Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark…
A.C. for ever-looking after myself,
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts…
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness….

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Preface

As can be seen in the Index above, the path of my ‘reconsiderations’ oscillates between past transgressions perpetrated by myself and types of transgressions perceived as being perpetrated elsewhere.

I am also most grateful for the members of The Continental Philosophy Group who allowed me to test run these ideas and who have considerably modified much of my subsequent thinking.

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.12.24.

Foreword

Although titled a ‘Foreword’ the following ‘introduction’ will, I confess, address a number of issues both relatively settled and relatively unsettled. The title, ‘*Reconsiderations*’, as noted in the second essay, is an allusion to a late work by Augustine titled ‘*Retractationes*’ in which he renounces former positions that, in hindsight, were then no longer coincident and concordant with his more mature Christian thoughts and beliefs. However, in my ‘reconsiderations’ I am more concerned, thankfully, with minor shifts in my previous work rather than feeling a need to renounce vast swarths of earlier work. I often quip that, ‘I am never wrong, and that my ideas are only modified’. To put that in a more philosophically oriented form of language I could translate this to mean, ‘my qualifications are never wrong, only re-qualified’. Of course, this innocuous formula hides the fact that small changes in input can belie vast differences in output as would be understood from an appreciation of a chaotic understanding of lived-reality. That, in the light of this observation, I must also confess to a considerable shift in my subsequent thinking as a result of these minor ‘re-qualified modifications’. (i)

A reader of *The Seventh Book*… would be under no illusion as to where I stood in regard to ideologically over-committed philosophies like ‘realism’, ‘idealism’, etc., along with all other unimodal and bimodal formulations… arguing that a trimodal formulation was the bare minimum and that all else be deconstructed, if you had the time and desire to do that, and, thereafter, relegated to the scrapheap of defective philosophies littering the roadside traveled by those non-ideologues who would wisely prefer to take a middle path guaranteed through the auspices of ‘working suspension’ (i.e., ‘extensive suspension’). However, some of philosophical friends have sapped my excessive enthusiasm for the automatic deconstruction, say, of all forms of ‘realism’ or an ‘idealism;, etc., and in this ‘space’ I proposed a trimodal logic of ‘weak positions’, ‘strong positions’, and ‘non-weak/non-strong positions’ and set out in this *Book* XII to non-relegate the latter. Where weak positions through their relative disorganization would not inspire any degree of commitment and only promoted, directly or indirectly, this lack of commitment, and, therefore, deserved to be relegated. On the other hand, strong positions were seen as either impossible to contemplate and/or were being contemplated through defective arguments that did not observe their stated intent to explicate a strong sense and semblance of their positioning (which I argued would be impossible to explicate in the first place stemming from forms of either rhetorical abuse, metaphorical abuse, and/or apparitional abuse of factual attitudes, etc.). Where, unfortunately, strong positions were also accompanied by forms of an ideological extremism that in being adopted would also be instrumental in the formation of pseudo-psychoses and occasional psychoses as a result of such co-associated forms of over-commitment, and obviously, deserving relegation likewise. In a marked contrast, the adoption and adaptation of a middle approach to a well-conjectured well-fortified non-weak/non-strong form of ‘positioning’ would oversee a more reasonable Goldilocks’ style of commitment that was neither under-committed nor over-committed in a world where some form of commitment is a lived-necessity, if anything, as a requirement for the fulfillment of a small set of our more important aspirations, be they philosophical or otherwise. (ii)

However, under the impact of my own critique I had to completely discount the very concept of both a philosophical or disciplinarian position and the positioning needed to arrive at that sense of an ideological location. In its place, I am arguing for a triangulation of 'approaches' whose effective intersection then gives the sense and semblance of a 'position', as an 'overall approach', or as an 'effective approach' or 'the simulation of an overall approach', without the ideological baggage and its propensity for over-commitment. Hence this substitution of an integrated conjecturally well-fortified approach whose triangulation would remain a work in progress, and so on. Where this description better describes what actually happens as we contest our ideas with others be they be either like-minded or unlike-minded on such issues. Where this metaphor of 'triangulation' is more 'the triangulation of a triangulation of approaches' where the relevancy of the approach adopted and adapted for such a task be evaluated in 'pragmatic terms of reference' as to whether such a process of input-output apparently has something to say, appears to work, etc. (iii)

The complex phenomenon of a 'universal pragmatics' as a 'working pragmatics' is closely explored and scrutinized in this set of essays. Contrary to certain pragmatists, I perceive this overall approach as non-exclusively centered in a deontological style of judgment completely shorn of its traditional connections to so-called First Principles, *et al*. But, a long list of qualifications is also attached to the exercise of this overall approach and can be found explicated, e.g., in the twelfth essay. A key argument I run in this respect is that the world of contracts could not operate without the deontological and existentially directed domain of the compactual (and, where I will also add, that an interesting relationship exists between the same that deserves to be philosophical explored in even greater depth). The point being made, if not already understood, is that a pragmatical functioning in this instance is dependent upon this deontological and existential domain of the compactual and that without the same this world of contractual functions would completely fall apart. I.e., a pragmatic approach needs to be cognizant of the centrality of a deontological basis in order to exercise relatively superficial functions, practices, cultural-intercultural forms of behaviour, and so on. (iv)

This 'working pragmatics' must also be scoped by the limits imposed by an anti-representationalism, albeit where such limitations limit the conventional representative nature of language, and where both sides of this coin not be overlooked. Invoking a conformal theory of truth determination that focuses on alignments and non-alignments between textual inputs and outputs and not the projected extrapolations of speculative entities that just do not deserve to impossibly focused upon. I am sure we are doing impossible things already without needlessly adding to this list more useless *impossibilia*. (v)

A number of areas for philosophical research in this set of essays have been recognized but not sufficiently approached. E.g., the importance of social systems as to how various disciplines are practiced and can problematically interact. E.g., the need for a reinvested and reconstituted understanding of the metaphysical as dealing with inter-ordered phenomenon. E.g., an exploration of the idea of 'progress' and 'being progressive' in that regard, that I would also have liked to have overseen reinvested… along the lines that the hypothetical underdetermination of lived-reality can be somewhat obviated

through ideas of salience, consilience, and propinquity, or standing, to the extent that a working pragmatics can productively oversee the emergence of positively amplified reiterations of e/valuational formation through the overlapping of approaches instrumental in the formation of an invested project or program that bears a dividend both augmented and enhanced through such chaotically captured forms of such relatively excessive patterns of an emergent re(-)e/valuation. Indeed, invoke an 'ongoing economy of re-e/valuation', etc., where, through reiterative resimulation, 'what is seen to work and works well', is pragmatically integrated within our repertoire of working projects and working programs. Where such 'progress' is arrived at, incrementally and non-incrementally, through the negative removal of those approaches that do not work well and through positive acceptance and integration of those approaches that do appear to proffer emergent forms of positive re(-)e/valuation. But, where 'progress' is not to be viewed as the hegemonic replacement of one major discourse by some other relatively incommensurable major discourse, and so on. (vi)

Or, as we might like to say, 'not all philosophies are equal', and, where we may well observe that most philosophies are disappointing failures and only shadows of what they could 'progressively' achieve if they were to apply a rich nexus of argumentation that demonstrates these attributes of a positive salience, consilience and propinquity… Where as noted in the twelfth essay, as an additional observation:

> Hence the necessary acceptance of economic, non-economic, and super-economic approaches in all disciplinary forms of enquiry. [66] (vii)

Or, more pointedly in IIN. *An Overview of Additional Shifts in Reconsideration* under a sixth heading:

> 6. That we need to take on board economic, non-economic, and super-economic approaches, but, most philosopher, disciplinarians, etc., haven't even contemplated the first on this list.[1] (viii)

Thence my critique as explicated in *The Seventh Book*… is basically preserved despite such radical modifications in this *Book* XII. Shifting this playing field from 'positions' to an 'ongoing, 'progressive' triangulation of conjecturally well-fortified approaches' where a working pragmatics is keen to preserve and modify those working-perspectives that proffer a relevant, demonstrable, emergent positivity in e/valuational formations… (ix)

Hoping, as ever, that the scattering of these primed seeds of ideas promoted in this set of essays may find fruitful grounds for their being successfully replanted, and, in turn, be found capable of producing genetically modified philosophies in a pragmatic progression of insightful observations better able to facilitate our passages through this overall world-of-life, both individually and collectively….

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.12.24.

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[1] *Pursuit*, III.XII.XIIM.0.

XIIA. Converting *Ad Hoc* Conjectures
To Relatively Non-*Ad Hoc* Conjectures

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2020 – 2024

XIIA. (1.) Converting *Ad Hoc* Conjectures to Relatively Non-*Ad Hoc* Conjectures

Reconsiderations:
On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds[2]

1. Preamble

The idea behind this *Book* 12, titled *Reconsiderations*, is do just that, namely, note those occasions where, e.g., I have had to change my mind, and, in those types of position that I believe fellow philosophers and disciplinarians should also do likewise. To begin this important process of reconsideration, for how else are we to pursue any form of progress, be that concerning the theory, practice and critique of our research, if such transformations in positioning were to be neither contemplated nor enacted, so, in the context of this understanding let us consider how might this task be better conducted, say, from a conjectural point of view given the exposition of this approach in the previous book? (0)

2. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In this first essay I lament the fact that if I had attended to the injunctive nature of this title forty years ago, or so, I might have been able to have accelerated the evolution of my thinking, e.g., on the necessary existence and nature of conjectures among a number of other observations some of which will be explored in the following reflections. (1)

All conjectures begin life as *ad hoc* speculations, but, to do meaningful work in this world they have to 'earn their keep' so to speak. In other words, we need to convert *ad hoc* conjectures to relatively non-*ad hoc* conjectures. What might this entail? (2)

For a start they need to be internally consistent. Or, should they be apparently anomalous in their dissemination they then need to be adequately harmonized. On the other hand, this demand should not be read as a strident call for absolute harmonization because as humans, as persons with our finite limitations, this is well beyond our pay grade. Indeed, arguably, this too would be beyond the powers of any form of a divine entity able to entertain intentional-like forms of cogitation or similar. In other words, absolute consistency is not attainable, but, only a reasonable degree of consistency is being called for. Basically, a working degree of consistency that allows us to run our conjectures from A to B. When we drive a car, e.g., we do not expect it to run perfectly for the next one million years, but, should it get us from A to B over the next decade would be more than acceptable. Although, it should also be noted, that electric vehicles can now operate for distances of one million miles under guarantee. The type of guarantee that could never apply to a conventional car running on petrol or so-called 'gas'. (4)

Another observation to make here, on this topic of perfect harmonization, is that should such 'perfect resolution' be realized it then immediately portends the 'death' of

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[2] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

that relationship subjected to such completion.[3] Just as too much or too little dissonance, or, too much or too little consonance signals the same ending of the relationship in question which can only be maintained through ongoing resolution never the perfected process of resolution since the latter is like the ending of a piece of music or a novel, namely, our meeting either the 'coda' or 'The end'. (5)

What else can we say about conjectures? That, preferably, we should be dealing with our ongoing re(-)presentations, or conjectural simulations, of non-virtual situations rather than virtual situations. Yes, I would much rather have a coffee in my favourite café in Melbourne, still, being in the Blue Mountains at this moment in time the only venue to hand would be in a local café. However, at the same time it would be wrong to suppose that an absolute incommensurability exists between the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual. E.g., a person with heart disease in experiencing a horrific nightmare could very well have a fatal heart attack. Or less dramatically, a prisoner of war being slowly starved might imagine their bowl of gruel and a piece of stale bread to be a 'wonderfully delicious meal' and, by such means, raise their spirits in the hope of surviving such an inhumane ordeal. (6)

Then, somewhat in a similar vein, our conjectures need to find a certain degree of external coherence or alignment with the lived-reality of 'our' lived-experience and, by such means, better appreciate their apparent truth value/s. A certain worker, on a wonderfully warm morning, might want to contemplate whether 'to go to work that day' or 'go to the beach'? Of course, if they were to work from home, they might be able to do both by taking their computer to the beach. However, not everyone has that type of an option and so they would need to carefully weigh up both possibilities in order to wisely chose what they actually decide to do. That, if going to the beach meant losing your current employment, and that possibility would not be chosen, then their rational response would be more in alignment with their reconciling themselves with the fact that 'they had to go to work'. Hence this observation that in the formation of our conjectures and acting upon them we usually follow those courses of action that are more in alignment with our situations, our obligations, and responsibilities, and so on. (7)

We could say, 'that our interpretations of lived-experience are conjectures, and conjectures are usually interpreted in line with our lived-experiences, etc.' (6)

I would also like to note that our conjectures, in being thought about, are 'virtually 'texts' that should we either speak about and/or write down the same then become 'non-virtual texts'. Furthermore, our sentences, in reflecting the trimodal nature of conjectural economies or their intentional equivalents (say, in a process of either description or prescription or proscription, or, in asking a question, making a comparison, or conjecturing along the lines of a counter-factual, etc.) all involve, overtly, a transformational process of some form or other where a certain bimodal function consists of an operator

[3] The moral of this observation is that to continue a relationship we need to avoid its perfected resolution and leave it in a state where it persists as a 'working relationship' through forms of an imbalance in, say, power relations, intentional objectives, narrational trajectories, acts of reciprocity, i.e., in being either relatively generous or accepting of obligations that are not too onerous or misrepresented, etc., etc.

and a logical subject subjected to the same, and, covertly, some form of trimodal situatedness that allows us to appreciate the ensuing transformational process be it envisaged in either virtual and/or non-virtual terms of reference. Applied to the grammatical construction of sentences we recognize the rule that a sentence must have both a verb and a noun. That even in voicing the verbal expression "stop?" both an action (as a function) and a noun (as a logical subject) is implicated if we are to fully understand what is being said. Thence this observation that functions are bimodal, but, that their situational appreciation must be trimodal in orientation. So, e.g., in voicing the expression of the name "John" its saturated comprehension would demand these three conditions, namely, 'who', 'what is happening', and 'where or how'. Say, in voicing this simple nominative, I could be saying, either "that person over there is called 'John'" or "John come here please" and to know which of these two possibilities was or was not meant then we would need to know the situation and the intentional context of that expressed 'sentential' utterance. (7)

Now, these reflections are the pre-introduction to a first essay where I am going to lament the fact that in uttering conjectures, which understandably have an *ad hoc* origination, as a philosopher or disciplinarian that they should not be left in that state as merely *ad hoc* regardless of whether they have a certain necessity or not as they enter into our pursuit of their overseeing the successfulness of our arguments. (8)

Therefore, in the form of an introduction let me note the following sections. (9)

First, the problematic background to a theory of existence and a philosophy of transformational retreatment. (10)

Second, the necessity for insisting on the *ad hoc* rule supplied through retreatment. (11)

Third, my rather lax, non-insistence on a mechanism for the insistence on this *ad hoc* rule of retreatment. (12)

Fourth, my ruling in an ordered philosophy on the *ad hoc* concept of a relative privileging *versus* a relative de-privileging of the archetypal economic correlatives in the archetypal economy at the basis of all economies. (13)

Fifth, my belated finding of a similar mechanism at the basis of such relative privileging, etc. (14)

Sixth, my even more belated recognition of the role the de-suspension has in the formation of a process of a definitive economic resolution (under the rubric of the positivity of the 'non-economic'). (15)

Concluding this essay with some final reflections on this slow process of philosophical appreciation that could have been considerably accelerated if I had been more insistent on supplying relatively less *ad hoc* forms of argumentation. (16)

3. A Problematic Background

Nearly forty years ago I began a project titled *The Reanalysis on the Nature of Things*[4] (which was an updating of an earlier book titled *The Analysis on the Nature of Things* echoing the ancient Roman author Lucretius and his work titled *On the Nature of Things*[5]). In the first two volumes[6] of this *Reanalysis* I wrestled with a number of problems which for convenience, and in hindsight, might be labelled 'the ontological problem of existence and its epistemological categories of experience?' (Categorical Existence), 'the epistemological problem of how do we experience mixed categories?' (Categorical Reception), and, 'the epistemological problem of how do we comprehend a process of transformation?' (Transformational Retreatment). (17)

Again, in hindsight, we had (trans-intentional/trans-cognitive) judgmental processes and their (intentional/cognitive) content between which we could articulate, on an *ad hoc* basis derived from an inspection of distinctive forms of categorical language pertinent to our reflections on epistemological types of experience, namely, six types of (trans-cognitive) judgment, and, six types of (cognitive) content, namely, and respectively, pre-essential judgments; aesthetical judgments; deontological judgments; pragmatical judgments; hermeneutical judgments of possibility; and ontical judgments of affirmatively entertained factual belief; and, pre-essential, non-integrated atomic thoughts; integrated molecular thoughts; ideation in a conceptual format; ideation in a perceptual-like format; possible facts, and actual facts. Initially, there was a conflation of ideational processes and content but these six orders were divided between a trans-cognitive level and a cognitive level in epistemological organization (with the act of judgment being considered to be more complex, i.e., more epistemologically organized, given judgment necessitated the judgmental appreciation of that conceptual content being put forward for judgmental appreciation (where appreciation always necessitated higher levels in epistemological organization). (18)

Now, on a cognitive level of epistemological appreciation I wondered how we might entertain 'the fact of a fact; or 'the idea of an idea of an idea', and so on.[7] Or, to complicate things even further, through a mixing of categories, how might we deal with, say, 'the idea of a fact of an idea', or 'the thought of an idea', or 'the idea of a thought', or 'the idea of a perceptual image as a fact', etc. Optimistically, I sat down and worked my way through formulating three sets of rules as to how these six cognitive orders might be conjugated either within the same order or between orders… (19)

Then, rather fortuitously, I stumbled upon a much simpler idea of a transformational philosophy in which all of these processes could be conducted, sequentially, as

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4 Divided between twelve books of which about seven volumes found some form of completion (although in a condensed and evolving version called *Summation*, I sketched out the entirety of this project).

5 Titus Lucretius Carus, c. 99 BCE – c. 55 BCE. The only work attributed to this poet and philosopher is his philosophical poem *De rerum natura* about the tenets and philosophy of epicureanism.

6 Titled, respectively, *Epistemology* and *Ontology*.

7 *The Reanalysis on the Nature of Things*, *Ontology*, *Volume* II, Day Nine, B2.

bimodal operations under the rules of a process I designated as a process of 'transformational retreatment'. (20)

Basically, when we think about something we subject it to a process of treatment in some form or other that automatically elevates the ensuing productivity by one degree in meta-status. Or, put another way, the object language of the pretreatment phase is translated, through the applied lens of treatment, into a meta-language elevated by one meta-degree. (21)

We witness this very idea in our use of titles, the specific title, say, as given to a novel or poem, etc. Because the title is 'about' the text it titles, therefore, it cannot be, in that role, the text *per se*, being about that text and not that text itself (that it entitles). (22)

To illustrate this process, I invoked the idea of an architect building a house from a pile of bricks. In effect, the architect-builder envisages the synthesized integration of those individual brick units within the integrated totality of that envisaged house. That 'envisaged house' is only an idea, a relational house built from the precise assembling of those material bricks. But, people do not live in the idea of a house but in material houses on the level of the object language so we had to de-elevate the meta-status of that transformational process in order to oversee the eventual building of that house as would be eventually referred to in the object language. (23)

In thinking 'about' the envisaged house as yet to be built, the following *ad hoc* rule is invoked, namely, 'in thinking about *x*, the sentential report about the treatment of *x* is automatically elevated by one meta-degree in meta-status'. (24)

But, because we live in houses on the meta-level of the object language, therefore, we then need to invoke a second *ad hoc* rule, namely, 'the automatic de-elevation of the treated report by one meta-degree in status' in order to return the transformational process of treatment back to the same meta-status of the pretreated product via this second transformational process of 'retreatment'. (25)

Now, it should be obvious that this second *ad hoc* rule is necessary because if every time we were to think about something it automatically jumped by one degree in meta-status every time that report was being entertained, and re-entertained, etc., then our very ability to communicate our various reports to other people, along with their entailed processes of treatments, would at best be a muddled confusion or at worse, something that just could not be reported (or even as something that could be thought about by ourselves)… (26)

So, in thinking about my recent holiday for the one thousandth and first time it now has a meta-status of one thousand and two… and still climbing. (27)

Now, I would argue, that I had a reasonable basis for invoking the first *ad hoc* rule from my research dealing with titles, etc., given the meta-textual nature of genres of behaviour as to how they assist us in both writing and reading textual reports. On the oth-

er hand, I had no such theoretical modeling, etc., to back up my second *ad hoc* rule other than the sheer necessity for its invocation. Now I lament that fact because if I had been more demanding of myself and had insisted on some further reasons as to why this de-elevation in meta-status was required, other than its mere necessity, I am sure it would have forced, and accelerated, the evolution of my philosophical thinking. In hindsight, I see that I had all the required bits and pieces to make such an argument but failed to put them together until many, many years later. (28)

I had recognized the *ad hoc* nature of this second rule, but, on the grounds of its sheer necessity, it needed to be invoked, and, on those grounds alone, left it at that. (29)

Then, many years later, realized that I had a mechanism already in place to model this second rule, namely, that of the de-suspension.[8] (30)

In the evolution of my understanding of the complexities of the transcendental suspension I had asked the question, 'how does one get out of the suspension?' since I had reasoned that if one were metaphorically 'trapped' in the suspension, one would be 'psychotic' and had used that metaphor as one way to understand this phenomenon of psychosis.[9] My simple solution was to 'suspend the suspension', and hey presto you are now removed from within its confines. I later designated this process as a 'de-suspension' and this aspect of the working suspension now plays a crucial part in its comprehension with ramifications that have travelled well beyond its invocation in those original terms alone. (31)

Now, if the first *ad hoc* rule is seen as a process of treatment that by necessity is initiated through the process of the suspension, then, the second *ad hoc* rule can be accounted for, quite simply and elegantly, through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension (say, through the inherent instability of the suspension itself). (32)

If only I had, away back then, metaphorically put, '1 plus 1 together to make 2, and, next, added 2 plus 2 to make 4', my philosophical evolution could have been accelerated by decades. But, as things have turned out, these things do seem to take time to sink in and, as obtuse as I am, I eventually rendered this second *ad hoc* rule a lot less *ad hoc* in its complexion. Hence this observation that even a necessary *ad hoc* ruling needs to be modelled in such a way so as to render it relatively less *ad hoc* despite the apparent necessity for its invocation. (33)

The concept of the 'de-suspension' also has played a role in rendering other *ad hoc* rulings a lot less *ad hoc*. But, first, let me restate the impact this reformulated second rule has for transformational retreatment. (34)

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[8] In ideas on the nature of the Extended Suspension (as contained within the broader concept of the Extensive Suspension [working suspensions].as were developed in *The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline, Volume* II.

[9] E.g., refer to my essay *Interpreting Psychotic Statements* (1999/2017); the book titled *Insight* (1993); and the essays included in the book titled *Beyond Therapy* (2001-2003).

At this point let me diagrammatically illustrate transformational retreatment:

General Scheme

2. Treatment
(Synthesis, Analysis, and/or Nomination)
[Phenomenological]

*

(Posttreatment 2)

1. Pretreatment
[Hermeneutical]

3. Retreatment
[Existential]

(Posttreatment 1)

Synthetical Scheme

2. Treatment
(Ideational) $House^{1}$

*

1. Pretreatment
$Bricks^{0}$

3. Retreatment
$House^{0}$

Analytical Scheme

2. Treatment
$Demolished\ House^{1}$

*

1. Pretreatment
$House^{0}$

3. Retreatment
$Demolished\ House/Bricks^{0}$

Key: superscripts = meta-level, i.e., object level '0', and meta-level '1'. (35)

As a convention, in diagrammatically depicting transformations, we travel from 1. pretreatment to 2. treatment to 3. retreatment. Posttreatment 1 emends pretreatment, and posttreatment 2 (in a counter-clockwise direction) emends treatment.[10] (36)

Next, let me diagrammatically depict the six cognitive orders in a linear format, and the six trans-cognitive (judgmental) orders in a circular format. (37)

Cognitive Orders in a Linear Format

1^0	**2^0**	**3^0**	**4^0**	**5^0**	**6^0**
Pre-Essentials	Essentials	Conceptuals	Perceptuals	Possibles	Actuals
		[Intentional Processes]			
[Intentional Contents]				[Intentional Contents]	
Integrated	Non-Integrated			Non-Integrated	Integrated

Trans-Cognitive Orders in a Circular Format

3^1
Deontological
(Pragmatic-Existential)

2^1
Aesthetical

4^1
Pragmatical

Phenomenologically Semantic
1^1

Hermeneutically Possible
5^1

Ontical (Factual)
6^1 (38)

[10] For a closer look at transformational processes in a counter-clockwise direction, e.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIQ.55, etc.

4. The Necessity for Insisting on the *ad hoc* Rule Supplied through Retreatment.

So, through a working process of suspension, the first *ad hoc* rule is established through the (reiterated) invocation of a (series of) suspension(s) in order to progress this process of transformational treatment. Then, through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension this second *ad hoc* rule is invoked in order to return to the meta-status initially possessed by original pretreatment product or candidate. Now, the careful scrutiny of these pretreatment product, the treatment product and the retreated product along with the identification of the probable treatment pathways and retreatment pathways we have, to hand, a critical device for analyzing the overall process of transformation being probably envisaged. I would conjecture some languages formally recognize such transitions and transformations, whereas, English, as a natural language, only sometimes indicates such transformational-transitions. So, e.g., in talking about humans we have the abstract concept of 'humanity'. Or, as philosophers if we were talking about a certain something we might add suffixes of 'like', or 'ness', or 'likeness', to the term or set of terms being treated accordingly. Hence such expressions, e.g., 'white' and 'whiteness', and so on. At the same time recognizing that the ensuing whiteness will also be found in the world on the same meta-level of its logical subjectivity being invoked. So, e.g., this (white-)board is white, i.e., has a whiteness about it, thence this white-board is white in color, etc. (39)

Therefore, a process of treatment is elevated in meta-status by one degree through the treatment process of suspension being invoked, and, will automatically through a process of retreatment be de-elevated in meta-status through the force of the ensuing de-suspension. That by carefully observing the imputed contours of this process we can critically analyze the trajectories of that process of transformation. (40)

Needless to say, the simplicity of these two rulings does away with a plethora of *ad hoc* transformational rules that might well be needed otherwise, or, if needed to be invoked are at least now being framed by the combined single trajectory of these two necessary *ad hoc* rules. (41)

As an observation, the economy of treatment, being trimodal like all economies (as an *ad hoc* rule of observation), consists only of three simple styles of treatment, namely, analysis, synthesis, and nomination. That there are no other overall modes of treatment other than these three as noted. At least this *ad hoc* rule can be argued for on the grounds of observations (although, I would also argue, that there does exist good theoretical grounds for proposing such an observation in the first place[11]). (42)

5. An Insistence on Additional Arguments for Reducing *ad hoc* Rulings…

Hence this injunction to observe additional arguments, when and where possible, in order to render necessary and less necessary *ad hoc* rules relatively non-*ad hoc* in both complexion and tenor (i.e., in both their phenomenological nature and trajectory). (43)

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[11] In terms of an archetypal economy where the basic gestalt functions of a foreground, background, and a co-associated subjectivity mirror these processes, respectively, of analysis, synthesis, and nomination.

6. Rulings on Ordered Forms of Privileging and Deprivileging

Now, another occasion presented itself when the concept of the 'de-suspension' could reinforce another *ad hoc* ruling as to how the six orders, be they either cognitive or trans-cognitive (judgmental) in orientation, precisely demand six and only six forms of judgmental content as being supplied through six distinctive forms of judgmental process. Let me provide a potted history of this decade's long process of evolution. (44)

By my expression 'order' is meant a distinctive type of phenomenological experience be that as a trans-cognitive judgment or as the cognitive content of that type of judgment (or, possibly, even distinctive types of emotional experience as well?). I designate it as 'order' because there also seems to be a relationship between these orders that seems to be 'ordered'. E.g., some putative sentences defy the rules of thinking as these atomic elements cannot co-inhere within the same thought, and, therefore, could not be thought as an idea, and not being able to be entertained as an idea could not possibly be imagined in an integrated form with the further implication that such an impossible image could not be thought of as a possible fact let alone be entertained as an actual fact, i.e., a fact that deserves to be accepted as true, as validly ascertained, etc. So, the top of a table could be either 'round' or 'square' but not simultaneously as a 'round & square'. Hence its status as possessing only a first cognitively ordered status, i.e., nothing more than a list of non-integrated properties, relations and logical subjects. On the other hand, a 'table' with a 'round top' could be thought of as an overall thought that could be integrated hence its second ordered status as a 'round-topped-table' (or if this table had a square top as a 'square-topped-table'). Now, obviously, an integrated thought can be entertained as an integrated 'idea'. On the other hand, some ideas cannot be imaged. So, e.g., the abstract idea of 'love', itself, cannot be imagined only exemplified through instances that appear to instantiate this abstract idea. Subsequently, a non-imagined abstract sense of love cannot be thought of as a possible fact let alone as an actual fact. Still, instances that appear to instantiate this abstract concept can be imagined and treated as facts both possible and actual. But, again, in contrast, we could imagine, e.g., what Father Xmas would look like, but, at the same time, we also know that this personage is only a mythical character and, so, therefore, lacks actual existence, cannot be treated as a sixth ordered fact, but, only as a fifth ordered possible fact. Now, in making these judgments it would appear that the first two and the last two types of judgment are respectively semantic (and phenomenological); aesthetical (given this ability to be integrated); and, hermeneutically related to possibility, and ontically related to factual affirmations. Less obvious, the process of conceptual judgment I perceive as taking a deontological-like nature, and, where perceptual-like states in imagination appear to take only a pragmatical or functional-like character. (45)

Very early on I settled on six cognitive orders and six trans-cognitive judgmental orders. But, then, why did I settle on this number six, i.e., these two sets of six categories (seemingly linked together and where the sixth order seemed to be dependent on the fifth, and where the fifth seemed to be dependent on the fourth, etc? Because, as an observation, this cataloguing of distinctive experiences seemed to fit this schematic pattern and at the same time, I was not able to think of counter-instances that could not be schematized

accordingly. Admittedly, all this is quite *ad hoc*. But, if it worked, then, as such, it works. As a heuristic device why not run with it? As a device it seemed to suggests that in the transformations of our thinking, thoughts were built up one on top of the other, and so on. Or, in effect, rules existed that allowed us to migrate from one type of experience to some other, or, back again when our thinking 'travelled' in the opposite direction. (46)

Now, whilst these two heuristic devices of retreatment and orders were being reflected upon, I was also coming to accept the apparent epistemological fact that our experience was economically structured in trimodal terms of reference and that our appreciation of such phenomena also needed to be similarly constructed in the same trimodal terms of reference. That the common denominator of these trimodal economic economies could all be translated in gestalt terms of reference, and that an easier way to depict these gestalt aspects was to imagine the following simplified understanding of the perceptual field, namely, through the invocation of a process that 'focused; on perceptual content in the visual field, where the same was juxtaposed against a perceptual background 'field', and, where the relationship between these two gestalt functions also came with an distinctive sense and semblance of subjectivity in keeping with the nature of the gestalt field in question, i.e., acting as the 'frame' or 'framing' of the type of experience in question. So, e.g., a perceiving portends a perceiver; a process of thinking portends a thinker; a process of dreaming portends a person dreaming, etc. Now, symbolically treating these three distinctive gestalt functions respectively, as Object (O), World (W), and Ego (E) would allow us to depict this simple archetypal economy of the gestalt in the following manner:

Depicting the Archetypal Economy in Gestalt Terms

2. Object (1^1)
(Focus)

*

1. World (5^1)
(Field)

3. Ego (3^1)
(Framing) (47)

Viewed through an ordered approach, I next noted that phenomenal-phenomenological oriented experience, e.g., appeared to be primarily a first ordered phenomenon, be it viewed in either cognitive or trans-cognitive terms of reference. It would appear therefore, to focus on a certain order that necessitates our relatively non-focusing on the other orders. Hence the conjecture, e.g., 'that if semantic-phenomenologically oriented experience is observed through focusing on the Object moment (symbolically rep-

resenting the moment of the intentional object), at the relative expense of the rest of the economy, then why not 'read' first ordered experience as, say, a focusing, or, a relative privileging of the Object moment at the relative expense of the other two moments and all the other orders from the Second to the Sixth. Or, by similar arguments, privileging the World moment in the formation of (fifth ordered) hermeneutically oriented experience, and, privileging the Ego moment in the (third ordered) formation of the (non-systematic) existential. So, these patterns of relative privileging/deprivileging granted, why not extend this same type of process to the other three orders and see what seems to fit or not fit this scheme accordingly. However, in this instance rather than focusing or privileging one economic moment, this time, instead, let us see what might happen if we were to privilege two economic moments or correlatives at exactly the same time. So, in focusing on both Object and Ego, I conjectured we were dealing with aesthetical judgments; focusing on Ego and World could be conjectured as pragmatical judgments, and, focusing on World and Object moments seem to portend ontical or factual judgments (which made sense, as we were concerned with the assessment of phenomenological objects (O) in the world (W) taking on, thereby, the characteristics of this type of an archetypal interaction). Thereby, through focusing or privileging either one corelative or two correlatives simultaneously we could generate these six types of trans-cognitive judgment or these six types of cognitive content as concordant with these archetypal forms of interaction. Let me summarize what has been marshalled to date on this topic of orders. (48)

Depicting the Ordered Economy in the Privileging/De-Privileging of Gestalt Terms

Object (1^1)

(6^1) **(2^1)**

*

World (5^1) **Ego (3^1)**

(4^1) (47)

That, by relatively privileging/deprivileging one or two archetypal moments six distinctive types of ordered phenomena could be generated…

Depicting the Trans-Cognitively Ordered Economy through Relative Privileging...

Phenomenological
O (1^1)

Ontical Facts
(6^1)

Aesthetical
(2^1)

*

W (5^1)

E (3^1)

Hermeneutical/Possible facts

Existential

(4^1)
Pragmatical

Evaluational Type	**Genesis through Privileging**	**+**	**De-Privileging**
6. Ontical E/Valuation (Actual Facts)	W.O		E
5. Hermeneutical (Possible Facts)	W.		O.E
4. Pragmatical E/Valuation	E.W		O
3. (Non-Systematic) Existential E/Valuation	E		O.W
2. Aesthetical E/Valuation	O.E		W
1. Phenomenological/Semantic E/Valuation	O		E.W

In other words, all orders could be generated through these six distinctive patterns of relative privileging and de-privileging. (47)

That, effectively, a certain degree of *ad hoc* constructivism could be minimized through the introduction of another level of *ad hoc* interventionism. (48)

So, e.g., by focusing or stressing or privileging intentional objectivity (Object) and simultaneously de-privileging the intentional background (World) and co-associated subjectivity (Ego) it would appear we have generated the distinctive recognition of phenomenological-semantic units that constitute, as expected, the intentional content of our first cognitive order along with the type of phenomenological judgment that would characterize this first trans-cognitive order. Where, by similar reasoning, we can account for the remaining five orders. (49)

However, this concept of the ‘relative privileging of one or two moments and the simultaneous relative de-privileging of the other two moments or the other one moment’,

obviously, introduces another level of *ad hoc* interventionism in the schematization of this heuristic device. Just what is involved in this process of relative privileging and its automatic relative de-privileging (other than some form of stressing or focusing or singling out) is not stated or analogically offered. On the other hand, this simple method does appear to proffer a certain simplicity, and somewhat of an explanation to account for the (superficially) distinctive nature of such ordered phenomena. Indeed, supplying a method for generating the distinctive nature of such categories whilst at the same time unifying the entire process as a just process of selective privileging/de-privileging. (50)

But, the introduction of this more integrated set of rules still does not proffer a mechanism for why such a more detailed scheme appears to work (or, at least, work more simplistically in comparison to its previous incarnation)? (51)

Again, after a long time in coming, it struck me that if we were to suspend, as a form of de-privileging, perhaps in the form of a dynamic balance one or two moments, then the automatic release of the de-suspension (from the state of suspension) could be read as that which privileges the other two moments or the other one moment (if the suspension is of the other two moments). Indeed, by such means proffering an elegant mechanism that would seem to be somewhat less *ad hoc* than the rulings previously exercised? In other words, for 'de-privileging' read 'suspension', and, for 'privileging' read 'de-suspension'. By such means, further simplifying and integrating the ensuing construction of this heuristic device. Of course, at the end of the day, the observed utility of such modeling should decide whether we continue with this heuristic device, and further refine it, or, discount it for something else that, hopefully, should prove to be more functionally effective (and, hopefully, less *ad hoc* in its construction). (52)

7. A Belated Re-framing of the Rules of Privileging and Deprivileging

Again, in the eventual re-framing of an ordered philosophy, this concept of the 'de-suspension' has been able to apparently 'illuminate' and integrate and render a more simple, useful set of rulings by seemingly working with what seems to be the underlying archetypal architecture at the very basis of an economy, indeed, all economies. (53)

In my previous book, *Book* 11, a bimodal suspension, as a suspension of two economic moments or correlatives, is defined as a process of mediation; where a uni-modal suspension is defined as 'intra-mediation'; and, where the overall suspension of all three moments or correlatives (correlativities) is defined as 'intermediation' (and as the basis for either the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of the systematic sense and semblance of the existential along with its e/valuation formation with the relatively non-existential). (54)

Of course, we now need to further define what might be meant by a 'uni-modal form of suspension' (intra-mediation) *vis-à-vis* a bimodal suspension (mediation) *vis-à-vis* a trimodal suspension (inter-mediation)? Here I would like to suggest that we could re-use the metaphor of 'bracketing' if we were to redefine it to mean 'rendering that be-

ing suspended as relatively inoperative until released by the de-suspension'. Where, by 'de-suspension', we could merely mean our 'simply returning to the *status quo* to that extent it was preserved as a relative transformational isomorphic invariance and also to that extent such preservation is no longer maintained through a transformation of process that is perceived to be able to be reiterated in both characteristic and conformal terms of reference'. Let me illustrate this understanding of an implicit process of transformational retreatment in which certain aspects are either conserved or transformed, and, as such, subjected to reiterable forms of conformal appreciation. (55)

In an accordance with this understanding, we have these three aspects of invariance, transformation, and conformal appreciation coming together in or overall assessment of a certain situation, E.g., I am holding a glass of water and then take a sip of water from that glass. My holding that glass, the glass, and the remaining water in that glass, all act as relatively invariant over the course of this situation. In a relative contrast, the movement of my hand holding that glass and my taking a sip of water both present the representation of the transformations that have occurred. Last, if 'I actually moved that glass to my lips and took a sip of water from that glass' then it is true that that is exactly that which occurred if I actually moved that glass to my lips and took a sip of water from that glass'. About this occurrence, this is my reporting. Evidence supports this reporting. The water level in that glass is now lower, there is no evidence of any spillage, I reported this occurrence, perhaps a witness observed the same, and, why would I wish to untruthfully report this set of relatively non-consequential reportings, etc. If anything, much of this is 'common sense'. In a process of change we observe both relative transformation and that which is not relatively transformed in that process of transformation. Proffering truth claims about both of those aspects of both invariance and alteration. (56)

Now, let me sum up the points being made by these reflections on the *ad hoc* origins of our conjectures, but, how we should also strive to render such conjectures in a less *ad hoc* manner, indeed, as relatively non-*ad hoc* in their re(-)presentations. (57)

In a process of treatment, i.e., either in an overt process of analysis or synthesis or nomination, or through some overt combination of the same, that being treated, in being subjected to such an ensuing set of distinctions, accommodations, and/or transformations there is the implication that in talking about such textual reporti(ng)s that such proceedings must be advanced in meta-status by one meta-degree. Now, this ruling could initially be seen to be *ad hoc* in its complexion, but, if we observe that in our dealings with the relationship, something has to either be itself or something other than itself, and must be relational in orientation then it must follow, too, that such proceedings are talking 'about' the relations that something has to that being reported and not a direct dealing with the contents of that initial reporting in question. In other words, in subjecting something to a process of treatment, it must take on an elevated meta-status given that what is being focused upon is the process of treatment and not so much that initial pretreated content being subjected to such treatment. Hence *ad hoc* Rule Number One. But, on the other hand, given Rule Number One, and, that in lived-experience we continue to deal with phenomena in the object language or with the initial meta-status pre-reporting then it follows that

we also reverse this elevation in meta-status by reversing this Rule Number One by *ad hoc* Rule Number Two that oversees a meta-reversal of this first rule. (58)

Now, given this inevitable and, practically, an immediate reversal of this first ruling we might suppose we could just overlook such an appreciation of the process of transformational treatment. However, from a critical perspective, such closer attention to such details allows us to carefully delineate the course of the specific transformations that occur since, theoretically, we might have arrived at similar conclusions by different pathways or different conclusions by similar, but non-equivalent, pathways. (59)

E.g., you might see that the water level in my glass of water is now almost empty and assume that I had drunk all the water in this glass. You could be correct, or, as it happened, without you observing me, I had used half the water in the glass to water the pot plant on the table beside me as that plant looked like it need a drink a bit more than myself. Or, e.g., you arrive somewhat late and see an empty glass on the table in front of me and assume I had drunk from it when in fact it had not been filled in the first place, or, then again, in your being so slow to arrive I could have drunk twice from that same glass. Hence, in ascertaining the facts of a situation we need to attend more carefully to the transformational pathways that actually need to be reported on since reports that merely note a before and an after are not sufficient in themselves for detailing the course of those transformations that are imputed to have occurred especially if those transformations themselves were not directly observed, etc. (60)

To reinforce this point about our needing to take meta-levels seriously into consideration can be found in our recognizing the existence of a meta-textual dimension in the formation of our textual reports along with their closer appreciation in both conformal and non-conformal terms of reference, i.e., e.g., in terms, say, of their descriptive, prescriptive and proscriptive ramifications, etc. (61)

“A handwritten letter that looks ‘like a letter’ is probably a letter that is handwritten” may seem to be stating the obvious. But, usually, a letter has a certain form, namely, some person or persons being addressed, the contents of that address, and it being signed by the person or persons having both written and intending to send that ‘letter’ as a letter to its recipients. The preservation of this meta-textual form allows that same letter to be electronically transcribed, either as an electronic facsimile or in a digital format, and, thereafter, sent as an email or similar. As long as most of those conventions of a ‘letter’ are duly observed in the both the writing and the reading of that text then its is both written and read as a ‘letter’, i.e., as conforming to the meta-textual rules that constitute the form and formation, i.e., format or genre, of a ‘letter’ as conventionally understood. (62)

Once we understand the form and formation, or format, of a certain genre we realize an appreciation of the necessary existence of this meta-textual dimension informing the construction of that textual situation in question. Indeed, ‘once understood’, that no text can be just the writing on the surface of a page or a computer screen, then we come to see that all texts are full of meta-textual devices, inserts, comments, etc. Hence our noticing titles, introductions, conclusions, asides, definitions, footnotes, endnotes, along

with the existence of a whole host of other features like allusions, quotations, humour, irony, foreshadowing or pre-echoing of ideas that will be presented later in that text or some further instalment, etc., etc. That, without an appreciation of this meta-textual dimension, texts could neither be written nor read! (63)

The title given to a text is a case that is illustrative of this point that a meta-textual dimension cannot be completely ignored. Admittedly, titles once were often merely a recitation of the first line or first phrase of that text. A good reason, then, why your first sentence or phrase should make a good start in the world of literature, clearly announce what the text is about in terms of its apparent intentions. But, today, a good title, will also 'misrepresent' that text and should be constructed so as to brilliantly misrepresent that text which on the face of such a comment would appear to be at loggerheads in announcing that text, and its intentions to hopefully find its anticipated audience. Since a title is supposedly 'about' that text then it cannot be that text *per se*. In other words, misrepresentation is inevitable, certainly to begin with. So, e.g., the book *Lord of the Flies* is not just about 'someone ruling over a realm of flies'.[12] Similarly, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was never about how the actual year 1984 would turn out to be.[13] Or, e.g., to say that 'person X' is both a 'philosopher and a scoundrel' is to overlook what else that person could well be that could qualify and either confirm or discount these labels of 'philosopher' and 'scoundrel'. Then, in simply ascribing 'person X' as both a 'philosopher and a scoundrel' how do we know whether the author was being merely humorous, or ironic, or critical, or just being controversial in order to better disseminate and profit from making such a provocative assertion. Indeed, how could an insightful philosopher possibly be a scoundrel at the same time? (64)

I also intimated that even though titles will misrepresent their texts, being 'about' their texts and not their texts *per se*, still, in coming to understand how the title misrepresents a text through that process of de-misrepresentation we come to a better understanding of that text itself. So, e.g., how might we initially read the title of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* written in six volumes and published 1776-1789? Ostensively, we are dealing with a very detailed history of the latter half of the Roman Empire in its various incarnations down to just after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and up to the year 1590. These volumes announce themselves as a 'history', but, what motivates the historian to write that history is even more important. Let us be honest, there is no historian who just describes the course of historical events without also inserting their suppositions, arguments, and conclusions, and so on. Just as, for the record, any philosopher who thinks they are just writing purely philosophy must be scoundrel! But, all that granted, let us take heart from the fact that in our 'progressive' de-misrepresentation of titles, and all other meta-textual devices, we do get somewhat closer to a better understanding as to what a text purports to present through this chipping away at just what the title does not actually 'represent', and so on. (65)

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12 William Golding, *Lord of the Flies*, 1954.

13 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 1949. Just as his novel *Animal Farm*, 1945, is not just about 'a farm with animals'. But such titles do capture this perhaps intentional element of misrepresentation?

8. The Non-Economic Ramifications of the De-Suspension

Interestingly, and most importantly, we should also understand that any process of treatment, be it analytical or an act of synthesis or nomination, that such processes, as representative of economic correlatives, cannot be exercised purely on their own (impossible) terms of reference. Indeed, if we are focusing on a process, say, of analysis, then, covertly, processes of synthesis and nomination are also operating by necessity since all three aspects must be co-present in the operation of that economy of treatment. (66)

In a previous exposition of Quine's critical *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, and my extended critique of the same makes exactly the same point.[14] In effect, 'no analysis without synthesis, no synthesis without analysis, and, no process of treatment without nomination'. In otherwise, all three aspects of treatment must be co-present. Or, translated through the lens of a conjectural economy, analytical propositions, synthetical statements, and conjectural propositional-statements must be all co-present in the operation of that economy, and, by extension, all economies. (67)

Implicit in such an understanding, is the contention that all economic representations function through the specific incarnations of suspensions and their automatic de-suspensions as the symbolic machinery of such epistemological processes. That in the mapping out of such an *ad hoc* series of representations we might note that for every *ad hoc* signaling out of a suspension, in some form or other, it is mirrored by the equal necessity to also supply the *ad hoc* addition of its counter-de-suspension. The belated recognition of this observation also crept upon me in my ongoing attempts to appreciate the work of the French philosopher François Laruelle along with his non-philosophical, or non-standard, critique of the philosophical enterprise (when viewed as a 'philosophical economy'). Namely, the very idea of the economic, the import of the mere circulation of economic e/valuational formation, is not enough in and of itself to actually be able to explain the impact of the economic itself. It stands to reason, if thought through carefully, that if the economic were to merely be potentially no more than endless processes of circulation, then what would be accomplished? As a trite example, if we left our washing to be endlessly circulated in a washing machine or drier at some distant point in time, we would be left with nothing but a pile of threads or lint. At some apposite point in time, we need to take our washing out of such a device otherwise what would be the point of putting our washing into such a machine in the first place? (68)

In retrospect, this *ad hoc* concept of the 'de-suspension' has had so much philosophical work placed upon it that it deserves to be duly recognized as a very important concept in philosophy (and in all other disciplines) as well in the sub-philosophical discipline of metaphysics in our concerns over the role being played by conformal truth assessments, etc., and how both suspensions and de-suspensions can be utilized to map our those trajectories concerned with the overall process of truth determination itself… for without the addition of a such a dimension of the conformal our conjectures would not be metaphorically 'worth the paper they were printed upon' or 'the fractional inexpensiveness of electronic hardware' we are currently using in lieu of the former. (69)

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[14] *Pursuit*, III.XIG.

Just how does the de-suspension figure also in this conjecture of the non-economic as articulated in its positive sense (as framed in the fork of the non-economical fork[15]) as a process of irruption in the decisive enaction of intentional behaviour? (70)

In a harmonic reading of an economy, as conducted through the lens of a harmonic economy, the so-called 'third moment' is that of 'resolution'. 'So-called' because which of any of the three moments of an economy is to be numbered as 'first' is quite arbitrary. Although, in this type of situation, as it is also our desire to end with the resolution of this relationship between the relatively consonance of a gestalt background (as a so-called 'first moment') and its introduction of the relatively dissonant material (as its so-called 'second moment') it is seemingly natural to accept this linear form of a representative convention. Of course, at the same time, we must also surmise that only with the effective co-occurrence of all three 'moments' could an experience of the 'harmonious' be issued as that which is 'to be experienced'. Hence the dialectical nature of the economic. A fact further reinforced by the observation that a process of perfect or perfected resolution then ceases to be a process of resolution, indeed, ceases to be a relationship of that type should such perfect or near-perfect resolution be issued and disseminated. Just, as metaphorically, 'when we pay in full the plumber they will then leave and neither party will have a need to continue to encounter the other…' (71)

So, how does this concept of the 'de-suspension' allow us to exit an economy given that the successful resolution of the dissonant or problematic in a relationship will lead to the immediate cessation exactly of that same relationship in the currency of the present rather than in historical terms of reference? (72)

Strike a match, and the lit match is no longer a match to be lit. Similarly, the burning match, when completely burnt, will cease to be a burning match. Indeed, it will be something that cannot burn (at least as understood in the burning of a match) and subsequently, cannot then be a match (at least as previously understood). But, if we were to use this as an analogy of the resolution of a relationship in its straddling of a process of transformation, and maintain the preservation of the relationship in question, then we also need to import another *ad hoc* ruling, or, more precisely, the import of a counter-*ad hoc* ruling in order to preserve the relationship and the ongoing relevance of that same relationship. Let me explain. (73)

As a provocative observation, we could say a judgment, in the specific expression of its definite characterization, is not calculative, no longer involves a sequential process of miscellaneous steps that need to be observed in order to arrive at some form of resolution. Now, that resolution is realized and we seemingly act accordingly. But, our ongoing relationship with our own senses of self, and others, is not being equally disrupted, so, we must surmise that the need for a counter-*ad hoc* set of conjectures will also be necessarily called for. Hence the invocation of a super-economy in which the economic, the resolution of the non-economic and its re-appropriation within the hyper-economic needs to be collectively envisaged, but, all that is another set of *ad hoc* conjectures to expedite. (74)

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15 As introduced and explored in *Book* 11. E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIJ.61, etc.

9. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Given this set of reflections on the *ad hoc* nature involved in proposing conjectures what might we surmise could be the relevant conclusions to take away from these recollections in the light of my reiterated lament berating my all too often belated attempts to accelerate the progress of such explorations along with the changing of my mind on such issues when and where necessary? (75)

Ad hoc conjectures often invite counter-*ad hoc* conjectures in this necessary process for the disciplinarian to convert the relatively *ad hoc* nature of conjectures into relatively non-*ad hoc* conjectural expositions. Into this mix, we need to appreciate what relevant mechanisms exist for us to successfully oversee this process of conversion which, at the same time, should also be understood as a process that can never be fully implemented. If the power fails, and we strike a match to light a candle we do not need to do this one-hundred times. Once the candle is lit, and is properly functioning as a lit candle, we can move on and do something else. Similarly, if we were to make a truth assessment that a certain sentence or report *x* is either true or false then if we are satisfied that, to the best of our abilities, this is the correct judgment to be made under such circumstances then let it stand as such until such a time might arise that we would then need to revise that opinion. What is found working for us, works for us, and, so, in that pragmatic vein, let us move on to now exploring new and perhaps more fruitful and fulfilling pastures. (76)

At this point, I must confess that the title of this essay is somewhat misleading. As stated*: Converting Ad Hoc Conjectures to Relatively Non-Ad Hoc Conjectures* I am more laying out the grounds for this supposition rather than actually supplying the rules for such a process of conversion. In this latter regard, we might surmise, quite rightly, that truth determination has a central role to play along with well-formed propositional-structures, the suitable use of well-informed facts, the running of well-expressed conjectures, and so on, would all act as necessary factors in the successful running of this type of an economy. But, such considerations will need to be explored elsewhere. (77)

If I am to point out just one observation that needs to be taken on board it is this understanding that although the initial proposing of a set of conjecture is an *ad hoc* affair, it behooves us, as either philosophers, or as metaphysicians (in a critically and radically reconstituted metaphysics), or as disciplinarians, or as secularists to seriously consider the conversion of our *ad hoc* conjectures into relatively non-*ad hoc* conjectural enterprises by whatever means are suitable in realizing the successful expedition of this objective. That if we were to be a lot tougher on ourselves in this respect we may well make a more assured form of progress in whatever field of research we were involved in, and, by exercising such concerns oversee the swifter expedition of such matters..!![16] (78)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 3.8.24.

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[16] E.g., in articulating the contention that all inter-ordered phenomena are metaphysical in its reconstituted sense, we might well ask, 'just how can processes of reduplication and duplication be undertaken given this urgent need to question what might motivate us as to why I would make such a proposal and how such a proposal might be converted into a less problematic, relatively non-*ad hoc* conjecture, etc.

XIIB. The Deconstruction of a Strong Realism?

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIB. (2.) The Deconstruction of a Strong Realism[17]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

If we had to choose, and could only chose one option, 'would we be a realist or an idealist?' I suspect most people would choose to be a realist, be a person, metaphorically, 'with their feet on the ground', be someone who is sensible, and works with what is to hand rather than dreaming about things that might not be so obtainable. Of course, once we have realistically worked out where we stand, and have a good idea of who we are, then, and only then, we might allow ourselves the luxury of a more idealistic temperament in the fashioning of our aspirations. But, are those people who profess a strong identification with a realist philosophy actually being 'realistic', or are they only deluding themselves into thinking that they are eminently reasonable in such matters? (0)

In this essay, I am calling upon all strict realists who profess a strong ideological preference for such extremism to seriously reconsider such an impossible philosophical form of positioning whilst, at the same time, accept that we can all work with a weak realism, along with weak forms of idealism and pragmatism, and through valid forms of argumentation, using both conjectures and hypotheses, arrive at forms of philosophical positioning that are more non-weak/non-strong, that have our well-motivated assent, and deserve both our commendation and recommendation. (1)

To this end, as a process of remediation, let me both deconstruct a strong realism and reconstruct a more viable form of a philosophical economy that does real work, is able to assist us in making sense of this world at large through a non-extremist form of positioning. (2)

After introducing this philosophical topic then let me deconstruct a strong realism under a number of headings, thereby demonstrating a variety of arguments that should easily discharge this objective. In this second section, under the heading of Deconstruction, there will be six sub-headings, namely, One World, Windows, Correlativity, Metaphorical Abuse, Simulation and Non-Simulation, and (the) Non-Necessity (of such an impossible approach). Under the heading of Reconstruction, I will propose, again, six sub-headings, namely, Intentional Objectivity, Suspensions, De-Suspensions, Over-Commitment, Pseudo-Psychosis, and Working Economies. Such reconsiderations will allow us to concentrate on the formation of a non-weak/non-strong form of realism that would be acceptable to both the critical disciplinarian and the radical philosopher. Ending this second essay, dealing with a reconsideration of such matters, along with the usual provisional conclusions, various additional comments, and observations, etc. (3)

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[17] * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. Introduction

Let me say this from the outset, any over-commitment to any form of positioning is instrumental in the formation of a pseudo-psychosis (or worse) to the same extent this over-commitment, in either epistemological and/or ontological terms of reference, is over-insisted upon. Without the healthy, regular imposition of working suspensions all people, whether as either disciplinarians and/or secularists, whether posing as either philosophers and/or metaphysicians,[18] will basically lose the plot… and who, before people of a more sensible disposition, will intuitively come across as somewhat 'unbalanced' or even 'unhinged', perhaps as too 'intense' or just 'weird'. (4)

In this regard, an excessive identification with either unimodal, bimodal, absolutistical, and/or relativistical[19] forms of positioning, in whatever disciplinary field of endeavour, will provoke the formation of a pseudo-psychotic (or psychotic) complexion wherein their appreciation of what is to be experienced as lived-reality will become distorted, more or less, to the same extent they become fixated on that specific topic. Only with the persistent use of working suspensions will such motivation find a successful working antidote to the formation of this condition wherein the appreciation of the topic and its themes, otherwise, will be either advertently and/or inadvertently misrepresented in a biased manner, find misleading forms of emphasis in modes of depiction less in an alignment with phenomenal-phenomenologically, hermeneutically, and both existentially and non-existentially oriented patterns experience. Such subsequent, relatively less-aligned forms of alignment will then manifest their collective impact in the form of consequential mis-alignments where such excessive professions of positioning will override more sensibly attuned forms of interpretation in our reports and their dissemination in this world at large. Moreover, the interactive quality of our dealings with such over-committed extremists will also be, all too obviously, a more difficult task to expedite on a more mutual basis given the resistance of the pseudo-psychotic, or psychotic, individual or community to openly engage and communicate on a more equitable basis. However, at the same time, we should also recognize that no one has a dominant shareholding in this pursuit of finding our working-alignments, that work for us, in the world-of-life, and, despite whatever insightless and unobservant claims are made, or fraudulent and mendacious forms of positioning that are insisted upon, still, the discordant nature and content to be found in our disseminated reports, likewise, can never be completely discordant with lived-reality. 'To lie we must tell the truth', and, 'to tell the truth we must also lie'. However, what marks out a more honest and responsible reporting of this world-as-lived is to be found in the integrity of both its acquisition and dissemination. I.e., that as found in and through our 'openness' to this same world-as-lived in the light of our ability to wisely change our minds when pragmatically confronted with better conjectures along their working hypotheses that demonstrate a closer attention to the apparently evidential, and so on. (5)

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[18] I.e., those philosophers who primarily work in the field of a critically and radically reconstituted metaphysics centered in the interpretation of inter-ordered phenomena, transformational retreatment, etc.

[19] A relativistical positioning can also be responsible for an excessive under-commitment in positioning along with an attendant lack of motivation to form well-formed, well-informed, and well-expressed conjectures, etc., capable of realizing apposite forms of intentional objectivity along with the obtainment of their successful, fruitful, and profitable instantiation.

2. Deconstruction

‘Remediation’ is a term I give to a ‘process of correction conducted in the transformational phase of treatment consisting of a joint deconstruction of the relatively defective and a reconstruction of the relatively effective that deals primarily with the formation of well-formed analytical propositions’. Hence, in line with this idea of remediation, the need to promote both a joint deconstruction and reconstruction. The overlooking of the former and the over-promotion of the latter being seen as detrimental to the well-organized and well-conducted course of such research. In addition to such conduct is the rectification of pretreatment through a joint mitigation of both meta-textual genre-construction and the selection of an appropriate choice in factual inputs along with an ongoing re(-)normalization of retreatment as we attempt to reasonably find ever closer degrees of textual alignment in the simulation of our pertinent reportings as viewed through the positive appreciation of both existential and non-existential forms of e/valuation. That the expedition of these phases, in an overall process of transformational retreatment, being better expedited, as already noted, under the direct auspices of well-pre-informed and well-exercised working suspensions. (6)

Given this call for both parallel deconstruction and reconstruction let us, first, now attend to the former. Under the following six sub-headings let me supply my take on this deconstruction of any and all exemplifications of a strong realism. A ‘strong realism’ being the ‘over-motivated dissemination of a particular kind of unimodalism erected on the improper extrapolation of an intentional objectivity’ that, in this instance, excessively over-focuses on such intentional objectivity at the expense of its economic origination regardless of whether this definition of its basic error is accepted or not accepted by an over-committed proponent of this type of an economically impossible philosophy’. Therefore, in the light of this working definition of a so-called ‘strong realism’, it behooves me to demonstrate why this type of unimodalism is economically impossible for it to be entertained contrary to all claims by ‘unrealistic realists’ that might insist otherwise. (7)

In one sentence, the overall argument against a strong realism, as a particular type of unimodalism, is that we can only live in one world and, so, therefore, the idea of a so-called ‘external world’ is internally inconsistent with the very basis of lived-experience, but, whereas we might say ‘that where there is smoke there must be fire’, in this instance, we might respectfully suggest such ‘smoke’ is no more than ‘mist’ which, under the heat of a well-reason critique, evaporates to reveal nothing more than a mistreatment of intentional objectivity that cannot be subjected to forms of economic isolationism arising from metaphorical abuse that ‘our eyes are like windows’ along with the fact that all sense and semblance of simulation is of simulation itself. (8)

But, we only live, and can only live, in ‘one world’ and to insist on its division or divisions into a so-called ‘external world’ or set of ‘external worlds’, and, by implications, in a so-called ‘internal world’ or a set of so-called ‘internal worlds’ is to mock our very ability of our being able to debate each other and deconstruct such nonsense… (9)

i. We Can Only Live in One World

Whether constructed or viewed as either a transcendental argument or as just a practical or pragmatic argument in regard to the lived-reality of lived-experience (as a textual reporting of living-experience) it cannot be otherwise that we live in one shared sense and semblance of a world, namely, this world at large, this life-world, this overall world-of-life, because how otherwise could we debate each other over the suitable formulation of such positions regardless of whether they are either constructed properly or improperly? (10)

Of course, this does not mean that we can perfectly grasp the transcendental unity of such world-experience, or that the world is perfectly integrated within such unity, because it if were this relational reality for us would have no reality since to be there for us can only mean it is there as a work in progress given that perfect resolution is the relational 'death' of that relationship in historical terms of reference. Rather, what is to be granted is that there is at least a working world for us within which we can interact with each other as embodied subjects and debate each other as embodied subjects within this one arena of this world at large. (11)

Or, in essence, that because we can debate each other this fact alone must mean that to further divide this 'shared world with others' is both unnecessary and would be counter-productive. (12)

Now, if it were to be said that the so-called reality of reality were to be divided into two 'worlds' (or more), say, this so-called 'external world' and a so-called 'internal world' and these two or more worlds were not there for each other then we could unequivocally say that what does not exist for us does not exist for us (and we need not there be there for that which is not there for us). On the other hand, if these two or more worlds were there for each other then they cannot be two absolutistically distinct realms of existence, so, why bother to make such a distinction in the first place? By what rational is such an insistence being organized? (13)

Given these impossible, false, and unnecessary claims for a so-called 'external world', etc., in our diagnosis of such defects let us ask why such claims would be made in the first place in order to better understand the problematic nature of this so-called 'problem of the external world', along with the so-called 'problem of other minds', and all other 'allied problems', and so on. That by such an understanding we can take a deconstructive scalpel to such ingrained so-called 'philosophical problems' and expose their quite unrealistic reality, and so on and so forth. (14)

As a first clue, I proffer the 'metaphor of the eyes' being mistreated as if 'windows looking out upon a world beyond…' (15)

ii. The Eyes Are Not Just Windows (Upon a So-Called 'External World')

Without a doubt 'windows' are 'looked through', and if we were to see the world outside, then we are looking through those windows to the world beyond. (16)

What this metaphor does not allow us to say is that if we were outside those windows that we could not also look inside…although, it is also true to say, some windows are more for viewing in one direction only (as, e.g., in a specially designed psychology laboratory where they like to observe without being seen observing the observed, or, as in most cars where you cannot see who is driving that car or even if someone is actually driving that car). (17)

But, with all metaphors, there are strict limits beyond which we should not go if we are not permitted to go in any non-metaphorical or literal manner. Yes, that person looks like 'John'… and is John, is one situation where 'like' can be validly converted into 'is'. On all other occasions, such conversion of the analogical into the literal is not permitted. So, e.g., the Moon may look like a big blue cheese… is never going to be eaten as if it were a cheese. Therefore, when not permitted, when a valid process of conversion is not able to be attained or obtained, i.e., appropriated, then such a manoeuvre should not be sanctioned, neither affirmed nor confirmed. (18)

So, yes, we do see the world external to the widows of a house but that does not mean we observe an external world in its misbegotten philosophical sense. We open the door, and then go outside. Yes, we do look through our eyes, but, then, we do not step outside! (19)

Furthermore, if our eyes were literally just 'windows' to look through then we must ask 'who' looks through those windows? Then, if that subject, themselves, has inner 'eyes' to see through those outer eyes, as windows, and so on, just when will such nonsense stop? (20)

But, if it were to be said, 'that what is seen is constructed' it would surely follow that that construction cannot be other than as a 'copy' of that of which it was constructed to be a copy. But, we only live in one world and, therefore, such so-called 'copying' must be directly engaged for how else are we to discern a difference between 'the merely imagined' and 'the not so merely imagined'. Otherwise, everything would be reductively 'just merely imagined' (if that were at all possible). Even in imagination, that imagined is directly engaged, and that is the nature of intentional objectivity. Just as a photo of an object photographed and the object that was photographed are just as 'real', just as constructed in our imaginative reconstructions and just as directly engaged. (21)

Where 'being directly engaged' has no need for a so-called 'external world' in apposition to a so-called 'internal world' other than as a metaphor. That, as a metaphor, it should not be misconstrued and allowed to operate beyond its metaphorical limits. Therefore, we must observe that these obvious limitations of this metaphor are being correctly addressed and not transgressed through this form of literal mistreatment! (22)

iii. Economic Correlativity Implies There Can Be No Economic Isolates

'Intentional objectivity' is but one 'economic correlative' in the trimodal constitution of the intentional economy for we can also note 'intentional motivation (and its intentional generation of intentional significance)' and 'intentional subjectivity' (in this particular formation of the intentional economy) in order, in the first place, to make economic sense of intentional objectivity in the manner we wish to pursue through that type of an overall conjecture. In whatever manner we construct this intentional economy, 'intentional objectivity' cannot be significantly entertained apart from the prior necessity of this context for an intentional economy as already being directly implicated through this concept of 'intentional objectivity' as enacted therein. (23)

Once this economic location of intentional objectivity in an intentional economy is suitably understood it then follows that, although, apparently, we can relatively focus on intentional objectivity, or intentional motivation or intentional subjectivity, in no way can we purely focus our attention, absolutistically, upon intentional objectivity, or, equally, upon intentional motivation or intentional subjectivity. Just as intently focusing on an intentional experience of subjectivity will find that it will equally elude our grasp, and, where our pure, undivided, non-distracted comprehension of either intentional objectivity or intentional motivation will also equally elude us in a similar measure. (24)

Now, given we cannot think of intentional objectivity apart from its economic location in an intentional economy it follows that we are not permitted to think of intentional objectivity as existing apart from its intentional origination within its intentional economy (and that economy, in turn, within its epistemological economy, etc.[20]). That granted, it then follows that economic correlativies, indeed, all economic correlativities in all possible economies, cannot be entertained through an impossible form of economic isolation as 'economic isolates'.[21] (25)

Conceived of in this manner, and that this context applies to all forms of economic comprehension, it follows that we cannot think of entertaining any economic correlative as existing apart from its economy of origination. That these inherent limitations, instrumental in all forms of thematization, implies that all forms of identification, and those identities observed therein, cannot be treated, absolutistically, as economic isolates, whilst, at the same time it does allow us to entertain such notions in relatively limited terms of reference. (26)

So, the thematization of intentional objectives, object-states, points of intentional focus, and so on, is allowed, still, such objectivity cannot be viewed through economic isolation alone! (27)

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[20] …and all its way back to the imputation of the necessary transcendental unity of the living-world, as life-world, as this world-of-life, a world that must be shared with others in order to appreciate, through both qualified differentiation and accommodation, both the uniqueness and the non-uniqueness of our individual existences, etc.

[21] As an analogy, we have the concept of 'quarks' in particle physics that cannot be extracted from the context of their quark environment and individually exhibited outside that context as individual quarks.

iv. The Philosophical 'Crime' of Metaphorical Abuse

So, all intentional objectives are discerned in and through an intentional process that cannot be terminated in the impossible extraction of its intentional content! (28)

Therefore, we should regard all intentional objectivity as provisional and as not able to be isolated economically. However, for the purposes of discourse, we overlook such constraints, but, philosophically, we do so at the expense of our reputations. (29)

That, to do otherwise, is to both commit 'metaphorical abuse' and exhibit ourselves as 'philosophical felons' who either shamelessly perpetrate such abuse or through ignorant inadvertence do not have the wits about them to realize how foolish they are before those who obviously know better. (30)

It is not a good look to talk about something that, actually, you cannot talk about, and even worse to say you can do certain things when on closer inspection you can only fail. All a bit like looking into a mirror and seeing that the room is on fire and then aiming an opened hose at the reflection of that fire in the mirror in the hope of putting out that same fire… (31)

Let me briefly use this fire motif to segue to the analogy of the fire triangle. Fire officers would wax lyrically on this topic that the economy of a fire needs the three 'correlatives' of fuel, heat, and oxygen and if we were to oversee the absence of any one of these correlatives then the process of fire can neither commence nor continue if already in progress. In a similar manner, the intentional economy cannot operate if one of its correlatives is either absolutistically absented or absolutistically isolated? In this economy of intentional objectivity, intentional motivation, and intentional subjectivity we can relatively focus on one of these economic correlatives (through intra-mediation[22]), or on a pair of correlatives (through mediation) and/or focus on all three correlatives (through inter-mediation), or, relatively overlook such correlatives through applying the corresponding contrary form of focus, or, effectively, its de-focus, i.e., its suspension whose subsequent suppression, through a suspension of that suspension, will find for us the forcefulness of the de-suspension. However, the more we move in one of these simple or complex directions the less able we are to move in another direction, and v.v. However, in qualifying this analogy of the fire triangle we also need to note that in running an intentional economy that an element of an open-ended exponential expenditure of psychic energy is also involved that the more we are either over-focused or over-de-focused on single correlatives or complex sets of correlatives the greater the investment in psychic energy is required to such an extent that an infinite budget would seem to be required to either impossibly focus just on such a combination or to impossibly direct our focus completely in the opposite direction. Hence, also, this invitation to consider the analogy of an economy of three quarks in which quarks cannot be excised, either individually or collectively, from such an economy (since as soon as a certain energy level is reached the imputed candidates for excision merely convert into to another set of bound quarks). (32)

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[22] On this topic of intra-mediation, mediation, and inter-mediation refer to *Book* 11, e.g., *A Third Digest*, etc.

v. The Discontinuous Spectrum between Simulations and Non-Simulations

Obviously, the virtual fire seen in a mirror is not the non-virtual fire being reflected in that mirror. Hence this observation that there is a discontinuous spectrum between the distinctive phenomenal-phenomenological modalities expected to co-occur in the presentation of a certain type of phenomena and in virtual iterations of that same phenomena that do not coincide with the non-virtual inventory normally experienced in a conformal reiteration of such modal expectations. So, e.g., when we eat one non-virtual apple, we find it compares very well to our previous experiences involved in eating non-virtual apples.[23] On the other hand, remembered apples, imagined apples, apples seen on computer screens or in photographs, ornamental wax apples, along with dream apples… all have differences in their modal presentation that allows us to differentiate non-virtual apples from remembered apples, and remembered apples from imagined apples, and so on. Given, e.g., that non-virtual apples can be both eaten and found to relieve physiological pangs of hunger, etc. (33)

But, this observation also has a certain rhetorical point. E.g., ornamental wax apples are just as 'real' as non-virtual apples. The experience of dream apples is just as 'real' as imagined apples although in a vivid dream or nightmare the intensity of that experience might make such an experience seem as even more 'real' and 'memorable'. How should the realist, naïve or otherwise, cope with such a diversity to be found in different types of experience all integrated with a similar theme? To insist on some form of a copy to match each and every distinctive type of intentional experience is to ask far too much when such complexity is obviated through the presentation of an intentional objectivity with a modal complexion in keeping with its perspectival directives as formulated in keeping with its aspirational modes of intervention as navigated, negotiated, and arbitrated in lived-experience. Then, the persistence of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance establishes logical subjectivity and the alterations, as discerned in and through comparative processes of treatment, can alert us to difference in identity observed over the course of that apparent process of transformation, and, where the former considerations then find an ongoing, reiterable, conformal truth appreciation over the course of that period of transformation. So, such differences in phenomenological typology can be observed as well as transformation conducted within the exemplification of such typological instantiations. Furthermore, in the phenomenal-phenomenological evolution of the intentional objectivity in question we should also note that such a process is neither completely dictated by ourselves nor completely dictated by that nature of either our recognition, encountering and/or engagement with our interpretations of that lived-experience being recounted in either our informal reports and/or in our more formal reportings. (34)

But, there can be no absolutistical differentiation between simulations and non-simulations since the simulation of a simulation results in its non-simulation, and, that which cannot be simulated cannot be there to be simulated in lived-experience! (35)

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[23] The mnemonic for this has previously been explored under the headings of density (of the modal spectrum), intensity (involved in our experience of those modalities), propensity (for the reiteration of similar tropes, memes, themes, etc.); along with salience, consilience, and propinquity (or proximity or standing).

vi. The Non-Necessity for the Positing of a Strong Realism

A camera, e.g., can present the simulation of an apple in the form of a photo. Moreover, that photo could be photocopied and that photocopy then re-photocopied, etc., or, electronically replicated in such a manner that little or no error is allowed to arise on the continual creation of another copy, etc. Carefully threading our way through such observations, we can note that simulations of simulations could well be considered to be non-simulations given this possible stability in the reiteration of such information. On the other hand, if we were unable to make simulations of simulations, then, that simulated experience could not be experienced. Now, given that we live in one world, that allows us to communicate through the sharing of information, and that through intentional objectivity we are directly in an engagement with this world at large, for how else could we be in a relationship with this world, and v.v., and, that intentional objectivity is continually re-iterated in order to maintain its logical subjectivity and through such reiteration soon come before our more consciously formed attention, then, it follows that a philosophy of strong realism is completely redundant besides being also impossible to entertain! (36)

In other words, intentional objectivity is not so much the middle-person but the very means that allows us to directly engage all forms of lived experience in line with the distinctive complexion and tenor of their distinctive types of phenomenal-phenomenological constitution. So non-virtual apples, as non-virtual apples are directly engaged in all forms of engagement from being seen to being eaten and digested. Indeed, for how else are we going to eat an apple other than by eating that same apple! (37)

Say, I were to tell you I had recently acquired two very beautiful oil paintings, and mentioned one was a landscape and the other, a seascape. Even with such minimal information, you could still imagine what they might look like. The first picture probably being more land than water if a water view were also to be entailed. Conversely, we must assume that that seascape would, in all probability, depict a much greater quantity of water, and so on. Then, you are taken to view these two painting, and our previous imaginings are completely eclipsed by what we actually see. It is as if these painting re-paint themselves before our mind's eye. Even if fully described in excessively depicted detail, on actually being viewed these two painting present a surplus of e/valuational formation that cannot be reduced just to the productivity of our conscious experience nor can these painting be said to be without phenomenologically constructed content… with the implication to draw that neither a strong realism nor a strong idealism need to be invoked in order to account for the richness of experience to be had through intentional objectivity that is neither purely passive nor purely active nor able to be fully and entirely engaged given that our experience is also perspectival in orientation and that no aspects can be exhausted nor the infinitude of aspects need to be invoked in the evolving enrichment of our lived-experience. On the other hand, weak realistic and idealistic (and pragmatic) contributions can be entertained and through exercising conformally constructed conjectures with evidently ascertained hypotheses we are able to review the simulation of this world as a non-simulation whose status can take on a non-weak/non-strong form of an ongoing re(-)assessment given that the ongoing simulation of a simulation, effectively, is a non-simulation whose conformal status is near-effortlessly able to be reiterated and,

therein and thereby, continually found to deliver forms of re(-)conformation until such a time we have to revise our opinions where, it should be noted, such revisions are only in part and never in whole, in a complete revision of that thematic-topic under review. (38)

Through this lengthy deconstruction of a strong realism, and an eventual acceptance of a composite weak realism, weak idealism, and a weak pragmatism that, through suitable conjectures and evidentially ascertained hypotheses, can be rendered in a non-weak/non-strong form of conformal ascertainment, we should be progressively led to a point of no return where we would, or indeed, should, give up these impossible and unnecessary notions of a strong realism (along with all other economically impossible and totally unnecessary forms of strong positioning). To reinforce this first conclusion, that a strong realism is both impossible and unnecessary, let me quickly summarize these arguments as just presented. (39)

As we live in one shared sense of a world at large, in order for us to be able to communicate with each other, the implication can be drawn that there is no need for its division into so-called 'external and internal worlds'. Moreover, such an idea is also economically impossible for a number of reasons. (40)

Yes, a world beyond a window is seen through a window, but, there is no real, absolutistical division for us between the inside and the outside of that building. We open the door and we can step outside, or, through that same door, we can re-enter that same building. That, although our eyes can be poetically compared to the 'widows of the soul',[24] still, this metaphor has obvious limitations when applied to a deconstruction of a strongly misguided form of realism. To make such a metaphor work, literally, we have to invoke an infinite regress which just makes such efforts look ridiculous. (41)

Then, if intentional objectivity is seen as a correlative aspect of the trimodally constituted intentional economy then we soon realize that we can neither absent nor isolate this correlative from the other two inseparably interconnected correlatives that constitute our working representation of an intentional economy (re(-)presentation). (42)

Obviously, a strong realism is exemplifying a process of metaphorical abuse that we must assume works in a weal realism but cannot function in any and all attempted, strong, economically impossible articulations of the same. (43)

Then, as simulations can only be of that which can be simulated, that which we have economic access to, then it follows that as relative simulations of simulations, effectively, are non-simulations it follows that all simulations are 'real', but, in judgment we note in which perspectives we are operating within in order to delineate those phenomenological realties that better approximate, and find textual alignment, with our phenomenal=phenomenological expectations and act accordingly. (44)

That through relational directness, etc., we have no need for a strong realism! (45)

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[24] A common cultural trope. A statement, e.g., attributed to Leonardo da Vinci. The Bible can also be cited, e.g., Matthew 6:22-23.

3. Reconstruction

That through a process of remedial correction we must also attend to reconstructing that which effectively remains after the exercise of a suitable process of deconstruction.[25] (46)

i. Intentional Objectivity

Hopefully, after conducting such deconstruction, we should be left with an enriched appreciation of intentional objectivity as well as recognizing that, that granted, there is no need for either a strong realism or a strong idealism, etc., and that by co-opting a mutually interactive weak realism, weak idealism, and a weak pragmatism, etc., we can, through well-supported hypotheses, then run ensuing conjectures that become progressively less *ad hoc* to emerge as provisional, relatively non-*ad hoc*, non-weak/non-strong conjectures in both complexion and tenor. To support this contention, let me revisit here this concept of 'intentional objectivity'. (47)

In this corrective remediation of treatment deconstruction of the relatively defective and reconstruction of the relatively effective are to work hand in hand. Under the heading of the 'relatively defective' we have inappropriate genre construction, misinformed factual inputs; propositional inconsistencies in terms of premises, argument, and conclusions along with improper forms of transformational treatment; consequential irregularities that are non-supportive of both the promotion of the non-existential richness and the existential enrichment of our relationships, and so on. In a positive contrast, an 'effective reconstruction', as a 'reconstruction of the relatively effective', we observe well-informed statements and the use of appropriate genres of behaviour, well-formed forms of propositional treatment, and well-expressed conjectures capable of advancing both positive non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation, and so on. A work in progress that only finds temporary periods of respite when we shift the center of our attention to relative more productive fields of enquiry and application that are then perceived to be relatively more pressing. That, by such means, we incrementally enrich the mutual presentation of 'our' intentional objectivity that is to be found to hand and is to be kept to hand by working within those perspectival aspects that are found to be more conducive to both observing and realizing our intentional aspirations as we navigate, negotiate, and arbitrate through(-)others given that our various shorter-term projects and longer-term programs can only find the requisite degree of fruition as a well-organized and well-conducted social process refracted through the ministrations of like-minded communities. That to this end, a deeper understanding of the role of intentional objectivity is instrumental in better facilitating such constructive forms of appreciation. (48)

The imagined world of the strong, ideological realist is just as missing in action as the imaginary world of the strong, ideological idealist. The non-ideological, non-strong philosopher or metaphysician, along with the non-ideological, non-strong disciplinarian and secularist are to be found sensibly working with 'what is to hand', namely, 'intentional objectivity, etc.' But, in the same vein, this economic concept also deserves to be

[25] Ideally, we would do this simultaneously with deconstruction.

both deconstructed and reconstructed. Misconceptions need to be dispelled and a refinement of this working concept also needs to be spelled out as will be attempted in the remainder of this essay. (49)

Intentional objectivity is constituted in and through intentional consciousness hence its obvious weak idealistic-like input and contribution. At the same time, in our direct engagement with this sense and semblance of a world, whose relative transcendental unity guarantees the mutual grounds of our communicative-cooperation with others, and so on and so forth, we should not be surprised to find a world directly being engaged with through the economic auspices of such intentional objectivity, etc. Thence a world that dictates what we will see of it to that extent we have already framed such perception and apperception in such a manner to recognize, encounter and engage with the simulations of the same. That what cannot be simulated is not simulated, and where simulation is only of that already being simulated, etc. But, that all such simulations, as non-simulations, given that the simulation of such simulations is not-simulated, is simulated as a non-simulation, it follows that we directly engage this world whose textualized reports and reportings find various degrees of representative-like alignment, through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment , to that extent that we find ourselves directly recognizing, encountering and engaging with the simulations of the same. Where all such experiences are both 'real' and 'ideal' in a weak sense, and, where our judgmental appreciation is both able and capable of determining how such representations are being put together in order to discern whether such determinations better approximate or fall short of our phenomenal-phenomenological expectations in the characterization of such matters. Indeed, our psychic integrity is such that when we are consciously alert our intentional production is similarly integrated to that extent that we can discern these modal differences in our expectations and anticipations and, therein and thereafter, ably differentiate those instances that better exemplify our conformal appreciation of such everyday experiences. By such means, without difficulty, we quite naturally differentiate those phenomena that better exemplify certain particular phenomenological types from those iterations that fall short of such expected degrees of exemplification courtesy of an appreciation of our intentional objectivity. (50)

Now, the phenomenological orientation of intentional objectivity is to be viewed as one correlative in a trimodal economy that could also include intentional motivation possessing a hermeneutical orientation and intentional subjectivity possessing a non-systematic existential orientation (and where the entire economy is capable of taking on a relatively systematic existential, pro-relational transformation when suitably suspended). As correlatives we find they mutually co-define each other through the joint negation of the other two correlatives. So, in this regard, e.g., 'intentional objectivity' is the 'joint negation of both intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity'. But, as these three correlatives, within their co-associated economy, mutually co-define each other through such joint apposition it follows that no one correlative can be separately excised and isolated apart from its simulated origination and functioning within that same economy. Indeed, to that same extent such an attempted excision and isolation is enforced to that same extent such conduct will fail. Thence the theoretical failure of a strong realism along with all other strong, ideological forms of this variety of extremism that just cannot

be propagated in such negatively entertained non-economic terms of reference. But, again, as already pointed out for a variety of reasons, we have no need for any strong form of such ideological nonsense since, e.g., such working concepts, like 'intentional objectivity', etc., can already be found to hand to successfully work with as must already be the case given that we can already work within this world at large, this overall world-of-life… given our ability to both critically and radically critique what we both say and do in this world as must already be found to hand. (51)

Fortunately, in our working within this world at large, we are assisted by the fact that in our researches, professional or otherwise, we will recognize, encounter, and engage in various forms of existential surplus that will accelerate our appreciation of the intentional objectivity already to hand. To invoke an earthy metaphor, it is as if 'we were given a sack of old potatoes that in appropriately planting in rich and well-drained soil would, in partial harvesting, year after year, were to produce more and more potatoes each and every year thereafter… (52)

Let us humbly recognize that the world as lived more dictates its own constitution than what ourselves, as creative as we are, could ever arrange.[26] Furthermore, contrary to certain wayward philosophers, who must be leading such solitary lives, our working in this world is forever a communal affair. Not only do we see this world through our own individual sets of eyes but also through the eyes of others given our education to do so, our communications with others and their ever-present widespread communications with us. For how else could Social-Media be designated otherwise than as 'Social' even if monopolized in certain quarters by the anti-social since even they are invested in manipulating public opinion, etc. (53)

Indeed, even in our dealing with processes of transformational retreatment, pretreatment is already arranged in intersubjective terms of reference. The facts we introduce into our narratives, hopefully well-informed and appropriate to the overseeing a productive discharge of 'our' intentional motivations as subjectively framed by our appropriate use of intersubjective genres of behaviour that, in parallel, both 'write' and 'read' such social patterns of performance. Hence, it could be successfully argued, that even the formation of both our own intentional objectivity and intentional motivation is not, nor could ever be, an entirely subjective affair. Witness the inescapable success of those arguments that contradict the performance of a private language. Witness too those arguments that analytical propositions cannot be thought in purely analytical terms of reference; that the imputed givenness of synthetical statements is an illusion (and should disrupt the very arguing of any form of strong realism, etc.), and, as argued elsewhere, that even conjectures, 'themselves' just cannot be proposed purely in conjectural terms of reference, as existing outside their respective conjectural economies, and so on. (54)

…and how is such a felicitous intersubjective world to be envisaged? Through the use of well-exercised suspension, etc! (55)

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[26] As already noted in paragraph 38.

ii. Suspensions, etc.

As an observation, for me confirmed on a number of occasions, it is indicative of an ideologue that they find it quite difficult, if not impossible, for them to deeply question their own positioning to the same degree that they resist the counter-arguments of others. Indeed, question them too effectively and such an over-committed person could get angry with the potential for violence should they feel their trenchant identification with such positioning to be equally threatened. Hence my succinct exposition of a 'pseudo-psychosis' where 'highly focused psychotic-like behaviour is exhibited when the person with such an over-commitment resists the questioning of their over-privileging of positioning to the same approximate degree that they hold such epistemological and ontological commitments. In a distinctive contrast, a person open to such challenges is more inclined to find an intellectual enjoyment in being challenged, entering into a non-monological dialogue, demonstrating a certain reasonable degree of commitment but prepared to modify their views should they find them in need of such qualification. To lead a responsible life a certain degree of commitment is required along with a commitment to being open to criticism, encountering new ideas, and their possible need to engage a radical reappraisal of positioning. Then, in a further contrast we have some relativists who either have a strong over-commitment to not making a stand of any definitive form or who possess a marked irresponsible, non-commitment to any form of positioning. (56)

As implied, the basis for conducting a well-balanced conformal appreciation of our positioning is approached through the use of working suspensions. Intuitively, such an approach is exercised in each and every intentional moment of our conscious lives but is amplified through a number of techniques that promote such an attitude that simultaneously oversees a suspension of belief but also the non-suspension of our disbelief where the latter will insulate the person from entertaining conspiratorial ideation that lacks an evidential basis in the fruitfully productive operation of our conjectures. To promote this aspect of the suspension a number of approaches could be utilized from questions to exercising counterfactuals, from invoking analogies to making provocative comparisons, from forcing a dialectical-like contradiction of positions to entertaining forms of a dynamic balance through a paralleling of positions with counter-positions, and so on. (57)

In my evolving understanding of the suspension, I am the first to admit that I am not merely interpreting a philosopher like Husserl but proffering a considerably different re-interpretation and a radical expansion of this expression whilst maintaining the Husserlian spirit in my explication of this complex concept. For a start, I conceive of the suspension as a trimodal economy and where the suspension is induced when there is a dynamic balance of its three correlative facets and where even the focus on such facets, themselves, are points of entry into this overall expression of the suspension (whose complexity I would explicate under the rubric of an extensive suspension[27]).

Part of this comprehensive reevaluation was to also connect the suspension with a causal dimension through volition and articulate the also closely connected but overlooked notion of the de-suspension. (58)

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[27] Looked at in detail in *Pursuit*, Volume II.

iii. De-Suspensions

The very notion of the de-suspension is necessary for otherwise how would we both enter and exit the potential paralysis of the suspension if we were to be either left therein or thereout[28] for even a moment longer than each individual moment we continually approach this site of such potential ambiguity in terms of its promising either empowerment and/or disempowerment. The force of the de-suspension can be empowering, but, if we were to be trapped in the suspension then that too would be totally disempowering, indeed, a place of the deepest psychosis whose proximity could only promise the depths of psychic paralysis we observe in a full-blown catatonic episode where the poor individual is left both mute and statue-like. So, the question is posed, how do we exit the suspension? Through none other than 'the suspension of that suspension', i.e., through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension itself! (59)

The suspension, thankfully, is inherently unstable, so even though at the very center of all forms of judgmental appreciation it is also perfectly balanced, dynamically 'suspended' through the counter-forcefulness and reactive nature of the de-suspension. Indeed, I would argue that it is the de-suspension that promotes a process of judgment, the definitive escape, 'non-economically' in its positive sense, from what otherwise could well be nothing more than endless cycles of unproductive circulation on the economic level of the merely virtual. That the role of the de-suspension is positively non-economic in the sense of an irruptive force that converts economic resolution into a 'definitive response of the last moment'[29] that causally converts the virtual into the non-virtual… through the very auspices of the de-suspension. Hence this causal implication in an expanded understanding of the 'working suspension-de-suspension'. (60)

In other words, I am arguing for a form of 'focus' in addition to the focus arrived at through foregrounding in a process of treatment, etc., by invoking the conjectured forcefulness of an ensuing de-suspension to mark out and emphasize that being 'focused' upon by such a mechanism (in this second sense of the expression focus as 'focus'). Now, what relevance has this for my polemics *contra* a strong realism? (61)

Simply put I am trying to explain how intentional objectivity, along with intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity, can be relatively 'focused upon' but not absolutstically focused upon as would seem to be projected or extrapolated through the demands of an ideological extremist posing as a strong realist. In other words, such 'focus', bringing to our selective attention one or more economic correlatives, and so on. But, on the other hand, being productive of a relative form of intentional 'focus' and not in some misbegotten form of 'givenness' or 'non-mediated awareness', etc. 62)

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[28] Implicating, respectively, I tentatively suspect either a 'psychosis' or a 'neurosis' (paralleling, respectively, the lengthening of the circadian rhythm over two, or three days [in eating and sleeping one day and not the next or, worse having this pattern repeat over three days] *versus* the doubling of this pattern over the space of one day [with, say, six meals and two periods of wanting to sleep or rest/siesta]. An observation I was to see often reiterated in my nursing of severe mental illnesses.

[29] Echoing the language of the French non-philosopher François Laurelle in his promoting a non-standard philosophy.

iv. How to Avoid Over-Commitment without Diminishing Commitment

Now, given this awareness that over-commitment, either ontologically and/or epistemologically, is instrumental in the formation of a pseudo-psychosis let us ask how we might avoid exercising such an extremist, ideologically oriented agenda and, at the same time, discern just what degree of commitment is both healthy and suitably apposite as we navigate, negotiate and arbitrate the course of our interventions in this world at large through the auspices of our primary relationships? (63)

Obviously, through the regular utilization of well-exercised suspensions would be a good place to start. At least preventing us from prosecuting an extremist agenda. (64)

But, then we need to attend to our intentional projects and programs in such a manner that we positively create, preserve and expansionally conserve the resident e/valuational formations within the re(-)presentational economies of such relationships. As already explored, non-existential e/valuation in aggregate can be either positive, neutral, and/or negative in orientation whereas existentially oriented e/valuation is only positive to some degree or other.[30] In the augmentation of the former and in the enhancement of the latter, the positive amplification of e/valuation need not be the expense of either orientation, and, preferably, through a suitable taking into account of both types of considerations. That, in this regard, the preservation of a certain degree of commitment is to be regarded as necessary for the responsible person in order for them to find the motivation to appositely discharge their deontological obligations, etc. (65)

Again, I would argue that we can find this dimension of concern and care (for our relationships and their relational participants) through the suitable utilization of working suspensions that are appositely representative of both those primary relationships and their inter-relational involvement that would also oversee their augmented and enhanced interaction.[31] (66)

Where the co-option of a working suspension should put us in a better position to enact those responses that are more relatively responsible despite the natural limitations of the finite person. That in this regard, there is a need to duly observe a progressive and relationally attuned existentialization of process that would be better promoted through observing well-informed statements, well-formed propositions, well-expressed propositional-statements along with the well-organized and well-conducted exercise of our conjectures in such a manner that is cognizant of the needs of our relationships, and their participants, and, at the same time mindfully attends to those pre-conditions, conditions and consequential post-conditions that amplify the positive e/valuational formation of our primary relationships, etc., in both non-existential and existential orientations. (67)

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30 As explored in *Book* 11.

31 Because an ethical responsiveness and responsibility cannot reside purely within the passive ambit, dynamic remit, and/or conjectural/existential composite, i.e., the overall orbit of a sole relationship. I.e., the pro-relational orientation of the existential cannot be just centered on a primary relationship because, if anything, relational consequences spill over or leak from interventions enacted within our primary relationships.

v. How to Recognize and Avoid a Pseudo-Psychosis, etc.

In the same vein, as in regard to the formation and maintenance of suitable forms and degrees of commitment, how are we to recognize pseudo-psychotic or psychotic phenomena in both ourselves and others? (68)

Through well-performed patterns of conformal truth appreciation as suitably expedited through well-organized and well-conducted working suspensions. (69)

To be noted, is a mindfulness that all sections of a conjectural economy need to exhibit clearly delineated truth determinations, both individually and collectively,[32] that, moreover, will assist us in the successful operation of our conjectures along with a promotion of their positively augmented non-existential e/valuation and their positively enhanced existential e/valuation. Thence this concern and care to be taken over the exercise of our conjectures in order that they, in turn, can existentially exhibit their concern and care of us, and, by extension, our due concern and care of others.[33] (70)

If anything, in the baking of a cake, use the right ingredients and then let the oven do the rest of the work. The moral here being, 'that we should attend to the pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional details so that the enacted process, itself, should then be able to look after itself… hopefully, on 'our' behalf, etc. (71)

In all of this, our ability to change our minds is crucial since to remain wedded to our ontological and epistemological over-commitments is a recipe for the inducing of a pseudo-psychosis, or a psychosis, along with a diminished insightfulness into the poverty of lived-experience concomitant with such positional inflexibility. Therefore, how might we recognize a need to change our re(-)presentative positioning and how might this process be conducted in light of a need to be aligned with a positive conformal appreciation of what exactly, in that situation, is conformally valid, etc? (72)

Again, through working suspensions, rendering our conjectures in a manner that is non-*ad hoc*, or at least, in a manner that is relatively less *ad hoc*, and so on. (73)

For a start, as a place to begin, attempt to be aware of the possible anomalization of the possibly problematic or the potential anomalization that could arise through a problematization of a re(-)presentative understanding of the situation, in its relational situatedness, in question. Being attentive to such potential problematicity or potential problematization of our re(-)presentative understandings of our overall situation in its situatedness. Where, by 're(-)presentative understandings' is simply meant those alignments discerned within and between either our informal reports and/or formal reportings… noting the persistence of relative transformational isomorphic invariance, what aspect of the situation are undergoing relevant forms of transformational alteration, along with a con-

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32 As noted in *Appendix* A.xx.

33 If anything, to mutually enhance our collective freedom through the better facilitation of processes of arbitration, etc. Contrary to the superficial dictates of an over-competitive, exploitive imposition of neo-liberal polices within The Political-Economy, and so on and so forth!

formal appreciation of the same derived from a careful delineation of such alignments able to be reiterated virtually, etc., in and through processes of re(-)alignment, i.e., mitigated hermeneutical forms of realignment through rectification in both genre identification and the reception of well-informed factual reports and reportings; plus those phenomenal-phenomenological processes of treatment that call for corrective remediation through parallel forms of deconstruction and reconstruction; all continually adjusted through approximations derived from ongoing process of re(-)normalization coupled with an awareness of those opportunities that might invite positive forms of both non-existentially oriented richness and existentially oriented enrichment. (74)

In a simplified form, the economy of re(-)alignment at the center of conformal truth appreciation is derived from hermeneutical realignment; phenomenological re-demis-alignment (as a form of error correction at the center of both deconstruction and reconstruction), and, re-alignment in those directions that promote both richness and enrichment of the relational situatedness in question. (75)

So, e.g., in successfully operating the simple conjecture of 'rain' we note the necessary alignment within and between statements, propositions, and propositional-statements that duly observe the conjecture that 'if I were to stand in the rain I would, quite understandably, 'get wet' (to which I should add it should not be necessary to actually stand in the rain to merely prove, or reprove, this same simple conjecture [already well-embedded in our body of knowledge that allows us, most of the time, to generally overlook the problematic and problematization of natural experience]). (76)

Then, if we find a series of alignments through the apparent reiteration of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, etc., then the meta-appreciation of such an alignment is true if the appreciation of such an alignment can be demonstrated as present, as presented, in either our reports or reportings (in line with the simple Tarskian requirements for a semantic definition of truth). The conformal nature of our determinations being evidently presented through our ability to reiterate, either virtually and/or non-virtually, such alignments as finding the requisite degree of reiterable re(-)alignments required to satisfy this definition:

Alignments between reportings 1, 2, 3 as A', in terms of A, is true iff A. (77)

Therefore, given the centrality of re(-)representative alignments, our derivation of their conformal status, the necessary role to be played by well-organized and well-conducted conjectures along with the suitable utilization of well-conducted suspensions it follows that if we correctly attend to these details that our standing in the world is proportionally augmented and enhanced accordingly. (78)

Therefore, it behooves us to avoid forms of over-commitment whilst preserving the requisite degree of commitment that would suitably motivate us to be responsible in the world at large, this world-of-life. As with all forms of strong ideological over-preferencing, a strong realism is antithetical to being in this world with others and should be duly discounted and avoided through the imposition of working suspensions, etc. (79)

vi. Working Economies

Obviously, an openness to our errors is to be commended. I.e., our needing to perceive the problematic as problematic, and then seeking to de-anomalize the anomalization of such lived-experience, in the process calling for us to change our minds when such changes are duly 'called for'. (80)

Closely allied to a strong realism is a strong empiricism and a strong materialism. Arguments *contra* a strong realism can also be mustered against these equally pernicious ideological allies. Not that, in a process of conformalization, should we avoid weak forms of the same when their relevant and apposite involvement in the formation of our conjectures, etc., is seeming called for and from thence, their modifications through a lens of the non-weak/non-strong. Where a trimodal approach is always more apposite than a mere unimodal or bimodal attitude to truth determination, etc. (81)

How could we escape all sensible demands for evidence? How could we avoid all notions of the material in an appreciation of our embodiment, our embankment in this world at large, that our embeddedness in the company of others is guaranteed through the material nature of our interactions as one embodied person standing before another embodied person, and so on? (82)

However, to prosecute strong reductions to just material matter or evidential experience would also overlook the existential fact of 'our being in this world' if such extremism were to be persevered with. That the more aware person would also be aware of the emergent dimension to lived-experience as well as both non-existential and existential dimensions in e/valuational formation, along with the dynamics of intervention, overseeing responsible patterns of enaction, and so on. (83)

Unfortunately, materialists, in an obsession with the material, overlook that the very idea of the 'material' itself, in a contrast, could not be material *per se*. Moreover, the concept should also tell us what was 'not material', or 'immaterial', etc.[34] That, through relational interactions, we also witness non-reducible surpluses of e/valuation. (84)

Interestingly, we could parody a certain famous empiricist[35] who 'reasonably' conjectured that the ideas they 'see' internally within their own minds were paralleled by object-states in the imputed 'externality' of the so-called 'external world' without rendering this *ad hoc* conjecture a lot less *ad hoc* by simply asking themselves, 'how, as only an empiricist, they could ever get to know, obviously, what was not amenable for a so-called 'empiricist' to 'observe' in the first place?' Claiming to be an 'empiricist' is one thing, but, to claim extra-ordinary super-powers is quite another claim altogether! (84)

Still, we should be observant of that deemed to be 'evidential' and act accordingly, even changing our minds if duly called for… (85)

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[34] A religionist, depending on the viability of their definitions, might rightly or wrongly, wish to also add 'spiritual' to this list.

[35] John Locke (1632-1704).

4. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

What am I allowed to conclude? (86)

That, although I have consistently deconstructed a strong realism, this does not mean that I am completely dismissing all realistic notions. Indeed, I would argue that we would make better sense of this world at large by conjoining weak notions of a wide variety of philosophies whose strong forms, admittedly, through their bad press, are so prone to 'poison the well of experience' in this regard. Then, through managing our conjectures, as conjectural economies; through discerning conformal alignment through noting reiterable re(-)alignments; and suitably exercising working suspensions; and so on, we should then find ourselves in a position to responsibly promote and disseminate non-weak/non-strong sentences in the form of well-organized and well-conducted disquisitions capable of assisting us in advancing an insightfulness into those opportunities that better promote a positive non-existentially oriented richness and an existentially oriented enrichment of to be had through paying closer attention to the phenomenological nature of our lived-experiences, and so forth. (87)

Over the course of this essay, I have argued that we live in one world and therein we have direct interactions with the discriminated and delineated relational contents of such interactions (because how else could those relations be observed if not directly entertained [by definition]). Moreover, merely seeing a world external to our eyes does not entitle us to impossibly imagine a so-called 'external world' along with the additional philosophical baggage that travels in the wake of such nonsense. Furthermore, it is really sad to see people, both professionals and amateurs, ever-wedded to committing repeated instances of metaphorical abuse as they naively insist on the so-called 'naturalness' of such 'realistic' experience when they mistreat intentional objectivity as if it were an economic isolate. Correlatives cannot be excised and separated from their respective economies. On the other hand, the mutual interactiveness of intentional objectivity, between ourselves and the world at large, merely supports the contention that a well-conjectured mix of weak philosophies, in an alignment with evidential reports and reportings, and so on, is all that is needed to run a viable philosophy without any need whatsoever to resort to strong, ideological, extremist forms of impossible narration that just do not serve us well when what is responsibly called for is an openness to what the world has to offer rather than telling the world what you think is on offer! (88)

That hand in hand with any strong form of positioning is an over-commitment to how that person thinks the world should be observed in line with such *a priori* thinking. Much better is it, for both ourselves and others, to maintain an existentially oriented open-mindedness to the revelatory nature of our lived-experiences, therein discerning what is relatively simulated and what is not relatively simulated in the hope of seizing on those positive opportunities to recognize, encounter, and engage the richness and enrichment of those relational opportunities that have a greater experiential reality than the feeble imaginings of those who are, obviously, so philosophically short-sighted..!! (89)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 9.8.24.

A: Appendix A[36]

At this point, in this exposition of the phenomenon of the de-suspension, let me conduct a short excursion through my closely connected concepts of 'inter-mediation', 'mediation', and 'intra-mediation', and from there resolve a couple of questions.[37] (90)

In an economy, say, the intentional economy, how do we 'focus' on one of its correlative facets? By focusing upon the same through its highlighting by the forceful use of the de-suspension. So, e.g., how might we shift our interest towards intentional objectivity and away from intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity? I would conjecture the mechanism that could oversee this shift in attention is to covertly promote a double suspension of intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity, in a process I designate as 'mediation', in order to overtly promote the ensuing de-suspension whose unleashed energy is then directed towards this bringing of our attention towards this correlative of intentional objectivity. (91)

Through mediation we can thematize the remaining correlative. Such focusing in a singular direction can be designated as a process of 'intra-mediation'. Then, if we conduct a dynamic balance of all three correlatives, we instigate an overall suspension that can be designated as issuing from this process of 'inter-mediation'. (92)

However, in observing the complex workings of the 'overall suspension', i.e., the 'extensive suspension', as arrived at through 'inter-mediation', we should also understand that all three processes of intra-mediation, mediation, and inter-mediation are co-occurring within this maelstrom of the 'suspension' itself whose delineated irruptions non-economically enable us to exercise patterns of volition that, quite understandably, are barely understood. (93)

Now, in furthering this excursion, let us also ask how are ordered phenomenon to be recognized, encountered, and engaged, and, similarly, just how are inter-ordered forms of symmetrical reduplication and asymmetrical duplication likewise engendered? (94)

If we individually 'focus'[38] on the three correlatives facets of the archetypal economy of World (the hermeneutical sphere of intentional motivation, etc.), or Object (the

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[36] Originally this exposition as a 'short excursion' on various incarnations of the conjectured force of the de-suspension was included in Section 2.iii titled De-Suspensions. But, as I perceived it to be a distraction to my polemics *contra* a strong realism I decided to enclose it in this first appendix. The important and pressing issues I am attempting to resolve here involve my setting out to convert relatively *ad hoc* conjectures into relatively non-*ad hoc* conjectures or, at the very least, converting relatively *ad hoc* conjectures into relatively less *ad hoc* conjectures by putting into practice this principle as explored in the first essay (XIIA). Those problematic conjectures being how do we envisage a '{3 x 2) x (3 x 2)' matrix associated with inter-ordered phenomena, and, the '(3 x 3)' matrix associated with the super-system of The Political-Economy? To make some progress in this regard, as preparation, I needed to also re-introduce these concepts of 'inter-mediation', etc.

[37] As explored in Book 11. E.g., as defined in *The Third Digest*. *Pursuit*, III.XIR.

[38] Technically, intentional focus is conducted in the analytical moment in our experience of intentional objectivity. However, in intentionally bringing a certain correlative to our attention this form of 'focus' is the product of intra-mediation.

phenomenal-phenomenological sphere of intentional objectivity, etc.), or Ego (the non-systematic existential sphere of intentional subjectivity, etc.) then, respectively, we find engendered an intentional 'focus' on the meta-textual sphere of the hermeneutical; or the semantic, textual sphere of the phenomenological; or the non-textual sphere of the non-systematic existential sphere.[39] In trans-cognitive, judgmental terms of reference we are focusing on what I have designated as the 'fifth order', 'first order', and 'third order' respectively. In conjecturally invoking the mechanisms of both intra-mediation and mediation how might we envisage the formation of these first three orders as noted? (95)

Quite simply, we have a process of overt intra-mediation focusing on these three orders as outlined, instigated, covertly, through a double suspension, i.e., mediation of the remaining two economic correlatives. So, e.g., in focusing on the first order of the phenomenological-semantic (in its atomic presentation of distinctive, individual phenomenological types of experience) this can be arranged by simultaneously mediating the other two correlatives of a fifth ordered intentional motivation (World) and a third ordered intentional subjectivity (Ego) in order to relatively promote intentional objectivity of the first trans-cognitive order. I.e., in effect we are using the de-suspension to overtly 'focus' on the first order/intentional objectivity through intra-mediation, which is set up by a process of covert mediation of the other two dialectical correlatives coincident with the fifth and third orders. By similar means we now also generate the orders of the fifth, and third. But, that granted, how might we then engender those three remaining orders? (96)

Again, quite simply by reversing these overt-covert distinctions. So, e.g., aesthetically oriented experience, in the second trans-cognitive (Judgmental) order, could be entertained through a form of covert intra-mediation of the World moment (coincident with the fifth order) along with the overt mediation of the Object moment (coincident with the first order) and the Ego moment (coincident with the third order). Let me diagrammatically represent these differences in suspended dynamics.

<u>Archetypal 'Focus'</u> <u>Inter-Archetypal 'Focus'</u>

Ego **Ego**

Covert Mediation *2. Overt Mediation

Object **World** **Object** **World**

*1. Overt Intra-Mediation Covert Intra-Mediation

(97)

[39] For purposes of technical precision, I have to define the 'non-systematic existential' as the so-called 'third moment' of the economic considered archetypally. In contrast, through inter-mediation, promoting the ongoing instigation of the overall suspension we see a transformation of the relatively non-existential to its relatively systematic existential expression. I.e., a more overt experience of the relatively existential through its pro-relational turn and its experience of the same through trans-relational expression of subjectivity (following the rule that intentional subjectivity reflects the type of intentional productivity currently in play).

In simplified terms, a 'focus' on the Object moment[40] (coincident with the first order) is arrived at through a covert suspension of the other two moments, or more correctly, the suspension of such a suspension. In contrast, the second order of aesthetic judgment is inter-archetypally situated and necessitates the convert intra-mediation of the opposite pole, namely, World (through intra-mediation) along with the overt suspension of both Object and Ego moments (through mediation) where, in this instance the overt mediation introduces the operative de-suspension, i.e., the suspension of the suspension, that then singles out the aesthetic trans-cognitive order, etc., overtly situated between these two moments. Thus, by these two types of strategies all six orders can be experiential delineated and exercised. (98)

By such means, through the ensuing de-suspension, i.e., the suspension of the suspension, we meet with a relative privileging that is either on a single archetypal moment or on a pair of archetypal moments singling out what is to be found between. (99)

But, then, using similar forces, how do we arrive at our inter-ordered phenomena through the symmetrical reduplication of the same order or asymmetrical duplication of dissimilar orders through the dominance of one order over a dissimilar order? (100)

To answer this question, first, I would like to propose that we need to be able to model our appreciation of conformal truth determination, and, second, to borrow from this 'meta-appreciation' of, say, the conjectural economy, in order to engineer the relatively active domination of one ordered economy, through an expression of one of its orders, over the relatively passive 'treatment' of that dominated order be it the same or different to that which currently dominates it. (101)

By such means proposing a bimodal-like mechanism where one order can dominate, manipulate, and appreciate the ensuing inter-ordered status of such intentional productivity (entailed in this form of a matrix best described as a '(3 x 2) x (3 x 2)'. Where economic activity is a matrix best described by '(3 x 1)' and ordered activity is a matrix best described by '(3 x 2)'. To complete this listing of matrix-forms we could also propose that the encompassing social system of The Political-Economy in which all systems are enveloped is in place by suggesting it has the form of a matrix that is '(3 x 3)', implicating the super-economy [of 'the economy of the overall economic'] that will be looked into shortly at the end of this *Appendix* A). (102)

Returning to a modelling of conformal truth determination it must follow that the appreciation of the overall truth determination of a specific conjecture needs to be conducted on a different meta-level, elevated by one degree, as would be the case in all forms of appreciation and where an appreciation of truth determination, in this regard, can be no different. (103)

E.g., let me return to my classic conjectural economy concerning 'rain'. (104)

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[40] Which, in this instance, is an economic form of focusing on a gestalt foreground.

Following the linear archetypal ordering of the harmonic economy, namely, 'World-Object-Ego', paralleling 'consonance-dissonance-resolution', the conjectural economy is modeled as 'synthetical statements, analytical propositions, and conjectural propositional-statements' we can note the following. First, the truth statements of these three components all need to be true in order to account for the overall truth of the conjecture in question. Second, this assumes the implicit harmonization of all three truth contributions in the assessment of its overall conformal truth status, which, in already being harmonized through this harmonic progression, implies, in this instance, that that should be the case. (105)

So, in this classic example of a conjecture we can note that, factually, when it is raining 'it is raining' is a true factual statement. Then, tautologically, it is either raining or not raining, and, non-tautologically, when it is raining you will get wet (if you are standing in the rain) and that that is propositionally true. Then, lastly, the conjecture is put together by noting that 'if you are presently standing in the rain then you are getting wet' as a true propositional-statement. In other words, for this overall conjecture to be true then all three components need to be true (and, moreover, the harmonizing of these three truth contributions must also be correctly assumed[41]). (106)

Now, the deeper analysis of this successful conjecture, in using a lens of a philosophy of transformational treatment, we might note that in inspecting its three truth contributions that each one must involve an elevation in meta-status by one meta-degree with the implication that we also need to consider an ordered philosophy as being capable of being appreciated through such a lens. Moreover, in retreating each of these truth contributions we can do the same, again, but this time collectively. In other words, our ability to also appreciate the collective truth status of this conjecture implies that it too must be able to be subjected to such truthfully ascertained processes of treatment and retreatment. The further implication following that as truth is neither ascertained analytically nor synthetically through a form of Tarskian alignment (through re(-)alignment) that, basically, it is conducted as a process of nomination (we might further surmise is 'seen', conjecturally, to be enacted as some form of apposite representative alignment between those sets of statements assigned as true, etc.). That, although ascribed through such nomination of that class or set, through retreatment, can then be applied to the members who possess a membership in that class nominated as possessing a truth membership as described, i.e., as nominated). In other words, truth status involves a nominating form of treatment, that through retreatment, can then be directly ascribed to the members of that class or set so truthfully nominated (contrary, understandably, in this situation of retreatment, to received philosophical opinion). Hence, both individually and collectively, the truth ascription of a successful conjecture is in place if all three truth conditions of the conjectural economy are both individually and collectively true. That to arrive at such an overall conclusion implies that an ordered economy must also engage a meta-ordered economy in order to ascertain its conformal truth status. (107)

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[41] We could imagine a situation where we mistakenly assemble three such truth 'contributions' which through a lack of mutual harmonization do not contribute to the overall truth assessment of the falsely conjectured conjecture being mistakenly both constructed and put forward as an integrated conjecture that has sufficient 'standing' in this world as lived.

Hence the theoretical basis is now conjecturally established for inter-ordered forms of productivity in which the dominating order from the meta-level of ordered replication is both able and capable of dominating a certain order on the object-level be it either of the same order or a different order resulting in, respectively, a hypothetical process of either symmetrical reduplication[42] or asymmetrical duplication.[43] [44] (108)

Where, we should also add, this form of inter-ordered bimodal domination is economic appreciated in covert trimodal terms of reference through the conjecture of the super-economic economy (possessing a '(3 x 3)' degree of complexity as a working matrix which is also implicated in the imputation of The Political-Economy in distinction to the discipline of a 'political-economy'[45]). (109)

Last, let me model how we might be able to analogue the '(3 x 3)' matrix that, I believe, best describes the super-system of The Political-Economy in which all social systems are conventionally assembled in their apparent relations to each other as noted in their assigned conventional and sociological terms of reference?[46] (110)

To answer this difficult question, we need to expand the economic to include the irruptive presence of the relatively non-economic in its relative positivity of expression within the enlarged confines of the super-economic as the economy of the overall economic in its inclusion of the economic sub-economy, the non-economic sub-economy along with its appropriation and re-accommodation within the hyper-sub-economy. (111)

Thence visualizing the three horizontal economies in constructive apposition with each other. This could be diagrammatically depicted (and notated):[47]

Non-Economic Sub-Economy	$^{3}W - {}^{3}O - {}^{3}E$
Economic Sub-Economy	$^{2}W - {}^{2}O - {}^{2}E$
Hyper-Economic Sub-Economy	$^{1}W - {}^{1}O - {}^{1}E$ (112)

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42 E.g., where 'the fifth trans-cognitive order of possibility of possibility realizes the inter-ordered phenomenon' of 'science', and, where 'the sixth ordered ontical treatment of ontical facts realizes the inter-ordered phenomenon' of 'history', etc. As explicated in both *The Seventh Book*, and *Book* 9.

43 An example of asymmetrical duplication could be, say, the disciplinary topic of 'the history of science' = '$(6^{1} \times 6^{1}) \times (5^{1} \times 5^{1})$', or simplified as '$(6^{2} \times 5^{2})$'.

44 Thereby supporting the conjectured contention that we can also run a '(3 x 2) x (3 x 2)' complex matrix implicated in forms of inter-ordered (or, by extension, in the formation of hyper-order productivity).

45 Where both are conceived of as hyphenated in distinction to the separate, non-hyphenated forms of just 'politics' and 'economics'.

46 So, e.g., the Business World is in the fifth sector and Academia is in the first sector of this scheme.

47 In line with the conjectural 'fact' that a conjectural economy, or any other economy, is true, when its three facets must also be both individually and collectively true. In the light of this conjectural 'fact' we might further surmise that the overall truth of a '(3 x 3)' matrix is similarly arranged, namely, all nine facets must individually contribute a non-dis-truth status/truth status as well as collectively with the further implication that the overall conformal truth status in super-economic terms needs to be presented in this very solid and systematic-like type of an alignment?

Then, in the following additional consideration let me defuse one more conjectural problem, namely, given the speculative conjecture of the secular economy as the product of the second aesthetic trans-cognitive order, the forth pragmatical trans-cognitive order, and the sixth ontical trans-cognitive order how are we to account for the imputed conjectural fact that all economies parallel the archetypal economy of World, Object and Ego, when, in this instance none of these three moments is in an alignment with the World moment (aligning with the fifth trans-cognitive order), Object moment (aligning with the first trans-cognitive order), and Ego moment (aligning with the third trans-cognitive order)? (113)

This so-called 'secular economy; was proposed to be somewhat in apposition to the philosophical economy (aka 'disciplinary economy') which was constructed on an alignment with the archetypal economy through its arrangement centering on the fifth, first, and third trans-cognitive orders paralleling, respectively, World, Object, and Ego. But, though invoking mediation, this archetypal alignment can be reinstated by noting the mediation of the fourth and sixth trans-cognitive orders centers itself over the third trans-cognitive order paralleling the moment of Ego, etc. By such means also simulating this archetypal alignment of the so-called 'secular economy' where the mediation of the sixth and the second trans-cognitive orders are centered over the Object moment of the first order, and, where the mediation of the second and fourth orders simulates the moment of Ego of the third trans-cognitive order. Hence, by such means, ensuring that the so-called 'secular economy' also has archetypal roots in the archetypal economy. (114)

In a simplified diagrammatic format, we can depict the same as follows:

> That the mediation, e.g., of the orders 2^1 and 4^1 (in the hexamodal economy of the trans-cognitively ordered orders), effectively, is the simulation of $\mathbf{3^1}$ through covert mediation, etc:
>
> 2^1…….'$\mathbf{(3^1)}$',,,,……4^1 (115)

Thus, by these means as outlined, we can conjecturally model matrices that are, e.g., '3 x 1' (economic/philosophical-disciplinary), '3 x 2' (ordered), (3 x 2) x (3 x 2) (inter-ordered), and 3 x 3 (super-economic/The Political-Economy), and also accommodate the archetypal economics of the so-called secular dimension (formed through the integration of the second, fourth, and sixth trans-cognitive orders[48]). (116)

Hopefully complying with this rule for the conversion of *ad hoc* conjectures at least to the extent of rendering *ad hoc* conjectures relatively less *ad hoc*. (117)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth falls, 8.8.24.

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[48] Through invoking the mediations of the second and fourth orders, fourth and sixth orders, and, the sixth and second orders.

B. Appendix B

In the announcement of workshopping this essay in an open forum[49] I noted the important observation:

> In this open forum we must also question the basis for a credible science if the scientific enterprise is miscast in the fraudulent form of an impossible realism. (118)

Now, if that observation were granted hypothetically, what might we be able to say about this 'scientific enterprise' that to all intents and purposes appears to be functioning quite successfully? (119)

Let me proffer some suggestions to explore here… (120)

First, we could consider a paraconsistent logic in order to understand to what extent we can determine some degree of inconsistency-tolerant manoeuvres are being entertained, perhaps in the form of a dialectic where definitions overlap, and so on. Just as claimed by myself that we cannot maintain either pure definitions, definitive processes and histories, identify absolutistical degrees of either truth certainty or uncertainty given that we are forever dealing with economic correlativities that cannot be isolated either individually (through intra-mediation), in pairs (through mediation), or collectively through inter-mediation). (121)

Or, second, we could be quite scathing and declare such an enterprise as completely fraudulent in two senses, namely, that the scientific enterprise is entirely fraudulent or that scientific disciplinarians are not operating and cannot operate in accordance with such a fraudulent philosophy and, therefore, are operating in an accordance with quite different criteria, etc? (122)

In my opinion, the latter suggestion is probably the more fruitful to explore without ruling other possibilities that might potentially overlap. (123)

A fruitful avenue here might be a reconsideration of the concept of the 'essential' given that it deserves to be critiqued if conducted along the lines of a traditional representationalism, or in an excessive, economically isolated reductionist mode, but, where for good phenomenal-phenomenological reasons we should also preserve a phenomenologically oriented experience of a relative presentation of an essential-like experience that structures semantic mapping of the world (as derived from processes of economic resolution expressed non-economically through definitive-like expressions of the last instance, etc.). (124)

Or, we could be equally 'misforgiving and forgiving', at the same time, by suggesting that scientists, as with all reputable disciplinarians in each and every discipline, are actually working with weak forms involved in their disciplinary approach and converting the same into non-weak/non-strong forms and formats but not ideologically con-

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[49] Refer to *Appendix* C.

verting the same, in practice, through the lens of a highly defective, if not quite to the extent of an impossible, strong, ideologically extreme form of process, etc. 'Misforgiving' in the sense that 'we just do not believe them if they make strong claims', and, 'forgiving' in the sense that 'we believe they are actually functioning through the conversion of weak interpretations into non-weak/non-strong formats through well-organized and well-conducted conjectures, evidentially based hypotheses, relatively well-established conformal consistency, apparent operational successes, demonstrate an existential authenticity and responsibility for their research, reasonably provide viable grounds for pragmatic optimism, etc. (125)

Interestingly, it may well be that scientists as 'scientists' have no substantial say in such matters given an overriding need for the appreciative nature of a meta-disciplinary approach that is better equipped to decide such matters. Although, to date, such questions seem to be barely decided given the lack of consensus and the absence of either a critical or radical philosophical clarity in the resolution of such persisting controversial issues? However, let us be more optimistic and suggest that an inter-disciplinary approach between more reflective scientists, philosophers, historians, sociologists, psychologists, metaphysicians (operating from the perspective of a re-constituted inter-ordered metaphysics) might at least be able to work out just what is not occurring… which we may well be assured cannot take the form of a strong realism impossibly constructed as a form of ideological extremism invoking the absolutistically essential, the so-called 'given', the privileging of sense data or similar, invoking so-called 'external worlds' (and 'internal worlds'), and so on! (126)

If a realist attitude is the apparent default orientation in the reported pursuits of the scientific enterprise, then this form of an over-emphasis on intentional objectivity would be conducted at the expense of the other two economic correlatives of economic motivation and economic subjectivity. Such a reductive mindset, with its focus on a non-phenomenological sense and semblance of the essential,[50] must mark itself out for an ultimate failure since the quest for an absolutistical reduction is impossible if not before then certainly at the boundary limits as defined by the Planck constant translated into four-dimensional terms of reference. Then, quantum mechanics appears to implicate the role of the observer, whilst a holographic understanding appears to be implicated in an emergent approach. That understood, it would appear that the scientific enterprise would be better served if a more economic approach were to be observed. But, I well suspect that that approach is actually being observed, if not overtly then covertly. That if realist tendencies were to be better suspended, then a more economically nuanced approach, in all probability, would be seen to be in already in place. Given the successfulness of this discipline, one must be forgiven for thinking that such a more open approach would be an even more profitable way to run this distinctive discipline… (127)

Illustrating, if indirectly, the importance that should be attached to deconstructing a strong realism (and all other forms of extremist positioning for reasons already outlined or will be outlined in later essays)...!! (128) N.T., 13.8.24.

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[50] I.e., as exercised in and through a misguided, unreconstituted, traditional style of metaphysics.

C. Appendix C

The announcement of workshopping this essay in an open forum is enclosed:

25 August 2024: Open Forum: *Contra* a Strong Realism:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

In this second open forum, we will be sharing and debating reasons 'why a strong realism needs to be deconstructed?' Hopefully we can do this with some subtlety because it is my belief that we should not be dismissing a weak realism, only those claims of a realist that are either impossible or defective, and poorly put together, and so on.

I have just started my next book titled *Reconsiderations* (echoing Augustine's late writings titled *Retractationes*). In this book I will be oscillating between those occasions when I changed my mind or should have changed my mind on a certain topic, and, those types of positions, deservedly, that give both philosophers and philosophy a bad name. In this second open forum, I will bring short extracts from my second essay titled: *The Deconstruction of a Strong Realism*. There, I have listed a number of arguments that support this contention and are being put up for debate along with the presentation of other arguments both against and for. Welcoming all contributions on this important topic.

To have good reasons for holding a certain position is one thing, but, to find better arguments that cause us, and others, to validly change our minds is even better and surely a sign of both our maturity and making some small degree of progress in such matters. In this open forum we must also question the basis for a credible science if the scientific enterprise is miscast in the fraudulent form of an impossible realism, etc.

(If people wish to read this second essay they will find it on my Homepage, Page 6, PrescienceXIIB). (129)

XIIC. Moving from an Aspirational Economy
To an Arbitrational Economy

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIC. (3.) Moving from an Aspirational Economy to an Arbitrational Economy[51]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

Once more I am recounting my previous sins, namely, two missteps in this instance, although, already some time ago retracted, and long since suitably modified or 're(-)normalized'.[52] First, I admit to an imperfect modelling of the aspirational economy where I misidentified the so-called 'third economic moment of correlativity', i.e., the '(non-systematic) existential moment', with the idealistic moment of 'why' instead of its correct identification with the pragmatic moment of 'how'.[53] Second, in resolving a certain conundrum posed by Richard Rorty, amongst other things, realized that an aspirational economy, although valid in its own terms of reference, must be understood as being completely subservient,[54] in practice, to the economy of arbitration. As we observe the origins of our freedom through(-)others, and not just through our own efforts, contrary to the ideological dictates of a rampant neo-liberalism, along with a mis-assortment of other pernicious ideologies, it behooves us to re-identify the more usual source of our human sense and semblance of freedom as being primarily through our relationships with others and not just through the superficial and parasitical misplaced competitive actions enacted merely through our own efforts. Of course, we need to act responsibly, and we do need to make an effort in such matters, but, only through the auspices of others can such aspirational ideation be mutually assisted in realizing but a small fraction of those desires and ambitions we entertain. That, simple reflection should reveal the lived-realities of this market-place where through such arbitration some of our intentional-objectives can move from the virtual sphere to a more non-virtual, actualized form of instantiation. Unfortunately, so beholden are we to certain cultural myths and major discourses in this regard that people continue to mistakenly wander around thinking that they have to act and behave like 'a stranded Robinson Crusoe who merely rises or fall through the efficacy of their own efforts'. As helpless babies we are born into the lived-reality of this world at large, but, throughout the course of our existence we are not that far removed from such powerlessness if we were to reject the ministration of others. A world, e.g., where a cast of thousands invisibly work for us just to deliver a simple cup of coffee in a café. (0)

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51 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

52 'Re(-)normalization' is 'that form of continual emendation that recurrently occurs through progressive processes, increment by increment, of both non-existentially and existentially oriented retreatment under the force of the de-suspension automatically invoked through the imposition of a working set of suspensions in conjunction with hermeneutical rectification of genres and facts in pretreatment and phenomenal-phenomenological remediation in treatment under the auspices of suitably delineated processes of transformational retreatment wherein is sought either intuitively delineated and/or deliberated upon forms of alignment within and between the same through overall processes of re(-)alignment, etc.(as explored elsewhere)'

53 Hence my later identification of the 'non-systematic existential moment' with its being primarily centered in the third trans-cognitively ordered order of the deontological, where, along with its complementary or supplementary adjuncts of the second trans-cognitively ordered order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the pragmatical collectively constitute an identification with the 'pragmatic' (to be read as distinctively different from this more narrow usage of the expression 'pragmatical'). Hence the designation of the ensuing philosophy as being an 'anti-representational existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism.

54 Admittedly a rhetorical flourish, but the point hold; responsibility is necessary just not sufficient ...

In the light of this Pre-Introduction, as an Introduction, this essay is divided between a recounting of these two missteps, ending with a provisional set of conclusions, etc. (1)

1. The Aspirational Economy

An intentional economy consisting of intentional motivation (centered on the background moment of 'World'), intentional objectivity (centered on the foreground moment of 'Object'), and intentional subjectivity (in keeping with the overall intentional field being focused upon and centered in the subjective moment of 'Ego') can be translated through the lens of aspiration in the following manner, namely, under the simplified rubric, respectively, of 'why', 'where', and 'how'. At least, that is now how I would translate this translation, through alignment, between the intentional economy and the aspirational economy. Let me explain (using the following diagram):

	Ego		**How**
	*		*
Object	**World**	**Where**	**Why** (2)

In traversing an economy of aspirations, as with intentional objectives, we need to know (first) 'where' we are in order to then move from that point to a where we might wish to arrive which is tantamount to exhibiting 'why'. To complete this economy, we invoke the third step in this argument through the import of 'how' since this will inform us as to 'how we progress from where we metaphorical are to where we metaphorically wish to arrive'. (3)

Seen as set up here, it seems obvious that, as constructed, the existential orientation of the 'Ego moment' must be aligned with the moment of 'how' if we have preallotted the moments of 'World' and 'Object', respectively, with 'why' and 'where'. So, to render such assignments in a less *ad hoc* manner, how do we account for such allotments? (4)

First, granting the more fundamental prerequisite of the trimodal constitution of all economies, and, similarly, our mapping of the same, we can safely keep to a collection of three moments in the formulation of whatever economy that is desired where, pragmatically, we hope that that heuristic device, as a 'heuristic device' is suitably and profitably capably of discharging the specificity of its mission. In this instance, namely, an outlining

of the arc or trajectory of aspiration (where we set out to realize a certain set of intentional objectives, say, going shopping or the seeking of the attainment of a certain degree from a certain university, etc.). (5)

Given such implicit simplicity, why did I misidentify the ‘existential moment’ of ‘Ego’ with ‘why’ and not ‘how’, and, misidentify ‘how’ with the idealistic moment of ‘World’. In the latter it seemed obvious to identify the functionality of the hermeneutic moment of ‘World’ with the pragmatic ‘how’, and, perceive ‘why’ as suggesting a motif or motifs for the coursing of the aspiration. Somewhat understandable, when explained in that manner. However, realistically, we need to know where we are (in a phenomenal-phenomenological sense) and where we are heading in an idealization of the aspiration, but, the moment of ‘how’ connects the same and, therefore, must be the so-called third moment of the ‘existential’. An insight further clarified by insisting on a pragmatic take on such proceedings. Where the resolution of judgment (non-economically) delineates the perceived, or apperceived, ‘manner’ of its realization, i.e., ‘how’. (6)

Now, that granted, what are the ramifications and limitations of this economy? (7)

Put simply, it charts a need to know ‘where’ we are in this world at large in order to travel effectively to our identification of a workable goal that is capable of attainment. That goal of ‘why’ being delineated in terms of its intentional motivation, hence its need to be read as ‘why’. E.g., I need to eat tonight and intend to have a meal cooked rather than eating out. With that intentional objective in mind, I decide to go shopping at the local supermarket nearby. Now, there would be no point in my shopping if once I arrived I had actually forgotten why I was shopping there in the first place. But, then, furthermore, in order to have an evening meal cooked rather than eating out I need to know how I am going to orchestrate this process given constraints on time, location, money, cooking skills, and so on. Thence this additional need to know ‘how’ these different events and considerations will be supervised in order to eat that cooked meal this evening. (8)

But, such considerations are superficial when we realize that every step in this progression will be assisted, either directly or indirectly, by the necessarily arbitrated ministrations of others! E.g., I walk towards the supermarket upon a street already constructed to that supermarket already constructed. My desire to purchase the foodstuffs chosen for the evening meal are already anticipated in the marketplace by world of arbitrated interactions. As noted, ‘casts of thousands’, through their collective impact of their intentionally directed efforts, I am able to buy the ingredients of this anticipated meal. Then, once home, through the use of electricity and water, etc., that meal is brought to fruition through the practically invisible efforts of others. Hence this critique of the intentional economy as a mis-focusing on the apparent efforts of the subject when a less superficial understanding would recognize the role played by the placement of the aspirational economy within the necessary and inescapable confines of the arbitrational economy. (9)

Obviously, an aspirational economy is necessary for the realizing the formulation of our intentional objectives, etc., but, without the presence of this world of arbitration none of those plans could be put into effect. (10)

2. The Arbitrational Economy

Initially, 'the economy of arbitration' was developed as an (economic) proposal to resolve a tension in Richard Rorty's 'arguments' in his book *contingency, irony, and solidarity*, 1989, that an incommensurability exists between the public sphere and the private domain. In a phenomenological perspective, etc., it is my belief that such an incommensurability exists, i.e., is apparent, but, common sense would tell you that it must also be a 'relative incommensurability' and most certainly not an absolutistically impossible candidate. (11)

Just as there is a relative incommensurability in natural languages between first person, second person, and third person; between singular, dual, and plural formations; or, for that matter, as well between tenses be they both simple or complex.[55] (12)

But, that on economic grounds, and grounds of observation, we have to seriously override any inherent 'irony' or suspected forms of transgression in our movement from one arena to the other or in our acting as if in both dimensions at the same time. For a start, it simply is the case that we appear to be able to communicate within ourselves and with others over our situation within either dimension or in the straddling of both dimensions at the same time. Although we can consider the bimodal-like functioning of our thinking about the public sphere from the private domain, or v.v., still, our ability to appreciate either possibility would suggest the economic need for a third dimension given this ability to appreciate such shifts in perspective, and so on. Where this approach is in line with my conjectural speculations about how we perform bimodal operations albeit in the context of their economic settings. With this economic conjecture in mind, I proposed the third dimension of arbitration as setting a mediational context where we could entertain both private-arbitrational interactions and public-arbitrational interactions. With this aspect of mediation in mind let me introduce my working concept of an 'arbitrational dimension' (as encapsulating this interactive ability to interface both private and public dimensions). (13)

First, this dimension is very much overlooked, and, usually, is not directly taken into account. However, for all this lack of recognition, still, is persistently consulted as we make our passage through this world at large, both individually and collectively. (14)

It is that territory where the working world anticipates those expectations as voiced, e.g., in commerce. So, we have a cast of ten thousand people to bring us the delivery of a coffee in a café. Or, build and mend our roads, houses, buildings, and all other forms of infrastructure, etc. It is where our public genres of behaviour, involved in the both the 'writing' and the 'reading' of intentional behaviour, have imprinted subtle forms of behavioral nuance perhaps barely even thought about let alone recognized, encoun-

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55 E.g., between 'he will' and 'he would'... If only on the grounds that we feel we can and need to make such distinctions, etc. I would also argue that, e.g., first person (singular) also 'mirrors' the 'contours' of the private domain whilst third person plural 'mirrors' the 'contours' of the public sphere. 'Mirrors' here being used to suggest a certain degree of relative transformational isomorphic invariance between logical subjects, etc., residing in those linguistic categories and finding, either correctly or incorrectly, various forms alignment or non-alignment.

tered and /or engaged. That, with such an inventory of covert behavioural prescriptions to hand, through the force of habit we act as if we don't need to overtly entertain such features, such fine details in the organization of the behaviours in question. On the other hand, as much as this sausage-making may be concealed from us it is only in our continual arbitration with others through this aspect of economic behaviour that we can find the forms of freedoms our location within The Political-Economy[56] permits us to exercise and both suffer and enjoy the ensuing consequences of such arbitrated behaviours. (15)

That, on economic grounds, given the conjecture for a trimodally constituted economy, we must argue for the trimodal mediation of the relatively incommensurable dimensions of the private domain and the public sphere through the conjectured supposition of an arbitrational arena where the complexities of personal-interpersonal interactions are effectively mediated (non-existentially), and intermediated existentially (through ongoing suspensions of the textualized representations involved in such private-arbitrated-public interactivity).[57] Hence its forming of a location for the existentialization of behaviours through interventions capable of enriching relationships be that through either the positive creation, preservation, and/or conservational expansion of the e/valuational formations of our relationships along with their non-existential patterns of richness-formation as would be discerned through corresponding processes of mediation[58]). Or, more simply, an economy has to be present and as we have already to hand the two parties of a private domain and a public sphere, so, therefore, it only behooves us to outline the missing third party, namely, this arena of arbitration. (16)

Then, invoking ideas of economic complexification, where, in archetypal terms, threefold economic modalities of one economy can be aligned with some other economy, additional conjectures can be reasonably entertained through discerning these parallel forms of commentaries, a process considerably short-circuited through invoking an already prepared parallel dictionary[59] able to further define, say, this third dimension of the 'arbitrational'. That, in this regard, we can note, e.g., that this so-called 'third moment' of the arbitrational aligns with, say, the stylistic aspect of the political-economy, the domain of the critical (as an entry into the relative-radical), as having a(n non-systematic) exis-

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56 The open concept of 'The Political-Economy' is proposed as a super-social-system in which the disciplines, like, e.g., science, history, philosophy, metaphysics, etc., find their place in the social-system of Academia which is juxtaposed against other social systems life the World of Business, the Medical Sphere, the Political Legislature, Civil Service (or its equivalent in the form of government employed consultants, etc.), etc. Without capitals, 'political-economics' is a discipline that cannot be reduced to either politics or economics (and is the optimum discipline to better explore and understand neo-liberal policy formation and its pernicious influences on the disciplines and social systems that constitute The Political-Economy.

57 Because the arbitrational economy includes the political sphere and the private domain it can also be equally designated as operating in both the political economy and the private economy. These three correlative facets of this economy can also be reviewed individually as sub-economies. Refer to paragraphs 26-30.

58 So, e.g., when we are hungry, we seek something to eat (and therein and thereby enjoying a relatively positive form of non-existential valuation. In having eaten, we can then project our attention in other directions of intentional objectivity, etc. Or, if we see that someone is hungry, and duly oversee their being fed, should we be able to do that, then such empathetic acts of concern and care convert that non-existential process of 'our seeking food and our eating it' into a positive process of relative existentialization.

59 As exemplified in *The Seventh Book*… etc. E.g., refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIB.69.

tential complexion, as having a coincidence with retreatment, non-continuities, the simulated non-textual aspect of the textual economy, etc., etc. (17)

At this point, I would like to introduce two arguments, back-to-back, namely, the Wittgensteinian argument *contra* a private language and my (economic) argument that, likewise, we cannot run a perfectly pure public language either. (18)

Non-ironically, a private language cannot be contemplated, therefore, the pure experience of a private domain, likewise, cannot be contemplated! So, a pure, completely incommensurable domain cannot be posited, except, 'ironically' (in order to salvage this conformally valid observation that private experiences do seem to be quite different, but not absolutistically different, from public experiences, i.e., as seemingly experienced from a public perspective given such phenomena as, e.g., our very abilities to debate, to oversee a pattern of consensus formation, the continual re(-)visiting of consensus, and so on). (19)

Now, in a reversal of this argument as just noted, namely, *contra* a private language, I would like to turn it on its head and also argue for the ultimate impossibility of a purely public language, making an argument that would be defined and designated as *contra* a pure public language.[60] (20)

Basically, without private input into a public language the continuation of a public discourse would eventually cease to make sense other than as an analytical-like collation of sentences with less and less relevance to the positioning of any person in this public sense and semblance of a world at large. Let me illustrate this contention. (21)

Recently, one of my essays was fed through an AI program in order to summarize its purport. This was an interesting experiment from my perspective as the program very authoritatively spat out a summary of ideas that superficially read well in English. However, in closely paralleling my text with its summary it quickly became obvious to me that one of my context-dependent expressions with both a negative sense and a positive sense, that I was at pains to clearly demarcate, namely, my 'non-economic fork', was being completely overlooked by this program. It seemed to understand the negative sense of this expression, but, could not comprehend at all that it had another meaning and that which was being pointed out to through context in its positive sense (as 'an irruption of resolution informing a definitive series of responses of the last instant, etc.'). Therefore, understanding this current defect of that AI program could mean, in a far broader context, that if the very basis for text generation relies on the 'digestion' of an open infinitude of texts and that that depository of texts were going to be added to by unrestricted AI processes of generation then, ultimately, such textual formation would look more and more like those texts as digested and as a consequence, less and less like any meaningfully aligned representations of informal reports and formal reportings purporting to be 'representing' (an alignment with) the world *per se*. An argument, whose universalization, would seem to suggest that without relatively private inputs, an ensuing 'public discourse' would reflect less and less on a world at large and more and more on a bland

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60 Titling this argument as '*contra* a pure public language'.

meaninglessness representing the over-proliferation of such textual production itself. Hence, by implication, the absolutistical incommensurability of a public sphere as a concept would self-deconstruct if followed to its logical conclusions and, correspondingly, should be suitably deconstructed and duly disposed of. That, at the same time, we are also presented by a qualified argument for the relative ability on our part for constructing, simulating and disseminating working 'representation' of this world as lived if only to the extent that we find a conformal degree of assurance within and between statements purporting to be representative of such discerned alignments and non-alignments as long as they are economically and conformally contained with their respective conjectural economies, or their close equivalents. (22)

Hence this series of economic argument for the contention of an arbitrational dimension which I would posit has an existential orientation, is non-economically expressed through the forcefulness of the de-suspension whose productivity reflects on the quality of our working suspensions, and so on. That we find this arena of interaction between both the private and public dimensions through its pre-constructed inventories of mechanisms that oversee the anticipation of our contractual and compactual requirements as we make our passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively. That through its relative existential complexion we find the very basis and expression of our freedom to be in this world, both with(-)others passively and before(-)others in a more dynamic sense of interaction, and, that together, through both mediation and intermediation, there is generated both non-existential and existential patterns of e/valuational formation (and where our freedom to be 'free' is primarily enhanced through apposite forms of existentially informed patterns of intermediated engagement[61]). (23)

So, this sense and semblance of an arbitrational arena accepted, if only hypothetically, what ramifications might we envisage through entertaining this form of economic positioning (of a private-arbitrational-public economy)? (24)

Through, hopefully, an insightful process of expedited revelation, a pandora's box of problematic issues will be summoned forth through these reflections on this overlooked dimension of the arbitrational economy. (25)

For a start, as this economy can be treated, in turn, as three sub-economies, let us ask how this might be structured should we seek to discern what might already be to hand in this regard. (26)

I would like to argue, e.g., that the public sphere could be represented by The Political-Economy (and its 3 x 3 matrix as briefly referred to in the previous essay and in *Book* 4, etc.). I.e., as possessing the three facets of the political, the economical (as a World of Business, etc.), and the critical.[62] (27)

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[61] Through an enhancement of the overall, ensuing, existential enrichment to be found in and through our relationships. Where by 'inter-mediated' we can read 'an overall transcendental suspension' or 'series of working suspensions', etc.

[62] Although this scheme would be further refined if the 'economical' were treated as 'critically regulated', and the 'public sphere' as potentially subjected to the re-occurrence of 'radical forms of re-vision', etc.

In a similar manner we might suppose that the private domain can be modelled, say, by the intentional economy (of intentional motivation, intentional objectivity, and the intentional subjectivity), or the representative economy (of representation, presentation, and re-presentation), or, if currently apposite, the aspirational economy (and its three poles of an initial weak idealism [why], a weak realism [where], and a weak pragmatism [how]. (28)

That, in focusing on the sub-economy of the arbitrational, what might we find already to hand in order to profitably establish a working model of the same? Here, I would like to suggest that prior references to the contractual and compactual dimensions at work in the arbitrational sphere could well be taken up as two key economic correlatives in this regard and that the inter-contractual-compactual interactions between the same could well be postulated as one way to further explore the workings of this sub-economy having already ascribed an existential dimension to the compactual, and finding the contractual aligns with the phenomenological, leaving the inter-compactual-contractual orientation by default aligned with the hermeneutical orientation, etc. (29)

With the sub-economy of the arbitrational being predicated on contracts and compacts, along with their necessary modes of interaction, we can already see how society endeavours to anticipate the expectations of its citizens. Furthermore, these institutions of a very wide variety of agreements would seem to suggest, moreover, that this sub-economy of arbitration could very well act as that psychic location for consensus formation itself? If not ‘the’ place then certainly ‘a’ place for dealing with these more complex forms of negotiation that fall under the rubric of ‘arbitrations’. Modes of agreement, as forms of consensus, that to a great extent must already be in place for us to be able to access the advantageous nature of their pre-employed establishment. Whose uptake and exercise foster the amplified orchestration and enhancement of an existential sense and semblance of freedom that can only be beneficially engineered and expedited through the auspices of others. Let me illustrate this conjecture by what is implied in a student pursuing a university degree or diploma or some other form of instruction and possible certification. (30)

Let me first visit the concept of a so-called ‘free education’. In my opinion there is an inherent confusion in how to understand what might be meant by the expression ‘free’. Now, I believe part of that confusion arises from a confusion over differences in contractual and compactual senses of that term, in the overlooked world of arbitration that need not be at loggerheads on this particular issue. Let me explain. (31)

On a contractual level, free education can be simply defined as ‘tuition fees are paid by either the state or, say, a wealthy patron or institution like a religious organization’. In the light of such a definition, the imposition of other costs and imposts could then render this overall process of free tuition to be quite expensive. Hence the understandable complaint that, ‘free education then becomes anything other than ‘free’.’ (32)

However, there is another somewhat overlooked sense with a compactual basis, namely, the recognition in international law that at least primary education should be free from tuition fees as a human right along with the obligations and responsibilities this imposes on all nations, the applicable educational institutions, and those primary school pupils themselves to suitably avail themselves of those entailed opportunities. In this instance, in this alignment with human rights, the word 'free' has more of a political connotation, say, as in being 'freed' as a slave, the right to vote, the freedom to assemble, and so on with the implication that this expression should not be merely reduced to its contractual definition of just 'free tuition' despite the near-inevitable proliferation of additional charges when this compactual space is under pressure form a contractual world in what I term to be a colonization of the compactual world by a contractual world. However, this pressure of the contractual world to colonize hitherto free zones of public discourse can be progressively remedied through periods of instituted de-contractualization which, as a politically organized process, is more likely to occur in relatively democratic settings rather than in relatively non-democratic settings unless such policy reforms are actually being instituted by the state or the relevant organizations in question. (33)

Even more important to note is that whatever is 'free' is never actually free in a wider context of appreciation, and, the evolving relationships between the contractual and compactual worlds may well have a greater relevance to the areas of concern concerning such issues. E.g., as I have pointed out on other occasions, parklike spaces in Australian cities are usually free to enter. However, the cost of running such amenities is paid for through the taxes, council rates, indirect taxes and governmental fees, and so on. So, 'free is never really free'. On the other hand, with such a compactual dimension in play, freedom of free access, etc., differences in contractual power between public organizations along with representative individuals and the public *per se* is somewhat minimized contributing to this freedom of access unlike in London when parks around town squares were and are still sometimes owned by those nearby residents. A bit like people in a congested cityscape looking longingly out into those green spaces of securely enclosed golf courses knowing they could be held as trespassers if they were to cross such wide-open spaces. A point of contention for me as I remember as a child how the local council golf course in my hometown of Dunedin was not so enclosed and people could carefully wander through its confines without too much ado and would do so whilst also respecting the rights of the paying golfers and, usually, without injury from wayward golf balls. (34)

Now, back to how students might navigate, negotiate, and arbitrate the individual trajectory required to obtain a university education. An important aspect of this world of arbitration, as here being defined by myself, is that such a world sets out to anticipate expectations through the pre-employment of such mechanisms that will successfully cater for such demands. Go to a university, or more likely today, go online and you will find the requisite forms to fill out, the outlining of the criteria needed for admission, a spelling out of the obligation of the parties concerned, etc. In the face of this complex world of arbitration, negotiations by the parties concerned are more around the edges. If you fulfill the minimum requirements that institution will in all probability admit you unless they have to restrict the number of admissions for whatever reason or reasons. However, if large sums of money are required, I am sure some bending of the rules might well be ap-

plied. I have witnessed foreign students with poor English reading and writing skills struggling with their lessons, and, on other occasions when English speakers with inadequate intellectual skills are being given passes they do not deserve. Admittedly, myself, when working in such an institution was extremely reluctant to fail any of my students and never did, but, that different academics had different standards for marking, yet, still, those students who did fail in either their exams and/or course work probably stood out as students who were considerably not following the obligations expected of them. (35)

That the primary point of this excursion of an aspiring student seeking admission to a university etc., is to point out that as much as an aspiring student might like to succeed at obtaining a university education such aspirations are to be completely refracted through the forms of arbitration needed in which such aspirations might eventually succeed. Without an enormous degree of cooperation between that student and their institution, the facilitation of their trajectory through its institutionalized modes of arbitration no student, purely through their own efforts, could obtain any worthwhile form of certification, etc. That this intentional aspiration, like all other aspirations, has to be arbitrated through the auspices of others. Hence what expressions of freedom we do find in this world at large are considerably realized through such processes exercised in this much overlooked arena of arbitration that is neither public nor private in orientation although, at the same time, neither divorced from the public sphere nor the private domain. (36)

Bringing to bear these quite overlooked ideas on an arbitrational sphere of influence might also better explain somewhat superficial ideas on what could possibly be entailed in a so-called ‘freedom of political choice’ as exercised in a relatively democrat form of governance. In Australia, e.g., we have compulsory voting where people have to be both registered to vote and must duly do so lest they be fined if they cannot present valid reasons for not having done so. On one level, this looks like an infringement on our freedom through the enforcement of such compulsion. Of course, you can just pay the relatively minimal fine if your principles are against the expected enforcement of such compulsion (although if not registered you might fall of the radar for some time in this respect). However, from a deeper perspective we might understand such arbitrational requirement as restrictions on individuals to ensure a wider sense of freedom for society at large given that compulsory voting does mean the less likelihood of the demos being captured by ideological extremists on either end of the political spectrum. Perhaps paying a small price for the insurance of the maintaining a more permanent enjoyment of our relatively amplified current tranche of political freedoms? (37)

Hence the error of my ways to conceive of the aspirational economy as that sole vehicle that can adequately explain how our non-virtually oriented, intentional objectives can be realized in this world at large, in this overall world-of-life. That to more fully explain the trajectories of human nature we do need to account for intentional economies but considerably encapsulated by arbitrational economies comprising elements of the contractual, compactual, inter-contractual-compactual interactions, de-compactualization, de-contractualization, and so on. Then, to further complicate matters, we also would need to note the role played by The Political-Economy given that there is some truth in noting, ‘that without economic surpluses there could be no economies of choice...?’ (38)

3. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

What might we conclude? To a great extent, a comprehensive view of the world cannot be achieved through the simple construction of reductive forms of modelling. E.g., reducing the non-virtual realization of our intentional objectives merely to the orbit of an intentional economy, be it aspirational or otherwise, is not going to succeed be that either in theory or in practice or in a seriously conducted form of critique open to the influences of the potentially radical should such novel re-considerations also be called for. (39)

As part of this broadening of our understanding is this call for the recognition of an arbitrational arena alongside both the public domain and the public sphere. To a considerable extent this would resolve some of Richard Rorty's concerns re the apparent and obvious incommensurability between these dimensions of the private and public. However, such concerns need not be taken too seriously given that the relatively incommensurable is not the absolutistically incommensurable. Furthermore, the seemingly self-contained contours of the private domain can be swiftly deconstructed through accepting the full implications of the argument constructed by Wittgenstein *contra* a purely private language. (40)

Perhaps, surprisingly, we can also turn this argument on its head and deconstruct a purely public language. Witness how AI programs in taking on board more and more AI reports, when accepted as more formal processes of reporting, becomes increasingly less and less representative of the social consensus citizen might actually wish to entertain if such AI acts of misrepresentative representations were not to be included in such public forms of dissemination. Indeed, imagine the embarrassment for a practicing solicitor or lawyer or barrister when confronted by the fact that they were using AI had generated case studies that did not exist.[63] Or, the skewing of results in drug studies when AI assessments of certain drugs, e.g., neither takes into account those studies that did not prove efficacy or all other forms of treatment that might prove to considerably more effective if not actually also more efficacious. Sadly, it is true that we should recycle our trash, but, in the ongoing recycling of disseminated trash that trash becomes even less representative of the consensus formations that would normally be arrived at in this world of dissemination. (41)

Meant as a minor criticism of Richard Rorty, he does not seem to outline how consensus formation is socially engendered and how it might be better served if we were to be more cognizant of its deeper social mechanisms.[64] As indicated in this essay, it is

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[63] E.g., a judge in Manhattan admonishes Michael Cohen for using a lawyer who inadvertently used AI generated legal case studies that did not exist in actual case law. This judge, Judge Jesse Furman noted that "His citations to non-existent cases is embarrassing and certainly negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent," Furment wrote. "But the Court cannot find that it was done in bad faith." Citing the *New York Post*, March 20, 2024.

[64] Rorty does clearly enunciate the direct relationship between democracy – social consensus formation – social solidarity – along with a better standard of living to be had in the relative openness of the democratic sphere of influence (where, otherwise, non-democratically oriented politicians are more likely to favour certain classes and individuals at the general expense of the public at large). An observation ex-

my belief that it is primarily in this arbitrational arena that forms of social consensus find suitable forms of institutionalization, and when and where modes of transformation also need to be exercised if they should be called for. Arbitration, itself, it would appear, seems to be the result of an evolving concretization of consensus formation. (42)

Popularity-seeking politicians are often bemoaning the excessive degree of red tape institutions both institute themselves and are subjected to by governments. However, once we appreciate the mind-boggling complexities of the arbitrational world, we may well be grateful that such institutionalized forms of consensus are actually in place because without such an overall set of such mechanism we might find ourselves, instead, bemoaning the metaphorical or literal inability of 'our favourite café to deliver our coffee of choice'. Of course, this does not mean we should not or cannot streamline some of those institutionalized conventions given the propensity for all organizations to proliferate an excessive production and dissemination of such rulings. However, it should also be noted that many of those calls for deregulation are sometimes backed by vested interests that may or may not be acting through surrogate parties in that same respect. Under the over-undue influences of the neo-liberal paradigm in policy formation, etc., all too often so-called 'efficiencies' are first called for in supervision and compliance with the public being less well-served in hindsight. (43)

In my confession of past sins, what have I learnt in this process of retraction? (44)

To begin with, that our phenomenological experience of the deontological, existential, and pragmatic considerations of a situation have a very close, almost identical, epistemological and psychological connection that should also be carefully accounted for. That in this version of the aspirational economy, the existential is practically coincident with a pragmatic 'how' that is primarily centered in the third order of the deontological, albeit as complemented with both secondary aesthetical and pragmatical inputs that also should not be ignored. Second, that as attractive as a reductive approach already to hand might appear, as but one of the correlatives in the overall economy of any economy in question, we should also invest our interest in both emergently oriented and existentially oriented forms of correlative economic concern and care with the implication being that we need to correctly recognize the 'scale' of our current explorations and discern to what extent they might be better enhanced by expanding our current terms of intentional interest. Just as the archetypal economy can be reinterpreted in any economy from the aspirational to the arbitrational to the ordered, and so on; and, thence, to the inter-ordered along with its reconstituted metaphysical implications; and, thence, to the articulation and practice and critique of disciplines; that are then conventionally encapsulated within their respective social systems through the distinctive utilization of their disciplinary 'codes'; and then their social ensconcement within the open-endedness of The Political-Economy. That, in effect, taking such reiterated forms of scale into account is crucial to the viability of the exposition being disseminated and the consensus that might form in its wake. (45)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth falls, 13.8.24.

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plored in the essay: *Imagining the Impossible*: *Part* 1. *Reinvesting in the Idea of the Economy* (*Pursuit*, III.V.2I).

A. Appendix A: Re-Defining the Compactual Dimension

In exploring the contractual-compactual economy, as noted in paragraphs 29-30, in its paralleling the sub-economy of the non-economic, for convenience, albeit framed in hindsight in this manner, the 'compactual' although termed as 'existential' would more correctly parallel our hermeneutic expectations for compactual behaviours to occur, whereas, the relationship between the compactual and the contractual, namely, the 'compactual-and-contractual', is the 'source' or 'center' of the existential in these expanded, trimodal, economic terms of reference. However, even though the so-called 'third moment' is referred to as 'existential' it remains as a 'non-systematic existential moment'. In a distinctive contrast, the manifestation of the 'systematic sense and semblance of the existential' arises through the overall intermediation of the working representation of the situation in question, i.e., in and through an overall working suspension (i.e., extensive suspension of the economy of the non-economic, etc.). Therefore, rather than rewrite this section, for convenience, let me through such pragmatic oversight treat the 'compactual' as 'existential' in orientation (although more correctly we should perceive it as the conventionalized, hermeneutic expectations that a relatively de-ontological, existential and pragmatic set of expectations should normally override contractual expectations. E.g., imagine the situation where someone walking in front of you is seen, by yourself, as dropping their rather fat looking wallet. Compactual expectations are such that people would normally view that as a situation where you would either tell the person that they had dropped their wallet or pick it up, summon the attention of that person, and then hand it over. Obviously, as well, we are not in a contractual relationship with this person, but. As a member of society, we are in a compactual relationship regardless of whether they see that to be the case or admit to themselves that to be the case or not. Now, a small number of people might see this as an 'opportunity' to simply acquire a wallet seemingly filled with cash. Admittedly, in this cashless era, such a 'find' is becoming an increasingly rare event. Putting that observation to the side, most people would probably view this situation where it is our compactual duty to immediately return this lost property without even needing to think about it. However, a less 'observant' person might simply ask themselves, 'would I be seen both picking up this wallet and not returning it?' or, they might simply tell themselves, 'I don't care what people think I will just take it and make sure I will get to keep it!' Interestingly, if this theft if seen people may well object to such an occurrence and loudly exclaim that such anti-social behaviour is unacceptable. On the other hand, if the thieving individual looks too menacing then they might well say nothing and act as if nothing was seen, that there was nothing to see here. Anyhow, the point of this imagined scenario is that society does have compactual expectations besides contractual ones and, so, it would be more correct to view the compactual-contractual economy, equivalent to the contractual-compactual economy, in its trimodal exposition as having three economic correlatives, namely, a hermeneutic-compactual orientation, a phenomenal-phenomenological contractual orientation, and a compactual-and-contractual non-systematic existential orientation where the sense and semblance of the overall systematic sense and semblance of the existential is to be experienced through the intermediation of this economy *per se* (albeit as situated within the overall economy of the economic, i.e., the super-economic). (46) N.T., Penrith, 9.9.24.

XIID. The Deconstruction of a Strong Idealism?

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIID. (4.) The Deconstruction of a Strong Idealism[65]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

The argument will be presented that an extreme, ideological version of a strong idealism is untenable, economically impossible, and cannot be contemplated. On the other hand, weak forms of idealism (along with weak forms of both realism and pragmatism) are tenable and can be constructed in conjectural terms in a non-weak/non-strong format in the pursuit of delineating and disseminating a credible philosophy or discipline. (0)

Just as there are a varieties of realisms, e.g., naïve realism, materialism, empiricism, etc., so too we can find various kinds of idealism, e.g., rationalism, transcendental idealism, epistemological idealism, etc., and in various degrees or strengths, e.g., weak, non-weak/non-strong, and the impossibly strong. Here we might like to speculate and conjecture that the preferencing[66] of an idealistic orientation is primarily the tendency to preference either an intentional motivation and/or intentional subjectivity with or without the belief in either so-called 'internal world/s' and/or so-called 'external world/s'). (1)

Be that the case or not, another avenue is to outline a logically well-constructed, valid observation, but, to then extrapolate such a well-constructed yet trivial position into an invalid form of conjectural absolutization. Practically, as an analytically oriented proposition, we can structure the following observation that 'the experience of the world, self, others, etc.', is 'always to be had as an epistemological experience', indeed, 'that the only experience we can have is experientially 'experienced',' and, therefore, conjectures disseminated by realists, along with the similarly minded, *et al*, where what is entertained is claimed to be more than experience, or given, or obtained beyond experience itself must be completely discounted as totally inconsistent with the trite, idealistic claim that nothing can be experienced except experience itself! That, as a comparison, that fraudulent claim would be like saying, 'that in deep sleep the featureless nature of that experience would also be subjectively experienced as a featureless sense of subjectivity to the same degree that a lack of a non-featurelessness was also present'. Or, more to the point, in an absence of experience there would be an equal absence of both a psychological process and its psychological content where nothing could be appreciated and, thereby, rendering such an absent experience as nothing other than as 'non-experiential'. (2)

But, then, on the other hand, to say that in experience there is nothing other than the experience of experience itself is to make a claim that would render our claim to be able to experience 'experience' as null and void as we would not know what would count as non-experience, as non-experiential, other than in those moments experience is not actually being entertained as in deep sleep which correctly would not count in this regard. Obviously, as all experience is constituted in intentional consciousness, etc., then it needs to be constituted in intentional experience, etc.[67] (3)

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65 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

66 Reading 'preferencing' as 'either past prioritizing, current privileging, and/or future promoting'.

67 By 'etc.' is meant the claim that intentional experience is appreciated in trans-intentional judgmental terms of reference and where the pre-intentional is to be referred to as either sensory-motor in orienta-

Furthermore, given differences in epistemological functions and content then this blanket term of 'experience' is then able to be experienced through the formation and nuances of such differences. That even though "'our world of experience' is 'the experience of our world'," still, were we to claim some form of a necessary overlap between these two forms of representation, still, we cannot claim their complete coincidence given their differences in intent. What is presented in the form of its intentional objectivity cannot then be represented as its intentional motivation or re-presented as its intentional subjectivity because objectivity is not intentionally experienced as subjectivity, and v.v., etc., even though, again, such correlativity cannot be entertained as economic isolates with the implication that correlatives mutually co-define each other through their joint negations. That granted, then we must realize that a strong, ideological, extremist form of idealism is just as untenable as a strong realism (or a strong pragmatism that merely insists on pragmatic functions without intentional content or intentional motivation, or, quite unwittingly, as also entirely absent of any coincidental sense of intentional subjectivity[68])! (4)

Quite simply, the trivial fact 'that experience is experienced' does not allow us to say, 'everything can be 'reduced' merely to experience' since such a claim could be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed as it stands. Moreover, to over-preference a so-called 'internal world' is just as fraudulent as to over-preference a so-called 'external world', or as in a dualism where there is this over-preference of both a so-called 'external world' and a so-called 'internal world'. Therefore, all strong forms of idealism must be completely discounted given economic isolates are not tenable for a variety of reasons, like, e.g., metaphorical abuse; that either individually, in pairs and/or collectively economic correlativity can be neither excessively extrapolated nor isolated, neither dismissed nor over-privileged, etc![69] (5)

In this essay, through a mix of deconstruction and reconstruction, etc., a strong idealism will be completely discounted whilst not discounting potentially useful forms of a weak idealism able to be integrated within our conformally valid, and able to be validated, conjectures. (6)

By such means outlining a metaphorical 'roadmap' as to how to deconstruct a strong idealism whilst preserving the potential relevance of those positions and their arguments that subscribe to positions of a more emergent tenor and complexion. (7)

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tion or a affective-mood in orientation, albeit where both pre-intentionally oriented forms of experience are still refracted through intentional categories, and so on, and therein and thereby semantically mapped in phenomenological terms of reference, albeit as functionally contained within their requisite genres of behaviour that both 'write' and 'read' the purport of such behaviours in intentional terms of reference, etc.

[68] In line with the conjectured position that intentional subjectivity, in archetypal economic terms more or less coincides with the non-systematic existential, the pragmatic, and the deontological categories or types of experience. So, to discern or conceive of a working pragmatism (as an expression to be considered as distinctively different to my distinction of the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the 'pragmatical') as devoid of intentional subjectivity is to unwittingly practice a form of categorical confusion in not realizing that there is this conjectured identity, more or less, between the existential orientation, the pragmatic, and the deontological, etc.

[69] I.e., there can be no pure intra-mediation, mediation and inter-mediation (and the same metric applies non-economically/super-economically).

1. Developing the Remediation of the Concept of the 'Ideal'

'Remediation', as noted, is 'the pre-prepared processes (through rectificational mitigation in pretreatment that then allows processes) of correction through treatment in which are co-opted, in parallel, techniques that involve both the deconstruction of the relatively defective and the reconstruction of the relatively effective (in conjunction with the de-suspended force of conformal re-approximations enacted through retreatment).[70] Remediation is conducted as a process of either analysis, synthesis, and/or nomination, with an emphasis on deconstructive/reconstructive analysis given that, economically, in depth there can be no isolation of such aspects of treatment, only varying degrees of emphasis or non-emphasis. Furthermore, the ensuing results of such endeavours are the formation of analytical-like propositions that contribute a relative 'backbone' to the conjectural economy. That understood, the presentations of such propositional-structures are either relatively tautologous or non-tautologous in orientation, but, again, where such distinctions need to be economically 'submerged' through their effective 'merger' in order to fully operate as this structural content of the conjectural economy. Just as 'it either rains or does not rain', and 'in the rain we will find rain to be wet given that rain is water in a liquid form' then this allows us to run a conjectural economy once factual inputs (on the topic of weather) and genres (dealing with how we observe and experience weather) are supplied as the pretreatment of, or preconditions for, an overall process of conjecturally nominated and denominated transformational-transitioning once the propositional material in question is fully appreciated as that 'logical subjectivity', through the discernment of 'relative transformational isomorphic invariance', where this can be delineated as that subjected to that overall process of transformational retreatment in an alignment with its conjectural representation, and v.v. Just as conjectural considerations about weather must involve the necessary conjunction of statements (and genres), propositions, and conjectural arguments that seek representative alignments and non-alignments in and through the entailed specifications of that conjectural economy in question. That, just as for 'weather', so, too, as for all other forms of conjectural retreatment. Moreover, as for non-abstract topics so, too, for abstract topics to the extent the rules for transformational retreatment must also apply. Therefore, all discussions on the viability of an idealistic philosophy either fall or rise on the ability of its conjectures to follow the same rules for reasoning as apply to all forms of conjectural treatment (internal to a conjectural economy) and retreatment (as externally revealed through the apparent productivity of that conjectural economy given our ability to delineate and disseminate a relevant 'conjectural difference' through the pursuing of such research). (8)

Now, in exploring the specific remediation of a specific set of conjectures pertaining to the presentation and dissemination of a specific idealist philosophy what can we note as pertinent to an appreciative assessment of its conjectural viability? (9)

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[70] A formula has come to mind after writing this summary of this 'amelioration' of representative textual-formation, namely, mitigation through rectification of information of factual statements and formatting of genres; correction or remediaiton through de-formational deconstruction and counter-de-formational construction; and, ongoing re(-)normalization of (non-existentially oriented) conjectural transformation of formation and (existentially oriented) conjectural conformation. Hence the formula of 'information, formatting; de-formation, counter-de-formation; formation, and conformation'.

For a start, its three components of propositions, etc., must be internally consistent to the degree they can function within the conjectural economy; that the net result of their interaction also needs to both produce and reproduce, i.e., re(-)produce a conformal product capable of re-iterative stability and being informative through supplying additional information as a conjectural difference that makes a relevant difference over the course of the appreciation of that specific conjectural economy (in its appreciation of the representative presentation of that economy in question). But, that granted, how can we evaluate both the internal consistency and overall consistency of a specific philosophy presenting an idealistic complexion and tenor? (10)

By observing the relative presence or absence of both transformational stability and transformational alterations in a conformal form of appreciation (through the auspicious of a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural appreciation established in the valid terms of a transformational process of retreatment). Or, much more simply, the presentation and explication of such an idealistic philosophy needs to work, and work in the manner as outlined, and work well. I.e., be transformationally stable, proffer a non-trivial conjectural difference, and remain conformally valid through reproducible forms of truth assessment. Where, ideally, if I am allowed to use this expression, the breakdown in any one of these three conditions would oversee the deconstruction of that specific philosophy and not necessarily guarantee that what might be left is viable without some form of a successful process of emendation through either posttreatment mitigation and/or posttreatment reconstruction and/or ongoing re(-)normalization, etc. (11)

Or, again, more simply, by pointing out a relevant defect, indeed, any defective aspect, would be enough to demonstrate the non-viability of that philosophy, or discipline, as it currently stands. E.g., to merely demonstrate that such a philosophical economy, or disciplinary economy, could not function in the manner as stated or implied, would be enough to render such an edifice as currently non-viable. Needless to say, many non-viable philosophical positions will fall by that fateful sword. In advertising, e.g., ‘to state you can deliver *x*’ and the market finds you cannot deliver *x* is tantamount to uttering or disseminating ‘misleading advertising’ and should be treated accordingly. (12)

However, such critiques need to also be viable. E.g., to criticize a certain idealistic philosophy as arguing ‘against the imputed (and impossible) reality of the external world’ could be likened to the application of a ‘medicine’ that could be more fatal than the assumed fatality of the condition in question which could well be in a position that either needs no recovery or through suitable forms of emendation could be reconstructed in a viable form. Therefore, let us note, first, the existence or absence of impossible economic claims, etc., and operate from this cursory form of inspection and appreciation. (13)

At this point let me introduce an interesting analogy in order to make a certain set of relevant points in the making of such an inspection and appreciative assessment. (14)

Recently, in having a bath, I noticed a stain upon the sides of the bath at the end under the shower. So, in wanting to leave a spotless bath, I tried rubbing it out with a flannel. I tried twice without success. Then, I realized this ‘stain’ was the projection of a

grey smudge through the glass wall that kept the water from the shower within the edges of the bath. Assuming the blotch in question was on the bath side of the glass, washed the surface with that flannel and seeing the stain disappear thought my task had successfully been accomplished.[71] However, the next time I had a bath that cursed 'spot' was once more seen on the end of the bath. Obviously, the smudge on the glass was on the outer side of that glass. With the shadow of my wet fingers progressively edging towards this 'stain' I was able to find this smudge with my fingers and duly removed it from the glass. It was an uncanny experience observing the two-dimensional shadow of my finger removing this 'stain' when this same stain could not be removed by my three-dimensional fingers using a flannel in the first instance. (15)

Now, admittedly, this analogy could be used for philosophically imagining an idealistic-like scenario, but, let us first attend to its closer inspection in more phenomenal-phenomenological oriented terms of reference in order to obviate any potential misuse of this phenomenon in any form as might be mis-utilized in its philosophical treatment. (16)

For a start, the two-dimensional shadow of my fingers, although it might be seen as relatively 'virtual', and as certainly not measuring up to the full complement of phenomenological modalities that would be expected with a non-virtual finger, still, it cannot be treated as anything other than 'actual', i.e., non-virtual in its own right. Shadows are just as real as that being shadowed, the viewer of the shadow, the very casting of that shadow, etc. Moreover, in the relationship between the finger, attempting to approximate the location of the smudge on the glass, and their joint shadow on the bottom edge of the bath we could refer to the relative virtuality of the shadows when compared with the relative non-virtuality of the fingers removing the non-virtual smudge on the glass. Furthermore, as analogy we have to be very careful how we actually approach this phenomenological situation since we must be careful as to whether we are indirectly importing either idealistic and/or realistic metaphors, etc. in the first place. If we were to imagine reality as being idealistically constituted and projected as an image on to our experience of a lived reality then we could equally argue, from a realistic perspective, that what is seen could only be seen through the realistic nature of a reality as lived. The idealist would want to focus on the projection of the image, whereas, as if turned around, the realist would want to focus on the three-dimensional fingers removing the actual, non-virtual smudge on the glass and ignore the image cast upon the end of the bath. (17)

That an in depth moral to be taken from how to philosophically interpret this phenomenon as an analogy is that the phenomenon in question is quite rightly agnostic about such interpretive perspectives. Shadows and the things shadowed are both non-virtual in one scheme and can be differentiated in some other perspective. That for metaphors to work they need to be correctly set up… (18)

But, that an even deeper moral might be that in interpreting lived-reality, a productive assortment of philosophical perspectives might be a more productive

[71] Actually, the running water leftover from my use of the flannel, instead, had disrupted the continuing projection of that 'cursed spot'.

option to adopt and adapt as I will argue over the course of these essays. Hence my earlier argument on asking, 'Where is Father Xmas?' and suggesting that we need to invoke a working assembly of philosophical positions in order to declare that 'Father Xmas' has only a 'mythological existence' and that such an answer to this question could not be arrived at if we were to follow either a unimodal perspective or bimodal set of perspectives, and, that only a fully economic approach could do full justice to this conformal 'observation' that Father Xmas only has a 'mythological existence', etc.[72] (19)

Now, if a certain set of metaphors, as analogies, etc., are to be co-opted to support a certain philosophical or disciplinary position then given my having just noted this phenomenological agnosticism we would need to import sufficient means to support such positional contentions. I.e., properly introduce a strengthening of our analytical propositions as the required structures needed for argumentation; produce appropriate hypotheses that reinforce those contentions in evidential terms; supply integrated forms of apposite argumentation; all to be conducted in a well-organized conformal context able to demonstrate requisite degrees of reiteration in truth determination and overall appreciation. That said, let me explore the following analogies and their potential deconstruction. (20)

Imagine a pet shop specializing in the sale of goldfish. On all of its glass shelving we see large, circular bowls each filled with small groups of goldfish. Now, a person antithetical to the idealist's style of positioning might like to claim that, in general terms, idealists are like those goldfish thinking that all the goldfish seen, both within their bowl and all the other bowls, to be as if swimming in the same bowl. Almost as if the world were one large goldfish bowl. Of course, a customer in that shop knows that not to be true. This defective analogy is being constructed to demonstrate that to think everything is constituted in the world of one goldfish bowl is an illusion. Yes, everything is constituted in intentional terms of reference but that does not mean we can extrapolate beyond our mind's intentionally constituted purview of its world as if it were a 'goldfish bowl' to included 'all other goldfish bowls'. Because our individual experience is intentionally constituted, still, that does not and cannot be used to argue that all things that could be experienced are and must be experienced only through our own intentional constitution and our own intentional constitution alone. (21)

Or, imagine the following. We look into mirrors and we passively see the world as if external to our own being. For the sake of this argument imagine we do not recognize our own images as our own reflections. Indeed, people in this very 'short-sighted' world, have proven that the image in the mirror cannot be us as it can be shown not to have the same left-right symmetries as possessed by ourselves. That the person seen in the mirror is merely mirroring our actions just as in those old-fashioned variety theaters where people mimed behaviour as if in a mirror. So, we raise our hands and in rotating

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[72] Refer to *Pursuit, Volume* II (as *Book* II). The 'etc.' here points to the fact that 'Father Xmas' has a 'fifth trans-cognitively ordered order of 'existence' (as a possibility to some extent, when the situation of his going down narrow chimneys and non-existent chimneys is excluded) but, at the same time, is a sixth trans-cognitively ordered order as a mythological 'fact' that exists in certain Western cultures along with the dissemination of this cultural artefact to other non-Western cultures, etc. I have read accounts of 'Father Xmas' even being spotted in a Tibetan department store in Lhasa. Just as strange, I suspect, as all the ornamental Buddhas I see sitting in people's gardens when walking around my suburb in the Blue Mountains.

one of our hands we find that image, say, of our left hand coincides with our non-reflected image of our left hand, but, as that would be the right hand of that image then these two people cannot be the same person, but, two different people. Of course, this argument is entirely spurious, which is the point of both this prior analogy and current anecdote. The world is not external to us and as if seen in a mirror. Then, when we see a written sign reflected in a mirror, it is difficult to read because the written characters now look as if written back-to-front. But, then, we might also ask, 'why not upside down?' If our eyes were truly lenses then the image of the world should also look upside down. But, because it is not upside down this must mean, for some hypothetically committed realists, that what is seen is this world itself, as if unmediated, that, indeed, the world is directly observed. Of course, a person antithetical to this vision of the realist, this version of realism, could quite similarly argue that the world is actually seen as 'if upside down', but, the mind inverts this inversion in order to see the world as if the right way around… with the implication that a more idealistic style of understanding is more sympathetic in its interpretation of the facts. That, e.g., people have worn inverter-glasses where the perception of the world is actually turned upside down, but, that in time the mind readjusts by, in turn, inverting that inversion. Or, in other words, our perception is not both immediate and unmediated, and, that our perception is not just mediated by 'our' mind itself. (22)

Of course, if people were to observe a more sensible, commonsense view of the world then a more rational approach would be to dismiss the apparent nonsense perpetrated by both the strong realist and the strong idealist, or, in a well-modified and well-qualified form and format take on board the perspectives of both the realist and the idealist where such different views can be suitably harmonized. The type of argument I would like to run where weak views, analogically represented and introduced, are sympathetically harmonized in forms that proffer some additions degree of e/valuational formation that cannot be reduced merely to the mere sum of their individual facets. (23)

By noting such tentative reflections, I would now like to segue to the observation that in our attempting to understand 'the sense and semblance of world-like phenomena' no amount of reductively oriented treatment can or could account for the experiential impact of such phenomena and that we are more or less forced to adopt and adapt some form of an emergent approach in coming to a better appreciation of the same. Let me demonstrate this point. (24)

I will do this using the same six deconstructive headings as used in my second essay a contra strong realism, namely, We Can Live in One World, The Eyes are Not Just windows, etc. However, first, let me detail, 'why we must completely discount a strong philosophical position and would be allowed to conformally promote a weak philosophical position to a non-weak/non-weak form of positioning?' I will do this under the following headings of Six Correctives, namely, Appropriateness, Propriety, Non-Existential Appositeness and Existential Appositeness, Negative Non-Economics, and Positive Non-Economics. (25)

Using the decision tree of a non-economic fork we are duty bound to either deconstruct and/or immediately deny any strong forms of positioning on the grounds that it

makes no economic sense and, both consequently and subsequently, cannot be found any economy presentation or semblance in phenomenological terms, etc.[73] Then, viewing such negative non-economic impossibilities as non-starters we turn our attention to the viability of a weak form of positioning in the hope that we can conformally upgrade it to a non-weak/non-strong status. As a rule of thumb, we can do this through applying these six correctives. (26)

In the first instance, we can note hermeneutical appropriateness in terms of factual input and the suitability in choice of genres, etc. Basically, stating an outline of your intentions and marshalling in that regard both the perspectival direction to be taken up along with the relevant facts that need to be brought to that form of pretreatment. (27)

When the stage is prepared, we can apply the propriety of phenomenal-phenomenological considerations by deconstructing that which is relatively defective and stands in need of deconstruction and focusing on that which is relatively effective and stands in need of constructive reconstruction (whilst remaining in an alignment with the appropriateness of pretreatment until that point in time we find we need to emend both in the light of retreatment and its posttreatment forms of amelioration). (28)

Moving to the next stage we note two forms of appositeness, namely, non-existential in orientation and existential in orientation. What collectively differentiates both orientations is the collectively conducted amplification of an e/valuational formation enacted in terms of both its non-existential incremental orchestration and existential non-incremental enhancement. It could also be pointed out that it may well be the case that given the existential trajectory of the relationship in question it may well require, on balance, less enactive resources in order to establish a non-virtual form of intervention, and, thereby, basically could well be found to require less effort? (29)

On moral grounds, we could argue that what benefits a relationship has a certain internal incentive to be enacted. On the other hand, a relative inauthenticity might appear to be the easier short-term path to take, but, that in the long-term that could well create more problems that the short-term worth of enacting such inauthenticity? I admit this contention to be contentious, but, if we were to take a longer-term perspective then this could well be the case. Furthermore, the accumulative consequences of relatively bad behaviour can only build until such a point that when the metaphorical ‘dam’ broke the ensuing consequences would then oversee a relative restoration of relational viability and integrity (that, most likely, would also involve much stress and distress)?[74] (30)

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[73] Alluding here to my formulaic terminology of a ‘(analytical/phenomenological) sense and synthetical/hermeneutical) semblance’ and the implication that there must also be, economically, the existential consequences of a ‘(conjectural) sense-and-semblance’ as well.

[74] In a recent interview with a certain Trump appointed diplomat, it was noted that despite that person’s reminiscences about the disruptions they had to experience because of Trump’s self-serving, unethical behaviour in promoting his own interests first, still, this ‘Republican’ is going to continue to vote for Trump. In the light of such obvious ethical contradictions, one must suppose this same person is hedging their bets and perhaps hoping and continuing to harbour the aspiration for a future appointment despite also bad-mouthing the Trump Presidency should the Republicans win government on 5 November, 2024? One must wonder at the inauthenticity of such enablement given that its continuance must eventually oversee

The last two correctives can be filed under my exposition of the 'non-economic fork' as introduced and explored in *Book* 11. Broadly speaking, the expression 'non-economic' has two senses, which, when combined in this device of a fork, negatively spell out the impossible *versus* the positive irruption of decisive forms of resolution along with the need for our attention to completely de-focus on the former and to focus, instead, on the virtues of the latter. (31)

Hence, in reference to this device of the six correctives we attend to the hermeneutically appropriate, the phenomenal-phenomenologically proper, the non-existentially, existentially, and non-economically apposite and viable whilst completely discounting the non-economically impossible regardless of whether that is represented in a format that is defectively misrepresented in a weak form or non-weak/non-strong form or in an already impossible strong form. (32)

The end result of such is that we should be running an anti-representational form of working representativeness that notes that all sentences, in their overall conjectural construction (through either their explicit and/or implicit incorporation of statements, propositions, and conjectures) presents a vision of lived-reality that is statistically reinforced through patterns of alignment, re(-)enacted through re(-)alignment, etc., whilst recognizing that no sentential elements can have, to the same exact degree, a perfectly identical conformal status except either through an arbitrary form of assignment or through some form of provisional ascertainment. That this same principle applies in its contrasting operations to the extent that in answering a question, e.g., the component of the rhetorical either/or likewise cannot be exactly contrary in their opposition unless treated in an arbitrary fashion as such or awarded that provisional status for whatever reason or reasons. E.g., in asking the historical question, 'did Julius Caesar cross the Rubicon?' we already know, or should know, that the affirmative has already been considerably affirmed whereas the negative reply will not even be entertained by a reputable historian other than for a few fleeting moments of professional rigour given that the suitable rejection of alternative versions of history is also to be called for in finessing an even

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the accumulation and discharge of an even greater intensity of a counter-response that one would hope could historically restore the necessary return of a more existentially oriented authenticity to the disseminated organization of that political situation in question. Basically, making this argument that relational viability and integrity, over the longer term, does depend on those existentially oriented factors that successfully establish both continuity and adaptability over the longer-term. One qualification I would like to make to this optimistic vision of the required integrity of historical processes over the longer-term being that an evolution in authenticity itself must be incrementally instantiated and requires the adequate historical preparation for the continuing evolvement of all serious and relevant forms of ethical re(-)orientation given as they say, 'Rome was not built in a day', or in alluding to similar sayings, effectively, with the same purport. That in the dissemination of power, cooperation needs to be maintained be that either through co-operation and/or co-option. That should a relevant major political discourse be lost, perhaps through an exposure of its inauthenticity, and in the ensuing light of its rampant internal contradictions, say, between stated aspirations and those remaining forms of a requisite arbitration that can no longer be found to hand, then, one would expect a transition to what hitherto would have been a relatively minor political discourse. As noted in my 'Three Critiques' on the phenomenon of the Neo-Liberal paradigm, this either occurs as a one-step process involving either a relatively existential form of replacement and/or a two-step process of a relatively positive non-existential form of remediation that then would be enacted through both deconstruction and reconstruction.

greater degree of representative alignment between either relatively formal textual reportings and/or relatively informal textual reports. Of course, there will be numerous occasions when we will have to reverse some aspects of our opinions but that this process is always upon a relative bedrock that only oversees the partial reversals of such research (in whatever field the discipline in question, along with its research, is being more closely scrutinized).[75] (33)

That, although critical of strong forms of realism, idealism, and pragmatism, and so on, we do not disregard the utility of such metaphors embedded in such positioning, since, in this regard, we should remain attentive to observing forms, e.g., of an evidential 'objectivity', albeit as discerned through reinforced forms of re(-)alignment, whilst also noting the necessity for an experiential role that needs to be performed in the reviewing of the evidential whilst also noting that the effective utility of our research demands pragmatic (and pragmatical) terms of reference in such a manner, e.g., that aligns, say, our aspirations with our arbitrations, and v.v., given, correctly, that all disciplinary activities and performances must have a communally oriented, socially interactive basis… (34)

In the previous essay, I noted the effective non-viability of both pure private languages and pure public languages leaving us to understand that we must, in this regard, walk a middle path between such impossible options. In applying various correctives to the course of our research we hope to progressively refine our appreciation of its apparent conformal status. Regardless of whether we act as philosophers or metaphysicians, as disciplinarians or as secularists, an appreciation of this conformal status is ever a possibility by virtue of the fact that we can only deal with what is to hand, and, that which is to hand, already has its conformal status somewhat appreciated as that, too, must also be already to hand. We could say, in this regard, that in tossing a metaphorical 'coin', that 'coin' is ever weighted in one direction and not so much in the other direction. Of course, the 'trick', so to speak, is in being able to discern which way that 'coin' is weighted before its falls and reveals itself to us, although it is also true that, in many situations, we may not currently have that degree of past insight, or future foresight, or currently possess such acumen. Still, this principle must hold, at least hypothetically, that all decision making, in general terms, is never really an impossible differentiation between equals unless assigned as such or awarded that provisional status. Otherwise, how could decisions, as decisive decisions of the last instance, etc., be made, as they are, and be held with a reiterable, conformal status if the decisive resolution of such forms of appreciation could not be conformally reiterated? Therefore, the perfect dismissal of the reiteration of such conformal features is not an option given that the lived-realization of lived-experience can neither ignore evidence, intentional objectivity, functional utility, etc. (35)

In many ways, an idealist is just a realist on the different side of a similar set of conjectural arguments, and, therefore, I would argue that a similar set of deconstructive arguments can also be applied accordingly. (36)

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[75] Hence my twin concepts of 'insurance and assurance', namely, that 'we can always reverse the decision trees of our research until we find a more assured point to recommence, hopefully, a new and more successful redirection of our research'.

i. We Can Only Live in One World

The very idea of an 'internal world' betrays the fact that it is a perspectival division within the openness of the extensiveness of this open-ended world at large even if the latter is regarded as a working conjecture (or as a working hypothesis within a set of a similarly minded conjectures[76]). As an arbitrary aspect, it divides the world in an accordance with the application of that additional sense and semblance of a division… causing more problems than its worth, as an explanation, etc., if strictly insisted upon given its metaphorical roots to begin with. Then, we could well ask, 'whose internal world?' 'Is it either 'yours' and/or 'mine', or 'ours', and so on? So, why then so many possibilities when the openness of this world as lived as a hypothesis, obviously, is superior in a more non-problematic sense and semblance given the inescapable dependence of the latter conjecture upon this former hypothesis of 'this world as already lived'. (37)

Moreover, given its roots resides in a fallacious argument that mistakes 'some' for 'all' why should we continue to countenance such impossible nonsense should it be so strongly insisted upon? (38)

Yes, my experience is constituted in intentionally constituted experience, etc., but, this does not mean that everything must be similarly constituted. E.g., we find fossils of trees and ferns, and other plants associated with coal-bearing strata. To argue that 'they must have been perceived in order to have existed' is more than fanciful, indeed, on par with declaring 'the Moon to be a big blue (or green) cheese' implying either a gigantic cow or similar, or a multitude of cows to make the milk to have made that 'cheese', and so on. Indeed, a rabbit hole of nonsense should we follow through on its implications. On the other hand, if the idealist wishes to go the whole hog, so to speak, and declare all intentional objectivity, either current or fossilized, etc., as constituted, say, by Mind, or similar, on a universal scale, then we deserve to know what motivates such an ideologue given that their reasons for doing so need not be so transparently presented through the more overt dimensions of such a conjecture. Usually, a religious dimension is implied although that need not necessarily be the case. As for evidence, through the co-association of evidential hypotheses, such is such a big ask that from historical instances alone we must intuit the expectation of a grand failure in any attempt to glue together such a universal conjecture. Still, arguing on emergent ground, the fractal nature of space, and its reiterative patterns of scale, etc., we could give such a proponent a starting pass in order for them to establish a beginning with the most probably impossible proviso of producing a consistency of evidence on such an integrated level of conjectural integrity that would then allow them to promote such a thesis. However, until such a time as evidence is sufficiently produced to establish this grand idealistic conjecture of Mind, or similar, let us safely assume that the transcendentally necessary conjecture of this world at large, as found to hand, is more than sufficient for the promotion of any viable, non-extremist form of disciplinary activity that operates within such ample limitations. (39)

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[76] Treating such a conjecture as a working hypothesis for establishing the conformal validation, and appreciation, in a conformal set of working conjectures. I.e., treating a relatively subsidiary conjecture as a hypothesis supplying evidence to the overall body of a set of conjectures (given that all conjectures are already exercised within a body of co-associated conjectures, etc., as per the Duhem-Quine thesis, etc.).

ii. The Eyes Are Not Just Windows for an Internal World

Although the eyes might be poetically compared to windows, still, as with all metaphors, certain limits intrude upon insisting on a one-to-one correspondence between the metaphor and that metaphorically being compared. If a perfect one to one correspondence were to be observed then we are not dealing with a metaphor or any other analogical device in that same regard. E.g., windows can be looked out from inside a building, and, looked through into a built space as when, say, one goes window shopping on the High Street. But, eyes do not possess this form of symmetry. Yes, an optometrist, e.g., can look into our eyes, but, this is certainly not meant or implied or needed to be referred to by the pronouncements of an ideological idealist. (40)

Such a comparison is illustrative but not directly declarative. The purpose of such a metaphorical comparison is constructed for other reasons that obviously operate beyond the merely descriptive. (41)

Now, we can argue from intentional objectivity to an extrapolation of objects referred to in time and space if the intentional objective or objectives are of a form that can be so spatially and temporally treated. On the other hand, abstract constructions cannot be projected in such a manner and only exemplified. So. E.g., we might assume that the couple seen courting is romantically entwined given they are seen holding hands and appear to be absorbed in each other's company. On the other hand, only from an extrapolation of instances of loving affection, in all its recognized forms, can we then entertain a more particular or general notion of love *per se*. Or, we can argue in reverse from something seen to our perception of what we believe we are seeing (removing ourselves, at the same time, from all mislaid notions of a pure language. If we were asked, 'what we were thinking?' we could answer that question with a variety of answers, like, e.g., 'I am not too sure, or I was thinking about *x*, or in wishing not to admit that we were actually thinking about *x*, we could say *y*… which all portends to the fact that we can speak about what we thinking either honestly or dishonestly… where such intentions are already formed and informed by the intersubjectivity of a public language). (42)

That, this granted, we can start to understand that the desire to run a strong realism might be to entertain in philosophical-like reflections the over-promotion of this emphasis upon intentional objectivity. So, that accepted, we might wish to understand some form of an idealistic preoccupation as operating in the converse direction to this economic correlative of intentional objectivity. But, here we have a problem. Which of the remaining two economic correlatives should we charge with this preoccupation of the idealist to either promote or over-promote a correlative that is not focused so much on intentional objectivity? My solution to this puzzle is to argue that either correlative or both correlativities could be singled out for such an orientation. Thence my designation of either a 'subjective idealism' that 'concentrates on the economic moment of intentional subjectivity' or a 'motivational idealism' that 'concentrates instead on the economic moment of intentional motivation', or, more likely in my opinion, a composite of both orientations where the idealist, themselves, in all probability confuses or conflates quite understandably, both intentional correlatives. I.e., mediating a composite of intentional motiva-

tion with intentional subjectivity, a mixing of what might be aspired after and the processes needed to enact the realization of such aspirations. Where, given the submersion of the aspirational economy within the arbitrational economy, we must also entertain that such overall impulses are also intersubjective in composition. As a consequence, we might also feel this necessity to also impute an intersubjective(-subjective) idealism *versus* an intersubjective motivational idealism, along with the more probable amalgam of both in a composite form of 'intersubjectively oriented idealism'. (43)

Now, with such complexities understood, and noting the enlarged argument that we can neither deal with a pure private language nor a pure public language what might we assume as sound forms of conjectures in this background to an appreciation of this idealistic impulse? For a start, the Rortean division of this world at large, this world as lived, into both an incommensurable private realm and public realm must be absolutistically untenable, despite its non-absolutistical observation to some extent, and, that we must also recognize a world of arbitration in which we cooperatively enact this intramediation, mediation, and intermediation of our intentions (via the overall mechanism of our working suspensions). Let me explore the implications of this apparent necessity for a more complex sense of the rationale for such idealistic tendencies on the part of those who seem to promote or over-promote these various forms of idealistic orientation. (44)

At this point in this discussion let me introduce what I would like to nominate as a working 'anti-representational-representationalism'. At face value this would seem to be a contradiction, however, a more dialectical stance is being indicated. Namely, a working representationalism is being put forward as a necessary form of textual coding that does set out to represent the world as lived, albeit as interpreted through ongoing economies of re(-)interpretation,[77] but, at the same time, does not invoke the 'negativity of the non-economic' through either direct and/or indirect allusions to an improper, unreconstituted, traditional style metaphysics. As an analogy, it is on par with the compactual-contractual relationship where neither compacts nor contracts can be suitably understood without understanding this overall economy of the compactual-contractual.[78] In other words, textual processes of representation are inescapable but must be conducted in such a manner so as not to contravene the spirit of an anti-representationlism, which, I would add, must also take on a positive form of nihilism along with a pragmatic-existentialism equally at home with an existential-pragmatism. (45)

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[77] I have expressed that through this redundant formula because I want to stress that this process of reinterpretation is an' ongoing process with all the forms of transformation involved'. I.e., the nomenclature '(-)' equals an 'ongoing economy, etc.'

[78] As all economies are trimodal I would like to believe that we can invoke a number of tested strategies that would allow us to render them in trimodal terms of reference. In this instance, we could deliver this outcome by noting hermeneutically oriented 'compacts-and-contracts', phenomenologically oriented 'contracts', and non-systematic existentially oriented 'compacts'. In some situations, this model would be applicable, however, in other situations we would need to adopt some other strategy. E.g., in a working representational economy, we might try, respectively, either 'rerepresentation, representation, and re-representation' or 'representation, presentation, and re-presentation' (with the use of the hyphen indicating possible chaotic forms of input/output, etc.). In regard to contracts, etc., the more interesting aspects of this economic interrelationship is often to be found in the relationships engendered between both contractual and compactual considerations. So, e.g., even though access to a park might be free, still, the cost of the upkeep of that park has to be accounted for.

Now, I believe this dialectical-like stance is possible because if we do away with both so-called 'internal and external worlds' then in the ensuing 'openness' of this 'one-world form of metaphysics' we need to insist that all relationships are engendered 'directly'. I.e., through intentional objectivity we are directly engaging the intentional object or, rather, 'intentional objective', and we do so in a manner dictated by the phenomenological nature of that relationship somewhat *per se*, etc. So, e.g., in interacting with a non-virtual apple I find, or should find on closer scrutiny, a satisfactory meeting with a relatively full complement of phenomenological modalities that I would normally and naturally expect in a proper encounter with that particular type of phenomenon (on the other understanding, of course, that I am also suitably interacting with the same in an appropriate hermeneutic manner and in an apposite existential form of e/valuation). Similarly, if I were merely entertaining the idea of an apple, then my interaction would only be directly interacted with it in the form of only a semantic interaction. Likewise, therefore, with 'remembered apples', 'dream apples', 'seeing images of apples in a photograph or on a computer screen', etc.[79] (46)

Now, I have noted that representation is to be understood as a form of textual coding to be exercised along with other strategies. Let me explain. (47)

To date I have argued, more or less, that both representational understanding and conformal assessment is enabled through the discernment of textualized forms of alignment realized through re(-)alignment.[80] But, to more fully understand what is in play we need to appreciate that we never deal with atomic-like sentences by themselves. That this same 'observation' also applies to our apparent isolation of individual economies. So, e.g., we could be focusing on a perceptual economy, but, in doing so find ourselves overlooking a need to also run economies of a semantic nature, historical orientation, conjectural forms of speculation, and so on, because without the latter there would be no perceptual economy in the first place![81] Hence the importation of a need to safeguard not only against those obvious sins of a unimodalism, bimodalism, absolutism, relativism, and so on, but, also against, say, a unimodal economics as a unimodal trimodalism, a bi-

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[79] By necessity, invoking the contrast of an 'indirect relationship' as being entertained through the directness of two or more relationships mediating the same. So, A know B who knows C, but, where A has not met C and only knows of C through B recounting their having met C. So, by these means we can claim A has had an indirect relationship with C through the recounted mediations of B. By such means, reclaiming the significance of an 'indirect relationship' by this stratagem that does not contravene the basic dictum that all relationships are directly engendered in order to be a relationship. So, A has a qualified direct relationship with C only to the extent that this is conducted 'directly' through the recounted mediation of B and certainly not to the extent of non-virtually encountering C directly.

[80] I.e., in accordance with this specific pattern of nomenclature just noted, namely, 'in and through an economy of ongoing re-alignment'. To date, this has been conducted under 'hermeneutic realignment, phenomenal-phenomenological re-de-mis-alignment, and non-systematic existential re-alignment'. However, this can be further finessed under the headings of a double mitigation, double remediation, and a double re(-)normalization. Let me elabourate on what the expression 'double' signifies in this context. 'Double mitigation' means 'rectification of both appropriately applicable genres and facts'. 'Double remediation' means 'correction through both deconstruction and reconstruction'. 'Double re(-)normalization' means 'apposite forms of regulation of both non-existential and existential processes of re(-)normalization'.

[81] Paraphrasing Kant, we could say, 'that without concepts, percept(ion)s would be blind, and, without percept(ion)s, there could be no concept(ual- content)s, etc.

modal economics as a bimodal trimodalism. Furthermore, we should also recognize, e.g., that even though in the use of deep AI learning models that there are claims that we are rapidly approaching the metaphorical 'wall' of human-generated data-sets, and, that the emphasis will need to switch to 'synthetic data' (generated through AI as it approaches the goal of AGI,[82] if that goal is not already exceeded in practical terms of reference[83]) that as all information (in a data-set) is approached through the specificity, etc., of a certain aspect or perspective then as noted in the previous book, *Book* 11, we need to be mindful of two important observations, namely, 'that no perspective can be absolutely exhausted' and 'that there can be no exhaustion of choices in perspective' even though, in practical terms, we can add two more observational conjectures, namely, 'that with diminishing returns we will naturally seek some other intentional direction to continue to operate within', and, 'that relevance is highly dependent upon finding a 'return on the intentional investment on our interest' (which we might quip is also the 'interest of our investment' or 'the interest to be returned on our investment'). Furthermore, this understanding that the apparent atomicity of sentences in a natural language, or in any other type of language, is an illusion needs to be suitably comprehended given that there must already exist a body of knowledge that allows those individual sentences to be effectively understood in the first place. Or, in gestalt terms, without the requisite background there would be no foreground to focus upon thence this requirement that there can be no economic isolates in any shape or form, be they correlatives within an economy, correlativities as contemplated in processes of economic complexification, individual economies, epistemological content and processes, up to the over-individuation of aspects of the super-economic and onward to the over-articulation of social systems within sectors of The Political-Economy, and all else entailed within the extent of these imputed continuities and discontinuities that constitute the conjectured articulation of the impossible entirety of The-(Trans-)Ontological-Epistemological spectrum (TOE[84]). However, that upon such a stage, against such a backdrop, we need to appreciate just how a qualified working representationalism functions without falling back on to the old habits of am impossible metaphysicalism. As just intimated, the to be demonstrated rectitude of our methodology will also devolve around coding, that textual alignment is to be realized through ongoing re(-)alignment along with the role to be played by the suitable adoption and adaptation of relevant perspectives, etc. To exemplify these conjectural observations let me work my way through a short series of anecdotes and analogies. (48)

A friend of mine remarked that in the writing of the will of a mutual friend, who had asked them to be their executor, he came to learn that our mutual friend was giving his brother, on a yearly basis, the sum of $3,000. My friend thought that this was being very generous. However, he subsequently learned that in the sale of a property owned by both our friend and his brother, many decades earlier, that some fraction of his brother's share was reinvested in the expensive inner-city property lived in by our mutual friend. Moreover, that in the writing of this will and making no mention of his brother's claim over the property and, later discovering that the brother was contesting the sole ownership of this inner-city property, such apparent generosity of our mutual friend now no

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82 The goal of an Artificial General Intelligence that some people think has already been attained.

83 Refer to *Appendix* A titled: *AI and the Problem of Representational Divergence*.

84 Echoing those misguided attempts to perfectly articulate a general Theory of Everything.

longer looked so generous. Indeed, given that this sum of $3,000 would not even cover a month's rent on such a place, given how the market would value such a rent, it looked as if the brother of our mutual friend was being generous and not the other way around. Hence, in one perspective we see what seems to be a generous disposition on the part of one sibling to give another sibling a certain sum of money, whilst, in a more realigned revision of the situatedness of this context, we might well form the opposite opinion. In this data-set of 'one brother giving another brother $3,000 a year' this same fact took on a quite different complexion when we realized that a certain contractual-like obligation pre-existed the reiteration of this financial transfer that it could not be cast as merely a form of compactual-like demonstration of brotherly affection. However, the reality of this simplified account has taken numerous twists and turns worthy of a Dickensian novel and my friends is pleased to note that he is of the belief that a new will has been written and that his services as an executor have not been requested much to the considerable relief of my friend (who, if called upon to act in that role, would now decline to take up such a responsibility). (49)

The moral of this anecdote is that changes in perspective upon the facts of a certain situation could, in all probability, elicit quite radically different interpretations. (50)

Now, I would also like to note that 'coding' plays a central role in how we interpret the representation of a certain situation, but, that this epistemological fact is all too often overlooked. In this regard, how should we read the following hypothetical email from a 'grandmother' to her 'granddaughter' where the 'grandmother' now lives in a part of the Ukraine recently captured by Russia and the 'granddaughter' lives in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine? (51)

The text of this email reads:

> Dearest Granddaughter, hoping you are well?
>
> Just a short reply. We are managing here. On August 20 we still have 2 roosters, 10 hens, and have collected 30 eggs. Our neighbours have acquired 2 cows. We have 1 sack of flour, 1 sack of oats, but now down to our last jar of pickles. So, we are managing and although you mentioned you would like to send some parcels of food, which would be nice, I doubt they would get through. So, thanks for the offer. Best of health, your loving Grandmother, xxx… (52)

Superficially, this email seems innocuous. It makes sense in a natural language and does not seem to be anything out of the ordinary. (53)

However, the person addressed is not named, and neither does the grandmother reveal her name. Furthermore, the email is sent encrypted via a VPN. Then it was sent by a friend of the grandmother in question and it was sent on to a friend in Kiev who then relayed it to the granddaughter in question. And we would be right to be suspicious because the email is in code. The granddaughter then sends the email to her bother working in military intelligence. (54)

So, let us re-read this same email once it is decoded. In the small town the grandmother lives in most of the streets were named after important dates in Russian history as viewed from the perspective of the former communist government. The expression ‘two roosters’ refers to ‘two military commanders who are living in this town’ having taken over an empty residence. The expression ‘two cows being acquired’ is an operation to apply to the date to then give the address, in this instance, the street where these two high-ranking military persons are living. I.e., August 1 plus 2 months gives us the street where these ‘roosters’ have their lodgings, namely, on the street ‘October 1’. Now taking the ‘10 hens’ when multiplied by 10 then gives us the number of tanks that have passed through this town over the last week via its train line, namely, 100 tanks. The number of eggs refers to an estimate of the number of troops present in that town when multiplied by 100, namely, approximately 3,000 troops. The remainder of this email gives the coded address where these ‘roosters’ are lodging. I.e., ‘1 sack of flour, 1 sack of oats, but now down to our last jar of pickles’ gives us the number of this house on this street October 1, namely, ‘111’. The expression ‘your sending food parcels’ is advice not to attack at this moment in time. Last, xxx… is merely code for ‘wishing that the Ukrainian state will soon reclaim its territories that are currently occupied and when it can, once more, peacefully resume living within its lawful borders’. (55)

A short time later a further email is sent:

> Dearest Granddaughter, hoping you are well?
>
> Just a short reply. We are managing here. On November 9 we eat our old roosters but now have a new one we call ‘Vlad’, 9 hens, and have collected 19 eggs. Our neighbours have sold their 2 cows. We are currently out of flour, have 2 sacks of oats, but now have pickled 4 jars of onions. So, we are managing and although you mentioned you would like to send some parcels of food, which would be nice, I doubt they would get through. So, thanks for the offer. Best of health, your loving Grandmother, xxx… (56)

Now, we know how to decode this seemingly innocuous email. We note the last ‘two roosters’ were eaten (i.e., killed) but a ‘new rooster is in town’. That the address of this high-ranking military person has them residing on the street ‘November 9 minus 2 (cows/months)’ namely ‘September 9’. The number of the house being ‘0 flour, 2 sacks of oats, 4 jars of pickles, i.e., ‘number 24’. That over the past week there have been about 90 tanks seen being shipped by rail, and troop number have dropped to around 1,900. The usual aspirations being expressed as before. (57)

Many months after the start of this illegal invasion the skies are now thick with drones functioning either in a lethal mode or for purposes of surveillance. Even though such coded reports in that regard are now somewhat redundant, still, in matters of a confirmation of data already gained by other sources they still have a role to play. (58)

Of course, in a stressful or conspiratorial-like environment the more often a coded message is sent the more likely it will be eventually recognized as being ‘encoded’. If every week this grandmother is sending updates about ‘her hens and her neighbour’s cows’ then the authorities might well become suspicious should they be able to intercept such transmissions. But, then, at the same time, we could also say that the more often messages are sent in such an environment the more likely non-coded messages might well be over-misinterpreted and misconstrued as being ‘coded’. (59)

By demonstrating this specific code at work, it is my hope to demonstrate that every discipline, in its own inimical manner, is representing the world at large in a coded format in keeping with the epistemological nature that distinctively differentiates the character of that discipline. So, e.g., in a history we get historical representations, in a philosophy we are being presented with philosophical forms of representation, and so on and so forth. I do not see this as problematic. What is philosophically problematic is when people, who are ostensively operating a certain discipline, also claim to be representing the world in an impossible economic format as might, e.g., be argued for through the negatively non-economic auspices of a strong realism, or a strong idealism, or a strong ideology equally professing some other set of untenable aspirations, etc. (60)

So, the question to ask now becomes ‘when is a coded form of representation tenable and when is a coded form of representation either less tenable or not tenable??’ (61)

Or, more succinctly, ‘when does the code work or not work?’ (62)

I would like to provisionally resolve this overall question on, say, three differing levels of organized complexity. Given this observation, in a certain discipline, ‘that not all sentences are equal’, or, rather, ‘that no sentences can be equal (and possess the same degree of conformal assurance)’, and, ‘that sentences cannot, correctly, be appreciated in atomic-like terms of reference’ it follows ‘that some sentences are more equal than others’ and that such sets of sentences need to be interpreted in and through their contexts of presentation (i.e., as being relatively analytical or synthetical or conjectural in orientation, as possessing an overall sense and semblance of an integrated logical subjectivity that is able to survive transformational retreatment, and, also characteristically represents both the nature of their discipline and it ‘ensconcement’ within its duly assigned social system…). (63)

So, e.g., the coded messages just noted would need to be seen to be well-formed in a natural language, as adhering to the rules of both that natural language and its imposed specificity of encoding, and for those people who are privy to such deeper encoding, that we are dealing with the craft of spying which basically falls within that sector of The Political-Economy that deals with all forms of social enforcement, be that either legal, or marshal, or regulatory of the financial world, or as a disciplinary body charged to either supervise, license, and/or regulate a certain professional discipline, etc. (64)

That these three relatively *ad hoc* levels in organization could be named, respectively, ‘relatively superficial’, ‘relatively structural’, and as pertaining to the ‘relatively

regulatory' through the distinctive nature of the rules of the social organization ordering that discipline regardless of whether natural language is either overtly or/and covertly co-opted from a coded perspective in the formation and dissemination of that discipline. (65)

So, in the formulation of the two coded emails just noted, we note the well-formed use of a natural language, their coded enstructuralization in the formation and dissemination of that discipline in question, and where the overall functions of those formal reportings or informal reports primarily conform to a certain pre-delineated social system in the conventional supervision of that discipline. Or, more prosaically, the exercise of codes (pertaining to a natural language) within codes (dealing with disciplinary modes of representation), within codes (expressing the social organization of that discipline in question). (66)

Now, we should also realize that although communication is exercised through the sequential treatment of these coded assemblies, still, actual transmission of an apparent intentional intent is only arrived at through that moment or moments when there is either a virtual or non-virtual alignment between communicators and communicatees respectively in either non-real-time or real-time. E.g., as in reading a novel or having a conversation with someone we understand. I.e., in and through an alignment arrived at in and through a progression of forms of textual alignment in which, within an overall economy of alignment, such 'apparent intent becomes intentionally apparent' be that either rightly or wrongly engendered to varying degrees. (67)

Obviously, communication operates through the necessary sequential steps involved in the 'writing' of a coded transmission and its sequentially de-encoded 'reading', but, correctly, actual communication is only arrived at when this process of intentional alignment is finally arrived at be that either adequately or inadequately realized, but, never in a form that is either absolutistically realized or in a form where the complete absence of communication is claimed to have not been realized to any degree whatsoever. The former is economically impossible and the latter renders an ensuing 'communication' both null and void. (68)

Basically, we metaphorically 'walk' a no-man's-land between the extremes because those extremes just cannot be 'walked upon…' (69)

What is this alignment arrived at through an economy of re(-)alignment? (70)

Here we need to re-invoke a philosophy of transformational retreatment and its utilization of a certain set possessing a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance, the characteristics of the transformations noted as seemingly imposed upon the former, and the ramifications ensuing from such transformations as would pertain to how we might historically recall the import of certain events, detail current implications of the transformational processes arrived at, and formulate what we might both expect and then anticipate through a well-supported conjectural appreciation of our lived-experience. (71)

iii. Economic Correlativity Implies There Can Be No Economic Isolates

Thankfully, through the careful operation of a conjectural economy, etc., communications are successfully realized through processes of re(-)alignment, be that within either our own senses of self or between our own overall sense of self and others. But given, the various (economic) arguments *contra* a pure private language it could be claimed that thinking of an individual cannot actually be a pure private affair. Similarly, for obvious reasons, there can be no pure public languages either with the implication that we more correctly enter into forms of dialogical encounter be they exercised relatively in virtual terms of reference (as if 'talking to one's own overall sense of self') or in non-virtual terms of reference as when we are entering into a non-monological dialogue when conversing with one or more individuals. (72)

Now, the realist would say, of course, that if our grandmother is counting tanks being shipped by that railway that she can observe, say, from the relative safety of her home in occupied Ukraine, then the expression '9 hens' means 'approximately 9 x 10 tanks', i.e., 'approximately 90 tanks'. But, this is an errant, non-economic form of simplification. Obviously, in all probability, she cannot see and observe all ninety odd tanks at the same time and, therefore, it is her textual reporting as they go past her window, one by one, that is being recorded. In other words, she notates mentally or by some other means, say, by placing one bean per tank into a cooking pot that then allows her to tally up the number of tanks actually being seen that day by counting up the number of beans in that pot. Then, she could convert the same into 'chicken units' and record it accordingly. Only she, and people in the know, know that '9 chickens' means '90 odd tanks'. So, the short-sighted realist does not realize that the alignment is already between texts, between either formal reportings in text and/or informal textual reports. On the other hand, the idealist cannot claim that this textual accounting is entirely constituted in self-referential terms of intentional acts since the number of tanks is completely independent of the person themselves. As you might also infer, that to enable this process of representation we have to strike a middle path between the short-sighted-realist who overlooks an inescapable form of textual representation and the long-sighted idealist who thinks the entire world is short-sightedly constituted entirely in and through their own intentional activity, and, thence, our permission to start from an integrated weak position where we can ignore the strong claims of all such ideologues. (73)

Now, to be expected from the obstinate realist that they would object to such a more complex sense as to how vision operates through a repetition of their repeated claim that it is the tank that is seen and not some form of textualization. In practical terms they are correct, but, more correctly, and constructed in a sound, philosophical form, is the fact that our vision has already textualized its interpretations and that this is already witnessed by the observation that they have already named what is being seen and what has already been seen. It is not that each tank has the name 'tank' written on its surface, but, because they see that '*x*' is a 'tank' must mean, and can only mean, that they have already textualized their 'report' of this informally treated occurrence that is then formally recorded in this grandmother's patriotic 'reporting'. (74)

This granted, we can now see how representation is arrived at through an assessment of alignments and non-alignments, either within and/or between text, as realized through an economic process that I have designated as a process of re(-)alignment[85] consisting of hermeneutic reiteration, phenomenal-phenomenological iteration, and existentially oriented re-iteration (where e/valuational formation forms and informs both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented instances of discernment along with the equally important appreciation of their transformational interactions in a conversion of the former into the 'value' of the latter, and v.v., etc.). Or, re(-)alignment through the integration of inputs that concern realignment through forms of hermeneutic mitigation, forms of phenomenological remediation (through the error correction of re-de-mis-alignment), and forms of ongoing existential re(-)normalization, through chaotically oriented forms of re-alignment (either critical and/or radical in complexion) that are then collectively constituted in our overall discernment of the e/valuational formation in question (preferably from both a relational perspective/(s) and a pro-relational perspective/(s)). Again, this same process of 'informational amelioration' can be looked at even more closely under the six headings entailed in the mitigation of genres and fact, the remediation of deconstruction and reconstruction, and, the progressive regulation stemming from the observance of the re(-)normalization of both individually and collectively of non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational input/output… then to complicate this picture further we can invoke the in-depth perspective of an understanding of transformational retreatment (and its attention shown towards aspects that are relatively invariant, subjected to transformational-transitions, and value formations) along with considerations of ordered, inter-ordered, and systematic forms of treatment, etc. That, effectively, none of this could occur without the prior textualization of such reports and reportings! (75)

That, therefore, we must conclude that such representation is enacted and conducted through an appreciation of the relations bourn between textual elements and textual sets whose simulations are textual and not pre-textual, etc. (even if the 'non-textual' nature of simulation is executed and expedited in and through positive, non-economic forms involving the decisive irruptions of e/valuational judgments whose resolution is already mediated through textual forms subjected to patterns of harmonic resolution, etc.[86])! (76)

Or, more succinctly, as 'interpretations' are 'judgments already made' and are 'arrived at through processes of textual re(-)alignment' it follows that such processes of treatment cannot be portrayed as economic isolates like the misguided attempt to nominate the so-called pre-simulated, which correctly, is both *post-hoc* and also *ad hoc*! (77)

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[85] The rest of this paragraph is a technical summary of what is implied in such a process and the casual reader might prefer to pass over it to the next paragraph.

[86] In other words, even if the realist were to seize on (my technical descriptions that) 'simulations are non-textual in orientation' in their phenomenal-phenomenological characterization, still, this is the result of irruptive, non-economic patterns of textual resolution in the sub-economy of the economic within the super-economic and has nothing to do whatsoever with the impossible utilization of the so-called 'pre-textual', or the so-called 'pre-simulated state of affairs' as defectively over-extrapolated from its already performed textualization as 'interpretations' arrived at through processes of judgmental appreciation, etc.

iv. The Philosophical 'Crime' of Metaphorical Abuse

Unfortunately, no one goes to jail for 'metaphorical abuse' although a fearfulness of meeting that fate might better concentrate the minds of the disciplinarian when they meddle in such nonsense-formation, and then go on and on to weave a fabulous set of confabulated ramifications in the wake of such misreported reportings. (78)

It is one thing to say that because experience is 'as if experientially constituted in intentional terms of reference, etc.', that we can then move on to say that everything we can consider must be so constituted. Our 'grandmother' is not in the armaments business of manufacturing tanks so, even though she is out there every day counting these tanks as they pass along that railway line, she is not constituting such implements of warfare. She merely reports on such occurrences in her formal reportings of such events. (79)

Similarly, because it is 'as if the realist sees 'tanks' as 'perceived objects', rather than as 'intentionally constituted perceptual objectives', it does not mean that they are then allowed to report in such a short-sighted manner since, among philosophers and disciplinarians able to take a more critical stance, such statements will be non-miscontrued as nothing more than the misguided misreporting of such events. (80)

Metaphors are an essential component in the process of interrogation, in the asking and the answering of a question, in any attempt in trying to be critical and, perhaps, in doing so, find themselves preparing the path for more radical forms of understanding. The logical form of each and every question is a rhetorical suspension, a dis-conjunction of the 'either/or'. I would argue that a first provisional answer is provided in a metaphorical form, namely, a response in the form of 'that it is like x' or 'that it is not like x'. But 'like' is not 'is' (and 'not like' is not 'is not'). Just as 'the forest seems to be empty of people' does not mean that 'it is actually empty of people since they could be hiding'. Then, in the form of a second provisional argument we move from 'like' to 'as-if, as-if, as-if… it is the case that A is x or non-x, etc. Or, that 'if A were x or non-x' then it 'that were 'true' then 'A is x or non-x…' (81)

Therefore, in line with such reasoning, we must non-misconstrue metaphors as able to exist in their own right, as economic isolates (focusing on the impossible disentanglement of the moment of phenomenological focus), or, as logical subjects that must be literalized despite their apparent intentional objectivity (just as the wayward realist is so quick to announce when 'like' is not 'is', etc., and, then, in those circumstances when a definitive answer demands either a definitive 'is' or 'is not', when, obviously, we are now no longer dealing with a relative focus on this dialectical and economical moment of the metaphorical, but, instead, on the conjectural, or, rather, the definitive-like ascertainment of either the literal presentation or non-presentation of some correctly interpreted event in our direct or indirect experience of either the lived-experience of ourselves and/or that of some other person or persons… (82)

What is metaphorical is metaphorical and cannot be mistreated literally, and, what is literally presented cannot be metaphorical in its phenomenological complexion! (83)

v. The Discontinuous Spectrum between Simulations and Non-Simulations

The simulation of a simulation is not a simulation of that which is pre-simulation (because there can be no pre-simulation before an act of simulation), and, the non-simulation of a non-simulation is not a non-simulation, and so on. The reflection in a mirror is not the object being reflected. I cannot see myself, so, seeing myself see my image must imply the existence of a simulation. But, because that 'being simulated' is also being resimulated in order to establish a stable intentional objective of perception then it implies that we are dealing with an objective that is found to possess a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, but, which at the same time, is able to take on those transformational differentials that explicitly denote that change of that logical subject that must also be observed… (84)

'Wax apples', 'remembered apples', 'dreams apples', and 'non-virtual apples', etc., cannot share the same modal spectrum in terms of what appears to constitute a non-virtual apple. In this regard, we should note the wisdom of any painting that declares, in writing, 'that the image of an apple is not an apple' when it can only be 'apple-like'. But, again the metaphorical can no longer apply should the situation in question effectively satisfy the range of expectations in terms of the density of modalities present, the intensity of those same modalities as found through experience, and where relevant themes, memes, motifs, textual representations, etc., all appear to support the contention of a certain experience that entails our recognition, encountering, and engagement with a non-virtual apple… (85)

As much as we might wish to merely imagine 'our eating a real, non-virtual apple' such a mental exercise will fail to recognize, encounter and engage a non-virtual apple since, thankfully, merely wishing something to be true is not much more than a guarantee that we, almost without exception, will fail. On the other hand, our ability to appreciate the phenomenal-phenomenological configurations of our intentional experiences means we are usually able to discern what meets our modal expectations and what clearly does not meet such expectation. So, in this regard, the idealist is not permitted to say that through merely imagining the non-virtual constitution of a certain phenomenon or set of phenomena that they are actually engaging the full complement of modalities that would normally be found to constitute that type of phenomenon or set of phenomena. Just as the experience of hunger cannot or should not be permanently overcome 'imaginatively' since its unresolved persistence would result in the inevitable death of that deluded individual. Then, on the other hand, a realist is also not permitted to say that since a non-virtual apple is being experienced that it can be 'perceived' to exist entirely apart from such experience for them since they have already named the content of that experience as an 'apple', and so on and so forth. Rather, and more wisely, we should take a middle path through the thickets of such nonsense and note that in our direct engagements, e.g., with apples, given that there can be neither so-called 'internal worlds' nor so-called 'external worlds', that it is in our assessments of the complexion of such phenomena that allow us to sort the metaphorical 'goats from the sheep' whilst also noting a discontinuous spectrum between similar phenomena that do not quite clearly fully measure up to such expectations… (86)

vi. The Non-Necessity for the Positing of a Strong Idealism

The understanding that experiences are textualized, in order for us to comprehend the same, should be enough for us to also realize that we do not need to submit to any form of a strong idealism, or, for that matter, any other form of an impossibly strong ideologically unsound vision of the world since we already have to hand, through the direct engagement of relational experience, enough information that would allow us, as a matter of probability, to either correctly nominate the phenomenon or phenomena to hand, or, definitively reject such an ascription, or merely find ourselves in a position where such denominated determinations cannot be currently obtained, or, for some other reason or reasons, we may rather wish to defer the pronouncement of such a nomination. (87)

That, even if we do not appreciate the economic impossibility of a strong idealism or a strong ideology, still, we could at least recognize the non-necessity for such a misconstrued form of an ideologically constituted conjecture. Yes, processes of qualified representation (either within and/or between textual reports and reportings) are conducted in experience that still does not permit us to declare everything is constituted in such experience since, for a start, we have no way of establishing the full truth of such pronouncements, but, that, fortuitously, the mere demonstration of a single exception would be more than enough to deconstruct such arrogant and errant nonsense! (88)

Just as this grandmother is not in the business of constituting tanks, as they pass her window, neither is she in the business of constituting public dictionaries of an intersubjectively utilized natural language. The word ‘tank’ (in English) is not and cannot be now constituted by a member of the public since its nomination, and co-associated denomination of definitions, etc., has already been formed and disseminated through the use of that natural language. So, how could an individual now constitute the world ‘tank’ when it can already be found in our dictionaries, even in dictionaries disseminated in a time before we were born. So, even if this observation were to be dismissed as trite, and as non-consequential as it is, still, given this aspect of lived-experience was constituted before we were born it stands to reason that the individual alone cannot constitute the entirety of this world at large… which is as common sense would dictate. So, this simple exemption granted, let us desist from the ideological nonsense perpetrated by the over-zealous idealist, and all other ideologues! (89)

But, this defeat of the over-zealous ideologue does not mean that they, and us, are left empty handed. What we find that is left to hand are various economies, various correlatives and inter-economic correlativities that appear to be able to be aligned, and so on. In effect, all the materials necessary to formulate a weak idealism, a weak realism, and a weak pragmatism, and so on, are ready to be melded together to both form and inform an integrated philosophical positioning, or disciplinary stance, that possesses enough rigour that is able to withstand the criticisms of all those possible or potential critics regardless of their ideological or non-ideological backgrounds… (90)

So, to this end, let us reconstruct a viable non-weak/non-strong form of idealism, etc., in order to demonstrate that such reconstruction is both possible and relevant. (91)

2. Reconstructive Arguments for a Non-Weak/Non-Strong Idealism, etc.

In *The Seventh Book*…, I argued for the deconstruction of the relatively defective [and ineffective] in conjunction with the reconstruction of the relatively effective [and rendering it relatively more effective]. In *Book* 11, I argued that we should invoke the philosophical tool of 'the non-economic fork' in order to delineate the negatively non-economic from the positively non-economic. **Now, once we understand that in an anti-representational-representationalism we are dealing with texts, and only with textualized formations, be they either directly and/or indirectly entertained, then it behooves us to dismiss both the impossible and the relatively defective and only deal with the possible and the relatively effective. In other words, to translate this philosophy of an anti-representational-representationalism into practice all we have to do is apply this non-economic fork. By doing so we rule out all non-textualized presentations along with the relatively defective and then immediately concentrate our attention, instead, on that textualized information that is relevant, informative, instructive, etc.** I.e., those operations that prove to be profitable in pursing those productive forms of practice able to instigate and institute the performance of our arbitrated-aspirations. I.e., those intentional objectives capable of realizing our pre-selected projects and programs be they either philosophical or metaphysical[87] in orientation, or of a disciplinary nature or work towards a more secularist set of objectives. (92)

Because we work with 'texts', and only 'textualized formations' in its broadest sense, this implies that whatever is not textually oriented in its imputed intentional constitution can be immediately dismissed. In avoiding such a category, much of a traditional metaphysics can be bypassed. Moreover, into this camp we can also include the hermeneutically inappropriate in terms of meta-textual genres and irrelevant narrational facts, etc. Added to this assortment of the impossible and useless we can also include that which is constituted in an improper phenomenological manner (analytically) or can be shown to be inapposite in terms of its consequential ramifications, etc. Thus, having disposed of the relatively unsuitable we now concentrate our attention on the relatively suitable, i.e., that textualized information that appears to proffer the relevant materials for the running of our conjectural economies, etc., in a style of operation capable of realizing our intentional objectives. (93)

Hence the necessity for a conformal approach to truth determination in our assessment of such curated information, etc. This is achieved by assembling and relating such information through the noting of both alignments enacted through processes of ongoing re(-)alignment and the apparent presentation of non-alignments which can either be ameliorated and emended or should also be bypassed and added to the previously discarded as either impossible or relatively defective, and as not being capable of finding reasonable forms of emendation, etc. (94)

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[87] I.e., as critically and radically reconstituted through the lens of an anti-representationalism, i.e., as an anti-representational-representationalism).

Positive truth assessments being realized in the reinforcement of evidential information and the conjectural soundness of arguments constructed upon the same in the light of such reiterated forms of re(-)alignment. (95)

Hence the anti-representational-representationalist needs to discern the relatively non-critical, the relatively critical, and the relatively radical. I note the adjective 'relatively' because in a transformational philosophy of retreatment these categories need not be treated as fixed. E.g., the relatively non-critical could be subjected to critical treatment and the positive truth values entailed in such apparent information could then be ameliorated and emended, or rectified, error corrected, re-regulated, etc. E.g., the critical could take a 'radical turn' through the exhibition of relatively radical forms of innovation, new vocabularies, or novel forms of practice, etc. Or, the radically-radical could be sequentially and incrementally rendered in a less radically, non-comprehended form as relatively-radical. Or, e.g., the relatively-radical in time could be rendered relatively critical through processes of accepted re(-)normalization through enacting its effective institutionalization as accepted practice, etc. (96)

The understanding that we are dealing with meaningful patterns of 'textualized formation' implies our ability to apply a vast range of philosophical and disciplinary tools as previously developed, etc. I.e., treating 'texts' as 'phenomenologically textual, hermeneutically meta-textual, and existentially as non-textual simulations, etc.' The conformal treatment of perceived or apperceived textual alignments and non-alignments in regard to the identification of instances of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, along with transformational-transitions of the former in conjunctions with their truth-assessments, etc. Moreover, given the advent of a positive non-economic appreciation of the irruptive nature of economic resolution we can also invoke a relatively more contextual approach to the same through the invocation of a relatively super-economic approach to consilience, salience, and propinquity (or standing) as they mirror a more economic manipulation of economically oriented operations, respectively, of hermeneutical accommodation, phenomenal-phenomenological distinctions, and (non-systematic) existential transformational(-transitions).[88] (97)

All in all, what has now been outlined, effectively, is the manifesto of the position of an anti-representational-representationalism that must also be reviewed as both existentially-pragmatic and pragmatically-existential besides demonstrating a positive nihilism given the deconstruction of those aspects of a traditional metaphysics that exhibited non-economically defective approaches to how we should deal with texts, their conformal truth assessment, etc. (98)

To conclude this essay, let me now focus my attention on how a weak idealism, etc., can be refashioned in a profitable manner through the viability imposed through the instigation and institution of conformally valid, non-weak/non-strong transformations-transitions, etc. (99)

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[88] Which will be explored in the next essay where I will be focusing on the positive concept of the 'non-economic' as 'an irruption of economic resolution and its incorporation into contextually wider terms of reference from the perspective of the super-economic'.

3. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

To date, I have been arguing that we can carefully salvage from a variety of extremist ideologies various insightful metaphors, rhetorical manoeuvres, (apparitionally conceived[89]) forms of conjectural argumentation, a re-conceptualization of the conformal, and so on. In this process, discarding what an anti-representationalist would consider to be more than problematic, whilst, on the other hand, preserving and emending what appears to be useful, relevant, pragmatically in an alignment with our intentional objectives, that which should be existentially promoted, and so on. Let me explore how this long-term program might be suitably instigated and what ramifications might flow from its successful institution… (100)

I have argued, in effect, that we cannot dismiss the necessary requirement for a representational philosophy as long as we understand that the raw material for such an approach is the suitable processing of the textualized formation of information and where such processing does not consume the appropriation of that which is not textual, and is either impossible or is barely possible to comprehend, or manifests as the relatively defective or useless, and so on. (101)

To this end, it is advisable to utilize whatever is to hand that can further advance our reasonable and commendable objectives. Rather than obsessing over patterns of philosophical over-preferentialism, etc., that do not deserve the attention and consumption of our limited time and resources, instead, let us focus on what can be salvaged and integrated to support those objectives that are both reasonable and commendable, i.e., proffer forms of both relatively positive non-existential re(-)e/valuational formation and also promote more positive forms of existential re(-)e/valuational formation. In this regard, one avenue to follow would be to utilize weak forms of realism, idealism, pragmatism, and whatever else has the potential for this style of fruitful application, and integrate and re-constitute the same along the lines of a non-weak/non-strong format without invoking either the impossible or the defective, without losing our commitment to be responsible people in this world at large, without adopting strong forms of over-commitment along with their pseudo-psychotic and psychotic associations, without adopting a non-commitment or lack of commitment associated with either weak or strong forms of a non-reality based, non-profitable relativism… (102)

To demonstrate the viability and vitality of such an approach let us consider the following observations. (103)

In the anecdote of the patriotic grandmother, we find her watching the trains from her kitchen window and for every tank being transported by train, that she sees, she puts one more bean into her cooking pot. This woman is no strong idealist, in this philosophical sense, and would never believe for a moment that ‘she is constituting the physical reality of those tanks in her personal consciousness’. No, as a ‘working idealist’ she is

[89] I am referencing the three correlatives of the interrogative economy. The ‘apparitional’ coincides with the conjectural, non-systematic existential, transformations, etc. E.g., refer to Pursuit, III.XIB.A.69. In effect, treating the apparition as counter-factual, conjectural, etc.

merely representing such observations that she has textually categorized as ‘tanks’ on a one-to-one basis with those ‘beans’ being placed in that pot. Then she adds them up and divides them by ten and turns them into ‘chicken units’ as to be reported in her next email. So ‘ten tanks’ equals ‘ten beans’ which then equals ‘one chicken’. Tanks do not become beans to then become chickens. But, in her representational calculus, this can occur because the transformations in significance are both textually instigated and instituted. Because one type of text is like any other text in terms of its textual constitution to the extent it can be treated and regarded as just like any other text *per se*. (104)

In a useful contrast, our practical grandmother is also working with that which is evidently observable. She sees what looks like ‘tanks’ and has had information also relayed to her to be careful to differentiate ‘real tanks’ from ‘mock-up tanks’ that will be used as decoys on the battlefield. So, to some extent she is also a ‘working realist’, indeed, a practical realist because she carefully notes if the tanks being seen are fully fledged tanks or those decoys just mentioned, or, for that matter, semi-destroyed tanks, travelling in the opposite direction, obviously in need of repair, and so on. As a practical realist she is attending to the evidence being presented as to whether each ‘tank’ being seen seems to be fully-fledged and metaphorically ‘ready to fly’ or one of those decoys she was warned about to be on the lookout for. (105)

This grandmother is also something of a ‘working pragmatist’. She believes that her small efforts in support of the Ukrainian military could make a difference, but, is under no illusion that her small contributions will be decisive. Still, as they say, ‘drop by drop either a bucket can be filled or a leaking bucket can be emptied…’ (106)

But, granted that a residue of metaphors and other devices, etc., that are weakly realistic or weakly idealistic in orientation, etc., can be salvaged, then, by what strategies can such materials be amalgamated in a form that is usefully non-weak/non-strong in orientation and that are also capable of instigating forms of commitment of a suitable degree that are neither too weak nor too strong in complexion? (107)

Obviously, we would need to work with information in a textual format that can be differentiated as either conformally valid or (non-)conformally invalid. That in order to make such an assessment we would need to be able to appreciate the viability and validity of our conjectural treatment of the overall representation of that situation in question in the light of our ostensive intentional objectives that we think are more suitable to engender, i.e., are hermeneutically appropriate, phenomenologically proper, and existentially apposite. Or, in cashing out such potential suitability, through closer forms of careful consideration, we can note an appropriateness of genres and narrational facts to be utilized in those forms of transformational treatment about to be engendered through the corrections to be instigated through both deconstruction and reconstruction along with the re-regulated re(-)normalization of relatively non-existentially oriented patterns of e/valuational formation in conjunction with existentially oriented patterns of e/valuational formation, and so on and so forth. (108)

Or, in effect, through the relative strength of our conjectural economies, etc., and their conformal evaluations in terms of their valid truth assessments, we are converting a weak realism and a weak idealism, as conducted through the lens of a weak pragmatism, into a format that is relatively non-weak/non-strong in orientation. That, in an attendance with such critical 'concern; should also be unleashed a corresponding degree of 'care'. Moreover, in converting or discarding the non-critical in a pursuit of the relatively critical, in all probability, we will also need to recognize, encounter, and engage with that which is relatively-radical and come to grips with the ramifications also unleashed in the wake of the same. That, by such means and similar, both our concern and care can then take on both a positivity of the relatively non-existential in conjunction with the positivity of the relatively existential. (109)

Should we have such confidence that in apparently 'doing the right thing', in performing patterns of existentially oriented intervention, that the ramifications of such an approach will duly deliver a just compensation for such concern and care? On balance, we should answer, 'yes!' However, the exigencies of this world at large are such that despite the best of intentions we are still privy to errors in judgment; find ourselves at the mercy of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information; be beholden to fallacious arguments; encounter mis-intended, unintended, and non-intended consequences; encounter those misfortunes that will be delivered by Nature, be confronted by both non-existential and existential forces as we make our passages, both individually and collectively, through this world-of-life, and so on and so forth. Still, despite the adversities of our being embodied, embedded, and embanked in this world at large, through working together the more important of our arbitrated-aspirations can be instigated for the benefit of both ourselves and others. Unleashed, for the greater part, definitively, through the positive irruption of the non-economic ramifications of our cooperative efforts which, as a topic, will become the primary theme to be explored in the next essay..!! (110)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 29.8.24.

Appendix A: AI and the Problem of Representational Divergence

In the previous essay, I first formulated an argument *contra* a pure public language.[90] Basically, if the dissemination of a public language were to have less and less private input and were to merely recirculate a recycled shuffling of content one could well imagine that its potential for representation of this world at large would become either progressively muted and/or bizarre.[91] In other words, the eventual 'purification' of a public language would render it less and less useful for a person who might wish to use it to navigate this now distorted sense and semblance of a world at large. (111)

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90 Pursuit, III.XIIC.18-22.

91 I believe this is referred to as 'hallucinations' when AI generated text demonstrates an obvious form of representational divergence?

In this *Appendix* A let me explore some of the issues that connect this practical problem of representational divergence with the philosophical problem of representation as viewed through the lens of a working ‘anti-representational-representationalism’. (112)

For many years it was the general understanding that the field of artificial intelligence (AI) was making little progress. However, with advances in processing power of computer chips and the coming together of a number of fields, like, e.g., machine learning; the digital acquisition of huge data-sets, as large language models (LLM); speech recognition and speech generation; image recognition; accelerated algorithmic learning, and so on, progress in this field is now practically impossible to measure. With machine learning scouring multiple data-sets some experts in this discipline of AI are claiming that we are about to reach or have now reached, or, maybe, perhaps even surpassed a stage designated as artificial general intelligence (AGI) where asking such a program to perform a certain task, from a huge variety of possible options, that it will successfully achieve and implement what was requested. That when such a program successfully outperforms the average human then it is claimed that we are witnessing the advent of an era of ‘super intelligence’. An event made possible through vast increases in the computing power of the latest chips, machine learning based on its processing large language models, and the formulation of algorithms capable of organizing the discharge of such electronic responses. Indeed, in the field of accelerated algorithmic learning, as with other aspects of this evolution, recent progress has literally gone off the charts. Some representatives of this discipline have noted that very recent innovations in the stack of software, in a hierarchy of interactive inputs and outputs, the acceleration in one year has seen a million-fold improvement. Very quickly, the charting of such progress has gone ‘vertical; and, in the process, has make a mockery of such graphic depiction. (113)

As noted, some commentators in this field are arguing that machine learning is now ‘scraping the bottom of the barrel’, and has met a metaphorical ‘wall’, as far as accessible data-sets can be utilized and that machines will have to continue to learn from what has been envisaged as ‘synthetic data’ fabricated by AI itself.[92] However, for some experts, all this could very well be quite problematic to the extent that AI, or AGI, could eventually collapse under a failure to make continuing progress in such machine learning, and, where, instead, in a non-independent-dependence upon dubious data, that it will then generate new data which will naturally also have an even more dubious conformal truth status given an ensuing divergence in representationally delineated nominations and denominations. That this ‘representational difference’, as a differential, could, in all probability, arise and whose continuing dissemination would or should prove to be increasingly problematic? Hence this concern, that without either adequate human supervision and/or adequate machine-organized supervision, the entire edifice of AI, along with its ability to generate AGI, could very well collapse. Indeed, cease to function in a useful manner! Unfortunately, in a ‘flood’ of misinformation, etc., it would seem natural to believe that this feared scenario of an eventual, fundamentally adulterated and flawed program in AI, of which a certain number of products can already be found for sale in the marketplace, could, in all probability, manifest itself? (114)

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92 Refer to paragraph 48.

However, theoretically, or hypothetically, although not dismissing the possibilities of the collapse of AI (and AGI) in our very midst, I would like to contend that a number of avenues are possible in order to prevent this somewhat incestuous manifestation from arising. (115)

Some of those possibilities were discussed within this essay:

> …that we need to be mindful of two important observations, namely, 'that no perspective can be absolutely exhausted' and 'that there can be no exhaustion of choices in perspective' even though, in practical terms, we can add two more observational conjectures, namely, 'that with diminishing returns we will naturally seek some other intentional direction to continue to operate within', and, 'that relevance is highly dependent upon finding a 'return on the intentional investment on our interest'…[93] (116)

That, in this regard, no perspective can be ultimately exhausted, and, with an infinite set of choices in perspectives it may well be the case that this so-called 'wall' or limit in AI learning as exercise in and through the use of large language models might not eventuate (in the creation of data, be it either non-synthetic and/or or synthetic in orientation)? (117)

Or, as pointed out 'that without either adequate human supervision and/or adequate machine-organized supervision, the entire edifice of AI, along with its ability to generate AGI, could very well collapse'. The implication being that human supervision might intervene and prevent such mis-representational divergences. However, given the ability for 'AI learning' to generate vastly greater amounts of text than humans are capable of producing then it may well be the case that human oversight just could not compete in this regard. Then the other alternative of instituting various forms of machine supervision is perhaps a bit like 'putting the fox in the henhouse' so to speak. Although not ruling out the last option, it would probably seem to be advantageous if human generated text were to be quarantined from computer generated forms of dissemination lest its adulteration of a general conformation in representative richness be lost. Then, at the same time, the very methods utilized by humans to ensure a relatively truthful representative conformalism could also be instituted. E.g., through the use, say, of 'representational certificates', perhaps stored in some form of a non-corruptible blockchain, in and through the mirrored representation of a so-called 'body of knowledge', that, although pre-embedded in the pragmatic use of natural languages, might need to be re-instituted in a meta-assessment of the apparent conformation of natural discourses as reviewed by the application of AI 'learning', etc. A process basically of artificial supervision that incorporates the various methodological approaches as utilized by human cognition, as organized in both subjective and intersubjective orientations, that effectively mirrors how social consensus and social solidarity themselves are being progressively arrived at and suitably subjected to various forms of amelioration, emendation, correction, rectification, mitigation, remediation, re-regulation, re(-)normalization, and so on. (118)

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[93] Refer to paragraph 48.

With an obvious degree of relevance, it is my belief that our reflections on this speculative topic of a potential collapse in AI learning through representational divergence should also help us to shape how to constructively review the functioning of a working anti-representational-representationalism. Thence the apparent import behind my making these additional comments… (119)

N.T., 30.8.24.

Appendix B: The Advertisement of XIIC & XIID

On 8 September there will be a workshop on the third and fourth essays in *Book* XII titled: *Moving from an Aspirational Economy to an Arbitrational Economy* and *The Deconstruction of a Strong Idealism*.

The third essay notes the general delusion most people labour under, namely, that as seemingly autonomous agents, people are of the belief that they have the power to enact most of their intentional projects and programs through the intentional force of their own efforts alone when in lived-reality it is only through processes of social arbitration that a small selection of some of those aspirations might meet with an adequate degree of realization. That it is on this basis that a Neo-Liberal mindset is both fostered and perpetuated, and presents such a risk to both the preservation and advancement of democratic governance.

The fourth essay is *contra* a strong idealism and continues the previous critique *contra* a strong realism. A complex argument is run that strong positions are either economically impossible to operate and/or are operated in a defective manner, but, that through the exercise of valid conjectures, etc., it is possible to promote weak positions to positions that are both non-weak and non-strong in orientation. That in doing so, a responsible middle path can be existentially observed between relative over-commitment and relative under-commitment.

In both essays a Wittgensteinian-like argument will be run, namely, ‘that pure public languages are impossible to profitably operate’ and where a general movement towards the same, without adequate private input, would observe a disastrous ‘representational divergence’. In effect, where the system would ‘hallucinate’. A phenomenon some experts fear will occur through an over emphasis being placed upon AI in which inadequately supervised processes of machine learning will inevitably ‘oversee’ the recycling of a proliferation of AI-generated texts. Such insights being used in formulating a working ‘anti-representational-representationalism’ that insists all representations and their conformal truth assessments stem from the collation of textual alignments and not otherwise (as was generally presented in various misguided forms of a more traditional metaphysics). That in the running of such arguments, and their critique, private input is welcomed…

Future presentations will also be discussed. One suggestion being ‘the voicing of personal reflections on what might be meant ‘by living well’.’ All other ideas are welcomed…

XIIE. The Discovery of the Non-Economic (and the Super-Economic)

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIE. (5.) The Discovery of the Non-Economic (and the Super-Economic)[94]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

If any moral, at all, is to be taken onboard from reflections upon my transgressions as outlined in this essay then it could well be our taking on notice that if are going to stake out any form of a philosophical position, or similar, then we need to account both for its positive contours and what it cannot be, and, importantly, to what extent the latter might also powerfully contrast and reconstitute the former. A metaphorical observation to the effect that 'if we are going to lock the front door then it would also be advisable to lock the back door as well'. Or, in other words, we need to define both the extent and context of our topic by both positively and negatively setting out to clearly articulate its limits whilst also noting how that working definition must also be brought back into this world-of-life, this world at large… since if we do not pay enough attention to these facets of our discourse then we leave ourselves open to having more holes in our argument than a Emmental-style cheese or trying to sail the seven seas in a leaking sieve….(0)

Over a lengthy period of time, I was slowly brought to a point where I had to recognize the apparent universality of what I have designated as an 'economic sense of perspective', i.e., that all value formation (in a double process of e/valuation[95]) necessitates a circulation of value that cannot be unimodal or bimodal in orientation but must be trimodal and, yet, where tetramodal formations, etc., can be read as complex forms of the trimodal, and so on. So, everything is economic and trimodally constituted! Without trimodal circulation of e/valuation there would be nothing real to see here. To insist otherwise, would be to talk nonsense, demonstrate the impossibility of either your shorter-term projects and your longer-term programs. Nothing else to do, nothing to see there, best we move on. Unless, through engagement, if we were bothered, we set out to demonstrate a deconstruction of your opponent's positioning which in all probability would be a waste of time especially if they were over-committed to such nonsense and could not see the obviously error of their errant ways. Sadly, such engagement is more often than not a counter-productive exercise for both parties… although the more optimistic might hope otherwise. So, surprise of surprise, when I discovered the need to also discuss and contrast the 'economic' with the 'non-economic' (in a similar manner I should add to how, for quite some time, I had contrasted the textual dimension by also including the simulated nature of the relatively 'non-textual' coincident with the so-called 'third moment'). (1)

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94 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

95 I.e., in a process of trans-intentional judgment with the delivery of that judgment in an intentional format. Hence the expression 'e/valuation' that could be read as 'evaluation and valuation'. Furthermore, through the perspective of an ordered exploration of the six forms of ordered e/valuation I only perceive second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetical e/valuation, third trans-cognitively ordered deontological e/valuation, and fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical e/valuation as more correctly deserving to take on this epithet of value (perhaps more along the lines of its normal usage?). Where, first trans-cognitively ordered phenomenological-semantic e/valuation, fifth trans-cognitively ordered hermeneutical e/valuation (of possibility), and sixth trans-cognitively ordered ontical (factual) e/valuation of relatively accurate factual assessment seem to fall outside this normal range of value *per se*? Rightly or wrongly, I attempt to preserve this distinction that value per se is more correctly the singular presentation or composite of the aesthetical, deontological and/or the pragmatical (to be further consolidated under a distinction between the relatively non-existential and the existential).

As an introduction to this essay let me meander my way through the following themes, namely, a confession along with an explication of this concept of the 'economic', the potentially endless nature of economic circulation; introduce the concept of 'conjectural chains' through the utilization of 'sets and series of conjectures'; the introduction of counterfactual and counter-counterfactual counter-sets and counter-series of conjectures, etc; the relatively definitive nature of judgmental decisions as moments of non-economic resolution; and, how a non-economic philosophy needs to complement an economic philosophy and be constructed from conjectural sets, etc., starting with the latter and find ourselves effectively arriving at a working understanding of the former'. In the final section dealing with provisional conclusions, I will outline the ramifications of this economic philosophy along with the necessity for a complementary philosophy of the non-economic. (2)

1. Transgressions

But, first, what sins or transgressions must I confess to, as having committed, as will be described in this essay, and, of course, have been long since retracted although given that the human condition is to be ever short-sighted the regular reiteration of our confessions should remain a life-long preoccupation? Making, from time to time, some hopeful progress as we stumble towards a more fruitful sense of direction... (3)

Picking up on this motif of 'stumbling in the right direction' let me recount the following anecdote. As a teenager I visited a maze. In a joyful sense of play, seemingly letting my intuition direct me through its contorted corridors, I stumbled out in under ten minutes. One of the young people in charge of the site had the perfect response to my surfacing so quickly, "see if you can do it again." In hindsight, I should have retired on my laurels but, unwisely, took up the challenge. This time I had a reputation to defend and it was now something of a chore. Thankfully, I did not need to be rescued but this time luck was not so much on my side. In some respects, this maze can be used to focus our attention on the nature of circulation. (4)

I guess our probable and actual passage through that maze could be written as series of choices where the minimum number of choices rightly made would get us out of that maze with the least effort in such decision making. On the other hand, theoretically, if we were to keep making wrong choices then we could never exit that maze. Then, again, we might also suppose that you would have to be very lucky to just continue to make right guesses, and, conversely, you would have to be very unlucky to continue to make just wrong guesses. Therefore, we might suppose that operating with a random mix of choices that the average time a person with an average run of luck would, in all probability, end up inhabiting that maze, say, for half an hour. Furthermore, a more fiendish form of maze would be constructed if our choices at each internal juncture involved more than a simple binary 'yes' or 'no'. (5)

What else could we say about mazes? That in entering such a device if we continually make wrong decisions then we do not get to leave. I would like to use this as a double metaphor for the philosophical idea of the 'economic', and, without recognizing, first, the significance of the 'economic' and, second, the limitations of such an idea, that in overlooking the ideas of both the 'economic' and the 'non-economic' we will be entertaining a double transgression. Let me explain. (6)

What is meant by this philosophical expression 'economic', why my insistence on this approach? Then, how is this approach to be approached, and then ask 'that if this approach is able to be 'entered', how do we 'exit' from such an orientation?' (7)

I use this expression because without a circulation of evaluative judgment no evaluation could be formed, no evaluation would mean there would be no valuation, no valuation would mean there would be no value, and life as a consequence would be impossible and, indeed, without value in all senses of that expression. Now the idea of 'circulation', itself, suggests a circling and not merely a going back and forth, or, for that matter a merely standing still on the same spot or a simple rotation of an object upon a fixed axis. The implication being that a space of circulation, as a metaphorical space for circulation, would need to be in place that, at a bare minimum, would demand at least three points. We can also think of these three points as correlatives (which mutually co-define each other through their joint negations[96]). (8)

Of course, this way of attempting to appreciate this concept of the 'economic' is problematic given that no analogy can be treated literally and remain an analogy because to do so is either impossible and/or we would no longer be dealing with the metaphorical. E.g., the Moon might look like 'a big blue cheese' it cannot be viewed as a cheese *versus* that person looks like 'John', and, indeed, 'is John'. (9)

Then, somewhat of a refrain in this set of essays, 'we should endeavour to move from the relatively *ad hoc* to the relatively less *ad hoc*'. (10)

We can approach this movement in conformation under the three headings of the Descriptive, Prescriptive and Proscriptive. Under the first heading, we should note how all enterprises of e/valuation on closer scrutiny all appear to be trimodal in orientation. So, e.g., the trimodal nature of time into past, present, and future; the three axes in three-dimensional space; that in archetypal terms treatment is either synthetical, analytical, and/or nominational; the three persons in grammar; either implicit or explicit use of singular, dual, and plural cases; how in the world of particle physics we need to note in relations to charge the three possibilities of positive, negative, and neutral; and so on. (11)

Taking a prescriptive stance can see us taking a universal approach to such triplicities in order to explain why 'the economic circulation of e/valuation appears to always take a trimodal format'. E.g., we could invoke a harmonic approach and note its linear

[96] E.g., we could say in a logical space S that with three specifically defined points that A is both not B and not C, etc. Or, as a metaphor, if a building has three doors that if you enter by door A that this implies you do not enter via either door B or door C.

sequentialization as ‘consonance, dissonance, and resolution’. And that granted, then attempt to better understand this apparent universality of the trimodal by supplying a gestalt model as the basis. Let me elaborate on that last point. (12)

In a (harmonic and) gestalt modeling, based on a gestalt appreciation of the visual field, we note the tripartite formulation of a (consonant) background field, the (dissonance of) foreground focus, and, an appreciation of this relationship in the (harmonically resolved) formation of a co-associated sense of (visual) subjectivity. The implication being that all three correlative aspects need to be co-present for a process of (visual) appreciation. In other words, without the relativity of consonance, dissonance and harmonization there would be no process of appreciation. That in principle this tripartite formulation applies to all other forms of (gestalt-oriented) appreciation. By such means reinforcing this ‘economic conjecture’ by rendering its general formulation in a relatively less *ad hoc* format. (13)

Given this conjecture of ‘economic correlativity’ what ramifications follow from its postulation? (14)

That, from a dialectical (and pro-relational) perspective it can be argued that all correlatives have to be present in real time, and, that they mutually define each other through their joint negations. So, in a harmonic reading of the economic we can say, e.g., ‘that the relativity of consonance is relatively neither dissonant nor harmonized or resolved, etc.’ The implication then follows that we cannot separate, except in qualified provisional terms of reference, the relativity of consonance from the relativity of both dissonance and harmonization and where the latter is realized through a process of ongoing resolution. (15)

As a process of resolution, we can say harmonization immediately ceases once that resolution is effectively instantiated. The implication can then be extended to infer that if a relationship is in experiential existence, through ongoing resolution, then that relationship ceases to be experienced once resolution is definitively realized. (16)

But, we love our relationships, especially our narrated or narrational relationships, so it is obvious that we must prefer ongoing relationships being realized through ongoing resolution rather than relational cessation being put into effect through definitive forms of relational resolution. In other words, metaphorically speaking, definitive resolution is relational ‘death’. E.g., pay the plumber in full and your relationship with the plumber, and their relationship with you, will come to a harmonious termination (which might explain why we could also tip a person for their service as a way both of recognizing the quality of their service and but also as a way of signaling to them our possible desire to avail ourselves of their services in the future should that occasion arise). (17)

That just as definitive resolution is not usually the intentional objective we have in mind so, too, must we desist from performing an inadequate and ineffective degree of ongoing resolution at the same time. I.e., neither over resolving nor under-resolving the situational dynamics as discerned through our representationally understood mapping of

the essential, relevantly important features of the relationship being experienced. But, we can also extend this Goldilocks; approach to resolution, as a process that can be neither over-done nor under-done, through its application to these other two correlative aspects of both consonance and dissonance given their mutual co-definition of each other through the relativity of their joint negations. I.e., neither insisting on a perfect sense and semblance of consonance nor an imperfect sense and semblance of consonance, nor, insisting on a perfect sense and semblance of dissonance nor an imperfect sense and semblance of dissonance. Or collectively, that we can neither have perfect consonance, or dissonance, or resolution nor an imperfect consonance, or dissonance or resolution should we desire to oversee either the creation, preservation and/or conservation(al expansion) of the (non-existentially oriented) relational richness and (existentially oriented) enrichment of our relationships. Thence the necessity for processes of ongoing relational resolution in order to create, preserve, and conserve our relational interactions, etc. (18)

However, we have a considerable philosophical problem, namely, if resolution is co-defined through its correlativities of both consonance and dissonance then how is resolution to be put into effect in relatively definitive, non-virtual, causal terms of reference if this process of economic correlativity persists? (19)

Hence these to two transgressions of not recognizing our entry into a trimodal world of economic circulation, and, then, our not recognizing that we must also exit from what otherwise would be an endless process of recycling![97] (20)

2. The Philosophical Problem of the Endless Nature of Economic Circulation

Just as when wandering in a maze, make wrong decisions at any juncture and we would never reach the exit that we know must exist (if only by virtue of the fact that we were able to enter that maze in the first place). (21)

Or, when applied to a series of conjectures, we would not reach a provisionally valid conclusion, or set of conclusions, if the decisions adopted and adapted are not suitably formulated and applied. I.e., conformal competence necessitates the suitable application of hermeneutical mitigation of genres and facts; phenomenal-phenomenological remediation through deconstructive and reconstructive patterns of treatment; and, ongoing transformational processes of re(-)normalization in both relational, non-existential and pro-relational, existential orientations. (22)

On a more intuitive level of understanding, we might well ask the questions, ‘how do we enter into a process of economic circulation, and, more importantly, how might we exit from the same lest we be trapped in an experiential maze that proffers no exit? (23)

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[97] Indicating three stages, namely, no economic recognition; economic recognition; and, non-economic recognition. A fourth stage could also be envisaged wherein we no longer need to make such artificial distinctions given intentional consciousness is continually propelled, moment by moment, through both suspensions and de-suspensions, and so on.

That these concerns mirror exactly the anxieties raised by the application of a working suspension and would naturally lead us to ask the obvious question would, or should, our access to the economic domain be put into effect through the auspices of a working suspension? And should you run this parallel or relatively isomorphic conjecture, then we must answer in the affirmative. (24)

Then, in the light of concerns raised by the possibility of an endless, non-decisively terminated process of the suspension we must also answer this second question, 'how do we exit from this possibility of an endless circulation?' In reply I answer, as noted by myself on numerous occasions, namely, 'through a suspension of that suspension itself'. I.e., 'through a suspension of the process of that suspension!' Indeed, I would argue that the suspension, itself, automatically invokes its own 'de-suspension'. Thence our exit, under normal circumstances,[98] from what could have been an interminable process of circulation, although we could also argue that there can be no real 'entrance' or 'exit' since the automatic de-suspension automatically reintroduces another suspension, and so on, that may or may not indicate a newly directed line of intentional objectivity given the chaotic nature of the suspension to either reiterate a current sense of intentional direction or initiate a new directedness through a chaotically oriented process of re-direction, and so forth. (25)

Now, this conjecture of the 'de-suspension' proffers an introduction to the complementary conjecture of the 'non-economic'. Rather than enduring endless cycles of circulation the process of resolution, entertained in a virtual, non-causal orientation, can now take on a non-virtual, causal direction. Whereas, before, we could only understood the harmonic moment of resolution as inseparably co-occurring only with the co-occurrence of the relatively consonant and dissonant, now, both hypothetically and theoretically, we have a mechanism for conjecturing how resolution could enter non-virtually into an observable moment or period of real time. At the same time, supplying information as to how to differentiate the relatively 'economic' from the relatively 'non-economic'. I.e., wherein the non-economic, in contrast to 'endless circulation', can now be seen to possess a definitive sense and semblance of a decisive, unilateral directedness that does, indeed, accurately mirror the contours of how intentional judgments are actually exercised in theoretical, practical, and critical terms of reference. Hence by borrowing this stye of nomenclature from French non-philosopher[99] François Laurelle who prompted me to appreciate how this positive aspect of the non-economic differentiates so succinctly the contrasting phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented characteristics of both economically oriented experience and non-economically oriented experience. (26)

Where, basically, ongoing resolution is experienced through an ongoing expression of a decisiveness that could not be anything else other than the relatively non-economic (as understood in its positive sense). (27)

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98 I conjecture that we can model a 'psychosis' on a 'being stuck inside the suspension', and a 'neurosis' on our 'being stuck outside the suspension' (and where both relative pathologies show different kinds of circadian rhythms, differences, disturbances, etc.).

99 Although he later preferred the expression 'non-standard'.

In this same regard, I will also conjecture that we can come to understand a differentiation between non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation as follows: that the de-suspension can enact a definitive moment of resolution whose potential phenomenological characteristics are ensconced in 'the definitive response of the last instant', and, where through engaging an existential potentiality we then perceive it as 'the definitive response of the next instant', which, if its existential complexion is suitably acted upon, then becomes 'the definitive response of the first instance'… upon the understanding that a relatively existentially oriented complexion is now being initiated and disseminated therefrom and thereafter. (28)

In effect, also assisting us in our being able to clearly differentiate responses that remain relatively non-existential in orientation in comparison to those responses that take on a relatively existential orientation. (29)

That, to a considerable extent, this circular vision of the economic *versus* the linear response of the non-economic is also to be found mirrored in conjectural sets *versus* conjectural series. Let me explain. (30)

3. Conjectural Chains

Some years back, I was told that I was going to be responsible over a few days for the care of our dog, a very friendly, somewhat large Pomeranian called 'Ramesses'. Now the weather was hot, and whilst I was wondering whether I should have another drink of water, and looking at the dog, I was wondering if he was thirsty too? His wistful eyes looking at me earnestly, and didn't seem to be too energetic like he usually is most of the time. I then glanced over to his water bowl and was horrified to see it was now empty. I immediately filled it and the dog went over to bowl and started lapping up some of the water for about a minute. Then he returned to his previous position, slumped down looking a lot relieved and went into a semi-sleep position albeit with one eye left trained on me no doubt, I am sure, that he was wondering when we would be going for his obligatory evening walk before he took his evening meal, which would be his main meal of the day. (31)

Now, I mention this event, another confession to illustrate a conjectured difference between somewhat 'virtually entertained conjectural sets' and 'non-virtually entertained conjectural series'. I mentioned earlier how in a virtual mode economic correlatives are more dialectically entertained simultaneously, as if in a set of concurrent conjectures given that they all mutually co-define each other through their inseparable, joint negations. Of course, individual thoughts are sequentially entertained, but in a set such ideas are more reflected as if they had occurred with a non-sequential status. So, e.g., 'I noted the weather that day was hot; and was wondering if I was thirsty, and should drink some more water; and was wondering if the dog felt the heat and was also thirsty…' where any of these individual thoughts, as active ideas, could have been entertained in any sequence or rearrangement of such ideas. On the other hand, in noticing the water bowl of the dog to be now empty I would now be entertaining a more linear, sequential

set of ideas, namely, the series of thoughts that went ‘I see the dog’s bowl water bowl is empty; am horrified at my care-less neglect; realize it should have water in it; that I had better immediately fill this bowl; then see the dog go over to the water bowl and drink; now note that the dog looks most possibly relieved; that he then settles in for a one-eyed rest whilst continuing to watch me, no doubt anticipating that at some time soon I would be walking him…’ (32)

Given that no economic correlatives, in each and every trimodal economy, can be entertained separately we could well conjecture, as a form of qualification, that both sets and series of intentionally entertained ideas, as conjectures, are actually co-entertained despite our thinking that they might be entertained, say, alternatively. Moreover, in entertaining the apparent specificity of a conjectural economy, say, in exploring the ramifications of a certain philosophical position or in entertaining some form of a disciplinary performance in line with the specificity of its own genre dictated performances we can attempt to representatively map the conjectural elements of our conjectural trajectories in argumentation in a similar manner, i.e., through their representational mapping accordingly (despite the dialectical-like impossibility of representing such entertainment in anything other than a vast simplification of such economic complexity and its potential non-economic perplexity arising from the actual choices adopted and adapted by ourselves in the enacted enaction of such e/valuational formations. (33)

Now, I am not downplaying the complexity of intentional ideation and trans-intentional judgmental appreciation, but, the main point I am trying to convey is that in setting out to map our ideational trajectories we can divide them in a representative form by noting the co-occurrence of conjectural sets and conjectural series and make the assumption that the former are relatively virtual and non-causal in orientation and that the latter are relatively non-virtual and causal in orientation, and, our representative mapping can take on this form of simplification. (34)

I.e., that a conjectural set is when and where a certain state of affairs is represented simultaneously, virtually and non-causally, and, a conjectural series is represented sequentially, non-virtually, and with causal possibilities. (35)

4. The Use of Counterfactuals and Counter-Counterfactual, etc.

To compound both complexity and perplexity is the need to understand that in a full reading, e.g., of the interrogative economy, factuals, counterfactuals and counter-counterfactuals, etc., are all implicated in any pretensions towards realizing a literal reading through what I have defined as the so-called third moment of the ‘apparitional’, i.e., the ‘as-if, as-if, etc.’, or the ‘what-if’, and so on. (36)

Facts are assigned a hermeneutic orientation in conjunction with genres in pre-conditional phase of pretreatment in a process of transformational retreatment. Counterfactuals can then be assigned as vehicles of treatment involving both deconstruction and reconstruction. Last, counter-counterfactuals can be assigned a relatively non-systematic

existential orientation on par with the proscriptive role of the existential in ethical determinations. Let me demonstrate this contention, this (apparitional) conjecture. (37)

E.g., we could run with the conjectural set of sentences to the effect, on a factual level, 'it is hot; I am thirsty; most probably the dog would be thirsty?' Then with some degree of counterfactual involvement we might well ask in a conjectural set 'am I thirsty enough to go a get some water to drink; if the dog were thirsty it would go and drink from its water bowl'. But in a counter-counterfactual set I note that I am not thirsty enough to go and get something to drink, but, then also note the dog cannot drink because there is now no water in its water bowl'. In a conjectural series I note that even though I am not thirsty at this moment in time because there is no water in the dog's bowl I should immediately get up and fill it forthwith'. 'When I do so, I note the dog immediately goes over to drink, and then returns to his favourite spot, slumps down, and now appear to be resting more comfortably'. (38)

Now let me apply a similar format to the outline of a 'joint economic-non-economic philosophy'. (39)

E.g., we could run a conjectural set as follows, 'economic correlatives inseparably co-occur; as trimodal in complexion, that could be represented harmonically as background consonance, foreground dissonance, and subjective resolution'. We could also argue 'that these correlatives are also simulating a dynamic suspension given that each can be defined as the joint negation of their partners, etc.' But, given the relevant degree of 'conjectural energy' (read 'emotional motivation') we can now envisage the moment of resolution taking on, within a conjectural series, a non-virtual, causally definitive emission whose irruption is indicative of such a transformation. But what relevance has this transformational 'entracement' possess in retreatment if it cannot be relationally recognized hermeneutically, encountered phenomena-phenomenologically, and engaged in its non-systematic existential constitution of that event, or series of events, as this situation unfolds? Thence the necessity for a following conjectural series wherein we can proffer an explanation as to how the non-economic could suitably find these collective relational considerations of recognition, encountering, and engagement in the context of a non-economic overlay upon the original economy in question. (40)

In attempting to answer how we might formulate this last conjectural series let me creatively postulate the following conjectural scenario in order to resolve this problem of how the relatively-radical[100] nature of the irruption of the relatively non-economic might be accommodated within wider terms of reference, i.e., within what cannot be other than the conjecture of a 'super-economic context'. (41)

Let me sketch this series of conjectured postulations: (a correlative set entailing a virtual sense and semblance of economic resolution) – (a conjectured series entailing non-economic irruption where economic resolution is cast in a non-virtual and causal format) – (conjectural set entailing a conjectured appropriation of the non-economic via

[100] 'Relatively-radical' and not radically-radical given only the former can be incrementally appropriated in 'bite-sized chunks'.

the conjectured auspices of the hyper-economic sub-economy within the super-economic economy of the overall economic) – (conjectured set entailing the now successfully attained re(-)accommodation of the non-economic). (42)

Broadly speaking, the causal transformation of a virtual economic sense and semblance of resolution once emitted is immediately re-absorbed via the hyper-economic sub-economy within the overall economy of the economic, i.e., super-economy. Where the trimodal constitution of the super-economic is constituted from its sub-economies of the hermeneutically oriented hyper-economic, the phenomenologically oriented economic, and the (non-systematic) existentially oriented non-economic. So, the moral of this scenario is that the non-economic exposes the limitation of the economic, but, that it is through economic appropriation within the hyper-economic that the non-economic can be 'economically appropriated'. Where we must conjecture that this higher-ordered process of re(-)appropriation is incrementally conducted (given the conjecture that the radically-radical cannot be appropriated other than in and through an incremental appropriation of the relatively-radical). (43)

Seen in these sets and series of conjectures, as a web of conjectures, the moment of economic resolution necessitates its implication in a causal dimension. That the trajectory of these argument is necessitated in order to cast economic resolution in a causal frame of reference and through the force of its argument hopefully assume a conformal status that is relatively less *ad hoc* when pragmatically viewed as a series of solutions to a series of interlinked philosophical problems. But, then, what faith can we place in such a scheme? Accepted as a heuristic device my superseding argument would be to make the pragmatic point, in what way can we do better. By what, through that which can be found to hand, would more successfully allow us to resolve, in an integrated manner, these sets and series of problematic conjectural re-considerations? (44)

5. Non-Economic Resolution

Let me reapproach this (positive) concept of the 'non-economic'. In order to define the extent of the economic it is necessary to define what is not economic, i.e., that which is relatively non-economic, i.e., not directly involved in circulation *per se*.[101] (45)

The dialectical nature of economic correlativity implies the necessary simultaneous co-existence of the trimodal correlatives that constitute an economy. However, in our observations of the economic we also discern processes of transformation that strongly suggest definitive responses of the last instant, etc. In other words, we need to invest in forms of resolution of these conjectural sets and series where a conjectural economy also sets up a so-called third moment that integrates a composite sets-and-series form of intermediated conjectures coincident primarily with transformations along with e/valuational formations that entail both non-existential and existential patterns of transformation (through the mediation of the former). I.e., there exists a need for a dialectical

[101] Discounting the necessity for it to be re-appropriated hyper-economically within the economy of the super-economic.

interaction between both conjectural sets and series that can both present the distinctive nature of the non-economic along with the accommodation necessitated through its hyper-economic re-appropriation. Where the limits of both the economic and the non-economic exposes this implication of the super-economic, and, where the limits of any one economy exposes its appropriation within a more dominant economy in order for us to even be able to appreciate the former, etc.[102] (46)

A non-economic aspect granted, hypothetically, what are the philosophical ramifications of a non-economic philosophy? (47)

6. A Non-Economic Philosophy

Succinctly put, an economic philosophy is non-productive being only able to engender the virtual, whereas, in contrast, the non-economic engenders the non-virtual through some form of causal co-option. That one mechanism already to hand, theoretically, is the forceful role of the de-suspension. Let me explore this possibility. (48)

I have suggested, indeed argued, that the force of the automatic invocation of a de-suspension relatively privileges certain combinations of correlatives that in turn generate a corresponding sense of ordered e/valuation. Along the same lines we could argue that the sense and semblance of the non-economic has a similar genesis? So, e.g., a relative privileging of the moment of resolution might actually in relatively qualified terms effectively liberate this virtual and non-causal moment of resolution and oversee its non-virtual and causal transformation. Suffice to say that we have the means (the de-suspension), the motive (aspirational objectives), and the necessity to (productively) oversee such a phenomenon (given the relative inertness of the economic when superficially approached). Hence this conjecture of the relatively non-economic in order to resolve a series of philosophical problems and proffer a working model that can account for the nature of both non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation. (49)

7. Accommodation through ‘The Non-Economic Fork’

In *Book* 11, I introduced the concept of ‘the non-economic fork’ which operates as a ‘fork’ (in contrast with the ‘non-fork’ of ‘the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork’). In its negative sense, it identifies the impossibility of those economic functions that cannot function in any economic context. E.g., the absolutistical isolation of an economic correlative in terms of its intentional functions or content or its ability to be appreciated in trans-intentional terms of reference. E.g., no visual image can be purely focused upon even though through our use of language it would seem that we would view it as separate and separated from its gestalt background and economic environment. But such language is provisional and uncritically constructed or ‘written’ and uncritically appreciated or ‘read’. A modicum of criticism should easily reveal that such language overlooks the manner of its relational genesis. Hence the negative aspect of this fork concerns itself

[102] Invoking the same type of mechanism/s implicated in inter-ordered phenomena.

with the impossible. Given that language compromises the lived-reality of such appreciation and, itself, cannot function in such impossible terms we end up dealing more with the relatively defective. In effect, where we say one thing, in attempt to describe what we might be doing, and actually do something else, etc. Hermeneutically, it should be possible to demonstrate such discordance, such relative non-concordance. Existentially, it is usually better to know what we can do and what we cannot do in the hope of realizing a more productive and conformal sense and semblance of a performance in such matters. A process clarified through remediation. Then, from a more positive sense of perspective we note the apparent creation, preservation and expansion to be arrived at in and through such e/valuational formation. Thence the positive productivity of the relatively non-economic where and when economic resolution is permitted to find a conformal, non-virtual, and causal manner of realization… along with all the possible positivity in consequences able to flow from such forms of enacted resolution. (50)

8. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

In this essay two more transgression of mine were duly noted, but, which, in the wider world are hardly recognized, namely, the necessity to see the world through an economic lens and, then, to just see the economic without also contrasting it with the relatively non-economic. But, I would argue that some form of salvation is to hand when we realize that both the economic and the non-economic have to be subsumed within the super-economy, the overall economy of the economic, through its envisaged appropriation within the conjectured auspices of the hyper-economic. Where, through intermediation, i.e., as an overall working suspension (as an extensive suspension), we have the means to overcome what otherwise might have formed a form of dualism, indeed, a potentially strong dualism between these modes of the economic and the non-economic. In the next essay, let me deconstruct all forms of strong dualism given that all forms of bimodalism, e.g., need to be economically circumscribed as well as being non-economically re-directed in a suitable manner able to proffer productive forms of resolution… (51)

Now, let me present a more integrated sense of a non-economic philosophy, etc., by running the following complex conjecture through invoking forms of economic complexification[103] whose elements have already been noted in this essay. (52)

For a start, we have the outlines of the conjectural economy as explored in *Book* 11, namely, synthesis (in the form of putative factual statements), analysis (in the form of analytical propositions), and conjectures (in the form of propositional-statements). (53)

Then, I noted that conjectures appear to take the form of (hermeneutically oriented, historical) conjectural series, (phenomenologically oriented, ahistorical) conjectural

[103] A philosophical or disciplinary device where trimodal economies are run in parallel based on a putatively argued for alignment in gestalt terms wherein points of economic alignment can then act as commentaries, complements, supplements, qualifications, corrections, insightful digressions, etc.

sets… to which we can add (existentially oriented, specificity defining) conjectural-sets-and-series. (54)

Against the same, I also suggested paralleling fact(ual)s, counter-factuals, and counter-counterfactuals… (55)

That, creatively, although somewhat already outlined for us in the formulation of a super-economy, as trimodally constituted in terms of the hyper-economic sub-economy, the economic-sub-economy and the non-economic sub-economy… (56)

Next, and last, we can note tentative alignments between any other parallels we might wish to invoke by consulting a parallel dictionary for economic complexification as tabulated at various point in this *Pursuit*.[104] (57)

Now, let diagrammatically present these instances of hypothetical economic complexification in the hope that their interactions can reconstitute and add a richer complexion to the theoretical intricacies of this topic:

World	**Object**	**Ego**
Hermeneutic	Phenomenological	Existential
Facts and genres	Arguments/Treatment	Retreatment
Synthesis	Analysis	Nomination
Statements	Propositions	Stat.-propositions
Conject. Series	Conject. Sets	Conject-Sets-&-Sers.
Fact(ual)s	Counter-Factuals	Counter-Counter-Fs.
Hyper-Eco.	Economic	Non-Eco. (58)

Make of this what you will, as a composite heuristic device, at the end of the day, it will either survive or be discarded, and, if taken up, then, inevitably, it will be emended, subjected to processes of re(-)interpretation, revised, built upon, and so on. Should any of the latter occur, I would rest with some degree of contentment although also somewhat unsettled through reflections to think that these strangely radical ideas, in part, could perhaps become in any sense orthodox? (59)

Life can be something of a ‘maze’. However, very rarely do we get to take an aerial view and map that maze in two dimensional terms that then allows our pencil or

[104] First noted in *The Seventh Book... Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A (Appendix A); Pursuit, III. XI.XIB.A (69), etc.

pen to work out to how to both enter and exit the same. For us, on planet Earth, this ‘maze is very much a four-dimensional construct of both our own individual and collective making. Within its confines we can imagine finding various rooms of various sizes with their own false windows, say, with their own libraries, too, and that when we enter a room to study that we then find our exits have been reconstituted in the process. A strange type of maze that, because it cannot be entered, correctly, also cannot be left, and, that when we sufficiently understand that then we should automatically find a certain freedom to both enjoy and suffer what this maze has in store for us. Indeed, a wonderful world that can be quite…[105] (60)

Of course, we should also note a need to recant three sins in the light of this essay and not just two, namely, that both the economic and the non-economic should be recognized, but, that ultimately there can be no difference between them from a super-economic sense of perspective. Hence this third defective attitude that also deserves to be recognized, encountered, and engaged..!! (61)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth falls, 4.9.24.

[105] Here, I admit, the reader has been set up to think… But, I leave it to the reader or audience to supply their own adjectives in this regard.

A. Appendix A: Ramifications of a Third Transgression: Overlooking the Super-Economic

Implicit in this journey from overlooking the economic... and then overlooking the non-economic... is the addition of a third mistake or transgression, namely, an overlooking of the super-economic. Briefly, what are the ramifications of this non-recognition, non-encountering, and non-engagement of this domain of the super-economic? (62)

Ideally, we could view this 'third transgression' as 'the non-observance of the non-fork' of 'the non-economic-non-economic fork' (which, admittedly, might be better signified as the non-'economic-non-economic' fork). On par with the non-fork of the 'non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork' where, basically, the philosophical distinctions surrounding the relatively incommensurable natures of the deontological and the pragmatical need to be transcended in an in-depth experience of such issues in lived-reality. I.e., in regard to the specificities of this non-fork, in a systematic existential reading of the situation, such issues are ultimately transcended in lived-experience. Thence the ramifications of overlooking this super-economic dimension are basically entailed in an overlooking of the systematic expressions of the existential. In recounting the ramifications of this 'super-economic turn', in a shift from both the economic and the non-economic, at the risk of resurrecting derivative metaphors that have died a thousand deaths already, we could say such a re(-)orientation entails 'going with the flow', 'entering the zone', 'being in the here and now (*hic et nunc*)', etc. Or, to import a theatrical analogy, it is 'all a matter of timing' when and where we need to be 'in the moment at the right moment'. A bit like the Buddhist prescriptions or injunctions that a 'perfect gift' is 'the right gift, given to the right person, by the right person, at the right time, in a right manner', and so on. Undoubtedly, a topic where an entire set of volumes might need to be disseminated in order to barely approach an understanding of such subtle and difficult to express matters that fully deserved our deepest concern and care... besides our also being able to recognize, encounter, and engage such an overlooked dimension at the center of our being in this overall world-of-life, in this world at large ..! (63)

N.T., Penrith, 9.9.24.

XIIF. The Deconstruction of a Strong Pragmatism

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIF. (6.) The Deconstruction of a Strong Pragmatism[106]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In my opinion the complex phenomenon of 'being pragmatic' should not be read solely through a pragmatical lens of expediency. Indeed, it needs to be centered in the midst of deontological experience, without reference to so-called First Principles, etc., without overlooking, at the same time, either pragmatical, utilitarian, calculative, and/or more functional forms of assessment. That in line with my in-depth appreciation it should even include an element of the aesthetical, say, in terms of harmony, harmonization, style, creative innovation, etc. Last, and most importantly, it should also be refracted through an existential lens and not just a non-existentially oriented, more practical sense of perspective (that aligns, more often than not, with a more pragmatical orientation). Obviously, when read in the above manner, we need to take a more nuanced approach to this controversial topic. A topic that is controversial for a number of reasons. Internal to this phenomenon of 'being pragmatic' we have this complexity of perspectives that in lived-experience needs to be carefully navigated and negotiated. Externally, we have the rich diversity of a zoo of competing positions and ideologies when confronting the subtleties of this topic and where we must also immediately rule out the viability of all strong forms of pragmatic positioning on the grounds that no economic correlatively can be entertained either unimodally or bimodally, and, where the non-systematic nature of the existential moment, as a moment of intentional subjectivity, which embraces the central sense and semblance of the pragmatic, needs to be entertained in a dynamic apposition or juxtaposition with the other two archetypal economic moments of intentional objectivity and intentional motivation. That even if the pragmatic were to be wrongly identified solely with the fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical judgment just what type of e/valuation formation should we preference – perhaps either the effective or the economical (or parsimonious), or the expeditious, or the efficacious, or the efficient, or the edificational, or the enactive, or the error-correcting or the emendational, or the ecological, and so on? So, with a superfluidity of possibilities, either taken individually or combination, just how are we to be pragmatical in the face of a diverse range of functional options let alone considerations even more central to the conformally oriented discharge of such discernment? Fortuitously, this problem has been previously addressed through my introduction of the heuristic device of the non-fork of 'the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork'. I will also make the argument that to be pragmatic we do not need to directly make such decisions given that it's the nature of existentially oriented experience, basically, to decide such matter for us. How might this experience of such decisiveness be achieved? Through attending to appropriate deliberations of both genres and factual input; proper processes of both deconstruction and reconstruction; along with apposite considerations of both the non-existential and existential outputs conducted within a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy should, for the most part, proffer modes of resolution that should advance and expedite the representative course of our relationships relationally, pro-relationally, and inter-pro-relationally. Hence the *raison d'être* of this essay, namely, as an exposition arguing for the necessity of adopting and adapting, and integrating, both non-existential and existential approaches to the complexities of this topic. (0)

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106 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

As an introduction, let me note, in effect, my writing a commentary on this pre-introduction since in the compass of that long paragraph most of the themes I would like to address are already being telegraphed. Then, I would like to render this complex argument in a less *ad hoc* format. Concluding as usual with a set of provisional conclusions, observations, comments, etc. (1)

1. Exposition

Let me affirm from the outset that my critical-radical pragmatic outlook is anti-representational, positively nihilistic, and existentially oriented, and, at the same time is non-exclusively centered in a deontological orientation minus all its traditionally unreconstituted metaphysical notions of so-called First Principles, etc., without an absence of both pragmatical and aesthetical features. In effect, the entailed commentary will outline how I attempt to integrate these distinctive features in a coherent philosophy, e.g., of an 'ani-representational-representationalism' where I connect the current disconnect between an anti-representational sense and semblance of a perspective in conjunction with the fact that we do inescapably entertain textualized forms of representation that allow us to navigate, negotiate and arbitrate this world at large. In metaphorically 'squaring this circle' I am engaging the complexities of a dialectic whose simplicity is that we arrive at the richness and enrichment of a positioning that allow us to better comprehend many important ideas of the pragmatist Richard Rorty that were left relatively undetailed as to how we might arrive at such conclusions, e.g., the relationship between an anti-representationalism and the representationalism presented through texts; the mechanisms that oversee consensus building and social solidarity; exactly why a democratic ethos is to be preferred and how it might be better re(-)constituted; the overlooking of an existential dimension; and, how metaphysical forms of appreciation still remain despite the necessary and successful deconstruction of traditional forms of metaphysical treatment that, for the sake of a succinct explanation, literally ask us 'to impossibly square the circle' so to speak, etc. (2)

If I were to proffer a summary of my position let me say, for the sake of an attempted brevity, that I am entertaining a 'non-fork' of 'the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork' in which we must observe, on one hand, the philosophical distinctions between the 'pragmatic' and its 'entailing both deontological and existential considerations], and, on the other hand, the experiential discontinuity with that which is 'pragmatical', as here defined, namely, as 'the functional utility of a relatively non-existential set of perspective' whilst recognizing, at the same time, that superficial forms of discordance do not and cannot exit on a deeper level of epistemological experience. That, ideally, 'relative incommensurability (via the being of the economy in question, in terms of its economic ensconcement in a hierarchy of economies) is also non-relatively non-incommensurable'. Or, looked at through a dimensionally oriented set of metaphors, horizontally, we have to observe these distinctions between the 'pragmatic' and the 'pragmatical', but, on a deeper level of experience, say, in vertical terms, there is no ultimate incommensurability given their belonging to the same economy of the overall sense and semblance of the pragmatic

(in its systematic instantiation of the existential). So, horizontally we must philosophically observe the distinctions between the (pragmatic aspects of the) deontological and the pragmatical, but, vertically, such a metaphysical-like transcendence of such a distinction must also be observed. Or, as noted 'relative incommensurabilties are non-relatively commensurable' (should we metaphorically 'widen' or 'deepen' or 'heighten' our terms of reference). (3)

To dialectically illustrate my background presupposition let me reintroduce my understanding of an ordered perspective. Here a diagram might better facilitate the outlining of my approach to this topic where 'value', as defined by myself, is centered on the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological and supplemented by the adjuncts of the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical (where the expression 'pragmatic' is not to be confused with my use of the expression 'pragmatic'):

3^1
Pragmatic
Existential
Deontological Judgment

EGO

2^1
Aesthetical

4^1
Pragmatical Judgment

*

OBJECT

WORLD

1^1
Phenomenological-Semantic Judgment

5^1
Hermeneutical Judgment

6^1
Ontical (Factual) Judgment (4)

In a linear 'horizontal' representation we note value formation is 2^1, 3^1, 4^1, centered in 3^1.

1^1 [**2^1** (**$3^{1)}$** **4^1**] 5^1 6^1 (5)

In a ‘vertical’ representation we find the centrality of the deontological taking precedence:

3^1

2^1 4^1 (6)

Moreover, although with difference senses the expressions pragmatic, deontological (3^1), and (systematic) existential are to be treated as relatively equivalent when we also consider an e/valuative complementation with both aesthetical (2^1) and pragmatical (4^1) adjuncts.[107] (7)

The above understood, let me begin this commentary with cited text in the first paragraph being placed in bold (and text being indirectly referred to being put in bold within brackets). (8)

In my opinion the complex phenomenon of ‘being pragmatic’ should not be read solely through a pragmatical lens of expediency. In *Book* 6, I noted, in citing my interpretation of a Confucian perspective, that an honourable person, a gentleperson, is not a person who is merely expedient. Similarly, an intuitive pragmatist, who is a good person, cannot be a person who just operates on a pragmatic level of expediency. In other words, a deontological perspective must also be taken into account. Just as contracts, e.g., must also reference (the hermeneutic expectations of) a compactual dimension (where deontological considerations of obligations, etc., must be also be taken into account and, indeed, given a certain preferencing because without the compactual underpinnings the contract in question could not function). Furthermore, this necessary importation is conducted without requiring or referring to a traditional-metaphysical notion of the deontological that references so either so-called ‘First Principles’, ‘Middling Principles’, and/or

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[107] Note 1^1 (or 1^0) can be read as the first order (where the trans-cognitive is usually implied unless stated as ‘cognitive’ or otherwise). The superscript of ‘1’ implies an ‘order’ and not its reduplication or duplication in an inter-ordered context. E.g., the 5^1 deals with the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutic possibility and, by extension, the discipline of the more practical hermeneut or the theoretical (or critical/radical) hermeneutician. In an inter-ordered process of reduplication $5^1 \times 5^1$ (or 5^2) gives us the types of judgment that would be dealt with in the world of science (as that realm of endeavour that deals with ‘the possibility of possibilities’). Now, to continue this line of exposition, we could say that ‘the fact/s of facts’ are the types of judgments that would be dealt with by an historian hence their discipline would be that entailed within the symmetrical reduplication of the sixth order as notated by 6^2. However, in a process of asymmetrical duplication the historian treatment of the world of science could be notated as $6^2(5^2)$. Of course, it would be nice to determine all disciplines through the use of an inter-ordered philosophy (including orders and inter-ordered complexes, etc.), however, this is a mistake since it is the Political-Economy and its social systems in their use of such codes that properly regulate the social world of disciplines and this type of philosophical transgression will be reviewed in the next essay, Essay 7.

'Last Principles', and/or, the sanctions of Divine agency, or similar. In other words, the deontological needs no such metaphysical underpinnings if we accept the conventional expectations associated with a general expectation that involves a respecting of obligations, duties, promises, etc., and, that an existential dimension has the power to relatively enforce such expectations, both on an individual basis on an intersubjective level of social cooperation. etc. Or, perhaps more to the point, the phenomenon of deontologically oriented behaviours also need to be seriously taken into account. Obviously, if we are going to explore the interactions between pragmatic (including deontological and existential orientations) and pragmatical forms of functional utility the ensuing explorations will inevitably take a complexity that needs to be honestly approached without either ruling in or ruling out certain aspects in moral positioning, etc. (9)

It is my impression, held rightly or wrongly, that Richard Rorty does not hold a positive attitude on the topic of deontological e/valuation, but, that either his reluctance to hold or an aversion to holding a positive view towards the same is understandable given the almost automatic coupling and equation between the deontological and its metaphysically co-associated imputations of Divine sanctions, hypostatized Principles, and so on. But, in exploring the phenomenon of the deontological, as it is to be found in lived-experience through reference, say, to obligations, dutiful performances, the honoring of promises, etc., functions without any need to reference such metaphysical props and forms of propagation. That, in this regard, we can tell a better story, form a more interesting and a more informative narrative by doing away with such unnecessary features in the same manner that a representational philosophy has no need for the impossible features of an unreconstituted traditional metaphysics… as Rorty so ably and rightly demonstrates. (10)

So, if **'being pragmatic' should not be read solely through a pragmatical lens of expediency** just what else needs to be involved? It is this view, as held by myself, on the phenomenological nature of 'pragmatism' that this essay seeks to address by deconstructing misguided forms of a strong pragmatism and replace the same with a non-weak/non-strong version that might more adequately account for how we can be truly pragmatic in lived-experience. (11)

My first answer to this rhetorical question is summed up as follows: **Indeed, it needs to be centered in the midst of deontological experience, without reference to so-called First Principles, etc., without overlooking, at the same time, either pragmatical, utilitarian, calculative, and/or more functional forms of assessment. That in line with my in-depth appreciation it should even include an element of the aesthetical, say, in terms of harmony, harmonization, style, creative innovation, etc. Last, and most importantly, it should also be refracted through an existential lens and not just a non-existentially oriented, more practical sense of perspective (that aligns, more often than not, with a more pragmatical orientation).** A number of features are listed here, namely, the centrality of the deontological complemented with pragmatical and aesthetical forms of supplementation all refracted through an existential orientation. Casting the centrality of the deontological plus pragmatical and aesthetical qualifications framed through an existential orientation as equivalent to the instantiation of the pragmat-

ic. Therefore, it behooves me to explain how this overall equivalence is to be constituted in the form of a representative argument that find conformation between living-experience and lived-experience as an interpretation of the former. (12)

Obviously, when read in the above manner, we need to take a more nuanced approach to this controversial topic. Why would this exposition be controversial? I answer **A topic that is controversial for a number of reasons. Internal to this phenomenon of 'being pragmatic' we have this complexity of perspectives that in lived-experience needs to be carefully navigated and negotiated. Externally, we have the rich diversity of a zoo of competing positions and ideologies when confronting the subtleties of this topic and where we must also immediately rule out the viability of all strong forms of pragmatic positioning on the grounds that no economic correlatively can be entertained either unimodally or bimodally, and, where the non-systematic nature of the existential moment, as a moment of intentional subjectivity, which embraces the central sense and semblance of the pragmatic, needs to be entertained in a dynamic apposition or juxtaposition with the other two archetypal economic moments of intentional objectivity and intentional motivation.** I.e., for a variety of ideological reasons, we have to contend with the preferential over-treatment of various positions that patently do not make enough sense to properly count as coherent arguments, and, consequently can have no semblance of a lived-reality that can be lived. One example we must also contend with here are strong, over-committed forms of pragmatism that fail a necessary degrees of coherency by being impossibly conceived of as economic isolates, economic correlatives extracted from their respective economies in such a manner where they completely lose relational meaning and, therein and thereby, all relevance. An example of this would be found fostered in claims that through the mere preferencing of a functionalism that its significance, alone, is more than enough to safely and surely run a philosophy or a discipline of any description. But a pure focus on functions, functionality or utility, or mere expediency, must fail if only for the fact that their appreciation cannot be 'pragmatic' as defined when what is being presented is 'pragmatical' which itself, in each and every version of the same, cannot be completely construed purely in such functional terms of reference, indeed, also needing deontological and aesthetic assistance besides considerations of conformance in terms of their truth assessments, etc. Let me explore these issues just raised. (13)

In this regard I note: **That even if the pragmatic were to be wrongly identified solely with the fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical judgment just what type of e/valuation formation should we preference – perhaps either the effective or the economical (or parsimonious), or the expeditious, or the efficacious, or the efficient, or the edificational, or the enactive, or the error-correcting or the emendational, or the ecological, and so on?** If we are deadest on the overpromoting of a functional account in order to explain and expound a 'correct pragmatic attitude' just which attitude should we focus on, and, could we correctly claim that such an attitude is completely free as well of either aesthetical and/or deontological considerations at the same time? (14)

This list beginning with 'the effective, the economical, etc.', is an *ad hoc* listing but is more than representative of what is entailed in what would reasonably count as a

'pragmatical attitude' (as distinct from the complexity of my interpretation of 'the non-weak/non-strong pragmatic attitude'). Should the short-sighted strong pragmatist promote one, or more, or all of those listed on this *ad hoc* list, or more, should they be found, preferencing these contenders alone as correctly instituting a pragmatical attitude? Then, whilst over-insisting on such functionality, as a form of functionalism, should they then contend that it is only the utility of such functions that will count for their successful candidacy? A short review of such matter should force us to surrender such a claim. If we were to preference the effective then we are also preferencing a set of deontological reasons why preferencing the effective is the way to go in such matters. For me this observation is non-problematic and one more reason why the deontological must be also focused upon in any considerations of what truly counts and can be demonstrated as 'pragmatic'. Similarly, in any scrutiny of the practical concept of the 'economical' (in its sense as 'parsimonious') it is obvious that we are also deontologically promoting the reasons why we should also be necessarily economical with our resources. That we should be careful with our resources and not waste the same. Hence this deontological-like injunction to promote our 'being relatively parsimonious', etc. That any desire to promote any form of pragmatical concern is to co-opt just this type of an imperative. So, 'being pragmatical' must also mean 'our observing the deeper deontological injunctions desired that cause us to promote that pragmatical attitude in question'. That, in the same vein, aesthetical considerations can also be entertained as noted when I make the comment: **That in line with my in-depth appreciation it should even include an element of the aesthetical, say, in terms of harmony, harmonization, style, creative innovation, etc.** Thus, the pragmatical, itself, as functional form of utility, as a form or style of judgment cannot be immune from both deontological and aesthetical considerations when subjected to the requisite degree of scrutiny required to reveal such a complexity in its phenomenological constitution that distinctively delineates various types of pragmatical focus and application. (15)

Of course, besides being controversial within the complex sphere of the pragmatic, as to how to envision its contours and contexts, as conceived by myself the pragmatic can also be viewed as controversially disseminated through the over-promotion of alternative forms of strong representation despite being also totally misplaced, being either completely impossible or where such impossibilities are defectively overlooked or where the working of a their marshalled metaphors are mistakenly substituted for their impossibly literal, non-functioning, over-zealous formulations. Hence the following comment: **Externally, we have the rich diversity of a zoo of competing positions and ideologies when confronting the subtleties of this topic and where we must also immediately rule out the viability of all strong forms of pragmatic positioning on the grounds that no economic correlatively can be entertained either unimodally or bimodally, and, where the non-systematic nature of the existential moment, as a moment of intentional subjectivity, which embraces the central sense and semblance of the pragmatic, needs to be entertained in a dynamic apposition or juxtaposition with the other two archetypal economic moments of intentional objectivity and intentional motivation.** Let me closely attend to what is outlined in these comments. (16)

Much of philosophy is a veritable 'zoo' but unlike a real zoo with real creatures that live an die within its confines this discipline, unfortunately, is redolent with strangely

misshapen creatures of the imagination often more dead than alive. But, be that as it may, through serious reforms the required degree of philosophical health could be mustered should we return to following a few simple principles, or observations, as long as we do not over-promote such ideas and therein and thereafter over-commit ourselves to their ideological distortions that would issue from their misinterpretations of what should be 'a well-lived lived-reality'.[108] (17)

Here, admittedly, I am assuming that the pragmatic attitude is coincident with the so-called third moment of 'the non-systematic existential', which, as a correlative coincident with the moment of Ego in the archetypal economy. As such, it cannot be economically isolated from its economic context of its current economy in question (along with the ensconcement of that economy in wider economic terms of reference, e.g., social systems, the Political-Economy, the super-economic, etc.). That to isolate any correlative is to create a so-called 'economic isolate', and, both consequently and subsequently, create an anomaly whether recognized or not. Either a 'totally impossible anomaly' if 'totally insisted upon through that type of ideological over-commitment' or a 'relatively defective anomaly' given that 'misguided disciplinarians are of the habit to say one thing and do something not concordant with the former, and v.v.' and by such means return some small positive degree of e/valuational formation to their disciplinarian enterprise. Of course, I am only being charitable here. Since, more importantly, the relative productivity of positive e/valuational formation is more important than whether it should merely be seen to proffer some small degree of profit. Here, we can be quite pragmatic and note that what produces more value should be preferred over that which is merely seen to proffer some small modicum of profit. In evaluating a course of action or in the judgmental appreciation of a certain discipline, and so on, such a comparative observation should be prioritized lest we be mesmerized by unmet claims of value that are never successfully cashed out. Freudian analysis, e.g., has found itself cut down to a size where its therapeutic claims barely compare to those that were initially pronounced by its founder. On the other hand, although barely a science, the therapeutic successfulness of the health industry overall is definitely a work in progress. Still, in an evidence-based professionalism, all its claims need to be properly reviewed. Indeed, they continue to need to be pragmatically assessed in the best manner possible by both professionals and patients alike. (18)

In treating the pragmatic, in its complex appreciation, as an economic correlative it behooves us to mistreat it as an economic isolate. Hence the observation that we neither do this unimodally nor bimodally in a form, respectively, of a unimodalism or a bimodalism and, neither do this absolutistically nor relativisitically. That such an observation should also be extended to include the absolutistical treatment of any trimodal economy as if it were to exist purely on its own without recognizing, etc., that all economies are also ensconced in an economic world that travels far beyond the ken of any arbitrarily singled-out economy. Just as the economic needs to be appreciated non-economically, and the both non-economic and the economic needs to be appreciated in relatively super-economic terms of reference, etc. (19)

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[108] The question 'what is a life well-lived?' entails a complexly fascinating ethical attitude since as it stands no particular type of moral stance is automatically being presented and promoted, let along over-promoted (or under-promoted in an unsuitable weak form of an untenable relativism).

Similarly, as an economic moment or correlate or correlative, and not as an impossible economic isolate, we need to understand that the pragmatic moment, coincident with intentional subjectivity (Ego), is also in a juxtaposition or apposition with the other two economic moment or correlates of intentional objectivity (Object) and intentional motivation (World). Hence the following comment: **where the non-systematic nature of the existential moment, as a moment of intentional subjectivity, which embraces the central sense and semblance of the pragmatic, needs to be entertained in a dynamic apposition or juxtaposition with the other two archetypal economic moments of intentional objectivity and intentional motivation.** (20)

But, even if identified in this manner we would be making a profound mistake since the pragmatic attitude must also take on board these pragmatical attitudes as previously noted (along with aesthetical considerations as well). However, we should not be making the opposite mistake of merely identifying the pragmatic with the pragmatical that promote a certain kind of functional utility. Hence this comment: **That even if the pragmatic were to be wrongly identified solely with the fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical judgment just what type of e/valuation formation should we preference?** An observation that we have already viewed. (21)

In effect, the moment of Ego, intentional subjectivity, also constitutes the constitution of the aesthetical order (2^1) and the pragmatical order (4^1) but more as qualifying adjuncts (given the centrality of the deontological order [3^1]).[109] Hence the centrality of deontological judgment, albeit considerably complemented or supplemented by both aesthetical and pragmatical judgments. (22)

Thence my complex rendering of this topic of the pragmatic. However, another important ingredient is the addition of an existential aspect. Hence this comment: **along with apposite considerations of both the non-existential and existential outputs conducted within a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy**… Identifying, in this regard, the 'existential' as coincident with the 'deontological' and the 'non-existential' with the 'pragmatical'. And where the 'pragmatic' can be considered to be 'the overall positive impact of both existential and non-existential contributions'. Where 'overall' can also be viewed as 'on balance'. Given, that on occasions, deontological forces can sometime operate to the relative detriment of the prime operator but to the benefit of the overall relationship. E.g., the solder that covers an active grenade with their own body to better preserve their comrades, or, the mother, that rather starves in order to feed her children, etc. (23)

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[109] In the first essay in this book, I have discussed how the relatively *ad hoc* ideas of a subtle preference/de-preference constitute of these three archetypal moment s of World, Object and Ego can be rendered in a less *ad hoc* manner by noting the role of the de-suspensional force to accomplish this conceptual sense and experiential semblance of these six distinctive judgments that constitute these six trans-cognitive orders. The aesthetic being the relationship as entailed between Object and Ego focused upon through an intra-mediation(al suspension) of the World moment; where the pragmatical results from the relationship between Ego and World that results from an intra-mediation(al suspension) of the Object moment; and the deontological order (and its existential and pragmatic implications) can be accounted for through the mediation(al suspension) of both the Object and World moments.

Given such complexities how are we to navigate, negotiate and arbitrate such complexities? Indeed, in just a pragmatical orientation we find a perplexing set of possibilities. As noted: **So, with a superfluidity of possibilities, either taken individually or combination, just how are we to be pragmatical in the face of a diverse range of functional options let alone considerations even more central to the conformally oriented discharge of such discernment?** (24)

However, such complexity is more apparent (at least to begin with) since a certain simplicity is also implicated in this complex schematization. As noted: **I will also make the argument that to be pragmatic we do not need to directly make such decisions given that it's the nature of existentially oriented experience, basically, to decide such matter for us.** (25)

Such an understanding is implicated in the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork. As stated: **Fortuitously, this problem has been previously addressed through my introduction of the heuristic device of the non-fork of 'the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork'.** Of course, the question then needs to be asked – how do we achieve this apparent involvement of less effort? To answer this concern, I noted: **How might this experience of such decisiveness be achieved? Through attending to appropriate deliberations of both genres and factual input; proper processes of both deconstruction and reconstruction; along with apposite considerations of both the non-existential and existential outputs conducted within a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy should, for the most part, proffer modes of resolution that should advance and expedite the representative course of our relationships relationally, pro-relationally, and inter-pro-relationally.** But, as ever, 'the devil is in the detail' so let me more closely explore my apparent intentions in this regard. (26)

The *raison d'être* of the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork is this existential ability to override the relative incommensurability between pragmatic responses and pragmatical responses… hence this comment **we do not need to directly make such decisions given that it's the nature of existentially oriented experience, basically, to decide such matter for us.** How might we understand this existential ability for relationships to find themselves empowered and able to act in an accordance with their own interests? Through the utilization of suspensions and their automatic invocation of the forceful nature of de-suspensions that possess the ability to instigate patterns of responsiveness potentially able to inaugurate positively oriented forms of ongoing existential re(-)e/valuation with a positive existential enhancement and a positive non-existential augmentation acting together in an overall amplification of such ensuing e/valuational formation. Where such apt responsiveness is seen to emerge through apposite processes of re(-)self-organization which, obviously, cannot be essentially viewed through the imposition of reductive modes of analysis alone. Where, as a result, an ability to delineate a conformal assessment of truth conditions cannot, therefore, merely in forms of analytical treatment or similar. The implication being that the even the assessment of truth determinations is an economic affair whose representational treatment must engender the collective cooperation of analytical, synthetical and conjectural inputs and outputs

(as argued elsewhere on numerous occasions[110]). Thence the comment beginning **Through attending to appropriate deliberations of both genres and factual input;** etc., where these aspects of mitigation, remediation and re(-)normalization are being referred to and instantiate those demands for the conformal overseeing of a suitably functioning conjectural economy that correctly enlists the aspects of the synthetical, the analytical, and the conjectural entering into a harmonious rapport capable of realizing the requisite degree of non-economic[111] resolution required to oversee both the .non-existential richness and existential enrichment of that primary relationship in its ensconced relational context, i.e., its relational situatedness. (27)

Hence this detailed mapping of what is required in order to oversee that such affairs are **conducted within a well-organized and well-conducted conjectural economy.** Where the overall objective of such an approach **for the most part, proffer modes of resolution that should advance and expedite the representative course of our relationships relationally, pro-relationally, and inter-pro-relationally.** Here we could read **advance** as existential in orientation and **expedite** as relatively non-existential, albeit in a relatively positive sense. The former being relatively 'pragmatic' in orientation and the latter as 'pragmatical' in orientation, but, where together, an 'overall sense and semblance of the pragmatic' is collectively arrived at through such existentially oriented processes of resolution. Because we do not live by bread alone nor through brioche (cake0 alone, and so on. That a healthy balance between the relatively non-existential and the existential needs to be observed. Moreover, it is through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential that a process of existentialization can proceed, and v.v. Thence this necessary symbiotic and pragmatic relationship between the same. (28)

But, what is entailed in an 'overall pragmatic turn', in this advancing and expediting a relationally receptive form of an overall pragmatic responsiveness? (29)

We find our answer to this question in the following comment: …**proffer modes of resolution that should advance and expedite the representative course of our relationships relationally, pro-relationally, and inter-pro-relationally.** I.e., that this responsiveness occurs **relationally, etc.** Let me unpack these three categories. (30)

To do so in detail involves a subtle shifting of the goalposts in terminology. Usually, a 'pro-relational orientation' is reviewed as 'existential in orientation' being 'the perspective of the relationship viewed through an emergent lens', i.e., 'that extent a relationship is factitiously greater in experiential terms, in its facticity, than the mere addition or summations of relational facets directly implicated in a certain relationship (be it experientially represented or relationally understood on its own hypothetical terms of reference). Where 'relational' refers to 'the primary constituents of that relationship in terms of both its parts and participants', i.e., 'objects, object-states, subjects, intersubjective organizations, etc.' However, the 'pro-relational attitude' entails 'the imagined or enacted perceiving of a relationship from its own simulated sense and semblance of perspective', albeit as 'it is found to be embedded, in turn, in its relational situatedness'. Where the

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110 Especially in *Book* 11.

111 We should note that 'expeditious(ness)' is included in our *ad hoc* list of pragmatical approaches.

inter-relational dimension refers to both the latter and the context of the primary relationship as well. More correctly, the site of the existential is this living-relationship between the relational and the pro-relational and its embedding in its relational situatedness. Where, more correctly, in these wider terms of reference the pro-relational is existential in its hermeneutic expectations that are then either enacted or not enacted as such from the inter-relational perspective. Therefore, it is this dynamic inter-relational encompassment that is the effective origin of existential enrichment, etc., and not the pro-relational *per se*. This subtle expansion of terms applies to a wide range of existentially reviewed phenomena.[112] In effect, it is this inter-relational perspective, the lived-dynamics between the relational and the pro-relational spheres that oversees an existential *redressement* of the relational situatedness-as-lived. An ongoing amelioration of the situatedness in such a manner that oversees either the creation, preservation, and/or expansional conservation of a composite responsiveness that ensures both a positive non-existential richness and an existential enrichment of e/valuational formation/s. Furthermore, the effective empowerment of our represented relationships oversees this to a great extent for us through the delivery and instantiation of possibilities amenable to this richness and enrichment of our primary relationships as situated in their relational situatedness. I.e., through having well-informed statements and well-formed propositions our conjectures, appositely conducted and enacted will find themselves suitably translated through existentially oriented forms of intervention, and v.v. (31)

Hence the concluding sentence that states: **Hence the *raison d'être* of this essay, namely, as an exposition arguing for the necessity of adopting and adapting, and integrating, both non-existential and existential approaches to the complexities of this topic.** (32)

Basically, an overall pragmatic attitude needs to entail both deontological and pragmatical inputs where their relative incommensurabilities are both existentially overridden and overwritten through being re-viewed through the auspices of their relational situatedness in such a manner that oversees the amplification of both a non-existential richness and an existential enrichment through this holistic form of appreciation. (33)

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[112] E.g., refer to *Appendix* A in the Third Essay (*Pursuit*, III.XIIC.A) where I discuss the expanded relationship between contracts, compacts and the existential interactions of the compactual-and-contractual orientation. In a similar vein we might view the world of universal physics where, it seems to me, we confuse quantum physics and its probabilistic wave functions with the world of physics entailed in superpositions, entanglements, condensates, etc. The corollary being that phenomena are reductively treated retrospectively; the quantum world deals with prospective probabilities; and, entanglements deal with the present, i.e., where a certain state of affairs is being in a current state of superposition. The implication being that we have at least a relative temporal incommensurability between the same and, therefore, such collectively should be treated as economic correlates, i.e., correlatives, and, as such, should not be conflated together unless an overall pragmatically oriented disposition is in place to review that universal economy in play, albeit as it is, in turn, integrated into those wider terms of reference. Or, again, in spatial terms we should treat, Minkowski, de-Sitter, and anti-de Sitter orientations on a similar footing, and only expect demonstrated dualities or correlativities in a conformal field theory to actually appear when we can erect the relevant forms of economic translation that will allow us to make these transformations across such relative incommensurabilities (and where they must all be interconnected given their economic definition of each other is through the joint negation of the other two correlativities [in and through a process of bimodal mediation that would then be appreciated through an effective equivalent form of trimodal intermediation])?

2. Rendering this Complex 'Pragmatic' Argument in a Less *ad hoc* Format

To work towards a provisional conclusion, etc., as a work in progress, let me attempt to reconstitute this complex 'pragmatic' argument in a less *ad hoc* format. In effect, setting out to more firmly establish this strain of argumentation as anti-representational, positively nihilistic, and existential in tenor, and, I should add, where through processes of narration this approach can also be found to be more amenable to both consensus building and social solidarity. (34)

As I have stressed on numerous occasions we cannot and should not perceive the overall pragmatic nature of our practical treatment of our relational deliberations to be reductively pragmatical nor can we for that matter ignore the same. So, how do we square this ethical or moral-like conundrum between the relatively deontological and the relatively pragmatical? (35)

In this regard, I would like to exercise a 'deontological reduction' where aesthetical and pragmatical inputs and outputs are reduced to a deontological format given this hypothesis, and observation, that the deontological underpins both aesthetical and pragmatical judgments besides deontological forms of judgment. However, on terminological and schematic grounds let me refer to this 'reduction' more as a 'pragmatic translation' (given that expressions like 'reduction' or 'analysis' should be utilized within forms of treatment, but, as this translation coincides with the deontological order which coincides with the Ego moment, it would more observe, therefore, processes of retreatment/posttreatment, third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, etc.). (36)

This 'translation' understood, it behooves me to demonstrate, through representative instances of exemplification, that both aesthetical and pragmatical judgments can be translated into a deontological format. This I can only do in part given that all three types of e/valuational formation all possess, theoretically but not practically, an infinite number of possible modes of expression. Therefore, by demonstrating that such a translation is possible, in an exploration of a few instances, I am hoping to rely on being given an 'extension' that allows me to apply this translation to all (phenomenological) forms, (existential) formations, (hermeneutic) formats, systematic approaches to its social formattings (in the form of social systems, etc. within the-political-economy [by articulating cultural-intercultural expressions of the former in our interpolation of the former within the Archetypal sense and semblance of the openness of the 'Overall Political-Economy' or 'The Political-Economy']), etc. (37)

That, with such a translation to hand, I then set out to show how a composite sense and semblance of a pragmatic re(-)positioning is such that its responding is of a form that better expresses this composite set of trajectories that would be entailed in the integration and integrity of a pragmatic responsiveness possessing the requisite degree of responsibility. Or, in other words, what is implied is that through a pro-relational representation and existential appreciation a pragmatic process is expressed that better assesses that positioning from both non-existential and existential perspectives. Arguing, in effect,

that through processes of re(-)self-organization, that our representative representations of the situation in question could well be of a form that possesses the requisite integration and integrity to oversee, through suitable forms of suspension, such apposite forms of existentially oriented intervention, etc. (38)

Given this understanding, we can now appreciate the imposition of a 'pragmatic qualification' to the extent that aesthetical, deontological, and pragmatical inputs and outputs can be organized, and re-expressed through re(-)self-organization through being instigated under the auspices of working suspensions (entailing forms of intra-mediation, mediation, and intermediation[113]) whilst recognizing, at the same time, that our powers of perception and apperception ae not perfectly iterated. Still, on the other hand, because we can never be completely wrong there is also implied a 'pragmatic guarantee' that, first, we can never be completely wrong, and, second, that it is theoretically possible to improve on such valid conformal positioning by expanding its range, through a refinement of its content, and by overseeing a better application of its processes, and so on. (39)

Thence the institution of this more comprehensive 'pragmatic turn' through 'pragmatic translation' wherein apposite processes induce the applicable formation of a non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork in which classical philosophical distinctions are transcended in 'pragmatic practice'. Furthermore, through instigating both an 'unreconstituted metaphysical exclusion' and a 'reconstituted metaphysical inclusion' a preparatory process of representational mapping of the pragmatic-pragmatical situatedness in question is undertaken. Then, through working suspensions, a 'pragmatic turn' is instituted that better represents the more effective strategies that would need to be pragmatic-pragmatically observed. Therefore, in order to promote such apposite mapping, it behooves the person or persons in question to clarify the nature of their aspirations in conjunction with expected forms of arbitration in order to better meet the successful discharge of such deliberations. That in this regard there would be a need to better outline generalities, particularities, and especially the relevant specificities needed to expedite such forms of concern and care. That, in modelling such a process, let proffer the following general demonstration, hopefully, that would render this line of argumentation in a relatively less *ad hoc* format.[114] (40)

First, let me demonstrate how three different forms of aesthetical judgment can be deontologically translated. Second, I will demonstrate the same with respect to pragmatical forms of functional utility. Last, in this regard, I will also demonstrate three relatively different forms of deontological e/valuational formation in order to also illustrate that the deontological, in turn, is also diverse, and not uniform, in its co-option of a potentially complex set of deontological forms of judgment. That, collectively, in any deep form of an overall deontological assessment, a potential number of different

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113 I.e., unimodal, bimodal and trimodal suspensions. Soon to be reintroduced in paragraph xx.

114 In the next nine paragraphs, the key expression will be placed in bold in order to highlight the key term involved in this process of deontological translation where, by implication, all forms of either aesthetical, pragmatical, or deontological e/valuational formation can all be subjected to various forms of deontological translation.

strategies could also be co-present and, therefore, should be suitably discerned, represented, and mapped as the pre-conditional material for this type of e/valuation. (41)

In a process of **harmonization**, be that either in aesthetical, deontological, and/or pragmatical terms of reference, or in some non-directly value-oriented field of conformal concern, e.g., history or science, we witness, whether recognized or not, some form of inner deontological necessity being expected and, hopefully, anticipated in the advent of a current moment or period. From a relational perspective, processes of harmonization are envisaged as necessary. So, e.g., all forms of dispute are perceived or apperceived as requiring some process of resolution. If resolution is not adequately arrived at then the problem persists, and, if seemingly intractable and problematic, and troublesome, then resolution is insisted upon if not by those current terms of reference then in some other form, say, legal or through some form of conflict resolution, etc. Thence the observation that adequate degrees of resolution, i.e. harmonization, in our relationships is a necessity and where that necessity has an injunctive force that, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, demands to be rendered as present, at least to that degree that oversees some sufficient degree of harmonization. Hence the deontological translation of this aesthetical aspect in deontological terms of reference. (42)

That similar arguments could be mustered for how we might better review matters of **style** (as perceived from a second trans-cognitive order). I.e., the empowerment of the author to distinctively imprint their aspirations upon the enactive matrix of that situation as it is refracted through inevitable processes of arbitration. Although this might be viewed as less of a necessity, still, people are called upon to resolve issues in a harmonious fashion and where this ability cannot be other than individually oriented given their distinctive ways of representing and mapping situations and upon what habitual forms of responsiveness they will ether invoke or innovatively transform. Where we might provisionally define ‘style’ as ‘the distinctive patterns of resolution that would more likely be invoked by one individual or a group of individuals *versus* some other individual or group of individuals. The, furthermore, as an observation we note that the current facticity of a patient, etc., is directly imprinted on the primary relationship in question. (43)

Considerations of style also invoke considerations of **innovation** with respect to the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of this e/valuational formation of relationships along with their relative non-existential, relational richness and relative existential, pro-relational enrichment. Moreover, perceived as some form of necessity, such consideration also impinge upon the uptake of innovative forms of response. Thence the recognition of either the need for and/or the recognition of innovative patterns of response is also deontologically dictated and duly delivered. (44)

Moving on to a (fourth trans-cognitive order of the) pragmatical sphere of judgmental influence we can easily note and articulate the deontological imperative or imperatives behind such a functional expression as, say, the **economical**. Why should we be economical? Why is being economical considered to be a virtue, besides, more often than not, also a necessity? Our resources are always relatively limited, and, therefore, need to be marshalled in accordance with our expectations in such a manner so as to best utilize

the same. What could be more deontological than that? On one hand, the pragmatical observation that being parsimonious could well be beneficial for us spills over into our needing to take such an orientation into our serious consideration. (45)

Or, again why not insist upon the observance of the enabling of that which is **effective**, indeed, more effective, in a certain situation given that our intentional aspirations, in both lived-experience and their arbitration, demand nothing less? We need to be effective if we wish to realize at least an acceptable degree of realization in the overall discharge of our intentional aspirations. (46)

Then, in the medical example I have cited before, in the treatment of gastric ulcers a medical response might well take, short of an emergency operation, the form of immediately amelioration of painful symptoms through medication that is effective, but, for the longer term, medication that treats the root cause of such symptomology is now to be preferred given its **efficacious** utility. Thence this apparent deontological difference between the 'effective' and the 'efficacious' despite the fact that both epithets are primarily pragmatical in orientation rather than, ostensively, deontological *per se*. (47)

But, now let me demonstrate that even (the third trans-cognitive order of) the deontological sphere of influence is similarly multiform and not uniform in its expressiveness. E.g., we have the deontological basis of the **promise** as forming the compactual basis for the performance of any type of contract, and, that without this deontological requirement of our honoring our promises the world of contracts could not even function let along be formulated as a viable venture. (48)

Deeply ingrained is also the perception for **fairness** and the inverse experience of unfairness when this deontological orientation of equitableness is not being observed, be that either conventionally and/or in a grossly non-observant fashion. Admittedly, through excessively reiterated forms of conventional imposition inequitable terms of reference can become normalized, and therein and thereafter, be overlooked in that regard. However, with the restoration of reflection the inequitableness of that type of situation might well be returned to our conscious attention in such a manner so as to disseminate our disquiet about the persistence of such practices. Where we must inevitably expect, eventually, but not necessarily in the immediate future, that a better human nature might reassert itself in historical time and insist on a greater degree of fairness being re-instituted, and so on. (49)

In a similar vein, is the patriotic discharge of our being **dutiful** to your country of allegiance or reflecting a certain gratitude and devotion to a certain institution, and so on. Or, in a similar vein, the observance of a distinctive need to show a certain level of respect to someone who is felt to deserve such respect. (50)

That these nine instances well illustrate, either directly and/or less directly, that the imperative or injunctive force behind the formation of the deontological impetus can take many forms and that we should not simply expect the deontological to be expressed in a uniform manner, i.e., through the simple discharge of just one form of deontological

expression. Of course, that could occur, but, we should not expect this to be the case for most occasions. Needless to say, over the course of these examples of deontological translation or clarification have we needed to defer to some form of the divine instruction of intuition of the numinous in the determining the injunctive force or the force of their embedded imperatives, and so on. On no occasion have we needed to invoke some form of either a transcendent or immanent principle, be it either as a so-called 'First Principle' or set of 'First-Principles', or a so-called Middling Principle or Principles, or, again, of a so-called Last Principle or Principles. Should the religious person wish to conduct that type of a religious philosophy then let them state clearly that that is what they intend, but, in the well-considered pursuit of both a critical and radical pragmatic philosophy that such traditionally guided metaphysical claims definitely have no role to play in the formation of pragmatically guided anti-representational-representationalism! (51)

In the illustrative light of these demonstrations it now behooves us to clearly articulate the intentional directedness of our aspirations and their expected forms of arbitration. In by doing so, bringing to the surface the deontological styles of trajectories that will need to be harmonized on a collective level of pragmatic determination. Thence the import of a 'deontological qualification' that all forms of e/valuational formation have a pragmatic form of correlation, and, that in the delineation of an existentially oriented dimension, we need to both correctly delineate such influences and assess to what extent such forces are actually present and to what degree and in what form they might individually and collectively assert their respective forms of influence? (52)

That in the progressive clarification and representation of this distinctive complexity of deontological trajectories, as forms of motivation, we can also appeal to a 'deontological guarantee' that states 'that in all forms of deontological assessment we can be neither completely right nor completely wrong in any falsely inspired indubitable sense and that demands for such impossible claims should be completely ignored'. (53)

What are the ramifications of these practical concepts of the 'deontological qualification' and the 'deontological guarantee'? (54)

That, for convenience, all forms of e/valuation can be rendered in either a full or a partial deontological format, and, that in the assessment of the application of that format we can be never completely wrong nor completely right in such matters, and, therefore, at least theoretically, such positions can be further refined through the application of critical forms of mitigation, remediation, and re(-)normalization, etc. (55)

Now, at this point in this essay let me proffer a detailed disquisition on a working anti-representational-representationalism. (56)

I will outline this through noting both defective and non-defective unimodal, bimodal, and trimodal contributions to an overall conjectural economy of a pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism. (57)

To begin with, we must understand that in relationships there can only be the directness of interaction, and, that such interactions, refracted through epistemological experience, are inextricably textualized, all the way up and all the way down! To contemplate the disentangling of the so-called 'sheer textual' from the extrapolation of the so-called 'not textual' or 'pre-textual' is impossible to perform, and it would be totally ludicrous to believe otherwise. So, that granted we have immediately dismissed all strong forms of both realism and idealism along with all their close allies. (58)

At the same time we must dismiss all strong forms of a pragmatic funcitonalism since functions without contents, either subjective and/or objective, either inter-subjective and/or inter-objective, is also impossible to perform, and it would be totally ludicrous to believe otherwise. (59)

The implications of this understanding is that there can be no pure, non-relational instances of unimodal, bimodal, and/or trimodal functioning in any form whatsoever. (60)

Hence a working representationalism must work within these anti-representational guidelines or limits. Dismissing all forms of defective unimodalsim, etc., and proposing non-defective forms of unimodalism, etc., all to be situated within the working confines of what is economically possible and not within that which can be demonstrated as not economically possible. (61)

Now, that granted, economically, we can now argue that on the grounds of the observation of inequalities, where provisional equalities can only be granted, synthetically, through an assignment of apparitional similarities or, analytically, through legislated equations or, conjecturally, through isomorphic forms of argumentation, that what we have left must be viewed as demonstrating such inequalities. Therefore, this granted, it follows that, in economic terms of reference, there can be no equality between economic correlatives in a certain economy or correlativities between different economies with the ensuing conjectural supposition that a certain economic forcefulness is set up between intentional objectivity, intentional motivation and intentional subjectivity, etc., outside all forms of suspension (i.e., intra-mediational, mediational, and inter-mediational) and that such inequalities will be expressed through the ensuing forcefulness of the entailed desuspensions. Or, in other words, in all forms of textualized experience, given that there can be no forms of experience that are not textualized, it implies that these trimodal facets that constitute the economic experience in question in such a manner that intentional objectivity, etc., is either dictated to and/or dictates the ensuing textual parameters of that experience. Let us explore this conjectural ramifications of conjectured supposition. (62)

E.g., we could imagine a virtual diet where we imagine eating all the foods we especially like to eat and, at the same time, imagine experiencing a full feeling of satiation in doing so. However, physiological forces will not be easily 'silenced' and we will soon succumb to feeling of an intense hunger that will inevitably force us to a position where we might well have to consider replacing our virtual diet for a non-virtual diet. Of course, if this replacement is not suitably organized in a timely fashion then that person will starve to death and will no doubt be fully aware that they are starving to death as

long as they remain consciously aware of the precarious nature of that situation.. So, even if they refuse to eat food, in some aspect or aspects of their self-awareness they will will know they are then on a path to dying whether they overtly accept that fact or not. I.e., hermeneutically, it should be able to be demonstrated that this starving person is aware, to some degree, that they are starving and are they are either starving themselves to death or being starved by others should they either not accept both nourishment and liquids or are placed in a position where access to such nourishment and liquids are being denied by others. In other words, in this type of situation, their consciousness is dictating to them that 'they are hungry and on a path of starvation'. I.e., an embodied physiological awareness of a lack of food is dictating the nature of their current intentional awareness. (63)

Or, in a converse manner, over the course of a vivid dream, should it be vividly entertained, implying a strong degree of gestalt or psychic self-integration, then we should also be aware that it is a 'creation of our own minds'. By altering the trajectory of this dream we can demonstrate to ourselves that the course of such experience is being directed, i.e., dictated from either our own intentional motivation and/or our intentional subjectivity through some form of re(-)organized intentional aspiration. (64)

In the conjecture of equalities, we surmise, on balance, that we are either being dictated to and/or dictating the course of our intentional aspirations. At the same time, not arguing that we just being dictated to or just dictating the course of events given that the overall economy demands the overall participation of all trimodal factors contributing to that economy (as it is, in turn, non-economically ensconced in a more comprehensive sense of the economic to that extent it can be appreciated as such). (65)

Metaphorically, we are 'climbing the tree' and 'heading towards the better lit' rather than diving into the murky world inhabited by the dark, unseen roots conjectured as belonging to that tree... (66)

Imagine entering a city never before visited, and doing so by train and looking out the window at the rich complexity of a vista never seen before. Such a view, in all its richness, is dictated by that landscape in conjunction with our ability to appreciate such a cityscape. The extreme motivations of either the strong realist or idealist cannot be accounted for. For the former, there is no unmediated access to this projected extrapolation of a city, and, for the latter, no amount of intelligence is going to just create the complexities of that vista. Still, such perceptions are dictated by that being perceived, and, without access to an intersubjective array of working genres such a vista could not be seen and appreciated as a 'cityscape'. (67)

So, we can dismiss all possibilities of both a strong realism and a strong idealism. In a similar vein, we can dismiss a strong pragmatism given that what works works must involve the suppositions of working representations as 'representations' that cannot be rendered as just 'functions' since 'working' functions are working 'functions' must entail a working economy of logical subjects, predicates and relations, i.e., as correlated with distinctive candidates subjected to transformations in terms of those bearers of both predicates and relations, and so on. (68)

Hence an all-pervasive textualism, where inequalities dictate, on balance, the intentional constitution and formation, etc., of our epistemological experiences. Thence the contours and confinement of an anti-representational-representationalism where no room can be found for a defective unimodalism, etc. (69)

Given the gestalt constitution of the archetypal economy it follows that this relative inequality between correlatives within that conjectural economy in question implies, on balance, that certain inequal, dynamic forces exist between these moments of World, Object, and Ego. E.g., World impinging more on Object, and not so much v.v., etc. Thence this six-fold, inequal, bimodal approach, with the ramifications that through the balanced suspensions of the bimodal processes of mediation, etc., we arrive at another way of visualizing the genesis of the six orders be they either cognitive or trans-cognitive in complexion. So, e.g., in the overt bimodal mediation of World and Object, and the covert intra-mediation of Ego, we arrive at the formation of the sixth trans-cognitive/cognitive e/valuation of the ontical, i.e., factual determinations, etc. (70)

Where, we might add, e.g., the inequality between Ego and Object (aesthetical e/valuation) and Ego and World (pragmatical e/valuation), in favour of Ego, would give us permission to deontologically translate such adjunct fields of judgmental determination (as previously conjectured). (71)

But, if we were to insist on either pure inequalities or that inequalities had no conjectural existence whatsoever then we are legalizing an overt form of a defective bimodalism (along with defective processes of mediation since the bimodal suspension of two facets or ordered forms of experience could not be experienced in a form of pure equality for that would imply the inability of a de-suspension to arise since it can only arise on the imputed basis of an inequality). (72)

I.e., although somewhat equalized within the embrace of the bimodal suspension (mediation) an ensuing de-suspension could not arise in the first place. The suspension of the suspension, be it in the form of a mediation, etc., arises in the distinctive form of the de-suspension by virtue of such inequalities in that act of mediation, etc. (73)

Therefore, to our list of the defective, we must also add defective forms of bimodal treatment, imputing either no inequalities or pure inequalities. (74)

As for a defective economic form of trimodal functioning we can propose an economy that is either completely non-indubitable and non-conformal or as completely indubitable and conformal. Let me explain. (75)

A ‘relatively conformal economy’ is such that it must ‘consist of a successful integration of a relatively conformal set of analytical propositions, a related relatively conformal set of synthetic statements, and a related, relatively conformal set of conjectural propositional-statements.[115] Let me demonstrate this equation. (76)

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115 As argued for in *Book* 11.

Quite recently, a certain racist politician stated, ‘that from a certain city in the US that he would, on winning election to the presidency, immediately set out to deport a certain illegal ethnic minority, described as ‘illegal immigrants’, falsely accused of eating the pets in that city, and originating from country X who will then be deported to country Y. To begin with we should note that there is so much that is ‘wrong’ with this weird, unhinged declaration of future presidential intent that it is barely able to be understood in anything other than a racist diatribe operating more on a connotational level of negative significance with quite frightening ramifications. For a start, these so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ are, actually, ‘legal migrants with full documentation’. Then, no evidence has been presented for a single instance of these same migrants eating household pets Furthermore, to illegally deport legal migrant originating from country X to country Y beggars belief that anyone other than an idiot, could have uttered such a ludicrous statement. As a residential promise it could not be kept because it cannot even be logically contemplated in the first place. That, what cannot be logically contemplated can have no ascription of a conformal truth determination since a process of truth assessment and corresponding determination just could not be applied. Where, in this instance, the statements that these ‘migrants’ are claimed to ‘eat household pets’ is just false, and, where the proposition that these ‘migrants’ are termed ‘illegals’ is false, and, where the conjecture that such logical subjects from country X are able to be deported to country Y just cannot follow, just cannot be applied. That ,‘therefore, we have within the orbit of this overall semblance of a set of sentences a non-conformational set of statements, propositions, and conjectures, where, obviously, a non-conformational set of sentences can appear to remain, although to dignify the ensuing linguistic remains as a reasonable set of sentences is quite laughable. That the mere breakdown in confomational status in one of these aspects of either statements, propositions, or propositional-statements would imply the ascription of a non-conformable status. Thence the purport of this equation that notes that the conformational status of a set of sentences is dependent upon the conformational status of its statements, propositions, and propositional-statements, etc. That should any one element be non-conformational in status then the entire set of co-associated sentences must be rendered as equally non-conformational in status (just as the internal conjectural economy represented in one sentence or in a set of sentences suffers accordingly). (77)

Hence a natural asymmetry between a sentence that is conformally valid or a set of sentences that are conformally valid and a sentence that is not conformally valid, that is conformally invalid, etc., since ‘not conformally valid’, as ‘invalid’ equates with either invalid or not applicable’ given the converse truth evaluation of that which is non-applicably ‘invalid’ remains ‘invalid’ either way. Just as, e.g., a bachelor can neither beat their wife nor not beat their wife, etc., for the obvious reasons of ‘not having a wife’. (78)

Given a recognition that all representations are inextricably textualized it follows that to disentangle such textual contributions is an impossible task. On the other hand, the realist’s intuition that experience matters can be redefined through this recognition of a textual pressure to dictate textual formation that is non-equally distributed between the three correlatives as collectively re(-)presented in any trimodal economy and should be critically noted, and, on occasion, also radically appreciated when and where necessary.

That, effectively, representation is to be discerned economically, etc., without our needing to invoke impossible forms of representational modelling that are either impossible to conceive and/or put into practice. (79)

Once these economic limitations are appreciated, we can then invoke various forms of either an explicit or implicit representational formalism without exceeding those limits through the assertion of a 'conformal' presentation where that set of sentences is either asserted to be absolutistically indubitable or as not absolutistically indubitable. That, seen in this critical light, we should realize all formalisms, in being invoked, are and must remain provisional even if practically treated as relatively indubitable, etc. I.e, whether we utilize relatively informal forms of reports or formal forms of reportings either way we must operate as if such research and its explorations are forever stamped as 'provisional'. Because we are now 'representing our interpretations of the world at large' and 'not presenting an impossible vision of the world as if it were either to exist before and/or after such forms of misrepresentation' even though, we should also add, that through the ongoing forcefulness of the de-suspension we may well find ourselves in a better position to experience an ongoing clarification of such a clutter of conformational treatments that we should also affirm an inevitable conformal evolution in truth determination as we continue to make our passages, both individually and collectively, through this overall world-of-life... (80)

Such relatively focused and constrained formalisms accepted, just what should we expect to be 'formally' articulated within their provisional limitations? The relevant articulation of either an explicit or implicit understanding of the elements falling within those economic correlatives as to be found within those economies being invoked, and, the articulation of those relevant forms of alignment through economic complexification should such parallels be explicated as such. Moreover, from such represented elements or materials we can then set out to appreciate between such textually articulated representations a higher order form of appreciation as to the alignments, non-alignments to be conformally discerned therein or there between. Let me clarify such relations. (81)

In a previous essay I noted the work of the patriotic Ukrainian behind the lines who puts a bean into the cooking pot every time she saw an individual tank being transported by train that passed her kitchen window. Then, in a coded message, the number of chickens noted in that messaged was to be understood as representing ten tanks that she had seen being shipped by train. So '60 tanks', as '60 beans', would then further become '6 chickens' by this simple transformational rule which would then be disseminated as such in that coded message. Now, using this simple example, let me outline the general formality involved in the ensuing narrations disseminated through such formal reportings, etc. (82)

In these processes of economic complexification, in the articulation of parallel economic elements, let me comply with a form of ordering I have previously designated as 'harmonic', namely, in archetypal terms of as hermeneutically oriented World (relative consonance), phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented Object (relative dissonance), and (non-systematic) existentially oriented Ego (relative resolution). (83)

Hence, e.g., ‘accommodations, distinctions,[116] and transformations’. (84)

Hence, e.g., ‘hermeneutically oriented consonance, phenomenologically oriented dissonance, and existentially oriented harmonic resolution’. (85)

Hence, e.g., ‘synthesis (statements), analysis (propositions), and conjecture (propositional-statements)’. (86)

Hence, e.g., ‘relations, predicates, and nominatives’. (87)

Hence, e.g., ‘inter-subjectivity, objectivity-inter-objectivity, subjective/intersubjective agents’. (88)

In archetypal terms, as ‘World, Object, and Ego’. (89)

Where ‘representation’ is to be viewed as ‘forms of modelling invoking the paralleling of the above, etc.’ So, e.g., the articulation of the transformation of nominatives through a reworking of their represcription/redescription of the elements as correlatively catalogued, etc. (90)

Or, in terms of the anecdote cited, we could say these elements implied or explicitly referred to form the following type of reporting, namely, ‘in this part of occupied Ukraine (World) in this genre of depiction, ‘x chickens’ refer to ‘x times 10 tanks’ (Object) seen passing by train’ (Ego). Thence this coded narration, which, through dissemination, on reception and recognition as being implicitly coded, would then be subjected to the transformational rules that would correctly decode this formal reporting in the manner as intended. (91)

We should also note that, from a pro-relational perspective, i.e., the perspective of the relationship in question, a process of communication is only arrived at that moment there is an alignment between the transmitter and receiver is realized. (92)

That in a similar vein, ‘representation’ is put into effect when ‘we can both simulate and resimulate the intended transformations articulated through the representational codes as presented on all intended levels of coded presentation’. Furthermore, as an ‘ongoing process re(-)presentation’ is put into effect through ‘this ordering of representation, presentation, and re-presentation’. (93)

Therefore, ‘representation’ itself is an ‘economy or representation, presentation, and re-presentation, etc.’ By ‘etc.’ is meant ‘the implication of a non-economic dimension along with the further implication of the relatively super-economic, etc.’ (94)

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[116] Here I admit to having confused ‘distinctions’ with ‘logical subjects, etc.’, and ‘nominations’. However, through self-correction, via economic complexification, we should re-perceive ‘distinctions’ with ‘phenomenal-phenomenological categories, etc.’

The ramifications of the ‘non-economic, etc.’ are also vast and understated or overlooked in the same manner that the existential implications of representational transformation are also all too often either understated or overlooked. So, how are we to understand this imputed existential dimension of a suitably constrained transformational-representation along with the co-associated conjunction of the same with working ideas on the nature of a pragmatic philosophy in this linking of a pragmatical and a deontological responsiveness, through deontological translations, with existential responsibility, etc? (95)

As a place to begin (this type of a critical-radical narrative that would better exemplify a working non-weak/non-strong pragmatics) we might start with the fact that the ‘existential orientation’ comes into existence through ‘the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential’, and, therefore, comes into this type of experiential existence by virtue of ‘this transformation of transformation’ that duly delivers on this ‘vision of an existential sense and semblance of a promise’. I.e., a promise to augment and enhance, i.e., amplify, a pro-relational form of e/valuational richness and enrichment to be associated with both the relatively non-existential and the existential respectively. So, that granted, how might this meta-transformation or trans-transformational state of affairs be realized? Through either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of e/valuational formation that relatively positivizes non-existential richness and positively enhances existential forms of co-associated e/valuation. (96)

Thus, reviewed along these lines, we must regard representation as both inescapable and constrained, Hence, this apparent contradiction of an ‘anti-representational-representationalism which should not be so viewed in that manner once we understand the anti-representational aspect supplies the limits for how a provisional representationalism is to operate within. (97)

Thence the implicit handling of both formal reportings and informal reports within the constraints of a relative formalism either overtly recognized or covertly understated and overlooked. Where these forms of short-sightedness, and others, have contributed to the disdain of unconstrained forms of undignified representational speculation, and so on and so forth. (98)

Hence the usefulness of a threefold classification that notes, say, in the presentation of a certain pragmatic philosophy, where we can run a ruler over such projects and programs and apply considerations that divides its overall format into either the non-critical, critical, or radical camps and therein and thereafter be treated accordingly. Where all strong variants of a certain style of philosophy will automatically fall within the first category and be subsequently dismissed. I.e., as either impossibly constituted and/or defectively organized. In contrast, relatively viable variants can be placed within or shuffled between the latter two categories of the critical and the radical, noting, furthermore, that the last category needs to be critically re-appreciated in terms of the critically pre-established. (99)

What hallmarks indicate a radical classification, and, how do the innovations of a radical formulation become critically re-appropriated (hyper-economically)? The novelty of innovations can be described as forms of non-continuities, forms of behaviour that contrast with the persistence of continuities and the disruptions of non-continuities.[117] To some degree processes of existentilization can be viewed as non-continuities to the extent such existentialization proffers a radical shift in direction, a chaotic process of re-direction that positively enhances e/valuational formation.[118] Let me now return to the pragmatic turn and its co-associated existential identification. (100)

From the archetypal perspective of the correlative of Ego we find the putative coincidence of both deontologically and existentially informed patterns of behaviour. To this we note the qualifications of 'adjuncts' to the extent that such patterns of behaviour also overlap with (the second trans-cognitive order of the) aesthetical and (the fourth trans-cognitive order of the) pragmatical. Collectively, these three orders just referred to constitute the domain of value formation. In contrast, the overall 'ontologically oriented domain' of the first, sixth and fifth trans-cognitive orders, respectively, of phenomenological-semantic judgment, ontical or factual judgment, and hermeneutical judgments of possibility form a sphere of discernment where e/valuational formation is less subjectively constrained in such a manner that they can be viewed as if in apposition to the deontological sphere and its deontological translations. In effect, positing a domain that contrasts with subjectively oriented pre-occupations; being generated between the archetypal moments of Object and World, and, therefore, referring more to considerations of embodiment, (environmental) embankment, physical time and space, and all allied phenomena… and not so much with respect to relational embeddedness, our experience of the relational and the ensconcement of primary relationships within a relational world, etc. That granted, at least hypothetically, the implication must be drawn that deontological translations, the relatively existential, and the pragmatic, as here re-defined, must, all effectively, coincide and be treated accordingly. Thus, it now behooves us to both demonstrate this coincidence and the ramifications that flow from this coincidence. However, first, let me explore how this existential turn is generated or induced (within this co-association between, on one hand, the deontological and its translations, and, on the other hand, the existential and how collectively this can be positionally re-framed as 'pragmatic' and 'not pragmatical' without, at the same time, noting the implied descriptions, etc., of the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork where pragmatical adjuncts are appropriated within the sphere of deontological translations, etc.). (101)

As argued elsewhere,[119] working suspensions in the form of tripolar or trimodal intermediations set up and induce the overall extent of an extensive suspension, a complex chaotically characterized phenomenon replete with de-suspensional and causal ramifications. Intermediations can also be seen to encompass unimodal intra-mediations and

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117 Hallmarks, in turn, that characterize histories of the past (documented discontinuities), histories of the present (potentially disruptive non-continuities), and histories of the future (expectational continuities). Refer to *Book* 6, e.g., *Pursuit*, III.(VI),7X.

118 Where the expression 'positively enhances e/valuational formation' is redundant given 'existentialization' is 'positive'. In contrast, non-existentialization can be either positive, neutral, and/or negative overall (as explored in *Book* 11).

119 Basically, in *Book* 11.

bimodal mediations. The outcome of such processes of suspension overseeing the formation of judgments be they referring to either the productive formations simulated within a deontologically oriented sphere and/or an ontologically oriented sphere. That the very presence of judgments indicates the inescapable use of working suspensions, etc. Where existential judgments, in coincidence with the existential correlative of Ego are primarily discharged in terms of their centrally focused semblance on intentional subjectivity, etc., and not so much on activities and judgments posted in an ontological sphere of relatively diminished concern and care in comparison to those judgments of value primarily posted in a deontological sphere of concern and care. Or, where such subjectivity must also reflect a 'transcendental' or 'trans-intentional' or 'judgmental sense of subjectivity'[120] at the same time, in a similar comparison to intentional forms of subjectivity, and, where, furthermore, all forms of distinctive epistemological activity have posted correspondingly distinctive senses and semblances of subjectivity that are all inextricably posted within the complexity of the 'epistemological hierarchy', or, i.e., the 'psyche'. That this psychic background allows us to migrate both sequentially and simultaneously with the ensuing expression of all such diverse forms of subjectivity, etc., and both engineer and experience such transformations as therein entertained. That, in this regard, existentially oriented experience is no different. In effect, allowing the existential character of the Ego moment to define and refine its distinctive influence in and through such deontological terms of reference, through its deontological translations, and so on. In other words, demonstrating this degree of coincidence between the deontological orientation and the existential orientation. Where, from the perspective of subjectively oriented volition, we can now extent this grand equation with a re-defined and refined understanding of the pragmatic dimension as also being coincident with both the deontological sphere and the existential sphere. Because 'whatever amplifies the e/valuational formation of value automatically amplifies this sense and semblance of the pragmatic, and v.v.' as an experiential definition of just what the basic idea of the concept of the 'pragmatic' entails and must entail. I.e., whatever better facilitates an amplification of value automatically augments and enhances an experience of the 'pragmatic'. Of course, an experience of the pragmatic that is not to be confused with the non-existentially oriented functionality of the pragmatical whilst, at the same time, coopting the same when and where it is deontolgically felt necessary to co-opt such an aspect in organizing this general amplification in overall value formation. Where, in effect, the co-option of pragmatical e/valuation non-existentially augments existential enhancement given that we must also understand that the distinctive sense and semblance of the existential emerges in and through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential. Thence this natural coincidence between the deontological and its translations, the existential orientation, and this re-defined sense and semblance of the pragmatic *per se*. (102)

[120] Re-defining the expression 'transcendental' as referring, primarily, to the 'Trans-Cognitive Aspect in the Epistemological Hierarchy along with its trans-intentional acts of judgmental appreciation, acts of volition, etc.'

3. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

To better organize the unfolding of this complex provisional conclusion, etc., let me use the following ideas as twelve headings, namely, a pragmatic definition (through the non-pragmatic-pragmatical fork); the inextricable textual nature of reports, etc; dictational pressures stemming from correlative inequalities; deontological translations; the coincidental existentialization of the ontological sphere, etc; 'transcendental' equivalences; representational formalism; anti-representational constraints on such formalisms; implicit ramifications for a pragmatic positioning; on the distinction between impossible and defective forms of strong pragmatisms *versus* the potential and actualized viability of non-weak/non-strong variants in positioning; and, a final summary of this important topic in the light of both its ensuing philosophical and meta-philosophical (inter-ordered metaphysical) ramifications (in our appreciation of pragmatic phenomena). (103)

i. Pragmatic Definition

I proposed the following experiential definition of just what the basic idea of the concept of the 'pragmatic' entails and must entail, namely, 'whatever better facilitates an amplification of value automatically augments and enhances[121] an experience of the 'pragmatic'.' To this we can also add that the extension of this definition is centered in the deontological along with its aesthetical and pragmatical translations, and further thematized existentially where the force of the de-suspension promotes both the richness of non-existentially oriented e/valuational formation and the enrichment of existentially oriented e/valuational formation. Hence this broad definition of the pragmatic that encompasses either the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of value as expressed through the amplification of such e/valuational formation… and, indeed, as expressed through the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-fork.[122] (104)

ii. The Inextricable Textualization of Reports, etc.

All relationships are direct (by definition of the 'relational') and where all intentional formation, etc., is inextricably textualized. Therefore, to even propose the possibility of disentangling such inextricable integration of relational experience and its intentional textualization, etc., is to enter into conducting a fool's errand especially if that person is not aware of how foolish they must appear to a critical philosopher or disciplinarian aware that such an impossible venture should not even be commenced let alone thought about. (105)

The previous observation can be re-paraphrased as follows: given that both epistemological and ontological processes are economic, etc., it follows, in psychological

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121 'Augmentation' is 'realized through incremental addition of the relatively positive, non-existentially oriented richness (or reduction of the relatively non-positive)'. 'Enhancement' is 'realized through non-incremental positive enrichment of existentially oriented e/valuation. Added together we can refer to the joint 'amplification' of such positive e/valuational formation.

122 This non-fork, in the light of deontological translations, can also be written as 'the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-aesthetical-fork'.

terms, that no economic correlatives can be fully extracted from their respective economies except in limited, circumscribed, provisional terms of reference. (106)

That the multiple ramifications of this simple understanding are vast and complex, but, in simpler terms, there is this distinct demand that we desist from economically trying to separate what cannot be separated, and, at the same time, desist from saying that we can demonstrate such impossible extractions since such claims are and must be defective. Hence the equivalent call to desist from all strong forms of philosophical treatment, etc., since all such claims are either impossible to demonstrate and/or should be represented as defectively engineered and unwisely disseminated. A bit like 'pulling teeth from a snake', given that that is impossible to perform and dangerous should you even unwittingly attempt to perform such an impossible task. (107)

iii. Correlative Inequalities

However, some intuitions of the strong ideologue can be salvaged when we realize, among other things, that in an economy as all things cannot be absolutistically equal we have to accept correlational forms of inequality. Let me explain what is meant and the ramifications of such an understanding. (108)

Although all intentional activity is textually deposited (in parallel trails of textualized traces) the apparent correlational direction in the origination of such inputs (and outputs) not being equal, unless observed in that manner or analytically legislated as such, implies, on a reasonable balance of probabilities, that should such a differential be more than apparent then we can determine its more dominant forces of constitution so, by such means, we could then find ourselves in a position to definitively declare which correlational factors dominated in the constitution of that specifically focused upon phenomenal-phenomenological event in question. So, e.g., in a vivid dream state we would most likely be aware that we were dreaming, say, about a 'dream apple' and that the level of our gestalt integration and psychic intactness is such that we would know or should know, more or less, that that 'apple' is 'an imaginary creation of our own minds'. Or, e.g., in seeing a non-virtual apple it would be normal for us to understand that we are perceiving a non-virtual apple in the existential richness of its phenomenological presentation and, therefore, must be a non-virtual apple *qua* 'actual' apple. Or, say, in the recalling of a memory of 'having eaten a certain delicious apple' then we might well feel that our intentional motivation in this instance is directing this type of phenomenological experience, namely our invoking or evoking a certain memory. Where these three experiences portend a different correlational differential to the extent that they were seemingly issued, on balance, more from our intentional-subjectivity, from our intentional-objectivity, and from our intentional-motivation respectively. (109)

Furthermore, that, by extension, in a mix of economies the more dominant economy would more likely constitute the basic nature of our current phenomenological interaction. Moreover, the same observation could also apply to considerations of either relevancy and/or successfulness, etc. (110)

The ramifications of this type of imputed observation can also explain, albeit in part, the vehemence the dogmatic realist or dogmatic idealist may purse in the dissemination of their false claims issuing from their mistaken and impossible forms of philosophical positioning. Correctly observing, in the first instance, a more dominant forcefulness through discerning a differential that preferences an intentional-objectivity, or, in the second instance, a differential that preferences either intentional-motivation and/or intentional-subjectivity. (111)

Similarly, a critical, and potentially radical, pragmatist should note the differential preference for a working intentional-subjectivity as refracted deontologically, and as refracted through deontological translations and existentially motivated forms of value amplification… where such value is practically amplified… and is suitably delivered via desuspensions through the non-fork of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-fork. (112)

iv. Deontological Translations

Implied through the exercise of the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-aesthetical-fork that despite the philosophical differentiation in theory between the deontologically-pragmatic, the pragmatical and the aesthetical, in the practical specificity of the existential judgment such precise philosophical distinctions are not observed in either 'natural' or 'transcendental' experience. Where by 'transcendental' is meant 'trans-intentional', 'trans-cognitive', 'judgmental', 'trans-conceptual', and 'trans-perceptual, etc. (113)

That the actual currency of this specific non-fork is expedited by virtue of the deep deontological-like nature of both aesthetical and pragmatical experiences. I.e., that the deeper structure of such forms of e/valuational formation, as value, has a deontological translation. Just as, e.g., the 'economical', as meant in the sense of 'being parsimonious', has the force of a certain imperative that adds this variety of expression to the deontological sphere of influence in all its diverse semblance of a distinctive of deontological-like phenomenology. That this broadening of its influence is sanctioned through the existential dance between the existential orientation and the relatively non-existential given that the relatively existential is realized through the relative existentialization of the relatively non-existential, and v.v. I.e., that the existential, centered in the third trans-cognitive deontological order, must appropriate the relatively non-existential in order to existentialize the same… and my such means extend the influence of the relatively deontological to include both aesthetical and pragmatical forms of input. (114)

v. Coincidental Existentialization, etc.

Hence the imputed observation that the experience of the 'pragmatic' is 'centered in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, is amplified existentially, and extends its influence through deontological translations, etc. (whilst being meta-philosophically appreciated in inter-ordered terms of reference)'. (115)

vi. 'Transcendental' Equivalences

Hence this 'transcendental' set of equivalences, from the trans-intentional perspective of judgment, between the pragmatic, the deontological, the existential, and deontological translations (as delivered through the non-pragmatic-pragmatical-aesthetical-fork, etc.). (116)

vii. Representational Formalisms

Language is inescapably representational, but, should be constrained anti-representationally. (117)

In a representational formalism we note its use of economic correlatives as economically constituted correlations that cannot be extracted from that economic complex unless in circumscribed provisional terms of reference be such elements referenced either analytically, synthetically, and/or conjecturally, etc. (118)

Hence, reference, via the archetypal moment of World, to an intersubjective domain along with its encompassment within the public sphere. (119)

Hence reference, via the archetypal moment of the Object, to objects, object-states and objectives as framed through some proper phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented form of intentional-objectivity along with its apparent encompassment within the private sphere. (120)

Hence reference, via the archetypal moment of Ego, to subjects, as intentional agents, etc., and its encompassment within the sphere of the arbitrated. (121)

Where we note logical subjects, transformations of the same, etc., within various economies, etc., all ensconced in a realm of the relational, etc. (122)

Thence various factors like accommodations, distinctions, and transformations; syntheses, analyses, and nominations/conjectures; consilience, salience, and propinquity or standing (in relation to the super-economic'), etc. (123)

Where an appreciation of such explorations and researches will note either the persistence or absence of representational alignments discerned either within textual situations or between textual situations.[123] Where discerned alignments can reinforce such formal or informal forms of representational concurrence. (124)

Where conformal truth determinations can be stated, and instituted, and extended, when different textual instances reinforce, through such expected forms of alignment, such progressively realized patterns of truth determination. (125)

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[123] Where 'textual situations' is technical code for the reviewing of 'a text or a series of texts and/or a set/s of texts, etc.'

viii. Anti-Representational Constraints

But, given such formal or informal depictions are either directly and/or indirectly representative of economic correlations it follows that they must be constrained within the limitations of an anti-representational-representationalism. (126)

Because, texts are directly bound by experience, and v.v., and, correlations cannot be mis-economically extracted from their respective economies and their wider forms of pro-relational encompassment it follows that the imputation of that which cannot be related to has no existence for us, and, that we have no need to refer to the same in any form whatsoever (be that reference either religious or non-religious in tenor). (127)

ix. Pragmatic Ramifications

Therefore, a pragmatic philosophy relates to the broad, re(-)imagined functioning of our relationships in terms of either a preferencing (through prioritization, privilege, and promotion) of their non-existentially oriented richness and/or existentially oriented enrichment. But, given the non-absence in our relationships of both the existentially oriented and the non-existentially oriented it follows that both aspects must permanently and persistently co-inhere as co-associates. Thence the observation that the 'pragmatic' is also forever equivalent to the 'existential', etc. (128)

Therefore, the pragmatic can never be reduced to the merely expedient since it cannot be equated only with the functional utility of the merely pragmatical. (129)

That the pragmatic must be observed, therefore, through the auspices of working suspension, since it is through the differential forcefulness of the ensuing de-suspensions that the pragmatic maps out a response that is both responsive and responsible. (130)

x. The Dismissal of Strong Pragmatisms

Hence, given a correlational coincidence with the archetypal moment of Ego it follows that we must dismiss all forms of a strong pragmatism, etc., as either correctly impossible to contemplate and/or as incorrectly performed in a manner that is never coincident with the economic forces found to hand. Because all correlatives are only correlations and, as such, can never be non-provisionally extracted from their resident economies, it follows such non-provisionally extracted imputations have no valid conformational status whatsoever just as we know that a distant mirage possesses no water as apparently seen. (131)

xi. Summary of Philosophical Ramifications

That a strong pragmatism has no place in the life of the critical philosopher or disciplinarian. On the other hand, a non-weak/non-strong form of pragmatism can and should be argued for. Finding reinforcement through the textual alignments that are found

or not found either within or between sets of texts that must also be viewed as circumscribed forms of textual representation. (132)

That through the auspices of working suspensions, that are properly organized and properly executed, we find the means to instigate existential behaviours more in harmony with the nature of those events. Where the differential consequences of well-regulated suspensions can result in the de-suspensionally instituted re-writing of aspirations, their arbitration, existentialization, and appreciation of the same, etc. (133)

Thence, by implication, the re(-)self-organized behaviour of working suspensions, either in parallel, as sets, or in sequences as series to institute improvements in performances, outcomes, and so on. Thence the broad value of a pragmatic philosophy. (134)

xii. Summary of Meta-Philosophical Ramifications

Let me start with a philosophical problem hitherto not explored but needing to be resolved. If the philosophical economy is one-part hermeneutical, one-part phenomenological, and one-part (non-systematic) existential, and, given that philosophical appreciation is effectively meta-philosophical then how can we continue to appreciate the philosophical merit of a certain philosophical positioning in philosophical terms of reference when we need to invoke the meta-philosophical, i.e., metaphysical (in its critically-radically reconfigured reconstitution). I.e., how can we appreciate the ordered constitution of a certain ordered exposition in ordered terms of reference when it requires inter-ordered terms of reference. Or, in other words, the ordered nature of philosophical exploration can appreciate non-ordered or pre-ordered formations (through their translation in ordered terms of reference), but, in order for philosophical research to appreciate itself we must invoke meta-philosophical terms of reference, i.e., metaphysical terms, albeit as reconstituted in anti-representational terms, etc. (135)

Now, one solution besides invoking higher terms of reference is to also assume that transformational retreatment can re-present the information required in a philosophically applicable format (but with the implication that we have to first invoke inter-ordered terms of reference and then apply suitable forms of retreatment and returning such research back to an ordered level of exposition). (136)

But such problems will be addressed in the next essay. (137)

Upholding the contention that all forms of a strong pragmatism should be dismissed as untenable, being either correctly impossible to contemplate and/or incorrectly performed in a defective manner, whereas, in a tenable contrast, a viable pragmatic philosophy can be rendered in a non-weak/non-strong format should it be suitably constituted in that critical, and potentially radical, type of an open and broad format..!![124] (138)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 19.9.24.

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[124] Existentially ‘open’ and ‘broad’ when viewed as centered in a deontological sphere of influence.

XIIG. The Re-Discovery of the Metaphysical (as Inter-Ordered)

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIG. (7.) The Re-Discovery of the Metaphysical (as Inter-Ordered)[125]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In the previous essay, I noted a philosophical problem that directly addresses the problematic issues of this topic as expressed in its title, namely, it is one thing to operate philosophically, but, in order to appreciate the quality and clarity of that philosophical work done, itself, we need to exercise a meta-philosophical point of view and that cannot be satisfactorily performed in philosophical terms alone. Indeed, one could question whether such 'appreciation' could be performed at all? Passing off a mere superficial cataloguing of arguments as if that 'review' could have anything critical to add to those discussions and, I must add, their attendant political intrigues that, if we were to be honest, we would also have to admit to. Where, in effect, we would need to perform some form of a metaphysical-like critique in order to more correctly claim a 'philosophical appreciation' of that philosophical form of research. Hence my current concern to signal that I have retracted my previous historical reluctance to accept and visit a metaphysical-like form of research, that a viable form of meta-philosophical research is both possible and necessary, and, that it needs to accept that it takes an inter-ordered format in its entirety (beyond the merely meta-semantic preoccupations of metaphysical categories alone), and that its reconstitution in its overall orientation must remain open, be pragmatic, anti-representational, positively nihilistic, and existentially imbued, as well as being able to suitably engineer thoughtful contributions to the overseeing of positive forms of social change… (0)

> *Metaphysical ghosts are still walking amongst us,*
> *Seeking only resuscitation and not resurrection*! (1)

The contours of this essay will recount my understandable reluctance to accept the possibility and necessity of metaphysically oriented forms of research, the role to be play by forms of inter-ordered analysis in their entirety, and both the critical and radical ramifications of this acceptance of a 'metaphysical turn'. (2)

The headings of this essay being Confessions; The Metaphysical Turn; The Presentation and Resolution of Two Differing Definitions (of the Meta-Philosophical Metaphysical); The Implications of an Inter-Ordered Meta-Semantic Categorical Perspective; The Ramifications of a Totally Inter-Ordered Interpretation; An Anti-Representational-Representationalism; A Positive Nihilism; The Co-Existence of a Pro-Relational Existentialism; the Social Consequences of a Fully Functioning Metaphysical Critique; Differentiating Metaphysically Oriented Text; then, an Integrated Overview; and, finally, Provisional Conclusions, etc. (3)

But, first, I must deal with a problematic preoccupation whose resolution in less *ad hoc* terms of reference would allow me to segue in my deconstruction of a strong dualism, etc. That problem could be referred to by simply asking, 'how could the necessity of a bimodal operationalism be incorporated within a putative trimodal economics? (4)

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125 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. Incorporating a Bimodal Operationalism within a Trimodal Economics?

First, an introductory statement of intent, and, second, briefly outlining the transgressive background behind this essay. (5)

The problematic issue is the question that arises from the observation, 'that in either a single operation or in any series or set/s of operations we have the appearance of a dominating function operating on either a single logical subject or a series of logical subjects or a set/s of logical subjects[126] in a manner that cannot be deemed to seemingly be otherwise that bimodal in character when economic considerations demand a putative, trimodal basis?' As an analogy, it is a bit like perhaps trying to comprehend how the physical form of a two-dimensional hologram can be used, and re-used, to simulate a three dimensional-like scene? This metaphorical image illustrating moreover, at the very least, that this type of transposition from a two-dimensional (bimodal) mode to a three-dimensional (trimodal) mode is not only a possibility but an actual-actuality when this metaphor is treated along more literal lines. Why is this philosophical problem both problematic and important? For a start, if we were to explain, in less *ad hoc* terms, i.e., in less speculative forms of (phenomenological-semantic) description and we were to invoke more detailed forms of (hermeneutical) prescription and (non-systematic existential) proscription how might we go about achieving that level or degree of rigour in dealing with a wide range of philosophical concepts configured on the basic of either our witting and/or unwitting recognition of this bimodal/trimodal configuration. As, e.g., in our ability to comprehend 'how we could appreciate a certain situation or entertain a more global meta-philosophical/metaphysical-like appreciation of the same?' or 'how we can comprehend both global and local forms of symmetrical reduplication (as in asking, say, 'what is a concept of a concept?' or 'what is a fact of a fact?' in an interpretation of this inter-ordered derivation of the historical discipline) and the asymmetrical duplication (as in asking, say, 'what is the concept of a percept?' or 'what is, say, 'the inter-ordered history of an inter-ordered science?') or 'how could we entertain the spatial and/or temporal transformations of a logically-subjective type of situation, say, 'in our perceptual comparison of either our own hands or feet?' or, the to-be-assessed importance of various concepts in a set of concepts or as to which responses in a set of probable responses might be better deemed to be more responsible?' and so on. In all of this it would seem that such covertly entertained or overlooked transformational considerations are or should be at the basis of a number of philosophical problems which should then be both recognized and resolved, to that degree necessary, before we attempt to resolve whatever else is overtly superimposed upon such a basis. Here, I can point out, that the idea of transformation is better philosophically approached within the context of a philosophy of trimodal transformational processes of retreatment (as already discussed in this *Pursuit*). So, 'operations', in being defined as 'accommodations (derived through hermeneutical synthesis), distinctions (derived through phenomenal-phenomenological analyses), and transformations (derived through alterations in non-systematic existential nominations)' being coincident with or paralleling economic correlatives must also supply the logical conditions that no one economic correlative can be entertained either absolutistically and/or indubitably in its own right, and, that our misguided preoccupation with a certain correla-

[126] Hitherto simplified to a 'logically-subjective situation'.

tive could be entertained completely apart from its other two correlatives – which profoundly points out the dialectical nature of our current topic.[127] Hence the importance of finding less *ad hoc* resolutions of this previously overlooked problematic basis before we then deal with philosophical problems that are superimposed upon this type of a bimodal/trimodal interface. (6)

The transgressive basis, or background, of this specific essay lies, first, in the fact that I had committed, very early on, a series of metaphysical delusions or confusions by adopting an adapting a traditional style of metaphysical thinking which, thankfully, second, ended in an extensive general avoidance of all things metaphysical, which, third, much, much later on, I found was being simultaneously undermined by two disparate definitions of the metaphysical which might be characterized as a local version focusing on a categorical metaphysics in a covert apposition with a more global overall sense and semblance of the metaphysical in incrementally taking on an inter-ordered complexion, and, sixth, finding satisfactory resolution of these disparate definitions through being successfully absorbed within a fully recognized inter-ordered format. Where, in the space of this last sentence, I have outlined how I eventually performed a successful 'metaphysical turn' or 'revolution' (if the latter is to be better understood through the lens of the three phases envisaged in a philosophy of transformational retreatment, namely, pretreatment, the metafication of treatment, and the de-metafication of retreatment, etc.). (7)

Now, I am in a position to commence an exploration of this overlooked, covertly entertained philosophical problem, as to 'how a reconstituted metaphysical/metaphilosophical perspective on a philosophical perspective, etc., etc., can be understood in relatively less *ad hoc* terms of comprehension'. (8)

Where, simply put, the bimodal nature of an operational function, as a transformational process, when refracted through the trimodal lens of transformational retreatment then allows us to mediate these two distinctive aspects of this ostensive dilemma.[128] But, as ever, the devil is in the detail, and this necessitates a need for both developing a recognition of this problem and an appreciation of its resolution. By such an approach we would then be in a better situation to appreciate the metaphilosophical/metaphysical dimension being exercised within the perspective of an anti-representationalism, etc. (9)

Without an in-depth richness of perspective there is no 'apperception' of a problematic issue to 'see' in the first place, or, if intuitively perceived, certainly no understanding of what is theoretically needed in order to both address and redress the ramifications of such short-sightedness. If a problem is not seen this does not mean the problematic does not exist. Rather, like an invisible cancer the damage done could well short-circuit the reasonableness of how we might effectively and efficaciously deal with such

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127 I.e., 'dialectical' in the sense 'that, on one hand, no correlative can be entertained purely in its own right, and, on the other hand, as a consequence, no correlative can be entertained apart from the co-mutual definition of its other two correlatives'.

128 I.e., through invoking the centrality of an in-depth transformational perspective, we can then proffer, metaphorically, a 'translation' between the bimodal and the trimodal, and v.v., etc.

globally or locally oriented philosophical forms of concern and care needed to redress those current anxieties and perplexities in any substantial sense. Indeed, as I am about to argue, this form of philosophical blindness will infect and contaminate, even sabotage such efforts. On one hand, the mental machinations of the mind, in metaphorical terms, are 'operations', but, on the other hand, if the transformational nature of such 'functions' is not suitably addressed the finding of relatively successful solutions, as patterns of resolution, would be more a matter of luck, or habit, or observation, or, even, 'magic'. Sadly, too much philosophical or disciplinary behaviour is theoretically propped up and 'explained' with *ad hoc* forms of magical-like thinking that could well be heading in the right direction, but, really do need to be thought through in greater depth in order to better establish such claims that then would allow us to argue that we were making a more substantial sense of progress in such matter. Of course, we are all guilty of such charges, including myself. *Ad hoc* forms of argumentation often work, but, such an in-depth reinvestment in our heuristic models would better facilitate an endeepening of our trust to be afforded in their apparent conformal status as provided through their more insightful appreciation of that situation in question. As 'operations, functions, alterations in position, transformations, etc.', are to be found behind the philosophical appreciation of each and every possible situation then it follows that such forms of oversight will quite naturally render all such efforts, to the same degree, as being relatively insightless. This does not mean we are completely insightless, but, rather, that, as our paths wander the no-man's-land between the absolutistically indubitable and the absolutistically dubitable, it follows that the relativity of our 'progress' flows more from the connections formed and the strength of those connections as we follow the course and integrity of their ensuing interconnections… (10)

Framed in this manner, it is obvious, as 'operations' underly our mental machinations, that an in-depth understanding of their 'transformations' would better serve us in our philosophical endeavours, etc. So, on one hand, we have the problematic concern of asking ourselves 'how an operational bimodalism is to be refracted through the necessity of an imputed economic trimodalism relevant to the situation currently under review?' Then, on the other hand, we need to better appreciate how this general concern is being conducted in both more particular and specific terms of reference as pertain to a more in-depth appreciation of those situational dynamics in question.[129] (11)

In other words, in all forms of representational behaviour, e.g., etc., the operational nature of that simulated, must at its core, confront both our recognition and reinterpretation of this 'bimodalism *versus* trimodalism' in a suitable manner that does justice to an in-depth appreciation of that situation regardless of whether our concern is philosophical, meta-philosophical/metaphysical, disciplinary, or secular.[130] Then, in juxtaposition to this central issue, I would further contend that we will find its application somewhere along a discontinuous spectrum of 'situations' from 'the ontological to the physical, and, from the

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[129] By 'general' we imply the 'relatively hermeneutical in orientation', by 'particular and specific' is implied 'the phenomenal-phenomenological in orientation and the non-systematic existential in orientation respectively'.

[130] It would be tempting to add here 'etc.' but I am inclined to think that this list is effectively exhaustive. In this type of regard, e.g., we might view the 'meta-disciplinary; as 'philosophical' in extent.

psychological to the epistemological' encompassing, in effects, all forms of intentional behaviour, etc.[131] Let me, through some examples, illustrate this spectrum. We could be dealing with metaphysical-like categories of 'time and space', 'identity', etc. Or, in more particular terms of 'type' or specifically in terms of 'instances' deal more directly with considerations concerned with 'time', 'space', 'time-and-space', 'nominated logical-subjects, etc.', all operating in the simulation of a certain represented situation, etc.' Or, focus, instead, on certain psychological aspects, or, the epistemological configurations of the intentional constitution, etc., apparently in question. Or, in other words, an inescapable confrontation that will need to be addressed in the review of each and every representative situation imaginable. (12)

More specifically, we have the philosophical problem of how we might better understand the function where we can engage the 'meta-philosophical/metaphysical appreciation of the philosophical as a process' to the extent as to how it could even be envisaged? Just how can *x* as a function operate on the same content *x* as an instance of 'symmetrical reduplication'? Or how can *x* as a function operate on the content *y* as an instance of 'asymmetrical duplication'? Say, as in the ordered reduplication of (sixth trans-cognitive) 'facts of facts' giving an emergent inter-ordered product of 'history', *versus*, say, the hyper-ordered product through asymmetrical duplication of the 'history of science' (where the latter, the operated upon element, itself, is being viewed as the inter-ordered production of fifth trans-cognitively ordered reduplication of the 'potentiality of potentiality' or the 'possibility of possibility')? Or, again, how can our understanding of a two-dimensional philosophy of cause and effect even attempt to explain the transformational process of 'lighting a match' or using 'that match to then light a fuse', etc? (13)

So, that understood, let me now deal with the conjectured nature involved in a 'bimodal operationalism'. The dominant aspect of a bimodal operation in question sets the parameters. So, e.g., a 'history of philosophy' is not a form of philosophy but exemplifies the discipline of history. However, translated to the sphere of reduplication, we should understand, e.g., that a philosophy of philosophy as a philosophical-like appreciation of the philosophical, effectively is a form of meta-philosophical appreciation. Arguing further, that such appreciation is tantamount to being a form of metaphysical appreciation, albeit as reconstituted through the obligatory lens of an anti-representationalism. That to (mis)treat a 'philosophy of philosophy' as just another form of 'philosophy' is mistaken, at least, initially, given our transformational ability to retreat the metaphysical back to a philosophical format (where we then need to discern metaphysically oriented text from philosophically oriented text, on par with text and metatext in a text, as an additional complication that will be later addressed). (14)

Now, all of this over-detailed concern on my part to render such understandings on a less *ad hoc* basis may well seem to be far too esoteric to most people, but, in many ways, that is the point. Without being able to economically accommodate such two-dimensional thinking we are then in no insightful position to better understand the three-

[131] By 'etc.' is meant also 'the pre-intentional, the trans-intentional and the post-intentional ramifications involved in the enaction of trans-intentional decisions either made, not made, or deferred, and so on.

dimensional nature of those transformations being exhibited in the specificity of their resective situations, etc. (15)

In other words, we need to supply the three-dimensional approach of a 'philosophy of transformational retreatment', or its equivalent, in order to complement, or supplement, any relatively *ad hoc* progress already made in such matters. Briefly, what does this entail? (16)

Seeing 'transformation' as a 'process that involves taking what has come to hand, as the material required, in line with our aspirational intentions, as hermeneutically embraced in the first stage of 'pretreatment'; subjecting the same to phenomenologically oriented processes of deconstruction-reconstruction in a second phase designated as 'treatment' that subjects the same through metafication to being elevated by one degree in meta-status; and, then, taking on board the de-elevation in meta-status by one degree through an existentially oriented process of retreatment through a process of de-metafication; and, that this then allows the results of such an overall process of transformation to re-configure those initial materials utilized in that stage of pre-treatment within this dialectic cycle that then enables it to re-continue in such a manner as long as the appearance of incremental progress is able to be demonstrated to one own overall sense of self… when, naturally, if such reflections were no longer 'profitable' we would then move on to a new topic of concern, a new strain and train of intentional simulation, and so on. Let me diagrammatically represent the progressions of this heuristic device:

OBJECT
Treatment
Meta-Status of 1
2

*

1	3
WORLD	EGO
Pretreatment	**Retreatment**
(Meta-Status 0)	(Meta-Status of 0)

<<<<<<Posttreatment of Pretreatment, etc. (17)

In effect, when we think 'about' something (through the utilization of a suspension) it becomes elevated in meta-status, but, simultaneously, through retreatment (through the force of the de-suspension) it regains its initial status as had in pretreatment. Now, viewed through this transformational lens, this transformational economy, we can now view the 'two-dimensional' operational process as resituated within a 'three-dimensional' transformational economics. All in all, running a dialectical approach through this perspective of retreatment where we also have to note at least six levels in

functional appreciation, namely, as a bimodal operation; as a ‘clockwise’ process of pre-treatment-treatment-retreatment/posttreatment; in a ‘counter-clockwise’ process of re-treatment-treatment-pretreatment; as simultaneous; as emergent; and, as emergently re-treated. That, this ability to transformationally read any textually represented situation, and where no situation could not be non-transformationally appreciated, it follows that what progressive emerges in our reading is a simulated richness of both non-existentially and existentially oriented experience that could not be encountered in any other form. How, otherwise, could a well-constructed novel, e.g., ‘come to life’, ‘absorb’ us in an array of non-textual-like experience, and, therein and thereafter, reduce us either to tears, or an intense joyfulness, or laughter, or, all of the above? (18)

The understanding of the dialectical nature of this heuristical device further enriching our appreciation of that transformational situation to hand that a mere bimodalism could never achieve for us. Indeed, countless philosophical and disciplinary controversies, and their endless squabbles that ensue, can be attributed to this persistent desire to remain in the two-dimensional world of the merely operational and, by doing so, superficially overlook the three-dimensional depth that could be more overtly brought to the fore in satisfactorily incorporating a bimodal operationalism successfully within a relevant trimodal economics. (19)

I note ‘overtly’ because we already have, at the very least, a minimum intuitive understanding of such matters since with no covert understanding in the first place there would be no understanding of anything whatsoever! All situations are transformationally approached, and there would be no appreciation of the situation already to hand if that were not to be the case. (20)

But, in dealing with the dialectics of what is already covertly appreciated we can then less superficially approach the manner in which the constitution of our topic is to be representatively experienced. Moreover, through insisting on the directness of our experience and the relatively direct manner of our engagement with such interpreted experience, through the reiterated thematization of these emergent aspects, as they emerge, through such re(-)simulation, our intentional thinking can take on, in parallel, the simulation of both subjectively and intersubjectively oriented experience that will progressively find a degree of a mutual concordance that cannot but reinforce our evolving appreciation of that conformal status of that current situation already to hand. In effect, inevitably, should we live long enough, to move from the relatively dubitable towards that which is relatively indubitable in complexion. How else could such progress not be deemed to be ‘pragmatic’ from start to finish? (21)

Asking ourselves, ‘how is it the case that we appear to be able to philosophically appreciate the philosophical merit of our philosophical ideation?’ and, then move on to ask, ‘what this must mean for our being able to perform such patterns of either reduplication or duplication?’ It is all very well to merely describe, or prescribe, or proscribe the understood nature of such performances, but, a less *ad hoc* reading of such patterns of behaviour should stand us in better stead. Allowing us, at this point, to more successfully deal with a succession of problems that, in part, live above such complications. (22)

2. Ten Problems that Require Less *ad hoc* Forms of Resolution

i. Confessions

A traditional style of metaphysics obviously incorporated 'something' that was found to have value. I suspect that 'something', among a number of other things that reinforced the proffering of a dubious sense of certainty and a certain sense of ideological safety, was an ability to definitively name processes and things that can only be delineated through an intuitive extrapolation from the imputation of an envisaged domain of the ineluctable, be that interpreted in either a religious mode or in a non-religious mode, with the latter taking either a spiritual or secular orientation. But, naming such things is one thing and the imputed reality of that named is another matter. Ideas that are fraudulently constructed can be easily deconstructed. So, we might suppose that such names, naming certain concepts and phenomenological experiences like, e.g., 'substance', 'space', 'time', the persisting continuity of 'identity', 'truth', and so on, conveniently nominate the utilized architecture of our thinking as we make our passages through this world at large. The reiterated usage of such linguistic habits then reinforces those same patterns of behaviour. However, in such matters we have to be more 'pragmatic' than 'pragmatical' and dispense with notions that are patently impossible forcing the reasonable philosopher to adopt and adapt an anti-representationalism. Still, metaphorical-like concepts like 'substance', 'space', 'time', the persisting continuity of 'identity', 'truth', and so on, are still pointed to through the use of the same type of language and we have to ask that in relativistical terms of reference, rather than impossible absolutistical terms, just how modes of a non-impossible representationalism must also be incorporated within the overall confines of an 'anti-representational-representationalism'. (23)

As just noted, traditional metaphysical ideas, when properly approached, are very easy to deconstruct. In this regard, I was most certainly influenced by critical Buddhist forms of critique. Very early on I would affirm a substance-less style of 'metaphysics' and, subsequently, generally would steer clear of a traditional metaphysics. So, to continue this confession, what changed? (24)

In the course of writing this *Pursuit*, relatively recently, I was quite horrified to find that I had unwittingly formulated two definitions of the 'metaphysical' which, on face value, could be (mis)construed to be in conflict. The persistence of categories like the apparently substantial, space, time, and so forth provoked me to invoke a metaphysics of categories as a sort of semantic extension of phenomenological categories. A second definition took a more globalized perspective by arguing that the philosophical appreciation of an act of philosophical appreciation (of a certain topic in question) could not be, at least initially, philosophical *per se*, being meta-philosophical[132] in orientation. Then, all I had to do, was to re-define the 'meta-philosophical' as 'metaphysical', albeit as reconstituted though this obligatory lens of an anti-representationalism. (25)

How would I manage to harmonize these two seemingly independent definitions? By that stage I had defined 'philosophy' from a trans-cognitively order perspective,

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[132] Refer to paragraph 14.

through the imputed les of a ‘trimodal philosophical economy’ as ‘one-part hermeneutic in orientation, one-part phenomenological in orientation, and one-part (non-systematic) existential in orientation’. Around the same time, I was also extending an ordered philosophy through processes of reduplication into an inter-ordered dimension. E.g., the reduplication of sixth cognitively order of facts, as the ‘facts of facts’, was envisaged as forming the basis for the discipline of ‘history’. E.g., the reduplication of fifth cognitively order of potentials or possibilities, as the ‘possibility of positively’, was envisaged as forming the basis for the discipline of ‘science’ in its delineation and determination of the theoretical possibility of such possibilities, etc. Where by ‘etc.’ we would include the need to match theory with evidence and necessary forms of critical assessment, and so on. On the modal of an inter-ordered reduplication of orders it was but a small step to go from the reduplication of orders to the reduplication of the philosophical economy. Hence my distinction of ‘global’ as referring to ‘the overall nature of an ordered economy, etc.’, and ‘local’ as referring to ‘the focusing on a specific ordered phenomenon, or inter-ordered phenomenon, etc.’ (26)

Rather than having two completely different definitions of the metaphysical the development of conceptual tools to appreciate the inter-ordered dimension involved in the reduplication of ordered phenomena (as distinctive types of judgmental experience) it is now easy to see the a globalized form of the inter-ordered domain effective overlaps and subsumes a more categorical definition that can be re-defined through the symmetrical reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of the semantically-phenomenological or phenomenologically-semantic. That, in effect, an extrapolation of the natural atomic-like categories to be found through a linguistic-physiological classification of experience. So, e.g., experiences of duration, intermittent re-iterations, days turning into nights and nights into days… can be classified under the semantic concept of ‘time’ along with all other allied concepts co-associated with the same (such as, e.g., ‘duration’, ‘re-iteration’ and ‘intermittency’, ‘alternation’, and so forth). (27)

However, with some reluctance, although perceiving the inter-ordered dimension to be somewhat metaphysically orientated, after some time I then decided to include all six forms of inter-ordered reduplication as ‘metaphysical’, and, where the metaphysical domain or dimension could not be anything other than being entirely defined through the lens of inter-ordered phenomena. (28)

All in all, this vision of the metaphysical, in the course of this expansion, has profoundly reshaped this version of a non-traditional style of metaphysics. Ideas that envisage the entailment of not only a ‘categorical metaphysics’ (through a reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order) but a co-equal addition of a historical metaphysics (through a reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order) and a scientific metaphysics (through a reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitive order). Hence the surprising ramifications of this reconstituted vision of the metaphysical. In some ways returning to a more traditional metaphysics, by perhaps proffering a reason for the persistence of such categories, whilst also insisting at the same time, on the overriding supremacy in this reconstituted discipline that it must also recognize the centrality of an anti-representationalism. Hence the earlier allusion to a ‘resuscitation’ of this discipline but not its ‘resurrection’. (29)

ii. The 'Metaphysical Turn' or 'Revolution'

My 'confession', and its various stages or shifts in orientation, is more of a 'revolution' than a mere 'turning' or simple act of re-directing our attention or, better, a simple re-framing of that related type of discourse. In doing research for my Thesis (Versions I & II), and taking on board the perspectives of a transcendental phenomenology, along with the economic evolution of the same in conjunction with ideas devolving from both hermeneutical and existential inputs I very early on differentiated between the sense and semblance of the 'Absolute' taking on either an absolutist reading *versus* an absolutistical reading. The former is refracted through the suitable exercise of a well-conducted and well-pre-informed comprehensive suspension and the latter is devoid of such critical forms of ongoing, constructive re-constitution. Obviously, as set up, the valid implication to be drawn is that I am affirming the working possibility of the former and completely dis-confirming the viability of the latter especially if it is also non-economically constituted (in the negative sense of the 'non-economic') (which is all too often what is exactly happening through acts of fiat, metaphorical abuse, fallacious arguments, etc.). (30)

In other words, I am wishing to make a categorical distinction between an 'absolute philosophy' and an 'absolutist philosophy' whilst, at the same time, proffering my tentative seal of approval to the former and not, under any circumstances, extending it to the latter. What differentiates them is that the former cannot entertain substantial metaphysical concepts in a traditional mould by virtue of the suspension whereas the latter cannot escape such fantasies. Or, more crudely expressed, the former can validly entertain metaphorical ideation as 'metaphorical', whereas, the latter is awash with an unchecked desire to literalize what cannot and should not be rendered in that manner as the result of such metaphorical abuse, and so. (31)

This would be an apposite time to make an additional confession and admit to metaphorically 'murdering' this term 'absolute', and its correlates by differentiating between 'absolutist' and 'absolutistical'. At least I have attempted to remain consistent in this regard and as a result have been 'murdering' this expression for the last three decades. The philosophical test is in asking ourselves, 'does the philosopher or philosophy in question either overtly and/or covertly use, consistently, an extensive suspension or a working suspension, or similar? By 'suspension' is implied all the formal and informal techniques that could be mustered that either directly or indirectly induce the consequences of an act of suspension. In my Thesis, e.g., I focused on the use of ongoing 'dis-valuation' (and negatively contrasted it with devaluation) as a process to achieve a similar result. So, e.g., the world is to be seen as dream, a bubble, a shadow, etc. On the other hand, the absolutist goes too far and then literalizes the metaphor to insist that the world is a dream, a bubble, a shadow, etc. An absolute philosopher is more concentrating on the means to an end rather than that end *per se* as entertained by an absolutistical philosopher, a philosopher who is (mistakenly) an 'absolutist'. E.g., I would like to intuitively credit Plato as doing this if only through his persistent Socratic critique of his arguments, given that a processes of continual interrogation, continual questioning effectively achieves the same result. Similarly, viewing Hegel, rightly or wrongly, as also invoking suspensions either directly or indirectly, etc. On the other hand, when 'dis-valuation' be-

comes ‘devaluation’, the philosopher ends up tying themselves in ‘knots’. E.g., in reading long sections of Shankara and finding him repetitively insisting that ‘the world’ is a ‘dream’, an ‘illusion’, ‘*maya*’, etc., his vision of the worldly seemed to take such a dark turn that when I turned to reading Ramanuja his theological vision of the world seem to positively glow. I suspect that when a philosopher or theologian, a metaphysician or disciplinarian is excessively prolix, myself exempted of course, that they are endlessly circling a psychic blindspot of epic proportions. Especially if the introductory paragraph is far too long (as an introduction). E.g., Shankara tortures both himself and his reader when in the beginning of his commentary, and its endless polemics, on the *Vedanta Sutra* (or also known as the *Brahma Sutra*) where he attempts to over-privilege one voice in grammar over the over two voices when the use of a suspension would have seen him applying a suspended equivalence of all three voices. Where, in attempting the seemingly impossible, he ties himself up through endless, and relatively unnecessary, contortions. At the around the same time, or correctly a little earlier, certain Buddhist logicians were also guilty, to my mind, of a similar over-privileging of certain concepts over other, such as, e.g., their unhealthy over-emphasis upon ‘particulars’ (*dharma*s) that in my estimation would inevitably and fatally deconstruct the application of their entire system despite whatever valuable logical innovations that were possibly made along the way that might usefully be salvaged? (32)

That, once I emphasized the centrality of the suspension, in all its varieties, I could no longer be a traditional metaphysician. Consequently, and subsequently, I avoided all forms of traditional metaphysics that did not observe this ‘condition’, namely, ‘that there is a necessary need to observe the centrality of an effective suspension’ if only in order to suitably conduct that course of research since questions demand suspensions and no interrogation of our representations is going to succeed without consistently and persistently observing such a necessary condition for doing such research in the first place, etc! (33)

However, despite avoiding the ‘look’ of a traditional metaphysics still questions about such intentional object(ive)s like, e.g., ‘space and time’, ‘identity’, ‘transformations’, ‘positive values’ *versus* ‘negative values’, and so on, cannot be effectively ignored by the serious philosopher. I suspect that ‘what does not enter by the front door may well enter by the back door’. That an inter-ordered reduplication of the distinctive, physiologically constituted semantic-phenomenological categories to be found in judgments exercised within a first trans-cognitive form of judgment, whilst suspended, had an obvious metaphysical-like complexion without, at the same time, needing to be associated with the impossible constitution of a more traditional style of a misbegotten form of metaphysics. (34)

More or less, at the same time, in pondering considerations of conformal assessment of truth determinations, or more broadly, entering into forms of philosophical appreciation that the philosophical appreciation of forms of philosophical appreciation could not be, at least initially, further acts of philosophical appreciation, but, rather, metaphilosophical forms of appreciation, i.e., which, to all intent and purposes is none other

than exhibiting a metaphysical-like complexion, albeit without the impossible baggage of a misbegotten style of a traditional metaphysics that so obviously has gone awry. (35)

Such progress, in both senses, has been somewhat of a circle, or a circling back, albeit, hopefully, without making the same or similar mistakes. Hence somewhat of a 'revolution' in that regard. But, a more important sense is also being implied. My use of the expression 'initially' is to alert the reader, or audience, to the contention that in the application of a philosophy of transformation retreatment we do have a type of circuit where the philosophical term of a 'metaphysical turn' might be more profitably translated through this lens of a philosophy of retreatment. Let me explain. (36)

In applying the circular economics of retreatment, we begin with the prior appreciation of our philosophical research. In a quest to critically appreciate the conformal status of such research, determine its overall truth value, that stage of pretreatment is then suspended and through metafication then takes on a temporary status of being elevated by one meta-degree. The de-suspension then automatically ensues and, in doing so, the de-suspension, through de-metafication, delivers a provisional verdict, which, through post-treatment of the pretreatment enables this revolution to be reperformed if this process is to be iteratively recontinued. That, through such reiteration it is possible for relatively chaotic forms of re-iteration to emerge that are 'relatively-radical' in complexion. As argued elsewhere, psychically, we cannot deal with the radically-radical, and, where only through the incremental re-appropriation of the relatively-radical can progress in such matters be achieve. Hence the applicable appellation of 'revolution', too, in these two additional senses imported from this philosophy of transformational retreatment. (37)

These various perspectives granted, how is a metaphysical revolution initiated, and, what are some of the ramifications to be expected from its transformational retreatment? (38)

First, the central importance of a working suspension, as either a series and/or set/s of suspension is and must be accepted. (39)

Second, an effective process of suspension can take many forms and is central to any philosophical process of interrogation, i.e., questioning. But, it could be rightly argued, that even wayward metaphysicians and misguided absolutistical philosophers are also posing apparent questions so what differences must in place in order to differentiate the same? Here, I would like to suggest that authentic disciplinarians are not undermining the trajectories of their questions along either theoretical, practical and/or critical lines of endeavour and, by such means, are more fully receptive to a relatively non-distorted reception of the ensuing implications and consequences as bound up in the ramifications of those suspensions. Rather than either over-reading and over-writing of such processes and/or under-reading and under-righting the same, instead, they are willing and prepared to be more instructed in such matters. Remain more 'open' to the inevitable advent of the relatively-radical given that incremental reiteration will invariably induce the emerge of such novelties, and so on and so forth. Otherwise, it would be time to soon return to our caves once more! (40)

iii. The Presentation and Resolution of Two Differing Definitions

Of course, we should also note 'that the *x* of *x* is not *x* or is non-*x*, and so on'. 'Philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' is 'not philosophical appreciation *per se*'. In line with that rule, 'meta-philosophical appreciation' could be given the appellation of being 'not a philosophy' or is 'non-philosophical', etc. However, I do not wish to push this too far since, through retreatment, the 'meta-philosophical' or the 'metaphysical' as here critically reconstituted, can be returned to philosophical discourse, and so on. (41)

Admittedly, in two different essays, I had unwittingly supplied two seemingly discordant definitions of this resuscitated discipline of metaphysics. A discipline, I should add, here acts as a sub-discipline within the super-discipline of philosophy (given that through retreatment it returns to this field of the philosophical, like aesthetics, logics, ethics, etc.). (42)

A first definition basically defined a 'categorical metaphysics' as an experiential type of inter-ordered phenomena that is 'realized through reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of a phenomenologically constituted semantics'.[133] Another second definition was unwittingly proposed along the lines 'that the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation (cannot be merely philosophical appreciation *per se* but) must be some form of meta-philosophical appreciation, i.e., some form of a metaphysical appreciation'. (43)

But should we decide to extend the notion of the 'metaphysical' to include all forms of inter-ordered formation, and, by including the reduplication of the philosophical economy as a type of global inter-ordered phenomenon then we have automatically created an overall metaphysical category that would include both a categorical metaphysics and this reduplication of a global philosophical economy within the overall confines of a metaphysical economy. Let me explain what is involved in this regard. (44)

Defining the philosophical economy (P^1) as (one-part hermeneutical orientation, one-part phenomenological, and, one-part (non-systematic) existential), etc.[134], can be mapped in ordered terms of reference as $(5^1 + 1^1 + 3^1) = P^1$. (45)

Then, through reduplication $(5^1 + 1^1 + 3^1)$ x $(5^1 + 1^1 + 3^1)$ we get a metaphysical economy $(M^2) = (5^2 + 1^2 + 3^2)$. Obviously, (M^2) is not equal to (P^1). So, therefore, the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation is not merely 'philosophical appreciation but 'metaphysical appreciation', here redefined as 'metaphysical appreciation' (in the form of a metaphysical economy as reconstituted).[135] (46)

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133 The reader might like to refer to either *The Seventh Book…* or *Book* 9.

134 By 'etc.' is implied an open-ended list of sub-disciplines that also contribute to the 'brand' of the philosophical economy, e.g., aesthetics (2^1), logics, dialectics, etc. A list, that over time, would be quite fluid. E.g., in the Medieval era the topic of astrology would have been on this list while the modern discipline of phenomenology would be missing.

135 Note, I have also defined, more as an experiment, the secular economy as 'one-part aesthetics, one-part pragmatical, and, one-part ontical (factual) appreciation', but, preferably, also left 'open-ended'.

iv. The Implications of an Inter-Ordered Meta-Semantic Categorical Perspective

Here things get quite interesting, from a creative sense of perspective, since in order to reduplicate all six individual trans-cognitive orders we have to innovatively configure these six individual metaphysical candidates and appropriately nominate the same. However, the intellectual intensity of this problem is somewhat lessened by realizing that we have already accounted relatively non-problematic nominations for half of these metaphysical categories. So, e.g., the reduplication of the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic or the semantically-phenomenological seems to give us a categorical metaphysics, and, the reduplication of the fifth order of possibilities or potentiality, in effect, gives us the discipline of science, and, the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order of ontical facts, in effect, gives us the discipline of history. But in reduplicating the three remaining orders of aesthetics (2^1), deontology/pragmatics (and a non-systematic existentialism) (3^1), and the pragmatical (4^1) now need to be accounted for…[136] (47)

In reduplicating aesthetics (and its cognitive integration of an atomic semantics in the form of molecular sentences) I am inclined to view this as informing the discipline of psychology in general, and, where its intersubjective treatment extends to the discipline of a sociology (although, alternatively, sociology could also be viewed as the reduplication of a psychology putting it into a hyper-ordered format). But, provisionally, let us view the reduplication of aesthetics as a form of psychology (with the possible inclusion of a sociology). (48)

In considering the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological (and as possessing a non-systematic existential correlation) I would be inclined to view 3^2 as political in the sense of exercising executive power (and not the sense and semblance of the 'political' as viewed in mere legislative terms of reference). (49)

Last, how might one view the reduplication of the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical and here I am tempted to view it as perhaps informing the discipline of economics and nominating it as 'economical'. (50)

As a digression, some resonance might be found in my ascribing the discipline of political-economics as one-part politics (32), one-part economics (42), and one-part stylistics (3^1 or 3^2?) given, too, that value in general embraces the third, second and fourth orders. However, we need to note that executive powers are to be found in the critical-existential axis whereas, in contrast, the political is equated with theoretical and the hermeneutical orientation. Last 'stylistics' is where political power is to be exercised, and, the practical dimension of business has to be then aligned with the a first ordered semantic-phenomenology. In order to envisage an economy of value we might have to invoke

[136] In other words, I am admitting to the fact that assigning an appellation to these three remaining inter-ordered metaphysical categories has been to date somewhat fluid, but, taking an optimistic and pragmatic tack am prepared to see what eventually happens when the metaphorical 'dust' settles. The reader is invited to see if they can provide alternative solutions here.

some form of interaction between the second, third and fourth orders? But such ideas, obviously, as yet have not been fully developed. (51)

Although provisional, let me tabulate these findings as follows:

1^1	Phenomenological-Semantics	1^2	Categorical Metaphysics
2^1	Aesthetics	2^2	Psychology/(Sociology)
3^1	Deontology/Existentialism	3^2	Political (Execution)
4^1	Pragmatical	4^2	Economics
5^1	Hermeneutics/Potentials[137]	5^2	Science
6^1	Ontics/Actuals[138]	6^2	History (52)

In effect, through reduplication of the philosophical economy, as defined, we arrive at the overall metaphysical economy. (53)

Within the global embrace of the metaphysical economy, we can then subsume these six sub-metaphysical disciplines (as mapped in paragraph 52). (54)

What ramifications does this have for the evolving understanding of this newly reconstituted discipline of a comprehensive global metaphysics? (55)

That we have to now understand that the overall field of the metaphysical (as here reconstituted as ‘anti-representation’ in tenor, etc.) will need to include various preoccupations, namely, those disciplines concerned with a categorical semantics; psychological considerations; as political in tenor, in the sense of exercising political power and not merely involved in the promulgation of laws, etc., and, as invoking the disciplines of economics, science, and history (or, rather, histories[139]). (56)

In some sense we could call these six disciplines as ‘metaphysically oriented disciplines?’ Namely, these six disciplines of semantics, psychology, politics, economics, science, and history. (57)

Noting, furthermore, that through retreatment even metaphysical topics can be retreated and reinserted back into, hopefully, conformally constrained, relatively less *ad hoc* philosophical discourses, etc. By ‘conformally constrained’ is meant ‘non-conspiratorially constituted, and as basically aligned with well-formed, well-pre-informed, and well-organized, conjecturally sound discourses, etc. (58)

It is also but a small step to take whereby the entirety of inter-ordered phenomena are now to be seen as only metaphysical in orientation, as reconstituted through this evolving concept of a resuscitated ‘metaphysics’ that has both a global form(at) and six distinctive local flavours as outlined above. (59)

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137 I.e., as dealing with the relatively virtual.

138 I.e., as dealing with the relatively non-virtual

139 That there are histories of individuals, families, countries, professions, along with histories of the past, present, and future, etc.

v. The Ramifications of a Totally Inter-Ordered Interpretation

Finding conformal insight and making practical progress is always an incremental affair. In this regard, it is understandable that there is always a certain degree of inertia and reluctance is sensibly shifting our positioning, be it either locally or globally. But, be that as it may, even if at first, we do not accept a metaphysical reinterpretation, say, of the disciplines of science or history or semantics or psychology or politics or economics,[140] still, such an idea should be contemplated given that nothing is lost by doing so and, should it be found to have some degree of an alignment with lived-reality, then we have more to gain. However, how might such a conjecture be best approach in an incremental fashion as indicated? (60)

Earlier I noted 'that the *x* of *x* is not *x* or is non-*x*, and so on'.[141] In the light of this formula we can note that 'the philosophical appreciation of a philosophical appreciation', as a 'philosophy of philosophy', is not only a 'meta-philosophical appreciation' equated with a 'metaphysical appreciation' but can also be designated as 'not a philosophy' or is a 'non-philosophy'. That understood, it would seem to be a not unreasonable question to ask, 'what relationship, if any, does the metaphysical possibly bear with respect to a non-economics?' In effect, this will enlarge that complex conjecture that is already attempting to find connections, if called for, between some or all inter-ordered phenomena, and the field of the metaphysical as here being reconstituted or resuscitated, and the super-economic realm of the non-economic, the non-economic sub-economy in its constitution of a conjectured super-economic. (61)

I am outlining this direction in order to see if we can conjecturally account, in a less *ad hoc* manner, for patterns of global reduplication implicating the non-economic within the orbit of the super-economic. It is all very well to interpretatively propose global reduplication as an inferred process, as a tentatively conjectured description used to merely name such an inferred process without at the same time, at least, proffering forms of modeling that might present such appellations as being then construed in a relatively less *ad hoc* frame of reference. It might seem strange to say that we invoke more *ad hoc* forms of explanation in order to then render the overall appreciation of the same in a relatively less *ad hoc* light. (62)

I have a medical book from around the year 1700 and it is prone to talk about 'animal spirits' in somewhat of a very Cartesian-like manner, but, once one is accustomed to their strange nomenclature it all seems to come together to make better sense of what observations are merely being marshalled to hand. In one chapter, obviously dealing with hypomania, the phenomenological descriptions supplied appear to be quite modern and prescient. Now the point I would like to make is it is not so much the *ad hoc* labelling brought to bear but the manner of their interconnections arrived at that is far more important and is more significant than any one *ad hoc* label *per se*. Although I am sure, e.g., Richard Rorty will find an essay to discuss a certain theme in greater depth, short of find-

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140 This list starts with the fifth inter-ordered order, proceeds to the sixth, and, thence, to the first and, from there, on to the fourth through the second and third.

141 Paragraph 41.

ing that essay various (implicit) pronouncements like ‘democracy is better’, ‘social consensus is good’, ‘how do we get to operate an anti-representationalism by asking ourselves what the manual might say’, and so on. I have found it frustrating, but, have also found such an elliptical terseness inspiring and able to provoke me to seek out how these statements could take on a positive form of conformal re-affirmation through a closer reading of such implied interconnections. (63)

The idea of a ‘closer reading’ is also somewhat of a dialectical paradox. If we got too physically close to any text, we would not be able to read it. On the other hand, this expression does ask us to pay closer attention to the details of that text. That to do that also implies that we stand back and assume some sort of necessary degree of suspended detachment. When reading an unfamiliar text, it all too easy to ‘hallucinate’ and see things in the text that are just not there… as we might discover when we reread that same text. In that regard, the admonition ‘to read the text in front of you’ takes on a greater urgency.[142] (64)

Can such connections cited be well-argued for? Hopefully this complex conjecture, if established, might simplify this understanding as to just how a pattern of global reduplication can actually be envisaged, etc? (65)

By ‘global’ is meant ‘the entirety of an economy (albeit as artificially extracted from the overall functioning of the psyche)’. By ‘reduplication’ is meant the symmetrical dominance of one form of intentional functioning over, ostensively, the same type of intentional functioning hence this symmetry’. In ‘global reduplication’ we seek to understand the ‘ramifications of one economy seemingly being able to dominate instances of that same type of economy in some form of an operational interaction’. (66)

So, let us run with the idea that a metaphysical economy as a non-philosophical economy is also being expressed non-economically, i.e., unilaterally through the definitive nature of the last instance reflecting that such definitive delineation is a result of a process of resolution able to be expressed, beyond the merely economic confines of the sub-economic economy, through the de-metafical force of the de-suspension. Where if the process of resolution were to be left entirely within the economic confines of the sub-economic it could only proffer a virtual sense and semblance of resolution. But ‘we cannot live on the idea of bread alone’ and so we need the virtual to find its ‘voice’ so to speak, and, thereby, ‘enter’ into a non-virtual form of expression in the messy causality of this world at large. (67)

If we were to arm-wrestle with ourselves, we would probably find a more dominant hand subduing the less dominant hand. A betting person would most likely assume most people to be right-handed and that in this context, fairly conducted, the right hand, on balance, should win more often than not. How is this awkward process possible? Because most people have bodies with two arms. Or, in an arm-wrestling competition with someone else, we then have two bodies coming to confront each other through this form

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[142] An expression that was often used by my Sanskrit teacher, Brian Parker, on a number of occasions more numerous than they should have been.

of behaviour. In other words, wider frames of reference allow us to understand how the ends of such limbs can confront each other given that such confrontations are conducted on a wider level of embodiment than just those arms themselves. Or, more to the point, all confrontations must occur in wider terms of reference than merely in terms of that temporary arena or debating stage or similar. (68)

Therefore, confrontations occur, in general terms, although relative combatants, but also must involve or co-opt wider terms of reference. Hence the implication of the general argument that the non-economic expression of a productive process of resolution must also occur within the wider context of the super-economic. How might such accommodation or appropriation be both supervised and achieved? (69)

First, let me pronounce on some simple rules dealing with unimodal, bimodal and trimodal patterns of suspension as introduced in *Book* 11, namely, respectively, intra-mediation, mediation, and intermediation as viewed from overtly focused and covertly de-focused (background) points of view… where intermediation delivers a de-suspension in keeping with its context, etc…

1. The overt focusing on intra-mediation gives us the covert backgrounding of mediation.
2. The overt focusing on mediation gives us the covert backgrounding of intra-mediation.
3. The overt focusing on mediation and intra-mediation gives us covert intermediation.
4. The overt focusing on intermediation will deliver a covert process that entails the automatic invocation of the de-suspension (through the ensuing process of de-metafication as a process of resolution). (70)

The above can be applied to the following diagram[143] detailing the super-economy:

Meta-Status of 1 Degree: **Economic**

*

Meta-Status of 0 Degree: **Hyper-Economic** **Non-Economic** (71)

Applying Rule 1 to the Economic gives us a focus on the Economic Sub-Economy. Implying the mediation of both sub-economies of the Hyper-Economic. Focus-

[143] How to diagrammatically represent the internal relations within the super-economic is quite difficult so I eventually settled on this parallel with transformational retreatment. Otherwise, using a vertical scheme, every one of the six possible permutations seem to pose difficulties in how these sub-economies might interact with the others. E.g., should one place the non-economic sub-economy at the bottom (in order to interface with the causal dimension) or at the top (so as to indicate the spontaneous emergence of a unilateral response of the last instance, etc. Linking it in a modelling of retreatment places it with the de-suspension as a definite response also taking on a causal dimension (in its movement from the Economic to the Non-Economic orientations.

ing this mediation, by Rule 2, gives us the de-focusing on the Economic. By Rule 3, gives us the overall suspension of that placed within that suspension. Then, by Rule 4, we have a fully functioning trimodal suspension (intermediation) along with the forceful delivery of the de-suspension. (72)

Now, suspensions by their very nature are symmetrically balance through the auspices of that act of intermediation, however, by their very nature de-suspensions are asymmetrically non-balanced accordingly. Hence the relative difference in power between relatively paralyzed suspensions (in an act of intermediation) and the asymmetrical nature of their ensuing de-suspensions. The implication to be drawn by making this observation is that although suspensions are enacted through symmetries, the breaking of these symmetries sees the ensuing forcefulness of those suspensions in question. Hence this imputed ability of a suspension to suitably express itself should it be both well-formed (genre-wise) and well-pre-informed (factually) hermeneutically, etc. (73)

Therefore, we might conjecture that if these interpreted-observational-conjectures were applied to the operations of the super-economic we could surmise that the irruption of non-economic expressions of patterns of resolution could well be envisaged through a covert or over super-intermediation where a covert non-economic act of intra-mediation is expressed *versus* the covert super-mediation of both the economic and the hyper-economic moments/polarities/correlatives, etc. (74)

Adding to this overall conjecture that the inter-ordered dimension may well describe an actively-enacted, or engaged, metaphysical complexion to such machinations. Where, e.g., an appreciation of the situation in question is overlaid with possibilities, a sense of the historical, replete with various categories, refracted through a sense of the psychological, with an appreciation of which executive roles we can exercise in that situation along with the economic costs of such forms of response, etc. That, if those sorts of experiential aspects are to be found co-associated with such situational forms of awareness, then we may well re-interpret the same as if having a metaphysical-like complexion over the course of such enactments. That this metaphysical-like commentary should not be just reviewed as something passively received but also as something that can be actively-enacted, and from an existential sense of perspective, something that could also be seriously engaged. So, that granted, how are we to understand the nature of an existential dimension in this context of an inter-ordered experience of the metaphysical? (75)

I have noted that the metaphorical ‘entry and exit’ to and from the existential is through the (extensive) suspension, also defined as a ‘working suspension’ for simplicity and convenience. However, as every intentional act can be viewed as being iterated through a suspension, a necessary qualification needs to be made in order to obtain a deeper understanding of this observation. I.e., where we would need to note the relative emergent quality of that suspension. Moreover, I have also conjectured that every intentional judgment that issues, through resolution, as facilitated through non-economic irruption, is also open, to some extent, to treating the unilateral response of the last instance as the unilateral response of the next instance in so far as it reveals its potential existential impact that we might permit or might not permit being taken up as the unilateral response

of the first instance when and where we then permit the enacted realization of that existential aspect in terms of a discerned recognition encountering and engagement of the apparent suitable specificity of that response within the resonant confines of its relational situatedness. Where by resonant I am merely telegraphing that this first response will oversee a succession of responses, hopefully, more in tune, in attunement, with the constitution of that situatedness in terms of either its creation, preservation, and/or conservation of an existential enrichment and non-existential richness, etc. Diagrammatically:

A unilateral response of the last instance –

Then, a unilateral response of the next instance –

If permitted, a unilateral response of the first instance, etc.[144] (76)

Or, put another way, the quality of an existential response will also reflect the representative quality of its inputs, arguing, as with a conjectural economy, on the necessity of being well-formed, well-pre-informed, etc. (77)

The test of the apparent suitability of an existential response being followed up in regard to the unilateral response, itself being taken up from a permitting the next instance to become enacted as the first response… in a series of continuing responses following on in the wake of the decision to intervene in that manner as indicated through re(-)self-organization. By re(-)self-organization is meant the emergent impact of the existential economy wherein positive chaotic phenomena are to be existentially preferenced by the emergent enactment of that simulated relationship *per se* as it finds itself experientially being simulated in intentional terms, etc. Although, more correctly, the suspension sets this emergent surplus heading in an apposite direction through the ensuing force of the de-suspension (in a breaking of the suspended symmetries being simulated). Hence these epithets of spontaneity; re-self-organization; alignment through ongoing re(-)alignment, etc; harmonization; motivational inspiration; through the potency of the relationship itself to instigate apposite forms of response that will enable an enrichment of existential e/valuational formation and non-existential richness in e/valuational formation. All in all, a seemingly effortless process of enaction is able to be instigated in causal terms from the empowerment of that relationship through the suspension whose specificity of response is such that it appears to be stamped by the essential nature of that relationship itself which, through the auspices of the suspension, cannot and should not be expressed as being 'substantial' in any sense, indeed, as pragmatically operating from an inter-ordered pro-relational, positively nihilistic, anti-representational sense of perspective, etc. (78)

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144 'First' in the sense of a new chain of responses linked to that first existentially oriented response (in its breaking away from the automatic nature of the initial, unilateral response of the last instance). 'First' in the sense of having broken away from that last instance through a suspension, through existential intervention, as self-organized by our suspended representation/s of that primary relationship in question, albeit as relationally embedded, etc. In the process, the first instance facilitates the creation of a new series of responses issuing ever after in the wake of enacting its permitted apperception along with its potential for the current promulgation of its relatively-radical re-directedness. Relatively-radical but never radically-radical (since the ramifications of the latter, as it stands, could not be currently comprehended).

vi. An Anti-Representational-Representationalism

In a qualified sense we here have to deal with two ‘givens’, namely, that it has been successfully demonstrated that a strong representationalism is impossible to contemplate courtesy of dialectical critiques,[145] a radical appreciation of economic positioning,[146] and the accumulative work of a succession of critical philosophers such as e.g., Richard Rorty, *et al*., and so on, and, that somehow or other languages function through some form of a non-strong representationalism, ‘Qualified’ in the sense that these back-to-back conjectures have to be worked for on the grounds that these demonstrations of the impossibility of a strong representationalism in conjunction with the necessity for a non-strong representationalism appear to go ‘hand in hand’ like the ‘two sides of a coin’. Hence this dialectical position of a ‘anti-representational-representationalism’. (79)

Now, continuing the train of argumentation from the previous sub-section let us note that, within an economy, forms of ordered research and inter-ordered products can be delineated. However, with respect to whole economies it is obvious that their reduplication or duplication must be situated in those economies that are more encompassing, i.e., of entire sub-economies themselves, etc. Is this accommodation or appropriation possible to conceive? Yes! Witness the necessary encapsulation of the aspirational economy under the auspices of the economy of arbitration in overseeing the successful enaction of a small number of our personal ambitions and our more socially oriented projects and programs often performed as the tender or currency or guarantee for the completion of the former, etc.[147] (80)

Therefore, as a matter of necessity it behooves us to supply the conjecture of the super-economy in order to account for the observed fact that the philosophical economy, itself, can apparently be appreciated, say, from a conformal sense of perspective, etc., the re-appropriation of the sub-economy of the non-economic, the hermeneutical-like re-appropriation of the non-economic sub-economy through the backgrounding of the hyper-economic, etc. (81)

But, as heuristical devices we do not need to prove that they have an actual ‘presence’ or physical ‘footprint’ in this world at large, only, that, from a pragmatic point of view, they currently supply the best modeling to date in order to successful explore through, such conjecturally contrived linguistic tools, the best means we have at our disposal for engaging the metaphorical ‘contours’ of the terrain under either general investigations, particular analyses, and/or specific examinations. (82)

Needless to say, even individual economies cannot be (mis)treated as ‘economic isolates’ just as correlatives should be approached within a certain economy or the paralleling of correlativities between economies or within more encompassing forms of economic appropriation as required in the reduplication of an entire economy, etc. (83)

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145 Both historical, e.g., Buddhist, etc., and, contemporary.

146 ‘Radical’ in the sense that we have to take on board the non-economic and its super-economic accommodation, etc.

147 As explored in the third essay, *Pursuit*, III.XII.(XII)C.

vii. A Positive Nihilism

The logical consequence of this anti-representational appreciation that both economies and economic correlatives, etc., cannot be (mis)treated as economic isolates in the impossible context of a certain strong philosophical framework that so shortsightedly attempts this impossible task is a 'positive nihilism'. (84)

'Nihilistic' in the sense that we clearly recognize that, either epistemologically or ontologically, we cannot deal with the impossible economic isolation of either entire economies and/or their economic correlativities other than in qualified provisional terms of reference, and, where such provisional terms of reference themselves either explicitly and/or implicitly accept that economic isolation cannot be attempted let alone completed. Yes, e.g., we can talk about the 'aspirational economy' as if it could stand alone, but, in our in-depth reflections upon the ways of this world as lived we find that would be impossible in practical terms. Indeed, if we even tried to adhere to that strong position, it would very soon result in our death as an inevitable result of our being so stupid to totally believe such impossible Neo-Liberal propaganda! We effectively find our freedom through others, and not otherwise… (85)

Similarly, in our intentional deliberations it may appear we can talk about something as if existing in its own right, but, such provisional positionality should not be delusively mistaken as anything other than provisional, as a partial extrapolation, as anything more than a convenient form of conventional oversight. Experience itself is not denied, only that if it were to be read through either a misguided substantialistic philosophy or an equally misguided philosophy of a negative nihilism such cogitation itself would immediately cease to function let along be experienced, and so on, and so forth. (86)

Echoing historical forms of refutation that a such nihilism is impossible, instead, I would argue that without such a positive nihilism nothing could be experienced, that experience would be impossible to have been experienced in first place![148] (87)

That to say some 'thing' is there or that there is 'nothing' there whatsoever, as positions, are both equally untenable! Things that do not change cannot be interacted with, and, a complete and thorough process of change, equally, cannot be contemplated since what then would be observed as being subject to change. But, change is observed and experienced because the pre-conditions for such recognition, encountering, and/or engagement demand the dialectics of a middle path in such matters, i.e., the conventional on one hand, and, on the other hand, an appreciation of a positive nihilism to the extent that the conventional *qua* conventional is the best we have in both critical and radical terms of reference…as ever a work in progress. As but approximations of living-experienced, to be both read and re-read as ever a work in progress… Hence an anti-representational-representationalism securely gives us our non-man's-land since intentional objectivity, intentional motivation, and intentional-subjectivity must be productively treated equally in order to appreciate the asymmetrical nature and productivity of the ensuing de-suspension. (88)

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148 Alluding to the famous rebuttal of Nagarjuna, e.g.

viii. The Co-Existence of a Pro-Relational Existentialism

It is impossible to contemplate relational contributions to a certain relationship without also being able to envisage a relational-like point of view to the extent that such contributions are being perceived to be accommodated within the ideation of that relationship as apperceived in the first place. (89)

If you were to merely perceive your 'hand' as a 'hand' but not as 'your' hand then I should well-suspect that you have immense problems that could not be overcome as things currently stand. (90)

But, fortunately, the way we see things is that they are introduced in relational contexts. The fact that all acts of intentional ideation are relationally framed within a corresponding intentional subjectivity is a first testament to this observation. If I see an apple tree then I am a person who is perceiving that apple tree regardless of the phenomenological nature of that apple tree and the phenomenological nature of my own economically constituted subjectivity. (91)

A recognition of our current gestalt background, and its hermeneutically oriented forms of intentional motivation must act as a second testament. This is what I am apparently and actively intending, from a position of volition, therefore, this must be how the relational field in question is being approached. (92)

But, all engagement is also emergently enriched to the extent a surplus of e/valuational formation is ever-present in an excess over the original richness of its investment. Thence the existential dimension. The comparative enrichment of output over input allows us to then compare the existential impact of various causal strategies we have adopted and adapted or the causal strategies as exercised by other. Hence the contours of this third testament, (93)

In our understanding and appreciation of a certain relational situation we note either objective and/or subjective elements along with inter-objective considerations of space and time, subjective, and intersubjective aspects, etc.[149] (94)

An existential dimension naturally coming to the fore through the advent of a working suspension whose qualities of expression are then a reflection of the overall quality of that suspension in terms of its organization and execution. (95)

Every intentional moment of ideation co-opts the co-associated expression of the existential, but, the specific existential qualities of that expression is another matter being directly dependent upon the qualities of its suspension. (96)

Thence the necessity to set up the preconditions for the existential enrichment of our perspectives through exercising a pro-relational perspective, etc. (97)

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[149] The 'etc.' merely noting the possibility that a religious person might be adding a fifth religious dimension to these undertakings.

ix. The Social Consequences of a Fully Functioning Metaphysical Critique

When we normally see a tree, we see a tree growing in the soil of the Earth or the soil of a container that supports it. We just do not see trees floating in space in front of us unless that tree is being shifted from one location to some other. Of course, there is the hydroponic 'solution' that has a plant supported in a liquid medium, but, that merely reinforces this observation, namely, that a living tree is living in the world and never through its being entirely dependent upon the sole resources of itself alone. (98)

The point of this observation is to note that we observe a relative interdependence of identity never its unqualified, total, absolutistical absence of support or the complete absolutistical domination of an identity (or a series and/or a set/s of identities as agents or with requite forms of agency) by some 'other' with the complete loss of all degrees of an apparent autonomy.[150] Since power is transmitted through nodes of reiteration dealing with the transmission or dissemination of that information, and, people, e.g., can disrupt such disseminations, be that enacted either wittingly and/or unwittingly. (99)

Of course, like a switch, turning it off, only works if the switch itself is first turned on in order to then be either switched 'on' or 'off'. The switch being 'first needing to be switched on' is an analogical representation of the economic background of the relationship in question. Without such a relational background, and its encompassing of the situation in question, there would be no 'relational elements' as catalogued in the first place as relational element in that type of situation. So, e.g., two friends stand within the prior imputation of a friendship. Otherwise, they are just two individual people, instead, within this relationship of this relational world at large. (100)

But, no relational situation would imply there could be no relational elements, and v.v. The implication from a personal perspective being that there could be no apparent 'individuals' without some form of a 'social encompassment', and v.v. Pointing out, as a consequence of this necessary observation, that this metaphysical domain experienced by one person, either wittingly and/or unwittingly, must also have social consequences, and v.v. Hence the logical-dialectical background to this aspect of our topic, namely, our experience of the inter-ordered nature of this metaphysical-like domain in experience. (101)

Therefore, that granted, we have to entertain the social dimensions of inter-ordered metaphysical experience under the six inter-ordered headings of the categorical, etc., along with the overall existential and non-existential impact/s presented through the apparent integrity of such experience as viewed both individually and collectively, both personally and interpersonally. Thence the metaphysical-like entracement of a semantic categorization of the world; noting the co-associated psychological complexions co-associated with our interactions; the execution and consequential appreciation of our decisions; an awareness of the embodied consequences of our commerce with others; entertaining various scientific-like conjectures about this world at large along with the narrated

[150] Even a slave can say 'no' to their supervisor. Then, even a dead body, as a corpse, 'resists' the efforts of another person to remove its, etc., by virtue of its remaining physicality.

formulations of all relevant histories progressively concerning the devolvement of the same… as textually deposited…. (102)

So, an inter-ordered complexion granted (even though inter-ordered disciplines will seemingly function as being viewed as without metaphysical implications by both disciplinarians and their audiences) along with the dynamic mix of both co-associated non-existential and existential concurrences to varying degrees, are we right to declare that all such intentional activity, etc., must also trace itself out upon the deposition of all 'texts', either 'classical' or 'non-classical' in orientation,[151] that we must inevitably leave in the overall deposition of our wake. That granted, then we must conjecture that meta-physically oriented 'imprints' must also be found (holistically) imprinted of all texts but that without the requisite hermeneutical perspectives for their discernment such traced out outputs will not, otherwise, be evident. Therefore, we must ask, the inter-ordered nature of the metaphysical dimension constituted in and through textual experience accepted, how we might prepare ourselves in order to discern such metaphysically imprinted entracements in our more formally viewed texts of a more classical orientation? (103)

To assist us in this regard, we already have to hand a hermeneutical awareness that meta-textually oriented depositions go hand and hand with textual entracements. Let me explain. (104)

Meta-textual inserts are those textual elements that either directly or indirectly inform us as the overall genre of the text in question and how that genre is to be taken up in either our writing and/or our reading of the same. So, e.g., a hand written letter looks like a 'letter', and, in comparison, a 'hand written email of a letter', generally, would look very similar. I.e., that, usually, in the text of a letter we expect to find either an address and/or an addressee, the contents of a letter that would either state that it was a letter or something to that effect, along with a signature in some form of the person who ostensively wrote that letter. Inspecting that letter more closely would then inform us as to whether it was a personal letter, a love letter, a business letter, the voicing of a certain complaint, etc., etc. Furthermore, over the course of our inspection of a classical text, in an alignment with its overtly apparent sense and semblance of intent, mostly likely reinforced with reiterations of co-associated tropes, themes, memes, etc., as stated or inferred, we would also find meta-textual introductions, conclusions, outlines of arguments, asides, definitions, counter-comments, maybe elements of irony or humour, the depiction of certain descriptions, etc., the voicing of certain intentional objectives, etc., where all such elements can be viewed as 'meta-textual' in orientation given that their primary significance it to help us read that text in question. I.e., where these conventional-like elements are either directly and/or indirectly instructing us as to how to view that text in question, be that as to how to write it or read it, or, going further, how to re-write that same text or how to re-read that text (since it could be more deeply encoded, say, through the use of irony, or humour, or even an unobtrusive code that would not be evident to the non-cognoscenti, etc.). (105)

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[151] It is difficult to draw a hard and fast distinction between classical texts, say, speech, written texts, photographs, etc., and non-classical texts, say, footprints, beads of sweat, differential traces metaphorically 'imprinted' (holistically) on brain structures and their attendant brain chemistry, etc.

x. Differentiating Metaphysically Oriented Text Formed through Retreatment

So, just how might we go about discerning these imputed metaphysically oriented entracements to be found in a nominated textual situation[152] should we invoke a similar pattern of discernment on par with our 'reading' of meta-textual entracements as a model for this type of reading? Thereby establishing the textual existence of this metaphysical dimension, and, thereafter, supplying us with further materials for an exploration of this same aspect both when and where it is found to be imprinted by experience? (106)

One reason why this vision of the metaphysical can be so easily overlooked is that through retreatment metaphysically oriented text becomes imprinted along with non-metaphysically oriented textual materials. Just as most people are not aware, nor need to be aware of what is relatively meta-textual and what is relatively not meta-textual and just textual to some extent or other. Another 'complication' being that through economic correlativity, in the textual economy (constituted from the economic correlatives of textual depositions, meta-textual instructions, and non-textually experienced simulations) no absolutistical separation of these elements can be enacted let alone contemplated. However, as there can be true absolutistical form of equality between so-called 'equivalent' texts or sections of text, it follows that no text can be perfectly paraphrased and that no segment of a text can be equally equated with some other text or segment of text. Be that in textual-metatextual terms or in non-metaphysical versus metaphysical terms of reference. On the other hand, this absolutistical inequality concerning the discernment of the metaphysical, we can apply this imputed differential to ascertain, as a matter of probability, or similar, as to whether a text or segment of text is primarily metaphysical in orientation or otherwise, etc., whilst also recognizing that no text whatsoever can be missing this metaphysical dimension in its entirety. That said, how might we apply this test (that can differentiate, with certain qualifications, between relatively metaphysical and the relatively non-metaphysical orientations, etc? (107)

In differentiating the relatively meta-textual from the relatively textual we could quite simply ask if this text is relatively prescriptive or relatively descriptive (or proscriptive in a non-textual sense where and when the relative existential is more making an appearance)? If the text in question appears to be informing us as to how to read that textual insert, rather than being something that is more to be merely read then we would see such focus as concentrating, in this instance, upon the relatively hermeneutical in orientation. In a similar vein, given the same type of inspection, what should we look for? (108)

Linking the irruption of the inter-ordered formation of metaphysically oriented e/valuational formation with the relatively non-economic and their close alliance with chaotically oriented processes of resolution as realized through chaotically inspired processes of re-direction, rather than mere redirection, then it is my suggestion that we look for the similar in order to differentiate those aspect of a text that appear to purport the distinctive mix of the metaphysical, as refracted through this inter-ordered prism, that

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[152] In the situation of a classical presentation be it either written and/or deposited in a non-written state. Say, in our reading of a novel *versus* the reading of a photo or a play or the observed non-verbal behaviour of a certain person as seen in a specific situation, etc.

inform us as having that distinctive sense and semblance of the metaphysical. In this regard, what should we be looking for? (109)

Ask yourself, if what you are focusing on is either relatively non-critical, critical, and/or relatively-radical in orientation? Hoping to find more of the latter… those innovations as if first seen, those new vocabularies that allow us to speak more informatively, those novel ways of doing things that are seen to better profit us" Then ask yourself, if what you are focusing on, perhaps, is an alteration or a transition or a transformation of some kind? Perhaps, say, in a categorical semantics, in a redefining of space or time, or identity, or some interesting variation upon the former – a startling description, or, the demanding presence of an imperative in the form of a pressing prescription, or, the impressive turning around of a process of proscription that is insistent that things now be done differently. Maybe some hinted psychological insight or cultural foresight; or the indirect expedition or the direct execution of a certain course of enaction that seems, hitherto, to be quite unexpected but existentially appropriate and proper and apposite, quite capable of enhancing a moment or period of relational enrichment; or, as well, furthering a non-existential richness in the daily commerce of our relationships; perhaps supplying novel ways of understanding and doing things; and, perhaps also enriching our historical narratives in a manner that casts a long, dark light or an enlightened darkness over how we may have got to where we have, or where we stand has evolved through struggles immemorial whose tragedies and successes etch the very stones and soil that ever more significantly surround the defining of yourself, ourselves, or may be clearly seen to have a cherished sense of standing for others..? (110)

Like a farmer with a forgotten stony field, we can be forgiven for overlooking the non-critical; with respect to the critical we might well wish to acknowledge how it is being so skillfully argued for, but, in standing before the relatively-radical our admiration can know no bonds. Finding the inter-ordered nature of the metaphysical being imprinted under the headings of either the semantic or categorical; or the psychological or sociological; or through the existential iteration of either existential hallmarks, characteristics, and/or predictors; or, the positive influences of those processes that augment the richness of the relational; or, perceiving new ways of understanding the nature of this world at large; and/or mark out the historical trials and tribulations along with the travails and treasures that re-chisel and shape a mix of histories that can speak to us in the very here and now… (111)

…allowing us to recognize, encounter and engage an existential sense and semblance of the living-present that enriches both past and future… increment by increment, be that through either addition or subtraction, we will eventually recognize, encounter and engage with that which is chaotically re-directed, in and through a sense and semblance of an emergence that cannot be merely reduced to the everyday… Before these rapt and unwrapped moments or periods of the relatively-radical… needing to take some time in order to let these unspoken things sink in… re-finding what has already been intuitively grasped. Moving ever on to further evaluate what will be found as next, again, as that which has been forever standing before us… and only now just seen... as if afresh… for the first time! A process, too, that takes its time… to become fully recognized. (112)

3. An Integrated Overview of these Less *ad hoc* Forms of Resolution

This topic of the metaphysical has a well-deserved bad press, where, e.g., a traditional style of metaphysical thinking has been so ably deconstructed by the likes of Richard Rorty, *et al*. But, most surprisingly, despite such successful deconstruction of impossible traditional accretions that deserve to be completely removed, the residue that is left, to my mind, is left metaphysically standing there right in front of us and staring back at us! Just how unobservant can we be, or, are we left merely hallucinating seeing ghosts of things long dead but which still deserve the respectfulness of a decent burial? (113)

If the philosophical appreciation of that which has been subjected to philosophical treatment, albeit before its ensuing retreatment, is to reviewed as meta-philosophical, i.e., as metaphysical, i.e. as both non-philosophically engendered and as non-economically expressed, and, moreover, where such expression is also to be reviewed as inter-ordered in complexion, then, it follows that the metaphysical complexion of the everyday is also a conformal fact of our existences that needs to addressed. On one hand, the everyday is mundane and secular, but, on the other hand, the everyday can still surprise us when correctly seen with 'new eyes'. (114)

I am fortunate to live in beautiful surroundings, but in taking the same path each day to walk it can quite quickly take on a conventional ordinariness especially if I am immersed in the silence of my thoughts. But, as a sort of meditation in mindful alertness, I set out to see what has not been seen myself before and continually surprise myself in seeing things afresh. A close exploration of the landscape about that can be done anywhere regardless of whether it be in a run-down town or waking along a beach, in rereading a favourite novel or text or in the unravelling of a new movie that could well be rich with visible clues if we have the eyes to see them..? (115)

Now, admittedly, it is one thing to take in what has already been seen, but, it is another thing to see the everyday as if metaphysically imbued with meaningful and significant details long overlooked. Am I right to insist that inter-ordered phenomena, those things generated through a reduplication of these distinctively ordered ways of judging things (and further re-expressed through duplication[153]) are to be truly reviewed through a metaphysical lens, albeit as reconstituted in the manner as set forth in this specific essay, e.g? And, furthermore, has this approach reduced the degree of *ad hoc* argumentation through this unique short-circuiting of argumentation implied through these forms of ordered and inter-ordered re-organization? To answer such expected criticism, quite simply, I would contend, that both global and local forms of reduplication and duplication somewhat simplify the thematic materials we might be dealing with, and in doing so, quite considerably reduces the level of *ad hoc*-like decisions to be made through the delibera-

[153] E.g., through the reduplication of sixth trans-cognitively ordered 'facts of facts' we get the discipline of history, or, rather, histories. Then, through duplication we could then find the discipline of history, say, doing a scholarly study on the history of science (itself seen as the reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitively ordered 'possibilities of possibilities', etc.). In that sense, duplication leaves us where we begin, be that either in ordered terms of reference or inter-ordered terms of reference.

tions of our conjectures… if anything, through inducing a greater degree of theoretical integration and critical integrity… (116)

How is such 'integration and integrity' to be arrived at through process of resolution and be expressed non-economically? (117)

Through processes of representation that are duly circumscribed by an anti-representational respectfulness to be fully arrived at through the concurrence of the reiteration of both expected textual alignments and expected textual non-alignments within and between texts. Let me explain. (118)

Now, it might be shocking to say that the fully paid up representationlist finds representational alignments within and between texts in such form that they can happily declare 'that representation is to be discovered extra-textually, as if 'outside the text'.' Albeit in meta-textual-like terms of reference. Alignments and non-alignments, at least initially, are not textual *per se*, being intra-textual or inter-textual in orientation. Where the expected reiterations of the same then inevitably contribute to a conformal reinforcement in co-associated truth determinations. (119)

Then, through the immediacy of textual retreatment our metaphysical findings, along with all other relevant considerations, will instantly take on a more re(-)normalized sense of positioning in the re(-)interpreted body of the relevant texts in question. Therefore, it behooves ourselves, as serious metaphysicians, e.g., to also discern and delineate those aspects of that textual situation in question that duly need to be recognized, encountered, and engaged as metaphysical in a manner that does a better sense of justice to our re-reading (and re-writing) of that textual situation. Such scrutiny should be achieved through applying sets of tests in the manner as briefly outlined in this essay. Asking, e.g., what is relatively non-critical, critical and relatively-radical in both complexion and tenor? Besides conducting forms of hermeneutical, phenomenal-phenomenological, and existential forms of consideration, etc., (in the course of conducting our philosophical appreciation) we then ask what alterations, changes in direction, what transitions and transformations seem evident in that textual situation, say, from semantic points of view; psychological and sociological points of view, etc. etc. By such means focusing on the relatively novel and potentially radical in comparison to more conventionally informed sections of text, and so on. (120)

The coming together of these various heuristical means must inevitably promote a conformal appreciation of that textual situation along with an enrichment of textual appreciation that cannot but assist us in meeting a progressively realized integration in our comprehension of that textual situation and, therein and thereby, setting us up to also recognize, encounter and engage the apparent integrity of that textual situation… whose sense and semblance represented in that textual situation will, through non-economic irruption, re(-)express the resident integrity of that textual situation as if re-lived, as if brought alive through such non-textual patterns of re(-)simulation… (121)

4. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

This is a difficult and controversial topic to defend, namely, that through a reduplication of philosophical appreciation, on a more global-like, economic level of performance, the same can ‘no longer continue to be immediately defined as remaining merely philosophical in both complexion and tenor’, as being needed to be re-badged as ‘meta-philosophical’ and as ‘non-philosophical’ and as ‘metaphysical’ in this reconstituted sense arrived at through ordered reduplication and its replication of inter-ordered phenomena. However, through its immediate retreatment back on to the meta-level, as the relative object-level, of the philosophical it then becomes all to easy to confuse such retreatment of such metaphysical-like insertions as nothing more than philosophical in both complexion and tenor. However, once these subtleties are recognized, encountered, and engaged we should then be able to make a much more nuanced reading of those texts redolent with such inter-ordered contributions and appreciate the integration and integrity of re(-)interpretations that can conformally be brought to those same texts. The apparent validity of such re(-)interpretations being discerned through the rediscovery of those iterative features of expected alignments and expected non-alignments, both between texts and within texts is found to profoundly reinforce such conformal determinations. Where, obviously, such a weaving together of these expected alignments and expected non-alignments is able to conformally reinforce such reiterable re(-)interpretations in a manner that need have no truck whatsoever with the impossible pronouncement of a strongly misguided, traditional metaphysics! That, by doings so, we conform to the necessary preconditions of a non-weak/non-strong pragmatic anti-representationalism. A course already initiated through the suitable use of working suspensions, and, where the de-suspension progressively induces those re-directions in position where we find ourselves more able to represent the overall hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential nature of the topic or topics in question through a performance we might well-earmark, to some extent, as more that of a serious process of ‘unlearning’, as an undoing of our mistaken interpretations… through distinctive processes of rectification, mitigation, and an ongoing re(-)normalization of our re(-)developing appreciation of the topic or topics before us. Hence, developing a process of weaving together of forms of alignment, etc., whose reiterations will be found to further conformally reinforce our ongoing processes of reinterpretation. (122)

That through the very force of this logic we are bound to interpret the inter-ordered as metaphysical in orientation, albeit in this reconstituted sense and semblance of the inter-ordered. That, if that were granted, then we must suppose that the metaphysical is also to be found in the very being of the everyday as we differentiate the relative non-critical from the critical, and through the reiterations of the critical recognize, encounter and engage with innovative and chaotic-like originality of the relatively-radical as to be progressively understood small increment by increment. Where, by such means, we find revealed both the potential enrichment of the relatively existential and the practical richness of the relatively non-existential… along with new and possibly exciting ways of seeing the semantic, the psychological and sociological, both the political and economical (as conjoined in the political-economic), along with the scientific and historical. (123)

All in all, nothing less than a total ‘revision’ of our ‘vision’, and so on..!! (124)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 3.10.24.

A. Appendix A: Applying a Similar Resolution to a Unimodal Non-Economics

The basic philosophical problem of an apparent bimodal economics is ‘to understand how we need to refract the same through a trimodal economics?’ One solution is to invoke a trimodal economy of transformational retreatment. Then, the philosophical problems becomes, ‘how do we both address local and global forms of symmetrical reduplication (and asymmetrical duplication)’. Where localized forms of reduplication can be dealt with in (sub-)economic terms of reference. On the other hand, globalized reduplication demands much wider terms of reference. Hence the necessary invocation of the super-economic, and so on. (125)

Interestingly we have a similar philosophical problem in dealing with the question, as to ‘how to re-incorporate the imputed expression of non-economic forms of resolution in their definitive irruption as ‘unilaterally decisive responses of the last instance’ (and next instance and the existentially inaugurated first instance)?’ Again, we can re-invoke the auspices of an economy of transformational retreatment as outlined over the course of this essay, albeit within the confines of the relatively super-economic, etc. (126)

But, as ever, some understanding of the apparent problematicity of these innovative philosophical puzzles is desired on my part, never your assent, let alone your full concurrence on such matter. Since it should only be through further debate that some degree of conformal appreciation in such matter might, eventually, be more mutually co-realized? (127)

N.T., 3.10.24.

XIIH. The Deconstruction of a Strong Dualism

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XII. (8.) The Deconstruction of a Strong Dualism[154]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

Various sources claim that there are various numbers of types of dualism. I would suggest that all strong forms can be deconstructed but until a definitive number of types can be delineated that this claim 'that all strong types can be deconstructed' is not one that can be definitively proven. However, be that as it may, we can demonstrate in principle deconstruction and to some extent this has already been set up in the previous essay. E.g., if a metaphysical type of position arises through the symmetrical reduplication of the philosophical discipline then we need to demonstrate how this state of affairs is possible, i.e., show how this form of bimodal operationalism.is possible and able to operate, albeit in trimodal economic terms of reference. To demonstrate this possibility I invoked a philosophy of transformational retreatment.as a trimodal economy in order to understand a specific function that always appears in the form of a bimodal operationalism. The further implication being that through retreatment meta-philosophical text, i.e., non-philosophical text, i.e., metaphysical text (in its reconstituted sense) can be retreated back to the level of philosophical text, albeit with a metaphysical origination or derivation (with the further implication that 'metaphysics' should be viewed as a 'sub-discipline' within the philosophical economy, i.e., as a sub-philosophical economy like a number of other disciplines, e.g., hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism; logics, semantics, aesthetics, etc.). To further reinforce this idea that a bimodal operationalism had to be economically re-sited, in order to be both more fully understood and to actually operate, I also invoked the analogy of a switch that had to be 'switched on first', incorporated within a live circuit, before it could properly operate as a switch (the implication being that no switch could truly function as a mere switch if it were to be approached in purely bimodal terms of reference). Against this backdrop, I will now explore this topic of deconstructing a strong dualism by introducing various varieties of dualism in order to demonstrate this 'trend' that 'in our only being *contra* a strong dualism can a qualified functional dualism be entertained as creditable should we have need to entertain the specific form of an economically incorporating relevant forms of a bimodal operationalism. (0)

In a spirt of playfulness, let me explore this contention by scrutinizing a number of dualistic forms of bimodal operationalism, e.g., a Cartesian-like setting and the sketching of a set of historical responses to the same; logical dualisms; contracts *versus* compacts; predicates *versus* relations, etc; forms of holistic entanglement; and, cognitive *versus* emotional dualism/s, etc. (1)

Completing this essay with the usual set of provisional conclusions, observations, comments, etc. (2)

The *raison d'être* of this essay being the deconstruction of all strong dualisms in principle and their replacement, when and where relevant, with the formation of a viable non-weak/non-strong form of operational bimodalism when found to be pragmatically useful… (3)

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154 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. Exposition of the Overall Argument…

I am not so much out to disprove the possibility of the viability of a strong dualism as to demonstrate that instances of the same can be variously deconstructed, but, refracted through the necessity of a trimodal economically incorporated bimodalism it should become apparent that only such a qualified form of bimodal operationalism could succeed should such dualistic forms of a viable functionalism be called for… (4)

i. A Cartesian-Like Setting and a Set of Historical Responses

Although not wishing to over-promote a Eurocentric vision of philosophy we might like to consider, for the convenience of this essay, dividing the overall history of philosophy into Pre-Cartesian, Cartesian and Post-Cartesian Eras (although the latter division may well be more an optimistic vision on my part than actually already established (say, as the [Post-Post-Modern} Contemporary Era given the number of professional and amateur philosophers still enmeshed in the misguided Cartesian-like mind-set). (5)

Descartes set up a logical conundrum that to my mind, shows, if anything, that that a strict dualism is just not credible. Defining 'matter' as 'corporeal and extended' and 'cogitations' as 'mental and non-extended' is acceptable within the course of a certain argument, but, more correctly, Descartes has no 'standing' to make such claims. Moreover, this philosopher cannot be called a 'strict dualist' since his philosophical economy is already trimodal given the crucial role to be played by the creative role of the Divine, God. Furthermore, as a series of conjectures and strict definitions his skepticism can only operate in part for, if argued for as a strong form of skepticism, he could not run his own series of arguments, period! However, that said, philosophers operating with all degrees of rigour or non-rigour have been seduced by the superficially attractive nature of his impossible arguments… and the rest is history… where some are still 'reacting' and 'attempting to resolve' the contradictory nature of his axiomatic-like statements when such strategies, from my perspective, have insufficient standing and do not deserve to be taken seriously other than as disruptive and unproductive historical anomalies, (6)

From the outset of such deliberations let me state quite categorically that economic isolates just cannot be entertained non-economically. All forms of phenomenological focus, be it perceptual or conceptual in orientation, etc., just cannot be entertained as stranded correlatives, as disconnected correlations, because all correlations are just that, namely, correlational correlates in a textually represented form(at) that are to find their relational significance in their respective economies to be refracted through that economy, or that complex mix of economies, where all identified correlations are to be viewed ass entirely dependent upon other related correlatives or related through the parallelization of other correlativities.to find their mutually qualified relational significance. In economic terms, we note the necessity, as a bare minimum, for trimodal terms of reference to be present (and where each correlative is defined through the joint negation of the other two parties). Hence, e.g., the invocation of the intentional economy to be one-part intentional objectivity, one-part intentional motivation, and one-part intentional subjectivity

(and where, e.g., that without objectivity and motivation there could be no sense and semblance of subjectivity whatsoever. Since, e.g., to be a perceiver something has to be perceived, and v.v.). Or, in gestalt-like terms, we cannot absolutistically focus on a point of focus since without backgrounding and subjectivity there would be nothing seen in such an impossible form of non-economic focusing. Again, only through the correlations entertained within a trimodal economy can such qualified correlational prospects be even approached in intentional terms of reference and in trans-intentional terms of judgmental appreciation, etc. (7)

Failing to see the non-economic nature of Descartes' conjectural arguments and strict logical definitions means either our being rightly somewhat suspicious of the same and/or being mesmerized by their captivating facility to trap an individual or certain school of thought within their tautological embrace as much as a 'thirst-driven fly might wish to drink within a pitcher plant'. As a response to such seemingly valid presuppositions, arguments and conclusions, a number of historical figures have cemented various type of response. Crudely sorted, we might nominate these various types of response as either attempting to impossibly present an acceptable form of a strict dualism; as proffering a dualism that stands in need of some respectable monadic-like harmonization (Leibniz); as an apparent or superficial dualism that is actually supported by the conjecture of a viable form of monism (Spinoza), or similar; and, as taking up dominant, strong forms of materialism; or qualified non-strong forms of materialism; or as taking up dominant, strong forms of idealism; or qualified non-strong forms of idealism, etc.; etc. Now, I am not claiming that this list is exhaustive, however, if we were to take the view that the world has some obviously necessary sense and semblance of a transcendental-like unity, in order to be 'one' world there-for-us, as mutually shared by ourselves in a public realm of interaction, whilst each person must have their own private point of view, then we can either informally or formally extract ourselves from such conundrums, *aporia*s, contradictions, paradoxes, etc., as presented and induced by the Cartesian type of impossible modeling! His arguments can only operate if we were to relativistically run with them, but, then, treat them as operating absolutistically. But, as I have noted, Descartes has no acceptable standing in such matters as his materialism, as a strong form of realism has been shown, by myself, to be untenable in the same manner as his 'parallel' rationalism or idealism. As for his theological standing, an obligatory dependence upon traditional religious beliefs is not an ideal place to begin in order to 'glue' his philosophy together so to speak and, therein and thereafter, give it a coherence it patently does not possess… (8)

Just because 'matter appears to be extended' does not mean we should treat it as 'merely extended' since we are already thinking about the same in 'non-materialistic terms of reference'. Similarly, and conversely, we should not treat 'thinking' as 'non-extended' since how else could we think about 'perceptual objects as other than as extended', etc. The basic point being that Descartes has no standing to make such impossible claims since his dependency on strong forms of both realism (materialism) and idealism (rationalism) are untenable and all shifts, either overt or covert in orientation, to co-opt all weak forms or forms of non-weak/non-strong argumentation would then undermine the general contradictory complexion of his system and the ensuing tenor of its co-

nundrums, etc. In effect, overseeing its deconstruction and leaving very little to be found left behind that might be worth salvaging… (9)

ii. Logical Dualisms

Imagine one of Descartes lesser evil Demons, if not today the Devil himself, in a malevolent mood, who encapsulates a poor victim within an unbreakable armour-plated glass cube. In front of the glass cube is a table with both an apple and knife on that table. The demon instructs this hapless victim with these impossible instructions, 'take a bite from this apple, with or without the use of that knife, and you will then be set free'. Of course, in the impossible dualism of these two options, the victim has to be free in order to eat that apple and take their first bite of the same, but, in being able to take a bite of that apple they would need to be free in the first place…Here, it must be said, we have a true conundrum. (10)

However, somewhat relenting, the demon decided to give their victim a sporting chance. If you should talk someone into eating that apple and take a first bite from that apple in front of you then you will be instantly freed to eat the rest of that same apple, because in your place, I will substitute for yourself that person you talked into eating that apple.in the first place. Then it is up to you to free this person by eating the rest of that apple should you wish to eat the rest of this very delicious apple… (11)

Some time passes, and our hapless victim is hoping someone will pass by and be persuaded to take a bite from that apple before they lose consciousness through the joint ill-effects of both starvation and dehydration. But, as luck would have it a poor, hungry student passes by and is persuaded to take a bite from that apple let upon that adjacent table. Of course, the full nature of the proffered contract is not revealed by the prisoner in the glass cube lest the student panic and make a quick exit. The student takes a bite and, instantly, they are forced to trade places with each other… (12)

The person released from the cube is now happy to have escaped the glass cube. Of course, the hapless student is now in a state of shock when the full nature of the contract is revealed to them. They ask the ex-prisoner to eat the rest of that apple and free them in turn. "Nah," says the ex-prisoner, adding. "I don't like to eat apples." "But, exclaims the newly imprisoned student, "it is your duty to do so, don't you think? I freed you, and now you must do the same for me". "Nah," exclaims the ex-prisoner, "In this matter I am completely free to exercise by freewill either way. Moreover, I don't like apples." Here the imprisoned student looks entirely trapped… as they contemplate their impending fate. However, the ex-prisoner relents and using the knife cuts the apple into edible portions and tentatively takes a first bite. Nothing happens, they eat some more of this quite delicious apple. Then, with the last mouthful, the student is released… the glass cube instantly disappearing… (13)

At that point, the ex-prisoner has awoken from the surreal confines of this horrible nightmare of a dream… taking a small modicum of self-satisfied pleasure that they did,

in ‘deed’, do their duty and freed that student from their imprisoned fate by eating the rest of that apple… even if all this drama were only a figment of their over-stimulated imagination. (14)

Ok, I had some fun recounting this imagined situation. Can this anecdote be used to make a series of philosophical-like points? (15)

As initially cast, we had an impossible situation. The prisoner will be freed when they take a bite from that apple. But they needed to be free first in order to do so. However, those conditions were emended and, so, let us do so likewise. Let me rewrite this scenario accordingly: let us rephrase the situation as follows – both the prisoner and the imprisoned student will be given their ‘freedom from their current hunger’ if they were to eat that apple or some other apple. They duly eat an apple, regardless of whether they like to eat apples or not, and duly find their hunger has temporarily left them. It is as if the apparent efficacy of these actions is supported by and supports a causal explanation that, in turn, is depended upon a causal arrow of time that ‘runs from’ the past through the present ‘into’ the future (accepting how these temporal metaphors are arranged in this analogical use of the English language). If now no longer hungry, then that person must have eaten. Causal efficacy and the arrow of time are jointly demonstrated in a conditional modeling of this situation. Namely, a period of hunger. Then, that an apple is eaten. When the apple is eaten, that person who has eaten is now no longer hungry. Demonstrating the asymmetrical nature of this causal scenario. Hunger *versus* a diminished sense of hunger, in parallel to, an uneaten apple *versus* an eaten apple (and not the other way around). Thence the (metaphorical) implication of a causal ‘arrow of time…’ (16)

We might also opine that the imperative of hunger to eat and, in this instance to eat what is to hand, namely an apple ‘seems’ to be on par with the deontological imperative of that ex-prisoner to ‘feel’ the ‘need to free their imprisoned student’ if only in gratitude for their having freed them first? But, let me say, it is not appropriate to conduct an in-depth ethical enquiry at this point (although I have already run the suggestion that even the pragmatical, in its various forms of expediency, are also somewhat also constituted as forms of imperative in their own right[155]). But let me now segue into a brief discussion of the apparent dualism between contracts and compacts... (17)

iii. Contracts *versus* Compacts

Once we understand the necessity for the coexistence of a compactual basis in order to be able to run the very possibility of a successful contractual agreement it would seem, albeit on superficial grounds, that we have a form of dualism between contractual and compactual aspects of this type of an arrangement between two or more parties. As they stand, on a first inspection, these aspects appear to be relatively incommensurable. Contracts operate between parties with an inescapable differential in relative power relations, On the other hand, a compactual basis assumes a society can also entertain contracts on a basis without a power differential, as a place where agreements can be hon-

155 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XII.XIIF.

oured, indeed, will be honoured. If I observe someone's leg trapped between a train and the platform and I am able to help, either individually or collectively, Neither myself nor others, hopefully, will first ask you, 'can you pay for our setting about to release your trapped leg?' Human nature being what it is, in such situations, thankfully, people will spontaneously forget their place in society, all thought of power differentials and struggles, and just work together in order to release this unfortunate person whose leg has got trapped between the train and platform as they were exiting that train.[156] That is a clear example of the compactual dimension, which, admittedly, is constituted in a diametrically opposed fashion to contractually organized behaviur. E.g., being predicated on the equality of the individual, etc. But, is that 'diametrical opposition' as wide as it has been here presented? Correctly, such incommensurability can only be relatively entertained. Otherwise, quite correctly, contracts could not be entered into in the first place. Without even at least the pretense of a person promising to honour a reasonably constituted, non-unconscionable contract no contracts would be ever entered into. Fortunately for most of us, who need to avail ourselves of contracts for whatever reason or reasons, because the world generally recognizes a need to honour contracts and usually accepts that requisite forms of compliance will also need to be applied should contacts not be suitably honoured, and, where, as a social phenomenon, contracts are entered into in this dimension of arbitration that arbitrated both private-personal and public-interpersonal dimensions of such social interaction. However, be that as it may, the most interesting aspect of this contractual-compactual interrelationship, as I have noted elsewhere, is in the nature of the economic interactions between these two relatively incommensurable dimensions that effectively oversee both the initiation and continuance and termination of such a recurrent mode of social interaction. That even if superficially 'dualistic' in operation and functioning, still, as a strict dualism, contracts could not operate in any form whatsoever if these aspects were truly to be incommensurable with respect to each other. But, contracts can be successfully performed by all the parties concerned, and, therefore, these aspects of the contractual and compactual cannot be absolutisticaly incommensurable! In effect, in this instance, as explored, an in-depth appreciation demonstrates that a strong or strict dualism is non-viable (as will be found in any version purporting to be promoting a sp-called 'strong' dualism). (18)

iv. Predicates *versus* Relations, etc.

The distinction between predicates and relations is usually understood, but, on occasions can be somewhat blurred. E.g., is a mosquito bite a predicate or a relation (or, more sensibly, the conjunction of both facets in a process of transformational (re)treatment)? In an economy of treatment, I have argued we only find analysis (or reduction), synthesis (or reconstitution), and nomination (as a naming of logical subjects). That, as an economy of treatment, these correlatives of analysis, synthesis, and nomination mutually define each other through their joint negations. So, e.g., 'analysis' is mutually defined as 'the joint negation of both synthesis and nomination', and so on. (19)

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156 The self-organized behaviour here involved the collective rocking the entire carriage back and forth in order to pull that leg free. As seen per this YouTube video recording of this specific event.

So, given this economy of treatment, and the relative internality of predicates to the nomination of a logical subject *versus* the relative externality of relations in respect to that same logical subject does this appearance of relative incommensurability imply some form of dualism? Taking a dialectical-like position we could both answer both 'yes' and 'no'. E.g., in a certain forest a certain tree is infected with an obvious disease like 'rust'. That tree can be described as 'truthfully using the predicate' that 'that tree has the disease called 'rust'.' Unfortunately, this disease of rust is spreading and so the same predicate 'rust' can now be applied to that forest. However, with respect to that initial tree, future infections of rust stand in relation to that first tree so infected as a 'relation', as being in a relational relationship within that forest as this tree *vis-à-vis* those other trees that also become infected. (20)

Hence this apparent dualism between, say, predicates and relations (as mediated by the nomination of logical subjects), in turn, cannot be viewed as a viable example of a strong dualism (despite our reluctance to view either 'predicates' as commensurable with 'relations', and v.v.). (21)

v. Dualistic-Like Forms of Holistic Entanglement

Another example of dualistic like behavior is to be observed in quantum processes of entanglement. Say two entangled electrons are created as a pair of speeding in the opposite directions where we know both particles share a conservation of spin, but, where we do not know which particle has which spin vector until we interdict one of these particles and measure the spin it has letting us then immediately know that the other particle must have the opposite spin. Is this an example of a dualism, perhaps a strong dualism given that in the measuring of an entangled pair of particles each one must automatically possess the opposite spin if we can measure the spin of either one of those particles in that entangled pair? Or, instead, should we view this type of situation as an example of the non-dual holism between these entangled particles that only take a definitive symmetry in the breaking of this holistic relationship? (22)

In resolving such a puzzle we would need to account for both local and non-local aspects of phenomenal-phenomenological interactions. I do not claim that I can decide such issues, but, in heading in that type of direction, let me explore the following ideas in order to differentiate three possible types of a qualified bimodalism. (23)

In a bimodal function we can say that the dominant party (in a process of reduplication or duplication) controls the nature of the outcome. So, e.g., 'the philosophy of philosophy' is a 'meta-philosophy', or a 'non-philosophy', or a 'metaphysics (albeit as reconstituted accordingly in inter-ordered terms of reference)'. Similarly, the 'history of philosophy' or the 'history of science' both remain forms or varieties of 'history'. Now in the interactive economy of 'passive recognition, active encounter, and pro-relational/existentially engaged engagement we can form three forms of bimodal operationalism, namely, the active treatment of passive content; the engaged treatment of pas-

sive content; and, the engaged treatment of active content (whilst observing the rule that the more dominant party determines the outcome in these form of asymmetrical duplication). (24)

Creatively, we can view my division of the irruptive non-economic behavior as mirroring, respectively, the definitive unilateral responses of the last instance (as the active treatment of the relatively passive content in question as viewed from a relational /non-pro-relational point of view [where a 'holistic' pro-relational perspective arises when viewed from the perspective of the primary relationship *per se*]); the definitive unilateral response of the next instance; and permission to enact the former as the existentially oriented moment of the definitive unilateral response of the first instance (in a chain of existentially re-directed behavior/s following on as a consequence from such existentially oriented enactment following on from this instance deemed as 'first' in the permission granted to enact the moment deemed as 'next'). (25)

How might this economy of interaction, and its triple typology of interaction throw light on this distinction between local and non-local in attempting to understand the holistic nature of non-local entanglement, etc? (26)

For a start, in an economic perspective these typologies are correlatives and, therefore, cannot be treated as economic isolates. Superficially, such distinctions can be made in a qualified form(at), but not absolutistically. Furthermore, from a non-economic perspective, definitive unilateral responses of last, next, and first instances can all be viewed as forms of resolution, (re)presented more as phases in an overall system of interactions (when viewed from a relatively super-economic sense of perspective). This analogy accepted, hypothetically, how then should we interpret 'local' and 'non-local' aspects of phenomenal-phenomenological interaction? For a start such distinctions should not be viewed as absolutistically established. So, e.g., our two electrons are entangled, but, after dis-entanglement, they still remain as two electrons with a joint history. Or, in other words, we could suppose that dis-entanglement is never absolutistically established, just as in the annihilation of a pair of particles, consisting of a particle and its anti-particle, we can never fully observe a completely perfect, one hundred percent transformation into energetic terms of reference alone in the event of their collision since other particles with mass will also be emitted although, of course, not in contravention of the conservation law of energy. Now, let us suppose that (in experiential terms) pro-relational treatment of either passive content or active content (as a form of functionalism) ideally accounts for a holistic, essential-like non-locality and that locality is more observed in the active treatment of passive content alone. Understanding, that as phases these three typologies are never absent when the situation and its transformational events is viewed form a more holistic sense of perspective be that either in terms of the primary relationships in question or its more extensive relational embedding in the entirety of the open-ended world of the relational. Treated in this manner we can then argue that transformations are either viewed in non-existential local terms of the relational or existentially engaged in pro-relational, non-local terms of reference without, at the same time, drawing too definitive a differential distinction between any of these distinctions, etc. The ramifications of such reflections, if deemed valid, would imply that we need to delineate in

relative terms the co-mutual overlapping of both relational and pro-relational terms of interactive reference whilst recognizing the co-mutual nature of this economy of interaction and all other economies. (27)

vi. Cognitive *versus* Emotional Dualism/s, etc.

One last type of dualism I believe also need to be briefly explored, namely, the apparent emotional dualism being entertained either within or between the Cognitive Aspect and the Pre-Cognitive/Affective Aspect of the overall Psyche.[157] (28)

I would argue, for example, that Augustine although renouncing a cognitive understanding of the Manichean religion never really renounced an emotional Manicheanism. For Augustine, despite his cognitive reduction of evil to the absence of the good (*privatio boni*), still his moral and religious universe was dualistically divided into both good and bad realms that would never be able to speak intimately to each other. Even with an excepting of his rhetorical flourishes that skillfully colour his language, the overall tonality of his discourses, say the Confessions, forever remain cast in such black and white terms that strongly suggest he was never able to fully free himself from his Manichean dualism (if only remaining as a residual tension effectively persisting more in affective terms of reference?)? (29)

But whether I am right or wrong on this issue is somewhat irrelevant to the series of point that I am wishing to make, namely, that an emotional dualism is a form of dualism that also needs to be explored, etc. The fact that Augustine can express his emotional dualism, e.g., in a single discourse, indeed, within a single sentence, is proof that he can so obviously relate these two-dimensional influences of his affective being, but, perhaps their continual recurrence is perhaps more suggestive of the fact that he never satisfactorily able to resolved the source of such tensions. In this regard, I would like to contend that to not satisfactorily resolve such disconcerting tensions is to ever distort the ensuing trajectories of our lives and the relationships we enter into along the way. That to marshal a strong variety of dualistic thinking in such a manner, on such an unresolved issue or set of issues, can only do a disservice to that individual themselves along with those other people they will come to recognize, encounter and engage along the way. That I would like to suggest that a health warning should accompanies all impossible attempts to run a strong, unresolved sense and semblance of a strong dualism, especially of an emotional variety. Given the ensuing distortions that stem from such unresolved issues it would be better for all concerned to dismiss and drop all forms of a strong dualism and only work with those instances of a bimodal operationalism when and where it is pragmatically appropriate to do so. (30)

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[157] We both express emotional topics and note our emotional reactions in cognitive terms of reference. Therefore, to draw a hard and fast distinction between the cognitive and the affective or pre-cognitive is practically an impossible task. However, we can still note to and from which aspects of the psyche are being more predominant in a complexity of such sentiments, and the type of predominant tenor such sentiments are found being expressed. E.g., stick a pin in yourself or someone else and the overall tenor is that of pain and our co-associated reception of the same. Remove the pin, and we then think once more 'about' our reactions to such painful stimuli, etc.

2. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Weak forms and non-weak/non-strong forms of an apparent dualism are ever present in the bimodal nature of all forms of a cognitive operationalism. Unless an operation devolves spontaneously, as in a non-economic process of resolution, all operations in time are sequentially invested and directed accordingly. Furthermore, as a rule, we must suppose that the dominating party (through symmetrical reduplication or asymmetrical duplication) decides the course of that interaction. So, e.g., 'the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' becomes a form of 'metaphysical appreciation', and, 'the history of science', e.g., remains a variety of 'history', etc. (31)

Running in parallel to the apparent bimodalim, or dualism, of a sequence of operations is the inescapable economic setting of such events. One method used to explore this trimodal economic setting of a bimodal operationalism is the application of a philosophy of transformational retreatment. I.e., starting with the immanently to hand in the form of a synthesized process of pretreatment we then proceed, through a suspension, to transcendently deconstruct and reconstruct the same, emphasizing over the bimodal course of that treatment a certain predominant form of treatment, be that correlative orientation either analytical, synthetical, and/or nominational (or a parallel equivalent determined through economic complexification). Then, in a process of retreatment we engage the forceful process of the de-suspension in a return to the meta-status of our pretreatment. The productivity of our retreatment, through posttreatment, re-organizing the re-formation of the pretreatment in the light of its influential retreatment. (32)

However, in the dialectical operations of this circle of retreatment, theoretically, as is the mutual economic nature of all forms of interaction, we can go, metaphorically, both 'clockwise' and 'counter-clockwise'; or in both directions simultaneously; seemingly linger at one orientation through overt intra-mediation and covert mediation;[158] or seemingly linger on the relationship between two moments or poles through overt mediation and covert intra-mediation; or, perhaps enter a moment of non-economic resolution through the intermediation of the entire economy. By such means entertaining processes of reduplication or duplication within the economy of transformational retreatment. (33)

Over the course of this essay, I have attempted to show that operations are bimodally oriented but are also situated within a trimodal economy. That dualistic positions can be scrutinized as a form of bimodal operationalism, and, that, when we explore their bimodal functions within their relevant economic settings, we will find that a strong dualism cannot be found (by virtue of the economics of an economy to the extent that a strong dualistic bimodalism is only an illusion when reviewed from a deeper economic sense of perspective. As demonstrated when the relatively incommensurable worlds of contracts *vis-à-vis* compacts are compared, and, yet, there can be no viable contracts without the due observance of a co-associated compactual basis. Let me now demonstrate on more

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158 Some of these ideas were developed in *Book* 11. Basically 'overt' means 'focused upon (preferenced or de-suspended)' *versus* 'covert' which is 'not focused upon (being de-preferenced or suspended)' The 'qualified suspension of a single correlative' is 'intra-mediation'; the 'suspension of two correlatives' is a process of 'mediation'; and, a 'process that suspend the entire economy' is termed 'intermediation'.

theoretical grounds that a strong dualism, like any other form of a strong (ideological) positioning is just as untenable as all other strong forms of positioning. (34)

Having disposed of the apparent bimodalism of operations as a misunderstood, tentative basis for dualistic forms of positioning, it could be argued that a dualistic sense of positioning can be relatively entertained through forms of overt mediation (and covert intra-mediation). E.g., the second trans-cognitive order of aesthetical experience is envisaged as the overtly entertained bimodal mediation of the Object and Ego moments or correlatives in conjunction with the covert intra-mediation of the World moment or correlative. But, given that no forces can be equivalent at any moment of time we might also suppose that with an emphasis upon the Object moment there might more emphasis placed upon the art object or art work, and, conversely, an emphasis placed upon the moment of Ego would find ourselves more creatively concerned with an aesthetic sense of process? (35)

Returning to the archetypal typology of a metaphysical or categorical style of dualism, say, of someone like Descartes, we have already noted his trimodal economy through various forms of metaphysical necessity also entails a vision of the Divine, God. However, in light of work done by myself on the deconstruction of both a strong realism and a strong idealism it is my contention that Descartes has no valid conformal standing that would enable his strong dualism to act as either a functioning philosophy or metaphysics. A strong dualistic metaphysics would necessitate the diminishment of all third parties (that can only be entertained through covert intra-mediation). If such a system were to propose a dualism between intentional objectivity (Object) and intentional motivation (World) that would entail the diminishment through covert intra-mediation of the remaining moment Ego which in my reinterpretation of Descartes' system would be aligned with the Divine. Or, alternatively, if a dualism were arranged between Object and Ego moments then the moment of World would suffer a similar fate. Admittedly, this is my reinterpretation of the required Cartesian manoeuvres in order to set up such a dualism, albeit within what could be designated as a Divine economy. Standing somewhat further back from this style of interpretation, but persisting with an economic model, it still behooves the proponent of such a system to explain how two correlatives can be over-focused upon at the economic expense of the remaining correlative? That given the inescapable nature of an economic economy neither one correlative nor two correlatives can be overly focused upon or overly de-focused upon. On the other hand, focusing on all three moments, with a certain degree of dynamic balance, is tantamount to proffering a working suspension. (36)

Thus, it follows, that for a working unimodalism or bimodalism, for that economy in question to operate economically, no strong format, form or formation is possible. On the other hand, working forms of the same are possible as long as they conform to these economic principles that observe the fact that no economic isolates can be ever conceived. That provisional forms of either a unimodalism (as in economic resolution) or bimodalism (as in the performance of operations) are possible as long as they are conjecturally introduced in a weak form and where additional conjectures are conformally supplied that countenance non-weak/non-strong forms of a viable functioning representa-

tionalism capable of achieving the requisite economic functions required. Thus, we must conclude with both the philosophical and metaphysical observation that no strong form of positioning is economically viable including each and every proposed version of a strong dualism! (37)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 7.10.24.

XIII. From Ordered and Inter-Ordered Phenomena to Social Systems

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIII. (9.) From Ordered and Inter-Ordered Phenomena to Social Systems [159]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

Time to confess once again. Perhaps this time the appellation of 'hubris' might better designate the nature of my sin although the transgression in question is more a matter of perspective and a humbling of both my horizons and ambitions in that same regard. Let me explain. There came a very short moment, perhaps no more than half a day, after discussing my latest thinking on ordered and inter-ordered phenomena that the disciplines associated with such a scheme practically entailed, seemingly, or at least the possibility, all disciplines that could possibly be envisaged. That ordered philosophy through both reduplication and duplication could proffer an integrated map of the disciplinary world, or, at the very least, supply points of probable connections that could be connected through forms of hybridization or extrapolation, or by extension from such a proximal point of interconnection. That from an ordered perspective the connectedness of the following professions could be pointed to, namely, phenomenologist and semanticist (and where the analytical nature of that Object correlative could also supply logician-dialectician, mathematician, and all other forms of disciplinary calculations); aesthetician, artist and critic; existentialist, ethicist (dealing with both deontological and pragmatical forms of ethical judgment); both theoretical hermeneuticist and practical hermeneut; onticist (dealing with facts and other evidential matters). Then, through symmetrical reduplication we can add inter-ordered disciplines such as the categorical metaphysician; psychologist/sociologist; existentialist, political executive/operative; economist and proponents of the business world (from a lawyer to vendor, from a consultant to a shoe-shiner); scientist; and, historian. Then, through duplication we can intersect these disciplines so, e.g., a historian dealing with the history of science, or, philosophy of history (where the 'profession of a philosopher' is defined as 'the global intersection of the hermeneutist, phenomenologist, and existentialist, etc.[160]). But, the fervent belief that all disciplines could be mapped in one inter-ordered[161] format and fully described accordingly was very soon shot down! That evening I saw a YouTube video of the German sociologist and philosopher Niklas Luhmann (1927-1928) speaking at length in English discussing how the discipline of law was not in the business of ethics or morals, and, autonomously acted as its own social system and would find its place in the world through the net result of the conjunction of history, politics, and culture, etc. Or, further paraphrasing this influential thinker, admittedly through my inter-ordered perspective, where we find the discipline of philosophy currently taught in Academia, but, where, e.g., the once respectable discipline of astrology was also taught, but, where academia could only approach indirectly as, say, a topic in history. In other words, where might have the code to differentiate one discipline from another but that tells us nothing about its current placement in the world! (0)

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159 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

160 Where by 'etc.' is implied 'the inclusion of all philosophical sub-disciplines, from metaphysics to aesthetics, logics-dialectics to ethics, and so on'.

161 Where 'inter-ordered', in its general sense, implies the entire gamut of phenomena from the ordered to the poly-ordered or super-ordered, e.g., the (inter-ordered) history of (the inter-ordered discipline of) history (which in notation would be $6^2 \times 6^2 = 6^4$, i.e., the sixth trans-cognitive order [dealing with ontical 'facts'] reduplicated four times given that its reduplication gives us the discipline of history), etc.

That, such a ‘revelation’ was humbling to say the least. That to fully describe a discipline we would need to approach it as a ‘social system’ and not merely as an inter-ordered phenomenon in some configuration of an ordered format! (1)

On the other hand, previous work earlier on in the beginnings of the *Pursuit*, Volume III, had already supplied a format (in a 3 x 3 matrix) for dealing with a schematization of inter-ordered phenomena within the outlines of a generalized vision of the Political-Economy (including the 3 x 2 matrix ordered phenomena along with its reduplications and duplications, etc.). (2)

But the shock to my system (pun intended) was that despite an ability to possibly delineate a useful system’s code of a discipline (in so far as one discipline is to be differentiated from another through noting its disciplinary distinctiveness, be that either in a definitional framework and/or in an ordered format, etc.), still, a more complete description of that discipline, as currently practiced in the world, must rely, instead, on an observation and appreciation of its history, and ow political and cultural forces shaped its social practice as a social system in the world which can only be appealed to through conducting the requisite historical, political and cultural forms of research relevant to its descriptive articulation. That, effectively, no *a priori*-like analysis would ever be able to do this for us. So, out into the world we have to go with the required ‘glasses’ so that we can see for ourselves just how the discipline in question is ‘ordered’ in social terms of reference. (3)

In this essay, first, let me briefly delineate an inter-ordered philosophy. (4)

Then, note my take on social systems.[162] (5)

Following this by my incorporation with the heuristic device of The Political-Economy as an open super-system in which we both differentiate and integrate social systems within this mapping of the social world. (6)

Against this backdrop looking into some of the ramifications of this systems perspective. (7)

Then, I will briefly discuss the historical transformations of social systems in general terms of reference. (8)

Ending with the usual set of provisional conclusions, etc. (9)

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[162] In this essay, my objective is not to proffer a close interpretative reading of Luhmann but to merely recognize his importance in the necessary enlargement of my horizons as recounted. Hence my mis-appropriation of just a few ideas from the research of this serious thinker (and, in that limited frame of reference, proffer a very focused form of critique). To get a much better understanding, I would recommend the reader refer to Niklas Luhmann; *Social Systems*; translated by John Bednarz, Jr. with Dirk Baecker; Stanford University Press; 1995 (or, find various YouTube videos dealing with this philosopher-sociologist some of which present this author, himself, articulating and defending his ideas whilst speaking excellent English).

i. Orders, etc?

Let me concisely sum up what I intend by the general expression 'inter-ordered phenomena'.[163] (10)

Very early on, I phenomenologically delineated six distinctive types of judgment along with a linear-like set of implicit transformational rules that would allow us to migrate from one to the next in that series in that sequence of 'orders' as 'ordered'. (11)

The first order, and more primitive judgment, concerns our looking at atomic-like, essential-phenomenological descriptions. E.g., saltiness and sweetness in the distinction of taste; a specific colour that falls within our general conventional understanding of redness; a dictionary-like set of shapes, such as, e.g., tables, and chairs, etc; along with the semantic rules for how such distinction will semantically operate with both respect to themselves and either their possible connection or non-connection with other distinctions, etc., hence essential-like phenomenological judgments in trans-cognitive terms of reference. (12)

So, a possible molecular combination of atomic distinctions is conventionally permitted when we find rules that allow for that specific form of connectedness. So, e.g., neither chairs and tables are 'tasted', but, such items, like tables and chairs, can be delineated as having a colour. Successful conjugations then move us into the second cognitive order which, as a judgment, gives us the second trans-cognitive order of aesthetic judgment. Where I see this 'aesthetic' appellation as recognizing this ability to integrate a series of semantic rules, etc. (13)

So, e.g., even though we can talk about 'square circles', given that they fail semantically to find the requisite degree of semantic integration, therefore, they cannot be ascribed with a second order of existence. On the other hand, we can refer to 'red-tables' (hence the nomenclature of the 'hyphen' in this instance when integration is affirmed in conformal terms). (14)

In bold, I will highlight the disciplines that seem to be entailed in this ordered scheme... (15)

The disciplinarians, therefore, that can be co-associated with this first trans-cognitive order of judgment, along with its successful transformational-transition to a second order, would conventionally exemplify, by implication, the following disciplines, namely, **phenomenology**, **semantics**, and all disciplines entertaining chains of equations like, e.g., **mathematics**, **logics**, **dialectics**, along with second order **artists**, **aestheticians**, **critics**, etc. (16)

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[163] For a more detailed approach the reader can refer to *The Seventh Book*… for an introduction, with a more detailed exposition in *Book* 9, and elsewhere.

In cognitively ordered terms, having traveled from non-integrated to integrated subsistant content (as thoughts) we now proceed to third cognitively ordered ideation (ideas as concepts, as existant processes) and, thence, to fourth cognitively ordered perceptual ideation, as 'percepts'.[164] However, in trans-cognitive terms of judgment, we move to a third trans-cognitively ordered category of deontological judgment and thence to fourth trans-cognitively ordered category of pragmatical judgment (not to be confused with pragmatic judgment which is centered non-exclusively in the third trans-cognitive order where, as existentially oriented judgment, it has its adjuncts in the second order of the aesthetical and the fourth order of the pragmatical.[165] (17)

In this third trans-cognitive order of judgment, namely, the deontological, we can note a role for the ethicist when also taking into account the adjunct role of the pragmatical (as found in the fourth trans-cognitive order). Hence the discipline of **ethics** (when both deontology and the pragmatical (along with the aesthetical is taken into account). This third order also aligns with the center of the existential orientation, the correlative of Ego, and hence the discipline of an **existentialism**. (18)

In the fifth trans-cognitive order we deal with potentiality, be that either as a possibility, a probability, and/or a potency (where, in the latter, actualization of the probable is practically assured imminently [if not immanently]). (19)

Dealing with 'possibilities', etc., we have the roles of both the theoretical hermeneuticist and practical hermeneut. Hence the discipline of **hermeneutics**. (20)

In moving from considerations of the potential to the actual we make a transition from less integrated to more integrated subsistant factual-like terms of reference. Hence the associated discipline with this type of judgment would be that of the factologist, i.e., the person concerned with the evaluation of historical evidence, etc. Hence the discipline of **factology** (not to be confused with the province of the inter-ordered historian[166]). (21)

Having outlined ordered phenomena (focusing on trans-cognitive judgment), through symmetrical reduplication we now shift our attention to inter-ordered phenomena and their implication of allied meta-philosophical/metaphysical disciplines. (22)

A 'phenomenological-semantics of a phenomenological semantics' gives us a categorical metaphysics. Hence the discipline of a **categorical metaphysics**. (23)

I view 'the aesthetical integration of aesthetical integration' as exemplifying psychological-sociological forms of categorization. From a subjective perspective we find the psychological category (as integrating personal experience), and, from an integrated

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164 I am preserving my deliberate misspellings... giving both 'subsistant' and 'existant' expressions a technical coincidence, respectively, with 'ideational content' and 'ideational processes' (somewhat preserved in the first, second, fifth and sixth orders when transferring our attention to the trans-cognitive orders of judgment).

165 Hence maintaining the 'observation' that the pragmatic is not to identified with the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the 'pragmatical' understood as merely the 'expedient'.

166 Where the historian is an appreciator of 'the fact of facts, etc.'

inter-subjective perspective, we find sociological categories (in the organization of relationships, communities, organizations, institutions, nations, etc.). Hence the disciplines of both **psychology** and **sociology**. (24)

In 'the deontological appreciation of deontological practice' we find the execution of politically oriented enaction. Hence the discipline of **politics** (focusing on the exercise of power rather than the theoretical nature of legislation and the business-like practice of political parties, etc., and including the operations of a business executive, CEO, or similar, etc). (25)

In contrast to the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order, 'the pragmatical functioning of pragmatical functioning give us the discipline of **business** along with allied disciplines like **manufacturing**, **service industries**, **law,** the **health** and **medical industries, vendors, political parties**, the **food industries**, i.e., **farming**, along with **hospitality**, etc., etc. (26)

In the reduplication of the fifth trans-cognitively ordered order of 'the possibility of possibility (as the potentiality of the potential)' we have none other than the discipline of **science**. (27)

In the reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitively ordered order of 'the actuality of actuality (as the fact of the facts)' we have none other than the discipline of **history**. (28)

Where through the global appreciation of the discipline of **philosophy**, as 'the philosophical appreciation of philosophical appreciation' we find the discipline of **metaphysics** (albeit as reconstituted within the constraints of an anti-representational-representationalism). (29)

Of course, the question must be asked, as it has, if anything to diminish its ad hoc presentation, just how is reduplication and duplication, etc., possible? (30)

Now, these manoeuvres of reduplication, etc., can be represented in the form of a series of matrices. (31)

E.g., the archetypal economic and its archetypal trimodal constitution as symbolized by World, Object, and Ego, can be represented as a 3 x 1 matrix. (32)

Then, within those confines we can include all economic correlates (and utilize such an idea through invoking forms of economic complexification) hence those parallels between the representative, intentional, temporal, conjectural economies, etc. (33)

An ordered economy, arrived at through subtle forms of preference/de-preference, as notated as a 3 x 3 matrix, can also be conducted within those economic terms of reference. (34)

However, inter-ordered reduplication and duplication, as a 3 x 2 matrix conjugating a 3 x 2 matrix necessitates super-economic terms of reference. (35)

As also the schematization of The Political-Economy (not to be confused with the hybridized hyphenation of political and economic disciplines) in its format as a 3 x 3 matrix. (36)

Therefore, through these forms of schematization (as represented by these recurrent matrices) a world of disciplines can be articulated form the philosophical to the metaphysical, from the phenomenology to hermeneutics to the existentialist; form science to history, an *et al*, etc. (37)

Thus, by noting this plethora of disciplines, it would be quite natural to imagine that this ordered schematization could encompass all possible disciplines, via direct implication, processes of extension, hybridization, forming interconnections,[167] etc., be they disciplines that have had a historical presence in the past, can be pointed out as currently evident, or, as yet unidentified in the future. (38)

But, as noted the exhilaration of this thought that the coded differentiation of all disciplines could be articulated in ordered terms of reference, etc., very quickly evaporated when exposed to the work of Niklas Luhmann. Disciplines are conventionally organized within specific 'social systems' that have an overall complex, re(-)self-organized chaotic historical, political, and cultural formation over time that cannot be predicted solely on the strength of such *a priori*-like machinations of a mere mapping of ordered phenomena, inter-ordered phenomena, etc! (39)

So, e.g., we find the discipline of philosophy currently disseminated primarily within the halls of academia. Likewise, the discipline of history, or, rather, histories, although it is also true that histories of the present are being conducted more within the realms of social media (as discussed elsewhere, e.g., in *Book* 6, etc.). (40)

So, that now understood, let us ask, 'what could be salvaged from such an aspirational ambitions? (41)

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167 E.g., as noted already in bold; by focusing on aspects of an extant discipline; hybridization, say, between physics as a sub-discipline in science, and mathematical chains of equations as discerned in the first and second trans-cognitive orders; and, formulating transformational rules that would allow us to interconnect what currently does not seem to be interconnected, etc..

ii. Social Systems

Luhmann insistently argues that the codes of a discipline, like, e.g., those pertaining to the field of law, are not moral injunctions but rather legal imperatives. So, legal judgments are not ethical determinations, but, rather, legal judgments as to what is either legal or not legal (illegal), or, also to be included in the former, that which is 'not illegal' or currently outside the direct purview of the law. (42)

But, what has been defined as either 'legal' or 'illegal' (and that which is 'not illegal') has shifted over time. We now no longer can own slaves or be enslaved as a slave. So, what has changed? In an appeal to the historical development of a legal system, as practiced in its social setting, we generally find laws are primarily thematized and enshrined in law through acts of political legislation. I.e., as being dominated, in this instance, by the political practice of enshrining acts of legislation within the requisite political system. That value shifts in overall cultural thinking eventually become reflected in the conservative pronouncement of a legislative body. Hence we must assume, on the strength of this first example, that social systems are hierarchically organized (within the envisaged embrace of The Political-Economy[168]). (43)

If anything, perhaps along the lines of duplication (rather than reduplication) between orders, etc. Just as the 'history of science' is a topic in 'history', so, the political treatment of the legal framework takes on a political character in the form of legislation should the same be successfully enacted, etc. Then, in a reversed contrast, the constitutional legality of a piece of legislation might be appreciated and deliberated upon, alternatively, in a supreme court of law, or its equivalent. (44)

Conveniently, I could resurrect my notion of The Political-Economy (as first developed in *Book* 4) (as a 3 x 3 matrix). (45)

Hence this philosophical distinction between 'the coded functioning of a discipline' and 'its coded functions as to be found within its conventionally organized social entailment' as would be described in either historical, political, and/or cultural terms of reference. (46)

Where by 'code' is meant a formulation that expresses the distinctiveness of a certain discipline *vis-à-vis* all other disciplines (in their distinctively different ways of the see the non-secular, disciplinary sense of a world at large. (47)

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168 As a schematization of the political-economy, to be viewed as a provisional heuristical device wherein social organizations find a sense of place *vis-à-vis* other forms of social organization. Note the hybrid discipline of political-economics (with a hyphen) is not to be confused with this schematization of The Political-Economy along with the third economic dimension of a stylistic sphere of operations.

iii. The Heuristic Device of The Political-Economy

As intimated, I utilize a 3 x 3 matrix to depict the provisional, open-ended nature of The Political-Economy where each row and column of that matrix is the symmetrical reduplication of the hermeneutically theoretical, the phenomenologically practical and the stylistically critical (and potentially radical).[169] Mapping this device as follows (with 9 sectors):

	Theoretical	**Practical**	**Critical-Radical**
Theoretical	**7**	8	9
Practical	4	5	6
Critical-Radical	1	2	3 (48)

In sector 1 we can place political legislation. In the business sector 5, we can place the financial functions, etc., of a political party, and, in sector 6, we can place all forms of executive enactment, say, as exercised through a Prime Minister and their Front Bench, or, a President and their Cabinet, or similar. (49)

As previously argued for in the use of this scheme, non-transparent, diagonal interactions are to be frowned upon, whereas direct horizontal or vertical interactions when professional discharged, are to be professionally promoted and enacted. So, e.g., either the functioning of a civil service and/or political consultants are to be utilized in either the implementation of legislated objectives and/or the operations of political executive. Similarly, politicians of either the legislature or the executive branches should have no direct, non-transparent dealing with the organization of political parties and their utilization of donations, etc. At least theoretically, since a relatively corrupt political party would covertly, if not overtly, not abide by such traditional instructions for the promotion of political propriety, etc. (50)

Hence, too, my putting lawyers and barristers, etc., in the world of business, in sector 5, whereas judges, in exercising executive functions, would occupy sector 9. (51)

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[169] Coinciding with the correlatives, respectively, of World, Object, and Ego (and the transformational stages, respectively, of pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment).

iv. Ramifications of Social Systems, etc.

What are the ramifications of this re-envisaged dimension of social systems (as entailed in The Political-Economy)? (52)

One of the important observations discussed in *Book* 9 was the idea that many world problems, such as, e.g., the obesity crisis, debates over the role of the medial world (as either a rightful service to be extended by societies and/or primarily as a business), etc., can be better approached by determining the center of gravity of such problematic issues as to whether it resides either within a certain system and/or as residing between systems. (53)

That like disciplines, systems share a certain degree of independent autonomy in the running of those political structures. So, the practice of law should not be mistreated, purely, as an economic consideration, or merely as a matter of science, etc., etc. (54)

That in my differentiation of disciplines through disciplinary differences, disciplinary meta-differences, and disciplinary non-differences... that such an exercise supplies a provisional appreciation of the distinctive coding of a discipline and, by extension, its supplying of such code to be used in the functioning of social systems in so far as those differentials automatically supply a basis for the additional accumulation of social rules as to how to run those social systems within their social organization of their meta-social systematization. E.g., the sphere of Academia, as the general location for numerous disciplines being taught within the academic realms of a university setting. Or, the extent of the Business World in so far as it entail a complex range of diverse businesses, e.g., from agriculture to the selling of food, from medical industries to hospitality, from lawyers and barristers to consultants, etc., etc. (55)

That the contemporary currency of a certain discipline is maintained within its social organization, be that either formally and/or informally recognized. That the derivation of its apparent governance and modes of practice have historical, political, and inter-cultural-cultural roots, and, such functions cannot be delineated, purely, in terms of ordered phenomena, etc. Which makes perfect sense since transformational rules are dependent upon the temporal and spatial configurations, etc., of that being subjected to processes of transformation in both time and space! Otherwise, such transformations are virtual and merely enacted in terms of ahistorical equations, or similar. (56)

That by interconnecting both ordered phenomena in their respective historical settings, etc., we are then in a better position to understand social change, etc. (57)

Hence, our appreciation of social change can be better understood, and, perhaps, how our interventions within the same might be better enacted on both a personal and an interpersonal basis, etc. Since the social world is ever in need of both existentially and non-existentially enacted forms of enrichment and a qualitative improvement in richness of value formation. (58)

v. The Transformation of Social Systems, etc.

From an appreciation of social systems, in observing their change, etc., just how can positive forms of social change be better engineered and implemented? (59)

Only through organized political behaviour can social change be overseen! (60)

Through either the positive creation of new relationships, the preservation of the positivity of existing relationships, and/or the positive, conservational expansion of the value of the former. (61)

Best assisted through an advancement in social cohesion arrived at through social consensus preferably in advancing the democratic potentiality of a certain political situation. But, unfortunately, many suffer under non-democratic forms of governance where the best that can be hoped for is the indirect mutual consolidation of our relationships with others through positive forms of social interaction centered, e.g., on our families, communities, religious facilities, etc., along with our fostered friendships where all forms of interactions are conducted, orchestrated and enhanced, within the parameters of a non-ostentatious conformance with social conventions. (62)

How should we define this general notion of the 'positive'? (63)

As that which orchestrates the positive richness of our relationships from a non-existential, relational perspective in conjunction with that which enhances the enrichment of our relationships from an existential, pro-relational perspective. Where either both the perception and the apperception of the positive is evaluated and valued in terms of the qualitative improvement of our relationships (under the headings of density, intensity, and propensity; and, consilience, salience and propinquity [or standing]).[170] (64)

Remembering that the dissemination of power is only conducted through ourselves as as member in a chain of re-iterated re-direction and re-distribution. Thence our promoted transmissions of the relatively positive, our de-distorted or obstructed transmissions of the relatively less positive, and our overseeing, either directly and/or indirectly, of the non-transmission of that which is detrimental to the ongoing promotion of such social richness and enrichment. (65)

Preferencing evolution over revolution, and, skillful dissemination of the positive *versus* the skillful obstruction of the relatively non-positive. Finding non-economic resolution in the unilateral decisiveness of the last instance, the next moment, and its permitted enaction through instantiation... working through well-formed, well-informed suspensions and conjectures, etc. (67)

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[170] I.e., respectively, the spectrum of modalities enlarged, the intensity of those modalities, and the thematic reiteration of those motifs that orchestrate and enhance such positive e/valuational formation; and, in more pro-relational terms, that which advances contextual forms of pro-relational appreciation, promotes positive forms of intentional objectivity in existentially oriented patterns of intervention, and, the re-articulation of those themes, memes, tropes, patterns of reiteration that promote a greater degree of 'psychic alignment' or 'closeness' or 'proximity' or 'standing' between people and communities, etc.

vi. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

The transgression in question in this essay exemplifies a more general problem, namely, that we cannot proceed from the relatively *a priori*-like to the relatively non-*a priori*-like without observing how the world is actually constituted historically, politically, and interculturally-culturally! (68)

Even if most, if not all disciplines, could be schematized in an ordered setting, etc., it still does not tell us how they were, are, or would be organized in temporal-spatial terms of reference, in terms of identities, and what might be disseminated, and so on. (69)

Not that too long ago Academia, in various cultural situations, would teach the topic of Astrology for a variety of reasons, i.e., in differentiating medical conditions, in the planning of decisions, in the determining of vocations, etc. Now, this topic could only be indirectly scrutinized through some other lens, say, historical or sociological, etc. (70)

Or, the fact that topics can emerge or bifurcate is not something, likewise, that can be determined on *a priori* grounds. Witness, e.g., the recently novel discipline of phenomenology, and, the re-arrangement of natural philosophy into science, psychology, etc. (71)

Interestingly, I would like to argue that much can be salvaged from an ordered philosophy, along with its reduplication as an a metaphysical-like study of inter-ordered phenomena, and the duplication of the former when disciplines dominate each other, or merge together, or bifurcate. (72)

I briefly argued that an ordered exploration delineated its distinctive coding. So, e.g., judgments in law are not moral judgments, and v.v. Although, of course we would hope that political legislation will eventually take on board how shifts in moral in inter-cultural-cultural values, etc., should be reflected in the legislated formulations of the law. (73)

As disciplines have a distinctive sense of identity then what makes them distinctively different from other disciplines is important to note. So, e.g., the theologian believes ‘that the world is not just a secular world, but, the same plus a theological aspect’. (74)

Prompting of us, then, to ask of them, ‘what value does this impart to the conduct of that discipline through setting out the genres of behaviour that are distinctively supportive of that discipline through this declaration of its disciplinary meta-differentiation. The theologian, e.g., then arguing for the merits, say, of prayer, hymns, religious rituals, good works, and so on. (75)

Similarly, prompting us to ask, in this regard, ‘what has the philosopher (and the reconstituted metaphysician) to offer that distinctively sets them apart from all other disciplines?’ (76)

A conformal theory of truth determination (along with its meta-philosophical/non-philosophical/metaphysical appreciation). (77)

Undoubtedly, an unfashionable observation to make, especially for myself as a pragmatist who operates in a discipline where certain prominent exponents proudly state ‘we have no need for a theory of truth’ in any form whatsoever. However, we live in dangerous times, in an imminent deconstruction of democratic modes of life being ever whittled away through the reiterated efforts of mendacious populist and authoritarian politicians alongside their short-sighted enablers. Without a theory of truth how could we have a theory of non-truth that would allow us to better understand mendacity, and its manifestations in misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, and worse, etc? (78)

In the ensuing deconstruction of a strong absolutism, in the next essay, let me proffer both a theory of truth and a theory of non-truth that does justice to the philosophical discipline and its reconstituted philosophical sub-discipline of metaphysics, where through transformational retreatment, they can work their magic together to better promote an active role for philosophy in order to advance its ability to prosecute this discipline, oversee the practicalities of this discipline, and advance the working prescience of this same discipline. By such means, advancing the operations of an anti-representational-representationalism, promoting a positive nihilism, along with a pragmatic-existentialism/existential-pragmatism..!! (79)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 11.19.24.

XIIJ. The Deconstruction of a Strong Absolutism

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

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Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

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XIIJ. (10.) The Deconstruction of a Strong Absolutism[171]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

The strong absolutist creates a double mistake, namely, by inappropriately literalizing a preferentially chosen metaphor, or two, and then by compounding the error through running a reductive economy by insisting, e.g., that Reality is just Matter, or Mind, or an Illusion, or the Escape from that Illusion, or Self, or Truth... and so on. But, we cannot validly insist that *x* is just *y* because our relational interactions in this world at large cannot be exclusively entered into. Even myself, who has continually preached the virtues of an 'economic philosophy', has had to make room for the non-economic and, thence, its ensuing super-economic re-appropriation, and so on. We live in an overlapping world of significance, and, no wave in itself or by itself can have any significance without this relational context, this sea of meaning, this ocean of non-forgetting... (0)

In this essay, in order to deconstruct the misguided positioning of a strong absolutist, I will need to outline a comprehensive theory of conformal truth determination contrary to the dictates of numerous pragmatists. If anything, such a theory, with a small 't', needs to be outlined in order to account for how the non-philosopher can comfortably travel through this world without generally experiencing an existential crisis, and, given the mendacious escalation of our representative politicians if anything, at the very least, a theory of the non-truthful also needs to be reinvested in in the marketplace of ideas, if not more so, lest the madness and mayhem of such populists and authoritarians proclaim how we should think from now on... as they happily divide their flocks of sheep from the goats, the other, and how all the so-called 'problem of the world' will be so easily solved through such racial and political forms of deselection, cancellation, eradication... (1)

We have been there before, but, we so easily forget... dependent as we are on the eternal vigilance of a few... who can be so easily silenced.... (2)

To begin, I will attempt to diagnose this current type of problem being here scrutinized, namely, in general, all versions of a strong absolutism. (3)

Then I will outline a theory of truth that takes a middle path by centering itself in an anti-representational-representationalism, or, more correctly, through understanding that we need to actually invoke a 'non-anti-representational-representationalism' or 'trans-anti-representational-representationalism' or 'meta-anti-representational-representationalism'. (4)

As a spin-off from this theory, I can then conversely form a general theory of mis representation and mendacity as a tool to counter mis-information, disinformation, mal-information, along with deliberate acts of lying, deception, fraud, and so on. (5)

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171 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

Using a set of provisional conclusions, etc., to prepare the stage for an existential re(-)evaluation of 'our being in this world together through-others...'[172] where the world at large can be viewed from a relational perspective, a pro-relational perspective, and a perspective where the former continually re(-)write each other through an ongoing trans-formation of perspective, etc., and where all three orientations need to come together to assist us in determining our place in this world both with-others and before-others. (6)

In the light of the above, revisiting the deconstruction of a strong absolutism. (7)

Ending with the usual provisional conclusions, etc. (8)

1. The Deconstruction of All Versions of a Strong Absolutism

Provocatively, let me state that our tools, be they non-philosophical or philosophical in orientation, both directly and indirectly reflect the 'interreacted-with-nature' of this world at large. So, e.g., a spade tells us that some parts of the world are spadable, but, that other parts of the world are not spadable. That soft soil can be dug with a spade, but, that rocky soil is not so spadable and perhaps might need the use of a pickaxe instead. That, as the interactive nature of our tools is a two-way process they reveal, each in their own way, what this world at large is for-us, etc., and how we, at large, can interact with it, can be there for-us, etc. (9)

I greet a friend on the street and they greet me back. This person is someone I can greet and they see me as someone to greet in turn… (10)

That the same applies to all theoretical constructs, quantum mechanics included. If the quantum world is only a calculation, then so be it, but, fortunately, this neither exhaust this perspective nor the infinite possible range of other perspective that might also be significantly engaged. Since when is a mighty mountain only to be viewed from one and only one perspective? (11)

But, what is represented, or misrepresented, through some form of conventional representation? (12)

Language is representative, with implications beyond itself. That aspect of text that refers to itself is meta-textual, i.e., a genre of behaviour that informs us as to how we can both write and read the text in question. Our interpretation of the overall form of a text is also reinforced by such meta-textual features. So, this text looks like and is a 'letter', and, that text tells us that it a 'shopping list', etc. So, our evolving understanding is progressively refined through a conjunction of textual content and meta-textual instructions on how to read that which is relatively content-wise. (13)

We invest a certain degree of interest in either our reading and/or writing, and, if the dividend of our efforts is poorly repaid, we move on to some other text, be that either

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172 The topic, more or less, to be taken up in the next essay.

classical, say, like a letter, or, non-classical, say like what we see when we look around at the perceptual world before us. (14)

But, the productive conjunction of text and meta-textual realizes the simulated sense of the relatively 'non-textual'. That aspect of textual experience that cannot be reduced merely to either text and/or meta-text. Like when we are absorbed in a wonderfully moving novel, or, when we are so absorbed, we do not hear, at first, our name being called, or, in the performance of a text, say, a piece of music, and we let the music play itself without the inevitably disruptive thoughts of 'how well I am playing' or 'how well I am not playing', etc. Hence this designation of this emergent aspect of reading as relatively 'non-textual in orientation'. In 'orientation' because without the interactive cooperation of these three economic correlatives of the 'text', 'meta-text', and 'non-text' no act of reading could even commence. Where, at the same time, this division into 'text, etc.', is a heuristic device. If you can supply a more productive use of our interpretative time then, please, run with that form of modeling..! (15)

In parallel with the economics of the heuristic device of 'text, etc.' I have also examined the use of the 'interrogative economy', at the center of all philosophical economies, etc., given without asking a question we could not proceed without any form of philosophical progress whatsoever, where, by 'progress', is merely meant 'our ability to entertain suitable forms of transformation in our representative textual appreciation'. Where, by understanding the anti-representational limits of textual representation we do not make the old mistakes a traditional metaphysics would so easily commit as a form of absolutistical nonsense… to the extent that we have most certainly no interest whatsoever in the so-called 'pre-representative' or the 'trans-representative', etc. With access to the simulations of the non-textual such an impossible dimension is neither needed nor required. (16)

But, heading back to the interrogative economy we note the transformations of our textual interactions through the pretreatment of what is hermeneutically already to hand, namely, as the 'conventional', i.e., as expressed in a rhetorical format of the disconjunctive suspension of the 'either/or'. E.g., is my cat sitting on the mat in front of the fire? I.e., it is either the case my cat is sitting there or is not sitting there? I look over at the fireplace and see the cat is sitting there. However, we give a first reply in the form of a first metaphorical answer, namely, it looks like my cat is sitting in front of the fire. I look again, determine it is my cat and note, 'yes, my cat is sitting on the mat in front of the fire'. This second reply being in what I term to be an apparitional format, namely, either 'as-if, as-if… it is the case my cat is sitting in front of this fire', or, 'it is the case', that as a philosopher I must treat it as provisionally valid, 'that my cat is not-not sitting in front of that fire (through the invocation of a double negative)'.[173] (17)

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[173] The latter apparitional mode is referencing Boolean Algebra based on the three relatively primitive functions of 'or', 'and', and 'not'. The first apparitional mode is the provisional treatment of the represented situation to hand by invoking an infinite 'as-if, as-if, as-if…' until such a time we cease our deliberations or have to rewrite the same through the transformative advent of new information, reconstructed conjectures, the utilization of new perspectives, etc., etc.

Now, only in provisional terms can we overlook this transformational progression and run with the apparent end-results of our short-circuited deliberations. (18)

Although it appears that we can make definitive judgments, and that that is the case, albeit in ongoing dynamic terms of reference (because such judgments can be overturned), still, these rhetorical and metaphorical contributions to this apparitional display of the provisionally definitive cannot and should not be ignored and completely overlooked (in this move towards an absolutistical sense and semblance of mis-positioning). (19)

Hence this observation, that overlooking or ignoring metaphorical contributions is a first step in taking an absolutistical style of positioning. Then, inserted into a reductive economy, where an exclusive mentality overrides the economic roots of our interactions in this world at large, we then find this impossible transition being entertained through an equal misuse of representative language. Thence the impossible non-economic running of an absolutistical economy indicative of the misrepresentation of a strong absolutism. (20)

So, e.g., what-if the world were an illusion? In the affirmative, this world must then be an illusion. I.e., there is nothing else but an illusion if treated through a strict reductive mode. So, that granted, an ‘act of enlightenment’ would be ‘the realizing of this recognition that the world is an illusion and just an illusion!’ (21)

Hence this critique that necessary metaphorical contributions should not be either ignored and/or over-stressed. Then, that granted, the running of a strict reductive economy would render this economy as economically mis-represented. Such observations being seen to apply to all instances or versions of a strong absolutism. (22)

In a contrast, a weak absolutism or a conjecturally strengthened non-weak/non-strong absolutism can be correctly operated if no misguided forms of an economic isolationism are in evidence. (23)

2. A General Theory of Conformal Truth Determination

As intimated, a theory of conformal truth determination must be a transformational process given ‘affirmations’ can be successfully negated through ‘the use of suitable conjectures’, and, negations in turn, can be successfully negated, and, therein and thereafter, affirmed through ‘the use of suitable conjectures’. (24)

Hence the transformational nature of conformal truth determination. So, that granted, let us apply such a perspective through the adoption and adaptation of a philosophy of transformational retreatment. (25)

In such a perspective, we start with what is to hand, namely, a conventional appreciation of what is either personally and/or socially considered to be either ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’. (26)

Then, through either the inadvertent and/or advertent application of a working suspension we then proceed to either apply a simple set of treatments and/or a complex series of treatments, that ideally, fall under the forms of either synthesis, analysis, and/or nomination in conjunction through economic complexification with other economies in parallel considered to be suitably applicable in our appreciation of that type of context in question. So, e.g., in a philosophical frame of reference we would also ask questions and, therein and thereby. invoke an interrogative economy as just explicated.[174] In such a question we might enquire as to either the affirmation or negation of certain relations (in a synthetic economic orientation) or predicates (in an analytical economic orientation) or nominations (in a nominative economic orientation). E.g., 'does philosophy have a functional role to play in the secular world?' or, 'is the practice of philosophy a worthwhile activity to explore?' or, 'is "philosophy" just another form of "semantic interpretation" or just a certain "broad kind of linguistic game"?' and so on?[175] (27)

Simply put, in a transformational approach, conventional truth is what is being represented to hand; then, treatment through a suspension, etc., must be mindful that conventional representation cannot be conducted beyond the ultimate barrier of its anti-representational limitations; whilst, the ensuing process of retreatment re-writes lived-experience through the ensuing force of the de-suspension in a manner reflecting the lived-reality of its living-reality, albeit as textually refracted and redacted through its on-going economic re(-)interpretation of that textualized formation of lived-reality. (28)

Hence the first outline of an anti-representational-representationalism, that surprise of surprise, occurs in an economy of a representationalism (conventional truth); an anti-representationally scoped invocation of an ultimate truth; and the third party that cannot be other than a non-anti-representational-representationalism, etc. This can be simply demonstrated. (29)

An important 'First Axiom' in an economic philosophy is to note 'that all correlatives can be provisionally defined through the joint negation of the other two economic correlatives'. (30)

With the implication of a 'Second Economic Axiom' to the effect 'that no economically isolated correlative can be presented, etc., as an economic isolate, i.e., as an economically isolated artefact in any intentional economies whatsoever, etc.' (31)

That, in applying a transformational perspective of retreatment, we can note, e.g., that 'retreatment' is the 'negation of both pretreatment and treatment', etc. (32)

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174 Paragraphs 16-17.

175 Exemplifying these three and only three forms of economic treatment that parallel, respectively, hermeneutic pretreatment, phenomenal-phenomenological treatment, and (non-systematic) existential re-treatment, etc.

Therefore, applying this First Axiom, we can note, as noted, that ‘retreatment’ is ‘the negation of both pretreatment and treatment’. Then, applying what we already know about an economy of interrogation this means that ‘retreatment’ is ‘the negation of the both the dis-conjunctive suspension of rhetorical process of pretreatment and the conjunctive suspension of the metaphorical process of treatment’. Or translated in conventional terms, etc., that ‘retreatment’ is ‘the negation of both the conventional and the non-conventional or the ultimate truth determination; and hence, surprise of surprise, retreatment is the negation of both conventional representational and non-conventional/ultimate anti-representational ‘presentations’. Or, in effect, retreatment can be seen as a non-anti-representational-representationalism’ or ‘trans-anti-representational-representationalism’ or a ‘meta-anti-representational-represent-ationalism’. That this existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism is also a ‘non-anti-representational-representationalism’, etc., and not just an ‘anti-representational-representationalism *per se*! (33)

But, that noted, we must also understand that The Second Economic Axiom demands that there can be no economic isolates so this overall theory of conformal truth determination must procced through a composite of conventional, ultimate, non-conventional-ultimate, perspectives, etc., which is non other than adopting and adapting a middle path in our overall conformal assessment of those current exigencies being placed under such tripolar considerations! (34)

Let me illustrate this transformational approach (in our passage form 1 - 2 - 3, & - 1 as a form of posttreatment):

2. Treatment

(1-2) Metafication[176] (2-3) De-Metafication[177]

1. Pretreatment 3. Retreatment

(3-1) Posttreatment (35)

Now, let me individually focus on these stages and sequences as badged as ‘conventional’, etc. (36)

Conventional representation is naturally extrapolated, i.e., projected into the world at large, even though it is purely based on a perceived or apperceived processes of

176 Elevation by one meta-degree in meta-status.

177 De-elevation by one meta-degree in meta-status.

alignment or non-alignment between textual statements, etc. Let me explicate this in finer detail. (37)

In conventionally falling back on what I believe that I already know, in this instance, let me make the assumption that 'the fruit bowl in the kitchen still has one apple in that bowl'. I.e., I entertain the reasonable belief that 'there is one apple in that fruit bowl in the kitchen'. However, in going to the kitchen I see that 'this fruit bowl is now empty'. Then, I remembered, that a certain person said they would take that apple to eat for lunch'. So, I was entertaining an inconsistent belief that I can now resolve by simply noting that 'this same fruit bowl is now empty' (giving a preference to 'perceptual knowledge' rather than merely 'remembered knowledge' in the form of a remembered belief). (38)

But, joy of joy, in passing through the kitchen that evening I then notice this 'empty fruit bowl' now has '1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 apples…' So, I have to re-adjust my belief system yet again. Pointing out the obvious transformational nature of conformal truth determination, 'conformal' in the sense that through a reiteration of truth determinations I can re-confirm such determinations as either currently re-confirmed (in real time) or re-verified (not in real-time), etc. (39)

So, statement 1 is still aligned with statement 2, etc., therefore, statement 1 is conventionally affirmed, albeit when re-viewed through a Tarskian perspective, namely, meta-statement 1 is true (T) if and only if there is evidence for that statement is evident:

> I.e., (statement 1)[1] is T iff statement 1 is evident (because, furthermore, statement 1 is also [currently] equal to statement 2, etc.). (40)

Correctly, all this is textually based, i.e., as textual (statements, etc.), meta-textually, con-textually,[178] etc., found to be relevant to such conformal considerations… despite the natural tendency to extrapolate such textual elements out in this lived-world at large, but, which is not permitted from an ultimate perspective that persistently insists on 'the emptiness of the economically impossible'. (41)

Although the representational is textual, and hence takes on board the textual orientations, meta-textual and con-textual orientations, non-textual orientations, etc., and through treatment, takes on (through suspensions/metafication) (metaphysical-like) meta-conjectural forms of meta-representational modes of treatment, along with the transformational rewriting of retreatment (through the de-suspension/de-metafication) in conjunction with the ongoing posttreatment amendments of the pretreatment phase, still, in no way is any one stage or sequence, etc., in this overall process of transformation has anything to do whatsoever with those misguided imputations of economically impossible states considered to be impossibly pre-representational or trans-representational or post-transformational, etc! Hence, by noting such ultimate limitations, an anti-representationalism is put permanently into effect despite our limited and qualified pre-

[178] Taking textual contexts also into account meta-textually as 'con-texts'. E.g., 'this' kitchen, 'this' fruit bowl, 'these' apples, etc.

treatment of what we assume is correctly to hand in representational pretreatment, etc. Or, in other words, all transformational modes, as heuristically entertained stages and sequences, are and remain textual, etc., but, never pre-textual or trans-textual, etc! (42)

In treatment, we now apply a suspension along with the metafication of our conventional pretreatment. Since we are 'relating to' the textual expression or expressions in question, etc. Just as titles are 'about' a text and not correctly that text *per se*. In treatment, we now apply a suspension along with the metafication of our conventional pretreatment. (43)

Then, as the suspension automatically invokes a de-suspension, retreatment likewise follows treatment, etc. Where, ideally, in dialectical terms, we can consider such an economy as hypothetically starting at any stage or sequence and ending at any stage or sequence, as travelling clockwise or anticlockwise, or in both directions at the same time, or as being entertained simultaneously, and/or in parallel (as in economic complexification). Furthermore, in the light of a positive treatment of the non-economic, in the resolution of an irruptive sense, we should also find room for the non-economic and the super-economic by extension… along with notions of the relatively non-critical, relatively critical, and the relatively radical. (44)

Now, in order to move to a general theory of misrepresentation, etc., how might we notate this general theory of a conformal truth determination as preparation for the same? (45)

First, by noting that although representation is 'textual' it cannot be just 'textual' given the wealth of economic factors, like, e.g., meta-texts, contexts, meta-conjectures, retreated meta-conjectures, etc. (46)

Second, by noting certain unsuccessful transformations or successful non-transformations among the same we can then proceed to formulated a general theory of conformal truth determination when reiterations of those truth determinations realized, when considered over a certain period of time, appear to maintain a certain concurrence of relatively isomorphic transformational invariance between propositional representations reputedly reporting to present the same state of affairs in question. (47)

Let me simply put that in notation. Conjecture 1 (C1) in con-text A, in terms of it relations (r, 1 - x), predicated (p, 1 - y) and nominated logical subjects (s, 1- z) are conformally true if they can be both affirmed and re-affirmed, but, through transformational retreatment can be written in a form that is eventually finds forms of re-iterated affirmation.

$[C1, etc,]^1$ is T iff [C1, etc.], as per Tarski. (48)

Or, in the advent of an initial process of dis-affirmation, a conformal truth status either accepts the non-truth (-T) of that set of conjectural assertions ascertained as not

valid, or, in conformally rewriting the same in valid terms of reference, through retreatment, etc., we can now note:

$[C1]^1$ -T iff -[C1] *versus* $[C1 – C2]^1$ is T iff [C1 – C2]. (49)

Besides running a transformational modeling, we could merely catalogue, say, Conjecture 1 as entailing con-text A, along with a set of r's, p's, and s's. Determining te conformal truth determination of the same merely needing the reiteration of the same from a Tarskian perspective. E.g:

[C1(A/r, p, s), C2 (A/r, p, s), C3 (A/r, p, s)]1 is T iff [C1 (A/r, p, s), etc.]. (50)

In running a general conformal theory of mis-representations, etc., it will be argued that we either non-deliberately mistake and/or deliberately change, as inputs, either a certain small set of relational, predicational, and/or logical-subjective elements in the cataloguing of a certain situation or misrepresent its con-text of presentation and/or overlook relevant inputs that, collectively, should alter the following outputs derived from either such inadvertent and/or advertent forms of effective misrepresentation, etc. So, e.g., if, before going to the kitchen that evening, I then entertained the false belief that 'there were no apples in that fruit bowl', but, 'then', I should be pleasantly surprised to find that 'there are now six apples in that same bowl' given, as an inference, 'that the person who eat the last apple in the bowl earlier has now replenished the same'. (51)

Hence in this plethora of either present or absent textual features in my cataloguing of lived-experience I am able to entertain both a general conformal theory of truth determination alongside a general conformal theory of misrepresented truth determinations. (52)

It should also be noted, in terms of a relative transformational isomorphic invariance, in various textual formats, that a conformance in determinations is possible when the reiteration of the relevant conjectures is able to demonstrate such relative stability or such relative instability with or without the rewriting of the same (through retreatment, etc.). So, e.g., the hermeneutic characteristics of pretreatment are in general terms of reference; whereas, treatment is conducted in terms of a phenomenological particularity; and, the specificity arrived at in the retreatment of lived-experience is just that i.e., as somewhat definitively specified in concrete terms of reference. Now, in a transformation from the general to the particular to the specificity of our direct engagement of lived-experience we should find a certain preservation in the relative transformational isomorphic invariance that would allow us to metaphorically 'thread' these three levels of that textual economy of re(-)presentation, etc., as invoked in a process of transformational retreatment, and so on. (53)

Just as in the situation when we remark 'is that John over there?' meaning 'is that either John or not John?' given that 'that person looks like John', and, in waving back to him, can now ascertain that 'that is John!' (or not 'John' if that person were not 'John').

Where, as in the forms of ‘fifth trans-cognitively/cognitively ordered possibility’ we can now move to a ‘sixth trans-cognitively/cognitively ordered actuality’.[179] (54)

3. A General theory of Misrepresentation and Mendacity

Now, not all misrepresentations, etc., are necessarily mendacious since as finite human beings we have, do, and will make mistakes, but, in being deliberately mendacious the products of such duplicity then forms a subset within the category of misrepresentation, etc., that rightly deserves to be differentiated. Let me now account for this overall relationship between the affirmation of the conventionally representative, the misrepresentative, and the deliberately mendacious, etc. (55)

Simply put, misrepresentation is mistakes in our cataloguing of the relevant elements in our conventional representation of a certain situation (in the form of a textualize representation of that situation in question, be those conjectures ‘conformally’ entertained as either a virtual set of conjectures or a possible non-virtual sequence of conjectures, etc. (56)

Again, simply put, an imputed act of mendacious duplicity is the deliberate making of certain small number of mistakes in our cataloguing of the relevant elements in our conventional representation of a certain situation (in the form of a textualize representation of that situation in question, be those conjectures ‘conformally’ entertained as either a virtual set of conjectures or as a possible non-virtual sequence of conjectures, etc.) with the deliberate intention to either directly deceive and/or or indirectly misrepresent the representative constitution of that situation in question. (57)

Therefore, that granted, we can now point out the potential ramifications of either such direct deception and/or indirect misrepresentation along with the speculative imputation of the apparent reason or reasons why such ‘misrepresentation’ was deliberately being entered into. Whereas elsewhere, inadvertent misrepresentations can be pointed out as either not being in conformity with either conjectured intentions and/or conformally demonstrated evidence, etc. (58)

However, sadly, from a theoretical perspective, the pointing out of mistakes, as in acts of fact checking, etc., rarely achieve a successful matching of their intended intentions. In light of this obvious failing, let propose, instead, a more focused form of an apposite response through invoking the fact that we then need to operate form a narrational perspective specifically designed to reinforce the presence of such misrepresentations and their insisted upon replacement by a narrative that also will deconstruct the misrepresentative or mendacious intent of the ideologically over-committed resistant party or parties perpetrating such deceptive misrepresentations and either directly and/or indirectly wishing to profit from such blatantly or patently perpetrated forms of inauthenticity. (59)

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[179] Between trans-cognitive judgments and cognitive content of those judgments we can find a certain degree of coincidence should those judgments be able to affirmatively validated as such, etc.

One way to understand the narrational economy is to see it as trimodally constituted from narrational facts, usually seen as pertaining to that narrative itself; the trajectory or trajectories of the narrative in question; and, the motivation behind the formation of that narrative in regard to some form of an overt and/or covert narrational anomaly or anomalies that that narrative, ostensively, is addressing and, perhaps, partially redressing (given the narrational fact that the full resolution of the *raison d'être* of a certain narrative would immediately oversee its termination and complete cessation). Ideally, in deconstructing either an inauthentic or economically impossible narrative, we need to demonstrate to that narrator the full resolution of their narration or the impossibility of their narrated project or program or that the continuance of such a narration really cast a very bad light on the narrator who 'may well not wish to be associated with that type of narration when its negatives and clearly articulated and imaginatively self-identified with. Given the power of our narratives and their selective gathering of either narrational facts, and factoids[180] if present, it is obvious that merely factchecking such co-associated narrational 'facts and factoids' is not going 'to cut the mustard', so to speak given the disseminative power of a forcefully articulated narration. Instead, we have to deconstruct the cogency of that narrative, both denotationally and connotationally, and, either fully resolve its problematicity or render its motivation as problematic or as not reflecting very well on the impugned integrity of the narrator. (60)

How might we deal with someone echoing the bizarre narration that in Springfield, Ohio, in the US, so-called 'illegal migrants', in their thousands, are eating the cats and the dogs, and other household pets, etc. (61)

As noted, factchecking alone will not stop the re-dissemination of this bizarre narrative (given the graphic nature of this narrative and how it fits so comfortably within the falsity of the super-narrative 'that migrants are bad, migration is getting out of hand, the country is being taken over, etc.). There is a place for this process, but, it must be brought to bear at the right moment in our rhetorical dismantling of this pernicious type of a narrated discourse. One point of entry is to suggest that the narrator sounds like they are being perhaps a 'despicable racist', and by branding these 'legal immigrants working in Springfield as 'illegal migrants' is merely feeding this racist trope. Magnified by citing a figure of '15,000 or more' of these hard-working workers, many of whom are working in the factories of this city. But, should the narrator of this trope then deny they are being 'racist' and merely stating the so-called facts immediately reply that there is absolutely no evidence for this fantastical trip they are on. Inform then that if they initiate a lie or perpetuate a lie then they are just as much a liar as the person or persons who started this nonsense. As there is no evidence for such claims then we must duly suspect the quality of their character and must wonder if anything else they might wish to say is even worth listening to! Then, to reinforce this rhetorical set of manoeuvres we might drop on them the impact that such nonsense has caused for all the good people of this city by running a consequential analysis that at some point needs yourself to be able to personalize this information and have the narrator either advertently and/or inadvertently identify with the

[180] Factoids, presented in misrepresentative narratives, etc., represented as 'facts' but have no assured evidential basis. Often used for peddling conspiratorial narratives or for the dissemination of strong forms of an absolutistical positioning (which, also, can be either religious or non-religious in orientation).

apparent victims of this pernicious nonsense. Like e.g., the children of a local school who had to have to their school photo session cancelled because of bomb threats, and, that the local hospital was similarly inconvenienced! Impress upon such a useful idiot that they are only a 'useful idiot' set up to perpetuate this despicable nonsense for some rogue politician who is unable to resist making a few more, cheap political points for the successfulness of their own misbegotten political objectives… and, stress again what this says about them, themselves, as to their character... when they so easily are conned into disseminating such sick, disturbed, and completely unsubstantiated nonsense. Did they do their Internet research on this topic? No, of course not, shouldn't they be ashamed at the obvious mendacity of such a discourse whose sole purpose, apparently, is to merely feed and further inflame a racist super-narrative?! Shame, shame, shame… (62)

On the other hand, if they admit to being a 'proud racist' and a firm believer of such nonsense, then it is time to tactfully disengage, but, hope that their friends are not so ideologically dogmatic on such polarized and polarizing issues. (63)

Now, I must announce a trigger warning: Those sensitive to violence towards animals might prefer to bypass the next paragraph… (64)

> **Distraught wife:** Abe, Abe, some dark fellows, next door, look like they are trying to sacrifice my Miss Scuttlebutt… with spears… they want to dispatch my precious pussycat…
> **Concerned husband:** Going next door…
> **A few minutes later a less concerned husband returns:** Only some students, Darling, from the local film school filming a satirical skit for their school's online magazine. Miss Scuttlebutt loves them, a real trooper. She was having great fun. Have no idea what that was all about, they said it was something political?
> **Director's comments:** But, the audience of that video would know what was being referenced. Political humour is very topical,[181] but, once the situational reference is recognized then the point of that humour targets the serious performers of that situational reference in such a manner that mocks such misplaced 'seriousness'. Just as the unwise participant in that infamous debate, when this already discredited racist trope was being reiterated by them, saw their debating opponent merely raise a knowing eyebrow and jokingly say, '"so extreme." With the implication, how could anyone be so daft to believe such nonsense. Where the perfect response could well be to just laugh, and then move on… (65)

That this excursion into the dismantling of discordant narratives, promoting either misrepresentation and/or mendacity, is now to be treated as a segue into how we might take an existentially oriented course in the opposite direction that promotes a relatively more beneficial process of transformational alignment with the lived-reality of our relationships. (66)

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[181] Read a Punch magazine from one hundred years ago and see if you understand the humour being expressed if you do not have an adequate understanding of the political situation being sent up?

4. A General Theory of Existential Recognition, Encountering, and Engagement

In relational terms we meet, in spatial-temporal terms of reference, the hermeneutical recognition of relational parts and participants, the phenomenal-phenomenological encountering of predicational parts and participants, and their (non-systematic) existential engagement with these same nominated relational elements, etc. However, from an existentially oriented. pro-relational perspective, through the auspices of the working suspension we experience a trans-historical and a trans-geographical take on the former, that through transformational retreatment, through the force of the de-suspended suspension we find the ongoing re(-)writing of the existential specification of that lived-experience in its relatively definitive concrete historicity. (67)

In this endeepened process of existentialization, we move from a relatively non-systematic existential engagement to the ongoing, overall integrity of a relatively systematic sense and semblance of an existential engagement through the dynamic intermediation of that economy in question.[182] (68)

In qualified bimodal terms of reference, we can invoke a middle path in conformal truth determination by arguing that we need to observe that neither a 'representational conventionalism' nor an 'ultimate anti-representationalism' can be run solely in their own terms of reference with a middle path coinciding (more or less) with the (hyphen) in an 'anti-representational-representationalism'. (69)

However, when refracted through a trimodal process intermediation we can now claim a middle path in conformal truth determination is centered by the three non-isolated correlatives of the 'representational', the 'anti-representational', and, the 'non-anti-representational-representation'.[183] (70)

By such manoeuvres, in applying such suspensions, etc., a middle path in conformal truth determination can be charted in co-association with an existentialization of process, etc.[184] (71)

Where by avoiding unimodal, bimodal, and closed trimodal terms of reference, in effect, a middle path is being exercised… regardless of whether we are aware of this fact or not! (72)

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182 'Intermediation' is 'the dynamic suspension of all three correlatives of the economy in question'. 'Mediation' is 'the bimodal suspension of two correlatives', and, 'intra-mediation' is 'the suspension of a single corelative'. This simplified nomenclature was explored in *Book* 11. Cited here in order to illustrate how a 'middle path' in conformal truth determination can be conceived of in either trimodal or bimodal terms of reference… as explored in the next three paragraphs.

183 As noted earlier, in paragraph 4, the non-anti-representational-representational can also be defined as either trans-anti-representational-representational and/or meta-anti-representational-representational.

184 With a deliberate allusion to how a Buddhist Middle path could be navigated, negotiated, and arbitrated in either bimodal terms of reference or in trimodal terms of reference? Madhyamaka often pursuing a bimodal pathway, and, the Yogacara pursuing more a (variety of) trimodal approach(es).

5. Re-Visiting the Deconstruction of a Strong Absolutism

In re-visiting the deconstruction of a strong absolutism, we can take a few leaves from our recent excursion into narrational theory.[185] (73)

Given the dissemination of such an impossible position or its defective dissemination is pursued, more than likely, through a strong use of narrative, therefore, let us address and redress such economic anomalies through a well-constructed process of narrational deconstruction by deconstructing that defective discourse through the suitable use of rhetorical strategies able to achieve this intentional objective. (74)

Demonstrating the economically impossible as 'impossible' and/or the defective as a 'defective' interpretation of the former, etc. (75)

6. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

What are the philosophical consequences of attempting to impossibly maintain a strong absolutism when a weak absolutism or a non-weak/non-strong absolutism (of a well-conducted and well-organized absolute philosophy[186] whose conformal formation is guaranteed through suitable forms of inter-mediation, etc.[187]) may well be all that is required conjecturally, philosophically, etc. (76)

We should have no problem with (absolute) philosophies that suitably explore various possible conjectures that might actually find a valid acceptance at some time in the future. But, to run such speculative and exploratory philosophies, as in the fields of science and history, e.g., we must deal with possibilities that might actually be able to find some valid form of actualization if not now then, perhaps, at some future point in time, or, find a retrospective acceptance once conformally established, albeit to a reasonable degree of conformal validation. (77)

Hence, we could envisage these four conditions for the operation of a working absolute philosophy. First, the permanent running of a suitable process of suspension (through inter-mediation that will insure against converting a weak or non-weak/non-strong style of positioning into an impossible strong form of positioning). Second, the use of metaphors that lend themselves to having a fifth ordered status as possibilities, etc. Third, the worked towards conjectural and evidential conversion of such metaphors into valid forms of a conformally affirmed sixth order. Four, the necessary use of an aversion to running extremely reductive economies since the economic isolation of either economic correlatives or their related intentional products, e.g., concepts, percepts, experiences in general, etc., should not be tolerated since such extremism is neither possible to correctly envisage be that through either recognition, encountering, and/or engagement. (78)

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185 In paragraphs 59-64.

186 Hence my somewhat contorted distinction between (a positive consideration of) the 'absolute' and the (negatively regarded) 'absolutistical'.

187 I.e., the continual use of full suspensions.

The worldliness of the world cannot be reduced to its current actualization since this world at large is what we make of it and that cannot be catalogued at any point in time. Without such conjectural speculation how would we recognize, encounter, and/or engage forms of innovation that either currently or retrospectively could well be nigh on impossible to envisage. Especially in light of the fact that relatively-radical innovations are impossible to intellectually appropriate unless they be broken down into sets and series of sequences of the relatively-radical that afford such forms of incremental appropriation. On the other hand, to run fraudulent processes metaphorical literalization in conjunctions with extreme forms of reduction is to immediately sabotage such an intuitive response to interacting with productive patterns and processes in a necessary search for modes of innovation that bring a greater depth to our lived-experiences of the worldliness of this world above and beyond that which is already to hand… (79)

As suggested, a way to deconstruct a strong form of philosophical positioning, etc., would be to do so through a deconstructive use of narrative. Then, through the use of a well-honed conjectural exploration and consequential analysis the impossibilities of such a distorted narrative can be exposed. Rhetorically, we can also insist on a 'please explain the possibilities of your claims when dealing with phenomena, etc?', somewhat on the explanatory edge of that strong positioning. So, we might annoy the strong realist and ask them to 'please explain, of course in realistic terms alone, say, quantum non-locality, etc?' Or, ask the idealist to 'please explain the historical trajectories of a certain discipline?' since, as discovered by myself,[188] no idealistic appreciation of the *a priori* structural-functions exist that can explain the diverse responses entered into historically, be that on the level of the person or in terms of a community, or an institution or a discipline, and so on. Or, asking of the pragmatical pragmatist how they can they 'please explain and justify any form of an approach that does not recognize the necessary deontological nature of the compactual, etc?' Where, in a similar vein, we ask of the dogmatic absolutist 'can they please explain the philosophical choices they make in their misbegotten utilization of metaphors and in their insisting on impossible degrees of reductive refraction and redaction?'[189] Given that what is overlooked is more than likely as important, if not more important, that what must be shortsightedly overlooked in the excessive demands of an unwarranted reductive environment. (80)

Now, let me conclude by arguing that a reasonable theory of conformal truth determination, suitably applied, must assuredly dispose of all misbegotten forms of a strong absolutism. (81)

In the overall theory of truth determination outlined in this essay I have argued, at least implicitly, that a strong absolutism cannot be reasonably proclaimed on the strength of the fact that a conventional truth can only operate successfully when bound by the ultimate limitations of an anti-representationalism, and v.v. Or, in the utilization of the suspensions of an inter-mediated nature, that the meta-philosophical/metaphysical apprecia-

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188 Refer to *Pursuit*, III.XIIG.

189 The expression 'redaction' indicates an inevitable loss of information, etc., that could invaluably supplement or complement those explorations, etc.

tion of a truth condition demands that it affirmatively rewrites its intentional contents-and-functions through ongoing processes of transformational retreatment… in a conjectural conformance with canons of either direct evidence, testimony, and/or inference… and in such a manner that its possibility of truth ascertainment be not rendered either impossible and/or defectively interpreted, etc., over the course of its dissemination. (82)

In bimodal terms, in seeking this middle path, we realize that the covert nature of an encompassing economy must also be present. So, we may have a conventional representationalism, on one hand, arrived at through various forms of textual alignment and non-alignment, and, on the other hand, we have the limitations of an anti-representationalism that also cannot be ignored. Imputing a relationship between the same as forming and informing the operative economy in question, namely, an 'anti-representational-representationalism', then allows us to apparently operate, ostensively, a bimodal economy. (83)

Or, in non-covert, overt trimodal terms we can suppose that the intermediated suspension of the overall economy of the conventional, the ultimate (in limitations) and the non-anti-representational-representationalism at least allows us to positively understand a non-economic role wherein the resolution of conformal judgments imprints themselves on the very 'fabric' of our thinking through this facet of the irruptive as expressed through the direct rewriting of transformational retreatment… (84)

That such ongoing intermediation, i.e., the suitable utilization of full, ongoing suspensions operating as 'working suspensions' (i.e., extensive suspensions) also takes up an existential dimension wherein we progressively adopt and adapt a goldilocks approach to commitment that is both reasonable and measures, neither non-committed nor over-committed… as we explore either our philosophical, metaphysical, disciplinary and/or secular interest in this world at large, this overall world-of-life… (85)

That in conjunction with such a middle path in conformal truth determination and a goldilocks approach to commitment, we then also need to take on board an understanding of how both misrepresentation and mendacity can flourish in an environment that is not suitably 'cultivated and weeded'. That we can be ever amazed at people who have no clue as to what is in their best interests and are permanently prepared to let other people tell them what they need and require, when, these political merchants of fantasy are only out to serve their own interests. As I have argued elsewhere, the creation, preservation, and conservational expansion of a relatively democratically oriented political system is an imperative in order to progressively advance both political consensus formation and the advancement of a social solidarity conducive to the our being able to live a better life both with-others and before-others, and, where, hopefully, we will find both an augmented and an enhanced sense of freedom that can only be obtained and realized through-others..!![190] (86)

To cap such explorations, as with these other essays in this book, we may well deride a weak version of a certain topic as being more than likely to be philosophically

[190] Refer, e.g., to *Pursuit*, III.V.2I.

ineffective, and, in contrast, where a strong version is either impossible to contemplate or is being defectively disseminated without the person perpetrating such nonsense not being able to realize the nonsensical fruitlessness of their mistaken mission. Then, again, it does make full sense to wonder in what way a non-weak/non-strong approach to your topic in question could actually manufacture more than enough sense to reward such a middle path, finding for us, thereby, one more useful tool in our portfolio of pragmatic techniques to assist us in the further exploration of what, on one hand, was being found to be problematic, and, on the other hand, is now found to act as the very remedy for its resolution. Where, therein and thereafter, now no longer problematic, but, the very method, itself, for this process of de-problematization? Let me explain. (87)

We can certainly dismiss a strong version of a realist philosophy as nothing more than one more mistaken version of an economic isolation of intentional objectivity in so far as it has been extended far beyond the full limits of its practical employment, etc.,[191] yet, an appreciation of the connotations of the expression being 'realistic' might have us questioning such a blanket dismissal and, therein and thereby, recognize that there is still a place for such a philosophy should it be well-tempered and suitably confined to these more circumscribed contours that appertain to the reasonable characteristics of the appellation of both the 'non-weak' and the 'non-strong'. That there will be those circumstances where a certain realistic form of a qualified intentional objectivity could be called for and, other occasions, where its usefulness is no longer so evident.[192] Similarly, the expression being 'idealistic' also has a similar set of positive possibilities whilst the designation of 'pragmatic' also has a practical significance where not too many people would not wish to be associated with. Can this more neutral observation be carried across the board to also include these notions of the 'dualistic' along with the 'absolutistic' and the 'relativistic'? (88)

Given the apparent bimodalism of all sequential operations and the fact that those operations could not be enacted if they were to be viewed as either unimodal or denied a deeper transformational trimodal complexion then it follows that the dualistic complexion of such operations cannot be dismissed since to do so would be to render such thinking as all but impossible. As a thoughtful person we realize we are also embodied, and, therefore, to just define ourselves as either mere 'body' or a sheer 'mind' is to make a nonsense of our 'being situated in this world at large' since matter then could not reflect on its situatedness and a pure disembodied mind would have no situatedness in this same world at large. Therefore, to speak of our 'situatedness' demands the cooperation of the dualistic-like influences that come together in our being situated in this world with-others, before-others, and finding, therein and thereafter, an inescapable existential freedom through-others. (89)

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191 Channelling this approach through the Kantian-like formula of 'making sure we do not transgress the theoretical deployment, the practical employment, and the critical (and also radical) re-deployment of the (economic and epistemological) limitations that naturally appertain to the nature of the topic in question'.

192 E.g., as noted, when dealing with a quantum non-localism.

But, be that as it may, what usefulness is there to find in a modified absolutism, or, for that matter in a modified relativism? ‘Modified’ in the sense of ‘taking a middle path between the barely thought-out nature of a weak positioning and the ideological extremism exhibited in an impossibly strong format. Although two topics that deserve to be more thoroughly explored suffice to say that the former sets the stage for such explorations, whereas, the latter, helps us to deliver our lines with a degree of insightfulness more in tune with an existential vision of this world in and through a revelation of both its richness and enrichment. But, let me take up this series of reflections in the next two essays that will basically flesh-out the overall trajectory of this *Book* XII. (90)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 21/10.24.

XIIK. From the Existential Ahistorical to
The Trans-Historical Existential

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIK. (11.) From the Existential Ahistorical to the Trans-Historical Existential[193]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

This is a very subtle transgression and I have to confess that only a few days ago I inadvertently recommitted this same mistake yet again. then, by referring to the 'existential' as 'pro-relational' I have rather unwittingly confused a pre-condition for the expression of the existential orientation for the experience of the systematic existential itself. Much like looking either at a signpost and confusing that signpost with the goal being pointed to, or, following the instructions of the signpost but not in a manner that would reach that destination. A bit like heading south down the coastline of Aotearoa New Zealand and hoping to reach the Antarctica (a metaphor, in reverse, I suspect, that would not work in Greenland or the very north of Canada?). At the same time this mistaken misidentification with a misinterpretation of the existential as the 'transcendent' and 'ahistorical' in character can be revealed and more closely explicated when we apply a trimodal modelling of a transformational retreatment. In effect, we arrive at a realization that existential experience is at the concrete coalface of lived-experience in a direct specificity of engagement through the ongoing inter-mediation (of an overall working suspension) in the simultaneity of recognition, encountering, and engagement. In other words, epithets that express the ahistorical, the unchanging, the totality, the integrity of existentially oriented experience, etc., are only pointing at it when, more correctly, all such treatments are being deconstructed through the de-suspension in which we find an intermingling, say, of the metaphysical metafication with the rewriting of a philosophical demetafication in the lived-emergence of the systematic existential arrived at through the suitable inter-mediation of a working suspension (as an extensive suspension). Where such distinctions are progressively overcome through an exposure of the sheer relativity of that which is being revealed through such simulated play, through such simulated playfulness, through a simulation of the simulation that cannot but be a 'non-simulation', the 'living-experience of the lived-experience as the lived-experience of the living-experience… to that extent it ceases to be just experience… in a failure of language we can merely point to 'experience experiencing experience…' However, despite such a successful-failure, as an ever-failing-success, let me re-define the 'trans-historical' as a concept that attempts to avoid the imprint of the historical be that either in and through a temporal economy of past, present and future, along with all talk as well of a transcending of the historical or a being immanent within the historical but where the full working suspension of the same, at the same time, returns us to the full impact of the historical. (0)

In dealing with this subtle existential concept of the 'trans-historical' let me apply the philosophy of a transformational retreatment to demonstrate how the existentially effectively rewrites itself without recourse to a unimodal, bimodal, or closed forms of trimodal economicalism, and, where the definitive and unilateral nature of the non-economic, in the imputed context of the super-economic, reveals a sense and semblance of the super-economic in its most radical expressiveness, but, at the same time not in such a manner that it cannot be accommodated in and through a relatively-radical incrementalism. Now, let me approach this topic through the following series of expositions… (1)

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193 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. First Exposition: A Reading through Transformational Retreatment

Now, first, let me start with a few corrections, or similar. I have previously identified the expressions ‘ahistorical’ and ‘trans-historical’, but, in the context of these last two essays in this *Book* XII, let me draw the following distinction. ‘Ahistorical’ is meant in the (now provisional) sense of ‘standing outside time or above time’, as if (falsely) thinking we have ‘a point or place in conscious experience where we can review the flow of the historical from the past to the present to the future, and, where the sense and semblance of the present now takes on an eternal-like significance of its ‘forever ongoing self-presentation’. Now, such an interpretation is not so much wrong as a step in both the right direction and a step back in the wrong direction. Yes, existentially oriented experience does have the mantle of the ‘eternally-present’ as its existential hallmark but we must understand the provisional nature of this significance as more signage that we are heading in the right direction, but, that we should not mistake this indicated direction for the goal of engaging a more systematic presentation of the existential itself. In these expositions, e.g., I will set out to demonstrate this point by arguing we cannot do so in either unimodal terms of reference or bimodal terms, etc. In my now redefined contrast with the ‘trans-historical’, I am suggesting that through the suspension we totally do away with all trace of the historical and the ahistorical altogether, but, then, through ‘the suspension of the suspension’, in the ‘de-suspension’, in the moment of retreatment, the historical in all its multiform modes of presentation comes flooding back in a directly engaged specificity embraced in the full concreteness of its engagement (in what I would like to refer to as a Hegelian-like moment, in a channeling of Hegel’s criticism of Kant on that type of positioning?). (2)

Mistakenly thinking that a Kantian-like sense of the ahistorical to be the full expression of the existential *per se* does not and cannot account for the transformative nature of existentially oriented experience. Where, in effect, the moment of resolution, in the moment of retreatment, we then potentially open ourselves up to the non-economic irruption of an ongoing re(-)direction of intent in a progressive opening ourselves up to our relationships in respect to both their non-existential richness and existentially oriented enrichment. That when we suitably adopt and adapt an open trimodal approach to our relational situatedness to hand, in and through its current relevantly detailed and conjecturally pre-prepared representational depiction then the de-suspension, in the moment of retreatment, in a mingling of the relatively metaphysical and the philosophical, the relative meta-disciplinary and the disciplinary, the professional and secular, etc., may well occasion its non-economic irruption where the prospect of relational resolution is now to be brought to the fore in a Laurellian-like moment able to either affirm the hermeneutic presentation of the pretreatment, as the relevant material to hand, or, to merely modify the same, or, to definitively declare the non-applicability of that represented pretreatment under such scrutiny in the context of those current explorations that now deem those initial materials to be either irrelevant or mistaken or fraudulent, etc., when conducted in a process of continuing conformalization of intentional contents, processes, perspectives, economies, consequential outcomes, etc., etc. (3)

Yes, the perspective that attempts to treat the relationship from its this sense and semblance of own its relational integrity, as having distinctly and non-reductively emerged from its relational situatedness, is a step in the right direction, but, should not be mistaken as indicating a more systematic sense of the existential (in its non-economic expression of its own economic resoluteness). How do I demonstrate this subtle point? By applying a trimodal interpretation as refracted through a lens of transformational re-treatment, and, then showing through economic complexification that the moment in question is either that of either 'historical material to hand' or 'ahistorical treatment' or that of a process of 'engaged retreatment', albeit as not activated in an impossible non-economic sense. The third moment of the relatively non-systematic existential portends 'resolution' but without non-economic enaction such resolution then remains merely virtual and not actualized. (4)

Let me diagrammatically represent this scheme and identify these distinctive stages and transitions with various key philosophers in order to articulate and highlight these various dialectical-like stages in this process of transformation with an existential orientation where only in and through the full completion of this cycle can we argue that we are now representing a relatively non-virtually enacted existential process involving our full, definitively re-directed engagement with the situatedness of that situation in question:

Kantian
2. Treatment
Ahistorical

Husserlian
Suspension

Tointonian
De-Suspension

*

Heideggerian
1. Pretreatment
Historical

Hegelain
3. Retreatment
Trans-Historical

Laurellian
Non-Economic Posttreatment (5)

Let me sequentially explicate the transformational 'logic' behind this scheme. We always have to begin with what hermeneutically 'is to hand' (and hence my allusion to Heidegger. We could also allude to Georg Gadamer and his observation that in order to conduct a suspension we have to deal with our 'prejudices' as 'prejudgments', etc.). What is to hand is our current understanding, an awareness of our intentions in terms of their objectivity and motivation, how this is channeled in our use of relevant meta-textual genres of behaviour and the narrational facts that appear to be co-associated with such a perspective of pretreatment. (6)

Then, hopefully, through the proper use of a working suspension (extensive suspension) (as a set/s, sequences, and/or series of the former) we arrive at a transformational process of treatment. Hence my obvious allusion to Husserl. (7)

In a process of treatment, we are taking a phenomenal-phenomenological perspective which, in simple terms is either analytical, synthetical or nominational in orientation, or, in more complex forms of (re)presentation, is a mix of the same (when, in conformal reality, all three orientations must be co-present given their status as directly associated with their co-economic correlatives and the impossible situation of their individual economic isolation[194]). Now a potential problem that needs to be confronted at this point is the understanding that although the moment of treatment is archetypally reductive and analytical in orientation, that in a process of treatment all three correlatives can be provisionally simulated phenomenologically either individually, in pairs, and/or or collectively given the non-isolated economic status of all designated forms of correlativity. Hence the observation, that treatment, archetypally, can only be a product of either reduction, synthesis, and/or nomination, although more correctly, a dialectical representation of all three possibilities that naturally co-occur but never in any degree of equality other than in the passing moment of the suspension that then finds itself automatically de-suspended. Furthermore, these three modes of treatment, through economic complexification, can be seen allied to their corresponding forms of economic treatment (as noted in a parallel dictionary outlining such parallels[195]). Hence the direct co-association, delineated through economic complexification, between, say, the 'reductive', 'retrospective', 'intentional objectivity', 'the phenomenological', 'textual deposition', the 'ahistorical', etc. We should also realize, that in the freezing of this 'circle of a transformational process', in lived-experience we will not be bound by observing either a clockwise direction or an anti-clockwise direction, or our metaphorically 'travelling' in both directions simultaneously, or, being everywhere in this circle at the same time. Noting, most importantly, that in treatment we assume an elevation in meta-status by one degree (through this process of metafication that is more concerned with the process of treatment rather than the pretreated content being subjected to such 'treatment'). Moreover, in the realization of this relatively ahistorical status, as arrived at through metafication, the key philosopher that automatically comes to mind is that of Immanuel Kant (along with the fixed nature of his categories, etc.). (8)

Then, in a process of retreatment we automatically find the ensuing de-suspension de-elevates the meta-status of treatment by one degree in meta-status. As I am not aware of any philosopher who discusses in any detail whatsoever this 'automatic process of the de-suspension' I have both reluctantly, and provisionally, added my near-worthless name to this list of august philosophers. In this transformational phase, we are thrust back into the full trans-historical reality of living-experience as it engages the coalface of the concretely historical in all its direct specificity (in an intermingling of meta-philosophical/metaphysical and philosophical/disciplinary modes of engagement). (9)

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194 Either as so-called 'pure presence' or 'pure absence'.

195 E.g., *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A, etc.

Retreatment, in some sense, can be seen as an intermingling of the metaphysical-like nature of a Kantian phase in conjunction with a Hegelian phase where the philosophical is being reconstituted in parallel to the evolving course of lived-experience. Through retreatment the ahistorical and inter-ordered metaphysics of treatment is brought down to the level of a process of philosophical reconstitution as it finds forms of resolution, albeit in a tentative virtual form, hopefully, with an intensity able to trigger the actual non-economic enactment of a form of posttreatment (that contributes to a positively augmented and enhanced process of re(-)e/valuational formation). (10)

In an enacted process of posttreatment, we engage the non-economic irruption of a process that revisits the pretreatment through a process of conformal re(-)organization wherein we either accept the *status quo*, or, subject that pretreatment to a minor process of ongoing modification, or, we outrightly reject the pretreated materials as irrelevant for the current objectives of either our short-term research project or our longer-tern program. Hence my obvious allusion to the non-philosophy, non-standard philosophy, or, as I would like to re-interpret it, the non-economic philosophy of François Laurelle. (11)

Where in posttreatment both an existentially oriented and non-existentially orientated experience is found intermingled, inter-mediated, and both meddling and intermeddling in the sense that although intermixed, both the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential remain to maintain an overall sense of presentation where one cannot be confused with the other, and v.v. In effect, establishing an ongoing conformation of process where a representation of truth is inescapably establishing itself through processes of alignment and non-alignment, through re-alignment and de-alignment and re-demis-alignment, etc., in that which is now to be found to hand even though, human nature being what it is, to the extent it is whatever it both ‘is and is not’, can also be distorted or obstructed, either appropriated or misappropriated in accordance with the integrity or non-integrity of our intentional motivation… proffering an explanation, of sorts, as to why conformation as a process can be so easily subverted when, with a little more effort, it can so patently be seen to express itself through an authenticity of the revelatory, through the existential openness of that ‘open’ to existentially oriented experience despite the residue of our ongoing resistance to interact with such potentially radical insightfulness (that can also present itself in a manner that could be too shocking to properly engage and act upon, perhaps, at the very least, for the immediate present). (12)

That this first exposition has taken a transformational tack… (13)

2. Second Exposition: An Economic Reading

In this second exposition, I propose an economic approach (and in the third exposition I outline the virtues of a non-economic/super-economic perspective in our attempts to grasp this non-differential differentiation between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential). All such approaches being conducted in order to no longer confuse preconditional stages towards existential experience with the systematic experience of the existential orientation *per se*, even though, at the same time, there can be no

ultimate differentiation between such apparently differentiated states. I.e., when we recognize that such engagements and encounters can no longer be viewed as economically isolated from the totality of such experience, etc… (14)

A first mistake is thinking that there exists an actual switch in which we can unimodally just turn on an existential orientation. Or, much like converting a lump of lead into a gold nugget by merely spraying it with an overall film of a gold-colored paint. (15)

A second mistake taking the form of a superficial acceptance of an operating bimodalism to the extent that existentialism is merely seen to be no more than both an existentialization of the relatively non-existential and not a non-existentialization of the relatively existential. Such a viewpoint being not so much wrong as being more shortsighted. The operation of a functioning bimodalism is always trimodally situated. Therefore, in trimodal terms of reference we need to reconfigure the dynamic contours of our current thinking lest we make this third mistake' by running a 'closed economics'. (16)

That, even in trimodal economic terms of reference, we need to carefully reconstitute the same since the moment of resolution can only be enacted in the openness of non-economic terms of reference. Thence this third segue to the following exposition… (17)

3. Third Exposition: A Non-Economic Reading

In this third approach, we understand that it is not enough to virtually resolve, existentially, a problematic situation, but, that this process has to be realized both non-economically and super-economically. As a formula we could say: 'contemplated economically, enacted non-economically, and regularized super-economically'.[196] (18)

'Non-economically' in the sense of enacting a causal, non-virtual process of resolution, and, 'super-economic' in the sense of realizing a radical process of re(-)alignment (in our textually deposited forms of re(-)modified representation) but also in a relatively-radical format that takes on the challenge of the possibly radically-radical through a process of incremental re(-)appropriation (hyper-economically, etc.) that then allows us to approach what had been hitherto radically-radical but has now become somewhat regularized through apposite forms of re(-)appropriation whose conjectural appreciation is progressively mitigated, remediated, and re(-)normalized. Effectively, in a refashioning of our representative materials in a manner that needs to be found fit for purpose, be that either pragmatically, existentially, philosophically, meta-philosophically, etc., be that in either a disciplinary mode or in a secularistic mode, etc. Let me explain. (19)

All intentional experience, etc., is textually deposited, traced out in a multiple types of textual entracements some of which are classical in hermeneutical orientation and some are non-classical in hermeneutical orientation… with an invisible residue tak-

196 'Regularized; in the sense where 'the relatively-radical is sequentially re(-)accommodated hyper-economically and, therein and thereby, critically appropriated (in more conventional terms of reference, etc.)'.

ing the form of parallel trails of entracements upon the very fabric of the world itself be it footprints on the sand; beads of sweat; electrical-like impulses seemingly travelling along and across neurons; or, the feeble, fickle, flickering of fertile and infertile thoughts whose thinking either leads to action or inaction, or the inaction of the undecided… (20)

That, the process of intentional cogitation ever deposits texts, be they either able to be read or make up our being able to read something else (in the formation of their material for reading or forming the context for that act of writing, etc.). Then, through reiteration those same texts that can be appreciated as both written and readable are brought before our intentional awareness in the form of either non-classical or classical texts *qua* texts. E.g., our smiling or shaking hands with a friend *versus* the writing and/or reading of a letter (given that we could also argue that the reader of a letter is also as if 'writing' the same just as the writer of that letter in rereading it might also find themselves needing to rewrite the same, etc.). (21)

Obviously, we can make no absolutistical distinctions between interpretative acts of reading/re(-)reading and inscriptive acts of writing/re(-)writing, etc. Although that said, even though we must also recognize a linear aspect to such processes, in a stark contrast, the moment of communication, itself, is a simultaneous act of alignment progressively realized through a process of ongoing re(-)presenting, etc., between the relevant parties concerned be that in either virtual and/or non-virtual terms of alignment as 'progressively' realized through this evolving economy of ongoing re(-)alignment.[197] Let me briefly comment on the apparent complexity of what is representatively entailed in such processes of 'communicative alignment'. (22)

In an 'ongoing representative economy', which can be designated through the following nomenclature as a 're(-)presentive economy', we can propose the economic correlatives of (a hermeneutically oriented process of) representation, (a phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented process of) presentation, and a chaotically oriented, (non-systematic, existentially oriented process of) re-presentation. Now within and between these three moments various forms of alignment can occur, respectively, of 'realignment' (as a form of hermeneutic affirmation or mitigation), 're-de-mis-alignment' (as a form of error correction or remediation), and re-alignment as a process of chaotically re-directing our intentional thinking when exposed to either the relatively-critical and/or the relatively-radical (in a process of re(-)normalization were through representative approximations provisionally explored as we find, through doing so, ever closer degrees of textual alignment both within and between different texts, aspects of the same text, different types of textual inputs, etc.). Where, it should be obvious that we are not finding patterns of alignment with imputed extra-textual, or pre-textual, aspects prior to such textual experience that by definition, moreover, 'cannot be experienced'! On the other hand, it is natural to extrapolate our textual simulations into the world at large, but, serious disciplinarians, whatever their actual professions, should know that by definition 'that which cannot be experienced cannot be experienced', and can only be reviewed as 'speculative', and

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197 'Virtual' in understanding the writings of a dead author or what someone has written in the recent past (or even what one may written oneself that you may now either agree or disagree with).

even then, as a ‘process of interpretation’, that the very same process, itself, cannot escape its own intimately bound forms of textualization, and so on! (23)

Then, surprise of surprise, the moment of communication is a spontaneously synchronized, parallel act, entertained either virtually and/or non-virtually between the relevant parties. Say, between the friend to whom a written letter has been sent and its author, or, say, between the novelist and their current reader (even, if that writer is now dead). Because such ‘synchronicity’ can also be viewed in virtual terms, as a form of intentional affirmation in which we find ourselves ‘re-living’ what the author had written (through the apparent immediacy of the non-textual as it is found to be re(-)simulated through its suspended sequencing and de-suspended de-sequencing… (24)

4. Fourth Exposition: Discernment through Economic Complexification: Part I

Now, I mentioned in this essay that this type of transgression being here reviewed, as a rather subtle type of mistake, can be exposed through invoking a process of comparative economic complexification in order to demonstrate the apparent incongruities of those misrepresented claims through the formal explication of such a demonstration. Let me outline what is involved in this critical form of scrutiny. (25)

I have introduced these discussions by noting that a comparison of the existential orientation to the ahistorical nature of the moment of treatment was a mistake on my part, and, that, in a similar manner my identifying the ‘existential’ as ‘pro-relational’, or v.v., was a similar type of philosophical mistake. That, furthermore, this type of mistake can be demonstrated by carefully invoking a process of comparative economic complexification. (26)

This philosophical tool of economic complexification is comparative by its very nature. It operates on the basis that all economic relationships are assumed to have a similar archetypal enstructuralization situated in the same gestalt nature of experience as is shared by all people, namely, the trimodal features of a gestalt background, a foreground of focus in that field, and, a subjective appreciation of the relationship as being entertained between background and foreground. I would contend that this assumption finds it conformation through observation. I believe it works and on those pragmatic grounds it finds its utility. However, until such a time we feel confident to support such a contention, let us suspend our judgment and leave ourselves open to a hypothetical exploration of this technique as outlined by myself. My simple request being, ‘give it a try and see if it works for you?’ (27)

How does this technique work? As I envisage that all economies share the same archetypal gestalt structures then when we correctly find an alignment with these three aspects, namely, of an intentional motivation (World), an intentional objectivity (Object), and intentional subjectivity (Ego) then we should find similar forms of alignment, where these features can be tabulated in a parallel dictionary and from their close scrutiny question whether we have correctly ascertained the corresponding types of features we expect

to be present in such an alignment. As a case in point, does the epithet ‘pro-relational’, on many occasions given to this idea of the existential, align either with this so-called third moment (Ego) of the non-systematic existential or with a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential (as realized under non-economic forms of resolution, the overall intermediation of a working suspension, etc.)? Now, a relational perspective entails the participants and parts that both subjectively and objectively constitute the constituents of a certain relational situation. As these materials can be found to hand, we might surmise that in a transformational economics that they coincide with ‘pretreatment’. In contrast, the pro-relational aspect of a relationship is the emergence of the apparent integrity of that relationship itself to the extent its facticity cannot be merely reduced to the inventory of its pretreated materials. However, the correct question we now need to ask is this, “should we now view the ‘pro-relational; as allied to either ‘treatment’ or ‘retreatment’?” Given the seemingly static nature of the pro-relational, despite its non-reductive emergence, we should be more inclined to place this appellation under the rubric of ‘treatment’ rather than ‘retreatment’ and the coincidence or paralleling of the latter with the non-systematic existential moment of Ego where (metaphysically oriented) metafication mingles with (the philosophically oriented) de-metafication. Where, in a similar vein, it finds its company along with the misapplied ‘ahistorical treatment of the existential’. Now, given such a state of affairs, namely, this assumed alignment between archetypal correlatives, then such correlativities[198] also act as open-ended commentaries on those same alignments. E.g., is the ahistorical like nature of the pro-relational also pro-phenomenological in nature rather than being either hermeneutically oriented or existentially oriented (in its non-systematic sense)? I would argue that as it appears to be the result of a suspension, as preparation for a process of treatment, we may then assume that it is rightly located in this moment of ‘treatment’ coinciding with ‘intentional objectivity’ or ‘Object’ (having ruled out the characteristic of a process of pretreatment. That, in effect, the epithet ‘pro-relational’ is an improvement over ‘the mere relational inventory of a relationship supplied in pretreatment’, still, it falls short of coinciding either with the so-called ‘third moment’ of the existential orientation in its non-systematic sense and/or a more systematic expression of the existential *per se* (as it would be arrived at through the overall suspension of an act of inter-mediation as would be exercised in and through the use of a working suspension (technically reviewed as an extensive suspension[199]). (28)

In other words, although it is not completely wrong to identify the existential orientation as ‘pro-relational’, more correctly, that ascription applies more to the transformational stage of ‘treatment’ rather than ‘retreatment’ or the non-economic expression of its ‘posttreatment’, etc. (29)

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198 Using here a technical approach to the extent that ‘each economy has its economic correlatives’ but ‘corresponding correlatives in other economies can be viewed and spoken of between economies’ as ‘correlativities’ (rather than the set of trimodal correlatives as would be found internal to a specific economy).

199 I.e., as co-opting the hermeneutic circle (of an overall suspension), the aspect of the de-suspension, and its causal implications when processes of resolution take on an irruptive non-economic complexion.

Or, to put it more plainly, comparisons conducted through economic complexification should be able to identify those forms of identification not concordant with their imputed archetypal terms of reference. (30)

Or, again, to put it in more vivid terms, we could say that the ahistorical aspect of treatment mingles with the historical nature of pretreatment to give a non-systematic existential aspect to the lived-experience of retreatment that then can be rendered as trans-historical in both its non-systematic and systematic forms of existential experience along with their co-associated import in the realization of unilateral responses of the last moment, etc., in consequential terms of reference, as expressions of e/valuational formation, etc. (31)

2. Ahistorical Treatment

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1. Historical Treatment 3. Trans-Historical Retreatment

(4.) Postteatment (32)

5. Fifth Exposition: Discernment through Economic Complexification: Part II

Economic complexification is not a complex idea. Its simplicity is this – given our thinking is economic to its core, i.e., trimodal, then it is obvious that between different economies we should be able to find forms of alignment in terms of those archetypal similarities. Then, I further contend, that these similarities can comment upon each other, and, through such natural commentary we should find an ensuing enrichment of our discourses if and when such a commentary is relevant to our current intentional objectives. So, e.g., phenomenologically we can argue (as a form of relative transformational isomorphic invariance) that ‘analysis’ is ‘retrospective’ and deals with the ‘temporal past’. By such means, delineating an extended series of attributes that can be co-equated in terms of their archetypal characteristics. Hence to this same sequence we can also add ‘phenomenologically oriented’ and ‘parts’ (as found in the hermeneutic circle treated trimodally), ‘texts’ (as textually deposited in a textual economy), the ‘relatively dissonant’ (when viewed through a harmonic economy of consonance-dissonance-resolution). Furthermore, we can also add ‘passive’ or ‘static’, and ‘ahistorical’ to our list, etc. The careful conflation of such terms then enriches the trajectories of our ongoing appreciation of that topic currently to hand. Or, with respect to my concerns on where to place the expression ‘pro-relational’ in order to have it aligned with this archetypal sense of an economy we can do the following. That, in this instance although we are dealing with the integrity of existential experience from the perspective of the relationship *per se*, still, our concerns are rather ‘passive’ or ‘static’ and ‘ahistorical’ (in comparison to dynamism of both the non-systematic and systematic expressions of the existential). Truly a step in the

right direction, but, not one that allows us to coincide with the full impact allotted to our interpretation of existential experience (through both non-systematic and systematic lenses[200]). The more dynamic type of experience that has been referred to as 'being in the zone', or 'as living in the here and now', as experiencing the 'eternally present', as 'being empowered', etc. Thence my reconsideration of its alignment with 'treatment', etc., rather than the transformational nature of 'retreatment'. (33)

6. Sixth Exposition: Unilateral Decisiveness of the Last moment, etc.

Another way to comprehend this complex concept of the 'existential' is to invoke a Laurellian approach, namely, attempt to understand how a 'unilateral decisiveness of the last instance', as a definitive judgment, produced through resolution, could also take on an existential orientation? That in this same regard, I have also introduced the notion of the 'existential' as a possible array of options exhibited in the corresponding articulation of the unilateral decisiveness of the next moment, and, where through permission, engineered or not engineered, the existential potentials of that situation can be taken up to then be expressed in 'the unilateral decisiveness of the first instance' through following through on that form of existentially oriented intervention. An existentially oriented sense of process where that very process, itself, then has us heading in a new and novel direction in a manner where we can quantitatively assess the import of such enacted deliberations. Where those same deliberations are observed as instrumental in either the creation, preservation and/or conservational expansion of values as ostensively amplified through the incremental orchestration of an overall. augmented non-existential richness and an enhanced existential process of mutual enrichment.[201] Where, the positive features of both the non-existential and existential orientations are duly observed as complementary and not as antithetical to either of these forms of positive e/valuational formation. (34)

Again, we can take a transformational approach in our observing the putative nature of these stages in the formation of such a unilateral act of decisiveness:

2. Treatment
Unilateral Response of the Next Instance…

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1. Pretreatment
Unilateral Response of the Last Instance…

3. Retreatment
Unilateral Response of First Instance…

(35)

[200] I.e., as devolves, respectively from an intra-mediational suspension on the third moment and the inter-mediational suspension on all three moments.

[201] As noted elsewhere 'augmentation' is 'an incremental affair', and, 'enhancement' is 'exponentially re-self-organized through chaotically induced forms of re-direction. Implicit to both types of 'amplification' is a 'positivity of e/valuation', i.e., 'either a promoted non-existentially oriented richness or an existentially oriented enrichment'.

Basically, this scheme suggests that non-existentially oriented e/valuational formation, be it either positive and/or negative in orientation, is produced in the unilateral response of the next instance. That this response also lays out, through processes of resolution, the existential potentiality to be found as if that response were to be treated as 'pregnant'. Then, the taking up of those positively perceived, or apperceived, options induce a chaotic process of re-direction in which that ensuing set of responses is set in train by this unilateral response of the first instance! Or, the existential productivity of a certain set of enacted responses can be traced to their initiation in that moment of the first response (and hence my branding that type of response as a 'unilaterally decisive judgmental response of the first moment'). By such means, taking into account choice; deliberation over a series of options; the consequences that flow from such enactions; the imparted degree of a possibly amplified, mutually shared sense and semblance of a freedom to be taken up both individually and collectively, etc. (36)

7. Seventh Exposition: A Super-Economic Reading of the 'Existential'

In a seventh exposition, we go beyond the irruption of the non-economic to better grasp the significance of this imputation of the super-economic in relation to the overseeing of an existential orientation. (37)

For decades I have maintained a distinction between the 'non-systematic sense and semblance of the existential' as a so-called 'third moment of resolution in the economic functioning of an economy', and, its non-virtual expression through an act of non-economic irruption. But, as is often the case, in order to dig a metaphorical 'hole' in order to dispose of certain materials, we then need to dig another hole in order to dispose of the soil dug up in the making of a first whole, etc., etc. But, in this instance, in order to move from a virtually enacted form of resolution to the non-virtual enaction of a resolved pattern of behaviour I have had to invoke the concept of the 'non-economic'. But, then, in order to (super-economically) accommodate this radical form of irruption I have had to re-sight it within the orbit of a super-economic sense of reference. Fortuitously, such a resolution also resolves a number of other potential problems at the same time. E.g., by supplying wider economic terms of reference that then allow us to re-accommodate the relatively-radical nature of the non-economic within this putative and open sense of the super-economic. Furthermore, by the incremental re-appropriation of the relatively-radical a radical style of response can be eventually re-appropriated in and through those incremental steps in its overall re-appropriation. In effect, giving it or returning it to a conventionally oriented re-reading in relatively-critical terms of reference. At the same time, this 3 x 3 matrix (of the three sub-economies of the hyper-economic, economic, and non-economic in the constitution of the super-economic) can also act as a basis for the 3 x 3 modelling of The Political-Economy (when treated as an open scheme within which

we can appreciate the overall political-economy [and where the same is not to be confused with the non-capitalized, hyphenated discipline of a 'political-economics'[202]]). (38)

What implications follow from the imputation of this scheme of the Super-Economic? (39)

That we can now safely make a distinction between the 'non-systematic existential' and the 'systematic existential' (where the latter follows from the overall suspension, through inter-mediation, of the economy in question). (40)

That the existential and non-existential potential of permitting a certain response comes about through the intermeddling of economic correlatives as refracted through a transformational lens of retreatment. Where not only do we have the mingling or the intermingling or the intermeddling[203] of not only metaphysically oriented correlatives in the moment of treatment but also their interactions with their de-suspension in retreatment and thence their posttreatment re(-)workings of pretreatment, whether dialectically regarded as occurring either sequentially and/or simultaneously, etc. (and where preferences in such matter is just that, namely, a matter of preference, but, where a more dialectically oriented understanding necessitates their co-associated inclusion). (41)

That the apparent initiation, or relative instigation, of the existential orientation is occasioned through the use of an extensive suspension, i.e., through the suitable use of a working suspension, etc. (42)

Hence, in the deliberation of our judgments, a judgment is expressed through the unilateral decisiveness of a response that ceases to be merely circulated within the orbit of the economic sub-economy. Hence this necessity for its non-economic irruption and hyper-economic re-appropriation within the wider terms of the super-economic (as 'the overall economy of the economic' or the 'super-economic'). (43)

That as conformal expressions of truth are delivered in exactly the same manner of judgments then it follows that existential determination can also co-express the same, indeed, both aspects are required to be co-present in order to authenticate the apparent

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202 As a necessary innovation in order to better appreciate the phenomenal-phenomenological nature, etc., of the major discourse of a now rampant Neo-Liberalism that cannot be fully appreciated separately in either political or economic terms of reference. Refer to my 'Three Critiques' of Neo-Liberalism.

203 Where the meta-philosophical/metaphysical not only mingles but intermingles with the philosophical/disciplinary processes of identification, etc., and where such strands are blended without losing their distinctive orientations as inputs in the ensuing of their delivery of an output expresses not only that which is emergent in orientation but also that which is non-emergent in orientation. As an analogy it is a bit like a seeing a 'broom' as 'both a broom along with its broom handle' that when used to sweep takes on a unity of experience that cannot be reduced to either the mere head of that broom or the mere handle of that same broom. So, despite seeing both a broom head and the handle of that broom, in sweeping we experience a sense and semblance of freedom by virtue of the fact that if we were to merely use that broom head alone to sweep it would be experienced as a relative loss of freedom in comparison. Usually, that loss of freedom would be overlooked. However, it is also the case that in having a relevant tool to hand itself is also productive of a sense of freedom (since if we were to merely pick up the leaves in a yard by hand, one by one, would be experienced as a comparative loss of freedom to do other things, e.g.).

reception of the relative authenticity of such responsiveness, albeit within the limits of human apperception able to sensitively review such matters without transgressing the natural limits of such appreciation. (44)

That the consequences of such responsiveness can be assessed in both quantitative and qualitative terms of reference. Namely, in the degree and manner of the ensuing responsiveness elicited through such relationally receptive acts of judgment. Where an existentially oriented response naturally acts on the behalf of the primary relationship in question, albeit as reviewed from the apparent totality of its relational context. Such 'enrichment' spilling over into non-existentially oriented 'richness' and existentially oriented 'enrichment'.[204] (45)

Now, the conjectural arguments mustered for economic complexification must also apply to a reading of ordered complexification (and thence to inter-ordered complexification) given a co-sharing of the archetypal organization underlying all economic (and super-economic) activity. Thence the following segues. (46)

8. Eighth Exposition: Ordered Complexification

Archetypal economic organization (as a 3 x 1 matrix) is based on the relationships engendered between the economic correlatives of World, Object, and Ego. Where the subtle[205] preferential treatment through intra-mediational focus on World gives us a hermeneutics, and when and where the preference is centered on Object that gives us a phenomenological interest, and, when centered on Ego this gives us a non-systematic existentialism (the metaphorical 'door' to a relatively systematic existential orientation). Invoking an ordered complexification so as to comment and enrich our working understanding of the existential dimension. (47)

In an ordered exploration (analysis) (as a 3 x 2 matrix) we also find the subtle preferential treatment of pairs of correlatives giving us three additional possibilities. (48)

Thence by either by overt (+) or covert (-) preferential treatment we arrive at these six orders (as explicated on numerous occasions elsewhere). (49)

I.e., defining the first order of the phenomenologically-semantic, in its form of atomic semantic essentials as pre-essentials, through a focusing on the Object correlative at the covert expense of the other two correlatives or moments of Ego and World. Hence, in notation: 1^1 = +O (-W/-E) or in the harmonic progression (of World-consonance, Object-dissonance, and Ego-resolution) as -W+O-E. Hence:

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[204] A distinction that also notes, respectively, 'non-chaotic, incremental augmentation' *versus* 'chaotic, non-incremental (exponential) enhancement' (assuming a positivity of e/valuational formation in both instances). Where the former arises through the unilateral response of the last instance *versus* the latter as the result of the successful instantiation through intervention of the unilateral response of the first instance.

[205] The expression 'subtle' is used to denote the preferential treatment of a correlative as correlative *qua* correlative, i.e., without economic isolation (which would be ideologically 'non-subtle' and impossible to perform).

1^1 = -W+O-E (50)

Now, an individually directed subtle emphasis on Ego and World gives us, respectively, a third order (3^1) of a deontological-(non-systematic) existentialism and a fifth order (5^1) of a hermeneutics. Hence:

3^1 = -W-O+E, &, 5^1 = +W-O-E. (51)

Thence our three remaining trans-cognitive judgmental orders, namely, 2^1, 4^1, 6^1, namely, aesthetical, pragmatical, and ontical (factual[206]) can be notated as:

2^1 = -W+O+E; 4^1 = +W-O+E; and 6^1 = +W+O-E. (52)

Orders can also be diagrammatically represented in a circular format:[207]

3^1
Deontological/Existentialism

2^1
Aesthetical

4^1
Pragmatical

*

1^1
Phenomenological-Semantics

5^1
Hermeneutical-Posibility

6^1
Ontical (Conformal Facts) (53)

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206 As actual facts (that are well-established) and not 'factoids' with 'no evidential basis or an insufficient evidential basis as a fifth ordered possibility (in either cognitive or trans-cognitive terms of reference)'.

207 On a superficial level we still have to presuppositionally proceed from the first to the second orders, etc. (hence this appellation of 'order'), but, in 'deeper', non-superficial terms of reference, given the non-economic isolation of our three archetypal correlatives we can dialectically migrate in any direction, or, dialectically observe a simultaneity across these six orders, etc.). so, e.g., we cannot simultaneously combine the semantic units of a (pre-essential) 'roundness' and 'squareness' so, e.g., a table-top that is both round and square, as an integrated essential concept, cannot be given a second ordered status as an integrated-essential. Similarly, a possible fact without evidential status cannot be given the conformal status of a sixth ordered actual-fact.

Thence the exposition of these six orders. Now, let me apply these orders to the trimodal economy of transformational retreatment noting that pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment apply respectively to the fifth order, first order, and third order respectively. The implication being that to travel from pretreatment to treatment we have to pass through the sixth order, and traveling from the first ordered treatment to the third ordered retreatment we must pass through the second order, and, in traveling from the third ordered retreatment back to a fifth ordered pretreatment we must pass through the fourth order (of posttreatment). Diagrammatically this can be represented as below:

III. Retreatment
3^1
Deontological/Existentialism

2^1
Aesthetical

4^1
Pragmatical

*

II. Treatment
1^1
Phenomenological-Semantics

I. Pretreatment
5^1
Hermeneutical-Possibility

6^1
Ontical (Conformal Facts) (54)

By closely exploring this scheme it is my contention that the transformational process can be further enriched with an ordered perspective, and along with that commentary, our appreciation of the transformational nature of existentially oriented behaviour, as unilaterally instanced through the first instance, can be progressively enriched accordingly. (55)

As here remapped, in transformational retreatment we start with pretreatment as located in the fifth order of hermeneutical possibility, i.e., dealing both with meta-textual genres of behaviour (in their writing/reading of textual depositions) and possibilities (of behaviour responses along with behavioral attitudes, etc.). Effectively, the scene is set through the corresponding adoption and adaptation of the specific genres taken up. So, e.g., if I am looking at apples in a bowl of fruit, therefore, I am concerned with the perceptual differentiation of apples in a bowl of fruit. Thus, currently, I am looking at apples and not eating an apple. If I wanted to do the latter, then I would need to invoke the genre of ‘eating’, namely, in more specific terms, ‘the eating of an apple (be that by either biting it or cutting off a piece of that apple with a knife, etc.)’. (56)

So, let's start (from our location in the fifth order) from this position of pretreatment. By virtue of its hermeneutic status, we need, first, to invoke the appropriate genres of behaviour that parallel and set the stage for our intentional objectivity and intentional motivation, etc. Furthermore, we must deal with a set of relevant facts, albeit as facts treated first as possibilities, i.e., as factual states of affairs that are possible to envisage and could be true, in which case they would then be assigned a sixth ordered status (as so-called 'actual-facts', i.e., facts with a conformal status that is evidential affirmed or find a requisite degree of affirmation from either testimonial and/or inferential forms of conformation. Noting of course, that a positive conformation is not the false equivalent of an indubitable ascertainment that is absolutistically arrived at and mistreated accordingly). So, in summary, we being with an integrated assortment of relevant genres plus an applicable set of possible facts. (57)

Now, to move to a process of treatment, through the application of a suitable suspension, we need first to travel through the sixth order where fifth ordered facts are either affirmed as 'conformally valid' or given the meta-status of truly having such the negative status as being 'conformally denied'. So, e.g., if we were to focus on the mythical figure of Father Xmas, we would note that this possible fact (overlooking how a rotund figure would never be able climb down a narrow chimney, etc.) as conformally denied, as 'conformally invalid' in the terms of the sixth order, but, that the mythological fact of this mythological figure does have conformally valid existence, albeit only in mythological terms alone. Thus, in summary, to continue our transformational explorations we must only deal with confirmed facts, those facts that are viewed as conformationally valid. To do otherwise is to potentially contaminate the nature of our explorations. (58)

From, the sixth order we now travel to the first order of treatment. Under the auspices of a working suspension, we either apply the individually simple forms of treatment namely, synthesis, analysis, or nomination, (and their equivalent or relatively isomorphic archetypal parallels as derived through economic complexification) or, more realistically, utilize a complex arrangement of the same (given the understanding that we cannot economically isolate a single correlative or a pair of correlatives). Moreover, with current material to hand (as refracted through the fifth and sixth orders) under remediation we deconstruct and remove what is relatively defective and reconstruct what is relatively less defective. The latter functions being supervised under the second order of the aesthetical (in which cognitively presented, atomistic, semantic pre-essentials are trans-cognitively integrated as semantically presented molecular essentials when the conventional rules for such reordering can be properly applied[208]). Hence, in summary, we can say that various

[208] E.g., the conceptual application of a 'colour' to a 'tabletop' gives us the integrated semantic presentation of a 'red-tabletop' (with the hyphen indicating second order integration). Of course, if we were to look closer and say that that tabletop is now actually seen as more 'orange' than red then we have to affirm, instead, an 'orange-tabletop'. Note, as explained elsewhere, 'conformation', to begin with, is 'the double confirmation in real-time and/or the double verification in non-real-time of a certain semantic configuration. E.g., I know historically that I put six apples in the empty fruit bowl, and, this afternoon I still see six apples in that same bowl… as double affirmation through remembered verification and visual confirmation. I say 'to begin with' since textual alignments and non-alignments on various levels of conformal interaction are also implied in order to run a suitably conducted conformal economy).

processes of treatment are applied, under the auspices of a working suspension, that effectively, rules out those presentations judged to be defectively constructed, and, where the relatively less-defective proceeds to the next order of the second. (59)

So, as stated, in moving from 'treatment' to 'retreatment' we pass through this process of second ordered, aesthetic-like integration of semantic pre-essential units in the representation of the relational situation or situations in question. This provisional integration gives to this process the overall perspective of the primary relationship or relationships currently be scrutinized, i.e., its 'ahistorical sense of a pro-relational point of view' that attempts to 'simulate the emergent integrity of that primary relationship', albeit as viewed from its relational sense of a 'context' (or 'con-text' when translated in meta-textual terms of reference as implied by its incorporation within a hierarchically interrelated set of genres that have already set the terms of this context, i.e., 'con-text'[209]). Hence, in summary, through aesthetic integration the reconstructive phase of remediation is conducted, preparing us for a process of 'retreatment' initiated and exercised through the automatic de-suspension of the suspension that sets the stage for the same. (60)

Through the collapse of the suspension, the de-suspension both naturally highlights what is to be highlighted and de-highlights what is not there to be highlighted in the first place. Given this uneven terrain of possibilities and actualities the world in its relative uniqueness is re-self-presented through the raw, impossible to completely filter lived-reality in its all its concrete uniqueness. At the same time, through a mingling or meddling of the meta-philosophical elevation of treatment and the de-elevated philosophical de-elevation of retreatment we also find the inter-mingling or inter-meddling of both strand of the represented presentation as if both 'parts-and-whole' (as argued for in the trimodal reconfiguration of the hermeneutic circle into 'whole/s', 'part/s', and 'whole/s-and-part/s'). The de-suspension returns us to where we left off conjecturally, albeit with those reconfigurations as either found affirmed or implied (through statement, restatement, and/or reinstatement) as realized through the forceful exposures of the de-suspension. In other words, in summary, retreatment exposes the concretely historical in its accessible specificity, and, by such means, reinforce the continuing currency of its conformal status, etc.[210] By doing so, its existential credentials are also presented and where the quality of that suspension/de-suspension goes on to determine the ensuing quality or non-quality of that entailed existentially oriented appreciation of those same proceedings. (61)

Imported in such a process of transformation retreatment is the forceful ability to either non-critically, critically, and/or radically rewrite the course of those proceedings through a transformational re-appreciation of those initial materials represented in pre-treatment. Doing so through the functioning operation of a fourth order, pragmatical orientation or orientations, when and where, such applications are permitted to enact such functional-structural alterations of the original pretreatment materials. E.g., in forgetting

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[209] E.g., the overall genre of a 'perceptual act of visual seeing' that is subjected to the differentiation of both 'seeing and 'counting pieces of fruit' (in a fruit bowl), namely, only those pieces of fruit, say, that are 'apples'.

[210] Imparting a Hegelian-like tenor to such proceedings.

that I had eaten one apple for lunch, I was surprised to find only five apples in that fruit bowl, but, then, quickly remembered that I eat one of those six initial apples in lieu of my eating lunch. Problem solved, in many senses of that expression, given the rhetorical representation of pretreatment in the form of either a simple question or a complex set and/or series of questions, etc. So, e.g., am I now correct in my belief, entered into through an overall act of conformation, that, with the marshalling of good reasons, I am now reasonably sure that there remain in that fruit bowl only five apples after that sixth apple was eaten by myself, etc? Of course, how long that belief can be maintained is dependent upon a number of relevant facts, such as, e.g., if other people inhabit that same residence that also like to eat apples, etc. So, in summary, the force of the de-suspension can carry on through to a pragmatical rewriting of the initial status of that pretreatment should that be applicable… setting up this process to be reiterated until such a time there is the insertion of some other pretreated pattern that, in turn, is similarly retreated and reiterated accordingly within this transformational economy. (62)

Thus, by invoking a process of ordered complexification we now can utilize six points of parallel comparison in order to further enrich our appreciation of both the existential and non-existential ramifications of such a transformational process. So, now, let us ask the question, 'just how do we delineate those textual depositions presenting an existential aspect from the co-deposition of non-existentially oriented textual depositions?' (63)

By comparatively scrutinizing those textual traces that portend an existential orientation as witnessed by the recognition, encountering, and engagement of existential hallmarks on a scale commensurate with the apparent existential magnitude of our research as suitably conducted in that regard. Furthermore, in textual situations that simulated in a time other than the immediacy of the present we can attend to the import of textual indicators from the past and note textual indications envisaged from a future point of perspective. So, e.g., in a novel the novelist may either insert or omit indicators of existential authenticity, or, present an absence or litany of indications delineating the effective authenticity of that envisaged form of political behaviour if situated in some vision of the future, etc., as might be written about in piece deemed to be, say, science fiction. (64)

Existential hallmarks, as experienced in real-time, fall under the four headings of the Subjective, Inter-Subjective, Objective, and Inter-Objective. Under the Subjective heading we note neither a historical nor an ahistorical sense of time, but, a transhistorical sense of an existentially engaged sense and semblance of time apperception that identifies temporal immediacy, simultaneity, synchronicity, and spontaneity. Under this same heading, we also would be on the lookout for the sense and semblance of the trans-geographical, i.e., where spatial constraints appear to be somewhat obviated (if only, for the moment, in virtual terms of reference), etc. (65)

That granted, if only hypothetically, we should now ask ourselves, 'how an existential orientation might be induced in the light of its ordered complexification, and, how such induction might be amplified?' (66)

‘Induction’ is ‘induced through the suspension’, and, through both the quality of that suspension and from the impact entailed in the authenticity of our ensuing enactment of suitably apposite unilateral responses of the first instance’. Furthermore, this ‘induction is expressed’ through ‘the ensuing forcefulness of the suspension of that suspension, i.e., its de-suspension’. (67)

Hence the presuppositional necessity for all relevant factors to coincide in this pattern of alignment that both augments and enhances the ensuing experience of an existential orientation. Where incremental augmentation brings us to a point of chaotic enhancement assuming a positivity in this pattern of responsiveness and its successful spilling over into either a set and/or series of apposite unilateral responses of the first instance. (68)

Moreover, from an ordered perspective, all six orders need to be entered, occupied, and fully sustained in that economy of transformational retreatment. (69)

Hence, in summary, the quality of our research and its suspensions affects the existential quality of our responses, equally being met in a relative authenticity of both responsibility and responsiveness as expressed through the ensuing instigation of existentially oriented patterns of existential intervention whose quantification and qualification can be comparatively assessed through both the ensuing delivery of a non-existential richness and existential enrichment discerned as positively present in ‘our’ appreciation of the e/valuational formation of those primary relationships in question. Or, in other words, through existential augmentation and enhancement we recognize, encounter, and engage an overall enrichment in that relationship placed under such scrutiny regardless of whether our involvement in that relationship is met directly or indirectly, non-virtually, or virtually as, say, respectively, in our being in a relationship of some kind, observing a relationship involving other people, our being able to intervene in a certain relationship, and, our observing the interventions of others in their relationships (be the latter reported in either non-virtual terms of reference or in virtual terms of reference as would be found in a novel or a closely observed history, etc.). (70)

Now, that complexification which applies to the archetypal, economic, and ordered domains, through extension, will also apply to the six distinctive configurations of the inter-ordered domain. (71)

9. Ninth Exposition: Inter-Ordered Complexification

Through reduplication of the orders (in the operation that symmetrically asks for ‘the x of x’) we enter the metaphysically oriented domain of inter-ordered phenomena (in our cultural-intercultural experience of The Political-Economy and its conventional instigation and segregation of social systems, etc.). In the situation of duplication (through the non-symmetrical duplication of ‘the x of y’) its products fall under the dominant heading of its operating function. So, e.g., ‘the history of science’ is a ‘history’ and, therefore, ‘not a science’, etc. (72)

Let me diagrammatically represent this domain by superimposing on the ordered domain its inter-ordered reduplication (square-bracketing ordered forms and putting in bold inter-ordered forms):

III. Retreatment
3^2
[Deontological/Existentialism]
Political Intervention

2^2
[Aesthetical]
Psychology-Sociology

4^2
[Pragmatical]
Practical Economics

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II. Treatment
1^2
[Phenomenological-Semantics]
Categorical Metaphysics

I. Pretreatment
5^2
[Hermeneutical-Possibility]
Science

6^2
Ontical (Conformal Facts)
History/Histories (73)

Arriving at these inter-ordered forms through reduplication. So, e.g., 'the semantics of a semantics/ a phenomenology of a phenomenology' is a 'categorical metaphysics' acting as a 'semantic metaphysics', dealing, e.g., with items like 'time', 'space', 'identity' or 'nomination', 'transformation of identities' long with alterations in 'predicates' and 'relations', etc. Where 'the aesthetic-integration of experience' would express itself through a 'psychology', and by extension, in a 'sociology, etc.' Where the irruption of resolution, coinciding with the moment of Ego, would oversee the instigation of political power and its consequent empowerment and disempowerment of both self and other. That the reduplication of pragmatical functions would create, in effect, a 'practical economic'. Where 'the possibility of possibility' forms the basis for a (general) science, and 'the fact of facts' forms the basis for a 'certain history within the overall topic of histories'. (74)

Now, in a similar manner to that observed in ordered complexification we can start with the fifth inter-ordered order of 5^2 of science and then proceed to the next stage 6^2 of history in that same clockwise direction. (75)

Hence our first considerations are that of a scientific-like nature and, in effect, enrich our appreciation of the meta-textual genres invoked in our specifically dealing with a certain general pattern of behaviour, like, e.g., 'perceiving apples' and our moving on to 'eating apples'. With respect to those examples, we could note the scientific-like view 'that apples that redden are more likely to be ripe, better to eat, etc.' (76)

In the next stage of this progression, we note the impact of conducting a relevant history would have in the performance of an improved reading of the situation in question especially in our dealing with the transformations that could occur in that relational situation. As noted, I remember putting six apples in that fruit bowl, and, in my now seeing six apples are still in that fruit bowl I make the reasonable assumption that they are the same six apples that I originally put in this same bowl. But, then, again, I could be mistaken, for it could have transpired, as a joke on April Fool's Day, that they were replaced by six ornamental apples from the tazza in the dining room that is sitting on the sideboard, and, that those six non-virtual apples are now, instead, sitting on that tazza. (77)

From the 6^2 we then proceed to the 1^2, a categorical metaphysics. By such means focusing on the relevant identities in question, etc. (78)

Moving on to the psychological-sociological ramifications through an appreciation of the experience of that experience as a psychological-sociological state of affairs in this second inter-ordered order (2^2). (79)

The next stage (3^2) has a political complexion given the executive-like functions of non-economic irruption of behavioural re-direction. (80)

That behaviour being channeled into exercising a repertoire of pragmatical functions as to be found in the next inter-ordered order of a practical economics (4^2), i.e., patterns of behaviour exercised from navigating the world to negotiating with others to that of arbitration through those institutions that anticipate and execute the entire range of economic behaviours that constitute the existential form of our lives as lived with-others, etc. (81)

Those enacted behaviours then reconfiguring our scientific-like appreciation of this world as lived, etc. or, more simply, those understandings that better expedite our invocation of genres of behaviour, etc., hopefully, with a beneficial complexion that results in advantageous outcomes. (82)

Where, in effect, through inter-ordered complexification, by such progressions, either advertently or inadvertently, we meta-philosophically/metaphysically enrich our appreciation of lived-experience and through such deeper forms of engagement more successfully open ourselves to an existentialization of experience as long as we suitably exercise, intuitively, our working suspensions in such a manner that we obviate the consequences of either obstructions and/or distortions primarily entertained through misguided forms of either ideological over-commitment (as would be found in a strong form of realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism and absolutism, or relativism, etc.) or through

the exercise of a relatively apathetic form of under-commitment (as would be found in a weak form of relativism, etc.).[211] (83)

Hence this rule of thumb, 'that an in-depth appreciation of those perspectives that are adequately enriched in detail should allow us to better appreciate, both pragmatically and existentially, their current phenomenal-phenomenological status and, therein and thereafter, allow us to appositely entertain and enact the requisite unilateral responses of the last instance, the next instance, and the first instance… along with an ensuing reasonable co-appreciation of their most probable consequential ramifications along with an expectation or anticipation of their mis-intended performances, unintended consequences,[212] and possible non-intended consequences if the latter are already being indicated and thereby, can be more immediately anticipated'.[213] (84)

It stands to reason that a fully fleshed appreciation of the relational participants in a certain relational situation, along with their pro-relational appreciation, etc., would put us in a better position to existentially appreciate the lived-reality of that situation. As noted, I would contend that that is better expedited through well-conducted working suspensions (extensive suspensions) where the consequences of such a practice, accumulatively, is the relative non-obstruction and non-distortion of lived-experience (in its more closely approximating a valid conformal interpretation of living-experience) as instigated through the re(-)directed forcefulness of a well-formed and well-informed de-suspension, etc. All in all, as a process that should be able to reconstructively build on its deconstruction of the relatively defective, and so on. (85)

Where the apparent complexity of this explanation is somewhat obviated through the relative simplicity that is simulated through ongoing, non-economically enacted processes of resolution. (86)

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211 'Obstructions', metaphorically, can be 'seen' as more thorough forms of a 'blocking' of our abilities to engage through suspensions and their ensuing de-suspensions directly with the lived-representations of that being interacted with, and, where 'distortions', metaphorically, are more 'partial blockages' with an ensuing less-integrated representative simulation of that being interacted with. Such defects, as defective interactions, apply to our appreciation of relevant perspectives, as dictated by the invocation of genres, facts, etc., be they either individually taken up or collectively inspected, be that as entertained separately, in a series, and/or in a set or a cluster of sets. E.g., even though a perspective cannot be exhausted what is required is that it be adequately exercised. Similarly, we cannot exhaust the infinite number of potential perspectives that could be taken up, but, where instead we merely need to entertain a reasonable number of such perspectives in order to acquire a relative reasonable representative simulation of what is needed to make the requisite judgments pertaining to an adequate appreciation of that type of experience.

212 Alluding to a previous essay: Our Simple Actions in a Complex World are Undermined through Unintended Consequences! Exploring Ideas Discussed by Edward Tenner in his Book: *Why Things Bite Back*: *Predicting the Problems of Progress* (January, 2009).

213 Where 'anticipation' is defined, practically, 'as arising in our immanent expectations', and, 'expectation' is defined, on the basis of an appreciation of past experiences, as 'not arising through the immediacy of current anticipations'.

10. Tenth Exposition: Metaphysical-Philosophical De-Complexification

The nature of unilateral responses of the last instance, etc., have a simplicity about their presentation in experience that belies the relational complexity of their origination as expressed, first, virtually, and, thence, through enacted processes of non-economic resolution. (87)

If this observation is granted, how might we explain this apparent asymmetry (post the suspension) between the unilateral decisions in regard to their relatively hypothetical counter-decisions that considerably add to an already existent working consensus that is not currently called into question in any fundamental sense? E.g., a weak relativist could be the sort of person who just makes no positional-decisions unless they really have to. For them, say, whether 'the moon is a big blue cheese' or 'the moon is not a cheese' is neither here nor there. But, should we suspend a well-formed and well-informed set of coherent conjectures then post the suspension we are left confronting the evidential weight of conjectural claims that 'the moon is a rock in space' and 'not a big blue cheese'. Admittedly, this example casts the relativist in a position that would be impossible to entertain consistently. We have to make decisions, and in order to survive we have to consistently make decisions that, on balance, ensure 'our' overall survival, indeed, on both an individual and a collective basis. In this regard, the formation of a social consensus predominantly aligned with our lived-reality is not so much an outcome as a precondition for our being able to have a social consensus in the first place. Or, without the requisite degree of social solidarity how could that society survive since in political terms they would in political reality, effectively, be ungovernable. (88)

Of course, it could be argued, that the world is not a place known for its overwhelming authenticity in our concern and care of others, in being respectful of our environment, and in our welcoming of strangers and those people who are unsympathetically treated as 'different'. But, then, again, there are people who do care and as it is said, 'those who are not against you, are for you' has a certain existential truth about it. We may complain that there is too much dissimulation or just outright contestment of what 'should seemingly be done', but, then, if we were to take a more transcendent view, or an in-depth immanent view, and truly attempted to appreciate this landscape in value-formation we might well be surprised. Our living together, our freedom to be found through-others may not be so evident in superficial terms of reference and yet that is a fact of our existence. Without a world of arbitration, e.g., we would all soon starve within the space of a few days. Therefore, we should revise this opinion on the general inauthenticity of how we relate to each other and assume, instead, that a general authenticity needs to be predicated in order to explain this non-fact of our existence that we are not starving except for those exceptions, unfortunately, that just prove this point. Like, for example, those suffering people of Gaza we daily see on our televisions and Social-Media being left to starve through the unconcerned and uncaring of those people in power who should know better and who are demonstrating a profound form of inauthenticity that would paralyze this world at large if it were to be extended globally). (89)

So, a background world of general, non-superficial authenticity needs to be first accepted so much so that we then need to ask just how does inauthenticity arise in such a milieu? (90)

Obviously, in a parasitical sense, in a de-authentication of what is already in place and which generally cannot be overturned except in small localized sections of its vast landscape! Furthermore, I would conjecture, for a start, that the overt mechanisms for this rewriting of a 'basic authenticity to be found in our lived-existences' would be none other than through processes of obstruction and distortion as just mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, let me discuss these two notions of inauthenticity to then explain how in the de-suspension of a well-conducted working suspension processes of resolution can effectively overcome these impediments of both obstruction and distortion in order to present a more aligned form of 'representation' as exercised in and through the workings of an ongoing economy of 're(-)presentation' (without falling, at the same time, into the traditional traps of an impossible metaphysical nonsense that is to be obviated and avoided through the successful rehabilitation of the entire philosophical landscape given its extensive use of a fully cognizant utilization of working suspensions that are well-conducted, and so on, and so forth). (91)

These two notions of 'obstruction' and 'distortion' are, in all probability, best approached through the philosophical perspective of how to appreciate the nature of narratives, those stories we tell ourselves and, then, just as importantly, disseminate with and before others, and v.v. In all of this, we are not alone, as if private islands of conversation with ourselves that, occasionally, spill over into the public domain. On the other hand, given the somewhat parasitical nature of inauthentically oriented practices we may well surmise that in order to be relatively inauthentic we have to rewrite these narrations we have already told both ourselves and others. In other words, through forms of either subtraction and/or addition, effectively, we have to remodel those narrative about to be retold. By 'obstruction' we 'delete access to that which we now wish to suppress', and, through 'distortion', we 'add a difference to what may have been previously recounted'. How might these two mechanism, and others, be imposed on the workings of a narrative? Let me explain by briefly proffering a philosophy of narration, namely, my take on this dimension of the narrative. (92)

One way to explicate the trimodal nature of the narrational economy is to divide a functioning narration into narrational facts, the overt explication of narrational arguments, and the relatively covert *raison d'être* of a narrational economy in an inherent desire to 'critically' de-anomalize some form of a relational anomaly usually through a process of ongoing resolution rather than a definitive process of resolution in which the narrational relationship would then radically deconstructed. Hence these three aspects of a narrative, namely, narrational facts, the overt narrative, and the covert motivation that motivates the trajectory or trajectories of that specific narrative. (93)

Now, this anatomy and physiology outlined, we can apply processes of either obstruction and/or distortion either individually or collectively to all three aspects as delineated in this version of the narrational economy. (94)

As an observation, we can note the ineffectiveness of fact-checkers in attempting to deconstruct a particularly mendacious narrative through our noting the general non-unravelling of that same process of narration. Narratives have audiences and if the audience refuses to countenance an alternative set of facts, then 'the original alternative set of facts will effectively remain in place'. (95)

To more effectively deconstruct a narrative, we may well have to confront either the very narrative itself *qua* narrative and demonstrate its defective conjectures, and/or, confront the very motivation inspiring that narrative and fault that accordingly. Rhetorically showing either that that narrative does not make sense, or, that that the purport of that narrative is not something you would want to identify with. But, best of luck in that enterprise as people are wedded to their narratives which may well explain they do neither want to see them perfectly resolved and then duly discarded nor replaced with something they do not identify with, and so on. (96)

However, should we persevere on this path of amelioration then such remediation can be conducted as a two-stage process of deconstruction and reconstruction or, by existential means, overseeing a one-step process of an ongoing simultaneous reconstructive-deconstruction in which, by skillful means, we manage to supervise this transformative type of a transition. Then, again, for those that are more mere mortals, perhaps a continual chipping away at the fraudulent fabric might eventually reveal its less sturdy fabrication just as an empty bucket can be eventually filled under a leaky tap. In that regard, just what should we look for? Valid points of contestment that are signaled by the disconcerting presence of either of these aforementioned obstructions or distortions that are present at those section of the narrated text by virtue of an inner insightfulness that never truly escapes the person despite either the pseudo-psychotic ideologically iterations of their over-commitments or the psychotic depths of their enduring yet non-endearing delusions… as these misguided parties venturing into their somewhat deliberately chosen forms of inauthenticity, be that either superficially advertently or non-superficially inadvertently entered into. That I am arguing here for a certain sense and semblance of 'choice' being exercised in this regard by virtue of the fact that should such points themselves be contested then an equal, if not greater, degree of resistance should clearly demonstrate the extent such misguided parties are over-invested in such apparent 'decisions' to either obstruct and/or distort these problematic areas of the text. Now, this is a subtle approach, almost a dialectical way of treating such problematic issues, but such insights should assist us in engaging with such texts and their authors if that type of an interactive occasion should be called for given that under most circumstances a process of non-engagement might be a more productive use of our time. On the other hand, our virtual deconstruction of such inauthentically motivated narrations could be of more use to ourselves to the extent we can become more conversant with the motivation inspiring such dissemination and perhaps offering us an explanation as to why such a narrative has been allowed to be fostered and then left potentially festering in the first place. All narration is motivated and it could well be that an understanding of that motivation is more important than demonstrating either an affirmation or dis-affirmation of the representative contents of that narration. Indeed, possibly proffering reasons why such obstructions

and distortions may have been introduced in the formation of that narrated text. Let me explore such features more closely. (97)

To tell a lie, we have to first tell ourselves the truth. Only then, by either disregarding and/or tweaking one or more elements of that narration, does it become deceptive, and, in this regard, we might note a small number of rules that the disseminator of alternative facts needs to follow in order to successfully deceive either the audience of that mischief and/or sometimes the very narrator themselves. A good lie, and an authentic situation might call for such dissimulation, needs, first, to be coherent and, then, narrate a possible situation that is not too ridiculous to contemplate. Only a few elements need to be 'tweaked' and such tweaking should be in an alignment with the fraudulent intent being exercised behind such dissimulation. Over the course of this dissemination such tweaking would involve either forms of obstruction and/or distortion. By obstruction we hide what we truly feel to be true by not mentioning such points of contention. In a contrast, through distortion, we reveal that point of contention through tweaking elements of its representation in such a manner so as to present the desired version of that same situation. Arguably, such alterations imply a certain degree of deliberate intent although it is not out of the question that such practices psychically divide the individual or party promoting such 'alternative facts'. That iteration can reinforce this psychic divide which has the accumulative effect of diminishing the integrity of that individual or party promoting such relatively unsupported or less supported claims, although, at the same time, the reiteration of a deception can also eventually induce its apparent credence given the intersubjective dimension in the general dissemination of information, etc. Against this backdrop, in meeting an inauthenticity of dissemination it may well prove more susceptible to its deconstruction given this overlay of either its obstructions and/or distortions, etc., when a more authentically produced text should evince a greater degree of both intentional integrity and intactness. (98)

Given these aspects of obstruction and distortion, and their resistance to be being either removed or reconstructed, how should we deal with such disseminated roadblocks in the manner of a more civil dialogue? Ideally, through a process of suspension. E.g., questioning such elements may well be itself enough to elicit their deceptive nature by virtue of the resistance that person presents in being either directly or indirectly challenged. If those elicited points of contention are revealed then a less resistant person would instead more reasonably proffer evidence or testimony or an inference that such claims were valid. However, if more fraudulent means are mustered to the defense of such points of contestment then, again, we are being alerted to the fraudulent nature of their promulgation. Treading carefully, in the face of such misrepresentation, we might find it advisable to either give up or go along with such claims in order to then render them as quite ridiculous or highly unlikely, and so on. In the infamous trope of 'they are eating the dogs, and they are eating the cats' (in a much-maligned Springfield, in Ohio) we might just raise an eyebrow and ask, 'what, by only one person; so, you mean more than one person; then, you mean hundreds of people you mean thousands of people, really, that is amazing...!' Adding, 'how could anyone believe such nonsense, you must be joking. You are not joking, you really believe this racist trope? What does that say about you?!' (99)

In recounting that demeaning trope, we see an obvious distortion being introduced, namely, *x* is eating the pets. This does not normally happen. It is possible, e.g., when a city is under a long siege in the middle of a war, but, thankfully, Springfield, Ohio, is not being subjected to such strife so that sort of an event just does not happen. Normally, we would ask for evidence. Then, in the face of the dismissal of such nonsense by city officials and the obvious lack of any credible evidence to that effect that should have seen the end of such farce. To dig in just makes it look even more ridiculous. (100)

In the dissimulation of an obstruction, when the narrator is faced by people asking why a certain aspect is not being mentioned, then we should ask why that apparent point of oversight might be contentious? Now, the type of a reply may well be indicative that that point, indeed, is contentious and should they refuse to appropriately answer that question then that in itself may well be evidence of their being obstructive, and thereby deceptive in that regard. As a case in point, When Trump's running mate in the 2024 elections, J. D. Vance, refuses to answer, on a number of occasions, with either a 'yes' or 'no', the question 'did Trump lose the 2020 election?' then we are presented with ample evidence of an obstruction. Vance answers with a deflection, and cannot confront the exact question itself and duly answer it as would be normally expected. He does not proffer a distortion since, in this case, it is a bit like asking 'if someone were pregnant?' and where the definitive reply, either way, cannot itself be distorted. Yes, they could lie by affirming a non-affirmation or non-affirming an affirmation. Pregnancy is a unilaterally distinctive result of certain process, and, one, as a woman, in a certain period of time is either pregnant or not pregnant, and never half-pregnant or pregnant on alterative days, etc. Either Trump lost the election, as he did, or, you say he won the election which is patently false. In some ways, it is also a bit like saying a certain pretender to the French throne had themselves crowned when such a ceremony is not officially recognized by the state of France. Therefore, an obstruction along with its non-recognition, is not so much a distortion, as would pertain to a lie or some other form of dissimulation, but, rather a refusal to admit a conventionally understood form of representation that should elicit the requisite affirmation or denial, and, as a result of such non-recognition could induce a process of concomitant distortion through the perpetration of such oversight, be that by that person themselves or by others parties beholden to the negative ramifications pertaining to the same defect.[214] In this regard we could also argue that the vehemency of an overcommitment to the distortion of an excessively reiterated lie (distortion) could eventually lead to the presentation of an obstruction just as, e.g., Trump's Great Lie (of others stealing the 2020 US Election, which, in reality, he consistently attempted to do so himself), as a distortion of lived-reality, has mutated into the form of an obstruction that the over-committed now must refuse to recognize or must appear to not recognize lest they lose their membership in Trump's successful takeover of the Republican Party. (101)

[214] Alluding to the effect that the excessive and intensive dissemination of this lie of the 'Steal' then lead to over-committed individuals wanting to obstruct the Certification in Congress on January 6, 2021 along with the ensuing distortions in US politics through these political anomalies not having been sufficiently addressed and suitably redressed earlier on in the Biden Presidency.

In confronting either an obstruction or a distortion, the apparent intensity of the resistance to such a confrontation is indicative of the inauthenticity of its dissemination. If it were the case that such defects were inadvertently introduced over the course of the narration in question then a different style of response should be elicited when confronted by such a criticism. In a genuine debate, a genuine type of dialogue would be entered into. Perhaps the narrator might apologize, or proffer what they think might count as evidence, or ask the interrogator what they think in this regard, or promise to amend their discourse or say why they still thought that to be the case, and so on. That type of an encounter is quite different from one entered into by someone overcommitted to a certain position that is being defended through the continuing inauthenticity of additional responses that, in effect, reveal more about the inauthenticity of that positioning than the lived-reality of its representation as would be argued for on the grounds of either credible evidence, testimony, and/or inference as presented in and through the integrity of a body of conjectures that could actually support such contentions or at least render them as an open possibility immune from either their establishment in a certain discourse through the mere iteration of affirmations or denials. (102)

Another feature of the positioning of others who are not utilizing adequate suspensions, be that either advertently and/or inadvertently, is the ensuing mix of projection and confession superimposed upon others without realizing, however, through not having enough personal insight to realize that these same ‘defects’ are being presented more intensely in their own reports and reportings, given that through an ideological imbalance they act as if one-sided critics unaware that ‘they do not practice what they preach’. E.g., a political candidate or supporter who indulges in, say, an *ad hominin* attack on another (member of a political) party whilst demonstrating the same defect, say, as to be seen written on their T-shirt or banner, or as verbally expressed when questioned or as disseminated on their accounts in Social-Media, and so on. As an observation and comment on this type of unbalanced phenomenon suffice to note that through some form of ideological ‘blindness’, as evidence of an insufficient degree of suspended thinking, disseminated forms of either projection and/or confession are emitted that reflect more on the disseminator of such non-insightful behaviour. How might we explain the reiteration of this quite prevalent type of phenomenon? Now, a proponent of a weak form of positioning, say, as a weak relativist, would not even posses the degree of non-overcommitted commitment to even bother to refute such over-committed positioning. On the other hand, a proponent arguing from an over-committed strong positioning would be inclined to vehemently argue with all parties, and, sometimes, even members of their own party over minor dogmatic points of either theory or practice in what they would perceive to be the requisite orthodoxy required in such matters, doing so in a manner that is more monological rather than dialogical. In a healthier contrast, a person who operates from a ‘fortified conjectural position’ that is neither strong nor weak, in a format I have described as both non-weak/non-strong, accordingly, would be less inclined to debate an opponent in such a one-sided manner and would in all probability prefer the potential productivity of a process of mutual interaction that is not so one-sided and more open to the possible purloining and appropriating of each other’s arguments in order to further fortify and strengthen the overall integrity of their conjectural representations in the ‘progressive’ evolution of

their relatively open interpretations of lived-experience and where through doing so they are actually testing the conjectural integrity of their own interpretations, etc.

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Now, the point of this digression, in the form of this short discourse on obstructions, etc.,[215] is that when we authentically open ourselves to representative possibilities, we need to do so through the use of well-conducted working suspensions and that our apparent failure to do so is directly indicative of an absence of the requisite degree of good faith needed to seriously conduct such explorations and subject the same to the degree of scrutiny required to possibly resolve such co-associated issues potentially driving such narratives . In other words, if we are to existentially engage the problematic aspects of our existence then we need to seriously entertain those measure that will see us possibly resolving such problems and disputes. That, as a parallel to this open positioning is the fact that in the non-economic irruption of resolution being exercised behind the enaction of behaviour we need to adopt and adapt a similar sense of an open positioning in order to existentially resolve such concerns in a manner that either creates, preserves and/or conservationally expands both the non-existentially oriented richness of valuation and the existentially oriented enrichment of evaluation that is beneficial to the membership coursing in those relationships. As conjectured, an essential precondition in this existential openness of positioning is the exercise of relevant, well-formed and well-informed working suspensions, etc., that prove to be productively instrumental in such processes of resolution. Therefore, to this end, let me collect the various arguments in this essay in order to present a cogent and coherent account of what exactly is meant by our existentially oriented engagement in such a manner that relates both the relational participants and parts in a relationship along with the unique perspective of its pro-relational treatment in order to realize its trans-relational expression in a specificity of unilateral responses of the last instance, etc., that prove to be both non-existentially and existentially insightful and fruitfully productive in the overseeing and ensuing supervision of such matters. (103)

Arguing, that in effect, through non-economic resolution, a relative simplicity is to be engaged in our experience of the relatively existential. Through an inter-mingling or inter-meddling of the meta-philosophically metaphysical and the philosophical, through the transformational nature of working suspensions, in an ongoing and re-visited process of retreatment, this dimension of the relatively existential is expressed through the specificity of its existential hallmarks and stamps itself on the lived-course of experience accordingly… (104)

4. Provisional Conclusions, etc., in the form of an Integrated Exposition

Now, as agreed, let me rework the various findings of these ten expositions in a more coherent and cogent form in order to address the more essential nature of both the non-systematic and systematic senses of my ‘overall concept of the existential’, and, by such means, proffer a style of doing both philosophy and metaphysics, and practicing our disciplinary professions in the midst of a secular world, in such a manner that, hopefully,

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215 I.e., obstruction, distortion, and both inadvertent projection and confession.

is mutually beneficial for our working together with all involved parties as participants in those relationships through being suitably invoked, articulated, and being openly entered into. As it is my contention 'that as our freedom is primarily realized through this mutual arbitration of others then it stands to reason that whatever promotes such engagement should also augment and enhance this shared sense and semblance of that existential freedom to be found through(-)others'. Therefore, with this objective in mind, let me set out to clarify just what is entailed in this expression 'existential', hopefully, without making a further series of mistakes and transgressions beyond those already admitted to as having been addressed and redressed over the course of this and other essays. (105)

Metaphorically, I have conjectured that the non-systematic existential, as the so-called 'third moment' of the archetypal economy, as a subjectively experienced process of resolution, etc., is the 'door' to the systematic sense and semblance of the existential, so, in apparently making this considerable claim let me explain just what is meant and the ramifications that ensue in the wake of its experiential establishment. (106)

To be brief and to the point, it is my contention that relational experience is a complex affair where we can experience the emergence of that relationship in a manner that cannot be reduced to either the mere parts of a relationship nor the simple sampling of that relationship in its apparent totality as if viewed from the sheer perspective of its pro-relational treatment as if an isolated entity in its own right! Rather, through a suspension of both these relevant aspects a third facet comes into view, namely, the trans-relational in an ongoing specificity of its trans-historical facticity. Then, through a working suspension (inter-mediation) of all three economic facets we can glimpse the outlines of the existential in its more systematically oriented sense and semblance. That, as an observation, the unilateral distinctiveness of such a response acts as a guiding force in how we intervene in good faith in this world with(-)others, before(-)others, and find an existentially shared freedom to be found primarily through(-)others, through the very being of others.[216] (107)

Now, to support this overall contention, that there is an existential dimension to lived-existence, let me support this conjecture by summarizing my various arguments as scattered in these previous ten expositions that have approached this topic, albeit from a number of disparate directions… (108)

First, existential experience is distinctive and expresses itself through a vividness of engagement that once recognized is never forgotten. It is something that is 'engaged' and not merely entertained. It 'engages us' and we find ourselves for a moment or period in time 'absorbed' within the 'openness' of its 'expansive-confines'. (109)

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[216] With the implied implication that in the disparagement of others by the ideologically over-committed we diminish the sense and semblance of an existential freedom that could have been fruitfully shared by both parties.

It is not a rare phenomenon and it is something we can engage in any moment or period of time. That the metaphorical entrance to and exit from such a dimension is through some form of a working suspension, be that exercised either advertently or inadvertently. Perhaps to be found through the asking of a relevant question; or making a metaphorical allusion; or in accepting the aptness of a solution to a certain problem; in enjoying the rich displays of nature as in the viewing of a sunrise or sunset, or the rising or setting of a full moon; in the songs of happy birds; or being moved by a beautiful piece of music; in the unraveled adventures of a wonderful novel; in having a coffee with a good friend; in the spontaneous laughter to be had in either the recounting or hearing of a well-constructed and well-delivered joke; in resolving our difficulties with others after a heated argument; in simply going for a walk and seeing mundane things not seen before that surprise us in not having been seen before, and so on. No doubt a list that could be endless added too… (110)

Then, we might wish to list the hallmarks of such experiences. Where time is intensely lived in the eternal present, when we sense of a 'spark' of spontaneity or synchronicity or simultaneity… when the limitations of geography seem to recede… when we feel a personal tone of intactness and integrity… or share an intersubjective solidarity and consensus with others… even a spiritual-like semblance of an atonement or at-oneness with what might, perhaps, be given a name… or better thought left as nameless…. (111)

Finding such an open-ended list of hallmarks as having being been recounted in the past, say, in a novel, or hoped for in our expectations to be had in our dealings with others… or as eventually to be hoped for between others that currently are not able to confront each other in good faith… (112)

In much of this essay, a transformational approach has be taken through the lens of a philosophy of transformational retreatment. As noted economically, non-economically, and our putative appropriation of the former in super-economic terms of reference. Moreover, a transformational approach has been more closely detailed through economic complexification, ordered complexification, inter-ordered complexification, and through metaphysical-philosophical processes of a relative simplification arrived at through de-complexification as instigated through the suitable enactment of apposite patterns of relational resolution. (113)

Let me summarize and integrate some of those findings articulated in that form of philosophical research. (114)

In an economy of transformational retreatment, in an attempt to model processes of transformation, I argue that we must begin with what 'is to hand', namely, the hermeneutically pregiven in a phase nominated as 'pretreatment'. Then, through a more pronounced form of suspension, we arrive at the phase of 'treatment' that takes an ahistorical turn along phenomenological lines through an obligatory elevation in meta-status by one meta-degree (metafication). Here we entertain either a simple form of treatment that is either analytical or synthetical or nominational in orientation, or, more correctly, we take on an unequal mix of all of the same. Then, in a process of de-elevation by one meta-

degree (de-metafication), as automatically instigated by the de-suspension, we enter a phase of 'retreatment' in which the ensuing transformational productivity, through entailed processes of ongoing resolution, is revealed. In such productivity there is the potential revelation of the existential in its more systematic sense, but, that form of exhibition is dependent upon the required working suspensions be exercised in order to further transform the non-systematic existential into a more overt form of the systematically existential. Then, given the requisite degree of motivational force, etc., the non-economic enactment of that overall process of resolution is then able to remodify the initial phase of pretreatment should that be deemed necessary, in a dialectical cycle that can theoretically continue till an adequate resolution is suitably realized or should we decide to intentionally move on to a new instance of such deliberations and ensuing enactments, etc. Where by 'dialectical' is meant 'our psychic movement in either direction, clockwise or counter-clockwise in the schematic representation of this economy, or, in the simultaneous economic functioning at all points in this scheme as would be argued for, necessarily, from an economic perspective, etc.' (115)

Through economic complexification we note we can conduct an enrichment of our appreciation of the economic by paralleling such information in archetypal terms. E.g., that the treatment mode of 'analysis' can be reframed as 'reduction', and as 'retrospective in orientation', or as 'phenomenological', as relatively 'dissonant', as 'textual', etc. Enriching our appreciation, likewise, on the other two modes of treatment of 'synthesis' and 'nomination' (that the reader or audience can do for themselves by consulting a parallel dictionary of hypothetical correlativities'[217]). (116)

A more detailed appreciation of transformation was presented through the closer scrutiny of an ordered complexification superimposed upon the trimodal configuration of this model of retreatment, i.e., describing what happens in those economic moments of pretreatment, etc., and how we distinctly move between those same moments of pretreatment, etc. As a summary of those findings, we might formulate this progression (starting with pretreatment) preparatory for a process of existentialization through a full process of inter-mediation (in our co-option of relevant working suspensions), namely, through being well-formed (in our uptake of relevant genres, and exercising necessary patterns of mitigation in that same regard, etc.), well-informed (in our choice of narrational facts), well-deformed (though deconstruction), well-reformed (through an integration of fortified conjectural reconstruction), well-re-formed (through forms of transformational retreatment), and thence well-re-performed (in the impact it will have on the ongoing representative modifications of pre-treatment). Noting, at the same time, the dialectical nature of this ordered treatment given that the economic cannot ultimately be read in either a clockwise or an anticlockwise direction, etc. Accepting, therefore, the provisional nature of that heuristic device as 'provisional', but, at the same time, setting us up to perhaps eventually make a relatively 'progressive' step forward, especially when the form of that device itself can, in turn, be constructively-deconstructed in a productively insightful manner... (117)

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[217] Originally posted as Appendix A: *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C. Appendix A, etc.

That in a process of inter-ordered complexification we now add a critically and radically reconstituted metaphysical-like overlay on our ordered reading of the preconditions for the overall existentialization of that transformational economy through its re-reading along the following lines, namely, starting with pretreatment as needing to resonate with a scientific appreciation of the task ahead. That this is then followed by a relevant historical reading of the situation in question. In a sense being not only well-informed in a factual sense but also being well-informed in a co-associated historical sense. By the time we coincide with 'treatment' we are now re-reading a phenomenologically based semantics through the lens of a categorical metaphysics along with our interest, therein, in considerations such as, e.g., identity, transformations of identity, responsibility, subjectivity-intersubjectivity, consequential expectations, etc., albeit in meta-philosophical-like terms of reference. In reconstructive phase we then note the ramifications of a psychological-sociological reading of that progressively enriched appreciation of that relational situation in question. Then, in our metaphysical-like reading of retreatment we take a political-like orientation to the extent we come to appreciate to what extent such virtual enactions can actually be non-virtually enacted, hopefully, in an existential orientation that fully observes both compactual, contractual, and inter-compactual-contractual forms of relational appreciation. Then, from such enriched inter-ordered forms of meta-philosophical/metaphysical appreciation we find ourselves in a position to permit the ensuing re-self-organization of behaviours in a more practical sphere of intervention that would also re(-)constitute the scientific-like parameters of our original pretreatment, etc. Where, in a formular, we note the following phases of identificational enrichment, namely, those collectively conducted, dialectically, through the individual lenses of the scientific, historic, semantic, psychologic/sociologic, (an enactive) politic(s), and (pragmatically instigated) economic (interventions). The net result being a more knowledgeable appreciation of the relational situation in question, in its relational situatedness, and our ability, accordingly, of making more suitably attuned decisions in a relatively progressive alignment with the advancing of a relatively re(-)self-organized, existentially re(-)fashioned insightfulness. (118)

As complicated as this must sound, when looked at through these various philosophical lenses, still, through de-complexification, through economic resolution as enacted through non-economic forms of intervention, we are presented with definitive-like solutions in the form of unilateral responses of the last instance, etc. It is as if nature does not compute, or conduct computations, but, rather, continually approximates through what I would describe as 'ongoing (incremental-like) processes of re(-)normalization' delivered through re(-)self-organization of the relational states in question.[218] (119)

That type of understanding does present the philosophical problem of how does nature determine where one relationship either starts and/or overlaps and another either begins and/or overlaps? (120)

Here, various proposal could be tentatively put forward which need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. For example, a holistic world could be argued for where there is

[218] Technically, in the use of the nomenclature of '(-)' we do not need to add either 'ongoing' or 'ongoing economy of…'.

ultimately only ‘one’ open-ended relationship that ‘exists’ within which ‘apparent relationships can be projected dependent upon the lens or lenses being invoked with corresponding degrees of virtualness/non-virtualness.[219] Or, we could argue that the natural distinctiveness of both participants and parts decides the parameters and extent of any relationship being envisaged therein (with either a relative overlap or a relative non-overlapbetween competing phenomenological appearances of those seemingly delineated ‘relationships’). Or, we might wish to take a more pragmatic appreciation of the ‘relational’ and merely argue, on pragmatic grounds, that a relationship is what is taken to be a relationship through the mere utility of its apparent functioning given that the positive-nihilistic constitution of all identificationally delineated formations is just that, namely, ‘positively-nihilistic’ in its phenomenal-phenomenological complexion, etc. (121)

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[219] But, here, admittedly, we have the fundamental problem in physics that a holographic principle appears to be able to be invoked in an anti-de Sitter space but not in a de Sitter space, and where the latter corresponds with the configuration of our cosmological sense of world. However, I would conjecture that if we were to take a relational point of view then we might well be able then to envisage a holographic-like principle from the essential nature of that super-imposed relational sense of perspective? Where the relational, to my mind, is naturally representative of a hologram given the essential nature of the relationship to present a monadic-like point of view from each point within that relationship? Thence, in reverse, giving us a definition of the expression ‘essential’ (in a phenomenological sense and not in, say, an Aristotelian perspective). So, then, the problem would become the question as to ‘how we can relationally treat a certain space-time in relational terms of reference?’ (and, here, we might need to envisage the application of a transformational-like utilization of meta-degrees through metafication, etc?). How might we relationally treat the already relational to the extent we find relational participants and parts as arrayed in this world at large and where they naturally seem to form both distinct and distinctive relationships like, e.g., ‘tree’, ‘forest’, ‘landscape’, etc? We could do so, perhaps, by envisaging the relational space between all the points in an apparent relationship in a kind of meta-relational disposition. Indeed, a symmetrical form of reduplication in the sense of ‘the relational space of a relational space’, mirroring an inter-ordered form of phenomenological treatment. As a case in point, ‘the heat of heat’ is neither ‘hot’ nor ‘cold’ being ‘temperature’. Moreover, in a confined space, thermal equilibrium is reached very quickly and the temperature is basically the same at any point in the ambit of that confined relationship. This analogy parallels my idea that the essential phenomenological ‘flavour’ of that relationship, more or less, is the same throughout that ambit and where the center of that relationship is effectively everywhere, albeit as refracted from the individual uniqueness of the perspective that would be seen, if that were to be the case, from each point in the ambit of that relationship. Elsewhere, I have defined ‘ambit’ in ‘passive terms of relational content’, ‘remit’ in more dynamical terms of relational functions’, and, ‘composite’ as the pro-relationally oriented unification of the former in the form of a so-called third ‘economic moment’ that, at the same time, cannot be reduced to these economic correlatives of ‘relational content’ and ‘relational functions’; and, where the inter-mediation of all three aspects would fall under the expression ‘orbit’ along with the implication of a systematic existential complexion that could be amplified through both incremental non-chaotic augmentation and non-incremental chaotic enhancement, preferably, of course, with the induction of an overall positively amplified orientation. That through some form of mediation between the ‘relational’ and the ‘pro-relational orientations’ we might be able to induce the sense and semblance of the ‘trans-relational’ along with an encapsulation of the relationship within its relational orbit that then would allow us to apply a holographic principle in principle in such a manner that might allow us to both imagine and engender some form of conformal treatment in both the scientific sense and in my sense of finding an alignment in its overall conformal truth determinations, etc. But, all of this is conjectural speculation that might or might not have some application in a resolution of such difficulties as to how we are to both philosophically and metaphysically interpret the phenomenological nature of a relational treatment of lived-experience and the possible ramifications this might have would a re-framing of physics, etc., and v.v.

What then, is the net impact of these manoeuvres in positioning on our understanding of the experiential nature of the existential dimension in its overlaying of a non-existentially oriented sense and semblance of experience? (122)

That neither a historical or mere relational treatment nor an ahistorical or pro-relational treatment of relationships can do a full justice to the lived-nature of the relational as it existentially manifests itself through the concrete specificity of the trans-historical (as redefined in this essay[220]). That, through the mediational suspension of the former we can dialectically arrive at this economic corelative of the trans-relational, and, thence, through the inter-mediational suspension of all three correlatives, we can then arrive at an experience of the existential in its more systematic orientation. Hence this explanation of what becomes more an intuitive experience arrived at through a de-complexification of our representative appreciation of the relational situation in question should we suitably observe the preconditions and conditions that expedite this form of an experiential transformation in an ensuing existential insightfulness. (123)

So, what then are these prerequisite pre-conditions and conditions that at least are viewed as hypothetically invoking this conditional and post-conditional experience of the systematic existential? (121)

Those aspects that detail the transformational-transitions under the auspices of an ordered complexification, namely, the well-formed, well-informed, the well-deformed, the well-reformed, the well-re-formed, and the well-performed, along with those aspects enriched under the auspices of an inter-ordered complexification, namely, suitable application of the relevantly scientific, historic, semantic, psychologic/sociologic, politic, and economic, all further advanced through those patterns of behaviour that induce a suspension that through its induction, therein and thereby, further inducts the total economic environment in question from the perspective of its overall suspension as a working suspension (extensive suspension). Since, as no correlative can act as an economic isolate any form of suspension that promotes a distinctive form of suspension will then further induce a simulation of the entire economy from the perspective of its relatively full suspension. E.g., in rhetorically asking an appropriate question, taking the form of a disconjunctive suspension it then follows that that type of suspension then holistically links us into the overall working suspension at the center of all economies as contained within their super-economic encapsulation given the inherent need to conventionally re-appropriate the relatively non-critical, critical and/or potentially radically-radical forms of non-economic irruption where the latter can only be sequentially appropriated as the relatively-radical, increment by increment, in order to advance its hyper-economic reappropriation. (125)

Or, again, as argued through an intuitive form of de-complexification, in an irruption of resolution, in a well-received process through re(-)self-organization of epistemological functions, all this is near-effortlessly thematized and delivered for us as if without the need for our deliberate intervention. On the other hand, through ideological over-

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[220] Paralleling my ‘trans-historical’ or ‘trans-relational’ nature of subjectively oriented experience as explored in earlier essays in the Third Volume of this *Pursuit*.

commitment or under-commitment; through bad faith; a lack of mental balance within and between our desires and aspirations; through pseudo-psychotic and psychotic obstructions, distortions, and inadvertent projections and confessions, etc., we lose our way, so to speak, and, therein and thereby, become unable to recognize, encounter, and engage the relatively systematic experience of the existential in its mutual enrichment of both our existence and freedom that is to be found through(-)others. A process of reception enacted in a progressive form of insightfulness that basically reflects that extent we have well-represented the nature of our relationships and where, through an adequate degree of suspension, this integrated relativity of experience is then able to provoke, through de-suspensions, the requisite degree of insightfulness required to make our passages through this world at large more successful both individually and collectively… in what one may tentatively ascertain to be a 'well-fortified form of relativism', albeit as subjected to the relevant adoption and adaptation of working suspensions as refracted through suitable processes of inter-mediation, i.e., through the relevant use of such working suspensions, etc..!! (126)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 1.11.24.

XIIL. The Deconstruction of Both Strong and Weak Relativisms

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIII. (12.) The Deconstruction of Both Strong and Weak Relativisms[221]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In line with previous essays, we can envisage this topic of a relativism as having three flavours, namely, the weak; non-weak/non-strong, as a potentially well-fortified version of relativism; and the usual suspect of a strong relativism, with the latter being predicated on impossible economic grounds and seemingly made to work only through the use of defective arguments. A moment's reflection should also reveal the total bankruptcy of a weak relativism given that this non-committed indifference to any form of positioning would be counter-productive to the nth degree. Indeed, a person confronting every decisive position, with a need to exercise a definitive sense of choice, would, in continually tossing a coin, have a better chance of survival than a person whose *laissez faire* attitude would demotivate them to make any choices whatsoever. Hence the need to deconstruct both a weak relativism and a strong relativism. But, what of this non-weak/non-strong version of a relativism, this potentially well-fortified version of this topic, is their room in the discipline of philosophy for this style of argumentation and what would that entail? In deconstructing all strong versions, say, of realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism, and in overlooking the ineffectual roles of their weak counterparts, should we seriously ask, 'is there a place for these well-fortified approaches in this many-roomed mansion of philosophy? Because, if we were to contemplate that scenario, then it implies that the philosopher has much work ahead of them. Namely, first, in the form of a remediation of this discipline, by deconstructing such misguided strong versions, and, second, replacing them, when and where appropriate, with these conjecturally well-fortified versions now rendered more fit for purpose. Third, recognizing the fact that the net ramifications of this radical re-organization of this discipline is that we should no longer stake out such tribal affiliations, but, instead, formulate a formidable mix of philosophical styles that would proffer a better chance of our successfully finding pragmatic resolutions and solutions to those problems that confront us either philosophically or metaphysically, either in the guise of a professional discipline or in the very midst of the secular world riven and polarized by forces and circumstances in stark need of those working measures capable of re(-)normalizing our cultural and inter-cultural enclaves. Therefore, may this essay attempt to be of assistance in this positive process of amelioration, this existentialization of discourse better able to instigate a more 'progressive' sense of engagement, where both commonalities and differences are respected, and where 'progress', itself, is to be arrived at through both social consensus and social solidarity to both mirror and echo the aspirations of the pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty. (0)

As an introduction to the structuring of this essay let me first explore this topic of 'relativism' and, then, in fashioning a non-weak/non-strong version illustrate how the force of the de-suspension illuminates the conformal contours of a well-formed and well-informed representative version of this world at large. Then, using this as a model, extend this broad treatment to all other fortified versions and note the ramifications of this 'pragmatic turn' where ideologies are discarded and valid and vital forms of commitment are sought instead. Ending with the usual provisional conclusions, etc. (1)

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221 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1. A Well-Fortified Relativism?

Both weak and strong forms of relativism self-deconstruct through an inevitable contradiction in terms, etc. On the other hand, a working situation entailing seemingly valid interpretations of a conjecturally fortified version of the relative reveals its conformal status through working suspensions, or, more correctly, through their invocation of de-suspensions that then do all the work so to speak. In effect, conformally demonstrating a revelatory differentiation between overall input and net outputs in the pragmatics of a working relativism. But, first, let us set out valid reasons, in general terms, for the thorough discarding of both weak and strong versions of a certain type of positioning, regardless of whether the format of that position be either philosophical, metaphysical, disciplinary and/or secular in orientation. (2)

A weak sense and semblance of positioning could be dismissed as just not being sufficiently viable in conjectural terms of reference and where the holder of such a relatively non-integrated positioning would inevitably suffer the lived-consequences of such inadequately prepared patterns of interpretation as necessarily required for their ongoing formulations of a working representation of lived-experience. In a marked contrast, a well-fortified sense and semblance of conjectural positioning has a pragmatic utility whilst remaining provisionally scoped by a recognition of the natural limitations of their current enquiries and their ensuing explorations. However, in a contrast to the former, the adherent of a strong sense of positioning, in effect, adopts and adapts a deluded sense of perspective that might be best understood through the lenses of either rhetorical abuse or metaphorical abuse or apparitional abuse, or, indeed, more likely, through a product of all three forms of an impossible style of interpretative (mis)appropriation. Let me explain in detail. (3)

As noted, central to the philosophical economy (as self-defined through an economic composite of hermeneutical, phenomenal-phenomenological, and existential inputs) we have the interrogative economy given the centrality of this requirement ‘to ask questions’ (as must also pertain to all disciplines, along with our living in the world of the secular, etc.). That granted, and no enquiries could be contemplated otherwise, we note the necessary implication of rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional inputs and outputs. A question devolves around the ‘either/or’ as a ‘dis-conjunctive suspension’. As a first reply, we have the metaphorical response in the form of ‘like’, which. in turn, can be cashed out as a ‘conjunctive suspension’ of ‘both like and not-like’. Last, in a second reply, when and where we are taking a literal turn, as our unilateral response of the last instance, etc., we effectively invoke the double negation of the joining together of the former, and, where we entertain, subsequently, the ramifications of a double negation or the running of a tentative reiteration of the ‘as-if…’ until we give up and move on, or find we have to change our minds in the light of new information (about either our conjectures and/or their narrational contents, etc.), or, just philosophically accept a position of provisional treatment even if practically contradicted in our taking a (betting-like) position of what we currently hold to be conformally true. Now, the net consequences of accepting this reading of the interrogative economy, and by extension, all other economies, is that we cannot and should not transgress these natural limitations imposed upon us by the

economic itself, albeit as also expressed in rhetorical, metaphorical and apparitional terms of reference, or, for that matter that violate any other forms of economic functioning as co-determined through economic complexification, etc. But, for the present, let us confine our critique to the ramifications of an interrogative 'lens'. Now, despite the definitive-like nature of unilateral responses, in our decisions to side either with the either or the or, with either a this or an alternative that, a non-weak/non-strong form of positioning recognizes the need for the provisional scoping of all conformal presentations of truth determinations. Now, it is the case that all presentations are entertained within the choice of a certain perspective or a certain set/s and/or series of perspectives in an infinite range of possibilities, albeit with varying degrees of relevance or irrelevancy, and, that no individual perspective in itself can be perfectly or absolutistically exhausted (since to do so would require more energy than the visible universe, as a start, to do so hypothetically). That, because there are an infinitude of perspectives and no individual choice in perspective can be exhausted it follows that a provisional attitude to its apparent conformal status must hypothetically apply despite the inevitable pragmatics of our also having to accept the currently apparent conformal status or validity of our working-representations, etc., as as are needed to be engaged in the here and now. As a case in point, social consensus is not necessarily the final arbiter in determining the representative-reality of our collectively interpreted form of a distinctive patter of lived-experience since even though the Sun appears to circle the Earth it is now the case that a scientific discourse is the major discourse in this regard given its needing to overrule this common-sensical view in order to launch satellites, etc. Or, as I would like to point out here, in this instance, Plato was right to denounce all poets and all other disseminators of mere opinion. (4)

In the light of this exploration, it would be wrong to always insist on the absolutistical determinacy of decisions exercised through the rhetorical situation, which given this non-exhaustion of a single perspective and along with the need to make decisions as to which perspective is relevant or not so relevant or what is near-irrelevant or completely irrelevant implies that to ignore the choice involved in this state of affairs is to indulge in a process of 'rhetorical abuse'. As a parallel, somewhat like that of a classical physics *versus* the physics of a quantum mechanics. We may insist on the practicality of a rhetorical determinacy, but, in wider terms of reference we have no self-entitled authority to do so! (5)

Similarly, in the phase of the first reply, in the tentative making of the metaphorical comparison, we have a similar type of philosophical problem. In metaphorical terms of reference alone we are not entitled to simply go from a metaphorical complexion to a literal complexion. Yes, 'the Moon may look like a big blue cheese', still, no one in their right mind is going to agree with any nursery rhyme that states that type of an equation. We are not permitted to travel from 'like' to 'is' unless we possess or discern additionally valid reasons that would allow us to ten make that transition. All else is a form of 'metaphorical abuse' as it to be found at the center of both psychotic and pseudo-psychotic reasoning and positioning. Or, as one paranoid patient explained it to me in a loud voice on a public bus, "I know people are not against me, it just feels that that is the case." No doubt passing from 'like' to 'intensely feeling' that 'that to be the case' whilst having enough insight to know that 'that was more a product of their own thinking'. Or, in a sim-

ilar manner, to the misguided thinking of the adamant realist who insists that, as "It is like the case 'where I can focus through my intentional objectivity on the intentional objectives in play" to then insist, "therefore, the objective counterparts of such ideation must be actually seen" as they effortlessly move also from 'like' to 'is'. Of course, what kills their representatively oriented argument is the need to evidentially produce additional support that would legitimately allow them to make this transition. In some sense, having already made that manoeuvre in their interpretive stance it is not necessary for them to move into territory that quite correctly is beyond the purview of human intelligence. A naïve correspondence theory is here neither needed nor able to be evidentially produced on its own terms. Evidence we may already have, in evidentially obtained terms of reference, but, the so-called empirical evidence that what we actually see in a perceptual field is that 'occult something' is what is actually seen, which by definition, 'could not be seen', is too ludicrous to contemplate and take seriously. (6)

There are situations when we are rightly permitted to make a literal ascription of the metaphorical reply, but, then, we are no longer dealing with the metaphorical *per se*. 'Yes, that person over there does look like John. And, yes, it is that person I know by the name of 'John'. Without such additional conformal evidence, we are not permitted to make this transition to the making of a literal determination, albeit within economic terms of reference. But, even here, we are scoped by the natural limitations of the 'apparitional'. Invoking (an allusion to) the trimodal configurations of a Boolean Algebra the so-called 'third moment' takes the form of a negation, or, rather a double negative. Yes, that person over there is not-non-John, i.e., is John (since to state that that is John we also have to agree with its double negation). I also like to treat the apparitional as potentially provisional through the iterative invocation of the 'as-if, as-if, as-if…' Of course, with enough weight of the evidential or testimonial or the inferential we are allowed to provisionally treat as-if x to be as-fi x… until that time when we find we then have good reasons to change our minds. It is 'as-if the Sun circles the Earth…' gets radically re-framed by a new and more successful sense and semblance of a 'working-perspective'. That when this apparitional phase is not duly appropriated within its terms of reference and in the bringing of those additional terms of reference required to make a unilateral response of the last instance, etc., that we find relevant to our current situatedness, then all else in that regard is 'apparitional abuse', i.e., mistreating the necessity for the maintenance of a provisional attitude as mistakenly 'non-provisional in tenor' when we never are in any position to ultimately make such declarations in anything other than through the lens of a provisional format. Of course, from a much more practical point of view in recognizing the current consensus, as arrived at through either the deliberations of ourselves and/or others, then, in those practical terms of reference, we are permitted to make that qualified transition as long as it not modified through some form of inherent apparitional abuse. (7)

Accumulatively, when we do not indulge in some form of either naïve or sophistical abuse of these three phases, either individually, in pairs, and/or collectively, then, and only then, are we allowed to proceed along a more pragmatic and non-ideological course or trajectory. Unfortunately, the 'strong' philosopher or practitioner, an epithet admittedly meant to be viewed 'ironically', falls into a trap of their own making. Either illegitimately making definitive decisions and choices in a manner and to a degree neither evi-

dentially permitted nor needed and/or literally confusing an unfounded sense or semblance of the literal with the metaphorical and/or proceeding beyond the limitations imposed in apparitional terms of reference. In abusing the economic terms of the interrogative economy, as a proxy for all economies, from the archetypal to the intentional, and so on, the strong proponent of that impossible sense and semblance of positioning needs to be either successfully remonstrated with or ignored. But, given this economic critique of their impossible positions, why should such impossible positioning be inevitably and invariably co-associated with a strong ideological over-commitment often bordering on the pseudo-psychotic if not, otherwise, actually coincident with a psychotic condition? (8)

As a first observation, and interpretation, I would like to argue that when such proponents do not have enough insight to avoid either simple or composite forms of either rhetorical abuse, metaphorical abuse and/or apparitional abuse, along with all other forms of delusional misidentification, then such fraudulent forms of commitment, through 'strong' forms of self-identification with such positioning, it then becomes increasingly difficult for that type of person to then disentangle themselves from such self-identification despite such self-identification being with that which cannot be other than 'an impossible state of affairs', albeit a relationship only with these 'non-well-formed, non-well-informed conjectures, etc.', themselves as but nothing other than 'patent forms of misinterpretation'. Their over-self-identification being with these 'misinterpretations' and not an 'impossible state of affairs *per se*'. That granted, then it is obvious that a relatively progressive form of insightfulness would be arrived at if they were no longer to subscribe to such patent nonsense (and, at the same time, they were to resist substituting some other form of patent nonsense in the place of the former).[222] Where, in turn, this concomitant, over-committed form of self-identification proves, more often than not, to be effectively difficult to set about engineering the deconstruction of such economically impossible, interpretative forms of ideological over-identification. In a similar manner, I daresay, to the fact that neither a reasonable person nor a deluded person would normally want to chop off an ear or a finger or a leg or both legs unless they saw some all-encompassing form of an advantage in doing so, be that excision enacted for either valid reasons, like the medical imperative of an amputation, etc., or, invalid reason, like surgeons performing an ordered amputation that was performed, unfortunately, on the wrong patient, etc.[223] To a neutral observer, it is as if the over-committed person has fallen into a trap of their own making and from which they can only leave through the unmaking of that same trap by that same person themselves... and where others can only be of help if the occasion were to arise that that person, themselves, were to see themselves as having been 'trapped through their own mis-applied agency'. That it is safe to say, as an obser-

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[222] Where the strong realist claims to 'see' what cannot be seen, where the strong idealist claims to 'think' what cannot be thought, etc.

[223] By the last 'etc.' I am including those deluded people who feel the need for some form of amputation, or similar, in order to find through the discharge of this fixation some form of psychic relief, either rightly or wrongly, once they have undergone such an event. Not too far removed from the phenomenon of 'cutting one's self' as an ill-formed response to stress, or, for that matter, probably not too far removed from people who have an iterated desire for the use of Botox injections or plastic surgery on a regular basis? The point of this over-self-identification is that to argue against such over-commitment is a bit like arguing against oneself. The type of experience a chess player might personally feel when they suddenly find themselves in the final position of a fatal checkmate.

vation, that ‘over-commitment’ is tantamount or a form of ‘over-self-identification’ as witnessed by the one-sided, monological-like, pseudo-psychotic or psychotic behaviour of such individuals when they symmetrically over-respond to any pointed criticism of their pseudo-psychotic or psychotic beliefs, etc., in which they display an obvious intensity in self-identification (along with, perhaps, a co-associated sense and semblance of a parallel form of self-entitlement?). (9)

Now, on reflection, it would appear that a weakly-held forms of relativism would leave that individual ill-prepared for the exigencies of life in this world at large. If all decisions in positioning held the same general lack of commitment, then that individual would be able to barely survive other than through the supporting services of others. Here, I am reminded of an elderly patient, very late in the night, who suffered an agitated depression of such an intensity that they could not even make up their minds as to whether to even go to bed or not. Acting on their behalf, I felt it my duty to gently, but firmly, head them towards their bed. After a fleeting moment of resistance, I could then see them entering in to a resistance-less state of acquiescence as they relaxed in the thought that they now no longer had to make this decision and consider it along with all its pros and cons. Trapped in the ‘either/or’ is not a pleasant state to have to endure, and, I would contend both the weak relativist and the strong relativist would find such ensuing equivocation problematic for a variety of reasons. The weak relativist would be inclined to skeptically dismiss all positions as suspect… but probably privy to those desires and imperatives that might decides such issues for them. On the other hand, the strong relativist would be committed to a neutral position determined through their all-pervasive skepticism and only grudgingly feel forced to head one way or the other, again, probably in response to temporary desires or more permanent imperatives like needing to eat, and so on. Here I am reminded of an anecdote told to me by a friend where a certain individual known to both of us went to a restaurant with my fiend and in not being able to make up their mind what they were going to eat was told by the frustrated waiter, in no uncertain terms, what they were going to have cooked for them. Fortuitously, reality intrudes on lived-reality and ill-conceived positions or positions that potentially contradict a more fundamental sense of position are more often than not conveniently overlooked or bypassed through the pressures of life that insists decisions that cannot be postponed have to be enacted… (10)

Thus, let it be said that we can safely discard all forms of weak and strong positioning on the grounds that a conjecturally well-fortified sense and semblance of positioning is to be found infinitely preferable. But, that granted, could we then soundly enact this type of orientation in respect to the entertaining of a non-weak/non-strong form of relativism? Does a well-fortified form of relativism, e.g., actually proffer an acceptable approach in our attempting to better comprehend a less problematic understanding of this overall world-of-life? (11)

An important takeaway we could adopt at this point is this, namely, that the philosopher, metaphysician, disciplinarian, etc., should dispense with unimodal ‘positions’ and, instead, substitute sets and series of multimodal ‘approaches’ to the topic or topics being scrutinized. Moreover, such approaches should be well-fortified and subjected to

suitable patterns of transformational retreatment and integration in view of their relative relevancy to overseeing iterable processes of resolution of such research, preferably in practical, post-conditional terms of reference, i.e., with positive outcomes in both non-existential and existential orientations. So, given this demand for well-fortified approaches how should this prospect be more efficiently inaugurated? (12)

I noted in this essay that 'asking questions' is central to the philosophical economy,[224] and, that the interrogative economy is one way to more closely address this economic issue. Thence this implicit form of economic complexification between these two economies of the philosophical (as one-part hermeneutical, one-part phenomenological, and one-part non-systematic existential [mirroring the archetypal economy, respectively, of World, Object, and Ego]) and the interrogative economy (as one-part rhetorical, one-part metaphorical, and one-part apparitional [also mirroring the archetypal economy, respectively, of World, Object, and Ego]). However, even more central to the well-conducted functioning of any economy is the suitable utilization of an adequate working suspension (explored elsewhere as an 'extensive suspension'). Furthermore, in applying a suspension, we must also take into account the automatic invocation of the de-suspension in which I envisage the primary work of the suspension is productively performed (extra-economically). In this regard, just what might this entail? (13)

To answer this type of question let me first look at a well-fortified relativism and then introduce a similar exploration in regards to the conjecture of a well-fortified absolutism and the possible role both philosophical approaches have in the exploration of a metaphysical economy… (14)

Central to the critical running of any economy is the suitable utilization of (sets and series[225] of) working suspensions. Should the disciplinarian exercise a suspension they can no longer be a supporter of a strong positioning or for that matter in maintaining any form of a uni-referential strong approach (whilst also, naturally, discarding the non-integrated versions of any weak approach as ill-prepared for the pursuit of productive forms of research). Indeed, the very hint of a 'suspension' is antithetical to the strong positionalist and as an ensuing 'breath of fresh air', should it be 'inhaled', could be the start of their disciplinary salvation. Unfortunately, through over-commitment as a form of intensive over-self-identification with a certain uni-referential positioning, and v.v., they

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[224] Paragraph 4.

[5] 'Sets' lay out the virtual groundwork of the economic, and 'series' are utilized in the permitted, non-virtual irruption involved in the enacted intervention of a non-economic approach that is then re-appropriated hyper-economically within the putative super-economic in order to appropriate the potentially radical-radical through incremental re-appropriation of the relatively-radical, etc. Thence the putative heuristics of the super-economic (as entailed in the 'pragmatics' of this radical stye of philosophy that is anti-representational, positively-nihilistic, existentially oriented, and where a well-fortified pragmatism should eventually be able to flesh out these complementary features through the adoption and adaption of a working-composite of relevant approaches rather than stunting such projects and programs in a non-pragmatic perspective preformed in a unimodal style of positioning. Thence these distinctions of the fourth trans-cognitively ordered 'pragmatical', a 'well-fortified pragmatism', and where the latter should aspire after the 'pragmatics' of a working-composite of relevant approaches, including e.g., the deontological, aesthetical and pragmatical adjuncts, the existential, an anti-representational approach, a re(-)presentative economy that incorporates an economy of transformational retreatment, etc.).

could well be fearful of proceeding in any direction that would inevitably oversee the deconstruction their much beloved vision of an impregnable positioning. However, should a well-meaning philosopher stand on the toes of a strong philosopher, or better, should a strong philosopher stand on their own toes, metaphorically, then they might be able to take on board this form of a wakeup call that we make our passages through this world in a variety of directions, even if our current directedness is unilaterally determined moment by moment, still, how we got there is not, and, that the taking onboard of an adaptable composite sense of re(-)directedness in approaches is the way to go in the fruitful expedition of both a critical and radical way of reseeing how we 'travel' through this world at large! (15)

Without the cognizance of even a single working suspension at the center of all projects and program the efforts of that blind disciplinarian in that prospect will be practically bankrupt. Should even a modicum of progress be found in such bankrupt performances this can only mean, covertly, that suspensions are being smuggled into the workings of their defective arguments. The avoidance of a working suspension is futile, and, their arguments can only be defective if they have no adequate cognizance of the economic, the non-economic, and the super-economic! That, where such arguments seem to work is by virtue of the fact that they are utilizing working suspensions in some form or other, and, where obviously, if they were to focus on such features then they could refine their various approaches and eventually have enough insight to drop such exclusive form of non-economic argumentation as meant in both senses of a 'non-economic fork'. I.e., positively reforming their argumentation both economically and non-economically, with the latter meant in its irruptive sense and not just in its impossible economic sense of attempting to do the impossible. By adhering to an over-committed, uni-referential sense and semblance of positioning they do both themselves and all others an enormous disservice. As veritable hypocrites that cannot do what they say 'they are doing' and can only do what they are doing 'by not doing what they say they are doing in the first place'. Doing the impossible, I would argue, can be compared to 'the pulling of the teeth of a snake' – something, that if attempted, is both difficult and dangerous, and, at the same time, impossible! (16)

What ramifications follow from this substitution of a multimodal approach for individually enacted, uni-referential positions? Then, what are the working consequences of adopting and adapting, say, either a well-fortified relativism or a well-fortified absolutism along with the coupling of a well-fortified inter-ordered metaphysics? I would argue that such approaches, in the plural, are revelatory… in theoretical, practical, and critical-radical terms of reference. At the end of the last essay, I noted the following comment, as an observation, which deserves to be explored:

> A process of reception enacted in a progressive form of insightfulness that basically reflects that extent we have well-represented the nature of our relationships and where, through an adequate degree of suspension, this integrated relativity of experience is then able to provoke, through de-suspensions, the requisite degree of insightfulness required to make our passages through this world at large more successful both individually and collectively… in what one may tentatively ascertain

> to be a 'well-fortified form of relativism', albeit as subjected to the relevant adoption and adaptation of working suspensions as refracted through suitable processes of inter-mediation, i.e., through the relevant use of such working suspensions, etc..!! [126] (17)

In other words, for a start, I am suggesting in no uncertain term that the de-suspension of the suspension of a suitably constructed pattern of representative formulation of textual alignments and non-alignments is capable of evoking a certain degree of conformally valid insightfulness. If anything, as an explanation of what actually happens over the course of lived-experience. Let me explain this 'observation' in some depth. (18)

Such ideas were first echoed in the concluding section of the tenth essay, XIIJ:

> But, be that as it may, what usefulness is there to find in a modified absolutism, or, for that matter in a modified relativism? 'Modified' in the sense of 'taking a middle path between the barely thought-out nature of a weak positioning and the ideological extremism exhibited in an impossibly strong format. Although two topics that deserve to be more thoroughly explored suffice to say that the former sets the stage for such explorations, whereas, the latter, helps us to deliver our lines with a degree of insightfulness more in tune with an existential vision of this world in and through a revelation of both its richness and enrichment…[226] [90] (19)

Then, if an economy were to be proposed between a well-fortified (modified) absolutism and a well-fortified (modified) relativism, just how might these two approaches in their own right be mediated through the addition of a third approach in order to create the heuristic of an overall economy designed to perform this form of inter-cooperation? Based on my resolution of the problem as to 'how a bimodal operation could be rendered economic in its ensuing trimodal constitution' I proposed the refraction of the same through an economy of transformational retreatment, which in this case, given treatment is subject to metafication could be viewed as 'metaphysical' in orientation. I.e., as meta-philosophical, and, thereby, as inter-ordered, and, thereafter, as taking a 'metaphysical turn', albeit as reconstituted through the lens of an anti-representational-representationalism, etc. Therefore, that granted hypothetically, just what is brought to this party through having an economy that is a working composite of a well-modified absolutism, a well-modified metaphysical orientation, and a well-modified relativism? In this regard, let me explore what might be gained from such an interaction and how it highlights how all three sub-economies might fruitfully co-operate, and, therein and thereby, mutually re-define each other? (20)

Casting a well-modified absolutism in the role of pretreatment would ensure that it would take on a hermeneutically oriented disposition. Hence this metaphor of 'setting the stage'. I.e., supplying the props and machinery for a certain type or style of performance. In an ordered complexification we observed the need for pretreatment, under a working-suspension, to be well-formed, etc., and, in moving to a meta-philosophical phase, arrived at through metafication, we noted an additional need to be well-informed,

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226 *Pursuit*, III.XIIJ.90.

etc. Then, through the reduplication of such ordered inputs an inter-ordered complexion was arrived at that depended on its conformal alignments. Moreover, through reduplication, an ordered complexification now took on an inter-ordered complexion with the implication that, from a metaphysical perspective, considerations of identity, psychology and sociology, the political-like exercise of power, the practical dimensions of the economical, along with scientific interest and historical narration must all enter into the fray to have a more fully enriched concept of the metaphysical. And the point of this hypothetical exercise? To have the approach of a well-fortified relativism as revealing itself as a resultant, through the ensuing resolution of all relevant dissonant factors, in and through this sphere of the absolute, and, therein, setting the conditions for retreatment as specifically expressed through the direct and forceful exhibitions of that de-suspension in all the uniqueness of its historical concreteness. What would be the point of doing suspensions if they contributed nothing to that specific philosophical exercise, or should they either critically emend and/or radically innovate a range of solutions, and so on? Hence this revelatory argument that the de-suspension, both adequately and appropriately set (in an absolute phase, etc.) would reveal its relational disposition, in its situatedness, along with its conformal status. Can we make a comparison here to the three phases of an economy of insightfulness as outlined through a speculative representational phase that is neither suspended nor non-extrapolated in conjunction with a treatment phase that is suspended but still remains (not-non-)extrapolated with a third phase of retreatment that is both suspended and non-extrapolated (through an intermingling or intermeddling of both the meta-philosophical (or metaphysical or meta-disciplinary) and the philosophical (or disciplinary). The intimated 'joke' of such an arrangement, as being played out by this economy of insight-formation, is that we cannot have the latter phase without the co-existence of all three phases (and where the systematic existential builds upon this through the intermediation [as an ongoing, overall working suspension] of this entire economy, albeit as embraced super-economically?). Giving us access to both the critical in its emendation of that pre-understood settings of that 'stage' along with the innovative advent of the relatively-radical that then, together, also allows the 'theatrical' nature of that relational situation to insightfully reveal the full nature of its phenomenal-phenomenological situatedness through the direct revelation of such representative-simulations, corrections, and innovations. (21)

Where, in this economy and its exhibition of both insight-formation and its parallel e/valuational formation, an ongoing working suspension ensures that this absolute approach desists from pursuing the bankruptcy of following the false siren of an absolutistical positioning. Where this continual invocation of a working suspension oversees the adequate and fruitful formation of an apposite degree of commitment underwriting the pursuit of existentially oriented processes of intervention through permitting unilateral responses of the first instance without, at the same time, falling non-authentically, into the motivational disposition of either an over-commitment of a strong absolutism nor the under-commitment of a weak relativism. Similarly, avoiding all extremist forms of both ideological over-commitment to be found in strong positions and non-ideological under-commitment to be found in weak positions. Positively substituting suitable forms of a necessary commitment to be found in the application and overlapping of conjecturally well-fortified approaches that seemingly proffer both working-resolutions and work-

ing-solutions in our confronting all narrational anomalies that deserve to be suitably ameliorated, be that either definitively or through the definite success to be afforded through mitigation, remediation, and re(-)normalization (with the latter being the approximated retreatment of approaches, etc.). (22)

What should we take away from these reconsidered shifts in philosophical thinking, etc? (23)

That the philosopher or metaphysician, the disciplinarian or the secularist, should dispense with either strong or weak forms of 'position(ing)', especially of a uni-referential disposition, and substitute 'approaches', especially of a multi-referential nature. Why?! Because such positional attitudes do not fully work as intended, and, in lived-reality we usually find a richer landscape when we no longer see it entirely through the narrow aperture of a single lens, and, instead, seek out those relevant approaches that mutually overlap and where, therein, there can emerge a much richer appreciation of that same landscape. A bit like a well-informed rambler wandering over an interesting section of the countryside who sees the geological stratification of that area along the horizon, in cuttings and the faces of cliffs, in the rocks brought down by creeks and rivers; who can see the quality of the soil from the perspective of a farmer well-versed in that terrain; who can see what original vegetation still persists despite the inroads of farming; who, from the formation of clouds, has a good idea of whether it might rain or not; who from the type of traffic upon the roads and the passing of trains has a good idea whether the economy is well-performing or in a period of decline, and so on. Should such a rambler put on a metaphorical pair of glasses that only allowed them to see exactly what those glasses would then allow them to see and you would surely think such a person to be not much more than a simple idiot for even wanting to permanently wear such blinkers! The lived-reality of lived-experience is much better seen through a succession of approaches and in this regard the disciplinary work of the professional should be no different… (24)

Paradoxically, in deconstructing strong (and weak) classical forms of philosophical positioning, such as, e.g., realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism and relativism, I have been forced to concede that a role does exist for these modified non-weak/non-strong conjecturally well-fortified positions if they be better conceived of as approaches that are best invoked when the relevant circumstances seem to suggest a profitable uptake of a suitable mix of such candidates. As a case in point, much of science is approached from the mis-advertised declaration of the positioning of a realist, but, in quantum physics, e.g., and in its dealings with entanglement and other anomalous phenomena, the insisted upon localism of a quantum realism just makes neither experimental nor theoretical sense. Or, in contrast, in the resignation of seeing a 'dualism' between classical physics and quantum physics,[227] or between matter and energy, or in attempts to incorporate gravity in both worlds, etc., transformational operations between these frames

[227] As a general observation as to how a quantum physics is practiced, the type of slogan that notes 'just shut up and calculate' is more indicative a pragmatical approach (through this Copenhagen Interpretation) rather than one of a realism (given, too, that quantum mechanics barely seems able to metaphorically model what it is actually up to, etc. Thence the plethora of minor discourses that seek, rightly or wrongly, to rectify this possible oversight?).

of reference would not be possible in the non-relational 'economics' of any form of a strict dualism. So, as tempting it must be to persist with a short-sighted sense and semblance of positioning a much more profitable middle path to take is the overall 'pragmatics'[228] of invoking and integrating, where possible, a mix of approaches that seemingly appear to afford a greater degree of potential success in that multidisciplinary approach to such research. I suspect that that is what usually happens but that a more strict conventional attitude to the performance of disciplinary genres, as major discourses, might override the uptake of such approaches in the dissemination, say, of an unofficial report or official reporting. Just as those who insist on the functioning operations of an impossible strongly stated positioning defectively misrepresent what they are actually doing given that they just cannot do 'what they say they are doing in the first place'. Fortunately or unfortunately, as to how the situation arises, in all professions there is an official way things are done, according to voluminous policy manuals, and, the unofficial way things are actually done since to follow official procedures would be, more often than not, either impossible through contradictions in those policy formulations or would realize defective forms of research or practice, and, as intimated, unofficial patterns of behaviour are more usually invoked because those techniques are quicker, more productive, more effective, and more successful… despite the inevitable obstructions and distortions inadvertently embedded in the over-systematization of prescriptive patterns of behaviour that must inevitably misrepresent both the descriptive and the proscriptive aspects in that type of situation that ultimately cannot be separated from the former, and v.v. Not that policy manuals have no place in the functioning of an organization, just that they should be cast as generalities and expectations, and so on. Just as, in a similar manner, ethical principles should be seen as ethical guidelines resonant with their cultural settings and not enshrined as Ethical Principles where it can be shown that they must both inevitably and interminably conflict as much as the proposition of any theological declarations on the identity of the Divine when ideologically driven from an absolutistical sense of positioning. (25)

Hence, one of these primary reconsiderations that I have had to reconsider is that disciplinarians, in each and every discipline, should desist from locking themselves into an ideological sense and semblance of a uni-referential position and, instead, adopt and adapt a mix of relevant approaches that appear to proffer the sought-after working resolutions and working solutions desired by that professional. That, in this regard, the philosopher is no different from any other disciplinarian in such matters. (26)

So, this de-positioning of positions granted, along with a substitution of overlapping approaches, what are the ramifications of this particular 'disciplinary shift'? Just how should the professional proceed in a rehabilitation of their discipline in this regard and what other disciplinary shifts should also be accepted and instigated (in the light of the findings of this series of essays written under this rubric of 'Reconsiderations'? (27)

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[228] I use this expression of a 'pragmatics' to indicate a complex sense of a 'conjecturally well-fortified pragmatism that is deontologically centered, existentially oriented, invokes an anti-representational-representationalism, is positively nihilistic, and has adjuncts in both aesthetical and pragmatical types of ordered judgment, etc.'

2. The Rehabilitation of the Philosophical Discipline, etc?

The professional disciplinarian cannot live behind the walls of an impregnable fairytale castle of their own imagination! Think about it carefully, explore the deeper implications of this metaphor as an analogy. Let us say the ideologue in question is both a rampant and earnest realist. They have defined themselves as a 'realist' and seriously wish to strongly maintain that impossible sense and semblance of a position. Why is such a position impossible? Because it can be neither attained nor obtained, indeed, just cannot be uni-referentially appropriated… be that in, or of, or through itself alone. Then, we should understand, in the same vein, that no perspective can be completely exhausted or, for that matter, completely non-exhausted, therein, unable to be entertained from some aspect or other. To manage either a *pro*-orientation or a *contra*-orientation, either positively or negatively, respectively through some form of an affirmation or negation, an absolutistical indubitability or dubitability just cannot be arrived at. Of course, when confronted by the ridiculous we make a bet that such nonsense is more than likely not something we will confront in lived-reality and act accordingly. That, indeed, is common sense. However, to seemingly maintain a strong positioning, in the realization of an ideological vision of a position, this misguided visionary has to decide, consciously or not so consciously, just what they do not subscribe to. A realist, more often than not, I suspect, is in a misbegotten dance with some version of an idealist and, subsequently and consequently, defines themselves accordingly, as not such a misshapen specimen. Even before the times of Plato and Aristotle we find this pathetic ballet being acted out between ideological rivals and followers, say, between the supporters of Parmenides *versus* Heraclites. A continuously controversial, interminably insoluble battle, say, among the Scholastic, e.g., as entertained between Universalists and Nominalists, and continued, e.g., with Locke and Berkeley, and somewhat re-enacted between, e.g., the ahistorical Categories of Kant and the concrete specificity of Hegel, even within and between the Continentals and Analysts[229], and thence, unfortunately, ever onwards into the Twenty-First century. (28)

Now, in order for the positionalist to define their working sense and semblance of positioning they have to also extend some form of a temporary, hypothetical credibility to their opposing opponent or opponents as (impossible) positionalists in their own right. Already, this necessary strategy involves them in an apparent bimodal operationalism where 'economics' demands, as outlined in these essays, the perspective of a transformational economy (say, of 'retreatment'). In order to outline their position, through a process of 'positioning' (that cannot be uni-referentially attained or obtained, i.e., appropriated solely on its own terms) it follows that they must be at least covertly 'bimodal' in this process of definitional thematization. Then, furthermore, given the trimodal economics of such transformational processes, this apparent bimodalism has to be reinterpreted trimodally, etc. Moreover, through evidential research, adequately conducting suspensions and noting the consequential ramifications that follow on in the wake of the automatic invocation of de-suspensions, along with other disciplinary techniques, either advertently or inadvertently adopted and adopted, say, through various forms of complexification, valid forms of argumentation, revalidation of conformal truth determinations,

[229] Admittedly, both terms are derogatory; with the latter being set up to make an allusion to the relatively unproductive and medically thin results of a Freudian Psychoanalysis, or similar.

etc., it follows, given this complex patterns of approaches, that that sense and semblance of their process of positioning, in lived-reality, can be none other than multi-referential in its ensuing constitution. That the false declaration of a uni-referentialism is only an illusion and should be seen as such, and where the professional ramifications of this quite radical disciplinary shift should be accepted and duly acted upon in an ongoing rehabilitation of the disciplinary field that that reformed disciplinarian will now better represent. That understood, we can ask, 'can this representative formulate an effective sense and semblance of a working integration of such perspectives?' Or, 'are they no better than either a weak relativist, who simple accepts a conflicting diversity of perspectives, or, a strong relativist, who gives their ideological consent to this chaotic world of diversity given that an infinitude of perspectives could be approached and that among the same there must always exist a small set of perspectives some of which might be judged to have some degree of relevance in their overall research and, therefore, should be 'progressively' entertained through approaching that particular type of disciplinary research through that perspectival mix of aspects regardless of whether that overall approach be relatively integrated or not so integrated?' But, having dismissed the weak relativist as irrelevant, as they cannot systematically act in this world at large as a weak relativist, and duly deconstructed as strong relativist, given that they, too, cannot maintain the economic isolation of a pure uni-referential positioning, it follows that we must now ask, instead, 'is it possible for a modified relativist, through a conjecturally well-fortified series of approaches, to entertain a relative, working integration of such perspectives?' (29)

Of course, when we find an ideologue pointing in a certain direction towards their imputed ideological 'residence' we easily understand in which direction they would be if they we were to head in the same direction. However, such a miscreant is to be found metaphorically lurking there outside these imputed 'walls', no doubt either pacing backwards and forwards or, from time to time, circling the heart or imputed center of their enterprise, but, not being able, even themselves, to lay claim to these impregnable defenses that just cannot be entered. A process of pure positioning just cannot be entertained, able to be somewhat circled, but, never fully appropriated because a non-referential sense of a relational-reference just cannot be envisaged! Like bit like cutting a stick in half and hoping to find only a one-ended pointer… (30)

Fortunately, for the positionalist, they can immediately cut their losses by understanding that in an apparent process of 'positioning', effectively, they are approaching a certain state of affairs that in being provisionally accessed, from a certain set and series of approaches, is enriched accordingly. That in giving up what they do not and cannot possess they regain an appreciation of what was and is already to hand, and, from that positionless-position, can now assume a more open attitude of mind wherein they can work towards making a conformal form of progress as they recognize, encounter, and engage those more relevant forms of access they are already working with, and, moreover, will also be discovered along the way. Understanding, at last, that any one perspective, being inexhaustible, can be neither exhausted nor non-exhausted, neither absolutistically appropriated nor absolutistically non-appropriated, and, furthermore, that being given the opportunities of an infinitude of perspectives, they should search for those that relevantly proffer more productive possibilities for insightful discernment. That, over the course of

their theoretical research, professional practice, and self-critical critique, therein, act accordingly and inevitably discover the potentially radical, innovative possibilities of their discipline. An 'attitude' that is preferably enacted through this explication of a multi-disciplinary approach that collectively fosters the emergence of a trans-disciplinary sense of a trans-disciplinary insightfulness. Since neither just a unimodal approach nor a bi-modal approach nor a closed trimodal approach can be exercised (through the necessary irruption of non-economic patterns of causally instantiated resolution) it follows that their professional success, either wittingly and/or unwittingly, is the result of a multi-perspectival form of an inter-relational 'rapprochement' as the only productively working, methodological pursuit actually functioning in their 'town', so to speak… (31)

Rather than ideological disputing other ideologues, in a process that has been proven to be relatively unproductive overall, with very little in the way of innovations to be discerned along the way, the disciplinarian is now ready to demonstrate the relative worth of their discipline, or, rather, their 'working set and series of disciplines' co-opted to fruitfully elicit 'working resolutions and working solutions' to the problems they would have been originally consulted upon by either non-professionals or fellow disciplinarians across a wide range of disciplines, be they acting as either professionals or amateurs.[230] (32)

What should disciplinarians hope to gain by discarding positions and, instead, working through a range of relevant approaches? Then, too, what other methodological shifts in disciplinary behaviour could also be profitably adopted and adapted? (33)

The ongoing re(-)normalizing of method, etc., that effectively works towards greater degrees of an integration of various working perspectives through an overlapping of insights better able to be cashed out in more practical and critical terms of reference. Through the progressive refinement of such incremental approximations entailed in the ongoing economy of normalization more productive forms of resolution will be critically worked towards and where, along the way, the advent of innovative forms of relatively-radical re-consideration will also need to be taken on board, and v.v. Where, as previously noted, the radically-radical, if it is to be fully appropriated needs to be approached through an incremental series of relatively-radical steps that, through putative hyper-economic processes re(-)appropriation at the level of the super-economic can then take on a more conventionally critical facet or aspect and sense of a perspectival sense and semblance of 'place' in our interpretations of more reintegrated, re(-)self-organized versions of an overlapping vision of a multi-aspectival world at large… (34)

Other disciplinary shifts also needed, as suggested in this series of essays, will be explored under the following headings, namely, An Anti-Representational-Representationalism (paragraphs 36-50); The Critical and Radical Rehabilitation of Classical Disciplinary Approaches (53-55); The Revelatory Nature of a Working Relativism (Courtesy of the De-Suspension) (56-59); The Necessary Acceptance of Economic, Non-Economic, and Super-Economic Approaches in Disciplinary Forms of Enquiry (60-66);

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[230] Because, for a start, even a professional, in consulting a discipline currently beyond their expertise, will do so as an 'amateur'.

Treatment of the Meta-Philosophical as both Metaphysical and Inter-Ordered in Orientation (67-84); The Necessary Treatment of a Bimodal Operationalism Through an Economic Lens, etc (85-86); An In-Depth Exploration of a Working 'Pragmatics' (87-hh); and, How Radical Innovations are to be Properly Addressed and Critically Appropriated (mm-ll). (35)

An 'anti-representationalism' (as an 'anti-representational-representationalism') should be a given, but, how a language, e.g., etc., represents the lived-reality of lived-experience should also be appreciated from a textual perspective for how else could a discipline be entertained and disseminated? Let me explore what this working, dialectical relationship between the anti-representational approach (contrary to that disseminated in a 'Traditional Metaphysics') and textualized forms of a representational approach (in a radically reconstituted 'Contemporary Metaphysics') entails? (36)

A person who both adequately and suitably exercises an anti-representational approach is a witness to the fact that certain disciplinary transgressions, as explored, e.g., in this essay, should not be tolerated! Basically, all those transgressions as evidenced in the exercise and dissemination of all impossible strong forms of positioning. As an 'exemplary' case in point, the errant realist goes beyond (in transcendental-like terms of reference) the natural terms of an intentional objectivity in a speculative extrapolation to a putative sense and semblance of world that just cannot be engaged in any form whatsoever since what is impossibly beyond such intentional objectivity is well and truly 'beyond' those defined terms of reference, whereas, in lived-experience, we have no need for such impossible terms of reference and can live quite happily what we can already access or could possibly approach through those means available to us. All else is an 'interpretation of such speculation' and should be treated accordingly, i.e., as an interpretation without a direct evidential basis that should not displace those interpretations that that are found to access an evidential dimension of lived-experience. In other words, such speculations do have a highly circumscribed conventional role in how we envisage this world at large, albeit in inter-dependent rhetorical, metaphorical, and apparitional terms of reference, but, that such extrapolated projections cannot substitute for those interpretations that are either directly and/or indirectly engaged. Just as an experience of the concretely present could not be envisaged without a both a past orientation and a future orientation, i.e., economically, etc. Or, more simply, the speculative only exists within the confines of a speculative economy, and, should not be allowed to transgressively infringe those limited terms of reference. (37)

So, the affirmation of an anti-representational orientation affirmatively excludes what correctly can be either represented and/or what should not be misrepresented. (38)

So, having already excluded the relatively misrepresented just what can be represented and how is it already being represented in and through our use of language? (39)

E.g., this 'set of ten one-dollar coins' represents, in total, 'ten dollars', and, where these 'same ten coins' could be substituted with a 'ten-dollar note'. However, if I were to unwittingly give you a 'forged ten-dollar bill' for those 'ten one-dollar coins', then, if you

were to eventually discover that that 'bill was forged' then this relationship of a note 'that represents ten dollars of currency' obviously breaks down. Ostensively, nothing has changed except how we now represent, either before ourselves and/or others, that 'fraudulent ten-dollar bill' only represents 'the forgery of a ten-dollar bill' and 'not a legitimate item of official currency'. In other words, what we these various representations represent is a matter of tuning into conventional processes of translation along with a working pragmatics as to the utilization of such representation beyond their most basic form of representation. So, here, e.g., this 'fake ten-dollar bill' is a 'pretentious piece of paper pretending to be something it is not, namely, a ten-dollar bill'. Hence in this instance this ten-dollar bill either represents 'ten dollars of currency' of or not much more than a 'pretty, deceptive piece of paper', but, at the same time, remains represented as a 'printed piece of paper'. In recognizing, as in this situation, a process of mis-interpretation we are merely re-ascribing different textual values to these more basic forms of representation. So, this 'piece of paper', that had I interpreted to be a 'legitimate ten-dollar bill', is actually only 'the forgery of a ten-dollar bill', admittedly very well done, but, for all that, not 'legal tender'. From a pragmatic perspective we know that we should not present it as if it were legal tender. Then, again, from a more pragmatical perspective we might want to pass it on to someone else in the hope that they do not see through the intentional deception being enacted through this specific act. (40)

What an exploration of this analogy should highlight is that representation is arranged through various levels of interpretation of text whose interpreted alignments and non-alignments establishes the 'currency' of those interpretations if I am permitted to express that non-unintended pun. That breakdowns in such forms of circulation occur when we misinterpret such alignments and non-alignments within and between texts through either now correctly interpreting what had been misinterpreted or now correctly interpreting what had been previously misinterpreted. That, as an observation, we note that a more basic level of interpretation has to observe the requisite relative, transformational, isomorphic invariance for these interpretatively super-imposed processes of both re-evaluation and re-valuation to take place.[231] (41)

Now, these textually based, conventional hierarchy of representations, as packaged in an overall form of representation, cannot be treated as just textual in orientation given these various processes of interpretation, misinterpretation, reinterpretation, etc. Let me explain. (42)

Let us assume that this old-fashioned ten-dollar bill is made from paper, not a fake, and is legal tender. This hand-written letter is just written on paper, and, not being signed by anyone famous or infamous is worthless as a piece of paper. Obviously, the paper in the ten-dollar bill has no intrinsic value (unless it just happened to be clearly

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231 I.e., in the re-evaluation of trans-intentional judgment and the re-valuation of the intentional content delivered in that and through that judgmental act. This occurs in processes of recognized misinterpretation. Otherwise, re-e/valuation would need to be either the addition and/or the subtraction of valuation, etc. E.g., if, instead, I were to bank those ten one-dollar coins and add 'ten dollars' to that bank account (where its more basic textual representation now takes on a more virtual, but not a completely virtual-like basis) then I have transformed 'my previous representation of ten dollars in the form of coins' into that of an updated bank-balance augmented by ten dollars'.

signed by some famous or infamous person[232]). However, by convention, and in a collective trust in the financial system, that ten-dollar bill cannot be written off as just a worthless piece a paper since in accordance with those pre-understood conventions, that same piece of paper can do work, be exchanged or converted into an augmented bank-balance, etc. In other words, there are similar texts and different texts and we need to know the differences in their conventional status. Moreover, in critically appreciating these conventions for representation we are also entering into a meta-textual level of appreciation elevated by one meta-degree. E.g., in knowing 'I banked a ten-dollar note' I can check 'my current balance in my bank account' using my smart-phone and in 'seeing' that that first ten-dollars in the form of a bill is now duly registered as ten extra-dollars in that account I can rest assured, at least for the moment, that I have neither gained nor lost financially. In others words, representations, whether as perceptual-like simulations and/or their conceptual equivalent in accordance with conventional transformational rules dealing with such representations, effectively, are texts, as deposited in intentional terms of reference, albeit in a hierarchy of representative levels as a composite of conventionally recognized textualizations in their individually focused upon modes of representative reception. Just as, e.g., a non-forged ten-dollar bill is a special piece of paper or plastic and coins are usually made from a mix of metals, and bank balances exist in hierarchically organized electronic world of banking from computers chips to cloud processing, and so on. That, basically, representations are texts but not just texts since they have their 'feet' in this world at large[233] and need to be appreciated in meta-textual terms of reference, etc., where rules for representation, rules for representational transformation, and their critical appreciation are somewhat bundled together on and between these levels in textual representation and where through alignments (observed through the reiteration of economic processes of re(-)alignment[234]) both establish and reinforce, and when applicable, transform such representational attitudes, etc. (43)

Now the key points to note here is that representation deals with 'text', 'textual economies', etc., and not speculative materials imputed to inhabit some form of an inaccessible world, be they extrapolated as existing there in a form nominated as either 'noumenal', or 'the thing-in-itself', or 'any other unnecessary form of metaphysical furniture' (and given a putative existence beyond what can be reasonably approached through the utilization of a reconstituted, inter-ordered 'lens', etc.). Moreover, what is even more important is the tabulation of alignments or non-alignments, along with transformational re-alignments, and so on. So, e.g., 'this piece of paper' validly aligns with my notion of a ten-dollar bill that is legal tender', whereas, in stark contrast, this 'old, unwanted, hand-

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232 In the past, some people preferred to keep the cheques signed by well-known persons, if written out for a relatively small sum, rather than cash them at a bank or elsewhere. Maybe then, one of the financial perks of being famous (by writing a cheque, and hoping no one will cash it)?

233 E.g., in paper or plastic, or in coinage, or in a world of computing, etc., etc.

234 Argued in essays previous to this current set of essays as operating through the interplay of the representations of hermeneutic conventions as meta-textual genres of behaviour and subject usually to only minor degrees of mitigation; plus, the presentation of phenomenological inputs as texts subjected to processes of ongoing re-de-mis-alignment as a form of error correction; along with non-systematic existential contributions delivered, as non-textual simulations, through chaotically oriented process of re-presentation. Hence this overall ongoing economy (of representation) as signified by the nomenclature of '(-)', i.e., as 're(-)presentation' and representatively appreciated as conformally valid, conventionally understood processes of transformation as viewed through this economy of re(-)alignment.

written letter is practically worthless' and has been placed in the rubbish bin beneath my desk. Thence, as a provisional definition, we can redefine 'the act of representation' as 'the conventionally understood treatment and appreciation of a text in terms of what it conventionally is seen to represent within a hierarchy of textual levels, in terms of its valid processes of transformation, and in terms of its overall pragmatics. (44)

As almost cast in the form of a joke, for a number of reasons, the uni-referential positionalist is like 'the self-proclaimed occupier of a castle who, lurking around its impregnable walls, just cannot enter their imagined residence'. It's all an illusion, indeed, quite a delusion too! How embarrassing! (45)

The possession of representations is a similar farce. The metaphorical roots of representations are in the world, but, what we attempt to appropriate is just through the presentation of texts, etc., along with various strata of conventional interpretations further imposed upon the same. We might be tempted to say, for a few moments before its retraction, that the metaphorical 'roots' of the roots of a tree are imputed as even more unseen in the soil beneath that tree. But should that tree be lifted to be transported to another location, those roots can now be seen and directly textualized, but, the metaphorical roots of roots, as non-roots, cannot be seen, can never be lifted, and, therefore, can be safely dismissed as irrelevant to us since the very exposed roots of this tree are now just as much directly represented through texts as that tree itself was and still is, and, importantly, that is all we need to run this economy of an imputed tree (besides the non-economic and its super-economic appropriation through an equally imputed hyper-economic form of appropriation). 'Texts all the way down and all the way up' so to speak whilst understanding that only as texts *qua* texts has that tree any lived-import in lived-experience. That, furthermore, even as 'texts' they cannot be reduced to mere texts in any textual economy since to economically isolate the same in that impossible manner is to lock ourselves outside their conventional usefulness, their utility and value, and so on. Just like the extreme, ideologically over-committed uni-referentialist whose position is an impregnable castle they cannot even enter. Moreover, as noted, and to be stressed, that the critical, and sometimes radical, appreciation of texts is not textual *per se*, being meta-textual or trans-textual, etc. That through alignments and non-alignments, as realized through an ongoing working economy of re(-)alignment, through treatment in terms of either phenomenological distinctions, hermeneutical relations, and/or the transformation of (both non-systematically and systematically oriented) existential inputs and outputs, we travel through a psychic world of both the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual in a manner that far exceeds any mere reductions to the representative appearance of texts as mere, intentionally deposited traces scratched out upon this imagined fabric of this world at large. (46)

It's all an illusion, indeed, quite a delusion too! *How embarrassing*! Of course, both illusions and delusions, along with all other forms of misinterpretation or mendacity cannot be just mere illusions or mere delusions, and so on. The illusion is still situated in the world, and, likewise, the deluded person is just as must still in this world. Otherwise, we would not be able to intuit that they are 'deluded' and to what extent 'their partial rewriting of this world as lived is being falsely entertained', since this overall life-world,

this seemingly integrated world-of-life would be there for neither of us. That, that being the case, it then follows that the imputed integrity of a position deserves to be thoroughly deconstructed, still, in living in one world, this world there for us, that an assortment of miscellaneous, but relevant, approaches can be entertained through a lens of integration. Just as much as it is possible, e.g., to focus on a text and then read it whilst neither imagining that it substantially exists in itself pre-representatively or that it has no existence other than as a pure illusion without metaphorical 'roots' in the co-called overall world-of-life. This overall world-of-life being this collection of major and minor life-worlds whose membership in the latter we might have circumscribed access to, but, whereas, with respect to the former, this life-world, as a realm of lived-experience, it is impossible for us to have a 'denial of access' as long as we have a life-to-live other than through that inevitable transformation of state simply known as 'death'. (47)

That, even both illusions and delusions, along with alleged misrepresentations and lies, all have one thing in common, that, like all texts, they must possess a certain degree of gestalt integration in their intentional deposition since a certain degree of textual integration must be both present and evident because without that requisite degree of qualified integration[235] such texts, regardless of format, could not be approached and formed, therein, deposited, and, consequently, could no longer be either read or written, be either reread or rewritten, and so on and so forth. (48)

That in a recognition, encountering, and engagement with this qualified integration of textual formation we make our equally qualified passages through this world at large, both individually and collectively. Recognizing, encountering, and engaging others through these qualified and relatively integrated forms of 'approach' that through overlapping impart this lived-illusion of 'our being with others', but, at the same time, neither with absolutistical understanding of the other nor with a complete degree of non-comprehension since, then, there could have been no recognition, no encountering, no engagement with the other in the first place, etc. Where, on one hand, we do 'read' people[236] somewhat like a book, and, yet, on the other hand, they will remain forever mysterious… even unto themselves… otherwise life would be very predictable and boring… thankfully, ever presenting this existential challenge that all things can only be approached through an array of overlapping approaches and never through the illusion of one path only! That paradoxically, to walk a single path, one can never arrive… that the appearance of walking in a certain direction, thankfully, is only the result of a process of imperfect prioritization since along the way we will also find ourselves having to walk in other directions as well, albeit as sequentially organized, one after the other... and in that illusory sense 'we only seem to arrive' as ever a 'work in progress' when we think and feel we have 'found some rest' along the way… (49)

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235 Otherwise, perfected integration would result in the 'death' of that (textual) relationship.

236 This reading needs to be trans-cognitively, cognitively, and affectively conjoined and relatively harmonized. Where the psychopath/sociopath can cognitively read the other and manipulate them affectively'; where the autistic person has problems reading the other affectively; and, where the more balanced person can also read others trans-cognitively, preferably through an existential lens that is not subverted either relationally or pro-relationally. I.e., in an in-depth pragmatic sense as will be explored in the next section.

Ever making ‘progress’… that can be even more so easily lost… Where, either ‘insightfulness’ or a so-called ‘enlightenment’, can appear to be arrived at though unilateral responses of the last instance, etc., but whose interpretations will persistently remain to be forever deciphered… being grateful, finding gratitude, that what is given with ‘one hand’ is not completely taken away by ‘some other’… (50)

In *The Seventh Book*…[237] I defined ‘pro-relational’ and ‘trans-relational’ as equivalents, but, in the previous essay[238] I redefined ‘ahistorical’ and ‘pro-relational’ as Object-oriented and ‘trans-historical’ as Ego-oriented economically, whilst elsewhere, I have defined ‘trans-relational’ with ‘trans-subjective’. Therefore, in order to regularize these categories and their respective economic classifications let me proffer the following scheme and its parallels (through economic complexification):

Hermeneutic/World	**Phenomenological/Object**	**Existential/Ego**
Relational	Pro-Relational	Trans-Relational
Historical	Ahistorical	Trans-Historical
Inter-Subjective	(Embodied) Subjective	Trans-Subjective

(51)

Now, in tripartite economy of the super-economic we can also refer to economic relations, non-economic relations, and hyper-economic relations, etc., along with the subsuming of the former within the super-economic (through super-economic intermediation). That granted we can then make the comment that the disciplines of philosophy, etc., have hardly started without a recognition of the economic, etc. An observation that will be expanded upon later in this essay.[239] (52)

Let us now explore the critical and radical rehabilitation of classical disciplinary approaches like, e.g., realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism, and relativism, etc. In the ‘position’ (as an approach of either) a weakly conjectured (phenomenal-phenomenological) form (or hermeneutically oriented format or existentially oriented formation) must be discarded as basically ineffective. In the opposite direction, an ideologically extreme positioning can also be rejected, but, this time, on the impossible grounds of it not being able to be visualized or conceptualized in any format whatsoever. However, should it seem that this impossible position(ing) is being productively worked with then we must assume that either this formulation is not exemplifying the impossibilities of an absolutistical form of positioning and/or a defective set of stratagems are being substituted for the former that can only cast the illusion that that ideological posi-

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237 *Pursuit*, III.VII.xx.

238 *Pursuit*, III.XII.XIIK.0, etc.

239 Paragraphs 203, 213, etc. Already alluded to in paragraph 35 under the heading: The Necessary Acceptance of Economic, Non-Economic, and Super-Economic Approaches in Disciplinary Forms of Enquiry.

tion in question is capable of being productively workable, etc. That between these two extremes of the ineffective and the non-effective (or the defective substitution of some other form of an apparently productive transformational-transitioning) we have the possibility of the conjecturally well-fortified that ceases to be a style of 'positioning', but, rather, a relatively integrated pattern involving the metaphorical triangulation of overlapping approaches (along with the working assumption of a simultaneous concurrence of informational contributions that, equally, in a final analysis, must also be dismissed along with the very concept of an absolutistical sense and semblance[240] of position or positioning). (53)

So, interestingly, we now have a lineup of 'once disreputable characters' but in our overall treatment of a 'collective sense of an approach', or 'rapprochement', we must carefully observe the rehabilitation of these philosophical approaches without falling into the old ways of these erstwhile extremists and where our best insurance is to continue to maintain an overall working suspension (i.e., extensive suspension) where any return to the position of a uni-referential 'positioning' is to be diluted and relegated to merely acting as either an isolated rhetorical manoeuvre and/or a metaphorical image and/or that of an apparitional appearance, and where such individual contributions must now be viewed as qualified inputs and not as unqualified outputs. Or, in other words, 'use what is useful but do not use what should not be used'. Or, again, through remediation, 'deconstruct what should be deconstructed and reconstruct what should be reconstructed when and where these two processes can be seen to work together', and, where, from an existential perspective 'we can either argue for and/or demonstrate either the relative creation, preservation and/or conservation of a positively oriented e/valuational formation'. (54)

E.g., one form of a collaborative approach is to assemble a well-fortified absolutism and a well-fortified relativism and through a transformation treatment of the former introduce, through ensuing metafication, a working meta-philosophical/reconstituted metaphysical *rapprochement* in the ensuing economy to be entertained between these three moments, respectively, of the relatively hermeneutical and existential and their mediation in the form of the meta-philosophical, i.e., the metaphysical in its inter-ordered

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[240] I.e., intentional in the form of its conceptual 'sense' and perceptual 'semblance' and where intentional content is derived from trans-intentional judgment. Hence my nomenclature of 'e/valuational formation' in which in an act of judgmental evaluation a certain valuation, hopefully, is conformally extracted. That, in this philosophy of overlapping approaches, in effect we make the 'working assumption' that conformally treated information can be collectively gathered over a certain period of time given that a process of complete change, when not evident, cannot be non-discounted. I.e., if we had to make a bet as to how the information to hand is conformally valid, through a reiteration of judgmental determinations, given the apparent presence of a requisite relative transformational isomorphic invariance, and the same cannot be completely eliminated in the next moment or two, that the same must also apply from the perspective of the three economic moments of the hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential perspective that then can relatively reinforce such apparent concurrence should such concurrence be seemingly evident. Thence this apparent preservation of an informative concurrence in living-experience that then allows us to invoke the same in lived-experience, as long as we understand all relevant hermeneutical circumscriptions, phenomenological qualifications, and existential limitations. I.e., conforming to considerations of genres, semantic descriptions, and existential specifications as defined through general prescriptions, particular descriptions and specific proscriptions (without exceeding the national limitations in which specification cannot pass beyond).

reconstitution. Where, by the introduction of the latter, we can then bring through that form of mediation, a variety of inter-ordered (and ordered forms) of treatment that, from and inter-ordered perspective, would include contributions arising from inputs/outputs from the semantic, the psychological-sociological, political, economic (in its transactional sense with or without a financial orientation), scientific and historical concerns. Furthermore, in this hypothetical economy (of a qualified absolutism, a qualified metaphysicalism, and a qualified relativism) it is my contention that in such an overall approach, through such selective mediation, that that experiential form of relativism would be revelatory and where the revealed quality of its production should parallel and match the overall quality of its organization, or, rather, re(-)self-organization. Where, as a 'chaotic phenomenon', it is to be hoped that the irruption of the non-economic sub-economy would reveal those transformational solutions that suitably resolve our problematic interpretation/s of that current situatedness in question. Thence this segue to the next innovative theme on this list, namely, the surprising implication that a well-fortified relativism should progressively reveal the thematization of the resolutions provoked through the de-suspension of that process of treatment already in progress should the relevant circumscriptions, qualifications, and limitations be duly observed… (55)

Now, I am going to argue for 'the revelatory nature of a working relativism', albeit courtesy of the suspension, or, rather, the automatic invocation of the ensuing uniqueness of a definitively resolved sense of the de-suspension. The imposed flatness of the suspension cannot be maintained in the de-suspension of that suspension and what irrupts from the continuous outputs of the de-suspension should reveal something of that which we are directly engaging (since through a natural definition of the 'relational' we can only engage 'what we are directly in a relationship with'). (56)

This definition of the relational is demonstrated in intentional experience when if we are visually perceiving a visual object or object-state then 'subjectively' we are automatically visual perceivers'. That this transformational rule applies to all intentional fields as well as pre-intentional experience and trans-intentional judgment. So, e.g., when I am in pain, I am also subjectively experiencing pain (even if also cognitively translated in and through both intentional and trans-intentional terms of reference). Similarly, if I am making a mathematical judgment then I am making a mathematical judgment (and thence this evaluative process of a mathematical trans-intentional judgment and its delivery, hopefully, of the valuation of its intentionally constituted mathematical content). (57)

In this regard, if we were to look at a glass of water then the relational immediacy of this experience is indicative of this well-fortified sense and semblance of a relativistical form of judgment suitably performed through the critical auspices of a prior well-formed and well-informed experience of a working suspension suitably conducted, etc. As long as I am awake, can adequately attend to the experiential contours of this experience then the glass of water I perceive is for all intent and purposes is the glass of water being currently held… and about to be drunk… (58)

Obviously, we do not need philosophers or metaphysicians to tell us 'we are holding a glass of water' when 'we know we are holding a glass of water'. However, it is un-

fortunately that few disciplinarians can comprehend the fact that to experience our holding a glass of water we must do so through the overall economy of our being able to hold a glass of water and know that we doing just that. An 'overall economy' because, correctly, we are invoking a series of parallel economies that are actually being entertained through working processes of economic complexification, that, in this instance, mutually reinforce this conformally valid appreciation that, indeed, I am holding a glass of water. Where we can imagine these parallel economies would include economies of perception, judgment, intentional motivation, memory, conjecture (that 'as I am thirsty', therefore, 'let me drink this glass of potable water'), consequential analysis, and so on. (59)

But, given this blindness to this inescapable fact of the economic, disciplinarians will wander hither and thither, in almost a random manner, and only covertly observe, inadvertently, on the whole, the dictates of an economic perspective. Sadly, along the way, inevitably trading 'false positions' for 'the lived-reality of approaches' in the misguided formulation of an ensuing ideological extremism that only deserves to be well-deconstructed, etc. But, lacking such insight, will remain ever beholden to such short-sighted ways of thinking and acting… (60)

However, even the arising of the interpretative powers of an overall economic lens is not enough since if we were to stop there we would be privy to only the eternal recycling of a virtual world of the intentional… unable to make decisions and never escaping the back and forth between the suspension and the de-suspension… a recipe no doubt for the paralysis of a permanent psychosis, a profound psychosis like that experienced by a catatonic schizophrenic unable to remain embodied in a working-body that no longer responds to intentional commands, remains mute, along with no deliberate directedness of movement except intermittently, in frustrated busts of activity that are immediately closed down through an endless process of decisive-indecision and indecisive-decision making.[241] (61)

The point of these (impossible) 'pure' economic observations is that we cannot live by the economic alone. To move from the virtual formation of an intentional decision to its non-virtual, causal co-option we need to also invoke a non-economic realm, an experiential dimension where we can experience, through enacted processes of resolution, the irruption of unilateral-like responses of the last instance, etc. That through whose natural auspices we espy the chaotic nature of the very chaotic nature of intentional experience itself. Without trans-intentional judgment there could be no intentional content, and, judgment is performed through working-suspensions as initiated, e.g., through the interrogative rhetoric of questions, through analogical modeling, through the tentative and

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[241] Classic, fully developed catatonia, now, is less prevalent that its occurrence in the old psychiatric institutions. I remember accidently bumping into one elderly gentleman who was mute, and never spoke, and, joy of joy, swore at me for all of a second or two. That was the only occasion I ever heard him speak. Although used as a metaphor this paralysis of patterns of motor behaviour could be interpreted as being non-metaphorically trapped inside the suspension (and where a 'neurotic' style of maladaptive behaviour might be envisaged as 'being trapped outside the suspension', and, where, I believe, both psychotic and neurotic patterns involve inverse circadian rhythms with former having one day being spread over the space of two or three days, etc. As a nightshift worker these patterns become more obvious when comparing sleep patterns, whilst also noting differential eating patterns performed during the day, etc.).

provisional invocation of apparitions of the literal, etc. Where through such irruption we either witness the mere iteration non-critical, the reiteration of the critical and/or the relatively more chaotic re-iteration of the potentially radical, i.e., the relatively-radical. Arguing, in the regard to the latter that the radically-radical just could not be comprehended unless approach through relatively-radical increment, increment by increment until the non-observation of the radically-radical is translated into these incremental appreciations of these now innovatively displayed, relative-radical increments. (62)

That this putative understanding of the relatively-radical and our non-comprehension of the radically-radical, unless the latter is reduced to a succession of interconnected relatively-radical moments, can be read as a sign that we also need to move to a super-economic level of appreciation wherein, through the imputation of the hyper-economic appropriation of such relatively-radical moments and their ensuing critical re-conventionalization, we can then realize the apparent significance of this aspect of radical experience when it can be finally discerned in a more full and meaningful manner, whose significance can then be communicated both to one own overall sense of self and to others able to witness the radical and innovative nature of such communications, that until such conventional re(-)appropriation, can be arrayed alongside neither the relatively non-critical nor the relatively critical. That, without the conventionalized appreciation of such innovative moments our status as humans would be little more than pre-programmed machines barely able to appreciate the significance of our 'being together in this world at large…' (63)

Thence this intuition, deserving greater detail, that the super-economic, through the hyper-economic, etc., conventionalizes that which is innovative, etc. (64)

Thence the import and relevance, of the professional disciplinarian, of this radical philosophical observation that we need to recognize, encounter, and engage these three aspects of the economic, the non-economic, and the super-economic and, therein and thereby, learn to both differentially distinguish and mutually accommodate the same! Otherwise, our professional efforts will be not much more than 'the blind leading the blind…' (65)

Hence the necessary acceptance of economic, non-economic, and super-economic approaches in all disciplinary forms of enquiry. (66)

To add a greater depth to our enquires we also need to note that in transformational 'treatment' and our review of the meta-philosophical, arrived at through metafication, is both 'metaphysical' and 'inter-ordered' in orientation. (67)

This equation was implied in *Book* 9 but, now, is explicitly argued for in this *Book* 12.[242] How might this argument be explicated? (68)

First, we must recognize that inter-ordered phenomena, like, e.g., scientific and historical forms of research, although inter-ordered in origination, are not necessarily

[242] E.g., paragraphs 17, 21.

reviewed through a metaphysical lens due to either overt and/or covert processes of re-treatment. On the other hand, a 'philosophical' review of products treated through meta-fication are necessarily 'meta-philosophical' and, by definition, are 'metaphysical', albeit as 'reconstituted through the qualifying lens of an anti-representational-representationalism, etc.' Where by 'etc.', is meant 'whatever falls under a critical (and potentially radical) 'pragmatics' (as will be soon re-explored and then re-summarized in the next section)'. (69)

'Inter-ordered phenomena' entail 'the collective range of individually focused upon processes of either reduplication or duplication of one of six distinctive types of ordered judgment'. (70)

Those six distinctive types of ordered judgment are atomistically analysed phenomenologically-semantic/semantically-phenomenological judgments (in a first trans-cognitive/cognitive order) and their molecular-aesthetical integration (in a second trans-cognitive/cognitive order), (non-systematic existential) deontological judgment (in a third trans-cognitive order),[243] pragmatical judgment (in a fourth trans-cognitive order),[244] possible-factuals (in a fifth trans-cognitive/cognitive order), and, actual-factuals (as provisionally treated ontical-facts) (in a sixth trans-cognitive/cognitive order/s). This heuristic device has been explored elsewhere on a number of occasions. (71)

In these bimodal operations of symmetrical reduplication and asymmetrical duplication the transformational operation takes the distinctive complexion of the operator in the latter, and, in the former is elevated by one degree. So, e.g., fourth ordered cognitive perception of a possible factual state of affairs remains the perception of the same, whereas, the sixth ordered fact of a sixth ordered fact becomes the discipline of the historical review pertaining to the same. Just as a history of science is a history of science whereas, similarly, a history of history becomes a meta-historical form of review. Hence:

E.g., x^1 of $y^1 = x^1$(of y^1) whereas x^1 of $x^1 = x^2$, etc.

E.g., x^2 of y^1 = x2 (of y^1) whereas x^2 of $x^2 = x^3$

…i.e., metafication is always an elevation by one degree in meta-status (and de-suspensional de-metafication is always a de-elevation by one degree in meta-status). (72)

Let me illustrate the equations above:

E.g., the conventionally true fact (6^1) of a perception (4^1)[245] remains that fact of a perception (6^1), but, the (set of) fact(s) of a (set of) fact(s) gives us a history (6^2). Then,

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243 Where the third cognitive order is concerned with conceptual ideation (as the cognitive/intentional content of that type of trans-cognitive/trans-intentional judgment).

244 Where the fourth cognitive order is concerned with perceptual ideation (as the cognitive/ intentional content of that type of trans-cognitive/trans-intentional judgment).

245 Both conceptually oriented and perceptually oriented ideation are viewed as cognitively ordered as noted in the previous two footnotes.

e.g., a history of a history gives us a meta-history elevated in status by one meta-degree (6^3), etc. (73)

Now, let us overlook duplication and focus, instead, on the reduplication of our six orders. Tabulated, this gives us the following inter-ordered scheme (as arrived at through the reduplication of the ordered):

	Ordered Product		**Inter-Ordered Product**
1^1	Atomic Essential	1^2	Categorical Metaphysics
2^1	Molecular Essential/Aesthetic	2^2	Psychology-Sociology
3^1	Deontological	3^2	Political Execution
4^1	Pragmatical	4^2	Practical Economics
5^1	(Virtual) Possible	5^2	Science
6^1	(Non-Virtual) Actual	6^2	History (74)

Basically, this argument that 'inter-ordered phenomena' are 'metaphysical' in orientation, and v.v., only holds true when they are reviewed in their inter-ordered elevation through treatment. But, as is evidenced in fact, the disciplines of both science and history, e.g., are usually reviewed in a philosophical light and not in a meta-philosophical/metaphysical light which, as a fact, can be accounted for through transformational retreatment in which de-metafication returns productivity back to the relative object language (in a form assumed to exist before transformational retreatment). (75)

Thence this observation(al claim) that reduplication of an ordered judgment prior to its transformational retreatment is primarily 'meta-philosophical' in orientation and, therefore, primarily 'metaphysical' (as experienced in both its conceptual sense and phenomenological semblance). (76)

This claim now stated, what is entailed in these six metaphysically oriented orders as would fall under the general domain of a critical pragmatics? (77)

Through the reduplication of a phenomenological semantics, we get a categorical metaphysics dealing with many traditional categories of experience, e.g., as pertain to the contents of intentional ideation, e.g., time and space; aspects of subjectivity-intersubjectivity; and 'field' phenomena (like possible facts and actual facts, etc.).[246] (78)

Then, in a reduplication of the molecularity of phenomenal-phenomenological experience or the relatively more integrated, we come to an appreciation of the psycho-

[246] I.e., as fall under the archetypal headings of World, Object, and Ego.

logical orientation in which such states of affairs are reviewed in and through a psychological perspective, which, in taking an intersubjective approach, then takes on a corresponding sense of a more inter-subjective sociological aspect. Hence this not-definitively differentiated coupling of the psychological-sociological (in much the same manner that I have viewed the delineation of any one distinctive cultural world as not being able to be definitively isolated from the world at large. (79)

Under the reduplication of the deontological, and centered in an existential-pragmatics, the ensuing productivity is viewed though a political light from an executive sense and semblance of perspective (and not the 'political' when viewed through the 'theoretical nature of a hermeneutical approach' which pertains, generally, to the political in is legislating orientation). By such means, accounting for the exercise of a political perspective concerned more with the execution of the relatively non-virtual as arrived although the non-economic and its ability to enact the relatively non-virtual, etc. (80)

In a form of apposition to the former reduplicated order of political enaction we arrive at (through its retreated translation) the world of a practical economics, i.e., the world of business, finance, manufacturing, agriculture, services, etc. (81)

Then, through the reduplication texts dealing with the 'potential' or 'possible' or the 'probable' or the 'potent' we arrive at a world of the scientific. (82)

When, the reduplication of texts dealing ostensively with conventionally conformation of true facts *qua* true facts we arrive at the topic of history, or, rather, the discipline of the histories of the past, present and future (depending upon the orientation of the historical research in question, although as argued elsewhere, there can be pure history in the singular and neither can there be the isolation of a history of the past from a history of the present, etc.[247]). (83)

Therefore, with these caveats in mind, the prospect of transformational treatment *qua* treatment is instrumental in a meta-philosophical/metaphysical-like orientation. (84)

In a similar vein to the operation of treatment let me now focus on the resolution of the philosophical problem that automatically invokes a trimodal economy in order to relationally situate the bimodal nature involved in the working application of a sequential operationalism, etc. Where, in effect, this problem is resolved through the invocation of a trimodal economy of transformational retreatment. (85)

By assuming a trimodal economy of transformational retreatment with the operation in question proceeding in the moment of treatment and whose productivity will be subjected to retreatment, and, thereby, restoring the original meta-level of representation as introduced in its initial moment of pretreatment. (86)

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[247] The classic instance here can be found in the historian apparently being able to analyse Julius Caesars' motivation for the expecting the very real possibility of a civil war once he had crossed the Rubicon without seeking permission from Rome, etc. He wasn't going to Rome 'to merely have dinner with the powers that be' unless his accompanying troops also had that type of a most unlikely invitation!

Overseeing this should be its critical, and potentially radical, supervision as exercised through the complex lens of an integrated 'working pragmatics'. (87)

In its simplicity, a functioning 'pragmatics' is such 'that, ideally, there is sought the path of least resistance in order to articulate that set or those sets of descriptions, prescriptions, and/or proscriptions in a suitable set of approaches in an anti-representational-representational format that affords either the better creation, preservation, and/or conservational expansion of positive e/valuational formation for the quanta of intentional effort expended in arriving at this comparatively commendable process of enactive-interpretation with respect to the characteristics of that intentional motivation that oversees such considerations'. Or more simply, 'whatever works for the least effort expended in such matters for the relatively better outcome'. (88)

But, to complicate matters a little further, we should also add, those techniques already referred to elsewhere, that strengthen conformal conformance through mitigation (of refinement of genres and conformal establishment of sixth ordered facts), remediation (through forms of interrelated deconstruction and reconstruction), ongoing re(-)normalization, and, an overall amelioration of motivational intent, etc. Hence the formula 'well-informed and well-formed;[248] well-deformed and well-re-formed; well-reformed and well-re-informed, etc.' Or, in a formula that notes the same process of conformal alignment, i.e., through 're(-)alignment (through realignment, re-de-mis-alignment' as a process of error correction, and re-alignment, etc.[249]), that may or may not re-write the current meta-status and needs of our current situatedness'. (89)

Suffice to say, that through the refined recollection of precedence and the conformal recognition of patterns, etc., that this type of discernment can become easier over time although the appreciation of the relatively-radical can be like beginning to walk all over again, and again... (90)

But, that said, the pragmatics of a situated interpretation is somewhat complicated by the fact that a working pragmatics is centered in the third order of the deontological with subsidiary adjuncts in the harmonization of the aesthetic and the expedience of a pragmatical type of investigation, involves an existential overlay, and the primary objective being a resolution of that situation in question in order to enact patterns of behaviour in keeping with the tenor of such concerns. (91)

That an additional form of complexity resides in the necessity for causal intervention through the irruption of the non-economic, which, in turn, necessitates the imputation of its hyper-economic re(-)appropriation in order to re-conventionalize the advent of our comprehension of all relevant relatively-radical inputs and outputs, etc. (92)

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248 As superimposed on or between these three economic moments in this transformational reading of treatment (and, by such means, constituting the basis for a more formal approach to this topic).

249 Reviewed, respectively, through hermeneutic mitigation, phenomenal-phenomenological remediation, and existential re(-)normalization.

Where, as a technical manoeuvre, we can postulate a parallel super-economic equivalent for all economic forms of mitigation, remediation, and re(-)normalization (with the latter being described, e.g., as the ongoing super-retreatment of perspectival approximations, and so on. (93)

That there is this pressing need to comprehend relatively-radical innovations whether as inputs and/or as outputs. Noting how critical and radical information is expressed, received, accommodated, and, despite being transformationally reformed in a radical manner, can then, itself, engineer processes of critical reformation in the form of a new outputs, etc. (94)

A working theory of innovation demands that there be incremental alterations of representative content, usually on a relatively superficial level of organization, otherwise radical inputs or outputs take on an incomprehensible tenor if they cannot be conventionally accommodated within genres already in place or could be put in place. However, be that as it may, small incremental shifts in a representative form of modelling can, in turn, unleash forms of re-formation whose intensity or quanta of alteration is greater than that ascribed to the nature of that prior chaotically inductive precipitant. (95)

I have also argued elsewhere that chaotic induction results from prior precipitants, and that the ensuing pattern of chaotic re-direction takes either the form of an analytical bifurcation, a synthetic emergence, and/or, a change of phase in the logical subjectivity of the relational situatedness in question nominated as the recipient of such relatively-radical alteration (given it occurs over the space of either one added or one subtracted increment of input). However, more correctly, a suitable series of approaches should indicate on a deeper level of scrutiny, that all three chaotic orientations co-occur (given their relative individual status in overall economic terms of reference cannot be other than as economic correlatives situated within the same overall economy). (96)

In addition, we should also regard a chaotic process as equivalent to a relational process of re(-)self-organization in which the chaotically re-directed changes are the product of that momentary shift in re-self-organization as sequentially enacted in that ongoing economy of re(-)self-organization. Where perfect resolution, if enacted, realizes the metaphorical death of that relationship. (97)

And where all else is collectively subsumed under the overall epithet of an implied process of ‘amelioration’. (98)

Where the collective impact of these approaches can be seen to fall under the overall notion of a general ‘pragmatic’ (and to be differentiated from either weak or strong notions of either the variegated expedience of a fourth trans-cognitively ordered version of the ‘pragmatical’ and/or an ill-defined version of a ‘pragmatism’. (99)

3. The Pragmatic Turn

What is entailed in the making of this 'pragmatic turn' (as performed beyond the mere expediency of the pragmatical, and so on)? (100)

This specific 'turn' is to be defined beyond the expediency of a weak pragmatism that is merely pragmatical. Indeed, 'pragmatics', as an umbrella term, needs to be redefined beyond even a well-fortified pragmatism by including a philosophical integration of the following perspectives or approaches, namely, its centering in the in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological[250] **with adjuncts in the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical; as having a positive-nihilistic form (that transcends a mere representative positioning); as being anti-representational but also investing in well-formed and well-informed forms of representation, etc., subjected to ongoing processes of non-suspension, suspension, de-suspension, extrapolation and non-extrapolation; and, above all, must also assume and express an existential orientation with an emphasis on relational enrichment without overlooking the non-existential richness of that same relationally-situated relational-situation… whilst, at the same time, be in a state of an overall conformity with our appreciation of its overall truth status or conformance.** (101)

An enriched version of this 'pragmatic turn', is better expressed through the form of a narrative, that, in turn, can be further enriched through its transformational retreatment, etc.[251] (102)

That, this complex understanding of a 'working pragmatics' is assembling from many concepts, observations, comments, etc., as made in this Book 12 and which, itself, is dependent upon all previous research. However, let me re-argue for the integrated-complexity of this concept of a 'working pragmatics' by marshalling both old and new arguments in order to briefly re-sketch out both the intent and impact of that complex definition of the pragmatic as re-sighted through the multiple lenses of an anti-representational-representationalism, etc. (103)

Furthermore, to give this set and series of approaches an overall unification let me refract them through a re(-)defining of 'conformance', i.e., 'a conformal theory of truth determination wherein positions are deconstructed and reconstructed as approaches that are differentially-integrated/integrated-differentially (through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension, etc., the projection and de-projection of extrapolation, etc.), etc. (104)

Applying this technique for oversight to the following under these implicit headings of A Transcendence of the Merely Pragmatical (116-118), Acceptance of a Central

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[250] Note my use of the expression 'deontological' has nothing to do with so-called ethical Principles with a capital 'P' as might have been expressed in a traditional (representational) metaphysics but more along the lines of the necessity of a compactual dimension underlying the expected functioning of a contractual domain, as a set and series of lived-imperatives, etc.

[251] Where by 'etc.' is meant 'through economic complexification', and, where its transformational retreatment, in turn, can be read as just one form of economic complexification.

Deontological Complexion (119-120), Being either Complemented or Supplemented with Aesthetical and Pragmatical Adjuncts (121-122), As Necessitating a Positive Nihilistic Approach (123-124), As Operating within an Anti-Representational-Representationalism (125-152), Invoking Extrapolated Non-Suspensions and Suspensions along with Extrapolated and Non-Extrapolated Suspensions and De-Suspensions (153-169), As Accessing an Enrichment of Non-Existential and Existential Patterns of E/Valuational Formation (170-202), along with a Re-Defining of an Overall Approach to the Conformal Dimensions to Be Exercised in a Pursuit of a 'Universal Pragmatics' that Can Operate as a 'Working Pragmatics' (203-210). (105)

Simplistically, let us say that truth-telling, which must be present to some extent in all our narratives, is something we both tell ourselves and tell others. That if it cannot be expressed to some 'other', in principle, it is not something we can tell 'ourselves'. Thence the implication of the first person both singular and plural. Moreover, there could not be a grammatical economy of the first person without either singular, dual (as a doubling of the singular), and plural along with the other two voices of the second and third persons). But, the existence of a narrative also implies narrational facts, a narration as preferencing a set and series of narrational approaches, and a critically oriented, but qualified, *raison d'être* as the motivation for the narration be that understood either covertly and/or covertly, and, where its 'qualification' must be understood lest 'that narration be either effectively exhausted through either inaction through the non-exercise of that narration or finds exhaustion through some definitive form of a completed act of resolution (which then spells the metaphorical 'death' of that relationship). (106)

The appellations of 'true' and 'false' have no intrinsic value given that they are applied either affirmatively or non-affirmatively to the textual formulation of conjectural formations. Moreover, the 'final' application of such epithets to a certain formulation is the apparent end product of a concerted effort on 'our' part on the behalf of the cultural-intercultural world at large, as an overall world-of-life. As 'the icing on the cake', so to speak, since without the basis of a 'cake' there could be 'no icing on an absent cake'. In other words, dispensing such appellations is dependent, first, on a pre-given body of knowledge that is generally held to be true or, at the very least, has to be accepted as true in order for these relatively superficial appellations to be then applied thereafter. Just as to perpetrate a lie, most details in your shared narrative, first, have to be co-accepted as truthfully valid. Otherwise, that lie could not be comprehended, and, therefore, could not be comprehended, in overall terms of reference, as either 'false' or 'truthful'. E.g., even if one person were to tell their partner that 'they had eaten the last two apples in the fruit bowl' that were there this morning knowing that they had only eaten one, still, the other party accepts that there were two apples remaining in that fruit bowl that very same morning, and that, now, as none can be seen, therefore, they believe the claim 'that both remaining apples were eaten by their partner' was a reasonable report to have been made their partner trusting, at the same time, that their partner to be telling the truth. But, then having convinced the partner of the truth of this lie then presents the remaining apple, and then gives it to their partner. With a laugh at being duped the other party laughs and tacitly forgives the first party for having been told that comical deception. Without these pre-given truth claims there could be no final truth claim regardless of whether the latter is

either ‘true’ or ‘false’. That such ‘final’ appellations of truth e/valuation depend upon the pre-existence of that pre-given body of knowledge that must be conventionally true, on the whole, at least hypothetically. Even questioning that immediate basis, itself, must expose an even deeper level of presuppositions, etc., in the form of a pre-given set and series of truth claims belonging to that field or domain. Just as, e.g., ‘whether Julius Caesar crossed or did not cross the Rubicon?’ is already dependent upon the existence of these logical subject of a person called ‘Caesar’, this existence of this river called the ‘Rubicon’, that the city of ‘Rome’, at that time, was the capital of the ‘Roman Empire’, etc. (107)

Hypothetically, this basis must be basically ‘true’ even if only accepted from an intersubjective conventional point of view. Thence the non-exhausted possibility that all facts used in a narration must bear some resemblance to lived-reality from an intersubjective, conventional perspective. Thence the ascription of ‘true’ or ‘false’ must only overtly apply to those relatively superficial conjectural formulations being focused upon as applied to or situated within this already pre-given body of knowledge, and, the same, in effect, must also be pre-understood by the parties privy to such meaningfully pre-understood communications entered into in either this topic, this domain, or field as approached in either a disciplined manner or from a relatively secular point of view. (108)

Furthermore, in line with the arguments of this essay, etc., no positions should be argued for, only approaches. Moreover, through sufficient number of positive forms of overlapping within or between relevant textual situations we can then define ‘truth’ as ‘the overlapping of suitably formed approaches wherein the ‘non-absence of non-alignments’ is indicative of ‘true’ or ‘non-false’, and, where the relative ‘absence’ of relevant forms of expected alignment is indicative of the appellation of ‘false’ or ‘non-true’. Truth determinations are also arrived at through a relative transformational isomorphic invariance reinforced through apposite forms of economic complexification. Let me demonstrate this broad claim. I.e., with respect to the relative presence or absence of textual forms of conjecturally reported alignment, etc; and where the former is further enriched through positive forms of transformational treatment that, hopefully, is either augmented and/or enhanced through suitably relevant commentaries that note apposite forms of alignment through economic complexification. (109)

‘Conformation’ is ‘never mere confirmation in real-time or mere verification in non-real-time’. The appellation of conformally ‘valid’ or ‘true’, etc., is dependent upon the richness of re(-)iterated forms of interpreted re-alignment. A process that can be overtly or intuitively (covertly) reinforced through re(-)iteration, and further enriched through discerning an existential dimension to that degree when such an environment is relatively present or relatively non-present. E.g., by putting recently purchased apples in the fruit bowl in the kitchen, early that morning, and making the hopeful assumption that some of them will still be there by lunchtime tomorrow; a fact whose true conformal status is to be reinforced or de-reinforced through either direct perception and/or honest testimony, etc. Where a reasonable, transformational interpretation of the number of apples left in that bowl would contribute to a speculative history of the same. That, under the rubric of ‘complexification’ we note in what manner other archetypally aligned economi-

cally translated narrational economies enrich the understanding of those alignments already deemed to be valid, etc. (110)

Or, in taking another set of conjectural directions, discern to what extent forms of archetypal alignment delineate a non-existential richness and an existentially oriented enrichment through apposite forms of comparisons. (111)

Or, in following another set and series of arguments, we hope to delineate either the same basic conformal truth status or an ongoing amendment of the same. (112)

Truth claims are applied to conjectures suitably situated in their conjectural contexts. Moreover, conjectures are a mix of simply represented evidential, testimonial, and inferential claims in contextual frames of reference already, more or less, ascertained in truth determinations already pre-formed, more or less, both in individual and overall truth claims. E.g., I remember putting six apples in the fruit bowl in the kitchen three days ago and that four had already been eaten by the end of the prior day. I enter the kitchen and look, and see those remaining two apples. Through pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment (and its posttreatment) apples are either being seen or not being seen. In this instance, I know that there were two apples left in that fruit bowls and thence this pre-given information as the initial basis for this act of perception. I look and see both this fruit bowl and apples within this bowl. I count the apples and find that there are, as expected, these two apples. And through the de-metafication of treatment, in a state of retreatment, I am now assured that there are two apples in that fruit bowl. Hence the isomorphic invariance of that fruit bowl and its two remaining apples in the form of a self-given testimonial, as found in its evidential treatment and conformation in the form of its retreatment whilst making the reasonable inference that those two apples were the same two apples seen at the end of the last day. Hence, in this instance, an isomorphic invariance between self-testimonial evidence, direct perceptual evidence, and a reasonable inferential interpretation (that the two apples seen were the same two apples seen the day before, and) that this represented state of affairs is correctly ascertained. (113)

Thence this ascription of ‘true’ to the conjecture of this represented state of affairs. (114)

Now, the conformal status of this conjectural basis understood, let me now articulate a working pragmatics in our interpretations of the former. (115)

The nature of the ‘pragmatical’ could be provisionally defined as ‘operating a set and series of functions in an expedient manner’, and, where by ‘expedient’ it can be defined as ‘the suitable application of either proper, appropriate, and/or apposite functions under the open rubric of either effectiveness, efficaciousness, efficiency, expeditiousness, stylistic elegance, and/or economical parsimony, etc.’ However, a working pragmatics should not be reduced to the expedience of the merely pragmatical! Why? Because a working pragmatics is open to a wide variety of inputs and outputs beyond the merely pragmatical. E.g., in the *raison d’être* of contracts, we cannot formulate the same purely in terms of the contractual since without an apposite compactual basis a contractual ar-

rangement would not be able to be conceived of let alone be able to be seen in the manner that it should operate! Where, by ‘should’ is implied the expected operations of a deontological dimension, etc. (116)

However, a deontological dimension does not contradict either the complementation and/or supplementation of a pragmatical adjunct. Let me explain. By ‘complementation’ is meant ‘the adding directly to the deontological complexion recast in terms of the deontological’, and, by ‘supplementation’ is meant ‘the adding indirectly to the deontological complexion in terms of the nature of adjunct nature (which can only be from the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical)’. Hence the additional richness and enrichment of various forms of pragmatical utility and stylistic clarity, etc. (117)

Expedience, say, maybe one way to satisfactorily resolve a problematic relationship, but, given a compactual basis to contracts and (all) other genres of social interaction it follows that a richer set and series of responses demand that we should usually entertain wider terms of reference beyond the merely pragmatical. (118)

Just how should we argue for the necessary existence of the deontological as central to a working pragmatic? (119)

The integrity of the relational dimension demands the ongoing resolution of relational dissonance and thence the existential basis for an authentic responsibility. This is, by nature, the sphere of the deontological along with its coinciding with the archetypal moment of resolution’. (120)

Thence the centrality of the deontological, albeit as complemented and supplement by its two adjuncts of the aesthetical and the pragmatical. (121)

Because processes of resolution also implicate an aesthetics of style, etc., and the expedited utility of functions, etc., in the joint formation of e/valuational formation (being, naturally, the experiential composite of the aesthetical, deontological and pragmatical contributions in the evolving formation of a personally-interpersonally oriented sense and semblance of e/valuation as ‘value’ is primarily understood as that ‘to be valued’ rather than as the ‘value of an operation’ as exercised in either the fields of semantics, hermeneutics, and/or factual assessment, etc.). (122)

The remedial deconstruction of positions and the reconstruction of approaches implicates a positive nihilism in line with an anti-representational-representationalism. ‘Nihilistic’ through the complete absence of a positional sense and semblance of substance and other misplaced allied concepts’, and, ‘positive’ by virtue of the fact that ‘through non-substantial approaches we recognize, encounter, and engage all forms of e/valuational formation along with the discoverable richness of the relatively existential and the inescapable enrichment of the relatively existential (although, more correctly, the relatively non-existential, both negative and positive in its comparative valuation, and the comparative positivity of the relatively existential are mutually co-dependent). (123)

Where a positive nihilism implies the operation/s situated within an anti-representational-representationalism can function, and v.v., and, furthermore, that without such a non-positional approach, being already in place, no form of productivity, either virtual and/or non-virtual in orientation, could or would be (non-economically) unleashed and duly registered (super-economically) by all the relevant parties concerned... (124)

What is locked impossibly into a position cannot change or shift, and, what has no location whatsoever has no logical subjectivity and likewise no ability to change. In contrast, overlapping can both transformationally change and transitionally shift in their effective locations. Where a critique of positions, after their deconstruction, leaves only approaches to interrogate rhetorically, metaphorically and apparitionally. i.e., economically, etc. (125)

Where, as noted, the appellation of a truth value is applied to the interpretation of the textual representation of a conjectural situation in terms of the relative concurrence or non-concurrence of either alignment, non-alignments or the non-applicability of the same. (126)

Therefore, the locus of this application of a conformal determination is proposed and tested within or between either informal textual reports and/or formal reportings when conducted on the basis of suitable forms of re(-)iteration. (127)

Thence the pragmatics of this overall approach since the determination of the conformal is neither just synthetically realized nor analytically imposed but economically simulated through a refinement of propositional-statements as exercised through well-fortified forms of relativism, etc., courtesy of suspensions and their de-suspensions, and so on… (128)

Through the relational directness and directedness of perception, conception, judgment, etc., when suitably conducted through the auspices of working conjectures and working suspensions all operating within a working pragmatics, etc. (129)

Where through re(-)self-organization an assessment of information is conformally appreciated in terms of its relative stability, etc. (130)

Where conformance demands the necessary-possibility of the requisite degrees and forms required for a re-iterated experience of identificational stability. (131)

Now, to make better sense of this complex notion of ‘conformance’ let me demonstrate how it applies in the citing of reports and reportings dealing with either evidential, testimonial, and/or inferential situations whilst understanding that all three orientations, effectively, are correlative facets of the economy of conformal truth determination. Where testimony has a hermeneutical orientation, evidence has a phenomenal-phenomenological orientation, and inferences are experienced in a non-systematic existential orientation which, collectively, explains why we can move from one orientation to

another merely through forms of translation, etc., should the requisite pre-conditions, etc., be in place that would validly permit such forms of translation, and so on... (132)

Where by ‘and so on’ is meant interpretation, transformation, all forms of amelioration through mitigation, etc. (133)

E.g., I bought six apples to put in the fruit bowl in the kitchen yesterday. Today, I can assume some might have been eaten, but, in all probability, some will remain. The easiest way to ascertain the number of apples left in that bowl is to go to the kitchen and look, count those remaining apples should some apples still remain in that fruit bowl. But, today, I am not at home and in the city, so, I decide to ring someone who is and get them to tell me. I trust their verbal report. I have no reason to do otherwise. I am told there are four apples left. Usually, in this household, two apples a day get eaten, so, I can infer that those apples will be eaten before the advent of the third day. As I am passing through the fruit and vegetable market tomorrow morning on the way home, I will buy a dozen mandarins as well as they are now in season... (134)

In a process of inference, I assume some apples will be left, i.e., between 1 and 6. In a visual report, I am told 4 apples remain. In seeing and counting the remaining apples a first report of 4 apples is noted and then that report was then disseminated by telephone. The contents of that report being duly noted by myself. When I return home, I place 12 mandarins in that same fruit bowl, but, in deciding to eat 2 after my evening meal know, through mathematical inference that that will leave 10. (135)

When I ring to find out how many apples are left, I am in no position to actually ‘see’ how many apples remain in that fruit bowl, which is why I am making that telephone call, but, when told there are 4, I can easily imagine 4 apples remaining in that same bowl. Obviously, whatever ‘correspondence’ I am entering into it cannot be with those apples *per se*. But, in each and every aspect of these enquiries into how many apples are left, etc., we are dealing with textual forms of representation, namely, either informal reports and/or formal reportings. As a formula we can note that perceptions are textualized, conceptions are textualized, judgments are textualized, and all forms of appreciation are textualized accordingly be they philosophical or meta-philosophical, be they disciplinary or secular in origination. But, a single textual report or reporting in and of itself cannot be ascribed a truth value. Analytically, it is just a textual representation that may or may not be intended to represent a certain experiential situation. However, through transformational retreatment we can find forms of alignment and non-alignment both within and between texts, and, it is in these reoccurrences of the represented presentations or non-presentations of texts that a range of truth determination can be applied and ascertained accordingly. (136)

Hence this understanding that conformal truth determination is affirmatively applied to iterative forms of alignment that satisfy the requirements that sufficient degrees of alignment have been entered into (whilst also understanding that both indubitable affirmations and indubitable negations are neither required nor able to be perfectly instantiated be that through recognition, encountering or engagement). E.g., I think I see about

six apples, and in counting them, I find that assessment to be correct. Yes, six apples were seen is duly reported, be that either to myself or to some other person or persons. I infer that that those apples will be eaten over the next two days. But, obviously, the product of my inference cannot be seen, and certainly not seen now, but, can be imagined, although it is also true that concepts need not be imaged as some concepts cannot be imaged, at least directly. E.g., I cannot precisely imagine, in visual terms, a crowd of exactly one thousand individuals, but, can substitute, what such a crowd of people might look like in general terms. Or give an instance of how an abstract noun might be instantiated, etc. Hence the only valid conclusion we can draw from these implicit arguments is that only through alignments between texts can we ascribe positive truth values to those same intersections that demonstrate such overlapping alignments. But, at the same time, a mere reduction to a logical level of explication must also surely fail. I can make a good guess as to how many apples might remain after a day or two, but, no logically constructed guessing is going to allow me to confirm in real-time that actual number of apples that precisely remain in that bowl at that moment of time when visually scrutinized. How do we account for this phenomenon of direct visual perception merely in inferential terms of reference? We don't! However, all visual reports or reportings are inescapably textualized, and, it is through distinctive forms of cross-referencing that are permitted either within and/or between those text that we encounter processes of confirmation through re(-)alignment in real-time and verification in non-real-time be that through either testimony and/or inference (although, more correctly, confirmation and verification is achieved through forms of textual comparison within an economy of truth determination that cannot be exclusively absent one or two of these correlatives of the evidential, testimonial or inferential (given that hermeneutic input dealing with genres of behaviour, narrations facts, etc., must already implicate testimonial forms of input, etc., etc.). (137)

But, as a potential counter-objection, it could be noted that if we were to choose for ourselves between a report or reporting that is basically testimonial, or primarily inferential, or directly evidential, surely, we would prefer to choose the latter? Undoubtedly, that would be correct. Especially if we were required to form a formal reporting on the specificity of a certain situation. But, an evidential representation still remains textual through its perceptual inscription, i.e., the textualization of its intentional deposition. Just as my statements that I can see x, y, and z obviously indicate that I am making textual reports or reportings about processes of intentional textualization that have already occurred, etc. How, otherwise, am I to disseminate such lived-experienced other than through their textualization, be that dissemination to either our own sense/s of self or some other person or persons. (138)

That, granted, how might we explain this preference? Because evidential reports are experienced with a greater phenomenological richness and enrichment (with respect to modal density, the intensity of those individual modalities, the bare re-iteration of thematic themes, etc., along with the contextual richness and enrichment of consilience (between perspectival approaches), salience (within a more influentially pronounced field), and propinquity (or standing), etc., etc. (139)

That, in this regard we could appeal to a well-fortified relativism on the grounds that in the suspension the automatic de-suspension reveals a textualized sense and semblance of world that is not flat and will definitively reflect the distinctive non-flatness of our world at large from the perspective, albeit from those perspectives being entertained, etc. Where current forms of textual alignment discerned through suitable processes of reiteration imply the relational directness of such textualized perceptions; reiterative stability of such forms of alignment should that be the case which cannot be other than the case except superficially when it becomes duly noted that co-associated inferences are found to fail and, therein and thereby, inferentially indicate relative forms of non-alignment; etc. (140)

Thence the bones of an anti-representational-representationalism. (141)

But, as a potential counter-objection, granted that perceptions and conceptions might be textualized, but, surely, judgments cannot be textually generated given their appreciation of both textual reports and reportings must be meta-textual through metafication? (142)

Then, retextualized through transformational retreatment! Where such a problem is no longer a problem when viewed through the lens of transformational retreatment in which judgments, in turn, are textualized through de-metafication! (143)

That it should also be noted, hypothetically, that alignments are not necessarily just re(-)iterated through evidence, testimony, and inference, but, also, through correlativity, complexification, ordered and inter-ordered forms of translation (such as aesthetic reinforcement, imperatives, probabilities, histories, factual ascertainment, etc.), etc. (144)

But, it should be noted, that as both traditional forms of representation and contemporary forms of representation must fail, so, too, must a mere theory of an anti-representationalism do likewise. That given the inescapable role played by representation in language what is required is an economy where the former is limited by the latter, and, where conformal truth determination is only realized through a suitable transformational appreciation of textual reports and reportings in terms of patterns of iterable textual alignments to be discerned in a mix of the requisitely required evidential, testimonial, and inferential materials with due standing, and not otherwise. (145)

So, evidential materials require the requisite temporal and geographical standing; and testimonial materials require the citing of the former in an intentional environment of trust; and, inferential materials require well-informed non-fallacious logical arguments with relevant conclusions, and, all of the aforementioned being well-fortified conjecturally, etc. Where ensuing dissemination is conducted through the form of a relevant narration. (146)

What are the ensuing ramifications of the overall integrity being apparently demonstrated through this type of philosophy given the appellation of an ‘anti-representational-representationalism?’ (147)

That, correctly, we cannot proceed without the invocation of working suspensions and the revocation of those extrapolations that either entail a substantial metaphysics and/or the extrapolated non-extrapolations of a negatively nihilistic metaphysics. Because without suspensions (as in an interrogative economy), no discipline could be commenced, and, that in the deconstruction of either the impossible and/or the ineffective all so-called 'strong and weak positions' should be duly dispensed with! That, metaphorically, the 'elite' disciplinarian who subscribes to this program just mentioned deserves to have a 'priority of seating' since in conforming to such a well-disciplined method it stands to reason that such representatives deserve to be listened to. (148)

On the other hand, those who practice suspensions, but, persevere with either extrapolations or the extrapolation of non-extrapolations, deserve to be regarded as 'deplorable' and afforded only a secondary form of seating... at some remove from the august presence of the elite. (149)

Then, again, sadly, those who practice neither suspensions nor the revocation of all forms of extrapolation can only be deemed to be 'incorrigibles', and consequently and subsequently, afforded only a tertiary form of seating... even more removed than the relegated seating of the deplorables. (150)

No doubt there are those hard-working, overt-committed disciplinarians who think along such lines, proclaiming their professions to be a gild of some importance that well deserves to be afforded such privileges and priorities. But, let us politely laugh at such misguided individuals. Because, in lived-reality, we have to live our lives as members of an elite who are also both deplorables and incorrigibles. This is the implication to be directly drawn from a critical philosophy that espouses an anti-representational-representationalism. Without extrapolations there could be no suspensions and where, in lived-experience, in order to operate from a critical sense of perspective we need to be a participant in all three classes of such peoples, without the relegation of any one class or the elevation of one class over another. Thence the moral of this deconstructed image of the relative professional, amateur, and secularist. (151)

That a working disciplinarian needs to duly recognize the interdependent roles of suspension, de-extrapolation, and extrapolation in the healthy functioning of their discipline! (152)

Just what are these relationships to be observed between suspensions, de-suspensions, non-extrapolations, extrapolations, and so on? (153)

Indeed, without extrapolations (of a so-called 'external world') there could be no counter-extrapolations (of a so-called 'internal world'); no suspensions without extrapolations, and no de-suspensions without suspensions in which the well-fortified conjectural suppositions could be interacted with within a working pragmatism. (154)

Where the hyphen in an anti-representational-representationalism indicates the economy of an anti-representational-representationalism, and a representationalism scoped by the limits of an anti-representationalism.[252] (155)

Where all three aspects contribute to the working approach of a viable pattern of conformal truth determination. (156)

Thence the necessary joining of hands between so-called ‘elite disciplinarians’, ‘deplorables’, and ‘incorrigibles’. (157)

To be further reflected in the transformational formula of (the hermeneutical generality of) ‘manner’, (the phenomenal-phenomenological particularity of) ‘form’, and (the non-systematic existential specificity of) ‘degree’ as they are made to mirror respectively the demands of an anti-representationalism, representationalism, and an anti-representational-representationalism. (158)

Given that manner is scoped by natural limitations imposed by genre through an overlapping of semantic perspectives; that form is scoped likewise by the overlapping content discerned within relevant sets of perspectives, and the interplay between the former existentially reveals the specificity of the relationship in question in its degree as it is to be found in the specificity of its situatedness... as directly revealed through the quality of its conjectural origination. (159)

Thence the need for well-conducted conjectures, etc. So, e.g., I am thinking about finding something to eat (manner), namely this apple being seen (form), because I am hungry (degree). If I were merely thinking about eating that apple later, say, for lunch, it may well be that I am not currently hungry, say, having just eaten my breakfast, but, expect I would like to eat something for lunch but not too much in order to conform to my current diet of generally skipping lunch. (160)

Now this may seem trite, but the articulation of ‘manner, form, and degree’ does transformational justice to the projection of our intentions. So, e.g., if it were the case that I needed to find a certain book (form) in this university library on a certain topic (manner) because I have to write an essay (degree) by this coming Friday as part of my university course. Where manner is future expectations in the form of pretreatment, the form of the book, when found, is the treatment in question (namely finding this particular book on this type of topic) in order to use as the required information so as to fulfill this imperative of my current need to write, and finish, this essay and have it written before the final date of its submission. Where the existential specifics of this situation are such that I need to write this essay as a demonstration that I have understood this topic (and, sadly, these days, have resisted the urge to have it written by some AI application although the assembling of information for that essay is no doubt could well be marshalled by such means?). (161)

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252 Where the hyphen could equally be represented by ‘(-)’.

The transformational nature of this formula mirrors the dynamics involved in a process of transformational retreatment, namely, a process with the three phrases of pre-treatment, treatment, and retreatment(/posttreatment) (along with mitigation, remediation and the ongoing approximations of re(-)normalization), etc., in the textual amelioration of narrational anomalies, etc.). (162)

What are the ramifications of this de-positioning of approaches? That a triangulation of approaches needs to be fully recognized given the implicit inadequacy of just one or two approaches in substituting for the surety seemingly supplied in a unimodal positioning.[253] In other words, an economy of approaches, at a bare minimum, is a trimodal economy of approaches along with the necessity for a non-economic style of resolution within the imputation of the hyper-economic within the imputation of the super-economic. (163)

Metaphorically we do not point with a 'one-ended stick'. Just as we cannot have a 'one-sided coin'. 'Imagine' if you could, and then speculate on the 'tossing a one-sided coin'? There would be no point calling it, if we could, as we would know the outcome would be both the same and impossible. But, then could 'we call the tossing of a two-sided coin?' That, too, would be just as impossible, since coins are actually three-sided although, correctly, the possibilities of our call are bimodally constituted (unless the coin landed upright on this third edge). In the same vein, we now should know that a bimodal operation more correctly needs to be reviewed through a trimodal lens of a transformational-retreatment (or some transformational form of an equivalence). Hence, e.g., the introduction of the provisional slogan 'manner, form, and degree'.[254] (164)

Can we explicitly demonstrate this necessary trimodal triangulation of approaches in their ability to substitute for the apparent, but impossible, process that, otherwise, would be involved in this (impossible) 'positioning of positions'? (165)

I see one remaining apple in that fruit bowl. But, since when do we merely see an apple other than, possibly, in the painting of a still life or in the work of a surrealist or as life-like plastic or wax ornament? Even, then, we could well ask if that painted image is well-painted or less convincing, what it might mean, what emotions you might feel when seeing that image, etc? We may see an 'apple', but, we would also see it as 'either something to eat or not to eat?', 'whether it looks nice to eat or is perhaps not yet ready to eat?' and, if judged as edible 'when would be the apposite time we might like to eat it, and so on. Inevitably and invariably, it would seem, we do not just single-mindedly function along logical lines, as if a well-ordered train timetable (in the running of a single train on a single line), but, entertaining a dialectical array of digressions that 'progressively' enrich our overall appreciation of that intentional objective subjected to the variegated manner of these overlapping perspectives being sequentially focused upon in this set of current reflections that remains under that specific train of entertainment. (166)

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253 To this list of the unimodalism and bimodlalism we can also add a closed trimodalism when no mechanism is present for the irruptive resolution of the non-economic, etc.

254 Where and when 'manner' aligns with 'pretreatment', etc.

In other words, we progressively triangulate our interests in overall world-of-life whether we recognize that state of affairs or not. At a bare minimum, we entertain open, trimodal economies of a non-positional orientation through a succession of approaches engendered on the basis of a succession of partially answered-questions proposed in terms of 'manner, form, and degree'.[255] Where, by 'open', is meant the non-closure of any one articulated economy of 'manner, form and degree' in the irruptive terms of its non-economic resolution, etc. (167)

Thence this dialectical-logic that replaces positional impossibility with the necessitated possibility of an ongoing, informative triangulation of approaches leading to the progressive enrichment and fortification of our co-associated conjectures in the context of their textualized narrations, be that to our own sense/s of self or others... (168)

Where the inescapable advent of the emergence of an enrichment of e/valuational formation 'progressively' takes on an existential orientation. Where this sequentially oriented process of an augmented richness will eventually reach a point of re(-)self-organized enrichment, hopefully, of a positive nature. Noting that the lighting of gunpowder or the detonation of dynamite is indicative of the explosive force of an equally chaotic state of affairs, that, in or on its own terms of reference, is neither positive nor negative other than through its refraction a triangulation of its personal-interpersonal terms of reference. So, such an explosion could be used to either build a dam or destroy a dam and hence the agnostic nature of its phenomenological existence... (169)

Which now allows me to segue to an existential appreciation of what, otherwise, would be merely a non-existential review, although, more correctly, given the non-absence of the personal and interpersonal in our interactive engagement/s in this world at large it implies the impossibility of making an absolutistical distinction between the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential, although, in non-relativistical, relative terms, such a distinction cannot be absolutistically drawn except in relatively truncated, pragmatical terms of reference. So, e.g., if asked, 'you eat this ripe green apple and this ripe red apple, how do they compare for you?' You might answer that 'they were both great in the specificity of their own unique sense and semblance of flavours', but, that you preferred the fresh, tart-like taste of the green apple knowing that other people, instead, might prefer the distinctive differences of the ripe red apple. Or, in other words, the views of others will also enter into the formation of our own opinions implying an existential orientation that cannot exempt itself from how we review our experiential footprints in this world at large. That, although we may well attempt to suspend both subjective and intersubjective perspectives, a so-called objective perspective has no ultimate existence other than as an approach, that like all approaches, is ultimately unobtainable, cannot be attained, cannot be appropriated in its falsely conceived entirety, and so on. Thence the ultimate inseparability of non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented aspects of experience. On the other hand, discernable differences can be entertained phenomenologically, etc., namely, the sole, comparative positivity of existentially oriented

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[255] Where completely answered questions would immediately oversee the metaphorical 'death' of that relationship being reviewed, and, thereby, the equal 'death' of that same co-associated narrative.

experience *versus* the potential positivity or negativity or effective neutrality of non-existentially oriented experience. (170)

Can we rewrite the possibility of an existential orientation in terms of extrapolations, non-extrapolations, suspensions and de-suspensions, etc? (171)

I am here making the case for a conjecturally, well-fortified relativism as being existentially revelatory by virtue of suspensions, etc. E.g., extrapolations are candidates for suspension and hence their de-extrapolation (certainly from the pernicious orbit of an ideological extremism). Moreover, through suspensions of well-formed and well-informed sets and series of conjectures , etc., we should arrive at informative de-suspensions wherein the world must work with us to the same, or similar, extent we need to work with it... in a conformal delineation of its triangulated de-positioning of working approaches from the overlapping of hermeneutical, phenomenological, and existential/non-existential orientations along with ordered and inter-ordered forms of analysis, the critical-radical application of suitable forms of consequential analysis, and so on... all within a working conformal framework. (172)

But, if all forms of resolution are chaotically induced non-economically, etc., then how do we discern between positive, neutral, and negative forms of non-existential e/valuational formation, on one hand, and, on the other, existential e/valuational formation assuming we can effectively discern such orientations despite their common origination in trans-intentional judgmental evaluation and its non-economic discharge through intentional forms of valuation, etc., along with both orientations in delivery being super-economically re(-)appropriated in terms of the non-critical, critical and potentially radical? (173)

Making this differentiation in terms of preconditions, conditions, and post-conditions, namely, as incrementally induced *versus* non-incrementally induced, augmented non-exponentially *versus* enhanced exponentially, and, in terms of differentially appreciated consequences. Let me illustrate this relative, overall sense and semblance of differentiation. (174)

Like bringing water to the boil, a new charity, created from scratch, accumulates funds, dollar by dollar, until that time when a certain level of funding is reached it then has to oversee a change of state, etc. Through an incremental augmentation in funding, it reaches various stages when it would need to do things quite differently, indeed, on some occasions in a transformational manner that would be quite radically different. (175)

Where, in those moments of a more overt sense and semblance of a transformation-transition differences in e/valuational formation would be noted, along difference in post-conditional consequences. (176)

Now that I am hungry, I going to eat this piece of freshly baked sourdough bread with some tomatoes and olives, along with some blue cheese, choosing, maybe, some Stilton or some Roquefort? I was hungry, but, my hunger is now sated. I have availed

myself of a positive form of non-existential re-e/valuation. In a distinctive contrast, I see this hungry person staggering past my front door. It is obvious that they are hungry. I do not have to feed them with the more than sufficient quantity of food I have kept in my larder. I ask them to sit on my doorstep and ask them if they would like to eat a 'piece of freshly baked sourdough bread with some tomatoes and olives, along with some blue cheese, choosing, maybe, some Stilton or some Roquefort?' They answer all of the above... and I prepare for them two pieces of bread one with Stilton cheese and the other with some Roquefort. With these two pieces of bread, I give then a bottle of water, a cup of coffee, two apples and large chunk of cheddar cheese to take with them. Hoping, of course, that if the occasion should arise if I were to be rendered destitute and hungry I, too, would be fed, be it through an organization or the charity of an individual person or family... (177)

The moral of my anecdote should be clear. The mere eating of a piece of bread has positive, non-existential value. We have to eat in order to live. In contrast, sharing bread with someone, in much greater need than yourself is a much richer experience for all parties concerned. Thence this relational difference between the incremental augmentation of e/valuation and the exponential enhancement of e/valuation. If anything, much like the metaphorical and alchemical 'turning of lead into gold'. (178)

Thence this differentiation in terms of pre-conditions, etc. Or, as is wisely said, seeing a difference between chalk and cheese, or, using a slightly better metaphor, a difference 'like that between night and day' (and where, too, night, in time, turns into day, and v.v.). 179)

Now, the next question to ask is how these process of non-economic resolution are able to be productive of an augmented richness and an enhanced enrichment? (180)

Incrementally enriched like the act of eating, mouthful by mouthful, where the richness in e/valuational formation is more like that of a linear equation within certain limits. Since to eat not enough is to lose weight and eventually die, and, where too much intake leads to indigestion, an eventual obesity, and perhaps a shortened lifespan. In a significant contrast, in giving food to a starving person we can apperceive value as operating on more than one level of functioning… (181)

Just how is such evaluation, through resolution, discharged both non-existentially and existentially? Through, conceivably, an intentional strategy that might oversee through chaotically induced co-option, the uptake of a path of least resistance or through the uptake of a path of minimal enactment or effort, or through the uptake of a path involved in the minimal enrichment required or through the adoption and adaptation of expectations for path of maximum enrichment, and so on. Despite some variation in the application of the motivation bought to such an affair we could say, on balance, that the ensuing process of resolution somewhat minimizes or simplifies or optimizes the ensuing situatedness of that situation in question, or, at least hypothetically. (182)

Where the process of resolution might be likened to ‘a bolt of lightning’ in relatively minimizing the complexity of current complications, just as, e.g., the equation ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is simplified in the form of the number of ‘4’, etc. (183)

But, how does this process of judgment, through non-economic resolution in the formation of both non-existential and existential orientations, relate to the conformal appreciation of truth determination? (184)

Across the entire gamut of extrapolations and non-extrapolations, suspensions and de-suspensions, etc. Implicating a working logics-dialectics; transformational retreatment; the use of non-fallacious argumentation; being well-informed; conducting consequential analyses on provisional conclusions; being cognizant of an arbitrational sphere; and, being open to an existential dimension in an amplification of e/valuational formation over the overall course of a mutual, ongoing enrichment of our primary relationships, and so on. Where the relative fruitfulness or fruitlessness of our endeavours should be able to speak for itself… (185)

Thence, on one hand, the relative complexity despite what is usually so obvious in that which is intuitively placed before us, and, on the other hand, the relative simplicity of our conclusions especially if they can be retested and debated by others, and where we find both a social consensus and a social solidarity on such points of representative alignment that, at the same time, under the influence of misinformation, etc., can be so much more difficult to demonstrate in our remonstrations with others... (186)

Where philosophers like to think the clear light of reason is enough to win an argument when it is more often a battle over a connotational space for affective reasons sometimes barely comprehended and where mental sets, paradigms and major discourses near-permanently control how we even questions such authorities or even if those authorative sources should even be questioned?! (187)

Moreover, through the perspectival nature of our representation of this world at large our disparate areas of knowledge are not so much incommensurable as poorly connected if at all and, therefore, in taking a more broad approach to a certain set of topics necessitates a considerable degree of navigation, negotiation, and arbitration as we attempt to put these representative pieces of a jigsaw together regardless of whether we are either acting as professional and/or amateur disciplinarians who, as well, must also be responsible secularists in an inescapable addition to the former. (188)

Therefore, these preliminary comments having been made, let us explore the conformal dimension of truth determination since without some inkling of this dimension our ensuing weak or strong forms of a dysfunctional relativism would deconstruct our passages and relative progress through this overall world-of-life. (189)

Like individuals, societies can go either forwards to further prosperity or backwards to a cultural-intercultural wasteland politically riven when we collectively permit short-sighted personalities, narcissists, idiots and the deluded to further divide us and rule

over us. Thence this ‘social definition of a relative scoping of progress’ that reflects, more or less, the degree that society is well-ordered and able to compassionately look after the widest range of its membership, and so on. In a similar vein, we can affirm a relative definition of ‘personal progress’ as ‘the degree of overall, personal success achieved by an individual in terms of the goals that they have set themselves and where, through successful forms of social arbitration, have managed to realize, necessary increment by increment. But, both social and personal progress is not something that is inevitable, neither immutable nor monolithic, and reflects how such objectives are intentionally thematized both collectively and individually. (190)

That our appreciation of the conformal dimension should reflect the same. That truth conditions should, hypothetically, be reiterable and demonstrable, and rendered coherent both logically and dialectically… in the context of a suitable overlapping of well-fortified conjectural approaches that are existentially cognizant of economic, non-economic, and super-economic restraints and freedoms. (191)

In first deconstructing and dispensing with positions, if necessary, we then nominate a series of approaches that we find are progressively clarified in terms of the pragmatics of our current situatedness. Persevering with the relatively fruitful and sidelining the relatively fruitless or the seemingly less fruitful. (192)

Noting the ‘relatively essential’ as ‘relatively superficial’ but as ‘crucial information’ and the ‘conventionally uncontested’ as its ‘relative conformal mass’ the exhibition of truth claims are usually performed with respect to the former. So, e.g., ‘did Julius Caesar cross the Rubicon (in his signaling the start of a civil war) or did he not?’ is left relatively uncontested by professional historians along with the non-contested existence of a Roman World, etc. (193)

Now, in the acquiring of relevant informational facts (and not factoids, etc.) we must recognize that we cannot perfectly represent a certain situation. Imagine a map of an acre of with a scale 1:1. No amount of effort is going to perfectly represent that terrain down to each blade of grass, each grain of grit, and so. So, obviously, in the formation of our relevant facts, in order to run a well-informed economy, we need to note only that which is relevant (where these concepts of the phenomenologically essential or the hermeneutically relevant are such that between the relative presence or the relative absence of such information we find a corresponding semantic differential with directly distinctive conformal ramifications). So, e.g., in conducting a murder enquiry, the detective in charge needs to know who was supposedly murdered by whom, by what means, and with what motive, and so on. That, e.g., the victim ‘was not wearing shoes’ might not be relevant, but, if on the other hand, if the victim were killed while they were asleep, we would assume they would not be wearing shoes, and, if shoes were found on the deceased then we must question, ‘whether they were asleep or not, and so on?’ (194)

Or, imagine if we were formulating a set of truth claims about one specific apple. Again, we cannot perfectly map that single object in all its blemishes, its individual atoms, etc. On the other hand, we can weigh that apple, determine to what extent it is sweet

or not so sweet by tasting it (or determining its percentage of sugars, etc.), describe its overall colour, declare the name of that hybrid being cultivated, etc. Operating in accordance with the requirements of the perspectives articulated, from that a short series of selected approaches we set out to obtain a relatively essential description of that object from that same selection of approached perspectives as announced. Noting, of course, that no descriptive economy can completely overlook both prescriptive and proscriptive dimensions as well. E.g., this apple is a product of the cultivation of *X* variety. Where cultivated apples for commercial distribution are usually of a certain named variety. Hence our needing to operate, therefore, within the prescriptive restraints of such nomenclature. Furthermore, a proscriptive dimension will also be in play although, admittedly, this could well be less obvious. I bought this apple, and I am, therefore, entitled to eat it. But, I could not eat this same apple until it was duly bought and paid for, etc. Therefore, this insightful observation, that the descriptive sub-economy is also part of a wider economy of the descriptive-prescriptive-proscriptive, etc., and, that this state of hierarchical play is the 'normal disposition' we need to recognize in the articulation, either overtly and/or covertly, in all our economic engagements. I.e., that no economy is 'an island unto itself', and, furthermore, no one individual could be completely skeptical or relativistic, or absolutistically pursue any one position other than through the relevant triangulation of relevant approaches as thematized through their corresponding forms of representational lensing. Thence a recognition of this hierarchical disposition with a more relevant focusing on a conformal surface rather than a conformal mass… along with the fact that this is experientially 'situated' within the apposite sense and semblance of the relationship in question. That the latter observation oversees an ensuing interrelated set/s and series of distinctions being thematized between relational participants and parts articulated in pretreatment, a pro-relational sense of the apparent integrity and ahistoricity of that relationship *per se*, along with the experiential specificity of its directly engaged, trans-relational, concrete historicity. Thence, and this should become obvious, a need to invoke a transformational approach as supplied, e.g., in an economy of transformational retreatment, etc. Where, we can also add, that the stage of treatment portends an inter-ordered metaphysical-like approach in this pursuit of a conformal appreciation of that which is being questioned in the application of a parallel economy of interrogation. Where by noting apposite forms of parallelism, both economically internal as correlatives and externally as correlativities, in and through processes e.g., of economic complexification, we can also conduct forms of error correction, etc., on those philosophical grounds, etc., that representationally observe the indication or non-indication, of textualized 'alignments' or 'non-alignments', in a relative transformational isomorphic invariance conferred on relatively superficial units of information whose conformal status can then supply a well-informed basis for our conjectural economies, etc. (195)

Yet, despite such complexities, through suspensions a de-suspended resolution presents a vast simplification that allows us to happily attend to the relatively superficial and note the relevant alterations of our pretreatments… and where the reiteration of the same reinforces that type of conformal status. (196)

Similarly, this simplification applies to our overall evaluation of ensuing patterns of e/valuational formations and contribute to our appreciation of the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential. (197)

How then do we go about such appreciation in a manner that might be described as either non-critically, critically, and/or radically oriented? (198)

But, first, a not unreasonable question to ask. Is the existential orientation an intersubjectively oriented phenomenon given, e.g., the sharing of food with a starving person oversees the existentialization of the relatively non-existential in evaluation? It could be answered, on the grounds that this question is improperly formulated in terms of its presuppositions, etc., that a deeper appreciation of the relational orientation would resolve the asking of this type of question. For a start, we can propose a relational framework that notes the conventional treatment of a relational situation by noting both relational participants (subjects) and relational parts (objects, object-states, objectives, etc.). Then, from the envisaged and observed unity and apparent integrity of a relationship, now viewed as an ahistorical aspect of treatment, we can propose a pro-relational dimension. Moreover, through the mediational suspension of the former we can add a trans-relational dimension when and where we can find also the mingling of both the ahistorical and the trans-historical in the concrete specificity of lived-experience. Indeed, an overlapping of both the inter-ordered metaphysical/meta-philosophical and the retreated ordered philosophical. But that through an inter-mingling and inter-meddling, through an inter-mediational suspension, we find a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential as it finds its voice through this suspension and amelioration of the working representation of the relational situation in its situatedness. Therefore, it is through the conjunction of these styles of relating that the existential orientation is induced and allowed to prosper on the behalf of the participants of a relationship, be that an individual person with themselves, one person standing before another, or one or more persons in their confrontation with the representatives of a community, organization, institution, or nation, and so on. That in this regard, an existential relationship with one's own sense/s of self could be envisaged through an open act of mindfulness, or in permitting the de-suspension of a well-formed and well-informed conjecturally well-fortified set of representations to speak for themselves in the direct revelation and exposure of the relative (in a form of relativism that is non-weak/non-strong), or, say, through act of ritual be that religious or otherwise, etc. Or, in effect, the direct result of (an ongoing) intermediation(al suspension) when we balance conventional extrapolations and non-extrapolations, along with non-suspensions, suspensions, and de-suspensions, and so on. (199)

But, this complexity granted, and its simplification through the non-economic enactment of de-suspensional forms of resolution, etc., how does a conformal dimension arise in the midst of this required progression engineered through the overlapping of such triangulated approaches in the representative simulation of these patterns of lived-experience? Quite simply – in a dialectical fashion, and, more completely – through the induction of a conformal status, albeit in a manner that should be regarded as 'provisional'. That even if such conformal intuitions possess an apparent indubitability they should be left open to emendation through ongoing forms of inter-mediational amelioration (as a

collective response arising from prior mitigation, remediation and re(-)normalization, and so on). (200)

Now, in my opinion, ‘truth’ (with a small ‘t’) is not much more than ‘being in an alignment with the intentional means of its production and the consequences of its outcomes’. Where the outlays of our investments are, to varying degrees, or should be exponentially profitable. Otherwise, our efforts, in superficial terms, are little more than 'trash in and trash out’ - where a 'pragmatics' of truth determination would have us observing all relevant inputs and outputs. Where by 'relevant' is meant 'that which makes a distinctive difference in our conformal judgments one way or the other'. Moreover, by 'superficial' is only meant 'those semantically mapped claims that are potentially contestable' given a relatively conventional, non-contested mass of supporting conjectures must underlie all contestable truth claims'. By ‘consequences’ is also meant ‘the implication of both relatively non-existential and relatively existential forms of co-e/valuational formation’ (which can be assigned, respectively, unilateral responses of the last and the first instances and where the former can be transformed into the latter through the intervening unilateral response of the next instance as explored elsewhere). (201)

In light of the above, we can again point out the role to be played by extrapolations (as projections of conventional forms of representation), etc., and, the parallel role of an economy of re(-)alignment. I.e., through conventional extrapolations, utilizing well-formed and well-informed conjectures in an integrated and coherent manner, we prepare the stage for the entertainment of the semantic countering of non-extrapolations through the imposition of working-suspensions, etc. Then, via the automatic de-suspension, the ‘non-flat’ nature of the ensuing re-configuration of lived-experience should dialectically exhibit those current forms of resolution that can be availed of in non-economic terms of reference, therein and thereby, presenting an openness of possibilities for the pursuing the instantiation of non-virtually oriented patterns of behaviour through the recognition of those elicited unilateral responses of the last instance, etc. Or, more succinctly, the de-suspension, itself, can be approached to reveal a deeper appreciation of our relational situatedness as that situatedness, in turn, which is situated in a wider world at large. Thence the revelatory nature of our working with well-fortified set/s and series of a relativistical approaches whose metaphorical triangulation proffers this refinement through progressively approximated processes of re(-)normalization. (202)

Now, it would be much easier to merely argue for an anti-representationalism alone but such a simplistic approach is effectively denied, ironically, on pragmatic grounds, for example. First, the concept, say, of ‘working extrapolations’ is necessary in order to argue for the experiential non-flatness of our overall life-world, our world as lived. Mere simulations of a world could not be contrived. Then, without a semantic mapping of this world at large we could not make any form of ‘progress’ whatsoever since the exercise of our intentional objectivity necessitates an ability to discriminate what we wish to focus on *versus* what we do not currently wish to focus upon, etc. Moreover, if the suspended and de-suspended senses and semblances of the world as lived were to be the same there could be consequences in a world that is obviously pregnant with a lived-consequentialism, both non-existential and existential in orientations. Fur-

thermore, an economy of conformal truth determination demands that we can discern both alignments and non-alignment in the formation of our working conjectures which, otherwise, could not be 'working conjectures'. Thence the co-equal importance of these three economic aspects and these three super-economic levels, namely, respectively, statements, propositions, and propositional-statements, and, the economic, non-economic and the hyper-economic. Where, together, an integration of these features then allows us to differentiate, resolve and enact beneficial forms of both personal and interpersonal engineering, and so on. In the process, being able to discern between the relatively non-critical, the critical, and the potentially radical (as explored elsewhere). In effect, demonstrating a successful working pragmatics theoretically, practically and critically. (203)

That in pursuing this vision or version of a 'working pragmatics' we must travel beyond a conventional understanding of both an 'open pragmatism' (simply defined primarily in 'deontological terms, albeit with aesthetical and pragmatical adjuncts') and a 'closed pragmatical approach' (operatively defined through the 'invocation of a number of functioning styles pursing various forms of expediency'). In effect, moving far beyond a classical approach to a pragmatic disposition. Indeed, in a deconstruction of positions and their impossible forms of positioning we need to clarify their working replacements through the utilization of this concept of 'an ongoing triangulation of approaches'. (204)

Consequently, we must further add to a deconstruction and dismissal of all weak conjectures (on the grounds of their non-well-fortified status) and the deconstruction and dismissal of all strong positions on either their impossible representation and/or misrepresentation through defective arguments, namely, the equal deconstruction and dismissal of all well-fortified, non-weak/non-strong positions and their defective forms of positioning, and, therein and thereafter, replace the latter with 'well-fortified approaches', etc. (205)

Now, that granted, such a 'working pragmatics' is then able to take on a more universal sense and semblance of an overall approach to this topic of conformation. Where the 'pragmatic merit' of such overlapping approaches is evaluated in terms of the 'relative profitability apparently realized over that degree of interest invested in the reiteration of its appreciation'. (206)

Defining 'alignment', realized through an economy of re(-)alignment, as those inputs that appear to overlap in more productive forms of output'. Let me explore this imputed observation, say, in terms of perceptual evidence, testimonial evidence, and inferential evidence. (207)

I am holding a glass of water. I see myself holding a glass of water. I blink, I still see myself holding this same glass of water. Both the same superficial and non-superficial conjectures are in place that allow me to conjecturally make this obvious form of alignment pre-conditionally, conditionally, and pot-conditionally as viewed through a lens of trans-formational retreatment. I filled this glass from the cold-water tap; I am in this room, I remain in this same room and see myself holding this same glass of water;

and, in drinking form this glass of water find myself slating my thirst in this hot weather, etc. (208)

That the lynch pin of evidential validation is its direct connection to the direct entertainment of a sufficiently well-interpreted set and series of sensory experiences. All other connections are either testimonial and/or inferential. But, the evidential economy, correctly, is a product of all three types of inputs given that evidence, itself, cannot be had in an uninterpreted state and, therefore, is dependent upon testimony and inferences to be both formulated and understood by others. Then, superimposed upon such necessities we find forms of error correction exercised through forms of alignment afforded through correlatives and correlativities in which the requisite degrees of parallelism need to be observed. Let me demonstrate these broad approaches to the demonstration of the required degrees of alignment needed in order to interpret and validate sense experience in a collective conjunction with testimony and inference. (209)

E.g., I am holding that same glass of water previously referred to. I am doing so in this room, and, my subjectivity reflects this overall act of perception in which I perceive myself to be the holder of this glass of water. In effect, we have three translations of the same evidential event whose relative transformational isomorphic invariance implies that 'I am in this room', and 'I am holding a glass of water', and that 'I am intentionally aware that I am doing as such'. The fact that I can find an alignment between these three approaches means I can triangulate this experience as, e.g., 'in this room I am knowingly holding a glass of water'. As trite as this seems it allows us to personally intuit the obvious and assume, that from an inter-personal perspective others would hold the same evaluation, namely, 'in this room they appear to be knowingly holding a glass of water' in my imputed estimation that they could report this 'same' observation about myself). That in observing these various forms of alignment internal to a relational situation the same can also be written from both a pro-relational point of view and the point of view of the existential specificity of what it is like to be holding a glass of water, when, we ourselves are doing as such be that either simulated and/or relatively non-simulated in interpreted sensory engagement. But, of course the expected forms of alignment are but a proverbial drop in the bucket of all possible forms of parallel alignment or non-alignment able to be entertained. Hence, when relevant, in addition to the former, we could import the correlatives of other economies, forms of economic correlativity between correlatives, the adoption and adaptation of different perspectives along with the transformational rules that would allow us to migrate from one to the other should the delineation of entailed aspects serve a useful purpose in this discernment of evidentially supporting forms of alignment, etc. So, in valid testimony, and its validation, we expect some connection with the events described and a fully connected chain of connections thereafter. Similarly, in inferences we expect, again, some connection with well-interpreted sensory experience and a fully connected chain of connections thereafter. Thence the possibility of our being able to do histories of the past, present and/or the future, etc., along with the world of science, etc., and all other forms of both inter-ordered and ordered forms of intentional operation through the demonstration of these requisitely expected forms of conformal alignment, etc. Where in effect, such considerations fall within the broad sphere of a working pragmatics'. (210)

4. Provisional Conclusions, etc.

Just what are we permitted to conclude? Just where might we start? (211)

In viably proposing a certain economy we must also presuppose that transformational rules must be able to be found that will allow us to migrate between correlatives in terms of an imputed transformational isomorphism in order to ascertain forms, manners, and degree of relative alignment and non-alignment between textual formulations dealing with the directly evidential, the testimonial, and the inferential; and, furthermore, between relatively non-existential and existential forms of e/valuational formation; between other economies via economic complexification; and, between the economic *per se vis-à-vis* the non-economic and the hyper-economic on the imputed level of the super-economic, etc.[256] But, first, can we demonstrate these transformational rules in a descriptive-prescriptive-proscriptive economy (and by extension argue for the same on the level of the super-economic?)? (212)

Admittedly, sitting in a boat on a river or stream, say, in Oxford, in England, if we were observing swans, we would soon draw the reasonable inference that 'all swans were white'. On the other hand, sitting on a boat on the Swan River in Perth, Australia, we might come to the opposite conclusion that 'all swans were black'. Obviously, in order to harmonize these contradictory findings, we would have to give up one or more of these inferences 'that all swans were just white' or 'that all swans were just black'. Of course, we could amend our inference to assume, instead, that 'all swans were either white or black'. Still, technically, we would be committing the same fallacy of confusing 'is' with 'ought'. And yet an exploration of the textual economy would show the intimate connections, as economic correlatives, between textual depositions and the meta-textual informing the formation of those texts as to how those descriptive texts, etc., should be formed, in the first place at the same time (along with the simulational nature of the non-textual as the 'third leg' of this economic process of textualization in the generation of content that will be both 'written' and 'read'). The implication of this understanding is to see how both descriptive and prescriptive aspects of textual formation, as economic correlatives, are already co-functioning in the very formation of the textual process itself... (213)

Can we demonstrate and explore this intimate form of economic cooperation between correlative aspects? E.g., when we see an object, be it a swan or anything else, we assume it has a colour, at least, an overall sense of being coloured, having an empirical surface that is seen at each point by possessing a certain ascertainable semblance of a colour. I.e., it's a necessary precondition for a surface to be seen that it possesses a colour that, theoretically, can be described. Hence, in this instance the conjunction of prescriptions and descriptions… that at the very least indicates a logical connection between the same. (214)

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256 Is there a valid option here for this 'etc.' Well, we could propose an extension between subjects, communities, cultures, organizations, institutions, nations, be that currently or in historical terms, etc. (and where this last 'etc.' may well be now exhausted?).

However, in proceeding further with some caution we might surmise the necessity to observe both forms of an inferential observation, namely, that although a logical connection is presupposed between descriptions, prescriptions (and ethically/existentially oriented proscriptions) as forming that style of economic behavior, still, it would also be wise to make a distinction between the 'relatively superficial' and the 'relatively non-superficial', and, where in the former, we must generally hold that no overt connections automatically exist between these correlative economic facets. So, e.g., a swan as an empirically observable object in a visual field must possess the fact of being coloured, but, having seen one hundred white swans only allows us to assume that the swans in this region are probably 'white', but such a 'prescription' must be subject to emendation should we then have to redefine the coloration of a swan from having observed swans that are not while, and so on. (215)

That the moral of this short exploration is that what might work or not work on a relatively superficial level of exposition should not be directly applied to a relatively non-superficial level of exposition, and v.v. That, in this instance being explored, descriptions and prescriptions, etc., are intimately connected on the level of textual formation, but, that such a connection cannot be merely assumed on a relatively superficial level of exposition. In effect, operating a rather pragmatic and dialectical approach to such issues. That, on an archetypal level of argumentation, 'that what appears to apply to one economy, ideally, applies to all economies (which as an observable state of affairs can only be tested *ad infinitum*, but, can be argued for, hypothetically, on economic grounds)!' (216)

What are some of the main findings of this essay and this set of essays? Let me note some of these tentative conclusions under the following headings: i. The Proposition of a Well-Fortified Relativism as a Profitable and Revelatory Approach; ii. The Dispensing of all forms of Position and their Positioning; iii. The Distinctive Nature of a Working Pragmatics?; iv. Additional Observations, etc. Ending this set of essays with: v. Some Provisionally Concluding Conclusions. (217)

i. A Revelatory Relativism

Before the advent of this twelfth book philosophical and disciplinarian positions described as forms of realism, idealism, dualism, absolutism (but not an absolute philosophy that carefully observes the centrality of the suspension), relativism, etc., were decried as forms of ideological extremism, inviting unhealthy forms of over-commitment or under-commitment and, therefore, should be duly shunned. However, in working through a systematic-like deconstruction of strong positions I have come to the 'position' that all positions should be shunned and that a metaphorical 'triangulation' of approaches must be substituted instead, albeit subject to the best disciplinary practice. I.e., well-fortified, well-constructed conjectures centered through the suitable utilization of suspension, and so on. No matter what position or approach that is adopted and adapted if it is subjected to ideological influences whose extremism remains non-ameliorated should be decried and duly shunned. Into such a negative category we must also add all dogmatic forms of pragmatism along with all other dogmatic forms of over-commitment given this equivalence between both extreme attempts to positions and over-commitment, and v.v., under-

standing that strong positioning is impossible to exactly articulate and/or is exercised through defective arguments that cannot reproduce the intentional objectives of such stated argumentation. (218)

Weak approaches are conjecturally disorganized, relatively incoherent, and self-contradictory, and, therefore, cannot be presented as approaches that could be viewed as conformally valid. In a similar 'contrast', both strong positions and approaches must also be reviewed as untenable on the grounds of either their impossible argumentation and/or defective argumentative representation. Equally, even non-weak/non-strong positions must also be relegated and if not able to be retranslated through the lens of an approach, i.e., subjected to suitable forms of suspension, etc., they, too, should be duly shunned, dispensed with... (219)

The ramifications of this turning around of this topic of disciplinary positions, this revolution, or, more correctly, this process of evolution, are quite profound and also feed into a broadening of a 'general pragmatics' as a 'universal pragmatics' operating as a 'working pragmatics'. Practically, whatever works should be utilized. So, if an overall approach incorporates ideas and perspectives from an assortment of classical and non-classical approaches so be it. Perhaps the scientific discipline can benefit, on occasions, from a well-fortified and carefully qualified realistic approach, then, if that perspective is fruitfully profitable, then run with it. Or, if the historical discipline might benefit from a well-fortified set of idealistic simulations in their attempts to better represent the historical trajectories of those events under such scrutiny and such a project or program proves to be fruitfully profitable then run with that. That the conclusion we should draw from such 'reconsiderations' is that a working pragmatics should be amenable to such influences, albeit as long as they are able to fruitfully function in a profitable manner and are duly circumscribed within the boundaries of their appropriate theoretical and hermeneutical deployment, their propriety of practical and phenomenological employment, and the appositeness of their critical, and radical, non-existential and existential re-deployment. In this regard, operating in such a manner so as to carefully differentiate the non-critical from the critical and the critical from the potentially radical and how, at the end of the day, in a conventionalization of the relatively-radical these three aspects of the non-critical, critical and radical are to be respectfully harmonized. (220)

In these reconsiderations of the relative, the absolute, the realistic or the idealistic, etc., I would like to contend that through the automatic invocation of the de-suspension we are invited to share in a revelatory process in which 'the lived-reality of lived-experience' reveals itself through 'the lived-experience of that lived-reality'. As no form of enquiry can be conducted with a process of questioning, etc., without invoking an interrogatory economy, we must assume, quite rightly, that to even ask a question has us entering some form of a suspension, be that entry enacted either advertently or inadvertently. Moreover, no question could be formulated without some co-associated sense and semblance of a resolution or answer (even if the question were to be defective, could not be computed or appreciated, and deemed to possess only such a non-answer). The world of the suspension is 'flat', but, in the automatic invocation of the ensuing de-suspension a 'non-flat world' of lived-experience will reveals itself to us. The lived-reality of this

lived-experience will forever have the irony of declaring a ‘final’ say as to how our interpretations should be both represented and, then, therein and thereafter, be better represented. A continual triangulation of approaches whose relevancy is directly proportional to the emergent excess of e/valuational formation they are able to generate and can be shown to be able to be reiterated both subjectively and intersubjectively. Where, what is ‘represented’ is ‘textually presented’, and, where, through the co-occurrence of interpreted alignments and non-alignments, processes of conformal validation and invalidation can be both progressively engendered and appreciated. Where, too, such a process takes time, but, in its apparent judgmental insightfulness, we have the momentary re-direction of unilateral responses of the last instance, etc. Thence this skeleton of an argument that declares a conjecturally well-fortified triangulation of a approaches is capable of instantiating a conformal validation of truth determinations further reinforced through the relative presence of the required forms of alignment and the relative absence of required forms of non-alignments, etc. Where, undoubtedly, the emergence of provisionally presented, conformal forms of validation demand this dialectical dance in an economy of conjecturally well-fortified approaches between these economic correlatives of a representationalism, an anti-representationalism, and an anti-representational-representationalism/representational-antirepresentationalsim. (221)

ii. The De-Positioning of Approaches

As explicated, we entertain an ongoing triangulation of differentially constituted approaches and never the impossibility of some form of positioning that permits us to entertain the delusion of an ‘impregnable castle’ or some other form of ‘fortification’ in the ‘finality of a fixed location in our semantic mapping of this world at large’. In truth, such an impossible edifice just cannot be entered! In falsely defining ourselves against what we are absolutistically not then our psychic center of gravity is somewhere between those we oppose and this act of opposition on our part. Through relations this world is defined, and, through the impossible imputation of non-acts of relation then we are equally, to the same degree, removed from this same world of relations. Just as in intentional experience, from an economic perspective, we must equally impute, to varying degrees of focus and non-focus, the trimodal functions of an intentional objectivity, an intentional motivation, and an intentional subjectivity where it definitively follows that when we visually entrained then we are also both visually motivated and operating as an apparent visual perceiver. All three must follow, together, since none can make a single appearance. Thus, likewise, the simplistic through that we can take up a certain position is worse than being ‘hollow’, being completely ‘empty’ of such a pretense. (222)

That, when this ‘triangulation’ of approaches is duly understood then we can no longer support the possibilities of both the futility of positioning and the futile, impossible appropriation of such positions. Such impossible endpoints cannot be arrived at and cannot be attained, neither obtained nor appropriated! should such a positionalist declare ‘that they are happily at home’ in their impossible edifices let us remind them that they are ‘homeless’ until, instead, they can existentially ‘find a home’ in this world at large, this overall world-of-life. That such a universal ‘home’ can be found is a testament to the

fact that such an aspiration is supported, indeed, well-supported, through the trajectory of a working pragmatics. (223)

iii. A Universal Pragmatics?

Both social consensus and social solidarity, to varying degrees, can be observed, therefore, it behooves the disciplinarian to both explain how both this is possible and how this type of aspiration can be better amplified, i.e., either augmented and/or enhanced? To this end, in a contribution to this philosophical debate, let me proffer the following exposition. (224)

A working pragmatics is centered in a deontological dimension of judgment devoid of either so-called First Principles, Middling Principles, and/or Last Principles and not in the expediency of a set of pragmatical approaches, but, not without adjuncts in both aesthetical and pragmatical types of judgment. Furthermore, the representative use of language has to be bounded by those limits that are anti-representative in orientation and setting up, as a consequence, an anti-representational-representationalism. By what arguments can such subtlety be effectively demonstrated? (225)

In the pragmatics of a contract without the observance of a compactual dimension the world of the contractual could not be prosecuted. The compactual dimension is primarily deontological, but, not exclusively. (226)

The formation of value falls under three distinctive types of ordered judgment, namely, a second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetic e/valuation; a third trans-cognitively ordered deontological e/valuation, and, a fourth trans-cognitively ordered pragmatical e/valuation. Hence their implication in such discernment where the aesthetical is realized through a stylistic resolution of dissonance, and, the pragmatical supplies a set of functional mechanism for the how the deontological might operate upon a more contractually oriented world. Given, too, that any combination of pragmatical functions, e.g., the efficient, the effective, the expeditious, the efficacious, the economical (or parsimonious), etc., all seem to be somewhat both deontologically constituted and motivated, each in their own way. E.g., what drives the desire to be economical other than an aspiration in the form of an imperative not to waste the limited resources that might be available given that few resources are practically unlimited (unlike the potential use of sunlight as long as we do not unnaturally contaminate the skies with an excess of clouds and dust, and unhealthy aerosols, and so on). Where the aesthetical dimension also seems to possess an aesthetical imperative that can reinforce both its power of resolution and whatever that resolution might be tendentiously tethered to should such a co-associated deontological or pragmatical facet be skillfully handled in such a manner? (227)

Then, hand in hand with such ideas, like e.g., the conformal triangulation of dialectical approaches; modes of extrapolation and non-extrapolation, along with suspensions, de-suspensions, etc; we must also understand that a profound wedge is being driven between the skepticism of an impossibly constituted negative nihilism and the dogmatism of an equally impossible absolutism rightly affords us a working highway along

which we can observe all manner of transformations courtesy of a positive nihilism. 'Positive' in the sense of potentially supplying an abundant emergence of both positive non-existential and positive existential forms of e/valuational formation. Again, 'positive' in the emergent sense of supplying a comparatively greater degree of both evaluation and valuation through productive forms of engagement that oversee the same. 'Nihilism' in the sense that through the deconstruction of both absolutistical substance and a relativistical substancelessness processes of transformation can be continually entered into that support both the augmentation and enhancement of such ensuing e/valuational formations able to contribute to both the richness and enrichment of such e/valuation. Thence this contention that a working pragmatics must also, either explicitly and/or implicitly, support the articulation of a positive nihilism in order to advance those ideas of transformation where through either critical or radical forms of appreciation we can oversee either the creation, preservation, and/or the conservation of an overall degree of relational richness. Indeed, a degree of relational enrichment capable of generally supporting the beneficial re-direction of our trajectories through this world at large, through the evolution of our overlapping relationships as we stand with(-)others, before(-) others, and find an existential freedom through(-)others... (228)

This indication of a 'universal pragmatics' must be seriously contemplated given that 'what works for one person' and is 'found to work for some other person as well' must portend the possible existence of a set of attitudes and approaches capable of advancing the successful fruition of our aspirations.[257] But, as should be already understood, very few of our many aspirations will ever be realized and that those aspirations that are entertained in an aspirational economy must be super-intermediated in and through the more encompassing economy of arbitration. The fact that this arbitration is enacted upon a working basis of a general consensus and social solidarity, must give us grounds for hope since it would follow that whatever better facilitates such arbitration, for the mutual advancement of all the parties concerned, must be none other than a 'general pragmatic's capable of such differential facilitation.in ongoing richness and enrichment of our primary relationships as they are found, in turn, in their relational situatedness. Since no relationship is an island unto itself despite the experiential semblance of its essential uniqueness presented through that holistically engendered enterprise... (229)

iv. Additional Observations

Along the way, numerous other philosophical rectifications of understanding have prompted myself to replace my now re-perception, or apperception, of such now misbegotten modes of thinking. Of course, as understood in the reception of the relatively-radical, all recognizable patterns of evolution can only occur step by step, increment of comprehension by increment of comprehension. Therefore, it is not so much 'out with the old, and in with the new' as a renewing of old understandings in a subtle re-wiring of such thought along with its subsequent re-thinking. A process sometimes of glacial shifts that... can suddenly move mountains in an avalanche of metaphorical ice and snow, rocks and gravel... sweeping all before it. Being a little less dramatic, what have I to demon-

[257] The simple test of a universal pragmatics is a pragmatic one, namely, 'that whatever works should be run with... until such a time that it ceases to be so comparatively productive'.

strate such truly ‘novel’ innovations, such ‘final’ vocabularies, such ‘definitive’ histories, ‘perfected; futures, and the like? (230)

A need to reinvest in a reconstituted appreciation of the metaphysical dimension, as a meta-philosophical dimension co-extensive with an inter-ordered domain. A dimension that takes into account our semantic mapping of this world at large along with psychological and sociological inputs, political and economic inputs, completed by both scientific and historical contributions... (231)

Where both ordered and inter-order phenomena need to be ensconced in a relatively integrated set of working social systems in order to better appreciate the current functions of the array of disciplines as they impose themselves, sometimes indiscriminately, upon the resistance of a long-suffering, secular world. Where such an approach needs to operate from the universal access to a working pragmatics that demonstrates its worth through the ‘returns’ we find on our ‘investments’ in this overall world of life. And, where an existential dimension must also be recognized and acted upon in our enacting unilateral responses of the next moment as existential responses of the first instance... without avoiding our deontological involvement within the same. Albeit to that extent both understood and circumscribed by the limitations of our being in this world at large with others who do not necessarily concur with us and could well resist such interventions despite the fact, overall, that a social consensus and a social solidarity will inevitably be fostered, at least eventually, should we faithfully persist in this form of a blind optimism that seeks, sometimes unwisely or ironically, in an ongoing ‘perfection’ of the future..! (232)

Along the way, other innovations have insisted that I change my mind and reconsider other possibilities... which the reader, or audience, themselves, can list should they wish to enumerate and re-evaluate such potential differences in opinion... (233)

v. Some Provisionally Concluding Conclusions...

It is as if this wooden ship of old and new ideas sailing upon these choppy seas of high anxiety has had all its planks and sections continually replaced, one by one, whilst floating on upon this same ocean of contending issues. Under this testing light of review, this process of ‘reconsideration’, an evolution of thought has been undergone where this variegated parade of problems and solutions sought has had to be seriously re-thought through and tempered accordingly in this workshop trialing this Contemporary state of play, this current state of artful conversation that, quite rightly, should not and cannot ever conclude. If this were to be the final nail in the coffin of impossible concept of positioning then so be it! But, alas, too many remain wedded to traditional ideas whilst even thinking they are in fashion with the latest trends. What is sorely required is both a respectful distance from the past and a respectful distaste for a fashionable future by walking a middle path between ideological extremes through a continual re-balancing of the conventionally critical with the unconventionally radical, and v.v. In these three volumes, and their division into twelve books, I believe my efforts reveal as much. If anything that each one of us is all too mortal since the recognition of the radical is a slow step by step

affair conducted over time, in time, in accordance with out limited abilities to witness such re(-)self-organization in our thinking. (234)

So, if that were to be the case, just what have I to show for these years of effort? An appreciation of the trimodal nature of the economic, albeit as qualified by the necessities of the non-economic, etc. A need to reinvest in a reconstituted version of the metaphysical and its extension in inter-ordered terms of reference. That the specificity of the existential orientation observes the inter-mingling of both ordered and inter-ordered phenomena. That the existential orientation has an intimate relationship with the non-existential orientation just as the compactual dimension both underlies and underlines the pragmatical functions of a contractual dimension. That a universally recognized pragmatics is centered in a deontological domain and not in the pragmatical expediency of pragmatical functions, although, at the same time is not divorced form the same through the existence of an ongoing resolution of such contestments, etc. That a dogmatic representationalism cannot operate without an anti-representationalism that in turn, equally, cannot operate without the former and its suspension, etc. Just as forms of positioning require mandatory deconstruction and replacement by the ongoing triangulation of approaches... finding as a result, in a working pragmatics, the necessity to invoke a mix of conjecturally well-fortified approaches that could include non-dogmatic styles of philosophy that hitherto would have been automatically blacklisted, such as, e.g., strong and weak versions of realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism, relativism, etc. (235)

What could be more symbolic of this turning around of prior patterns of conceptual thinking than the threefold division of disciplinarians into those who are the elite and who ‘practice suspended non-extrapolations’ *versus* the deplorables who ‘practice suspended extrapolations’ *versus* the incorrigibles who ‘practice neither suspensions nor non-extrapolation...’ in the shocking realization that all three aspects are implied in an insightful economy overseeing the formation of a conformal appreciation of lived-experience. Or, when translated into a philosophically recognizable language can take on the form or nomenclature of either an antirepresentational-representationalism and/or a representational-antirepresentationalism divided between its ‘three supporting legs’ of a qualified representationalism, an anti-representationalism, and a representational-antirepresentationalism/antirepresentational-representationalism. **But, at the end of the day, that only through a dynamic balance of all three of these correlated economic aspects involved in the conformal process of truth determination can a systematic sense and semblance of an existential dimension be properly comprehended in such a manner that it can be co-opted, or, rather, where it can co-opt us, in the service of our relationships in order to oversee the beneficial engineering of our interactions with others. Since, it is only through the joint participation of those well-fortified collective forms of intervention that we can participate in an existential freedom fostered through(-)others as enacted through those unilateral responses of first instance...** Thankfully, for many people, they intuitively know such things, but, for the more dimwitted, like myself, we seek complex philosophical explanations of what for others could be as ‘simple as walking along a path and admiring the view..!!’ (236)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 30.11.24.

XIIM. An Overview of Additional Shifts in Reconsideration

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Minds
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2024

XIIM. An Overview of Additional Shifts in Reconsideration[258]

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

In a recent email, I recounted some of the critical and radical shifts arrived at, by myself, in the writing of *Book* II, namely:

> My Book 12 is titled *Reconsiderations* and have ended up doing a lot more than accounting for past transgressions. Just some of these shifts in thinking:
>
> 1. We should drop uni-referential 'positions' and adopt multi-referential sets and series of 'approaches'... I.e., perspectives that cannot be exhausted, I.e., cannot be rendered as indubitable...
>
> 2. Take up an anti-representational-representationalism... I.e., alignments between texts, simulations, etc., and not some inaccessible vision of represented reality.
>
> 3. That an anti-representationalism implies a positive nihilism, and, at the same time a place for a qualified representationalism, and their mutual cooperation.
>
> 4. Accept non-weak/non-strong (conjecturally well-fortified) 'approaches' that include realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism, relativism, etc... Quite a turn-around for me.
>
> 5. That the automatic invocation of a de-suspension post the suspension is effectively revelatory... arguing for this relativistic approach...
>
> 6. That we need to take on board economic, non-economic, and super-economic approaches, but, most philosopher, disciplinarians, etc., haven't even contemplated the first on this list.
>
> 7. Treat metaphysics as meta-philosophical, etc. Through an anti-representational-representationalism (and as what I term inter-ordered through a reduplication of orders... with the implication that doing metaphysics involves doing psychology, science, history, etc.)...
>
> 8. Appreciate bimodal operations though a trimodal transformational lens... (resolving a philosophical problem, namely, given all operations appear to be bimodal - operator and that operated upon - how do we accommodate the same in a trimodal economy). This problem is quite esoteric...
>
> 9. Treat a well-fortified pragmatism as a pragmatics centered non-exclusively in a deontology, as existential, anti-representational, etc...
>
> 10. That there is a place through innovation for the radical... (0)

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258 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

1a. [In the presentation of this Shorter Overview (as my conference presentation for the Mini-Conferences of 2024), let me focus solely on the first on this list]. (1)

I will be citing sections of the twelfth essay:

> What should we take away from these reconsidered shifts in philosophical thinking, etc? [23]
>
> That the philosopher or metaphysician, the disciplinarian or the secularist, should dispense with either strong or weak forms of positioning, especially of a uni-referential disposition, and substitute approaches, especially of a multi-referential nature. Why?! Because such positional attitudes do not fully work as intended, and, in lived-reality we usually find a richer landscape when we no longer see it entirely through the narrow aperture of a single lens, and, instead, seek out those relevant approaches that mutually overlap and where, therein, there can emerge a much richer appreciation of that same landscape. A bit like a well-informed rambler wandering over an interesting section of the countryside who sees the geological stratification of that area along the horizon, in cuttings and the faces of cliffs, in the rocks brought down by creeks and rivers; who can see the quality of the soil from the perspective of a farmer well-versed in that terrain; who can see what original vegetation still persists despite the inroads of farming; who, from the formation of clouds, has a good idea of whether it might rain or not; who from the type of traffic upon the roads and the passing of trains has a good idea whether the economy is well-performing or in a period of decline, and so on. Should such a rambler put on a metaphorical pair of glasses that only allowed them to see exactly what those glasses would then allow them to see and you would surely think such a person to be not much more than a simple idiot for even wanting to permanently wear such blinkers! The lived-reality of lived-experience is much better seen through a succession of approaches and in this regard the disciplinary work of the professional should be no different… [24]
>
> Paradoxically, in deconstructing strong (and weak) classical forms of philosophical positioning, such as, e.g., realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism and relativism, I have been forced to concede that a role does exist for these modified non-weak/non-strong conjecturally well-fortified positions if they be better conceived of as approaches that are best invoked when the relevant circumstances seem to suggest a profitable uptake of a suitable mix of such candidates. As a case in point, much of science is approached from the mis-advertised declaration of the positioning of a realist, but, in quantum physics, e.g., and in its dealings with entanglement and other anomalous phenomena, the insisted upon localism of a quantum realism just makes neither experimental nor theoretical sense. Or, in contrast, in the resignation of seeing a ‘dualism’ between classical physics and quantum physics,[259] or between matter and energy, or in attempts to incorporate

[259] As a general observation as to how a quantum physics is practiced, the type of slogan that notes ‘just shut up and calculate’ is more indicative a pragmatical approach (through this Copenhagen Interpretation) rather than one of a realism (given, too, that quantum mechanics barely seems able to metaphorically

gravity in both worlds, etc., transformational operations between these frames of reference would not be possible in the non-relational 'economics' of any form of a strict dualism. So, as tempting it must be to persist with a short-sighted sense and semblance of positioning a much more profitable middle path to take is the overall 'pragmatics'[260] of invoking and integrating, where possible, a mix of approaches that seemingly appear to afford a greater degree of potential success in that multi-disciplinary approach to such research. I suspect that that is what usually happens but that a more strict conventional attitude to the performance of disciplinary genres, as major discourses, might override the uptake of such approaches in the dissemination, say, of an unofficial report or official reporting. Just as those who insist on the functioning operations of an impossible strongly stated positioning defectively misrepresent what they are actually doing given that they just cannot do 'what they say they are doing in the first place'. Fortunately or unfortunately, as to how the situation arises, in all professions there is an official way things are done, according to voluminous policy manuals, and, the unofficial way things are actually done since to follow official procedures would be, more often than not, either impossible through contradictions in those policy formulations or would realize defective forms of research or practice, and, as intimated, unofficial patterns of behaviour are more usually invoked because those techniques are quicker, more productive, more effective, and more successful… despite the inevitable obstructions and distortions inadvertently embedded in the over-systematization of prescriptive patterns of behaviour that must inevitably misrepresent both the descriptive and the proscriptive aspects of behavior that ultimately cannot be separated from the former, and v.v. Not that policy manuals have no place in the functioning of an organization, just that they should be cast as generalities and expectations, and so on. Just as, in a similar manner, ethical principles should be seen as ethical guidelines resonant with their cultural settings and not enshrined as Ethical Principles where it can be shown that they must both inevitably and interminably conflict as much as the proposition of any theological declarations on the identity of the Divine when ideologically driven from an absolutistical sense of positioning.

[25]

Hence, one of these primary reconsiderations that I have had to reconsider is that disciplinarians, in each and every discipline, should desist from locking themselves into an ideological sense and semblance of a uni-referential position and, instead, adopt and adapt a mix of relevant approaches that appear to proffer the sought-after working resolutions and working solutions desired by that professional. That, in this regard, the philosopher is no different from any other disciplinarian in such matters. [26] (2)

N.T., 5.11.24.

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model what it is actually up to, etc. Thence the plethora of minor discourses that seek, rightly or wrongly, to rectify this possible oversight?).

[260] I use this expression of a 'pragmatics' to indicate a complex sense of a 'conjecturally well-fortified pragmatism that is deontologically centered, existentially oriented, invokes an anti-representational-representationalism, is positively nihilistic, and has adjuncts in both aesthetical and pragmatical types of ordered judgment, etc.'

1b. What ramifications follow from deconstructing and discarding the impossibility of a single ideological ‘position’ for an array of relatively non-ideological ‘approaches’?

> As almost cast in the form of a joke, for a number of reasons, the uni-referential positionalist is like ‘the self-proclaimed occupier of a castle who, lurking around its impregnable walls, just cannot enter their imagined residence’. It’s all an illusion, indeed, quite a delusion too! How embarrassing! [45] (3)

But no illusion or delusion is a perfect illusion or delusion:

> Of course, both illusions and delusions, along with all other forms of misinterpretation or mendacity cannot be just mere illusions or mere delusions, and so on. The illusion is still situated in the world, and, likewise, the deluded person is just as must still in this world. Otherwise, we would not be able to intuit that they are ‘deluded’ and to what extent ‘their partial re-writing of this world as lived is being falsely entertained’, since this overall life-world, this seemingly integrated world-of-life would be there for neither of us… [47]
>
> …That, even both illusions and delusions, along with alleged misrepresentations and lies, all have one thing in common, that, like all texts, they must possess a certain degree of gestalt integration in their intentional deposition since a certain degree of textual integration must be both present and evident because without that requisite degree of qualified integration[261] such texts, regardless of format, could not be approached and formed, therein, deposited, and, consequently, could no longer be either read or written, be either reread or rewritten, and so on and so forth. [48]
>
> That paradoxically, to walk a single path, one can never arrive… that the appearance of walking in a certain direction, thankfully, is only the result of a process of imperfect prioritization since along the way we will also find ourselves having to walk in other directions as well, albeit as sequentially organized, one after the other... and in that illusory sense ‘we only seem to arrive’ as ever a ‘work in progress’ when we think and feel we have ‘found some rest’ along the way… [49] (4)

But, with some optimism, yet balanced with a little less pessimism:

> Ever making ‘progress’… that can be even more so easily lost… Where, either ‘insightfulness’ or a so-called ‘enlightenment’, can appear to be arrived at though unilateral responses of the last instance, etc., but whose interpretations will persistently remain to be forever deciphered… being grateful, finding gratitude, that what is given with ‘one hand’ is not completely taken away by ‘some other’…
>
> [50] (5)

N.T., 6.11.24.

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261 Otherwise, perfected integration would result in the ‘death’ of that (textual) relationship.

2. On one hand, we have languages that set out to represent ‘something’ about the world of lived-experience, and, on the other hand, we have limits placed upon the same, namely, in the form of an anti-representationalism counter to traditional metaphysical ideas on a range of related topics. That ‘something’ I argue is textual when appreciated in terms of an overlapping of alignments or the relative absence of the same. As noted:

> That, in this regard we could appeal to a well-fortified relativism on the grounds that in the suspension the automatic de-suspension reveals a textualized sense and semblance of world that is not flat and will definitively reflect the distinctive non-flatness of our world at large from the perspective, albeit from those perspectives being entertained, etc. Where current forms of textual alignment discerned through suitable processes of reiteration imply the relational directness of such textualized perceptions; reiterative stability of such forms of alignment should that be the case which cannot be other than the case except superficially when it becomes duly noted that co-associated inferences are found to fail and, therein and thereby, inferentially indicate relative forms of non-alignment; etc. [140]
>
> Thence the bones of an anti-representational-representationalism. [141]
>
> But, as a potential counter-objection, granted that perceptions and conceptions might be textualized, but, surely, judgments cannot be textually generated given their appreciation of both textual reports and reportings must be meta-textual through metafication? [142]
>
> Then, retextualized through transformational retreatment! Where such a problem is no longer a problem when viewed through the lens of transformational retreatment in which judgments, in turn, are textualized through de-metafication! [143] (6)

But, more interesting, in my opinion is the relationship being observed between the representative (pretreated as extrapolated), the anti-representational (treated as suspended), and the representational-antirepresentationalism/antirepresentational-representationalism (retreated as both suspended and non-extrapolated) and experienced as an intermingling and intermediation of an overall working suspension. (7)

Thence this correspondence with a conformal theory of truth determination where all three facets are needed to run that conformal economy of truth determination. (8)

Thence the anecdote of the elites, the deplorables and the incorrigibles:

> No doubt there are those hard-working, overt-committed disciplinarians who think along such lines, proclaiming their professions to be a gild of some importance that well deserves to be afforded such privileges and priorities. But, let us politely laugh at such misguided individuals. Because, in lived-reality, we have to live our lives as members of an elite who are also both deplorables and incorrigibles. This is the implication to be directly drawn from a critical philosophy that espouses an

> anti-representational-representationalism. Without extrapolations there could be no suspensions and where, in lived-experience, in order to operate from a critical sense of perspective we need to be a participant in all three classes of such peoples, without the relegation of any one class or the elevation of one class over another. Thence the moral of this deconstructed image of the relative professional, amateur, and secularist. [151] (9)

In effect, a formulation of three truths under the umbrella of a relatively unified conformal theory of truth determination. (10)

Why 'conformal'? In a distant echoing of a conformal field theory if only to the extent that through economic complexification, etc., we can supply transformational rules that would allow us, if successful, to transition between different interpretations with the same set/s of truth determinations dealing with the same relational situatedness being explored and scrutinized. As a way, therefore, of reiterating a relatively invariant set of truth determinations, and, moreover, the further linking of forms of alignment that reinforce current truth determinations until such a time a need for revision is called for. Conformal in the sense of an affirmed reiteration of an apparently definitive truth determination that is either confirmed in real time and/or verified retrospectively. E.g., I am holding a glass of water, and, blink, and see myself still holding this glass of water. Or, e.g., I bought six apples yesterday and am pretty sure no one has eaten any of those apples as yet and so expect to see six apples in that fruit bowl when I return to the kitchen… and where that inference was re-affirmed when I went to the kitchen. (11)

A conformal approach should also cut across the intersection of a various overlapping approaches in a concordant manner with a co-option of our perceptions, expectations, memories, inferences, etc. (12)

By such means reinforcing these notions of textual alignment and where unexpected textual non-alignments would also need to be accounted for. (13)

That even in the re-envisaged resetting of truth values the require harmonization of anomalies must remain a relatively superficial affair. Thence the dismissal of an incommensurability on the level of the non-superficial and hence our ability to translate between different discursive perspectives although more often than not such translations between diverse discursive fields is probably not worth our while. Just as a geologist making sense of a biblical Genesis would find that they would not be doing science, etc. At the same time, finding anomalous exceptions to your conjectures does not ultimately falsify them given that modes of harmonization could well be supplied, just as the conjecture 'that all swans are white' should be amended to include black swans as well.[262] Just as this implicit congregation of three co-associated set/s of truths can be integrated within a transformational scheme that cannot preference any one or two economic facets in this overall performance of a semantic theory of truth determination (as per Tarski, and where conjectures define content, with dialectics mutually co-defining the applied logics, and v.v., given e.g., that a principle of identity is dependent on how we define contents). (15)

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[262] In effect, indirectly critiquing both Kuhn and Popper.

3. That an anti-representationalism implies a positive nihilism, and, at the same time a place for a qualified representationalism, and their mutual cooperation. (18)

> …that representation is arranged through various levels of interpretation of text whose interpreted alignments and non-alignments establishes the 'currency' of those interpretations if I am permitted to express that non-unintended pun. That breakdowns in such forms of circulation occur when we misinterpret such alignments and non-alignments within and between texts through either now correctly interpreting what had been misinterpreted or now correctly interpreting what had been previously misinterpreted. That, as an observation, we note that a more basic level of interpretation has to observe the requisite relative, transformational, isomorphic invariance for these interpretatively super-imposed processes of both re-evaluation and re-valuation to take place. [41] (19)

That mistaking alignments and non-alignments is one thing, but, mistaking conventional extrapolations as other than 'conventional extrapolations' is an error with quite a different complexion and occurs alongside a distinctive set of negative and unproductive ramifications. As honest disciplinarians, we should be in an alignment with what we both 'say' and can 'do', otherwise anything goes and does, and, such misbegotten behaviour is nothing less than a scandal that should be called out. Unfortunately, wedded to major discourses, disciplinarians besotted by misinformed facts, fraudulent narratives, fallacious arguments, non-evidentially aligned conclusions, along with rhetorical and metaphorical abuse, and an inauthenticity in motivation may not even be in a valid frame of mind to apperceive the rampant errors of their ways. Witness the proliferation of strong positions and the fact that positions are even attempted to be held whatever their conjectural basis. One more error, too, that I can also add to my long list of transgressions subjected here to such necessary forms of ongoing 'reconsideration'! (20)

> Now the key points to note here is that representation deals with 'text', 'textual economies', etc., and not speculative materials imputed to inhabit some form of an inaccessible world, be they extrapolated as existing there in a form nominated as either 'noumenal', or 'the thing-in-itself', or 'any other unnecessary form of metaphysical furniture' (and given a putative existence beyond what can be reasonably approached through the utilization of a reconstituted, inter-ordered 'lens', etc.). Moreover, what is even more important is the tabulation of alignments or non-alignments, along with transformational re-alignments, and so on… [44] (21)

Hence this overall economic approach titled an 'anti-represetnational-representationalism'/'representational-antirepresentationalism…' Which, as a trimodal economy can be regarded as consisting of a 'representationalism', an 'anti-representationalism', and an antirepresentational-representationalism. Where an appreciation of the so-called third moment can be the most interesting and overlooked. On par with the compactual – contractual – compactual-contractual economy (and the interesting dynamics of that last, so-called 'third moment'.[263] (22)

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[263] Being 'third' as a result of our arbitrary point of commencement (usually using a harmonic archetypal progression of World-Object-Ego [mirroring consonant field, dissonant focus, and resolution]).

4. That we need to accept non-weak/non-strong (conjecturally well-fortified) 'approaches' that, when and where relevant, could include a mix of either realism, idealism, pragmatism, dualism, absolutism, and/or relativism, etc. Admittedly, quite a turn-around for me. But, this is an excellent example of what it means to be ‘pragmatic’. In its broadest sense, whilst, I should also add, my still preserving a long-established distaste for all strong forms of ideological extremism. Simply substituting ‘non-weak/non-strong approaches’ for ‘non-weak/non-strong positions’. (23)

Metaphorically, an ‘overall well-fortified approach’ is not a ‘castle’ being defended impossibly from inside, but, more a set of conjecturally sound economic representational perspectives designed as heuristic devices to do disciplinary work that in overlapping point out a certain area in our semantic mappings of this world at large. But, from a pragmatic perspective we should employ only those approaches that collectively work for us and add a comparatively greater degree of value than that being invested in such mapped-out devices. So, e.g., a well-modified realistic approach could be one avenue that contributes, say, to a scientifically conducted biological project or program, whereas, in contrast, unless suitably argued for, a realistic approach would more than likely fail in dealing with the calculations in a quantum mechanics or in the operations of a conformal field theory? (24)

Being ‘pragmatic’ is ‘focusing on what appears to be relevant’ to the successfulness of our projects and programs. Here we could define a ‘pragmatic form of relevance’ that allows us ‘to co-opt a larger set of overlapping perspectives’ just as ‘lived-reality’ cannot but ‘co-opt a non-virtual sense of ‘operational space’ from its ‘virtual equivalent’.’ Where this specific intersection allows us to define ‘lived-experience’, e.g., as possessing the requisite degree of causal efficacy over the course of our experience (that must also include the non-casually efficacious). Thence the non-avoidable implication of the non-economic, etc. (25)

But, as an objection, it could be said that an appreciation of textual alignments and non-alignments cannot itself be ‘textual’. This is correct but, through retreatment the meta-textual along with the meta-disciplinary/meta-philosophical/metaphysical overlaps the textual and gets to intermingle and meld through mediation, and, become productively enactive through suspensions, de-suspensions, etc. (26)

Thence the emergence of positive, productive forms of e/valuational formation:

> That through alignments and non-alignments, as realized through an ongoing working economy of re(-)alignment, through treatment in terms of either phenomenological distinctions, hermeneutical relations, and/or the transformation of (both non-systematically and systematically oriented) existential inputs and outputs, we travel through a psychic world of both the relatively virtual and the relatively non-virtual in a manner that far exceeds any mere reductions to the representative appearance of texts as mere, intentionally deposited traces scratched out upon this imagined fabric of this world at large. [46] (27)

5. That the automatic invocation of a de-suspension post the instantiation of a suspension is effectively revelatory... arguing that this relativistical approach should not be dismissed as a mere 'relativism' especially if that approach is well-formed, well-informed, etc., i.e., is well-established, as conjecturally well-fortified, etc. (28)

> A process of reception enacted in a progressive form of insightfulness that basically reflects that extent we have well-represented the nature of our relationships and where, through an adequate degree of suspension, this integrated relativity of experience is then able to provoke, through de-suspensions, the requisite degree of insightfulness required to make our passages through this world at large more successful both individually and collectively… in what one may tentatively ascertain to be a 'well-fortified form of relativism', albeit as subjected to the relevant adoption and adaptation of working suspensions as refracted through suitable processes of inter-mediation, i.e., through the relevant use of such working suspensions, etc..!![264] [17] (29)

As a form of speculation, albeit for the purposes of forming a heuristic model, I tentatively suggested the mixing of an absolutistical approach in pretreatment, and a relativistical approach in retreatment, and, a meta-philosophical/metaphysical approach for treatment, and, where in a mingling in retreatment the metaphysical is metaphorically given 'flesh', so to (mis)speak to concretely be expressed through the ensuing historical specificity both therein and thereafter engendered? (30)

Then, if an economy were to be proposed between a well-fortified (modified) absolutism and a well-fortified (modified) relativism, just how might these two approaches in their own right be mediated through the addition of a third approach in order to create the heuristic of an overall economy designed to perform this form of inter-cooperation? Based on my resolution of the problem as to 'how a bimodal operation could be rendered economic in its ensuing trimodal constitution' I proposed the refraction of the same through an economy of transformational retreatment, which in this case, given treatment is subject to metafication could be viewed as 'metaphysical' in orientation. I.e., as meta-philosophical, and, thereby, as inter-ordered, and, thereafter, as taking a 'metaphysical turn', albeit as reconstituted through the lens of an anti-representational-representationalism, etc. Therefore, that granted hypothetically, just what is brought to this party through having an economy that is a working composite of a well-modified absolutism, a well-modified metaphysical orientation, and a well-modified relativism? In this regard, let me explore what might be gained from such an interaction and how it highlights how all three sub-economies might fruitfully co-operate, and, therein and thereby, mutually re-define each other? (31)

> Casting a well-modified absolutism in the role of pretreatment would ensure that it would take on a hermeneutically oriented disposition. Hence this metaphor of 'setting the stage'. I.e., supplying the props and machinery for a certain type or style of performance… [21] Then, if an economy were to be proposed between a well-fortified (modified) absolutism and a well-fortified (modified) relativism, just

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264 *Pursuit*, III.XIIK.126.

> how might these two approaches in their own right be mediated through the addition of a third approach in order to create the heuristic of an overall economy designed to perform this form of inter-cooperation? Based on my resolution of the problem as to 'how a bimodal operation could be rendered economic in its ensuing trimodal constitution' I proposed the refraction of the same through an economy of transformational retreatment, which in this case, given treatment is subject to metafication could be viewed as 'metaphysical' in orientation. I.e., as meta-philosophical, and, thereby, as inter-ordered, and, thereafter, as taking a 'meta-physical turn', albeit as reconstituted through the lens of an anti-representational-representationalism, etc. Therefore, that granted hypothetically, just what is brought to this party through having an economy that is a working composite of a well-modified absolutism, a well-modified metaphysical orientation, and a well-modified relativism? In this regard, let me explore what might be gained from such an interaction and how it highlights how all three sub-economies might fruitfully co-operate, and, therein and thereby, mutually re-define each other? [20]
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> Casting a well-modified absolutism in the role of pretreatment would ensure that it would take on a hermeneutically oriented disposition. Hence this metaphor of 'setting the stage'. I.e., supplying the props and machinery for a certain type or style of performance… [21] (32)

Of course, we can toy with such ideas, or, later put them neatly in a forgotten cupboard should we wish. The main point of this imaginary thought experiment being looked at here is to primarily focus on this idea that the ahistorical metaphysical-like nature of treatment through retreatment is rendered, therein and thereafter, in a form that is historically concrete and through its revealed specificity emerges, in effect, in a form that could well be designated as insightful that could well be bordering on the not revelatory? (33)

Thence the power of the de-suspension to reveal a world that is anything other than 'flat' (as would be momentarily experienced within the suspension… and where, one would suspect, that this dramatic contrast between a suspended 'flatness' and the de-suspended 'non-flatness' to be if anything perhaps, on occasions, as something that would be quite 'shocking'? Indeed, taking on a radical complexion. (34)

But, a problematic question comes to mind, that if all de-suspended experiences were to be 'shocking' and 'relatively-radical' how is it that in our passages through this world most of the time appears to be quite mundane (unless existential re-appreciated)? (35)

Perhaps the reader or the audience might be better qualified to supply a convincing resolution of this conundrum? Have we become inured to experiencing an existential wonderment when each and every moment could well be revelatory? (36)

But, then in being both 'pragmatic' and 'open' to a resolution of this puzzle, perhaps we should accept the possibility of a bewildering array of solutions? (37)

6. That we need to take on board economic, non-economic, and super-economic approaches, but, most philosopher, disciplinarians, etc., haven't even contemplated the first item on this list! (38)

To insist on just an economic reading, in our interpretations of lived-experience, itself, would have been fatally presented as a 'position'. The apparent integrity of a trimodal approach can be appreciated but should not have been over-insisted upon… with 'salvation' coming in the form of the non-economic.[265] Otherwise, in retrospect, we could not have explained how the relative importance of the economic could have even found itself appreciated if left in endless circulation. (39)

> …even the arising of the interpretative powers of an overall economic lens is not enough since if we were to stop there we would be privy to only the eternal recycling of a virtual world of the intentional… unable to make decisions and never escaping the back and forth between the suspension and the de-suspension… a recipe no doubt for the paralysis of a permanent psychosis, a profound psychosis like that experienced by a catatonic schizophrenic unable to remain embodied in a working-body that no longer responds to intentional commands, remains mute, along with no deliberate directedness of movement except intermittently, in frustrated busts of activity that are immediately closed down through an endless process of decisive-indecision and indecisive-decision making. [61]
>
> The point of these (impossible) 'pure' economic observations is that we cannot live by the economic alone. To move from the virtual formation of an intentional decision to its non-virtual, causal co-option we need to also invoke a non-economic realm, an experiential dimension where we can experience, through enacted processes of resolution, the irruption of unilateral-like responses of the last instance, etc. That through whose natural auspices we espy the chaotic nature of the very chaotic nature of intentional experience itself. Without trans-intentional judgment there could be no intentional content, and, judgment is performed through working-suspensions as initiated, e.g., through the interrogative rhetoric of questions, through analogical modeling, through the tentative and provisional invocation of apparitions of the literal, etc. Where through such irruption we either witness the mere iteration non-critical, the reiteration of the critical and/or the relatively more chaotic re-iteration of the potentially radical, i.e., the relatively-radical. Arguing, in the regard to the latter that the radically-radical just could not be comprehended unless approach through relatively-radical increment, increment by increment until the non-observation of the radically-radical is translated into these incremental appreciations of these now innovatively displayed, relative-radical increments. [62] (40)

Therefore, the imputation of the economic illustrates how we perceive and apperceive; the non-economic as to how definitive unilateral behaviour is enacted; and the putative super-economic accounts for appropriation of the relatively-radical. But, which insightful disciplinarians are cognizant of such 'shifts' or 'turns'? (41)

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265 This transgression being detailed in the fifth essay.

7. That we should bite the metaphorical 'bullet' and equate 'metaphysics' as 'meta-philosophical', etc., albeit as reviewed and scoped through the lens of an anti-representational-representationalism, and, furthermore, equate this reconstituted vision, or version, of 'metaphysics' as an 'inter-ordered phenomenon through a reduplication of ordered phenomena', i.e., as six distinctive types of interconnected judgments... with the implication, therefore, that 'doing metaphysics' involves doing a mix of the following, namely,[266] a categorical semantics (dealing with identity, transformations, time and space, etc.); an interconnected psychology-sociology (without a hard division between the same), political appreciation of power preferably from and existential-pragmatic and compactual point of view; economic appreciation of contracts, etc; science; and, history, or, rather, histories [267] of the past, present and future. Obviously, considerably expanding the traditional boundaries of a traditional metaphysics? (42)

Noting also that intermingling or intermeddling, through mediation between metaphysical-like treatment and existentially oriented retreatment, the metaphysically oriented operations are rendered in the object language through the specificity of the latter phase of transformation. Where the three phases of transformational retreatment can be viewed as mediations and where the overall trimodal intermediation[268] of the same then renders the entire transformation operative in unilateral terms of a responsiveness that, hopefully, is suitably appropriate, proper and apposite[269] and whose evaluation and valuation can be approached in pragmatic terms of reference, i.e., as finding the successful degree of functional fluency desired in terms of the enacted resolution both aspired after and successfully refracted through arbitrational terms of reference, etc. (43)

That such an understanding is also preparatory to a beneficial comprehending of the nature of the existential orientation:

> An appreciation of the trimodal nature of the economic, albeit as qualified by the necessities of the non-economic, etc. A need to reinvest in a reconstituted version of the metaphysical and its extension in inter-ordered terms of reference. That the specificity of the existential orientation observes the inter-mingling of both ordered and inter-ordered phenomena. That the existential orientation has an intimate relationship with the non-existential orientation just as the compactual dimension both underlies and underlines the pragmatical functions of a contractual dimension… [235] (44)

But, operations able to induce a non-existential or existential orientation all appear to be sequentially bimodal and not trimodal in constitution? (45)

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266 Refer to the diagram or chart in *Pursuit*, III.XIIL.74.

267 As explored in *Book* 6.

268 Where intermediation is a dynamically balanced overall suspension of all economic correlatives, and, mediation is the dynamically balanced mediation or mingling or meddling of two economic correlatives through a relative suppression of the third economic correlative. As discussed in *Book* 11.

269 Technically having pre-defined 'suitable' as 'hermeneutically appropriate, phenomenologically proper, and non-systematic existentially apposite'.

8. That we need to appreciate bimodal operations though a trimodal transformational lens... resolving the following philosophical problem, namely, given all operations appear to be bimodal - operator and that operated upon - how do we accommodate the same within the economic necessity of a trimodal economy? (46)

Admittedly, this problem is quite esoteric... but whose resolution is important to understand since we would have, otherwise, a blatant contradiction between the dictum that economies are trimodally constituted and the short-sighted observation of the apparent self-sufficiency of a bimodal operationalism:[270] (47)

> In a similar vein to the operation of treatment let me now focus on the resolution of the philosophical problem that automatically invokes a trimodal economy in order to relationally situate the bimodal nature involved in the working application of a sequential operationalism, etc. Where, in effect, this problem is resolved through the invocation of a trimodal economy of transformational retreatment.
>
> [85]

> By assuming a trimodal economy of transformational retreatment with the operation in question proceeding in the moment of treatment and whose productivity will be subjected to retreatment, and, thereby, restoring the original meta-level of representation as introduced in its initial moment of pretreatment. [86]

> Overseeing this should be its critical, and potentially radical, supervision as exercised through the complex lens of an integrated 'working pragmatics'. [87]

…so, in relatively superficial terms, we can appear to function through the bimodal lens of an operationalism, but, more correctly, such an approach, less superficially, is trimodally constituted in transformational terms… (48)

For how else could and should we understand the point of an operation, since its very function is to institute a process of transformation… and transformation could not be appreciated in bimodal terms. Indeed, how could the very transformational transition, itself, be appreciated given that we also need to stand back from the pretreatment and the posttreatment, etc. (49)

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[270] Decades ago, in a 'pre-economic era', I proposed the necessity of a bimodal operationalism as central to the very formation of sentences, etc. I.e., the necessity, namely, of a logical subject and an operator. That if an apparently sensible sentence possessed just a single word, then the missing feature was to be supplied in the overt rending of that sentence once appropriately understood. In revisiting this former dictum, we also have to take into account the context of that operating process and where all three aspects need to be refracted through the trimodal lens of a process of transformational retreatment. So, e.g., in order to explain how the uttered sentence in one word of 'John' might be understood we need to supply a verbal component plus the addition of the element of the context of its utterance. So, e.g., perhaps as. 'John come here', as said by Jack who wanted to give John his birthday present. Of course, without these explicitly and implicitly understood features we can only speculate from the generality of its implied functions, say, as an imperative or similar. A bit like the annoying habit of having to listen to people yell into their mobiles all manner of titillating information that we can only speculate about given the non-knowledge of its contextualization, who the other person is, and so on.

9. That we should review a ‘well-fortified pragmatism’ as a ‘pragmatics’ centered non-exclusively in a deontology, as existential, anti-representational, positively nihilistic, etc...[271] (50)

As here laid out in detail when exploring the nature of the pragmatic turn (beyond a mere pragmatism that more confuses the pragmatical with the deontological, etc.):

> This specific ‘turn’ is to be defined beyond the expediency of a weak pragmatism that is merely pragmatical. Indeed, ‘pragmatics’, as an umbrella term, needs to be redefined beyond even a well-fortified pragmatism by including a philosophical integration of the following perspectives or approaches, namely, its centering in the in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological[272] with adjuncts in the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical; as having a positive-nihilistic form (that transcends a mere representative positioning); as being anti-representational but also investing in well-formed and well-informed forms of representation, etc., subjected to ongoing processes of non-suspension, suspension, de-suspension, extrapolation and non-extrapolation; and, above all, must also assume and express an existential orientation with an emphasis on relational enrichment without overlooking the non-existential richness of that same relationally-situated relational-situation… whilst, at the same time, be in a state of an overall conformity with our appreciation of its overall truth status or conformance. [101]
>
> An enriched version of this ‘pragmatic turn’, is better expressed through the form of a narrative, that, in turn, can be further enriched through its transformational retreatment, etc.[273] [102] (51)

Why outline this extended detailing of the existential-pragmatic dimension? To help us navigate its complexity (and its equal simplicity as outlined in footnote 14). (52)

Where and why we should not confuse this general understanding of the ‘pragmatic’ with the trans-cognitive order of the ‘pragmatical’ and its focus on, say, the efficient, the effective, the efficacious, etc., without at the same time not also including this aspect as an ‘adjunct’ when and where appropriate, etc. Furthermore, incorporating this complex phenomenon of the pragmatic within a working pragmatics that duly recognizes the metaphysical, the narrational, the existential, the anti-representational scoping of the same, as functioning by virtue of its positive nihilism, etc., (since the dogmatic concept of ‘substance’ is non-operable, and, a skeptically absent ‘logical subject’ implies nothing transformed… and no possible existence of a lived-experience likewise)! (53)

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[271] What might this final ‘etc.’ refer to? That a ‘pragmatics’ is, at the end of the day, ‘first, that which actually functions, and, second, that which functions more effectively!’

[272] Note my use of the expression ‘deontological’ has nothing to do with so-called ethical Principles with a capital ‘P’ as might have been expressed in a traditional (representational) metaphysics but more along the lines of the necessity of a compactual dimension underlying the expected functioning of a contractual domain, as a set and series of lived-imperatives, etc.

[273] Where by ‘etc.’ is meant ‘through economic complexification’, and, where its transformational retreatment, in turn, can be read as just one form of economic complexification.

10. That there is a place through innovation for the radical... along with the conventional need for its super-economic re(-)appropriation… each relatively-radical increment by each relatively-radical increment… (54)

I have used the innovation of 'sliced-bread' as a way to understand that the radical can manifest as a series of interconnected innovations where each innovation needs to be individually appreciated in order to understand both those before and after. (55)

Corner stores would slice bread, but, bread making factories took charge of this aspect and recognized the greater utility of sliced-bread… and how they could charge for this simple and cheap addition of added value. But, then, sliced-bread needed to be wrapped. So, it had to be wrapped. This meant, moreover, that bread could now be branded like everything else at that time, etc. Establish the value of your brands, and charge more on that basis of product recognition, etc., etc. Where one innovation inevitably leads to another… (56)

Richard Rorty, e.g., recognized the importance of innovations, the creation of 'novel' and ironically 'final' vocabularies, etc. But, how are innovations to be arrived at? One increment at a time. Where we can comprehend the relatively-radical and not the radically-radical (unless, it too, over time, is sequentially approached). (57)

By implication, that the productive disciplinarian is innovative! That productive societies resolve their social problems in a similar manner when and where necessary, etc! (58)

But, such innovations are the result of the irruption of non-economic processes and their issuing of unilateral responses of the last instance, etc. But, their comprehension in turn, demands a critical process of ongoing re(-)appropriation, etc. Thence the necessary imputation of the super-economic dimension as an 'open' field for such conventionalization of the relatively-radical.[274] (59)

Thence the necessity to distinguish between the negative concept of the non-economic unable to function economically through either not being constituted in an economic manner and/or where our appreciation is not constituted in an economic manner, and, a positive use of this expression of the 'non-economic' as the irruption of a unilateral response, etc.[275]

> …In other words, an economy of approaches, at a bare minimum, is a trimodal economy of approaches along with the necessity for a non-economic style of resolution within the imputation of the hyper-economic within the imputation of the super-economic. [163]

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[274] 'Open' in the sense of not being treated as a position but as an overall approach that can be approached form an infinitude of perspectives and where a 'pragmatics' rules on questions of relevancy, consequential ramifications, conformal validation, existential intervention, etc.

[275] As explored in *Book* 11.

> Metaphorically we do not point with a ‘one-ended stick’. Just as we cannot have a ‘one-sided coin’. ‘Imagine’ if you could, and then speculate on the ‘tossing a one-sided coin’? There would be no point calling it, if we could, as we would know the outcome would be both the same and impossible. But, then could ‘we call the tossing of a two-sided coin?’ That, too, would be just as impossible, since coins are actually three-sided although, correctly, the possibilities of our call are bimodally constituted (unless the coin landed upright on this third edge). In the same vein, we now should know that a bimodal operation more correctly needs to be reviewed through a trimodal lens of a transformational-retreatment (or some transformational form of an equivalence)… [164] (60)

Furthermore, this interest in the super-economic, etc., is directed to assist us in better understanding our place in this world at large…

> Thence the co-equal importance of these three economic aspects and these three super-economic levels, namely, respectively, statements, propositions, and propositional-statements, and, the economic, non-economic and the hyper-economic. Where, together, an integration of these features then allows us to differentiate, resolve and enact beneficial forms of both personal and interpersonal engineering, and so on. In the process, being able to discern between the relatively non-critical, the critical, and the potentially radical (as explored elsewhere). In effect, demonstrating a successful working pragmatics theoretically, practically and critically.
>
> [203] (61)

But, given the underdetermination of each and every perspective, and an approach that might wish to orient itself accordingly, how is the disciplinarian to overcome the inevitable charge of being accused that they were merely fabricating their claims, and where there is no reason why other claims should not also be either accepted or rejected, accordingly, and so on? (62)

Well, there should be room for everyone, and, innovations are needed prior to the advent of ‘succeeding’ innovations to be arrived at… in the future realization of once impossible disciplines that could not have been contemplated until the conventional appropriation of such necessary prior innovations. That a viable ‘pragmatics’ is ‘now to hand’ to decide such issues of relevance, conformance, comparative functioning, and so on. (63)

Unfortunately, ruling paradigms have the habit of having a zombified existence in the world of disciplines when they have a shelf-life that is all too often extended far beyond their due by date. Charitably, we could and should argue that all approaches have some validity that is greater than the quanta of their mere import, but, that the real question remains to what comparative extent is such surplus e/valuational formation is better able to beneficially expedite our passages through this world at large, be that either personally or interpersonally? (64)

Similarly, on the other hand, mere falsification of an observation, or similar, is never enough in this day and age of spin, mis-information, and worse, to disrupt its continual adherents from continuing to loudly proclaim forms of over-commitment (whether seriously believed by those same proponents or not). How can this dis-conformal defect of the Contemporary era, so wedded to simulations, and so on, be better addressed and successfully redressed? (65)

I would like to argue that we need to recognize, encounter, and engage with a 'universal pragmatics' as a 'working pragmatics' open to non-economic resolution, etc:

> This indication of a 'universal pragmatics' must be seriously contemplated given that 'what works for one person' and is 'found to work for some other person as well' must portend the possible existence of a set of attitudes and approaches capable of advancing the successful fruition of our aspirations.[276] But, as should be already understood, very few of our many aspirations will ever be realized and that those aspirations that are entertained in an aspirational economy must be super-intermediated in and through the more encompassing economy of arbitration. The fact that this arbitration is enacted upon a working basis of a general consensus and social solidarity, must give us grounds for hope since it would follow that whatever better facilitates such arbitration, for the mutual advancement of all the parties concerned, must be none other than a 'general pragmatic's capable of such differential facilitation.in ongoing richness and enrichment of our primary relationships as they are found, in turn, in their relational situatedness. Since no relationship is an island unto itself despite the experiential semblance of its essential uniqueness presented through that holistically engendered enterprise... [229] (66)

But, to affect such a revolution in thinking we would have to give up much along the way, like misbegotten 'positions'… although being amply rewarded for such necessary sacrifices…

> Along the way, numerous other philosophical rectifications of understanding have prompted myself to replace my now re-perception, or apperception, of such now misbegotten modes of thinking. Of course, as understood in the reception of the relatively-radical, all recognizable patterns of evolution can only occur step by step, increment of comprehension by increment of comprehension. Therefore, it is not so much 'out with the old, and in with the new' as a renewing of old understandings in a subtle re-wiring of such thought along with its subsequent re-thinking. A process sometimes of glacial shifts that... can suddenly move mountains in an avalanche of metaphorical ice and snow, rocks and gravel... sweeping all before it. Being a little less dramatic, what have I to demonstrate such truly 'novel' innovations, such 'final' vocabularies, such 'definitive' histories, and the like? [230] (67)

But, is this revolution, this 'turning around' possible?

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[276] The simple test of a universal pragmatics is a pragmatic one, namely, 'that whatever works should be run with... until such a time that it ceases to be so comparatively productive'.

> What could be more symbolic of this turning around of prior patterns of conceptual thinking than the threefold division of disciplinarians into those who are the elite and who 'practice suspended non-extrapolations' *versus* the deplorables who 'practice suspended extrapolations' *versus* the incorrigibles who 'practice neither suspensions nor non-extrapolation...' in the shocking realization that all three aspects are implied in an insightful economy overseeing the formation of a conformal appreciation of lived-experience. Or, when translated into a philosophically recognizable language can take on the form or nomenclature of either an anti-representational-representationalism and/or a representational-antirepresentationalism divided between its 'three supporting legs' of a qualified representationalism, an anti-representationalism, and a representational-antirepresentationalism/antirepresentational-representationalism. **But, at the end of the day, that only through a dynamic balance of all three of these correlated economic aspects involved in the conformal process of truth determination can a systematic sense and semblance of an existential dimension be properly comprehended in such a manner that it can be co-opted, or, rather, where it can co-opt us, in the service of our relationships in order to oversee the beneficial engineering of our interactions with others.**[277] **Since, it is only through the joint participation of those well-fortified collective forms of intervention that we can participate in an existential freedom fostered through(-)others as enacted through those unilateral responses of first instance...** Thankfully, for many people, they intuitively know such things, but, for the more dimwitted, like myself, we seek complex philosophical explanations of what for others could be as 'simple as walking along a path and admiring the view..!!' [236] (68)

Then, again in the impossible task of perfecting our future, through an inevitable succession of innovation, etc., could this 'progress(ion)' be even stopped?

> Albeit to that extent both understood and circumscribed by the limitations of our being in this world at large with others who do not necessarily concur with us and could well resist such interventions despite the fact, overall, that a social consensus and a social solidarity will inevitably be fostered, at least eventually, should we faithfully persist in this form of a blind optimism that seeks, sometimes unwisely or ironically, **in an ongoing 'perfection' of the future..!** [232] (69)

Where, finally, we must put our optimist faith in the existence of a 'working pragmatics' whose imputed existence seems to be guiding the unseen hand of our individually and collectively bound destinies… **given that we only find an existential sense and semblance of freedom through(-)other..!?** (70)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 3.12.24.

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[277] 'Intermediation' as 'the dynamic balance of all three economic correlatives' is also defined as the process of a 'working suspension'. 'Mediation' being defined as 'the dynamic balance between two economic correlatives' and can give rise to the third correlative – a bit like the stereoscopic vison of our two eyes that then gives us the difference of third image in 3D.

XIIN. A Fourth Digest
(That can be appended to *The Seventh Book*…)

Reconsiderations:

On Those Occasions Where We Change Our Mind
Or Should Change Our Minds

BOOK 12

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique…

N. K. Tointon

020 – 2024

XIIN. A Fourth Digest (That can be appended to The Seventh Book…)*[278]

0. Preamble

Appended to *The Seventh Book*… is *A First Digest* (C) in the form of two additional modules.

Similarly, appended to Book 9 is A Second Digest (12Y)

Again, *A Third Digest* (XIR) is constructed that can be added to *The Seventh Book*… where a summation of my latest research is formulated in a more precise format.

In this, a Fourth Digest, (XIIN) I summarize important aspect of Book XII along with the 'modified re-qualifications' articulated in that book. (i)

1. Introduction

In looking for a 'device' to more efficiently facilitate the formulation of this Fourth Digest I have fallen back on my threefold division of 'Theory, Practice, and Critique', in the form of three additional modules, which one might also regard more as 'Theory, Critical Practice, and Radical Critique', but, will also here be titled: *The Theoretical Substitution of* '*Approaches*', *The Practical Treatment of Transformation*, and, *The Critical Appropriation of the Radically Emergent*. (ii)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 2.12.24.

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278 * A link to the latest version: http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html

XIIN. A Fourth Digest:

The Theoretical Substitution of ‘Approaches’,
The Practical Treatment of Transformation, and,
The Critical Appropriation of the Radically Emergent,
And,
A Concise Overview

2. I. The Theoretical Substitution of 'Approaches'

'The qualified, and, then, only re-qualified!' (0)

Deconstruction all 'positions' *qua* positions, be they weak, strong or non-weak/non-strong, and, substituting conjecturally well-fortified 'approaches' through on-going processes of 'triangulation'. (1)

Because positions cannot be contemplated as such given their apposition to the consistent opposition of other relatively integrated approaches. (2)

Because, on reflection, that is how so-called 'positions' are approached. (3)

Where the positionalist has a 'castle' they can never enter! (4)

Deconstructing and rejecting all unimodal, bimodal and trimodally closed or open 'positions' and focusing, instead, on presentations of the economic, non-economic and the super-economic (in the critical appropriation of the relatively-radical, etc.) (5)

Thence the complete dismissal of both weak formats and strongly ideological formats regardless of whether those formats are characterized as either realistic, idealistic, pragmatic, dualistic, relativistical and/or absolutistical, etc., in the constitution of their claimed characteristics. (6)

In a distinctive contrast, borrowing from the same, whenever relevant and fruitful, if re-represented as an economic set of conjecturally well-fortified approaches seeking to triangulate the phenomenal-phenomenological characteristics of the relational situatedness in question, etc. (7)

So, e.g., a realist approach in quantum mechanics might not be so appropriate given the contradictions between 'realism' and 'locality', and so on. (8)

Being open to a 'universal pragmatics' as a 'working pragmatics' that allows us to discover, in comparative terms, more beneficial operations in both the personal and interpersonal engineering of e/valuational formation/s' preferably with an augmentation of the relatively non-existential and an enhancement of the relatively existential. (9)

Where the complexities of a working pragmatics is cognizant of: namely, its centering in the in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological[279] with adjuncts in the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical; as having a positive-nihilistic form (that transcends a mere representative positioning); as being anti-representational but also investing in well-formed and well-

[279] Note my use of the expression 'deontological' has nothing to do with so-called ethical Principles with a capital 'P' as might have been expressed in a traditional (representational) metaphysics but more along the lines of the necessity of a compactual dimension underlying the expected functioning of a contractual domain, as a set and series of lived-imperatives, etc.

informed forms of representation, etc., subjected to ongoing processes of non-suspension, suspension, de-suspension, extrapolation and non-extrapolation; and, above all, must also assume and express an existential orientation with an emphasis on relational enrichment without overlooking the non-existential richness of that same relationally-situated relational-situation… whilst, at the same time, be in a state of an overall conformity with our appreciation of its overall truth status or conformance.[280] (10)

Or, more simply, optimization as initiated non-economically through internal processes of enacted resolution. (11)

Observing here the unilateral moment of the last instant, discerning the next, and subjecting the same to non-virtual existentialization and intervention through expedition of the unilateral response of the first instant (in this chaotic re-direction of trajectories) albeit through the expectations and anticipations of a consequential analysis. (12)

Hoping to find a transformational alignment between these moments, and the historically envisaged moments of past, present and future, etc. (13)

Channeling our aspirations through the wider auspices of an economy of arbitration as we navigate between both private and public domains. (14)

Finding a middle path through both suspensions and non-extrapolations and the enaction of existentially oriented patterns of behaviour re-directed though de-suspensions and re-extrapolations as we recognize, encounter, and engage with the 'old', the 'new', and the 'radically renewed and innovative irruptions of the non-economic'. (15)

Where working-suspensions can be 'entered; into from a learnt repertoire of stratagems, like, e.g., asking questions, invoking analogies, invoking *contra*-intentional content and/or counter-functional patterns of behaviour, and so on. (16)

Discerning that different disciplinary functions are informed by different disciplinary differentials, and, where disciplines are historically ensconced in social systems whose interactions can further contribute to both social problems and their eventual resolutions. (17)

Where economies can be explored internally through economic correlativity and explored externally through economic complexification, etc. (18)

Where judgments are ordered in atomic or molecular forms or in terms of their distinctiveness accommodation and transformations. (19)

Where a meta-philosophical appreciation, effectively, is metaphysical, albeit in a reconstituted format, but, where ordered and inter-ordered phenomena then intermingle through transformations retreatment in a practical specification of lived-experience. (20)

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280 *Pursuit*, III.XIIL.101.

3. II. The Practical Treatment of Transformation

Conjectures are economic compositions of pre-given, hermeneutically oriented synthetical statements; ahistorical, phenomenologically oriented analytical propositions, and non-systematic, existentially oriented conjectures as propositional-statements. (21)

Mirroring transformational retreatment, respectively, as pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment, and, where a bimodal operationalism is refracted through the same. (22)

Where the meta-disciplinary character of treatment, presented more as an inter-ordered set of phenomena, casts a metaphysical like shadow over all practical patterns of transformational retreatment. (23)

Where through mingling and intermingling, respectively through mediation and overall intermediation, we find viable metaphysical notions overlapping transformational patterns of retreatment be that either non-critically, critically, and/or radically. (24)

Thence our ability to identify and, thereby and thereafter, recognize, encounter, and engage all manner of phenomenally oriented experiences. (25)

Semantically locating and mapping such phenomenal-phenomenological identities; supplying a suitable repertoire of genres of behaviour that further reinforce a mirroring of such mappings, and, then through their mediation, as a bimodal suspension, continually help us to directly re-live the full sense and semblance of the concrete present in the lived-reality of such engagement, preferably with an existentially oriented complexion... (26)

Transforming the relatively *ad hoc* into the relative less *ad hoc*; work our way from aspirations to arbitrations; discern the economic, the non-economic, and the super-economic; recognize the inter-ordered dimension as meta-disciplinary, meta-philosophical, and metaphysical in orientation; work our way through a transformation of ordered, inter-ordered, and socially systematic perspectives; parallel the ahistorical and the trans-historical through retreatment, etc., etc. (27)

Supervising the practical employment of our efforts through the suitable performance of an apposite narrative, and v.v. (28)

Remaining open to the innovations of the novel through the irruption of the relatively-radical. (29)

Invoking a working-pragmatics in an evaluation of our work as a disciplinarian, be that as either a professional or an amateur (since in the initial utilization of novel approaches we all begin as ‘amateurs’)… and through the requisite mindfulness oversee the utilization of working-suspensions and the ramifications that must follow on in the wake of all forms of behaviour… since the critical appreciation of practical matters necessitates a suitably conducted process of critique through working-suspensions, etc… (30)

4. III. The Critical Appropriation of the Radically Emergent

Recognizing the relevance of the provisionally pre-given, as that ‘to hand’, through pre-judgmental prejudices, etc. (31)

Encountering proper modes of treatment through suspensions, invoking well-formed genres of behaviour, and becoming well-informed; deconstructing the defective and re-constructing the relatively less effective as the relatively-effective. (32)

Engaging both the relatively-critical and relatively-radical. (33)

Through posttreated retreatment observing the provisional re-constitution of the newly pre-given as that ‘now to hand’. (34)

Overseeing amelioration through various stratagems. (35)

I.e., through the mitigation of the hermeneutic contributions to our narratives through adopting and adapting appropriate genres of behaviour and the factual re-assessment of our facts (in terms of their ontical status). (36)

I.e., through the remediation of phenomenal-phenomenological through deconstruction and reconstruction. (37)

I.e., through ongoing re(-)normalization in which apparently valid approximations are tested, retested, re-tested, etc. (38)

Appealing to pragmatic criteria for an evaluation of our critically enacted efforts, etc. (39)

Finding a conformal appreciation of our qualified representations; scoped within an anti-representationalism; where the interplay of the former, through both mediation and intermediation, iteratively outlines the alignments and non-alignments resident in our discourses in such a manner that we can transcend the understood underdetermination of a specific perspective through an enrichment of overlapping connections that allows us then to transformationally transition between a diverse nexus of perspectives… whilst, at the same time, appreciating that no perspective in itself can be exhausted, and that an infinitude of perspectives await their individuation in the hope of their envelopment, and the emergence of a positively existential overflowing of the relatively-radical whose critical re-appropriation must be by each incremental innovation by each incremental innovation… within the conventional appreciation of a working-pragmatics… validly beholden to a mix of evidence, testimony and inference as the intentional content correctly subjected to the guidelines of Tarski… in their reiteration to provisionally re-establish the current parameters of the conformal! (40)

5. IV. A Concise Overview

'Finding that which 'works',[281] and then seeking to find with others that which works even better, and so on'…[282] as supplying the first and last working-definitions[283] of a 'universal-pragmatics'..!![284] (41)

Noël Tointon, Wentworth Falls, 2.12.24.

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[281] I.e., whatever establishes an apparent fulfillment of our intentional objectives. E.g., walking in a straight line is usually the shortest distance between two points, however, if a mountain intervenes in between then an easier route might be our going around that mountain instead.

[282] In other words, seeking and finding relevance in e/valuational formation. Earlier I noted that 'relevance' as a concept can be extended to spill over one frame of reference or perspective to encompass a much wider range of perspectives, and, through that form of extension proffer a greater degree of e/valuation. As an analogy we could imagine looking at one tree in a forest at random. When we walk around that tree, we see it from a number of angles. However, in walking back into that forest we will soon lose sight of that tree and so the tree only has a small range of perspectives to be seen within. On the other hand, looming high above that forest we see a distinctive mountain top, and although occluded by some trees, from time to time, still, that mountain is seen form a greater range in perspectives (which for convenience could be measured in terms of square kilometers, etc.). We very quickly ascertain that this mountain is the object being seen above the trees in this forest. We do not need to climb that mountain to fully understand it, and, form the sightlines of a few perspectives, and in a virtual adumbration of other sightlines imagined, we also recognize the fact that we do not have to walk all the way round that mountain, again, to fully understand it as a mountain *qua* mountain. Interestingly, our stereoscopic vision combines two of those sightlines, at a time, in the merging formation of an emergent sightline now in 3D. This observation, in effect, proffers a parallel to how 'approaches' will also combine to produce an emergent sense and semblance of an 'overall approach' that, again, should not be reduced to an impossible position. Although, if the disciplinarian avails themselves of a working suspension, then some of their mistaken conjecturing can be undone, although, unfortunately, the de-suspension will again be misinterpreted through the conventional institution of such misbegotten habits. A short sampling of text should illuminate whether the disciplinarian in question is cognizant, e.g., of the economic, etc., whether they know how to suitably argue, exhibits a certain degree of existential authenticity and exercises their use of narrative in an informative manner, etc. (in light of the holistic nature of textual depositions in so far that they can be seen to reflect the overall integrity of their non-economically instantiated patterns of resolution, and so on).

[283] The easy part is intuiting the e/valuation seemingly to hand, and, how that e/valuation is being amplified (through either non-chaotic augmentation and chaotic enhancement although both aspects must be co-present economically). Then, we need to be cognizant of this complex character of the pragmatic dimension as itemised in paragraph 10. So, e.g., the pragmatic must be primarily deontological in orientation but must also be scoped through pragmatical and aesthetical adjuncts. Where, an adherence to 'approaches' is more sympathetic to the positively nihilistic nature of identity. So, therefore, a metaphorical walking of a 'middle path' that will be further instantiated through the suspension and its de-suspension. Moreover, an anti-representationalism is also better instituted when representations are seen to be textual artefacts subjected to an overlapping of alignments or the non-overlapping of non-alignments

[284] In effect, returning the complexity of the overall pragmatic dimension to the simplicity of its 'functional effectiveness'.