Skepticism and the Transcendental Attitude: Part I:
A Critique of Husserl’s Critique of Descartes….*

0.   Pre-Introduction

	The following paper, I believe, is a more Contemporary oriented poly-textual type of text – it operates on a number of levels and in a number of perspectives, and, some or all of these various facets are to be read with an emphasis decided upon either individually by a reader or collectively by a group of ‘readers’. (1)

I.   Introduction

	Descartes (1596-1650), like many philosophers both before and after him, including the philosopher Husserl (1859-1938), sought to find out what, if anything, one could believe to be either true or false, and, how they might be absolutely self-assured of the validity of just that evaluation; ever hopeful that such an indubitable judgment could be made. Surprisingly, Descartes (and Husserl) adopted a technique of the Skeptics, namely, a thoroughly skeptical attitude in the hope of finding something upon which one could be self-assured of as indubitable and able to resist the skeptical thrust of this approach despite, and in spite of, this particular attitude that appears to call all things into question. This sense of the indubitable, as an apodictic experience, being both self-evidently self-evident and impossible to entertain in any other contrary fashion. (2)

	Husserl praises this technique of Descartes and declares him to be a transcendental philosopher in this regard. However, once Husserl thinks Descartes has diverted himself from the transcendental suspension, the thorough exercise of this skeptical attitude, he therein believes that he has made his first mistake. How does Husserl interpret this expression of the transcendental, and, how does Husserl re-construct this point between his successful insight into the nature of the transcendental and his failure of spirit to move forward and follow through from that insight? (3)

	How does Husserl define the transcendental? For a start we can note he contrasts it with the expression of transcendent and also invokes a difference between the natural attitude and the transcendental attitude, noting the latter to be objectively critical in its exercise… let me quote a small extract from a recent essay of mine where I deal with this issue of differentiating the transcendental from the transcendent, etc: (4)

*          For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html
	Both the phenomenologist, etc., and the theologian must not confuse this expression of the ‘transcendental’ with the term ‘transcendent’. On the other hand, these expressions are related. Let me critically re-define the dialectical space between these two closely related expressions and in the process also defuse their non-critical superimposition in the mind of the non-critical philosopher. (774)

	Without wasting time, coming straight to the point (and acting as mutual co-definitions of each other), the semblance of the transcendental arises through the suspension of both the relatively transcendent (nature of ‘structure’ and ‘process’) and the relatively immanent (nature of that ‘being-structured’ and that being relatively subjected to a process, i.e., content). Through mutual interdependence and correlativity (in the formation of all processes of identity either epistemologically oriented or ontologically oriented) there can be no absolute sense of either the transcendental or the non-transcendental, nor, the transcendent or the immanent! Hence the non-absolute relativity of the transcendental, etc., by virtue of the existential fact that the transcendental (attitude) defines and is defined by the ‘relatively non-transcendental’, i.e., the phenomenal as entertained in and through the natural attitude, etc…. (775) (5)

II.   Objectives

In this paper I would ideally like to look into the following:

1.	The nature of the skeptical attitude,
2.	Descartes’ treatment of the skeptical attitude,
3.	Husserl’s critique of Descartes in that regard,
4.	My critique of Husserl. (6)

My objective is to sketch out what I believe should be meant in the expression (an) overall transcendental suspension (OTS) and the inescapable relevance this device has for conducting serious, critical, fruitfully productive processes of philosophical reflection, i.e., in effect, a critical transcendental philosophy. I shall do this through quotation, discussion of the same, and, the use of various though-experiments set up by myself to demonstrate various points I would like to make in regard to the OTS and its critical exercise along with an indication as to why such a path should be fruitfully productive for the committed philosopher! (7)
	To connect these initial objectives with this final objective this poly-textual paper is divided between the form of a traditional paper; a set of interactive thought-experiments; comments upon the nature of the same; various attempts to sketch out a language consisting of specialized concepts for dealing with the same and offering, at that time, a form of critique; various meta-textual comments commenting upon these facets and offering various possible connections between the same. Furthermore, this total paper is open-ended to the extent that it must remain unfinished and operate as an ‘introduction’ to this final objective of establishing the nature, function and importance of the overall transcendental suspension (OTS) in the critically conducted exercise of philosophy (and which will be exercised, hopefully, later in the year, in a paper where I will examine major mis-translations of prime Buddhist Texts in the Yogacara tradition by subjecting key passages of the same to a re-translation through this type of ‘critical lens’). (8)

III.   An ‘Experimental’ Paper

1.	Experiment No. 1 - What does it mean to be skeptical?

When we are skeptical we call into question that which we entertain in a skeptical fashion. If we were to say an object is real, a fact is true or a certain work of art was beautiful, etc., a skeptical attitude towards the same, in turn, would question, respectively, the imputed ‘reality’ of that object, the historical ‘facticity’ of a so-called ‘fact’, the objective ‘aestheticality’ of a that state of affairs treated as a work of art, etc. To that extent we are being skeptical about a certain facet or perspective of the phenomenal-phenomenological reality of that state of affairs. (9)

In the same vein let us take a series of examples and treat them skeptically, say, this table in front of us; or, is it possible that other people in this room are merely robots or alien simulations or ideas merely inserted by some divinity or devil, etc; or, whether it is possible to doubt the existence of ‘our’ own sense of self, etc? (10)

2.   Experiment No. 2 – Can we be absolutely skeptical of presuppositions?

	Can we be absolutely skeptical? If I doubt the existence of ‘this table here’ I do not call into question the floor on which it would have stood if it were to exist, etc. But could I not doubt the existence of this floor too, and so on? Is it not the case that to be skeptical you cannot call all presuppositions into account in the same manner that suppositions and/or some presuppositions might be subjected to skeptical doubt?! Then, could one doubt the existence of one’s self who is subjecting such suppositions and presuppositions to some form of skeptical treatment? (11)

Not according to both Descartes and Husserl. For the former there is the apodictic certainty that it is oneself who is being skeptical and that one cannot be skeptical about one’s self being skeptical in that same moment of time. For Husserl that which is truly evident is self-evidently true. The phenomenon is manifested or the set of phenomena are manifested in such a manner that they could not be found manifested in any other form when it is evident that they are evidently true to self, i.e., self-evidently self-evident. So, e.g., the phenomenon of the world as a world per se could be imagined as otherwise, i.e., to be non-existent, but, one could not imagine this phenomenological act of the self to be completely absent or non-existent – either one is entertaining the phenomenon of the world or one is not entertaining the phenomenon of the world, but either way, one is still entertaining a phenomenological act of the self regardless of the existence or non-existence in ‘reality’ of the apparent, intentional contents of that act, indeed, the very nature of the phenomenon or phenomena in question is irrelevant to the very existence of that mental act. The phenomenon of the phenomenological act itself cannot be called into question, so, in being skeptical one can be skeptical towards the reality of the phenomenon in question but not skeptical towards the very phenomenon of the phenomenological act that carries out this skeptical attitude! More or less what Descartes is on about but stated in and through the lens of a phenomenological philosophy. (12)

{There is a profound philosophical distance between Husserl and Descartes, and, the problematic for Descartes is re-translated in and through a new philosophical language carved out, in large part, by Husserl and Husserl’s treatment of the work of a number of philosophers, psychologists, etc., after the time of Descartes such as, e.g., Brentano}. (13)

	For Husserl, what is entailed in a phenomenological attitude, and, more specifically, a transcendental phenomenological attitude (as opposed to the naïve, non-transcendental nature of the natural attitude)? (14)

	Husserl’s approach to phenomena is conducted through the critical lens of a transcendental attitude wherein what ‘appears’ is treated as the ‘phenomenon in question’, as the ‘mere phenomenon’ under examination. Under such focus the question is asked “just what is the essential nature that distinctively differentiates that phenomenon in question from all other phenomena?” E.g., when we taste seawater we perceive it to be brackish or salty to the taste. Seawater is perceived to have this essential characteristic. Take an ordinary glass of water and add a teaspoon of salty seawater to it spoonful by spoonful until we eventually taste the saltiness of this glass of water. Then, we need add no more teaspoons of seawater to make the water taste salty, and assure ourselves of this characteristic, because the brackish nature of that glass of water is now already essentially established. Additional teaspoons of salty water merely reinforcing the conviction we have that that glass of water is now brackish to the taste (and no longer like ordinary drinking water). Drinking water, the brackish water in that glass of water, and seawater are all perceived to be essentially ‘water-like’, but seawater and drinking water contaminated with seawater are essentially ‘brackish’ to the taste in contrast to the potable nature of mere drinking water. Such characteristics being determined phenomenologically, i.e., being perceived as distinctly differentiated! Once our contaminated glass of water is perceived as brackish it is perceived as salty to the taste and not otherwise. The perception of such essentials excluding what is not subsumed by such differentia. (15)

	Husserl also reminds us that phenomena are intentionally entertained. As intentional objects (or object-states) we bear a certain attitude towards the same in their thematization. Furthermore, because the intentional states are experienced in consciousness, in part, we constitute these same intentional states as intentional-objects-for-us. But such an observation should not be mistreated automatically as a simple form of idealism! Obviously, intentional states of affairs are constituted by us in experience but that does not mean that they are exclusively and solely constituted merely by us and for us alone! Such an idealistic position is too stupid for words! Moreover, Husserl insists that we should be operating within the transcendental suspension (as re-defined by myself as the OTS) wherein no priority or privilege can be ascribed to any party, in either an idealistic or a realistic format, be it a sense of self or some form of an intentional object-state or intentional field, perceptual context, sense of world, etc. In the same vein, we cannot be naïve realists and insist upon the imputed primacy of empirical states of affairs or pre-intentionally constituted sense-data all situated in the impossible realm of a so-called ‘external world’! All such philosophical fictions can be dismissed on the grounds that, as critical transcendental-phenomenologists, we are to solely deal with the mere appearance of phenomena themselves as they come to appear to us as distinctly differentiated essentially. To do that we must invoke the (overall) transcendental suspension, a technique that seemingly parallels the skeptical attitude? But, surely, would it not be the case that being skeptical is merely taking another type of position, namely, a contrary position, and, that this converse position-taking might allow us to play the Devil’s advocate but little more?! So, what sort of skepticism has Husserl in mind (when he both praises Descartes’ skeptical turn and criticizes him for not following through on such a profound insight)?! (16)

	Husserl uses the classical Greek expression epoché (meaning a stoppage). He uses this expression as a form of ‘bracketing’ or non-destructive ‘putting out of action’. We entertain a certain state of affairs (in intentional consciousness) and we then try to understand the mere form of that simulation, as an appearance, without allowing our beliefs and prejudices (as pre-judgements) to pre-determine the essential configuration of the constitution of that state of affairs. We try to let ‘the things themselves speak for themselves.’ So what is watery is seen as watery and when water is salty it is seen as both salty and watery, etc.  To this end the skeptical attitude is conducted to see to what extent those essential configuration cannot be seen as other than what they appear as. When water is just salty it is not sweet, neither is it sour or bitter. Such salty water cannot be other than as ‘salty water’. To this extent a skeptical approach is adopted to test the essential limits of that under examination. It is a way of highlighting the apparent essential configuration of that constituted in consciousness by for us. Moreover, we take at face value what is apparently essential in the configuration of that intentionally constituted state of affairs. By calling all apparent facets of that phenomenon into question its essential configuration can be elicited by us for us on an essence by essence basis. So salty water is seen as both ‘salty’ and ‘watery’ incontrovertibilly to the extent that we correctly go about phenomenologically appreciating the essential nature of that phenomenon. (17)

	The phenomenal nature of that under focus can also be explored through the use of a process of eidetic reflection wherein, in a process of explorative phantasy, we transmute the morphology of that to hand without altering its essential topography, i.e., e.g., we could call up before our imaginations a simple equilateral triangle and then by altering the relative lengths of those sides transmute it into an isosceles triangle then into a scalene triangle and thence into a right-angled triangle and back again to an equilateral triangle; these morphological transitions all being exercised within the topography of what it still means to be as a triangle. By such means we creatively explore the essential field of that under examination; examining the general extent of its morphological variation without disrupting its topographical essentiality. (18)

{By a systematic connection between such concepts Husserl approaches the whole question of the nature of philosophy from a much richer set of angles than Descartes, indeed, the whole problematic itself is also re-translated in this process of re-questioning} (19)

3.  Experiment No. 3 –  So what is the point of being ‘skeptical’ for Husserl? 

	E.g., with the phenomenon of a table we could question the following… does this table apparently before us exist… is it a table… does it have a relatively flat-like top (like a tray)… does it have legs or supports… etc., etc???? (20)

	Do not such questions essentially help us to define the phenomenal nature of that to-hand; in this instance the nature of a table as a phenomenon? (21)

	As previously noted (in paragraph no. 16) the point of being skeptical is not to carve out a negative or contrary position, but, to realize a transcendental point of view in our research into that currently being examined. By putting our prejudices (as prejudgments) out of play we allow ourselves the luxury of merely examining the phenomenal form of that to found-to-hand. Our skeptical treatment is a technique for eliciting and itemizing the essential features that constitute that phenomenon or set of phenomena, indeed, are constituted by us in our intentional constitution of this state-of-affairs as intentionally examined by us. But to what end? (22)

	In response to this question Husserl might answer: to establish a transcendental philosophy that would allow us to be critically critical (and not critical and philosophical in some superficial sense)… realize what exactly is apodictic in experience… and, therein establish a critical philosophical science. (23)

	Such objectives, in the light of a Postmodern critique, are severely discredited, but, still, we are offered a variety of philosophical tricks of the trade that can help us navigate this World-of-Life in a relatively critical, non-absolute manner… (24)

{So let us explore this imputation of an apodictic element in human experience, specifically, in our so-called ‘critical philosophical reflections upon an intentional sense of self and those intentional objects constituted by a transcendental sense of self’??} (25)

4. Experiment No. 4 - How indubitable is the ‘apodictic-like’ experience’? 

	When I think about some intentional state of affairs that state of affairs may or may not exist in reality, however, the existence or non-existence of that intentional object-state can never call into question the existence of that very self itself thinking that thought (whatever its egological nature might be)! I might doubt the existence of particular state of affairs, I can never sensibly call my own sense of self into question at the same time. Is it really ‘me’ thinking this thought (and, in turn, thinking ‘about’ this same thought, etc?). Yes – inescapably and, therefore, apodictically! (26)

	Descartes’ realization was that we could not be sensibly skeptical about our own processes of (intentional) consciousness; e.g., when I think about something it is surely ‘I’, whatever that be, that is thinking about that something! By necessity there must be some intentional sense of self that is consciously entertaining that proposition regardless of the existence or non-existence of the ‘reality’ of the intentional contents of that process of consciousness. Hence the transcendental necessity of this intentional sense of self which can be none other than a transcendental sense of self, i.e., the transcendental ego (whatever its egological nature be or not be). (27)

In Husserl’s much misunderstood thought experiment about the possible non-existence of the world for a thinking agent apparently thinking about the existence or non-existence of the same the point he makes, among a number of insights, is that the thinking agent must exist: ego cogito, ego sum (the self thinks ergo [therefore] the self must exist). (28)

{Think about it – but ask, what sort of necessity is this sense of necessity – analytic and/or synthetic [and/or synthetic a priori?]? Or should we invoke a transcendental sense of necessity?} (29)

5. Experiment No. 5 – Is Evidence ‘Self-Evident’?

	Husserl also argues that flowing on from the apodictic nature of the ego there are also self-evident states of affairs that can be treated as (absolutely) evidential, i.e., as self-evidently self-evident. The carefully and critically conducted results of our eidetic reflections might fall within such a classification as indubitable? Is it not the case that when we detect the brackish nature of water that is contaminated or is being progressively contaminated in that manner as also indubitable, i.e., that the water that has a salty taste is brackish, i.e., salty, and, is not otherwise?! (30)
Once the salty nature of water is experienced as ‘salty’ how could this salty taste be called into question when the phenomenon to hand, namely, this water being tasted, is perceived to be nothing but being salty? (31) 

Now, we cannot be absolutely skeptical – that ridiculous type of position has already been ruled out of court! We can question that salty flavour – but once determined as essentially salty all we have done it to elicit an essential feature that indubitably belongs to our phenomenological experience of that particular phenomenon to hand, namely, that ‘salty water’. Here, being relatively skeptical has merely elicited the essential characteristics of that currently to hand under examination, namely as ‘water’ that is ‘salty’! (32)

	Because Husserl sees us as transcendental and intentional agents that constitute meaning for ourselves it follows that ‘if water is constituted for-us as salty’ then ‘it is salty to us’, neither more nor less! So, in this light, Husserl’s channeling of the skeptical approach realizes an essential understanding of that intentional state of affairs under examination, that this is done under the auspices of a transcendental suspension, and, that this research conducted in this critical transcendental-phenomenological manner allows us to attend to the mere phenomenon to hand in its sheer phenomenality. That this research elicits for us that which is apodictic in this type of experience… hence this critical nature of this transcendental science just outlined?! Did we or did we not, in theory, elicit the apodictically necessary nature of those phenomenological investigations? (33)

{Yes, according to Husserl!? But, always as a ‘work in progress’?}. (34)

	One of the insights proffered by Husserl is the tripartite equation ego – cogito – cogitatum (ego – cogitation – intentional object-state). This is a definite improvement upon Descartes by taking into account, among other things, the necessary existence of an intentional object-state in each and every intentional act. Husserl then also argues for a correlativity between each and every intentional act and its intentional object-state. Indeed, that our intentional analysis can be conducted from either side of this correlative state of affairs between the intentional ‘process’ and its intentional ‘content’. (35)

	Now, I would argue that there is a tripartite correlativity between all three aspects of ego, intentional act and its intentional object-state, and, these dialectical-like moments mirror the three dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle as argued in my own research. The hermeneutic circle of comprehension being the only source for the creation of value (as argued and defined by myself through its synthesis of sense [as to the essential place of its intentional objectivity], meaning [as realized in and through the field of the intentional process], and, meaningfulness [as existentially determined in relation to a particular or collective sense of self or ego regardless of its egological nature/s]). (36)

{Now, I would argue there is a considerable psychic distance between Husserl’s researches and my own researches, albeit, as I would like to believe, headed in the same critical direction. That being the case, Husserl’s problematic (as a re-interpretation of the Cartesian problematic) is once again being radically re-defined and re-interpreted by myself and others (through he advent of new conceptual languages for doing this type of task). Time does not allow me to seriously argue this point, instead, let me define how I would re-define the transcendental suspension in the light of my own research)}. (37)

6.	Experiment No. 6 – What is the ‘Value’ of the Self-Evidently Self-Evident?

If we think we exist in the world and that we are tasting salty water then we are tasting salty water. But what if we are in a dream doing the same sort of thing. Are we or are we not tasting ‘salty water’? So, what is self-evidently self-evident about our critical transcendental-phenomenological reflections in this regard? (38)

	Can our critical transcendental-phenomenological reflections save us? (39) 

It has been noted by a number of commentators on the work of Husserl that Husserl’s concepts of the suspension, epoché, etc., is forever a work in progress. That we need to note various differences and nuances between such expressions as transcendental suspensions and transcendental reductions. In various places they are treated as synonymous and elsewhere as non-synonymous! E.g., in and through the process of the suspension a reduction is realized, i.e., a reduction to its essential constituents. Therefore, ‘suspension’, in this instance, does not equal ‘reduction’ since the former is necessary a priori before the latter can be conducted. (39)

	In the light of the tripartite equation of ego - cogito – cogitatum I would argue that there is a third element masquerading in the shadow of these umbrella terms of the transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction, epoché, bracketing, etc., namely an element of a transcendental synthesis or transcendental reconstitution (facets indeed touched upon by Husserl especially in his Fifth Meditation and elsewhere?) (40)

	By the invocation of this dialectical aspect of a transcendental re-constitution we can now ‘balance’ the aspect of a transcendental reduction as a process of transcendental analysis. Then, in this balance, between synthesis and analysis, we have the aspect of a transcendental suspension. Finally, in a balance of all three moments we have what I have defined as the overall transcendental suspension (OTS). Once we recognize that no one of these tripartite moments should be privileged, prioritized, promoted, or, de-privileged, etc., then we have before us the recipe for a proper, appropriate and valid conduct of an overall transcendental suspension, in essence, a powerful tool for the conduct of a critical transcendental philosophy, indeed, for  ‘doing real philosophy’(?) (41)
	However, the critical transcendental-phenomenologist, I am sure, would note that between a certain state of affairs and its dreamed equivalent there is a world of difference, such as, e.g., a greater modal richness in modalities present and in the quality of the presentation/re-presentation of the same, etc. Such a differentiable state of difference adequately accounting for this distinction in language and practice and, thence, is non-problematic outside the blinkered confines of the more traditional philosopher. (42)

	Surely, intense, critical scrutiny, objectively balanced (in the light of our research project) of that constituted by-us for-us cannot be anything other than that constituted by-us for-us! Hence the self-evident nature of that which is truly evidential, i.e., self-evidential! (43)

	And the value of that value? As that which critically assists us in our passage though this World-of-Life! Surely, in what we do, if we know what we are doing, we can do the same with a greater degree of facility! And, thence, with existential consequences more in keeping both with the nature of ourselves and the nature of our projects as we stand before-others? (44)

{My basis criticisms of Husserl, among many, being his overlooking and confusing of these three dialectical modalities embedded in the selective and qualified exercise of the relatively skeptical technique of the (overall) transcendental suspension, and, his overstressing the absolute possibility of a transcendental science when what we have to hand is never more than a ‘work in progress’, albeit a work that truly is conducted in a critical transcendental mode or spirit}. (45)

	But this complex paper, in its simplicity, must end at this point; as a beginning just begun, and, no doubt, as a conversation forever to be re-started by others… (46)

	In being able to disseminate this paper I must thank you, as an ‘active reader’, for your participation, assistance and performance in the dissemination of this text… no longer ‘my’ text but ‘your’ text, and, thence, that which becomes ‘our’ text! Before the infinite openness of the horizons of the Life-World we now must thank each other for without each other this text could not be… and that is the very democratic-like nature of dissemination (a dissemination forever existentially differentiated by the nature of both our own acts of involvement and our own acts of non-involvement)… as we continually and continuously exercise overall transcendental suspensions in the natural course of our lives as lived before others! (47)

							        Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.3.06.