Chapter II - The Disvaluation Of The Natural Attitude

A Phenomenological Interpretation

	In this chapter I would like to demonstrate in some depth one structural feature that both these traditions appear to have in common, namely, the tendency to subject the relative-empirical world, as viewed though the natural attitude, to  a  distinctively  qualified process of disvaluation;. Disvaluation is a term which I have adopted in order to distinguish it from devaluation taken in an extreme absolute sense. The words disvaluation and devaluation have many similarities but in this chapter I wish to contrast them. Devaluation has the connotation that if the process of disvaluation was to continue we would in time, for all practical purposes, be left with either that which was very little and insignificant, or, that which was effectively worthless. To illustrate this aspect of meaning we can allude to the financial situation of hyperinflation wherein the currency is subjected to excessive devaluation. Moreover, in contrast to disvaluation, devaluation has an intransitive connotation whereas disvaluation appears to express a state of affairs underlying a limited process rather than the definitive end of a radical process. In this thesis disvaluation will be treated as limited and process-orientated (in contrast to devaluation which will be treated as absolute and intransitive; as a final resultant-product derived from a completed process conducted in a thorough and extreme fashion).   
	Disvaluation is a distinctively qualified devaluation that occurs in an absolute philosophy's adoption of meta-phor's of illusion, magic, depreciation and/or similar allusions in their treatment of the nature of the empirical-everyday-relative world. In contrast to absolute devaluation disvaluation is the qualified devaluation of the relative world, this qualification ensures, firstly, that disvaluation is non-nihilistic in scope and intention, and, secondly, that such treatment explicitly or implicitly leaves untouched how the Absolute, as an absolute dimension, in and through its relationship with the relative, is to be found reflected in, or expressed through, the phenomenality of the everyday world. In both traditions the spiritual merit of the empirical world as viewed through the natural attitude is discounted without severing and dichotomizing the spheres of the Absolute and the Relative. Preserving the relationship between these two realms two fundamental questions are then thematically addressed by both traditions, either explicitly or implicitly, namely, what is the nature of this relationship, and as some form of evidence in what fashion is this relationship found to be expressed in the relative world? As the sense of the absolute is treated in the context of a religious-philosophy these fundamental questions effectively establish, through the nature of their explicit, or implicit, formulation and the manner of their resolution, the philosophic nature and style of that particular religious point of view under examination.   
	As I have stated it is my intention in this chapter to demonstrate that with respect to this feature of disvaluation there is between these two traditions a marked degree of structural and functional isomorphism. To facilitate this study I shall, throughout this thesis, generally limit myself to two basic texts, one representative text from each tradition. In regards to the Neoplatonic Tradition I shall use the Enneads of Plotinus preferably in the translation by A.H.Armstrong. In regards to the Buddhist Mahayanic Tradition I shall use The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines in conjunction with its Verse  Summary  as  translated by E. Conze.
	The former text was written some time between 253 - 270 A.D. and edited (approximately 300 A.D.) by Porphyry after Plotinus' death in 270 A.D. Most of our Buddhist text was collectively written over a period from 100 B.C. - 100 A.D. A Chinese translation of this text in 179 A.D. effectively establishes a terminus date although miscellaneous additions continue to have been made to this text, as was often the case in this literature of The Perfection of Wisdom. Later texts written in this same tradition either summarizing or elaborating upon basic themes already established in The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines.
	In this chapter I shall first examine the Neoplatonic use of metaphors of illusion and depreciation. Then I shall examine the Buddhist use of metaphors of illusion and magic. Following this I shall then enter into a process of comparative examination to show how the use of these three types of metaphor possess the same type of structure and function in their disvaluation of the relative world as viewed through the natural attitude. Confirming this structural and functional identity lets us establish the fact that there is at least one feature isomorphic to both of these traditions, namely, disvaluational treatment.
	Lastly, I shall briefly investigate the phenomenological implications of the disvaluationally-orientated attitude towards the relative world, as viewed through the natural attitude, in order to come to a deeper understanding of this concept of disvaluation and in the process letting this last section act as an introduction to the next chapter wherein these topics of disvaluation, illusionism, etc. will be reinterpreted under phenomenological-hermeneutical terms of reference.
	Throughout this chapter I shall endeavour to establish the fact that between these two traditions, as represented by our two basic texts, there exists a structural and functional isomorphism in regard to this feature of disvaluation. The primary purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate  textually one isomorphic feature. Our study of disvaluation in effect establishes a prima facie case in this regard (suggesting in the process that our overall comparative research is not only possible, through the application of this concept of isomorphism, but also fruitful through the contrast and potential commentary each tradition has in relation to the other). That in the final analysis this degree of commensurability can be deepened when we subject our research to a phenomenological-hermeneutical re-interpretation.
	By isomorphism is meant that some structural and/or functional feature that underlies a certain state of affairs, or system, is also found to underlie another state of affairs, or system; that in effect in the transformation necessary to arrive at the second system from the first a feature found in the first system is found to be preserved under that transformation. This concept of isomorphism also implies that superficially two systems may appear disparate yet on a deeper structural or functional level a symmetry is found to be present that to all practical purposes is coincident or equivalent.
	By structural is meant the manner in which certain key components, in the  metaphorical body of a philosophy, relate to other key components.
	By functional is meant the manner in which the system as a whole functions structured the way it is. By extension this functional aspect will find its reflection in how this philosophical-religious structure effects the lives of those people who are influenced by that system, and vice versa. In this thesis I shall argue that both religious philosophies are structured in non-absolutist, transcendental-absolute terms of reference and incorporate negative theological processes that have the apparent function of creating, and assisting in, the development of religious insight.
	The Neoplatonic and the Buddhist Mahayanic Traditions both utilize metaphors of illusion to illustrate  analogically, and treat, our general perception of the world as mistaken; as a misrepresentation of how reality, from the absolute point of view, truly is. In this process of disvaluation our natural attitude towards the world becomes effectively suspended. All experience then becomes treated as phenomenal and as such is regarded as changing, deficient, illusory, as involved in a multiplicity of mental constructions that distort, or conceal, this (vision of) ultimate reality. On the other hand, to some extent, the apparent world is also seen as a reflection, or distortion, as an emanation or indication, of the absolute dimension, which, in contrast to the phenomenal, is regarded as either the numinous, the One, the eternal, the immutable, the pure, the inexhaustible, the simple, the non-dual and/or the sacred, etc. However, and this must be stressed, such epithets (whether negative or positive) must be seen as pronouncements made, or inferred, in the midst of a transcendental perspective with all the qualifications and restrictions adopted by that specialized format in keeping with the style of that non-absolutist absolute tradition. Moreover, once this dichotomic contrast is drawn it is then often dissolved or transcended, in keeping with the transcendental nature of that format, through some form of fundamental equation (and suspension) of those dichotomies. In its religious-textual context, therefore, this process of disvaluation (through the analogical use of metaphors of illusion, magic and/or depreciation, or denigration) must be recognized for the complex issue it is, that, correctly, cannot be divorced from the structural-functional system that constitutes its overall sense of value, i.e., its general intentional meaning and meaningfulness.
	Both traditions use metaphors of illusion to achieve effectively a disvaluation of the relative world. A stylistic difference can be noted through the fact that the Neoplatonic Tradition uses explicit metaphors of depreciation to achieve a similar end whilst not adopting metaphors of magic. On the other hand the Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition does not seem to use explicit metaphors of deprecation or denigration.
	Depreciation can be perceived as a process of de-appreciation that insists on the direct disvaluation of a certain state of affairs. In this process something that is initially taken to possess some degree of value is disvalued through comparison to some metaphor that directly suggests its correct valuation would be on a par with the relatively unworthy or worthless, although, in keeping with the non-literal nature of the metaphorical, this identification is not strictly insisted upon.
	In both traditions metaphors of illusion are utilized to treat the phenomenal as relatively valid from the relative point of view. Thus in the process of disvaluation the relativity of the empirical world is not nihilistically dismissed as pure illusion. This qualified treatment of illusion I have labelled in the introduction to my thesis, illusionism. Utilization of metaphors of illusion therefore effectively disvalue this relative world but do not absolutely devalue it.
	This process of disvaluation is achieved through the analogical use of metaphors of illusion, etc. Disvaluation appears to be conducted through a process of analogical transference wherein one, or more, of the intentionally important strands buried in the general metaphor invoked are are contextually set up to be extracted from this metaphorical image and applied to this everyday vision of the world. E.g., Plotinus states:

...life without God, is a trace imitating life.
	Here Plotinus compares all living apart from the One as in effect inauthentic, as a lesser substitute or imitation. Traces as a metaphor appears to possess both a denotational sense of illusoriness and a connotational sense of depreciation or denigration reinforced through the association of mimicry. The former sense suggests that the world is in some way less real than the Absolute, a lesser copy of the real world of the Absolute. In the same way as an object in the three dimensional world casts a two dimensional shadow the relative world in being compared to a trace is analogically compared to Reality as being in some way less real. In effect the claim is made that some essential property or relation that holds in the comparison between an object and its trace reoccurs in the comparison between the absolute dimension and the relative world. The feature shared in both processes of comparison would appear to be comparative and differential degrees of reality. With respect to the latter sense the depreciatory connotation of a mimicking trace implicitly suggests that the world is a place less substantial and less real. Moreover, in the association of Reality with light there is the implication that material existence is less bright than Reality, that without the emanational influence of the Intelligible Realm (nous) the phenomenal world would be a realm of practically absolute darkness and evil.
	The illusion of the trace involves our mistaking the trace of a certain object, or state of affairs, for the being of that object, or state of affairs, and then realizing at a later point in time our initial mistake. It would appear that the import of a metaphor involving an illusory experience revolves around the primary experience of the illusion and our later secondary realization of the illusoriness of that illusion to be an illusion. First, the illusion is seen or experienced at face value, and, then, the illusion of the illusion is seen; a process that implies two levels, or stages, of conscious awareness. However, if the metaphor of the trace was completely analyzed and this analysis was transferred to the context of the empirical world vis-à-vis the absolute dimension it would, eventually, be realized that (in this world) as traces, or shadows, are just as real as the objects traced, or mimicked, or shadowed that no ontological distinction could be drawn between this world and the absolute dimension. On this subverted, or deconstructed, analysis the Relative would be just as real, or unreal, as the Absolute, a consequence that would rob this metaphor of its intended disvaluational role. Indeed, I am sure, that if all metaphorical analogies were to be fully analyzed they would be found to possess no final metaphorical impact and that metaphorical impact can only arise through a contextually and intentionally-determined metaphorical selectivity. The metaphor is introduced, so to speak, into a deliberately selective situational context wherein certain strands of meaning are set up to be discriminated out of, and extracted from, that metaphorical image. Then once discrimination is achieved it is then applied to the subject matter the metaphor was contextually designed for. In our last quotation the subject matter is in effect all that which is not the Absolute, namely, the relative-phenomenal world. From our metaphor the analogical strands of denotational illusiveness and the implicit/explicit connotational depreciation are extracted and applied to our subject matter treating it to a consequent disvaluation.
	It would appear, therefore, that this use of metaphor is a two stage process - the extraction of the strand or strands of analogical meaning intended to be applied to a certain context, and, their application to that context in order to highlight intentionally the point of this analogical transference. However, I find that this two stage process in its religious context is more correctly a three stage process wherein the dichotomy drawn between what is real and what is illusory, or less real, in an absolute-oriented philosophy is eventually evacuated, if not almost immediately, of its metaphorically derived meaningfulness. This qualificational collapse is achieved through the equation of the dichotomic aspects discriminated in the overall situation after the appropriate application of this metaphorical device in the manner it was apparently designed for. This tripartite process of metaphorical allusion, analogical application and dialectical rectification ensures in its final stages that the relevant religious-philosophy adopts, and maintains, a transcendental turn or transcendental re-orientation in its transcendental-absolute style of structural-functioning.
	Realizing that this type of metaphorical usage in its religious context is a three stage process lets us come to appreciate the epistemological character of the metaphorical intention and its non-ontological orientation or pseudo-ontological orientation. In my use of the term ontological I mean both a distinctive category of existence and our being in the world. By ontological orientation I mean that type of consciousness that is directed towards the world as the overall horizon for all forms of intentional objectivity (and thereby including a world of lived physical-historical experience) rather than in the opposite direction of the epistemological where consciousness is orientated towards the phenomenon of self and its knowing this ontological orientation through its intentional activity. Although it is not argued for I propose, and perceive, both terms to be merely resonating polarizations on a continuum, in an organizational hierarchy of fields of consciousnesses, between the unity of mind as an overall sense of self and the world as a projection of all things dis-unified (although the world itself is seen as the unification of this projected dis-unity). The mind, on this continuum, or in this hierarchy, metaphorically oscillates in its overall orientation towards one or other of these polarizational tendencies without realizing, in theoretical terms of reference, either polarizational mode as a pure state of consciousness. Put more simply these two terms, the epistemological and the ontological, are two ideal polarizational orientations inherent in all types of intentional consciousness that can be moved towards but never realized. Relative realization of these intentional tendencies is discovered through the co-thematizational definition supplied by the opposite pole implying that these polarities are correctly virtual and mutually correlative. By pseudo-ontological orientation is meant the tendency to ascribe greater physical-like reality to a certain state of affairs, giving to the same greater existence as if existence could be treated as a property that can be increased (or diminished). Correctly existence can only be given to the logical subject treated as a concept or class whether membership is singular or plural, this type of logical confusion being examined in some depth, along with the reason for its presence, in the following pages.  
	A transcendental attitude attempts to transcend this phenomenal dichotomy between the epistemological-ontological, the mental and the factual existence of the physical, mental activity and imputed extra-mental content, etc. In recognizing the necessary intentional correlation between noesis (intentional act) and noema (intentional object, or content) the philosopher takes a transcendental turn the moment they entertain a trans-intentional, and trans-phenomenal, appreciation of phenomenal presentation.
      In philosophical terms of reference when degrees of reality are invoked what is involved is, most probably, our qualitative epistemological appreciation of the subject matter under investigation and not our ontological appreciation of it. Our epistemological understanding involves levels of awareness entered into and left in a process of unfolding, and development, wherein each level is the perspective for appreciating what comes before it (both in a temporal sense and a judgmental sense). It is a tautology to state what is is and what is not is not. Degrees of ontological reality cannot therefore be directly involved in the utilization of this type of metaphor, rather what is at stake is the matter of insight. When this point is understood we can then understand how these three stages are not mutually contradictory but more moments in the deepening of a process of insight through the enlarging of its religious perspective provoked by the religious text under examination - from the metaphorical to the relative to the absolute point of view.
	Textually, a transformation of the religious' persons understanding is intended; an enlargement of their vision is provoked by their attending to the use of metaphorical language articulated along with its dialectical collapse through its juxtaposition of fundamental dichotomies developed in this applied metaphorical understanding. The safety, and sureness, of the phenomenal world is undercut by the application of metaphors of illusion; this disvaluation, through doubting or disvaluing our natural attitude, creating in the process the psychic need for reality, religious validity and value in general. This complex need appears to be met through the introduction of the sense of the  absolute (and therein a religious sense of the Absolute), that which is not the merely phenomenal but more the ground, or necessary preconditions, for the constitution of the same.
	However, even that ground is undercut through the provoked realization of the limitations of our discursive thinking. This would appear to be achieved through the fact that treatment of the Absolute as some sort of absolute phenomenon is contradicted by our realizing that Reality as the Absolute must somehow transcend predication and all forms of phenomenal assertion that would be therein contained. Let me elaborate on this point and establish this observation.
	Predicates and their anti-predicates must be involved in some sort of relationship as correlatives. This relationship can be observed in the fact that in the process of double negation that restores the predicate to its predicateness and the anti-predicate to its anti-predicateness both predicate and anti-predicate must in the process of logical manipulation pass through the state of anti-predicateness and predicateness respectively. Thus it follows that predicate and anti-predicate must be correlatives, correlationally related to each other, the limits of one defining the limits of the other, and vice versa. Some form of mental interrelationship must be invoked in order to account for this informative contrast. That being the case their absolute demarcation from each other is thus an impossible mental operation to perform, dealing with one correlative means that we are indirectly dealing with the other simul-taneously. Because we cannot absolutely divide predicate from anti-predicate (nor predicate also from its logical subject for that matter) then from the absolute point of view there exists their absolute non-difference, their absolute self-differentiation is thus not distinctly possible. Applied to all mental distinctions an extreme critique must therefore reveal some point beyond which these limits become revealed with a consequence that these distinctions therein dissolve and disappear with the breakdown of their relative boundaries. Logical language, and thought, in applying itself to phenomenal reality must fix this patterned flux of our experiential existence within some form of contextual framework at the expense of a freezing, and fabrication, of reality distorting in the process its essential-fluidity? Both the Neoplatonic and the Buddhist Traditions place a heavy emphasis on the unsatisfactoriness, from a critical-philosophical point of view, of predication, language in general, those attempts that try to describe absolute reality. In order for the religious philosopher to enter into a religious discourse about this absolute dimension beyond a discursive-phenomenal point of view their use of language must become specially adapted to a transcending of the boundaries between predicate and anti-predicate, predicate and logical subject and yet manipulate such a feat within the confines of a predicationally bound language. One way this type of linguistic manoeuvre can be conducted is in what I define as a negative theological process. What I would like to point out here is that the third stage in the use of metaphors of disvaluation where dichotomies drawn are juxtaposed, equated and dissolved is conducted within the confines of a negative theological process and that this type of procedure will be investigated in a later chapter dealing with the same. Suffice to say the process is complex but that sufficient has been indicated to enable us to understand where, and how, the religious utilization of metaphorical disvaluation is headed.
	Now, at this point, I would like to add some additional qualification to this idea that the invocation of degrees of reality is a subterfuge for the introduction of degrees of epistemological appreciation because, in this scheme as it stands, its associated psuedo-ontological character would not be adequately accounted for. From my own understanding I believe this confusion with the ontological (direction in intentional activity) arises, firstly, through the hierarchical stratification of reality associated with these levels of insight, and secondly, through the ascription of a greater degree of power to that evaluated as higher in this hierarchical stratification of reality.
	In a court a king is just as real as anyone of his courtiers but in terms of power and function he is normally considered to be more significant. In a like fashion the Absolute is treated in a dynamic creative sense as more powerful than any item in the phenomenal world. The use of degrees of reality thus entails a spectrum of powerfulness, the Absolute in an absolute religious-philosophy being generally treated as the infinitely powerful, inexhaustible in scope. Being absolutely powerful the Absolute is also regarded as possessing a greater sense of presence and value. Overall, the use of arguments that involve degrees of reality generally confuse levels of awareness, ontological stratification and distinctions in power and value.
	Let us take a second quotation from Plotinus that uses a metaphor of illusion to examine the validity of our understanding as developed at this point in time.

Intellect is, most certainly, beautiful, and the most beautiful of all... this universe of ours is a shadow and image of it.
	Firstly, I believe an inspection of this quotation should confirm much of my analysis of our previous quotation. The general metaphor invoked is comparison to a shadow and this is reinforced through its conjunction with a metaphorical comparison to that of an image (as seen in a mirror, e.g.). Both metaphors imply an object and a shadow, or image, and as the everyday world is treated as like the latter, as a shadow or image, it is implied that there exists a real world above and beyond this lesser vision that somehow is separated from, yet finds itself reflected in, the deceptiveness of this world. However this lesser vision is dialectically qualified by logical implication as beautiful - Intellect is, most certainly, beautiful... this universe of ours is a shadow and image of it... therefore, this world must be beautiful to that degree it be an image of Intellect. Thus, although the empirical world is treated like an illusion it is none the less treated as a beautiful illusion; an illusion whose beauty reflects the greater beauty and glory of the Absolute.
	Plotinus goes to some considerable trouble to qualify his general devaluation of the world as a disvaluation lest he be confused with the extreme type of absolutist position often taken by the Gnostics, etc. wherein matter e.g., is almost invariably treated as absolutely evil and quite distinct from the realm of spirit, the numinous or God. This second quotation, therefore, quite aptly highlights our second qualification to our concept of disvaluation, namely, that the Absolute is found to be reflected, or expressed, in some fashion, to some degree, within the realm of the relative.
	Such treatment of the world reinforces Plotinus' non-nihilistic stance and at the same time gives, and preserves, a degree of value that can be discovered within its ambit. Existence, therefore, in this beautiful world cannot be experienced as a mere illusion but is, or should be, a process that has, or should have, some form of positive value and meaningfulness. These two qualifications imply firstly, that the relative is relatively valid within the context of the everyday phenomenal world but that such validity or value is limited and relative, and secondly, the relativity of the empirical world gains what absolute validity it does have through indirectly reflecting the realm of the Absolute albeit through the prism of the relative. Understanding the philosophy behind this type of transcendental-absolute exposition and coming therein to appreciate this distinction between absolute and relative value, or validity, helps us to comprehend the equivocation that Plotinus appears to enter into where, on one hand, he states the world is an illusion, and, on the other hand, he states it is a place of beauty. Plotinus may appear hesitant in this regard but I am sure he is fully aware of the implications of his transcendental-absolute position dialectically qualifying his position on the distinctiveness of the relative and the absolute whilst at the same time indicating the nature of their interrelationship. By dialectical is meant here a particular type of philosophical argument carried out like a dialogue, or debate, that realizes, and qualifies, the limits of logical items introduced into that process of argumentation recognizing that the reality of the world cannot be caught, and experienced, by the superficial net of logical-extremes.
	Our last two quotations both possess a connotational element wherein, by implication, the relative is subject to depreciation through allusion to qualified forms of imitation, faintness, darkness and/or evil. In the following quotation this depreciatory element is made explicit.

This life then, multiple and universal and primary and one-who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life? For the other lives, the lives below, are darkness and little and dim and cheap; they are not pure and pollute the pure lives... For the evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace of life and a trace of Intellect... 
	The relative-phenomenal world, all other than the Absolute, is here subjected to explicit depreciation. This realm of evil, however, is treated as relative and not absolute. Evil is defined not as something in itself but through the qualified absence of life. The Absolute as Life is given statue through the implication that it is not petty, that it is light-orientated, rich and pure. Moreover there is a sense of dynamism, energy and power imparted to it through the sense that Life is lived as a process of living that is all living. Further, we are invited by Plotinus to enter into this process of real living, which transcends this apparent life of ours, by looking upon this realm of the Real, the One. In effect it is claimed some form of insight is entered into that lets us see the difference between the Relative and the Absolute. With insight the illusion is then seen for what it is, the element of depreciation that insisted on this fact in the first place can now quite naturally flow from the realization that as the empirical world is an imitation of the real our sights are better set upon this other world, this source of real value. Hence, it be could claimed, insightful depreciation is more entered into through default, through the fact that our natural interest reserved for the world becomes displaced and redirected towards the Real. However, depreciation also has a positive role for Plotinus of actually seeming to help the person come to realize this reality of the Absolute as the One. By explicitly, or implicitly, depreciating the relative, and phenomenal, nature of the world our sight is prompted to become focused, instead, on that which is not the multiple (as the empirical world appears through the richness of its phenomenal presentation), i.e., our interest is to be redirected towards the One seen as the pre-conditional and pre-presentational ground of that sensuous reality. The use of depreciation therefore also appears to be a method whereby, theoretically, the Absolute can be experienced? In effect, metaphors of illusion and depreciation are used by Plotinus in both a descriptive sense and a prescriptive sense; in both a structural sense and a functional sense. Realizing that Beauty and Goodness are greater than this everyday vision of the world our natural disdain, given such insight, for the latter should open us up to a redirection of our vision towards the former (whilst the latter would, therefore, be consequently reperceived as deceptively attractive). Disdain for the phenomenal world, thus, has the positive aspect for Plotinus of helping the religious person come to a position whereby the absolute dimension can be seen to reveal itself.

This life then multiple and universal and primary and one - who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life?

	On the positive role of depreciation Plotinus states:

...but by rejecting the "so much" you have become all - yet even before this you were all; but because something else came to you after the "all" you became less by addition: for the addition did not come from being - you will add nothing to that - but from non-being... You will increase yourself then by rejecting all else, and the All will be present to you in your rejection...
	Depreciation consists, therefore, in not only identifying that which is non-being (or orientated towards that which is non-being) but our also rejecting it, casting it aside so that in the process the Absolute can be revealed as the constitutional ground metaphorically beneath or behind phenomena. Plotinus' emphasis on purification and psychic separation from that which is subjected to depreciation is a natural consequence that follows from this philosophic position, putting into practice this process of disdaining.
	Plotinus in effect tells us that if we just look upon this phenomenal world we do not enter into a process of true living. The moral to be drawn, therefore, is that in disdaining this relative world and longing for the Absolute it is claimed the person opens them self up to insight, enters into participation with the Real. Thus it would appear that the element of depreciation, implicitly or explicitly, is also a methodological tool for the creation of insight to be seized upon by the person who seeks to realize and experience the facticity of the Absolute. Hence it appears, for Plotinus, that realization of the illusoriness of the relative world would necessitate our disdaining it, motivating us in our establishing a redirection of a (transcendentally) purified vision away from the phenomenal world towards the One, the Absolute. In effect the general process of disvaluation associated with the utilization of metaphors of illusion and depreciation is used by Plotinus as both a description and a prescription. As a description it seeks to demarcate the realms of the Relative and the Absolute and as a prescription it seeks to provide the means whereby one can experience their interrelationship and, therein, re-orientate one's self towards this absolute dimension.

The perfect soul, then, which directs itself towards intellect is always pure and turns away from matter and neither sees nor approaches anything undefined and unmeasured and evil. It remains, therefore, pure, completely defined by intellect. That which does not stay like this, but goes from itself because it in not perfect or primary but is a sort of a ghost of the first soul, because of its deficiency...
	An examination of this last quotation should reinforce our understanding of this concept of disvaluation and also bring to our attention a number of other themes that appear to be closely associated with it. For example, in this quotation we can note the presence of an emphasis on purity and, by extension, its prescriptive demands for a process of purification as a precondition for religious insight. From a reading of this section of the text it can also be implied that the soul by not turning way from this world must remain in this world as a secondary, as an image and, moreover, in its collaboration with matter is seen as being in darkness, as being in a realm of non-being and evil. The phenomenal world is thus seen as deficient, as an illusion whose order, beauty and goodness are weakly given to it secondhand, as a pale imitation of the Absolute by the Absolute. In this quotation we can thus observe a hierarchicalization of reality, namely, a primary (the Absolute) and a secondary of various degrees (dependent on the extent of its fall vis-à-vis the Absolute).
	Treating the world to depreciation negatively evaluates it worth relative to the Absolute, however, the Relative being in a state of ongoing relationship with the Absolute has expressed through this relationship that which is in common to both realms. These essential attributes, attributes that characterize the nature of the Absolute, are weakly expressed in the Relative so that to all purposes the Relative can be described as an image and, in practical terms, as an illusion when that image is mistaken for absolute reality; reality being seen as the prerogative of the Absolute. In a sense the treatment of the empirical world as an illusion naturally denigrates its relative worth. On this analysis it becomes apparent that metaphors of illusion and metaphors of depreciation are intrinsically linked although this linkage is not necessarily articulated to the same degree nor, for that matter, made fully explicit. Moreover allusions to hierarchicalization, purity and purification, indirect reflection of the Absolute in the world, degrees of being and value seem to follow naturally from, and act as a precondition for, metaphors that disvaluationally treat the world. I would propose, therefore, that the two processes involving metaphors of illusion and metaphors of depreciation both possess the same essential structure and function, and, that the same can be described through a general concordance with the various themes just listed (although these features need not be articulated to the same degree nor made fully explicit). No doubt other themes will also be found to accompany this general concept of disvaluation. An analysis of disvaluational language and its closely associated family of conceptual structures effectively acts as an ideal introduction to the general religious nature of this type of absolute philosophy, which I believe is common to both of these two traditions, and at the same time reveals, through different direction and degrees of emphasis within this general disvaluational structure, stylistic differences between these two traditions.
	Let me now investigate the Buddhist aspect to our comparison. In this section I shall first discuss various instances of illusionism and attempt to show that our three qualifications attached to this metaphorical usage equally apply in this tradition. Secondly, I shall note a stylistic difference in that this tradition uses no metaphors of explicit depreciation, or denigration, and uniquely adopts explicit metaphors of magic, but, that such overall adoption has in effect the same essential structure as that which attaches to our more general concept of disvaluation.
	Our first qualification noted that disvaluation is not treated absolutely and, therefore, was non-nihilistic in scope. Our second qualification made the observation that as the relative cannot be nihilistically dismissed it followed that the relative point of view must possess some degree of relative validity. That accepted the question would then quite naturally arise, without being necessarily made textually explicit, as to how and in what manner the Relative relates to the Absolute, and vice versa? A complex third qualification was later developed that treated degrees of reality as pseudo-ontological; as stages in a process of increasing epistemological insightfulness, and, as experientially indicative of a hierarchical stratification of reality in terms of power and value. It was stated that this last qualification had the tendency to express itself through the polarization, equation and dissolution of fundamental dichotomic tensions textually introduced, and developed, through the application of a disvaluational treatment process.
	The Perfection of Wisdom Tradition and its philosophic systematization in the Madhyamaka in various ways stress their non-nihilistic intentions. Nagarjuna in his influential Mulamadhyamakakarikas states:

"It is" is a notion of eternity (sasvaka), "It is not" is a nihilistic view (uccheda). Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to "being" or "non-being".
	Nagarjuna's philosophy is grounded in, and founded upon, this Prajnaparamita Tradition and historically he is claimed to have written a commentary on The Perfection of Wisdom in 100,000 Lines". As a philosopher he explicated various trends in this tradition, made explicit various presuppositions, arguments, implications and conclusions; generally systematizing this endeavour under one ostensively coherent framework. The nature of this framework is effectively meta-philosophical (and transcendental) in scope because this type of philosophy presents itself as a dialectical methodology that criticizes and attacks the deficiencies that it claims are naturally inherent in all absolutist, philosophical views about reality (as subsumed under the natural attitude, whether formulated in naïve or non-naïve terms of reference).
	As this text makes no direct reference to its non-nihilistic intent let me therefore show that this implication, as a consequence, can still be drawn, and, that such a state of affairs in its historical context was taken for granted. In the form of a dialogue in its dealing with the nature of the experience of perfect wisdom the text states:

That thought which is no thought, is that something which is?
Does there exist, or can one apprehend in this state of absence of thought either a `there is' or a `there is not'?
No, not that.
Was it then a suitable question when the venerable Sariputra asked whether that thought which is no thought is something which is?
It is without modification or 
discrimination.
Well do you expound this, Subhuti...
	In this intriguing dialogue the question is asked of whether, in (an) enlightenment (state of mind), the thought of existence or non-existence is entertained? It was answered that this question was not a suitable one to ask for the reason that in the experience of perfect wisdom no thought is present, consciousness being without modification or discrimination. Effectively this question cannot be allowed because the presuppositional structure to the subject matter of this question is constructed in such a way as to disallow such a question being asked of it. The transcendental rules of the game are articulated in such a way that the question of existence or non-existence cannot be applied to the trans-phenomenal nature of reality and its experientially enlightened reception.
	In the question did the bachelor kill his wife an answer of yes or no can have no sense, or real meaning. In this example it is obvious that the necessary presuppositional conditions are not met in order for the question to be meaningfully asked even though grammatically the question superficially appears to be sensible.
	Returning to our previous quotation we can now ask why this question is presuppositionally inappropriate, i.e., why certain logical preconditions are not fulfilled before a certain type of question, or description, etc., can be meaningfully asked, or applied? Our quotation informed us that from the absolute point of view, i.e., the experience of perfect wisdom, consciousness is without modification or discrimination and, therefore, predicates can be neither attributed to nor denied of its logical subjectivity. Moreover, in keeping with the dialectical nature of this transcendental-absolute style, this text continues and in a few lines further on even disallows the presuppositional ground of subjectivity itself, both logical and personal.

I who do not find anything to correspond to the word "Bodhisattva", or to the words "perfect wisdom", in which Bodhisattva should I then instruct and admonish in perfect wisdom? It would surely be regrettable if I, unable to find the thing itself, should merely in words cause a Bodhisattva to arise and pass away.
	As this text itself states certain questions, and by implication all non-metaphorical phenomenally implicated questions, are not suitable candidates for an appropriate reply or response when the inquiry is made from the transcendental-absolute point of view. In the ensuing evacuation of presuppositional ground language and concepts, as expressed in words, are treated as conventional signs that are empty of their purported structure and content. Language is treated as a pragmatic device useful in the realm of relativity (the world of relations in contrast to the non-relational world of the absolute dimension) but directly useless in itself to describe reality (treated from the perspective of the Absolute). Not only matters of existence, non-existence, logical subjectivity, personal subjectivity, etc., are evacuated of a presuppositional ground but this same text in many other places collapses, by implication, all cognitive categories in the same manner.

Form itself does not possess the own-being of form, etc... A mark does not possess the own-being of a mark. The marked does not possess the own-being of being marked, and own-being does not possess the mark of [being] own-being.
	This removal and destruction of presuppositional ground would appear to rob progressively language of any meaningful role it could have; dissolve any discourse, or dialogue, that one might wish to enter into. That being the case we may well ask ourselves the questions why should this type of text demand, and, the reader of this type of text attempt, the apparently impossible - the comprehension of its message and the putting into practice any instructions associated with that text? Obviously such a type of textual discourse cannot be considered normal. Even this text itself recognizes this when it tells us that it is difficult to comprehend, can cause despair and despondency, dejection and fear. Therefore we can further ask why normal language is subjected to such a process of abnormalization. This text in this same chapter to our previous quotations states:

He [the Bodhisattva] does not go near any dharma at all, because all dharmas are unapproachable and unappropriable. The Bodhisattva then has the concentrated insight "Not grasping at any dharma" by name... When he dwells in this concentrated insight, a Bodhisattva will quickly win the full enlightenment. 
	It seems therefore that  abnormalization of discourse has a practical religious point to make, namely, the articulation of a methodology for the creation of insight into reality from the absolute point of view. However, is such insight insight into the nihilistic nature of reality, or, can reality escape such an accusation? The inapplicability of predicational attribution to reality, from an absolute point of view, still leaves open the question as to whether reality has any value or meaning transcendent to that presuppositional ground treated collectively? It is at this point in our investigation that we can now critically examine the use of metaphors of illusion, and other metaphors of disvaluation, in order to answer this question.
      With respect to our last quotation the same chapter continues and soon makes the following curious point:

What do you think, Subhuti, is form, etc., one thing and illusion another?
No Lord. Because it is not so illusion is one thing, and form, etc. is another; the very form is illusion, the very illusion is form.
What do you think, Subhuti, is that notion "Bodhisattva," that denomination, that concept, that conventional expression, - in the five grasping aggregates (of the skandhas)?
Yes, it is. Because a Bodhisattva who trains himself in perfect wisdom should train himself like an illusory man for full enlightenment. For one should bear in mind that the five skandhas are like an illusory man.
	In effect because there is no underlying substance, or structure, basic to the personality in Buddhist nominalistically-orientated analysis it follows, from such a position, that the person should see themselves as presuppositionless, groundless, inherently empty of such fictitious entities. Thus the introduction of a metaphor involving illusion is in a religious attempt to re-evaluate the nature of the person from the transcendental perspective of the absolute dimension. Abnormalization of language in this section of dialogue abnormalizes its relativity in order to introduce a sense of the absolute; a frame of reference that transcends the presuppositional ground that scopes and limits the Relative. Moreover, the text also indicates that the relativization of the phenomenal through discursive mental processes is itself a type of abnormalization, a distortion of the same through mental constructions that effectively conceal reality:

They [foolish, untaught, common people] have constructed all dharmas which yet do not exist, they neither know nor see the path which is that which truly is.
	Taking the person to be like an illusion this text proceeds to take this concept to its logical limits. As illusory people, like those in a dream, etc., are neither bound nor freed, and, as we are like illusory people, according to the text, it follows that in truth, from the absolute point of view, we too must be neither bound nor free! By our very nature we must be enlightened, but, through our short sightedness and not being able thus to see into the true nature of our being we neither know nor see this.

For all-knowledge is not made, nor unmade, not effected...
So it is. For form, etc. is neither bound nor freed. And that is true also of the Suchness of feeling, etc...   the form of the illusory man is neither bound nor freed. The Suchness of the form of an illusory man is neither bound nor freed.
	By unraveling this text in this manner I have sought to show that the abnormalization of the relative, through the evacuation of presuppositional ground (through the disintegration and withdrawal of cognitive-categorical structures) meaning is not made merely nonsensical but indicative of a breakdown in the appropriateness, or applicability of the phenomenally based sense of the relative, in its attempt to describe the meaning, or sense, of this transcendental-absolute dimension. The non-nihilistic intent of this text is highlighted by the positivity such treatment is claimed to have for the person who instigates, and pursues, its methodological critique of the relative, and, who enters into an experientially receptive openness towards the inexpressibility of this absolute dimension. Metaphors of illusion introduce us to the concept of emptiness, and, by implication suggest that our estate is naturally enlightened, but, that for most of us, bedazzled by the phenomenal nature of the world, are not aware of this true state of affairs. Such metaphors then are used to destroy the apparent relativity of our being in order to reveal this absolute trans-phenomenal dimension that grounds our (non-absolutist) experiential sense of self. That accepted our text would, therefore, stand far removed from any nihilistic intent that could, mistakenly, be superficially argued for. Indeed the Buddhist philosopher has traditionally taken a middle path between the extremes of nihilism and changeless eternalism; a position restressed by Nagarjuna which earned for his school the title of Madhyamaka - Middle Path. This position is effectively implicit in most mainstream Buddhist denominations and is central to this Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition. In effect, its transcendental attitude suspends, and transcends, both nihilistic and eternalistic considerations.
	Let me now continue this examination of metaphors of illusion in order to uphold the application of my second and third qualifications.

The Suchness of these dharmas and the Suchness of all dharmas, and the Suchness of the Tathagata [Buddha] are simply this one single Suchness. There is no division within Suchness. Just simply one single is this Suchness, not two, not three. Suchness has passed beyond counting, because it is not. A man scorched by the heat of summer, at noon might see a mirage floating along, and might run towards it, and think `there I shall find some water, there I shall find something to drink.' What do you think, son of good family, has that water come from anywhere, or does that water go anywhere, to the Eastern great ocean, or the Southern, Northern or Western? 
No water exists in the mirage. How could its coming or going be conceived? That man is foolish and stupid if, on seeing the mirage, he forms the idea of water where there is no water. Water in its own being certainly does not exist in that mirage.
	The text then continues using metaphors involving the dreaming of a number of Tathagatas (Buddhas):

One cannot conceive that in that dream any dharma at all had the status of a full and perfect reality, for that dream was deceptive.
Just so the Tathagata has taught that all dharmas are like a dream... in agreement with the teaching of the Tathagata, they do not imagine the coming or going of any dharma, nor its production or stopping.
	This passage begins with an air of positivity that would contradict a position of nihilism. Even though empirical content is treated as empty the experience of relativity is not dismissed. In the mirage there is no real water, in the dream about a miscellaneous number of Tathagatas there are no real Tathagatas. These metaphors are adopted in order to show by analogical transference that from the transcendental point of view of the absolute, realized through enlightenment (through coursing in all-knowledge, etc.), that the everyday world is equally an illusion without, at the same time, denying its relative validity.

Like a magical illusion are those beings, like a dream. For not two different things are magical illusion and beings, are dreams and being. All objective facts also are like a magical illusion, like a dream. The various classes of saints, from Streamwinner to Buddhahood, also are like a magical illusion, like a dream.
A fully enlightened Buddha also, you say is like a magical illusion, is like a dream? Buddhahood also, you say is like a magical illusion, is like a dream?
Even Nirvana, I say is like a magical illusion, is like a dream? How much more so anything else!
	In this quotation even terms that ostensively apply to a religious interpretation of the Absolute, in its philosophical and religious treatment, are subject to disvaluation. The absolute dimension must be seen to resist a phenomenalization of itself through attempts by language to relativize its inherent inexpressibility. Descriptive treatment by language must weaken this dichotomy between the Absolute and the Relative and in the process diminish the sense of the absolute along with its religious sense of the Absolute (in the form of the numinous, or, the sense of the divine, or, as an expression meaning ultimate reality, or, what so ever).
	One of the ways open for language in a religious frame of reference to deal with the inexpressibility of the nature of reality is to indicate a feeling for this sense of the absolute (or Absolute) through the negation of some phenomenal, or positive religious, item. Such negation, however, is not simple nor straight forward. The item treated through negation is not nihilistically dismissed in some iconoclastic fashion but is more qualified or transcendentally scoped. Its limits in dealing with the absolute are clearly articulated and in the process its positiveness is effectively encapsulated, preserved in such a confine and qualified through the limits imposed by its negational scoping. At first negation appears to proffer a complete dismissal of that subjected to its critique. However, given a larger frame of reference, positivity is restored, albeit in the confines of the relative, whilst some sense of the absolute (and its inherent religious numinousity) is revealed through revealing a sense of its limitation before the unlimited. Disvaluation, through metaphors of illusion, depreciation or denigration and magic, is a type of negative theological process wherein positive religiously formulated categories, both sacred and secular, become scoped and systematically reinterpreted. Through the juxtaposition of limitation before the unlimited the relative is related to the unlimited power and value of the transcendental sense of the absolute (and its non-absolutist religious treatment as an Absolute). Hence the restrictions placed upon a positive theological category by the negative theologian, i.e., its scoping, in effect constitutes a way whereby the transcendental-Absolute and the phenomenal-Relative can be made to relate to each other. This absolute backgrounding to a positive theological item, across the boundaries of its scoping, then allows the sense of the absolute (or Absolute) to appear to reinvest that particular item with a deeper religious significance both in a connotational sense and a denotational sense. The former sense preserves the religious feeling, or aura, the original positive theological item possessed on a connotational level. The denotational sense dialectically reconstructs, and qualifies its cognitive conceptualization and expression, in order to appear to be in some degree of harmony with the transcendental nature of the absolute philosophy that re-evaluated that item of positive terminology. This latter aspect effectively re-writes positive theological terminology, subjected to a negative theological process, in a transcendental format or transcendental language (through the systematic use of a variety of transcendental translational techniques, e.g., transcendental suspensions, etc.).
	In our last quotation a fully enlightened Buddha, Buddhahood, and even Nirvana, were scoped by declaring them like a magical illusion or dream. In the same sweep of identification everything else is declared to be even more like a dream. Taken at face value as dreams are contrasted with our waking states a dissolution of this contrast, between waking and sleeping, must rob even dreams of their being meaningful. Rather, as I have earlier stated, the use of a metaphorical allusion is selective in what feature or features of the image are extracted and analogically applied to the intended subject matter of such treatment. What appears to be the intention of this particular treatment process can be examined on a connotational level and a denotational level. Dreams are states of consciousness wherein certain situations may appear to be real. However on waking the reality of their presentation comes to be appreciated as a simulation of reality. The denotational feature extracted from the imagery of dreaming, e.g., suggests the ability to appreciate mistaken interpretational processes, and, by extension the world of appearance then becomes treated as a distortion of reality as it really is (constituted). That the connotational aspect suggests that the world is in some way defectively interpreted; that the relative world is an unpleasant place that is insufficiently lit or illuminated; unsubstantial and  fragile; and manifestly deceptive. Our metaphorical image of dreaming comes to suggest, therefore, that reality is distorted in our discursive appreciation of the world but that this distortion, from the transcendental-absolute point of view, can be recognized to be as such opening us up by implication to a vision of the real - the reputedly true nature of the situation.
	In the context of our two traditions metaphors of illusion are implicitly depreciatory in the way they discount the value, or validity, of the world as perceived through the natural attitude. The Buddhist adoption of metaphors of magic also possess an implicitly depreciatory element. These two features of illusoriness and depreciation combine together to act in such a way as to circumscribe the phenomenality of that under examination, and would suggest that an expansion of our appreciation would reveal the limits and apparent deceptiveness of the phenomenal. Effectively, the use of such metaphors creates an interpretational system that retranslates statements obtained through the exercise of the natural attitude. It is claimed that reflection on such meta-translations engineers a process of insightfulness and that the systematic application of such techniques prepares the ground for that person to intuit the reality of the world from the absolute point of view. This change of perspective, I would argue in my interpretation of this type of text, realizes a process of revelation wherein the person who comes to experience this transcendental re-orientation comes to intuit, or believe that they have experienced, the nature of the relationship between the Relative and the Absolute and, therein, also the nature of this (religious) sense of the absolute (or Absolute). 
	The anti-absolutist tendencies of this type of text must not be misread as being against a transcendental sense of an absolute (and its possible religious treatment as an Absolute). Likewise, its obvious anti-phenomenalistic tendencies must be not be interpreted as being nihilistic, and anti-sympathetic, in its attitude towards the world (as entailed in its associated sense of the natural attitude). Lastly, the relativity of its transcendental attitude towards the phenomenal must not be construed as being merely relativistic in orientation, and, that all forms of philosophical endeavour are merely species of relativism! The programme of an non-absolutist absolute philosopher is to steer clear of all such forms of relativism, and propose in the process, various transcendental methods for the re-evaluation of the phenomenal.
	A second way of establishing a relationship between the Relative and the Absolute asserts itself, in this type of religious philosophy, through the identification of fundamental dichotomies. Through the adoption of a higher dialectical point of view the polarization and tension of religious terminology is collapsed with a consequent sacralization of the profane. The unlimited is then perceived as investing the limited with a sense of the limited before the unlimited which in turn returns a sense of value to the relative world. The concept of degrees of reality in a contextual examination should reveal this process of revaluation at work textually. This complex concept of degrees of reality was analyzed into the following strands - a pseudo-ontological element [i], a process of epistemological insightfulness [ii], the power [iii] and value of the Absolute [iv]. Let me at this point in time, in the following textual examination, indicate that this analysis of the concept of degrees of reality is at least moving in the right direction.

And he [a Bodhisattva] also considers the full enlightenment [ii] and its happiness [iv], and the perfection of the sovereignty [iii] over all dharmas, and the accomplishment of the measureless and unconquered supreme wonder working power which has conquered all [iii], and the power [iii] of the Tathagata's cognition [ii] of what is truly real [i] which is without covering, attachment or obstruction, unequalled, equal to the unequalled, incomparable, without measure, and the power [iii] of the Buddha-cognition [ii], preeminent among the powers [iii], and the vision and cognition of a Buddha [ii], the perfection of the ten powers [iii], the obtainment of that supreme ease [iv] which results from the four grounds of self-confidence [iv] and the obtainment of Dharma through the realization [ii] of the ultimate reality of all dharmas [i]. 
	I believe, in the quotation of this paragraph, that these major themes present in this complex concept of degrees of reality are sufficiently self-evident to that extent that they need little further discussion. It would appear that the complexity of this concept is implicated in any philosophy that utilizes disvaluational techniques in order to draw a contrast between the sense of the absolute versus the sense of the relative, or phenomenal.
	The theme of value or valuation, as I see and define it, is an existential one. The term value being essentially an open-concept open to a variety of interrelated meanings and contexts and not able to be pinned down to any one clear logical definition. First, there is a sense of validity, what is valid in some existential sense. In a dynamic sense it can be treated as that which gives value whilst in a static sense it can be treated as that which has value, is valuable. In a personal mode it can also be treated as that which evaluates the relationship of self, on one hand, to the being of the Absolute and, on the other, to the being of others and the world. The overall effect of value being seen and experienced as a feeling of worth, happiness, transcendental detachment, valour, natural self-confidence, sense of personal integrity, etc. However, in this chapter I do not wish to elaborate upon my understanding of this concept of mine but instead merely to point out this component in the complex concept of degrees of reality and its implication in the concept of disvaluation (through the restoration of value imparted by the imputed recognition and experience of the transcendental presence of the absolute in the world).
	Metaphors and descriptions of magic appear to be used in the text The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines in four ways, namely, (i) to exalt the power of a buddha or buddha-like person, (ii) as a skillful device used or described by the same to introduce to an audience two closely related concepts of (iii) the non-self-existentness and (iv) selflessness of phenomena (or as a straight forward simultaneous illustration of these two doctrines).
	The first usage is used dramatically to set this text in a magical-religious-like atmosphere wherein buddha-like figures are shown to have a super-human nature and divine-like attributes giving emphasis to a devotional element that permeates this text.
	The second usage involves the skillful (upaya) adoption, or description, of magical illusions in order to illustrate, more often than not, the two closely related doctrines of the unsubstantiality, or non-self-existentness, of phenomena and the selflessness of the same. These two doctrines represent respectively the emptiness of the world and the emptiness of the personality. Together these two doctrines represent the emptiness of all dharmas.
	This term dharmas is another difficult Buddhist concept to deal with initially. In the above context dharmas can come to be seen as distinctive types of phenomenon that unceasingly come into existence and flash out of existence at the same time. As a meditational device its philosophical elaboration led initially to a severe reductionist and nominalistic critique, but, dharmas themselves came to be spared such criticism. Consequently, in the academic environment of early Buddhist monasticism they were given an increasingly realistic and atomistically orientated interpretation. However with the advent of the Mahayana critical techniques that were applied in a dharmic analysis of the world and the personality came to be transferred to the dharmas themselves. In the process Buddhist philosophical thinking dramatically shifted from a radical realism to a critical radicalism and in the matrix of this transformation was born a systematic absolute-orientated philosophical approach to the world with a marked emphasis on the via negativa.

Thereupon the Lord on that occasion exercised His wonder working power.The entire assembly... saw the Tathagata Akshobhya surrounded by the congregation of monks, accompanied by a retinue of Bodhisattvas... Thereupon the Lord again withdrew His wonder working power. The Lord Akshobhya, the Tathagata, then no longer appeared... And the Lord said to Ananda: All dharmas do not come within the range of vision... For all dharmas are of such a nature that they can be neither known nor seen... All dharmas are unthinkable, similar to illusory men. All dharmas are unfindable; because they are in a state of non-existence.
	In this last quotation the Buddha is stated to have conjured up another buddha figure - the Tathagata Akshobhya along with a vast congregation of people, and then to have dissolved the same. The point of this exercise was to impress skillfully upon his audience that the nature of all dharmas is essentially the same, namely, like an illusion.
	This type of metaphor is also used to illustrate the point that not only is the world like an illusion but that the personality is similarly constituted (and that the Bodhisattva, as a Bodhisattva, is aware of this).

A fictitious creature (who has been conjured up by the Tathagata) to do a certain work (in converting beings), performs that work, but remains without discrimination... Just so a Bodhisattva performs the work for the sake of which he develops the perfection of wisdom, the perfection of wisdom remains without discrimination.
	Metaphors of magic are effectively a special type of metaphor of illusion. Both types of metaphors have the same overall structure and function. Both are denotationally disvaluational and, on a connotational level, implicitly depreciatory towards the relative world as seen through the natural naive point of view. Both are used with the same type of intent, namely, to function in such a manner that would seem to help us to be able to discriminate between a transcendental realm of the real in contrast to a lesser world of the phenomenal whilst, at the same time, establishing their interrelationship.
      In entering into a comparison of both traditions with respect to their adoption of disvaluational treatment processes we must ask ourselves four questions. Firstly, do these traditions use similar metaphors, and secondly, in the use of those metaphors that are ostensively the same are the same metaphorical processes of selection at work? Thirdly, can those various disvaluational structures individually considered be treated as essentially isomorphic between these two traditions, and fourthly, does there exist an adequate degree of structural and functional isomorphism on a collective level that would allow us to affirm that the same general concept of disvaluation is at work in both worlds? It stands to reason with respect to our last point that the presence of a number of isomorphic features of themselves do not imply that overall these two philosophic religious traditions are either structurally and/or functionally isomorphic. Two different political cultures may, e.g., both possess courts, judges, prisons and death sentences, etc., but this coincidence does not imply that the pursuit of justice is exercised in the same fashion.
	Previously, in this chapter, I argued for a contextually and intentionally-predetermined metaphorical-selectivity in the use of metaphorical structures. It was claimed that the metaphor was intentionally introduced into such a frame of reference that one, or more, strands embedded in the open richness of the symbolic matrix of the metaphor become discriminated in, and separated out of, such a matrix and applied to some pre-determined subject-matter deliberately set up to be so highlighted. The whole analogical process, when correctly devised, comes to be seen as obvious, naturally appropriate and decisively illuminating. The use of an image, as an analogy, focuses and presents us with, the essential point to be made often in a vivid, artful and interesting fashion.
	In this chapter I have discussed how both traditions use disvaluational treatment processes to, firstly, effect a relative-absolute contrast, and secondly, to indicate the nature of their interaction within this contrast. I have noted that both traditions use metaphors of illusion and at least involve themselves in an implicit, religiously motivated, highly qualified depreciation, or denigration, of the naïve acceptance of the (positively reformulated sense of the) natural attitude. However when we compare the textual instantiation of their metaphorically treated and illustrated concepts of illusionism we would find different processes of metaphorical selectivity at work. Although the same types of metaphors are ostensively present, e.g., dreams, images, etc., the metaphorical processes are differently constructed in both traditions, yet, a deeper appreciation of this difference, in my opinion, would reveal and establish an effective level of structural and functional isomorphism that would support my contention that this same general concept of disvaluation is at work in both worlds. That behind the conceptual and metaphorical machinery the same intentions, structures and functional consequences can be observed. Indeed, through such a comparison each tradition naturally lends itself to act as a commentary on the other and in the process helps to reveal other common conceptual structures associated with this disvaluational attitude. However, to establish this deeper level of general coincidence, or isomorphism, this phenomenological approach must take on a transcendentally reconstructed formulation and this will be attempted in my next two chapters. Indeed, this question itself, and allied topics for investigation, must be translated into a transcendental format in order to make sense of this type of project.
	In the Neoplatonic context the metaphor of illusionism is constructed in such a way that the element of being a copy, a trace, or simulation, of reality is extracted from it. The phenomenal world is treated as if it were some copy of some heavenly-like realm, albeit in a weakly diminished form. This dim copy therefore barely reflects the perfection of this higher realm of reality. As a consequence the moral is drawn that although the world appears real we must not mistake its deceptive charms for the reality that lies metaphorically above it or beneath it (in the transcendental treatment of this contrast).

Nature is at rest in the contemplation of the vision of itself, a vision which comes to it from its abiding in and with itself and being itself a vision; and its contemplation is silent but somewhat blurred. For there is another, clearer for sight, and nature is the image of another contemplation. For this reason what is produced by it is weak in every way, because a weak contemplation produces a weak object.
	On the other hand the Buddhist context extracts from the imagery of illusion the observation that illusory phenomena, as phenomena, are only a simulation and that in effect the reality of the situation is such that there is no substance to the appearance. Subjecting the phenomenal world in general to the treatment process that considers it to be in the same class as that of illusory phenomena the conclusion is drawn that both the world and the manifestation of personality, as they appears in the world, are without substance or permanent-underlying reality. It follows, in such a frame of reference, that there can be no authentic valid self-initiated thought of self-existence; that such discrimination on our part can have no true ground for its self-constitution without denying however the manifestation of such an appearance to our consciousness, or, this appearance before the conscious perception of others.

...as with an illusory man. Praise does not penetrate into him, win him over. When there is no praise he is not effected, or frustrated. Just so the true nature of dharmas is just so much...
	Although different processes of metaphorical selection are adopted the disvaluational consequences of such analogical treatment remain practically the same in both traditions. Disvaluation is qualified as non-nihilistic in scope and intention, the Relative is related to the Absolute via the argument that the essential nature of the former is the same as that of the latter with degrees of reality being invoked between these two realms from the relative point of view. That from the absolute point of view the phenomenal is merely constituted, and, that the Absolute from the absolute perspective is non-hierarchically the same or the One; i.e., non-different, non-dual, without intentional discrimination, etc.

The five skandhas have by the Tathagata been declared as world [loka]. Which five? Form, feeling, perceptions, impulses and consciousness...
The perfect wisdom of the Tathagata has pointed out the five skandhas as `the world' [loka], because they do not crumble... For the five skandhas have emptiness for own-being, and as devoid of own-being, emptiness cannot crumble away.
	In this quotation the more apparent ontology of the world is stated to consist of the five categories known as skandhas. Because, it is stated, through a number of arguments, the essential nature of each skandha is emptiness then it follows that as the world consists only of these five categories it too must be empty. Moreover as the emptiness of emptiness is emptiness, because emptiness is without own-being, it cannot be subject to change, cannot crumble away and must therefore transcend the phenomenal nature of the world of change (samsara). Thus the essential nature of the world is equivalent to this transcendental sense of the absolute because it too is without own-being. However, this absolute must not be treated as some type of absolute phenomenon because that would defeat the purpose of this exercise to indicate that the Suchness of reality is beyond the direct reach of intentionally constituted discursive consciousness. In effect the world is reperceived to be non-nihilistically deceptive whilst the relationship between the Absolute (Nirvana) and the Relative (samsara) is perceived, from the transcendental perspective of this sense of the absolute, to be one of a fundamental, intrinsic equivalence.

	In comparison we can note:

For there is not in that Good something seen and its light, nor intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which generates these afterwards and lets them be beside it; but he himself is the ray which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the generation, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the kind it is, that would not have come into existence.
	Here the connotation of light dismisses the experiential possibility of a nihilistic interpretation. At the same time the equivalence of seeing and the light to see by, intellect and object of intellect, establishes an interrelationship between the Absolute (Supreme/Good) and the relative world of duality; a relationship based on a transcendental, or essential, equivalence (when accounted for from the perspective of this Absolute dimension).
	As I have remarked earlier the conception of disvaluation also has a prescriptive aspect, an aspect that has practical methodological implications. The utilization of disvaluation as a method for the instantiation of religious insight into the nature of the relationship between the Relative and the Absolute produces a religious frame of reference with a marked emphasis on purification. This demand is pronounced in both texts. Associated with it is also an element of devotion through a personification of the nature of the Absolute, a personalization that appears to be implicitly present in the religious experience of this relationship. The nature of the method for the reception of such insight being perceived as essentially reductive, destructive, negative and potentially iconoclastic.

...when it is enlightened it has what it has sought, and this is the soul's true end, to touch that light and see by itself, not by any other light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing. It must see that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his own. How then can this happen? Take away everything!
	This negative process of removing all lesser entities, processes of thought, etc., from the centrality of our being, would in this analysis be interpreted as the thorough imposition of a disvaluation of the relative (although, not an absolute rejection, or devaluation, of the relative as the world of the phenomenal). Disvaluation not only indirectly describes the Absolute, by negative means, but directly opens up for the religious person, it is claimed, or so it would appear, a path towards the experience of the relationship between Absolute and Relative, and, thence, the experience of the Absolute (from the perspective of the absolute dimension).
	In comparison we can note the meditational application of the doctrine of emptiness is claimed to produce a similar result.

In that Beyond there is no discrimination. Through their non-discrimination do all dharmas become fully known to the Bodhisattvas.

As contrary to the ways of the whole world is this dharma demonstrated, - it teaches you not to seize upon dharmas, but the world is want to grasp at anything.

For just the very skandhas, elements and sense-fields are empty, isolated and calmly quiet. As a result... they cannot be apprehended... Where there is no perception, appellation, conception or conventional expression, there one speaks of `perfection of wisdom'.
	These three quotations each present an apparent paradox to the effect that the experience of perfect wisdom is not an experience of perfect wisdom; through non-discrimination dharmas become fully known; through the non-grasping of dharmas dharmas become known, etc. However, in this absolute style of philosophical-religious exposition paradoxes, contradictions, etc., are never presented as insoluble; without some form of an implied interpretational resolution. Each of one these quotations suggests the implicit use of an interpretation to the effect that trans-intentional experience is experienced trans-intentionally, i.e., the sense of the absolute dimension is intuitively experienced in trans-intentional (and trans-phenomenal) terms of reference, i.e., in transcendentally orientated consciousness. Not that transcendental consciousness is, in my understanding, completely divorced from discursive, cognitive, phenomenal consciousness, but, merely, the transcendent transformationally purified re-expression of the former level of consciousness.
	To conclude this chapter I would like to re-discuss briefly  the phenomenological aspect that appears to be implicated by this concept of disvaluation. I believe such an enquiry would throw further light on our understanding, as developed so far, and, in the process, give us a deeper appreciation of this disvaluational treatment process at work in both traditions. 
	Disvaluation is in effect a specifically qualified devaluation of the natural attitude. The natural attitude is that attitude that naïvely accepts the world as it is thought to be perceived, both by ourselves and others, and which is thought to be the intersubjective and objective subject of social discourse. Phenomenological research as formulated by Husserl, for example, cannot equally be accused of nihilistic intent. Experience is bracketed, its interpretation is not denied but subjected to an epoche; our relevant prejudices, or i.e., our pre-judgments, are subjected to a suspension of value whilst simultaneously the form of the experience is subjected to a phenomenological scrutiny in order to bare its universal configuration, or essential structure.
	A phenomenological investigation of experience must, in order to ground this discipline, first establish the essential structure of experience, in effect investigating the essence of all essential form as it is had in conscious experience.
	Disvaluation of the natural experience in effect suspends or brackets experience. Questions of existence, or non-existence, now no longer enter the arena of our conscious attention rather our concern becomes focused upon the essence or general phenomenal form, i.e., the structure of that experience. Moreover, transcendental considerations (of the bracketed experience) question the nature of the essential structure in general.
	Buddhist investigations from the perspective of this absolute-transcendental point of view are found articulating a doctrine of emptiness declaring in effect that the essence of essential structures (dharmas) to be essentially essenceless (sunya), - a one, undifferentiated realm of Suchness above and beyond processes of discursive intellection. Although such a position appears to be non-essential in character, and ostensively anti-essential, the (transcendental-) phenomenological reduction in its being exercised is set up to reveal, through a process of deconstruction, that the essence of phenomenal reality is essentially essenceless, i.e. empty.
	Neoplatonic investigations appear to uncover a transcendental ground of the Absolute equally above and beyond all trace of the dual, predication, processes of language, etc. Both of our traditions appear, therefore, to practice a complex phenomenological type of investigation and, although, the language of each tradition ostensively appears to be quite different it is my belief that on structural and functional levels, in this regard, the degree of isomorphic equivalence is quite profound.
	With increasing sophistication the practice of a phenomenological type of investigation makes its first developed historical appearance, I believe, with the advent of proto-absolute-orientated philosophicalization, finding its precursor in the rise of Skepticism around B.C.300. Qualified skepticism brackets our ontological-existentially-orientated beliefs without dismissing their relativity.
  	Eventually a phenomenological style of investigation, through the increasing phenomenological treatment of that phenomenologically orientated investigation itself, gives way to a transcendental-phenomenological treatment of phenomenal presentation. Therein a transcendental reduction, etc., of this phenomenal relativity reveals the structural form intentional to the act of consciousness under investigation. A transcendental investigation examines the essential nature of this essential structure. For Plotinus the essence of essence is the One, a One that is beyond number, measure or shape. In a like fashion our Buddhist text states (my italics):

...all this Suchness... is just one single Suchness, is without any trace of the variety of positivity and negativity, as being one, non-different, inextinguishable, unaffected, non-dual, without cause for duality.
	Noting this apparent phenomenological isomorphism between these two traditions it naturally leads us to ask the question if other themes of the phenomenological method are also present? Husserl himself indicates that his research was not unique, nor original. We might also concede that he was one of the first philosophers to explicate, and articulate clearly, a transcendental-phenomenological methodology whilst, at the same time, also examining the presuppositional ground beneath its practice and in the process refining its exercise? Suffice to say that this intriguing question cannot be appropriately examined here but that enough detail has been indicated to suggest that the concept and practice of disvaluation appears to be phenomenologically structured and motivated. Overall, our phenomenological appreciation reinforces our perception that between these two traditions a significant degree of descriptive structural and prescriptive functional isomorphism can be affirmed, and, that the use of disvaluational treatment, as a religious-philosophical technique, effectively has a transcendental phenomenologically-orientated motivation and consequences.

Endnotes II - Disvaluation