPHERE
(Relatively Phenomenological/Cognitive)
Treatment/Remediation

Re-Calibrational
****
Re-Emendational

SECULAR SPHERE
(Relatively Hermeneutical/Affective)
Pretreatment/Rectification

[384] The 'secular economy in general' includes both metaphysical and philosophical inputs, etc. Whereas, in contrast, in apposition to the philosophical and metaphysical economies, I am tentatively running the conjecture that a 'specific secular economy' can be seen to 'coincide with the 2nd, 4th, and 6th trans-cognitively ordered orders' (whereas the 'philosophical economy' coincides 'with 1st, 3rd, & 5th trans-cognitively ordered orders', and, the metaphysical economy can be seen to be the conjunction of the former and their integrated elevation by one relative meta-degree to the status of the inter-ordered).

Note: Each economic correlative has its own mode of functioning, e.g., rectification, etc. Then, above the '******' we have the rising modes of functioning inter-correlatives, and, below '******' we have the falling modes of functioning. Defining the 'Secular Economy in Particular' as the 'Secular-Philosophical-Metaphysical Economy' only. (55)

Although not meaning to complicate things, let me define the three following secular economies along specific, particular(ity in phenomenological type), and general levels of identification. Because I can individuate the philosophical economy in ordered terms as one-part phenomenology (as distinctively centered in the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic and its focus on atomicity of phenomenological type), as one-part existential (in its non-systematic aspect) in the third order of the deontological (and expressions of personal volition and political power); and one-part hermeneutical in the fifth order hermeneutical possibility, I set out to supply individual economies to both the secular and the metaphysical as well. To this end, by supplying a specific secular economy and a specific metaphysical economy I formulate the provisional outlines of the secular economy in general. (56)

Whereas, defining the specific secular economy, as completing the uptake of the philosophical economy as just noted. By tentatively invoking a set of three ordered categories not taken up by the philosophical economy in its specificity. Hence invoking the 'specific secular economy' as 'one-part aesthetical e/valuation (in the second trans-cognitive order), one-part pragmatical e/valuation (in the fourth trans-cognitive order), and one-part ontical evaluation (as actually established facts) (in the sixth trans-cognitive order). (57)

Noting a secular economy in particular when referencing only a philosophical orientation (and, therein and thereby, as exercising a relatively non-disciplinary approach even though the philosophical remains acting as a proxy for the disciplinary orientation in general). Hence the following diagram of the Secular Economy in Particular:

METAPHYSICAL ECONOMY
(Inter-Ordered Economy[385])

PHILOSOPHICAL ECONOMY
(1st, 3rd, 5th Ordered Economy[386])

SECULAR ECONOMY
(2nd, 4th, 6th Ordered Economy[387]) (58)

385 I.e., in inter-ordered notation as 1^2, 2^2, 3^2, 4^2, 5^2, 6^2.

386 I.e., in ordered notation as 1^1, 3^1, 5^1.

To recapitulate, the ‘secular economy in general’ is a composite of ‘secular-philosophical/disciplinary-metaphysical/meta-disciplinary/meta-philosophical’. (59)

Where the ‘secular economy in particular’ (is philosophically oriented) is a composite of ‘secular-philosophical-metaphysical (orientations viewed as economic correlatives)’. (60)

Where the ‘specific secular economy’ is a composite of three fully worked out sub-economies, namely, the secular economy (2^1, 4^1, 6^1), the philosophical philosophy (1^1, 3^1, 5^1), and the metaphysical economy (1^2, 2^2, 3^2, 4^2, 5^2, 6^2). (61)

In these diagrammatical representations of the secular economy I note six dynamic forms of transformational-transitioning between their three more static-like processes of critical thinking, namely, of hermeneutical rectification, phenomenological remediation, and existential re(-)normalization. Misrepresented through simplification we could essentially articulate these three styles of thinking as, first, representing our arguments through the lens of our meta-textual genres that, second, then set the stage for the presentation of a process of treatment conducted through the remediation of both deconstruction and reconstruction, effectively, simulated to some extent under the auspices of an overall working suspension/s wherein, third, the de-suspension can then ‘explode’ the same and, therein and thereby, leave us with the residue of our research either advertently or inadvertently stamped with its conformal truth determination/s should we be able to better approximate both the non-existential and existential e/valuational formations to that extent we do so in a relative mix of either good faith and/or bad faith (but never in any purified sense given that that the existentialization is the ongoing existentialization of the relatively non-existential, etc., and, that such an ideal objective is unobtainable even if worthwhile to work towards in relatively circumscribed terms of reference). (62)

But, in order to suggest the simulated illusion of ‘movement’ between these mutually co-defining triple correlatives two sets of transitional-transformations are hypothetically proposed, namely, re-emendational, re-conjectural, and remonstrational, and, revocational, re-de-conjectural, and re-calibrational. ‘Re-emendational’ merely notes that alterations of our genres will re-set the stage for treatment in a different manner. In reverse, we not that re-calibrational is where treatment re(-)writes the relevant genres of our current shorter-term project or longer-term program. From treatment, through remediation, i.e., through deconstruction and reconstruction, new conjectures are proposed for truth assessment from a metaphysical point of view. Hence ‘re-conjectural transformational-transitions’. (63)

In reverse, retreatment can retreat both the parameters of treatment and the representation of that which was initially to hand on pretreatment. I.e., re-de-conjectural demands for our conjectures to be refashioned, albeit in relatively superficial terms of reference, and, remonstrational demands that insist we enact a relatively amplified form of existential intervention in the secularity of this overall world-as-lived. In and through

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387 I.e., in ordered notation as 2^1, 4^1, 6^1.

some form of resistance, primarily through some form of bad faith, or a lack of good faith, such remonstration would then be resisted through some form of revocational re-fashioning…[388] (64)

But, dialectically, we must concede such 'movement' is more an illusion, although, through our very focusing on such details does give some added weight to our ability to manifest a distinctive orientation towards the same that then does give us the appearance of intellectually doing something along the lines as suggested through such forms of focusing and de-focusing… (65)

As depicted, this heuristic of the tripartite economy of the secular economy in general (and equally the philosophical or disciplinary or metaphysical economy or economies in general) three ways to go clockwise (from the secular to the philosophical to the metaphysical, etc.) and anti-clockwise (for the metaphysical to the philosophical to the secular). But, for this 'movement' to head either way we have to understand how this heuristic modelling is more an illusion than a living-reality. Living-reality is always interpreted, or, more correctly re(-)interpreted, and, so living-experience is refracted through such interpretations as lived-experience. However, taking a dialectical tack and running various theses and counter-theses at the same time, in effect, running working suspensions, we can re-qualify such modelling by noting a number of such qualifications. For a start, linear thinking needs to be both reversed, and treated as circular, and then travelled in both directions, and, then rendered as spontaneously immediate… and where all positions are to be treated as if co-temporal and co-associated… as if all positions were mirrored in an infinite number of mirrors… so, if we could visit, albeit as if by proxy, this more holistic sense of perspective where we might then like to make a number observations, albeit again refracted through the finiteness of our language/s but more in metaphorical-like terms of reference. (66)

Now, the 'observations' I would like to take away from this heuristic paradigm are infinitely numerous, but, as a matter of expediency, instead, let me concentrate on some key points that could well be deemed to be insightful and apposite for this type of research. For a start, our very ability to engage such transformational thinking is dependent upon the relatively-radical immanence of conformal appreciation of the truth determinations embedded in such cogitation. Or, in other words, for the transformational processes to be (non-existentially) recognized hermeneutically, encountered phenomenologically, and (existentially) engaged the very persistence of the same relative transformational isomorphic invariance is necessary and whose immanent persistence then acts as the very guarantor that such a process as both a transformational process and as a true process of transformation[389] where this articulated meta-persistence is true iff such persis-

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[388] My articulation of such movement is both heuristic and *ad hoc*. But, then I ask, given these economic parameters, can you do better? Where this possibility of either pragmatic and/or pragmatical improvements can never be written out of our equations and completely discounted. In effect, proffering a place for the commencement of this form of research, and, most certainly, not its end.

[389] Adding the qualification that a fullness of truth determination cannot be reduced purely to this necessary dependence upon the persistence of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance but in addition we must also add, from the relative-radical secular dimension and the relatively-radical transcend-

tence is evident.[390] Thereupon, upon such an immanent basis, all true processes of transformation are equally transformational processes of truth determination. Indeed, there could be no truth determination without the preservation of such a transformational invariance, and v.v. Hence the radically immanent re(-)presentation of truth determination through processes of transformation and not otherwise. Of course, the problem then becomes how do we subvert or obstruct or misinterpret such truth determinations when without the same there could be no processes of transformation. Here we have to obscure such relative conformal precision, given our finiteness and imperfections of cogitation, memory, the limitations of position and time, conventional expectations, bad habits, and so on and so forth (as, without doubt, an excellent topic that deserves to be explore in its own right). (67)

So, rectification, etc., and re-emendational considerations, etc., and re-calibrational considerations, etc., could not function without such relatively-radical immanence of this relative transformational isomorphic invariance threading such processes that, altogether, collectively involve affective, cognitive, and trans-cognitive judgmental processes. (68)

By ‘radical’ is meant ‘relatively-radical’ and ‘not radically-radical’ since the radically-radical cannot be comprehended, given that it could not be recognized, encountered, and engaged (i.e., as the non-economic that is re-appropriated hyper-economically in the overall economy of the super-economic). Hence this relatively-radical immanence cannot be absolutistically immanent. Thence this relativity of the immanent. (69)

In effect, (mis-)taking a leaf from the non-philosophy, or rather, the non-standard philosophy of François Laruelle…[391] (70)

But, in a relatively-radical qualification of such a non-standard philosophy let me contrast the relatively-radical immanence of the metaphysical re(-)presentation of an ongoing conformal truth determination (and both its roles of insurance and assurance[392]) with the relatively-radical transcendence of remediational processes in which all manner

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ent domains of treatment, the envisaged ramifications of such interventions be they either predominantly non-existential or existential in both tenor and complexion.

390 Citing Tarski where i’ is t iff i. Where ‘i’ = relative transformational isomorphic invariance upon which the simulation of all relatively superficial details and characterizations are, therein and thereby, imposed.

391 I.e., that we have to confront and accept an immanent dimension of the metaphysical, in its ability to appreciation the truth in conformal terms of reference, and in radical terms of reference, albeit as qualified by myself as ‘relatively-radical’ and ‘not radically-radical’. Then, to even the books so to speak, we also need to accept the relatively-radical nature of the transcendent domain of disciplinary treatment as perceived, as an arena of interventions in the equally relatively-radical nature of the secular domain, etc. That in the suspension of the both the relatively-radical spheres of the metaphysical and the philosophical, etc., the relatively-radical nature of the secular domain should reveal itself to us – from the overall phenomenon of resistance to the social cohesion arising from working forms of social consensus, and all else in between. This ‘in between’ inviting speculation, observation… and, no doubt, much further research.

392 The twin concepts that together insist that we cannot be absolutely mistaken, can return to a point of greater relative certainty (insurance) and then to re-proceed on our way once again (assurance) that, hopefully, is successful…

of perceptions take on this equal illusion of the relatively-radical transcendence of an intentional objectivity albeit in keeping with the transformational generation of such presentations (in an overall economy of re(-)presentation[393])… (71)

Where the equal entertainment of the relatively-radical immanence of a conformal process of truth determination of a metaphysical orientation is balanced, but can always be better balanced, by the relatively-radical transcendence of intentional objectivity as pertains to a philosophical or disciplinary orientation contribute to the making of a working suspension whose conjoined overlapping I would argue promotes the emergence of a secular sense of worldliness along with the full affectivity of such an orientation in proportion to the emotional intensive of such affective investment and re-investment co-opted to enforce our role as an enabled causal agent to experience this existential richness and potential re-enrichment of this world-as-lived, this overall world-of-life… (72)

Let me through the following 'mediation' give metaphorical 'flesh' to this secular economy in general where we both see and oversee this overlapping between the metaphysical sphere of a relatively-radical immanence of conformal truth determination/s in conjunction with the relatively-radical transcendence of intentional objectivity where our ability, therein and thereafter, to act as causal agents is further reinforced through the affective intensity of our motivation of the course of such interactions, and so on… (73)

I hold a glass of water in my hand. I 'see' this glass in front of me knowing that it is constructed for-me, by myself, since my eyes are not windows, cannot be mere windows. In 'holding; this glass, I truly become 'the holder of this glass', and my intentional subjectivity takes that on board. Similarly, I truly 'see' this glass and likewise I become 'the see-er of this very same glass' that I am also holding in my hand. This relatively-radical immanence of truth determination truly expresses what is occurring. Of course, we can be mistaken, but, paradoxically, I am truly being mistaken, albeit in some small set of superficial details with the implication that I can only be truly mistaken in part, and only in part. That, further explorations might reveal my relative mistakenness, but, of course, could never present my total mistakenness in some relativistically constructed 'nightmare'. But, then, on the other hand, I cannot be absolutistically dogmatic about my ongoing interpretations of my experiences since through my finiteness I can only approach the lived-reality of such experiences through the limitations of a limited number of perspectives and where no perspective can be absolutistically exhausted. Where, again, being truly mistaken can only be in relatively superficial details since the very transformation of my thinking cannot absolutistically depart from what must transformationally remain as isomorphically invariant in it threading of such experience and our ongoing re(-)interpretation/s of the same… where no perspective can be exhausted and where an infinitude of potentially relevant perspectives cannot be taken on board… but, for all that, need not limit us entirely since we need, more often than not, just that which can be found to hand.[394] (74)

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[393] Where this economy comprises hermeneutical representation, phenomenological presentation, and (non-systematic) existential re-presentation, and, our total inability to reduce this economy to either mere representation, etc.

[394] Where our very questioning must also be working with what is found to hand, and so on.

So, this glass of water is 'handled' and 'seen' through the simulation of a relatively-radical semblance of transcendence which intentionally has me equally experiencing as a co-relatively-radical transcendent sense of intentional subjectivity within the specificity of this secular world. At the same time, my seeing and handling this glass of water pronounces itself with the assurance of an immanence of conformal truth determination where I cannot currently think otherwise could not be true, but, where through emendation relatively superficial aspects of that process of overall truth determination become rectified, remediated, and re(-)normalized through a critical re(-)iteration of process. Indeed, in such a situation, no matter its apparent epistemological-ontological status, through ongoing re-normalization we stand to better realize the phenomenal-phenomenological constitution of that which we are directly interacting with and through such greater clarification find ourselves in both a better position to entertain what is being experienced and to then re-determine its more exact constitution in experience. By such means determining the experiential differences between 'wax apples', 'apples seen on computer screens', 'remembered apples', 'dream apples', 'imagined apples' and those 'apples found in full conformity with our modal expectations' in which we know are the only intentional objects to hand that can actually be bitten into and satisfactorily eaten, again in line with our full modal expectations. Just as I can drink from this glass of water in my hand and, thereby, savour this water being drunk whereas my thirst is not quenched by visiting either 'remembered water' or 'imagined water'… (75)

So, this observation of this co-association of 'the immanence of the conformal truth determinations' with its co-occurring 'transcendence of its connected intentional objectivity' can be nominated a 'primary observation' to make in this regard. But, that granted, let me deal with a couple of objections that one would expect, quite rightly, to be immediately raised. If in an act of remembering my past drinking from a glass of water or in the expectation of what would occur in an imagined act of drinking from a glass of water were to be immediately branded as immanently true in the very intentional act of my now recalling or imagining the same in my present intentional consciousness then what could possibly demarcate the truth status of these experiences *per se* from my non-virtual acts of drinking from a glass of water *per se*? (76)

In reply I would simply argue that in 'clearly and distinctly' reflecting[395] upon the intentional constitution of these three different types of experiences such differences would and should become evident if not self-evident. E.g., if I wished to quench my thirst then no memories or expectations will do this for me, certainly not if considered over an adequate period of time. Admittedly, our imaginations can be very realistic-like, but, still, no continual iterations of a memory or an imagining will eventually satisfy my thirst, or hunger, the objective realizations of my intentions, and so on. Just as merely 'thinking about catching a fish is not going to catch a fish…' In a more detailed countering of this first objection, we can note that the modal spectrum of the intentional constitution[396] of

[395] With a deliberate allusion to Descartes *et al*, albeit channelling phenomenological ideas on what constitutes the 'essentially distinctive' in particular or typological terms of reference

[396] As explored under the mnemonic of 'density, intensity, and propensity; and salience, consilience and propinquity (or standing [or instantiation])'.

the distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological constituents being experienced *per se* in comparison with our modal expectations, along with the distinctive nature of our responses, when we encounter the non-virtual exemplification of the type of phenomenon, as had in lived-experience, are quite different and will be quite different. As noted, memories and imaginings will not quench my physiological demands of my thirst, and so on… (77)

Now, a second objection is one that would rightly demand a lot more time to suitably resolve, namely, why is there, e.g., so much mendacity and duplicity in this world at large, especially on the political scene, and, surely all of us should be able to see through such deceitfulness when it is obvious many people do not, at least, over the short-term? So, if this automatic immanence of conformal truth determinations applies to our experience of all phenomena, please explain this difference, namely, between this expectation of meeting the instantiation of this idealistic observation and its obvious discordance with its realistic counterpart? Such a topic deserves to be closely explored with the degree of detail it so rightly deserves, but, at this juncture, let me point out that for a variety of reasons such immanence is clearly misinterpreted. Let me non-exhaustively list some of those reasons – *a priori* thinking not in an alignment with the task to hand; misapplication of inappropriate genres of behaviour in need of rectification along with a deficient inventory of well-informed and well-established facts; poorly assembled materials for processes of transformational treatment that stand in need of serious remediation through reconsiderations of proper approaches for deconstruction and reconstruction along with the correctness of conjectural formulations reflecting the necessary detailization of such research; a clear lack of an attention to pathways for both non-existential and existential e/valuational formation; and, overall, an inability to modify in our narratives those elements of our conjectures that are neither evidently nor self-evidently aligned with our experiences as found to hand, etc. Or, put another way we could appeal to bad habits, fraudulent histories, inappropriate conventions, wishful thinking, peer group pressures, and all manner of inauthentic modes of behaviour whether either advertently and/or inadvertently invoked, and so on and so forth… (78)

Now, I have admitted that a full resolution of this second objection does need to be undertaken in greater depth. Later in this essay, in dealing with misinformation, disinformation and mal-information, along with conspiracies, delusional thinking, and all manner of illusory speculations, etc., I will at least begin such a process. However, for the moment let me attend to this previous suggestion that a number of observations can be made re this demonstrable exhibition of a relatively-radical immanence of metaphysically oriented truth determinations along with relatively-radical transcendence of intentional objectivity in our experience of phenomenal-phenomenologically[397] oriented patterns of intentional experience (along with the inescapably co-associated forms of intentional subjectivity that can be characterized as secular, especially in an affective orientation; transcendently phenomenal in a philosophical and disciplinary manifested set of orientations; metaphysically immanent in and through the exhibition of a

[397] This formulation of the 'phenomenal-phenomenological' notes that intentional constitution is not just self-constituted in intentional experience alone, but, is also aligned with the radically transcendent nature of experience as subjected to remediation, etc.

conformal expression of truth status, not to forget a pro-relational trans-relational sense and semblance of subjectivity co-associated with existentially oriented forms of experience, etc.). With this complex sense and semblance of positioning let me now articulate a set of observations[398] that can be made in this context of non-standard positioning (that is observant of economic, non-economic and hyper-economic contributions). Let me do this under the following six headings, as six observations that should be made in the light of such non-standard positioning. (79)

As a first observation we can note this co-associated necessary immanence of a conformal truth determination from a metaphysical sense of perspective (that can also be characterized as both meta-philosophical and meta-disciplinary in orientation). Such a position arises because without the persistence of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance there could be no re(-)presentation of the requisite, co-associated conformal truth determination, and v.v., as found to hand in and through alignment between the generality, particularity, and specificity of the phenomenal-phenomenological readings of the situation in question, etc.[399] (80)

A second observation notes the relatively-radical transcendence of phenomenal-phenomenological experience as presented in and through either philosophical and/or disciplinary forms of treatment. Without this equally necessary transcendence there could be no fully operative working suspensions if this form of correlativity could not be placed in apposition to the equally necessary immanence of metaphysically oriented conformal truth determination/s. (81)

Thirdly, we can observe that the suspension of the relatively-radical immanence of conformal truth determination and the relatively-radical transcendence of phenomenal-phenomenological experience is necessary and productive of the correlative expression of secular experience whose complexion and tenor must also be equally 'radical' in relative terms of reference. (82)

Fourth, that secular experience is to be affectively experienced in a sense of the presently-future as either relatively to-be-disconcerting, neutrally neither to-be-disconcerting nor to-be-non-disconcerting, and/or to-be-non-disconcerting with our current interpretations of lived-experience. Where an experience of the disquiet of the semblance of the disconcerting provokes the invocation of modes of resolution that either non-existentially and/or existentially address and redress the experienced disquiet of such affectively oriented apparent forms of dis-conformation.[400] (83)

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398 Almost as if 'axioms' in the manner as utilized by François Laurelle, say, as exercised in his book *The Biography of the Common Man*.

399 Here I must also add that we cannot reduce truth determinations solely to its necessary dependence upon this relative transformational isomorphic invariance since we must also compliment the same with a consequential analysis, and similar (given that lived-reality does not conform to *a priori* thinking etc., and ever has the potential to reveal its own re-readings, and so on).

400 Later I will add to this future affective sense and semblance of the to-be-disconcerting, etc., the cognitive awareness of a somewhat past co-associated of a being disconcerted along with a metaphysical and existential sense and semblance of a present concurring or non-concurring. A sense of the presently-experienced future is such that its future expectations are being currently anticipated in the present as a

As a fifth observation we should note that an overall working suspension demands the dynamic suspension of all relevant metaphysical, philosophical and secular contributions (as both inputs and outputs), etc., in the ongoing process of a re(-)normalization of lived-experience.[401] Because these correlative aspects of the secular, etc., cannot be experienced in, through, of, or by themselves, and, where alignment through re(-)alignment demands the fully effective functioning of such an overall working suspension. (84)

Thence, the sixth observation, that even though the relatively-radical transcendence of phenomenal-phenomenological experience and the relatively-radical immanence cannot be entertained apart from the relatively-radical nature of secular experience, still, we can only focus on one or other aspects of experience by virtue of this lived-basis in the totality of lived-experience. That, through an overall suspension of lived-experience, the secularity of lived-experience, as a correlative form of experience, itself, as well, cannot be entertained other than as a relatively-radical form of experience likewise! Hence secular experience will also be represented in and through its own distinctive patterns of a relative-radical secularity by virtue of the relatively-radical nature of both metaphysically and philosophically oriented experience, etc. Hence the co-associated relatively-radical experience of affect, facts, the perceived/apperceive concurrence and non-concurrence (between the metaphysical and the philosophical, etc.), demands for non-existential and existential modes of resolution, points of resistance, the mildly euthymic enjoyment of interpersonal-personal experience under normal circumstances, and so on. That, by such means, we can revisit the full sense and semblance of the secular despite its colonization by non-existentially and existentially oriented modes of either mis-placed ideological, philosophical, disciplinary forms of intervention and/or well-placed conjectural, existential, and empathetic forms of intervention (in keeping with the trajectories of our relationships as supplying a net existential richness and enrichment of relational interactions, etc.). (85)

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form of to-be disconcerting stems from my assignment of the 'future' with the 'secular' through economic complexification that equates the 'hermeneutic nature of pretreatment' with the 'economic orientation of the secular' along with this experience of 'the presently-experienced semblance of the future' (whose future 'expectations' practically coincide with its present 'anticipations'). Arguing, in effect, that various forms of unease motivate, e.g., the anti-intellectual non-engagement and cancelling of academic research along with the latter's call for a reversal of more 'enlightened forms' of policy direction, etc., resisted (at this moment in time) primarily by the so-called 'conservative' Right (conceivably reacting 'conservatively' to such currently anticipated forms of change, etc.). Of course, different parties either will or will not experience the same patterns of dis-conformation as experienced by certain other parties that, therein and thereafter, for the latter, will be driving such distinctive forms of secular resistance as evident, e.g., in the banning in various states in the US of books in both public libraries and school libraries, calls for the removal of the imagined or non-imagined teaching of Critical Race Theory, the dismissive treatment of trans-gendered persons and calling for a now impossible return to the hegemony of binary social classifications, and so on.

[401] 'Re(-)normalization' being seen as an ongoing process of approximation where we seek increasing forms of alignment with an existential reading of lived-experience as to be eventually discerned through an advancing of social consensus in such matters. However, in existentially oriented acts of intervention the individual or group of individuals in question have to take on board a responsibility for such a proactive stance that may not be currently shared by the relational parties affected by such interventions.

From this last observation, we can also note the co-occurrence of both non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation. Would this contention be correct? Is it possible, say, in the simple drinking of a glass of water that it must be read through both a non-existential and an existential lens? Surely, we can quite simple describe this phenomenal-phenomenological experience as just 'drinking water from a glass'? Yes, that we can do should we wish to just approach this intentional act from the mere point of a description of its non-virtual (or virtual) performance. However, even such a simple act will eventually call to our attention the deeper necessity of its full observation in both a non-existential and an existential light or frame of reference. Without drinking water, we get thirsty, and, should our thirst be not quenched, we die! Hence this existential imperative to observe these existential demands for the continuation of life. Thence our ability to be empathetic when we recognize the needs of others, as to our sharing water with them, and, hopefully, their sharing water with us should the occasion call for this same type of a concerned and caring response... (86)

For the sake of an artificial balance, let me now propose six negative observations to further define a working appreciation of the secular world, albeit as viewed, e.g., through the secular economy in general, etc. (87)

First, no pure analytical truth determinations can be either presented or found *in situ* because they are economically bound with both conjectural propositional-statements and synthetical statements, and, so likewise, the secular, etc., cannot be entertained (absolutistically) in its own right. Although, we might think, e.g., that we can work with analytical propositions by themselves, more correctly, we are mistaken because such propositions can only be read, e.g., through the lens of a conjectural economy (or some other relevant economy).[402] Therefore, the entertainment of either pure propositions or pure statements or pure conjectures is an illusion just as a letter on a piece of paper cannot be read as just a text without also invoking meta-textual and non-textual inputs, and so on. That, invoking the same argument, the correlative orientation of the secular must be read in a similar fashion. (88)

As a second observation we can note that the appreciation of the economic cannot be engineered non-perspectivally and that this applies equally to the secular, etc. An economic approach is a perspective. The meta-economical approach likewise is perspectival regardless of whether the metaphorical adoption and adaptation of a 'lens' is taken up as either a perspective or a meta-perspective. In a similar manner, the economics of the secular, etc., is perspectival without exception. (89)

Third, no matter what frame of reference is adopted and adapted, no perspective can be fully exhausted, i.e., fully detailed in its reading, be it secular or philosophical or metaphysical in its orientation, etc. Of course, an exhaustion of a per-

[402] An observation already argued for in *Pursuit*, III.XIG. To temper this observation, we note that the secular can and will 'represent' itself in and through a variety of relatively-radical formats, etc. The hermeneutical orientation of the secular being more 'represented' rather than presented transcendently or re-presented immanently.

spective is never needed as we only need to operate in terms of what is both suitably adequate and relevant to the completion of the tasks to hand. (90)

Fourth, there also exists the impossibility of exhausting the infinite range of perspectives that could be supplied in the reading of the secular, etc. On the other hand, this should not concern us too much as an existentially pragmatic and non-existentially pragmatical set of choices in the adoption and adaptation of relevant perspectives is of far greater importance. (91)

As a fifth negative observation we can note that irrelevant perspectives make no difference and in our appreciation of the secular, etc., the same negative observation applies. Where by 'relevant' is meant that which makes a difference in transformational outcomes would also make a difference in our reading of the same, be it secular or otherwise. (92)

Here, a sixth negative observations notes that we cannot engineer perfect working suspensions but neither can we conduct completely imperfect working suspensions. Moreover, we must work with what is to hand, namely, the secular world where processes of interrogation, by virtue of their invoked genres of behaviour, as modes of expectation, more or less supply their own terms of resolution or at the very least an intimation in which direction or directions such processes of resolutions might more productively proceed towards and find suitable degrees of (intentionally objective) realization. (93)

Now, on matters of resolution, we do so through proposing conjectures that find the necessary degree of support, conformation, conjectural competency, etc. In our appreciation of the secular, etc., the same approach applies. Given a metaphysical appreciation of truth determination then we might perceive, or apperceive an anticipated inter-ordered complexion to such proceedings, i.e., an awareness of semantic mapping; the aesthetic-like integrity of psychological and sociological contributions; indications of causal intervention from the personal to the political along with an indication to what extent such proceedings are taking on an existential complexion besides a non-existential complexion as well as noting possible consequences intended, mis-intended, unintended, non-intended, etc; an awareness of functions and functionality; a mapping of the configuration and re(-)configuration of genre expectations along with scientific implications; and, historical considerations.[403] (94)

Refracted through The Political-Economy we might also determine how the topic to hand is embedded in a social system and to what extent ordered and inter-ordered phenomena play a coded role in the formulation of their co-associated patterns of e/valuational formation. Where both the observation and resolution of a discordance either within a social order or between social orders could contribute to an amplification in

[403] Invoking a summarization of the six inter-ordered orders as realized through the symmetrical reduplication of the six distinctively ordered forms of judgmental phenomena.

e/valuational formation. With respect to ether non-existential and/or existential e/valuational formation/s.[404] (95)

We should also note that relational facticity, to that extent a relationship emerges beyond the mere summation of its relational participants and parts, is directly proportional to the degree relational resolution is actually realized. That without resolution there would be no relationship, and, without ongoing relational resolution there could be no continuing relationship from an historical perspective. (96)

Now, armed with such insights, let us re-explore this phenomenon of secular resistance especially in regard to misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, etc., and notions of authenticity, existential richness and enrichment, the nature of existential intervention, narratives, and all other relevant, allied topics. Where, by such means, it is to be hoped that an enriched concept of the secular can be further explicated… (97)

As a place to begin, let us dissect this phenomenon of resistance where ideological thinking finds other forms of ideological positioning as potential discordant and as approaches that should not be engaged and merely dismissed. Witness the hostile reactions to controversially perceived themes like, e.g., gender, race, religion, political orientation, etc. That given the admitted stance of not wanting to engage in some form of a debate or any other form of reasonable style of encounter marks out such a response as more or less non-cognitive, affectively motivated, indicating of an experience of discordance between the perception of the other party and where the hostile respondent, themselves, might apparently wish to make a contrasting ideological-like stand in terms of these same topics… (98)

How might we better explain this anti-intellectualism that so vehemently exasperates academics, and their sympathetic allies, elites, representatives in government, etc? For me this form of a response is a negatively inspired form of secular resistance. Let me explain. (99)

First, let me note that there is asymmetrical difference between non-existential e/valuational formation and existential e/valuational formation, and, second, that there also exists symmetrical differences in the temporal economy between past, present and future (much to the annoyance of theoretical physicists who would probably prefer to insist on just the symmetrical nature of temporal processes without having to add qualifications like, e.g., initial conditions, other forms of limitation, etc.). (100)

Practically, in line with its definition, the net existential impact of intervention, disciplinary or otherwise, is conceived of as ‘positive’. I.e., as ‘beneficial’, as ‘productive of a net benefit to the relational participants (and parts[405]) of the primary relationship in question’. Hence the corresponding concept of ‘enrichment’ (through ongoing existential re(-)enrichment)’. In a contrast to the existential, the spectrum of the non-existential has been explored under the headings of the ‘positive, neutral and negative’, respectively,

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404 A key observation explored in *Book* IX.

405 E.g., the environment should this aspect be beneficially re-considered.

say, as ‘valuable, neutral, and as ‘detrimental’ (if not as ‘evil’ in more extreme circumstances).[406] Therefore, as a change in nomenclature, let me assign ‘richness’ to ‘positive forms of non-existential enriching’ in a contrast to a ‘deficiency of richness’ through a ‘negative form of de-enriching’. (101)

With respect to the temporal economy let me note differences between ‘past, present, and future’ along the lines, respectively, of ‘discontinuities, non-continuities, and recontinuities’[407] whilst at the same time from the perspective of the disciplinary world, the secular world and the world of metaphysical-like appreciation of conformal truth determinations degrees of experiential unease along the lines, respectively, of the either disconcerted, neither disconcerted nor non-disconcerted, and/or or non-disconcerted; the non-concurring, neither the non-concurring nor the concurring, and/or the concurring; and, the to-be-disconcerted, the neither to-be-disconcerted nor to-be-non-disconcerted, and the to-be-non-disconcerted’. (102)

Therefore, I would contend that the motivation and expression of an inti-intellectual non-engagement, as a form of secular resistance, is based on a non-acceptance of an existential reading of the type of situation in question; as promoting a negative, non-existential reading; and, where the secular unease motivating such anti-intellectualism is taking the form of a to-be-disconcerted (at the prospect of what appears to be entailed for that demographic that finds itself not concurring in envisaged realization of such a negatively perceived/apperceived prospect). In a sense we might suppose that a certain fearfulness is being thematized within that demographic, as expressed through its co-associated disseminations, that the desired recontinuity of the future, for them, is somewhat threatened in regard to those changes as affectively received, experienced, and re-disseminated through the deposition of texts associated with that demographic segment of society. (103)

However, taking a broader perspective, we might suppose that when societies resolve such issues that this contributes to an enlargement of a social consensus and subsequent amplification of a co-associated social cohesion. In effect, seeking to find mechanisms, models of interaction, etc., that might put flesh on the voiced observations of Richard Rorty and his consistent calls for a reinvigorated forms of democratic governance capable of instituting and reflecting such augmented and enhanced forms of social consensus, etc. In this regard, in my re-reading of his problematic private-public discontinuity in such matters and my introduction of the existentially oriented sphere of arbitration we might like to equate the ‘secular domain’ with the ‘public sphere’, the ‘disciplinary world’ with the ‘private sphere’ (through the individual ministrations of either professionals or amateurs), and, the ‘metaphysical/meta-disciplinary/meta-philosophical domain’ with the ‘arbitrated sphere’ of social interaction (along with the distinctive temporal orientations of these three spheres of interactiveness as, respectively, future, past and present). That, for such an approach to work, we must suppose a deeper level of non-incommensurability despite relatively superficial expressions of discontinuity, non-continuity, and recontinuity along with either the fearful and/or non-fearful attitudes to

406 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIP.15 & XIO.9, 14, 39.

407 As explored in *Book* VI.

change being registered both therein and therebetween by various demographical segments of society (within the overall embrace of The Political-Economy). (104)

As a corrective to the secular resistance of such negative forms of non-existential e/valuational formation how might we suppose the re-institution of processes of resolution might be enacted that, thereby, they might successfully resolve such issues, and, therein, re-establish a healthier response to social change, advance social cohesion, along with, perhaps, the necessary reforms needed to promote more democratic forms of governance, etc? (105)

Again, we have here a topic that deserves its own detailed exploration. However, let me make a few suggestions that obviously require further research, discussion, ongoing forms of emendation, etc. (106)

One aspect that I feel demands considerable attention is the affective component that seems to so prominently be motivating the political manifestation of such anti-intellectual responses by the Right. From a more neutral perspective, one might suppose that such a form of resistance has valid grounds for its motivation given this affective sense of need that motivates it in the first place. It would be wrong to disparage the existence of such resistance, and the ensuing response of its negative insistence on a re-righting of perceived wrongs, but one might hope that if this cognitive rift between affectively secular and the disciplined world experiences as to-be-disconcerting, as a form of unease, then, obviously, there is needed the successful resolution of what at root is motivating such discomfit in the first place and, in that direction, we might wish to travel together in that same regard. Indeed, it should be the only place to go to since without addressing that affective form of motivation then this desired form of redress, hopefully desired by all parties seeking this ideal of the eventual reestablishment of the requisite social consensus and cohesion could not be instituted and sought through suitable processes of re(-)normalization, etc. Or, put more simply, to be on the same page we need to be on the same page in order to address and redress the motivations of all parties, preferably with an existential complexion and tenor that resolves the perceived, or apperceived, discordance between such demographic segments constituting the relatively-radical secularity of their social world. (107)

In such matters, I well suspect that our ability to more closely address this phenomenon of a negative resistance might then see us finding ways of redressing the same. Much as our ability to suitably ask a question will see us more likely finding both a suitable resolution and response to the requisitely required de-fusing of such a ‘problem’. How might such a response be further fashioned? That I must leave to further reflections whilst noting that comprehensive forms of resolution will also need to be consistent across these domains of the secular, philosophical, and disciplinary, and the metaphysical, given the relatively-radical existences of all three domains that are also even more radically connected together (given such evident expressions of social consensus and ensuing cohesion and an imputed collective desire for the same). (108)

2. Provisional Conclusions in the Form of a Summation, etc.

This essay arises out of the overlapping of a large number of conjectures, e.g., the affirmation of the secular economy;[408] that a conjectural economy implies that only through a short-sightedness can we merely go through the motions of reviewing propositions as just proposition, etc;[409] that a metaphysical-like appreciation of conformal truth determinations must be present by virtue of the fact that without the persistence of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance there could be no recognition of such truth determinations (whilst also recognizing, at the same time, that an appreciation of truth values cannot be reduced to just the same and needs to be complemented by suitable forms of consequential analysis, etc.);[410] that although the secular world is subjected to continuous and potentially conflicting forms of disciplinary intervention, still, through resistance, be it relatively negative or positive in e/valuational formation, the relatively-radical and social nature of the secular world will assert itself;[411] that we have to accept the relatively-radical nature of the immanence of a metaphysical-like sphere (in its inter-ordered characterization along with its functions of existentially oriented processes of arbitration) in apposition to the conjecture of relatively-radical transcendent sphere operating in the private world of disciplinary interventions[412] as exercised through process of transformational treatment in its recognition of the conjecture of relatively-radical correlatives;[413] that relatively-radical forms of asymmetry exist between existential e/valuational formation and non-existential e/valuational formation as well as between the past, present, and future (tenses) in the temporal economy;[414] that through processes of resolution within the overall secular economy we can invest in a strengthening of both social consensus and cohesion…[415] being a sampling of some of the key conjectures raised and where the following sections of this essay will attempt to re-argue, ending with a dialectical exploration of the holistic nature of the overall secular economy, and so forth… (109)

Reordering these eight conjectures in the following sequence… (110)

i. The Affirmation of the Secular Conjecture

In reviewing and assessing the truth status of the secular conjecture we need to note that if the secular dimension in the secular economy, be it viewed either in general, particular, or in specific terms of reference, is to be read as ‘economic’ then as an economic correlative it cannot be read as an impossible economic isolate. In other words, we must first accept the position that no pure, completely independent sense and semblance of the secular world is possible to either recognize, encounter, and/or engage. On the other hand, we can to some extent separate, or suspend, the disciplinary contributions and

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408 The Affirmation of the Secular Conjecture.
409 The Conjecture Denying the Isolation of Economic Correlativities.
410 The Affirmation of the Immanence of the Metaphysical Conjecture.
411 The Conjecture asserting a Relatively-Radical Secularity.
412 The Conjecture of the Transcendent Sphere of Disciplinary Interventions
413 The Affirmation of the Conjecture Asserting Relatively-Radical Correlatives
414 The Conjecture(s) Asserting Asymmetrical Symmetries (and Non-Equivalence).
415 The Conjecture Asserting Social Consensus through Social Cohesion, and v.v.

the inescapable metaphysical ascriptions of the truth status applied to such interventionally conjectured proposals in order to ascertain to what extent and in what manner we might be able to entertain a seemingly distinctive metaphorical 'voice' emanating from this conjectured sphere of the secular. As a short-term project, or, better, as a longer-term program, we have already begun the articulation of such a secular prospect by noting a relatively negative form of resistance in those vehement, anti-intellectual insistences on a rejection of those contentious red flag issues symbolically perceived as deserving to be rejected and replaced by the implicit or explicit demand for a return to some form of an idealised conservatism. That the basis for this intensely expressed form of motivation is conjectured to be an affective experienced form of dis-concordance for reason or reasons that deserve to be explored and which, in hazarding a guess, might well have their roots in the disenchantment and disgruntlement stemming from the excessive implementation of neo-liberal style politics and policies, etc. Hence, in this type of instance, secular resistance is being expressed, perhaps more inadvertently than advertently, from that social sense and semblance of both an individual and collective experience of this disconcordance (taken up as a future-oriented social expectation to continue to-be-disconcerted on the part of the relevant demographics 'voicing' such concerns). (111)

Now, interestingly, if we were to ask what a 'positive form of social resistance' might look like we could conjecture that it would take the form of 'social consensus formation and its attendant sense and semblance of a co-associated social cohesion along with a social openness to that disseminated formula of 'diversity, inclusivity and equity (DIY)'.' (112)

Therefore, in the affirmative, a relatively distinctive secular dimension needs to be articulated quite possibly, and most likely, to the same extent disciplines are explicitly disseminated along with their immanently and implicitly disseminated truth assessments and appreciations, but not in any impossible, extremist format that demands the exhibition of an economically isolated sense of the secular (just like the impossible quest for a return to a pure wilderness untouched by the impacts of the secular world and the proliferation and institutionalization of its disciplinary forms of intervention, etc., whilst recognizing, at the same time, the value of well-conceived and well-conducted processes of re-wilding in either the creation, preservation and conservation of the requisite environmental richness and enrichment that should be enacted for the metaphorical 'health' of our planet). (113)

ii. The Conjecture Denying the Isolation of Economic Correlativities

As just noted, we need to affirm the conjecture for denying the possibility of isolated economic correlativities (and, by extension, the economic isolation of all forms of identification; pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment; function, organization, ramification, truth assessment, conformation, competence, etc. Thence the negative province of the non-economical fork, as a fork, to exclude both the economically impossible and the economically non-viable. Hence the equal affirmation of the conjecture of the non-isolation of economic correlatities. (114)

Because not one economic correlative, etc., can entertained in its own right! (115)

iii. The Affirmation of the Metaphysical Conjecture

This 'metaphysical conjecture' can be formulated as 'the invariable co-association with all intentional formation and its judgmental appreciation of both its immanent truth assessment and conformal validation regardless of either their recognition, encountering and/or engagement with the same through various forms and degrees of non-observance'. In other words, despite the automatic ascription of truth assessment and their apparent conformal validation we must also assume that the ensuing truth status of such automatic appreciation need not be found to hand in a form that is not undistorted, obstructed, mis-interpreted, conventionally misconstrued, culturally reframed, and so on. (116)

Therefore, the critical philosopher, *et al*, must be ever aware that through exploration and closer scrutiny it might well be possible to better access such truth claims given their automatic ascription regardless of whether that conjectured fact is recognized or not recognized, etc. (117)

Thence this equation of truth status co-associated with our articulations of relative transformational isomorphic invariance. But, at the same time we should not reduce truth claims merely to this co-association with these intuitive and immanent co-associations with those aspects of transformational retreatment that remain relatively invariant over the course of those transformations in question since we also have to take into account both prospective forms of consequential analysis (or rather 'investigations' given their futuristic secular orientation[416]) and the immediacy of existential forms of retreatment. That understood, it follows that this association of truth assessment with these articulated forms of relative transformational isomorphic invariance is more correctly a province of the reductive nature of the analytical, as a process of recall, etc. (118)

So, that understood, the automatic co-association of truth determinations with the immanence of articulated periods of relative transformational isomorphic invariance can be perceived, or rather, apperceived as an analytical phenomenon with an orientation of the retrospective recalling more what has occurred (in its identification and equation with the same). Whereas, in a double contrast, consequential investigations proffer the to-be-expected ramifications of a more prospective orientation in conjunction with the immediacy of existential implications. (119)

Translated through the non-economic lens of a non-standard philosophy we could redefine and refine our appreciation of this temporal arena along the following lines, namely, that definitive responses of the last instant involve this retrospective equation of truth assessment with their periods of relative transformational isomorphic invariance;

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[416] In my critical use of terminology 'preteatment', e.g., is co-associated with 'generality, prospectivity, the secular orientation, investigations,' etc. On the other hand, 'analysis' (and predication) as one of the three simple styles of 'treatment', along with synthesis (and relations) and nomination (and its semantic mapping of nominatives), and co-associated solely with the deconstructive and reconstructive remediation of treatment implies, terminologically, that the prospectivity of 'consequential analysis' is more correctly a process of 'consequential investigations'.

that definitive responses of the next instant involve a focus on a receptivity to our consequential investigations, and, through existential permission then take on the form of definitive responses of the first instance wherein the immediacy of an existentially oriented motivation is able to more fully express itself. Hence, in the evolving emergence of an overall assessment of truth status, along with its conformal validation, all three temporal orientations need to be taken into account in the formation of the totality of an assessment of the truth status of that being re(-)presentatively simulated and imprinted with such immanent forms of assessment, realized through re(-)assessment, despite the addition of those imputed processes of occlusion, in all its variety of obstruction, that can either hinder or prevent our more aligned processes of conformal truth re(-)e/valuation. (120)

In the form of the mnemonic of 'could, would, and should' we can now simply identify the same with the definitive responses of the last, next and first instants. An overall assessment of the emergent competence of the report or reports in question being refracted through this 'could' have occurred as identified, 'should' occur in light of consequential expectations, and 'should' be permitted in existential terms of reference. (121)

So, now the pressing question that needs to be asked is, 'how can these miscellaneous forms of occlusion or obstruction be possibly circumvented, or diminished, or dissolved, or resolved, or bypassed, or suspended, and so on? (122)

It might well be applicable to invoke all of those metaphors like, e.g., 'circumvention', etc. Or, to just simply insist on the suitable utilization of working suspensions, or rather, find ourselves dependent upon the automatic delivery of the de-suspensions to integrate these definitive responses of the last, next and first instants…! (123)

But, life is not meant to be easy. The requisite education is also required. We need to do our 10,000 hours and develop those skills that allow us to become competent in those fields of endeavor upon which we become attentive to, gravitate towards, and so on. Although, intuitively, we can also argue that much has already been achieved that what work that remains only stands in need of further rectification, remediation, and ongoing re(-)normalization, and so on… since we must already be in a position to both understand and ask such questions. In a dialectical sense, of where we both 'already know and do not know…' the contours of this world of truth seeking… but could well have some ideas on what to expect… (124)

However, in questioning such co-associated ascriptions (of equivalence, expectation, and observance[417]) why should we hold this metaphysical contention of immanence at all? Because on the basis of such transformational invariance we find the transformational invariance of the truth conditions applied to the same. So 'this' persists as 'this', 'this' could be subjected to this 'this' or this 'that', and, to choose between this 'this' or this 'that' demands an appreciation of which course is truly more productive of both non-existential richness and existential enrichment (with a preference for that latter entering

[417] I.e., the equivalence between truth assessment and its related relative transformational isomorphic invariance; consequential expectations; and, the observance of an existential immediacy, etc. At the same time we should also make room for an emergent *je ne sais quoi*.

the overall formation of our intuitively emerging assessment, albeit refined, over time, through re(-)normalization, and so on). (125)

Or, from an optimistic perspective, that through working suspensions in fields of the requisite educational experience we stand a good chance find greater degrees of alignment, through re(-)alignment, with such automatic truth assessments and their co-validations, etc. In part, proffering an explanation of the experiential fact that in the asking of reasonable question we are already on the road to oversee their probable resolution in some form or other.[418] (126)

Indeed, through a working suspension of both the immanence of conformal truth determination and the transcendence of what is being truthfully assessed we can expect to find the relatively-radical sphere of the secular… (127)

iv. The Conjecture of the Transcendent Sphere of Disciplinary Interventions

Now, as intimated, disciplinary forms of treatment operate as operations enacted within a relatively-radical transcendent-like domain of simulation in relational space constituted as relational participant and parts, as relational actors and acter, relationally envisaged under the headings of Time, Space, Subjectivity and Inter-subjectivity; and, where ethical considerations can be further organized under the headings of Actors, Recipients, Acts, Performances, Consequences, and Situation, or, existentially simplified under an appreciation of the pro-relational (as might be recognized, encountered and engaged through the auspices of the de-suspension). (128)

Hence our ability to phenomenal-phenomenologically discern modal density, intensity and propensity (of the essentially iterative and harmonically resolute nature of tropes, memes, themes, etc.); and, their complementation through salience (of various perspectives), consilience (between different perspectives) and propinquity (or standing within a certain perspective); as well as operations of distinction, accommodation and transformation (and the latter as viewed under the headings of pretreatment, treatment and retreatment/posttreatment); etc. (129)

Because remediation, e.g., demands something in something else in order to enact deconstruction and reconstruction, and so on. Where that ‘something else’ is registered in that which is relatively transcendent, as transcendent to the situatedness of that being identified and operated upon, etc. (130)

But as something else it also takes on the mantle of the relatively-radial sense of and semblance of the transcendent. Relatively-radical because it is different to that being identified, whilst at the same time not being radically-radical as that would defy all significance, all sense, meaning, and meaningfulness. (131)

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[418] I.e., either recognize that a question has an accessible resolution or that it cannot be resolved either currently or at any point in time.

Thence this relative-radical nature of this simulated transcendent disciplinary domain as an assortment of disciplinarians intervene in the secular world through conflicted and conflicting dialogues with varying degrees of incommensurability as carved out by such actors. (132)

v. The Conjecture Asserting a Relatively-Radical Secularity

But, it deserves to be argued that through a working suspension of both this disciplinary domain and the immanent validation of its conformal truth assessment we should find revealed the relatively-radical world of the secular that defies all such divisions and accommodations crafted by disciplinarians, be they professional, amateurs, and/or resistant secularists (etc.). (133)

As argued, the secular world cannot be a pristine economic isolate[419] (as if it were an untouched wilderness defying the imprint of all textual depositions). But, at the same time, as a conjectured relatively-radical domain of secular interdependence let us articulate the possible contours to be revealed through its suitably approached processes of an interactive 'clarification', i.e., as engendered through relational and pro-relational forms of recognition, encountering and engagement… starting with negative resistance, then moving on to positive resistance, and so on… (134)

In noting negative forms of resistance I speculated that the vehemence of an anti-intellectual non-engagement with scholars, and other nominated elites, was motivated affectively through the invocation of certain emotions that I would further speculate have their roots in political, economic, and stylistic forms of social disenchantment and disgruntlement if not initiated at least promoted through relatively excessive forms of enacted pro-neo-liberally oriented policy formulation along with the intended, mis-intended, and unintended consequences stemming from such forms of excessive implementation. Obviously, the direction of such disenchantment, etc., cannot just remain an emotional charged, affective force, but, will find itself cognitively directed towards identified and symbolical targets with varying degrees of successfulness and failure. All in all, the fruitful recruiting grounds for reformers, populists, fascist, communists, terrorists, and all such folk, be they non-extremists or extremists, whether such political styles of identifications are either profitable or otherwise. (135)

'Negative' in this instance because of 'being disrespectful to certain others', having negative implications, consequences, and resonances with the past, i.e., exhibiting negative forms of non-existentially oriented behaviours along with an absent or diminishment of existentially oriented behaviours. (136)

Under the heading of a positive form of secular resistance I have already included the building on pre-established forms of social consensus formation and its co-associated social cohesion along with an 'existential openness' to the persisting of issues concerning diversity, inclusion, and equity (resisted by certain demographics unable to conduct the requisite suspension eithers advertently and/or inadvertently). (137)

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[419] Paragraph 111.

But, what can we safely ascribe to a secular locus? Tentatively, I have already suggested:

> …the co-associated relatively-radical experience of affect, facts, the perceived/apperceive concurrence and non-concurrence (between the metaphysical and the philosophical, etc.), demands for non-existential and existential modes of resolution, points of resistance, the mildly euthymic enjoyment of interpersonal-personal experience under normal circumstances…[420] (138)

To which I would like to add, the placement of our embodiment, embeddedness with others, and our embankment in a world all too often so sadly diminished by negatively motivated and socially organized non-existential intentions, be they either enacted as intended, or met as mis-intended, and/or unintended.[421] (139)

> That, by such means, we can revisit the full sense and semblance of the secular despite its colonization by non-existentially and existentially oriented modes of either mis-placed ideological, philosophical, disciplinary forms of intervention and/or well-placed conjectural, existential, and empathetic forms of intervention (in keeping with the trajectories of our relationships as supplying a net existential richness and enrichment of relational interactions, etc.).[422] (140)

vi. The Affirmation of the Conjecture Asserting Relatively-Radical Correlatives

The identification of all economic correlativities is such that they cannot be other than relatively-radical in their comparative differentiation whilst the correlatives within a specified economy will follow likewise on archetypal grounds. Given different economies are constructed within a different set of economic parameters it follows that even in economic complexification between parallel correlatives some sense of the relatively-radical must still apply given the constitutional differences in perspective between their parent economies. So, e.g., the asymmetries between past, present, and future, and, historical observations, therein respectively, of the historical identification of discontinuities, non-continuities, and recontinuities.[423] Similarly, 'past' is not exactly equivalent to 'analysis' or 'reduction' nor the 'phase of treatment', etc., even though we use this method as a working commentary on the economy being commented upon. (141)

vii. The Conjecture(s) Asserting Asymmetrical Symmetries (and Non-Equivalence).

This conjecture follows from the affirmation of the conjecture asserting relatively-radical correlatives while the accompanying conjecture of non-equivalence follows from the fact that propositions of equivalence can only be epistemologically situated economi-

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420 Paragraph 85.

421 Like, e.g., exploitation, misappropriation, theft, unsustainable practices, slavery, and all manner of inauthentic practices, etc.

422 Paragraph 85.

423 As explored in *Book* 6.

cally as analytical propositions, and, therein, that extra-economic forms of equivalence cannot be entertained in non-virtual terms of reference. Even the identification of truth assessments with their related instances or periods of relative transformational isomorphic invariance is complemented by the need to also add both conjectural investigations and a comparative evaluation of the differential existential merit associated with those former investigations (with the implication that the enaction of different trajectories must result in differences in comparative existential formation even though in practical terms near enough is often good enough to counted as a working equivalence). (142)

viii. The Conjecture Asserting Social Consensus through Social Cohesion, and v.v.

Despite the multi-various ministrations of a set of relatively incommensurable and less incommensurable disciplines within the domain of the secular, still, as a positive form of resistance such disparate forces invite forms of resolution contributing to social consensus and social cohesion and a social openness to diversity, inclusiveness, (and the ensuing momentum of a process that would also promote) equity. Where, through positive forms of non-economic irruption, such points of resolution will also present an integrated sense and semblance of a secular world within the economics of the overall world of life, this more, open extensive, unified sense of a world at large. (143)

xi. The (Conjecture of the) Holistic Nature of the Overall Secular Economy[424]

Relationships are formed through the ongoing harmonic resolution of that which is relatively dissonant within their co-associated correlative fields that, in contrast, are relatively consonant. (144)

With the advent of either too much or too little relative consonance, relative dissonance, and/or relative resolution the ongoing formation of the relationship historically breaks down and meets dissolution in the situatedness that entails its dissolution. (145)

The ongoing persistence of resolution therefore characterizes the distinctive nature and facticity[425] of that relationship, albeit as circumscribed by the limitations of its distinctive origination. (146)

Where our experience of facticity is the existential excess or surplus of e/valuational formation over that invested in that relational process as experienced in our simulation of that relationship. (147)

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424 I am the first to admit here that my explorations of the concept of 'holism' and its relationship as a concept to a pragmatic philosophy remains a work in progress, but, at the same believe enough has been laid out to oversee a more integrated philosophical version of this topic in this same regard

425 'Facticity' being viewed as 'the experiential surplus of e/valuational formation that is emergently expressed through the auspices of that primary relationship, albeit as situated within the overall world of the relational'. In effect, to that extent a whole is expressed and experienced as 'greater than that mere summation of that totality', or, 'to that extent the harmonic resolution of the relationship is experienced within the 'living reality of its lived-experience' as irruptively communicated non-economically, etc.'

In our transformational experience of the relational persistence of the relationship as realized through ongoing resolution we witness the related expression of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance to which we automatically associate a corresponding truth determination. So, if such invariance is perceived, or, rather, apperceived, then the truth determination of the same is the assertion of its distinctive nature as arrived at through a set of aligned reports that metaphorically 'thread' the same. Just as seeing 'that' certain glass with 'this' water, holding 'that' glass with 'this' water, raising that glass with 'this' water to my lips, and drinking 'this' water from 'that' glass is observed as the transformation of the spatial location of 'that' glass; and the transference of 'this' water in 'that' glass as now 'this which has been drunk'. 'That' glass remains invariant over this transformation, and likewise, the imputed persistence of 'this' water both before and after it has been drunk. Furthermore, if I were to drop 'that' glass and shatter it, still, 'that persisting glass-ness' of 'that' now shattered glass can now be assigned the truth status of that which continues from thereafter...[426] (148)

But, even though there is an automatic equation between the relative instance or period of relative transformational isomorphic invariance and an assignment of its asserted truthful affirmation, still, its full truth, and truthful, appreciation cannot remain merely in the form of an analytical expression as its appreciation cannot be just bound by this nominated treatment of an equivalence between the assigned truth determination and this observed invariance in this economically isolated form of this propositional presentation and hence its necessary co-association with both factual inputs and both non-existential and existential e/valuation patterns of e/valuation (both expected and immediately anticipated [in line with historical patterns of recall]). Because propositions, statements, and propositional-statements of conjectures must all be co-expressed in our overall appreciation of an integrated indication of its working truth status. Thence this observation that an integrated form of truth appreciation demands a conjectural economy or some other viable form of a co-associated working equivalent or set of such working equivalents. (149)

Now, an understanding of this correlativity within the parameters of a distinctly delineated relationship through ongoing resolution implies that all relationships are holistically engendered, but, that this holism can only be directly appreciated from a pro-relational perspective of the apparent relationship *per se*, albeit as it is in turn situated in its relational environment, but not form its indirect appreciation as a relational situation between either certain relational participants and/or relational parts, and, from thence, the various headings, say, of objects, the inter-objective, subjects, and the inter-subjective, and so on. But, the directness of relational involvement, through resolution, implies that a pro-relational stance both oversees and participates in the holistic accommodation of such relational participations. Moreover, this same pro-relational stance can be simulated

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[426] Of course, merely insisting that the truth determination is merely co-equated with that which is transformationally invariant, as the logical subjectivity of 'that' nominated transformation, is not going to address the truth-states to be co-associated with that transformation *per se*. That, in this overall scheme, this is the analytical portion of the overall conjectural economy and needs, therefore, to be complemented by both a secular contribution of facts, genres of behaviour, etc., as reconfigured through a consequential investigation that is then enacted through the third economic correlative component that oversees and permits, to that extent possible, both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented processes of e/valuational formation.

through the overall suspension of the transcendent sphere of treatment, the immanent sphere of retreatment, and the lived-sphere of the secular (which to be focused upon merely necessitates the appositional suspension of both treatment and retreatment in a form of posttreatment that represents the secular dimension in lived-experience within the overall economy of ongoing re(-)presentation). (150)

I have argued that each discipline has a distinctive sense of how it views the world. So, philosophers see it philosophically, and, historians see it historically, etc. Whilst the theologian is no different in such matters. Where their disciplinary vision of the world minus a general vision of the secular leaves a disciplinary difference or differential. Hence philosophical difference, historical difference, theological difference, etc. Where minor differences would spell out less major differences within a certain disciplinary field. (151)

The next question to ask was, 'what value does this difference or differential possess in lived-experience?' Because the enjoyment or suffering of such value was to be viewed through a hermeneutical lens involving the very genres of behaviour, where the generality of this value would be experienced, where this meta-difference was then viewed in a hermeneutic light as a disciplinary meta-difference or meta-differential. (152)

But, as the disciplinarian needs to work in the world, hopefully, for the benefit of others, then we next needed to impute a disciplinary non-difference or disciplinary non-differential. (153)

Noting that what cannot be interacted with can be neither recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged. (154)

Moreover, 'what is not there for us is not there for us, and we need not be there for it' as a central observation that has shaped theology, e.g., etc. (155)

So, in hindsight we can see that the secular world has 'threaded' the entirety of the disciplinary world... (156)

In reverse, in imputing a secular sense of difference, etc., we can see that the disciplinary world, in turn, has 'threaded' the secular world. (157)

Holistically, truth is revealed through an appreciation of relational interaction and never through the impossible invocation of the non-interactive. (158)

Where this relational truth permeates and pervades the totality of the primary relationship, albeit in its embeddedness as to be found within the openness of the relational world. (159)

Where its determination has neither a definitive place nor time, finds an essential definition through reiteration, cannot exhaust a perspective nor the number of perspec-

tives that could be taken up even though what is seen as adequate may well remain more than adequate with respect to that research being undertaken. (160)

Where work done in one discipline, through slippage, can accelerate our appreciation in some other. (161)

Holism needs neither an external world nor an internal world given that information pervades the entirety of the relationship in question. (162)

With the right hermeneutic set of lenses any intentional artefact could be found to reflect the entirety of the world at large. (163)

Just as in the days before online advertising, the advertisements in the newspaper could, through scrutiny and statistical comparison, be read as having something to say about the world more generally, like, e.g., relative employment, what people seem to be buying, etc. Or, where old-fashion, landline telephone books could tell you who lived where and with whom, and so on. (164)

So, 'those who have eyes to see, and ears to hear' will directly engage the phenomenologically essential along with the hermeneutical and the existential. I.e., the philosophical economy. (165)

Where noting the aesthetical, the pragmatical, and the ontical will give us a secular take on this world at large, namely, through the positioning arising from the aesthetic-like harmonization of our texts through re(-)alignment, functional utility through a reference to the pragmatical, and a cultural-intercultural body of facts through ontical discernment, etc. which can then be authenticated through metaphysically oriented appreciation… be that demonstrate either intuitively and/or formally. (166)

Discerning the relational fabric of this world at large... (167)

In a world where we should leave nothing behind except our footprints and contributions conceived of as possibly beneficial for others... (168)

That with respect to the holistic nature of relational experience, the pro-relational stance is a direct experience of this same essential holistic expression of the relational as realized through ongoing resolution, albeit from its own perspective/s as 'sighted' within that relational dimension of the pro-relational orientation as equally expressive of both the existential and the pragmatic, and v.v. (169)

Thence the relatively-radical and distinctive nature of pro-relational existential experience *versus* the relatively material-like nature of relational experience. (170)

Hence the power of the conjectural economy to deal with the automatic assignment of truth assessments and their conformal metaphysical-like appreciation since the mere assertion of analytical-like truth assertions, etc., cannot be economically counte-

nanced because such economic isolates cannot be economically re(-)presented non-holistically, and, therefore, the suitable explication of lived-experience implies that the secular world is more fully and directly engaged through working suspensions and their automatic de-suspensions, in and through suitable conjectural economies, or their viable substitutes, that, as like conjectural economies, they are to be also observed as well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed. (171)

Joining the philosophical and secular economies through suspension gives us a metaphysical take on truth assessment and appreciation that from the judgmental perspective and retreatment sees no difference between assessment and the appreciation of that assessment. Just as when things are perceived in some form of an alignment this does not mean that there are two different things, namely, things in alignment and the alignment between the same even though in conventional terms we might have good reasons for making such distinctions in those conventional terms of reference. (172)

In shaking hands, two hands become one and, then, in parting, cannot resume the same status as they had before that encounter...[427] (173)

Where, through working suspensions the secular; the philosophical and the disciplinary, the metaphysical, the meta-philosophical, and the meta-disciplinary re-emerge as integrated, with integrity, as integral to lived-experience...[428]

Where, through retreatment, the truth, and the truth of that truth, and the lived-reality of such experience must re(-)emerge as one despite obstructions...[429] (174)

Where an existential freedom is found through(-)others and where they find the same through(-)us, and, that this is indicative of the holistic nature of ‘our’ lived-experience..!! (175)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 15.7.24.

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427 Through, e.g., the observation or axiom of non-equivalence.

428 Along with all forms of inter-ordered experience.

429 Through this e/merging between the secular, the disciplinary, and the metaphysical.

Appendix A: On the Formation, Obstruction, and De-Obstruction of Conformal Truth Appreciation

In the last essay I ran the contentious conjecture that what is related to the relative transformational isomorphic invariance under review automatically was afforded a form of truth determination reflecting that distinctive 'integrity of process under review'. (0)

However, I also noted that in assigning a truth value to a mere act of transformational invariance it did not have, through such assignment, anything to say about that process of transformation itself. That in this regard we need to complement such assignment with two additional observations, namely, its consequential investigations as to possibly optimising various causal trajectories, and, the joint non-existential and existential e/valuation of those possible trajectories if we were to permit their enaction[430] to that extent this were possible for us to both organize and instigate. (1)

A second problem was also noted, namely, despite this automatic assignment of truth values to the related acts of relative transformational isomorphic invariance, in lived-experience, without a doubt, we find the public world awash with claims and counter-claims as to the validity of these assigned truth assessments. For the sake of naming this problematic observation I have designated it here as 'the problem of obstruction', i.e., despite this automatic assignment of truth claims, if only to clearly articulate the transformational invariance of the logical subject or subjects in review, still, public opinion is obviously not so clearly aligned with such assignments. (2)

Hence the addition of a further problem, namely, how do we overcome such obstruction in and through a process of de-obstruction, in whatever form or forms that might take in order to clarify, amend, and advance the progress of our various discourses that intersect, seemingly, with the same topic under review? (3)

Hence this overall problematic of the 'formation, obstruction, and de-obstruction of conformal truth appreciation'. (4)

First, what is meant by my expression 'the relative transformational isomorphic invariance' being referred to as 'the logical subject or subjects of those explorations being placed under the scrutiny of this equated form of truth determination? (5)

To begin with, this expression is defined by myself within a 'philosophy of transformational retreatment' as follows. We hermeneutically begin with the pretreatment possessing a certain meta-level in meta-status (which, usually, is the object-level in meta-status). Then via a process of treatment we advance by one meta-degree since the object is subjected to a transformation in meta-status at the same time (since in our referral to something, being 'about' something, we can no longer be simply referring directly to what the object of that referral is. Just as, e.g., a title to a book or essay is 'about' that

[430] Where' enaction' has been defined as 'intentional deliberations to institute a responsive process of either action, non-action, and/or inaction'.

book or essay and is not that book or essay *per se*, hence this shift towards the relatively meta-textual (where we find genres of behaviour inform us as to how that text is either to be written and/or is to be read). But, such a meta-textual transformation is also read on par with the meta-level of the original text and to account for this fact we also naturally de-elevate the ensuing results of our processes of treatment by one meta-degree in meta-status. Crudely, we could analogue this by noting that an architect imagines the design of a house that is then built and can be inhabited, whereas, only the architect can inhabit their imagined designs for this house before it is built. It should also be understood that in economic terms, a simple process of treatment can only take one of three correlative forms, namely, analysis, synthesis and nomination. Correlative because we can define any one form of treatment through the joint negation of the other two styles of treatment, and, by various transformational processes arrive at any one of the other two styles of treatment. More correctly, we would need to argue that all three processes must economically co-occur given their correlative status, but, individually come to our attention through various forms of focus or de-focus, etc. I.e., without some form of analysis, there could be no synthesis, and v.v., and, without nomination, there would be nothing to either analyse or synthesize, etc. That I refer to this process of an often overlooked de-elevation in meta-status as a 'phase of retreatment' which also has the power, through posttreatment, to amend or reconstitute the original pre-transformational situation of the pretreatment, and, hence, re-continue this cycle of transformational retreatment should we wish to continue these phases of treatment, etc.[431] Or, in reverse, retreatment can also reconstruct the course of the treatment in question. (6)

Therefore, this transformational rule 'that with treatment there is an elevation in meta-status by one degree'. (7)

However, it this rule were to rule alone we would be hopelessly lost in an infinite world of meta-levels, therefore, we must break this first rule by invoking a second rule of retreatment, namely, 'with retreatment there is a corresponding de-elevation in meta-status'. (8)

Interestingly, 'treatment' is to be viewed through the prism of 'the performance of an act of suspension in some form or other', whereas, 'retreatment is to be viewed as 'the automatically applied act of a corresponding de-suspension'. (9)

Now, the *raison d'être* of this philosophy has a critical sense of purpose in so far that we need to be critically precise, to that degree required, in the articulation of pre-treatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment along with the specific transformational pathways invoked in order to clearly delineate these various aspects of this process of transformational retreatment, and, furthermore, observe, or at least impute, the existence of the requisite 'relative transformational isomorphic invariance' that permits this entire process of transformational retreatment to be successfully exercised (in those critical, theoretical terms of reference as a currently to be preferred model set up to parallel the imputed psychological processes of judgment that would be operating in those con-

[431] But, more correctly conceived of as dialectically mediated process rather than our treatment of it sequentially in either a linear and or circular manner conducted in either direction or in both directions.

jectured epistemological terms of reference although the conformal treatment of such a conjecture should observe both pragmatic and pragmatical considerations when applied through its specific adoption and adaptation). (10)

Therefore, it is conjectured, via this model of transformational retreatment, that transformation is only successful if and only if there is the requisite preservation of the required form of logical subjectivity in question. This was brought out in the essay when I noted:

> So, if such invariance is perceived, or, rather, apperceived, then the truth determination of the same is the assertion of its distinctive nature as arrived at through a set of aligned reports that metaphorically 'thread' the same. Just as seeing 'that' certain glass with 'this' water, holding 'that' glass with 'this' water, raising that glass with 'this' water to my lips, and drinking 'this' water from 'that' glass is observed as the transformation of the spatial location of 'that' glass; and the transference of 'this' water in 'that' glass as now 'this which has been drunk'. 'That' glass remains invariant over this transformation, and likewise, the imputed persistence of 'this' water both before and after it has been drunk. Furthermore, if I were to drop 'that' glass and it were to shatter, still, 'that persisting glass-ness' of 'that' now shattered glass can now be assigned the true status of that which continues from thereon.[432] (11)

Moreover, this experiential invariance granted, I now contend that an automatic assignment of a truth designation is automatically assigned to the same. Hence the use of these two indexical 'that' and 'this' as cited above, e.g. So, in the context of this example cited, 'that' is truthfully the 'glass' being referred to, and, 'this' is the truthfully the 'water' in that glass about to be drunk. Where an alignment within and between this set of reportings established the (more formal) persistence of these relatively preserved nominations. So, invoking Tarski:

'(That = glass & this = water)' is T(rue) iff (That = glass & this = water) (12)

But, as already noted the overall truth assessment of a situation must also attend to consequential investigations along with both non-existential and existential considerations.[433] (13)

So, we now have arrived at a point where we can consider these twin problems of obstruction and possible methods for de-obstruction in order to clarify the relatively truthful appreciation of such truth claims (and, when and where necessary, they would need to be either amended and/or subjected to more radical forms of reconstitution). (14)

Here, let us be creative and speculatively postulate a variety of mechanisms that might be obstructing a clarification of this process of both truth determination and their

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[432] Paragraph XIQ.148.

[433] Refer to A.1.

appreciation, and, where such metaphorical approaches might find their co-associated metaphorical forms of resolution. (15)

As noted in my use, say, of ‘truth assignment and appreciation’ or ‘truth determination and appreciation’, etc., because any truth claim could be rightfully or wrongfully assigned it can only be in the case of their appreciation that we would considered such assignment to be coincident with the way those reportings actually report such things through the demonstrated alignments or non-alignments noted either within and/or between those conjectured propositions, statements, and propositional-statements contained in such sentential reports. Where by ‘conformal’ is meant ‘the ability to replicate such determinations and their re(-)appreciated assessments’. (16)

A number of candidates, or suspects, spring to mind, namely, an imperfectly constructed conjectural economy with its analytical proposition that are not well-formed; where statements are ill-informed by being not well-informed; and where the propositional-statements of the conjectures, themselves, are defective through not be well-expressed, say, coherently, in a non-contradictory manner, within a well-organized and well-executed set of arguments, and so on, and so forth. To this we can add a number of contributory factors like poor memory; misinterpreted testimony; an inability to clearly see the situation in question; a misinterpretation of relevant reports and texts; the ensuing confusion created, say, through the introduction of either misleading and/or irrelevant texts and reports; incorrect premises, fallacious arguments, and wrongly derived conclusions; poorly observed processes of pretreatment, treatment and retreatment/posttreatment, etc., etc. (17)

Now, we could argue that all of the defective contributions above could ‘obstruct’ the course of those proceedings, and, that the remedying of such overall obstruction would be to invoke those counter-processes that would ‘de-obstruct’ the defective progression of those same proceedings! Of course, this theoretical remedy, as in life, will be more difficult to observe and appropriately institute in lived-experience, still, if we do not see something clearly, we either improve our line of sight, or move closer, or turn the light on, or think more about what is actually being seen, confer with others, and so on. (18)

Now, given the above, what am I allowed to conclude? (19)

An automatic truth assignment is given to our intuitive recognition of those related instances of relative transformational isomorphic invariance. (20)

To the articulation of such a logical subject or the set of such logical subjects besides the positing of an assigned truth value coincident with such relative transformational isomorphic invariance we must also add to its analytical character the future expectations of a consequential investigations, as statements, and in what manner we enact such conjectured options in terms of their expected and anticipated non-existential and existential e/valuational formations as propositional-statements. (21)

But, truth assignment also needs to be appreciated which already implicates a Tarskian-like reading of the same whose conformal status is reinforced in direct measure to our ability to replicate such truth assessments, or amend or reconstitute such proceedings. (22)

But, in lived-reality, much of this is second-nature to us and only needs, hopefully, to be more closely attended to… applying both existential-pragmatic and non-existential pragmatical criteria in this aspiration to think and act more clearly both before our own sense/s of self and before the sight of others before whom, in all probability, we wish to find both consensus and approbation along with understanding and the meeting of a well-meant disapprobation… should it be necessary to amend and ameliorate, augment and enhance the net benefit to be had on our passage through this world with(-)others, before(-)others, and engage an existential freedom to be found through(-)others in this world of the secular… (23)

Where, holistically, through working suspensions and de-suspensions, through pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment/posttreatment, and so on, such economic distinctions imposed upon living-experience, as lived-experience, through a more conclusive process of retreatment, collapse into the re(-)living of such experience through this emergence and merger of the secular, the philosophical and all other forms of the disciplinary, and the metaphysical as both the meta-philosophical and the meta-disciplinary. (24)

Thence the value of our discerning the ‘truth’, perceiving its obstruction, and apperceiving its de-obstruction… circumscribed we should note, at the same time, by an awareness of ‘our’ natural limitations… working to convert the weakly observed into these non-weak/non-strong forms of provisional, ongoing assessment through the reiteration of both those conformal processes of re(-)assessment and re(-)appreciation… through their emergence and merger... whilst avoiding all strong forms of ideological extremism and their co-associated obstruction of our abilities to clearly delineate a more suitable path through the integral secularity of this world as lived..!! (25)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 16.7.24.

Appendix B: On 'Re-Seeing' the 'Shape' of the Secular 'Voice' Given the Affirmation of the Secular Conjecture

Obviously, 're-seeing the shape of the secular voice' needs to be read as a mix of metaphors that cannot find a literal expression and can only be read in metaphorical terms. That understood, what is meant by 'the affirmation of the secular conjecture'? (0)

In perceiving the 'secular world' as 'the inadvertent recipient of the overlapping of the potentially conflicting ministrations of a plethora of disciplines, both non-religious and religious in orientation, all with varying degrees of a mix of incommensurability and commensurability, we must be left to wonder in what manner the independence of a secular world could even be contemplated let alone asserted'. However, in the making of an 'affirmation of this conjecture' that 'a secular world has a 'shape' of its own, can speak with some semblance of a 'voice',' it behoves the asserter of such a conjecture to demonstrate the truth of their assertion. In this short monograph I will set out to demonstrate the unique 'shape' of that 'voice', or, rather, 'choir of voices' in whose 'singing together' we find presented the 'vision' of a 'certain degree of social consensus that permits the functioning of The Overall Political-Economy within whose inescapable confines we paradoxically find our freedom to operate together as individuals and organizations, communities and nations, and so on…' (1)

Here the 'world of the secular' is juxtaposed to the 'world of disciplines both non-religious and religious in orientation'. Furthermore, in line with the essays in this *Book* 11, *On Conjectures*, this juxtaposition is also with the third economic dimension of 'conformal truth assignment and its truth appreciation'. Therefore, in this context, the 'secular' is 'neither disciplinary *per se* nor concerned with matters of conformal truth appreciation'.[434] Hence our concern is with this imputed 'residue', should it exist, that is 'neither directly defined by either disciplines, be they either non-religious or religious in scope, nor directly concerned with the mere assessment and appreciation of the truth status of what may or may not be found after disciplinarians, e.g., philosophers, *et al*, and metaphysicians, *et al* have left for secularists to explore should they be left, indeed, with a secular world to explore. Hence this pessimistic tone, yet, as such specialists, be they either professionals or amateurs, have to operate in this arena of the world at large then let us be optimistic that at the end of this noisy banquet for these feasting specialists that a world for the secularist might be left in which they, too, also can dine? Hence the import of the affirmation of this secular conjecture 'that a secular sense and semblance of world has a 'shape and voice' in which the secularist can authentically participate in the requisite integrity of purpose that can be neither reduced to the merely disciplinary nor the merely conformal!' (2)

An allusion and comparison can be made here to comparing the 'imputation of a secular world' to the 'myth of the wilderness'. As long as humanity inhabits this planet,

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[434] By 'conformal' is merely meant 'our ability to replicate the e/valuation of the truth assessment that was previously determined (through judgmental evaluation) and assigned (as a judged valuation) in a certain relational situation' on the grounds that if it cannot be replicated then we need to either emend such a claim or re-conceive the terms for its future e/valuational reference.

Earth, the idea of the pure, untouched wilderness is a myth. On the other hand, the concept of 're-wilding', when properly expedited, does have a profound relevance for the conjoined survival of both ourselves as a species and the wonderful variety of all other species with which we must also share this planet, hopefully, to the mutual benefit of all parties. The point being made by such an allusion is that the seeking of a pure, untouched secular world cannot be the object entailed in the affirmation of this secular conjecture, rather, that the secular world still remains as a working concept whose envisualization contains and displays a rich, secularistic world in its own right despite the ministrations of disciplinarians, like, e.g., philosopher, *et al*, and metaphysicians, like, e.g., judges and juries, *et al*.[435] (3)

Where might one begin? Let me start with the observation that I would define as a 'process of negative secular resistance…' then discover that the secular world is a rich tapestry of themes that defy dissection by specialists… and end with an example of a 'process of positive secular resistance…' (4)

In recently reading a controversial academic expressing their dismay that the Right would simply target their work, and themselves, without actually engaging with the complex findings of their research, as a consequence they opined that they had become more a 'symbol', a sort of 'red flag', for this anti-intellectualistic style of an attack.[436] This observation led me to suppose that a form of 'secular resistance' was being instigated and organized by the Right[437] which on the basis of its anti-intellectual credentials must be primarily affective in its motivation. Certainly, an emotive element was being expressed and disseminated through the virulence of such a non-cognitively, non-engaged style of criticism, a form of disputation that by no reasonable measure could be deemed, or redeemed, to be a 'critique'.[438] Therefore, from this observation I concluded that the secular domain is primarily 'affective' in both its characteristic complexion and the tenor of its objectives. Moreover, this style of criticism was 'disrespectful', and, therefore, 'negative' in its aspiration. If anything, a perfect example of so-called 'cancel culture' being exercised by the Right, by a Right that has also hypocritically and endlessly complained that they are the endless target of such a politically charged re-writing of their world. A world in which the Left and all else must also inhabit, but, where a division of major discourses leaves a polarized world with a diminished semblance of a working social consensus. (5)

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435 Metaphysicians do not have sole charge of assigning conformal truth determinations and appreciating their truth status since we have a plethora of other disciplines also charged with the same, e.g., from courts of law to art critics, *et al*. Furthermore, this is something the secular person must also perform, moment by moment, as they make their intentional passage through this world at large. Hence this 'social role involved in the adjudication of truth determination' is viewed as 'metaphysical' in orientation.

436 Refer to the first footnote attached to paragraph 15 in this specific essay.

437 I am trying to be descriptive here, and relatively apolitical. For 'Right' we could also substitute 'Left' when describing similar patterns of secular resistance. It is defined as 'negative' in terms of 'non-engaging and disrespecting the work of this academic (although the ramifications of this disrespectful non-engagement could also be included in this qualification).

438 Furthermore, 'resistance' would also find itself being refracted through a variety of forms from reluctance to revolution, as diagrammatically noted in paragraph 30.

Now, from a theoretical perspective,[439] as outlined for example in this set of essays, I would like to compare this tripolar economy of the 'secular, disciplinary, and conformal' to a number of other tripolar economies and therebetween find informative forms of an alignment with this economy of the secular (that equally could be called 'disciplinary' and conformal') by noting, e.g., that the secular aspect coincides with 'statements of fact' (in a conjectural economy), the 'public sphere' (in the social economy comprising a public domain, a private sphere, and their mediation through the field of arbitration); an 'orientation towards the future' and its 'expectations' (for processes of recontinuity where many events will also be performed in a similar manner to how they are being performed today); and so on, and so forth. (6)

Summarizing this first foray into interdisciplinary forms of comparative alignment by noting that the secular world is primarily, but not exclusively, 'affective' in orientation, 'public' in tenor (as one would expect), concerned with 'facts'… to which I would also like to add, given this 'hermeneutic orientation', concerns associated with its utilization of meta-textual 'genres of behaviour', the emphasis upon the 'rhetorical', and processes of 'questioning' (as explored in an interrogative economy), as possessing a 'political disposition' (in contrast to the economics of finance and the executive functions of the stylistic dimension in my previous readings of the political-economy), etc. (7)

Another way of seeing the secular world is as that place, or 'arena', where what is to-be-found to hand is 'found to hand', be it material, tools, genres of behaviour, facts, habits, conventions, rules of engagement, and, I well suspect, whatever we are inclined to take for granted, perhaps, overlook when not looked at closely… Indeed, the 'public world', as 'the secular arena for discourse', regardless as to how it is divided up between various major discourses and their polarization, along with their relatively incommensurable worlds of disciplinary practice, never appears to be completely willing to subject itself to the conflicting hegemony of truth determinations that may not be as 'conformal' as certain specialists would like us to believe, be they predisposed to construct their dissemination along either non-religious or religious lines of social coercion.[440] (8)

Now to conclude, let me ask the question, 'what might a positive form of secular resistance look like?' (9)

In the light of the above, I would be inclined to accept the premise 'that a positive form of secular resistance would be none other than our coming together through an overall resolution of social conjectures in the ongoing formation of a certain degree of social consensus which we should, each in our own way, seek to recognize, encounter and engage in such a manner so as to create, preserve, and conservationally expand this wonderful world of social understandings upon which our lives are then more successfully led and whose integrity is better promoted through social cohesion, through more democratically oriented forms of governance, in which we respectfully observe the fascinating variety of this world both human and non-human, in all its diversity, inclusivity, and as deserving those forms of equity that will ensure our collective survival and all

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439 Designated myself as a process of 'economic complexification'.

440 'Conformal' in the sense of 'being able to be both scrutinized and successfully reiterated'.

individually expressed forms of freedom that further the existential and pragmatic integrity and integration of this ‘our precious, yet fragile, world of the secular..!!’ (10)

But, let us now ask the question, ‘how does the secularist find an authenticity in the characterization[441] of their behaviour both individually and collectively?’ (11)

Through the adoption and adaptation of our overall attitudinal orientation through a respectful-openness to the secularity of this world at large through a suspension of all conjectures that are superfluous to such existential discernment. (12)

Effectively, through a decoupling of all prior commitments, through both a suspension of belief and disbelief, through simulating a pro-relational attitude and from such a trans-relational perspective simulating the simulation of the existential re(-)orientation under the auspices of the non-simulated. (13)

Through both suspensions and their automatic invocations of their de-suspension, through the suspension of the suspension itself, we experience the collapse of all economic correlativities like the conformal, the disciplinary, the secular, and so on. (14)

Re(-)discerning lived-experience in the midst of living-experience... (15)

Regardless of whether we are non-religiously oriented or religiously oriented, we engage the secularity of this overall world-of-life through the emergence of an excess of existentially oriented re(-)e/valuation... hopefully, with enough faith and optimism that the disruption of the radically-radical is suitably ameliorated through our incremental appropriation of the relatively-radical... taken and lived step by step, moment by moment..!! (16)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 16.7.24.

441 By ‘characterization’ is meant ‘both complexion and the tenor of its more probable trajectories’.

XIR. A Third Digest
(That can be appended to *The Seventh Book*…)

BOOK 11

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIR. A Third Digest (That can be appended to The Seventh Book…)*[442]

Preamble

Appended to *The Seventh Book*… is *A First Digest* (C) in the form of two additional modules.

Similarly, appended to Book 9 is A Second Digest (12Y)

Again, *A Third Digest* is constructed that can be added to *The Seventh Book*… where a summation of my latest research is formulated in a more precise format.

In this specific digest, I intend to divide it into three modular sections with the addition of a partial commentary as *An Overview in the Form of a Commentary on A Third Digest* as can be appended to both this *Book* 11 and *The Seventh Book*…, namely:

1. On Definitions Preparatory to the Operation of a Conjectural Economy
2. On Conjectures
3. On an Affirmation of the Secular Conjecture
4. On the Differentiation and Integration of the Non-Critical, Critical, and Radical
5. On the Discernment of the Existential Dimension
6. On the Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline.

7. An Overview in the form of a Commentary on 'A Third Digest'

In the summary formulation of this digest, and its partial commentary, the implications of this research continue to be developed.

I envisage the writing of a twelfth book titled *Reconsiderations* will oscillate between aspects of this philosophy where I have had to change my mind and modify my findings, etc., and, in what way the discipline of philosophy, etc., must also reconsider the nature and direction of their disciplinary behaviour… (0)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 23.7.24.

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442 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

XIR. A Third Digest

1. On Definitions Preparatory to the Operation of a Conjectural Economy

‘Conjectures’ are ‘arguments utilizing analytical proposition and synthetical statements representing a modeling of lived-experience that through alignment is then the logical subject of a process of appreciative conformal validation or invalidation’. (1)

A ‘conjectural economy’ is ‘a trimodal composite of synthetical statements, analytical propositions, and conjectural propositional-statements (echoing through complexified alignment the archetypal economy, respectively, of a hermeneutical background, a phenomenological foreground, and a non-systematic existential sense and semblance of archetypal subjectivity)’. (2)

‘Intermediation’ is ‘the trimodal suspension of all three economic correlatives in the economy in question’. (3)

‘Mediation’ is ‘the bimodal suspension of two correlatives in the economy in question’. (4)

‘Intramediation’ is ‘the unimodal suspension of one economic correlative in the economy in question’. (5)

‘Rectification’ is ‘a process of pretreatment exercised through mitigation dealing with hermeneutical consideration of genres and facts, etc.’ (6)

‘Remediation’ is ‘the process of treatment exercised through correction as exercised phenomenologically through both deconstruction and reconstruction involving an elevation in meta-status by one degree’. (7)

‘’Re(-)normalization’ is ‘the process of retreatment exercised through ongoing re(-)approximation through re(-)alignment involving the de-elevation in meta-status by one degree through the de-suspension (in a process of posttreatment of either pretreatment or treatment)’. (8)

A ‘working suspension’ is ‘an extensive suspension involving the suspended sub-economies of an overall transcendental suspension, the de-suspension, and its causal conversion of a virtual simulation into a non-virtual state of affairs’. (9)

‘Non-economic’, in its positive sense, is ‘the irruption of economic e/valuational formation through economic resolution’. (10)

‘Non-economic’, in its negative sense, is ‘proposing that which is either economically impossible or economically defective to the extent the co-associated conjecture is rendered inoperable’. (11)

‘Hyper-economic’ is ‘that sub-economical aspect that re-appropriates the non-economic (in its positive sense) within the overall economy of the economic, i.e., the super-economic economy’. (12)

‘The archetypal economy’ is ‘a 3 x 1 matrix generated between the correlativities of the World, Object, and Ego moments’. (13)

‘The ordered economy’ is ‘a 3 x 2 matrix generated through the privileging/deprivileging of World, Object, and Ego’ by respectively de-suspension/suspension of these archetypal moments producing six distinctive trans-cognitive and cognitive orders, etc.’ (14)

‘The Political-Economy’ is ‘a 3 x 3 matrix generated through a horizontal economy of World, Object, and Ego *versus* the vertical economy of the super-economic consisting of the hyper-economic sub-economy, the economic sub-economy, and the non-economic sub-economy’ (hence the implication of super-intermediation, super-mediation, and super-intra-mediation, etc.).[443] (15)

‘The metaphysical sub-economy’, within the overall philosophical economy, is ‘the meta-philosophical discipline concerned with conformal appreciation’. (16)

‘The metaphysical sub-economy’ is equated with ‘the overall inter-ordered economy’ which arises through ‘reduplication (and duplication) of the six distinctive forms of trans-cognitive judgment that (in)form the trans-cognitive orders’. (17)

‘Reduplication’ is ‘the symmetrical domination by one ordered format of the same ordered format’. E.g., ‘the inter-ordered discipline of history’ is defined as ‘the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order (of ontical facts) of the sixth trans-cognitive order (of ontical facts) (and is producing six inter-ordered orders). (18)

‘Duplication’ is ‘the asymmetrical domination by one ordered format of a different ordered format (and is productive of thirty combinations)’. E.g., the duplication of the sixth inter-ordered order of history of the fifth inter-ordered order of science in the formation of the history of (the discipline of) science. (19)

‘Transformation’ is ‘a process of change that can be viewed through the lens of a philosophy of transformational retreatment involving the three dialectical phases of pre-treatment, treatment and retreatment/posttreatment’. (20)

‘Conformal truth determination’ is ‘a process of truth determination that is able to be reiterated and consists of its logical subjectivity in the form of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, a transformed complexion, and its e/valuational tenor’. (21)

‘Pro-relational’ is ‘the existential identification with the primary relationship from the imputed perspective of that relationship itself in trans-relational subjectivity’. (22)

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443 As will be explored in the first essay in *Book* 12.

2. On Conjectures

The conjectural economy makes sense of both analytical propositions and synthetical statements through the necessary economic addition of conjectures well-expressed through non-deformed propositional-statements. (23)

Therefore, we cannot appreciate propositions *qua* propositions, statements *qua* statements, conjectures *qua* conjecture, nor, can we appreciate their comparative contrast if we overlook the necessity of a conjectural economy or its economic equivalent. (24)

Thence the trimodal nature of the conjectural economy should be well-formed phenomenologically, well-informed hermeneutically, and well-expressed existentially (in a non-systematic sense through the non-deformation of propositional-statements). 25)

E.g., tautologically, in weather, 'it either rains or does not rain', and, non-tautologically, 'under rain, we get wet'; synthetically, 'if it is raining, then, yes, it is raining now can be treated as a true fact'; and, conjecturally, 'if it is raining, then you will get wet if you get rained upon'. (26)

No one economically correlated party in the conjectural economy in itself could function either in a non-existential pragmatical fashion or in an existential-pragmatic fashion since the economic demands the correlation of all three correlativities in each and every economy. (27)

All economies are perspectival expressions of the archetypal economy and, by virtue of this basis, the conjectural economy can be commented upon and enriched through economic complexification.[444] (28)

So, e.g., the 'analytical' can be viewed through a 'phenomenological lens' as conducted through 'remediation', i.e., deconstruction and reconstruction; the 'synthetical' can be viewed through a 'hermeneutical lens' as conducted through 'rectification' (of the function of genres and the affirmation of factual considerations); and, 'conjectural' can be viewed through a 'non-systematic existential lens' as conducted through processes of ongoing 're(-)normalization'. (29)

Philosophy, like any other discipline, ideally, should operate for engineering the beneficial benefit of others besides the entertainment and employment of just disciplinarians themselves. (30)

Philosophy, like any other disciplines, stands in need of the affirmation of conformal truth determination, which, correctly, is primarily the business of the metaphysician and those delegated to act in that type of role.[445] (31)

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[444] As illustrated in the next proposition where we find parallel forms of alignments between the 'analytical' and 'phenomenological' and 'remediation', (and 'retrospectivity', 'treatment', etc.), etc. A parallel dictionary notes tabulates such alignments.

Conformal truth determination and the ascertainment of the competence of disciplines in their respective social systematization is the province of the metaphysical discipline. (32)

A reconstituted metaphysics operates primarily in inter-ordered terms of reference. (33)

I.e., where conformation is also being conducted in terms of semantic categories; psychological and sociological forms of integrity; existential-deontological-pragmatic e/valuational formation; non-existential pragmatical e/valuational formation; scientific concerned dealing with potentialities, and historical concerns dealing with overlapping histories of the past, present, and future. (34)

A non-economical fork, as a fork, deconstructs the impossible and the defective, and, reconstructs the positive as indicating productive forms of non-economic e/valuational formation as evidence for forms of economic resolution. (35)

The super-economic economy integrating the sub-economics of the economic, the non-economic, and the hyper-economic. (36)

Where conjectures can be closely appreciated under the headings of the Non-Critical, Critical, and Radical, and where the latter is appreciated in micro-incremental terms of reference given the relative-radical can be appropriated hyper-economically but not the radically-radical. (37)

Where, as a non-fork, the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork notes how the distinctive nature of philosophical definitions is overridden in the formation of both existentially oriented forms of e/valuational formation. (38)

Where non-existential value is either positive, neutral or negative, but, where existential value is expressed only in comparatively positive terms of reference. (39)

A well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy conformally consolidates truth determination within a body of cultural-intercultural knowledge that can be refined through the twin methodological concepts of ‘insurance and assurance’.[446] (40)

Relative transformational isomorphic invariance establishes the basis for a transformation, transformational treatment and retreatment establishing form and value. (41)

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445 Besides philosophers, and their concerns for truth determination, we have judges and juries, art critics, executives and management, quality control, etc. However, more correctly, the discernment of truth determination is a necessary adjunct in the performance of all credible disciplines.

446 As exemplifying the Duhem-Quine thesis, etc.

3. On an Affirmation of the Secular Conjecture

A discipline, be it non-religious or religious in scope, is defined as the disciplinary difference once the secular perspective is subtracted from its distinctive disciplinary expression. (42)

The value of a discipline being its disciplinary meta-difference as per the meta-textual expression of that type of the distinctive mix of genres of behaviour that underwrite the hermeneutical functioning of that discipline. (43)

But disciplines must operate in the world at large and hence a disciplinary non-difference must also be proposed as the so-called third moment of the disciplinary economy. (44)

Because if discipline bore no relation to the secular world, then what does not exist does not exist for us, and, therefore, we would not need to be there for it.[447] (45)

But, if the secular world were to only be the arena for the miscellaneous ministrations of the disciplinary world well we might ask what is there that is left that would allow a secular world to metaphorical 'speak' with its 'own voice'? (46)

Such multi-various interventions granted, still, we can confirm the affirmation of a secular conjecture through various observations and strategies. (47)

E.g., we can note the paralleling of the public dimension with the apparent hermeneutical nature of the secular world given this paralleling of the 'public dimension' and the 'hermeneutical', etc. (48)

E.g., through noting the affective intensity of negative forms of resistance of an anti-intellectual complexion and tenor. (49)

E.g., noting reasonable conjectures concerning other forms of resistance from non-expressed expressions of reluctance to the expressions of forms of rebellion or more successful forms of revolutions, be such transformations arrived at through gradual evolution in consensus or more violently expressed forms of disagreement. (50)

E.g., that as disciplines must function, besides operating upon themselves, in the world at large in order to devolve suitable forms of both non-existential and existential e/valuational formation. (51)

Which stands perfectly to reason given that the de-suspension of all suspensions, at the center of all psychological operations, reduces the degree of epistemological organization in treatment and retreatment to the region of our very embodiment in this world at large. (52)

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[447] An important lesson for a theological discipline (that can also be used to validate a 'radical theology' as a 'radical secular theology').

4. On the Differentiation and Integration of the Non-Critical, Critical, and Radical

‘Discernment of the relatively distinctive’ is ‘differentiation’, the ‘integration’ of the same is ‘accommodation’, and, the ‘suspension of the former’ can be read as its ‘transformation(al characterization)’. (53)

Then, the persistence of the relative transformational isomorphic invariance accounts for the logical subjectivity of the primary relationship in question along with its relational participants (subjects) and parts (object-stated) which could also be referred to as ‘actors and acters’. (54)

To this relatively invariant logical subjectivity we can the transformational characterization of its complexion and tenor, i.e., its phenomenal-phenomenological mapping in a semantic sense of world along with a delineation of its apparent intentional objectivity (as treated through a set of intentional perspectives). (55)

Then, to that logical subjectivity and its characterization we can add an evaluation of its non-existential and existential e/valuation formations along with the differentiation integration, and transformation of the same through the inescapable processes of intervention in the secular world at large preferably of an existential tenor. (56)

The apparent observation of the truthful delineation of the same taking the form, as per Tarski, namely P’ is T iff p (preferably reviewed in the context of a sentential report). (57)

So, e.g., the relative transformational isomorphic invariance ‘i’ can be accounted for as true (T) when: (I)’ T iff (i) (where brackets merely signal sentential report). (58)

In view of the trimodal nature of the conjectural economy, or the invocation of a relevant economic equivalent, a sentential report is a composite textual report noting analytical propositions, synthetical statements, and apposite conjectural propositional-statements. (59)

Because no economic correlative can be treated as a viable economic isolate although we seem to do so in provisional terms of reference through focusing on aspects of the economy in question. (60)

However, should such limited provisional ‘focusing’ be denied then that person automatically removes themselves to the sphere of the economic impossible whose remediation demands the compete deconstruction of the same as strong ideological nonsense in the worst scenario worse, or, at best, as merely a defective imputation, etc. (61)

Excessive insistence on any formulation veers into the extremist ideological territory of the impossibly ‘strong’ along with the co-association of a potential pseudo-psychotic complexion. (62)

Because the relatively ‘strong’ must be discounted as ‘ideological nonsense’ we are left with both the relatively ‘weak’, through its speculative presentation, and the conformal affirmation of the relatively ‘non-weak/non-strong’. (63)

The economics of truth determination functions more effectively and representatively through the use of a trimodal logic of the relatively ‘weak’, etc. (64)

The imputation of speculative conjectures is relatively weak, but, through evidential conformation, the correctly affirmed then takes a ‘non-weak/non-strong status’. (65)

The ‘conformal’ is ‘the reiterable whose status preserves its non-weak/non-strong status’. (66)

Beginning with the use of evidence, testimony or inference in the presentation of a conjectured imputation either as a confirmation in real time or as a verification retrospectively. (67)

Thence the conformal process begins with the confirmation or verification of a confirmation or a verification, etc. (68)

However, more correctly, since the process of truth determination is arrived at through, e.g., insurance and assurance, etc., in and through the medium of a cultural-intercultural body of knowledge, as per the Duhem-Quine thesis, etc., it follows that the delineated truth of either propositions, statements, and/or conjectural-statements is a retrospective affair. (69)

‘Insurance’ merely notes ‘our ability to return to a point of greater assurance’ in this accommodation of cultural-intercultural knowledge, and then ‘correctly proceeding from such assurance’ in order to find a greater conformal degree of ‘assurance’. (70)

Thence the ‘relatively weak’, the ‘relatively critical’, and the ‘relatively radical’ with the latter recognizing the unique non-economic resolutions instrumental in the reconstruction of novel terms of reference. (71)

Where the radically-radical cannot be appropriated in hyper-economic terms of reference unless approached sequentially through the apposite use of micro-incremental points of well-represented chaotically inspired re-direction through the ironically expanded use so-called ‘final vocabularies’, ‘definitive histories’, or similar, etc. (72)

The well-represented arising though the demonstrated persistence of transformational alignments either within and/or between sentential reports. (73)

Giving conformal truth determination a reconstituted metaphysical basis that, through invoking the use of well-performed conjectures, implies that the appreciation of such ordered judgments must be inter-ordered in their characterization. (74)

5. On the Discernment of the Existential Dimension

A more complete title could be ‘On the Discernment of the Existential Dimension in the Coursing of Everyday Experience’. (75)

Where e/valuational formation is both non-existential and existential in its characteristic complexion and overall tenor. (76)

Where ‘existentialization’ arises through ‘the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential’, and, ‘de-existentialiation’ is ‘the relative de-existentialation of the relatively existential’. (77)

Where processes of ‘non-existential e/valuation’ arise through ‘pragmatical, non-deontological, and non-pragmatic oriented processes of origination through the utilization of a non-pro-relational, relational sense and semblance of perspective. (78)

In contrast, an existential orientation takes place through the invocation of a non-pragmatical form of pro-relational e/valuation. (79)

Where an existential evaluation takes on only a comparative degree of an experiential positivity. (80)

Through the conversion of judgment from a merely relational perspective to a pro-relational perspective in which the potential existential enrichment of the primary relationship is to be considered additional to its pre-existing non-existential richness. (81)

Judgment is delivered through working suspensions (invoking a set of extensive suspensions), but, where a suspension of the well-represented re(-)presentation of the relationship *per se*, albeit as we find ourselves emplaced in the overall relational world at large, then delivers an existential appreciation of our embodiment, our social embeddedness and our physical embankment in a world to hand. (82)

Enhancing the sense and semblance of the existentially beneficial through positive processes of chaotic re(-)direction arrived at through the apposite, sequential exercise of an incremental orchestration of that ‘event’ or series and/or set/s of such ‘events’. (83)

Where through ‘thoughts thinking themselves’ in and through suitable suspensions there automatically is invoked the existential forcefulness of the de-suspension as it returns us to our interventions in a secular world preferably with an existential complexion and tenor in and through a process of an existential surplus or existential excess in e/valuational formation. (84)

Thence the existential nature of conformal truth determination where both the disciplinary and the conformal are ever returned to the secular world from which we have never left wherein we must stand with(-)others, before(-)others, and find our existential freedom through(-)others, in and through the auspices of the w/holy Other. (85)

6. On the Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Without consensus there could be neither disciplinary nor interdisciplinary cooperation. (86)

Consensus is further arrived at through reported forms of alignment expressed in textual terms that is further reinforced through aligned forms of behaviour, and v.v. (87)

Hence the textual basis for a reconstituted metaphysics in its concerns with textual alignments, reiterable forms of truth determination, the appreciation of non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation along with the competence of those disciplines in their social settings. (88)

Where the discipline of philosophy is concerned with issues of conformation within and between a vast number of sub-disciplines that systematically fall within its social embrace. (89)

Being able to both delineate and resolve problematic concerns either within this discipline or between disciplines, or, within or between social systems. (90)

Where the value of a discipline should be measured by the relatively beneficial impact of its interventions in terms of both pragmatical, non-existential e/valuational formation and the pragmatic nature of existentially oriented patterns of e/valuational formation. (91)

Furthermore, the determination of the overall relationship between pragmatic and pragmatical forms of e/valuation formation necessitates an understanding of their interrelationship given that the relatively existential is ‘the relative existentialization of the relative existential, etc. (92)

Noting the utilization of the extended suspension under the rubric of working suspensions. (93)

Treating conformation as a central concern given a working relationship with the use of conjectural economies that are well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed through well-non-deformed forms of conjectural transformational retreatment. (94)

Where through the existential forcefulness of the de-suspension we are ever returned to the secularity of the overall world-of-life. (95)

Thence the respectful nature of the pursuit of philosophy as a discipline..!! (96)

7. An Overview in the Form of a Partial Commentary on 'A Third Digest'

'Definitions' are 'a form of analytical-like equivalence whose canonical isomorphism is meant to present an exact equivalence when equivalence is either completely trivial or provisionally identical (granted that the overriding principle of non-equivalence states that an exact non-trivial equivalence cannot be rendered in lived-reality unless we overlook differences in transformational characterization, or in time and space, or sense and reference, or meaning and meaningfulness, etc.)'. (97)

To more fully appreciate the definitions supplied, both their significance and limitations, refer to the relevant sections of texts in this *Pursuit*. (98)

Just as philosophy forgets to observe the role of both suspensions and de-suspensions it also overlooks that individual sets of propositions, e.g., just cannot be entertained in those economically restricted terms of reference. Hence proposition 23 (as an extended reading of Quine's 'two dogmas', etc.). (99)

Furthermore, also binary sets of propositions and statements, or, statements and conjectures, or, conjectures and propositions, likewise, cannot be strictly appreciated in those bimodal terms of reference. Hence proposition [24] as an economic extension of this observation partially described by Quine.[448] (100)

On economic grounds we must also presuppose that a trimodal formulation is at work. My suggestion is the utilization of a conjectural economy encompassing analytical, synthetical and conjectural aspects concurrently. But other relevant economies could also be chosen as long as the intended work becomes suitably realized [24] when it notes the use of 'equivalent economies' that are also relevant in terms of the desired economic richness of non-existential pragmatical e/valuation formation and the enrichment flowing on from existential, pragmatic evaluation formation). (101)

But, as per the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork [38, etc.]. (102)

As noted, all economies are trimodal. A functioning economy can have its correlative economic modalities delineated through a careful observation of that economy in question. Even if those modalities are seemingly covert in their mutual cooperation. Hence their conjecture be they putative, implied, inferred, etc; or, described, prescribed and/or proscribed, etc. (103)

Where the further implication should also be drawn, namely, e.g., that we cannot have just ethical descriptions, etc., but, a fully-fledged economy that must also utilizes prescriptions and proscriptions. Where, all things not being equal, will involve the determination of how that relevant economic pie is to be divided up between its ostensive correlatives. (104)

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448 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIG.

So, despite the necessary use of conjectures, one could still see the same economy as being primarily treated as either analytical or synthetical in style (which can go some of the way to explain why the inescapable necessity of conjectures has been all too often overlooked). (105)

E.g., in lighting a fire using matches we can note the following: ‘a fire is either lit or not lit, and, a well-struck match has successfully lit a fire (even it is only the match that is burning); here a fire has been started, therefore (as a conjecture) we can note that, indeed, a fire is burning’ [26]. (106)

Because without conjectures neither analytical nor synthetically oriented sentences would or could be understood either individually or jointly. (107)

As per [27] there could be neither pragmatical nor pragmatic patterns of e/valuational formation. Thence, too, the necessary correlation of all correlatives within an economy or between economies when this form of a commentary contributes to the apposite enrichment of the initial economy. (108)

‘All economies are perspectival expressions of the archetypal economy’, and, where all perspectives cannot be exhausted, but, where evidence of evidentiary satisfaction is enough to terminate that form of scrutiny, and, where an exhaustion of an infinite range of possible perspectives obviously cannot be conducted, but, again, evidence of evidentiary satisfaction is enough to terminate that multi-polar form of scrutiny. Thence the dialectical nature of our research given such explorations are already multi-polar in orientation, although, again, all things not being equal, such a frame of reference, either simple or composite in its origination, can be characterized through an overlooking of its less prominent economic correlatives and constituents. (109)

On the other hand, the judicious use of economic complexification can quite quickly enrich the complexion and tenor of our research. (110)

Thence this observation that the analytical can be looked at through a phenomenal-phenomenological lens, and v.v., etc. [29]. (111)

Where all disciplines should operate, respectfully, upon an open basis of helping others [30]. Thence this need, that we observe both pragmatical and pragmatic forms of e/valuational formation [24, 59 etc.]. (112)

Hence a disciplinary set of considerations and a conformal set of considerations [31] to which we can also add a secular dimension, and, hence the nomination of the ensuing economy the title of either secular, disciplinary, and/or conformal. (113)

Where the province of the metaphysician is individual conformal truth determination and overall competence of a specific economy in its conventionally located systematic social setting [31]. (114)

Metaphysics being reconstituted in an anti-representative context through an appreciation of comparative conformal alignments within and between texts in a representations of their originating economies, etc. [31]. (115)

Hence this basic concern with the identification of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc. (116)

Where the economy of re(-)presentation has no connection whatsoever either between and/or within so-called internal worlds and 'external worlds', and, where the economic process of 're(-)presentation' represents the 'ongoing economy of the correlatives of the hermeneutical representation of meta-textual genres and factual inputs subject to rectification plus the phenomenal-phenomenological presentation as subjected to remediation plus the non-systematic existential re-presentation as subjected to this unending, ongoing process of cultural-intercultural re(-)normalization, etc. (117)

Where through suspensions even extrapolated imputations are simulated through the forceful nature of de-suspensions as if produced though an apparitional form of representation whose chaotic complexion is productive of a relatively radical unique sense of non-economic irruption, etc., as implied by non-dis-conjunction nature of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork [38]. (118)

Where economic resolution within the overall economy of the super-economic irrupts in a positive non-economic orientation that is then immediately re(-)appropriated in hyper-economic terms of reference [36]. (119)

So, the irruptive nature of the positive aspect of the non-economical fork is articulated through the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork in the current uniqueness of its ordered accommodation that will transcend the artificial distinctiveness of those ordered distinctions. (120)

Hence, e.g., the practical brief of the architect of a bridge where they must balance and resolutely resolve 'distinctively ordered' deontological, pragmatical, and aesthetical concerns. (121)

A preoccupation with truth determination prominently characterizes certain disciplines, e.g., judges and juries, art critics, etc., [31], but, more correctly must also thread all credible disciplines besides our coursing through a secular sense and semblance of the world.at large. (122)

But given an appreciation of conformal truth determination is of ordered forms of judgment we then encounter their inter-ordered reduplication and duplication just as, e.g., the factual appreciation of factual inputs realizes the inter-ordered basis of historical research, etc. [33, 34]. (123)

A conformal economy oscillates in a space between the non-critical, critical, and the radical as if correlatives because even in the performance of a lie we must speak the truth so even the non-critical cannot be completely defective [27]. (124)

On the other hand, what is completely defective are the declared establishment of impossible thoughts as found in so-called 'strong' forms of ideological extremism that misleadingly 'invoke' the non-economical without recognizing its negative sense as impossible to contemplate [53]. (125)

Preferably moving a weak conjecture to a non-weak/non-strong conformal status through valid forms of demonstration be that directly evidential and/or indirectly attested or inferred [36] avoiding, in the process, the impossibility of a strong status. (126)

Remaining open to the existential uniqueness of the relatively-radical as progressive re(-)appropriated micro-incrementally [37, 38]. (127)

Where overall, truth determination is expressed through the triple necessity of some aspect of invariance, transformational characterization, and e/valuation [41]. (128)

Defining 'secular' here in apposition to both non-religious and religious disciplines on the grounds that all disciplines are economically constituted in a similar manner, i.e., through disciplinary differences, etc., through their distinctive apposition ot the secular. But, in turn, the secular can be defined in apposition to disciplines as a non-disciplinary difference, non-disciplinary meta-difference, and a non-disciplinary non-difference which, moreover, assumes the existence and affirmation of a secular conjecture [42-47]. (129)

As a place to commence such speculations, I noted that the affirmation of the secular conjecture postulates its coincidence with the public domain [48], with affective psychological states and processes of resistance [49, 50], consensus formation [50], locus for value formation [51], as a place of embodiment, embeddedness and embankment [52, 83], as well as that arena that is found to hand [83], etc. (130)

Being both relatively transcendent to the world through suspensions and relatively immanent to the same world through our forceful return through the automatic delivery of the de-suspensions [52, 97]. (131)

Where, through economic complexification, we can say differentiation is phenomenologically oriented, accommodation is hermeneutically oriented, and transformation is existentially oriented (both non-systematically and systematically[449]) [53],

(132).

[449] The 'non-systematic existential' arises through 'the bimodal suspension of differentiation and accommodation', and, the 'systematic existential' is a 'trimodal suspension of the entire economy in question as representatively simulated'.

Relationships from the perspective of their actors and acters is relational in status, but, the relationship viewed through the imputed lens of its own integrity is pro-relational and existential in orientation (and is experienced trans-relationally[450]) [80]. (133)

Truth determination being refracted through a Tarskian format [57]. This could be judged to be relatively non-problematic, whereas, what is problematic is how appreciation observes this format. The modeling of the super-economic being one attempt to obviate such controversial difficulties as to how to interpret these differences in meta-states, etc. Supplemented by a transformational philosophy of retreatment, etc. (134)

In terms of an imputed sentential alignment, etc., we note that the meta-sentential report is true if and only if the sentential report itself is evident [58]. (135)

Relatively focusing on a correlative aspect is one thing, but, to argue that we can entertain the same as an economic isolate is impossible [60]. Hence the need for remediation, etc. [61]. (136)

Where such impossible attestment is insisted upon then we either recognize, encounter, and/or engage an extremist positioning along with its potential for a pseudo-psychotic complexion and tenor [62]. (137)

It must be stressed that the conformal is affirmed through valid reiteration [66-70] and takes on a non-weak/non-strong status [66]. (138)

The relatively novel is chaotically re-presented through re-direction [71]. (139)

Where the relatively existential is chaotically re-presented in innovative terms of reference [72]. (140)

Philosophically we cannot do without some form of representation and this is supplied through the conformal treatment of alignment (transformational invariance, etc.) between sentential reports subjected to Tarskian conditions, etc. [74]. (141)

Thence the reconstitution of this anti-representational metaphysics [75], along with an inter-ordered complexion and tenor [75, 76]. (142)

Noting the discernment of value (e/valuational formation) as either non-existential, existential, and/or non-existential-existential in orientation. Because the co-existence of the non-existential is necessary as the basis for the existential through the requisite existentialization of the latter [76-78]. (143)

‘E/valuation’ because ‘trans-intentional judgment (in the Trans-Cognitive Aspect of the epistemological hierarchy, i.e., psyche) delivers a valuation in intentional terms (in the Cognitive Aspect)’ [76-82]. (144)

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[450] On the observational grounds that subjectivity is tempered by the predominant complexion and tenor of the apparent focus of its intentional objectivity.

Thence this (more recent) distinction contrasting the enriching of non-existential 'richness' with the existential 'enrichment' of valuation through either a relational creation, a preservation, and/or an expanded conservation [82]. (145)

Where judgment is enacted through suspensions, etc. [82-86], along with the emergence of a non-existential richness and an existential enrichment through existential surpluses in e/valuational formation, returning us to the secular through de-suspensions along with the sense and semblance of an existential freedom [86]. [146].

Where the non-religious can view the existential dimension through the wholly Other as non-Other, and, the religious person can view the existential dimension as holy Other as also non-Other... where existential insights can re(-)interpret both the secular and the non-secular (in whatever form or forms we might wish to refract the perceived or received sense and semblance of the existential) [86]. (147)

Noting the important insight that many problems in The Political-Economy stem from conflicts located either within and/or between social systems.[451] [91). (148)

On one hand, philosophy is just another discipline (with a rich nexus of sub-disciplines), whereas, on the other hand, philosophy is a door to the sub-discipline of a reconstituted metaphysics focusing on an appreciation of both conformal truth determination and systematic competence of those same disciplines (and their sub-disciplines), etc. [87-97]. (149)

Where, joy of joy, the net result of a systematic existential perspective, arising from the overall suspension of the economy or economies in question, is to be released and projected back into the secular world in all its concrete specificity… (150)

Where the suspended de-coupling of the relatively-radical transcendence of treatment and the relatively-radical immanence of retreatment propels us immediately back to this pretreated world as lived, albeit this life-world suitably amended through posttreatment, in this simulated simulation, as a non-simulation, of this overall world-of-life… (151)

The impact of the philosophical can be pointed to through its ability to articulate the amplification of both beneficial, non-existential valuation and beneficial, existential valuation as realized, together, through positive forms of intervention primarily with an existential complexion and tenor [92]. (152)

Thence the potentially positive value of the philosophical discipline along with its sub-disciplines like a reconstituted metaphysics, etc. (153)

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451 As explored in Book IX. E.g., the tensions between various food industries and the business world where the ruling ethos of either domain is at loggerheads, and, the problems that ensue when profits are put before the health of people, etc., as one of the causes at the root of the so-called 'obesity epidemic'.

Hence the respectful prosecution, practicality, and prescience of the philosophical discipline that is able to differentiate between the non-critical, the critical, and the relatively-radical... along with an appreciation of both the relatively-non-existential and the relatively-existential... in our pursuit of a more mutual and beneficial path to be taken up in our passage/s through this world at large [98]..! (154)

By 'respectful' is also meant 'our openness to the productivity of working suspensions, etc.,' as we optimistically await the resolution of our anticipated-expectations[452] in the ongoing realization of the existential characterization of the uniqueness of that 'event' [94, 98]. (155)

Understanding, of course, that the exigencies of our situations will afford some people more freedom in their situatedness than that for others since the best of possible worlds for people is never the best of all possible worlds given that we must also suffer the net consequences of the enactions of all others... to the extent they either individually and/or collectively acted through suitable or unsuitable forms of commission, or did not act through suitable or unsuitable forms of omission, or could not make up their minds either way for whatever reason or reasons. (156)

Therefore, we can both ask and answer the question, 'how does the secularist find an authenticity in the characterization of their behaviour both individually and/or collectively?' regardless of whether they act as either a non-religiously oriented person or as a religiously oriented person. (157)

In and through a respectful-openness to the world at large through a suspension of all that is superfluous to such existential discernment. (158)

Decoupling ourselves from all extremist positioning, all *a priori* attitudes, all attachment to our ontological and epistemological commitments, suspending all forms of belief and all forms of disbelief...[453] (159)

Through simulating a pro-relational attitude by identifying our attention with the holistic perspective of our primary relationships in a relational sense and semblance of world in the aspiration that we become aligned accordingly. (160)

Being prepared to see our world 'turned upside down, inside out, and back to front...' as we are directly confronted by the re-directed radical nature of existentially oriented experience. (161)

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452 As a conjunction of future 'expectations' and the immediacy of present 'anticipation' (along with the implicit coupling of a past 'recall')

453 Where ideological extremists, conspiratorial advocates, all people with over-commitments, etc., indeed, all people, need to invoke the suspension of both belief and disbelief. Invoking, when and where necessary, a suspicion of suspicion, and so on. Having faith de-suspensions will do their pragmatic work....

Recognizing, encountering, and engaging the impossible nature of the radically-radical through the incrementally re-directing enhancement of our evolving appreciation of the relatively-radical. (162)

Intuitively working with the amended rectification of the pretreatment of our conjectures, subjecting them to treatment through remediation arising from deconstruction and reconstruction, and permitting existential retreatment to intervening in this world through the approximations more aptly realized through re(-)normalization. (163)

Turning the ‘key’ and opening the metaphorical ‘door’ of the non-systematic existential and respectfully stepping inside the disruptive dimension of the systematic existential through both suspensions and de-suspensions... as both disciplinary and conformal forms of intentional directedness collapse into the lived-authenticity of this secular world at large… (164)

Leaving lived-experience as ultimately unable to be differentiated as either secular experience or non-secular experience..!! (165)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 29.7.24.