Appendix III - On How To Interpret This Thesis

	Some brief comments are here listed on how to interpret this thesis. In order to understand some of its primary intentions and objectives, both methodological and comparative, I have taken the opportunity here to explicate certain key features in the text, both explicit and implicit, in order to avoid a number of possible misinterpretations that might otherwise be easily adopted. These features are listed under the following five headings of Transcendental Phenomenology, Transcendence, Isomorphism, Bi-modal/Tri-modal Considerations and Transcendental `Empiricism.'

1. Transcendental Phenomenology

	As stated the nature of these investigations was conducted in a transcendental-phenomenological programme and not merely in a phenomenological format! By transcendental-phenomenological is meant trans-intentional, trans-constitutional and trans-phenomenal/phenomenological terms of reference. As a consequence an `appreciation' of cognitive intentionality, language, textual depositions, etc., must be conducted in trans-intentional terms of reference, etc. Perceiving a noetic-noematic correlation on the level of intentionality implies that our terms of reference are essentially trans-noetic-noematic in orientation. Moreover, as the noetic-noematic polarity, and the polarities between transcendental Ego, Object and World, are treated as ideal it implies that such items have no transcendental reality! Expressed in phenomenal (or phenomenological) terms of reference they only have a provisional reality under those terms of reference pertaining to the natural attitude (or that perspective that involves some form of non-transcendental phenomenological treatment). Under transcendental-phenomenological considerations such items have meaning only as provisional metaphorical constructions. When translated into a phenomenal/phenomenological mode they take on a degree of pragmatic relevance in keeping with the nature of those conventional terms of reference that attend upon that interpretation/re-interpretation of the natural attitude. 
	In such a light the noetic-noematic correlation cannot be dismissed as `dualistic' as this intentional polarity can only be ideal. Intentional objects can not be `got at' and in a similar fashion intentional intenders equally cannot be `got at.' Similarly, transcendental Ego(s), Object(s) and World(s) are all equally transcendental `fictions,' pragmatic devices for use in conventionally constructed textual forms of discourse.
	Various methods can be used to signal that a certain segment of investigations is to be conducted in this mode of the transcendental-phenomenological. Such a mode of operation is recognized when we perceive the central presence, and exercise, of an explicit or implicit transcendental suspension, etc. One method to signal such terms of treatment can be adopted through the specialized use of acts of ongoing questioning of that under investigation, either subjecting that under investigation to a series of implicit/explicit questions in a state of ongoing resolution without final resolution, or, in its place the adoption of an explicit/implicit framework of ongoing global questioning. 
	In an attempt to conduct such a style of investigation, albeit in informal terms of reference, my overuse of the question mark was criticized and was itself questioned. Although, miscellaneous types of declarative statements were made there was an implicit attempt to conduct the overall flavour of that research in transcendental terms of reference. As the nature of my research is transcendental-phenomenological I had hoped that the use of a question mark would supply this aspect of an implicit transcendental suspension wherein the assertion of the declarative proposition would be neutralized leaving us with only the residual meaning structure to function under those restricted terms of reference. The act of transcendental suspension involves the bracketing and separation of all forms of value judgment leaving the proposition in its bare intentional configuration, i.e., as a vehicle of sense only. In our philosophical consideration of this meaning-structure all forms of ontological and epistemological value and commitment are put to the side without arresting the thematizational unfolding, and interpretive development, of that phenomenon, or those phenomena, in that phenomenal field focused upon by that noetic act entailed in that proposition. In this light a proposition can be stated but cannot be asserted. Moreover, the propositional translation, as an interpretation of this phenomenon (whether it be textual or non-textual), cannot be treated as anything other than provisional. In its treatment in a hermeneutic circle of some kind or other, through additional input (either retentional or protentional) the sense of this proposition is subject to re-translation and re-expression. This sense-structure itself might even be exposed as ilformed and as correctly lacking sense, or as needing further clarification, or, its previous form might be confirmed as currently adequate to the task to hand. The act of questioning kept in its place as a question establishes a transcendental suspension. The logical structure of a question expressed in the form S is either p or -p? can be seen to be very similar to my treatment of the metaphor as an implicit transcendental suspension in the form of S is p and -p. The use of a question as a transcendental suspension is touched upon in Chapter VIII (e.g., pgs. 362-363).
	With this information to mind I ask my reader to treat my text, other than those sections concerned with forming various conclusions, as being subjected to a global act of ongoing questioning along the same lines as a global commitment to a Husserlian suspension of a world thesis. However, when our transcendental reflections come to an end we then may find ourselves in a position of forming conclusions that, for the moment, are not provisional. Indeed, it is my opinion that when those reflections `do that for us' then we find ourselves in a position of experiencing an act of judgment that expresses itself with a certain degree of transcendental conviction. In a transcendence of the hermeneutic circle (through a super-transcendental suspension) analytic and synthetic aspects blend to form, in my opinion, a qualified synthetic a priori. Qualified by virtue of a dependence upon the constitution and presentation of the relevant information that prepared the foundations for that spontaneous and appropriate act of judgment.
	Essentially, this act of doubt is to purify the complex of propositional statements of all value commitments. It is, therefore, not an indication of hesitation or indeterminacy on my part, but, a recognition of the tentative and provisional nature of this research whilst being subjected to the investigations of our transcendental reflections, and, an openness to the thematization of those propositions (as a system of meaning structures and functions) undergoing an open process of interpretive development centered on the re-presentation of that phenomenal state under investigation. In the course of writing this thesis I came to the conclusion that focal considerations in this regard are primarily phenomenological, and, that background, contextual considerations are primarily hermeneutical in complexion. All investigations by their very nature are restrictive in their terms of reference. In this thesis the two primary phenomena under comparative examination are the two texts chosen for this research. In this regard I am not interested directly in a phenomenological examination of religious experience per se (the intentionally directed manufacture of texts allowing us to focus on texts as a double, perhaps re-duplicated, intentionally created and appreciated phenomenon in this regard). My concept of testimony recognizing the textual nature of reports about the phenomena of certain religious experiences, but, as previously stated this is not a direct area of focus in the terms of reference adopted by this thesis.
	Husserl, himself, I am sure, regarded his research as provisional until such a time that the sense of that under investigation had been adequately clarified and appreciated. The fact that he persevered in his research is an indication that he believed that such research can be adequately clarified and appreciated. That in essence there can come a point in time in our phenomenological(-hermeneutical) research when we find ourselves either not being able to contribute further to that research, or, that the research itself has adequately reached a point of determination to which further research merely confirms the finer details of such an undertaking (implying, under those conditions, that further research is now, in this direction, also a waste of our intellectual resources, albeit for these different reasons).
	To be noted that transcendental investigations are essentially timeless and tenseless. In this regard my use of the present tense, where appropriate, is to be regarded as primarily ahistorical or more correctly, as trans-historical or trans-temporal. The same type of attitude applies to spatial, causal and egotistical aspects of the phenomenal/phenomenological when subjected to our transcendental reflections.
	In keeping with the informal nature of my transcendental investigations I can often be found signaling my intention to treat a proposition, or a series of propositions, in a transcendental perspective by the use of an introductory `that.' The proposition/s is/are being stated without being asserted in a provisional phenomenal or phenomenological format. Under the umbrella of this implicit transcendental suspension observations are noted, new propositions are introduced, weak logical conclusions are drawn, new methodological inputs, etc., are supplied `tentatively' but in a `determined' fashion (until such a time those investigations reach a point of provisional, but definitive, conclusion).

2. Transcendence

	In this thesis I have concentrated my attention on an explication of the horizontal, circular nature of my vision of the negative theological process. A vertical moment of transcendence is recognized in this thesis under the concepts of trans-intentional, trans-constitutional, trans-phenomenal/phenomenological terms of reference, in my hermeneutics of absolute typology, as implicit in the concepts of testimony in this regard and the super-transcendental suspension (wherein there is a state of ongoing balance between the three hermeneutic moments of suspension, reduction as a process of analysis and reconstitution as a process of synthesis). It was suggested by myself that trans-intentional terms of reference are implicated in the spontaneity noted in the necessary formation of acts of judgment and, by implication, would allow our overall model to find some grounds for the hermeneutical treatment of this dimension of the transcendent (and immanent) not directly focused upon in this thesis. However, in this regard the phenomenologist must tread carefully and accept all terminology as metaphorical and avoid merely accepting the apparently literal complexion of such religious expressions that are associated with this sense of the transcendent (and immanent). For a start I have argued elsewhere that the concept of transcendence cannot be understood in pure-logical terms of reference. Such a concept is understood through its implicit or explicit contrast with a correlative sense of the immanent. Treated non-metaphorically such language becomes senseless, ilformed and essentially meaningless. In this light religious concepts like pure consciousness, the complete cessation of thought, the pure being of the One or whatsoever, etc., must be cautiously treated and taken in a non-literal metaphorical mode (along the lines, e.g., as adopted in this thesis). 

3. Isomorphism 

	Without doubt the two textual traditions under comparative examination in this thesis do appear to be incommensurable on an initial scholarly level of inspection in today's philosophical-hermeneutical climate. My thesis is an attempt to show in what way an exhibition of deeper textual structures would permit our re-perceiving these two traditions and therein allow us to regard their deeper motivation, and the textual expression of the same, as belonging to a similar contemporaneous genre of philosophical style, namely, a transcendental-phenomenological programme, in effect exercising a transcendental-absolute style in textual discourse. I have argued that the similar use of disvaluational language, treatment of metaphors of illusion, adoption of an apparent negativity, central adoption of transcendental suspensions, etc., contribute to one aspect of this equation. On the other hand, and probably more important, is a recognition as to which contemporary genres these two traditions do not fall under and by such contrast indicate their deeper allegiance, in varying degrees, to a transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical approach as modeled by the methodology adopted, and constructed, in this thesis. 
	A recognition of isomorphism is not a recognition of an identical philosophical equivalence but is to be seen as the empathy that can be demonstrated between two or more systems which adopt similar pathways and/or grounds, in the decisions they make in their distinctive treatment, and thematizational definition, of certain (similar) classes of problems to be resolved through such systematic mediation. Transcendental by virtue of the type of suspensions invoked, phenomenological by virtue of a recognition of cognitive intentionality, and, hermeneutical by virtue of a recognition of these two former aspects in the construction and interpretation of its texts (and the re-interpretation of earlier texts considered by those traditions as relevant to the formation and re-formulation of that tradition).

4. Bi-modal/Tri-modal Considerations

	One criticism I would make of this thesis, in line with its critical treatment of bi-polar, bi-modal constructions and their substitution by a tri-modal formulation (Chap. IV, pg. 176), is that although the transcendental-phenomenal distinction cannot be accused of being a dichotomy, or a duality, it could be accused of lacking a pre-phenomenological medium, or basis, that would allow that bi-modal treatment to possess a meaningfully constituted sense in the first place. The degree of sense that appears to be possessed by this bi-modal formulation must be, in due measure, to the formation of an implicit background that gives the necessary degree of contrast to, and relative grounds for, such a proposal. However, this type of critical argument could continue and ask why should we stop at the pre-formation of a third party in bi-modal considerations? Why not select a variety of fields that add to the meaningfulness of that under investigation, indeed calling for a multi-modal appreciation of an mono-modal intentional object or bi-modal state of intentional contrast? When we look at some portion of a landscape, e.g., we could possibly view it as a tourist, or as an artist might, or a geologist, or a geographer or agriculturist, etc. We inspect the terrain in accordance with the nature, and quality, of our current intentions. Different ways of viewing that area of focus need not be counter-productive, or mutually destructive, but through a careful choice on our part such a multi-modal inspection might well enrich these various attitudes exercised simultaneously and/or successively. In my opinion an overall appreciation of the history of both Neoplatonic philosophy and Buddhist philosophy should recognize the development of a similar shift from mono-modal to bi-modal to tri-modal and, finally, multi-modal interpretations without the absolute displacement of any one modal point of view in the development of these traditions. In this regard, in my estimation, the philosophical framework of Plotinus is essentially mono-modal and only implicitly bi-modal and, to a lesser extent, tri-modal. Plotinus seems to lack an explicit, or effective, Doctrine of Two Truths or some such equivalent. On the other hand relatively implicit tri-modal formulations are taken up by later Neoplatonists, e.g., Proclus. In the Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom a bi-modal relationship between the phenomenal and the transcendental is explicit although tri-modal influences are relatively implicit and become fully explicit in the Yogacara. Some later developments in Buddhist philosophy might be read  in a multi-modal perspective, e.g., as might be reasonably exercised in our interpretation of the Avatamsaka Sutra. This multi-modal approach should not be confused with the anarchy of a relativistic position. On the other hand the mono-modal position should not be confused with the dogmatism of a uni-vocal position. In this schema we might also like to consider Nagarjuna's `no (substantial, self-existent) position' as a type of transcendental position that refuses to reify empirical or speculative entities beyond, and within, their empirical or speculative terms of deployment.

5.  Transcendental `Empiricism'

	Finally, in my use of the expression transcendental- empirical is meant trans-intentional `experience' or `intuition' (whether of the transcendental or phenomenal, whether of a sense of the absolute or Absolute) that by virtue of its trans-intentionality is direct, beyond the immediate scope of cognitive intentionality and is, at the same time, capable of seeing through the intentional constitution of the phenomenal (and the phenomenological). I would interpret the expression yathabhutam, seeing things as they become, in this manner remembering the dictum that the very limits of the phenomenal (samsara) are the very limits of the transcendental (Nirvana) (to paraphrase Nagarjuna in this respect).

Errata