Chapter IV - Analysis Versus Deconstruction

Introduction 

	This chapter investigates the hermeneutical implications of the relationship between transcendental processes of analysis and synthesis that appear to be operative in texts that emphasize the use of a via negativa? Essentially, this chapter continues on from where the last chapter left off and investigates the possible presence of a more comprehensive transcendental programme than that merely supplied through the use of a transcendental suspension. The transcendental nature of this programme being established through the use of a transcendental suspension effectively put in place through a miscellaneous combination of textual mechanisms that might include processes of a negative theological character, processes of disvaluation, metaphorical devices, analogy, allegory, critical deconstruction, paradox, etc. Central to this interpretation will be the use of an heuristic device constructed from a transcendental-phenomenological reinterpretation of the Heideggerian hermeneutic circle.

	Everyone is acquainted, I would assume, with the philosophical puzzle posed in childhood of which came first the chicken or the egg? On the surface this question appears to be reasonable? However, the apparent dilemma of this puzzle arises when no particular egg and no particular chicken are presented in the terms of reference for the resolution of this problem. What constitutes the expression first if we have no clear empirical criterion for what might count as evidence, or no other clearly formulated criteria in this regard that might act as if evidence for some form of priority? Moreover, there is an underlying correlativity at work between chickens and eggs, or rather, chickens, hens and eggs. Under such circumstances there can be neither logical nor existential forms of priority if all parties of the question have a mutually co-thematized identity. In the absence of empirical terms of reference and realizing that hens, eggs and chickens are correlatively defined we should recognize that there can be no resolution of this problem, or more correctly, no resolution of this pseudo-problem. The presuppositional ground of the pseudo-problem implies that there can be no possible solution (whereas a normal problem has a solution which may, or may not, be realized or realizable).
	In philosophy we have a more sophisticated pseudo-problem along the same lines, namely, which came first - synthesis or analysis? If synthesis is co-defined in relation to analysis, and vice versa, then we can expect no form of logical priority to follow. Although the pseudo-problem can have no sensible solution that does not mean that this type of sentence can have no meaning or sense. On the contrary, no grammatical rules are broken, we recognize it as presenting a question and, moreover, we can analyze the meaning of the sentence in such a manner as to expose its inability to be resolved. Then, for the philosopher, on reflection an understanding why this type of construction breaks down is more often than not an informative process, a process of insight that casts some light into the deeper regions of our phenomenal being.
	In this century, in some quarters, pseudo-problems have pre-occupied a considerable proportion of the noise, or conversation, of modern philosophy. Their analysis has allowed us to clarify a considerable number of philosophical issues, but, does this type of research allow us to pose new questions, and re-pose old questions, of a more creative and relevant nature to our-living-in-the-world?
	In the last chapter I equated philosophy and metaphor. Re-stating this attitude let me present it in the following format that doing philosophy is working through (the) metaphor(ical). In simplistic terms we might define a metaphor as a happy pseudo-problem (and perhaps psuedo-problems as unhappy or failed metaphors?). As previously noted our appreciation of a metaphor is in constant danger of misinterpreting the relationship, central to its being as a split reference, between its literal dimension and its metaphorical dimension. A tension between is and is not is continually held in balance through a type of transcendental suspension that is not prepared to say yea or nay to either party. As long as this transcendental suspension remains in play the metaphor can fruitfully go about its work; or at least be allowed to realize its potential in the context it was designed for.
	In the last chapter I looked at the metaphorical concept of illusionism, that type of approach that treats the world as like an illusion without entering either the nihilistic camp of the thorough skeptic (and relativist), if that could be possible, or the domain of the naïve believer who accepts everything presented as being presented-at-face-value, if that too could be possible. Structured like a pseudo-problem, in this case as an apparent contradiction, we could rephrase the metaphorical structure of illusionism as the world is both like an illusion and is not like an illusion (or as I expressed it in the last chapter: So the phenomenal world is like an illusion but is also not absolutely like an illusion). Of course a successful analysis of the expression like must defuse the semblance of a contradiction and spread out before us, as a reason, why metaphors don't usually trouble anyone other than philosophers?  Why would I term this use of metaphor, assuming its exercise to be a fruitful enterprise, a happy pseudo-problem (or as a happy metaphor)? The simple answer to this question is that in the case of illusionism, e.g., I perceived this metaphorical structure for all its dialectical expression, as possessing a possible resolution, in this particular case, a form of resolution that realized a transcendental solution. The transcendental nature of this solution is such that the resolution is written in terms of the constitution of the phenomenal qua phenomenal and that this meta-appreciation necessitates transcendental terms of reference. Moreover, these constitutional terms of reference are discovered through the auspices of the transcendental suspension both through its installation and our transcendental development of this suspended material. A transcendental phenomenologist could not be successful in their research if they could create a transcendental suspension but not develop it, move on and productively exercise it in the unfolding of their transcendental-phenomenological investigations.
	An acceptance of this analysis just recounted presents us with two immediate problems, how do we meet or face, or put in play, a transcendental suspension and, once that has been achieved, what do we meet or face, or find, in the exercise of this type of transcendental process? In the previous chapter I discussed the nature of a transcendental suspension as the suspension of all forms of judgment and therefore as applying to all forms of value and not only to considerations of a factual nature (i.e., in terms of both existence and non-existence). So e.g., in our aesthetic appreciation of an art object a a transcendental suspension would translate the intentional structure of this experience into the following type of format: that a is both a and not-a, is both an art object and not an art object that might be aesthetically interesting (beautiful) or not aesthetically interesting. Or we might rephrase it in softer terms of reference: that a might not be a which although regarded as an art object might not be an art object which might or might not be aesthetically interesting (beautiful). Rephrased in either format we are presented with a structure essentially isomorphic to the structure of the metaphorical experience, albeit, written in concrete terms of reference. In answering the question how do we meet or face the transcendental suspension? it would appear that in neutralizing every aspect of our overall thesis in a conceptual state of suspended animation with its corresponding anti-thetical components we put in play, and realize, a distinctive state of transcendental suspension centered intentionally about this point of paralysis or counter-balance. That point is intentionally unique, and defined in our psychic world as that mid-point between the thesis and its anti-thesis. Thus it would appear that the transcendental suspension and the process for its realization are defined in reference to the intentional nature of the thesis itself. In answering the question concerning the manner and the nature of the productivity of the transcendental suspension let me attempt a response, in nature both theoretical and hypothetical, along the following lines - let us investigate the phenomenal relationship between a process of analysis that defines, and is defined, by a mutual process of synthesis. Further, as an example, let us entertain a possible state of affairs wherein we can simultaneously, and simplistically, describe our initial hermeneutical interpretation of a religious text never before seen in a language that can be easily read by ourselves. All that completed let me describe my findings in this regard, disregarding, in line with the hypothetical nature of this imaginative reconstruction, all controversial considerations that might arise from its criticism...
	Already we have anticipated the religious nature of this text. Perhaps the title tells us that? In reading on we find other anticipations confirmed, or disconfirmed, and that there is a ongoing relationship of mutual thematization between the apparent totality of the text and any level of subdivision within that text. Moreover, this kind of circular relationship is also in evidence in the virtual relationship between that text and other texts in the same tradition, or some other, and that this aspect of allusion is assumed both in relation to its gestation and its appreciation. 
	Usually, it was noted that, hermeneutical interest was maintained until there was a decrease in the rate of realized thematization. However, it was also noted that, in theoretical terms of reference, it could be said that this interpretive process could never come to complete fruition. How do we know, or not know, that the text does not ultimately mean to subvert itself e.g., through some form of irony or secret code? Then again how can we prove in the terms of reference of that text itself that our hermeneutical appreciation is fundamentally accurate? Of course in practical terms of reference most texts are treated when and where necessary with just enough care and attention, and depth, to allow us to realize an adequate recognition of what that text appears to stand for...
	How does this two-way process of mutual comprehension get started in this hermeneutic circle, the title given to this type of process of co-thematizational interaction observed by Heidegger? If the parts are read in the context of the total text, and vice versa, how does our hermeneutical project ever get off the ground, get started?
	The simple solution to this apparent dilemma is to take what has already been constituted as being constituted-there-for-us. We take the text into our hands, we look at it, we make various initial observations, listen to the comments of others, we note various anticipations and we start there. In its own way the text is also a condensation, or encapsulation, of the very context in which it has had its gestation so that it not only allows us, or invites us, to reconstitute that text but also, in some measure, reconstitute its traditional context, or at least that aspect of it closest to the gestation of that text. Also, at the same time, through the provocative power of that text it can constitute for us, as a possibility, through a recognition of style, a virtual introduction to the personality, or psychic being, of its author or authors. Moreover, in a metaphorical sense, through the power of that text we are invited to interrogate that piece of literature and, in turn, allow ourselves to be interrogated by it.
	How do we meet, and face, the pre-constituted as the pre-constituted? The solution to this question is, I believe, through a transcendental suspension of those anticipations that direct us towards that text as a text to be read! Now we are in a position to realize that the two-way nature of the hermeneutic circle, or any other bi-polar relationship for that matter, is not a two-way process but three-way! Thus, in accordance with this phenomenological analysis, both the logical and the phenomenological forms of priority are actually with the transcendental suspension and not with either the act of thematizational synthesis nor with the act of thematizational analysis. As both analysis and synthesis must individually fail us in starting this task of hermeneutical appreciation it follows that we must begin elsewhere, and yet in such a manner that bears some relation to these two interacting polarities. The candidate for such a mission can be none other than the transcendental suspension itself which being that phenomenological attitude that allows us to meet the preconstituted in an act of transcendental openness also allows us to face intentionally the relevantly preconstituted material; allows us to recognize experientially its uniqueness, and historicity, through its unfolding definition in terms of the suspended counter-balance put in place between its open thesis and anti-thesis (whilst in a state of balanced play between analytical and synthetical orientations).
	The expression pre-constituted has a number of non-conflicting meanings, or levels of meaning, of which the following three senses will be noted. First, we can consider it as applying to all the relevant material already constituted there for us like the phenomenal presence of that text itself (along with its overall structural-functions and its substructural-functions), its manifested context (or place of discovery, gestation, etc.). Then, we could regard the preconstituted as including the total relational interaction of all previous forms of experiential input relevant to the situation to hand and its implicit formation as the appropriate psychic background, or horizon, against which this text is to be read. Lastly, there is the important transcendental sense of the pre-constitutional possibility of such hermeneutical appreciation being able to take place.
	Accepting that some form of suspension is called for, in order to meet with that area of the pre-constituted in line with the focus of our investigations, are we right to assume that the nature of that suspension is transcendental and not e.g., merely psychological, or cognitive, etc? The answer to this question, I believe, can be found in a phenomenal analysis of the fact that as the thematical nature of the thesis is counter balanced by its anti-thesis, without their mutual cancellation, it follows that the nature of our research in this regard must be trans-thematical, i.e., transcendental (assuming that thematical value is given a conceptual, or cognitive translation, and that transcending those terms of reference realizes a transcendental trans-constitutional point of view). Thus a transcendental perspective accepted it follows that the nature of our ongoing analytical and synthetical investigations must also be transcendental in nature by virtue of the fact that the transcendental suspension has already established those terms of reference.
	Thus from this simple analysis of this hypothetical religious text we can conclude that, in theoretical terms of reference, our hermeneutical research, or any form of research for that matter, proceeds through three ideal moments, namely, a transcendental suspension, a transcendental analysis and a transcendental synthesis. In this manner we can account for the productivity of a transcendental suspension. Moreover, in realizing that these three types of transcendental process, in our experiential reconstitution of experience, are correlatively co-thematized it follows that the definition of any one can be realized through a negational treatment of the other two parties to this expanded hermeneutic circle. Hence, e.g., a transcendental suspension can be defined as the negation of its correlative and co-thematized transcendental analysis and transcendental synthesis, i.e., in effect a transcendental suspension of its correlative processes of transcendental analysis and transcendental synthesis, etc. Put in more simple terms the balance of (the noetic acts) analysis and synthesis realizes a state of suspension in the same manner as the juxtaposition of (the noematic content of) the thesis and its anti-thesis. With this insight to hand can we move on to an examination of the ideal transcendental-phenomenological natures of these moments of transcendental analysis and transcendental synthesis.
	In the first section of this chapter, after the completion of this introduction, I will conduct an analysis of analysis in the light of this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical-circle as just outlined, using this scheme as an heuristic device to clarify distinctive aspects of the phenomenological-hermeneutical process. In this examination I will show that the religious use of analysis in texts dominated by the use of a via negativa masquerades behind the surface of a confusing and complex pattern of processes both analytical and synthetical in nature, and, that the latter mode, or orientation, has a particular importance for our understanding of the deconstructive and reconstitutional nature of any attendant negative theological process. Then, in the second section, I will attempt to sketch out my interpretation of that negative theological process, i.e., the apparent manner in which the via negativa is used in this type of absolute religious-philosophical text as exemplified by these two texts chosen for this thesis. In the third section of this chapter I shall return to a deeper examination of this hermeneutic circle as redefined by myself. In a fourth section I shall offer a series of concluding comments itemizing a number of important changes made in my own understanding of this type of text. Finally, as a conclusion I will briefly sum up the hermeneutical consequences that follow from this type of transcendental research as proposed by this thesis to date, and, the manner in which the second half of this thesis will attempt to redress certain defects in its presentation in order to present clearly the similarities and differences between these two traditions in the areas of concern focused upon in the course of this thesis.

1.	Analyzing Analysis

	From my own phenomenological investigations of the essential nature of a process of analysis I would be led to believe, and expect, that this type of mental process is reductive, retrospective and relatively destructive of a pre-constituted state of greater synthesis, or integrity. Reductive in the sense that the whole is re-organized in our analytical appreciation in terms of some number of relatively elemental-like constituents that are seen to constitute that object, or state, under analytical examination. However these elements are pre-conceived to pre-constitute that object and hence it is always possible to alter the nature of our analysis by focusing on a different set of elements. Be that as it may analysis is still generally considered to be objective if our investigations had the same terms of analytical reference and were conducted to the same degree of critical scrutiny. Such reduction appears to be of that already constituted and, therefore, to be essentially a retrospectively-orientated pursuit. The relative successfulness of that reconstituted analysis over other possible forms of analysis, in terms of both structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness, reinforce the convictions of that analyst as to the reality, or at least the propriety, of those terms of reference. This type of conviction when exercised in, and through, the natural attitude is severely criticized by both the Neoplatonic tradition and the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition. Lastly, analysis appears to be relatively destructive of that subjected to its enquiry, however, in a returning of those elemental components back into the totality of the original object or state subjected to that analysis the fruits of that analysis can attempt to contribute to a greater (provisional) understanding of that pre-analytical state of affairs. Those philosophers who dispute a pro-analytical methodology arguing, in absolutist terms of reference, either that reality cannot be broken up, or reduced to a certain number of parts and/or that no mental imposition of categories can be made to apply to the ongoing appreciation of phenomenal reality.
	To a certain degree the analytical experience de-experientializes the pre-analytical content by fixing it in a definitional structure in accordance with the analytical mode of examination (although the dialectical relationship, or thematizational dialogue, between the analytical mode and the achieved results of that analytical style ensures an ongoing re-evaluation, to some degree or other, in the constitutional terms of both these interdependent constituting and constituted parties). In accordance with the mode of analysis that which is pre-defined as essential is searched for, either recognized as present, or, realized as not present, i.e., as absent. Pragmatic criteria often pre-deciding, and then maybe confirming, the choice adopted in the type of analytical mode chosen for this research.
	In a transcendental frame of reference the empirical observation of the reductive analysis is purified of phenomenal characteristics to reveal the perceived constitutional structure as a series of named, or noted, relations between these parts and their pre-definitional whole or situational totality.
	In my opinion, therefore, an analytical process is reductive, retrospective in its temporal orientation and relatively destructive of the pre-definitional state of affairs. Moreover, the derived elemental components are defined, de-experientialized and enstructured in accordance with the mode of analysis, and the intensity and carefulness, of that examination. The merit of this type of endeavour residing in the relative usefulness of the elemental data either in terms of that original pre-definitional state of affairs, or some other, when introduced into a process of re-constitution. The structural-meaning and the functional-meaningfulness of those contextual-elements being derived through those processes of re-constitution.
	The Buddhist term vicara  (or vigraha) is usually translated as analysis. The object of this analysis is to see (the reality of) all conventional things to be as they are (yathabhutam), namely, as without inherent self-existence. Superficially there does appear to be some resemblance in practice to a conceptual analysis if only in the systematic manner this style of investigation is brought to bear. However, in the realization of emptiness, i.e., realizing the lack of inherent existence in the constitution of (all) phenomenal existence, it is implied (and experienced) that all phenomena have the same (samata) ultimate nature; i.e., the lack of inherent existence with the consequence that they lack an ultimate (self-existent) nature. This type of meditative awareness is, in my opinion, not correctly analytical in accordance with what I would perceive to be a phenomenology of the analytical experience. A large bowl of fruit could be analyzed to reveal its different content, e.g., x apples, y oranges, etc. On the other hand if we were asked to look at this bowl and report what contents might be held in common among its constituents components we would, I believe, answer quickly to the effect that the bowl was a bowl of fruit. Analysis realizes difference, on the other hand this special type of analysis appears to reverse this analytical direction for an abstractional and integrated orientation? Paul Williams notes along similar lines:

Emptiness itself is in a sense an abstraction. It is the absence of inherent existence and is seen through prajna, analytic understanding in its various forms. Emptiness is not a vague absence, still less an Absolute Reality. It is the absence of inherent existence itself related to the object which is being critically examined in order to find out if it has inherent existence. Emptiness is the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) in this tradition in the sense that it is what is ultimately true about the object being analyzed, whatever that object may be.
	Analysis appears to be defined, in practice, through negation in such a manner that the analytical process concentrates on what is not to be excluded in its investigations. However, when this application of negation cuts into, and across, the already analyzed it would appear we are entering different territory. It is my contention that the reversal of an analytical process is deconstructive (of that analysis), re-constitutes the experiential dimension in that enstructured analysis and effectively simulates and synthesizes the original experience immobilized in that analytical conceptualization. Under these circumstances the temporal orientation of this type of experience might be considered as prospective or future-directed (in contrast to the retrospective nature of analysis and the current orientation of the suspended presentation).
	Analysis can be seen as the intentional analysis of something, namely, some type of experience whose object is either directly under consideration or indirectly referred to. This activity is structured in accordance with the hierarchical instructions given to that act of reduction in its negation of all else other than that which is to be analyzed. In a sense the analyzed escapes being analyzed (further), although, the correlativity of analysis and synthesis must mutually inform each other in the exercise of either modal orientation. Now, it would stand to reason, that if this process was to be reversed we would have in effect the deconstruction of the analytical-hierarchical structure that encapsulated the simulation of that original experience. A simulation because although the original noetic experience can not be retained its noema can be re-constituted (given its adequate reconstruction). However, although the original experience as a simulation can be realized its very meaning is found through its uniqueness in its analytical mapping, or enstructuralization. Conversely its function, or meaningfulness, is discovered, or realized, in a freeing up of that enstructuring or envelopment of meaning. The inherent correlativity, or interdependence, of structure and function in this analogical model (of the encapsulation of experience) implies the necessary mutual thematization of both parties. Moreover, an emphasis placed on one modal aspect of this polarity must be conducted at the relative expense of its correlative modality. This inverse relationship suggests an epistemological Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in this regard although the overall energy of the relationship can not be constant and must in some measure reflect the overall level of gestalt awareness currently in progress.
	This model accepted certain other conclusions, I believe, can be drawn. First, that there can be no reduction without synthesis, no distinction without accommodation! The implication can be drawn that the second and third moments of our transcendental re-interpretation of our Hermeneutical Circle must accompany each other. Second, as the pre-constituted is met, and faced, through the auspices of the transcendental suspension it follows that all three aspects of our interpretive schema must be co-present. Third, as the transcendental suspension can be defined either, through a balance of either thesis versus anti-thesis, or, a balanced process of reduction versus reconstitution, it follows that not one of these dialectical moments can be given a completely independent and ultimate self-definition. Fourth, as the analytical is hierarchically structured in its reductive mapping of the world of experience it would naturally follow that the type of analysis that emphasized this type of moment would be transcendent in orientation. Conversely, an emphasis on the deconstructional enfreeing of the reconstituted simulation of experience must be essentially immanent in its overall orientation. Lastly, a philosophic interest in a functioning-meaningfulness must involve some form of deconstruction of analytical structure and it is my contention that much of the philosophy that passes under the rubric of a via negativa, or a negative theology, falls under this classification. The implication follows from this phenomenological examination that there can be neither a pure form of deconstruction nor a pure form of analysis, and, that deconstruction is dependent on a prior process of analysis as the raw material for that process of deconstruction.
	With this model in mind let me re-interpret a series of comments made by C. W. Huntington on this subject of (conceptual) analysis or analytical meditation.
	Traditionally, insight meditation is accompanied by a calming of the mind (samatha):

Purification of the mind... is not accompanied solely through the practice of samatha, however, for within the Buddhist tradition meditative stabilization of the mind is only a foundation for the practice of vipasyana `insight'...
	In a re-interpretation of this statement we might like to draw a parallel between samatha and the nature of the transcendental suspension. With the latter defined as a balance between analysis and deconstruction and insight defined in terms of deconstruction it would be easy to envisage a relationship between these two terms on the grounds that an emphasis, or de-emphasis, on analysis would shift our attention from one to the other. The consequence would then follow that analytical meditation is in reality a deconstructive enterprise!?
	Prajna (wisdom or insight) is a difficult term to define and is perhaps best left untranslated?  Miscellaneous translations seem to fall into two camps; either seeing it as some form of intuitive wisdom, or, as the exercise of analytical wisdom. In my own understanding I would see it as falling between both camps. One aspect of this term does suggest an element of intuition, or seeing, or at least seeing through (phenomenal) reality. On the other side it appears to be exercised, and realized, as if it were analytical, both by nature and by derivation, although derived through the deconstruction of analytical material - the re-experientialization of deconstructed analytical structure. The spontaneity and appropriateness discovered in this functioning-meaningfulness presenting itself as, or through, e.g., an act of insightful discernment, a compassionate appreciation of reality, as related to a skillfulness in means (upaya), an appropriateness in response, an experience of pragmatic truth, as a process of salvation, etc.

...intellectual understanding is firmly grounded not in any transcendental "truth" or "reality" but in the application or actualization of both philosophical and religious teachings, so that the adept is enabled to perceive directly all experience as an instantiation of self-deconstructing Buddhist conceptual categories.
	The author uses the expression grounded suggesting transcendental constitution and so should perhaps have used the expression transcendent "truth" rather than transcendental "truth?" A properly formulated concept of the transcendental need not, indeed should not, involve self-existent grounds on the understanding that if the transcendental suspension is properly instigated and exercised questions of a pre-constituted a priori existence or non-existence, self-existence or absolute non-existence should not arise, let alone persist, in the formulation of a purified transcendental philosophy! It is interesting to note that the author refers to a state of affairs where they perceive directly all experience as an instantiation of self-deconstructing Buddhist conceptual categories implying the priority of conceptual material for deconstruction. Moreover, the directness of that experience indicates an experiential, or intuitive, approach to both the nature of phenomenal reality and the associated teaching of religious-philosophic pronouncements on this subject. Lastly, the re-experiential treatment of all experience is suggestive of a systematic approach both towards the nature of phenomena and the critical-insightful structures put in place by that religious philosophy.

	C.W.Huntington a little further on states:

The conventional world remains just as it is, but with the steady refinement of philosophical understanding and the direct application of these concepts, one sees the meaning of emptiness unfold as a new dimension within the old order of things - a new natural interpretation that "seems to emerge from the things themselves."
	One is reminded here of the Husserlian dictum of going back to the things themselves, and letting the phenomena speak for themselves. This new dimension could be interpreted as a transcendental dimension as long as that dimension is not treated as divorced from an empirical one, i.e., the transcendental as the constitutional form of the phenomenal.

	Two paragraphs further on the same author states:

Understanding becomes no longer a matter of interpretation or belief, but one of a direct perception and unhesitating action. It is not that questions of epistemic and ontic reality are entirely irrelevant to this process; they are, in fact, symptomatic of the archetypal samsaric form of life that is permeated with fear and suffering.
	Of interest here is, first, the iteration of a direct perception and unhesitating action. In my interpretation of the moment of transcendental synthesis (whether it be seen as a simulation, a process of deconstruction, thought a reconstruction of an original experience, etc.,) there is realized in an act of judgment (from the perspective of that type of mental act) a mental event of a form that is seen to be experienced as direct and spontaneous. Moreover, from an adequately informed position (of transcendental suspension) there arises in the spontaneity of such a (transcendental) response an appropriateness in that act, or moment, of responsiveness. From the present time orientation of the transcendental suspension the prospectivity of the response is directed towards the unfolding of the near future. This direction of response is relational, i.e., directed towards the totality of that state of affairs (as a relationship) through the integrating nature of the transcendental synthesis. In this manner I would account for the type of language used that suggests understanding, compassionate sympathy (through re-simulation of the personal or interpersonal situation) and the discovered appropriateness of that direct response. As the deconstructive nature of transcendental synthesis is prospective (from the present moment of the transcendental suspension) there can be no retrospective treatment of the sense of self, as an ego, that asks itself "what am I going to do" which being thought about in a process of thought can only be effected retrospectively, i.e., after the passing of this act of decision-making, and then obviously enacted non-spontaneously. 
	As a second point for discussion I would like to re-interpret the following statement when, this author tells us that questions of epistemic and ontic reality are entirely irrelevant to this process. From a transcendental perspective this must be correct. In, and through, a transcendental suspension an understanding (or hermeneutical appreciation) is purified of such language as deals directly with epistemic and ontic considerations. However, it would be my criticism that a transcendental perspective is realized through a deconstruction of such views and, therefore, their presence is absolutely necessary for the full development of such a productive transcendental process of insight. Far from being irrelevant their presence is one vital step, or stage, in the unfolding of this dialectical process of thematization as involves this (transcendental-phenomenologically) redefined hermeneutical circle. Realizing that each moment of this heuristic device is co-defined by the other two moments suggests that an authenticity of presence and insightfulness must necessitate the full development and balance of these three moments that in the end allows the person to express themselves in a ongoing harmony of means and ends, realize a pragmatically valid appreciation of the situation-to-hand, discover an existential sensitivity in their relationships, etc.
	From a transcendental perspective the meaning and meaningfulness of the parts of a relationship are discovered through that relationship, and, that this inter-relational interdependence has more value than the artificial and superficial extraction of those de-related entities. Indeed, the complete separation of those parts from their relational context would deprive those entities of all meaning and meaningfulness. Such entities would be thus empty, and, moreover it follows, that their emptiness in the relational context itself allows them to function in that context. As Huntington notes (on the disvaluational concept of illusionism):

Like magical illusions, beams of light, fairy cities, dreams, or reflected images, from the perspective of this soteriological truth they are all without intrinsic being. As seen through the eye of perfect wisdom, the relation between things seems to exert much greater claims to meaning and existence than do the things themselves.

	On the same theme this author notes:

One perceives that the concepts of "I" and "mine" are of indisputable conventional value but no transcendental significance.
	In the next paragraph the author derives the following conclusions:

By means of perfect wisdom the bodhisattva experiences himself and all things as composite and contextually real, similar to the images of a dream or magical illusion. Actualization of emptiness dissolves the afflictions of delusions, clinging, and antipathy into insight, non-clinging, and compassion.
	From previous analysis we must recognize the metaphorical nature of this concept of illusionism. To treat this metaphor, or any other, literally is to destroy its philosophical powers of commentary. There is a difference between dreams, e.g., and the world in relative conventional terms of reference, however, as the metaphor is attempting to tell us, from the transcendental perspective no intentional object has a self-existent substantiality of being (whether we treat that object from its own point of view or from some other).
	I have chosen to re-interpret these passages from Huntington not to set up an alternative position but to refine the implications and consequences of his exposition. I have done this in order to demonstrate, among other things, that the expression analysis is a misleading translation for this type of mental process that appears to be involved in this type of meditational investigation and the type of insight claimed to result from its exercise. By this indirect method I have attempted to differentiate phenomenologically between a process of analysis and a process of synthesis (regardless of whether it is transcendentally orientated or non-transcendentally orientated). It is my contention that synthesis (regardless of whether its intention is to be reconstructive, deconstructive, simulational, functional, etc.,) is dependent on the pre-constitution of analysis (and realized through the pre-establishment of a productive transcendental suspension), and, that deconstruction is similarly implicated. That an investigation along these lines should allow us to realize that this type of awareness, although dependent upon the pre-analyzed, is quite contrary to a process of analysis. It is my belief, that seems self-evident, that no process of analysis by itself could ever realize, or induce, a compassionate disposition. That this reductive, retrospective and relatively destructive type of approach would in fact, by itself, lead to the disintegration of the relational integrity of this type of phenomenon. That a mental directedness towards experiencing the relational nature of the relationship would naturally open us up to such a prospective orientation, and, in conjunction with a transcendental suspension allow us to realize the spontaneous unfolding of such an attitude and its consequent sense of encounter.
	Although I have not argued, in this section, that a similar form of analysis applies to a hermeneutical interpretation of the Neoplatonic tradition such an application is implicit. In the next section in demonstrating processes of deconstruction at work in our Neoplatonic text I will argue that Plotinus operates with a similar scheme as outlined in our re-interpreted hermeneutic(-al) circle.

2.	The Via Negativa

	The via negativa suggests through the use of the word via a passage or process, a spiritual progress towards..? That goal being pointed to through the use of some form of negation in a sense equally appears to deny us access as much as it seems to affirm such an invitation. The goal is not described but rather pointed to through a metaphorical pointing, or showing. Take the metaphor literally and we metaphorically `return' to a world of contradiction, apparent imperfection, unsatisfactoriness and dis-ease.
	This perception of potential membership or invitation is initiated, and reinforced, through the conjunction of disvaluational language, using metaphors of illusion, depreciation, magic, etc. Thus this type of religious philosophy also seems to set out to induce, in our psychic being in this world, a potential difference between this world of multiplicity (and its consequent sense of confusion, and potential for impending chaos), as viewed through the natural attitude and any positive connotations given to, or suggested of, this goal of the via negativa. The limitations of the person are painfully exposed apparently in the hope of getting the individual both to re-evaluate their position in this world and to re-orientate themselves towards the nature of that negative theological goal. However, in distinction to other contemporaneous traditions, this criticism of our apparently being-at-home-in-the-world is mild in comparison. Although the world is disvalued it is not absolutely devalued as is prominently the case among numerous strands of Gnosticism, Dualism, Manichaeism, etc. We can find this difference highlighted for us in the Confessions of St. Augustine in his transition from the period of his `flirtation' with the Manichees and the period of his `conversion' to the Neoplatonic perspective. However, in both types of religious tradition this potential difference is soteriologically motivated and driven. Personally, I find the Neoplatonic type of perspective to be more sophisticated, and consistent, in its formulation, and philosophically more satisfying, than a dualistic position. The former in their criticism of the latter are more successful and, I believe, this success was one factor in the virtual disappearance of this type of dualistic tradition (although elements of this type of world-view still permeate and influence our language). 
	When I started this thesis I began with the observation of two notable parallels between these two traditions and the intuition that the emphasis on these isomorphic features must figure prominently in the structure and function of both philosophies. Further, it alerted my curiosity when I noted the relative contemporaneous nature of these two traditions. Moreover, I had, and still have, in my possession a very beautiful piece of Gandharan sculpture of the seated Buddha approximately late second century - early third century A.D. The harmonious synthesis of Greek and Indian influences in this work inspired me to ask the question if there could be some form, or forms, of philosophic interaction between East and West along beside forms of interaction of an aesthetic and commercial nature? 
	The first of these correspondences I noted at the start of this thesis in my introducing the topic of metaphors of illusion (illusionism). The second correspondence was the observation made by Raoul Mortley in a paper titled What is Negative Theology: The Western Origins on a glut  or surge in the use of the alpha privative in the formulation of religious-philosophic texts around this period in time. The Sanskrit language has a similar construction and the text of the Heart Sutra immediately came to mind. In this Perfection of Wisdom text long strings of negations are plied, fundamental, traditional Buddhist categories are seemingly negated in a shocking fashion that ostensively appears to attack the very foundations of that tradition. Thus we are presented with a textual innovation that, as a fashion, appears to have included texts from miscellaneous traditions both West and East.
	The use of the alpha privative in the Greek language is ambiguous. Plato makes a pun on this ambivalency in the use of the name Apollo (A + pollo) contrasting its traditional etymology as the `absence of many things,' with `many poles' suggesting `a multiplicity of things.' Plotinus also discusses this word in the light of a negative theology. 
	In this thesis I do not wish to draw a distinction between the use of a via negativa and a negative theology although some people have made such a distinction. However, in using this expression of a negative theology, and its implication of a positive theology, I do not wish to imply that the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition is theologically motivated. The use of this expression is convenient, and not that far removed from what I believe is the function of negative theology in certain key structural (conceptual) and functional (soteriological) terms of reference. Moreover, I see the use of the via negativa as a process, namely, a negative theological process whose general form can be textually observed in different traditions both theological and non-theological in scope. 
	A negative theology has been described as the application of a series of negations to a carefully discriminated selection of positive theological terms, terms that traditionally defined the essence of that embedded positive theological sense of the numinous.

The negations are not indiscriminately piled onto each other in some sort of ecstatic outpouring of denials, but rather are carefully tailored to existing claims about the divine essence. The new effusion of alpha privatives is fairly precisely aimed at contradicting older theological claims: the negations are parasitic on prior affirmations, and they cannot invent themselves.
	Certainly the center of the negative theological process appears to fulfill the above conditions. However, and this has caused some problems in my attempt to define the nature of the negative theological process, around the margins of a positive theology many items without a direct religious nature are also subjected to such an attack. Indeed, it is now my understanding that the true object of such a critique is not the traditional positive sense of the numinous, what ever form that might or might not take, but the nature of the phenomenal world and the language inevitably associated with its expression. In essence the natural attitude, albeit a religiously orientated formulation of the same (centered in the associated sense of the numinous if traditionally present) is the subject of this specialized and complex form of negation. In effect a transcendental suspension is being put in place by invoking a skeptical attitude towards the natural attitude as held by an exponent of that associated positive theology. As a consequence all forms of positive theological religious treatment of the everyday phenomenal world and all other worlds accepted in that positive theologies' religious cosmology; whether as utterances of a descriptive or prescriptive nature, are held in abeyance and subjected to some form of transcendental-phenomenological critique and retranslation. In this treatment we are witness to the transformation of an ontologically and/or epistemologically orientated positive theology into a transcendental-phenomenologically orientated form of absolute philosophy. The centrally placed imposition of a transcendental suspension guarantees at least the start of a process of transcendental-absolutization. All forms of phenomenal language are bracketed, not only language that deals with the relevant sense of the numinous if present, although, there is an emphasis on the positive religious center of that tradition subjected to this process of transformation. Thus, if only by implication, all forms of phenomenality are subjected to this process of transcendental translation. Considerations of time, space, number, motion, ego, intentionality, causation, power, etc., are all fair game to be subjected to this process of transformation along with the traditional epithets that would have applied to traditional positive categories whether numinous or non-numinous in orientation. Whenever the sense of the numinous, or some positive category, is under an apparent attack the natural world of the phenomenal is also implicated. In such a critique, in keeping with a broad spectrum transcendental suspension, all forms of value are subjected to this type of treatment. Thus we are witness to a critique of not only the ontical or factual nature of the natural world (under the influence of disvaluation, illusionism, etc.,) but also a mix of questions of an aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, thematical nature, etc. All forms of judgment have the potential of falling within its ambitious grasp. If this attack is focused on the sense of the numinous, or traditional positive categories (e.g., dharmas) by direct implication the phenomenal world of the natural-religious attitude is also under attack. In this disvaluation of the phenomenal there is, in inverse proportion, an equal magnification of the transcendental perspective. However, this distinctive style of discourse is extremely careful to qualify this transcendental-absolute perspective in non-phenomenal-orientated language and imagery. Of course the phenomenal basis of this special or abnormal language cannot be completely escaped, however, it can be scoped, placed in check, by a number of special mechanisms a number of which have already been investigated in this thesis. These textual mechanisms include the direct use of negative theological processes, metaphors of disvaluation, the use of analogy and allegory, the modified use of paradox, processes of deconstruction, the use of silence, productive skepticism (through the use of the transcendental suspension), etc.
	In asking the question what is negated in a negative theology I now find myself in a position to construct a more convincing answer. First, it must be realized that our focus on the involvement of some process of negation per se is to miss the essential nature of this process of transformation as a process of transformation. One might almost say that the use of negation is almost incidental to this process however obvious a feature it may, or may not, be found to be textually present. It is quite conceivable that we could formulate a negative theological-like position without the ostensive use of negation.
	For the sake of argument let us suppose we all happen to be frogs sitting around the edge of a muddy pond formulating a negative theology. One frog makes the first suggestion - "I believe the Great in its greatness to be like mud!" A second frog adds their piece - "I believe the Great in its greatness to be like a reflection in this pond!" A third frog makes their contribution - "I believe the Great in its greatness to be like a magic dragon fly!" A fourth frog croaks out his obligatory formulation - "I believe the Great in its greatness to be like the bottom of a pond of infinite depth!" A fifth frog finds it their turn, and smiling wisely nods their head, and does not speak. The other frogs soon smiling in a recognition of what this last frog has managed to `say' without speaking.
	To unpack my anecdote let us note the type of utterance each frog was perceived to transmit to their fellows...
	The first frog used a disvaluational metaphor of depreciation. The implication to be drawn was that as mud is not pleasant (assuming that frogs do not really like a muddied pond) that the Great was not-pleasant from which was meant to be implied, through an implicit process of qualification, that the Great transcended all forms of pleasure and non-pleasure. Here negation is of course present by implication through the negative connotation of the metaphor. Also implicated would be a transcendental suspension set up between pleasure and non-pleasure (and the implicit transcendence of both parties in that suspension).
	The second frog used a disvaluational metaphor of illusion implying that the Great was both in existence (like the phenomenon of the reflection itself) but also not in existence (like the subject matter seen in that reflection itself) and in effect transcending, through the auspices of a transcendental suspension, the phenomenal characteristics of existence. 
	The third frog used a disvaluational metaphor of magic which could be analyzed along the lines of a metaphor of illusion, an example of which was used by the second frog. Although various implications might be drawn, essentially, the magic dragon fly as a perceived, or imputed, phenomenon both had existence and non-existence implying a transcendental suspension, an implicit process of transcendence, etc.
	The fourth frog used a paradox. It might be interpreted along the following lines. As a bottomless pond has no bottom it would appear that to suggest it has is to deconstruct that type of phenomenal language that uses a literal use of spatial metaphor. In this process of deconstruction the allusion might then be drawn that the greatness of the Great could be treated, via the implicit transcendental suspension, to transcend all forms of  spatial determination.
	The last frog used the negative theological device of silence (and the smile). Nothing was affirmed and nothing was negated - in the context of the expectation of a speech a perfect transcendental suspension was, instead, put in its place.
	Admittedly in each of these five examples negation can be shown to be present in some form, but, we would miss the point of this type of exercise if we were to drag it on to the center stage so to speak. Even a positive theology could be written in negative terms. E.g., the expression God is great could be translated into the following form: God is not insignificant, meaning, one should presume, that God is not to be taken as insignificant, with the further implication, that God is to be taken as the greatly significant. More important for our understanding is, I believe, the negative theological imposition of a transcendental suspension (absent in positive theological usage). The use of negation under these circumstances suggests a balance rather than some form of negation or opposition. Following on from this special qualified use of negation is both a sense of deconstruction and transcendence, and, as a consequence, the parallel creation of a sense of the transcendental. This sense of the transcendental transforming the terms of reference under which the original sense of the phenomenal was to be interpreted, i.e., through a change in the hermeneutic terms of reference we are now presented with the re-interpreted through this re-translation of the original terms of reference. In this process of re-evaluation and re-orientation there is the intentional expectation that some form of insight will be created, or generated, that may eventually contribute in a positive manner to the experience of a soteriological dimension along with its transformation of the way we purport ourselves in the world.
	As has been noted the negative theological process has been described as parasitical on the presence of a positive theology. However, given that wider terms of reference were found through the implication of the natural attitude and its being subjected to a transcendental suspension we might like to re-formulate a negative theological process as the bracketing of the natural attitude as entailed in a positive theology, or its religious equivalent, in such a manner as to realize a transcendental-phenomenological purification, or transformation, of content from the transcendental dimension of the trans-constitutional, trans-phenomenological, trans-intentional perspectives, etc.
	Although still defined as parasitical the negative theological treatment of the sense of the numinous, or some other positive theological category, or the phenomenality of the natural attitude itself, still does not seem to do adequate justice to the intuitive expectation that the positive connotations of the original grounds of that treatment are somehow restored to those items subjected to that critical treatment. This style of philosophy may directly, or indirectly, disvalue the natural attitude it never subjects it to a process of absolute devaluation. It would appear therefore to be a process that cannot be completed in one stage, or process, of negative theological treatment. Thus we must continue our investigations and examine in what manner the transcendental suspension itself can be made productive in this type of transcendental programme.
	A number of commentators have described the negational characteristics of the via negativa as exhibiting a process of abstraction. Plotinus himself occasionally uses this term (aphairesis). However, the Enneads demonstrate many instances of this type of method. It has been suggested that behind this methodology lies an  incremental view of reality, the idea that reality is incremental in its generation, a position well illustrated in the Neoplatonic tradition by the doctrine of emanation. Although this incremental approach has an epistemological emphasis its exposition in the Neoplatonic perspective also has a parallel ontological character wherein each higher level of being contemplates the creation of a lesser level without an actual process of physical creation. Under such a scheme spiritual progress can be defined as a psychic reversal of this process of emanation with a progressive return to higher and higher levels. However, there comes a point in this type of scheme where the differentiation between the epistemological and the ontological is collapsed, deconstructed and transcended and under such circumstances this type of theoretical approach must break down. Then spiritual progress must take another form, find itself illustrated, and discussed, through the use of a different set of metaphors, along with a qualificational re-evaluation of metaphors that utilize some form of abstraction. Although the sense of the absolute may be revealed when everything is striped away, or experienced as empty, as there is now no meaningful room for a dichotomy between the transcendental dimension and the phenomenal dimension what sense would there be in trying to talk about one? This dilemma, and its tension, often finds some degree of resolution along the lines of a doctrine of two truths, though the use of a double perspective. From the transcendental perspective this can be accepted as a fait accompli - there is no real need for enlightenment, salvation is almost an illusion, etc. Such abstractional language must in the end be provisional, in a sense we must lie to tell the truth, just as both of these traditions see language as a distortion of reality. From the phenomenal perspective all the roles of a positive religion can be reinstated, albeit scoped and systematically retreated in the current light of that associated transcendental-absolute exposition.
	In The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines we find on the subject of language vis-à-vis the transcendental perspective:

To call it `perfection of wisdom', O Lord, that is merely giving it a name. And what that name corresponds to that cannot be got at... 
Perfect wisdom is perfectly pure because, like space or an echo, it is unutterable, incommunicable, and offers no basis for apprehension.
	In a like fashion Plotinus claims the One is beyond speech and beyond the duality of intentionally structured discursive (analytical) thought:

It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for what ever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a "something". But "beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect" is the only one of all the ways of speaking about it which is true; it is not its name, but says it is not one of all things and "has no name", because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it.
	Plotinus then continues in this same quotation and introduces the following instance of an abstraction(al qualification):

But when we raise the difficulty "Then it has no perception of itself and is not even conscious of itself and does not even know itself", we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves around and going in the opposite direction. For we are making it many when we make it an object of knowledge and knowledge, and by attributing thought to it we make it need thought.
	With the implication that the One is in no need of thought. Not that there is no intuition (epibole) or any form of intuition, but through a merging of being and thinking there is now no intentional distance between these merged parties, or, for that matter, any different parties that have merged. In effect the One has a trans-intentional grasp of itself, an intuition that eliminates distance and difference. There is here a contrast drawn between intuition, held by the One, and intellection, entertained by the Intellect (nous). 
	It is interesting to note that in this process of deconstruction Plotinus is also prepared to subvert the stability of the Forms versus the One. This concession, although qualified by its analogical form, and, that its intuition is empty of content, is a possible indication that at the highest level insight cannot be achieved through abstraction or deconstruction alone.

What then? Will it (the One) know neither the other things nor itself? The other things are later than it, and it is before them what it is, and intellection of them is additionally acquired and is not ever the same nor of stable things. But even if the Good were to know stable things, it would be multiple. For these later things go with intellection and have substance, but the intellections of the Good are only empty observations.
	Here, it would seem, Plotinus describes the intelligible objects as unstable in relation to the One, just as sense objects are unstable to the human soul. However, this concession appears to be undermined by the observation that the One has a vision that is essentially empty of content.
	Abstraction then, rather than working on just an incremental model, would appear to operate on a more basic level, on the presence of some form of intentional difference. Abolish this difference and the function of abstraction ceases to take us any further. In some measure a completely purified transcendental dimension considered in its own right through a process of abstraction is a contradiction in terms, the sense of the constitutional as the constituting necessitates that which is to be constituted, and vice versa.
	One way of coming to recognize the experiential aspect of abstraction is to see it as opposing the intentional distancing taking place within the directedness of intentionality. Although the intentional process needs the provisional demarcation set up between the intentional subject and the intentional object, and, between the intentional object and its associated field or horizon of intentionality, the collective interaction of these three poles must also necessitate their mutual accommodation. Abstraction could be seen therefore as a returning to that mutual accommodation. On the other hand analysis could be viewed as that type of intellectual process that increases the intentional distance between these three poles. It stands to reason, therefore, that a reversal of this analytical process would also produce an intellectual interest in this experiential sense of the abstract. Thus we could, in terms of this reinterpreted hermeneutical circle view abstraction as either a deconstruction of analytical enstructuralization, or, as the collective deconstruction of all three poles along with the collective field of meaning and meaningfulness generated between them. If we were to accept only the former then we might consider the deconstruction of analytical structure as metaphorically releasing its encapsulated intentional insight, or experience, through a process of re-simulation. In this sense deconstruction appears to place a greater emphasis on the re-experientialization of the post-analytical treatment of experience, letting us attempt to re-encounter that intuition, provisionally returning us to the reconstruction of the situation of its encountering. In this third moment of transcendental reconstitution meaning is transformed into the meaningfulness of function and it is along these lines that I would wish to re-interpret the Buddhist concept of emptiness. For a start emptiness should be treated as contra-analytical, contra-retrospective, i.e., prospective; and through its integrational and pro-relational attitude as enhancing meaning with an appropriate meaningfulness of function. Deconstruction, as a form of abstraction, de-enstructures the analytical encapsulation of the experiential returning it to the spontaneity of the transcendental suspension. This informed freeing up of experience allowing the process of judgment to enact a course of activity that is both appropriate to the situation to hand, and, of minimal distortion in the existential course of its unfolding? The systematic use of emptiness, as a spiritual process, transcendentally purifies empirical-phenomenological consciousness provoking a judgmental response that is both insightful and functionally appropriate in its encounter of that relational situation.

When there arises an act of consciousness which has none of the skandhas for objective support, there the non-viewing of form, etc., takes place. But just this viewing of the skandhas is the viewing of the world. That is the way in which the world is viewed by the Tathagata. It is thus that perfect wisdom acts as an instructress in the world to the Tathagata. And how does perfect wisdom show up the world for what it is? She shows that the world is empty, unthinkable, calmly quiet. As purified of itself she shows up the world, she makes it known, she indicates it.
	When the skandha of form, e.g., is viewed non-analytically as without self-inherence then form is indicated as it truly is, i.e., without the rigidity of analytical enstructuralization, i.e., as empty. This transcendentally purified trans-intentional unthinkable state of consciousness is experienced as calmly quiet, i.e., as experienced through the auspices of the transcendental suspension (along with various other allusions, i.e., a lack of moral perturbation, non-karma creating involvement, soteriological realization, nirvana, etc.). Throughout this state of abstraction this world still remains a world, albeit directly perceived without the distorted imposition of obsessive conceptual elaboration (prapanca), etc. Form is still seen as form but as a transcendentally purified phenomenon that is also seen as empty, and therein capable of unfolding in accordance with its true dependent non-self-inherent nature. This empirical non-speculative account, through the use of the transcendental suspension, effectively being re-presented as a transcendental-empirical phenomenology.
	The use of abstractional language might well be considered as an idea borrowed from mathematical thinking? Philosopher are, I suspect, more often than not creatures of fashion and advances in mathematical thinking in both the Graeco-Roman world and the Indian subcontinent could have made some contribution in this regard, and vice versa.
	Unfortunately, an apparent problem presents itself when we attempt to compare textually these two traditions on their use of abstractional-like language. For a start it would be a valid question to ask if the Buddhist perspective possessed some form of an incremental approach to reality and if this question was answered in the negative, as one would suspect it must be so answered, in what way could we then compare these two traditions under these disparate circumstances? Fortunately, I believe the appropriate use of this reinterpreted hermeneutical circle or (hermeneutical triangle) can come to our rescue?
	For a start some form of an implicit hierarchical stratification of the natural attitude in religious terms of reference can be seen to be at work in the Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines; although, I might add, my resolution of this apparent dilemma does not depend on this aspect of my interpretation. The text tells us in metaphorical language that the perfection of wisdom (which might be better presented in the text with capitals as The Perfection of Wisdom, iconographically personified as a woman) is the mother of all the Buddhas (Tathagatas). Then as the text implies that miscellaneous Buddha figures can create their own buddha-fields (buddha-ksetra) along with their inhabitants, animals and plants, etc., we might then like to draw some form of comparison with the process of Neoplatonic emanation in so far as this apparent act of creation is more like an act of contemplation without actually manifesting a self-dependent, self-supporting entity or structure, etc. However, this observation is incidental to my resolution of this dilemma.
	The presence of a pronounced hierarchical stratification of the natural attitude is indicative of an emphasis on an analytical mode of thinking and philosophizing. Phenomenologically, we might perceive analysis along the following lines. Analysis involves some form of reduction to a more elemental state of affairs. The act of definition could be seen as an act of focus on that component part (or those component parts collectively treated as a provisional entity) conducted through a withdrawal of focal interest from elsewhere in the phenomenologically treated world. That withdrawal is in effect a negation of the rest of that field, or horizon of focus (and by implication a withdrawal from the infinite horizon of all other horizons). In other words getting ourselves back to a refocusing on this retained segment of our world, i.e., noematic content subjected to phenomenological retention, involves a retracing of the psychic pathway that took us there initially. Obviously this mapping is hierarchically constructed. Now it follows that an act of abstraction is a reversal of this type of analytical process and could take two forms, namely, a partial withdrawal or deconstruction of our analytical attention in some section or segment of this hierarchical stratification, or, a thorough deconstruction that would include as well the virtual, or actual, deconstruction of that analytical hierarchical schematization of experience itself. As I have argued earlier in this chapter analysis is an enstructuralization of experience, effectively a retrospective experiential fixation in the analytical structure of this hierarchical schematization. To re-experience the experience, i.e., to reproduce it, or re-construct it, involves a process of synthesis, simulation, deconstruction of that metaphorical analytical encapsulation. Of course an original noetic act of experience can never be re-experienced only simulated or i.e., re-simulated (and that even an act of retention is effectively a process of ongoing re-simulation).
	The solution to this dilemma is, therefore, a consideration of the relative degree to which a process of abstraction, or deconstruction, has been allowed to unfold. Plotinus spends considerable time discussing the nature of the One and in the process, by proxy, deconstructing many types of phenomenal characteristics of the natural attitude, e.g., considerations of a spatial nature, temporal nature, the nature of intentionality, the nature of causation, the nature of the ego and personal identity, etc. However, how ever much we can admire the tenacity of his persistent investigations he rarely considers a deconstruction of this emanational hierarchy itself, almost at the center of his religious-philosophical enterprise. That type of exposition might be best regarded as one way this type of religious philosopher attempts to understand the transcendental nature of the absolute from the perspective of the phenomenal? To a certain extent this does seem to have been metaphorically considered when, in the analogy of the inner sanctum of the temple, where there are no images, images are only seen on the way in and on the way out. In a sense abstraction takes us to the inner sanctum but leaves us outside. Inside we seek, and are sought, by another type of seeing, a seeing that transcends the duality between a thinking intentional subject and an intentional object of thought:

...in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties, but had already run up beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine; these become again the first things he looks at when he comes out of the sanctuary, after his contemplation within and intercourse there, not with a stature or image but with the Divine itself; they are secondary objects of contemplation.
	Be that as it may Plotinus does seem to be somewhat reluctant to deconstruct thoroughly his transcendently orientated vision of the world.  On the other hand this Buddhist tradition does appear to adopt a more thorough deconstructional critique releasing in the process an immanently-orientated vision of the world.

Even Nirvana, I say, is like a magical illusion, is like a dream. How much more so anything else!
	Here the whole soteriological concept of enlightenment appears to be deconstructed, the raison d'être of the Buddhist path. To be noted is the use of the disvaluational metaphors of illusion and magic. However, should we literally treat this disvaluational-deconstructive use of metaphorical language and accept this statement to imply that Nirvana, etc., is just like an illusion, etc., rather than it being like an illusion but not absolutely like an illusion, etc? Reconsidered in this light we might ask ourselves if deconstruction does not ultimately deconstruct itself? Indeed, what is the emptiness of emptiness as nothing other than the phenomenal world being perceived from the transcendental-absolute perspective to possess no self-inherent non-independence of identity with, as a consequence, the ultimate co-incidence of the transcendental (nirvana) and the phenomenal (samsara), and, moreover,  in the process being preserved intact from the conventional-empirical point of view?

	On this subject C.W.Huntington states:

These two forms of truth are not mutually exclusive, but a greater value is placed upon the "highest" truth because of its soteriological efficacy... Application of deconstructive analysis to conventional experience neither creates nor destroys anything. It merely reveals the contextual, "dependently originated" nature of this experience.
	However, we might well ask ourselves whether it is possible for the application of a deconstructive investigation neither to create nor destroy anything? What exactly is deconstructed in a process of deconstruction? 
	The answer to this last question has already been noted as the enstructuralization of the (pre-resimulated) experience. Analysis is the analysis of something, that something being seen as the experientially orientated dimension of structural-functioning. Analysis must focus its attention on the structural-functioning of some structure because there  can be neither a pure act of function nor a pure subject of that function through the intentional nature of experience, i.e., its relative dependence upon an intentional subject(-ive act) and an intentional object. Thus we may presume that in our interpretation of some phenomenal event, or some type of phenomenal event, that analysis is the metaphorical dying, and death, of its enstructured experience, and, that deconstruction is the dying, and death, of that enstructuralization without the complete dying, and death, of either party. Thus we must conclude that insight, whether it be of a transcendental or non-transcendental orientation, involves the analytical destruction of experience, and, the deconstruction of that analytical destruction, but, which in the final analysis puts all back together again through the midwife of the transcendental suspension. Moreover, because the three moments of this reinterpreted hermeneutical circle, or triangle, are co-thematized, through the auspices of the other two moments, the implication can be drawn that this transcendental suspension is an informed, and productive, source of meaning, and meaningfulness, through the balance being put in place between the relevant processes of analytical-reduction and deconstructional-reconstruction. Because deconstruction is parasitic on reductive analysis it follows that when that relatively destructive process is brought to a state of completion, or exhaustion, deconstruction effectively self-deconstructs re-realizing a state of transcendental suspension wherein the pre-constituted was originally encountered. Then we have the virtual appearance of nothing being created, nor destroyed, finding only the insightful realization of that meaning and meaningfulness of that phenomenon as it becomes revealed in either transcendental and/or phenomenal terms of reference (dependent on the nature of those exercised investigations).
	What is the nature of the relationship, if any, between deconstruction and negative theology? Derrida, who has promoted the concept of this philosophical method,  has gone to some length to distance his vision of deconstruction from the deconstructive tendencies of negative theology. According to Kevin Hart:

So deconstruction is neither a negative theology nor a philosophy of absence: a point which Derrida has been at pains to stress in a recent essay, "Comment ne pas parler."

	The same author continues and states his own position:

My position is not that deconstruction is a form of negative theology but that negative theology is a form of deconstruction.
	He also treats negative theology as the deconstruction of positive theology:

In short, negative theology performs the deconstruction of positive theology.
	But my own exposition of this subject would suggest we must be careful in how we go about seeing this relationship. For a start negative theology, earlier in this chapter, was seen as creating a transcendental suspension that transcendentally transformed, in its treatment, the natural attitude implicit in that positive theology's perception of the world; certainly wider terms of reference that a mere positive theology. As a result we are presented with a transcendental treatment,  and translation, of the phenomenal world and all forms of value discovered within that attitude, e.g., ethical, aesthetical, pragmatical, soteriological, etc. Then my own investigations extended the apparently parasitical nature of negative theology to suggest that deconstruction, once it has exhausted its analytical raw material, must eventually self-deconstruct presenting us with the re-instatement of the transcendental suspension along with its pre-established transcendental productivity; supplying a meaning and meaningfulness from within its embrace through the balance put in place between an exercised analytical-reduction and its trailing deconstructed-reconstitution. But the greater insight to be gained from this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical investigation is that the nature of the negative theological process is circular! Negative theology may be parasitic on positive analysis, but, then so is each later stage, or moment, in a dialectical process. As each of these moment in this reinterpreted hermeneutic circle is co-thematized in reference with the other two moments we would be safe in assuming that the overall process of investigation, what ever its orientation towards any one, or two, of these moments, must be phenomenologically constructed in like fashion (regardless of whether our investigational bias is ontologically or epistemologically orientated, transcendentally or phenomenally motivated, etc.).
	In this light emanation, e.g., could be considered more as a circular process and not so much as a hierarchically stratified vision of spiritual reality. Likewise, the Buddhist quest for enlightenment, a longing for the other shore, could be re-considered as an ongoing possibility open to us here and now. As the mantra of the Heart Sutra might be interpreted to indicate: gone, gone, gone beyond, gone altogether beyond. Going beyond that which is beyond is suggestive of our returning to where we began, albeit with all the richness of insight(s) gained along the way.
	Thus through this circular dialectic we can also account for the insight that negative theology far from being destructive, or merely negative, is in fact constructive, or re-constructive, and positive! Although negative theology will criticize and scope the language, and boundaries, of a positive theology in reality, in its phenomenological manifestation, it must equally be subjected to the critique and influence of a positive theology (and the ongoing transcendental productivity of a transcendental suspension). By these means it demonstrates a practical and theoretical meaning and meaningfulness within the ambit of that tradition, and recovering the same ongoing re-establishment of identity from the roots of that tradition and its encounters with other traditions.
	In asking the question why negative theology, or the same question rephrased as, what motivates negative theology, could we assume, from the current state of this exposition, that we would now be in a position to construct an appropriate, and adequate, explanation that, as a response, could discharge this type of question in a satisfactory manner? Personally, it is my belief, that a simple answer cannot be given to this question. However, in looking at the pre-conditions that must prevail for the establishment of this style of religious-philosophy I am inclined to perceive its development as perhaps inevitable under the weight of a critical-academic based scholarship progressed to a point where it could skillfully reflect upon the course of its own controversial traditions, the development of its own sense of philosophical history, its own methods for the phenomenological appreciation of phenomenal reality and the development of a transcendental re-interpretation of the same? Then, again, an accumulating appreciation of meditational experience might have assisted this process, although, at the same time, I do not regard this reinterpreted hermeneutic circle as being at all mysterious, being in reality nothing other than  the very constitutional underpinning of our being able to think intellectually about this world and existentially enter into an encounter within the orbit of its embrace. Nothing more than a recognition that this world is a world of meaning and meaningfulness discovered through the suspension of all entertained phenomenal polarities; a world continually re-discovered through a judgmental suspension of our intellectual processes of reductive-analysis and deconstructional-reconstitution. Others might see in the circular nature of this dialectic a process of enrichment that attempts to overcome the limitations of language. Discovering through this style of research a freedom to transcend the logical dichotomization of thought that lurks beneath the thinking surface of our being and which remains forever ready to trap the unwary philosopher who carelessly probes the empirical manifestations of our phenomenal appearance as a spiritual presence in this world.
	In this circular hermeneutical schema, as sketched out so far in this and the previous chapter, deconstruction has been defined through a series of contrasts and equations. At the same time the sense of the phenomenological has also been radically re-defined by myself in a like fashion. In the next section let me gather these various strands together and systematically re-present this reinterpreted hermeneutic circle noting the implications it has for transcendental, phenomenological and hermeneutical forms, or patterns, of research.

3.	Transcendental-Phenomenological-Hermeneutical-Circle

	A text can only be meaningful as a text through its functional differentiation from all that which is a non-text (even though some people may wish to read the entire world as a text, see the world as intentionally structured, this definition must still hold). In what way are we to enact this demarcation? Therein lies a controversial issue that I do not wish to become embroiled in. Let us say, and I am trying to be neutral here; that the edges of a text are ragged, somewhat indeterminate. Where a text ends and its textual tradition begins is a difficult territory to arbitrate, especially notorious in this regard is the manufacture of religious texts. Certainly the two texts chosen for this thesis are not exempt from these difficulties.
	Any apparent object in the world, as a phenomenon in its own right, can be analyzed, part by part, in accordance with our own wishes, and then have that research gathered together and, in turn, re-instated back into our understanding of its context. In the midst of these investigations when we recognize the intentions of some other person, or persons, as being present then we find ourselves, I believe, presented with a text of some description or other. Between the parts of an object, and, the totality of those parts, when we find, or think we have discovered, their mutual co-intentional constitution we suspect the involvement of an intentional agency in the creation of that text. In our hermeneutic appreciation of a text this third party, of mutual co-thematization between the various levels in a text, must be recognized to be present in order for us to encounter that text as a text.
	In our analytical pulling apart of that textual object and focusing on a series of distinctive elements, be they notes of music, sentences on paper, commercials on television, etc., our time consciousness in its fixation of experience is effectively retrospective in its temporal directedness. On the other hand our synthesis of those fragments and re-instatement of them into an ever wider textual context, under this teleologically driven ambition for the re-constitution of textual meaning, is essentially a process of recognition that is effectively prospective in its temporal directedness. And, as you might expect, or at least suspect, our entry to that textual dimension, and its hermeneutical encirclement, is through the present orientated time consciousness of the transcendental suspension. This suspension anticipates the nature of this object as a textual device and therein allowing us to move more deeply into its embrace. From there on, our interpretive enterprise is continued with until such a time is reached when, for the present, we either meet with diminishing returns in our textual re-constitution, or, we are prevented in some way from continuing this process.
	It is my contention that the intentional constitution of a person is revealed in, or from, the exercise of a transcendental suspension! Revelation, or its non-concealment, is dependent upon the spontaneity of the transcendental suspension both in our being revealed to someone else and in their being reveal to us, and, that to all practical purposes this can be seen to be a mutual process regardless of whether the author, or authors, of a text either physically or virtually confront us, or, we them. 
	The transcendental phenomenologist would argue that the transcendental ego is the possible constitution of the person as a person regardless of whether the current terms of reference are either subjective or intersubjective. The transcendental ego can have no name other than Ego (or Transcendental Ego) or some other equivalent expression (in the form of a metaphorically-denoting function?). In our re-interpreted hermeneutic circle we must come to consider it as a fact of our being that the intentionality of a textual discourse is discovered, faced and met, through the moment of the transcendental suspension. With a little further reflection we should realize that the structural-meaning of the intentional object (Object) is realized in a state of analysis exercised through the moment of the transcendental reduction, and, that the contextual consideration of the intentional object is made functionally meaningful before the intentional horizon (World), associated with that type of intentional content, through the moment of the transcendental reconstitution. That transcendental reconstitution is realized, in present-orientated time consciousness, in its return to, and through, the moment of the transcendental suspension (in effect acting as the pole of transcendental subjectivity, or Ego). I am now in a position to differentiate, and accommodate, the transcendental, phenomenological and hermeneutical dimensions of a text through the schema of this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical circle.
	On the hermeneutical level of treatment textual elements and combinations at the level of the partial text, text, or textual tradition are discerned through an adopted mode of investigation. On a phenomenological level of treatment cognitive states of suspension, reduction and reconstitution are put into effect through the manner we confront this text in our interrogation of it, and, its interrogation of us. This cognitive treatment of the phenomenon is transcendentally re-treated through the putting in place of a transcendental suspension wherein all forms of value are subjected to a bracketing, a balancing of the presented thesis and its anti-thesis, a collapsing of epistemological and ontological differentiation, etc. And in a reverse fashion the transcendental process of judgment is post-judgmentally re-treated in cognitive terms of reference, etc. Phenomenologically-descriptive value, in my understanding, being derived from the transcendental moment of reduction, whereas, on the other hand, hermeneutically-interpreted value being derived, in my opinion, from the transcendental moment of reconstitution; and that between description and interpretation there must be, to some degree, a process of mutual co-operation.
	With this hermeneutical grid in place the text can be investigated for instances of metaphorical-suspension; analysis/deconstruction; time-orientation; expressions of value; textual-innovation; structures of consonance, dissonance and resolution; establishment of styles, etc.
	Using this complex heuristic device let me demonstrate its hermeneutic potential in our re-interpretation of the following interesting paragraph written by Paul Williams in Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. In this extract I would like to demonstrate a number of problems raised in this section, especially, the question of the relationship of "analysis" to  "insight" (prajna).

   A final note. The Perfection of Wisdom texts repeatedly assert that the Bodhisattva does not engage in discursive thought. This may suggest a problem in relating the absence of discursive thought to prajna as the result of analysis. It seems to me that the Prajnaparamita sutras, in speaking from the Buddha's non-dual, non conceptual awareness, give little attention to how the Bodhisattva is to raise his or her perception to that level. Wisdom, I have argued, involves initially extending the analysis, to realize as fully as possible, in the first instance intellectually, the truth of emptiness. To conclude that wisdom for the Perfection of Wisdom is the result of simply cutting discursive thought, making the mind a blank perhaps, would, I think, be a historical and religious error, perhaps the error referred to in Buddhist hermeneutics as `confusing the result with the cause.' Otherwise, as Tsong kha pa points out, spiritual, salvific value would follow from fainting or deep, dreamless sleep.
	In this paragraph I find five areas of concern raised by the author in attempting an interpretation of this tradition.
	First, he suggests that there is a problem in relating the absence of discursive thought to prajna as the result of analysis. As I have pointed out earlier in this chapter the expression analysis is, as a translation, probably wrong, or at least misleading. I believe we can equate at least one (critical) aspect of discursive thought with this expression of analysis. However, as argued previously the analysis of analysis remains some form of analysis (or meta-analysis). I don't believe we have as yet in our language a term that properly corresponds, and does justice, to that mistranslated expression of analysis, however, the process is, I suspect, a form of abstraction or deconstruction (which is also at the same time a process of experiential reconstitution, or re-simulation, of that aspect of consciousness that was subjected to a process of discursive-analytical enstructuralization along with all forms of distortion entailed in such treatment). Perhaps we could, in the meantime, provisionally substitute for this expression of analysis the expression investigations or critical investigations on the understanding that some form of abstraction or deconstruction is indicated. In accordance with my present understanding on this subject I would consider these two terms of deconstruction and abstraction to be equivalent and intended to be applied either on the level of the enstructured or on the level of the enstructuring. This translational clarification completed we might find that this relationship is now one between discursive-analytical conceptual thought and the other two moments of our reinterpreted hermeneutical circle, namely, the transcendental reconstitution and the transcendental suspension. The relationship then becomes one of reversal on the understanding that these three moments are co-thematizationally defined. This form of appreciation implying that the reductive nature of discursive analysis is contra-suspensional and contra-reconstitutional; our trans-cendental suspension itself breaking down to an ongoing balance between  reductive-analysis and reconstitutional-synthesis. As just stated the relationship then becomes one that metaphorically entails the reversal of discursive thought, i.e., abstraction and/or deconstruction of analysis. In phenomenological analysis we have a reduction that entails the search for, and clarification of, essential states of consciousness. Taken to the extreme we would then present ourselves with the reified fictions of essences. This might help explain the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition's antipathy to dharmas although leaving room for a modified and provisional dharmic analysis as the raw material for these critical investigations. As I have stated elsewhere the deconstruction of deconstruction is the self-deconstruction of that deconstruction. Without the pre-condition of some form of essential-reductive analysis deconstruction would either come to an end or not be able to start if not already in progress. This deconstructive dependence on essential dharmic-like states might also be able to explain the continuing post-Madhyamakan interest taken in various forms of dharmic analysis especially with the logical branch of the Yogacarin and the persistence of the Sautrantika.
	A second area of concern was raised regarding the little attention given textually to how the Bodhisattva is to raise his or her perception to that level of the Buddha's non-dual, non conceptual awareness. I would dispute this. Given the right hermeneutical approach, i.e., one more appropriate to the task of the interpretation to hand, we should be able to view this type of text, I believe, as a continual commentary on a triadic mediational methodology involving the calm abiding of the transcendental suspension in conjunction with the reversal of discursive thought through deconstructional-abstraction.
	A third area surfaces from an incomplete resolution of our first area of concern. This initial extension of analysis must fail us if we treat this analysis as analysis. As the analysis of analysis only realizes some further form of analysis an abstract insight could never be realized. Once some traditional form of analysis is established, along with a series of subjects for meditation, their deconstructional investigation must produce some form of insight which with further practice, and stabilization, allows the practitioner to institute automatically and spontaneously, and maintain, such a process of non-discursive discrimination? That, at least, would be my tentative re-interpretation of this type of textual concern.
	A fourth area of concern involves the conclusion that wisdom for the Perfection of Wisdom is the result of simply cutting discursive thought. Some care must be exercised with this type of metaphor. When used by Plotinus what is probably meant is a process of abstraction involving a progressive turning around, or reversal, of intellection; stripping away phenomenal characteristics, transcendentally purifying empirical consciousness,  making formless, taking away the foreign, the avoidance of the multiple, moving away from the direction of the external, etc. Does this author imply a simple cutting through, a cutting out, cutting up? Either way this type of text  may wish to warn us that this type of process must not be exercised in a self-conscious mode of retrospective reflection (analysis) in the form of an intellectual commentary. "The bodhisattva that thinks he is a bodhisattva (in a discursive analytical mode) is not a bodhisattva" because a bodhisattva operates (without operating in a calculative mode of thought in the Heideggerian sense of the term) from the position of an abstractional transcendentally-suspended state of thoughtful-being.
	The last area of concern is that making the mind a blank perhaps, would, I think, be a historical and religious error. If we were to perceive this process as the putting in place of a transcendental suspension then as that suspension is co-defined through the balance of a transcendental reduction and a transcendental reconstitution we should then find ourselves in a position to recognize that this type of  consciousness involves both an informed sense of balance, and, an emptiness or neutralization of discursive thought? What would then be involved is certainly not an emptied emptiness nor a vacant void. This balance, in accordance with this position as developed in this thesis, is an equilibrium that involves, among other things, both an informed retention of past processes, and, anticipatory processes of protention (without which, I might add, there could be no form of hermeneutic appreciation).
	To do such a text justice would involve the integration of a number of different disciplines - transcendental-phenomenological, psychological, hermeneutical, contextual, etc.	I may not have successfully resolved these five areas of concern voiced by this author, but, I have attempted, at least, to interpret better the metaphorical language present without taking this metaphorical language too literally? As a heuristic device this re-interpreted hermeneutic circle can be used in part or more systematically (on, and between, each of its three levels). On the other hand if we can formulate a better approach to this type of text then let us adopt that interpretive procedure.

4.	Concluding Comments

	In this section, as a series of comments, I would like to summarize a number of key points raised in the course of this chapter on the nature of the negative theological process. Under this heading I have also included, where relevant, a brief discussion on a number of changes and refinements in position adopted by myself in the course of rewriting this thesis. In noting these modifications I hope to be able to highlight some of these points, reveal the genesis behind their formulation and allude, in part, to the motivational force behind the intentional formation of this chapter.

i.	Negative Theology and Absolute Philosophy

	That the presence of a via negativa is often indicative of an absolute-transcendental style in philosophical discourse. By absolute is meant that type of exposition that considers the constitution of phenomena from the point of view of that constitution qua `constitution.' By transcendental is meant that perspective that is trans-phenomenal, pre-constitutional, trans-empirical, pre-predicational, etc. and is discovered through the auspices of a thorough transcendental suspension. An absolute philosophy, as just defined, necessitates some form of negative theological process placed centrally to the disposition of that exposition in order to transform a non-absolute philosophical ground into its absolute equivalent. An absolute philosophy as defined by myself, I must stress again, is not concerned with questions of appearance and reality, only matters of constitution!

ii.	That Negative Theology Takes a Variety of Modes

	Negative theology can take a number of disparate modes, but with the same fundamental form, through e.g., the systematic exercise of disvaluational metaphors (of e.g., illusion, depreciation, magic, etc.); through the systematic negation and transcendence of a positive theology; the systematic and specialized use of metaphor, analogy and allegory; through the imposition of a transcendental suspension; through processes of abstraction or deconstruction; through the use of special types of paradox, silence and other allied devices...
	For myself I found this was an interesting discovery being able to link together this miscellaneous set of features, as just listed, and often found to be present in this type of transcendental discourse associated with a text that has a more explicit form of negative theological flavour. Their major linking feature is that each in their own way sets out to induce a transcendental suspension, etc. In the process a direct attack is mounted on the natural attitude being at the same time an indirect attack upon the positive theological influences that help constitute the formulation of that more traditional pre-critical position. To be noted that by a positive theology was included a broad spectrum of religious constructions that range from concepts about the Divine, the sense of the numinous to the traditional categories of an ostensively non-theological religious disposition.

iii. The Terms of Reference Wider than Mere Negation

	Although negation is involved, directly or indirectly, in the instantiation of the negative theological process, it is the specialized treatment of negation that establishes a negative theological process and not the use of negation per se.
	One of the difficulties in my initial attempts to formulate the distinctive requirements of a negative theological process, and for which I received much criticism, was that an investigation of the use of negation at the level of that apparent negational usage, in those restricted terms of reference, contributed little to an understanding how the negative theological process appeared to operate. Moreover, a study of how negation was used would have been heavily dependent on research done in these two traditions that would have been decidedly anachronistic to the time frame involved in this thesis. Extrapolating back from such research would have been dangerous and, as I have shown, essentially fruitless or, at least, contributing nothing new to either field. In this thesis I have found the adoption of a phenomenological perspective, with a small number of other approaches incorporated in the former, to be more important than a narrow study logically centered on the involvement of negation. 

iv.	That the Subject of Negation is the Natural Attitude

	Although a positive sense of the divine, or a positive-religious philosophy, may be subjected to a negative theological critique correctly it is the positive theologically treated sense of the natural attitude that, I believe, is under attack. Under this critique there is a transcendental transformation of philosophical structure and function through the establishment of a transcendental suspension. That if a negative theological critique should appear to focus solely on some traditional concept of the divine, or numinous, its indirect treatment of the natural attitude is done so by using this concept as a form of proxy for the positive theologically formulated sense of the natural attitude. This interpretation is made to explain why no such concept is necessary for the adoption of a non-theological style of negative theology, why the critique of a concept of the divine or numinous appears to treat phenomenal features that are not traditionally associated directly with the traditional sense of that concept, and why non-religious phenomenal features are also under some form of phenomenological critique.

v.	Transcendental Suspension as a Common Feature

	All forms of negative theological process (as examined in this thesis) possess, and are exercised through, the presence of a transcendental suspension.
	By these means we can hermeneutically integrate a number of features that often occur together in a negative theologically formulated text. Moreover, the transcendental suspension allows us to recognize, and understand, the transformational nature of this style of religious-philosophy both in its translation from a traditional non-transcendental use of discourse, and, in the transcendental transformation unleashed in the adoption of that transcendental suspension.

vi.	The Trans-Analytical Nature of Negative Theology

	A negative theology necessitates the productive use of a transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution. Hence the trans-analytical, but not anti-analytical, nature of the negative theological process.
	By realizing that religious investigation expressed philosophically through the medium of a text is not necessarily just logical, nor just analytical, in its intention puts us in a better position to interpret hermeneutically texts that move outside those non-dialectical terms of reference.
	A negative theological investigation is also facilitated by a recognition that although the expression analysis, or analytical, might be used this type of transcendental discourse can neither operate nor be interpreted in an exposition that adopts only the narrow traditional sense of this type of expression.

vii.	Negative Theology via Abstraction and Deconstruction

	That the transcendental reconstitutional critique, in its treatment of transcendental reduction, realizes an abstractional and deconstructive response in its exercise of the via negativa. In the course of this thesis, so far, I have not tried to distinguish seriously a fundamental difference, if any, between these two expressions of abstraction and deconstruction. Such an examination will be taken up in Chapter VII.
	 That if the emphasis is left, in this transcendental reconstitutional critique, with the pre-exercise of the transcendental reduction we find ourselves presented with a transcendently-orientated discourse, whereas, if the emphasis is placed on the process of transcendental reconstitution we find ourselves being presented with an immanently-orientated style of discourse. That both styles of discourse cannot be completely disentangled but do, overall, present us with a different variety of theological, political, emotional, soteriological mix of attitudes.

viii.That the Negative Theological Process is Circular

	That the exercise of negative theological treatment is a circular process mirroring the natural functioning of the mind through three dialectical moments, namely, transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution. When all three moments, and their respective time-orientations, are in a state of ongoing balance this type of investigation, I believe, finds an existential spontaneity and sense of authenticity in its encounter with the phenomenal world. This might be considered as a mutuality of interaction, in the intentional structural-functioning of that particular relationship, between the three ideal poles of the transcendental Object, transcendental Ego and the transcendental sense of World. Each moment, exercised or interpreted, in this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical circle constituting the meaning and meaningfulness of the other two moments along with all parties that appear to fall under those individual orientations.
	Originally I viewed the negative theological process as a triadic-hierarchically stratified structure. As a consequence I  could not find a satisfactory way of re-investing positive theological items, or aspects, of that implicated pre-critical discourse with some form of positive re-constitution. From an inspection of texts of this type such a re-transformation appears to take place, albeit under the over riding systematic influence of that negative theology. By invoking a circular process of dialectical treatment these difficulties could easily be surmounted, moreover, it allowed the process to recontinue itself indefinitely, a feature that often characterizes this type of text.

ix.	The Positivity of Negative Theology

	That the positivity of the negative theological process can be seen to be theoretically achieved from a number of stages in the dialectic: - through each stage considered individually, through the mutual co-thematizational reinforcement of these stages considered in any combination as pairs, or, altogether in either direction around this hermeneutic circle starting from any moment.
	E.g., from the de-structuralization of analytical encapsulated structural-function and the prospectivity of the transcendental reconstitution realized in the transcendental suspension, or, from the inherent productivity of the transcendental suspension itself, or, from the existential spontaneity and sense of authenticity realized in the ongoing harmonization and balance of these three moments considered collectively as a totality (and creating perhaps in the process a `vertical' moment in the form of an ongoing super-transcendental suspension complete with a trans-intentionally experienced sense of `transcendence?').
	That this positivity manifests itself, I believe, through the realization of all forms of value and has the potentiality of being expressed through all levels of the human psyche. Hence the ability of a negative theology to involve itself in a wide variety of matters that might include observations and issues that could concern, e.g., aesthetics, ethics, pragmatical questions, politics, psychological states of consciousness, etc.
	Thus, on a theoretical basis, I believe we have a number of grounds for investigating the positivity of the negative theological process. Hence in our hermeneutical treatment of this type of text we are now in a position to investigate the experiential dimension expressed, or attested to, through the element of testimony incorporated into this type of text. In this manner we might treat the presence of tranquility or calmness, e.g., as an indication of the need for, or the presence of, the transcendental suspension; the witnessing of abstraction as an experience of personal expansion; the existential realization of personal meaning and meaningfulness as a person-in-the-world through the practical exercising of this negative theological methodology; spontaneity in feelings of compassion, or love, for others, e.g., as a consequential experience of this dialectic, etc? These suggestions are tentatively made as an initial attempt to interpret hermeneutically the close practical association that both this type of text and the practitioners of this type of religious-philosophy  often appear to have in the fields of social responsibility, personal responsiveness, and miscellaneous forms of inter-personal response of a religious and/or non-religious nature.
	The question of the positivity of the via negativa has intrigued me for many years. Both texts appear to go beyond, and wish to go beyond, the terms of reference of their respective positive pre-critical positions. The critical nature of negative theology might account for this emphasis but the systematic interaction of all these miscellaneous components under the umbrella of a highly integrated religious-philosophy would seem to suggest that the negative theological process itself is central to this process of re-evaluation. Thus I am more inclined to conclude that these nine key-points just commented upon are more starting proposals, than the finished product, in a comparative analysis of these two traditions as accessed through the two texts chosen for this study.

Conclusion

	To end this chapter I would like merely to restate my overall conclusion that the negative theological process involved in the use of the via negativa, as exercised by these two traditions, has a similar form. Both traditions, by a variety of similar means, appear to adopt a transcendental suspension and through the use of this device transcendentally transform the nature of their pre-critical positive positions. This type of transcendental-phenomenological critique subjects their inherent positive theologically formulated natural attitude to a process of transcendental transformation that involves the simultaneous use of processes of analysis and deconstruction. Implicit in this circular hermeneutical process is the inter-dependence of these three dialectical moments upon each other with the conclusion that should be drawn that, correctly, analysis is as dependent upon deconstruction as deconstruction is dependent upon analysis. That neither analytical nor deconstructional forms of hermeneutical investigation will, by themselves, do justice to this of text. That this type of text is an example of the exercise of a transcendental-phenomenological style of exposition and is, perhaps, best approached through the same type of philosophical-hermeneutical treatment?

Endnotes IV - Analysis versus Deconstruction