XII: The Possible Theological and Non-Theological Implications of 
Value-in-Circulation*

0.    Introduction

	The relationship of all relationships is the Life-World. The existential excess of such an open relationship must have a theological or theological-like implication. As already noted, this excess of value would be re-invested back into the body of that overall relationship, but, that could not be in and through an absolutely reductive modality. Hence this theological-like embodiment of the world in and through its forms of embodiment, and, in what manner this theological difference is an actual difference in value to the extent it is not absolutely re-invested?? Let me examine the hypothetical possibilities of this set of propositions. (0)

	In the previous ‘essay’, a set of propositions in the form of a summary, I noted the following:

The relationship of all relationships 
Has an existential surplus of value. (72)

That surplus of value
Has a theological implication. (73)

That excess too is then re-invested 
Back into the body of the world. (74)

Thence a provisional theological embodiment
Since the theological cannot be absolutely reduced. (75)

Hence value is also theological in orientation
When it is emergently re-aligned. (76)

*Link to latest version of paper on my Homestead Homepage Site (circulation12.rtf).
www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html 
Moreover it was also noted:

But ‘wholly otherness’ cannot exist
Being not-there-for-us it cannot be-there-for-us! (54)

Therefore otherness is preconditionally constituted 
In a relatively more basic non-otherness. (55)

Let me examine more closely these types of comments in order to ascertain whether this aspect of a theological implication has relevant ramifications both theologically and non-theologically in our topic of circulation-in-value? (1)

1.    Theoretical Framework Behind the Proposition of a Theological Implication

	In two volumes of hypothetical theological research I have explored the concept of a theological difference, namely, the difference between ‘a vision of the world without a theological complexion’ and ‘a vision of the world with a theological complexion’. It was conceded that this approach had much to offer us in this regard, but was qualified by the non-concession that any approach towards a traditional or non-traditional classical (or non-classical) theological system was not implicated as things stood. To take this point further let me examine what theological value would or should imply in a hypothetical theological economy (that conservative theological representatives might not necessarily agree with). (2)

	Theological value demands a theological economy of circulation just as any other form of value would demand its associated economy. What are the implications of this simple proposition given our understanding to date? (3)

	An economy has value realized at all points in that relational space equally and produced spontaneously through the bifurcation of that moment. Therefore, in a theological economy, theological value would arise moment to moment through each and every point in that relational space, albeit from the point of view of those moments; i.e., in a reflection of their epistemological organization. Furthermore, an intentional appreciation of that value would be conducted through the dual lenses of genre or genres of activity and interpretation; on the further assumption that there can be no pure genre of either activity or interpretation, i.e., there can be no genre of pure, active activity nor a genre of pure, passive interpretation. Theological power would be co-opted and could not be just activated or received. Dissemination of theological power in that sense would have a democratic-like flavour even if centered in a theological source or center whose epistemological tenor was greater than the intentional tenor of its ‘participants’. (4)

	Should value be registered as just an intentional phenomenon? I smile at a stranger and they smile back. I shake their hand and they shake mine, both parties being aware of the fact that in this culture a form of introduction is through ‘shaking hands’. In time this other person becomes my lover and I their lover. My beloved is worried about a certain problem. I reassure them and gently caress their forehead. We talk through the problems that concern my friend and through reassurance resolve their concern in this regard. On the way to work each day I am usually met by a very friendly cat. I stroke the head of this beautiful creature and met by a loud purring sound. Should I limit this expression and reception of value purely in a realm of human affairs. A friend has a pet rock and gently strokes it. Do we have a similar type of situation here? Somehow I do not think so. A pet rock seems to be as unresponsive as any other rock. Could we extend the analogy in the other direction? Is it possible in a theological realm of value that value is expressed and received in super-intentional terms of reference on a par somewhat with an intentional sphere of operation? Even if that were granted, would not power arise, be expressed and received simultaneously at every point in that relationship? We could argue that! Even though a theological act could be expressed from a certain point on behalf of that theological relationship still in its formal basis power would actually be disseminated in and through its overall collectivity. Hence in ‘alignment’ it would be on behalf of that relationship, in ‘non-alignment’ it would not be on the behalf of that relationship to the extent that it is not fully aligned, since some degree of alignment must be present for this chaotic change of state to occur in that relationship. Could we suppose that power could operated through ‘inertia’ to the extent that gradations of power are mere extensions of discontinuous changes of course once made and remain under some degree of ‘inertia’ subject to some form of ‘friction’ to the extent that they eventually erode or self-erode in time, and, come about through discontinuous acts of bifurcation? I believe this model could be useful. Sudden changes in apparent activity and/or apparent passivity occur through bifurcation whose extent is then left to inertia subject to temporal limitations of friction and/or other acts of bifurcation that are imposed upon the former. However, all that granted, apparent centers of theological power, as like the apparent sources of any other expression/reception of power, would still operate along the same lines, namely, that power is formally disseminated through all points in that relationship equally albeit in a reflection of their current epistemological organization. Thus, in the course of theological circulation, in flows of apparent theological power, even though such changes in power might appear to be sources still, formally, the entire relational field is implicated in the dissemination of the same both actively and passively. Let me put this in a context where a monarch is exercising their power to demonstrate how this should be read through the formal model of a democratic dissemination of power. (5)

	An absolute monarch enters the court, sits on their throne and speaks, pronouncing certain observations, laws and other edicts. Here, power appears to issue forth from the monarch and spread throughout their realm. However, a democratic dissemination of power would read this in an entirely different manner despite our ability to switch between these via a translation that allows us to move from a classical frame of reference to this formal frame of reference. Read in the light of the latter mode we see a monarch assume the powers that are granted them, moment by moment, through the institutionalization of their power. However, only through such democratic assent or non-dissent can such dissemination proceed. Should it be disrupted then there would be a disruption in the apparent power of that monarch. Furthermore, the ongoing dissemination of that power proceeds by the same underlying mechanism. Only in the democratic assent or non-dissent does it continue to the degree such a basis s in place. Given some degree of non-assent, then through such friction the initial inertia of that apparent act of power is eroded (as we find in the disintegration of a command economy or through the disruption of a civil war or even an imminent election when a change in government seems more than likely, e.g.). So, a classical (and conservative) theology could be reread through this relatively democratic model of dissemination. However, there are certain implications that might not be palatable to a conservative theologian. (6)

	Even though power might appear to be expressed through a certain privileged point of articulation, still, it is only on this formal basis that power can be apparently expressed and received. A hypothetical theology would demand a hypothetical economy, and, the apparent circulation of theological value would be more an illusion being, correctly, the product of the entire relationship, and expressed as a chaotic phenomenon with discontinuous changes of state issuing from every point in that relationship equally at the same time albeit through the prism of the individual epistemological organization currently in residence therein. So, we stroke a rock and it is merely worn away albeit ever so minimally. We stroke the head of a cat and the cat either purrs or snarls, etc. (7)

	This formal democratic model accepted, then power is expressed, received and re-expressed, etc., in keeping with the epistemological organization of that point or participant under examination along with a recognition of its more fundamental basis in this chaotic change of state entered into through the bifurcation of its associated moment of expression. Now, all of this is not to be atomistically isolated but understood as changes in state in its associated system. If that system be theological in tenor, then theological disseminations of power are under examination, or, if that system be non-theological in tenor non-theological disseminations of power are under examination. Have we hypothetical grounds for supposing a theological dissemination of power is conceivable? Let us therefore discern, hypothetically, between a theological-like dissemination of power and a non-theological-like dissemination of power. (8)

2.    The Possible Differentiation of a Theological-Like Implication?

	Now, from the transcendental argument of non-impossibility arises the argument of transcendental possibility and its extension as a transcendentally actualizable possibility in some manner or other, to some degree or other. Let me explain. As argued here and elsewhere, a theological difference is not inconceivable. As a conceivable possibility transcendentally, through an impossibility of pure actuality and pure potentiality, it follows that it must exist in some manner or other, to some degree or other (even if that be the barest minimum possible). In it minimum form we must give to the world a minimal degree of unity above and beyond its mere summation of parts. Thence this importation or imparting, derivation or acceptance of a minimal degree of a theological difference. That accepted, it follows that theological value would follow (although not necessarily, or fundamentally, in intentional terms of reference or in non-intentional terms of reference). Hence, from possibility arises some manner and degree of actualizable possibility (either effective and/or ineffective in manner or range). To this extent our hypothetical theology can move from a hypothetical economy to a relatively non-hypothetical economy (although not necessarily in any shape or form reminiscent of a classical or conservative theology, be they in a traditional or non-traditional format). Thence, apparent theological flows of value would circulate in accordance with basic, formal preconditions of a relatively democratic basis. Differences in activity and/or interpretation could then be read in and through different realizations in different moments of time as discerned through the respective epistemological organizations of those points or participants under examination (given and/or treated in adequate or inadequate forms of alignment in that regard). From this devolves a theological implication being read as either relatively significant or relatively insignificant. Moreover, such interpretations need not nor cannot rule out non-theological implications and interpretations (even if only by virtue of the ruled relative insignificance of accepted theological inputs/outputs). In this regard, e.g., the transcendental unity of the Life-World can be seen through either the lens of the theological and/or the lens of the non-theological. To this extent, the mere acceptance of bare, minimum theological implication may well be no use for a classical and conservative theologian. However, should they wish to run a theological economy then certain transcendental conditions automatically apply, as noted, should they wish to construct a viable theology. (9)

3.    A Closer Examination of Hypothetical Theology

	At the start of this essay I quoted seven propositions from the previous paper that alluded to theological possibility, i.e., the world as being perceived to be flavored with a theological difference. Let me examine them more closely and reveal the logical presuppositions and suppositions at work (in their encapsulated arguments). (10)

The relationship of all relationships 
Has an existential surplus of value. (72)

	Just as a relationship reveals its existential surplus of value as the difference between its totality and its mere summation of participants and parts, so, too, must the relationship of all relationships be possessed of and possibly reveal its existential surplus of value. Now, relationships are interactive and not merely isolated one from another. Because in our existential appreciation of a certain relationship we also need to take into account the consequences that would be or are or have been expressed in and through that relationship to-hand. To this extent, therefore, no relationship can be seen as completely isolated from any other relationship or the sheer totality of all possible relationships (even if open-ended or subject to infinite permutations and combinations). As noted, this complexity is already, on the whole, pre-negotiated for us. Therefore, it follows that the relationship of all relationships would express an existential surplus of value, namely, theological-like value (given its implication in a theological or theological-like difference). (10)

That excess too is then re-invested 
Back into the body of the world. (74)

	However, such a surplus is not absolutely free-floating but is invested back into its relational basis to some non-absolute extent or other. Hence theological embodiment and thence our seeing the world, should we wish, as a form of theological embodiment (contra numerous classical or conservative theologians). By such an approach we are able to declare a phenomenal-phenomenological basis for a viable process theology (given that the only forms of viable theology possess those same criteria – since “what is not there for-us is not there for-us!”, and, “’interaction’ implies ‘proces’!”). (11)

Thence a provisional theological embodiment
Since the theological cannot be absolutely reduced. (75)

	Such a theological form of embodiment (in and through and beyond a sense of world, nature, a nation, a culture or culture in general, etc.). Because there can be no absolute reduction, therefore, this surplus could not be complete reduced back to its relatively non-theological basis of world, etc. (12)

Hence value is also theological in orientation
When it is emergently re-aligned. (76)

	Through emergence and through alignment we move towards and enter this elative dimension of the theological (be it speculative or hypothetical, proposed or treated as actual). With an emphasis upon or towards the overall transcendental unity of the world we should find when we re-align such forces, find ourselves in alignment with such forces that a theological-like tenor should be evident or become evident in time, etc. By re-alignment is meant: an ability to apparently receive and disseminate a certain kind of power in keeping with the nature of that power under consideration, and v.v., given that its formal basis is chaotically disseminated/re-disseminated through re-self-organization of the relational economy of that relationship in question. Adequate alignment realizing an adequate dissemination of power in keeping with the nature of that economy in and through and beyond that point under such alignment possessed or given to it. (13)

	Two more verses were also alluded to:

But ‘wholly otherness’ cannot exist
Being not-there-for-us it cannot be-there-for-us! (54)

Therefore otherness is preconditionally constituted 
In a relatively more basic non-otherness. (55)

	In a relationship, as a relatively distinctive relational economy, we are constituted by the relatively other. I.e., not so much through difference, if at all, as through relative discontinuity. There can be no viable theology that predicates a ‘wholly other’ as its source of theological power. Therefore, the basic mediation of a relative presuppositional non-otherness in which a certain form of a relatively discernable discontinuity is allowed to operate therein or thereupon or thereunder. Thence our ability to hypothetically participate, actively and passively, in a viable theological economy despite this manifestation of a relative otherness. Moreover, alignment is predicated on this ability to mediate apparent otherness and other forms of theological differential. (14)

4.    Provisional Conclusions

	Interestingly, treating the open relationship of all relationships is conducive of establishing the transcendental possibility-actuality of an existential theology. However, such a system, and its associated relational economy, need not bear much resemblance to a traditional or non-traditional classical or conservative theology. For a start we can predicate no ‘wholly other’. Then, such an economy, despite apparent differentials in theological power reflecting differences in epistemological organization, must still be predicated on a more fundamentally democratic disseminative basis. Furthermore, options must remain open for forms of existential alignment wherein adequate forms of receptivity, both active and passive, are in place and in play. Hence, we can speculate to this degree that the operation of a viable theological economy would by necessity exhibit this type of transcendental machinery as hypothetically and archetypally examined. However, as already noted, the end result need not bear much resemblance to the articulation of relatively naive forms of theology! So much so, that we must also automatically assume, or subsume, the co-existence of a non-theological implication to the extent that theological explanations can and should also run parallel non-theological modes of activity and interpretation!

   Noël Tointon, Sydney, 19.6.09.