XXIII: Value-in-Circulation: A ‘Critical’ Overview:
Living through Our Embodiment with the Other – Part V
And, Re-Negotiating Existentially with the Other: Part VI*

0.    Introduction

	We are constituted by an inescapable otherness, and that inseparable otherness is constituted by us! Our relatively mutual and/or relatively non-mutual constitution of the other, of each other, is conducted through negotiation. In such negotiations a certain degree of basic responsibility, however, must be demonstrated to some extent by virtue of the fact that the harmonic resolution of interactive intent must take the other into account to some extent within those negotiation as enacted, being enacted, and/or, about to be enacted. In a relatively authentic orientation responsibility is existentially augmented in our re-alignment with the essential nature of that relationship as it finds itself in its embodied relational-situatedness. Given this understanding, how do we critically assess the existential orientation of this overall sense of responsibility? Is this critical dimension based on absolute principles or relative non-principles, is our judgment to be made on our own subjective grounds, with or without change, or, on the subjective grounds as defined by other, with or without change? In this paper let me examine this critical dimension by adopting a middle path through this plethora of controversial perspectives. As a result let me formulate and examine the thematization of our awareness of a critical dimension that allows us to move through this world with a minimization of obstruction and a maximization of a sense of freedom whilst conducted in the mutuality of a responsible environment! (0)

	In this paper let me explore this dimension of the critical. To some degree the existential dimension or perspective can be also seen as a critical dimension. Mirroring, in parallel, the three moment of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension and the overall transcendental suspension let us add the dimensions of the theoretical, the practical and the critical. In thematizing the phenomenological nature of this existential dimension of the critical (through the co-occurring lenses of the phenomenological and the hermeneutical) let us attempt to understand how we might be able to discern this dimensional-facet and by what processes of judgment responsibility can be accurately assessed and evaluated, and, therein and thereafter, followed up in such a manner so as to ensure a greater degree of responsibility in further process of enaction, etc. To this end, let me discuss the dialectical nature of judgment and thence how an assessment might be made. This will be conducted under the following eight headings, namely, The Overall Nature of Responsibility; Responsibility as a Phenomenon; The Pre-Negotiated Hermeneutic Expectations of Responsibility; The Existential Dimension of Responsible Interaction; Adopting a Middle Path; Being Critical without Being Critical; Responsibility as a Living Project; and, Provisional Conclusions. (1)

*Link to latest version of paper on my Homestead Homepage Site (circulation23.rtf).
www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html

1.    The Overall Nature of Responsibility

	If we are going to link and identify responsibility with the existential then we will need to make the following distinctions. Just as we have discerned a difference between the overall sense of the existential and the non-overall sense of the existential then we should follow suit with its identification with the sense of the responsible, namely, with the distinctions of the overall responsible and the non-overall responsible. Furthermore, just as these distinctions between these senses of the existential can also be conflated in a general sense of the existential so too should we be able to do the same with an overall sense of the responsible when this overriding of distinctions is called for. With this background in mind let us proceed. (2)

	A non-overall sense of the existential/responsible concerns itself with the third dialectical moments of the overall transcendental suspension/overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension. In the former aspect we find an emphasis on the non-textual type of experience realized when we run with a balanced relationship between text and its associated meta-textual/contextual settings. In a hermeneutic setting, this relationship is perceived as taking place between a sense of retrospective analysis and prospective synthesis (of background) in a contemporaneous sense of the historical present. However, in an overall sense of the existential/responsible, a balance of all three moments is perceived as instrumental in the emergent creation of an existential sense of the present, i.e., an ahistorical sense of the spontaneous, eternal moment, a contemporaneous sense of the present wherein value is devolved in a non-circulatory fashion, moment to moment. It is in this setting that these distinctions have been cast and it is into this subtle environment that we need to note which sense is more adequate to the current task to hand. (3)

	To this end the title of this section is somewhat misleading. In a general understanding of responsibility we are not concerned with an overall sense in its technical sense but more with a general sense (through a suitable conflation of the overall and non-overall senses as noted above). (4)

	For the moment let us put aside these subtleties of distinctions and attempt to discern the existential character of responsibility as found within and without a relationship (given this need to also take into account its relational-situatedness) (5)

	Responsibility, in general terms of reference, appears to concern itself with the health or integrity of a relationship and the course of its processes of interaction therein and there between in our emplacement within the world-at-large. By this concept of world-at-large is meant the world as found relevant to its in its emplacement within the Life-World itself. For the sake of an example, we might say a rock finds its relevance in the world as a ‘rock’ and therefore its world is primary material. On the other hand, a sculptor might see what they could do to this piece of rock in turning it into a sculpture. This finished artwork now finds itself inserted into the artworld, a human phenomenon and not merely just as a material phenomenon. If it were to happen that this sculpture got buried and lost it would return to being a piece of rock with the potential of becoming an item in an archaeological, etc. This concept of world-at-large therefore has implied the fact that an object, object-state or objective for intentional focus can have a hierarchy of values being focused upon in our interactions with it within this world-at-large. Responsibility is similarly complex when not isolated to a specific state of affairs as focused upon within its internalized relationship of context. E.g., two lovers have a profound degree of responsibility with respect to each other, but, at the same time, they will also need to note how to resolve competing claims for their attention in the world at large. The very stuff of drama! Usually, such problematic areas of interaction have their potential conflicts pre-resolved for us unless such modes or patterns of resolution are themselves going to cause further problems for our two lovers. Now we get to the very nitty-gritty of dramatic material. How is responsibility going to devolve in such a relationship where the desire of the lovers to be lovers is going to be a cause of conflict within that wider social frame of reference, i.e., the relational-situatedness of that relationship. Just how is responsibility to be defined in this type of situation when conflict might well be irreconcilable. Obviously, a certain responsibility of response will be called for that might well be judged less responsible or more responsible or responsibly neutral from a variety of perspectives upon that particular or specific situation. As a neutral observer how might we judge what course or courses of action or non-action might better or best address that particular or specific situation? Indeed, just how is responsibility to be ascertained? In one word ‘transcendentally’! Although, let it be clear, that by taking a transcendental perspective, this does not imply that an absolute, univocally perfect response can be found in each and every situation, indeed, that even such perfection exists. Let me explain. (6)

	The existential is realized in and through and beyond a creative response to a certain situation wherein value is devolved in and through and beyond an emergent excess or surplus of value. There is no absoluteness here. A differentially greater degree of value is realized in our responses to a certain situation in its relational situatedness. We can be ‘charitable’ here and say that value is always devolved. The more important issue though is how much and how much more by adopting different paths and patterns of response. So, in this light, responsibility can be evaluated relatively. This course of action appears to better resolve that situational-crisis than this other proposed course of action. Or, that might be a controversial issue in itself that may need resolving. Every course of action can be seen to leave a wake, be that considered virtually and/or non-virtually. Put simply like this, the problem is how can these possible courses of action, enacted or non-enacted, be evaluated in terms of their overall responsibility? My response to that question is to claim, predictably, that through an adequate overall transcendental suspense this is type of evaluation is not only possible but something we are doing all the time, and, often, doing well most of the time! Of course the important qualifying word is ‘adequate’. This expression has been defined by myself elsewhere as ‘internally proper, externally appropriate and situationally valid’. Relational-situatedness being taken into account though noting its ‘external appropriateness’ as noted. As also noted, much of our relational complexity is pre-negotiated for us and the problem is most often merely dealing with a conventional type of pre-negotiated simplexity that needs little else in the way of resolution. E.g., in Australia we drive down the left-hand side of the road. To do otherwise is to act irresponsibly, to not act in a responsible manner. However, if a small child were to wander on to the left-hand side of the road and we were not able to brake quickly enough, then to drive on to the other side of the road where there were no approaching traffic and avoid this small child would be to act responsibly! Obviously there can be no hard and fast rules, and, what decisions we might make occur in a dialectical hierarchy of potential precedence/deferral, etc. Our sensitive or insensitive attunement to such demonstrating the degree of responsibility we appear to possess or appear not to possess. This example also opens us on to another approach to this question what is responsibility (and how do we instantiate and evaluate the same?)? Namely, the question of empathy, that a necessary degree of empathy is needed in order to act responsibly both internally, within a relationship, and, externally, in our relational-situated with the world-at-large. To this end let me now examine responsibility through a phenomenological lens. (7)

2.    Responsibility as a Phenomenon 

	As just noted, responsibility is dependent upon a profound, socially developed sense of empathy with others (and, therein, a profound sense of empathy for our own sense of self/selves too?). Without reinforcing such a claim let me look more closely at the formation and consequences of responsibility as a phenomenon. (8)

	A number of concepts/phenomena appear to be associated, rightly or wrongly, with this particular phenomenon-type, such as, e.g., a sense of conscience, a sense of doing one’s duty, acting in good faith, looking out for others (especially those less able), maintaining group solidarity, acting as ‘ambassadors’, being and acting authentically etc. etc. Most of these attributes of behavior can be seen as factors that support the group, the well-being of the group and those entailed within that relationship. More broadly speaking, responsibility could be seen as those factors that support and promote the relationship in question. A complexity of considerations that is essentially simplified through pre-negotiation of genre expectations, etc., and, from an ability to appreciate simplexity through noting those feature more or most relevant to the current situation in question. A complication in the formation of responsibility often arises through a defective appreciation of the relevant relational-situatedness of that relationship under consideration in its relational environment. Again, the same types of considerations need to apply, namely, an appreciation of inter-genre complexity and its relevant pre-negotiations, and, a recognition of the relevant conditions associated with that relational-situatedness in its simplexity in conjunction with all relevant considerations realized internally to that relationship (be they virtually and/or non-virtually obtained and enacted). The question must remain, how is this level of complexity to be intentionally approached? By means of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! Now, here we have a clue, since it is the transcendental nature and orientation of the phenomenon of responsibility per se that we should be directly investigating. (9)

	By virtue of this relational orientation that the phenomenon of responsibility takes on a fundamental transcendental complexion? For us, the phenomenon of judgment is and must be primarily a transcendental aspect of intentionality being an appreciation of conceptual relationships between within or from concepts. Hence this trans-conceptual orientation, i.e., transcendental orientation. In an appreciation of those factors or forces that promote a relationship that we intuit an appreciation of this transcendental presentation of responsibility. However, such processes and conclusions of this type of appreciation are transformed back in a re-conceptualization of that situation-to-hand. How is the transcendental to be approached, and, how are we to return to a responsible re-conceptualization of that situation-to-hand? Through our ‘entry’ into and our ‘exit’ from the overall transcendental suspension (through a suspension of that suspension, etc.)! Nothing mysterious is here being premised! It is something we do every intentionally conscious moment of the day. Metaphorically, to perhaps confuse thing, we should not be of this world nor of that world too, in other words, without having left the immediacy of the here and now of this world we enact a sense of transcendental balance that allows us to make our passage through this world in an existentially oriented attitude that is open to and actively embraces a fully developed sense of responsibility. A profound sense of responsibility attempts to ensure in our being-with-others, and our acting on their behalves and on our own behalves, that there is the maximum necessary resolution of relational tension and conflict in the realization of a harmonious and fruitful promotion of all our relationships! Adopting this as a provisional definition of responsibility let us see to what extent this formula might need to be qualified and adapted? (10)
	
	Let me examine this provisional formula link by link. ‘Profound’ intimates that this phenomenon is transcendentally based, i.e., in trans-conceptual/trans-empirical terms of reference. This aspect of identification is reinforced through the words of ‘resolution’ and ‘harmonious’. ‘Fruitful’ suggests an existential surplus. The expression resolution of relational tension and conflict suggests the implication of a de-ontological dimension, which, in turn, could implicate a relatively and superficially antithetical practical dimension too. Then, where there is one transcendental sense-field then others follow suit if not overtly at least covertly by virtue of the fact that the transcendental dimension has one deep epistemological nature (in and through and beyond the process of conceptual judgment). The ‘fruitful promotion of our relationships’ is also a transcendental orientation since being pro-relational is pro-transcendental. Our formula also notes the need for an integrated sense of responsibility dealing both with the internality of a relationship in question and its externality in and through and beyond it overall sense of its unique relational-situatedness. Argued, also, if more by default, is the observation that responsibility has limits (both in its formation and its subsequent appreciation). We only need to be so responsible in a certain relationship and only so responsible in some other to some other degree of expression. If we are driving carefully down the left side of the road in Australia, in accordance with the road rules, then we are being as responsible as needed. However, if a small child wanders on to the left-hand side of the street and you are unable to stop soon enough it would now be more responsible to drive on to the other side of the street especially if there were no approaching traffic. You have broken one rule to promote another, namely, you should avoid injuring or killing people whilst you drive. Now, it may not be in the rule book for learner drivers, still, it is an unwritten rule of our being-with-others that normally we should go out of way to not injure or kill others and within reason or there abouts, attempt to protect others from being injured or killed (by themselves or others or by accidents in their environment, etc.). Responsibility, therefore, is this tuning into the situation to hand and intuitively working out which rule or set of rules to apply and which rule or set of rules should be discounted. Hence this need to determine courses of action or inaction that promote internal harmony and fruitfulness of a particular relationship-type or specific relationship in question whilst, at the same time, taking into account its relational interaction in its relational environment and therein determining this relative precedence and privileging of its associated relational-situatedness. Being responsible is our taking such issues and aspects into account and assuming responsibility for the consequences of actions both apparently intended and non-apparently unintended. Sharing in the fruitfulness of our responses means taking the good with the bad. Let me now examine this aspect of our accepting responsibilities. (11)

	We could be somewhat perverse here and look into this aspect of our investigations by focusing first on how people appear to avoid their apparent responsibilities. Do we need to accept such? How might people not own the courses of their actions and non-actions when seemingly involved whether they like it or not? No doubt there are many strategies one could adopt here. E.g., deny ownership. It wasn’t me that injured that child on the road. Or, downplay responsibility. They just jumped into the middle of the street at the last moment chasing after their ball. Admittedly, I was using my mobile (as telephone records would demonstrate). The sun was in my eyes. Or, I was distracted by the car following too closely behind me, etc. Sometimes, we can invoke pure accidents of nature (although the risks beforehand are often recognized). So how do we accept responsibility? Through its non-avoidance? Some form of ownership? Or, should we act responsibility during the commission or non-commission of those acts of behaviour in question? In ‘being responsible’ we already ‘accept responsibility’. Otherwise we might need to ‘accept responsibility’ for ‘being non-responsible’, or, worse, in our ‘being irresponsible’. (12)

Now, interestingly, I noted ‘our’ being responsible or otherwise. To what extent might our intuition be valid here that responsibility also has an inter-personal or inter-subjective element or dimension? To what extent is ‘the other’ also culpable for the consequences of ‘our’ acts of commission or omission? If a child happily and thoughtless wanders into the middle of a busy street chasing their wandering ball to what extent are the parents culpable for not better instructing or supervising that child? Indeed, as noted before, an inter-subjective dimension of pre-negotiations also needs to be taken into account and recognized as a necessary pre-requisite for determination of responsibility (and all other forms of judgmental determination since we must start somewhere and that somewhere is the apposite genre or genres of engagement apparently designed for that type of occurrence through a prior determination of what constitutes that very type of occurrence itself as an intentional objective). (13)

	If a child has no meaningful conception of a busy road in terms of their possible injury or death then obviously that child has no meaningful conception of its dangers. For it to survive in the world it will need quickly to learn such meaningful information that will assist their survival in this world at large. This aspect of ‘survival’ and our ‘promotion’ of the relationship in question are key factors in our coming to understand the phenomenological nature of responsibility (as primarily a transcendental phenomenon of judgment). It would appear, therefore, that much of what is needed for our being responsible is already pre-determined for us in the social world at large, and, that much of this is instrumental for our surviving in the world. However, who is to take responsibility for this mass of social norms when situation by situation we need to promote some rulings and at other times, or even in the same moment or period of time, we might need to discount those same rulings? How do we know when to promote or discount which rulings? To this end we need to exercise ‘our being responsible in the world’  and intuitively determine in a responsible fashion a certain course of action through processes of redirection and/or re-direction. Although much is pre-negotiated for us in the final analysis we must own those decisions and be allowed to won those decisions for right or wrong. There are time when being responsible we still take a wrong turning as recognized by ourselves and others in retrospective hindsight. Hopefully, without serious consequences and with an endeepeded insightfulness on our part to not repeat the same mistakes some other time. In all of this we should also be seen to possess the right to responsibly fail. We were trying to be responsible but although conducted in good faith we took a wrong turning…. (14)

	This inter-subjective aspect of our responsible assessment of situations is already embedded in genres of engagement. However, as noted, this complexity needs to made our own through the invocation of apparently apposite rulings along with their promotion and/or discounting. Even, here, this simulated interaction of genres to some considerable extent is pre-negotiated for us. In this light complexity becomes more a matter of simplexity. However, occasions or periods of time might well arise for us wherein such pre-negotiations runs may well be seen to run counter to our desires and to our desires to also be responsible. How such conflict to be resolved if resolution is possible? (15)

	Fortunately, or unfortunately, resolution is always possible but may well not be in a form considered desirable or successful, etc. Our very ability to act or not act in itself reflects a process of resolution (through resolving those issues to hand or deciding not to resolve those issues to hand since all behaviour is realized through such acts of intentional resolution be they resolute or irresolute). Let me now examine more closely this inter-subjective, hermeneutically oriented dimension and how social cues in that same regard are delivered in order to promote or discount such understandings and, in turn, are accepted or rejected. Furthermore let me examine how responsibility is realized even if our appreciation of such ‘responsibility’ may itself be later promoted or discounted ‘rightly’ or ‘wrongly’. In effect how are assessments of responsibility and responsible assessments to be adequately made in either real time or prospectively or retrospectively? (16)

3.    The Pre-Negotiated Hermeneutic Expectations of Responsibility 

	I would like to propose the following as a thought-experiment; a thought-experiment of an intended experiment of an apparent experiment. A number of studies have shown that human beings will often override their own ethical analysis in the light of peer group pressure, other forms of re-framing moral considerations. E.g., we have the archetypal experiment where a scientist is seeking information about how a group of individuals will interact individually in the context of an apparent scientific experiment where in response to certain questions or by some other selective parameter the person in charge is allowed ‘to shock’ another individual when those parameters are not met, often with some form of an escalating voltage. The real experiment, the intended experiment, however, is the extent these individual ‘in charge’ will apparently escalate that voltage under pressure from a scientist in charge of the overall experiment. Thankfully, the person ‘in control’ is not really ‘shocking’ the apparent recipient of such an event; the latter play along as if they were ‘being shocked’. Sad to say in one intended experiment 65% of those ‘in control’ completed the full course of voltage escalations. That means only 35% at some stage opted out of this apparent experiment! Obviously, when you think about it, concentrations camps in their inhumane reality need not suffer a lack of committed staff when their tasks are suitably re-framed (as patriotic duty or the like) and subjected to carefully planned and executed incremental shifting of moral horizons, etc. (17)

	These individuals apparently ‘in control’ who individually administer the shocks thought they were participating in an experiment, i.e., the apparent experiment. However, the real experiment, the intended experiment, was testing to what extent individuals would shock another in the name of science, doing that under the pressure of scientific authority that would sanction such a process. Our thought experiment is to look at how responsibility was assumed, subsumed, perverted… by the different acters and actors in this overall experiment of the apparent experiment and the intended experiment. All parties in this overall experiment are not in an alignment with themselves or how they present themselves with-other before-others. (18)

	Such an experiment was recently presented on television in the context of an examination of human violence. Even though most individuals went to the highest calibrated voltage, say 450 volts, you could see they were having some moral qualms about shocking their subjects. Still 65% would do so. Obviously, they were overriding their own moral objections of what they themselves were doing. This was conducted in the presence of suitably dressed ‘scientist’ who insisted that thy continue to compete the experiment. This insistence was presented itself as a moral imperative. Once started it should be finished in the good name of science, a ‘fact’ insisted upon by the authoritarian figure of the ‘scientist’. No doubt a number of imperatives are mustered here to override the moral objections these ‘controllers’ were obviously experiencing. In this experiment let me attempt to discern how responsibility was being exercised in this overall experiment by all the parties concerned. (19)

	Those apparently ‘in control’ were obviously not fully listening to their moral consciences but they could not be called irresponsible or even non-responsible. Responsibility for them was re-framed as person who were the honorable participants in an important experiment who would do what was asked of them. Equally, they must have discounted their sometimes expressed moral objections to what they were doing and in the end overrode such qualms. The participant who did not complete the course of escalating voltages were still culpable to the extent that they participated in it to begin with, opting out along the way. I am sure no ethics committee would have permitted this type of experiment and one must wonder how many people would not participate in this type of experiment whatsoever. Am I being optimistic here? Hopefully. Now, even the ‘subjects’ and the ‘scientist’ themselves are not above board so to speak. Their apparent presentation is not in alignment with the intended experiment to the extent they must simulate their presentation in alignment with the apparent experiment. Asking people, indeed, inciting people to shock others, whether simulated or non-simulated, must be an immoral action even if its overall intent is for the cause of science (when the experiment itself has already called into question the very fact that such a commitment should be given, certainly not in an unqualified manner). For all parties ‘responsibility’ is re-packaged, re-framed. De-ontological considerations are discounted in the light of pragmatic imperatives. In the light of this brief analysis just what can we learn about how responsibility should be properly exercised? (20)

	Except for sociopaths or psychopaths (and very young children) who have some idea what is socially acceptable and what is socially unacceptable but have no social feelings for the same nor social qualms for doing what society, or moral citizens, might consider to be unacceptable, most people are morally configured to some extent. Most people are morally configured. There is even honour among thieves. Some degree of integrity has to be at least simulated in order to take unscrupulous advantage of others, just as, in comparison, a liar must first learn to tell the truth on a considerable scale in order to alter a few almost insignificant details in hope of putting in play significant beneficial consequences for themselves and/or others. How then is responsibility put in place, put in play? By exercising judgments whose source materials, on one hand, are injunctive (hermeneutically oriented) genres of social engagement, and, on the other, relatively precise (phenomenological) descriptions of the situation to hand wherein such precedents are to act as an informative and controlling commentator. All intended response is generated in an emissive field (often of an obligational character). We drive down the left-hand side of the street in Australia because that is expected of us. Still, we swerve to the other side of the street to avoid a child or small animal or pet because that is also expected of-us by-others, and, equally, of-us by-ourselves. Our conformance to expectations is not an affair merely dictated to-us by-other, or by the ‘look of others’ or the ‘mouth or ear of others’, since these same standards have been thoroughly internalized. Indeed, often they have an de-ontological flavour. A sense that by conforming we are doing our duty be that interpreted in a patriotic sense or a humanitarian sense or a spiritual sense, etc. Sometimes such conformance does not seem to make much pragmatic sense (unless we invest in ulterior motives, utilitarian horizons, etc.). With an apparent inherent conflict between de-ontological framing and pragmatical framing how are we to decide, if we must, between such frames of reference. Indeed, how should we decide to re-frame such considerations and therein and thereafter promote or discount one frame of reference over some other? In the process accepting, whether we like it or not, moral responsibility for our acts of commission and/or omission. Just how can we be responsibly responsible? (21)
	
	Let me rephrase that question: how should we respond in a responsible fashion? By being conversant with the relevant expected genres of social engagement and being conversant with an adequate phenomenological description of the situation to hand in the hermeneutic light of the former along with the exercise of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! By such tripartite reflection framing should not be re-framed if it leads to a diminution of the existential tenor of that situation to hand (be that experienced non-virtually and/or virtually!)! Let me explain in detail. (22)

	One might say that in ‘listening to our consciences’ all voices should be properly heard. If a de-ontological voice is clearly telling us that what we are doing is wrong or very suspect then let us listen to that voice. On the other hand, if a pragmatic voice is telling us that we stand to gain or that gain is be obtained for some other party and that is not in some form of an de-ontological conflict then let us adopt that course of action. When the waters are muddied let us listen to the more insistent voice or voices! Before we frame a course of action, if we have the luxury of time, let us ensure that all processes of re-framing are conducted in and through and beyond the adequate exercise of an overall transcendental suspension! Our intuitions should be a well-respected guide, especially if we must act rapidly if not spontaneously in that regard. By such means we seek an adequate resolution of the problematic nature of that which confronts us. In our thought experiment just how should those parties behave in the light of this insistence upon an adequate overall transcendental suspension? (23)

	I believe that an ethics committee would most likely be happy as to how this overall experiment was configured. There were no people who were really shocked. A fact that causes some relief for those apparently ‘in control’ when told at the end of the experiment. Perhaps, some form of counseling or discussion at the end at this experiment might be called for? 65% of those in control, if not more, might feel they were duped and shown up to be morally defective (when it could be pointed out to them that it is normally the case in this type of ‘experiment’ that most participants oblige by continuing to the end of the apparent experiment, etc.). It could also be used to conduct an analysis of how society, e.g., can manipulate our conformance to standards not otherwise considered acceptable and inauthentically coerce forms of submission and compliance, etc. Perhaps exploring just how we might better deal with these types of situations where there are obvious conflicts between de-ontological considerations and pragmatical considerations, etc. Indeed, in the process, clarifying and re-formulating social genres of engagement that already exist, to some extent, to deal with just these types of problematic or controversial situations. Hence the presence of ethics committees, processes of law reform, ongoing reform of various institutions, positive changes in public attitudes, etc., etc. In truth, nothing is ever absolutely novel, and, we continually re-build on previous patterns of social engagement through their re-adoption and re-adaptation! To this end let us promote those patterns of re-framing, when called for and called forth, that are transcendentally delivered and existentially viable! (24)

	Obviously, our moral passage through this world with-others before-others is a continual work in progress. To an advancement of such an end, that has no end, let us be receptive of how we should responsibly act in a responsible fashion to the best of our ability! First, however, let me ask the simple question “why!” To respond to such a rhetorical point let me outline how existential augmentation as a phenomenon facilitates this passage through the world with-others before-others. (25)

4.    The Existential Dimension of Responsible Interaction 

	Why should we be moral? Why should we be ethical when others will take advantage of us through such conformity? Because we live in the world with-others before-others and our relationships generally benefit through such interaction on balance. Indeed, let us realize that we could not live without others. The dream that we could live on a desert island or in a cave on the top of a mountain is just that – a dream. It is not one that could apply to every individual person on this planet! Our clothes are made for us, the food is grown for us, our utensils are made for us, etc. Our very existence in this world is facilitated by others from birth to death… and afterwards (through burial I some form or other, through the reading of wills, etc)! Only through a facilitation of this facilitation, with or without our input, is this fact of our existence to be advanced! In truth, our relationships only promote us when there is a promotion of those relationships. Hence this concept of existential augmentation. Through an increasing density and intensity of interconnectedness is there an augmentation of our very existences in this world-with-others! Hence this phenomenon of the existential (as an aspect of transcendental experience in general). (26)
	Existential augmentation ensures an existential surplus of value that spontaneously overflows in a non-circulated fashion equally into every point in a relationship in such a manner that it cannot be reductively referred back to its mere basis in the world. That value is then re-invested back into the non-transcendentally oriented basis of that relationship whilst maintaining this non-reductive semblance of a relational difference in the world at large. The facticity of a relationship being this non-reductive footprint of the relationship in the world, i.e., its non-reductive semblance of presence in the world. A broom may be a handle and its head but the presence of that broom is the difference made through its integrated use. Try sweeping a large yard full of Autumn leaves with a toothbrush or the mere head of a dismantled broom. Can you not feel that difference? Materially-wise, neither an intact broom nor a dismantled broom either adds or subtracts from the net material of the world, but, the former contributes an existential sense of presence that cannot be reduced merely to its material basis! This differential aspect is its relational difference! Furthermore, dependent upon the relationship’s associated epistemological degree of organization that impact will manifest itself in accordance with such a basis. So, e.g., we can talk to brooms but only people will talk back to us! That differential difference demonstrates this expressed difference in the nature of the relationship we enter into in this world. So, e.g., we sweep with brooms but can talk to sweepers. (27)

	Need I state the obvious. Although all relationships have their natural limitations, still, inter-personal relationships are productive of a type of value that cannot be directly acquired from non-personal relationships! The very experiential richness of our world is promoted through inter-personal relationships and what existentially advances the same usually advances our experience of value. As an individual in the world we are immersed in a complex sea of value through our relationships therein. That the promotion of that richness of interaction normally promotes the richness of our experience of being a person in and though and beyond our being in the world. Such promotion is conducted existentially, hence this concept of ‘existential augmentation’. Let me explain this transcendental phenomenon (or, rather, this aspect of ‘our’ transcendental-phenomenology). (28)

	In our transcendental appreciation of the world we enter into a series of judgments whose value, in turn, is appreciated in a series of transcendental acts of evaluation. This transcendental ‘edge’ to our being is the result of our ability to appreciate the ‘value of the world’ as a ‘world of value’, and v.v. By such means we can form a series of informed intentional responses and, therein and thereby, hopefully, through the expression of such intent, fruitfully live our lives with-others before-others. We do not live our lives merely with others. We also stand before them. Before their look, their mouths and ears, their very being in the world-with-us. All intentional responses are emitted in and through and beyond an emissive field that ascribes a value to such intentional acts be they actually emitted or merely simulated to oneself. The formation, expression and overall experience of value is as a transcendental phenomenon. Because it is only through the resolution of judgment, rightly or wrongly, appropriately or inappropriately, correctly or incorrectly, that value as value per se is to be emitted through our intentional responses. Value is ascribed in this process of judgmental determination as an existential excess as found and realized in that act or series of acts of judgment. Judgments are trans-empirical, trans-perceptual, trans-conceptual in epistemological orientation. Basically, a judgment is made between, within or from an integrated series of relevant concepts and, therefore, by its very nature cannot primarily be empirical or perceptual or conceptual. Similarly, it cannot be a simple feeling, a complex emotion or subjective mood. Because the raw ingredients of judgment are concepts, because of their dialectical ability to act as both integrated resultants or an assembly of pre-integrated components (and this establishes the simplexity of complex concepts) then the results of such conceptual interactions must be the simulation of trans-conceptual, namely, acts of judgments. Thence the transcendental nature of this aspect of experiential phenomena. Hence the transcendental implication of this aspect in determinations of responsibility, an appreciation of an existential excess of value which flows over into our very experience of value itself by virtue of the non-reductive nature of this aspect of transcendental experience. (29)

However, we also need to account for the fact that this overflow of value flows over and back into this world where we stand with-others before-others. Such value is returned to the world and it is tide of value-formation that we experience the non-circulatory nature of value-formation despite the pre-transcendental necessity for their to be an economy of ‘value’ in the first place. We could put it like this. Money can change hands, literally or by proxy, yet that money has no value in and of itself. We would be very short-sighted if we were to believe that the mere accumulation of such funds was the point of this exercise. Even a hoarder of cash who puts their notes and coins in the mattress, or the walls or ceiling of their house, or even in the bank itself, is or should be aware of the fact that the reason why they have accumulated such funds is in the possibility of returning it back to the financial economy and, thereby and therein, obtaining certain services and/or products as desired that makes money so desirable in the first place. Of course collectors might admire gold coins, prized bank-notes, rare stamps and the like, exquisite works of art, in the final analysis such possession are also symbolic of what they could be traded for. The real value of such ‘currency’ is when it is put back into circulation, although, admittedly, the process of collection can become an end in itself (through the adamant refusal to return such items back to a state of circulation or where we might also find that such items are no longer desired either as collectibles or as perceived forms of currency, i.e., with the perceived ascription of some vestigial form of economic value). Without a doubt we have a paradox here, namely, that value is emitted in a non-circulated form that only finds its currency when returned to circulation?! This entangled conceptual state of affairs can be defused by noting that value is correctly emitted from an economy in and through and beyond its transcendental treatment. Then, such value becomes currency when this excess is returned to the economy from whence it was derived. Over-flowing as transcendental value and becoming currency when that overflow is received and treated non-transcendentally. Quite simple, really! Let me now concentrate our examination of the existential formation of value as a ‘transcendental experience of phenomena’ and as a ‘phenomenon of transcendental experience’. (30)

	The appreciation of phenomena is a transcendental experience by virtue of the fact that such appreciation is elevated by one degree in meta-status, i.e., in order to appreciate something we must metaphorical stand back from the same and this standing back is essentially trans-conceptual, etc. This is the nature of transcendental experience, i.e., that it is trans-conceptual, trans-perceptual, trans-empirical, i.e., is trans-phenomenal in orientation. ‘Orientation’ by virtue of the fact that we cannot be completely removed from that under appreciation. How is the trans-phenomenal approached, i.e., how is the transcendental dimension or perspective approached and entered? In and through the overall transcendental suspension (as examined elsewhere by myself)! Basically, by presenting what is to be appreciated in a format for appreciation. However, an adequate overall transcendental suspension necessitates the proper ongoing balance between phenomenological-descriptions, hermeneutical-prescriptions and the existential sense of the dynamically balanced interaction between the former. Phenomenological descriptions are written in terms of the apparently apposite genres of engagement along with their pre-negotiated conventions both for dealing with such genres per se but also with genres that deal with their interaction between different genres. As what is selected is written/modified through re-writing in intentional terms of the apparent intent being intended, i.e., in the light current motivation, it follows that what we focus in upon is in that light of current relevancy. Furthermore, through a psychic integration of intent (through the relative, non-absolute transcendental unity of consciousness) it also follows that through processes of ongoing resolution that such complexity is rendered more as a matter of relevant simplexity. Then, as much of the pre-existing negotiation within and between genres is already pre-negotiated it naturally follows that this simplexity, normally, is relatively non-controversial. That controversial material can only arise on the periphery of our pre-negotiated horizons. However, be that as said, some issues can still remain quite controversial because of the current flux in those ongoing negotiations. In a rapidly changing political and/or cultural sphere considerable room needs to be additionally found in order to deal with relatively novel situations, changing practices, shifts in ethos, etc. In the advent of a Contemporary era, i.e., a Post-Postmodern era, certain established lines of negotiation can become disestablished through processes of re-entered and re-engaged negotiations. With the radical re-writing of certain social premises and attitudes, chaotic moments of re-direction can become more prominent. But, for all that, processes of a more radical nature must still work with those material precedents already to hand, which, through processes of adoption and re-adaptation, effectively become re-negotiated even though core propositions will remain relatively invariant, albeit re-interpreted in the overall light of a shifting sense of ethos, aesthetic re-directions, cultural-translocations, etc. (31)

	Into this mix of relative discontinuity and dislocation, the co-occurrence of core-invariance, chaotic processes of re-direction, the re-affirmation or dis-conformance with precedence… where and how is this sense of the existential to found, and, how is such a factor to be promoted, and, how should such promotion (or demotion of re-evaluated precedents) to be appreciated? Or, even more bluntly, why should we bother (to engage with a process of existential augmentation)? (32)

	Value is realized in and through and beyond the lived matrix of our interrelationships. Augmenting their richness augments the value of our existence. Thence the importance of processes of existential augmentation! Value is realized through our relationships, and, the quality of that value is in a direct relation to the quality of those relationships as lived. Now, as previously noted (more in passing) that value is realized spontaneously in a non-circulatory manner, equally, at each and every point in that relationship, but, is enjoyed (and suffered) only when it is returned (to some form of) circulation. Of course, such considerations are not necessarily financial. Indeed, most forms of circulation are not financially oriented. Collectors of fine art, e.g., can mutually enjoy the artworks of their art-collecting friends, especially, and even more so, if those collector friends were to share in a similar passion or a similar set of passions. I am sure that mere interest and approval in such circles is a form of circulation in its own right. The point being made here, almost as a digression, is suggestive of the fact that circulation need not concern itself merely with material tokens but could well be taking place in processes of exchange of a more psychic or intentional orientation. (33)

	In the light of the above, how is the existential overflowing of value to be recognized and returned to its economy of issue or some other economy? By means of adequate overall transcendental suspensions! Thence its recognition. By the adequate suspension of such suspensions! Thence its return to an economy of value! And how are adequate overall transcendental suspensions to be formed, and, then, suspended in turn? Through the adoption and adaptation of a middle path. Let me explain. (34)

5.    Adopting a Middle Path

	An overall transcendental suspension is primarily a dynamic balance between all epistemological factors that influence an act of judgment. Moreover, the suspension itself, too, is subject to this state of balance through a suspension of the same, etc. Technically, we could list these factors under various headings, and, in practice, attempt to ensure this complex dynamic balance is put in place. Critical appreciation ensuring that all the relevant boxes have been ticked. Furthermore, because of the harmonic nature of this process (as reflected in the parallel heuristic devices of the hermeneutical circle of comprehension/overall transcendental suspension) we should also realize that there is intentionally emitted and appreciated a productive, non-reductive aspect of an overall existential excess of value. Non-technically, we could trace the same path, more or less, by adopting a middle path between all implicated extremes, i.e., between all forms of nomination, and all types of processes conducted therein and thereupon. A middle path in this regard mirroring the proposal of all imputations whether perceived, treated or appreciated as virtually oriented or non-virtually oriented. In Hussurlian-like language all this can conducted through brackets in a process of bracketing; global suspensions through a suspension of the thesis of the world being real; treating all phenomena as like an illusion (but not identical to a mere illusion), etc. In essence, treating all phenomenological presentations as mere form and mere form only. Let me illustrate how we might take this shortcut in the form of an adoption of the middle path in this regard. (35)

	Imagine the following situation. A mother is reading her book while her small child is wandering very close to the water’s edge of a very swift river. You take the child’s hand and call out to the mother. She rushes over very thankful that her child is safe. She says how grateful she is and how she had though her child was asleep beside her but must have woken and wandered off. How do we adopt a middle path here. You see the child (and don’t question this fact). Are they or are they not too close to the water’s edge? This dis-conjunctive suspension is suspended in the affirmative. Is this or is this not a dangerous spot for a child to be. Again, you find the affirmative. Should I or should I not stop this child from falling in. An affirmation is felt to be obvious and you act accordingly, in an alignment with this appreciation of danger for the child. You see the mother, assume that this is the child’s mother and ask yourself should I call out to her or not and you find yourself shouting to the ‘mother’. You say something to the child in a friendly manner and wait for the mother to retrieve her charge. You have conducted a series of suspensions by the means of a middle path and you found all your instincts and patterns of upbringing coming together in an affirmation of that path you adopted and adapted. How is it the case that from an effective suspension (be it of a rhetorical dis-conjunctive form of the either/or of the question, or, a metaphorical conjunctive form of like-and-not-like, etc.) you easily came to an intentional course of action as demonstrated in your empathetic responses to that child in immanent danger? In asking ‘is that child in immanent danger from falling into that swift river’ you might more likely find more weight on the side of an affirmation and duly act in accordance when the suspension was suspended and that weighting was reveal in and through and beyond that intentional affirmation. In this near spontaneous appreciation of the situation to hand you acted in a responsible fashion by intentionally aligning yourself in the light of that appreciation and coursing accordingly. In all of this a middle path is not sitting on the fence but allowing the apparent weight of evidence to be tested by a consideration of its opposite, etc., and trough this process find a degree of resolution that reflects your consequent re-alignment in that regard. Of course you might have come to an opposite conclusion and realized the child was old enough not to fall in but still kept a good eye on its welfare. Perhaps you might say “hello” to the mother and by such skilful means distract her from her book to allow her to re-assess the situation for herself? In this scenario you might find some small degree of satisfaction by hearing the mother tell the child to not go so near to the water’s edge. To some extent we might say that in the very testing and questioning of our interpreted premises is to adopt an immediate middle path and that our responses to the weight of apparent evidence allows us to adapt our responses therein in the light of such reasonable evidence, on balance, tested through weighing possible alternatives at the same time, or, at least considering their mere possibility, etc. All too often those of a dogmatic nature refuse to confront alternatives that might at the very least let them test their dogmatic positions and assertions issued therein? (36)

	A valid appreciation of alignment can only be realized through a reasonable process of re-alignment since we can never critically assess a situation without some form of re-alignment in the process. Exercise of the overall transcendental suspension at least allows us to examine other possibilities. Even if we are certain that we are correct it does not hurt to enter into this overall transcendental suspension since if such understanding is correct we will find it affirmed through re-affirmation, perhaps, in the process finding some small degree of re-alignment wherein a certain nuance is returned to the topic or aspect in question. Or, we could say that only through the apparent neutrality of the overall transcendental suspension that re-alignment is realized that allows us to make an affirmed affirmation (by realizing that the re-alignment re-realized is the same as that originally affirmed, hence affirming an affirmation and allowing us to invoke a concept of critical appreciation). Through this dialectic between the ‘critical treatment’ of that under examination and the ‘critical appreciation of the same’ a process of incremental re-alignment can be entered into that progressively sees us moving in touch with reality-as-it-is (to that extent we can reasonably and effectively simulate/re-simulate the same). (37)

	
6.    Being Critical without Being Critical 

	Operating via a middle path also has the advantage of avoiding and/or diffusing an over-commitment psychosis be that either epistemological and/or ontological in orientation. Such a psychotic or psychotic-like condition has been discussed elsewhere and termed a pseudo-psychosis since it does not overtly fall under the heading of organic, affective, cognitive and/or judgmental (in overall orientation). Covertly, it is my intuition that all psychotic conditions are the result of organic malfunctions be they physiological and/or structural-functional in orientation. Be that as it may, let me define a pseudo-psychosis of over-commitment (or under-commitment?) as a condition overtly realized through the lack of an overall transcendental suspension and perhaps, covertly realized through some form of an organic and/or structural-functional malfunctioning from simple or complex causes (be that brain damage, chemical poisoning, blood-poisoning through infections, other complication from infections, enzymes inactivity/over-activity – blocking/non-blocking of enzymic activity (that may or may not be the resultant of genetic or epigenetic defects), defective conditioning (with or without changes in brain function/organization), short-term/long-term traumatic-stress complications, displacements in affective/cognitive/judgmental structural-functions, etc. Or, from over-motivated (under-motivated?) cognitive processes? The latter might be able to ‘induced’ through excessive emotions like hate, fear, thwarted over-affection, extreme sadness or depression, etc. However, rather than focus on a possible cause or a set of possible causes let me merely describe this extreme state of affairs wherein over-commitment can induce pseudo-psychotic like phenomena (authored or co-authored in orientation). E.g., if one found oneself being over-motivated to hate someone or a certain institution or political party or members of a certain race or religion, then the repetition of such an over-affirmed position (of hostility) could well warp the appreciation of that person or set of persons to such an extent that no mater what that hated party does or does not do they will be continually mis-read. Such mis-reading and their inability to re-align such mis-readings may well be held to such an extent that a psychotic-like variance with reality results with attendant dysfunctional consequences in interaction or non-interaction with the same by that pseudo-psychotic individual or set of similarly oriented individuals. Hence hate-crimes or mob-violence, etc., etc. Now the important point I would like to make here is this, namely, an inability to re-align our positions would be instrumental in this formation of this type of psychotic or psychotic-like condition. However, the re-institution of a transcendental suspension might well be able to diffuse the same if it could be incrementally put in place and in play. Hence the potentially therapeutic-like consequences of the adoption and adaptation of a middle path. Such an approach putting in practice one way of instantiating an adequate suspension in this regard. That, generally, a process of re-alignment must continually be put into practice for us to maintain a reasonable and fully insightful interaction with others, with our own senses of self, with reality itself. Indeed, by being able to entertain the opposite of our views or other possible points of view helps us to progressive re-align our own interactions with others and by such means open ourselves to the richness of reality that forever defies the concrete inflexibility (in a mirroring of reality) as expressed through an analytic a priori like attitude be that psychotic or non-psychotic in nature or orientation. Hence, by such means, as the middle path and its inherent overall transcendental suspension, we remain open to the overall richness of reality that is very phenomenal-phenomenological nature of reality (in a greater fullness or richness of that reality as found there-for-us). (38)

	In the exercise of a middle path we adopt a critical sense of positioning that is not critical or overcritical (or under-critical) of that under examination. In being critical (in a denotative sense) without being too critical (in an connotative sense) we open ourselves to the subtlety of reality and by such attunement make progress in our engagement with that reality-to-hand through such receptive processes of re-alignment be that incrementally redirected or radically re-directed in nature. Without such attunement, such neutrality, there can be no real shift or shifting position or re-positioning. Without such flexibility we cannot be flexible in our responses in this less-engaged sense of engagement. Indeed, by an over-commitment to a certain position (or under-commitment to any position?) we rob ourselves of an insightful-authenticity wherein we overcome the dichotomy between the ontological and the epistemological which on a functional level is instrumental in the very formation of a psychotic or psychotic-like position and its defective sense of positioning. I believe x is y when x is not y demonstrates, or should demonstrate, a dysfunction in our thinking between the reality of what is or is not and how we are removed from knowing what is or what is not. Now, if the over-emphasis is on the intentional object, state or objective our psychotic or pseudo-psychotic condition is more an ontological psychosis. On the other hand, if the over-emphasis is on a belief-state this distortion is more epistemologically oriented (in its construction or de-construction), then, as a consequence, that condition takes on a more epistemological flavour. E.g., some one might say they know they were a divine being because they have a rash or mole on their shoulders where their angelic wings are attached/were attached or are going to be attached. Then they might elicit other forms of ‘evidence’ of such a similarly directed nature as to reinforce this belief. Or, someone might think the same about someone else along the same sort of lines (that they are a divine being for whatever ‘reason’). Hence this epistemological orientation (being more a matter of interpretation). On the other hand, in contrast, if some one were to individually or collectively mistreat a certain member or members of a particular religion or denomination or race, etc., as being aligned with a certain stereotype, then such willful and incorrect attitudes might well be described as ontologically non-coincidental with reality as more generally appreciated. Hence this incorrectly aligned ontological orientation. As noted it would be my belief that the incremental reuptake of a middle path could well be instrumental in a progressive realignment with the reality of that situation. By being able to merely entertain possibilities that might not be palatable and/or in temporarily giving up one’s own position we should find ourselves being opened up to a subtlety of possibilities of engagement that could not otherwise be recognized nor encountered. Hence this tolerant aspect of the middle path that is instrumental in processes of progressively re-attuned re-alignment along with the fruitful consequences of such at-onement with the reality of our reality as currently being engaged (both quantitatively and qualitatively in our engaged openness to a greater richness of density and intensity of modal interaction)! (39)

	The critical consequences of an adequately re-aligned project of engagement will no doubt speak for themselves! The survival and enrichment of the life-process is the result of progressive processes of such re-alignment. Hence this attunement between responses and responsibility and their mutual entwining in an overall field of responsibility. Let me now look at responsibility as a living project, a project for living-with-others, as a project for the enhancement of the life of ourselves with-others before-others. (40)

7.    Responsibility as a Living Project

	Why be responsible? Because most of the time we must be. For society to function a level of trust and caring for others, etc., is absolutely necessary. Into this necessary mix non-responsible behaviour can then be entered into. Without a functioning society nobody could be irresponsible since this integrated-social relational background is necessary as the ground for relatively responsible and relatively non-responsible behaviour. To steal ‘money’ it must be recognized by others as ‘money’ and as something that could be ‘stolen’, and, as something that ‘should not be stolen’. An economy must be present for stealing to take place. Similarly, an economy of responsibility must be present before acts of non-responsibility or irresponsibility can occur within the same. What exactly is this economic-like dimension in our interactions with others in this sense of society? (41)

	I would like to argue that a social surplus of value through ongoing re-constitution in circulation perpetuates a sense of society and culture, the semblance of a life-world (be that defined through some sort of enclosed activity, say chess, or, left open in a general sense, etc.). Imagine a world with two people x and y who own respectively a and b and who are able to performs certain services p and q respectively. Now, in this world let us say that x desires a and/or service q, and, fortunately, y desires b and service r. In a meeting and resolution of competing desires for objects and/or services x could arrange for object b by either swapping object a or performing a service q. Fortunately, the opposite holds for y, namely their double desire for object a and service p. So, let us say, that in this situation x receives b and also performs service p whilst y receives a and performs service r. In this economic framework we still have x and y, a and b, and the services p and r that have been performed or can be offered. The economy is both this framework and the fact that circulation has or is taking place. Items a and b have been traded, services p and r have been performed or could be performed. We could say that the greatest potential richness of this economy is the number of individual transactions divided by the number of individual participants. In this instance a full cycle of this economy would constitute four points divided by two (participants) giving a richness of two units. We might say that a resolution of economic desire is met when all relevant and accessible economic desires are resolved. Essentially, actual economic richness (of interaction) is indicated by actual transactions entered into divided by the number of (active) participants. So, if x and y merely swap a and b then economic richness is 2 divided by 2 (being the number of participants) giving us an actual economic richness of 1 unit. The relative richness of the actual exercise of that economy is equivalent, simplistically, to potential richness divided by actual richness, being now 2 units divided by two participants and, therefore, equals 1 unit. As a proportion that is 50% of full economic potential (being 2 units/person). How otherwise might we to treat this economic creation of value, treat this value-in-circulation? (42)

	We could safely postulate a certain surplus, given that we have a functioning society (between two individual) hence our focus on that value realized in circulation. In this we could count the number of actual transactions in a certain period, evaluate to what degree the economy is actually functioning, calculate the density of transactions per individual participant. Or, we could differentiate the velocity of turnover, or, integrate its overall performance (by measuring its overall degree of integrity, etc.). What is at stake here is to realize the degree a society seems to function above and beyond the mere summation of its non-integrated factors like object units, performance units, and the number of participants, etc. At the end of the day our simple economy is apparently left with the same participants, same object and same services that could be rendered. However, objects have been swapped and services rendered and this goes to show that possible richness may or may not change, actual change is indicative of this economic circulation of value predicated in the existence of that set of relationships constituting that relational economy (as described and/or prescribed). Moreover, this economic activity needs to be ongoing along with a persistence, if not amplification, of economic potential (since an overall increase in economic activity would compensate for a relative loss of economic re-iteration in other sectors). (43)

	Such economic modeling, as here attempted, is very crude. It is meant more as an analogy in order to understand this richness of economic interaction that constitutes an inter-personal relationship, community, a society, a culture, a particular life-world or a general, intercultural sense of world, etc. In these various economic realms of value-in-circulation a certain density of interaction can be quantified and qualified in terms of the density of modes in operation and their respective intensities of being operated. Now, we need to ask ourselves, that if the value in circulation is the excess of value realized in an economy over and above its mere inputs (density-wise and/or intensity-wise) to what extent this relational difference can be adequately appreciated? Furthermore, to what extent is there a relational difference between that relational difference internal to the relationship in question and its relational difference from its specifically located external relational-situatedness? National economies need to address this meta-differential when dealing with the value of their currency adjusted for inflation over time, fluctuations in exchange rates and other forms of differential pressure (such as the general perceived intent of other economic participants that form e.g., both bubble economies and their pricking and deflating). In elections an open system of bets can often predict the outcome of an immanent political contest, however, in ongoing ‘guessing’ the direction of other participants ‘herding instincts’ can and do warp realistic estimates of real economic value (in moments of time rather than averaged out over time). Having merely introduced this problem of meta-differential tension in the overall value-in-circulation between internal and external aspects of a total economic world, centered in our examination of an internal economy, we should ask to what extent do we need to address such an issue in our examination of the circulation of excess value? In our prior considerations of responsibility it was noted that authenticity of response, i.e., being responsible, would need us to be cognizant of such a tension. The wider picture needs to be noted when relevant. Today these sorts of question are being asked in the context of the environmental debate over global warming. Should Australia be selling coal to be burnt in power-stations in Australia and overseas when it should be investing more in renewable energy both here and overseas? Perhaps investing in nuclear power or in more advanced form of nuclear power creation might also be called for? Regardless of how one reads this type of issue, the type of point being made here is this, namely, that ethical considerations, e.g., indeed, all forms of consideration, need to be conducted in the widest relevant terms of reference possible and not restricted purely to internal considerations. That point should not be controversial! The controversial aspects of our considerations arise when we question to what extent we should go beyond mere internal considerations or even that we should go beyond the same. However, as a general position, considerations should never be merely internal in orientation if they could have an effect on their environmental ecology. Often, however, such consideration need not progress beyond internal boundaries although, in principle, we should be aware of possible consequences (adverse, neutral and/or positively non-adverse) that might stem from such external considerations. As noted before, evaluation of responsibility should not be left as a mere internal matter when responses are emitted in a field of responsibility that often extends beyond the internal boundaries of that relationship or relationships in question. (44)

	Let me now return to the issue of responsibility and its contribution to the enrichment of relationships and the world of relationships and thence to the Life-World itself (as the transcendental basis for all forms of life). (45)

	If, in being truly responsible, we have to understand the internal dynamics of a relationship in which we are an active participant, and have to understand the relationship that relationship has to the world-at-large along with the consequences of our actions and non-actions in the internality of that primary relationship in question along with the differential differences incurred through such acts of commission or omission then how are to be able to even start to be responsible? Thankfully, under most circumstances, without too much difficulty… by virtue of the fact that most of what we have to commit ourselves to do or not to do is already pre-negotiated for us. Indeed, these pre-existent genres of engagement have already basically navigated the territory for us and all we need to do is find ourselves acceptably choosing the corresponding genres of engagement, adopting such guidance and adapting such modes of engagement to the relational tasks-to-hand. Even our navigation around these different genres is also pre-negotiated for us. You drive in Australia down the left-hand side of the road. But in avoiding an animal or person on the road if you can safely go round them you are allowed to go on to the other side of the road. Or, if we are not too concrete in our thinking if confronted by a door that says it should be kept shut or locked at all times and we have ‘permission’ to go through it we unlock it and go through it shutting it after ourselves and seeing to it that it is locked again if need be. One set of rules can be overruled by another set of rules when these forms of arbitration are laid out for us either explicitly or implicitly. Normally, we do not like to run over animals and persons on the road when we drive. So, there is an imperative to avoid doing that. Or, doors are meant to be used as doors at some time or other. A door forever locked in reality ceases to be a door. If it were the case that humans only operated on strict logical principles then how could they go through doors that said at no time they should unlock and open that door? Or, in driving, they only drove on the left-hand side. How could they make a turn in the middle of a very long road with no cross-roads, or, for that matter, how could they turn right at an intersection and therein cross over the right hand side of the road. No doubt a conditional logic could be constructed in which absolute proscriptions could be overruled in certain types of situation by certain noted qualifications. Basically, this cultural pre-negotiation of our genres and inter-genre-interaction gives us the cultural formation of a complex conditional logic often with various modalities of response all of which needs to be adopted and adapted to the current situations-to-hand. Put another way, we might say that our cultural world/s is/are economically pre-constructed in order to expedite the facilitation of a set of desired experiences intentionally formed (in a first sense of the ‘intentional’) and which could be labeled under the rubric of intent (in a second sense of the ‘intentional’) all of which could be subsumed under intentional motivation. In effect, a cultural world defines, facilitates and directs patterns of behaviour generally construed as supportive of that cultural world. Supportive in the sense of founding and re-founding that cultural world, and, enhancing the richness of value created therein. The products thematized in this phenomenon of value-formation being non-circulatory in origination and arising at each and every point in that relational field equally, but, however, being perceived and thematized as an excess over-background inputs that can then be economically directed and/or redirected and/or re-directed to some extent in a manner as directed or redirected or re-directed by that mix of genres adopted and adapted therein. As noted, such behaviour is predefined in the light of the simple or complex modal expectations brought to bear in that regard. Even the blatant disregard of such proscriptions will be defined as contra those patterns of behaviour where and when some degree of conformity is expected. Or, as the case maybe, not in conformity with such expectations. On a long straight desert road it may well be easier to drive down the middle of the road for miles until such a time oncoming traffic is seen upfront or you notice someone who wants to overtake you from behind. It is the nature of the human condition, thankfully, that we are not predictably-predictable but unpredictably-predictable or predictably-unpredictable, but, never, unpredictably-unpredictable. This non-extreme relational difference is realized through some form of a middle path where we adjudicate conflicting desires and imperatives, conflicting commands and habits and normally follow well-worn paths to the realization of our culturally formed desires and ambitions, aspirations and practices entered into for their possible attainment. This milieu we operate within is the ‘cultural’ world we have found ourselves at home in to some extent or other. Looked at more closely it is a swirling sea of hierarchical sets of rules whose qualified navigation is generally prescribed for us. Such complexity is usually integrated for us through the thematization of a sense of purpose hence the apparent simplexity of goal-directed behaviour. Even controversial situations are never removed from this matrix of genre-directed expectations and goal-directed activity since their controversial nature is defined through a clash of genres! However, processes of resolution either accede to a dominant genre or re-write less dominant genre or genres to override former prohibitions. Or, periods of postponement are entered into where decisions in these controversial fields are either delayed or deferred, abandoned or ignored insightfully or non-insightfully (the latter being perhaps the thematization of processes of insight being psychotically subverted?). (46)

	Alignment and re-alignment implicate some sense of reality, knowing what is real, evaluating such alignment, invoking an ability for truth-determination, and, an ability to critically re-appreciate the critical. Judgment, all forms of appreciation, necessitate the utilization of a suspension. An adequate overall transcendental suspension overseeing to that extent possible that we can determine the apparent end result of a process of re-alignment. In effect, truth is one of the values produced in an existential excess produced and reproduced in and through and beyond the environmental economy of that relationship in question. Or, perhaps more correctly, we can view it as but one aspect of an economic surplus where other values or valued-aspects are generally co-produced as the value-in-circulation associated in that situated relationship. Such value-aspects being a mix of essential forms of assessment; an ability to examine degrees of coherence; an intuitive appreciation of deontological questions of duty, respect, honour, empathy, etc; pragmatic considerations as arise in perceived fields of practice; a facility to envisage possibility along with a refinement of the same in a capacity to determine factual histories, etc. In essence, a capacity to make ordered determinations and therein and thereby produce and reproduce a critical appreciation of that relationship under review both per se or internally and in its relational-situatedness. In my next paper let me look more closely at this thematization of truth determination as a value expressed in and through and beyond processes of existential augmentation wherein truth is one aspect of value circulated as an existential excess despite its origins in a non-circulatory form or a denial of its ‘economic’ basis. In our looking more closely at such issues attempting to understand the very dynamics of the life-process itself and coming to see it as a cultural project being conducted with-others before-others and being redirected and/or re-directed in accordance with its existential complexion along with its chaotic re-thematization. (47)

8.    Provisional Conclusions.

	To briefly conclude this essay let me focus on a critical overview of the nature of responsibility as an illustration of our living through our relational embodiment with others and how, in this matrix of response, we existentially set about to re-negotiate our path or paths through this World-of-Life with-other before-others. (48)

	In our ‘thought experiment of an intended experiment of an apparent experiment’ I noted that everyone acted with some form of responsibility however that sense of responsibility got re-framed. It wasn’t that people were not being responsible so much as how they exercised their re-framed vision of what it could mean to be responsible. Basically, to get to the central issue of this examination, we need to ask why is it that some people ignored a de-ontological sense of responsibility that just demanded that ‘shocking people was just not right’. Of course such considerations are incremental in scope and people might well make reservations about doing or no doing so at various voltages considered acceptable or not considered as not so unacceptable, etc. Holding an electrode with a voltage that is so weak we could not feel the current in any way would not be seen as unacceptable. Under the sway of the mystique, authority and power of science some ‘experimenters’ felt themselves beholden to completing the imperative of the experiment. However, one third revised their opinion in that regard and either refused to conduct this ‘experiment’ or opted out during the apparent course of its escalation of the voltage. A number of those who continued to the very end of the ‘experiment’ discovered they had not shocked another human being at first visibly showed sighs and other signs of relief at not having actually injured another human being as they stated they feared they had. They stated as such. No doubt other feelings of shame and being duped would complicate this initial picture and create a more complex set of emotions soon after they were fully informed as to the real nature of their participation (in front of ‘the look’ of the camera). What should we learn from this thought experiment? It is true people scoped and re-scoped their sense of being responsible. However, should we not pay more attention to our de-ontological ‘feelings’ or ‘intuitions’? But, then, in an overall transcendental suspension, should we or even can we privilege such an aspect of our judgmental-determination? My answer to this important piece of rhetoric is to impute the fact that we should not privilege any ordered or non-ordered aspect of the psyche in the transcendental performance of a critical process of judgment, and in its critical appreciation, however, we should attend to the true weight of ‘evidence’ that is realized when we suspend that same suspension, etc. If a de-ontological strand is ‘screaming at us to do or not do x or is niggling away at us in our non-observance of our intuitive duties’ then perhaps we should accept such evidential privileging of certain de-ontological patterns of responses over and above other non-deontological patterns of response. Similarly, when we find in and through and beyond the suspension of the suspension, etc., that we find non-de-ontologically ‘voiced’ imperatives then perhaps we should listen to them likewise. In all of this there is no absolute, there are no absolutes; certain no absolute list of do’s and don’t’s (although such lists culturally offer us a ‘provisional’ template for our actions in general)! What we need to do is ‘to clearly listen’ to those strands of ‘evidence’ that appear to promote or de-promote certain courses of action with certain desired or non-desired consequences. In all of this, re-framing should only occur at the behest of such psychic ‘evidence’, treated as an ‘imperative’ in keeping with their character of origination, the internality of the relationship and its relational-situatedness. So, if a pragmatic ‘voice’ arises above the background nose of our ordered examinations then we should respond pragmatically, etc. Or, if a deontological ‘voice’ demands we should pay attention then let us respond accordingly, etc. Then, if there are a mix of competing ‘voices’ to deal with then let us attempt to define, resolve and act in accordance with such processes that appear to maximize a sense of value that operates in the relational-situatedness of that relationship (even if that meant over-writing its internal imperatives?)? To do this we have to-hand, to some extent or other, pre-negotiated and re-negotiable patterns of behaviour dictated by genres or inter-genre oriented forms of mediations. Then, in the light of a neutral consequential analysis, the entire process can then be re-appreciated from the perspective of a critical appreciation (of the critical as a process of re-appreciation through ongoing re-alignment re-conducted to that extent that benefits that relationship-in-its-relational-situatedness). Thence the next aspect of our research, namely, how do we live embodied with-others and set about existentially to re-negotiate therein before-others? (49)
Noël Tointon, Sydney, 10.10.09.