XVI: Value-in-Circulation:
Re-Discovering the Other Without Alienation and Without Oppression!*

0.    Introduction

	We are constituted by an inescapable otherness, and that inseparable otherness is constituted by us! (0)

	In time and space, in manner and in intensity, in all distinctive phenomenological features we are constituted by otherness. Our sense of self-definition is through a contrasting reversal of the same in an attempt to find the non-otherness of our own identity. But just as no absolute self can be found so too can no absolute other be found! Neither, certainly, through some form of an absolutely other whose non-relational status is such that we never experience the same, nor, certainly, through some form of an other absolutely able to enter into each and every relationship. In regard to the first form of otherness, we should meet a profound sense of alienation along with a concomitant sense of utter loneliness! In regard to the second form of otherness, we should meet a profound sense of oppression along with a concomitant sense of pure powerlessness! Although forms of alienation and loneliness are encountered, in truth, they are met through an absence or absenting of the same and not through some form of absolute primal disconnection since we also argue that it is through otherness that we find our sense of identity and value in the first place. Then, alternatively, although forms of oppression and powerelessness are encountered, in truth, they are met through their presence encroaching upon an inner sense of freedom and potential self-empowerment that normally lets us find our own sense of identity and value as is so obviously the case through our relative encounter with the otherness of the other. Just as no absolutely alienated sense of the other could be experienced so no absolutely oppressive sense of the other could be experienced likewise. Is it not the case, therefore, that our experience of the other is neither through absolute alienation nor through absolute oppression? Just how is it, then, that the ‘other’ is experienced in order to find our identity and value in a world where we normally do not meet extreme forms of alienation and do not meet extreme forms of oppression not that such phenomena are not encountered in a relative form? In this paper let me examine why extreme alienation and extreme oppression are not normally encountered in our passage through this world despite certain notorious historical and concurrent events where alienation and oppression are decidedly manifest through a contra-existential dis-valuation of the human condition by others…. (1)

	In this paper I would like to show that the default position, so to speak, in all of our relations with others is between these poles of alienation and oppression, indeed, as far away as possible from these adverse climates for the value-formation of human identity. I will examine this topic under the following headings: our phenomenological encounter of the other, the phenomenological nature of alienation, the phenomenological nature of oppression, and, how such adverse elements might be subjectively and inter-subjectively dealt with through overt and covert forms of existentialization of the social environment. (2)

*Link to latest version of paper on my Homestead Homepage Site (circulation16.rtf).
www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html 
1.    Our Phenomenological Encounter of the Other

	Between the forever absent and the forever present there is another sense of otherness, namely, that there-that-is-other-than-this-here. Significance is discerned through significant contrast. Too much contrast and there is no significance, and, too little contrast and again there is no significant contrast. This is a dialectical sense of otherness. The resolution of a relationship between the ‘non-other’ and ‘that other than the non-other’. Significance is generated through this relationship, through relationships in general, in particular and specifically. Now, realists would believe that relationship could only be maintained between specific particulars, whereas, in contrast, idealist would believe that universals in some form or other must also be implicated. Should a philosophy or metaphysics, or a logic or a language, etc., be predicated upon the basis of either one or the other? No! (3)

	Our encounter with the other through others is a given of our existence. That encounter could not be one of ‘our relationship with a pure absence’ nor one where ‘we just cannot escape from the same’. However, between these two extremes we have a world of contrast… and all that is necessary for us to interact with others. (4)

	If there is no absolute sense of self and no absolute sense of other how can relationships be formed if at all?! By virtue of the relationship already in place, imputations of participants can be provisionally focused upon and extracted. The essential nature of that relationship phenomenally and/or phenomenologically characterizing the same. Furthermore, through the hierarchical nesting of all relationships within other relationships a sense of place, or sense, can be provisionally focused upon and, therein, imputations can be thematized with some degree of provisional stability. Our engagement of relationships phenomenlogically being facilitated through an overall transcendental suspension/overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Effectively, parallel and interacting acts of synthesis, analysis and synthesis-analysis allow us to operate in a natural mode where imputations become the relatively fixed points of focus, manipulation, etc. Further operations re-processing the same, fixing in retention that under focus for examination. Now, all of this happens in their respective fields of focus along with their concomitant senses of self. So, , e.g., a visual field (itself a nested hierarchy of fields dealing with focus, colour, edge-determination, movement, facial recognition, etc.) is in an intimate relationship with a visual object-state (or objective) and an imputed visual perceiver. These poles of interaction (between objects/subjects/fields) must be present for the distinctive phenomenology of vision to emerge. Hence absolute isolation (from otherness) would imply the non-emergence of relations, the non-emergence of relationships! Moreover, an inter-subjective dimension is also in play since genres of experience (with their parallel co-genres of activity and interpretation) need to be in place and exercised in order for value to fully emerge intentionally through re-iterated processes of adoption and adaptation. All forms of value, therefore, being emergent forms of value (as simulated/re-simulated between these three poles of objective-focus, associated subjectivity and corresponding fields (also implicating an inter-subjective dimension through the utilization of genres of experience, an inter-subjective mapping of sense and a subjective thematization of associated senses and non-associated senses of self in the light of genres of defined forms of self-expression, etc.). All of this could not be otherwise than dialectical! Furthermore, through the ongoing appearance of emergent relations arises the appearance of a circulation of value. Hence value-in-circulation through ongoing emergence of the value of those relationships (as focused upon through a transcendental appreciation of experience since value can only be determined through an appreciation of the relational and thence its primary nature and status as transcendental [despite its  transformational re-treatment in non-transcendental/natural terms of reference]).(5)

	What is meant by the word ‘dialectical’? Merely, a non-absolute univocality of value (be that in sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness). Because all aspects of value are apparent functions, i.e., processes, through ongoing emergence, and those functions are thematized through non-absolute contrast it follows that the formation and tracking of the same is similarly signposted, i.e., in and through hierarchical maps of non-absolute contrast. So, a process of translation is always forever present. E.g., I report seeing a red apple. ‘I’ and ‘not some other person other than myself’ is ‘seeing’ rather than ‘feeling’, etc., an ‘object’ that is ‘solid’ and ‘round’ and ‘red’ rather than ‘non-solid’, ‘cubic’ and ‘green’, etc., etc. When one thinks about it, it is obvious that redness, e.g., is not something that can be directly defined in and through language. Indirectly we can define it as not not-green, not-yellow, as a certain range of wave-lengths, etc., etc. If we are to point it out and say ‘this is red and that is red’ and between them we have, more or less, the range of ‘redness’, still, in pointing our ‘redness’ we must do so through the genre of colour identification, and, this pointing out is itself, therefore, embedded in a linguistic frame of reference whose fundamental operation is just as much a process of relative definition-through-contrast (being contrasted against other genres of pointing out say number, invariant identity, transformed identity, different types of field, etc., etc.). (6)

	Therefore, value is determined and judged in a dialectical reality that often escapes us through an over-concentration upon processes and/or end-products of imputation. I am seeing a red apple. I am thinking about my seeing this red apple. I tell a friend that I see this red apple on that apple tree. In an object mode we need not be philosophical and examine too much how we might phenomenologically come to this situation of seeing this red apple on that apple tree. However, philosophically and critically this implication of a dialectical dimension is of paramount importance lest we fall into the realist-idealist trap of privileging either ‘content of a process’ or ‘process with content’. And the antidote for this philosophical disease of imputational shortsightedness is to exercise an adequate overall transcendental suspension (or parallel, overall hermeneutical circle of comprehension) and therein de-privilege what should be de-privileged in critical phenomenal-phenomenological discourse (without losing sight of the natural course of our pre-philosophical discourse). Such a process of critical phenomenological translation realizes a transformational re-evaluation of value; being the critical objective of our philosophical investigations. Indeed, defining the nature of ‘critical’ in this regard through a transcendental-phenomenological lens in this regard However, it should also be noted, that the end of our investigations is not only to deliver insight but ensure a practicalization of the same. Through a dialectical process of the suspension of the suspension, etc., we fully re-enter back into the same world with-others before-others. (7)

	How then does this realm of the other operate in our dialectical treatment of phenomenal-phenomenological reality as constituted by-us for-us with-others before-others? (8)

	Through inter-subjective genres of experience the ‘other’ is forever present. Moreover, in one Life-World there can be no absolute distinction between self and other, between a so-called ‘inner world of experience’ and a so-called ‘external world’. Philosophically they are unobtainable imputations. On the other hand, this does not mean that ‘my point of view’ is ‘your point of view’. However, points of view are dialectical possibilities in a transcendental dimension whose expression must be grounded in and through and beyond the transcendental unity of the Life-World. ‘My point of view’ is a ‘point of view’ and as a point of view is just one possible point of view among an infinitude of the same. All of these points of view as ‘points of view’ can be co-entertained indirectly through simulation to that extent they are either directly accessible through re-simulation or indirectly entertainable through some simulated form of resimulation. E.g., pain may be a privately oriented experience, yet, our expression of this type of experience is not just a subjective affair. The very concept of ‘pain’ is an inter-subjective concept. Of course someone could be merely ‘simulating pain’ but even that, whether understood or not understood, is something that can be inter-subjectively appreciated (which re-establishes this same point also by default since we know what both ‘to be in pain’ and ‘to merely simulate pain’ means even if we were currently unable to differentiate which possibility might apply in a certain given situation). (9)

	How is the ‘other’ involved in our dialectically constituted experience of reality? In and through all forms of contrast that produce, re-produce and/or reproduce intentional processes with thematized intent, i.e., consciously appreciated intentional content (be that intentional objectives, intentional processes and/or associated senses of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity)! (10)

	‘Otherness’ in this sense is open-ended as ‘all things other than that focused upon and in which the identity of that focused upon is given its identity through contrast’. ‘Otherness’ in this sense is inescapable! But this sense need not be alienating nor oppressive but, then, could be if relatively expressed in either or both of these directions (of relations to an other that is either purely absent and/or over-present). (11) 
2.    The Phenomenological Nature of Alienation

	The phenomenon of alienation does exist, but absolute alienation cannot exist! Is alienation an experience of intensity in separation or merely a phenomenological separation be that as a process or as an end-point in a process of separation? As an intensity there can be no absolute intensity in a superlative sense. However it certainly has an existence in a comparative sense. Then, as a process it signals a loss of relation, a diminished relationship, an absence of interaction that is experience as a loss. Two lovers become alienated. They experience what is no longer there in their relationship with each other and that is experienced as a loss and perhaps as a painful sense of loss. In some sense they are still in a relationship in order to experience the loss in that relationship or that that relationship is lost. Alienation in this sense is more an ‘absenting’ rather than an absolute loss. That experience of loss could be painful or it might not be registered or registered now as painful. Do we have a model here for the experience of alienation? Most likely, with the implication that a sense of otherness that is absolutely separated could not be experienced as alienation. But, if we move from a superlative dimension to a comparative dimension we can make much better sense of this type of phenomenon. ‘Absence’ can only be experienced in a relationship whereas absolute alienation is no longer something that could be experience as there would be no relationship in place for the experience of alienation to be expressed. Only if that relationship be still in existence, have facticity, could alienation be still evident as a sense of loss however painful or not painful that might be. (12)

	The above accepted, it follows that there can be no absolute sense of alienation by virtue of an absolutely other otherness. We either stand in relation to the same or we do not stand in relation to the same. Therefore, alienation can never be realized through some form of absolute separation, however, a process of relative separation would or could be instrumental in producing an experience of alienation. It would appear that for alienation to manifest itself there must be a period in time where no or less alienation was already experienced hence ‘alienation from…’ In our existence with-others how, then, is alienation experienced and ameliorated? Through the experience of a relationship and an absenting of one or more parties in that relationship in a denotative sense and in a connotative sense this experience of absence is registered in and through a complex set of negative emotions. Could this definition be applied to a more general sense of alienation? Possibly, when considerations of an overall relational facticity are taken into account? In the light of this definition it would now seem to present to us a way out of this general sense of alienation by virtue of our re-normalizing that general sense of relational facticity. (13)

How is a renormalization of the general relational facticity of our existence to be achieved? Though the existentialization of this general relational facticity. How is this type of project to be evaluated, achieved and re-evaluated? Through relational re-enrichment, conducted as a process in transcendental terms of reference. Through receptivity to an overall transcendental suspension/overall hermeneutic circle, these three steps of evaluation, restoration and re-evaluation will automatically take place. Such productive restoration arising through an atunement or an at-onement in that overall sense of how we relate to the world, effectively, in and through and beyond this sense of relational re-alignment wherein relational potential is activated and this beneficial differential is experienced as a quantitative and qualitative improvement in overall relational facticity. How is this beneficial improvement of our being with-others before-others to find an existential process of renormalization? (14)

	How is a process of realignment to be entered into that is existential and not merely an impingement, or worse, an oppression of the other? Through finding a receptivity to the ‘life’ of that relationship in question and then if necessary acting on its apparent behalf. Our simulation/re-simulation of that relationship along with an automatic co-simulation/co-re-simulation of an existential excess resident in that relationship, empowering such decisive intervention. Treatment of that relationship, in and through its simulation/re-simulation, subject to adequate transcendental appreciation opening us up to its transcendental evaluation, transcendental intervention, and transcendental re-evaluation along with a recognition of the existential-differential realized in and through and beyond such a process of renormalization. A positive differential signifying an improvement in the facticity of that relationship in question. As a consequence, certain existential characteristics signifying an enrichment of that relationship should rise to a greater degree of relative prominence. (15)

	Through the consequential empowerment of a relationship we must now ask the question, given our process of existential renormalization is not realized in a process of oppression how are to oversee that this, in turn, is not the result of the empowerment of that relationship in its oppression of some other relationship and its subjective/inter-subjective content? In other words, how is a degree of existential balance arrived at in and between the actual realization of a particular relationship or set of relationships vis-à-vis all relationships that constitute the Life-World? To answer this question let us examine the phenomenon of oppression. (16)

3.    The Phenomenological Nature of Oppression

	If all intentionality is the result of a chaotic state of re-self-organization would it not be the case that we could not differentiate relatively existentially oriented intentional acts from relatively non-existentially oriented acts. Metaphorically, we could claim that the cascading re-alignment of neuronal activity in the formation of a specific thought was pre-conditionally prepared through the equivalence of an overall transcendental suspension and expressed conditionally through the suspension of that former suspension. Given this modeling, how could we differentiate the existential status of one intentional act and compare it to some other, and, determine the existential status of any intentional act within its relational context vis-à-vis the relationship of all relationships (as constituted in the Life-World)? (17)

	In my opinion, the existential status of a specific intentional act is expressed in and through and beyond the adequacy of its pre-conditional overall transcendental suspension as conditionally expressed through the quality of its suspension in turn. If we have an adequate overall transcendental suspension in place, and an adequately conducted conditional suspension of the same then it should it follow that its overall expression should reflect that adequacy of preparation and expression. How, though, can that existential expression be adequately reflect beyond its relational context of expression, i.e., be existentially oriented both within its relational context and beyond that relational context in the wider world (of the Life-World itself)? By virtue of the fact that in a relationship we can only stand from where we approach the same, albeit through suspension, and, that same standing is also reflective of the fact where we also stand in the wider world itself! The very prejudices, as the necessary pre-judgments that bring us to reflect upon a certain situation, are, in effect, the very same prejudices that allow us to stand in the world itself. Situated in a relational context is only arrived at through our situation in the wider world itself at the same time. Without the latter there could be no former positioning without its presentation in the wider world since its emplacement is within the Life-World at that very psychic center that we currently find ourselves. We can only suspend what we have arrived with, and in this we bring our entire life-history to that point, point by point, in those aspects relevant to our case to-hand, and let our relational context coincide with the wider world, albeit from our point of view, and, therein and thereafter, practice this suspension with the entirety of that material already to-hand. Our existential task is to understand the relevant nature of that positioning and overcome it in and through an adequate overall transcendental suspension as we stand both within that relational context and as it stands within the entirety of the Life-World itself. Hence this more ‘complex’ concept of re-alignment wherein the essential understanding of the relational context in question is aligned within the wider world itself, and, an adequacy of suspension is applied both to our understanding of that relational context in question and to our understanding how that prior understanding relates to the wider world itself as currently understood by ourselves. This re-alignment also extends to how we think others, existentially and non-existentially, appear to relate to the same situation to hand (and to that same type of situation to-hand). The consequences of our reflections, enacted and/or non-enacted, contributing to our newly-arrived at or re-arrived at reflections in this regard. (18)

	With, so to speak, one toe in a relational context under reflection, and the other toe equally in the world at large, how do we deal with this concept of oppression of the other (albeit in a relative sense) given that we too are in each and every relationship by virtue of our participation in the entirety of this same world-to-hand. In this engaged specification of this one World-of-Life we therein encounter and recognize the apparent circulation of all apparent value (of that value-in-circulation) as found focused upon in and through that relational context? In what sense are we oppressive and we find others to be as equally oppressive, or, accumulatively, even more oppressive than any overt or covert act of oppression committed by us? Is it the case, then, that oppression is unavoidable? Indeed, the very hallmark of our being-with-others, perhaps, moreover, accompanied by overt or covert act of simultaneous exploitation of an inevitable non-mutual nature?! (19)

	Being present in a situation is not necessarily oppressive. One could be at a soccer match enjoying the spectacle. That does not compare with out being at a slave auction and making a successful bid. Then, we might have purchased our slave, hopefully more than one, to take them to a safe place to liberate them, to free them from the bondage of slavery. Or, is my very participation at that auction an action that sanctions and perpetuates that same type of institutional process that has institutionalized this form of oppression? Therefore, what must transpire, in essence, for it to be characterized as oppressive (and as exploitative?)? Obviously, just being there is not enough, certainly a necessary condition but not sufficient in itself. (20)

	In my opinion, oppression is a form of dominating power relation that occurs when one party or a set of parties forces its will on some other party or set of parties. Or, more exactly, when the balance of power relations is not equal and those power relations are exercised through one or more points of view without regard to the apparent existential coursing of that relationship itself, i.e., non-mutually. There is obviously an imbalance in power relations between a mother and her child, but, normally, that relationship could not be called oppressive (and exploitative). We also have the anomaly of a submissive person doing the bidding of a dominant person, however, our definition should encompass the same by virtue of the fact that in this co-authoring of actions the submissive person is effectively enacting the will of the dominant person. By non-mutually could be meant ‘that set of actions enacted in and through and beyond an inadequately conducted set of overall transcendental suspensions (relevant to the coursing of that situation in question).’ An oppressive orientation being, therefore, one non-mutually conducted in an imbalance of power relations. That granted, would it be possible for two parties or two friends of equal power to mutually or non-mutually oppress each other, or, for one party only to oppress the other? What is mutual cannot be non-mutual. However, it would seem feasible that one party could oppress the other party despite having the same power status. Therefore, we should emend this definition. That, oppression is the non-mutual exploitation of some other party or parties and whose practice is relatively reinforced through a power imbalance in favour of that oppressor or oppressors. Now we must ask, are we right to couple ‘oppression’ and ‘exploitation’ together? Is oppression the non-mutual exploitation of some other party or parties, etc? Without this difference in power status being enforced, or indicated as a possibility, without that degree of enactment, oppression then would more be a figment of our own imagination. So, it seems feasible to couple these two elements of oppression and exploitation. What is meant by exploitation? That enacted non-mutually through oppression and exaggerated by an imbalance in power status in favour of the oppressor or oppressors. Furthermore, in the intentional directedness of the oppressor or oppressors, exploitation that achieves its intended aim or aims could be treated as an accomplished act of exploitation to that degree such intentions are non-intentionally realized in that process of enactment, i.e., that overall act of oppression. (21)

	Therefore, in the light of the above, an act of oppression by the other, through some other, as a sole party or as a set of parties, is engineered in an intentional act of non-mutual exploitation exaggerated by inequalities of power relations that favour the oppressor or oppressors. However, it is obvious that this non-existential course of enactment could be existentially re-addressed through those mutual processes that re-address the same. For a start, adequate overall transcendental suspensions should be put in place and put play, in such a manner, in such an intensity, that re-addresses the defective nature of that prior history to that extent this is achievable. Obviously, this may not be possible, indeed, usually not possible. However, future situations of oppressive-exploitation could be circumvented by the enacting of such foresight. By adequate is meant enacted to that degree proper (within that relationship), appropriate for (as should be held between that relationship and the wider world to-hand) and valid in that situation to-hand (when judged in a thorough process of re-alignment). By such means coming to the relativity of an ‘end’ that allows us to act properly, appropriately and validly. (22)

	Now, I believe it stands to reason, that the same process of the existentialization of an oppressive situation is the same recipe, in principle, that we need to apply to a situation of alienation be that self-induced and/or introduced by another. (23)

4.    Methods for the Existentialization of the Social Environment

	How does one mutualize a situation of relative alienation (having dismissed situations of absolute alienation)? And, how do we mutualize situations of oppressive-exploitation and its associated alienation (having also dismissed situations of absolute oppression)? I would like to suggest that the same processes of rectification and re-normalization should be in operation. In effect, either type of situation being conducted through processes of re-mutualization of process. Let me examine these two general types of situation in some depth in order to ascertain if I am correct in this regard? (24)

	Is it the case that non-mutual processes of relative alienation and relative oppression both are productive of forms of alienation? If so what mighty that entail? What exactly is the nature of this consequential alienation produced through processes of alienation and/or oppression? In alienation through absence there is a loss of interactive richness. In alienation through oppressive presence there is also a loss of interactive richness by virtue of the diminution of freedom imposed upon that individual or set of individuals. In exploitation a resource is used, exercised and/or consumed, for the benefit other than that resource. Where that resource is human capital and this resource is being exploited there is an imbalanced imbalance in benefit between the exploiter and the exploited. When profit is not equally and equitably returned then there is an imbalance. However, when that imbalance is excessively imbalanced then we can assume a process of blatant exploitation is in operation with a concomitant resultant of alienation by virtue of this process of exploitation to the extent that an individual and/or set of individual is not able to avail themselves of this surplus, and, more importantly, might also have to suffer in the formation of this non-equitably distributed surplus. This could be measured in a complex fashion through noting non-distribution of profit, the degree of servitude imposed, the degree of discomfit inflicted along with the extent of that imposition to the extent the exploited individual and/or set of individuals are not able to follow their own reasonable programs of intentional directedness. Normally, various restrictions versus benefits are negotiated and traded. However, in situations of a non-mutual nature these conditions are imposed and maintained in a no-existential manner and by non-existential means. All that granted we need to investigate whether alienation through absence and alienation through presence (that is oppressive in nature) produce/re-produce a similar type of adverse, non-beneficial type of situation? We have one situation where we might be able to test this thesis, namely, in a form of love that is oppressively exercised and desired, and, then, non-mutually withdrawn at the discomfit of the love-forlorn. Whether such a type of relationship should be described as one in which ‘love’ occurs  is not the point of our examination. In the presence of a desired oppressive form of love the loved-person has a diminution in their degree of freedom. Then, in the loss of that desired form of oppressive love they again experience a loss of freedom in and through their desired to be oppressed in the manner as exercised before. Both situations involve a loss of freedom but from a subjective point of view there is a difference, whereas, from a more objective point of view there may well be little difference perceived although the loss of that oppressive form of love might be seen as an opportunity for the love-oppressed person to free themselves from that form of bondage. Is there a deeper perspective on these non-existential forms of practice be they through commission or through omission? One could argue that a loss of freedom, what ever its situational cause, is a loss of freedom. That a ‘loss of freedom’ implies an inability to do what might need to be done or to exercise what other possibilities might avail themselves. That in essence, our common point of focus is basically centered in these questions of freedom and to what extent such could be exercised. Focused in this manner, alienation, be it through isolation or oppression, is effectively the ramifications endured through a relative loss of freedom that could not be exercised or is just not taken up as an opportunity they could avail themselves of. Heading in this direction we would find alienation could be negatively determined as a loss of possibilities that could profitably exercised either through their absence and/or their non-appropriation. However, frustration of the human will, an intentional directedness to operate in a desired direction, would be inductive of negative symptoms like loss, e.g., and positive symptoms like anger, e.g. All in all, a case could be made that adverse processes imposed and/or self-imposed upon the human psyche would be productive, or should be productive, of a variety of non-existential attitudes and non-existential consequences inductive of a general state of alienation manifested in and through various forms of frustration and the expression or non-expression of the same, etc. This general state of affairs accepted, as a description of alienation in this more broad sense (through isolation from opportunity and oppressive loss of opportunity) then it would follow that various strategies could be adopted and adapted in order to reverse the impact of this condition of alienation. Let me now examine these broad strategies that could be appropriated for this general process of rectification and consequent re-normalization. (25)

	As already suggested, processes of mutualization should be called for. This could be put into effect through an effective reduction in relative power imbalances. Through processes of empowerment wherein disenfranchised individuals or sets of individuals are able to be better represented and/or engaged in process of decision making. Through the adoption by key parties inside or outside that initial relationship, i.e., parties effectively able to influence decision making in that overall relationship, to enter into a process of adequate transcendental reflection wherein they enact process of decisions that act on the behalf of that relationship through this process of transcendental reservation. Then, general processes of mutualization could be entered into wherein processes of decision making are more reflective of overall aspirations, needs, goals, directions, etc. All of this would naturally benefit, normally, from a greater degree of relational transparency, relational regulation (and self-regulation) and a corresponding enforcement of such existential conditions that would ensure a prospering of that relationship in question and a simultaneous prospering of its relationship vis-à-vis all other relationships, especially those relationship relatively closer to the same. (26)

	How are these processes of mutualization, and re-mutualization, to be entered into? As already intimated, in and through and beyond those practices of a transcendental receptivity to the nature of that relationship and its place in its relationship to all other relationships, especially those relatively closer to that relationship in question. What rules and insights could we proffer to that end? (27)

	Let me rephrase this by noting how this triple formula of (greater) transparency, (proper) regulation and (appropriate) enforcement of the same might operate in obtaining this aspiration(al goal)? In a greater degree of transparency we are given a better opportunity to gather all relevant information that might need to be pre-conditionally obtained prior to an overall process of transcendental reflection and transcendental enaction. In this regard ‘relevant information’ is sought in order to essentialize our simulation as a closer approximation to the essential nature of that relationship under examination. By ‘relevant’ is meant ‘essential’ which is meant that whose presence or absence makes a crucial difference to that process of judgment-making. In a conditional state of transcendental reflection the proper degree of regulation needs to be in place. I.e., an adherence to the degree of reflection necessary for the expedition of our overall process of judgment, namely, a proper degree of detail needs to be brought to our simulation/re-simulation in terms of the required degree of spatial, temporal, manner and intensity of detail necessary to effect an existentially oriented process of judgment appropriate and to be appropriated in the light of the enforcement of detail necessary to adequately discharge our duty in this matter of judgment and ensure appropriate post-conditional consequences are observed as in train. Hence processes of rectification ameliorate prior processes and their consequences that are not existentially adequate to the functioning of that relationship in question, and, consequently processes of re-normalization are put in train, i.e., observed as actually taking effect or are set up to take effect. (28)
	
	In a process of greater transparency, actors in a relationship are able to find themselves placed in a better position to operate knowingly, etc., on the behalf of that relationship (in a process of transcendental reservation wherein what is called for is called forth). This is the optimal general pre-conditional condition for transcendental reflection to be productively exercised. In a process of regulation, wherein the relationship self-regulates the propriety of its own operations, be those regulations enforces internally and/or externally, there is a need for their existence in order to operate properly in an act of transcendental judgment through an adequate overall transcendental suspension. This is the optimal general conditional condition for transcendental reflection to be productively exercised. Then, through, post-conditional adaptation of conditional regulations the fine-tuned enforcement of transcendental regulations necessary for an adequate act of transcendental practice is called for and called forth. Through a transcendental examination of existential practice from an existential point of view a more detailed process of rectification can be applied, etc. This is the optimal general post-conditional condition for transcendental reflection to be productively exercised. Hence this formula of transparency, regulation and enforcement; a formula, I might add, that can be fruitfully applied on a political level or any other level of decision making (by virtue of its clarification of detail for the transcendental process of existentially oriented decision making)! Thence a justification of this formula by virtue of this transcendental analysis (of what is entailed for existentially oriented decision making). This same type of practice ensuring existential augmentation and a greater instantiation of authenticity. (29)
5.    Provisional Conclusions

	What should we conclude? Let me list a series of points put forward in this short essay. (30)

	That there can be no absolute isolation from the other for there to be a relationship with the same. Equally, there can be no absolutely oppressive relationship since subjectivity is still demanded in an oppressive relationship with the other. However, even though we can have no absolute forms of isolation and oppression, relative forms do exist and spread their non-existential wake throughout the entirety of the Life-World. (31)

	The consequence of relative relational isolation is a sense of alienation whose profundity will reflect that degree of isolation or absence. Similarly, the consequence of relative relational oppression is a sense of alienation whose profundity will reflect the degree of oppression or presence inflicted in that relationship. Alienation is to be perceived as the commission and/or omission of practices instrumental in the induced formation of non-existential attitudes and non-existential consequences. (32)

	The amelioration of a non-existentially oriented relationship is realized in and through and beyond processes of existential rectification and existential re-normalization. As noted this can be conducted through a removal of the degree of imbalance in imbalanced power relations, processes of indirect empowerment through better forms of representation and/or direct empowerment through participation, a general existentialization of process, etc. As also noted this can be conducted via the formula of greater transparency, proper regulation (through the promotion of better self-regulation of that relationship itself) and a more appropriate sense of supervision in the form of an enforcement of those same forms of existential regulation. (33)

	In all of this, a better, more existential approach to the nature of relational process is being argued for in order to promote processes of existential augmentation and existential authentification. Through an amplification of an existential surplus attendant upon the very process of relationships an enrichment of relational existence is being called for and being called forth! ((34)

	Hence the formation of a richer, more existentially productive sense of the other, a sense of the other that is existentially re-defined through our promoted ongoing existential re-negotiations with the same! Thence the existentialization of the social environment and its promotion of processes of existential augmentation and existential authentification! (35)

						              Noël Tointon, Sydney, 16.7.09.