Skepticism and the Transcendental Attitude: Part II: 
The Overall Transcendental Suspension
And its Philosophical Ramifications*

0.   Pre-Introduction

	In this paper I will first discuss the role that a distinctive variety of skepticism has as one method for the formation of the transcendental attitude. Then, this philosophical insight will be used to define the nature of this ‘neutral’ re-positioning that automatically flows from the imposition of the overall transcendental suspension (OTS) (as a precondition for our entry ‘into’ this transcendental dimension and its phenomenological translation of experience as ‘phenomenal’ lived in and through this sense of the Life-World). Next, I will discuss the philosophical ramifications this has for the transcendental phenomenologist along with its implication of a qualified transcendental idealism. Lastly, I will argue by what means this type of Absolute philosopher is able to differentiate the relatively real from the relatively less real. Overall, this paper completes where I began in Part I by defining the nature of the overall transcendental suspension and noting its philosophical ramifications as the preparation for my next series of papers dealing with a critical examination of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika titled: ‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Parts I-III. (1)

I.   Introduction

	Husserl (1859-1938) defines his style of philosophy as a transcendental idealism. He also describes it as critical among other things (such as a search for the apodictic, foundational, etc., and has been seriously criticized in the ensuing Postmodern climate for this, however, and it is my belief, that much can be salvaged from his philosophical investigations to re-invest our philosophical endeavours in this Contemporary era). In our understanding as to how a certain variety of skepticism can produce a transcendental attitude and in our ensuing understanding of the nature of the overall transcendental suspension let me show both what is implied and what is not implied in the adoption of this style of critical, qualified form of transcendental idealism. Then, from this transcendental ‘position’ let me sketch out how the critical phenomenologist can truly engage the intersubjective-objectivity of the world as an active member of a philosophical community engaged in a ongoing meaningful dialogue before-each-other with-each-other! A conversation that can be realized as progressively insightful, and, is phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential in its transcendental orientation! (2)

*          For latest version of this paper: www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html 
II.   Objectives

In this paper I would ideally like to look into the following:

1.	The nature of the skeptical attitude that produces a transcendental attitude,
2.	Defining the nature of the ensuing overall transcendental suspension,
3.	A critical articulation of the philosophical ramifications of this ‘position’,
4.	An outline of how this type of philosopher appreciates phenomenal difference. (3)

My overall objectives are to sketch out the theoretical nature, practical application and critical ramifications of this style of philosophical examination, and, to prepare the ground for my refutation that the Yogacara Tradition in Buddhist Philosophy is simply idealistic in tenor and, as a consequence, that to translate it though this type of lens is to completely mistranslate and misunderstand the general nature of this type of text! That because this tradition could be described as transcendentally idealistic in complexion in the same vein as our (re-)interpretation of Husserl’s mature transcendental philosophy, that both traditions can act as a commentary on the apparent and not so apparent intentions of the other; besides offering in the process a fruitful commentary on our Postmodern and Contemporary eras! (4) 

III.   Definition of the Overall Transcendental Suspension… 

1.   The Skeptical Manoeuvre in the Formation of the Transcendental Attitude

	“I don’t believe you… you must be joking… you must be kidding… not likely… what if it were not the case…” these expressions all suggest some form of a skeptical approach to that under examination, or, i.e., in ‘question’. Resolution of the entailed doubt is realized in an ‘answer’. An answer is expressed through the form of a metaphor to begin with… “that looks like that might be the case”… and, when we are more definite or dogmatic, we say “that is the case.”  E.g., “Is that Bill? …no, he doesn’t look like Bill, but he does look like Lindsay… hey it is Lindsay!” (5)

	Questions and answers are both types of suspensions. A question is a dis-conjunctive type of suspension, i.e., to ask a question its possible solutions are already entertained simultaneously in our asking of that question: “(in front of me) is this person’s name Francesco” means “is the name of this person (in front of me) Francesco or not Francesco?” In effect, to ask any question means we must be able to entertain to some degree, simultaneously, the possible answers of that question. A positive assertion logically implies, initially, as a metaphorically oriented response, “that this person does, indeed, look like Francesco,” and, as a final response, when this truth value is treated as (self-evidently) self-evident, “that this person is, indeed, none other than Francesco”. An answer, as a response to a question, in accordance with this exposition, is treated initially as a metaphor. A metaphor is either explicitly or implicitly a simile, i.e., a logical structure based upon the phenomenological nature of ‘like’, i.e., that x is both like a and not like a. A definitive answer collapses this conjunctive suspension and realizes the final response of either “it is a” or “it is not a” (or that the question is not appropriate, is ill-formed in its construction and/or is currently unable to be definitively answered). (6)

	Now, to be skeptical about our answer, any answer, say p, all we have to do is to re-question it, i.e., is it the case that x is p or is x not p…?  In the process invoking a rhetorical ‘or’. Then, in forming an answer we tentatively suggest that x is like p, i.e., ‘that x is both like p and not like p’ (i.e., has some resemblance or resemblances to p). Finally, making a definitive response by breaking this symmetry between the metaphorical ‘and’ embedded in a metaphorical ‘like’, collapsing the metaphor and, therein, stating definitively that x is either p or not p. As just noted, this process or transformation is commutative, i.e., can be conducted either way, i.e., the answer can be questioned and/or the question can be answered. Indeed, very little psychic energy seems to be involved in this type of transformation if we invoke these three phases of ‘the rhetorical question – initial metaphorical answer – final collapsed metaphorical answer, or the reverse of the same. Logically we might notate this as:

i.   Is it the case that x is p or not p (the rhetorical question)…
ii.  Is it the case that x is both like p and not like p – (noting a resemblance)…
iii. Is it the case that x is either p or not p… (as a provisional decision) (and v.v. in 
     the opposite direction). 
More simply: (rhetorical ‘or’ – metaphorical ‘and’ – decisive ‘or’, and v.v.) 

Treated in a circular format: 

i

ii 				iii

…we have i - ii - iii, or, i - iii - ii, or, iii - ii - i, or, iii - i - ii, etc.     (7)

	Now, time does not permit me here to argue the following, but, it is my proposal that an overall transcendental suspension follows this same type of dialectical transformation above and, hence, mirrors this progression from the rhetorical to the metaphorical to the decision of a definitive response, and v.v., etc. That, these three dialectical moments equally mirror the three moments of the hermeneutic circle as previously analyzed by myself elsewhere, and, in turn, mirror respectively the persistence of a background field, the gestalt interaction of a focus upon an intentional object-state, and, the semblance of an agent (in keeping with the nature of its current intentionality as primarily determined by that intentional field and thence its overall psychic constitution as a reflection of the epistemological organization of that agent intentionally entertaining that type of intentional object-state, etc.). That, in effect, that an overall suspension is an ongoing dialectical balance between a dis-conjunctive suspension, a conjunctive suspension and a trans-conjunctive-dis-conjunctive suspension. The expression ‘dialectical’ implying that all three moments must mutually co-define each other, since, e.g., without an intentional field there could be no simulation of an intentional object-state, and v.v., etc. In other words, each party could be negatively defined by the negation of the other two parties in this dialectical triad. (8)

	This might sound very complex and complicated but the underlying principle is very simple. When there is a dynamic balance between all three of these (archetypal) moments then (intentional) value is simulated (and/or re-simulated). Break this triadic symmetry and value ceases to be thematized in that respect. (9)

	Hopefully, you will also recognize where I am heading when I make the following proposal that the application of a certain carefully conducted type of skepticism is productive both of the formation of value and the creation of an appropriate transcendental attitude. That, indeed, the formation of value in our lives as lived in this World-of-Life is realized in and through the adoption of this transcendental perspective that maintains this evolving balance between these three moments of the Ego, Object and World as the intentional subject, the intentional object-state and the intentional field). (10)

	What is this carefully conducted type of skepticism being invoked here? None other than a dynamic balance being maintained between this cycle of questioning, metaphorical replying and making a tentative definitive response…! By instigating and maintaining this sense of balance we entertain an ongoing overall transcendental suspension. This OTS is productive/re-productive of value, and, value continues to be formed as long as this cycle is both maintained and balanced; i.e., without giving precedence, priority, privilege, promotion, etc., in some form or other to any of the parties involved either within the OTS or between these moments of the OTS themselves! Indeed, in a transcendental philosophy these ‘p-words’ must be avoided! (11)

2.   The ‘Definition’ of an Overall Transcendental Suspension

	By such means as just noted, among others, I have re-interpreted, in phenomenological depth, the phenomenal nature of the transcendental suspension as argued for by Husserl. In effect, I have equated his sense of the transcendental suspension with my explication of the overall transcendental suspension. As a process I have argued that the OTS is a dynamic balance between (the Husserlian senses of a transcendental reduction, transcendental (re-)constitution and a transcendental suspension). (12)

	Hence the nature of the OTS is an ongoing, dynamically balance triadic formation between three ‘dialectical’ moments that are simply analytical in orientation, synthetical in orientation and an orientation that is also the mutual balance of the former two moments (and is centered in processes of identification/self-identification). When these three moments are in dynamic balance our transcendentally-oriented investigations are allowed to proceed. Hence our metaphorical ‘entry’ into this dimension of the transcendental! In this process a(n archetypal) hermeneutic circle is also invoked! Then, may I add the observation, that if we adopt a slightly pro-analytical stance our investigations take on a phenomenological flavour, or, if we adopt a slightly pro-synthetical stance our investigations take on a pro-hermeneutical flavour, and/or, if we adopt a balance of both we take on an existential stance… (13)

	The active and proactive adoption of this transcendental perspective places us in a transcendental attitude where all forms and types of phenomenal attitudes, i.e., non-transcendental attitudes, are purified through being translated through this transcendental lens. All forms of precedence, priority, privilege, promotion, etc., are neutralized or balanced, i.e., bracketed. This ongoing imposition of a transcendental skepticism puts out of action all our beliefs, prejudices and judgments without being destructive of the same. In a sense they are fixed and balanced, center our intentional being in this World-of-Life. Within these metaphorical brackets life goes on as usual – outside these metaphorical brackets our attitudes towards the same are transcendentally purified, clarified, thematized… and from such a balanced sense of perspective we engage the world with an authenticity of being, an appropriate sense of comportment, with propriety and the semblance of a self-evident self-evidential-ness. In this absolute lack of phenomenal positioning we transcendental position or, more correctly, re-position ourselves in this World-of-Life before others. Adopt some form of a preference and we loose this sense of balance and become absolutist is re-orientation. Our transcendental re-orientation and re-education is forever a work in progress. Moreover, it is an ongoing balance between the transcendental sense of the absolute and the non-transcendental, phenomenal sense of the relative. The transcendental act of purification being a dialectical balance wherein both dimensions must be maintained in this dynamic state of balance. That is why we can treat this process as an ‘act of purification’ since this sense of balance must to some extent already be present in order for us to experience any semblance of value in our passage thorough the world, either authentic in orientation or inauthentic in orientation. Without doubt the OTS must be present to some extent in order for us to perceived and experienced value in the first place! Thence our alienation from the transcendental dimension of the Life-World cannot be absolute since all value must be predicated upon this dynamic balance between the psychic dimensions of the phenomenal and the transcendental! (14)

	Hence the adoption of this qualified form of skepticism, as outlined in this exposition, is our pathway into experiencing this transcendental dimension already present to some degree in our intentional lives as we course through this inescapable World-of-Life. By whatever means we produce and re-produce this ‘experience’ of an OTS by those means we ‘enter’ into this sense of the transcendental. Through an ongoing balance of questioning-and-answering we transcendental re-position ourselves in this transcendental loss of position. But, within those metaphorical brackets the phenomenon of our lives-as-lived-before-others must continue, albeit with this additional input of this sense of a transcendental rectification as provoked, consequentially, through the course of our transcendental investigations! (15)

3.   The Existential Ramifications of Transcendental Practice

	What are the existential ramifications of this philosophical position and what are the philosophical ramifications of this act of non-phenomenal-positioning of ourselves in this World-of-Life (as a transcendental re-positioning of our life in this world before others)? As a fully paid up transcendentalist we find our phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential investigations are invested with the ‘spiritual’ consequences of such a positionless re-positioning. Taking phenomena at ‘face value’ (but not as ‘surfaces’ upon the nonsense of the inscrutable ‘in-itself’) we are given a distinctive sense of freedom to appreciate the world with a greater degree of psychic depth and clarity. This ‘depth’ of vision is into the constitution of the world as constituted by-us for-us. Although this type of philosophy might be described as a transcendental idealism (through a recognition of ‘our’ own constitution of the world in our own experience) such a transcendental vision of the world is not ‘idealistic’ in its classical sense! Our constitution of the world is open-ended – we do not individually, or collectively, solely constitute this world as it appears either before ourselves or any inter-subjective sense of self! As a transcendentalist, as defined, we cannot exercise any form of preference, priority, etc., otherwise we would loose the authentic formation of value that arises through this sense of the transcendental being maintained in a dynamic balance with all entertained senses of the phenomenal! Therefore, please note, and remember, that we cannot give any form of priority to the mental, the ideal, the egological, etc., etc!! Being a practicing transcendentalist automatically rules out our being an idealist in any shape or form! Neither can we be an empiricist or realist, or, adopt any other form of ‘ism’! To hold otherwise would be to invoke a bald paradox or blatant contradiction that just could not be traversed and, therein, resolved in the course of those now inauthentic investigations! (16)

	Furthermore, by means of an ongoing transcendental rectification we re-restore a sense of authenticity that never can be completely lost in our lives as we course through this transcendental dimension of the World-of-Life. All semblance of value has its roots in this dimension of the transcendental. This is not meant in any mystical sense although a number of philosophers do give this perspective a religious and or spiritual re-interpretation. Again, I would argue that such a manoeuvre can only be ‘authentic’ if, and only if, the OTS is invoked and maintained. Therein, all forms of religious and/or spiritual prejudice, as forms of pre-judgments of the world, must remain bracketed in the course of those transcendental investigations. That, however, does not preclude such interpretations since their raw-material, in the form of such ‘prejudices’, is automatically subjected to an ongoing process of transcendental rectification. What that might entail for this type of philosopher is perhaps best left to them to delineate and discern? Suffice to say, in my opinion, that ‘real’ philosophy is conducted and fruitfully realized, when its passage is conducted under the auspices of a properly, appropriately and validly conducted OTS! (17)

	But, before I conclude this essay, let me examine the following philosophical problem, namely, from a transcendental ‘position’ how does this type of philosopher appreciates phenomenal difference, and, in particular, discern the relatively real?  (18)

	If all forms of ‘reality’ are constituted by us and all are treated on par in and through the exercise of the OTS how does the transcendental philosopher differentiate the factual from the non-factual, the apparently actual from the possible, the relatively real from illusions, delusions, dreams, psychotic phenomena, etc., etc?! (19)

4.   How Does this Type of Philosopher Discern the Relatively Real?

	For much of our non-philosophical lives we effortlessly, or so it seems, find this type of differentiation without any difficulties whatsoever. So, the real problem in this regard is more “how does the apprentice transcendental phenomenologist account for a resolution of this type of problem? Otherwise they could quite easily be dismissed as simple idealists!” (20)

	In my next series of papers, ‘Entry’ into the Transcendental Dimension: Parts I-III my re-interpretation of the philosophical and spiritual motivations of the Yogacara Buddhist needs to be armed with a resolution of this apparent puzzle to finally put to rest all imputations of an idealistic nature being mis-applied to this tradition of religious thought. (21)
	Because the transcendentalist cannot give any form of priority, etc., to any aspect of their investigations they cannot, therefore, promote and/or demote any features of the same (both before, during or after)! If they were to preferentially treat, e.g., the intentional object-state and, therein, take a realist type of position, they would be guilty of infringing this transcendental maxim of the necessity for the instantiation and maintenance of the OTS. This short-sighted type of philosopher arguing that the ‘real’ is just ‘seen’ (or has been seen or seen by others or can be correctly inferred, etc.). Heading in this realistic direction has this type of philosopher believing they are dealing with real ‘object’ in the so-called ‘external world’. Or, heading in the opposite direction, has the philosopher apparently heading towards the idealistic realm of (the) so-called internal world(s). But, the  so-called ‘philosophers’ who will persist to live in this ‘flattened world of philosophy’, more often than not, must perpetually find themselves forced to play this type of tennis match, a game, that quite correctly cannot even be played if it were to be more closely analyzed phenomenologically and transcendentally! Because no dialectical moment can be preferentially treated, etc. (22)

	Our phenomenological activities cannot commence unless these three parties of the egological, the intentionally objective and the intentional field were not co-present simultaneously. Given such transcendental conditions, and an adequate awareness of the same, how could we even feel the need to preference one of these intentional parties over the others? Without being able to impute their isolated, non-interactive, absolutistic existences they can only exist in co-relation to each other to that extent that they can be invoked. Thus, with one stroke, the transcendentalist does away with such ‘isms’. However, this transcendental-phenomenal realm of existence granted, how does this type of philosopher discern the real given that all experience is simulated within these same transcendental-phenomenal terms of reference? (23)

	By applying the OTS properly, appropriately and validly! (24)

	So, that granted, how is this feat of differentiation realized in practice (when analyzed from this theoretical point of view)? Just how can we be phenomenologists, hermeneuts/hermeneuticists, existentialists, historians, scientists, literary critiques, artists… indeed, philosophers themselves? To resolve this philosophical puzzle let me offer a number of theoretical guidelines as to how this phenomenological determination of ‘reality’ might be done… (25)

i.	By delineating the existential richness of those investigations

This can be done by noting the comparative, relative richness of modalities actively exercised in those investigations, and, by noting the relative existential overall richness of those individual modalities actively exercised. The relatively more ‘real’ is then discerned by reference to the number of modalities actively engaged and the relative richness of phenomena found therein. By ‘richness’ is meant the surplus of value discovered on its re-simulation relative to the degree of psychic energy invested in those investigations (just as, normally, my expectation that a ripe apple has an apple-like flavour is rewarded in my ‘tasting’ the same above and beyond the mere act of its sampling). (26)

E.g., a dream apple may look like a real apple phenomenon but does not in eating overcome a more profound physiological sense of hunger, etc. In other words the modality of ‘physiological hunger’ is not actively engaged, and relieved, in our experience of eating a dream-apple. Moreover, there is a greater relative richness of those modalities engaged in our engagement with a ‘real’ apple. Such a philosophical position does not, however, dismiss the reality of any phenomenon since the OTS ensures that this aspect of our investigations is always ‘suspended’. In this aspect of our investigations ‘relative richness’ of modalities/relative richness of our engagement within those modalities, is at stake and not some privileged notion of ‘reality’. (27)

ii.	Through an appreciation of current psychic-gestalt integrity

The more psychically integrated we are the more our phenomenal processes will reflect that more integrated state of affairs. (28)

E.g., in a dream state with integrated, non-surreal imagery there is the implication that our gestalt integration is such so as to allow us to discern the fact that ‘we are dreaming’. On the other hand, a loss of integration is reflected in psychic dream imagery that is less than real, is surreal or just lacking reality altogether however pleasant, horrible or troubling we may find ourselves in having experienced such experiences. (29)

iii.	Psychic ‘center’ of our epistemological organization

In a phenomenological schematization of types of conscious phenomena we should be able to delineate what forms of epistemological priority are necessary in the formation of the same. E.g., ‘a judgment is between, from and/or within concepts’ and, therefore, there is an epistemological priority for the existence of concepts prior to acts of judgement even though there is also a dialectical necessity for their co-presence in the formation of judgment itself. E.g., the idea or perception of pain is dependent, to some extent, on the past presence or the present presence of pain-like phenomena, etc. (30)

E.g., if we were to find we are performing epistemologically rich processes of judgment then it follows that we are more epistemologically organized by being centered at this relatively ‘higher’, more organized level of epistemological functioning in the epistemological hierarchicalization of the psyche. Then, it follows, we should be in a better ‘position’ to be able to appreciate the phenomenological natures that constitutes of those phenomenal ‘realities’. (31)

iv.	By discerning the relative causal effectiveness of different positionings

The perceived causal effectiveness of our presentations/re-presentations is also co-associated with the perception of the relatively real. (32)

E.g., dream money or monopoly money does not usually operate effectively for us at the local supermarket. (33)

v.	By discerning the current apperception of judgmental competence

Do our current acts of judgment appear to be apposite, coherent, consistent in orientation? (34)

E.g., in my observations of this apple-like phenomenon I believe I am currently competent to discern the veracity of its determination to be an apple… I take a bite and find it meets my expectations on an apple-like taste, sweetness, etc., confirming this view of my own level of judgmental competence. That overall, all features focused upon and contextually related seem to be functioning as interpreted and expected, etc. (35)

vi.	Through a discernment of relative relevance in our research

If I am engaged in practice s then I expect the value to flow from that exercise to be s-like in production/re-production. (36)

E.g., I am currently reading a novel and expect that book to be progressively unraveled within my current expectations in accordance with the nature of that genre. (37)

vii. 	Through a discernment of relative transformational invariance or stability

The relatively real is also experienced through its usual co-association with the effective stability of those phenomena as engaged by us. (38)

E.g., I see a long, coiled green object on the grass and think it to be a snake. I look more closely and find it to be only the hose not yet put away. Here the interpretation of the snake phenomenon is not found to be as stable as the coiled object phenomenon underlying the former. Recognizing it to be a hose I now have the opportunity to use it as such, reinforcing the much greater relative stability of that imputation. (39)

viii.	By experiencing the relative intensity of effective deconstructive measures

The relative reality of a ‘text’, i.e., its interpretation, is tested by the degree to which skeptical attacks can deconstruct its re-interpretation. A not-so-integrated-text being more easily deconstructed when critiqued, etc. (40)

E.g., as World War III has not yet occurred we would expect it to be relatively easy for an historian to deconstruct any promoted thesis to that effect. In other words, documentary evidence used to argue for that conjecture would just not be strong enough when measured against the ‘weight’ of positive and/or negative evidence to the contrary, etc. In a same fashion the inauthenticity of a certain thesis would more likely assist, wittingly or unwittingly, its easier deconstruction! In the same fashion the formation of a lie should be more easily deconstructed given the right application of an appropriate deconstructive technique in our in-depth examination of the (historical) constitution of that overall text. (41)

ix.	By examination of the apparent intensity of inter-subjective objectivity

A sense of the relatively real is also subject to inter-subjectively oriented pressure. Usually, such forces reinforce our perceptions of an inter-subjective sense of ‘reality’. However, inter-subjective acts of fiat do not legislate reality into or out of existence. (42)

If you believe in witches then ‘witches’ exist. If you believe this woman to be a witch then, for you, she is a witch. However, if that woman concerned does not believe she is a witch then from her point of view she is not a witch. Perhaps under torture she lied, created a co-authored statement in order to more quickly terminate her suffering. Knowing the reality of her textual fabrication from her point of view she remains not a witch (unless that ‘reality’ is equally co-founded for her when forced to concede she might have been a ‘witch’ and comes round to believing the ‘reality’ of that co-authored text). However, a subjective and/or inter-subjective examination of the co-authored nature of such testimony should suspend this interpretation of witchcraft on the grounds that that testimony was incorrectly advanced, etc. Hence a critical examination of texts, etc., should help us to decide, on inter-subjectively oriented grounds, the deeper ‘relevance’ of such evidence, testimony, etc. (43)

x.	By re-examining the consistency of apparent self-evidential constitution

In and through a relatively deeper transcendental phenomenological examination, etc., one should find oneself in a better position to properly appreciate the self-evidential nature of the constitution of that to hand. E.g., a phenomenon or set of phenomena present/s themselves textually. An investigation of the same should reveal intentional inconsistencies or isolated incongruities in its/their simulated textual formation. (44) 

E.g., if one were to believe that the mental illness of schizophrenia was caused by ‘spirit possession’ then one might have to account for the fact that those patients taking medications seemed to improve faster by their taking those medications if that were found to be the case. Such an observation appears to favour a medical model, in the process weakening the former thesis, etc. By removing or resolving such apparent incongruities, contradictions, parallel unconnected beliefs, etc., puts one in a stronger position to eventually appreciate the proper, appropriate and valid nature of that apparent intentional constitution to hand! (45)

	Or, other theoretical approaches could be formulated and utilized in our critical transcendental phenomenological investigations, etc. (46)

	In effect, I would like to argue that the adoption of this type of skepticism is both philosophically and practically productive! To my mind this transcendental vision of the Life-World is nothing other than how we normally go about examining it. We question what we find-to-hand, we suspend our expectations, we test our hypotheses, we seek inter-subjective confirmations, etc., etc. This is more or less what we do as non-philosophers. Furthermore, the qualified transcendental idealist, as a transcendentalist as defined, is open to the open-ended-ness of their intentional constitution. So, an object that is treated as ‘in the external world’ (so-called) is found to participate in ‘our’ thematization of it as an ‘external-like object’ in the ‘world’ as mediated by our current state of embodiment in and through our encounter with it spatially and temporally, etc. So, too, do we encounter other agents in a similar fashion, albeit as agent-like in our encountering of them and their encountering of us. Indeed, our very use of language in the constitution of our appreciation of our intentional thematizations, and v.v., is a testament to the inter-subjectivity of the meta-textual presence of the appropriate intentional field/s in which those processes of thematization are to occur. An archaeology of these intentions, as teextually sedimented in the psyche and deposited in the world, could demonstrate nothing other that this fact in this regard! So be it – we are but co-associated, co-mutually defined forms of identity floating in the open-ended sea, or rather, ocean of the Life-World where, despite the fact that we find an infiniteness of each horizons and an infinity of horizons, still we find where  we are situated by the very nature of our appropriating of that found-to-hand in a world prepared for us in its having already been appropriated by-us for-us! (47)

IV.   Conclusion

	Let me simply list the findings of this paper.

1.	The utilization of a skeptical approach that entails the ongoing questioning-and-answering/answering-and-questioning realizes an overall transcendental suspension.
2.	The nature of this ‘suspension’ is tripartite as noted in the determination of its definition.
3.	The ‘transcendentalist’ could be called a ‘qualified transcendental idealist’ albeit with the qualifications as already noted (namely, an acceptance that intentions are constituted in experience from the point/s of view adopted, but, not in a classical idealistic setting because of the open-ended nature of that process of constitution with that phenomenal reality, and, the fact that it is conducted in and through the utilization of a thorough, ongoing overall transcendental suspension [without the exercise of any preferential position other than that initial content already considered to be prejudicially pre-judged which, as a necessary pre-condition for that particular overall suspension, then allows it to commence through its particular individual situated-ness in this World-of-Life]).
4.	That the transcendentalist determines the relatively real through their transcendental phenomenological/hermeneutical/existential investigations of the phenomenon-to-hand without reference to impossiblia.(48)

						                    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 24.3.06.