

On the Nature of the Radical

BOOK XII - Part IV

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

**How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique...**

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2026

*This set of essays is dedicated to my philosophical friends
David Richie, The Reverent Henry Thornton 'Harry', Robert, John,
Brian, Francesco, Jakob,
Lindsay, Souad, Paul, David, Mark, and Mark...
A.C. for ever-looking after myself,
Fellow wisdom seekers at the Continental Philosophy Group,
Many teachers and mentors,
And numerous others who have helped me
To both shape and test my thoughts...
In gratitude, I proffer this small token of my thankfulness....*

Index

Book XII – Part IV (Pursuit12Part4)

On the Nature of the Radical

Section A: An Initial Introduction

Section B: A Second Introduction

Section C: A Third Introduction: Dialectical Reflections on the Ethical, the Political, and
the Existential

Section D: A First Exposition: Dialectical Explorations of the Ethical, the Political, and
the Existential

Section E: A Second Exposition: A Radical Re-Understanding of the Non-Critical, etc.

Section F: A Third Exposition: A Radical Re-Imagining of the Existential

Section G: A First Set of Conclusions: Re the Ethical, the Political, and the Existential

Section H: A Second Set of Conclusions: Re the Conformationalization of Experience

Section I: A Third Set of Conclusions: Re the Nature of the Existential, etc.

Section J: Some Additional Conclusions: Re the Anticipation of a Radical Theology

Section K: A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities

Section L: A Seventh Digest that can be Appended to *The Seventh Book...*

On the Nature of the Radical

BOOK XII - Part IV

The Pursuit of Philosophy as a Discipline

Volume III

The Prescience of Philosophy as a Discipline:

Beyond Criticism:

**How Should Philosophy
Progressively Perfect an Ongoing Critique of its Discipline,
And,
Through Such Constructive Insight,
Perceptively Appreciate the Nature of the Human Condition??
A Critique of Theory *versus* A Theory of Critique...**

N. K. Tointon

2020 – 2026

Section A: An Initial Introduction:

On the Nature of the Radical¹

*Without the continual advent of the relatively-radical
We would still be using rocks and pieces of wood
In the shadow of caves and lean-tos, but, now,
Instead, we have tools imprinted on 'grains of sand'
In a place called 'home' we can no longer point to...*

0. Pre-Introduction and Introduction

The expression 'radical' comes in two primary flavours where one flavour is impossible to experience, at least for the present, and, where the other is only just possible to experience, namely, respectively, the 'radically-radical' and the 'relatively-radical'. The former is so radical that it cannot currently be critically appropriated, but, one day could be comprehended when suitably mediated through a successful sequence of increments that are relatively-radical and connected in a relatively-radical manner able to be critically appropriated step by step. The latter is chaotically arrived at incrementally, but expressed non-incrementally, through the advent of such chaotically re(-)self-organized 're-direction'.² We can envisage this taking place in an 'economy of critique' which, as a 'heuristic device', could be provisionally constituted as consisting of three economic cor-relatives, namely, 'one-part relatively-non-critical, one-part relatively-critical, and one-part relatively-radical', and, where any one correlative, as in the articulation of any economy, can be co-mutually defined through the joint negation of the other two parties. Through reiteration we can say that in our apparent moving from the relatively-non-critical to the relatively-critical it takes place through the iteration of a non-chaotic process of 'redirection', but, in moving from the relatively-critical to the relatively-radical, this sudden shift, instead, is through a chaotic process of 're-direction', i.e., in and through an 'economy of re(-)direction'. In the opposite direction, we find the relatively-critical needs to appropriate the relatively-radical in and through the evolution of a successful economy of 're(-)appropriation', and, where a return to the non-critical is merely exercised through an overlooking of the relatively-critical through some form of diffraction or scattering, or similar, i.e., in an effective 'loss of direction'. Then, to such considerations, we need to understand just how does the overall radical nature of both the relatively-non-existential and relatively-existential somewhat define our integrated experience of both the relatively non-existential orientation and the relatively-existential orientation within the overall re(-)encompassment of the relatively-radical, etc. As well, at the same time, the evolution of our understanding of the ramifications of the relatively-

¹ * Link to earlier essays: <http://www.homestead.com/Noelshomepage/Noelshomepage6.html>, etc. Or, essays in book form: <http://https://noelshomepage.homestead.com/pursuit.html>

² My nomenclature of 're(-)E' indicates an 'ongoing trimodal economy E' where 'E' consists of the 'phenomenological presentation of E, the hermeneutical representation of E, and the non-systematic, chaotically oriented re-presentation of E'.

radical, etc., will also be delineating a detailed unfolding and re-envelopment of the overall argument that the world of the conformal is seemingly designed as if relatively-self-sustainable and inevitably proffering some form of a progressive conformalization in its experiential unfolding of the very nature of lived-experience itself? Where, as a complex imputation, through economic repetition, and subjective-intersubjective arbitration, etc., such sense, semblance and significance collectively emerge not only economically, but, also non-economically. But, that granted, then, the ‘non-economic resolution of the relatively-economic’ will also need to be immediately re-appropriated hyper-economically within the relative confines of the super-economic given, otherwise, both the endless, theoretical, non-productive nature of the economic and an experiential failure to appreciate the disruptive significance of such non-economic resolution. Where either the endless circulation of the economic would just be economically non-productive and incapable of any degree of extra-economic resolution be that in either non-causal, epistemological and/or causal, ontological terms of reference, or, where the relatively-radical process of resolution would find itself merely dissipated upon the sands of an immediate non-comprehension to forge a forgetfulness that was never formed in the first place. But, given the unilaterally decisive nature of decisions of the last instance, etc., then this imputation, or its equivalent, or its improvement, needs to be articulated, among other things, in order to extricate ourselves from the psychic insanity of a suspended world that knew no form of the de-suspension... an aspect of judgmental experience that seems to have been so totally overlooked by phenomenologists, hermeneuticists, and existentialists, *et al.* Moreover, through an over-emphasis upon the worlds of the disciplinary, disciplinarians have overlooked the contrasting and representative world of the secular upon which, and without which, an existentialization of our interventions in lived-experience could not be even entertained. Therefore, to remedy such ensuing disciplinary, philosophical, and metaphysical defects, let me conduct the following explorations into the nature of the relatively-radical in the hope of explicating a suitable extrication of ourselves from such subsequent dialectical conundrums, namely, on one hand, say, the necessary economization of this world of lived-experience, and, on the other hand, the equally necessary non-economization of this same world of lived-experience, along with the necessary experiential re(-)appropriations of the relatively-radical by the relatively-critical, and so on in order to experience the emergent, ongoing conformalization of lived-experience, as both subjectively and intersubjectively shared in this overall world-of-life, in this cultural-intercultural life-world that characterizes our lives-as-lived in this world at large... (0)

Hence the nature, formation, and appropriation of the relatively radical. Thence, to this same list, we would also need to add, ‘just what are the ramifications of this appreciation to be extracted from this working-comprehension of the overall nature of the relatively-radical?’ To this end, let this extended-essay explore such considerations concerning the relatively-radical under those four headings, namely, ‘Nature, Formation, Appropriation, and Ramifications’. But, to begin, let me re-articulate certain key aspects of previous research under a heading of Preparation that will be relevant to the success of this ensuing exposition. For convenience, let me do this again through the abbreviated lens of the eightfold path for the explication of conformal truth determination as just previously outlined in Book XII, Part III. In effect, at each stage on this eightfold path, reintroducing philosophical techniques and their ramifications as arrived at through the

pursuit of such procedures. Including a series of emails recounting recent radical shifts in my current thinking. Ending, as usual with a Provisional Conclusion, etc. (1)

1. Preparation for this Radical Exposition...

This Eightfold Path in Our Heuristic Appreciation of Conformal Truth Determination was given the following headings:

I. Virtual Intervention

1. Problematization
2. Economization
3. Complexification
4. Conformalization
5. Re(-)Conformalization
6. Simplification

II. Non-Virtual Intervention

7. Interventions
8. Ramifications. [17] [401] (2)

Under the first step or stage of **problematization**, as a (reduplicate) problematization of the philosophically problematic, as a meta-problematics, to be enacted through a reduplication of the problematic, I noted how the philosopher should be more concerned with the problematic nature of either philosophical problems and/or the philosophical problematization of the relatively non-problematic in a contrast to the disciplinarian whose rightful concern is more with the problematic nature of their specific discipline, although, conducting, in effect, a philosophical turn' or, at the very least, enacting a 'philosophical-like turn'. Hence, in effect, the 'working philosopher', in a contrast with the disciplinarian in general, effectively takes a 'meta-philosophical turn' as a 'metaphysical turn', where the philosopher is now, technically, a 'metaphysician', but, where through transformational retreatment, the research of that metaphysician is then returned, through a 'metaphysical return', ostensibly, to a more philosophical basis (allowing, in effect, that such a philosopher can then argue that metaphysics is a sub-economy within the broader concept, and discipline, of the 'philosophical'). However, the philosopher who is not engaged, either advertently and/or inadvertently, in the productive invocation of metaphysical turns, cannot be truly referred to as a 'working philosopher' given their inability to appreciate the problematic nature of the philosophically problematic along with the epistemological depths required for the ongoing processes of re(-)appropriation required, I would argue, for more productive forms of such insightful invocation. (3)

I can make this argument because to pose the question, ‘what is the problematic nature of the³ problematic?’ in effect, engineers a reduplication, and not a duplication, as previously defined elsewhere. I.e., where the equation x of x is non- x , or not- x , or meta- x . Where, e.g., an ordered product becomes an inter-ordered product elevated by one meta-degree through reduplication and not through duplication that preserves the ordered status of the dominant operator. Where the concept of the ‘ordered’ reflects my belief that primary or more basic or simple judgments come in six flavours, namely, the pe-essentially essential as atomically discrete phenomenological units expressed in semantic terms of reference; the aesthetic-like integration of the former in a molecular format; deontological judgments (at the center of existential judgments), pragmatical judgments of utility; judgments of potentiality or possibility; and, ontical judgments of a conformally viewed ontical disposition. Where the meta-philosophical transformation, through reduplication, is to be viewed as a metaphysical turn, albeit as both viewed and reviewed in non-traditional terms of reference, i.e., as an inter-ordered phenomenon and only as an inter-ordered phenomenon. But, as just noted, in a philosophy of transformational retreatment the metafication of the treatment, as reflected in the meta-status of the inter-ordered product, and its elevation by one meta-degree, is re(-)normalized through retreatment through a process of de-metafication (in a de-elevation by one meta-degree). Thence my overall argument that both a ‘metaphysical turn’ (through the working suspension) and the ‘metaphysical return’ (through the automatically ensuing de-suspension of the working-suspension) are being both engineered in a process of transformational retreatment along with the articulation of the imputed preservation of a certain relative transformational isomorphic invariance. Where the determination of the preservation of a certain distinctively discerned isomorphic invariance allows us to then proceed with the conformalization of our conformal truth determinations through critically observed processes of re(-)conformalization. At this point let me clarify this concept of the conformal, in an economic process of re(-)conformalization is arrived at through ‘reiteration of either real-time confirmation and/or retrospective verification (and/or prospective conjectural imputation), etc.’ Where by ‘etc.’ we must include reiteration as conducted by ourselves, demonstrable articulation as exhibited before others, and a propensity to be eventually be treated either in the affirmative or dis-affirmative in an eventual process of an existentially-pragmatic form of consensus that emerges over the longer-term. Hence this abbreviated formula **that conformance is reiterable, demonstrable, and amenable to both existential and pragmatic forms of consensus building over the longer-term...** (4)

However, before I proceed further, I need to address a very interesting philosophical problem that I have created for myself, namely, when is a process of metafication,

³ As examples of this contrast between reduplication and duplication we have the following exemplars. In regard to reduplication we have ‘the heat of heat is temperature (and where temperature is neither hot nor cold)’. The fact of facts (as a reduplication of the sixth trans-cognitive order) is history (as a sixth inter-ordered product). In contrast, in the operation of a process of duplication we have ‘the temperature of this cup of coffee is not yet, say, at a temperature that is comfortably drinkable’. The history (as a sixth inter-ordered product) of science (as a fifth inter-ordered product) remains a history (as a sixth inter-ordered product and not as a science as a fifth inter-ordered product, nor as a super-ordered appreciation of the competence of an inter-ordered product nor as the mere meta-treatment of the same unless directly viewed through the lens of a philosophy of a transformational retreatment wherein we are then also returned to both the meta-status and inter-ordered status of the initially presented dominant operator).

this elevation by one meta-degree in meta-status, a process of either duplication or reduplication? In duplication the status of the operator is preserved, but, in reduplication the resulting product is elevated in ordered status. So, e.g., an ordered product takes an inter-ordered, metaphysical-like status, and, an inter-ordered product would then need to take an extra-ordered status, and so on. Let me explain in some detail as to why this degree of differentiation is important to understand. (5)

E.g., imagine the mere act of a comparison of two sets of facts concerning the possible interpretation of a certain situation where such considerations could be considered as being conducted in a duplicated process of meta-reflection. So, if such scrutiny were conducted on the level of those sets of facts *per se*, say in terms of their relatively intrinsic constitution as reviewed in terms of their apparent non-contradictory nature, their non-incoherent nature overall, and a general concordance with a set of cultural-intercultural inventories of relatively non-disputed facts, then, such research whilst meta-enacted remains merely duplicated and not reduplicated. On the other hand, in a contrast involving reduplication, we would find not only an elevation in meta-status by one degree but also an elevation in ordered status also by one degree. Moreover, by an ‘elevation of ordered status by one degree’ is meant, say, the shift from an ordered status to an inter-status, or an inter-ordered shift to an extra-ordered status, or an extra-ordered shift to a super-ordered status with, perhaps, little real need to go any further in such an ordered progression?⁴ An argument for such ordered elevation through reduplication can be inferred from observing an array of statements that can be read in this fashion, i.e., to the extent that such reduplications are understood as reduplications *qua* reduplication in contrast to mere duplications where this natural differentiation seems to be so easily appreciated in such an intuitive manner. E.g., the following are read as duplications, which you can easily recheck for yourself – the ‘fact (6¹) of a possibility (5¹)’ as a fact (6¹); the ‘possibility (5¹) of a fact (6¹)’ as a possibility (5¹); the ‘ethos or style or aesthetics (2¹) of a certain history (6²)’ as an ethos or style or aesthetics (of that history); a history of aesthetics (2¹)’ as a history (6²); the comparative competency of a certain set of historical constructions (6²) as a relative competency (6³); the ‘deontological constraints (3¹) of a certain politics (3²)’ as the deontological constraints (3¹) (expected to be applied in that specific political situation), etc. In contrast, reduplication produces an ordered elevation by one degree in ordered status, which, again, you can recheck for yourself – the ‘fact (6¹) of facts (6¹)’ as a history (6²); the ‘history (6²) of a history (6²)’ as its historical competence (6³); the phenomenological-semantics (1¹) of a phenomenological-semantics (1¹) as a categorical metaphysics (1²) (dealing with the semantic categories articulated in and through those distinctive phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented terms of reference); the ‘distinctively integrated aesthetics (2¹) of the distinctively integrated aesthetics (2¹)’

⁴ E.g., say, sixth trans-cognitively ordered ‘facts’ to inter-ordered ‘histories’ to extra-ordered forms of historical ‘competencies’ (where historical constructions are judged in comparative terms of how comparatively competent they appear in their interpretation of the historical, and where the next stage in this progression would be to ask the reduplicative question of how competent is such judged competency in pragmatic terms which might be better left to the eventual pragmatic consensus formed on such a topic by, say, critical historians, radical philosophers, innovative metaphysicians, practical secularists, etc.).

as the ensuing psychological-sociological spectrum of distinctive psychological-sociological types of experience (2^2),⁵ etc. (6)

Or, in general the duplication involved in the ' x^n of y^m ' has the ensuing ordered status of x^n , and, the reduplication involved in the ' x^n of x^n ' has the ensuing ordered status of $n+1$, i.e., x^{n+1} . (7)

But, going beyond the linguistic classification of statements into those involving either duplications or reduplications how might we theoretically account for such definitive differentiation? (8)

In the duplicative operation of ' x^n of y^m ' we can nominate ' x^n ' as the 'operator' and the ' y^m ' as the 'operand' as long as the ordered status of ' n ' does not equal the ordered status of ' m '... where the rule of duplication will ascribe the ordered status of the ensuing product z as equal to the ordered status of the operator, i.e., ' z^n '. Or, in other words, under such asymmetrical circumstances, the dominance of the operator persists in the formation of the ensuing product with ordered status of the operator. (9)

However, how do we understand and hypothetically model the nature of reduplication? (10)

In other words, it would seem we must ask, 'how does the operator operate on the operator in such a manner so as shift the ensuing ordered status of the final product in such a manner that it has been elevated by one degree?' Here, I think we need to translate this question into the form 'how do we operate on the ensuing operation, as if an operand, when produced by the same operator?', and, where we distinguish between a hypothetical, simultaneous, ahistorical-like 'process' of reduplication and a hypothetical, sequentially conducted historical process where the operator merely repeats its function on the historically produced operation as if that operation were, in turn, an operand. As an illustration of the latter we can note the operation of flipping a coin sitting on a table and then repeating that same operation. The 'flipping of a coin', when repeated, is merely the sequential flipping of a coin. In a contrast to this example, we can note the inherent differentiation between a 'first order differentiation' and a 'second order differentiation'. E.g., in a cold weather climate, it is better to have a bath around midday when the temperatures might be a bit warmer than in the middle of the night when the temperatures are more likely to be colder. So, the heat of the hot water in the bath is cooling and we can note this difference in temperature as a 'first derivative'. Then, as an observation, we note the rate it cools is greater in colder weather and that this accelerated rate of change in cooling, under these specific circumstances, is a 'second derivative', which, in accordance with general expectations, is greater, i.e., faster, in colder weather (and, indeed, is somewhat proportional to the comparative differences in temperature to being with).⁶ However,

⁵ E.g., cognitive intentions, trans-cognitive judgments, etc., versus dual-interactions, families, communities, etc., etc.

⁶ We can note a similar phenomenon when drinking a cup of tea or coffee. In cold weather the window of opportunity to drink that beverage can considerably shrink in proportion to the comparative difference between the ambient temperature and the initial heat of that drink once served.

er, even though the temperatures are taken in historical time the second ordered differentiation is assumed to have occurred simultaneously at a certain point or period of time t . Or, we can consider the fiction that we determine the first derivative and the second derivative as if measured simultaneously at that certain period or point of time t . Moreover, if the third derivative is found to be zero then we can assume the second derivative follows the exact course of a certain function f in that period or point of time t . That, on this model of the first and second derivatives we can treat a reduplicated function f^2 as the ‘ahistorical-like process of the same operator simultaneously operating on the operation possessing the enactions of the same operator’. So, e.g., the possibilities (as potentials or probabilities) of possibilities (as potentials or probabilities) as being instrumental in the formation of sciences (in the plural reflecting the differentiated natures of those possibilities, potentials, probabilities, etc.). So, e.g., the phenomenology of chemicals in their interaction with chemicals gives us a ‘chemistry/chemistries’, and, the physicality of physical phenomena gives us a certain specific physic or the generality or particularity of a certain physics as reviewed in the plural, etc. That this same observation can be applied to all inter-ordered phenomena, hence metaphysics (1²), psychologies-sociologies (2²), politics (3²), economics (4²), along with sciences (5²), and histories (6²) (in the plural and, as well, non-exclusively divided between preferences for either histories of the past, present, and/or future). (11)

To augment this understanding of the seemingly ‘ahistorical character’ of reduplication (and its manifestation as if it were a ‘process’, i.e., as a double operation) we can reference the virtual simultaneity invoked in relating first derivatives with second derivatives, and v.v. Moreover, by introducing concepts like ‘working suspensions’, ‘de-suspensions’, ‘harmonization’, ‘retreatments’, etc., we can put more metaphorical ‘flesh on this sketch of a bone’ articulated through this mere formula for reduplication. Furthermore, let me introduce, as an allied problem, in the form of the following question and how its resolution also impacts upon such understanding, namely, ‘if operations are apparently bimodal in character how are such operations to be understood as operating within the trimodal constitution of that economy in question?’ By noting the relatively covert nature of field-effects in the performance of that operation in both its differentiations (and integrations) in lived-experience. E.g., as noted, in cold weather we have noted the accelerated heat loss of the bath as incurred through the more rapid cooling of that bath water. (12)

It could be argued that operations only operate under the auspices of suspensions and where the ‘suspension of the suspension’ delivers the ‘de-suspension’ whose reduplicated force is instrumental in delivering the ensuing reduplication or duplication in question. Furthermore, the type of preference being given within that economy allows us to note the ensuing type of treatment realized thereafter, namely, the delivery of synthetically oriented relations through hermeneutically oriented forms of synthesis (or reconstitution) *versus* the delivery of analytically oriented predicates through phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented forms of analysis (or reduction) *versus* the delivery of non-

systematic, existentially oriented nominatives, or, a more ostensive complex of the former.⁷ (13)

As an imputed rule of thumb, we could also argue that under metafication (or extrafication or superfication) in a process of reduplicated treatment the ensuing product is both elevated by one meta-degree in its co-associated orderfication and in its co-associated metafication, etc., by re-purposing the rules of transformational retreatment which argues ‘that treatment is elevated by one meta-degree and the ensuing process of retreatment is de-elevated by one meta-degree’ (through the ensuing force of the operational-transformation, respectively, of the suspension and the de-suspension). Wherein the envisaged process of transformational retreatment returns all forms of production back to the apparent level of either the philosophical, or the disciplinary, or the secular (without cancelling the transformational characteristics of the processes of either duplication or reduplication⁸). Where, basically, reduplication is an ahistorical process of transformation in ordered status in contrast to a process of duplication that merely preserves the ordered status of the operator. (14)

Now, let us explore the constitution of the interrogative economy (as would be invoked in the asking of any general, particular, or specific question) at the very basis of the philosophical economy [treated as one-part hermeneutical in orientation (5¹), one-part phenomenal-phenomenological in orientation (1¹), and one-part non-systematic existential in orientation (3¹)]. (15)


A primary tool to be invoked, and here explicated in detail, is the ordered scrutiny of the philosophical economy as refracted through the re-viewed auspices of the interrogative economy (along with the soon to be explicated de-suspended extrication of ‘the secular economy’ as counter-paralleling the former economies (in their mirroring of the archetypal economy), and v.v., as an inverse economy (to those structured directly in line with the archetypal economy). I.e., as demonstrated in the asking of a question the envisaged trimodal correlatives of the interrogative economy are seen to parallel, through economic complexification, the envisaged trimodal constitution of the philosophical economy, but, whose full explication necessitated an ordered exposition with the surprising result of our needing to discern the inversed form of the secular economy whose very existence supplies the necessary counterfoil to the existential economy to the extent existentialization is only through the relative-existentialization of the relatively non-existential nature of this apparent representation of the secular economy, and v.v. Now,

⁷ Under the effective umbrella of the Boolean operators, respectively, of Or, And, and Not (and whose negations, in turn, give us the Nor, Nand and Dnot, which, in turn, respectively give us the six orders, namely, hermeneutical-possibility 5¹, phenomenal-phenomenological 1¹, the deontological-existential 3¹, the integrated-aesthetical 2¹, the functioning-pragmatical 4¹, and the factually-ontic 6¹. Where, e.g., the operation of the Boolean operator Or is conducted as a dis-conjunctive suspension, the operator And is conducted as a conjunctive suspension, and the apparitional moment is conducted as a suspended/negated product of the former and, at the ‘same time’, subjected to a double negation in order to move the apparitional to a literal affirmation or an effective dis-affirmation. Where the negation of Or (as a dis-conjunctive suspension) gives us Nor (as a negative dis-conjunctive suspension), and the suspension of And (as a conjunctive suspension) gives us Nand (as a negated conjunctive suspension).

⁸ So, e.g., the metaphysical-like constitution of the historical, through reduplication, is characteristically preserved even if re(-)presented on the ‘ground’ level of the philosophical, etc.

admittedly, this summary is technically complex, but, once understood is only based on a small incremental series of very simple ideas which I will now attempt to replicate in a non-complicated manner as is possible in this instance. (16)

Asking a question invokes an ‘either/or’. Over there, in the distance, “is that person my friend called ‘John’?” Meaning, is that person either ‘John’ or ‘not John’? To answer a question, I first invoke a metaphorical reply in the form of like, namely, is that person like John, or, not like John? He certainly ‘looks like John’, but, looking like does not imply a literal ‘is John’. So, a second reply demands, effectively, a literalization of our response. I refer to this second reply as an apparitional reply given this need to find a literal decisiveness in our judgmental discernment given the metaphorical *qua* metaphorical cannot be treated literally, given ‘like’ cannot be a literal ‘is’. However, naturally viewed through the lens of the philosophical economy we have a considerable problem. Based on the conceived similarity of the archetypal economy, as underlying all economies, the ‘philosophical economy’ was defined as ‘one-part hermeneutical (based on the ‘either/or’ as the Boolean operator ‘Or’), one-part phenomenological (based on the metaphorical ‘And’), and one-part (non-systematic) existential ‘Not’ (as a proscriptor)’ it is obvious, on closer inspection, that as things stand, we do not yet coincide with a literal ‘is’. Fortuitously, re-read through a hexamodal scheme of an ordered exposition we find that the double negation of this third moment duly gives us a factual and literal ‘is’ with the implication that the apparitional moment requires a process involving a double negation and not the simple negation of the existential moment alone. Let me simplify things through the use of the following diagram (where the indicated numbers signify trans-cognitive orders as distinctive types of relatively simple judgments):



Let me interpret these parallel tripolar schemes of the interrogative economy and the philosophical economy (coinciding with the fifth, first and third trans-cognitive orders) and its ordered translation along with the implication of the counter-parallel secular economy (coinciding with the sixth, second, and fourth trans-cognitive orders). In the following translation (of the interrogative economy through the parallel lens of the philosophical economy) let me attempt to explicate this in simpler language (and relegate the technical terms to the sections enclosed in brackets). (18)

In the posing of a question, indeed, in the asking of any question, our economic emphasis is on the hermeneutical moment centered on the either/or (as the Boolean operator Or). In a more complex question, the entailed differentiation to be answered is not just a bimodal ‘either this or that’, but, for convenience let us put complex questions to the side since it is to be understood that the same considerations will be found to apply. In effect, a well-constructed question either explicitly or implicitly pre-answers the possibility of itself by supplying the differentiation to be decided upon in the answering of that question. (Technically, through economic complexification, we can consider the asking of the question prioritizes the nature of this economy as ‘rhetorical’, i.e., as invoking the generalization of the ‘either/or’, i.e., the Boolean operator Or. In more detail, this can be envisaged as first asking what precise meta-textual, hermeneutical genre of activity is to be correctly invoked in order to form the outline of that questioning, as defining the general nature of those interrogations). But, as already noted, the first reply is metaphorical, i.e., the supplying of an answer with a tentative ‘like’, i.e., the Boolean operator And. Where the metaphorical, more correctly, simultaneously, is a ‘both like and not like’, i.e., as an operator that invokes the Boolean operator And). So, a second reply is called for that I term as ‘apparitional’, i.e., giving the appearance of a literal is’ or as a ‘not-is’ (in the negation of the premise of that question). But refracted through the third moment of the interrogative economy, as read through the parallel lens of the philosophical economy, we find a simple negation does not by itself produce the required response, but, however, a double negation does. I.e., either affirming the premise of the question, namely, that ‘P is actually P?’, or, instead, having to affirm the negation not-P is true, i.e., P is not true?’ So, by expanding our trimodal terms of reference through the hexamodal format of our six trans-cognitive orders we see that the apparitional moment is fully ‘answered’ through a double negation that, then, is either affirmed or denied. Then, we can join the metaphorical ‘dots’ to propose a secular economy (comprising the sixth trans-cognitively order of factual judgments, second trans-cognitively ordered aesthetic-like integrations of consilient perspectives and the imputed integrity of the salience required in our pragmatical considerations as conducted in the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical (which is not to be confused with the broader idea of the ‘pragmatic’ centered, existentially, in the third trans-cognitive order with its secondary adjuncts in both the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical. Coherent, non-contradictory, and narrationally integrated sixth trans-cognitively ordered facts also give us the consideration of our apparent ‘standing’ or ‘propinquity’

[or ‘non-standing’ or ‘non-propinquity’] to the relational situatedness in question⁹).¹⁰ Arguably, everyone has a similar standing in how we review a set of propositions, once understood, however, in viewing the intentionally re(-)presented contents of such experiences this aspect will vary considerably. (19)

The upshot of this exploration of the interrogative economy is the need to also recognize an ‘inverse economy’ that I have designated as being representative of a ‘secular economy’. I would argue this inverse economy of the secular also parallels the aspirational economy, the contractual economy, and the narrational economy given all these economies must individually overlap with the sixth trans-cognitive order of the factually ontical as in, respectively, the need for a certain realistic realism, etc; that we need certain narrational facts (in a general concordance with a cultural-intercultural inventories of the factual), etc; and, that in contracts the fact of the parties concerned, along with their inter-related obligations and other responsibilities all need to be suitably observed and accordingly documented within the terms of the ensuing contract. But, given the dictum that all economies are thought to mirror the archetypal economy how do we explain the very existence of an inverse economy that is somewhat anti-parallel to the construction of the archetypal economy? By invoking the reduplication of the archetypal economy as naturally forming an ordered economy where the suspension of the archetypal economy, or its nominated representative, say, the philosophical economy or the existential economy, forms the secular economy or its nominated representative, and, where the suspension of that suspension, i.e., its de-suspension, re-forms its parallelism with the archetypal economy or its nominated representative/s. (20)

Hence the **economization** of a nominated economy is fully articulated when its economic correlatives are fully explicated in overt terms of reference, be that through either the articulation of a trimodally constituted observation, the trimodal delineation of relevant linguistic categories, and/or the mere heuristic imputation of such trimodal aspects, etc. E.g., respectively, the observation that we speak of simple time in terms of the past, present, and future (and complex time, with six variants, in terms of one tense dealing with one or other of the other tenses, etc.); or, speak of phenomenological descriptions, hermeneutical prescriptions, and non-systematic existential proscriptions; or, devise a gestalt economy on the intentionally-trans-intentionally basis of an imputed focus, field, and frame (or framing), etc. Or, by extension, invest in an inverse economy with a trans-cognitively ordered emphasis on a conformal representation of sixth ordered facts and their related forms of standing, a second ordered integration of overlapping perspectives as a form of an aesthetically oriented consilience along with the functional integrity of a set of fourth ordered pragmatical functions whose overall salience is able to enact certain sequential operations capable of discharging our co-associated intentions, etc. (21)

⁹ E.g., am I in a position to both see and correctly identify that person over there as ‘John’? Without such standing we cannot directly answer the related question, however, we could indirectly resolve those interrogations through the use of either testimony and/or inferential conjectures,

¹⁰ ‘Trans-cognitively ordered’ merely means as a ‘trans-cognitive judgment’ *versus* that same judgment rendered in cognitive, intentional terms within the cognitive orders. Arguing that judgment is both trans-conceptual and trans-perceptual in orientation, i.e., trans-cognitive (given that a judgment, as per Kant, is trans-conceptual in its epistemological constitution).

That the virtue of such economization is to recognize how certain economies entail others; can be entertained in parallel; have one or two of their economic correlatives overlap; take an inverse format; or are enveloped, in turn, in more encompassing economies. (22)

Thence the virtue of **complexification** in which economies can be entertained in some form of an aligned parallel that, in effect, either directly comments or indirectly commentates upon the economy subjected to such parallelization, and v.v. Thence the formation, on a more formal basis, of a dictionary of economic parallels that can be immediately invoked in order to enrich our current understanding of that being subjected to such close comparative scrutiny.¹¹ (23)

Hence the example, e.g., that the ‘past’ is more in an alignment with ‘analysis, reduction, the phenomenologically particular, treatment, and its remediation of intentional content, etc.’, etc. (24)

That complexification can be entertained in terms of the isomorphic invariance to be observed between economic correlatives; economies entertained in parallel; within and between aspects involved in the imputed stages envisaged within processes of transformational retreatment; between ordered forms of productivity, etc., and so on. (25)

With a richer understanding of the situated-relationships in question we are now in a better position to observe the currently apparent truth status of that being placed under such scrutiny... given that context automatically confers such a differentiation that might need to be contested should considerations arise in order to warrant such a more radical form of re(-)conformal re(-)contextualization. (26)

As noted, truth determinations are everywhere, and, most of the time we do not feel the need to seriously question the same. However, in a philosophical context, in taking this metaphysical-like turn, such considerations are now ever-present to a certain extent given that we find we remain beholden to the same truth ascriptions in our return to the everyday through the metaphysical return to both the relatively philosophical and the relatively non-philosophical spheres (of the non-secular disciplinary worlds and the world of the relatively secular). (27)

As noted in a recent letter... (28)

...thanks for your reply to my example of holding a cup of coffee in my hand (it works for me better than just a glass of water as I will demonstrate) (as an example of our near-incontrovertible evidence that lived-experience can be stamped, rightfully or wrongly, with its truthful ascertainment). (29)

In this contestment, that our appreciation of experience is not only discerned, but that all such discernment is also ascertainment in terms of a parallel co-appreciation of its truth determination, we probably agree more than disagree...

¹¹ Such a dictionary was first tabulated in *The Seventh Book*... Refer to Appendix A

but, my argument in this regard is just the start of a probing of experience along more intentional lines, refracting a more holistic perspective as intimated, e.g., by Strawson, etc. I.e., that truth determination is not a localized, atomic affair, but, a more global arrangement where systems of truth determination are engaged with, where all facts are not equal in terms of their conformation, and where some facts have considerably greater degree of assurance, etc. Treating truth determinations as an isolated process of individual determinations falls under my description of both a non-superficial form of fraudulence, despite the sincerity of short-sighted philosophers, etc., and a superficial form of fraudulence when distorted by demonstrable misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, etc. (30)

Now, when we experience something, we are experiencing something (that, however, might not be exactly what we first thought). But it is true we are experiencing 'whatever' as we think we find it being presented, say, holding a cup of coffee when having a coffee with a friend, or in a dream, or in a remembered event, or in my imagination, or hypnotised to think my glass of water was actually a cup of coffee, etc. (31)

To differentiate the lived-reality of any of those experienced events we phenomenologically see to what extent our modal experiences are satisfactorily met. So, the apple both tastes nice, is known by me to have been bought in the market yesterday, and satisfies by pangs of hunger unlike the other types of experience as cited above. Noting these three headings of a satisfactory meeting of modal expectations in our appreciation of the modal complexion of the phenomenal situation¹² in question, accounting for the history of our re(-)presentations, and has the requisite causal efficacy in line with our reasonable expectations... (32)

By 'modal complexion' is meant their spectrum or density and intensity of experience. I would also add propensity for thematic iteration (so my coffee is hot, but cooling, and this then gives me a generous window of opportunity to drink the same). (33)

All intentional processes have intentional content as well... and my experience of content can also reconstruct my constructions... so, e.g., I thought my cup of coffee was cool enough to drink but found, instead, it to be still far too hot to drink (so experiences cannot be just passively constructed, etc.). (34)

Now, I say this ever so nicely, but you must be neither superficially fraudulent nor non-superficially fraudulent (lol). A deluded person, or a person who is seriously mistaken, is being superficially fraudulent by letting some form of over-committed, pseudo-psychotic-like conspiratorial thinking dominate their thought, or, being too beholden to misinformation, disinformation, or mal-information, etc., etc., and, in the process, seriously distort their thinking, say, through mistakenly accepting certain facts as conformally evaluated facts when that is not the case, by

¹² I.e., our intentional translation of the phenomenal event in its phenomenological setting or situatedness.

mis-appropriating arguments that are patently fallacious, or settling on conclusions that are fraudulently arrived at, etc. By non-superficially fraudulent I am channeling Quine's deconstruction of the analytical-synthetical distinction by noting, among many other things, that facts are contextually generated and their ensuing truth determinations cannot correctly be isolated from their intentional backgrounds of introduction, argumentation, etc., as expressed and validated through conformally pre-appreciated subsidiary and secondary statements, etc., etc. (35)

That in this light, some statements have a greater authority without sidelining a necessarily healthy skepticism. I.e., that all facts, as statements, are not equal in their factual status. For example, it's not currently worth our while to contest the overall veracity of the statement that 'Julius Caesar cross the Rubicon... as signalling the beginning of a civil war both initiated and won by Julius Caesar'. Of course, in comparison, what we envisage he may have had for breakfast is another matter entirely. In that instance, as an enquiry that, through a lack of evidence, can only be evaluated as entirely speculative in tenor... (36)

Philosophers are all too often non-superficially fraudulent in how they isolate and treat facts as if like individual grains of sand tumbling through an hour-glass... (37)

That, correctly, facts come as agglutinated combinations and should not be sprinkled about like confetti. Where those concatenations seriously colour the truth status of any additional statements we might like to separate or add to such an agglomeration. That is why we can both imagine a person like Father Xmas and also know that he is only a mythological figure in a certain culture like our own... because this 'cultural fact' is already pre-packaged as only a 'mythological fact'. Otherwise, we are like very young children who think Father Xmas actual exists merely because we can think of him as if existing in non-mythological terms. However, most children are more perceptive than we might credit and are more likely to play along with such a charade in order to express some of their desires and aspirations, be that for Xmas gifts, treats, etc. Indeed, discerning this culturally entertained entity as 'mythological', is expressed as an 'idealized cultural projection' that pragmatically functions at the time of Xmas in 'accordance with certain rituals and behaviours enacted in the spirit of a certain period of festivity towards which people demonstrate an obviously anticipated enjoyment, and so on'.¹³ (38)

Evidence, broadly conceived, should decide such issues. So, people talk 'about' a mythological Father Xmas, therefore, Father Xmas exists as a designated index (indexical) of such cultural(-intercultural¹⁴) conversations. Because those

¹³ Alluding to the rhetorical question posed in *Pursuit, Volume II (Book II)*, namely, 'where is Father Xmas?'

¹⁴ E.g., we get Xmas-like rituals observed around the world from Japanese department stores to shops in Lhasa, Tibet.

contexts are mythological in tenor, therefore, Father Xmas (F.C.) has only a mythological form of existence. (39)

Now, Tarski to the rescue. This expression 'about', in effect, is elevated by one meta-degree. So F.C.' is T iff F.C. (and where it is understood 'F.C.' is here only represented/constituted in mythical terms only).¹⁵ (40)

Of course, Tarski does not give us either the particular and/or specific rules of evidence that would then allow us to make such determinations in those more precise terms of reference, supplying only the general conditions for making such truth determinations. But, without such general rules no general truth conditions could ever be supplied let alone either particular or specific levels of identification. (41)

Thanking you for your comments. They have spurred me to make this reply as a critique of my claim 'that truth is everywhere, should not be avoided, should be confronted, and is generally co-presented with all disseminated descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions, etc. That, in effect, in understanding truth determination we need to take a much more holistic, non-atomic, non-isolated style of an approach. As a response, on my part, I have found it necessary to be more detailed in my exposition, where I have needed to dot all my 'i's and cross all my 't's... in the light of your comments.... (42)

As already noted, the 'conformal' is defined as 'reiterable, demonstrable, and amenable to consensus formation (in both relatively-existential and relatively-non-existential terms of reference)'. Hence this conformal economy necessarily needs to invoke such reiteration, etc. Thence this economy of **conformalization**. (43)

Where through reiteration, conformalization is re(-)normalized (and, therein and thereby, overseen to become less relatively-erroneous) through ongoing economic processes of **re(-)conformalization**. (44)

But, this vision of the economic only makes sense if we also invoke its resolution in non-economic terms of reference. Let me briefly explain. (45)

The harmonic economy has the economic correlatives of focal dissonance, background consonance, and resolution experienced through a form of intentional subjectivity co-associated with the nature of that relationship between that focus and field. But, a definitive resolution also apparently ends that resolved relationship. So, in order to either appreciate either that definitive resolution of that disrupted relationship or to appreciate

¹⁵ I.e., the meta-concept 'Father Xmas' (F.C.) is true (T) if and only if (iff) the concept Father Xmas is evident (say, in cultural-mythological term). In *Conformalization*, I rewrite this Tarskian formula in terms of a philosophy of reduplication. I.e., the reduplication of orders produces an inter-ordered form of productivity which can then be translated and reinterpreted through a metaphysical lens, albeit in non-traditional terms of reference. Otherwise, I prefer to utilize this formula as a meta-conceptual format *versus* a conceptual format (through that form of reduplication) and not have it left merely in a more realistic format where the concept is true should its realistic representation be demonstrated as evident.

the partial ongoing resolution of that continuing relationship we need to re-appropriate such transitional-transformation/s, albeit no longer purely in terms of that original economy, hence the imputation of the hyper-economic within the orbit of the super-economic whose trimodal configuration can be proposed as an economic basis, non-economic resolution, and the re(-)appropriation of the hyper-economical. Indeed, proposing, as if by default, an internal economy of the economic be re(-)appropriated by the encompassment of the relatively external economy. With the internal factors of dissonance of distinctive differentiations, the consonance of accommodations, and harmonic transformations being mirrored by the relative externality of the super economy with its parallel forms of salience, consilience, and propinquity (standing). (46)

Where resolution is productive of a non-economic process of **simplification**. I.e., through the suspension of the suspension, i.e., its de-suspension, we spontaneously leave the orbit of the merely economic in a potentially radical irruption of e/valuational formation that immediately demands re(-)appropriation in hyper-economic terms of reference within the imputation of wider terms of reference, namely, the imputation of the super-critical. Where the non-critical could find forms of critical rectification, or, where the critical could be merely reconfirmed, or, where the radical form of resolution chaotically emerges through a process of re(-)conformal re-direction, and where the ensuing processes of non-economic resolution continue to spill over into a non-virtual world that overseas our enacted interventions in this world of lived-experience... (47)

In effect, truth is arbitrated, re(-)realized through processes of resolution that involve both the subjective and the intersubjective, both the private and the public spheres of influence through the auspices of a world of arbitration wherein the existential nature of the compactual continually re(-)defines the non-existential nature of the contractual realm, allows a secular world to be expressed despite the near unavoidable ministrations of disciplinarians, philosophers, metaphysicians, *et al.* (48)

In attempting to better understand this complex process of truth determination, through invoking an expansion of a more closely detailed process of complexification, we should find that such enrichment of detail should induce even greater degrees of either conformance or dis-conformance, i.e., the affirmation of our propositions as either positive statements of fact or as the dis-affirmation of such pronouncement as negative statement where and when those propositions are then denied the status of statements (when and where a sixth ordered transformation in ordered status is not able to be effectively established). (49)

Where, through non-economic resolution such simplification, subjected to existential permission, is then able to spill over into the causal efficacy of a non-virtual world of lived-experience in the enacted form of interventions, be they exercised through action, non-action or the deferral of inaction through either deferral or postponement, reformulation or cancellation. (50)

Where, through the irruption of the non-economic, we then witness an authorization of certain patterns of behaviour, be they either the corrective remediation of the non-

critical, the mere reconformalization of the critical, and/or or the advent of the relatively-radical through chaotically informed processes of re(-)conformalization, or, for whatever reason or reasons, an apparent retreat, to some degree or other, from such more rational forms of expression back to the levels of the relatively-non-critical... (51)

So, that granted, if only hypothetically, just what are the historical ramifications, in terms of histories of the past, etc., to be found applying to such existentially and non-existentially oriented patterns of an **intervention(alism)** given forms of appreciation that, in wider terms of reference, take on an ordered, inter-ordered, extra-ordered forms of interpretation, etc? (52)

As would be noted under **ramifications**, among a number of provisional conclusions, the secular economy, as the collective suspension of the existential economy (or any other non-inversed economy), finds itself expressed in and through both existential and non-existential aspects that are intimately bound together in the integrated form of the relatively-non-existential-and-the-relatively-existential and where this inequality, between the relatively-non-existential and the relatively-existential, given the axiom that all things cannot but be not equal, is expressed in accordance with both the circumstances and attitudes being expressed therein. (53)

Although certain pragmatistical situations might call for a non-existential orientation in e/valuational formation, such as in the example of merely making a sandwich for our own consumption *versus* the existential invocation of a deontologically inspired sharing of food when proscriptively called for, more correctly we should see the non-existential and the existential as if ‘forever walking together as if hand in glove’.¹⁶ Thence the beauty of this heuristic device that sees the division of the six trans-cognitive orders divided between the simultaneous possibilities of both an existential orientation and the possibilities of a secular orientation.¹⁷ In effect, providing a model that sees the necessary cooperation that must take place between these two contrasting spheres of influence, and all other contrasting sphere of influence, as we should be able to witness, e.g., in the interactions that take place between a compactual dimension in the exercise of a contractual dimension, and v.v., in our interactions between the worlds of the private and the public as mediated through processes of arbitration, in our appreciation of both ourselves and the needs of others, etc. (54)

In effect, the existential richness of our relationships emerges hand in hand with our conformal awareness, and v.v. Hence the proposition: **Existential conformance and**

¹⁶ This comparison, as a comparative illustration of the non-existential *versus* the existential, was explored in *Pursuit*, III.XII.III.27-37; 446.

¹⁷ In the resonance enacted between the secular aspects of the sixth, second, and fourth trans-cognitive orders *versus* the existential (and philosophical) aspects of the first, fifth and third trans-cognitive orders. Although more correctly, a systematization of existentialization of process (is entered into through the non-systematic existential moment) as enacted through the overall intermediation, as a balanced suspension, of all economic correlatives, all ordered and inter-ordered phenomenal, through the collective suspension of the overall process of transformational retreatment, etc., where the suspended event also oversees a suspension of its re(-)presented context of its situatedness as well, etc.

performance go hand in hand!¹⁸ Which should be more closely translated, and thereby read, as ‘successful existential conformance and successful existential performance go mutually hand in hand’ (and not otherwise)! (55)

In other words, it is necessary that we observe the conformal state of our interactions because otherwise we will not be able to meet the full existential enrichment of our relationships. Or, put more bluntly, in a more non-existential mode, if you defy a more truthful re(-)presentation of our world-as-lived you could very well be setting yourself up to be severely whacked on the proverbial ‘behind’, so to speak. Therefore, in the light of this existential observation about this world at large, I continually despair when I see those all too many short-sighted politicians continually flouting such a sensible proscription. (56)

Taking a deeper reading of this phenomenon of **conformalization** does mean that we are continually confronted by truth determinations given their co-association with all forms of intentional determination. Where, in effect, our more productive alignment with reality-as-lived is predicated on this alignment with the conformal as to be found everywhere in this world at large. Furthermore, this radical intuition will also find a more fully instantiated realization, namely, that to the extent the truthful is allowed to be expressed then to that same degree, more or less, our arbitrated patterns of aspiration will be more likely to find a more satisfactory form of instantiation. Thence our close attention to this existential aspect of experience needs to be truthfully cultivated in order to better facilitate our passages through this overall world-of-life both individually and collectively. Indeed, it should follow that from such concern and care our very aspirations themselves will be less-ill-formed and misshapen and, therein and thereafter, better able to be both orchestrated and enhanced through this inescapable world of arbitration. (57)

As promised, what does this closer attention and detail to an existentialization of secular experience portend both in a disciplinary orientation and in a philosophical orientation, and, in both philosophical and metaphysical terms of reference? (58)

First, we must recognize that conformal truth determination is a bit like living a lie and then learning to de-falsify what proves to be not in conformance with a better interpretation of our lived experience. Just as in the ‘successful’ telling of a lie, we cannot be completely in non-conformance with this world as lived. But, equally, we cannot be in perfect conformance with a world that cannot be completely comprehended given an inability to exhaust the potential salience of any one perspective or to exhaust the consilience to be found between an infinite range of perspectives in the light of our current propinquity or standing in this world as lived. But, in this in-between-world, between the impossibilities of perfect truth and perfect non-truth we learn to happily live with what is to hand and our ongoing re(-)interpretations of the same as arbitrated in our interactions with others, and so on. Furthermore, we need to de-mystify our discernment of the truth by realizing that logical truth is dialectically arbitrated and in lived-experience is not so much merely applied or simply denied as finding an organic, conformal presentation through ongoing processes of economic re(-)presentation and all that that entails in terms

¹⁸

Pursuit, III.XII.IV.E.1.

of how we need to differentiate the relatively non-critical from the relatively-critical and the relatively-critical from the relatively-radical whilst at the same time appreciating the integration of this systematic emergence of the truth-fulfilling of a truthfulness that is more lived than merely ascribed through the superficial logic of an equation cut loose from a world of supporting contentions, conjectures, apparent evidence and its ongoing re(-)interpretations, and so on... as spill over into a pragmatic world with an existential complexion, and so forth... (59)

In the light of this background, as just articulated, in the pursuit of their disciplinary vocation, the disciplinarian will need to overcome various disciplinary problems. But, such problem solving remains disciplinary in ideation unless a more philosophical orientation is invested in through processes of reduplication rather than duplication. Similarly, a philosopher merely interested in their discipline as a discipline *qua* discipline will be merely applying philosophically oriented techniques in the somewhat vain hope of finding a non-controversial form of philosophical resolution. Now, it is not that that might not achieve a certain minimal degree of success that might somewhat guarantee the persistence of their working within their vocation, and meeting with a certain degree of respect, stemming from such relatively limited forms of success. However, in taking a more radical turn they would more likely stand to successfully pursue a much greater degree of philosophical successfulness. Let me briefly explain what this difference between this differential pursuit between reduplication and duplication would involve from the perspective of the philosophical discipline, etc? (60)

Contrary to my previous explanation(s), that philosophical discernment either deals directly with so-called 'philosophical problems' or indirectly with the philosophical problematization of the hitherto relatively non-problematic, I now re-envisage the philosophical discipline as dealing specifically with the reduplicated meta-problematics of a problematic appreciation of the problematic, be the latter either a philosophically perceived problem *per se* or the problematization of some aspect, or series, or set/s of lived-experience that is found to deserve the scrutiny of such attention. A degree of focus, set at the same time, within the encompassment of a pragmatic world of existentially appreciated e/valuation regardless of whether we are either advertently and/or inadvertently aware of such simplified-complexities, such complex-simplifications that, correctly, characterize the nature of the philosophical enterprise in accordance with my current understanding of this philosophical discipline... as refracted through this reduplicated, meta-problematic lens.... (61)

2. The Nature of the Radical

As an introductory gambit, let me introduce the idea of the ‘radical’ under the artificial separation of three temporary headings, namely, Chaotic Re-Direction, Radical Implications of a re-positioning of perspectives, and the ensuing Radical Ramifications arising from the collective impact of such interacting patterns of radical re(-)self-organization. (62)

A re-directed process of radical change can somewhat, superficially, be viewed under a mix of three approaches, namely, radical divergence or bifurcation, radical integration or emergence, and a radical change of phase as a phase change in state. But, where these three aspects are, more correctly, to be considered as expressions of the same re-directed process of change. Not just a repeated process of change in a mere process of redirection (that establishes the background consonance of an intentional field), but, in a process of divergent re-direction that chaotically heads in a direction quite different to that hitherto as had been followed before this spontaneous irruption what could be re-badged as relatively-dissonant despite its origination in a form of non-economic resolution. The former being continually arrived at, incrementally, in a non-chaotic process of redirection *versus* the non-incrementally articulated expression involved in the spontaneity of this chaotic process of re-direction. However, even though a process of re-direction is arrived at through chaotic re(-)self-organization, still, we usually have a good idea, more often than not, just what this process of re-directed change would entail. We bring water to the boil by increasing the temperature of that water degree by degree, until we then meet boiling point, when water undergoes a change of phase from a liquid to a gas. Where we arrive at chaotic change through a process of incremental orchestration (be that either through incremental addition or subtraction), either advertently or inadvertently, we interactively recognize, encounter and engage the spontaneity of a chaotic process of re-direction that is non-incrementally expressed even if arrived at through the necessary succession of increments as the required pre-conditions for such non-economically oriented resolution... (63)

Now, some forms of chaotic expression are either instrumentally engineered, like the expected boiling of water in preparation for the producing of a pot of tea or the dunking of a teabag, and/or, the meeting with the unexpected expression of some form of chaotic phenomena that could catch us unaware in that moment we find ourselves interacting with that re-directed re-presentation of a chaotic phenomenon, or series, or set/s of phenomena, in that chaotic situation, like e.g., a sudden, somewhat unexpected-expected bolt of lightning anticipated in the very midst of a violent storm that has already signalled such random-like phenomena. But, then, given the relatively regular repetition of those flashes of lightning and its co-associated sounds of thunder we are also witness to the non-random-random-like regularity of chaotic phenomena that promotes everything from the beating of the human heart to the tidal wash of overlapping waves, from the uniqueness of each and every moment to our intentional perception of the fragile succession of such moments in experiential time given the obvious limitations and finiteness of the human individual, the historical persistence and fracturing of communities, organizations,

institutions, nations... in the tenuous resilience resident in the very replication of life itself. (64)

Where the idea, and concept, of the 'radical' can be equated as synonymous with a 'chaotic process of re-direction in both intentional formation and its trans-intentional judgmental appreciation' as long as such appreciation is duly arrived at, moment by moment, through those relatively-radical innovative increments that set us up to appreciate that successful process of ongoing incremental re(-)appropriation. (65)

Hence the chaotic complexion to be associated with the novelty of our experience of re-direction as we apparently seem to suddenly move in a different direction. In and through such chaotically re-directed interaction we have the opportunity to recognize, encounter, and existentially engage with this innovative re-mapping of experience. Hence the existential, decisive-like comprehension of the potential-possibilities of the specificities pregnant in the very 'here and now' (*hic et nunc*); the ironic-like delineation of 'final vocabularies'; the dynamic discernment of so-called 'definitive histories' along with our inevitable progressions when also propelled beyond the same; our recognition, encountering, and engagement with creative forms of re-mediation in which we deconstruct and reconstruct a vision and version of lived-reality that can never again be quite the same, form moment to moment... (66)

Thence, from this ever-present re-direction of experience, we can also re-engineer more insightful-like forms of awareness through the simple re-construction of that evolving ideation, step by step, stage by stage. In this radical 'turning around' involved in this dialectical re-qualification of the logical, in this radical reconfiguration of the critical that some will call the more profound depths of education when invested in through such ongoing re(-)education. Not the apperception of something completely new, but, the novel re-appreciation of something already learnt, but, now seen afresh, beaconing with new possibilities, projecting a wider net with the novel advent of these readjustments to our conformal appreciation of a lived-reality whose reiteration sparks moments of experience whose evident ramifications are now more widely cast... (67)

I would contend, and like to demonstrate, how these eightfold steps replicating a productive conformalization of experience both individually and collectively can re-engineer this chaotic process of re-orientation whose re-directedness can be instrumental in articulating new and radical ways of doing philosophy, of being a disciplinarian, in utilizing its ensuing metaphysical insights at the very core of also being an existential-secularist in the very midst of this arbitrated world of the other... (68)

That, this claim having being declared, it now behooves me to evidentially support this contention, namely, that each step has its radical ramifications, but, that collectively, the net impact of such revision will also be radical in its own right. (69)

Through the insight of reduplication, in comprehending the problematic nature of the problematic, the working philosopher, whether as a professional or amateur, now has the opportunity to become a more productive philosopher no longer involved and

emmeshed in a linguistic manipulation of ideas whose limits are not duly recognized and where controversial manoeuvres can never meet their due comeuppance in a definitive resolution and recognition given the sheer impossibilities of such ill-conceived philosophical approaches and the often equally short-sighted philosophical problematization of the hitherto relatively non-problematic. Thence the necessity of accepting these wider terms in our approaching a conformal recognition of a mutual process of truth determination through arbitration, existential thematization, pragmatic consensus formation... (70)

Through economization the philosophically problematic is non-problematically translated in and through a (hermeneutically oriented) format, (non-systematic existentially oriented) formation, and (phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented) form that both differentiates and integrates the non-decisive indecision of the 'economic' and the decisiveness of the 'non-economic' (more fully comprehended when decisively re-appropriated hyper-economically). (71)

In an economic translation, we open ourselves up to the potential richness of complexification and how such details can clarify and re-define the course of our argumentation. By such means finding a conformal process of reassurance that we are finding a clarified concordance with the best that can be informatively supplied in and through the non-mis-appropriation of such relevant cultural-intercultural terms of reference. (72)

Under conformalization, we comprehend the ubiquity of truth determinations as paralleling all forms of discernment, and, both consequently and subsequently, no longer feel the need to avoid such a confrontation with what is already to hand in this same regard. (73)

Working with what is to hand, we entertain processes of re(-)conformalization through processes of mitigation, remediation, re(-)normalization, and so forth. (74)

By such means setting ourselves up to experience the ensuing simplification at the center of non-economic acts of resolution. (75)

Through existential and non-existential forms of permission we enter productive patterns of intervention that pragmatically should progressively enrich our more relevant relationships both existentially and non-existentially. (76)

In an openness of humility, we can then set about learning and unleashing the positive ramifications of our efforts both individually and collectively... (77)

But, there is more, since the net impact of such radical innovations, themselves, has the power to intervene in an even more productive fashion. Where the ubiquity of truth ascriptions needs no longer to be either avoided and/or merely approached in passive terms, and, where in turn, they can be found to actively intervene and engage on our own behalf given, through emergence, this chaotic power to positively promote existential and non-existential patterns of re-direction to both individually and collectively enhance the course of our overall existence in ways not hitherto thought possible, but,

where through the advent of the relatively-radical can now give voice to the novelties of such ‘impossibilities’... Thence this re-direction, this clear and distinct re-shaping of intent in general, particular, and specific terms of reference. (78)

Now, picking up further on such themes let me here add some more recent ideas on these issues. (79)

Recently, I have revised my ideas on the nature of the relative differences and non-differences between reduplication and duplication.¹⁹ For a start, we might ascribe reduplication to the suspension and duplication to the de-suspension (with the ensuing preservation there of the ordered status of either the relative operator and/or the ensuing operation). Now, it might be thought that reduplication, in its differences from duplication, may well be more apparent than substantial. E.g., the x^1 of $x^1 = x^2$ could well be a process of duplication to the extent that it should, instead, be read as the x -ness of $x = x^2$. Thus, reduplication, effectively, is a meta-operator operating on its object-self with the duplicated preservation of the status of the meta-operator giving the ensuing product the same ordered status as per duplication. I.e.,

$$\text{Reduplication is } x^2.x^1 = x^2. \quad (80)$$

$$\text{Just as } y^2.x^1 = (y^2.x^1)^2. \quad (81)$$

Therefore, when an operator operates on itself it must be in the form of the relative meta-operator operating on the relative operator with the ensuing operation taking the relative meta-status of that relative meta-operator. The use of the expression ‘relative’ (and ‘meta’) can be extended to both extra-ordered and super-ordered forms of reduplication. So, e.g., the $6^2.6^2$ (the historical appreciation of the historical becomes the extra-historical appreciation of historical competence through the meta-historical appreciation of the historical). Of course, the question now posed is should such metafication be elevated by one degree or should it be an actual doubling of the ordered status of the operator in question. Given the new reading that the x^1 of x^1 is actually x^2 of x^1 here we must now assume that the x^2 of x^2 results in a product (p) with the ordered status of x^3 .²¹ Thence the following rules of reduplication and duplication, etc:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First rule of (re)duplication: } x^n.x^n &= x^{n+1}.x^n \text{ with an ordered product status of } (p)^{n+1} \\ \text{Second rule of duplication: } x^n.y^m &= (p)^n = (x.y)^n. \quad (82) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{So, e.g., } x^2.x^2 \text{ is no longer to be read as } x^4 \text{ but as } x^{2+1} = x^3. \quad (83)$$

¹⁹ *Pursuit*, III.X.(Part)III.

²⁰ With the product in brackets.

²¹ Where by ‘ordered status’ we more correctly mean the initial ordered status of the operator and the ensuing ordered status of the product reflecting the actual status of the operator. I.e., this expression must include ordered, inter-ordered, extra-ordered and super-order degrees of ‘ordered status’.

Therefore, extrafication, e.g., is merely our proceeding from an inter-ordered status to an extra-ordered status through metafication (i.e., an elevation by one meta-degree). (84)

Thence this simplification of these ordered rules whilst recognizing the radical ordered differences between the trans-cognitively/cognitively ordered, inter-ordered, extra-ordered, and super-ordered. (85)

Furthermore, I have had to revise my ideas on the core democratic basis of the dissemination of power to note the concept of ‘general consent’, and that non-virtual volition proceeds through the third inter-ordered order of the ‘political’ along with the ramifications that follow on in the radical wake of that shift in reconsideration.²² (86)

‘General consent’ comprises three elements or facets that may be developed or less developed, namely, ‘passively oriented communicative consent, actively oriented enacted consent, and the existentially oriented engagement of collaborative consent (when the relationship develops a more overt existential complexion through a pro-relational/trans-relational/extra-relational forms of emphasis)’. (87)

An even more radical reconsideration is that non-virtual empowerment, i.e., volition, i.e., referred to as ‘political’ (as in the ‘political-economy’ when both the third and fourth inter-ordered categories are conjoined). (88)

I.e., that only the third inter-order of the reduplicated deontological is capable of engineering non-virtual enactment. (89)

But, as noted, this has problem of its own making (that need to be addressed and redressed on two different levels). (90)

First, given that the dissemination of power has its origins in the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological we must wonder why the dissemination of power is so often marred by non-existential characteristics. The successful resolution of this puzzle is undertaken when we realize that as dissemination is issued through suspensions and their de-suspensions that should those suspensions not be well-organized egotistical distortions and obstruction are then free to interrupt and disrupt such non-existentially oriented expressions of our volition. I.e., all inequalities are not suitably balanced dynamically within the auspice of the working suspension. Then, all ensuing productivity does not suitable preference those preferences that should be duly preferred, i.e., the deontological, the existentially compactual, the arbitral, and the cooperative, etc. (91)

Second, the ordered economy cannot present productivity of the third trans-cognitive order of the ‘political’ in a pure form, and, that it behooves us to maintain such a state through either the creation of new relationships, preserve the e/valuational formation of current relationships and/or conservationally expand the same. Thence the eco-

²²

Refer to *Pursuit*, III.X.III.

nomie re(-)iteration of processes of existentialization in an effort to further refine such third inter-ordered ordering should that be deemed necessary... (92)

Now, the radical implication of these reconsiderations, as being now explicated, is that existentialization proceeds through the well-exercised suspension; the well-articulated focusing on preferences that deserve to be noticed; and, all further processes of suspension that refine such an existential complexion as long as all pre-conditions, conditions, and post-conditions are duly observed in such a manner that further working suspensions are found to express the same. (93)

But, given such a locus for the expression of both politically oriented and non-politically oriented volition how are we to connect the inter-nodal dissemination of power with, say, social organizations, such as, e.g., Academia, the Business World, the Political Domain/s, etc? (94)

3. Formation of the Radical

How is this formation of the radical to be productively engineered? How do we positively instantiate, in both non-existential and existential forms of a skilfully re-engineered process of re(-)self-organization, such active recognition, passive encountering, and apposite engagement? Through the relationally respectful implementation of suitable, well-formed and well-informed working suspensions, and all that that entails. Let me unpack what is involved in the answering of this important question. (95)

There is no point in being merely radical for the sake of being radical. Indeed, such an attitude, in all probability, would be destructive of our more positive aspirations. Instead, we need to be receptive to the possibility of the radical, in practice be more receptive to the pre-conditions that foster such radical insightfulness. (96)

As noted – that is through the suitable utilization of working suspensions. (97)

By ‘working suspensions’ is meant ‘the use of suspension that work’. By ‘working philosopher or disciplinarian’ is meant a ‘philosopher or disciplinarian that does real work, i.e., competently performs those functions required for the promotion of our mutual arbitration with(-)other, before(-)others, and allows us to find a more extensive existential sense and semblance of a working-freedom through(-)others, through the auspices of our relationships as experienced through our embodiment, embeddedness, and our embankment in this world at large. (98)

A working suspension is also code for an extensive suspension as re-interpreted in more expansive terms of reference that naturally go beyond the epistemological confines of any one embedded individual... given our cultural-intercultural location in this overall world-of-life. (99)

Suspensions come in many forms and levels of dynamically counter-balanced representations of detail. Even in the simple asking of a question, in our previous explorations of this interrogative economy, we find the rhetorical, dis-conjunctive suspension of the either/or, the metaphorical, conjunctive suspension of the so-called first reply, and the apparitional negation and double negation of a so-called second reply implicating both the interlocking representations of an existential dimension and a non-existential secular dimension whose overlapping interactions, as simulations, portend a world of value and the value of a world that cannot be reduced to the merely material or the conventionally understood. (100)

Then, to complicate such matters, we must also take into this account a process of the de-suspension, and where the non-economic force of the de-suspension spills over into the non-virtual realm of the causal... and from there, through such suspended representations, out into the social world of the other... and the world at large. (101)

But, to balance such complexity, through (my concept of) 'economic induction', I would argue that 'if one were to thematize any one aspect sufficiently then that would allow us to holistically experience the complex economic structure of the effective totality of that experience'. One way to comprehend this concept is to understand the dialectical concept of 'economic correlativity'. Given all economies are trimodally constituted, and, that our apparent representative appreciation of the same is similarly constituted. Then, that being the case, or provisionally granted hypothetically, it follows that given any one economic correlative is equivalent to the negation of the other two correlatives, and, by 'negation' read 'suspension', then our direct in-depth appreciation of any one correlative is also an indirect appreciation of the other two correlatives, i.e., that economy in its totality. Furthermore, through harmonic resolution, the relative harmonic nature of any one moment, reflecting the relatively consonance of the (hermeneutically oriented) background, the relative dissonance of the (phenomenologically oriented) foreground, and the relative resolution of (the non-systematic existentially oriented sense and semblance of) intentional subjectivity, and, given the dialectical nature of such harmonically viewed moments, it implies that a certain degree of resolution is already pre-imprinted on each and every economic moment. Furthermore, through complexification, the same understanding applies to the comparative utilization of parallel, overlapping, or enveloped economies, along with all forms of ordered appreciation and, thence, to the concept of the secular economy as also holistically representative of the economic situatedness, as well, implicated in any one economy. The ramifications of such a dialectical understanding is that, as noted, the in-depth appreciation of any one 'economic moment', as an 'economic correlative', holistically reflects the entire economy through that enacted economic lens currently in question. Moreover, as such insightfulness is orchestrated through processes of working suspensions, it follows that through the automatic reduplicative 'suspension of such suspensions', namely, as 'de-suspensions', we are then non-economically taken through such continual momentary processes of resolution to an ongoing thematization of the net import of such apparent, representative simulations. Where, at the same time, through ensuing processes of simplification, the net import of such 'reflections' is also attendant upon such processes of ongoing resolution. Furthermore, once such an appreciation is non-existentially recognized and encountered, and duly engaged existentially, the

overall, essential import of this trans-intentional, judgmental appreciation of the co-associated intentional content would then be essentially thematized in phenomenal-phenomenological terms where the net import of such cogitation, once recognized, etc., is then merely re-validated in conformal-like terms of reference. Like a mirror, the economic constitution of the economy is such that all three economic correlatives, as dialectical moments, co-reflect each other, and, where any in-depth essential-like appreciation of the same will inevitably reveal the net import of that economy in its current intentional configurations. That, as the overall functioning of working suspensions are intuitively instantiated as learnt responses, and, are effectively initiated through the implementation of simple strategies, like for example the asking of questions, or the conducting of metaphorical-like comparisons, or the skeptical non-acceptance of apparitional simulations... such processes of reflection are automatically engendered with the ongoing thematization of an essential-like, representative simulation in much the same metaphorical manner that our appreciation of the upper part of an iceberg through extrapolation is equally indicative of that greater part of that same iceberg that is hidden under the waterline of that same iceberg itself. Hence this concept of 'economic induction' that argues that if any form of a single suspension is sufficiently entered into then the net import of that dialectically engendered economy will also be essentially revealed through the ongoing, simultaneous, non-economic resolution of that ensuing economic simulation itself'. Where, through related and relevant processes of reiteration, the invocation of any simple strategy that initiates a process of suspension will automatically be instrumentally effective in holistically revealing the net import of that same process of economic evolution. That once such is understood, then the specificities of that understanding cannot but be essentially reiterated in a manner that no longer needs to be reiterated given the essential conformation of such distinctive patterns of economic resolution. Just as the asking of a sensible question already alerts us to what would be the making of a sensible reply, so, too, our sensible pursuit of some intuitive form of a suspension would intuitively present an essentially representative appreciation involved in the evolution of such a sensibly re(-)self-organized response. Just as each day follows the night, de-suspensions automatically follow upon the formation of suspensions, and, where, through reiteration, the essentially representative formation of appreciation follows in the wake of the evolution of such processes of conformal thematization. When and where the simplicity of a suspension engenders the non-economic simplicity of a response through processes of resolution above and beyond the complexities involved in the formation of that type of experience. Just as the knowledge of the intricacies of sausage making are not required in the mere eating of that type of food, so, too, an in-depth comprehension of the complexities of intentional experience are not needed in an appreciation of the end-products of our intellection. (102)

Now, to put this same argument more simply. The mere asking of a question, or some other related strategy, through repetition, has the power to provoke a suitable response. Therefore, it behooves us to frame our questions, as conjectures, in a well-formed and well-informed manner in the hope that a well-presented question will evoke a well-represented reply. (103)

Understandably, to theoretically argue for such a claim would involve the successful coming together of a number of interrelated concepts capable of supplying a

working resolution of such a more complex, problematic enquiry. However, the upshot of such research is a greater facility in our metaphorical-like probing of such issues with the attendant clarity of our theoretical modelling whilst extending the range of additional questions recreated in the wake of such intellectual forms of expansion. (104)

The radical, as a phenomenon, is characterized by the nature of its origination without being able to be completely reduced to the same, informed by a hypothetical space between the non-chaotic and the chaotic, the suspended and the de-suspended, the simplicity of ordered judgments and the reduplicated complexity of the metaphysically inter-ordered, the economic and the non-economic, the thought of action and the permitted action of thought, the temporary newness of the merely novel and the novelty of the truly new that was not seen before and, not too long ago, comprehend as something that was thought possible let alone critically understand. (105)

In the world, as in experience, the radical is arrived at through the incremental orchestration of inputs, either through subtraction or addition, until such a point is met through an irruption of the chaotic that is seemingly spontaneous and non-incremental in complexion. In experience, each moment of suspension is met by the automatic delivery of the de-suspension where, upon this momentary trajectory, certain points can then be found to take a more overt semblance and dissemination of the chaotic. Again, like bringing water to the boil or the making of ice cubes in the refrigerator. Or, the melting of icecream or the setting of a moulded jelly. (106)

Such a point of bifurcation or emergence or phase change of state, as characterized by the context of its interpretation, on some occasions dramatically casts the radical as disruptively chaotic, and, yet, on other occasions, such relative shifts in 'direction' might be barely registered. Some might argue that each and every moment is radically engendered, whereas, others, who are more conservative, might characterize the radical as that which is disruptive of such sequential continuity. Or, then again, some might find the sense and semblance of the radical to be manifested through processes of reduplication rather than through processes of duplication. Say, in the reduplication of the suspension of the suspension as the de-suspension, and in the inter-ordered formation of a re-constituted, non-traditional metaphysical through the reduplication of ordered judgments. Again, the non-economic resolution of the economic can also be seen as a chaotically oriented phenomenon. Where the unilateral decisiveness of the non-economic is able to transform the envisaged thought of action into the enacted precision of distinctive patterns of behaviour. Or, where, in either disciplinary research or the midst of the secular, we find our interaction recognizing, encountering and engaging with the privilege of meeting with innovation of the radically new. (107)

As noted, the center of radical experience is entered through the suspension and, then, automatically left through the suspension of that suspension, i.e., its de-suspension. In processes of judgment, the radical helps us to see things not hitherto seen before. Indeed, the conformance of conformal truth determination, itself, can be seen as a radical phenomenon, and, where in turn, through reiteration, re-demonstrations, and evolving forms of consensus the origination and ramification of conformal truth determination can

perform a radical role in the reshaping of the cultural landscape, indeed, as having a radical life of its own able to give each era its own distinctive ethos, its own distinctive zeitgeist, assist us in delineating the unique features that categorize the advent of the contemporary nature of the Contemporary era?). (108)

Given this role of working suspensions, and not minimizing their theoretical modelling through the conceptual practice of economic induction, let me outline my current thoughts on this complex topic (perhaps in the hope that such complex modelling might also assist us in this interactive recognition, encountering, and engagement with those forms of insightfulness that might better facilitate a mutual non-existential and existential enrichment of our lives through the auspices of our interactions with(-)others, and so on. (109)

The former analysis of the interrogative economy implicates a broadening of our horizons beyond the simplicity of the archetypal economy to also include an inverse economy perceived as mirroring the secular world within the orbit of these six trans-cognitive (and cognitive) orders that, then, through reduplication, also expands to re-include a re-vision of a re-constituted non-traditional metaphysics, albeit under the headings of its co-associated six inter-ordered orders. At the radical center of such emergence is the process of the suspension, something that is intuitively exercised without the need for its theoretical mapping. Still, such a guide could well channel a degree of both focus and application of intent that would better expedite our pursuit of a more positive sense and semblance of a non-existential e/valuation whilst also being framed and re-presented through the positivity of the existential able to supply a surplus of relational value capable of both reinforcing the validity and validation of those same relationships through which we will find a mutual degree of authentication despite an intrinsic emptiness... engaging a positive nihilism through the deconstruction of negative nihilism. Where such mapping is only a guide, a heuristic re(-)presentation, whose claim to fame can only reside in its pragmatic effectiveness. Seeking comprehension and comparative competence whilst abrogating a representative mirroring of reality, trading pure theory for the messy impurity of practice. Still, 'existential conformance and performance go hand in hand'.²³ Just as lived-experience needs to be aligned with lived-reality. By all means critique such a systematic outline of method, but, my rejoinder to you is can you do better, could you even equal this evolving set of techniques without surrendering to the mindless social complicity of a conventional wisdom neither sufficiently shaken nor stirred? (110)

In mapping the extensive suspension, as a working suspension, and in also entertaining its expansion²⁴ to involve a social dimension beyond the purely personal, we can

²³ *Pursuit*, III.XII.Part III. E.1.

²⁴ Where the expansive suspension (of social arbitration, etc.) entails the extensive suspension, which, in turn, entails the extend suspension (as an economy of the suspension-de-suspension), that then entails the archetypal economy (modelled as an overall transcendental suspension) and its secular offspring within an ordered framework also subject to the metaphysical implication of its inter-ordered reduplication... all subject to transformational retreatment in which all these forms and levels of input are eventually given a uni-dimensional-like output in and through lived-experience. But, treat this complexity as a working suspension, and, also understand that through economic induction the exercise of any form of a suspension is capable of instantiating the simplicity of a non-economic form of resolution as expressed through a

envisage its center as the archetypal economy, say, as refracted through the interrogative economy, and where the same is also in resonance with its ‘secular economy’ and their containment within its ordered expression along with its metaphysical reduplication as an inter-ordered phenomenon. By such means already accounting for an economy of the de-suspension and thence its non-economic resolution as having the required power to initiate intentional behaviour beyond the merely virtual... spilling over into apparent acts of permitted volition and where such inevitable and inescapable forms of intervention, hopefully, will also possess the requisite existential complexions in order to skilfully enrich the course of our relationships... as navigated, negotiated and arbitrated. Where, at the end of the day, through transformational retreatment the productivity of our intentional lives displays itself as lived in this world at large, in the overall world-of-life. (111)

For the sake of simplicity, recognize that there exists a plethora of different types of individual suspensions, but, as an economy of the suspension, and its delivery of a de-suspension, they all should work together under the epithet of a working suspension, and where, through the simplicity of economy induction, the non-economic force of resolution can overrule our intentional deliberations should we get too bogged down in the details of such metaphorical ‘weeds’. However, in providing a working map of such inputs let me note the following as a hierarchy of such inputs, etc.

A Diagrammatical Map of the Hierarchical Structures of the Working Suspension:

Expansive Suspension

(With a Personal-Interpersonal Navigation, Negotiation, Arbitration...
With an Existential-Complexion... and an Inescapable Interventionalism)

Extensive Suspension

(With a Causal Implication)

Extended Suspension

(The Suspension-De-Suspensional Economy)

Overall Transcendental Economy

(And its Ordered Encompassment...
With Inter-Ordered Co-Associations;
Modelled on the Interrogative Economy + Secular Economy)

Archetypal Economy²⁵ (112)

However, despite the intricate details in this mapping of such complexity, our intellectual appreciation of suspensions, as an intuitive process, is short-circuited consid-

unilateral decisiveness of the last instance, etc. The extended suspension was explored in Book II. As you will perhaps surmise, this explication of the ‘suspension’ continues to remain a work in progress.

²⁵ With increasing epistemological complexity implied by going up this page.

erably, as previously argued, through the concepts of both economic induction and non-economic simplification, etc. (113)

Arguing, in return, that from the intuitive exercise of such simplicity we come to recognize, encounter, and engage a multi-various world of infinite complexity where any one perspective, in its own right, cannot be exhausted, and, where an infinitude of possible perspectives, in turn, cannot be exhausted, and, where our primary preoccupations should be the pragmatic quest for both pragmatic relevancy and the ensuing existential enrichment of our primary relationships. (114)

Where entering a suspension is as simple as asking a question... (115)

...and the simple seeking of a resolution of such an interrogation... (116)

...already prepared in the well-organized question, that as a conjecture, hopefully, is also well-formed and well-informed, etc... (117)

...with the inevitable meeting with the relatively-radical... (118)

...requiring its ongoing re(-)appropriation by a critical re-purposing... (119)

4. Re(-)Appropriation

The radical, like the proliferation of truth values, as found ever-stamped on all intentional production, can be found everywhere. But, given the chaotic complexion of the radical, and the necessity for its re(-)appropriation, its expression, as exercised through reduplication, etc., more often than not, understandably, is just overlooked. So, that granted, just how is the radical to be acknowledged and interacted with? I.e., recognized, encountered and engaged? Through the imputation of critical processes of ongoing re(-)appropriation... as exercised through both suspensions and de-suspensions... as suitably orchestrated sequentially, and so on! (120)

What can we say about the nature of radically oriented aspects of experience? That only the relatively-radical can be interpreted and where the radically-radical cannot be interpreted unless incrementally re(-)appropriated, successfully, step by step. Implicated is the irruptive expression of the chaotic in orientation. That processes of reduplication could well be implicated in some, if not all, forms of chaotic expression. That, the relatively-radical, as the relatively-chaotic, is incrementally arrived at, but, non-incrementally through the spontaneity of processes of re(-)self-organization... (121)

However, much like the overlooking of the omnipresence of truth determinations the indications of the relatively-radical are even more overlooked. Just like traditional scientists who not too long ago persistently pursued a deterministic philosophy when the micro-cosmic world of quantum physics effectively undermined a non-momentary, macro-cosmic world of relativity. Of course, roll a boulder down the hillside and it will roll

down that slope until it stops. Or, strike a match and the match is lit. But such causal demonstrations of a bimodally imputed cause-and-effect belie a chaotic world when attended to more closely. Even though predictions and bets placed can be profitably cast this does not mean that we have such a perfectly-perfected knowledge in either such things or in all things. We might depend on some people as if they operated like well-run timetables, but, the human condition is surely an excellent example of the chaotic dimension ever-ready to intrude upon the course of our expectations. Would you rather prefer the type of friend, as symbolic of the relationship, who brought exactly the same gift on each encounter, or, a friend who brought something different and, perhaps, on other occasions, nothing at all? And, if we were to prefer imperfect variations on a theme in our friends why not recognize that same preference for the variable across this world at large? That without this element of the chaotic there could be no expression of the relatively-radical, and, without this radical dimension, surely, we would still be living in the forests and desserts with just sticks and stones?! (122)

That granted, if only hypothetically, let us ask what is the overall relationship to be engendered between the chaotic, the radical, the conformation of truth determinations, the implication of reduplication and, possibly, the transformations also arising through duplication between actors and acters with a different ordered status, differences in meta-status, and so on? Then, when such issues are more or less settled, how is such variety to be sequentially re(-)appropriated through the auspices of the relatively-critical before moving on to appreciate some of the philosophical ramifications following on in the wake of such radical re-considerations? (123)

In metaphorical language imagine, if you would, the following. We are endlessly circulating in a world becoming more familiar, on one hand, and, on the other, increasingly more problematic. Suddenly, in a moment of non-economic resolution the problematic finds a definitive, indubitable-like sense and semblance of re-direction which we immediately follow, or, more correctly seem to constitute by ourselves. But, having solved one philosophical problem (of resolving and escaping the potentially endless nature of economic circulation) we are now confronted by another, namely, how do we understand and comprehend the non-familiarity of this now novel landscape. In our sudden exercising of a linear process of resolution we are now having to face the apparent enormity of just how are we going to understand this novel terrain we have been thrust towards...? (124)

Hence the immediate need for the imputation of the hyper-economic, or its equivalent, in order to resolve the novelty of such novelty. I.e., through reduplication new terms of meta-reference are supplied in which we can commence this process of appropriation, which through ongoing re-iteration would take place within the evolving formation an economy of re(-)appropriation. (125)

But, then again, through transformational retreatment, all processes of treatment are restored to the meta-level that were originally issued from with the implication that the hyper-economic is, more or less, a more refined reflection of the economic domain to begin with. Of course, with every metaphorical revolution of the both the economic and

our projected sojourn through the non-economic to the hyper-economic and back to the economic nothing will stay the same even if each modicum of change, of alteration, is overlooked and remains neither recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged as such. (126)

Paradoxically, this non-economic resolution, as a metaphysical-like turn is also, simultaneously, a meta-physical return to the very philosophical or the disciplinary or the secular domain from whence we just left, more or less, the same moment we returned. The implication being that horizontal economy within the economic sphere and the vertical economy from the economic to the hyper-economy through the non-economic and back would, in effect, mirror each other, albeit with subtle differences like the uncomfortable fact that, in economic terms alone, there could be no definitive processes of resolution, etc. (127)

Invoking this complex heuristic of both horizontal sub-economies and the overall economy of the economic to the non-economic to the hyper-economic, etc., (within the orbit of the super-economic) we analogically resolve this double problem of both metaphorically escaping the economic and being meaningfully re(-)appropriated economically. I.e., in our metaphorically observing a trajectory that is directly established through the auspices of the working suspension and its automatic invocation of its co-associated de-suspension, and so on. Indeed, by deferring to such a heuristic we can then focus more closely on both the structural-dynamics of the economic and its paralleling of the super-economic through the medium of this imputation of the non-economic along with its incorporation within its review as a process of transformational retreatment. At the same time incorporating it within its inter-ordered reduplication along processes of duplication that would occur wither within or between the same. Briefly, let me outline what would be entailed under such complex mapping. (128)

In transformational retreatment we have pre-treatment, transformation through metafication to treatment, and thence through the transformation of de-metafication to retreatment on par with the ordered and meta-status of the initial products. This process aligning with the fifth, first, and third trans-cognitive orders. Then, in transformational-transitions to and from such orders we can invoke, respectively, the sixth, second, and fourth trans-cognitive orders. Then assuming their metafication of these six orders we can then invoke their meta-philosophical/metaphysical correspondents. Then, that granted, we can further invoke processes of duplication either within or between these orders and their products, inter-ordered correspondents, extra-ordered forms of appreciation, etc. Arguing, in effect, that we are also invoking a similar trajectory between the economic-non-economic-hyper-economic, etc., given this ability to subject all transformations to processes of a restorative retreatment. Hence, e.g., the transition from the fifth trans-cognitive order to the first trans-cognitive order must be through the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical (factual) with the implication that this individual transformational-transition must be well-informed, etc. Thence the uptake of functional epithets like mitigation, remediation, re(-)normalization, and so on, as discussed elsewhere. (129)

In effect, tracing an arc from the economically critical back to the critical through the non-economic irruption of resolution and the hyper-economic, and, by such means,

finding a process that duly observes the critical re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical... (130)

6. A series of Miscellaneous Emails Detailing My Recent Radical Shifts in Thinking

Over the course of writing *The Advancement of Democratic Governance*, a current process only half-completed, a number of my views on ethical and political considerations, etc., were to transform. Given the incremental nature of these shifts in approaching this topic and my having shared some of these innovations at meetings of The Continental Philosophy Group and by emails, I decided to edit these various emails in their sequential order of origination given this shifting feast in ‘radical thinking’. (131)

‘Radical’ in the sense of ‘turning previous things around’; and a ‘general reluctance to accept such reconsideration and the ramifications of such shifts’. (132)

Although I somewhat retrospectively chastise myself for being so slow to accept these innovations and their radical ramifications, still, we can only encounter the radical ‘step by step’. (133)

As a ‘philosophical map’ what has transformed, or, rather being subjected to a process of radical modification? (134)

The basic argument that as the orders are relatively passive judgments it follows that patterns of non-virtual enaction cannot be enacted in those terms of reference alone. Through reduplication of these six orders we then arrive at six inter-ordered orders that, effectively, are metaphysical in scope, albeit as non-traditionally reconstituted by myself. That among this list only the meta-deontological as the political, as a prime form of direct volition, is capable of enacting our intentional objectives in non-virtual (‘actual’) terms of reference. The implication follows that all action has a primary basis in deontological judgment,²⁶ albeit as reduplicated as the ‘political’ (along with secondary adjuncts in the aesthetical and the pragmatical). (135)

But, this shift, itself, is not without creating a new set of problems. (136)

If behaviour is rooted in the ethical (i.e., the deontological, along with the pragmatical and aesthetical as secondary adjuncts) then how do we account for the obvious fact that so much unethical behaviour is to be seen in this world? (137)

Because our egos get in the way and create ensuing patterns of distortion and obstruction (of the deontological albeit expressed, through reduplication, as the ‘meta-

²⁶ An experience of the deontological that is shorn of all traditional metaphysical references to any sense of the Numinous or Divine and entirely divorced from so-called ‘First Principle’, etc; where the allusion to the deontic, say, as an existential-like sense and semblance of duty, enacted responsibilities, and so on, is to the experiential nature and integrity of our relationships instead, to that extent they are found to be embedded, in turn, in a world of the relational, i.e., the overall life-world, the world at large, etc. Where the relational is viewed as emergent and not able to be reduced to their mere material instantiation.

deontological' as 'political volition'²⁷). Thence the adverse, distorting role of ideologies, desires, a lack of empathy for others, and so on. (138)

And the remedy for this dystopian view of the world a large? The exercise of better, more suitable suspensions. (139)

In the wake of such shifts a number of other issues also arise, like e.g., the nature of values, how should we re-view the nature of the existential, the pragmatic, the nature of conformal truth determination, and so on. (140)

But, let these problems, along with their theoretical resolutions, practical solutions, and both critical and radical appreciations unfold through this sequences of emails and speak for themselves... (141)

First Email... sent to D., and J.

Hi D. and J.

Many thanks for a great afternoon last Sunday.

D., I much appreciated your piece on egoism, an area that was quite new to me.

Of course, a serious critique should realize how short-sighted that type of approach must be. I guess Dewey's take on that would be 'that ethics cannot be just reduced to personal feelings given we are with others first and not just with ourselves (like stranded Robinson Crusoes)'.²⁷

Also appreciated your support for my seemingly way out points of view.

Especially two interconnected ideas, namely, a deontological origin for intentional motivation, and, that we can have a wide range of scientific-like treatment (as long as that is not some form of scientism).

First, that all motivation, primarily, is deontologically directed in its origination (being somewhat motivated to be expressed in the form of an imperative, and in line with the apparent dictates of my heuristic concerning ordering of judgments, etc.)...

But, distorted or obstructed in its expression by ideology, egotistical motivation, defective empathy, non-mutually expressed desires, and so on...

Hence the need for various suspensions (which, for convenience, we can call 'working suspensions')...

²⁷ I.e., in this ordered schematization as the third inter-ordered order.

Then, we find an alignment between relational motivation and relational expression... I.e., the (recovery of the relatively) existential.

In this approach the existential is move uncovered rather than constructed.

My complex heuristic seems to suggest that only the deontological in its reduplication (as meta-deontological/volition/the political aspect in the political-economy) is capable of converting virtual intentions into non-virtually enacted intentions...

So, phenomenological-semantic judgment (first order); aesthetical judgment (as an integration of the former)(second order); deontological judgment (third order); pragmatical judgment (with a more expedient flavour)(fourth order), hermeneutical judgments of possibility (fifth order); and ontical or factual judgment (sixth order) are all the result of what I term to be passive suspensions, i.e., inform the intention but leave in a virtual format (and unable to be enacted in non-virtual terms).

Then, through reduplication (as the x of x we arrive at x'). So, e.g., the phenomenological nature of the phenomenological becomes a categorical metaphysics (of semantic categories as used in a natural language). Where, e.g., 'the possibility of possibilities' becomes a 'science', and, the facts of facts become a history (in order to interpret those fact, etc.).

In duplication, (not to be confused with reduplication), (as the x of y , the ensuing product takes the meta-status and ordered status of the operator $[x]$ and not the operand $[y]$). So, e.g., the 'history of science' is a 'history' and 'not a science'. Or, e.g., 'the history of aesthetics' is a 'history' and 'not a (philosophy of) aesthetics'.

But the rule of reduplication can be rewritten as a rule of duplication by noting that the x of x is, more correctly, the x' of x . I.e., e.g., 'the fact of facts' should really be read as 'the factuality of facts', i.e. 'the historical appreciation of the merely factual'.

By reduplication the six ordered orders become as follows:

1. Phenomenological => Categorical Metaphysics
2. Aesthetical => Psycho-Sociological Spectrum
3. Deontological (which being actively activated in non-virtual terms of enaction)
=> **Meta-Deontological/Volitional/The Political** (as inscribing the Political-Economy)
4. Pragmatical²⁸ => Economical (in the Political-Economy)
5. Hermeneutical-Possibility => Sciences
6. Ontical-Factuality²⁹ => Histories (of the Past, Present, and Future).

²⁸ Making a distinction between being generally pragmatic (and existential in a broad holistic sense) and being functionally expedient in a pragmatical sense, in line with this fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatical.

²⁹ 'Ontical' as 'those propositions treated as factual, and, therefore, as statements'.

These six inter-ordered orders (effectively metaphysical in complexion, albeit as reconstituted in this non-traditional sense) are exercised through active suspensions, but, only the third inter-ordered order is capable of exercising intentional volition, i.e., converting virtual intentions into actual, non-virtual intentions.

Thence my argument that all volition is meta-deontological in flavour (and political in a dissemination of power between people).

So, if forced by this heuristic to accept this schematization then two further problems arise, namely, if all enacted action has a moral origination, holistically reflecting the nature of our relational interactions, then we must ask how do we explain the observation that people do not generally seem to operate in that manner (in their being ever respectful of others), and, how might we become ethical when it would appear we merely need to recover, at least as a place to begin, what was originally deontologically motivating our interactions in the first place?

The resolution of these two problems can be summed up by 'ego' and 'suspensions'...

Through a misplaced sense of ego there is ethical distortion and obstruction. E.g., because of an ideological extremism, egotistical desires, diminished empathy, etc.

The solution being the reimposition of working suspensions adequately capable of for us to return to our being ethical, etc.

I.e., in this scheme 'being ethical' is not so much doing rightful behaviour but 'uncovering what was there already to begin with (and then working with that in order to further existentially enrich the current richness of our relationships)'.

Quite a turning around...

However, we must also account for the fact that ethical behavior seems to be divided between deontological judgments and pragmatism (of a more calculative, expedient orientation).

I also add an aesthetical dimension and refer to these as 'secondary adjuncts' to the primary role of the deontological/meta-deontological. One argument for this relegation of the pragmatism is that juries consistently side with a deontological aspect in such considerations. I.e., that the deontological and the pragmatism (and the aesthetical) are not equals.

In arguing for an ordered epistemological dimension I view the deontological as an Ego-Ego type of interaction, whereas, the aesthetical is an Ego-Object type of interaction and the pragmatism is a Ego-World type of interaction. Moreover, any ethical style of interaction must involve this aspect of intentional subjectivity, i.e., Ego (ruling out the tertiary adjuncts of the remain three orders).

Refracted through the deontological the two types of judgment on either side, namely, the aesthetical (in a stylistic integrity of purpose) and the pragmatist (in various forms of motivated functions) qualify but don't fundamentally rewrite the deontological, but, then the total expression suffers on the way out so to speak (when not properly suspended).

The force of the suspensions coming from their suspended-suspensions, i.e., de-suspensions...

Interestingly, much that is expediently pragmatist (not to be confused with an existential-pragmatist) is deontologically constructed in a less holistic sense. E.g., effective, efficacious, efficient, economical, expeditious... all in their own way a more focused form of the deontological. Perhaps in aggregate contributing to the overall semblance of the ensuing deontological judgment which cannot be purely reduced to the same.

The upshot of this radical way of seeing things, again, is that the ethical is not so much doing as uncovering or recovering what was there all along, but, distorted and obstructed by misplaced egoistical interventions. That 'suspensions', or more correctly, 'de-suspensions' have the power to perform this uncovering/recovery, etc.

We do have a parallel here with lying, to the extent that we cannot be completely lying, since we have to tweak the odd true fact in order to lie. Similarly, all we have to do to be ethical is reverse the relatively superficial distortions and obstructions that prevent us from being more fully aligned with our originating motivations.

Of course, easier said than done...

Then, we can note that in this inter-ordered aspect of this scheme we find 'sciences', and, through duplication, the endless possibilities of their conjunction with all other ordered and inter-ordered orders. So, hypothetically, we could have a 'science of a categorical metaphysics (in dealing with categories like time, space, energy, etc.)', or, a 'history of science', and, the potentially equal possibility of a 'science of history'...?

J's observation that history has refined its historiography over time (and daresay he did mention 'progress', and I am sure meant with a small 'p') then I would argue that this has occurred because of the continuing prevalence of a scientific attitude (as discussed, say, by Dewey, e.g.). In other words, the ability of the discipline of the historical as refining its methodologies, etc. (in its desire to conformally reference that demonstrated as apparently 'evidential', i.e., whatever work even better in overall pragmatist-existential terms of reference).

This then forces me to conclude, going even further in affirming the usefulness of this scheme, that why postulate, from time to time, disciplinarians doing interdisciplinary research when such a process could be re-viewed as happening all the time, across time...

Where such 'progress' is not inevitable, can occur and be promoted through various profitable perspectives, and can also be undone, and so on.

Treating the orders as the province of the philosophical, then why not a science of the philosophical being advanced through the continuation of a scientific attitude..!?

I am definitely out on a limb for holding these radical points of view... and grateful for your understanding.

As you can perceive the argumentation here is quite tortuous and these background ideas in my *Advancement of Democratic Governance* need to be taken up elsewhere for a more reasoned exposition (and will find a place in my book *On the Nature of the Radical*).

Currently looking at the hypothetical collapse of Russia (as the waxing of an 'empire'). My next essay is *Wither Democracy in the US?* (as a euphonic pun). Your thoughts re this are welcome D...

Enjoy your week, N. (142)

Second Email...

Hi D., your exposition quite skilfully deconstructs a simplistic egoism.

My observation that if we aspire after something we more than likely need the cooperation of others. Hence my concept of 'arbitration' (as one way to connect Rorty's anxieties over the apparent divide between a private world and a public world). That would be another angle to take too.

Yes, I know people can be quite horrible and outrightly unethical...

So how do I resolve this 'anomaly' between this theoretical imputation of a deontological origination of our motivation and its unethical expressions in the world?

By invoking a rampant egoism de-centered by ideological extremism, selfish desires, a lack of empathy, and so on...

The existential remedy?

A better use of working suspensions.

Since all judgments involve suspension... just taken up more fully.

The parallel is to telling a lie. We first must tell the truth to then tweak a few details... but the chaotic consequences of a few tweaks can be catastrophic.

So, the deontological impetus (holistically reflecting the relationship) only needs to be somewhat distorted or obstructed to present a relatively non-deontologically oriented pattern of behavioural expression.

How do we turn the relatively non-deontological around? In a similar manner to the rectification of a lie (according to the extension of this analogy). Of course, all analogies have limits and the remediation, mitigation or re-normalizing of practice will also be different from dealing merely with an errant report.

The implication of this approach is that this imputed aspect of the existential is recovered through a return to what is already present, albeit as a distortion or obstruction of what is deontologically present... and our then needing, in all likelihood, to refine what is already to hand.

Seeing an ethics along these lines is quite radical (although not without precedents). The innovation being the proposal of a set of mechanisms for articulating what is meant by existential... as a certain relational alignment with the deontological... and our viewing this as productive of a pragmatic process or praxis capable of further enriching the 'richness' of our relationships where an emergence in value cannot be reduced to a bankrupt materialism or realism, etc.

D., you obviously see the problems created by this approach.

People can be nasty, but they cannot be completely nasty... even though they may as well be written of as such??

So, as a formula: deontological - distortions or obstructions - suspensions - existential recovery of the deontological - further refinement if needed.

Some would add 'salvation' but not going that far.

Like Caputo's claim that a 'radical theology is a radical secularism...' and this is perhaps one way to interpret that equation.

Thanks for your comments D.

Wishing both of you a great week, N. (143)

Third email...

Hi D., your exposition quite skilfully deconstructs a simplistic egoism.

My observation that if we aspire after something we more than likely need the cooperation of others. Hence my concept of 'arbitration' (as one way to connect Rorty's anxieties

over the apparent divide between a private world and a public world). That would be another angle to take too.

Yes, I know people can be quite horrible and outrightly unethical...

So how do I resolve this 'anomaly' between this theoretical imputation of a deontological origination of our motivation and its unethical expressions in the world?

By invoking a rampant egoism de-centered by ideological extremism, selfish desires, a lack of empathy, and so on...

The existential remedy?

A better use of working suspensions.

Since all judgments involve suspension... just taken up more fully.

The parallel is to telling a lie. We first must tell the truth to then tweak a few details... but the chaotic consequences of a few tweaks can be catastrophic.

So the deontological impetus (holistically reflecting the relationship) only needs to be somewhat distorted or obstructed to present a relatively non-deontologically oriented pattern of behavioural expression.

How do we turn the relatively non-deontological around? In a similar manner to the rectification of a lie (according to the extension of this analogy). Of course, all analogies have limits and the remediation, mitigation or re-normalizing of practice will also be different from dealing merely with an errant report.

The implication of this approach is that this imputed aspect of the existential is recovered through a return to what is already present, albeit as a distortion or obstruction of what is deontologically present... and our then needing, in all likelihood, to refine what is already to hand.

Seeing an ethics along these lines is quite radical (although not without precedents). The innovation being the proposal of a set of mechanisms for articulating what is meant by existential... as a certain relational alignment with the deontological... and our viewing this as productive of a pragmatic process or praxis capable of further enriching the 'richness' of our relationships where an emergence in value cannot be reduced to a bankrupt materialism or realism, etc.

D, you obviously see the problems created by this approach.

People can be nasty, but they cannot be completely nasty... even though they may as well be written of as such??

So, as a formula: deontological - distortions or obstructions - suspensions - existential recovery of the deontological - further refinement if needed.

Some would add 'salvation' but not going that far.

Like Caputo's claim that a 'radical theology is a radical secularism...' and this is perhaps one way to interpret that equation.

Thanks for your comments D.

Wishing both of you a great week, N. (144)

Fourth Email...

Again thanks, D.

Like your thought experiment and your well-argued critique.

Say, one good person, myself, and a psychopath/sociopath (have given up differentiating them as different countries have different definitions) live on an island together. Now, if the latter kills the good person it means I am left with this murderous criminal. Fortunately, this class of individual is usually not a criminal (although make a higher proportion of a prison population). What am I going to do?

Thankfully, I don't have to worry too much, since, although I do live on an island, I am surrounded by many people most of whom usually do the right thing. E.g., don't murder people, and, believe strongly that those who do should at least go to prison for some considerable period of time.

Problem solved, resolved through an ongoing evolution of social responses that have become institutionalised.

So, your argument for social evolution is quite apt.

Indeed, ethics needs to be refracted through a social lens and not so much through a theory of human nature. Moreover, reducing it to just 'feelings', as is the practice of an egoist, is far too short-sighted and contrary to experience to deserve philosophical remonstrance. As per Dewey, we live in a world of social arbitration first, a world of both navigation around and negotiation with others.

That most people generally do the right thing for me is 'evidence' of how 'economical' my ethical theory could be interpreted.

Just as to tell a lie you must tweak only a very small fraction of it, similarly, in our 'reading' of our relational situations we have learnt, more or less, what suitable types of response might be called for and those types of response that are not called for.

I am not arguing that we are perfect in this 'reading' of our relationships, but, equally, we are obviously good enough to generally get along...and, hopefully, survive those who might like to con us, or be too aggressive, or even those who are too murderous for their own good.

On balance, the motivation of most people is to work with others. My suggestion that suspensions are the way to-go is more something mundane rather than transcendental. In our intentional lives we are doing inadvertent suspensions all the time. However, to become a little bit mindful, and more mindful of others, such a practice needs to become more advertent, deliberate, and hopefully, more pragmatically-existential.

In my explorations of the interrogative economy, the asking of a question, we start with a rhetorical 'either/or'. A first stab at an answer, a response, is a metaphorical 'like' that is 'both like and not like'. Then in an (apparitional) testing of evidence we do so through both negations and double negations. Hence the Indian logic, e.g., a bull is not a cow, a cow is not a bull, but both a cow and a bull are the double negations of that type of animal that references an instance within the class of cattle.

But, suspensions come in many varieties.

Where the suspension automatically de-suspends itself... as an irruption from endless economic circulation in a process of resolution that supplies a definitive direction to our intentional enaction... expressing how things are being 'read'... and could be better 're-read'..

Thanks D. for your various critiques of my radical style of ethics that seems to be a little less bizarre as I learn to run with it.

J., I have posted Ari Aster's interview re his latest movie Eddington. A director more philosophical than Wes Anderson?

Enjoy your week, N. (145)

Fifth Email...

D., am honoured by your lengthy replies.

Like your thoughts on maladaptive behaviours. You could argue that they go with the territory - if adaption, then because relative adaption cannot be perfect, say, degrees of suitability, then maladaptation is co-prefigured... and we need to live with that as you note.

Just watched a podcast with my breakfast... and these ideas are not yet 30 minutes old.

As a teenager read books written by Dr Kramer, the assyriologist, about how biblical myths were prefigured in texts centuries earlier. Apparently, he found religious formulae cropping up even in pedestrian texts dealing with a recording of daily life. So, this scholar reasoned that sacred and secular texts mirrored each other and where the written language, through scribes, were constructing their lived-reality through the politics of their times. A bad paraphrase, nevertheless...

I keep mentioning 'deontological' but according to my heuristic approach, through reduplication, it is more correctly 'meta-deontological' passing as 'volition' or the 'political aspect of the political-economical' where enaction is economically inscribed on the cultural-intercultural fabric of what passes as 'society'. As inscriptive, constructive, indeed, through arbitration, as re-constructive. So, in this sense, it is more political, as 'politics' rather than being seen as merely ethical. But, at the same time, primarily refracted through a deontological lens with the aforementioned problems, resolutions, and remedies.

In other words, in our dealing with the relatively pre-negotiated world of arbitration, all enaction as a response within the same is 'political...'

Now, as this sense and semblance of the political can be reviewed though passive, active, and (existentially and collaboratively) engaged lenses then (referring to my Essay Five) (and channelling some of your ideas David on negative and positive rights) we can schematize this accordingly:

'Passive'... with an aspiration for a 'freedom from'...

'Active'... with an aspirational for a 'freedom to'...

'Engaged'... (as my third category in this economy of freedoms) with an aspiration for a 'freedom through'.

Where my extended vision of the 'deontological' has now finally become much more 'political'.

On par with the historical, scientific, etc., it means this political-ethics must likewise persistently pervade, infuse, be holistically reflected in all patterns of enaction... presenting a much more dynamic vision, say, of any desire for democratically oriented governance or any other style of governance.

Ideas hot of the press, but needing to be continually 're-forged' there...

Now to get myself out of bed...

Enjoy your day, N. (146)

Sixth Email, written to another philosophical friend...

Some of my ideas are heading off in radically new directions, one small increment after another.

E.g., most of our relating to the world (of self and others, etc.) Is primarily deontological (according to heuristic scheme) but supplemented aesthetically and pragmatically (the latter in a more expedient sense). But to enact our interventions in the world our intentions need to take a more active form (which I see as a form of reduplication, i.e., the deontological-ness of the deontological = meta-deontological = (in effect the) political.

But why some people, if not all people, exhibit degrees of duplicity, inauthenticity (in a relative non-alignment with their deontological roots)?

Through a lack of suspensions, egotistical involvement, and both over-ego-involvement (absolutism) and under-ego-involvement (relativism).

Remedy - better suspensions, and so on.

But the latest twist concerns values.

Polanyi suggests that values become depersonalised by society and lose their rootedness in personal experience. I can understand where he is coming from, but, the way I see it all enaction is political (as shaping the political economy) and so must value be likewise whether we like that or not.

Where values, therefore, are primarily deontological, albeit refracted meta-deontologically, i.e., politically. Where secondary values are aesthetical and pragmatical. Where tertiary values/value formation is either phenomenologically-semantic, hermeneutically- potential, and/or optically factual.

Where through reduplication these six types of value undergo a metaphysical turn.

Where through a second reduplication we appreciate the existential/pragmatic competence of those six types of metaphysical judgments...

And where through forms of retreatment all such values through a counter-metaphysical turn take on a potentially philosophical complexion, hopefully, with a critical-radical complexion.

Unfortunately, without adequate discrimination all these distinctions become hopelessly conflated and confused... sadly, that is the current state of play, and why much of philosophy is so fruitless and barren!

But, it does keep me off the streets, lol. (147)

Seventh Email, addressed to myself in light of the previous email...

How might we address Polanyi's concerns re the observed de-personalization of values (that must have a personal origination but end up being say, being either institutionalised, socialised, dehumanized, and/or rendered relatively inauthentic?)

The solution I propose is to invoke a third level in addition to a philosophical level, its non-traditional metaphysical reduplication, in a reduplication of the latter that realizes a level of appreciation that e/vacates the competence of the former, and, if suitably conducted, can be viewed as a pragmatic-existentialism or existential-pragmatism.

That through a thorough form of retreatment then presents the ensuing productivity of such e/valuational formation in a philosophical format. A formation whose form needs to be critically-radically re(-)interpreted through suitable lenses for doing so. Say, 'internally', identifying economic distinctions, accommodations, and transformations, and, 'externally', identifying economic salience, conscience, and propinquity (as a form of relational standing). By 'internally, etc.', is merely meant 'in relation to the apparent constitution of the intentional enactment in question'.

In other words, this third level in our evaluative explorations effectively appreciates the relational enrichment that that relationship could possibly see emerge through a pragmatically and existentially related process of collaboration. (148)

Eighth Email, written to myself whilst travelling...

Now I find a bath a place most conducive to doing philosophy. In moving from one side to the other I noticed the ensuing wave bounce of the left and then the right hand side of the bath. I reason that if the bath had no walls then the consequence of shifting position would dissipate off to Infinity. That, by extension of this metaphor, we could imagine the consequences of our actions playing within the metaphorical walls of our relationships, indeed, through overlap, all our more prominent relationships. That a consequential philosophy, more or less, demanded this metaphorical circumscription to some extent or otherwise the net impact of our enacted intervention would soon dissipate and render a philosophical consequentialism practically null and void.

But we should take a more dialectical sense of perspective and ask how we might appreciate this relational consequentialism if not other than our ability to also appreciate that also beyond the individual thematization of our more prominent relationships.

Just as an appreciation of the waves within the bath also needed our awareness if also being in a 'bathroom and not just within a 'single bath'.

Usually, our interactions within these overlapping 'bathtubs', relationships, is non - problematic since our various cultures proffer a range of hermeneutical genres of behaviour for dealing with events similar to the same. Becoming somewhat problematic only when we enter the chaotic territory between now competing paradigms for arbitrating our expected responses. But all things never being equal even indecision can be decisively dealt with through either actions or non-actions or deferred inactions. (149)

Ninth Email, also to myself written on my one whilst travelling...

Now I find a bath a place most conducive to doing philosophy. In moving from one side to the other I noticed the ensuing wave bounce of the left and then the right hand side of the bath. I reason that if the bath had no walls then the consequence of shifting position would dissipate off to Infinity. That, by extension of this metaphor, we could imagine the consequences of our actions playing within the metaphorical walls of our relationships, indeed, through overlap, all our more prominent relationships. That a consequential philosophy, more or less, demanded this metaphorical circumscription to some extent or otherwise the net impact of our enacted intervention would soon dissipate and render a philosophical consequentialism practically null and void.

But we should take a more dialectical sense of perspective and ask how we might appreciate this relational consequentialism if not other than our ability to also appreciate that also beyond the individual thematization of our more prominent relationships.

Just as an appreciation of the waves within the bath also needed our awareness if also being in a 'bathroom and not just within a 'single bath'.

Usually, our interactions within these overlapping 'bathtubs', relationships, is non - problematic since our various cultures proffer a range of hermeneutical genres of behaviour for dealing with events similar to the same. Becoming somewhat problematic only when we enter the chaotic territory between now competing paradigms for arbitrating our expected responses. But all things never being equal even indecision can be decisively dealt with through either actions or non-actions or deferred inaction. (150)

Tenth Email...

What can we say in a critical exposition of this heuristic, namely, these six orders (generated from an archetypal economy), their metaphysical reduplication, and then their pragmatic-existential appreciation of an evaluative competence through reduplication of the latter, and, then their inevitable overall retreatment through an overall de-suspensions back to a philosophical level of exposition that then stands in need of critical-radical forms of ongoing re(-)interpretation? A process quite complex and simple at the same time - the arc of the economic, non-economic, and hyper-economic.

Let me first elaborate my reasoning, and where I can, render it more succinctly..?

The six orders have a relatively passive format that can only be enacted in virtual terms of reference. Say, i see an apple on this apple tree: it has a ripe, aesthetic integrity: it is on my apple tree so if I were to pick it I would not be stealing; let me chose this specific apple that is easy to pick: yes, i could pick this apple; but how do I render my eating of this apple so admired?.

Metaphysically, knowing this is an apple (growing on an apple tree), as a piece fruit, doesn't help.

Moreover, having this psychological desire to eat, in and of itself, doesn't help either, only intensifying my desire to eat that apple.

However, the reduplication of the deontological as the meta-deontological volition, in its political ability too intervene in the world allows me pick this apple.

Politically acting upon the face of this lived-world through it being enacted therein.

Doing so in a scientific-like manner acquired from both experience and reflections enacted in this arbitrated world with others.

Thence, the historical appreciation of my 'having picked this apple'...

Problem solved... well almost.

In an appreciation of this process, I apperceive how competently it was enacted. And through requisite suspensions the pragmatic-existential merit of this apple eaten.

Reviewing all relevant distinctions through the relevant critical and radical lenses required to perform such e/valuational formation.

I.e., in a conformity between lived-reality and lived-experience this overall intentional act of choosing, picking, and eating of an apple was successfully enacted.

Now, it should also be added that all these philosophical orders, inter-ordered metaphysical orders, and extra-ordered pragmatically-existential orders can be permanently seen to interact besides our focusing on episodic forms of interactions.

A few months back I 'baristared' my thumb one morning whilst still half-asleep. I created a dark, bruised moon-like impression at the bottom of my nail. Joking to others that my current stigmatum (stigmata in the form of careless accident) was either too early or too late for Easter. Interestingly, months later I noted my dark moon had moved up towards the center of my nail, that some months hence it would be clipped, waxing as it finally

disappeared from my thumb. I make the scientific assumption my nail is growing from the base out and the rate of growth is visibly evident in this rising moon.

Historically I have a history of the past in the form of how that dark spit originated. A history of the present from current observations. In a process of extrapolation an hypothesis that this rising moon will eventually wax and disappear a number of months later, in an expected history of the future.

This anecdote outlining a relation here between a succession of histories and their scientific interpretation... demonstrating how a scientific appreciation of the historical and a historical appreciation of the scientific can work together and that his inter-ordered continuity of interaction crosses time and, by extension, we could assume similar interactions take place between all orders, inter-orders, and extra-orders... in effect weaving an interpretative mat/map of lived-experience in conformity with lived-reality, and v.v.

That all lived--constitution is constructed, and where both we and the world, with others, constitute such lived experience. Where all value is similarly constituted in a manner that is both personal and political, and, where the deontological roots of our lived-reality can be expressed both pragmatically and existentially through the well-formed, well-informed exercise of the suspension/de-suspension of our conjectural economies, etc... (151)

Eleventh Email... written as a reply.

Hi M., delighted that you would provide a commentary on my philosophical sketch. Indeed, very much what I would call an 'interrogative commentary', one exercised through asking a set of questions prompted by the text itself.

You ask how do we acquit ourselves of this deontological perspective without recourse to ethical standards, or similar?

You note:

But why some people, if not all people, exhibit degrees of duplicity, inauthenticity (in a relative non-alignment with their deontological roots)?

And comment...

You know as well as I that exhibiting 'authenticity', assuming this were possible, is very difficult. Authenticity in relation to what? Implicit in the above sentence is the premise there is a universal or absolute right. A Socratic dialogue with all roughly 8 billion humans is impossible. You have not explicitly told us what are the deontic standards and how we have acquired them.

My reply to this reasonable request:

That because our relationships are forged through relational experience they already are done so through deontological forms of responsibility whether we are reasonably aware or unaware of such a constitution. As a metaphor, in asking a question the answer is already formatted in line with the questioning. Similarly, in living together with others our

patterns of engagement conform to meta-textual, hermeneutical genres of behaviour along with their embedded deontological responsibilities, etc. Indeed, the very existence of the relationship per se is the ensuing result of such process of resolution viewed as both intentional and moral. The experiential fact of our having relationships is a testament to their already being relatively resolved in ethical-like terms of reference. Mind you, this is not perfectly executed and instantiated, but, the 'force' of the deontological is already with us so to speak. That force is affectively charged, cognitively directed through post trans-cognitive judgments. My heuristic once understood, implies that only volition as the 'meta-deontological' or 'political' is able to have us act in this world with others. I.e., our intentions to intervene in the world can only be primarily channelled through this aspect of our psyche. Then the philosophical problem 'is not how to be moral but why do we act in an immoral manner given this alternative insight that we should already be in a morally oriented frame of reference to begin with?'

My resolution of this philosophical 'anomaly' is that ego gets in the way. Through ideological distortions, desires, a lack of empathy for others, etc.

Remedy - the better exercise of our suspensions. Suspensions cannot be avoided in the coursing of our intentions, but, need to be better exercised.

As I state:

Remedy - better suspensions, and so on.

And you comment...

Better suspensions implies better knowledge which implies better information from a greater inflow of data. Are we as humans limited through our physiologies to intelligence limitations?

My reply:

Suspensions certainly need to be better informed, i.e., well-informed. But, they also need to be well-formed. But, we also need to differentiate just what suspensions are.

This topic deserves a book in its own right.

But, basically, a functional-structure where x is simultaneously juxtaposed against $-x$ or y in some form or other.

E.g., ask a question and you invoke the either/or. To entertain the question we need to entertain the two possible answers or replies simultaneously. Is this a ripe apple or not a ripe apple? Should I eat this ripe apple or this ripe mandarin?

Or, we could entertain three parties or infinite parties including the entirety of the imputed world (at large) in a global suspension as per Husserl. His methodological method exposing the transcendental constitution of the intention or intentions in question. I.e., treating what is apparent rather than attempting to discern what is real, or ideal, or prag-

matical, or good, or ethical, or beautiful ,and so on... in an attempt to expose only the constitution of the intention under such phenomenological scrutiny.

But I go much further than Husserl in order to argue that intentions, etc., are economically constituted in trimodal terms of reference, and, each economic correlative is exercised through the use of its own type of suspension.

E.g., the interrogative economy, involved in the asking of a question, needs to be understood through the succession of three suspensions, namely, a rhetorical suspension (of either/or), a first reply in the form of a metaphorical suspension of 'like' (as 'both like and not like'), and a second reply in what I refer to as an apparitional suspension (through the use of both negation and a double negation).

Now, to complicate matters we can have what I term ' intro-mediation' in the suspension of a single intentional function or set of intentional content; 'mediation' in 'the suspension of two elements in and through a dynamic balance'; and, 'inter-mediation' when 'all three economic correlatives (as functions) are duly suspended collectively'. The latter being exercised in processes of existentially oriented discernment.

To further complicate matters, albeit temporarily (lol) we have 'passive suspensions' as 'the result of ordered judgments (six in number)'. Active suspensions (through what I term reduplication) that have a metaphysical-like character or complexion (and include a categorical metaphysics concerning topics like space, time, etc.); a psychological-sociological spectrum; volition with political implications, economical (as in a political-economics); sciences; and histories. Then I envisage, through reduplication again, our appreciation of the relative competence of the former as a parallel set of six extra-orders... and as implicating an existential-pragmatic dimension in experience.

So, e.g., in the sixth trans-cognitive order (as an ordered judgment) we have facts, propositional -statements currently treated as 'statements of fact'. Now, through reduplication, the factuality of a set of facts we arrive at an historical appreciation of the same. Moreover, through 'the factualness of the factuality of a set of facts' we then arrive at the apparent historical competence of that historical interpretation/s currently in play, etc.

Then returning to basics, the archetypal nature of an economy is 'synthesis, analysis, and nomination' paralleling a harmonic progression of 'consonance (of field), dissonance of gestalt foreground, and the inter-subjective experience of the resolution of the former'... where each of these economic correlatives, as noted, is exercised through a characteristic form of suspension (that parallels the interrogative economy, etc.).

That in the light of this brief exposition, the overall topic of 'suspension' is considerably complex, but, again, it all boils down to the simple idea that a suspension is a simultaneous juxtaposition of either x and $-x$, or, x and y , etc. The x *versus* $-x$ being an example of intro-mediation, x *versus* y being an example of mediation, and the overall suspension of all three economic correlatives being an example of inter-mediation.

Thanking you for your comments M. I am hoping you have a better understanding of suspensions and at least suspect their central role in this radical philosophy I am outlining.

That basically we are good (to begin with), and, could do better, but, unfortunately through either over-ego-involvement or under-ego-involvement we either distort and/or obstruct the ethical purport of our intentions as we intervene in this world at large. The ramification of this ethical approach being quite radical compared to conventional ethical approaches. Essentially, we need to be undoing the undoing and better do the well-doing of that which should be done....

This vision of the ethical radically reconstituting how the existential (and pragmatic) are then to be viewed and acted upon...

Very best regards, N. (152)

Twelfth Email...

You raise the sensible objection how can a master and their slave have an ethically related relationship?

I am arguing that in the thematization of our representative-representation of the same we work with an essential, holistic relational appreciation, more or less, from the perspective of the working-relationship itself.

But, given our ensuing appreciation of the same is clouded by egotistical concerns, the insufficient and unsuitable exercise of suspensions, etc., the net result is then an imperfect realization of this ethical-political dimension.

In the situation of the master and their slave this interaction between two people, in effect, is sullied by such egotistical concerns. However, despite the conventional nature of their roles the master must still be mindful of their slave needing to be fed, hydrated, given sufficient shelter, etc. Failing this minimum degree of concern and care would mean the inevitable death of their charge.

So, yes, it is in the selfish interests of the owner to ensure such minimum conditions are effectively met, but, such an understanding has already come through the origination of our intentional appreciation of our situatedness itself.

At the same time in their interactions a minimal degree of consent also needs to be fostered. In despair the maltreated slave could just withdraw their services at any time of their choosing and be prepared to just accept the consequences of their denial of service.

Such 'democratically' centered consent being analysed by myself under the three headings of comprehension, exercise, (and if amenable to such disseminated instruction, then taking a more existentially collaborative stance which might be adopted by the slave if the master were to also exercise a more concerned and caring form of interaction).

But, how might we reverse the inauthenticity of this egotistical contamination of our relational interactions? By invoking better suspensions... I.e., more suitable suspensions in both form and degree.

Nothing mysterious, just working much better with what we already have to hand since the intentional economy, whatever its intentional directedness, must utilise a variety of interlinked suspensions.

By such remediation, etc, deconstructing the superficially adverse and reconstructing the relatively non-superficially non-adverse.

On the model of rectifying a lie, I.e., deconstructing those misrepresentative elements and reconstructing an ongoing refinement of the narrative...

This turning around of the deontologically oriented has profound consequences for and ethical-politics (given the ethical entering primarily in the deontological and its political expression in a form theoretically treated as meta-deontological, volitional, as effectively political by virtue of its being expressed in a public world (subject to what I call arbitration and not just the mere negotiation of intent)).

So, succinctly, the ethical is not so much performed from scratch as un-covered and re-covered and not merely re-covered over, again....

Best regards, N. (153)

Thirteenth email...

Your presentation on the 'Anthropocene' has inspired me to write a reply, hopefully, one I will be able to present soon at an upcoming session of The Continental Philosophy Group.

Will look at humanist, and post humanist approaches with the latter critiquing the former (probably over the problem of nature, and the fact we are also not divorced from animals, plus our being both embodied and operating to some extent virtually...).

Then critiquing anti-humanist as a small pessimistic subset of the latter. While noting trans-humanist hype as similar to AI hype. Much of that technology is already here, so what, and the rest is not much more than speculation. Discuss it when it happens, if it gets any further off the ground.

Then introduce super-humanist approach/es as both pragmatic and existential... as a relational resolution of the humanist and post-humanist debates.

But the drift of my argument is to then head towards why Anthropocene anxieties are gaining traction despite non-geologic acceptance (Holocene does cover much of that territory, but, maybe in one hundred years we could then argue for a stratigraphical discontinuity, say, between the absence and presence, say, of radioactive materials post-1945, micro-plastics, everlasting chemicals, heavy metals, etc?). Those anxieties focusing on global warming, environmental pollution and degradation, species extinctions, etc. That the better way to deal with this crisis is through a more democratically oriented form of governance that is not corrupted through the financial influences of vested organisations like, e.g., petro-chemical industries, etc. Letting scientific innovations allow cost curves to increasingly replace less ecological and less sustainable practices...

Because of the vast sweep of this essay will have to write more laconically... in a style more suggesting of topics and themes for discussion along the way.

In the background can run arguments how the virtual is reshaped along non-virtual lines of enaction, how the pragmatic and existential is engendered, the implications of a pragmatic-existential turn, where values have a role in shaping cultural practice, etc., etc.

The moral being donations, e.g., are killing democratic governance... with an exhortation that democracies need to do better. Be less neo-liberal. Become more representative of their citizenry, and so on.

My guess is that this essay will be more a series of headings, a few sentences under the same, a series of questions indicating possible critiques, means for establishing the same, to what extent the speculations are reasonable, potentially valid, but, for the present not much more than speculative.

But proffering a lot of points more deserving of discussion.

Enjoy your week, Noël. (154)

Fourteenth Email...

About a quarter of the way into this current essay and see some quite esoteric ideas finding a place there which is quite a challenge, but, no doubt, much more of a challenge for the reader or audience. E.g., how do I manage to equate 'pragmatic' and 'existential' (in a philosophical problem simply labelled **Equation**); determining the nature of the relationship between value and the experience of both the relatively existential and non-existential (**E/Valuation**); just how do we convert, i.e., enact, within intentional terms of reference, the virtual into the non-virtual (**Enaction**); and just how is the consequential recognised and dealt with (**Recognition**)? Then, the question of the nature of nature/Nature has to be addressed and somewhat dialectically salvaged through a phenomenological lens, etc., whilst also recognising the distinctive types of judgments are also

overlapping variations on the integrated nature of judgment itself (**Nature**). All this should keep me busy for the rest of the week, but, if I were to be more honest, at least, the ensuing month. Not that I don't have other things to do as well which can be quite frustrating...

Now, having raised these five philosophical problems (nominated in bold) let spell out how I intend to defuse and resolve the same (in a process that will eventually assist our comprehension of the various humanistic approaches that could be entered into in order to better comprehend this issue of the Anthropocene as spelt out through its apparent mix of embedded descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions³⁰).

Under the heading of **Equation**, from an existential perspective, I see no real, discernible difference or differences between my concept of the 'existential' and the concept of the 'pragmatic'. Assuming a deontological turn, i.e., that all behaviours, both those with moral implications and those behaviours without direct moral implication, are primarily refracted through the reduplication of the deontological characteristics of the third trans-cognitive order (of judgment) with secondary adjuncts in the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatistical as well as the second trans-cognitive order of the aesthetical we may also assume the following...

Existential³¹ = Pragmatic,³²

and, the same equals

Aesthetical + Pragmatic + Pragmatistical,³³

Which, in turn, equal all six trans-cognitive orders of passive judgment, etc.³⁴

I.e., Trans-Cognitive Orders, Inter-Ordered orders, and Super-Ordered Orders.³⁵

Because an economy is enacted and thematized when duly resolved in inter-mediated terms of reference, i.e., through the trimodal suspension of its economic correlatives, and, where the same principle automatically applies to any form or all forms of ordered exploration.

³⁰ As a description of global warming, etc; as a prescription of the behaviours that might better address this problematic issue; and, where existential proscriptions will also be called for.

³¹ Meant as a working composite of both non-systematic and systematic orientations of the existential, i.e., where the non-systematic is derived through a bimodal mediation(al suspension) of the Object and World moments (and its expression of the Ego moment), and, the systematic existential is the trimodal intermediation(al suspension) of Object, World and Ego moments.

³² Not to be confused with the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the pragmatistical.

³³ As secondary adjuncts to the deontological/meta-deontological. I.e., as second, third and fourth trans-cognitively ordered orders.

³⁴ As now including tertiary adjuncts, and as subjected to an overall (hexamodal) suspension.

³⁵ This last line in this overall equation cashing out the 'etc.' in the previous line. In effect, invoking quaternary adjuncts?

We could further translate this intuitive observation along the following lines: under the implication of the moment of Ego, at the center of the passivity of the deontological and the activity of its inter-ordered reduplication we can complement or supplement the same through the indirect ego-involvement (Ego) of the pragmatist as a series of less-focused suspensions, and as also integrated through the co-associated influence of the aesthetical. But, why stop there, given that the existential, in its more systematic aspect, is to be discerned through inter-mediation of an entire economy this same approach can be extended to either the trans-cognitive orders, and/or the inter-ordered orders, and/or the super-ordered orders.

In **E/Valuation** we note that value emerges both existentially and non-existentially, and, where the former expresses itself only through degrees of positive enrichment and where the latter is divided up between the relatively positive, the neutral, and/or the negative, i.e., non-existentially positive, non-existentially static, and/or non-existentially negative (and de-enriching of overall e/valuation). Where such evaluations/valuations can be conducted internally to the event in question through noting accommodations, distinctions, and transformations, and, externally, through considerations of consilience, salience, and propinquity or standing.

As for **Enaction**, the relatively virtual is transformed into the relatively non-virtual through reduplication, i.e., some suitable holistic form of suspension with all co-associated de-suspensions.

The type of suspensions articulated through the instantiation of those constructed representations found to hand. Converting virtual intentions to non-virtual actualizations through such processes of suspension/de-suspension that enact such outcomes. Thence the ramifications of the diagrammatical formula just depicted.

The virtual delineation of our intentions carves out possible trajectories that specific enactions can enable in relatively specific non-virtual terms of reference. The **Recognition** of the relative possibility of these intentional trajectories then allows us to appreciate, to some extent, the consequences of our enactions where and when such enacted deliberations will be matched with their envisaged outcomes to that extent such progressions are duly observed. I.e., through a mix of passive, active, and/or collaborative patterns of engagement.

As for the nature of 'nature', altogether unwisely reified as **Nature** (in absolutist terms of reference through improper forms of representative extrapolations) we might, instead, prefer more nuanced forms of language centered around phenomenological, hermeneutical, and/or (non-systematic) existential forms of treatment, etc.

In this regard, I would like to proffer the following suggestion, namely, that modernist (and humanist) visions of the world are intuitively correct but completely argued for through invalid forms of argumentation, whereas, in contrast, the post-modernist (post-humanist) visions of the world are fraudulently arrived at being misinterpreted conclu-

sions, basically, of valid forms of argumentation. That, through a suspension of both types of approach we would arrive at a more pragmatic-existential/existential-pragmatic form of argumentation that is both validly argued for with validly arrived at conclusions. Hence, my category of the type of super-humanist perspective that is jointly inclusive and critical of both humanist and post-humanist forms of argumentation and interpretation.

Obviously, the question to now ask must be, ‘how are these discontinuities between argumentation and ensuing interpretations, on the part of both humanist and post-humanist approaches, so disparately and defectively enacted?’ Quite simply, although the ensuing exposition is a vast simplification, the humanists observe no suspensions, and, the post-humanists, observe no de-suspensions. Let me explain.

The adoption and adaptation of relevant working suspension would completely defuse all representative nonsense both exhibited and disseminated by modernists. Then, in a recognition that suspensions are automatically de-suspended, this understanding would then permit post-modernists to both resume and finalize more productive forms of argumentation.

‘More productively’ means ‘operating more in an alignment with our relatively delineated perspectives and approaches’ through ‘the utilization of well-formed and well-informed processes of economically constituted conjecturalization, etc.’ Thence the philosophical, metaphysical, and existentially-pragmatic benefits that would flow from such a more integrated approach, being further augmented and enhanced through the delineation of relevant accommodations, etc., and the suitable application of processes of mitigation, remediation, and re(-)normalization, as explored elsewhere, and so on.

So, these sweeping theoretical claims accepted, if only hypothetically, what are we now allowed to say about the so-called nature of nature, the nature of experience, the experience of nature, through the misperception of Nature, and so on?

To dismiss, e.g., the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of the intentional objectivity in question is too stupid for words, given our obvious abilities to both re(-)iterate to ourselves and to re(-)demonstrate to others the phenomenal-phenomenological stabilities of such experience. If anything, the absence of such correspondences between the personal and the interpersonal, etc., is more an indication of the absence of some physiological basis being articulated in and through such comparative statements. So, the colour blind person might not be able, say, to differentiate red from green, and v.v., still, they both claim seeing the objectivity of the intentional objectives being referred to through such forms of communication, etc. Thence, in this instance, where both parties can describe what is generally be seen, but, where the colour-blind person cannot express those nuances of colour that can be seen by others.

So, let us accept a phenomenal-phenomenological version of our reality as lived that is capable of generally expressing those forms of alignment that can be discussed between such interacting parties on those levels of articulated discussion that can be shared in general, particular and specific terms of reference. Just as although a red-green colour

blind person apparently sees no difference in colour between a ripe tomato and a lawn well-watered by an adequate rainfall, still, for all that, in practice, by both parties, the former will continue to be eaten and the latter only looked at and, perhaps, walked upon.

Again, the same type of argument applies on both a hermeneutical level of exposition and a non-systematic existential level of exposition.

What is meant by the modernist not suitably performing adequate suspensions?

By extrapolating (well-)beyond the limits of our natural expertise. Thence philosophical-ly rendering 'representations' as only worthy of a poorly represented secular sense and semblance of world. In the process, not appreciating that all intentional objectivity is approached through a set of perspectives, either relevant or not so relevant, that in number cannot be exhausted, and, individually, where each approach, itself, cannot be definitively exhausted.

In an informative contrast, the post-modernist does not recognize that the ensuing consequences of all arguments should devolve through de-suspensions, i.e., the suspension of those suspensions themselves. So, this 'chair' is seen to be a 'chair-representation' through suitable suspensions, that, then, through de-suspensions, allow us to both discern the same and enact our sitting upon that same chair if so desired and permitted (by both ourselves and others). So, an antique and genuine Chippendale chair can be imaginatively sat upon, whereas, in that same museum, we should only sit on those seats and benches earmarked for such 'public sitting'.

Or, put another way, the intuitions of the modernists have a certain cultural-intercultural relevance despite their fraudulent arguments conducted in impossible absolutist terms of exposition, whereas, post-modernists all too often deride such cultural-intercultural intuitions, but, at the same time, observe a general reluctance to suspend their own suspensions at the root of all economic activity. However, by suspending and de-suspending both approaches, a super-humanist set of perspective and approaches can be both duly delineated and demonstrated.

What relevance does this super-humanist perspective and approach possess?

Our ability to both discern the virtual and non-virtual, and, therein and thereafter, duly enact all ensuing performances with the requisite concern and care required for such personal-interpersonal interactions, and so on. Indeed, performing an alignment between the philosophical, the metaphysical (as here non-traditionally re-constituted), the existentially-pragmatic/pragmatically-existential...

By such patterns of re(-)orientation, we develop that degree of discernment that enables us to existentially intervene in this world as lived in such a manner that both individually and collectively enriches our passages through this secular world at large, and so on.

Again, enjoy your week, Noël. (155)

Fifteenth Email (to myself)...

The more I think about this arbitrary 'economy' of the humanist/modernist, the post-humanist/post-modernist, and the super-humanist/super-modernist the more I feel this heuristic device has merit far outweighing the value of its input/s.

In this regard we can refer to the fallacious arguments of the modernist given their overlooking the dialectical limits of the logical and the experiential limits of the logical-dialectical (given we operate as embodied in this world as lived, and not merely embodied either just materially or ideally). In other words, it would be a very unwise person to simply dismiss the aeon's of knowledge collectively arrived at both culturally and inter-culturally. Hence this take on the modernist that their intuitions about the lived-experience of lived-reality have a certain historical soundness to their exposition, but, that such insights are not well served by the fallaciously constructed proliferation of an absolutist logic. Logical identities can be pointed to but not appropriated in the impossible process of their mere nomination. Thence their description as more a 'positively non-nihilistic' style of argumentation.

In contrast, as noted, the postmodernist's arguments are relatively impeccable, i.e., non-fallacious, but, the interpretation of their conclusions entirely missed the point should their exposition be totally reductive. The total reduction of something is nothing, and, thence, description of this style of argumentation as 'negatively nihilistic'. It is all very well to deconstruct a series of arguments fallaciously put forward by the modernist, but, to proffer nothing in their place is to do philosophy, for a start, a great disservice. My concept of 'remediation' makes just that point, namely, no reconstruction without deconstruction, and v.v. Moreover, from a relatively existential (and pragmatic) perspective this process is simultaneous, whereas, from a relatively non-existential perspective this process can be exercised in two stages, i.e., deconstruction followed by reconstruction.

Now, in a bimodal suspension of the former, i.e., in an act of mediation (as so defined), I envisage the emergence of the super-humanist/super-modernist perspective. Given its existential and pragmatic complexion this style of argumentation could be described as 'positively nihilistic', i.e., as a type of process that completely constitutes lived-experience by virtue of the fact that the transformational nature of the process dialectically emerges beyond both the unproductive rigidity of a positive non-nihilism and the rootlessness of a negative nihilism. Thence its description as 'positively nihilistic'.

But, that granted, we must also recognize that the economic configuration of this economy, as one-part modernism, one-part post-modernism, and one-part super-modernism, cannot get off the ground unless each of these three aspects be viewed no more than and no less than as 'economic correlatives', and, where as such, that cannot be appropriated in themselves, but, only somewhat pointed to. In other words, even though these three correlatives can relatively critique each other, at the end of the metaphorical day they must mutually persist, despite such criticism, given the fact that the economy in question emerges through the irreducible interactions of such dialectical facets or aspects.

Why this expression super-humanist/super-modernist? As alluding to the ‘super-economic’ (and not the hyper-economic with its hermeneutical parallels, nor the trans-humanist remodelling of themselves by such artificial means). To some extent also modelling the triad of the philosophical (sub-economy) as ordered, the metaphysical (sub-economy) as inter-ordered, and the existential-pragmatic economy as extra-ordered (in its existential and pragmatic determination of inter-ordered competence).

And now to apply these potentially insightful approaches to that essay on the Anthropocene in the form of a reply (description of the existential crisis we are in through our collectively acting non-responsibly and irresponsibly) and an exhortation (to do better through the auspices of both a positive prescription and a negative proscription).

‘Till I put such thoughts into words once more... (156)

Now, given this topic of the ‘relatively-radical’ has been a tacit concern in the formation of my recent book *Essays on the Advancement of Democratic Governance*, and that a not inconsiderable hiatus in time has occurred since writing this initial introduction I thought it would be advisable to restart this book under *A Second Introduction* (with the understanding that any perceived differences in my approaches can be put down to later processes of re(-)consideration, or, just processes of possible oversight). (157)

Noël Tointon, Penrith, 1.2.26.

Section B: A Second Introduction:

On the Nature of the Radical

*Simple comparisons are much
Like waves on water,
All perspectives have to situate
Their tri-modal apperception...³⁶*

Let me define the ‘relative-radical’ by noting ‘its relative differentiation from the both the ‘relatively non-critical’ and the relatively-critical.³⁷ Thence the ‘relatively non-critical’, the ‘relatively-critical’ and the ‘relatively-radical’. ‘Relatively’ being a qualification that notes ‘there can be no absolutistical differentiation and isolation of definitions (except in practical terms when we encounter analytically pre-constructed situations, etc., say, in the mathematical counting of a certain type of object, etc.)’. Indeed, the ‘relative-radical’ is critically rendered in a critically comparable situation through those processes that oversee its critical-re(-)appropriation, etc. Otherwise, the relatively-radical would be radically-radical and completely non-comprehended. (158)

So, the non-critical can be critically appreciated, and, the relatively-radical can also be critically appreciated (i.e., in and through a carefully conducted process of critical re(-)appropriation). (159)

The non-critical can be divided between the relatively-nonsensical, the uncritically appreciated, and the critically appreciated as relatively un-critical. There can be no absolutistical-nonsense, as the absolutistically-nonsensical, because, like the radically-radical, exemplifications of such a category could not be comprehended! (160)

A conceptual category should not be thought if its only exemplification is pure absence *per se*. So, the concept of ‘the current King of France’ makes sense because, currently, although there is no exemplification, its exemplification would be recognized should its exemplification were to exist. On the other hand, the first ordered concept of a square-circle can only persist as a non-integrated molecular concept because its atomic concepts exist, but, not their impossible integration. (161)

As vacuous a concept as the ‘noumenal’, as ‘a pure thing in itself, etc.’, when its metaphorical semblance is (mis)treated literally as making literal sense when it cannot. Where, likewise, the phenomenal can only be discerned within the phenomenological, or, more correctly, the phenomenal-phenomenological. (162)

Just as boiling hot water must be carefully approached because it, our experience, likewise, can never be a pure construct of the mind alone even if interacted with as ‘experience’. (163)

³⁶ As hinted at – the water, the waves, and the situation of that wavy-water, say, a pond or ocean.

³⁷ Having eliminated the impossibility of the radically-radical *Section A*.

So, as soon as a ‘purely reductive argument’ is proposed, dismiss it as fast as you should also a ‘counter-reductive argument’ that proposes only a pure process of emergence only! (164)

So, the relatively-radical can now be defined, non-absolutistically, as ‘not relatively-non-critical nor relatively-critical’. (165)

To lock a house with a back door and a front door we need to lock both doors. In a similar sense, an overall argument is locked when both a negative argument works when supported with a positive argument letting only dialectical light in through the windows above those metaphorical ‘doors’. (166)

Moreover, all the intentional directedness to conduct a judgment must be trans-intentionally enacted. Where the metaphorical ‘door’ to the trans-intentional (within the Trans-Cognitive Aspect) as an ‘entrance’ (to the ‘outside world’) is through a set of working suspensions. Furthermore, through the automatic working de-suspension, we have an ‘exit’ back to the intentional construction of our arguments (metaphorically in the form of being ‘inside our house’). Realizing furthermore, that the relative ‘exit’ or relative ‘entrance’ through ongoing re(-)iteration of our passage through a door is never merely a reversed equation given an axiom of difference, i.e., just as going through the door of your house and walking to work is ‘your going to work’, but, your return from work is ‘your returning from work’, etc. (167)

But, because suspensions are mirrored by de-suspensions there can be no non-metaphorical ‘outside’ and no metaphorical ‘inside’. That, in a similar vein, to say truth applies only to propositions is a short-sighted view given that forms of textualized alignment have to be both perceived and apperceived as ‘either in an alignment or not in an alignment’, etc.). Just as textual ‘perception’ is appreciated through trans-textual ‘apperception’. Given our necessary existence within the apparent transcendental unity of the same semblance of world. For how, otherwise, could conformal truth be intersubjectively appreciated in mutual terms of reference? (168)

Moreover, the trans-economic nature of interrogation (through the situatedness of the economic³⁸) implies an ordered philosophy (in those ways that might be practically realized) given that the philosophical nature of the disciplinary economy can only be factually based in the secular economy in and through an ontical orientation. Furthermore, in reverse, an aspirational reading of the secular economy demands a meta-philosophical and meta-disciplinary approach, i.e., a metaphysical approach (as non-traditionally reconstituted), where through reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological there is realized the enactive expression of the political, and, where through the further reduplication of the same a more full, and fulfilled sense and semblance of the existential, is pragmatically realized. (169)

³⁸ Ethical situatedness can be seen in and through the tertiary adjuncts of the deontological. Or, the secular economy can be treated as the situatedness of the philosophical-disciplinary economy. In both cases we see the intersection of the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical.

All dependent upon the conformalization of relevant forms of alignment, and, causally dependent upon an acceptance of an alignment between the relatively pre-conditional, conditional, and the post-conditional along with the necessary delineation of the political. Otherwise, how would an intention be formed, then expressed, and finally realized to some degree or other (as the post-conditional state informed through the intentional construction of its thematized aspiration and most probable arbitration, etc.). (170)

So, the negative definition of the relatively-radical is as ‘negation (read suspension) of both the relatively-non-critical and the relatively-critical’. As a positive definition let me supply the following, namely, the ‘re-directed expansion of the overall set of all working frames of reference in a moment or period of time t ’. But, given, more or less the critical re-appropriation of the relatively-radical immediately follows upon its incrementally experienced re-direction we can define it as occurring at time t even though, experientially, through critical economic re(-)iteration a process of relatively-radical appropriation would also occur over a certain period of time T . (171)

How should we interpret that process of ‘expansion’? (172)

Now, some forms of relatively-radical ‘discovery’ occur through some form of a process of integration and equivalence. E.g., in physics we have the Maldacena Duality when two different fields of physics find themselves equated as correlatives (through certain transformational rules) (through invoking a holistic-dimensional form of appreciative appropriation).³⁹ (173)

The point of this observation is to note that even relatively-radical forms of compression for the sake of this definition are still expansionary given the necessary persistence of prior forms of pre-expanded materials and an expansion in the re-directed realization of novel forms of innovative expansion. Just as ‘having shoes with shoe-laces untied that then become tied’ implies an expansion, say, in the form of ‘shoes, laces, and, now, the typing of those previously untied laces’. In that manner, all innovation is expansionary. (174)

Let me illustrate that the ‘relatively-radical experience’ is experienced as an ‘expanded interpretation’ (with varying degrees and manners of interpretational significance). (175)

E.g., in regard to the topic of the Russo-Ukrainian war, a short video was disseminated on a YouTube channel in the following format. The pictorial frame was equally divided horizontally between a golden yellow field of wheat with a beautiful blue sky above the same. About ten seconds later, a HIMARS rocket⁴⁰ is suddenly seen to streak

³⁹ I.e., through an identification that AdS = CFT, i.e., as correlatives implies a transformational equivalence can be established, in this case, between ‘anti-de Sitter space’ and ‘Conformal Field Theory’. Unfortunately, we live in de Sitter space and have yet to find a correlative relationship with respect to the former.

⁴⁰ M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

vertically upwards leaving a thick exhaust trail in its wake. End of video. Quite a beautiful image, almost like a painting. But, in reading the comments, I came to realize very quickly that I had overlooked an intentional design feature in this video that would have been immediately recognized by a Ukrainian citizen. The yellow wheat field and the blue sky was symbolically alluding to the Ukrainian flag. The exuberant rocket streaking vertically was more or less implying the message ‘that Ukraine now had these HIMARS rockets so the Russians had better be careful. Indeed, the radical consequences of having these rockets meant that the Russians had to move many of their forward logistics, like, e.g., ammunition dumps, etc., back from the frontlines by about 90 kilometers. (176)

My recognition that this ‘wheat field and blue sky’ was analogically representing the Ukrainian flag was experienced in a sudden moment of as radical insightfulness. My overall frames of reference were expanded by this insight interpretation that was in addition to my prior interpretations developed in my ‘reading’ this video. That wheatfield was no longer just a wheatfield but also represented the Ukrainian flag. All in all, quite a brilliant piece of propaganda. (177)

Now, can I be certain that I was not over-reading that video? Here, the hermeneutic rule of thumb is that intentional formation needs to be reiterated in order to reinforce the apparent recognition of a seemingly implied intent. In other words, intentions are set up and reinforced through forms of ‘bare’ reiteration, i.e., through the apparent repetition of themes, memes, and other trophic devices.⁴¹ By ‘bare’ is meant those patterns of resolution that seem to proffer some reasonable degree of iterative reinforcement of apparent intent (*versus* the mere repetition of a consonant background and the sheer dissonance of a presented difference, and, where, patterns of resolution proffer a ‘bare’ or ‘simplified expression of intent’ further reinforced through similar or interrelated forms of reiteration. I.e., in order to argue that this propaganda film was meant to invoke an allusion to the Ukrainian flag we need only note that this was a film made and disseminated in the context of this Russo-Ukrainian War, and, moreover, most Ukrainians would immediately recognize the ‘flagged symbolism’ being alluded to. Furthermore, it reinforced the nationalistic sentiment that this country is now using powerful rockets in this war, so, Russia be warned! (178)

Similarly, during Russia’s illegal Special Military Operation in Ukraine, for a national figure or a well-known identity to attend a public event, say, wearing the colours blue and yellow many people would now recognize that that person is expressing, symbolically, their support for the Ukrainian people. (179)

Using the same anecdote, let me proffer another radical re-reading of the same. From a harmonic perspective, and I believe necessary for the dissemination of information itself, along with the simulation of relational states of affairs, we need these gestalt features of consonant backgrounds, dissonant foregrounds, and their ongoing resolution to be experienced through the requisite forms of a co-associated intentional subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Moreover, in this regard we need to observe neither the ab-

⁴¹ This topic of iteration is discussed in my set of four essays titled: *From Mere Repetition to Sheer Iteration..?* (2.11.14-29.11.14).

sence of the required degree of needed resolution nor the perfected resolution of the same (given that either extreme is indicative of a relational ‘death’, the ‘death of our being able to experience the relationship being simulated’). Similarly, in relative terms, either too much consonance, dissonance, or resolution, or, too little consonance, dissonance, or resolution also contributes to the experiential ‘death’ of the relational. Now, two equally sized and juxtaposed bands of contrasting colours would be experienced as quite relatively dissonant. Here there is a visual contest as to which colour is the relative background and which colour is the relative foreground.⁴² But, in this video, this static form of unresolved dissonance is relieved through the sudden advent of the rocket moving the foreground wheatfield into the background of the distant sky, by, if anything, by making the expanded field of ‘the field and the exhaust of the rocket trail’ the background with the relative dissonance of the sky being divided by that rocket exhaust. But, at the same time, the sudden appearance and movement of the rocket above the wheat field becomes the dissonant feature of this video... resolved as being read as ‘a rocket rising from behind a wheatfield, that is also read as the Ukrainian flag’, etc. (180)

Now, in hindsight, with the relatively recent flood of AI created videos, etc., I have somewhat revised by remembered reading of this same piece of propaganda art. Rather naïvely I thought how expertly the camera had been positioned in order to have the bottom half of the frame as a vivid yellow wheatfield juxtaposed against a beautiful blue sky, and, then, to perfectly have the frame vertically cut in half by the sudden flight of this rocket. My retrospective reading, now, is that such a composition more than likely utilized the use of a set of AI tools. Hence the vivid colour saturations, the balanced perfection of this composition, and so on. (181)

All in all, this anecdote illustrates the nature of the relatively-radical to be that type of experience that ‘forces’ us, more or less, to re-evaluate our prior interpretations in and through an expanded process of re-framing. In my recounting of this anecdote, I noted my initial reading, then realized the Ukrainian flag was being intentionally alluded to (after reading some of the comments posted), then noting my retrospective harmonic commentary on the visual composition of this video, and, finally, realizing that most of the artfulness of this video was, in all probability, contrived through the use of AI (implying that no actual wheatfield need be filmed with a HIMARS rocket ascending above that same field). (182)

That given these two definitions, that the ‘relatively-radical’ is ‘the negation (suspension) of both the relatively-non-critical and the relatively-critical’, and, as ‘that difference arrived at through an expansion of our overall frames of reference’ then we could argue for a ‘relatively-radical differential’ as the ‘relatively-radical minus the sum of the relatively-non-critical and the relatively-critical’. I.e., as that moment of insight or period of ongoing insightfulness, enacted insightful moment by insightful moment, in which we

⁴² Both visual representative art and visual non-representative art, say, abstract art, need to establish, as a bare minimum, some form of a psychic background-foreground, and, some means for interconnecting the same. I would go further and suggest a ‘safer’ route for the artist by noting a foreground, background, and their being linked with either an articulated midground or the suggestion of the same. In the alluded to video, the rocket could be seen to interpretatively act as the midground connecting the foreground field with a background sky.

experience the re-direction of this insightfully oriented force of re-interpretation. ‘Force’ being more read as a ‘shift induced through re-direction rather than through mere redirection’. Where ‘re-framing’ can be seen to be ‘relatively radical in terms of its needing to be re-framed through that overall set of frames’. (183)

Now, the relatively-radical is not only experienced as radically re-directed, as an apparent innovation, to some degree or other, in a moment or over a period of innovative re-direction, but, also as potentially possessing a relatively-radical set of ramifications. ‘Ramifications’ is redefined by myself to ‘collectively include current implications (be they either explicitly and/or implicitly expressed and interpreted as such), prospective consequences (as consequential differentials that create/recreate the perception of quite different outcomes before the comprehension of the relatively-radical), but, also as retrospective re-interpretations that radically alter in a relative sense our interpretations of the past and the consequential shifts for the present and future resulting from these processes of re(-)interpretations’. In other words, the relatively-radical import of such innovations can be experienced in different temporal orientations, i.e., the relative past, present and/or future, and in and through corresponding histories of the same. (184)

As a rhetorical question, one could ask ‘what is radical about the relatively-radical, or, what is not radical about the relatively-radical?’ In effect, asking ‘what is phenomenologically present in an experience treated as relatively-radical?’ (185)

It might be regarded as obvious that with new information in the internal economics involved in the construction and interpretation of an intentional objective that the relatively-radical could be arrived at through incremental patterns of orchestration that enter into and through points of either bifurcation, emergence and/or phase change (whilst also accepting that these correlative orientations are part of exactly the same economic picture). I.e., transformational patterns of re-direction are to be arrived at, in the ‘internality’ of this perspective, through orchestrated increments in accommodations, distinctions, and/or transformations. However, less obvious might be the relatively more important contributions arrived at through an orchestration of incremental re-assessments of the situatedness involved in the situating of that relational-situatedness falling under the correlative headings of consilience, salience, and propinquity or standing. Let me explore what I perceive to be the more important ‘external’ contributions in the realization of the relatively-radical. (186)

In the articulation of a certain intentional perspective (as demanded, say, by Husserl, in the processes of intentional formation and judgment, and their interpretation, and appreciation, etc.), it should be noted that that same perspective cannot be absolutistically exhausted. Therefore, at least theoretically, room is always present for additional information be that incrementally arrived at through either addition and/or subtraction, and, hence, the potential for the arrival of the relative-radical should that novel transformation of perspective arise. Similarly, as with salience, so, too, with consilience, in an accommodation of perspectives concerning relational-situatedness. In a relative-radical re-reading of consilience a re-integrated expansion of reference-frames could also be expected to arise in points of bifurcation, etc. Last, in a relative-radical act of re-direction

we should also expect our standing to also change! Let me demonstrate these considerations. (187)

Say, you are out for a pleasant walk along the beach.⁴³ It is not very crowded but then you see not too far away a toddler seemingly set on merging as soon as possible with the frothy ocean that fascinates them so intently. Suddenly, you see that this child, in all likelihood, will drown, and, that there is only yourself who can prevent this terrible occurrence from happening. In other words, you realize that you now have ‘standing in this situation’ and it is a deontological imperative that you stop this child from entering the surf and most likely drowning. If that child was wading into the surf with one or two of its parents you would have no standing in that situation, assuming of course, that the parent or parents were acting in a responsible manner. So, you do what is called of you to do, namely, prevent that child from going into the surf. You introduce yourself to that child, smile, perhaps jokingly flick some water at them, get them to dig some sand, etc., hoping, at the same time, to espy their absent guardian or guardians. Illustrating the metamoral of this anecdote, namely, that in relatively-radical experiences there could well be an inescapable corresponding change in standing. That, indeed, given the economic correlativity of these aspects of consilience, salience, and propinquity that any change in any one correlative would induce a correspondingly related change in the remaining aspects (as well inducing the potential observation of possible corresponding changes, relatively-radical or otherwise, in the internality of the economic construction of that intentional objective). (188)

Under that understanding, that economic induction holistically permeates both the intentional objective and its relational-situatedness it would be prescient of ourselves to further explore such co-induced aspects... (189)

In the exploration of the ‘Ukrainian propaganda video’ it could be successfully argued that in further exploring, retrospectively, my first impressions of its artistry and my later noting that these elements could have been assembled using AI tools that this approach, effectively, is taking an extension of its apperceived salience. I.e., more or less, exploring further the salience of the apparent specificity of that perspective alone and finding, both therein and thereafter, a relatively-radical reinterpretation in revisiting that perspective. (190)

Somewhat similarly, in reading the comments, and realizing that this landscape markedly echoes an allusion to the Ukrainian flag, that this relatively-radical revisiting of my current appreciation of this video just viewed would effectively fall under the heading of a relatively-radical process of consilience wherein is now found an accommodation of these differently imaged possibilities. Viewed through my philosophy of transformational retreatment, I would argue that there is to be found here a ‘relative transformational isomorphic invariance between ‘the wheatfield and blue sky’, on one hand, and on the other hand, ‘the same colours of the Ukrainian flag’. Namely, these horizontal band of a blue above a horizontal band of yellow. Indeed, that once seen, could not be ‘unseen’. Where, through consilience, these two images merge through that transformational form of con-

⁴³

An anecdote obviously derived and reworked from Mencius.

silience given the apparent preservation of that isomorphic invariance (when moving from ‘the salience of the perspective of the landscape’ to ‘the salience of the perspective of the imposed flag’, and v.v.). (191)

Given that these reflections on these relatively-radical re-readings of this specific video are not discordant with each other could well be seen as being indicative of how these ‘externalized’ correlatives of the ‘consilient, salient and standing’ have a mutual role to play in their co-associated formations. Through the lens of a (non-overall) philosophical economy we find a description of salience, a prescription of consilient accommodation, and the proscriptive implications of the purported standing, or rather, the re-purported standing, namely to the effect, that in the propagandistic terms of its implicit message, Ukraine now has HIMARS and, so, Russia, be warned, tremble, and suffer accordingly. Indeed, the radical ramifications of the advent of this weapon on the battle field meant, for Russia, that it had to relocate many kilometers back from the frontline its more vulnerable pooling of resources like ammunition, fuel, tanks, the billeting of troops, and so on. (192)

In the light of these reflections what are we allowed to say, in general terms, about our experience of the relatively-radical? That given a process of a relatively-radical re(-)reading we could well surmise that in the continual orchestration of inputs that points of chaotic re-direction would eventually be non-economically experienced that indicate a co-associated re-constitution of ‘internal’ accommodations, distinctions, and transformations, and, ‘external’ consiliences, saliences, and standings. That, any relatively-radical prospect of re(-)reading a non-economic change in any one feature should well induced either relatively-covert or relatively-overt in all remaining features. That, in effect, we have arrived at the articulation of an ordered philosophy, albeit by other economic means. Let me explain. (193)

Now, the relative ‘internality’ of the non-overall philosophical economy is already established as consisting of a set of fifth trans-cognitively ordered hermeneutic possibilities, i.e., accommodations; a set of first trans-cognitively ordered phenomenological pre-essential essentials, i.e., semantic distinctions (in an atomic format); and, non-systematic, existentially characterized deontological imperatives, etc., i.e., indicative of virtual transformations (that become non-virtual in orientation through non-economically permitted acts of permission [through either aligned and/or misaligned forms of affective, cognitive and/or existentially oriented trans-cognitive inputs/outputs] that oversee a process of reduplication as the third inter-ordered order of the political)... (194)

The relative ‘externality’ of an intentional objective can be accounted for through noting the formation of the secular economy where, namely, consilience is accounted for through aesthetically oriented integration in the second trans-cognitive order; where salience is accounted for through the pragmatism of a certain functional approach deemed relevant for current aspirational objectives; and, where standing (propinquity) can be easily accounted for through the ontical status of our current reading/s of that relational situatedness in question given that in the relatively-radical re-reading of a certain situation the apperceived nature of newly re-visited standing will in all probability reflect

the perceived intensity of this relative-radical shift in directedness currently being experience. I.e., where shifts in standing will be experienced as a certain differential indicative to what extent our apparent propinquity has changed given the re-directedness of that relatively-radical process of re-reading. Just as indicated in the shift in standing we would apperceive if we were to see that toddler was so intently heading towards the imminent dangers of that surf. In contrast, if that toddler were being closely accompanied by their parent or parent then we would have no standing to intervene, be that conceived of in moral, legal, or existential-like terms of reference, etc. (195)

Combining here both philosophical (and disciplinary) and secular (and aspirational) economies within the embrace of an ordered economy allows us to make the hyper-economic ‘observation’ that a relatively-radical re-reading in one ordered feature will, in all probability, should induce a co-associated difference in our re-reading of any other ordered aspect. Moreover, by ‘ordered’ we should also read that this applies equally to ordered, inter-ordered and extra-ordered forms of ordering. Thence the co-association of relatively-radical inputs as creating the potential conditions for the ‘observation’ of a relative-radical re-ordering of the entirety of experience (including the Affective aspect, etc.). However, be that as it may, invoking an axiom of inequality, that nothing can be exactly equal or identical to anything else, including any other moment in the existential description of any one identified-identity, it follows that we should not expect these co-associated inductions to be equally evident, be that either self-evident and/or other-evident. (196)

Now, an ordered perspective has important ramifications for conformal theory, i.e., an integrated theory of truth determination. (197)

It is often stated that truth is a property of propositions and not so-called objects in either the so-called ‘external world/s’ and/or the so-called ‘internal world/s’. More correctly, such an attitude should be both critically and radically translated through an ordered perspective to read as ‘pertaining to either an ordered state of affairs and/or ordered transformations between the same’. Let me illustrate this shift in emphasis. (198)

Mere propositions are merely channelling conventions for enshrining ordered differences be that interpreted constitution either advertently and/or inadvertently constructed. Consequently, and subsequently, we have a recipe for philosophical and disciplinary forms of confusion, let alone secular and aspirational forms of additional confusion. E.g., if I am in my very small orchard and happen to be looking at some apples ripening on one of my apple trees then I rightly believe I have the requisite standing to make such a self-evident observation. If I had actually made this ‘observation’ in a dream or in an act of memory then my apparent ‘standing’, respectively, is only ‘in a dream’ or ‘in an act of memory’. Or, if someone I trust makes such a claim, such a description, then, if I am not present and cannot possess the same standing, then my apperception of their standing in such matter should be regarded by myself as ‘other-evident’. Moreover, such communications could be relatively-radical in complexion if I found myself having to re-evaluate my current situatedness re the report on that same situation in question. E.g., I could have been absent from my orchard for over a month and am surprised to hear that I

have apples that have ripened that have neither been found by possums, birds, or neighbours. I suggest that they be picked and am pleased to see them in the fruit bowl in the kitchen when I arrive home. (199)

How should we conformally read such an account? (200)

In a relatively-uncritical reading we invoke Tarski to simply note that the fruit bowl has apples in it (A) if and only if the proposition ‘the fruit bowl has apples in it’ (A’) is true (T):

I.e. A’ is T iff A. (201)

However, as philosophers who do not give credence to the any strongly held impossible notions of a positioning misidentified as ‘realistic’, ‘idealistic’, ‘dualistic’, ‘materialistic’, ‘rationalistic’, ‘absolutistically constructed’, etc. (or relativistically non-constructed in an incoherent, contradictory, non-integrated fashion) we are more inclined to re-read the same through a meta-propositional/propositional re-reading, namely:

I.e., A’’ is T iff A’. (201)

Moreover, as implied we should retranslate the same through a suitable ordered perspective. E.g: the transformation from possibility to ontical factuality is observed when that operation is perceived to be in evidence:

$[5^1 - 6^1 (A)]''$ is T iff $[5^1 - 6^1(A)]'$. (202)

Or, treated as an operation of duplication (in a successful transformational-transition from the fifth trans-cognitive order to the sixth trans-cognitive order of the ontical):

$[6^1.5^1 (A)]$ is T iff $[6^1 (A)]'$. (203)

Thus, we must conclude, in this instance, that all operations of the sixth trans-cognitive order are valid when the apparent facts are allowed to speak for themselves, and, that the ordered form of the propositions in question are correctly articulated in a format comprising both meta-meta-forms and meta-forms! I.e., truth is not to be correctly ascertained through the indiscriminate use of propositions in general, but, through the suitable exercise of those ordered propositions that are appropriate, proper and apposite to the objective/s of their current situatedness in critical-radical re(-)reading of both that situation (as articulated philosophically) and its situatedness (as articulated in secular terms), and, where through ordered correlativity, both economies can be encompassed within the overall philosophical (and disciplinary) economy as explicated in its requisite format of ordering, etc.⁴⁴ (204)

⁴⁴ Whereby ‘etc.’ is implied all relevant ordered forms, i.e., (affective), cognitive, trans-cognitive, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered.

Furthermore, and most importantly, that if in relatively-radical experiences (which could be applied to each and every re-directed moment of ordered reformation) that are suitably ascertained conformally, then we must surmise, if only in ideal terms of reference, that given an automatic reconstitution of standing, that we must then recognize the total re-constitution of that ordered complex, which in itself, is tantamount to supplying an additional definition of the ‘relatively-radical’. Moreover, by extension, that this must also apply to both the inter-ordered and the extra-ordered complexion co-associated with that same state of affairs as conformally re-perceived in the entirety of its ordered terms of reference. I.e., in the experience of the relatively-radical any ordered alteration is an alternation of the entirety of its ordered complexion. Thence proffering a potentially ‘radically ‘re-reading of that relational state of affairs in terms of its relevant accommodations, distinctions, transformations, consiliences, saliences, and standings. Hence this third definition of the ‘relatively-radical’ as ‘radically re-ordered’. (205)

Let me now explore the ensuing ramifications of this third definition of the relatively-radical. (206)

That any relatively-radical changes in any one of these six facets of accommodations, etc., registers a relatively-radical overall process of transformation, whereas, understandably, mere changes in such inputs/outputs does not by itself immediately signal a relatively-radical process of transformational-transitioning. Furthermore, we may surmise that when the orchestration of additional or subtracted inputs/outputs does not entirely transform the complexion of that relational state of affairs then we must assume that, holistically, no current relatively-radical process of change was or is being entered into. On the other hand, should the relatively-radical transformation is in evidence then we must surmise a corresponding alteration on all levels of ordering. So, with a relatively-radical alteration in standing we should be able to provide a potentially equal shift in the histories associated in the recording of that relational state of affairs. Although, at the same time, the manner of our ‘objective preoccupations with the intentional constitution in question’ should more predetermine the nature of such ‘preoccupations’. (207)

That, all in all, the characteristic nature of the relative-radical is suggestive of the fact that the relatively-radical is somewhat not radically different in terms of the transformations of its ordered complexion. Thence this understanding that immediate processes of critical re(-)appropriation must fundamentally deal with similar patterns of critical re(-)appropriation. I.e., deal with the critical reincorporation of phenomena constituted along similar lines, albeit with a relative-radical complexion (in distinction to relative-non-critical inputs/outputs). (208)

I.e., shifts that are seemingly not relatively-radical in their inputs/outputs will most likely involve no relatively-radical shifts in standing. However, on the contrary, relatively-radical inputs/outputs will result in relatively-radical shifts in standing which should be properly addressed, etc! (209)

Suitable forms of such addressment/re-dressment (*redressement*) should be correctly ap/perceived and acted upon. What might this entail? (210)

For a start, that there is a profound resonance between the ethical, the political and the existential (given the phenomenological nature of the relatively-radical complexion, etc.), given that the latter can be provisionally defined as ‘the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical’, and, where the latter, as the deontological, along with its secondary adjuncts as situated in the midst of its tertiary adjuncts, encompasses an ordered terrain that must also entail relevant inter-ordered and extra-ordered ramifications. (212)

E.g., alterations in standing can also be re-expressed as alterations in the relevant histories, or, relevant re-readings of the ethical responses, and co-associated political and existential responses of responsibility, that may or may not have been initiated, etc. (213)

I.e., in our reasonable expectations to find in relatively-radical forms of appreciation a variety of inputs and outputs in our world at large as now more broadly understood, and so on. (214)

That, we can here conclude that given the advent of the relatively-radical that every correlative, be they relatively internal or relatively external, will be re-directed accordingly. Although, as well, given the axion of inequality, that nothing can be equally co-identified (except analytically), that such an advent will be differently received, just as different people in different places will see differently despite also being able to agree on what appears to be transformationally invariant at that moment or period of time. (215)

However, as a qualification we should also add that just as the dissemination of power implies the preservation of a democratic core enabling cooperation, be that through either co-option and/or co-operation,⁴⁵ in a similar manner, given the momentary re-direction of each and every moment of intentional experience we can also argue that the relatively-radical must also be co-embedded at the metaphorical ‘center’ of all intentional experience with the important consequence that in all deliberations the phenomenon of decisive decisions of the last instance cannot be conducted without the co-presence of the hermeneutical possibility of decisive decisions of the next instant and the non-systematic existential prospect of decisive decisions the first instant. (216)

These qualifications accepted, it must then also follow that standing (propinquity) is ever in a state of potential flux, moment to moment. Of course, in most periods of time there would be no need, usually, to re-ap/perceive in what manner a relatively-radical shift in our standing may have also occurred, but, at the same time, more than likely, a relatively-radical shift in standing would clearly announce itself (be it called ‘conscience’, or ‘acting in good faith’, or ‘being open to the authentic’, or, just ‘responsibly responding with due concern and care’, and so on). (217)

Who knows when the dramatic moment might present itself, ‘should the earth seem to suddenly shift beneath us’, when and where we will be ‘called upon’ to act in

⁴⁵ Where ‘cooperation’ as an expression entails a mix of both ‘co-option’ and ‘co-operation’, and where a greater mutual emphasis on ‘co-operation’ is usually indicative of a more existentially oriented form of enaction.

accordance with our ap/perception of that situation to hand? On the other hand, most of our lives will be lived in the everydayness of ordinary experience, still, even here, this sense and semblance of standing can never desert us. Furthermore, in an openness to the exigencies of life, the relatively-radical can also be thrust upon us, upon the lived-being of our relationships themselves, since we must also understand that the very nature of existence is imbued with the relatively-radical likewise, from one moment to the next, from one period of time to the novel re-characterization of another period in time that could be, for whatever reason or reasons, or even without an apparent reason, our then finding its presenting a radically different complexion to our previous experiences of time and space, ourselves and others, given the contrast of such differences as presented through both its altered and altering confines... (219)

Still, as in the dialectical genesis of a lie, where truth must first be held and told, no change can be completely transformed, completely altered, since the iterated binding of our being, as experienced both before(-)ourselves and before(-)others, will continue to be 'threaded' even if the psyche should 'fall apart' in the midst of the deepest psychosis... (220)

Otherwise, that would be a relational death, without either resuscitation or resurrection. Given that the relationship continues to exist, and be expressed, as long as there is neither too much nor too little consonance, dissonance, or resolution. Where the correlative elements of the harmonic economy must continue to continually co-exist, or, then, oversee the absenting of that same relationship itself... in a loss of both agent and agency... given that all forms of subjectivity are experienced economically, and identified through forms of perspectival triangulation. (221)

In the midst of this relational inventory of parts and participants, how does the person find a sense and semblance of freedom. One answer is to invoke an economy consisting of a 'freedom-from', a 'freedom-to', and, a 'freedom-through others'.⁴⁶ Where the relatively-existential orientation of the latter is defined through the suspension, i.e., negation of the former (previously defined as a form of mediation). I.e., 'freedom-through' is experienced through its negated contrast with both a 'freedom-from and a freedom-to' without the cancellation of the same since the economic cannot exist without the co-presence of its tri-modal correlatives. That granted, simplistically, we can then define our 'experience of the relatively-existential' as our 'co-experience of that freedom to be found as a freedom-through others', and its extension 'through the relational nature of experience itself given the non-absenting of those same economic correlatives'. As I have argued elsewhere, our experience of the differential characteristics that highlight a focus on this freedom-through can be divided between its 'existential hallmarks' as experienced by the person themselves and the imputation of the same set of phenomena as 'existential indicators' when viewed as present in someone else. In our reading of a novel, e.g., this would be either the relative presence or absence of first-person existential hallmarks and/or the relative presence or absence of third person existential indicators. However, more correctly, given the transcendental subjectivity of the relational, in relationally oriented experience, the relatively existential and the relatively non-existential co-inhabit

⁴⁶ As already explored in *The Fifth Essay, Pursuit*, III.X.(Part)III.V.

the confines of the second-person, be that signalled as either singular, dual, or plural in the number of agents being found present in that simulated form of the relationship in question. Indeed, the sense and semblance of the systematic experience of the existential is fostered from a harmonization of both non-existentially oriented experience and the existentially oriented experience as harmonically blended in the enactment of decisive decisions of the first instance... (222)

So, the relatively-radical question must now be asked, ‘how is the non-systematically oriented existential experience of the deontological to be experienced as the systematically oriented existential given, according to our economically-ordered heuristic, that the ‘existential’, as the ‘existentially-pragmatic/pragmatically-existential’, i.e., ‘relational competence’, is defined as an ‘extra-ordered phenomenon’ and ‘is not defined as either an ordered phenomenon or as an inter-ordered phenomenon’, ostensibly, ‘being neither ordered nor inter-ordered’?’ To do justice to such an important question let me explore, in depth, the participating elements and contexts that would lead us to a definitive resolution of this distinction between the orientations of the non-systematic existential and the systematic existential. (223)

But, first, let me revisit a previously explored problem, namely, how can a hexamodal economy operate given this definitional restriction that only an open, tri-modal economy, as economically situated in its relevant, tri-modally constituted, relational frame of reference, can function economically, and not otherwise? I.e., surely a hexamodal economy would be a contradiction in terms? (224)

That would be correct, with the implication that to run a so-called ‘ordered economy’ it cannot be anything other than tri-modal in its functioning, etc. (226)

To answer such a serious accusation we can simply reply that an ordered economy, be that either ordered, inter-ordered, or extra-ordered, is only an arbitrary re-reading of its trimodally operation begging the question how an apparent hexamodal economy can be actually operate along tri-modal terms of reference. Let me proffer some possibilities. (226)

Elsewhere, I have articulated an ‘ethical economy’ as ‘centered in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological along with its two adjuncts, namely, the second trans-cognitive order of the integrated-aesthetical and the fourth trans-cognitive order of the pragmatism (contextually situated in the relational environment of its tertiary adjuncts of the first, sixth, and fifth trans-cognitively ordered orders of the phenomenologically-semantic, the ontically factual, and hermeneutical possibilities). (227)

Using that prototype, we could envisage a material economy centered on the first trans-cognitive order of the phenomenologically-semantic and an immaterial centered on the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutical possibilities, and, where ordered economics arises through the conjunction of all three sub-economies of the relatively ethical, material, and the immaterial. (228)

Another solution resides in our recognition of both a (non-overall) philosophical-disciplinary economy and a secular-aspirational economy, and, by invoking the joint suspension of the former in order to thematize a working economy that integrates the same within an ‘overall economy of the philosophical, secular, and the philosophical-secular’ that for convenience can be separately referred to as an overall philosophical (and disciplinary) economy’, or an overall economy of the secular, or an overall economy of the philosophical-secular and where such appellations merely reflect the current nature of our more focused forms of concern, etc. Just, as in practice, phenomenal-phenomenological concerns within the philosophical economy can have our current economic concerns referred to as ‘phenomenological in orientation’, etc. Then, as a matter of convenience, we then exercise and articulate an ordered economy as operating within the confines of that wider economy of the overall philosophical, etc. That, then, through reduplication, we can propose the utility of a meta-philosophical, metaphysical economy (as non-traditionally reconstituted) as an economy of inter-ordered phenomena, and, through reduplication of the latter forward the proposal of an existential economy as an economy of extra-ordered phenomena. Where, more correctly, the existential economy can be seen to be both existentially-pragmatic and pragmatically-existential, as anti-representational, as positively nihilistic, and as defining and articulating the further concept of ‘relational competence’. (229)

Interestingly, in a treatment of ‘suspensions’ as ‘negations’ we can notate this understanding involving the overall philosophical economy (OP), the philosophical economy (P) and the secular economy (S), as negations of each other with the implication that the ‘overall philosophical economy’, effectively, must be ‘zero’, i.e., ‘positively nihilistic in its existence’, but, not as ‘zero’ over the course of its experiential thematization (given this equation as cited above) and, therefore, as not negatively nihilistic:

$$OP = \{(P) + (S) - [P + S]\} = \text{Zero. (230)}$$

Actually, this observation is ‘doubly zero’ for the following reasons. The secular economy S is actually the negation of the (non-overall) philosophical economy P. I.e., the overt/covert intro-mediation of P = the covert/overt intro-mediation of S, and v.v.⁴⁷

$$\text{I.e., } P = -S, \text{ and, } -P = S. (231)$$

$$\text{Therefore, } OP = \{P + (-P) - [P - (P)]\} = 0 - 0 = 0. (232)$$

Similarly, in the gestation of our interest, in a process of unequal deployment, etc., it follows that over the coursing of such interest our experience is not registered as such... (233)

⁴⁷ We see this in my assignment of the Boolean operators given to these six orders where the secular economy (S) are the negation of the philosophical economy (P). I.e., through into-mediation we get the first order ‘And’ giving us the fourth order ‘Nand’, etc. hence the matching of ‘And, Not, and Or’ with Nand, Nor, and dNot’.

In truth, each and every economy is similarly built. Let me demonstrate this with respect to the philosophical (and disciplinary) economy (P). Being one-part phenomenologically-semantic (S), one-part hermeneutical (H), and one-part non-systematic existential (as the so-called ‘third moment’) (E). Now, according to ‘the correlative principle of dialectical equivalence’, that defines any one ‘correlative moment’ as the ‘negation of the other two moments’ then we find this economy as follows:

$$P = \{S + H + E\}, \text{ given } E = -(P + H), \text{ then } P = \{S + H - (S + H)\} = 0. \text{ (234)}$$

The same mathematical-like treatment applies to whichever moment is to be conventionally defined as the so-called ‘third moment’. Thence the same application of this observation to all economies. Applying the same insight to the ordered economy if treated either as collective aggregation of an ethical sub-economy (centered on a non-systematic existential orientation primarily characterized as deontological along with its secondary adjuncts), a material sub-economy (centered on the phenomenological orientation), the immaterial sub-economy (centered on the hermeneutical orientation),⁴⁸ or, the subdivisions into a philosophical-disciplinary economy versus a secular-aspirational economy plus the negated conjunction of the former. In whatever way we approach the ordered economy (as understood in its ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered incarnations) the same theoretical observation applies, namely, all economies have component-relations that ultimately cancel in this form of a mathematical-like ‘emptiness’, but, where the apparent fullness of that economy is replete with significance-generation through an inequality in experiential-focus along with the apparent generation of a non-reductive emergence of e/valuational formation in the form of an existential excess or existential excess in e/valuation. (235)

In various dialectically constructed frames of reference we can hypothetically ‘visualize’ the operations of an ordered economy, say, in uni-modally directed linear terms, in bi-modally redirected linear terms, in uni-modally and bi-modally redirected circular terms, and, in the simultaneity of an ordered economy where all facets are co-experienced, albeit in a hexamodal holistic orientation ‘plus’; when we also find ourselves entertaining inter-ordered and extra-ordered terms of reference. This multi-dimensional set of possibilities as outlined has the further implication that all ordered phenomena are correlatively co-present with the consequence that a differential change in one correlative facet will have a corresponding differential alteration in all other ordered facets albeit with the qualification that our intentional attention cannot be either focused in a purely global manner nor just purely focused on any one ordered facet with the ensuing expression of our ‘representative interest’, reflecting these inequalities of interest, being expressed in the summaries of experience being self-reported upon in the formation of our self-narrations (and other-reported upon in the sharing of our narratives, etc., be that in ether virtual terms or in non-virtual terms of reference [given that the very formation of formal self-reports and informal self-reportings are all conducted from a fluc-

⁴⁸ With the understanding that all secondary adjuncts are shared contiguously between these sub-economies of the ethical, etc. So, e.g., the adjunct of the aesthetic-integration would be shared by both the ethical economy (centered on the deontological) and the material economy (centered on the phenomenologically-semantic), etc.

tuating midpoint somewhere between the subjective and the intersubjective reflecting the nature of our current interactions with our own senses and semblance of self and others, etc.). Now, the upshot of this dialectical stance is to argue that with the noticeable advent of the relatively-radical all facets of ordered experience are altered likewise. This is why I will argue that in the experience of the relatively=radical standing will be affected accordingly. Say, walking along a beach and enjoying the scenery and simply see a toddler playing on the sand, as a set of decisive decisions of the last instance to merely keep walking along this beach, to suddenly seeing a toddler heading unchecked towards the surf and feeling it your duty to intervene given your now suddenly altered standing in this manner as radically indicated. You now have an altered standing in this relational-situation, from a relative absence of standing to the presence of such standing, and, deontologically, must intervene as a decisive decision of the next instant in which you should enact as a decisive decision of the first instance. You duly stop this toddler from entering the surf. Maybe, throw some water at them, joke with them, toss a piece of seaweed at their feet, anything that distracts them from following through on their fatal fascination with the beckoning undulations of the swirling surf. In other words, we may not be aware that the advent of the relatively-radical affects all facets of ordered experience but let us assume that that is the case. This acceptance then leads us on to impute a parallel between the concept of ‘economic complexification’ and its ordered counterpart as a ‘concept of ordered complexification’. Let me explain. (236)

In the above example, with our noting a differential sense and semblance of standing we should, on closer scrutiny, discern parallel shifts in the other features of accommodations, distinctions, transformations, consiliences, and saliences. So, in reflections on this example cited, we would note in terms of our relational accommodation ‘that I am no longer just walking alone along this beach’. The differential distinction is that ‘I am also about to witness the danger about to befall this child if I were not to intervene’. I experience a transformation in standing both expected and to be delivered ‘given my existential permission to intervene’. From the perspective of consilience ‘I do not see any other perspective where this child will be prevented from possibly drowning other than through my own interventions’. In terms of salience ‘I perceive the most pragmatical course to take would be to intervene between this toddler and the line of surf and somehow distract this child from following through on their fascination with that surf. I duly do so through this intended intervention ‘by enacting this decisive decision of the first instance’. (237)

Of course, once this intervention is successfully performed then a series of scenarios await in which I need to pass my temporary guardianship of this child to its legal parents, etc. One could easily imagine grateful parents or minders relocating this child and being thankful for this act of intervention. But, all that which follows would absolutely make no difference to your intervention as you felt it was your deontological duty to intervene which you duly did so. Indeed, such behaviour is indicative of the compactual dimension so often overlooked by people with a contractual mentality and who cannot see beyond that short-sighted transactionalism and who, as a result, have little idea of beneficial notions like ‘good will’, ‘acting in good faith’, existentially oriented obligations, and so on. Where all else is parasitical on such a cultural reservoir of a collectively constituted social ‘concern and care’... in which our relationships are mutually enhanced

and enriched accordingly, proffers a ‘freedom-through’ that cannot be reduced to either a ‘freedom-from’ or a ‘freedom-to’, indeed, demands their joint suspension, and subsequent negation, in that which must duly inform a deeper exposition of this overall economy of freedom.⁴⁹ (238)

Hence this concept of ‘ordered complexification’, paralleling economic complexification, in which ordered facets could be found a role of commenting on any other ordered facet. Thence the theoretical possibility of forming a parallel dictionary of ordered parallels, namely, ‘A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical, Ordered Correlativities’ (on par with ‘A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical, Economic Correlativities’). That by extension a parallel and non-parallel dictionary could be entertained between both philosophical and secular economies, etc. Given ordered complexification and a relative non-economic complexification given the non-coincidence between these hypothetical economies. (239)

But, given such additional and potentially endless complexities what is the con-formal status of such referencing? Both non-heuristical and heuristical! ‘Non-heuristical’ in the sense that a value is assumed that goes beyond the heuristic itself in and through the pragmatic application of the same. ‘Heuristical’ in the sense that, even charitably, a certain surplus in e/valuational formation can be surmised, but, in its defence, the rhetorical argument could be made, namely, ‘find yourself something better!’, and, ‘if you can?’ (that will need to-go beyond both the philosophical and non-philosophical defects of current conventional approaches and where the expected application of apposite hermeneutical genres just do not seem to be currently sufficient, especially in light of a history of interminable controversies and ever-unresolved forms of intellectual conflict, etc! (240)

When something works, use it, and, when something does not seem to work, or does no work well enough, change it for something that proffers a greater semblance of relevant value... (241)

Historically, the adoption and adaptation of an economic approach is relatively-radical (even though, I would argue that our doing so is not that radical once understood). Taking up an ordered approach is even more radical in that regard. But, again, let pragmatics decide whether such an approach has the promise of greater value for you? If it doesn’t work for you try something else (but, preferably, at the very least, attempt to understand what you might, otherwise, just wish to dismiss on *a priori* grounds. (242)

Through the operations of both duplication and reduplication a broadening of our understanding should duly follow. Say, as in common parlance, it is obvious that when we talk about a ‘history of science’ that we will expect to see a corresponding ‘history’ being explicated and ‘not a science’. From this simple observation we note that operations, as operators operating on operands, that the ensuing productivity of such an operation observes the continuing maintenance of the status of the operator. In this example cited, this is simply ‘the continuing formation of a history’. (243)

⁴⁹ I.e., that this ‘overall economy of freedom’ is heuristically formed through the ‘conjunction of a freedom-from, a freedom-to, and a freedom-through’. Refer to *The Fifth Essay, Pursuit*, III.X.V.

Interestingly, in closely looking out the six orders you can find neither historical judgments nor judgments of a scientific complexion. Those six trans-cognitive orders,⁵⁰ more or less, focus upon the following, namely, atomic, pre-essential phenomenological-semantic conceptual materials (1¹); molecular, essentially integrated aesthetical-like materials as the ‘subsistant’ thoughts as the content of ideation (2¹); deontological centered ethical judgments (3¹); pragmatological judgments (4¹); potential-hermeneutical factual-like ‘subsistant’ states in a non-integrated format (5¹); and, ontical-factual states of affairs considered to be validly given their integration in a conformally validated context as the sense and semblance of, in part, of a world at large (6¹). For convenience, this could be summarized as ‘pre-essential, essential, deontological, pragmatological, potential, ontical classifications’. (244)

Along with duplication (as the x_1 of $y = y_2$) we have the subset of (x_1 of x_1) translated as (x_1^2 of $x_1 = x_2^2$). Or, in more general terms reduplication is a form of duplication in the translated form (x^{n+1} of x) i.e., $x^{n+1}.x^n = x^{n+1}$. E.g., ‘the facts of facts’ is translated as ‘the factuality of facts’ giving the rudimentary basis of a ‘history’ (in which we can then interpret in a historically oriented manner). Or, e.g., ‘the possibility of possibilities’, translated as ‘the potentiality of possibilities’ giving (the rudimentary basis of) a ‘science’. Thus, other than a sociological investigation of the world of social organizations where we will find how society approaches and organises, both officially and unofficially, topics like ‘histories’, ‘sciences’, etc., but, which can be theoretically accounted for through requisite patterns of reduplication. (245)

That through reduplication of the trans-cognitive orders we then arrive at the formation of the inter-ordered, meta-philosophical, non-traditionally constituted metaphysical categories treated as an additional series of topics (that also have their social organization in politic-economics as could be recounted from a historical-socio-economic sense of perspective). Thus, from these six ordered orders we then find through reduplication these six inter-ordered orders, that, for convenience can be nominated as ‘a categorical metaphysics (1²), a psycho-sociological spectrum (2²), the political (3²), the economically-enacted (4²), sciences (5²), and histories (of the past, present, and future) (6²)’. (246)

Then, through a further process of reduplication we arrive at what I treat as extra-ordered categories of a meta-meta-philosophical, relational competence with an orientation of existential-pragmatism/pragmatic-existentialism. Hence ‘categorical competence (1³), psycho-sociological competence (2³), political competence (3³), enactive competence (4³), scientific competence (5³), and historical competence (6³)’. (247)

Treating reduplication as just another form of duplication (given the x^n of x^n is to be translated as x^{n+1} of x^n and this can be notated as $x^{n+1}.x^n$ and this produces an operational product with the ordered status of x^{n+1}). (248)

⁵⁰ By ‘trans-cognitive’ orders is meant ‘trans-intentional’ judgments, where ‘judgments’ are ‘trans-intentional’ by virtue of the fact that ‘judgment’ must be ‘trans-conceptual, etc.’, given that ‘judgment’ is ‘meta-conceptual’ and ‘not able to be reduced to concepts, etc.’ *per se*.

E.g., the history of aesthetical matters is a history ($6^2.2^1 = 6^2$). Whereas, the aesthetics of a certain history is and remain an aesthetics (say, in terms of style, ethos, etc.) ($2^1.6^2 = 2^1$). (249)

E.g., a ‘collector of facts (data/information)’ could be referred to as a ‘factologist’. However, an interpreter of such factual information is a ‘historian’, and, where the critical appreciation of the work of a historian can be described as a form of behaviour in which we appreciate the apparent historical competence of that being placed under such a review. (250)

Treating the overall philosophical (and disciplinary) economy as a category that can be reduplicated in its own right then from the reduplication of the overall philosophical economy gives us the overall meta-philosophical, metaphysical economy along with its six sub-fields of a categorical metaphysics, etc. (251)

In a similar manner, we can take the ethical economy, centered in the deontological, along with its secondary adjuncts (and contextually embedded in the relational world of its tertiary adjuncts) and note its political manifestation in inter-ordered terms of reference (given that the reduplication of the deontological $3^1 \Rightarrow 3^2$). Then, in turn, the reduplication of the political economy gives us an existential appreciation of political competence (where through the reduplication of $3^2 \Rightarrow 3^3$). So, in this resonance between the ethical and the political and the existential we can rephrase the same... (252)

The ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical as $3^3.(3^2.3^1)$. (253)

Thence, in accordance with this economically order heuristic, we can here indicate the intimate relationship between the ethical (centered in the deontological), the political, and the existential through these processes of reduplication. (254)

This should be seen to have profound ramifications for an in-depth appreciation of our critical-radical review of the political, etc. (255)

Briefly, let me demonstrate this ‘observation’, that needs to be both actively observed and engaged with, besides being merely reported, namely, that good political governance of any form is dependent upon conformal patterns of treatment. Good government depends on having spokespeople that report on what the government is attempting to achieve, etc., without resorting to the output of a propagandist; where ideological positioning needs to be suspended and duly deconstructed in order to reveal what should be both existentially present and also non-existentially presenting a positive sense and semblance in e/valuational formation. An internally oriented political governance should be attempting to work on the behalf of it citizenry in order to either create, preserve, conserve (and, on some occasions, super-conserve) a richly rewarding culture where people are both looking after each other and are being looked after by that same political culture. An externally oriented political governance is to oversee a strengthening of our political ties with those government with a similar political complexion, and, oversee the existen-

tial challenge to either create, preserve and/or conserve the overall relational richness of that specific society. (256)

That in this existential call to promote the pre-conditions, etc., for an overall enrichment of the psycho-sociological richness of that society, we need to observe an existentialization of process that better oversees such forms of cultural enrichment and improvement for most, if not all, of its citizen. Where this existential approach is as far away from any form of a utilitarian calculus, or similar, as one might sensibly imagine given the complexity of such non-calculative, super-relational forms of a situational awareness. Hence this implicit injunction to both cultivate and better cultivate the political culture being found to hand in order to enact this existential injunction calling for the progressive existential enrichment of that political culture in question. (257)

But, although there is a place for theory, how do we metaphorically ‘step’ from the page and enter on to the stage of the lived-world, find suitable forms of ongoing re(-)alignment between the lived-reality of lived-experience, and v.v? To work towards and achieve this radical sense and semblance of an ‘end’ let me first explore these interrelated dimensions of the ‘ethical’, the ‘political’, and the ‘existential’ (where the latter is to be seen as both the ‘existentially-pragmatic’ and the ‘pragmatically-existential’, and, together, as falling under the concept of ‘relational competence’ in this imputed expression of the relatively systematic existential [notated as either 3^3 or SE])! (258)

I.e., observing in terms of this economically-ordered heuristic that the political orientation (3^2) is realized through the reduplication of the ethical (3^1), and the (relatively systematic) existential orientation (3^3 as = SE) is realized through the reduplication of the political (3^2). That granted, then the following equation(s) hold:

$$3^3.(3^2.3^1) = 3^3 \text{ (given by re/duplication } 3^2.3^1 = 3^2, \text{ \& } 3^3.3^2 = 3^3). \text{ (259)}$$

This could be read as: the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical = SE. (260)

Or, more simply, as the double reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological (in this formation of a relatively systematic formation of the existential that cannot be reduced to the non-systematic status as the so-called ‘third moment’). Or, as the political-ness of the political = SE, given the ethicalness of the ethical is equal to the political (3^2), etc. (261)

But, given these equations through reduplication we must now ask just what is meant by these expressions ‘ethical’, etc? (262)

Over the course of the *Pursuit*, I have further refined the concept of the ‘ethical’, in an ethical economy, to be centered in the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological along with its secondary adjuncts of the second trans-cognitive orders of the aesthetically-integrated and the fourth trans-cognitive order of pragmatical-functionality, along with its tertiary adjuncts of the three remaining trans-cognitive orders of the phenomeno-

logical-semantic first, the ontical sixth, and the hermenetically-possible fifth (and where these tertiary adjuncts basically act as the field in which ethical responses and responsibilities is relationally-situated, i.e., its relational-situatedness.⁵¹ (263)

That the concept of the ‘deontological’ is to be viewed as ‘presenting a certain imperative calling for some responsible form of an engaged response that amplifies the current relational richness of the relationship at that moment in time be that through either the creation of value, and/or the preservation, conservation, an/or a super-conservation of e/valuational formation’. Then, at no time is this general sense and semblance of an imperative to be misconstrued in and through any form of a religious frame of reference, being, instead, treated agnostically as an imperative arising from the perceived trajectory of that situated relationship itself. Of course, a religious person is free to either interpret and/or re-interpret the co-associated set of events through a religious prism once that situation in question is first viewed in and through a thorough process of suspensions along with its automatic invocation of de-suspensions, hopefully, with enough deontological-like force to clearly articulate a set of differences between decisive decisions of the last instance, the next instance, and the existentially oriented deposition of the first instance. (264)

Why this characterization of the ethical as primarily deontological and only secondarily taking on an both a somewhat unequal aesthetically-integrated orientation and a pragmatically-functional orientation (as situated in the relational context of its tertiary adjuncts)? (265)

Because, for a start in a court of law, a jury inevitably finds a deontological reading more resonant, more pertinent, than either a pragmatical reading and/or an aesthetically-integrated reading. Then, phenomenologically, we can better describe ethical responses and responsibilities as being experienced along the lines of a deontologically oriented imperative that in our relational apperception is found to be relationally generated (and nether self-generated nor other-generated⁵²). (266)

Divorced from a traditional religious reading of the deontological, we experience an empathetic reading of an imperative simulated within the ‘representation’ of that relationship in question. In an identification with the same, therein, we experience a sort of potential difference between the way things are and how they could be, or, perhaps, should be, or would be better if that were able to be enacted. Returning to the recent example, if we see a child heading towards something potentially dangerous, normally, if not too distracted by other things, we react in a concerned manner, and, if we possess the

⁵¹ In a similar manner we could invoke a materialistic or phenomenalistic economy centered on the first order of the phenomenologically-semantic, or, the immaterialistic or hermeneutical economy centered on the fifth trans-cognitive order of hermeneutic-possibility. Then, in the secular economy we could general three further economies (modelled on the ethical economy as just outlined. Say, an aspirational or ideal/istic economy on the second order of aesthetical-integration, and an ontical or real/istic economy on the sixth order of the ontical, and the pragmatical or functional economy on the fourth order of the pragmatical).

⁵² I.e., being either defined ‘by what the subject thinks or some other subject or institutions tells a certain other subject what to think in such matters’).

relevant standing, we note we could intervene and would do so if no one else is there to intervene before us, in our expression of that form of caring. At the same time, this expression of the deontological can be complemented or supplemented with either those two adjuncts of the aesthetically-integrated and/or the pragmatically-functional. In permitting patterns of behaviour, either non-existential in orientation and/or existential in orientation, although more correctly no absolutistical distinction can be drawn between the same, drawing only a certain degree of preferential treatment for one or the other, along with a certain mix of these two adjuncts, then the determination of our intentions will find patterns of enaction through the meta-textual form of genres of behaviour that appear to be suitably amenable to overseeing a resolution of such complex imperatives. To some degree the questions we ask also frame the manner of their co-associated responses. Should we see an unsupervised toddler heading straight towards the imminent dangers of the surf then we invoke the genre of an intervention where we either try to prevent that type of situation from occurring or then feel a more intense form of intervention where we have to ameliorate the situation to hand by rescuing that same child. At the same time we should also recognize that imperatives also inform the complementary or supplementary functioning of these two adjuncts of the aesthetically-integrated and the pragmatically-function. In the latter instance, we look for how the deontological force of an impending state of intervention might unfold through a pragmatist lens, noting, e.g., to what extent considerations of either efficiency, effectiveness, efficaciousness, expediency, economicalness (economy or parsimony), etc., might better help us to reconfigure the exercise of our care. In a similar manner, the very integrity of our intentional volition necessitates a certain degree of aesthetically-oriented integration in order to consistently, coherently, and collectively shape the contours of our volition given our perception, or apperception, of a plurality of potential options. Of course, hopefully, our responses will also be responsibly informed and here we need to note that the economy of permission is affectively motivated, cognitively directed, and trans-cognitively discharged through a process of judgment that, more often than not, needs to take on board an existentially oriented determination that fully reflects in what manner we can also responsibly discharge that same intent in a manner that either creates, preserves, and/or conserves relational richness. Indeed, on some occasions, super-serve a more expansive form of conservational expansion given also the advent of the relatively-radical be that either incrementally orchestrated, advertently, and/or the very result of a process of inadvertent re-direction that comes to establish a more positive sense of an existential surplus or excess in e/valuational formation. So, e.g., steeping tea leaves in tepid water is hardly going to give you an excellent cup of tea, whereas, bringing the water to the boil first is something we already know is how it should be done *versus* suddenly needing to comfort a friend in distress and proffering an unexpected cup of tea may well be more than enough for that upset person to feel that they are seen, and heard, and deeply cared for. In bringing water to the boil, we are harnessing chaotic phenomena in an expected manner, whereas, in the delivery of unexpected behaviours we may well find considerably positive forms of valuation that far exceed the ordinary everydayness of our interactions with others when the habitual expectations of habits are broken in a manner that demonstrates an authenticity of concern and care that even surprises the person performing such a skilfully attuned responsiveness. Where 'responsibility' is a 'pattern of responsiveness that proffers a far greater degree of a positive sense and semblance of value, in a process of

e/valuational formation that induces a greater degree of relational resolution that directly contributes to the relational richness and enrichment of that relationship as it is found situated for us in the world at large. Thence this non-absolutistical division between relatively non-existential permissions and relatively existential permissions as bridged by ‘decisive decisions of the next instance’ between ‘decisive decisions of the last instance’ and ‘decisive decisions of the first instance’. (267)

Ideally, through a super-relational orientation towards the relationship in question, in and through our appreciation of its apparent situatedness, existentially oriented permissions can be contrasted with non-existentially oriented permissions whilst also recognizing that it is only through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential that a process of existentialization can be enacted in and through that process of responsive-responsibility. (268)

Thence this understanding that the deontological is further reinforced through an aesthetic-like imperative of integrity of purpose and the many minor imperatives that underwrite the complexities of a pragmatist attitude that, to be quite honest, could well make or break the successful delivery of that form of an impelled intervention. Ideally, in a more attuned state of alignment, all these contributions need to successfully find forms of resolution in which relational richness of our relationships are either created, preserved, and/or conserved (if not, on occasions, also super-conserved). (269)

How are our interactions in this world at large to be both screened and suitably interacted with? (270)

By noting that we interact, in an economy of interaction, by delineating navigation, negotiation, and arbitration, and responding accordingly. (271)

I enter a coffee shop, and avoid banging into the person just leaving by navigating both their exit and my entrance. I negotiate with the barista in a manner already arbitrated for most of us in and through a series of genres, say, by communicating what we wish to drink, what we might wish to eat, indicating whether we wish to stay on the premises or take our purchases with us, etc. On reflection, I muse upon the many years people had placed a whole series of bets, say, that in a decade hence people will still want to order a coffee in a café, and so on. (272)

I reflect upon the simple fact that we can be respectful of the person making our coffee, say, by smiling at them, clearly telling them what we wish to order, thanking them, and so on, or, in a contrast, that some people merely request a certain transaction and treat it accordingly as not much more than a transaction to the detriment, I am sure, of both parties. That all behaviour can be done in an existentially manner mindful of both oneself and the other or in a manner that conforms or barely conforms to social expectations, and so on. Now, we can interpret this rather superficially as somewhat of an existential veneer superimposed upon the relatively non-existential, be that either relatively positive, neutral, and/or negative in orientation, or, non-superficially, by recognizing that an existential core persists at the center of all intentionally directed interactions since

without this minimal democratic pre-condition in our interactions, with both ourselves and others, the very communication of intent could not proceed, be disseminated. (273)

This understanding immediately allows me to segue to the dimension of the political to the extent that the enaction of all non-virtual intentions needs to be interpreted accordingly, at least to the extent that our enacted behaviour has the potential to encounter political-like ramifications. (274)

Within this ordered heuristic the site for the transformation of the enaction of virtually expressed intentions transitioning to the actual enaction of non-virtual intentions is realized through the reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological, at the center of the ethical economy as supplemented or complemented by its two adjuncts, and as situated with respect to its tertiary adjuncts.⁵³ This transformational-transition I term ‘political’ by virtue of the fact that our acting in the world at large means a distinctive depositional process on the face of this world as lived that is ‘signed’ by ‘ourselves’, which, given the ubiquity of arbitration, means that that is more than likely something determined through intersubjective processes of involvement with others, and, where our individual occupation of this lived-space is inescapably ‘us’ in the singular and, whilst contested, cannot be completely appropriated by another party. Hence our individual passage through this world, despite the full derivation of our intentions, cannot be completely dictated by another, and, that this additional fact is also reflected in the democratic core of all interactions with others. Our embodiment makes a claim upon the surface of our world, since where one person is no other person can be and stand, and that that standing has political ramifications. Moreover, the dissemination of power is through shifting patterns of cooperation, i.e., a mix of both co-operation and co-option given this necessary and basic democratic core of behaviour at the very center of all processes of intentional interaction with others. E.g., the state can co-opt our payment of taxes, but, it might be possible for us to also not co-operate with the payment of the same. E.g., two friends may see themselves as equals, yet, in passing through a narrow doorway, one of them will need to defer to the other, even if they take turns in this process of deciding who shall go first in such a situation. Thus, even in an ‘economy of cooperation’ through an inequality of power relations as to how ‘co-option’ and ‘co-operation’ is divided up is itself a relational interaction indicating the third dialectical moment of a ‘co-operation-and-co-option’.⁵⁴ (275)

⁵³ At various times I have made a distinction between the ‘complimentary’ and the ‘supplementary’, but, in terms of the ethical economy, at this point in time, I do not wish to make a distinction between the same.

⁵⁴ I.e., defining the economy of cooperation as one-part co-option, one-part co-operation, and one-part ‘co-operation-and-co-option’/‘co-option-and-co-operation’. Similarly, in regard to the contractual economy, or the compactual economy, given this aspect is a necessary part of the contractual process. I.e., one-part compactual, one-part contractual, and one-part ‘compactual-and-contractual’/‘contractual-and-compactual’. Simplistically, we could say the contract is navigated (around), the compactual aspect is negotiated, and their working conjunction is arbitrated. In lived-reality, given considerable imbalances in power relations, that the compactual dimension is more pre-negotiated and imposed, somewhat overlooked, but, at the same time, tacitly understood. Without some degree of mutual understanding, there would be no point for either party to enter into a contractual process.

Now, decisive decisions of the last instance, etc., are exercised through processes of economic resolution that are expressed non-economically and hermeneutically accommodated. I.e., ideally, economic resolution is in ordered terms of reference, non-economically expression in extra-ordered terms of reference, and hermeneutic accommodation in inter-ordered hyper-economic terms of reference. That, if only ideally expressed in this manner we present ourselves with an apparent contradiction, namely, how is the 'political' only a reduplicated phenomenon and not a doubly reduplicated phenomenon given the 'non-economic' is 'extra-ordered in orientation and not inter-ordered in complexion'. By recognizing that these facets or aspects are co-present and act as orientations not definitively separated and segregated processes. Hence the dialectics of 'permission' where through the current intensity of the affective in conjunction with the presentation of a clearly directed or re-directed intentional objectivity can spark a process of *de facto* permission without its *de jure* authorization operating from, and on the behalf of, an existentially oriented sense and semblance of a super-relational perspective. In an intuitive appreciation of the need for an alignment between these three levels of the affective, cognitive, and trans-cognitive (judgment), and, an alignment also between the trans-cognitively informed levels of the (economically) ordered, (hyper-economically) inter-ordered, and (non-economically) extra-ordered, and, these co-associated parallels between the ethical, the political, and the existential (expressed as relational competence), a process of existentially oriented permission is neither fully recognized, nor encountered, nor engaged. On the other hand, through the auspices of suitably exercised patterns of suspension, the duly discharged delivery of a responsible-responsiveness cannot be fully expressed, be that either appropriately, properly, and/or appositely in its delivered expressiveness. I.e., in a form where we thematize decisive decisions of the last instance and then existentially permit decisive decisions of the next instance to be taken up as decisive decisions of the first instance. That, only a fully discharged sense and semblance of permission is indicative of our existential standing in such matters. All else indicates a relatively non-existential stance, be that either positive, neutral, and/or negative in complexion. Thence, an appreciation of the ramifications of our enactions in this world at large is a political affair that also needs to develop an existential awareness of the apparent manner as to how such interventions were aspired after, arbitrated, and as to how they 'contributed' to the ensuing creation, preservation, and conservation, etc., of a positive e/valuational formation in our more important relationships. (276)

Thence our appreciation of the political dimension through an appreciation of both relevant ethical and existential dimensions in and through an awareness of these interactions that are of and between these interconnected ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered phenomena. (277)

Basically, as already outlined this relationship between the ordered aspect of an overall philosophical economy; the inter-ordered meta-philosophical, metaphysical economy (as non-traditionally constituted); and the extra-ordered meta-meta-philosophical, existential economy (that is equally pragmatic, relational, and conformationally competent) is a consideration of reduplication centered on the third order/s of the deontological/political/existential (in its more systematic sense as the 'relational'). Hence:

Ethical (E) \Leftrightarrow Political (P) \Leftrightarrow Existential/Relational (R) = Governance (G) (be that either personal, interpersonal, political, inter-political). (278)

Hence G = the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical... (279)

Where ethicalness of the ethical is Political (P), the politicality of the political is relational (R) = the ethicality of ethicalness. (290)

With this relatively-radical re-understanding of these interactions between the ethical, political, and existential dimensions it should be obvious that at the very center of good political governance, etc., exists, and persists, the sense and semblance of a well-functioning ethical economy, a dynamically harmonious and balanced interaction between all relevant aspects that contribute to-good governance, be that as discerned through one's own sense/s of self, others, communities, organizations, institutions, governments, international affairs, and so on. That this entails a dynamic balance and harmony between the Affective, Cognitive, and Trans-Cognitive aspects of the psyche; between the broader semblance of the philosophical, the metaphysical, and the existential, between the contractual and compactual, between navigation, negotiation, and arbitration, and so forth. That, how these facets of experience are to be engaged can only be through well-formed, well informed, and well-exercised conjectural economies subjected to suitable processes of suspension in which, through the ongoing delivery of de-suspensions, we progressively find through ongoing processes of re(-)alignment greater and more productive degrees of conformalization. (291)

Such, hypothetically granted, what are the obvious, and less obvious, ramifications of this relatively-radical 'turning around' of much of what, to date, would have countered as a traditionally transmitted conventional wisdom that is not so much usurped as standing in need of this complex, but equally simplifying, radical process of an ongoing re(-)interpretation. (292)

But, where is one to begin? For a start we see that a transactional approach without a mutually exercised basis in the compactual dimension of the relatively-existential, is a recipe for 'bankruptcy' in all sense of that expression, be that from the moral to the political, from the governance of business to the non-business of governance. As a poster child of that existential fact, we do not need to look too far! (293)

The mere observance of a transactional approach completely overlooks the existence of the dimension of an 'existential surplus', which, as an 'existential excess', is to be both fostered and treasured. Now a materialist, et al, would say that such a state of affairs is merely imagined. Something that cannot exist being without having a materially based form of existence. But to the *cognoscenti*, it is the same difference between having a coffee with someone, through no fault of either party, where both parties just do not know how to interact on a deeper level', and, 'two friend having a coffee who are continually surprised where their deeper conversations ever seem to end up in a serendipity of ideas and insights that surprises both parties'. In this apparent differential, between interactions with other people that can inspire either insightful or the far less insightful forms of mu-

tual understanding, the world is our school and where, in some situations, the world is found to be a better teacher... (294)

Now, the materialist fails to account for the positivity of this existential differential, but, equally, all ideologically oriented positions will also equally fail us. Indeed, the endless catalogue goes on and on what with all shapes and hues of so-called 'realists', 'idealists', 'dualists', 'monadists', 'pluralists', 'absolutists', 'relativists', and so on and ever on. What preachers of such errant nonsense, each running with a metaphor taken far beyond its use-by date, treating the metaphorical in a literal manner that defies a deeper, more creditable logic, as a dialectic, where no identity can be literally extrapolated from its economic matrix of creative generation. Yes we think we understand the so-called 'realist' or 'idealist', or the so-called 'anti-realist' or 'anti-idealist', and so on, but, in lived-reality, in lived-experience, treating the metaphorical in a literal fashion is insanity incarnate! (295)

Simply put, in intentional consciousness, we have intentional objectivity towards the intentional object or objective (as the noematic), but, equally, we also have an intentional motivation in the background motivating such intentional objectivity (as the noetic). Both (noetic-noematic) correlatives mutually co-define each other, one without the other is a fictitious nonsense. At the same time, evidently rendering the inescapable economics of this lived-situation is the equally inescapable fact that all forms of intentional experience have their corresponding forms of intentional forms of subjectivity. A visual field is co-associated with a visual perceiver, a thinking state of affairs portends a thinker, in a dreamer we find the dreamer dreaming. Thence this correlativity between intentional focus on an intentional object(ive) in an intentional field motivated to focus on such intentional objectivity all apparently experienced by a corresponding sense of an intentional subject. Separate and isolate any one of these correlative modalities and the pre-associated economy collapses. No identity without difference, but, with absolute difference there is no identity, and v.v., and, with absolutely no-difference then equally there can be no identity, and v.v. Thence the initial dialectics of the economy. (296)

But, then, too, all economies are situated in their own senses and semblances of a situational economy, and, moreover, no economy can function economically if there were nothing but an endless recycling of economic value. For the advent of a decisive event, the enacting of a decision, then we must also understand the non-economic nature of such economies. Thence this co-associated, correlative dimension of the non-economic! (297)

Thence, on occasions, the advent of the relatively-radical. Never the radically-radical, because, then, there could be no economic re-appropriation of that which could not be appropriated, and therein, comprehended, in that form, small increment by increment, in the hyper-economic re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical. (298)

Horizontally, we have economic 'focus' in a gestalt 'field', and co-associated subjective 'frame and framing'. Vertically, we have the economic, the hyper-economic appropriation of the non-economic as correlatives in their right given their dialectical necessity of their orientations. No non-economic disruption of the economy in the advent

of the decisive decision of the last instant, etc., then, no economic productivity. Too much non-economic disruption, then, no hyper-economic comprehension of the relatively radical nature of that now decisive, radically-radical break. Where incremental, non-chaotic additions or subtractions, as inputs, finally find expressions as chaotic, relatively-radical outputs... in a dialectical dance between the non-critical, critical, and the relatively-radical... in an ongoing process of incremental comprehension (as afforded through this necessary imputation of the relatively hyper-economic). (299)

All of this is being gone over again because without this critical-radical backdrop there can be in-depth philosophical understanding of what is being meant by such expressions as 'ethical', 'political', 'existential' and co-associated operations of 'reduplication', 'duplication', 'retreatment', etc. Moreover, without 'working suspensions' philosophical thinking remains interminably controversial and becomes, yet again, unproductively enmeshed in the swamp of ideological nonsense masquerading as profound ways of seeing the world. But, such wayward thinking should be appreciated as only 'metaphorical' and not something that should be shoehorned into a literal straightjacket. In this regard, we could tolerate 'weak ideologically oriented propositions', even run creative forms of connectedness in patterns that might be correctly characterized as both non-weak and non-strong in complexion. However, to run strong, ideologically oriented forms of propositional logic is just too bizarre to even contemplate by the more insightful. (300)

Hey, the Moon tonight looks like a big blue cheese, doesn't mean either the speaker or the listener of such a metaphorical description would remotely think 'the Moon is a big blue cheese'. Even children are not going to be fooled by such poetic license. On the other hand, how many eminent philosophers forever chatter and murmur among themselves about the so-called 'real', or the so-called 'ideal', wax and wane about so-called 'particulars' or so-called 'universals', prattle on about so-called 'First Principles' or so-called 'Last Principles', and everything else imagined in between, from 'mortal souls' to 'immortal gods', and so on, and so forth, *ad nauseum*. (301)

Every genuine disciplinarian in this overall world-of-life has authentic work to in this world at large. Alas, some forget themselves, or, rather do not forget themselves enough! (302)

Given the economic nature of our thinking, along with the disruption of the non-economic, and the imputed re-connectedness of the hyper-economic, the insightful disciplinarian would realize that we first navigate through a triangulation of perspectives as well as finding the obligatory triangulation of its situatedness. In the overlapping of such perspectives there can be no fully functioning, self-respecting sense of positioning, no valid sense of an isolated position. All ideological talk on such a topic, that there could be such a position, to be held through a logical act of defensible positioning should be seen, quite rightfully, as mere nonsense. Yes, understood in a weak sense through an appreciation of the phenomenology of the metaphor or metaphors in question, but, never something that could be strongly isolated and understood in itself. Do I even have to demonstrate the patent absurdity of such an absurdity. (303)

An anti-realist, or an instrumentalist, or a facile pragmatist, or similar, might deflect toward the productivity of the world of quantum physics and argue that ‘quantum objectivities’ are no more than ‘quantum descriptions’, that we should lower our sight and just calculate (as in an accordance with some form of the Copenhagen Interpretation).⁵⁵ But, I immediately point out that this mere reduction to sheer descriptions is a completely unacceptable form of nonsense on many dialectical grounds that deserve to be simply refuted (without arguing the obverse that we have to strongly impute equally nonsensical entities like ‘quantum objectivities’, ‘collapsing wave functions’, and ‘both all other abstract and non-abstract identities’, and so on. ‘There is no quantum world, only abstract quantum descriptions’ completely ignores how textual descriptions are not just phenomenologically delineated but also hermeneutically and existentially appreciated. The descriptive economy cannot be just descriptively entertained. In textual terms, I would argue, that the appreciation of descriptions is also both a prescriptive affair and a proscriptive affair. This economy of descriptions, like all economies, has to be suitably triangulated. All behaviour, virtual or non-virtual in orientation, is mediated through the adoption and adaptation of intersubjective meta-textual genres of behaviour. Without this meta-textual prescriptive dimension the process of descriptive focus just could not occur let alone commence. Similarly, the (relatively non-textual simulation of) a proscriptive orientation of all non-systematic existential contributions must also be co-present since without such proscription all things, both sensible and non-sensible, could be proclaimed to apply in a prescriptive manner. Otherwise, we would be overrun by ‘green noises’, ‘tables that were both round and square at the same time’, ‘bald kings of France currently booked to have afternoon tea with subjects and non-subjects alike’, indeed, a fantastical stable of weird and wonderful nonsense even more nonsensical than any ideologue posing as a ‘serious philosopher’ or ‘earnest disciplinarian’. (304)

Any reduction of a so-called ‘quantum’ world to ‘mere descriptions’ is so laughable that it hurts. To maintain such a position is impossible since without a triangulation of perspectives there could be no weak sense of a metaphorical semblance of a ‘position’, but, strongly forced, without a triangulation of perspectives, it is all a bit like the sawing off a high branch on a tree with your insightful self-sitting towards the end of that same branch. Whoops, without the situatedness of that tree, your position self-deconstructs should you be witless enough not to realize that state of interdependence. No descriptions without prescriptions, and no prescriptions without proscriptions, therefore, any reduction to pure descriptions is nothing more than a verbal incantation that seems vaguely reasonable, in a weak sense, but completely self-deconstructs in the situational destruction of its relational connectedness to this world at large, regardless of whether it be either imagined or non-imagined. What goes for the virtual intentions also-goes for non-virtual intentions, and v.v., since even the world at large cannot be strongly divided into a world of mind and a world without mind, etc. (305)

Of course, you could imagine in a dream that you were about to be assassinated and then die from a heart attack, but, usually, people are assassinated outside a world of

⁵⁵ Alluding to the more direct injunction, ‘Shut up, and calculate’ as exclaimed by the physicist N. David Mermin (which was originally uttered as a critique of science’s apparent ignoring of more foundational issues, but, now has come to be seen as an iconic motto for the Copenhagen approach).

dreams. In other words, despite my being elliptical here, causal effectiveness is a product of non-virtual intentions, as a due reflection of their standing, given, too, the modal density, intensity, and propensity of our intentional productivity, as also given through the consilience of a relevant set of salient perspectives in which our standing allows us to intervene in a manner consistent with such propinquity'. (306)

I.e., even though in a dream we might imagine the appeasement of our physiological hunger through an imaginary act of eating, still, that hunger will soon re-assert itself. The implication being, that in a non-dream state we are exposed to many more modalities of presentation than say in a dream, or in an act of memory, or, in an act of the imagination, etc. Thence this greater density of modalities in our presentation with the relatively non-virtual. (307)

Similarly, even though on some occasion our dreams might be truly vivid, still, in a non-dream state of sensory perception the intensity of what is either to be recognized, encountered, and/or engaged can be truly amazing. Try to drink a cup of very hot tea and you soon realize that 'any misinformed description' of it as 'now ready to drink' is a complete misnomer. Yes, we construct a world of descriptions, but, equally, this same world describes itself to us through our very interactions with it. Therefore, any pure reduction to a world of mere descriptions is a patent nonsense. Again, and again, the world reinforces its 'presence for us' and 'our presence for it' as something that cannot be reduced to a mere 'this' or a mere 'that'. Likewise, dismiss such reductive nonsense, either individually or collectively, to focus simply on an isolation of either descriptions, prescriptions, and/or proscriptions, etc. (308)

Invoke suspensions and dismiss the ideological! Await de-suspensions and marvel at their potential extension of an insightfulness, sometimes novel and innovative, either extended in a relatively-radical form of a re-iterated process of retreatment or merely re-appropriated in a relatively-critical form of retreatment (once the relatively-radical, say, is no longer experiences as the relatively-radical *per se*). (309)

That these simple strategies of deconstruction, remediation (through simultaneous deconstruction and reconstruction), mitigation, re(-)normalization, exercising patterns of rectification through the progressive imposition of ongoing re(-)alignment allows us to make 'philosophical progress' by now 'preventing us from making non-philosophical progress' through what cannot be other than 'an imprisonment in misleading notions like 'positions' and 'positioning', deconstructing positions and re-positioning, etc.' (310)

Hence this prohibition of these fraudulent notions of 'positions' and 'positionings' and their fruitful substitution by the working concepts of a 'triangulation of perspectives and (situatednesses) as situations'. Concepts also coloured by our current intentional attitudes, a questioning as to what is motivating us, a seeking of existentially oriented outcomes in which the relational richness of our relationships is advanced either creatively in the advent of the relatively new), preserved (through a preservation of current relational richness), and/or is sought a conservational expansion (in the relational richness and ongoing enrichment of our relationships). (311)

In a similar manner, no longer seeking to defend or attack any form of positioning although I also admit there is a place for weak positions or non-weak/non-strong forms of positioning have a metaphorical role that, equally, should know its place in an understanding that all forms of a strong positioning are simply untenable, period, nonsense, and will mock their promoters as idiots, as no better than magician mumbling useless and ineffective incantations. Witnessing real power in the hands of those who no longer travel these endless *culs-de-sac* and who, instead, take their exercise on following those ethical paths of a well-exercised existential governance. (312)

Implicit in this dismissal is a rejection of all impossible, strongly argued uni-modal, bi-modal, and closed tri-modal forms of a nonsensical ‘positioning’ and its replacement with a suitable triangulation of perspectives and situations. (313)

That, such an understanding having been arrived at, implies we can now attend upon an appreciation of the ‘political’ that whilst radically rewriting conventional notions it will do so without displacing the existential core of significance operating within such concepts and functions, etc., that gave them their apparent significance, their sense, meaning, and meaningfulness in the first place. (314)

So, e.g., the ‘political’ is ‘not ethical’, but, the ‘ethicalness of the ethical’ (and the latter as understood economically, i.e., as centered in the deontological, etc.). I.e., as arrived at through a reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological (and its non-systematic existential characteristics, along with its secondary adjuncts, as situated in respect to its tertiary adjuncts, etc.). Where by reduplication is understood the ‘meta-treatment of the pattern of treatment in question’ and where, by ‘duplication’, is meant ‘the ordered status of the ensuing product as it reflects the meta-status of that operator’. (315)

So, even though the ‘political’ is ‘not the ethical *per se*’, still, it should not be divorced from the same given the ‘political’ has the ‘meta-status of the meta-ethical’, i.e., as its ‘ethicalness’ as needs to be understood in ‘meta-philosophical, metaphysical terms of reference (as non-traditionally understood)’. The startling implication that can be immediately drawn is that both the deconstruction of the ethicalness of the ethical and deconstruction of the ethical itself can only be productive, as to be expected, of a relatively non-productive pattern of governance. Moreover, through less productive forms of relational resolution the ensuing facticity of the relationship in question could also be diminished accordingly. I.e., the relational richness of that relationship would take on a period of diminishment, relative relational impoverishment, an ensuing loss of freedom for all its parties even though that loss will be experienced by different parties in different ways to different degrees. (316)

⁵⁶ By extension, we can include all improperly formulated tetra-modal formations, etc. Treating hexmodally ordered formations as two interlocking economies that collectively form the ordered formation in question. E.g., the non-overall economy of the philosophical plus the economy of the secular gives us the overall economy of the philosophical (and disciplinary) which is none other than the six orders of the ordered level of the overall philosophical economy). Admittedly, a diagram would make this more memorable in a visual sense.

That said, we can also view the ‘political’ as ‘those decisive decisions of the last instance as potentially revealing decisive decisions of the next instance that may or may not find some form of fulfillment as decisive decisions of the first instant’. Where the ethicality of the political, as the politicality of the political shines forth in illuminating those patterns of intervention more characterized as existential in orientation. By extension, refining the sense and significance of the existential orientation, in turn, as ‘meta-political’ in orientation, and so on. (317)

Invoking an ‘axiom of non-identity’, namely, ‘that all forms of identity cannot perfectly equal some other form of identity or that nominated as the ‘same identity’ at any other points in time and space, or any other space-time equivalent, say, vectors, etc., it follows that all ethical situations cannot be treated as ethically non-different, as politically non-different, and as existentially non-different’. I.e., between all comparatively treated events, in intentional terms of apparent responses and delineated responsibilities, the ethical, political and existential ramifications attendant upon those events will all be different even if rendered on *a priori*-like grounds as ‘similar’ or ‘same’. Then, that granted, it would be natural to ask ‘how do we appreciate such imputed differences, given on *a priori* grounds, that such differences must exist? To simply answer this question, I would argue that through forms the invocation of suitable modes of appreciation where higher terms of meta-reference will need to be articulated, either overtly and/or covertly. but, understanding, that through the ensuing de-suspensions all outputs will be returned to an object-like level of disquisition through transformational retreatment. Let me elaborate. (318)

‘The ethicalness of the ethical’ is a form of appreciation that is denominated as ‘political in orientation’. Similarly, ‘the politicality of the political’ (as ‘the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical’) is denominated as ‘existential’ (meaning ‘existentially-pragmatic’/‘pragmatically-existential’). Thus, in order to appreciate the ‘relational competence’ of the same we would then need to invoke a ‘meta-appreciation of the existential’, so, individual extra-ordered forms of existential appreciation of the political and the ethical would reflect the nature of their existential topicality, but, the overall competence of that process of existential enrichment is something that would fall more collectively under the umbrella of ‘relational competence’. Hence the following progressions to illustrate these distinctions. ‘A person who merely collects and collates validly ascertained facts’ is someone I would call, say, a ‘factologist’. In comparison, ‘the facts of facts’, i.e., ‘the factuality of facts’, is something appreciated by an ‘historian’.⁵⁷ Then, in ‘a history of history’, i.e., in ‘a historicity of the historical’, we form an appreciation of the ‘historical competence of that historian and their constructed histories’. Thus, we are led to make a distinction between ‘historical competence’ and ‘relational competence’ and where the latter is the overall appreciation of the former. Therefore, this concept of ‘relational competence’ is the appreciation of the extra-ordered topic or topics in question and should not be confused with, say, historical competence or metaphysical competence of

⁵⁷ Translating ‘reduplication’ as a ‘special form of duplication’, and applying the operation of duplication accordingly.

the categorical, or scientific competence or political competence, or enactive competence or competence of our reading of the psycho-social spectrum, etc. (319)

As argued earlier, and elsewhere, the ethical is centered in deontological judgment (the third trans-cognitive order) but not exclusively, i.e., also implicating aesthetical qualifications (second trans-cognitive order) and the pragmatological qualifications (fourth trans-cognitive order). Indeed, the presentation of an imperative, in some form or other runs through all three orders. In the aesthetical orientation it pertains to integrity and harmonization (as realized through relational forming processes of resolution centered on the so-called third moment of Ego and their coinciding with the deontological impetus.⁵⁸ In the pragmatological orientation it concerns a series of relative minor imperatives such as those that impel considerations concerning either effectiveness, efficiency, efficaciousness, expressiveness, expeditiousness, economical, and/or expedience, etc.⁵⁹ As for the priority of the deontological imperative, it should only be read in a secular sense as whatever seems to impel an advancement of existential richness and enrichment through intentional acts of either relational creation, preservation, and/or conservation (or super-conservation). By ‘secular’ is merely meant our reading the apparent force of the imperative being experienced in a non-religious sense without recourse to irrelevant and seemingly impossible notions of First Principles, and so on (but, where the religious person, of course, is quite entitled to invoke such supernumerary notions albeit, preferably through a critical and radical framework that complies with all relevant economic dictates, etc., i.e., in and through a suitable suspension of all ideological readings, the triangulation of perspectives, operating in an ordered environment or an equivalent framework, etc. (320)

Arguing concurrently, that relational facticity, the extent a relationship emerges and cannot be reductively reduced to its material basis or apparent embodiment in the world, and, that this relational or existential excess or surplus in e/valuational formation is a direct reflection of its ongoing relational resolution in lived-experience. Where complete resolution is the final demise of that relationship, and, where, it existential-like status is dependent upon its Goldilocks region between too much or too little consonance, dissonance and resolution (and where these harmonic correlatives mutually co-define each other, economically, through their joint negations like all economic correlatives. Where by ‘negations’ we can also read ‘suspensions’, and, by ‘the suspension of those suspensions’, as ‘de-suspensions’, we can read ‘the delivery of some form and degree of an existential difference, i.e., as an existential excess or surplus’). (321)

Now, in the light of the above let me ask the following questions. What is ethical, what is ethicalness and what is ethicality, etc? (322)

Contrary to a (mis)reading of Husserl that insists on our ability to explicate and disseminate a series of pure descriptions in a delineation of phenomenal-phenomenological experience there cannot exist any such form of economic enaction conducted in a uni-modal modality, etc. implying that the ability to conduct descriptions must also be accompanied by credible forms of economic correlativity (that again cannot

⁵⁸ Say, considerations of advancing degrees of integrity and integration,

⁵⁹ A useful mnemonic that can be creatively added too.

be merely reduced to the bi-modal correlations of the noetic-noematic given the necessary economic triangulation of events in their apparent situatedness, which must also be constituted in tri-modal economic terms of reference). That granted, it then behooves us to find suitable tri-modal terms of reference for a more complete characterization of such situated-events, etc. In a descriptive economy, focusing on the relatively phenomenological, I would add the hermeneutics of prescriptively formulated meta-textual genres of behaviour along with non-textually simulated, non-systematic existential contributions in the form of proscriptions, etc. I.e., the implicit, if not explicit, triangulation of descriptions, prescriptions and proscriptions. Let me apply this soon to notions of the ethical as informed deontologically and through its two adjuncts of the aesthetical and pragmatological. But, first, let me explore two parallel notions of consensus and dissensus and the implications of their overlapping interactions. (323)

It is all very well setting out to establish deeper forms of consensus, as per Rorty, but, it is obvious that the political environment is also quite polarized, or, when interacting with another person, there would always be some degree of difference, and so on. So, it stands to reason, that the establishment of consensus must also involve parallel processes of a decreasing state and degree of dissensus. However, by virtue of our ability to enact some degree of communicative-interaction, given our necessary embodiment in a world of communication, we must also assume that there would exist a considerable asymmetry between both overall facets of ‘consensus’ and ‘dissensus’ with the relative centralization and emphasis being discerned with and expressed through the former. Indeed, only in terms of a concurrent consensus could we communicate in the first place, and, that our mutual working towards a state of an increasing concurrence would see the deconstruction more of the latter and a concurrence more of the former. Where this concept of ‘remediation’ can be progressively fleshed out, hopefully, through this expansion of this more central aspect coincident with a concurrently formed consensus. That, in this regard, in enquiring as to what is the so-called ‘right thing’ to do in a certain situation we can map such considerations in terms of these parallel descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions and virtually explore in what form and manner certain transformation is both a current directedness and a possible re-directedness might apparently add to or subtract from the relational richness of that same relationship in question, albeit as also appreciated in its overall situatedness as well, i.e., to that extent such forms of ideation appear to be already pre-framed by such interrogations in the first place, etc. (324)

Therefore, in asking the question ‘what is ethical?’ we could start with a description of a situation that confronts us as having ethical possibilities. Then, in parallel with hermeneutical prescriptions and non-systematic existential proscriptions, as preparation for a ‘formal’ process of suspension, we can run in parallel such co-associated characterizations that fall under these correlative correlations of the descriptive, the prescriptive, and the proscriptive. E.g., we could note those relevant entries in a relational inventory in question, i.e., note relevant participants and parts. Articulate genres implicated in these explorations. Qualify the former by noting what also needs to be proscribed. Then denominate the central set of imperatives, noting problems with their correlation or overlap; articulate in what manner integration and integrity co-inhere in such a situation; then itemize more important pragmatological features using an appropriate mnemonic, e.g., what

approaches are relatively more effective, etc. Then, in effect, negate everything in expediting the ensuing suspension, be that either globally in total and/or locally through the running of a series of sequences subjected to this blanket process of negation. Over the course of such reflections, await the delineation of those thought processes that appear to proffer a relatively greater degree of insightfully oriented re-e/valuational formation. In the process sorting and processing what appears to be relatively non-critical, the relatively critical, and the relatively radical... where ensuing alterations in the delineation of an ongoing e/valuational formation should more correctly correspond with these three headings. (325)

I.e., where clarification of the non-critical, through suitable patterns of textual alignment, through re(-)alignment, will present themselves, and, in the process, expose apparent forms of error, etc., and, by such means entertain the critical transformation of the same. (326)

I.e., where the relatively-critical is found both reaffirmed and re-affirmed through processes of going reiteration and re-iteration effectively re(-)confirming such conformational alignment. (327)

I.e., where the relatively-radical is realized through patterns of non-economic irruption on an incremental basis that quickly, if not immediately, will need to find forms of suitable accommodation on a parallel incremental by incremental basis, and, where, through such a process expose both their relatively-radical complexion and the relatively-radical nature of their ensuing hyper-economic accommodation along more critical lines of re(-)alignment. (328)

Arguing, that there would exist distinctive existential characteristics that would, to a reasonable extent, differentiate these three headings. (329)

Now, in terms of both dissensus and consensus, progress, viewed either quantitatively and/or qualitatively, can be measured in terms of a conversion of the former into the latter. In quantitative terms we either find additional phenomenological modalities of interest and/or greater or lesser degrees of modal intensity associated with those same modalities evidently found to be present. In qualitative terms we find the addition enrichment of either certain salient perspectival points of view or consilient forms of accommodation along similar lines, in effect, finding either the constructive reinforcement and/or the deconstructive destruction of certain relevant tropes, memes, themes, 'bare' forms of iteration, etc. (330)

In the form of a summary so far, let me note that various forms of economic correlativeity are being entered into, namely, descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions *versus* the relatively non-critical, critical and radical. To these parallels we can add re events – distinctions, accommodations, and transformations versus re situations – salience, consilience, and propinquity or standing. The, to the same, we can also add features of the ethical economy concerning minor imperatives concerning integration, integrity;

effectiveness, efficiency, etc; and major imperatives that are more deontologically oriented. (331)

How are these ingredients to be metaphorically ‘mixed together’ and ‘baked’ within one oven of the intentional? Through sequences of ‘simulations’ and the entertainment of ‘negations’ of the same whilst methodically approached with patience. But, this is nothing more than exercising patterns of judgment other than conducting the same under the auspices of the relatively-critical and a patient awaiting of the relatively-radical... insightful increment by insightful increment fashioned through suitable forms of an awareness that both indicates and demonstrates greater degrees of alignment through processes of re(-)alignment. In that regard, it is merely more of the same, albeit approached as well-exercised conjectures that are both well-formed and well-informed, etc! (332)

Framing our interrogations on conventional grounds already to hand, hoping to move beyond such limitations through relevant forms of appreciation. I.e., suspending such information, letting de-suspensions deconstruct and reconstruct what harmonically emerges from such cross-interactions, correlations, forms of resolution, irruption, and a desire to re(-)comprehend what is to be better comprehended through such persistently re-iterated re(-)considerations. Given that reiteration can never remain in a state of mere reiteration, giving birth to the insightfulness of re-iteration through re(-)iteration. (333)

More of the same, in order to discern when less of the same is no longer the same whilst being more of that which is not the same... (334)

Following, i.e., paralleling, the harmonic formula of ‘consonance, dissonance and relational resolution’. I.e., reiterating the consonant, introducing the relative dissonant, finding forms of insightful resolution between the former (through the mediation of the former⁶⁰). (335)

Thence, in part, this nomenclature of ‘the decisive decision of the last instant, etc.’ (336)

But, this provisionally granted, then ‘what does the ethicalness of the ethical mean?’ (337)

As a first understanding, an appreciation of the former. But, an emergent mode of appreciation that cannot be reduced to what had been appreciated as merely being to hand already. (338)

In effect, the political radically emerges from the ethicalness of the ethical, where, the political is neither divorced from the ethical nor identified with the same... as if in resonance with each other and where one should not be seen without the other, but, at the same time, neither should be confused with the other! (330)

⁶⁰ I.e., mediation as the bi-modal suspension (that is either relatively foreground and overt or relatively background or covert)

Now, I turn to defining the ‘political’, or, rather, a re-defining this expression given the relatively-radical nature of this heuristic, etc. However, we are confronted by a philosophical problem, namely, in asking the question we should also ask another question, ‘have we been able to successfully define the ‘ethical’ given a somewhat externally oriented sense of definition through looking at a series of phenomenological descriptions, etc., etc?’ (331)

In effect, we need to take a dialectical stance by defining both what an economic correlative is not (through the joint negation of its two other economic correlatives and what it is through the use of a double negation.⁶¹ Let me explain. (332)

The successfulness of an economy is appreciated through the discernment of its relational competence (or more specifically, its overall relational competence if all six ordered channels are correctly observed rather than a relational competence, say, of the political economy, mirroring the ethical economy and its two adjuncts, etc., or the relational competence of the archetypal economy as viewed through philosophical/disciplinary; meta-philosophical, metaphysical; and meta-meta-philosophical existential considerations versus a contrasting secularization of the former [although the addition of ‘adjuncts’ allows it to naturally extend into its mirror contrast]). The point being that overall relational competence implies an economy whose functioning successfulness is discerned through this lens able to discern this ‘overall relational competence’. In other words, if the economic correlatives of the economy of overall relational competence are the ‘ethical’, the ‘political’, and the ‘existential’, then it automatically follows, e.g., that the ‘ethical’ is ‘not political and not existential’ whilst, at the same time being dialectically engendered as ‘not “not ethical, not political and not existential”’, i.e., in effect, as also ‘ethical, political and existential in its mutual co-arising and co-realization’. (333)

Taken from the internality of an economy or (overall) relational competence we must first define the ‘ethical’ as ‘both not political and not existential’, etc. So, if e.g., the ‘ethical’ is to be discerned as ‘not political and not existential’ then that should cause us to redefine, from a correlative perspective, the ‘ethical’ as ‘neither political nor existential’. What might that mean when from an economic perspective we also know that ‘relational competence’ of ‘the ethical, or the political, or the existential’, has to be, collectively, ‘ethical, political, and existential’. Taking up this dialectical challenge we find how such expressions are almost made to re-conform with their conventional definitions. So, e.g., in order to define an ethical pattern of enaction as distinctive from a political form of enaction this must imply that the intentional efforts of an individual are involved in contrast with the collective efforts of individuals viewed from a social sense of perspective that can then be labelled as ‘relatively political’ in scope. Or if responsibility is an existential characteristic, then it also implies that both the ‘ethical’ and the ‘political’ cannot be directly held to be ‘responsible’. Of course, from an economic point of view we also know that an ethically situated form of intervention should also be both non-existential and existential in scope. How do we square these contradictory demands. By

⁶¹ A logical technique for reinforcing the definition of a definition, albeit within the limits of its defining.

noting the differences in perspective whilst dialectically encompassing that same sense and semblance of a difference within the overall perspective of that same economy. Let's call these two perspectives of 'the economically correlative' and the overall economic as 'non-open' and the 'non-closed' respectively. (334)

In the more focused, non-open perspective we have this contrast between the 'ethical', the 'political', and the 'existential', say, along the lines of the 'ethical' as that 'being the actions enacted by an individual or the concerted efforts of a group of persons (be that through either action, non-action, and/or inaction)'. Conversely, the 'political' can be viewed as 'the ramifications of ethical actions from a social sense of perspective'. Then, say, from an existential sense and semblance of responsibility it can be seen as applying considerably more to the facticity of the relationship, itself, and not either to a person *per se* nor a collection of person *pers se*, with the implication that such an aspect applies to the relational situation in question (*per se*).⁶² In this same vein, we can parallel the 'ethical' to both the 'philosophical level of ordered disquisition' and 'the particularity of the phenomenological'; the 'political' to both the 'metaphysical level of inter-ordered disquisition' and the 'generality of the hermeneutical; and the 'existential' to both the 'relational level of competency ascertainment' and the 'specificity of non-systematically existential (in contrast to the 'non-local' or 'non-focused', overall 'globalization' of experience). Thus, in this manner, we can not note this internal definition of the relatively political (as an economic correlative in the economy of relational competence) as considering more a metaphysical orientation, an inter-ordered orientation more hermeneutically focusing of considerations of the general or generality. (335)

In this heuristic schematization, from the indirect admittance of an existential orientation, we could also note the 'ethical' as concentrating on 'concern', the 'political' as 'care' (through the non-virtual delivery of some form of enaction), and the ensuing e/valuation of the same as 'competency'. Thence this mnemonic of 'concern, care, and competency'. I.e., the ethical orientation considered considerations of concern, the political orientation is concerned with care through the enaction of patterns of responsiveness, and the existential dimension considers the ensuing competence to embrace or not embrace considerations of responsibility on the behalf of that relationship in question, albeit as embedded in its relevant world-of-life, and so on. (336)

Of course, with these internal considerations in place, we can now bring relatively external considerations into play in order to reinforce such complex dialectical definitions. That, thankfully, given both economic complexification and ordered complexification, a simplicity of mapping will also be in put into effect by virtue of this imputed universality of heuristic schematization, albeit as dialectically engendered. So, e.g., if we are exploring the ethical, political and/or existential ramification of a certain set of events in the context of their apparent situatedness then through economic complexification we can denominate the philosophical and disciplinary spheres of ethical concern as relatively retrospective, etc; the meta-philosophical, metaphysical sphere of care as both political and prospective in temporal orientation, etc; and, the meta-meta-philosophical sphere of

⁶² In economic terms of reference, the expression *per se* cannot be interpreted along absolutist lines, hence, e.g., the use of 'the relatively' ethical *per se*, etc.

the relational as contemporary and existentially occupying a domain of relational competency. Thence by such means distinguishing the ‘ethicality’ (of the ethicalness of the ethical’) from both the ‘ethicalness’ (of the ethical) and the relatively ethical *per se* (where each orientation is indicated through a distinctive focus conducted through the obligatory triangulation of the economic, etc.). (337)

At the same time, we can also argue, given that we are dealing with the same economy, that through transformational invariance ‘the ethical’ equals ‘the political’ equals ‘the existential’, albeit from the perspective of the embedded relational situation in question. So, that granted, despite these relative distinctions between the ethical etc., it also follows, say, that political enactment should also be both ethical and existential in orientation. (338)

This mnemonic of “‘ethical concern’, ‘political care’, and ‘existential competency’” can also be paired respectively with the non-economic considerations of ‘the definitive decision of the last instance’, ‘the definitive decision of the next instance’, and, ‘the definitive decision of the last instance’ reinforcing this division of temporal orientations as hitherto outlined. (339)

What are the more prominent relatively-radical ramifications to be discerned within this heuristic schematization? (340)

This remains a work in progress. In effect, a dialectical threading as to how the ethical is both ‘not political and not existential’ and is ‘not not political and not not existential’ (and where a more systematic sense and semblance of the existential is arrived at through a process of inter-mediation, i.e., an ongoing suspension of the ordered heuristic itself). (341)

On one hand, a distinction between the ethical, political, and existential, and, on the other, how there can be no absolutistical distinction between the same. In traversing this middle ground, we note how, e.g., how the relatively-ethical differs from the relatively political, and, how the suspension of the former (through mediation) gives us a provisional sense and semblance of the existential prior to its overall suspension through inter-mediation. (342)

In what way, then, is a relative difference between the ‘ethical’ and the ‘political’ could be profitably drawn? For a start, we could propose that the ‘ethical’ is rather ‘individually focused’ in contrast to the ‘implicit social orientation’ of the ‘political.’ However, in a dialectical contrast, we should also claim that ethically oriented patterns of behaviour cannot consequentially escape their having political ramifications, albeit to varying degree of politicalness (given the previously introduced axiom of non-equality). E.g., I know this example might seem rather trite to some people, but, yesterday, I saw a special on eggs at an independent retailer and not a chain store or supermarket chain) where a boxed dozen could be bought for only \$2.50. Unfortunately, as expected, they were sourced from ‘caged chickens’ and, for quite some time, I have refused to buy such eggs whatever their price. Such decisiveness on my part is a political act of omission. I suspect

the reason why they were such a large stack of such eggs on this special is that many people are performing the same type of political act of omission as myself. As optimistic as I am, I have some evidence for this supposition since, in a recent egg shortage, the only eggs that had been left sold in the supermarkets were inevitably sourced from ‘caged chickens’. As they say, ‘don’t get angry, get organized!’ Or, as I would like to put it, instead, ‘get concerned, and care!’ Placing concern within an ordered sphere of being deliberately concern, and placing care within an inter-ordered sphere of caring given the decisive political dimension of enactment centered in the third inter-ordered order of the political. Or, where ordered phenomena of concern are relatively virtual in enactment and where inter-ordered phenomena of caring are relatively non-virtual in expression given the enactive prominence of the political and the political economy. (343)

Now, the ethical economy has been carved out within a ‘hexamodally ordered economy’ as primarily being centered in the third trans-cognitive order of the (non-systematically existential) deontological, with secondary adjuncts in the aesthetical second order and the pragmatical adjunct of the fourth order, and situated in the three remaining orders of the ordered economy. Interposed, and contrasting both the ethical economy (of 3^1 ; 2^1 & 4^1) is the secular economy (consisting of the 2^1 , 4^1 , and 6^1 which could be interpreted as opposed to the philosophical/disciplinary economy along similar lines, namely, as having a primary locus in the sixth order, and secondary adjuncts in the aesthetical second order and the pragmatical fourth order). A third economic party is the archetypal economy as transformed under a ‘non-overall philosophical umbrella’ in its focus on the non-systematically deontological (3^1), the hermeneutical potential (5^1), and the phenomenologically semantic (1^1). Where a further potential enrichment of content is realized through processes of duplication and reduplication (where the latter is interpreted as a vertical form of duplication).⁶³ (344)

In the next complex chart, diagrammatically represented on the next page we can trace out these various economies as thematized in ordered terms of reference, etc., and come to understand why they are presented in two these two diagrammatically depicted formats, namely, linear version and a circular version. (345)

Into this maelstrom of overlapping economic models, within the complexities of this ordered economy, we should also recognize how ‘quiet’; the place is relatively speaking. Orders operating upon each other with an organized simplicity and articulating how we can formulate complex intentional states such as binary x of y , or the ternary or non-binary when it entails a chain of such operations and where the productivity continues to reflect the ordered status of the initial operator, such as when we attempt to envisage ‘the image of a fact of an historical narrative’, etc., where the ensuing product is an image (in the fourth cognitive order of the perceptual). (346)

⁶³ I.e., the difference between the x^n of y^m , notated as $x^n.y^m = z^n$, and where n , z , etc., is a number from $0 - 3$, and, $x^n.x^n$ is to be read as $x^{n+1}.n^z$ where a first r^n is to be treated as x^{n+1} ; and where productivity is an ensuing operation characterized by the effective ordered status of operator, namely, z^{n+1} . In the special case of reduplication productivity can both ascend and descend (recognizing that in transformational retreatment we end up with a product that can be stripped of its operative status, at least nominally, or, merely preserved in conventional terms of reference. E.g., where the ethicality, ethicalness and ethical are all reduced to the same ordered status in a process of transformational retreatment.

For the sake of generating some diagrammatical simplicity, let me repost the following, namely, a linear and circular representation of the ordered economy:

1^3	2^3	3^3	4^3	5^3	6^3
1^2	2^2	3^2	4^2	5^2	6^2
1^1	2^1	3^1	4^1	5^1	6^1
1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0

3^3
 3^2
 3^1
 3^0

2^3
 2^2
 2^1
 2^0

4^3
 4^2
 4^1
 4^0

*

1^3
 1^2
 1^1
 1^0

5^3
 5^2
 5^1
 5^0

6^3
 6^2
 6^1
 6^0

Table

	Cognitive⁰	Philosophical¹	Metaphysical²	Existential³
1	Atomic Semantic	Phenomenological	Categorical	Cat. Competence
2	Molecular Sem.	Aesthetical	Psycho-Sociological	P.S. Comp.
3	Conceptual	Deontological	Political	Pol. Comp.
4	Perceptual	Pragmatical	Enactive	En. Comp.
5	Potentiality	Possibility	Sciences	Sc. Comp.
6	Actuality	Ontical	Histories	His. Comp.

(347)

Hopefully, these diagrams can help to clarify the theoretical constitution of these various economic ideas. (349)

Translated into the economically ordered form of these tables we can now better understand how complex processes of intentional ideation can be both represented and sequentially operated upon according to these (horizontal and diagonal) non-specialized and (vertical) specialized rules of duplication. E.g., the operation entailing a certain history of a certain science remains a history. In notation: $6^1.5^1 \Rightarrow 6^1$. E.g., the operation entailing a certain phenomenology of a certain history becomes a certain phenomenology. In notation: $1^1.6^2 \Rightarrow 1^1$. E.g., the fact/s of a certain set of facts in translation becomes the factuality of a certain set of facts which becomes a history. In notation: $6^2.6^1 \Rightarrow 6^2$. E.g., a certain history of a certain history becomes the historical competence of a certain history. In notation $6^3.6^2 \Rightarrow 6^3$. E.g., the aesthetics of a categorical metaphysics becomes, i.e., remains, an aesthetics (be that in the form, say, of an *ethos*, *zeitgeist*, *mythos*, etc.). Then, in a complex series of sequences the final productivity continues to reflect the ordered status of the initial operator. E.g., the image of a certain fact in a certain history remains an image. In notation: $4^0.6^1.6^2 \Rightarrow 4^0$. (350)

In the 1970s exploratory resolutions of such considerations figure in my second volume of writings under the rubric of *Ontology* in an ambitious work titled *The Reanalysis of Nature* (superseding a previous work title *The Reanalysis of Nature* with a very oblique reference to Lucretius). In that second volume two solutions were stumbled on, namely, a comprehensive charting of such complex phenomena and the concept of transformational retreatment where all sequential computations (bimodally engaged) were retreated back to the same initial meta-status of the initial grounds of that operation. Work to date has considerably streamlined such considerations in light of these rules pertaining to duplication and retreatment, etc. As an offshoot of this endeavour, a more complexly formed ordered philosophy has arisen which now figures in a relatively-radical reconfiguration of these concepts of the ethical, the political and the existential. In the light of such schematization let me now demonstrate how these concepts of the ethical, political and existential, in their overall, systematic-like, economically oriented interaction/s, can profitably redefine field subsumed under the novel concept of an ‘overall relational competence’ as a broad way to better understand the concept of a relatively systematic sense and semblance of the existential (far beyond its origination in a theory of judgment that became expedited through the utilization of an ‘overall transcendental suspension’. This latter concept, in turn, being a relatively-radical re-interpretation of the phenomenological world of Edmund Husserl that, a long time ago, ceased to be a ‘mere interpretation’ or a ‘critical reinterpretation’ of the same). In light of the above, let me now demonstrate the utility of this heuristic approach – with the same rejoinder – at least critically attempt to understand what I am philosophically up to with my consistent reply to your criticism, namely, work with it in order to set out to make it critically work better, or, radically replace it with something better – either way, take a pragmatic approach! If it appears to offer little assistance, in the expedition of your research, go elsewhere, proffer something better... (351)

Now, how do we integrate these relatively ‘internal’ and ‘external’ approaches to this imputed interconnection between the ethical (as understood as centered in the deontological orientation without the history of prior ideological overtones issuing from some form of an unreconstituted traditional metaphysics), the potentially dangerous world of the political, and a broad philosophy of the existential (as pragmatic, entailing relational competence, as proposing the creation, etc., of a relational richness and enrichment, and so on)? (352)

To accomplish this complicated process of clarification, albeit instituted on the basis of a number of simple rules, let me do this in a third section titled: *Dialectical Reflections on the Ethical, the Political and the Existential*. (352)

Section C: A Third Introduction:

On the Nature of the Radical:

Dialectical Reflections on the Ethical, the Political, and the Existential

*The ethical, the political, and the existential
Are neither the same nor dissimilar,
Just as ice, and water, steamy vapours
Are all consumed, ejected from rain-filled clouds...*

Now, having introduced a series of ideas concerning duplication, reduplication, retreatment, the nature of suspensions/de-suspensions, and so on, let me put these ideas together in a more integrated heuristic format in order to directly address considerations dealing with the experiential nature of the radical, the existential and pragmatic, and so forth. (353)

One theoretical obstacle has been ‘how to address the difference between duplication and reduplication?’ To date, this difference has been minimized by invoking a rule that states ‘reduplication is only a specialized form of duplication in which the operator that operates on itself merely has to elevate its ordered status by one ordered degree so as to then merely follow the rules of duplication, albeit with a higher ordered status, namely, in either inter-ordered or extra-ordered terms of reference’. (354)

However, as successful as such a rule might seem to operate it would be preferable to understand why such a rule should need to be proposed in the first place. Much like the invocation of retreatment as a return to the relative object-level in meta-status when all forms of treatment, left to their own devices, would elevate status to stratospheric levels of non-comprehensibility. However, theoretical relief eventually came in the form of the ‘imputed observation’ that all suspensions co-invoked their automatic de-suspensions and thence an immediate countering of all forms of elevation arrived at through treatment, thence this concept and rule of ‘retreatment’. Interestingly, this return of metaphysically oriented inter-ordered forms of productivity to a philosophical and disciplinary level of explication obviously meant, in the hands of the ‘non-observant’, that philosophical and metaphysical categories could very easily get mixed up without the necessary critical apparatus to hand in order to defuse such confluations. Moreover, existential considerations, likewise, along with the inter-ordered category of the meta-philosophical/metaphysical (as reconstituted), would also have their initial extra-ordered status conflated with the ordered and, as a result, would add to the pursuit and persistent non-resolution of those interminable historical controversies that, hitherto, quite understandably, have severely diminished the working status of the philosophical discipline as a form of profitable practice. That, given such unresolved problematic theoretical features, it is no wonder that philosophical practice, in general, can so easily be viewed as

occupying a controversial format that, if too focused upon, appears to operate only form a deconstructive sense of perspective. (355)

This provisional diagnosis granted, how are we to approach this issue of reduplication in a formal manner that would allow us to address and redress, indeed, critically bypass, such controversial issues in a more work-like manner? To this end, let me attempt to formally argue ‘why an operator, that operates on itself, can only do so from some semblance of a meta-perspective, that to some extent, also restricts reductive retreatment to the merely ordered level of explication despite its possible origination in either inter-ordered and/or extra-ordered terms of reference?’ (356)

In a process of duplication ‘ $x.y$ ’ the ensuing product, in that specific operation, takes the ordered status of the operator ‘ x ’. In other words, ensuing status of the operation is dependent entirely upon the ordered status of the operator. (357)

Let me rewrite this type of operational function in a formal instance of reduplication as follows - ‘ f ’, as ‘ fx ’.and the entire operation as ‘ $fx.x$ ’. Now, we know that the ensuing ordered status reflects the actual status of the operator. I.e., ‘ fx ’ is actually equivalent to ‘ fx^1 ’ Or, more correctly, fx^{x+1} . (358)

That is the outcome desired, but, how might we work towards this outcome along more formal lines rather than in merely supplying an *ad hoc* rule (or ruling) that imposes a rise in ordered status in the operation characterized as reduplicative rather than merely duplicative? (359)

In an operation $fy.x$ the operation ‘ O ’ takes the ordered-status of y , hence, ‘ O^y ’. It cannot and, therefore, does not take the ordered status ‘ x ’ thence ‘ O^{-x} ’. (360)

However, applied to an operation of reduplication we find the automatic ruling out of the ensuing product of that operation should it be merely imitating the status of either the operand or operator. I.e: $fx.x$ cannot produce an operation with the status of x . Therefore, as it stands, we cannot produce an equation where the operation simply acts on itself in such simplistic terms of reference. Hence the rule ‘that no operator can act on itself should the operator and operand have the same status’. (361)

But, the viability of such an operation can be demonstrated, therefore, fx cannot have the same status as x , and, being x implies, equally, it cannot be $a, b, c; u, w$, and so on. E.g., ‘the heat of heat is temperature’ which is neither hot nor cold. (362)

Assuming an operation is entered into through some form of a suspension then we could say the status of the operation is not the status of the operand. Or, that the ensuing status, given it cannot be x , must be, in some sense, ‘ $-x$ ’ treating the suspension as a general form of negation. Then, it could be argued that as the status of the operation cannot be either $-x$ nor can it be $a, b, c; u, w$, and the operation is viable, then its status can only be meta- x , i.e., x^{x+1} , = x^1 . (363)

Thus, we can produce this rule by default, as the only reasonable option left, i.e., to assume an elevation in status whilst discounting its suspended negation and all other options as characterized as not possessing x -ness (whilst discounting x^2 , x^3 etc.). How might we derive the same in a more direct fashion? (364)

One solution is to propose that the opposite of a suspension (as a negation) is a de-suspension (as a negative negation, double negation, dNot). Let me try this solution, differentiation and integrations, as, respectively, negations, de-negations..? (365)

In the *Twelfth Essay* in *Volume I* (as *Book I*) the formula noted that ‘the x of x is not- x , non- x , or meta- x ’. We could translate this in ordered language as ‘the operator operates on the operand as if in an internal suspension where the suspension can be read as a metaphorical negation’. Thence not- x , etc. Then, as every suspension invokes an automatic de-suspension, let us propose an external suspension (of the internal suspension) as is subjected to the negative Boolean operator of the double negation (dNot). Now, under the internal suspension the operation has an ordered status that is not the operand, i.e., in this event, as not- x . Then, under the automatic invocation of the external suspensions, as a double suspension, i.e., a de-suspension, it follows that the ordered status of the operation is also x . But, the ordered status of the final product cannot be both $-x$ and x , therefore, that ‘ x ’ of x cannot operate as an operator upon itself (when operator and operand have the same ordered status). However, in the x of y , i.e., $x.y$ or $fx(y)$ the cancellation of $-y$ and y leaves the ‘real’ status of x as applying to the ensuing product of that operation both when and where the usual rules of duplication correctly apply. The implication being that the proposed operation ‘ $x.x$ ’ cannot operate if both x s have the same ordered status. Thus, if the ordered status of these two parties differ, then ordinary rules of duplication follow, or, if the operator appears to be operating on itself then the product, or, rather the non-product, remains itself unchanged (if the operator and operand are identical). E.g., an inter-ordered x of an ordered x produces an operation with an inter-ordered status. I.e., $x^2.x^1$ produces x^2 . Or, e.g., if we had instead an extra-ordered x of an ordered x then the ensuing product would have an extra-ordered status. I.e., $x^3.x^1 = x^3$, etc.⁶⁵ That this same rule of duplication applies to sequences (and sets). Just the factual status of a history of philosophy is a factual consideration (and neither a historical nor a philosophical concern). (366)

Now, let me introduce a set of technical distinctions and one observation that will finally resolve such theoretical ‘difficulties’ (as in lived-experience this philosophical problem is more an artifact of unproductive philosophical habits, which, once exposed, manifest more as relative non-difficulties). (367)

Although this previous resolution might appear to be merely substituting one rule for another, still, the philosophies behind these two rules are different despite being equated. The simple rule of duplication formalizes an observation. Whilst, on the other hand, the second rule notes the role of the suspension followed by the de-suspension as a mechanism for disestablishing those instances when an operator is illegally set up to operate upon itself (in line with the philosophy of transformational retreatment). (368)

⁶⁵ E.g., $x^1.x^3 \Rightarrow x^1$, etc.

However, let me make the following observation and then propose a distinction between these epistemological levels of increasing complexification by noting that in the ‘escalation’ of the ‘ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical’ that extra-ordered existential appreciation of relational competence is defined through the use of the final indicator of ‘-ality’ (as in ethicality, politicality, etc.), and inter-ordered appreciation of the relatively-metaphysical is defined through the use of the final ‘-ness’ (as in ethicalness, politicalness, etc.). (369)

Now, that understood, let me propose the following observation in a harmonization of this hierarchy of distinctions. Imagine a cat staring into a mirror for the first time. Perhaps, with some consternation, it sees ‘another cat’. But, this ‘cat’ only moves when it moves. That, when paws touch on the mirror, there is no sensation of meeting another paw, as if sense-less. The ‘other cat’ is also scentless, soundless, remaining motionless when the cat, itself, doesn’t move. It would seem as if the cat eventually dismisses the ‘other cat’ as not much more than a ‘shadow’, something, to take note of when it moves, but, that such movement appears to move only when the cat, itself, moves. All in all, only a ‘shadow’ of a cat. An amusement that soon ceases to frighten that cat and then soon ceases to amuse that same cat as well. What is the point of this analogy? (370)

The reflection of the cat is soon found to be not a ‘cat’ that could scratch and dominate the cat whose reflection is being seen in the mirror. But, the absence of the ‘second cat’ as a second cat does not mean that the reflection, itself, was not real, was not something being experience even if its interpretation was eventually written off by the ‘first cat’ as not something to be too bothered by. Now, an ordered philosophy began as a linear sequence of steps whose questioning allowed us to determine what type of cognitive content was being experience and, in parallel, what type of judgment was being observed. So, e.g., ‘simultaneously square and circular tables’ could not be thought and, therefore, could not be integrated as aesthetically coherent phenomena, whereas, round tables tops painted red could be both imagined and seen when evidently present. In notation ‘square-and-circular-table-tops’ do not exist as coherent thoughts, i.e., that ‘square and circular table tops’ could not be conceptually evident as ideas, etc., and, thus could never be perceptually evident, whereas, round-table-tops-painted-red’ could be both conceptually and perceptually evident, and, that, if one were to observe the same, then we had an actual (non-virtual) fact rather than the (virtual) possibility of such a factual state of affairs that could only be virtually entertained as a hermeneutic possibility (given these meta-textual hermeneutical genres of ‘tables, our use of concepts dealing with ‘circularity’, ‘redness’, ‘being painted red’, etc.). But, although we can use these orders as a checklist in order to determine what cognitive order or trans-cognitive, judgmental order was being more referred to the contextually defined use of a certain set of propositions, still, we should also recognize the co-existence of all orders simultaneously at the same time despite our selective focusing on the ordering of a sequence that allows us to pinpoint what that proposition was more specifically dealing with. Even though our hypothetical cat eventually dismissed the reflection of the ‘other cat’ as something on par with a ‘shadow’, still, such a classification did not nor could not render the entire experience as just an illusion. The cat saw its reflection in that mirror regardless of whether it enter-

tained it as a reflection of itself or as a shadow or something to be dismissed, etc. In other words, in our classification of types of experience we make such ordered distinctions, but, in lived-reality, we are entertaining all ordered distinctions at the same time, albeit to differing degrees of emphasis and focus, etc. The ‘appearance of an ‘other cat’ is seen, even if there is ‘no other cat’ and only the seeing of its own reflection. Regardless of how that cat actually interprets such experience that type of experience, along with all other experiences, as for us, still exists as operating on all ordered levels of epistemological organization despite the overall ordered characteristics being applied to the same. Our reflections of our face are interpreted as only a ‘reflection of our faces’, still, the lived-experience of that seeing of our reflection is just as ‘real’ as looking at the mirror itself, or our looking at our own hands, or the faces of other people, and so on... (371)

It is this reality of experience that allows me to treat the ‘non-critical’ as ‘relatively-non-critical’, as a potential transformational-transition to an interpretation viewed as a ‘relatively-critical’ state of affairs. Just as there cannot be lies that are one hundred percent untruthful. Just as pure nonsense cannot exist, and, equally, that we cannot recognize, encounter, and engage that which is non-provisionally or absolutistically true. Or, just as the radically-radical cannot be something there for us, only, on an incremental basis as the partial novelty of the relatively-radical. (372)

So, although we can exercise this heuristic (in a linear or circular format) in order to determine the classification of a certain intentional state of affairs (inclusive of the pre-intentionally affective and the trans-intentionally judgmental), still, such selectivity must also recognize the co-existence of all ordered states of experience. Yes, our reflection in the mirror is interpreted as an “illusion of a ‘second person’”, but, our experience of that interpreted-experience is just as much an actual experience as our experience of that mirror, its placement, say, in a bathroom, and so on. Thence my preoccupation to better interpret the experience as either ‘relatively-virtual’ or ‘relatively-non-virtual’ rather than to append the misleading descriptor of ‘real’ or ‘actual’, or ‘true’ or ‘false’, and so on and so forth. (373)

Now, importantly, the same overall, relatively non-discriminatory approach can be applied to inter-ordered phenomena and extra-ordered phenomena. In other words, albeit as viewed in and through this economically-ordered heuristic, it is the case that all phenomena, whether we are aware of this imputed observation or not, co-exist on all epistemological levels of ordered phenomenality, i.e., as can be technically reframed as ‘the phenomenality of the phenomenalness of the phenomena in question’. One profound implication that can be drawn from this co-existence of all ordered aspects is that when we invoke the apparent operation of an on operator operating on itself as an operand we already have three possibilities of interpretation depending upon the ordered status of the operator actually being proposed overtly or covertly, advertently or inadvertently, etc. So, if the operator and operand have the same identity and ordered status then the product, or, rather in this instance, non-product, is the identity of the operator itself. So, $x^n.x^n$ is x^n . E.g., $x^1.x^1 \Rightarrow x^1$. On the other hand, if $x^2.x^1 \Rightarrow x^2$, or, $x^3.x^2 \Rightarrow x^3$, or, $x^3.x^1 \Rightarrow x^3$. (374)

In other words, the productivity arrived at more reflects what we are focusing on, and, that all states of affairs are co-present despite that focus in question. Translated this means – we don't have to magically account for processes of reduplication as all forms of reduplication are already co-present and merely need to be referenced if both relevant and applicable. So, in determining the reflection of your own face in a mirror as a simulated copy of does not at the same time fully deconstruct from the ontical (fully factual) existence of that experience and only qualifies it as an experienced simulation that only partially bears an imputed resemblance to your own face, i.e., can be seen in the mirror but cannot be separated from the experience of the genre of 'looking into a mirror and seeing the reflection of your own face', and so on. The ramifications of this co-presentation of full ordered complexity means, e.g., that the ethical, the political and the existential, among other things, cannot be non-dialectically entertained in any isolated form or shape. That all forms of apparent 'isolation' are 'provisionally isolated non-absolutistically in an accordance with a contextual triangulation of perspectives, etc. That, this understanding in turn, implies a one-world metaphysics, i.e., no external worlds and no internal worlds. Then, from a conformal perspective, e.g., all philosophical chatter about a so-call 'truth' or 'Truth' being out there 'in the external world' (or merely within the internality of the mind of the person themselves) is itself, nonsensical, beyond its metaphorical deployment, etc.⁶⁶ Yes, we sort of understand the metaphor, but, really, we are already immersed in the natural world (*umwelt*), this world-of-life (*lebenswelt*)⁶⁷ so all talk of 'internal worlds' and 'external worlds' is no more than misguided chatter, the mistreatment of our metaphors along with the natural retreatment of all forms of experience seemingly isolated through the overlooking of such perspectives, etc. (375)

Hence, among other things, the dialectical-like overlapping the ethical, the political and the existential domains within the simulation of the lived-reality of lived-experience, etc. (376)

At this juncture it might also be advisable to introduce a distinction in the exercise of a philosophy of transformational retreatment to note distinctions between 'specified retreatment', 'particularized retreatment' and 'generalized retreatment'. In a wholesale

⁶⁶ I.e., its metaphorically treated theoretical deployment, empirical employment and critical re-deployment.

⁶⁷ I am thinking of the terminological shifts in Husserl's thinking here. Although *lebenswelt* was first enunciated in 1917 it only finds a more formal expression in the *Crisis*. Still, the idea of the natural world (*umwelt*) can be perceived as a persistent idea... whose clarification can be exposed and expressed through suspensions (as suspensions, reductions, and, I would also add, as reconstitutions, in effect, constituting the suspended economy as falling under these three economic correlates). Or, we are in the world, as one-world, whose intentional constitution can be exposed and expressed through an economy of suspensions, etc. That granted, then concepts of a so-called 'external world/s' versus a so-called 'internal world/s' are no more than misapplied metaphorical ideas where it becomes both impossible and philosophically illegal to postulate the same non-metaphorically. So, by extension, through the lens of an ordered exploration, say, through the refraction of the interrogative economy, we through necessity must accept the overlap of the philosophical and secular worlds and their unity in the form of one world without any real distinctions into so-called 'external worlds', etc. That from the natural nature of the world there can be no real distinctions into so-called internal and external locations, etc., even though, at the same time, we cannot escape a the re-simulated re(-)simulation of a constituted world born from the overlapping of economic perspectives that cannot be absolutistically identical with each other.

process of a generalized retreatment everything is returned to an ordered level of textual explication, be that enacted either rightly or wrongly. I.e., returning all intentional materials to an ordered status be that correctly for products that can directly subsume or assume an ordered status on a primary basis or on a secondary basis with the conflation of either the inter-ordered and/or extra-ordered forms of productivity. Hence one reason why interminable philosophical controversies forever reign supreme given this lack of critical acumen to discern those products with a more directly established origination from those with a secondary disposition in either the metaphysical sphere (as reconstituted) and/or in existential terms of reference (as determined through relational competence or pragmatic competence), and so on.⁶⁸ Indeed, this same observation also applies to judgmental act versus judgmental content delivered after their act of judgmental formation... where, through a general lack of dialectical qualification, such defects further ensconce an endless conflation and perplexity especially when only superficially explored against the lack of the requisite critical apparatus that would allow us to definitively defuse such ambiguities, contradictions, paradoxes, conundrums, *aporias* and all co-associated philosophical controversies... (377)

I.e., in cognitively ordered terms we find the poorly discriminated conflation of ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered forms of judgment in terms of both their cognitively retreated content and their cognitively retreated processes of judgment. However, although some differences are conventionally discriminated, such discrimination is haphazard, ideologically distorted, insufficiently suspended, errantly impregnated with affective forms of motivation, infused with non-existential forms of ambition, and so on. It is no wonder, therefore, that some philosophers and other disciplinarians argue more for the sake of arguing, staking out their disciplinary pretensions rather than attending more closely to the lived-reality of their lived-experiences from perspectives that should be more critically appreciated, if not radically re(-)appreciated. (378)

How to defuse such co-associated controversies? By critically demarcating primary content of ordered complexion from secondary content, say, of either a metaphysical or an existential complexion. Moreover, a dialectical approach assumes and expects that there would exist certain limits beyond which the disciplinarian should not transgress. Either recognizing, encountering, and/or engaging such limitations through the careful use of language that notes, say, 'orientation', 'relativity of extent', 'provisional treatment of conformal ascriptions', etc., and, by maintaining suitable working suspensions, etc., along with arguments that are not fallacious, and so on. (379)

The radical ramifications of such approaches hardly need to be announced once duly reflected upon. In this regard, we are dealing with the radical ramifications stemming from the critical application of an ordered philosophy within its dialectical restraints. In a distinctive contrast, through the sequential addition or subtraction of incremental contributions a theoretical point should eventually be reached with a chaotic complexion. From a temporal perspective, the irruption of these chaotic moments can be classified as either bifurcated, emergent, and/or indications of a phase change in and through

⁶⁸ Where, if needed, we also need to note the super-ordered should it be invoked and the cognitively ordered if relevant.

a chaotic change of state. However, from an atemporal perspective these three types of chaotic phenomena are mere expressions of the same chaotically oriented transformation in state. E.g., a process in bifurcation in the conventional progression of time could be read as an emergent phenomenon when read retrogressively, etc. Then, in terms of the characteristics of the chaotic complexion, such events could be read as either unitary events, sequential events, holistic events, and/or periodic events, etc. E.g., lighting a match; or, the using a match to light a fuse that ignites something else; or, the entire swaying of a tree; or, the recurrent precipitation of rain in a wet environment that remains continually damp under such circumstances, etc. (380)

As a seemingly trite exemplar, the first type of radical transformations is much like that of a successful student critically applying their learning to the passing of their final exams with a perfect score that then sets them up to either follow the career of their choice or succeed at whatever career they find they can apply for. I.e., in and through a **relatively non-chaotic, relatively-radical process of re-direction** that then allows the person or persons concerned to pursue other course of enaction given the arising of such distinctively different pre-conditions. (381)

In a distinctive contrast, the second exhibition of the radical presents itself in either an expected format or in an unexpected mode of presentation, say, the difference between ‘boiling water’ and ‘finding one or more trees on your property blown over in a storm’. I.e., in and through a **relatively-chaotic process of relatively-radical re-direction** regardless of whether that be expected or unexpected in format. (382)

As a third variety of chaotic phenomena let me apply the former considerations to the gestation of intentional processes (noting all relevant crossovers of former considerations to the extent transformational phenomena are either experienced as re-directive, chaotic in either expected and/or unexpected modes of presentation). Just as economic theory, purely on its own grounds, could never give rise to definitive decisions along with the semblance of intentional choice, but, contrary to experience, we do find this ability to exercise intentional choice, along with its legal ramifications, and, thus, therefore, we must suitably make room for the irruption of the relatively non-economic along with its critical, hyper-economic re-appropriation, and so on within the imputation of the relatively super-economic. Thence either our recognition, encountering, and/or engagement with these pre-intentional, intentional, and trans-intentional expressions of the epistemologically chaotic. I.e., in and through a **relatively-radical epistemological process of insightful insight or insightful oversight**, etc. (383)

Thence these critically approached patterns of re-direction; chaotic phenomena and the chaotic distribution of ordered phenomena. With respect to the latter, let me now explore the radical implications in noting the dialectical equivalence and non-equivalence between the ethical, the political, and the existential as re-defined previously in conjunction with the radical transformations involved in our reflecting upon and enacting transitions between the relatively-non-critical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical. We might describe this typology of differences as comprising, respectively, ‘relatively-radical situational events’, ‘relatively-radical phenomena’, and ‘relatively-radical episte-

mological phenomena' (although these classifications could all be collectively included under the rubric of a 'phenomenological philosophy, etc., dealing with the advent of the relatively-radical'). (384)

By taking this approach I am also including the radical ramifications of an economically-ordered heuristic given that this ethical-political-existential axis, derived through reduplication, will radically reconfigure a working philosophy dealing with these topics of the ethical, the political, and the existential. I.e., by noting this fourth category of the **relatively-radical nature of a heuristic radicalism**, that, given all experience is being modeled, then it follows, from time to time, that the radical ramifications of such modelling could also eventually become evident, if not self-evident initially. (385)

What, then, would be the relatively radical ramifications of this economically-ordered heuristic? Let me outline the exploration of this topic under the rubric of a first exposition (as a summarized method to introduce this topic that, to some extent, could be disseminated in a form that could metaphorically 'stand by itself'). (386)

Section D: A First Exposition:

On the Nature of the Radical:

Dialectical Explorations of the Ethical, the Political, and the Existential

*The ethical, the political, and the existential
Are neither the same nor dissimilar,
Just as all ideas are pursued through overlapping sets
of three things, no more and no less...⁶⁹*

The following exposition is relatively-radical in the sense that, in modelling lived-experience, we may well find ourselves surprised by uncovering significant ideas present in such a scheme that were not at first either recognized, encountered, and/or engaged, that, as a consequence, could well re-direct the nature of our subsequent thinking on such matters. (387)

The modelling I will be using I call an ‘economically-ordered heuristic (as a heuristic device)’. Its uptake is meant to be provisional in the sense that should it be found to be useful then its adoption can be taken up until such a time it no longer proves to have such pragmatic(al) utility. Its use is meant to be critiqued, but, my rejoinder to my critics insisting on its non-uptake is for them to find something better and demonstrate the superiority of their introduced form of modelling. (388)

That, such modelling cannot be escaped, but, we should both not be mesmerized by such metaphors and learn to not transgress the metaphorical limitations of such a scheme. (389)

That such an understanding begins with the conventional, i.e., that cultural-intercultural ‘knowledge’ already to hand, but, should end with a critical re-organization of the same. Thence the ‘pragmatics’ of such an approach. Where the relatively-radical is experienced only through incremental shifts of perspectival thinking and never through radically-radical transitions that are not incrementally appropriated in and through critical terms of reference. Where, through the novelty of an unexpected approach, in effect, we think thoughts that ‘had never been thought before’ and need to be mapped out, step by step, for others to also be able to think for the first time...⁷⁰ (390)

Now, to set the stage so to speak, let me propose (as a consequence of this economically-ordered heuristic about to be outlined) that there exists an intimate dialectical relationship between my redefinitions of the ‘ethical’, the ‘political’, and the ‘existential’,

⁶⁹ The idea behind this section is to construct a section that can stand alone and could be presented over the space of a few pages. Because a lot of detail will need to be left out it forms, therefore, a ‘first exposition’. This section could also be subtitled: *(fools rush in) where angels fear to tread...*

⁷⁰ With an obvious allusion to Richard Rorty and his ironic use of so-called ‘final vocabularies’, etc.

and where these three categories are both simultaneously different from each other and the same. (391)

In technical terms, I will be arguing ‘that the political is a reduplication of the ethical’, and, ‘that the reduplication of the political gives us the existential’, the latter being a dimension to experience that is generally overlooked, especially by short-sighted people who take only a contractual or transactional approach in their relations with others that is also devoid of a recognition of what I call a ‘compactual dimension’ (in which agreements are deontologically constructed, promised, honoured, enacted, etc.).⁷¹ (392)

‘Reduplication’ has the formulaic format the ‘ x^n of x^n ($x^n.x^n$)’ is (\Rightarrow) not- x^n , non- x^n , meta- x^n , etc.’ Much cited examples are ‘the heat of heat is not heat but temperature which is neither hot nor cold’. ‘The fact of facts is a history which is not factual *per se*’. Then the just cited example, that ‘the ethics of ethics is the political’, and, the politics of politics is existentially oriented’. (393)

However, as a work in progress the qualifications needed to make this simple formula work need to be clearly spelt out. (394)

Basically, we are working with an ordered operation (in the bi-modal format of $x.y$ where reduplication appears to operate on itself as x of x , i.e., $x.x$) and ordered status is ‘ n ’ which has the following values, namely, ‘0’ as the cognitive content of a judgment, ‘1’ as the judgmental process of a simple process of ordering (with six ordered aspects or perspectives, namely, a first trans-cognitively [judgmentally] ordered atomized phenomenological-semantic classification [e.g., colourness, redness, saltiness, liquidity, wateriness, solidity, icelikeness, boiling, etc.]; molecularized aesthetical-integration; deontological e/valuation; pragmatism e/valuation; hermeneutical potentiality; and ontical factuality). That through reduplication of these six ordered aspects or perspectives we then arrive at six inter-ordered co-associated correspondents with a meta-philosophical, metaphysical complexion with an ordered status of ‘2’; and, then through a repetition of reduplication we arrive at a meta-meta-philosophical, extra-ordered level of the pragmatically-existential/existentially-pragmatic (expressed as a form of ‘relational competence’ within the relationship in question) with an ordered status of ‘3’. (395)

For convenience refer to the following diagrams and the mapped depictions of these 24 ordered aspects or perspectives.⁷² The first depiction is in a linear or block format. The second depiction is in a circular (or hexagonal) format (and within which we can imagine moving either clockwise or counter-clockwise, or, where all six orders on these four epistemological levels in ordered complexification can be entertained as simultaneously co-present to some degree or other). (396)

⁷¹ As argued on numerous occasions, that without a compactual dimension contracts just would not be entered into, etc., since, if given the absence of the required degree of trust, etc., then the requisite environment in order to operate within would not be found to exist as a pre-condition for the very underwriting of a contract, and so on. That environment also being constituted with various other ‘reasonable’ expectations concerning compliance, enforcement, the termination midterm or the finalization as the effective discharge of such an agreement, etc.

⁷² As initially (re)presented in paragraph 347**

Four Levels of Ordered Complexification

1^3	2^3	3^3	4^3	5^3	6^3
1^2	2^2	3^2	4^2	5^2	6^2
1^1	2^1	3^1	4^1	5^1	6^1
1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0

3^3
 3^2
 3^1
 3^0

2^3
 2^2
 2^1
 2^0

4^3
 4^2
 4^1
 4^0

*

1^3
 1^2
 1^1
 1^0

5^3
 5^2
 5^1
 5^0

6^3
 6^2
 6^1
 6^0

Table

	Cognitive ⁰	Philosophical ¹	Metaphysical ²	Existential ³
1	Atomic Semantic	Phenomenological	Categorical	Cat. Competence
2	Molecular Sem.	Aesthetical	Psycho-Sociological	P.S. Comp.
3	Conceptual	Deontological	Political	Pol. Comp.
4	Perceptual	Pragmatical	Enactive	En. Comp.
5	Potentiality	Possibility	Sciences	Sc. Comp.
6	Actuality	Ontical Factuality	Histories	His. Comp.
				[347] (397)

Admittedly, this all sounds far too complicated, but, if you would just accept the basic outline of this heuristic device, you then will better understand how this ordered approach both re-shapes and inter-relates these issues of ‘the ethical’, ‘the political’, and ‘the existential’. It will do this in the critical-radical form of a very practical philosophy that can help us to more deeply understand these topics as working guidelines over the course of our passage through this world-of-life as we both individually and collectively move through this world at large before others... (398)

With the ethical centered on a philosophical-disciplinary level of ordered explication; the political centered on a meta-philosophical, metaphysical inter-ordered level (as non-traditionally reconstituted); and, the existential centered on a meta-meta-philosophical extra-ordered level: In terms of increasing epistemological complexification as hierarchically structured accordingly, albeit as centered in the third order on each of these three levels of the ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered):

Existential

(Meta-Meta-Philosophical/Extra-Ordered)

Political

(Meta-Philosophical, Metaphysical/Inter-Ordered)

Ethical

(Philosophical-Disciplinary/Ordered) (401)

Now, as ‘the political is defined through reduplication as the ethicalness of the ethical’, and as ‘the existential is defined through reduplication of the politicality of the political(ness of that to hand)’ it follows that ‘the existential is also the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical’. Or, as ‘the politicality of the politicalness of the political where the expression ‘political’ is viewed as the retreatment in philosophical terms on a philosophical-disciplinary level of explication despite its effective origination in metaphysical, inter-ordered terms of reference). (402)

In view of these formulae, we can propose a technical terminology along the following lines, namely, ‘-ality’ as extra-ordered, ‘-ness’ as inter-ordered, and ‘-al’ as ordered. So, e.g., ‘the factuality of the factualness of the factual’ parallels ‘historical competence (in extra-ordered existential/pragmatic terms of reference), the historical, and the factual.’⁷³ (403)

However, as I recognized recently, ‘the x of x , as $x.x$. as not- x , etc.’, needs to be carefully interpreted since not all x s are equivalent. I.e., if reduplication is viewed through the rule(s) for duplication then the resulting product of that transformational op-

⁷³ Mirrored in three levels of somewhat overlapping disciplinarian activities, namely, the work of the existential or pragmatic historian in terms of a critical-radical appreciation of historical competence; the historian; and, the factologist (as a non-interpretive collator of relevant facts)..

eration is a preservation of the ordered status of the operator. In other words, the ordered status of the operational product preserves the actual order status of the operator and not the operand. Just as, e.g., a specifically argued ‘history of philosophy’ is a ‘history’ (and ‘not a philosophy’), and, a specifically argued ‘philosophy of history’ is a ‘philosophy’ (and ‘not a history’), etc. Duplication being the operational rules for the transformational reading of a certain operation where the ensuing ordered status exactly reflects the order status of the operator and not the operand. (404)

If, in the equation ‘ $x^n \cdot x^m \Rightarrow O^n$ ’, x^n is the operator and x^m is the operand, then, the operational product O has the ordered status n (and not m) as O^n . (405)

Effectively, once the ordered status of the operator is established, then reduplication is just another iteration of a duplicated operation. (406)

However, despite this duplicative reading of reduplication we must also understand that at the end of any process of treatment, whatever its manner of operation, all productivity is returned to the effective object-level in meta-status on the understanding that as all operations proceed through the required forms of suspension they become elevated in meta-status by one degree, but, through the automatic invocation of de-suspensions, as suspension of those same suspensions, it follows that that elevation in meta-status is then immediately returned to the effective object-level in meta-status. In a philosophical discourse that is on an ordered level of disquisition. Unfortunately, metaphysical concepts, initially formulated in meta-philosophical, inter-ordered terms of reference, then find themselves conflated in philosophically ordered terms of reference. Thus, as a critical reaction to such unavoidable patterns of such ensuing conflation, we could propose one primary basket of philosophical expressions and two other secondary baskets of metaphysically and existentially originated materials. In accordance with this understanding, correctly, the politicalness of the directly political should be placed in that second basket dealing with the meta-philosophical nature of the metaphysical (as non-traditionally reconstituted by myself). (407)

Thence, ‘ultimately’ the nomination of the overall character of this ‘working philosophy’ can aptly be referred to as both a ‘pragmatic-existentialism’ and an ‘existential-pragmatism’ since it behooves the critical-radical philosopher, working as an honest disciplinarian, to work towards delineating their final arguments in line with such a perspective (without, at the same time, devaluing or dis-valuing, either an ordered philosophy and/or an inter-ordered metaphysics, and v.v., etc.).⁷⁴ (408)

So, once the outline of this scheme is in place, and is better understood, then a number of critical-radical claims can be articulated (as will be noted in the following in my use of a bold type). (410)

⁷⁴ I have put ‘ultimately’ in single quotes to indicate my use of it more as an adverbial intensifier rather than an interjection or state of classification (i.e., from the ‘ultimate perspective’ although that is also alluded to if suitable suspensions/de-suspensions are also correctly imposed and a dialectical-like philosophy is skilfully operated with).

That, the ethical is an ordered philosophical concern, that the political as politicalness is a meta-philosophical, metaphysical, inter-ordered concern, and, that both the existential and the pragmatic (in their existential-ality and pragmatic-ality) are meta-meta-philosophical extra-ordered types of concern. (411)

That, in transformational retreatment to a philosophical (and disciplinary) level of exposition both political and existential considerations will inevitably be conflated with philosophically ordered considerations unless a critical-radical schematic re-interpretation can re-establish their differences in ideational origination. (412)

Thence, my proposal for that three-basket review of all philosophical exercises in order to disentangle non-philosophically originated materials. (413)

Where, all operations are transformationally entered into through the required application of the requisite suspensions, etc... (414)

Moreover, that such differences in ideational origination along with the nature of transformational retreatment should be taken into account in a critical-radical reading or rereading of the recorded productivity of such transformational operations. (415)

But, a considerable critical-radical re-writing of these topics awaits us as will soon be demonstrated. (416)

For a start, I have argued, through the reshaping lens of this heuristic device, that the only point in this scheme through which political power can be decisively expressed and exercised is in and through the third inter-ordered category of the political, itself derived from a reduplication of the ethical characteristics of the third trans-cognitive category of (the non-systematic existential nature of) the deontological. Hence the reasoning behind making the next series of radical claims... (417)

That the enaction of behavioural patterns of redirected activity ostensibly occur through the auspices of the third inter-ordered order of the political despite, ideally, a provisionally permitted empowerment through the third category of the non-economic irruption of existential competence. (418)

However, in the pursuit of politically motivated enaction existentially oriented permission can be overruled, more often than not, by either an emotional intensity and/or ideological over-commitments (although, more correctly, through a combined combination of the latter). (419)

Thence this explanation of the observation that much political behaviour, especially in non-democratically oriented forms of governance, but not restricted to the same, is non-existentially characterized as something quite often as anything other than 'ethical' in tenor. So, although the political is rebranded as 'the ethicalness of the ethical' much political behaviour is anything other than 'ethical' in orientation when existential permis-

sion is overruled by over-emotionally expressed form of ideological overcommitment that overlook the potential existential enrichment of the relevant relationship/s being subjected to the rule of such inauthentically exhibited patterns of behaviour. (420)

Arguably, when ethical understanding is in an alignment with the existential nature of the primary relationship or relationships in question then one must expect political enaction to follow in an alignment with this existential understanding. (421)

That, qualified perspective granted, **it behooves the ethical politician, i.e., all participants in a certain relationship or in either a certain set and/or series of relationships, to mindfully observe the existential spirit of the ethical through the suitable imposition of well-conjecturally exercised well-formed, well-informed, and well-performed working suspensions, etc.** (422)

When and where suitably performed suspensions are the direct antidote to over-emotionally charged form of over-ideological commitment, etc. (423)

Now, let me begin with a redefining of the nature of the ethical in an accordance with my appreciation of what is implied in and through a fine-tuning of this heuristic scheme. (424)

That, primarily, the ethical, centrally, is a deontological concern, but, qualified by two secondary adjuncts in the form of the aesthetical and the pragmatical orders! (425)

By ‘deontological’ is meant ethical imperatives experienced in and through the primary relationship/s in question in such a manner that behooves some suitable political form of interpreted delivery in order to either create, preserve, and/or conserve (and possibly super-conserve) the relational richness to-be-experienced in a relational appreciation of that relationship being placed under such evaluative focus. (426)

This concept of the ‘deontological’ is not to be conflated and confused with religious interpretations of the deontological where this expression is construed as meaning an ethical form of practice operating in accordance with so-called First-Principles, etc. On the other hand, this does not rule out that a religious person might wish to interpret and articulate what is possibly meant for them by deontological priorities and imperatives, etc., as formulated in an alignment with their religious views. However, the injunction to do all forms of (ethical, political and existential) appreciation through the suitable utilization of working suspensions would and should temper, hopefully, all misdirected forms of zealous over-interpretation involving over-emotionally charged forms of ideological over-commitment.⁷⁵ (427)

As ever, both the secularist and the disciplinarian has to work with what is to hand in the expedition of their inescapable interventions in this world of life, and, moreover, through suspensions, etc., the relatively-non-critical is converted into the

⁷⁵ As per paragraphs 421-422.**

relatively-critical, and the relatively-critical could well open up the relative-novelty of the relatively-radical, and, thence, its re(-)appropriated return to the relatively-critical. (428)

On what grounds do I argue for this centrality of the deontological in ethical discernment (and its ordered location in the third trans-cognitively ordered order of the non-systematic existential-deontological)? (429)

In a neutral phenomenologically oriented inventory of ethical states we find ethical considerations seem to fall under two headings, namely, the ‘deontological’ and the ‘pragmatical’. To this list I also add the secondary adjunct of the aesthetical wherein is expressed an ethical-deontological-like imperative for an integrated sense of ethical harmonization of purpose, as a re-purposing, as a required form of ethical integrity in pursuit of ethically motivated interventions in this world at large (on the political understanding that all patterns of enaction⁷⁶ have a certain political potential to alter the redistributed dissemination of political power in and through our relationships, etc.). (430)

Now, pragmatical considerations are ascribed a location in the fourth trans-cognitively ordered order of the ‘pragmatical’ (4¹), and, aesthetical contributions are ascribed a location in the second trans-cognitively ordered of the ‘aesthetical’ (2¹). I define these two subsidiary forms of ethical contributions as ‘secondary adjuncts’. That the remaining three trans-cognitive orders perform a situational defining of the relational context in which the primary relationship/s are located in situational terms of reference. Let me diagrammatically represent these three correlative aspects of the ethical economy from an ordered perspective:

Deontological (3¹)

Aesthetical (2¹)

Pragmatical (4¹)

Phenomenologically-Semantic (1¹) Ontical-Factuality (6¹) Potentiality (5¹) (431)

Why this emphasis of an ethical centrality in the deontological, albeit with secondary qualifications in the aesthetical and the pragmatical? (432)

Although I had for decades treated ethical experience as divided between an equal overlapping of deontological considerations and pragmatical considerations I have recently had to revise this opinion to more favour the centrality of the deontological. Let me explain both my reasoning and the consequences of such a shift in emphasis. (433)

⁷⁶ I.e., as defined elsewhere where ‘enaction’ refers to ‘all patterns of activity, non-activity, or inactivity through deferment.’

If, in a court of law, two interpretations were being put forward as justifications for certain patterns of behaviour, then, on balance, a credible deontological account more often than not overrules an equally credible pragmatism account (constructed, say, in the form of a calculation of its costs-and-benefits). Imagine that an ambulance has suddenly stopped on the edge of a road in a no-stopping area in order to quickly attend to an elderly woman who has fallen over on an ice roadway and is currently unable to get herself up from that road... when along comes an over-zealous parking inspector who fines that ambulance driver for parking in a no-parking area. As the inspector notes, 'the law is the law and no-one is above the law'. Now, if such a contested case over the inappropriate nature of that parking fine were to go to court, then, in all likelihood, either the presiding judge and/or the resident jury would quickly decide in favour of that ambulance driver since, evidently, there was a deontological imperative for them to quickly come to the aid of that injured pedestrian. Thus, given this tendency for the deontological to override the pragmatism or utilitarian or the conventional understanding, I surmise the ethical is naturally centered in the deontological mode of judgment, albeit not without appropriate qualifications also being brought to bear from its secondary adjuncts in the aesthetical and pragmatism orders. Then, from the contextual perspective of those tertiary adjuncts, the relevant nature of that relational situatedness should also have some input in how the ethically apposite is to be better discerned in order to oversee ourselves seemingly acting in an alignment with both the non-existentially and existentially oriented betterment of our relationships. In the anecdote just cited, by parking that ambulance in front of that injured woman there would be less chance for her to be run over by oncoming traffic... that in an empathetic reading of that situation it would have been better for that traffic inspector to have looked the other way since, as even as a personal observation, both normally and usually, deontological imperatives will override pragmatism imperatives.⁷⁷ (434)

Interestingly, imperatives also figure in both aesthetical and pragmatism judgments, in their complementing or supplementing the primary set of deontological imperatives in question. In aesthetical considerations we would look for an integrated perspective, a harmonized attempt to discern our ethical integrity *vis-à-vis* our contemplation of those modes of response that would assist the betterment of that relationship, etc. (i.e., positively in both a non-existential and existential sense). Pragmatism functions might also be appealed to in order to better expedite both a responsive and responsible manner of intervention being overseen and enacted therein. Hence certain appeals might also be made either to the effective, the economical, the efficacious, the expeditious, and/or the economical, etc. (435)

Thus, in our ethical deliberations, in accordance with this economic-heuristic, it behooves us to delineate the central deontologically oriented claims that need to be invested in in order to discern suitable modes of an apposite, responsible-responsiveness. (436)

To some extent, in asking the question 'what relevant deontologically oriented claims need to be delineated?' more or less is already answered by observing in what

⁷⁷ Please note that I am continuing to observe a difference between an ordered use of the expression 'pragmatism' and an existential reading of the 'pragmatic' on an extra-ordered level of explication.

type of a situation are we involved in in terms of its meta-textual, hermeneutically prescribed patterns of behaviour generally co-associated with that set of genres seemingly in question. So, e.g., if we were dealing with some party or parties entering into a contract then those considerations relevant to the well-exercised functioning of that contract should be held to the fore by all relevant parties concerned. Or, e.g., if you were to find a person who had injured themselves by falling on an icy road you might entertain the following imperatives, namely, making sure they do not get run over by oncoming traffic; ascertain whether they could get up off that road or should remain there until more suitable medical help should arrive; and, if necessary call, for medical assistance; if possible remain with that person; and treat for the possibility of shock by keeping them warm, and so on. Of course, the individual parameters of that situation would have some input as to how these imperatives might be suitably discharged alerting us to the necessity of also consulting these tertiary adjuncts that better define the current situatedness of that relational situation. Indeed, the prime impetus in the formulation of our existentially attuned ethical considerations here are relational in orientation and they completely eclipse all other forms of ethical discernment unless both able and capable of acting as secondary adjuncts in the formulation of our existentially oriented patterns of intervention, i.e., those patterns of responsible-responsiveness that either create, preserve and/or conserve the richness and enrichment of that primary relationship/s in question. In other words, dispense with all non-relationally oriented forms of so-called ethical or moral discernment unless they appropriately complement or supplement such proceedings. (437)

Now, let us address the political nature of ethically motivated patterns of intervention. (438)

Once we find ourselves within the orbit of a certain relationship enacted intervention is inescapable given that our involvement will be a response acted out through either actions, non-actions, and/or inactions with the latter resulting from either moments or periods of deferment. (439)

Thence, the political-like nature of all relational involvement that cannot be escaped from. Therefore, given there is no relational escape, given our responses will be either enacted as actions, non-actions, and/or inactions, it follows that it would be better for the current quality of our relationships, in which we already act as participants, if we were to act responsibly therein. (440)

In effect, there is this potential for all behaviour to have political ramifications. E.g., in walking down a busy street, everyone usually tries not to bump into each other. In our negotiations with others, we share something of our aspirations, and they, in turn, will be doing something similar. But compromise is the order of the day, often reflecting power differentials to the extent the more influential person or persons can more exert their political sense of will, etc. Indeed, such compromises, to a great extent, are already arbitrated for us in a pre-established world of public-private patterns of mediation. But, given the ethical necessity of our concern with deontological priorities, noting the relevant configurations of our relationships, overseeing the arbitrated negotiation of our arbitrated-aspirations, and so on, just how is political power actually exercised within this

matrix of overlapping concerns? I.e., just how are virtual intentions transformed into non-virtual intension? (441)

In accordance with this ordered heuristic, the transformational conversion of our virtually enacted intensions as non-virtually enacted patterns of behaviour can only occur in and through the inter-ordered order of the political, in this third metaphysical category of the ‘political’ despite either the existential permission being granted non-economically and/or overridden by non-existentially oriented forms of misdirected permission rooted in affectively intensified patterns of ideological over-commitment. (442)

Unpacking this characterization of the political we note that non-virtual intentions find some form of permission to be non-virtually enacted in a political format either existentially and/or non-existentially. In the latter orientation, emotions and over-commitments are posited as having the forcefulness to overcome more reasonably attuned existentially oriented patterns of permitted enactment better refracted through suitable patterns of suspension. (443)

In the light of this ambiguity of ‘permission’, non-economically obtained from taking either a relatively-existential and/or a relatively-non-existential pattern of empowerment, the ensuing result is the enactment of a non-virtual pattern of responsiveness, albeit that enacted through either a mix of activity, non-activity, and/or inactivity. (444)

Now, the perceptive person should be anticipating the imminent need to confront and resolve a very pertinent philosophical problem, namely, that if the political, through reduplication, is the ethicalness of the ethical, then how do we explain the indisputable fact that much of political decision making is often not remotely existential in orientation, say, is instrumental in initiating illegitimate wars of conquest, for subverting democratic institutions, for overseeing all manner of negatively characterized forms of unethical behaviour, and so on? (445)

In a pre-recognition of the evident validity of this objection, on a superficial level of exposition, I have already noted the role of emotions and over-commitments to successfully subvert an existentially initiated form of permission in the enaction of political responses. Or, rephrased, without the adequate mediation of suitable suspensions all manner of non-existentially oriented behaviours can be given an uncensored license to be performed on the ‘stage’ of worldly events. It behooves us, therefore, in attempting to ascertain the presence of both a positive non-existential status and the natural positivity of the existential to discern to what extent unchecked emotions and ideological over-commitments could be either distorting and/or obstructing the initiation of a relatively beneficial existential stance in relational formation. Should such adverse features be identified, then, we need only ascertain to what extent such detrimental influences have a final, overall impact on the ensuing performance of such misdirected behaviours. (446)

Conversely, in the absence of such non-suspended emotions and beliefs then we may well surmise that our conjectural appreciation of the relevant relationship/s in ques-

tion might allow us to find refracted through their existential surpluses a certain degree of positive empowerment that either creates, preserves, and/or conserves the existential richness and enrichment that can beneficially foster the generally positive enablement of that same set of relationships in question.⁷⁸ (447)

I use the expression ‘set of relationships’ since an ethical relationship is usually either uni-relational or bi-relational in orientation, whereas, an overall political relationship could well be multi-relational in orientation. Moreover, in this differentiation between the ethical and the political, as viewed through this economically-ordered heuristic, we find the former philosophically ordered and the latter as meta-philosophically inter-ordered in metaphysical-like terms of reference. But, as already noted, the end-product of transformational retreatment can see both parties conflated on the imposed object-level of a philosophical or disciplinary level of deployment, etc. This can also take a secularized translation if and when we preferentially take an aspirational perspective on the six orders pertaining to the overall philosophical economy... (448)

In now introducing this concept of a ‘secular economy’, in apposition to a ‘philosophical or disciplinary economy’, within the hexa-modal confines of an ordered philosophy (to be nominated as the ‘overall philosophical economy’) I am now anticipating an additional problem, namely, ‘if all economies are tri-modal in their constitution, and only openly tri-modal, then how can a hexa-modal economy be viewed as ‘economic’ given this undeniable contradiction (of being non-economically hexa-modal in its configuration)? (449)

Or, retranslated, ‘how can the hexa-modal configuration of the so-called ‘ordered economy’ internally function along tri-modal economic lines in order to effectively constitute the overall functioning an ordered economy, albeit through the use of these tri-modal configurations within the apparent functioning of this so-called ‘ordered economy’.’ (450)

I have already outlined one such economy that functions within the apparent configuration of an ordered economy, namely, the ethical economy consisting of a primary centralization in the third trans-cognitive order of the (non-systematic existential) deontological order; its secondary adjuncts in the second and fourth trans-cognitive orders, respectively, of the aesthetical and the pragmatival, along with its three tertiary adjuncts in the three remaining orders. Where primary centralization, secondary qualification, and tertiary contextualization dialectically constitute this ethical economy whose reduplication gives a parallel political economy, and, through further reduplication outlines an existential economy that concerns itself with an appreciation of relational competence, an

⁷⁸ I.e., generally overseeing a positive, non-chaotic augmentation and the chaotic positivity of an enhancement of the facticity co-associated with that set of relationships in question. Where ‘facticity’ is defined as ‘the existential excess or surplus arrived as an experiential output in e/valuational formation that is greater than the mere sum of the inputs contributing to the material, non-relational footprint of that same set of relationships in question. A bit like the difference in having to use the head of a broom to sweep should the broom itself be broken. Or, e.g., much like the difference between a car that is fully functional versus that same car in breaking down, etc.

expression of the pragmatic, the embodiment of an anti-representationalism that is also positively nihilistic in its experiential complexions. (451)

Usually an economy mirrors its archetypal roots in a universal, gestalt-like configuration of the relative-consonance of a background field (World), the relative-dissonance of a foreground focus (Object), and a suspended resolution (as a negation of the former) in the form of a harmonic process of resolution (Ego) (given that the latter aspect represents the inescapable transcendental or intentional subjectivity co-associated with all manner of relationships entertained metaphorically ‘between a relative-background and a relative-foreground’ that inevitably presents itself as a distinctive existential-like form of subjectivity in resonance with that type of intentional objectivity and intentional motivation in play. So, if you are entertaining an imaginative state, then you are an imaginer; if entertaining visual perceptions, then you are a visual perceiver; just as when you are looking at a bowl of apples, then, you are, co-equally, a person looking at a bowl of apples, and so on, and so forth. (452)

But, given my mistaken apprehension of this archetypal configuration as underlying all economic formations, I was eventually humbled to find that an aspirational economy, e.g., could not imposed upon its three correlatives of the hermeneutically oriented moment or correlative of World, the phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented moment or correlative of Object, and the non-systematically existentially oriented moment or correlative of Ego. Instead of a triangulated disposition between the fifth order (World), the first order (Object), and the third order (Ego) I eventually realized an aspirational economy actually superimposed much, much better on the alternative set of three orders, respectively, of the sixth, second, and fourth. That, in expediting an aspiration, we need to realistically begin where we are in this world at large, i.e., with the ontical domain, in a validly conformal appreciation of a well-informed sense and semblance of this world at large (Where). Then, in the idealization of a realizable, intentional objective, in well-forming the aspiration in question, we need to-go to the integrated-integrity of the aesthetic moment (Why). Last, in expeditiously fashioning a viable path from the former to the latter we need to ally ourselves with those pragmatistical functions that would achieve the realization of that aspirational objective (although, more correctly, such obtainment would, more than likely, be channeled through suitable forms of arbitral intermediation orchestrated through the auspices of others) (How). Thence this economy of Where, Why, and How, and, how it does not coincide at all with the philosophical (or disciplinary) economy erected on the harmonic basis of the archetypal economy (of World, Object, and Ego). Thence its subscription as secular in orientation, and, by extension, as a basis for the contractual domain. Then, just as there is an economy of the contractual and contractual that is formed through the addition of a third correlative of the joint interactions of the compactual-and-contractual domains we can, in a similar fashion, dialectically engender an isomorphic economy consisting of the philosophical economy and the secular economy along with the envisaged third correlative of the joint interactions of both the ‘philosophical-and-the-secular’. However, despite such dialectical machinations for convenience we can envisage an ordered economy despite its hexa-modal configuration. Let me diagrammatically represent these internal economic subdivisions within the ordered ‘economy’ that allows it to seemingly function with a hexa-modal complexion:

factualness of facts as forming a history, and, ‘the heatedness of heat as presenting the concept of temperature’. That with the operator having an ordered status elevated by one degree we can then apply this simple rule of duplication in which the ordered status of the operation then takes the ordered status of the operator. On the other hand, regardless of the ordered status of the operator through duplication we can envisage the following:

i. Reduplication where the ordered status of both the operator and the operand are the same, in effect, we are merely presenting an identification. E.g., fact of fact merely presents the form of a certain fact. $6^1.6^1 \Rightarrow 6^1$, or, $5^1.5^1 \Rightarrow 5^1$. E.g., a certain categorical metaphysical item of/with a certain categorical item merely presents an identity between those metaphysical identities, where, if those items are different gives us an equation, and, if the same merely presents the self-identification of the same. In notation these two possibilities could be expressed as follows: $a1^2.b1^2 \Rightarrow (a=b)1^2$, and, $a1^2.a1^2 \Rightarrow a1^2$.

ii. Reduplication between ordered elements differing by one degree in ordered status then presents the classical version of reduplication. E.g., the factualness of a certain fact presents us with an historical interpretation that incorporates that specific fact. Which, in notation, could be read as $6^2.6^1 \Rightarrow 6^2$.⁷⁹

iii. Reduplication between elements separated by two or more elevated degrees in ordered status merely presents us with a double (or triple) process of reduplication. So, e.g., the ethicality of the ethical (as the existentiality of the ethical) is conducted as a form of existentially oriented appreciation. So, in notation that example would read $3^3.3^1 \Rightarrow 3^3$.

iv. Reduplication between elements separated by two or more de-elevated degrees in ordered status is merely exhibiting a partial or completed process of transformational retreatment. E.g., $1^3.3^3 \Rightarrow 1^3$ (which could be interpreted as producing an ethical rationalization of the existential treatment initially conducted in extra-ordered terms of reference, i.e., in terms of its apparent relational/existential/pragmatic competence). (458)

Now, let me outline a recent resolution of a problem that had bedeviled a considerable amount of my time, namely, how exactly do we accomplish a process of reduplication (within the types of parameters as just articulated above)? What exactly is the inter-ordered treatment of the ordered, or, the extra-ordered treatment of the inter-ordered, or the order treatment of the inter-ordered, etc. (as exemplified through transformational retreatment)? (459)

In the metaphysical treatment of the world (at large) as taking a transcendental-like uni-worldly constitution, given the inescapable deconstruction of such impossible concepts of so-called ‘internal world/s’ and so-called ‘external world/s’, then, we must ask ourselves, ‘just what could possibly be meant by our actively engendering a process of reduplication, say, that is classical in complexion? (460)

⁷⁹ If we were only dealing with possible facts (and not ontical facts) then the ensuing product would be either a general science or a provisional history that could be treated either as a ‘probabilistic history’ or as a ‘fake history’. Usually, the classical reduplication of possible facts (as the possible-ness of possible facts) gives us a science whose domain is in keeping with the nature of those probabilities.

However, to swiftly short-circuit such potential complexity it would be better to postulate the following. (461)

That, even though these ordered phenomena can be transformationally visited sequentially, by correctly following the transformational rules that allow us on certain occasions to migrate through the entirety of this scheme, still, such individuated sequences of mapping are best envisaged as eternally co-present within the entire orbit of this heuristic device and that only through the correct application of distinctively required patterns of suspension can individual sequences be more overtly articulated, be that through either (classical) reduplication and/or the general rule of duplication. (462)

In other words, all states are co-present, and, individuated sequences merely require the utilization of those patterns of suspension that articulate a more overt expression of such processes. Rather than envisaging a process of either duplication or reduplication all that is required is our ability to focus on that aspect of this heuristic scheme that correspondingly engenders the overt functioning of that which is required and is already co-present in the overall epistemological functioning of this scheme. (463)

In such a scheme, we can postulate both states and observables...⁸⁰ (464)

What are the potential ramifications of this turning around of this problem, namely, merely identifying states and observables through requisite suspensions involving those patterns already pre-functioning within the entirety of this economically-ordered heuristic (comprising ordered phenomena, inter-ordered phenomena, and extra-ordered phenomena [along with how we also historically apportion the collective utilization of such functions in the social organization of the world viewed as a specific political-economy within the generality of the Overall Political-Economy representing the world at large through the overt use of processes of re(-)presentation, reduplication and duplication, transformational retreatment, etc., etc.]?) (465)

E.g., in migrating from the first order to the second order (be that in cognitive or trans-cognitive terms of reference) we merely apply the conventionally articulated rules for semantic integration. E.g., a round or a square table-top can be painted red, but, the impossibility of a table-top that is both round and square then forbids us from ascribing that impossible object with a colour. E.g., water can be either brackish or not brackish to the taste, dependent upon the presence or absence of salt, but, water by itself can be neither a strong acid nor a strong alkali, neither salty or sugary, etc., without the addition of the same, etc. (466)

A necessary and welcome complication in this heuristic scheme is the fact that economic circulation would continue for 'ever and a day' if left in a non-decisive process of non-enacted resolution. (467)

⁸⁰

Indirectly alluding to vectors in complex Hilbert space, and, co-adjunct operators.

Thence, with respect to the relatively ‘endless’ circulation of the economic, there is necessitated the enacted resolution of the relatively-radical irruption of the relatively-non-economic in incremental terms of reference along with its ongoing incremental critical re(-)appropriation in relatively-hyper-economic terms of reference, and, where this vertical mapping portrays the inescapable nature of the super-economic for otherwise there could be no political forms of non-virtual enaction, and so on. (468)

As already argued, the political enaction of the relatively non-virtual can only occur through the auspices of the third inter-ordered order of the political. However, as the vertical schematization matches the economic with the ordered, the hyper-economic with the inter-ordered, and the non-economic with the extra-ordered we must first question how political enaction can occur in inter-ordered terms of reference and not in extra-ordered non-economic terms of reference? (469)

The following strategy is proposed, namely, that existentially oriented permission (3³) permits political enaction (3²) but that usurpation by over-emotionally charged forms of ideological extremism in economic terms of reference (3¹, etc.) then we may surmise that political enaction is compromised in purely political terms of reference (just as a parallel example, a ‘pure’ transactional approach to the compactual nature of contracts would similarly oversee their eventual contractual deconstruction⁸¹). (470)

Just as ‘existentialization’ is ‘the existentialization of the relatively-non-existential and not of the relatively-existent’ it follows, therefore, that there can be no pure exemption of one from the other. Just as in the argument that a democratic-like core of the existential must center all political interactions for otherwise the dissemination of political power would be too distorted, if not completely obstructed, ‘ending’ that political relationship. Regardless of whether such an ‘ending’ were through the death of one or more parties or merely their non-interaction. I.e., through either the absenting of the interacting parties for whatever reason or reasons, or, through the metaphorical ‘death’ of the political relationship in question. Just as too much consonance, dissonance or resolution or too little consonance, dissonance, or resolution can historically disrupt the continuation of any relationship. (471)

In effect, all ordered aspects in the interpretation of the set of relationships under focus must be ‘co-present’ just as economic correlatives can be neither over-preferenced nor under-preferenced given the dialectical nature of their co-existence since any correlative is defined through the joint negation or suspension of the other two parties. Similarly, in a similar dialectical process of complexification, any one ordered aspect, theoretically, could be defined through the joint negation of all other ordered aspects. Such ordered complexification effectively implies that the total absenting or presenting of any one order or set of orders is impossible. Therefore, existential permission approved or non-approved, respectively, through a positive degree of relational competence or through an insufficient degree of relational competence could still be usurped and re-written through such decisiveness being imposed from some other ordered facet of this heuristic scheme.

⁸¹ As explored in both *Pursuit*, III.X(Part)II, and, *Pursuit*, III.X.(Part)III.

As can be demonstrated in either the commission of inauthentic patterns of irresponsible political responsiveness and/or the omission of responsible political responsiveness. (472)

In ‘non-economic language’, in ‘the sense and semblance of decisive disruptions of economic circulation in the articulation of a definitive responses’, political action is initiated regardless of whether its permission is authentically or inauthentically supplied. However, an existentially oriented pattern of permission is more likely to initiate a relatively existential pattern of responsible-responsiveness in contrast to patterns of permission imposed from relatively non-existential modes of permissiveness. Or, in a parallel explanation for the dissemination of relatively non-existential patterns of responsiveness the aspect of the non-economic can be induced both non-non-economically and inauthentically. Thus, although the ordered can be aligned with the economic, the inter-ordered can be aligned with the hyper-economic, and the extra-ordered can be aligned with the non-economic, still, through induced patterns of ordered complexification political power can be both authentically and inauthentically disseminated, although, more correctly and dialectically, there can be no pure commission or omission of either one or other. Just as existentialization is the existentialization of the relatively-non-existential, etc. (473)

Thence the non-economic formula that notes ‘the definitive decisiveness of the last moment’ gives rise to the potentially existential choices of ‘the definitive decisiveness of the next moment’ that if suitably taken up, i.e., existentially permitted, then becomes ‘the relatively definitive decisiveness of the first instance’ with an existential complexion voicing the requisite degree of relational aptness overseeing either the creation, preservation, and/or conservational expansion of the existential richness and enrichment of that primary relationship/s in a harmonic resonance with the well-informed representation, etc., of its own relational situatedness. (474)

Or, in other words, our letting the existential weight (facticity) of our relationships decide, on ‘their’ own behalf, how patterns of a more responsible-responsiveness are to be disseminated through coinciding patterns of intervention. The expression ‘their’ is more appropriate since no single relationship should be experienced as ‘a relational island unto itself’ with the implication, in this relational ethics, that the well-formed representation of the relationship itself effectively has the power⁸² to decide on its behalf how we should enactively intervene, as that relationship before all other relevant relationships, be that through the enaction of patterns of activity, non-activity, and/or inactivity in our observance of this progressive creation, preservation and/or conservation of relational richness, etc. (475)

⁸² As the chaotic expression of an economic surplus initiated, self-permitted, from the perspective of the overall relational ‘point of view’ itself given the pro-relational integrity of a set of interacting relationships can initiate such harmonized patterns of enaction should all relevant conjectural understandings be resolutely well-formed, well-informed, well-performed, etc. Hence this concept of ‘the self-empowerment of our relationships’ when the non-economic manifestation of such self-permissions are neither distorted nor obstructed, neither usurped nor replaced. If anything, almost in an act of non-intervention, non-action, or similar, grateful to let what happens happen regardless of its non-existential ramifications (as alluded to, e.g., by Machiavelli, and others pointing more explicitly to this phenomenon of ‘non-self-involvement’, etc., when permitting this relational acting on the behalf of our relevant relationships at the center of a relational ethics (in its existential understanding of this unfolding of deontological imperatives, and so on).

How do we appreciate this differentially augmented and enhanced state of relational richness, hopefully, to be realized as a process of relational enrichment? (476)

Non-existential augmentation is incremental and non-chaotically oriented and focuses on the increase in positive non-existential e/valuational formation being experienced within the ongoing economy of that re-presented relationship as situated, i.e., in and through its suitably contextualized re(-)presentation.⁸³ (477)

Existential enhancement is a non-incremental, spontaneous, chaotically induced advancement in positively oriented patterns of e/valuational formation by virtue of being in a conformal alignment with the well-conjecturally understood re(-)presented nature of that overall relational economy in question.⁸⁴ (478)

How then is relational enrichment to be related to, comparatively discerned, and further promoted? (479)

Our differential appreciation of the relational bonds of our various relationships through various forms of empathetic reception usually tell us, if only intuitively, how deep or how strong those co-associated relationships are in lived-experience. In effect, a simulated appreciation of the facticity of those individuated relationship appears to be

⁸³ Augmentation is a bit like giving dollars to a well-deserving charity. There being a positive augmentation dollar by dollar. Of course, after x dollars accumulated, more or less, that charity will then need to chaotically re-self-organize its characteristic set of functions by virtue of the fact that it will need to adapt to its considerably augmented status along with an additional set of responsibilities in regard to collecting its donations, recording the same, determining who would manage what, devising how its costs will be paid for, and how the remaining monies will be best distributed, and so on. Those chaotic changes in institutional reconstitution, hopefully, will be of a nature that could be described as a positive enhancement, i.e., where positive consequential outputs will greatly exceed its donated inputs and, in a certain sense, contribute to a greater degree of freedom in the choices that could be made along with a greater sense of an expected professional responsibility, and so forth. Note the formulation ‘(-)’ is to be read as an ‘ongoing economy of re-constitution, etc.’ Furthermore, the non-existential e/valuational formation has three overall potential flavours, namely, positive, neutral, and negative. In a distinctive contrast, existential e/valuational formation is always positive, be that either augmentatively and/or exponentially enhanced. On the other hand, not all chaotically induced sequences of e/valuational formation will be positive, indeed, could well be either more negative or considerably neutral. Previously, I have contrasted positive non-existential value with existentially oriented value as like the making and eating of a sandwich because you are hungry *versus* the making and eating of a meal with a friend or a group of friends when and where that other person or those other persons are quite hungry and in need of such sustenance. Or, the sort of difference between a starving student hardly able to study and a well-fed student who then can intently return back to their studies... to the extent other positive behaviours can then follow on in the wake of existentially apposite patterns of behaviour. In a sense, where the existential proffers a radically broader sense of possibility and choice, etc. In a deeper understanding of these differences other issues would also need to be more explored like, e.g., concepts of sacrifice, personal integrity, deontological imperatives, freedom/s, choices, responsibilities, the acceptance of a non-transactional, compactual dimension, and so on. *The Third Exposition* in this book will make a start on addressing such issues.

⁸⁴ Making a technical contrast between ‘augmentation’ and ‘enhancement’, and, an argument for the power of a better understood conformal alignment in our re(-)presented simulations of the relevant relationships being contextually found being emplaced in that overall relational situatedness being re(-)simulated, etc.

experienced here. Such relational intensities being evident in the degree and manner of responsibility felt either expected and/or should be discharged assuming a difference between a spectrum of expectations entertained by ourselves and the seemingly inherent obligations also co-associated with our relationships and where such a variety of differentials also deserved to be somewhat harmonized as well. Of course, an evolving awareness of the problematic nature of our relationships will also frame how those forms of resolution could well be entered into in both a non-existential and existential manner (given, too, the understanding that existentialization is the existentialization of the relatively non-existential, etc., and that such distinctions cannot be absolutistically drawn in a non-dialectical fashion). (480)

The recent resolution of a problem, namely, ‘how are processes of reduplication and duplication engineered?’ affords the insight that we should more be interested in ‘how such processes are experientially delineated?’ on the grounds that, being on a par with economic correlativity, ordered correlativity is ever-present and merely needs to be re-focused upon in order to bring to experiential prominence the distinctive characteristics of those desired functions currently in question. The argument for the triangulation of perspectives (as *contra* impossible forms of positioning, along with the non-countenancing of dispositions of a uni-modal, bi-modal, and closed tri-modal complexion) devolves from the fact that economies in their tri-modal constitution cannot possess absolutistically isolated economic correlatives and thence the necessity for their dialectically oriented forms of treatment along with the parallel fact that ordered forms of correlativity, likewise, cannot be definitively isolated except in relatively superficial formulations that should not be exercised in critically conducted philosophical formats, etc. That by this ‘etc.’ we must also include all sub-philosophical disciplines like logic(s), aesthetics, relational ethics, etc., and inter-ordered forms of meta-philosophical metaphysics and extra-ordered forms of both meta-meta-philosophical existential and pragmatic considerations. This radical resolution shifts the locus (and focus) of our concern from ‘how are forms of reduplication and duplication exercised?’ to ‘how do such forms of exercise focus on the all-pervasive continual co-existence of such epistemological processes?’ and where the expected reply is expedited through the additional question ‘through the utilization of what suspensions can a working philosophy automatically expedite the required re(-)occurrence of such distinctive patterns of (responsible) experience?’ (481)

In this regard, let me briefly reinvoke my analysis of the interrogative economy as guide in this type of quest. (482)

Questions are founded on an ‘either/or’ (on the Boolean operator Or) and this economic aspect is engineered through the exercise of a focus on a dis-conjunctive suspension centered on the fulcrum of ‘or’, where a well-formed question is constructed on a resolution being either the accepting of this ‘this’ or this ‘that’ (or, as well, on ‘some other this or some other that’).⁸⁵ This analysis continues to note a first reply, namely, a met-

⁸⁵ E.g., it is either raining or not raining, or, it was raining some of the time and not raining at other times, or, it was only partially raining, or, inside the bathroom the misty rain came in through the large open window in a form that deposited itself on the mirror, etc. That some questions have an implicit tri-

aphorical response. E.g., ‘is that John over there?’ would first invoke ‘that person looks like John or that person does not look like John’ given a reading of the metaphorical ‘like’ is centered on the Boolean operator And, as a conjunctive suspension. But to definitively resolve this question, if we are in a situation where this can occur, then we need to invoke an apparitional ‘as if, as if...’ centered on the Boolean operators of both Not and dNot (as a double negation). Then, it could be further argued that our determination of this question can be further reinforced by adding the additional suspensions centered on the two remaining negative Boolean operators of both Nand and Nor (in conjunction with the truth tables collectively integrated under the auspices of these six Boolean operators and their co-associated suspensions entered into under the rubric of the overall working suspension required and intuitively exercised in overseeing a definitive resolution of that specific question [in accordance with our ability to marshal the relevant evidence for our being able to then entertain such required patterns of conformal alignment]). (483)

In other words, we do not need to worry how something is put into effect when it is continually co-present throughout all moments of intentionally constituted consciousness, but, rather, how do we focus on such processes in a selective suppression of all other processes not currently relevant to our present circumstances. Of course, even that question begs the issue to the extent that somehow we can intentionally engineer such outcomes given that throughout our life’s education we just learn to affect such outputs (perhaps much on par with the ‘riding of a bike’ to the extent we learn how that is done and then forget the micro-management of such processes and where their refocusing could well be detrimental to this concurrent overall sense of being in control as the overall delivery of a complex response without having to intervene at the individual micro-level of some sequential input. The same sort of analogy is present in our ‘learning to dance’, and, in how ‘an executive CEO just lets their managers deal with the day-to-day operations of that company’). (484)

Ideally, we could just note which types of suspension might need to be focused on; which operators, operands and operations are in question; and on what epistemological level/s such functions are to be appreciated, i.e., be that on an individual or mix of cognitive and/or trans-cognitive forms of ordered explication. Towards an appreciation of such outcomes, we should also add some form of a consequential analysis that allows us to conformally discern non-critical, critical, and potentially radical contributions to those same deliberations, etc. (485)

Given that resolution is some form of harmonically re(-)directed thematization it follows that the three correlative contributions to harmonic processes (of relative consonance, dissonance, and resolution) must be co-present, and, that, on an ordered basis, all forms of ordered correlativity will also automatically apply. That against such an economically-ordered backdrop it merely behooves us to delineate those functional strands that appear to promote the resolution of our current preoccupations. (486)

modal range of responses. So, e.g., the trick question ‘are you manic?’ need not imply ‘you are or must be depressed’ since you could also be ‘neither manic nor depressed’.

That, in this regard, our continuing education is progressively built up upon such modular-like considerations. Acquire a use of such modules, and their cooperative interactions then allows us to develop and explore higher-orders in an adaptation of such functioning forms of situational awareness, etc. (487)

However, again, an almost mountainously sized obstruction presents itself in the form of the consequences that will flow from and after obligatory processes of transformation retreatment. As already noted, in attempting to understand a process of transformational treatment, all elevation of meta-status under the auspices of suspensions is automatically reversed under the automatic delivery of the suspension of those suspensions in a process of de-suspension. Consequently, the critical philosopher, then has to deal with the subsequent conflation of a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines, a variety of operations, a variety of ordered, inter-ordered and extra-ordered phenomena, along with an appreciation of the relative successfulness or non-successfulness of such procedures, and so on. However, through the use of this heuristic scheme, and others forms of mapping, such problematic consequences can be somewhat obviated once the *raison d'être* of such devices are correctly applied with a possible view to overseeing and strengthening such patterns of rectification. Thence, e.g., the clarification of which steps may have been mistakenly taken up, and, which steps may well have been well-taken both philosophically and practically. (488)

As a broad outline, transformational retreatment is a philosophy dealing with transformations from an object-level to a meta-level, and then back to the relative-object level in meta-status on the simple understanding that all forms of treatment impose an elevation in meta-status by one degree under the auspices of the relevant suspensions, and, that through the de-suspension, as the automatic suspension of such suspensions, there is then the automatic de-elevation in meta-status by one degree. In this progression we commence with a relatively hermeneutic process of pre-treatment (dealing with appropriate genres of behaviour, etc.), proceed to a state of phenomenological-like analysis with an ensuing elevation in meta-status by one degree, and, thence, through the co-associated de-suspension a return, more or less, to the original object-level or similar in meta-status. However, from a complex ordered perspective, the retreatment product will have a mix of ordered levels left in a potentially conflated state of affairs that then calls for either the critical philosopher, metaphysician, existentialist and/or pragmatist (etc.) to critically and radically disentangle such non-critically construed productivity. (489)

As a short summary, what radical ideas are being presented in this first exposition? (590)

Given, through reduplication, 'the formula of the ethicality of the ethicalness of the ethical' (and its parallel in the form of 'the politicality of the politicalness (of the political) of the political [in its transformational retreatment to philosophical-disciplinary terms of reference]', and, by extension, 'the existentiality [of the ethical *per se*] of the existentialness [in its political expression] of the existential [as an ethically oriented imprint on performed behaviour]), and, an understanding that the transformation of duplication is reversed through de-duplication, then it follows that the existential, the political,

and the ethical are intimately interconnected. Furthermore, treated as an economy in its own right,⁸⁶ means that we can preferentially migrate within such a scheme from the ethical to the political to the existential and back to the ethical, etc. In moving, say, from the existential immediately to the ethical, or v.v., we perceive the circularity of this economy. As a metaphorical analogy with water, despite the usual progression from ice to liquid water to water vapour, and v.v., still, under suitable temperatures and pressures we can also account for the direct transition from a solid state to gas (sublimation) without the immediate stage of a liquid form of water if conditions for such transitions are present, etc. A metaphorical appeal to the restoration of this analogy suggesting that we can go directly from the existential to ethically oriented decision making, say, in and through a process of transformational retreatment (rather than through the process of a double de-duplication). The implication being that existential inputs can radically re-direct ethical behaviour and thence, through their performance, political behaviour, and v.v., etc. (591)

That, in the third meta-philosophical, reconstituted metaphysical, inter-ordered category of the political virtual intentions can find a non-virtual formation (as decisive decisions of the last moment, etc.). Although, ideally, the permission to invest in such forms of situated interventions is existential and extra-ordered in orientation, still, through the conjunction of affectively motivated ideologically driven forms of ambition such ‘permissions; can be co-opted non-existentially, be the latter productive of either relatively positive, neutral, and/or negative forms of non-existential e/valuation. (492)

For a variety of interconnected reasons, in this heuristic, the third trans-cognitive order of the ethical is to be radically re(-)written solely in terms of the deontological, albeit with its supplementation or complementation with adjuncts in the second order of the aesthetical and the fourth order of the pragmatological (and where the latter is not to be confused with the pragmatic and its identified equivalence with the existential). Moreover, this concept of the ‘deontological’ is not to be conflated in anyway with religious ideas of so-called First-Principle’, etc. The ‘deontological orientation’ being experienced as a ‘certain ideal desire whose differential semblance of a difference is harnessed to oversee a suitable rectification of that same identified deontological difference’. This relative preference being placed upon deontological considerations is evident in courts of law where deontological interpretations both overrule and override more pragmatological forms of explanation. By ‘pragmatological’ is included ‘utilitarian calculations, mere cost-benefit analyses, and, not insignificant contributions to ethical discourses under the headings of the effective, efficacious, expeditious, economical, efficient, etc.’ That, when sufficiently reflected upon, both the aesthetical and the pragmatological primarily consist of less centralized, but relevant, forms of deontologically driven judgments and behaviours. E.g., harmonic and stylistic pressures to perform an integrated pattern of realizable behaviour and a cluster of minor deontologically oriented inputs concerned with the more successful use of limited resources to hand (where, hopefully, both types of contribution are able to further invest in the ongoing richness and enrichment of the primary relationship/s in question). (593)

⁸⁶ Which can be equally referred to as an ‘ethical economy’ or ‘political economy’ or ‘existential economy’ (in distinction to an ethical sub-economy of the deontological, plus its aesthetical and pragmatological adjuncts, along with its situatedness in the three remaining orders, etc.).

Moreover, under the dominant heuristic influence of a relationally oriented existential ethics all other forms of ethical assessment not consistent with the same can only proffer a less satisfactory semblance of an ethical commentary or explanation. E.g., as in any ethics that starts with an 'isolated sense and semblance of subjectivity', or begins with an over-preoccupation with 'the other', or, at the same time, any philosophy that does not also recognize the overlapping domains of 'a private self, a public sense of self, and an arbitrated sense of self' that is not primarily advanced through existentially oriented inputs/outputs, etc. At the same time, ethically translating an ethical situation through focusing on a prioritization of more relevant deontological imperatives. (494)

The political, likewise, is radically re(-)constituted. Given the recognition of a democratic-like core to all forms of personal-interpersonal interaction, it behooves us to build upon the same through positive forms of non-existential augmentation and existentially oriented enhancement. (495)

Thence the necessary recognition of the existential orientation as a counterweight to the positive, neutral, and negative orientations of the relatively non-existential, and so on. As that which positively emerges from patterns of intentional behaviour that are consistently respectful of all relevant inputs. Given the advent of events that either create, preserve, and/or conserve a positive richness of e/valuational processes in topics that suitably delineate a direct appreciation of existentially oriented patterns of e/valuational formation, etc. (496)

This economically ordered heuristic, comprising the ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered, is also suggestive of both subtle and less subtle consequences arising from relatively non-existentially oriented patterns of behaviour, be those forms of appreciation conducted in either relatively-ethical, relatively-political, and/or relatively-existential terms of reference. Hence the established grounds for an eventual optimism in the creation, preservation, and/or conservation of our relationships should an existential alignment between lived-experience and the lived-reality of such experience be promoted, albeit subject to the exigencies of the social environment, etc. (497)

Thence the necessity for well-formed, well-informed, and well-exercised conjec-tural economies, etc., in conjunction with inputs/outputs issuing from well-observed forms of a consequential analysis, etc. (498)

Whence this benefit to be gained from carefully conducted patterns of existentially oriented interventions given this discernment of the relatively-non-critical, the relative-ly-critical, and the relatively-radical, along with our discernment as to how we can atten-tively travel from one orientation to another whilst prioritizing a critical-radical receptiv-ity to that which promotes an ongoing enrichment of our more important relationships, and so on. Thence, philosophically, this expression of the existentially-pragmatic as a pragmatic-existentialism, and v.v. (499).

Now, at this point in this First Exposition an obvious question to ask is what is radical about such proposals indicated in this section? (500)

Let me very briefly answer that question under the following headings, namely, The Phenomenological Nature of the Radical, a Radically Re(-)Constituted Ethics, A Radically Re(-)Constituted Politics, A Radically Re(-)Constituted Existentialism, and The Ensuing Anticipations of the Radical Re(-)Self-Organization of this Topic. (501)

A conformal economy needs to recognize both the dialectical distinctiveness and the integrity of the conformal e/valuations entered into within and between the sub-economies of the relatively-non-critical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical along with the incremental nature of its transformations either observed and/or imputed therein. That both non-existentially oriented and existentially oriented acts of judgmental appreciation are dependent upon either the rectified critical re(-)organization or radical re(-)self-organization of the same basically reflecting either relatively non-chaotic or relatively chaotic inputs/outputs, etc. Where, with respect to the latter, on occasions the relative addition or subtraction of small inputs can contribute radically different outputs whose ramifications may seem to bear little resemblance to the apparent directedness of such inputs. (502)

Contrary to a pragmatic suspicion around the determination of deontological patterns of ethical or moral e/valuation, etc., here such considerations are to be approached through the complexities of a broad-spectrum deontological lens that looks, primarily, at the centrality of key deontological operators (that basically determine the ethical nature of such events), and, secondarily, at the relative globalization of aesthetically oriented operators and the relative localization of pragmatological operators. Thence our interest in relevantly applicable central deontological facets such as, e.g., honesty, faithfulness, loyalty, duties, compassion, responsibility, compactual pre-conditions, concern, and care, etc., our interest in such global deontological facets such as, e.g., harmonization, resolution, realizability, integrity, etc., and, such localized deontological facets such as, e.g., effectiveness, expedience, efficaciousness, efficiency, economical-ness, expeditiousness, and so on. (503)

On the political front we realize that power can determine patterns of moral evaluation, but, that which weakens the dissemination of power will eventually arise through a lack of moral integrity, and v.v. Therefore, it is reasonable to be optimistic, just unreasonable to imagine it as self-arising instantaneously without self-assistance and other-assistance. (504)

Existentially, we recognize and seek to realize the radical nature of existentially oriented interventions given that micro-inputs can have radically redefined macro-outputs inaugurated and extended through decisive moments of the last instance, etc. (505)

Thence the co-associated critical re(-)organization and the radical re(-)self-organization of the philosophical, the metaphysical, the existential, and the secular. (506)

Section E: A Second Exposition:

On the Nature of the Radical:

A Radical Re-Understanding of the Relatively-Non-Critical, etc.

*The non-critical, the critical, and the relatively-radical
Mirror each other, walk hand in hand,
As if a shadow, a corpse, and a smile...*

Intuitively, we have learnt to do much of this disentangling, however, on ethical, political, and existential levels of deployment, etc., there is much left to be done, especially, if current considerations are either distorted or obstructed through emotionally overcharged absolutistical forms of ideological over-commitment or through a relative lack of critical commitment on the part of under-committed relativists, etc. An exploration of this topic of the transformations within and between the relatively-non-critical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical allows me now to segue to *A Second Exposition*. (507)

Here, let me be somewhat creative in my attempts to both dialectically differentiate and accommodate these relative notions of the non-critical, critical, and radical... then suggest we can parallel the same, respectively, with the economic characterization of the philosophically ordered, the hyper-economic appropriation of the metaphysically inter-ordered, and the non-economically instigated nature of the existentially non-economic, and, at the same time, observe a direct parallel between the ethical, the political, and the existential. The metaphorical-like strategy that I am about to adopt, and will adapt through the ensuing exploration that I am about to undertake, is taken from ideas about the nature of space(time) as utilized by a theoretical physicist, namely, the flat nature of Minkowski spacetime, the curvature of de Sitter spacetime, and the hyperbolic nature of anti-de-Sitter spacetime.⁸⁷ In my insistence that we dispense with philosophical or disciplinary positions and replace them with the requisite triangulation of perspectives I am making an oblique reference to the curvature of de Sitter spacetime. Then, in invoking an unqualified Euclidean space in Minkowski spacetime I make an allusion to how parallel lines never meet and in this reference to parallelization note my use of both economic complexification and, by extension, an ordered complexification (operating on and between ordered, inter-ordered and extra-ordered terms of reference). Last, and that which concerns more the dialectical nature of this topic, I make an allusion to the hyperbolic

⁸⁷ Minkowski and de Sitter spacetimes are the two most fundamental symmetric solutions to Einstein's field equations in general relativity. While Minkowski space represents a completely flat, empty universe, de Sitter space represents an empty universe with a positive cosmological constant (dark energy), which causes it to be curved and expanding. An anti-de Sitter space in general relativity is similar to a de Sitter space, except with the sign of the spacetime curvature changed. In anti-de Sitter space, in the absence of matter or energy, the curvature of spacelike sections is negative, corresponding to a hyperbolic geometry. Interestingly, the Maldacena Duality establishes a correlativity, in holistic terms of reference, between a Conformal Field Theory and an anti-de Sitter spacetime (in the famous AdS/CFT correspondence.).

nature of anti-de Sitter space in order to map how irreducible dialectical differences, despite commonalities, could be modelled as distinctive artifacts in a hyperbolic-like semblance (effectively characterized as relatively non-spatial and transformational in a temporal sense in a contrast to de Sitter space as relatively spatial and lacking a temporal dimension when viewed as relatively empty [despite the recognition of the vacuum energy of space that, in self-cancelling maintains an illusion of emptiness and a lack of a transformationally instantiated time]). (508)

Invoking these three types of space(time), lets me refresh, first, my approach to the triangulation of perspectives as *contra* impossible philosophical and disciplinary notions of uni-modal, bi-modal, and closed tri-modal forms of so-called ‘positions’, leaving open tri-modal economies in their situational contexts, and nothing else.⁸⁸ That granted, then noting both the relative internality of archetypally based economies and the relative externality of secular based economies (as constructed through aspirational forms of motivation).⁸⁹ Next, let me re-outline the forms of parallelization involved in both economic complexification and ordered complexifications. Then, in trying to understand a hyperbolic form of spacetime let me delineate dialectical differences as if *contra*-perspectives or counter-perspectives to a more fundamental commonality existing both pre-suppositionally and pre-conditionally to these more radical forms of expressive ideation. But, first, let me demonstrate how these dialectically different states of the relatively-non-critical, etc., are also intimately interconnected pre-suppositionally, etc. (509)

Throughout this exercise in metaphorical comparativeness is the understanding that between the relatively-non-critical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical, through a small set of tweaks, we can migrate from one classification to the other given that the presuppositional ground of all three of these orientations is and must remain relatively invariant. E.g., imagine someone asked for the date of my birthday and I informed them my birthdate was 6 June 1950. Now, I know one the three factors in this reported date is wrong. In effect I have told a lie in which just one element of information is deliberately replaced by one unit of misinformation. But, in doing so I have lied, but, then again, I have not nor could tell a complete and absolute lie where all the necessarily re-

⁸⁸ I.e., ruling out simple tetra-modal economies, etc. Thence my earlier preoccupations to demonstrate that a hexa-modal economy of the orders needs to be re-understood through some form of a tri-modal reinterpretation (which has been supplied through noting the nature of the ethical economy [and political economy, etc., through reduplication in inter-ordered terms, etc.] and the philosophical-disciplinary economy *versus* the secular-aspirational economy along with their joint accommodation in the formation of the overall-philosophical-disciplinary ordered economy, albeit as tri-modally reconfigured through some additional heuristic framing as outlined, etc.). Recognizing, at ‘the end of the day’ through total transformational retreatment the need for those three baskets in order to delineate the origination of philosophical and secular patterns of treatment from both meta-philosophical, metaphysical forms of inter-ordered treatment and meta-meta-philosophical, existential-pragmatic forms of extra-ordered treatment. Hence the overall philosophical-disciplinary economy can then truly encompass all disciplines (in their operations upon the secular world) given a through transformational retreatment, albeit as recast in the form of those three baskets (in order to successfully defuse what, otherwise, would be a traditional recipe for the eternal persistence of interminable controversies).

⁸⁹ Thence the six distinctive types of operations, as discussed elsewhere, falling under the relative internality of distinctions or differentiations, accommodations or integrations, transformations or transformational-nominations, and, the relative externality of consilience, salience, and propinquity or standing.

quire information is replaced by misinformation. Needless to say, ‘I am a person, all people are born, and, therefore, must have a birthdate’ even if I did not know the exact date of my own birth. In order to rectify that lie, all that is needed to be done is to ascertain the total validity or invalidity involved of those individual factors disseminated in the reporting of my age by comparing it either with authentic documentation, like e.g., a birth certificate, or by asking those people in a position to correctly emend these instances of my non-truth-telling through some form of testimony, etc. Then, in turn, migrating from the relatively-critical to the relatively-radical through some innovative, chaotic-like reframing of relevant narratives in which relative-radical processes of re(-)direction open up novel understandings, new concepts needing new vocabularies, and so on. However, a more full appreciation of the relatively-radical also implies the additional necessity for its critical re(-)appropriation back into critical terms of reference in order to more fully comprehend the ramifications of that incremental form of that relatively-radical set of novel information. On the other hand, should this critical re(-)appropriation not satisfactorily occur we might then be likely to surmise that the relatively-radical was only instrumental, in that instance, of effectively adding to the relatively-non-critical. In other words, this economy between the relatively-non-critical, the relative-critical, and the relatively-radical is metaphorically circular, in both directions, and, where we can migrate from one orientation to some other through a relatively superficial tweaking of such relatively-superficial factors. That, all in all, a conformalization of such relatively superficial content allows us to migrate from the relatively non-critical to the relatively-critical and thence to the relative-radical and, hopefully, back to the critical without a falling ‘backwards’ into the relatively-non-critical orientation (whilst understanding a commonality of cultural-intercultural knowledge acts as an effective overall, relative transformational isomorphic invariance equally underlying all three economic orientations). That, given the necessary persistence of this underlying, relative transformational isomorphic invariance threading these three states of the relatively-non-critical, etc., we must assume a relatively dialectical state of affairs is in existence in each and every economy, regardless of how we might view such framing, be that in non-traditional terms of reference or otherwise. (510)

Economic conditions, namely, the openly tri-modal status of all economies, implies that a determination of a so-called philosophical position, or a so-called disciplinary position (given that philosophy is a discipline like all other disciplines), implies the necessity of at least accessing three items of information in order to locate that economy in the narration of a potentially disseminated discourse. Hence, the necessity for a triangulation of perspectives, and, never the mere dissemination of an impossible to locate uni-modal position (or a bi-modal set of ‘positions’ or a closed tri-modal set of positions’). In effect, an economy of apparent positionality, as a determination of its characteristic features *vis-à-vis* other possible forms of positional configuration, demands an economy of positionality that cannot be other than through a triangulation of perspectives, and, that its contextual determination must be similarly constituted likewise. Therefore, an ‘ensuing overall sense and semblance of perspectives is being realized through this obligatory triangulation of perspectives’. However, such a tri-modal set of perspectives, in turn, needs to be located in a relatively external sense of location coincident with the secular world as it becomes thematized through those aspirations that will either contribute to our positive

standing in that relational situation or as not effectively situated accordingly. Indeed, as recently argued in those economies directly based on the archetypal, and the philosophical or disciplinary, etc., we cannot approach and oversee a secular world of aspirational intentionality, and, conversely, the aspirational construction of the world cannot initiate productive forms of change given that existentially permitted or abrogated political power is exercised through the reduplication of the ethical in the form of a political transmission that converts virtual ideation into non-virtual patterns of enaction along with all that is attendants upon such ideational deliberations. Thence this double triangulation of an overall sense and perspective of a ‘curved space’ amenable to such deliberations. (511)

In an internal economy, we find under the fifth order dealing with hermeneutic possibility the notion of accommodations (and the parallel notions of a reconstituted synthesis). Coincident with the first order, we find a phenomenological preoccupation with distinctions, modes of analysis, differentiations, etc. Last, under the third trans-cognitive order of the ethical (primarily dealing with the deontological) we find the sense of the nominative, as the locus of transformations, etc. But, in situating such an economy in the secular world we then need to take a relatively external approach where under the sixth order of the ontical we note conformal forms of evaluation that ‘realistically’ establish the factually ontical along with an understanding of standing (propinquity) both when and where we can intervene in certain situations and, at the same time, find those situations in which we cannot intervene through a corresponding loss or absence of standing. From such a basis we have already entertained or will be about to entertain the sense and semblance of purpose that ‘idealistically’ thematizes a set of perspectives through some form of consilience able to integrate the apparent intent of our motivation under this heading of the second order of the aesthetical. Indeed, in thematizing such aspirational intent, a triangulation of motives would need to be articulated and entered into. Then, to imaginatively ascertain the course of our passage through this world at large, it then necessitates our accessing a ‘pragmatical’ course of enaction that would more effectively assist us in its execution if and when it might find expression in the required form of politically oriented patterns of response (arrived at through reduplication of the third trans-cognitive order of the deontological (and non-systematic existential). By such means, through the contrast and integration of this philosophical (and disciplinary) economy and the secular economy (based on its aspirational contours) are we then able to arrive at an ordered economy, that, through reduplication, can then be extended to both inter-ordered and extra-ordered formats. (512)

Now, let me outline the *modus operandi* of economic complexification and ordered complexification respectively. (513)

‘Complexification’ is defined by myself as ‘parallel readings by virtue of a commonality of archetypal structural-functions that allow texts to economically comment on each other in a form that complements or supplements a close reading of either text. So, e.g., in arguing that in the temporal economy the retrospective aspect of the past mirrors the reductive aspects of analysis allows either aspect to enrich the reading of the other. Multiply this across the board in economic terms and such correlativites between the aligned correlatives of the economies so juxtaposed gives a complex mutual sense and

semblance of significance to the primary text supplied with such multiple commentaries. In pre-assigning such alignments beforehand and tabulating such results gives a dictionary of parallel correlativities.⁹⁰ Consulting such a device would then let us take on board such ideas that the analytical, or reductive, is a form of treatment, subject to remediation, deals phenomenologically with descriptions, and so on. That, correctly applied, such a device can also act as critical tool when we find we have misapplied the wrong epithets. E.g., in dealing with the analytical we should note that we are dealing with the textual and not meta-textual, hermeneutic aspects of the textual process and hence our preoccupation with phenomenologically oriented semantically based descriptions and not hermeneutically oriented prescriptions, and so forth. (514)

Similar considerations would be afforded to the secular economy as it parallels the aspirational economy and the contractual economy, etc. (515)

Interestingly, as already indicated, neither the (non-overall) philosophical-disciplinary economy and the secular economy can individually account for the dissemination of intentionally formulated intent. Aspirations located in the secular economy could not be enacted other than through the philosophical-disciplinary economy and, then, through a reduplication of the ethical in the form of political enaction be its effective permission exercised either non-existentially and/or existentially. In reverse, the political instantiation of intent could not proceed without its secularized formulation. Just as an in-depth exploration of the interrogative economy depends on our taking on board the realistic appreciation of its ontical standing (propinquity), etc.⁹¹ (516)

To a great extent ordered complexification is established on economic grounds when the (non-overall) philosophical-disciplinary economy and the secular economy are combined (through sheer political necessity given the inability of either economy, on its own terms, being able to transform virtual intent into non-virtual patterns of enaction). The resulting product is the overall philosophical-disciplinary economy. Why overall, etc? Because the disciplines co-associated with the six trans-cognitive orders of judgment do not fall just within the ambit of the non-overall philosophical-disciplinary economy. Moreover, through transformational retreatment all disciplines co-associated with any form of ordered complexification can be given a non-direct sense and semblance of presence in either cognitively ordered terms of reference or in trans-cognitively ordered terms of reference. So, e.g., the vocations of the phenomenological-semanticist, the practical hermeneut or critical-radical hermeneuticist, the non-systematic existentialist, etc., and, the secular aesthetician and stylist, the pragmatist functionalist, and the factologist all fall within the (first basket of the) trans-cognitively ordered orders to which we can then add in a retreated format all other vocations able to be discerned in either ordered, inter-ordered, and extra-ordered terms of origination. So, although the role of the historian is primarily meta-philosophical and metaphysical in orientation, as reconstituted in non-traditional terms of reference, still, through retreatment such a disciplinary career will

⁹⁰ As posted in Section J.

⁹¹ Where the apparitional moment is bifurcated between the Boolean operators of Not (negation) and dNot (double negation), etc. Where the coinciding of these two economies then gives us the ordered economy (along with its reduplications).

then turn up in philosophically oriented ordered terms of reference despite its inter-ordered status in origination. But, by using those ‘three baskets’, potentially controversial forms should be suitably able to critically bypass such traditionally conflated metaphysical traps. (517)

To more fully appreciate what is implied in the concept of ‘ordered complexification’ we should note the recent argument that all ordered phenomena already have an ordered complexion throughout the ordered complex in its entirety. That much of what is experienced in experience would be fully echoed there holistically, across the entirety of the ordered complex. However, this would take either a positive format and/or a negative format. So, tabletops that are both round and square in shape, e.g., are entirely absent, whereas, in contrast, tabletops that are either square or round can be found a place in this more formal sense and semblance of a world. Similarly, as a complex fact, a mythological Father Xmas does not exist (outside its resident mythologies), but imitational Father Xmas’ do exist, especially, just before the time of Xmas.⁹² (518)

In other words, such identities are more discerned through the suitable utilization of the requisite degree of either well-pre-informed foresight or insight being brought to such considerations. Moreover, arguably, the net result of both negative and positive formats contributes to the distinctive identity of such discerned entities.⁹³ That, it is more our focusing on what is already present rather than our painstaking creation or recreation of some psychic corner in our psyche that has to construct from scratch the ordered sense of identity being re(-)presented. Without a doubt such processes are proceeded with, but, remain more focused upon after the fact rather than as metaphorical ‘blank canvasses’ upon which to practically start with. Indeed, it is this all-pervasive pre-scaffolding that allows us to entertain the transformational-transforms of both duplication and reduplication along with acts of distinction, accommodation, alteration, consilience, salience, and the determination of standing, etc. In effect, the more complex that being focused upon, as a relatively more prominent differential, that then allows us to arrive at the simulated completion of such an envisaged process... (519)

Thence the application of the rules of duplication and reduplication; distinctions, etc., consilience, etc., processes of retreatment, and so on. (520)

Moving on in this scheme of reduplicative overlap, parallelization, etc., I would now like to explore the hyperbolic as a metaphor for the dialectical, and v.v. Rather than either overlapping or running informatively in tandem and proffering forms of commentary I see the counter-position of the dialectical in somewhat similar terms to our attempting to understand the hyperbolic nature (of an anti-de Sitter spacetime). On one hand, these elements of the relatively non-critical, etc., are distinctly different, yet, on the other hand I am arguing for their interconnectedness (as explained earlier). As a meta-

⁹² In logics/dialectics I see this as ‘shutting both the front door and the backdoor’. A mythological Father Xmas is a conformat fact whereas a non-mythological Father Xmas is not an ontical fact. I.e., only as a negative ontical fact, i.e., as a non-existent entity, Father Xmas can be culturally-interculturally identified as a persisting mythological fact that can, in that form, be asserted, reasserted, etc.

⁹³ As demonstrated though my in-depth explorations of the interrogative economy.

phor, a bit like seeing ‘ice or snow, liquid water, and clouds of steam as different entities whilst also knowing that all three states are mere phases in the current constitution of the overall phenomenon of water as individually experienced as different. Here, no overlapping or informative parallelization, but, instead, a distinctive divergence of a covert commonality that might well not be recognized. That, to discern some form of commonality, we have to retrace these divergent instances back to a common point of reference. As simulated non-textual experiences, one could argue that they are my acts of representation, through re(-)presentation, that establishes such content as that distinctive content for myself. Then, upon this commencement of a re(-)presented constitution we can then extend such commonality in additional terms of reference when and where such correspondences, resonances, etc., can be pointed out in conformal terms, doing so by invoking transformational rules that allow us to evidently conclude that such certain dialectical notions can and do conformally share the same evidential ideation. E.g., that ice melts and can then be drunk as liquid water, etc. (521)

In terms of the relatively non-critical, etc., the successful rectification of relevant errors in the relatively-non-critical can convert it into the relatively critical. Then, through incremental addition or subtraction of certain inputs in time and space certain point can be reached in which chaotic phenomena will more evidently reveal themselves along with the potential for the radical evocation of wider terms of reference. That, in order to better comprehend such radical evocations, then critical forms of accommodation will need to be invested in in order for the hyper-economic to more successfully appropriate such extensions in this expanded field/s of conformal knowledge. But, such novel intentions might well have got things wrong and the ensuing formation of certain radical notions might then have to be relegated to the realm of the relatively non-critical. That, in this economy of the relatively-non-critical, etc., while there is a discernable difference between the mere iteration of the relatively-critical and the sheer iteration of the relatively-radical, still, it behooves us to critically re-appropriate the relatively-critical in order to make better sense of such seeming radical notions, etc. Understanding, that on some occasions, we will move into the territory of the relatively-non-critical as well. (522)

I am tempted to analogue the ‘dialectical’ as if in a ‘hyperbolic space’... using this type of ‘space’ as temporal in orientation, transformational, as if there were no space in such a ‘space’. Conversely, we could sympathize with Einstein in not being able to disprove Gödel’s argument that space can be representatively written up as if not possessing ‘time’. An empty space would have no need for time, objects in space needing time to transverse the same, but, then, ‘a thoroughly empty space’ proves to be an impossible concept both to contemplate and to observe in lived-reality. (523)

Still, in running with this nebulous metaphor, the dialectical is a bit like operating in hyperbolic space in such a manner so as to spontaneously go from one phase to any other tri-modal economic phase, treated as an economic correlativity, just as ice can melt, but, equally, in the confines of low-pressure space, can sublime directly to a gas. Regardless of its current phase, despite the nature of its current phase, water is still water... be it ice, liquid water or a steamy vapour. In other words, a continuous dialectic between ‘the one and the many’ is inescapable. The molecular constitution of ice, e.g., cannot be

absolutistically different from either melted water or a vaporous steam, whilst, obviously, being relativistically different at the same time. Or, in an economic ‘calculus’, that which is neither non-critical nor critical must be radical, just as that which is neither a de Sitter space nor the flatness of a Minkowski space must be hyperbolic in its overall characterization, etc., i.e., in the form of an anti-de Sitter space. (524)

Another metaphor for the dialectical taking precedence over the logical is the gestalt argument that neither a foreground nor a background can be perfectly reviewed on its own terms of reference, and, equally, transcendental or intentional subjectivity cannot be completely divorced from the type of intentional activity currently in play. If you are a person ‘seeing an apple tree’ then you are ‘a person seeing an apple tree’, albeit in keeping with the apparent phenomenal-phenomenological nature of what is being seen, be it a perception or a dream, a memory or an imagination, etc. (525)

Metaphorically, space is reviewed through the sweep of time, and, time is reviewed through space as a ‘before’ or ‘after’, and so on. (526)

Now, let me further borrow from both physics and mathematics through the lens of a categorical metaphysics (given a scientific preoccupation with hybrid identities like, e.g., time-and-space, energy-and-matter, and the persistent desire to formulate a general-relativity-integrated-within-a-theoretical-quantum-reality, and v.v.). (527)

A relatively-non-critical sphere of concern cannot be absolutistically differentiated from a relatively-critical sphere of concern, and v.v. It is as if the relative sub-structures of these two spheres cannot be differentiated, but, only relatively superficial features would let us differentiate one from the other. In the represented depiction of a world where ‘Julius Caesar did not cross the Rubicon’ there would be little difference to discern from the representation of a world where ‘Julius Caesar did cross the Rubicon’, but, given, the apparent constitution of both worlds is much more dependent upon Julius Caesar having crossed the Rubicon, etc., then we have to credit ‘the inescapable ramifications following on in the wake of ‘his having crossed the Rubicon’ as being more in an alignment with our vision of the ensuing world as arrived at through that same consensus given such consensus is so well-informed in that regard, namely, that this fact of his crossing the Rubicon, etc., far better accounts for the ensuing rise of the Roman Republic, and so on. It is as if this ‘alternative fact’ that ‘Julius Caesar did not cross the Rubicon’ could not be (mis-)predicated on anything other than the mis-depiction of the received fact that ‘Julius Caesar, indeed, did cross the Rubicon, etc.’ Yes, we could imagine the opposite of such a fact (his deciding to not cross the Rubicon), but, the contrary historical ramifications in the imagined wake of that alternative fact could hardly be contemplated given vast chunks of seemingly settled history so fixedly standing in the way of our accepting such revisionary perspectives. Such imagined obstructions forcing us to revise such distorted revisions, whereas, on the contrary, when a re-visioned history can successfully bypass such traditional concerns then that minor discourse will eventually become the major discourse in that same regard. (528)

Or, on a substructure of certain pre-conditions that contextualizes this historical fact, the fact that this same substructure must underly the representation of both of these two possible ‘facts’ determines one to be a ‘true fact’ and the other as a ‘false fact’ or a ‘lie’ if ‘one were to disseminate the same whilst knowing it to be false’. Now, in a similar manner, I would like to propose a relative indivisibility of both moments and periods of time on the understanding that, vertically, temporal structural-functions, presenting as operators, are hierarchically structured in a manner that overlaps one upon the other. I.e., all time is momentary, say, on a Planck level, but holistically bound at the same time in periods or chunks with the chaotic ‘time’ in between such periods then being defined as ‘inter-periodic moments’.⁹⁴ Internal to such ‘chunks’ or ‘blocks’, as these ‘periods of historical time-and-space’ we can refer to moments therein as ‘intra-periodic moments’. Saturating this system I would propose a de Sitter-Minkowski-anti-de Sitter economy (where time and transformational operations are initiated in anti-de Sitter ‘space’ or its metaphorical/non-metaphorical equivalent, and, space and matter, as operands, are operated upon in de Sitter space or its metaphorical/non-metaphorical equivalent. Within these blocks or periods, I propose the application of Markovian-like processes⁹⁵ in complex Hilbert spaces, but, in between, in inter-periodic moments, I propose non-Markovian-like processes more or less invoking the entirety of the history of such blocks (and where the application of complex Hilbert spaces would only have a relegated or secondary status at best). Regardless of the potential success or actual failure of this schema-

⁹⁴ I am making my interpreted allusion here to the indivisible quantum theory of non-Markovian sequences as theoretically presented by Jacob Barandes. This approach perceives quantum systems as evolving through non-divisible ‘chunks’ rather than through either smooth continuous trajectories or discontinuous jumps. In my appropriation of this scheme I want to have my metaphorical cake and eat it at the same time, namely, by treating space-time as momentary (at the Plank level), and where chunks of such moments re(-)self-organized in periods of moments have a certain overall holistic indivisibility that is only disrupted or redefined through inter-periodic moments of chaotic-like re-iteration, that, from an economic perspective, over a longer set of vertical and horizontal sequences would be redefined as ‘economically/non-economically re(-)iterated’. Such an approach would effectively relegate observables, etc., represented in complex Hilbert spaces, to a secondary status and as intra-periodic in orientation. I.e., that Markovian processes would only occur within these blocks or periods in a form of either continuous reiteration and/or discontinuous re-iteration dependent upon the immediacy of the current prior moment in question. In a deliberate contrast, I am arguing that blocks or periods experience inter-periodic forms of transformational-transition that collectively reflect the resident memory or history of that block or period in its entirety. Moreover, that such transformational-transitions are instantiated through either alignments or non-alignments with co-associated strata that, likewise, are constructed from sets of parallel non-Markovian blocks arranged either vertically or horizontally as either strata and/or groups. The implication being that processes of duplication, including reduplication, can only occur within periods and not between the same. That inter-periodic transformations would be more relational engagements rather than virtual, passive recognitions and non-virtual, active encounters through requisite standing, and more like existentially oriented engagements marked by existential hallmarks, etc., i.e., in an immediacy of time and an entanglement of the spatial that then collapses to commence the formation of a new block or period in either that same set of strata and/or that set of groups in question. Applied in the context of conformance, I am suggesting a re-conformalization of such blocks through either a confirmation of their apparent alignment or non-alignment with other members in that same set of strata and/or that set of groups. By such means moving the relatively-non-critical or the relatively radical back to the sphere of the relative-critical, and v.v., and, where relatively defective readings of this process basically augment a relatively-non-critical sphere of concern (and care).

⁹⁵ Where a Markov process or a Markovian process is a random-like (stochastic) process dependent upon the chaotic re-configuration sequentially issuing from the state of the last current moment rather than from the history or memory of the entirety of a periodic block of moments.

tization, a metaphorical comparison is being proposed in order to understand these transformational-transitions between all three of these economic correlatives of the relatively-non-critical, the relatively-critical, and the relatively-radical (or, through economic complexification, the correlatives of the super-economy consisting of the hyper-economic, the economic, and the non-economic). That moments of chaotic inter-periodic re-direction arise from the holistic memory or history of the entire block undergoing this irruptive non-economic-like disruption and being established through forms of transformational processes of re(-)alignment with other strata in acts of apparent conformalization rather than through mere relatively non-chaotic reiteration. Let me attempt to make things a little simpler diagrammatically:

Did Julius Caesar cross the Rubicon (in January 49 BCE)?

/////Julius Caesar///// R /////+Crossed Rubicon///// - Yes: Critical Conformation = T
 /////Julius Caesar///// R /////-Crossed Rubicon///// - No: Critical Non-Conformation = F

Therefore, Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon (in 49 BCE)

Structurally, under full conformal appreciation:⁹⁶

Non-Critically Represented:⁹⁷

/////Cross Rubicon in January 49 BCE/////

/////Julius Caesar/////

/////Roman Empire/////

/////Mediterranean World/////

Critically Represented as a Set of Strata:

/////+Cross Rubicon in January 49 BCE/////

/////Julius Caesar/////

/////Roman Empire/////

/////Mediterranean World/////

In flipping [-Cross Rubican] => [+Cross Rubicon], in hindsight, we have effectively moved from a non-critical to a critical aspect of our conformal economy.⁹⁸ (529)

⁹⁶ A conformal truth state is realized, by a previous definition, through a confirmation (in real time) or verification (in non-real time) of a confirmation or verification, but, more correctly, through a triangulation of perspectives involving either confirmation/s and/or verification/s.

⁹⁷ I.e., '-Cross' = 'did not cross', '+Cross' = 'did cross'.

⁹⁸ The intent of this 'diagram' is to first demonstrate the logic that locks both doors of a 'logical house', and, to demonstrate that in order for the representation to be either true (T) or false (F) there must first exist, presuppositionally, a Mediterranean World, a Roman Empire, and a certain person designated as the historical Julius Caesar. By correctly affirming this proposition that this famous historical individual crossed the Rubicon (as an act signalling his apparent intent to start a civil war) we move from its negation to its assertion as indicating, retrospectively, a movement from a relatively-non-critical facet to a relatively-critical facet in our overall economy of conformation. That most of this economy is critically constructed otherwise the truth claim 'that Julius Caesar did cross the Rubicon' could not be comprehended.

That, given the existence of the Mediterranean World, a Roman Empire, and a notable historical figure of Julius Caesar, etc., it is obvious that most of the conformal economy consists of a relatively-critical substructural sphere of influence. That, therefore, relatively-non-critical features must be somewhat relatively superficial in their relations in any conformal economy for otherwise no propositional truth value could be discerned without such a necessary conformally validated presuppositional basis in the first place. In somewhat of a similar stance, relatively-radical inputs, if true, also supply rather superficial or adventitious contributions until suitably re(-)evaluated in critically conducted, hyper-economic terms of reference and conformally confirmed through the requisitely required degrees of co-associated alignments capable of making and reinforcing that same truth claim. (530)

How might I instructively use this metaphorical approach of ‘indivisible periods subject to inter-periodic moments of chaotic re-direction in an ongoing economy of re-direction [re(-)direction]?’ If we were to use our imaginations, in contemplating the possibility of computations of nature capable of predicting the course of a three-bodied interaction occupying a random, non-re iterating trajectory what might we hope for? For a start, given that these three bodies are located in a shared orbital space we might surmise that there exist periods of time that are not chaotic in complexion. Such periods (with a Markovian complexion) would seem to present islands of relative non-chaotic stability. On the other hand, in approaching moments of bifurcation/emergence/phase-changes, it would now be timely to conjecture that the stable memories of such blocks, as set histories, could well find induced chaotic moments of re(-)direction in a non-Markovian manner. That, basically, bifurcations, etc., at such points with a chaotic complexion generally observe the instigation of a novel path with the least effort that is not so much calculated as experienced through simulations that adopt and adapt a path of least resistance between such relatively stable blocks or periods. In other words, the chaotic complexion of the natural world (and the world of consciousness) does not ‘calculate’, but, rather, express itself along a series of paths exercised through both the least resistance and the least effort needed to enact the relatively chaotic sections of such trajectories. That, in a similar manner, novel conscious states are experienced in a similar manner, namely, through the interfacing of relatively non-chaotic blocks or periods with chaotically induced inter-periodic moments when and where paths of least effort or energy, therebetween, are re-directed. That, analogically, similar occurs in a conformal economy when and where non-aligned facets of that economy are tested and are then found to be either aligned or could be brought into alignment or as not currently aligned and not capable of being brought into some form of significant alignment, etc. (531)

Whatever we think about the nature of truth our survival in the world at large is predicated on an overall alignment between our lived-experiences and the lived-reality of the same, and v.v. Hence in our rectification of lived-experience, in and through a process of re(-)alignment, the transformational-transition from a facet to be found in the relatively-non-critical and its conversion to the relatively-critical such a transformation must be relatively superficial. A person might entertain the mistaken fact that ‘Julius Caesar did not cross the Rubicon’ then the very presentation of that mistaken ‘fact’ as a ‘true fact’

demands that it be possible along with all the contextual relationships it has in order to operate as that possible fact, be its truth under contention, mistaken or not mistaken. We could toss coin and say ‘yea’ or ‘nay’, but, that which underlies the comprehension of the possibility and significance of that fact is quite asymmetric. A Mediterranean World must rightly exist, along with a Roman empire and a notable statesperson by the name of ‘Julius Caesar’. That to even entertain the mistaken belief that ‘Julius Caesar did not cross the Rubicon’ one must accept the truthfulness of its presuppositional contextualization. In other words, the possibility of a non-critical sphere of influence is predicated, almost as a contradiction, on the overwhelming existence of a sphere of truthful proposition in an alignment with a body of propositions in a general conformational alignment with each other... in varying degrees of relative incontrovertible necessity, e.g., no Roman empire without a Mediterranean World, no Julius Caesar without the Roman World, and so on. On the other hand, as claimed in a misguided traditional metaphysics, we do not require the separation of a world from a world of texts, indeed, we need only claim a realm of texts and their agreements through alignments and non-alignments through non-alignments. (532)

However, as members of the secular world, it is natural to project beyond the textualization of our experiences, but, as either critical and/or radical philosophers, and as mindful disciplinarians, such imputations are to be viewed as entirely unnecessary and more often than not, unhelpful, and, even more to the point, as basically impossible and should be avoided, ignored, abstained from, and, when necessary, suitably deconstructed. That, in this regard, from a broad economic perspective, we can propose a set of no-go theorems, and I would like to contend, supply a non-no-go theorem to account for a certain number of the former. E.g., from a no-go perspective declaring that ‘pure’ uni-modal, bi-modal, and closed tri-modal ‘positions’ as ‘positions’ to ignore, avoid, distance ourselves from, etc.⁹⁹ Furthermore, that ‘pure’ tetra-modal, penta-modal, hexamodal positionings etc., are also to be ignored and so on. Interestingly, as already explored, the six orders, on any level of ordered formation,¹⁰⁰ neatly shape the relativity of a so-called internal world of the intentional objective and the so-call external world of its situated contextualization. Hence the formula of accommodations, differentiations, and transformations of the philosophical-disciplinary world, and, the consilience, salience, and propinquity or standing of the secular world (along with their bi-modal interaction as forming a third economic correlative in parallel with the non-economic in the vertical economy of the super-economic). That, collectively, those interactions of these three economic correlatives form the working functions of the hexa-modal economy of the orders (along with their reduplications, de-reduplications, duplications, de-duplication, processes of transformational retreatment, and so forth. (533)

In developing a basis for converting relatively-non-critically formulated information to relatively-critical formulations, and await relatively-radical re-formulations of the former, let me articulate a central non-no-go theorem, supply its theoretical support

⁹⁹ By ‘pure’ is meant ‘mistreatment that is absolutistical; a literalization of the metaphorical; as dysfunctionally unqualified in terms of its requisite features, goals, and data; and is effectively impossible to contemplate in that unqualified format, etc.’

¹⁰⁰ I.e., on a cognitive level or a trans-cognitively ordered ordering, inter-ordering, and extra-ordering.

inter term of its formulation and observations, and then formulate a certain number of no-go theorems reflecting its prohibition of a pure uni-modalism, etc. (534)

That no formulations, in a potential mapping of theory and practice, etc., should be ever countenanced in any form of a non-open tri-modal economical pattern of treatment'. Hence this Central Non-No-Go Theorem (titled as an Obligatory Open Tri-Modal Economicalism' or 'Central Theorem'). (535)

In regard to this Central Theorem, as an important non-no-go theorem, what support can we proffer for such a prohibition, by what positive rules does it operate, and by what negative rules does its reproduce a certain series of No-Go Theorems? (536)

In a gestalt understanding and appreciation of relations it is to be argued that we can neither focus on a foregrounded point in its own right, nor a backgrounded field of context in its own right, nor in any co-associated sense of intentional subjectivity (neither in any affective pre-intentional subjectivity, judgmental trans-intentional subjectivity, consequential post-intentional subjectivity nor transcendental subjectivity). Consequently, even relations, or any other epistemological product, can be treated non-relationally, i.e., in a non-gestalt fashion. Moreover, this implies that even these three orientations, 'themselves', cannot be focused upon individually in their own right and must be treated as unobtainable 'correlatives'.¹⁰¹ I.e., being viewed as unobtainable, as not able to be appropriated on their own terms alone, etc. Furthermore, such pre-conditions can be collectively treated as exclusive conditions for understanding and appreciation. I.e., that these three, and these three pre-conditions both collectively and together alone, can be treated as conditional requirements for the pursuit of understanding and an appreciation of that being understood. (537)

That understood, theoretically, practically implies that all relevant observations, in turn, must be formulated, likewise, through this same open tri-modal economic philosophy, etc. Thence the critical ramifications of this approach that must also apply to our critical re(-)appropriation of the relatively-radical (in order to make better sense of the same, etc.). (538)

Subsequently, from this Central Theorem, we can formulate the following series of no-go theorems, namely, the thorough prohibition of all patterns of absolutistical exposition including that a pure uni-modalism, a pure bi-modalism, a closed tri-modalism, and any pure form of a multi-modalism starting from a pure tetra-modalism and higher. (539)

E.g., any reference to a pure uni-modalism is prohibited. On the other hand, suitably qualified, non-literal patterns of metaphorical treatment can be permitted and cannot prohibit both weak formulations and non-weak/non-strong formulations. (540)

Modelling the rest of these no-go theorems on the same pattern of this uni-modal prohibition, forbidding the imputed dissemination of a pure uni-modalism, etc. (541)

¹⁰¹ In either economic complexification or in ordered complexification comparing different correlatives between different economies sees us viewing such 'inter-economic correlatives' as 'correlativities'.

With this Central Theorem in place, and its co-associated set of no-go theorems articulated accordingly, let me demonstrate the philosophical relevance of such a critically discursive approach.¹⁰² (542)

First, let me supply two axioms for interpreting the same, namely, a Central Axiom of Application and a Central Axiom of Interpretation. (543)

In the application of the Central Theorem we must discard all absolutistical forms of interpretative interventions, etc. (544)

In interpretation, post-transformational treatment, we need to note imputed forms of ordered origination, in accordance with the three baskets of the ordered, inter-ordered, and the extra-ordered, along with either their primary locations or transitional status when transitioning from one order to another as exercised in processes of duplication, reduplication; pretreatment, treatment, and retreatment, etc. (545)

Now, let me argue for two types of chaotic transformation, namely, Markovian and Non-Markovian in characterization, i.e., sequentially divisible in origination and indivisibly non-sequential in origination. Basically, chaotic moments of bifurcation/emergence/phase change that are spontaneously enacted in a certain moment arrived at incrementally, and, spontaneously enacted from the net presentation of a certain period of moments treated collectively and without division into moments that can be described in Markovian terms of reference. Why the appropriation of this very recent innovation in theoretical physic?¹⁰³ (546)

In this, my revised vision of a conformal theory, we have chunks or blocks of conformalized materials (that can be translated in propositional terms of reference) that have overall ascriptions of truth values that, radically, i.e., seemingly in a chaotic-like fashion, can be converted into reiterable, attainable truth determinations and/or where prior determinations can be radically flipped, either transposed or rendered undecided. By a 'prior determination in truth values' is meant, 'positive, negative, or non-decided truth values in a binary style of operations or trivalent forms of ascription in a ternary system, etc.'¹⁰⁴ In effect, I am arguing that a Markovian style of process is sequential, either chaotic or non-chaotic in complexion, whereas, in a marked contrast, an indivisible, Non-Markovian process sees, or rather, oversees the conformal alteration of a block of propositional-like materials in a change of its truth status. So, e.g., in doing a particular style of historical research, say, a history of the present, the sudden change of interpretation may well arise from the overall alteration of a block of conformalized materials rather than from a mere moment of chaotic re-direction. (547)

¹⁰² Let me refer to 'conjectures' as 'relatively unproven theorems', 'theorems' as 'relatively proven conjectures be that through either observation and/or through theoretical forms of consistency, coherence, et, and non-contradiction, etc.', and, 'axioms' as 'methods for interpreting the former'.

¹⁰³ First formulated around 2021 and then further promoted by Jacob Barandes.

¹⁰⁴ Leaving open tetra-modal forms of ascription, or complex truth ascriptions framed through the use of matrices, etc.

In the form of an imaginary anecdote let me illustrate this radical-like process of truth re-ascription. (548)

Imagine yourself as a child who has been enrolled in a rather unconventional school. This particular school allows its teachers to teach what those individual teachers personally believe in regardless of whether there were to exist a national syllabus that generally reflected a certain conventional consensus as to just what, therein, would have been currently considered to be either true or false. One teacher, with a rather unconventional Christian set of beliefs, believes that dinosaurs and humans co-existed not too long ago given a very recent creation of the Earth, and, the other teacher is firmly convinced that Moon Landings were staged in a Hollywood style studio. Naturally, the pupils taught by these two teachers, at first, would be more inclined to believe what they were being taught was 'true'. However, out in the real world, they might quickly come to the conclusion that to voice such beliefs might not be a good idea. Should an element of skepticism intrude then they may well then question the veracity of what they were taught as true. Should one of those pupils wish to pursue a science degree in biology then arguing that 'dinosaurs and humans co-existed' would not be a good career move. Similarly, being told that the American flag is seen 'waving' in its cinematic depiction of these so-called 'moon landings' is proof that there was a draught of air and could not have been filmed on an airless surface of the Moon. Of course, when told the American flag is only a thin printed sheet of metal and, in being bumped, would naturally look like it was 'waving in a breeze'. At some point, a person more open to the ways of the world and its conventional understandings, would naturally find themselves radically changing some of their view. In my assessment of this radical type of change it would not be so much a certain incrementally arrived at unit of information that would suddenly convert the conformal status of that defectively treated block of conformal materials, but, rather, an overall reinterpretation of that block itself. Indeed, in such transpositions, it is my understanding that it is usually the case that a whole series of attitudes and beliefs, more or less, spontaneously change at the same time. Hence my appropriation of this form of theoretical research in order to better describe this chaotic-like transition in overall truth determination. I.e., that although some chaotic processes could be understood as being instigated in moments of bifurcation, etc., still, it could well be the case that other transformational forms of chaotic transition could well be instigated as the transposition of entire blocks of conformalized materials rather than from mere patterns of momentary re-direction. (549)

In my modelling of the re(-)presentational economy I invoke the three correlatives of presentation, representation, and re-presentation. Here, 'representation' is the mere 'reiteration' of intentional materials, etc.' With the iteration of similar material this forms a consonant-like background when viewed in gestalt terms. Then, with the incremental reiteration of represented materials a point will inevitably be reached when we meet a point of chaotic bifurcation/emergence/phase change.¹⁰⁵ That such a transformation, although re-directed, unlike being merely redirected, could still be treated as a sequential process and hence can be viewed as operating sequentially as a Markovian-like process.

¹⁰⁵ As previously discussed, that from one perspective a bifurcation can be viewed as an emergence, etc. In other words, a point of chaotic transformation can be interpreted as either a bifurcation, or emergence, or phase change.

Now, I would like to contend that this economic correlative of ‘presentation’ could well operate from a non-Markovian orientation. I.e., a block-like presentation that in being iterated could well be subjected to a transformational-transition in which the entire conformal complexion of that process is flipped or has flipped. Let me recount the type of experience I have in mind where a block of intentionally presented materials undergoes a transformational-transition. (550)

Imagine travelling to a country town. We are walking down the main street of this rather picturesque township and admiring the shops as we pass by. The totality of this perception is both presented, in its apparent integrity, and given a certain perceptual stability, through being reiterated, i.e., represented. Then, one of us remarks that they remember that this town has a very famous café and, in looking for it, we see it just ahead of us, marked out with a long queue of customers standing in line outside. My appreciation of this town is now ‘not just a pleasant country town’ but a ‘township that has this very famous café’. We joint the queue and head off to a nearby park to enjoy our coffees, eating their very famous pies and rhubarb crumbles. Although the moment I saw this café confirmed that this township had this famous café, still, in lived-experience this township already was ‘that township that had this famous café’. That re-presented moment of confirmation merely confirmed what was already in a conformal alignment with the lived-reality of this town as recognized both by myself and by those people in whose company I visited this town. The ‘overall presentation of my factual awareness of this town’ became the ‘overall presentation of this township plus this famous café’. That the visual confirmation of this represented-presentation merely conformally confirmed what was already being presented and not so much something being suddenly or spontaneously re-presented (with a hyphen). Yes, confirmation was re-presented, but, conformation was still being presented given this is what we already knew to be the case. Or, my alignment with this lived-reality was being reinforced and not so much suddenly imposed in an insightful moment alone. Let me recount another anecdote in order to reinforce this somewhat subtle distinction between the chaotic presentation of intentional material, etc., and the chaotic re-direction of a spontaneous-like moment of re-presentation. (551)

As a teenager, on a first visit to Auckland organized by myself, I was amazed one Sunday morning by the fact that the only people on the street were brightly dressed Polynesian in their Sunday best all seemingly heading off to church. They appeared to be the only people going to church and although I could not identify with their very vivid sense of fashion they had to be admired for the colour they brought to the streets. This was quite contrary to the racist myths, let me say, that considerably tarnished the reality of these newly arrived migrants. Then, of course, they also congregated on a certain infamous street in gangs with their motorcycles. To my mind, they demonstrated a great sense of mateship, never bothered me when I went past and I am sure, if I were a bike enthusiast, I would be marveling at the wonderful machines so proudly displayed and lovingly looked after. So, when did this racist myth collapse before the evidence of the lived-reality of my lived-experience. With the first brightly clad family that went past, or the second, or the third? No, in retrospect, this myth sort of crumbled around the edges and then would have just flipped. These proud people were obviously making Aotearoa New Zealand their home and it felt homely to have such people walking the streets on

would have been, elsewhere, a very lonely Sunday morning. In hindsight, I note that contemporary, conservative-traditionalists may no longer go to church on a Sunday morning, but, these citizens did so like many would have done so some fifty or sixty years ago. I suspect in this age of social connection through Social-Media that a void might now be present where cultural organizations like churches, bowling clubs, tennis clubs, other sporting organizations, gardening groups, scouts and girl-guides are only slowly being replaced by the advent of new forms of social interaction along with what remains of those more traditional forms of interaction? (552)

What is the import of this seeing 'presentation' as a more a 'collective, indivisible, non-sequential, non-Markovian style of chaotic process?' (553)

Section F: A Third Exposition:

On the Nature of the Radical:

A Radical Re-Imagining of the Existential

*At high noon the barest shade is underfoot,
With the dawn and in the eve, shadows are everywhere,
But, in the darkest night, no silhouettes are seen,
Our selves once traced out, now forgotten...*

Section G: A First Set of Conclusions:**On the Nature of the Radical:****Re the Ethical, the Political, and the Existential**

*A definitive decision is approached
Through the suspension of the suspension;
As if catching a fish with a hook
That releases it at the same time...*

Section H: A Second Set of Conclusions:**On the Nature of the Radical:****Re the Conformalization of Experience**

*To tell the truth we must lie,
To lie we must tell the truth,
The honest person knows the difference
Through questioning the details...*

Section I: A Third Set of Conclusions:**On the Nature of the Radical:****Re the Nature of the Existential, etc.**

*In judgment judging judgments,
Just what could go wrong..?
In predetermining truth,
Just what could go right..?*

Section J: Some Additional Conclusions:

On the Nature of the Radical:

Re the Anticipation of the Formulation of a Radical Theology

*The truth of truth is non-truth,
The non-truth of non-truth is truth,
No truth without non-truth,
No non-truth without truth,
Through judgment judging judgments...*

(to be re/written)

What are the ramifications of this radical perspective on the nature, etc., of radical experience and the necessity for the relatively-radical to find suitable forms of ongoing critical re-appropriation, i.e., critical re(-)appropriation? To begin, let me do this under the heading of three questions:

1. What is the nature of truth determination, on one hand for the layperson or secularist, and, on the other hand, the disciplinarian, say, the philosopher, etc?
2. What are the differences between, on one hand, a philosopher, and, on the other hand, all other disciplinarians assuming the necessary existence of an imputed distinctive disciplinary difference between disciplines, etc?
3. To what extent are processes of reduplication responsible for radical-like experiences unlike those experiences orchestrated through duplication, etc?

Venn diagram
Proof it is chaotic

Section K: A Parallel Dictionary of Hypothetical Economic Correlativities¹⁰⁶

<u>Type of Economy:</u>	Archetypal World	Archetypal Object	Archetypal Ego
Philosophical:	Hermeneutics	Phenomenology	Existentialism
Temporal:	Future	Past	Present
Herm. Circle:	Whole	Parts	Whole-and-Parts
Criticality:	Pre-Critical	Critical	Pot. Radical
Harmonic:	Consonance Theory	Dissonance Practice	Resolution Critique
Descriptive:	Prescriptive Relations	Descriptive Predicates	Proscriptive Nominations
Directedness:	Redirected	Directed	Re-Directed
Mod. of Error:	Mitigation	Correction (Remediation)	Align. with Relatively Non-Erroneous
Iterations:	Reiteration	Iteration	Re-Iteration.
Representation:	Representing	Presenting	Re-Presenting/ Anti-Representational
Retreatment:	Pretreatment	Treatment	Retreatment/ Posttreatment
Textual:	Meta-Textual	Textual	Non-Textual
Continuities	Continuities	Discontinuities	Non-Continuities
Philosophical Tools:	Rectification (through mitigation)	Deconstruction (through remediation)	Re(-)Normalization (through re-approx.)
Interrogative Eco.	Rhetorical Dis-Conjunctive Sus.	Metaphorical Conjunctive Sus.	Apparitional Dynamic Bal...
(Imputational:¹⁰⁷)	Non-Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Extrapolation	Suspended// Non-Extrapolation...
(Imp.Eco read as:)	(Global Suspensions)	(Local Suspensions)	(Trans-Rel. Sus.)
[Overall Eco. of Eco:	Hyper-Economic	<i>Economic</i>	Non-Economic] [69] (mmm)

¹⁰⁶ Originally posted as: *Pursuit*, III.VII.III.C.A; III.IX.9.B, and III.IXB.69.(A).

¹⁰⁷ The imputational economy is discussed in *The Seventh Book...* modules 406, 407, 901.

Section L: A Seventh Digest
That with Previous Digests Can be Appended to *The Seventh Book...*

The relatively-radical is neither relatively-non-critical nor relatively critical. (1)

Neither the radically-radical nor something that can be radically divorced from the former. (2)

Given wrongly known-knowns, known-knowns, known-unknowns and unknown-knowns, and forever unknown-unknowns. (3)

The humble and thoughtful person recognizes the omnipresence of the latter. (4)