XXIV: Value-in-Circulation: Critical-Appreciation:
The Formation of an Integrated Theory of Truth:
Living through Our Embodiment with the Other – Part VI
And, Re-Negotiating Existentially with the Other: Part VII*

0.    Introduction

	We are constituted by an inescapable otherness, and that inseparable otherness is constituted by us! In our assessment of this reality, how do we critically appreciate the theory, practice and critique exercised in and through and beyond our careful intentional considerations? Just how do we critically understand our own critical review of reality? Is this something we can do, and if so, how? (0)

	In this paper let me explore this dimension of our critical appreciation of our own sense of being in the world and being in the world with-others before-others? It is one thing to be critical but how critical can we be when we re-visit and critically appreciated our own critical reflections? (1) 

First, let me re-visit a thought experiment examined in the previous paper. In this thought experiment let me re-examining how we re-frame responsibility. In the process let me introduce this concept of ‘critical-appreciation’ that I perceive as being achieved through ‘progressive re-alignment in the context of a narrative treated to an ongoing overall transcendental suspension’. (2)

Second, let me propose an integrated theory of truth in order to understand the role played by a progressive sense of re-alignment (in the two senses of ‘ongoing’ and ‘making progress’). I will be using work done on this topic under the heading of an ordered analysis in the light of this concept of critical-appreciation. (3)

	In the next section I argue for a middle path between absolute and relative. (4)

	In a fourth section, in a set of provisional conclusions, let me conclude this series of papers on this complex topic of value-in-circulation noting the role played by our pre-negotiations with others, a re-negotiation of the same, and, a recognition of a future need for ongoing processes of re-alignment in such negotiations. Furthermore, let me examine how the utilization of the concept of relational-embodiment can be incorporated in a practical philosophy of life as to how we can navigate and re-negotiate our passage through this World-of-Life in an existential, authentic manner with-others before-others? (5)

	In a Postlude let me address a number of issues that spill over from this series of papers that will need to be re-examined elsewhere at a later date. (6)

*Link to latest version of paper on my Homestead Homepage Site (circulation24.rtf).
www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelshomepage3.html

Section I – How Should We Re-Frame Responsibility?

	In the previous paper I proposed a thought experiment where we examined an intended experiment of an apparent experiment. In an experiment to test people’s compliance with instructions from an authority figure that might clash with personal conscience we have the classic work of Stanley Milgram. Here the apparent experiment is the apparent situation as presented to a series of active subjects who think they are shocking another subject when the latter gives an incorrect answer to a question asked by the former. Unbeknownst to these active subjects who have been asked to administer an electroshock, of increasing voltage, to a passive subject, no one is actually being subjected to an electric shock, the real experiment is being conducted to see just how far this set of active subjects will go before becoming non-compliant, if at all, with their instructions from an authority figure of a scientist (no doubt suitably kitted out in a white laboratory coat, sitting behind an impressive desk, etc). Our thought experiment is to wonder why such a large percentage of these active subjects will continue to proceed with this apparent experiment? I don’t believe most of these people take a great delight in shocking a fellow human. Nor do I believe they could be written off as irresponsible or non-responsible. Instead, they seem beholden to the de-ontologically framed pragmatic concerns of the scientist to continue this ‘imperative of doing science’ even if that means suppressing their own sense of conscience. (7)

The Milgram experiment was a series of social psychology experiments conducted by Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram, which measured the willingness of study participants to obey an authority figure who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their personal conscience. Milgram first described his research in 1963 in an article published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,[1] and later discussed his findings in greater depth in his 1974 book, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View.[2]
The experiments began in July 1961, three months after the start of the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. Milgram devised his psychological study to answer the question: "Was it that Eichmann and his accomplices in the Holocaust had mutual intent, in at least with regard to the goals of the Holocaust?" In other words, "Was there a mutual sense of morality among those involved?"
Milgram's testing revealed that it could have been that the millions of accomplices were merely following orders, despite violating their deepest moral beliefs.[3] Milgram summarized the experiment in his 1974 article, "The Perils of Obedience". (8)

	What was the apparent raison d’être that inspired about three quarters of the subjects to continue to the end of the experiment? Some sort of narrative would have been proposed as to why this ‘important’ experiment needed to be done. We could be creative here and propose one of our own. The important point, however, for what ever reasons, is that the series of active subjects were inspired through the authority of the scientist and the apparent importance of their work to override their own consciences in that regard. (9)
	It would be wrong of us to assume this set of active subjects were being irresponsible or non-responsible. Most of these subjects continued on as asked by the ‘scientist’. Many voiced their concerns but were overruled by that ‘scientist’. Most duly complied. At the end, when informed that the experiment involved no one being shocked (in a re-creation of this experiment for a television documentary) relief was visibly and audibly expressed that ‘they had not killed that other person’ they believed had been the recipient of ‘a course of shocks of increasing voltage’. (10)

	Such an experiment, in my opinion, indicates that people have malleable consciences and usually re-frame, rightly and/or wrongly, a sense of responsibility in the light and pressures of context. Let us look beyond this type of situation, be it simulated or non-simulated, and examine how we should adequately respond to a variety of situations without an improper and inappropriate exercise of an invalid sense of responsibility. Just ‘what voice/s’ or ‘whose voice/s’ should we listen to in ethically navigating this World-of-Life with-others before-others? (11)

	In making an ethically oriented judgment (should I shock this person/should I obey the scientist/should I do as I said I would contract to do???) we need to ask ourselves on what side of the following psychic fault-line should I be – on the side of doing my duty (in accordance with my de-ontological sense of a conscience) or should I do what is practically demanded in the sense of what is useful or beneficial to some particular party or parties? Here we have the is/ought distinction as thought to be distinguished in the naturalistic fallacy where it is stated that we should not confuse descriptions with prescriptions. But judgment, in my researches, involves a deeper basis beyond merely separating such relatively superficial, but important, distinctions. In a previous paper I have argued that an architect of a bridge, e.g., in order to do their duty in their design of a bridge that won’t fall down, need not make it withstand 1,000 km winds but perhaps withstand only 300 km winds, e.g. Hence in order to execute their duty they need to also attend to pragmatic considerations in the formation of the same. Finance is usually in limited supply and there is no need to build even more expensive bridges built to withstand extremely unlikely wind-speeds that no one will ever witness. Here there is a dialectical cooperation between the de-ontological and the pragmatical in order for the architect to build the most cost-effective bridge that won’t fall down in 200 km winds or so. (12) 

Moreover, it is my contention that all judgments have the same deep transcendental basis, and, that we cannot nor should not make an absolute distinction along those lines however useful to uphold in a relatively superficial, less absolute, sense. For a start there is a close relationship between aesthetical harmony and ethical harmony! Then we need to know what we are dealing with, discern relevant genres of negotiated behaviour, know our facts as to what is factual or not in our appreciation of the situation-to-hand in question. In effect, all judgments will involve elements of the pre-essential (in defining what we are dealing with), the aesthetical (in dealing with harmonic resolution), de-ontological considerations of duty, pragmatical concerns of utility, etc., hermeneutic considerations of genres, etc., and, making factual determinations. These six types of consideration form the six topics of an ordered analysis (which will be re-introduced in the second section of this paper). (13)

	In seeking to resolve a certain problematic issue in an ethically oriented domain how should we go about the same? In my opinion we need to define what we are dealing with. Bring to this inner discussion the relevant genre or genres of engagement. Then ‘listen’, metaphorically, to those ‘voices’ that are de-ontological or pragmatic in persuasion. By exercising an adequate overall transcendental suspension we can then observe, in the suspension of that suspension, etc., what ‘evidence’ is left after such a process of appreciation? By ‘evidence’ is meant the relative weight or intensity of a particular strand of thought realized in and through and beyond this application of that adequately conducted suspension vis-à-vis all other relevant strands of thought in our simulated appropriation of the essentials of that situation in question under such careful ethical consideration. In utilizing an adequate suspension we de-align ourselves from our previous positioning in that regard. Then, in the suspension of the suspension we should let this series of voices find some consensus through some form of a resolution. In the process we should become re-aligned, find a new sense of positioning that may or may not coincide with our original positioning. We always come to a certain situation, any situation, by exercising our prejudicial pre-judgments in that regard. However, in and through and beyond the critical exercise of an adequate suspension, etc., we should become progressively re-aligned in such a manner that truly attempts to resolve the problematic nature of our ethical concerns through such a process of proper, appropriate and valid re-positioning. (14)

	Hence this concept of critical-appreciation! All appreciation in some sense is critical. Metaphorically, we must stand back to look at what we are focusing upon. We do so by adopting a higher epistemological level of constructive functioning in order to appreciate what is being focused upon. By critically re-examining such earlier criticism we can then re-position ourselves in a more attuned fashion in a manner relevant to that task to hand. In this there are no absolute absolutes. Principles are only guide-lines for behaviour. In finding, for-us, an apparently adequate solution to our current situation we are no longer being thoughtlessly critical (in a connotative sense) but thoughtfully critical (in a denotative sense). Hence this identity between critical re-alignment and critical-appreciation and the progressive nature of such a process. That, through the adequate exercise of an ongoing process of suspension, and its suspension, etc., this degree of adequacy is progressively thematized. (15)

	How is this thematization progressively realized? Through the progressive formation and clarification of a representative narrative that we tell ourselves and from which we can then tell others where we stand, what we stand for, etc. A narrative that invokes a sense of the other to the extent that an other could be told what our relatively primary and secondary concerns are, i.e., what these priorities appear to be and how they are re-constituted in and through and beyond an ongoing process of critically progressive re-alignment. (16)

	Returning to this thought experiment, I would like to make a number of observations, etc. For a start, I believe we could say that all the participants in this experiment re-frame their sense of responsibility. Those that opt out of their contract to participate in this experiment, before or during, we might say listen and listen well to a primary de-ontological voice that tells us that this type of conduct is just wrong!  Today, this apparent experiment would not pass an ethics committee?! Many of those active subjects that continued to the end of the course voiced their concerns in that regard. At the end of the experiment and finding out that no one got shocked, initially came as a great relief to these active subjects. Although relatively commendable to stick to a contract thus contracted, or, to reasonably obey figures of authority, still an inner voice that declared this type of action to be wrong should have been listened to. This reluctance to listen to this de-ontological voice of conscience and override it by the voice of the scientist who appears to know what should be done meant following a pattern of behaviour that compromised the moral integrity of those active subjects. By suppressing their de-ontological voice they re-framed their behaviour along more pragmatic lines through an abrogation of their own inner consciences. But everyone in this experiment re-framed their consciences for right or wrong. The ‘passive subjects’ dissimulated by only appearing to participate in an experiment in which they were ‘to be shocked whenever they gave a wrong answer’. The true scientist or scientists in this situation had another experiment in mind, namely, the intended experiment to see just how far people can be beholden to the authority of others even in contravention of their own conscience. For those ‘active’ subjects to be duped in that fashion, and to be filmed in the process, in this original experiment and/or in later repetitions of the same, is not exactly a nice thing to do and I am sure some of them might need some form of counseling afterwards. For a start they could be consoled by the thought that three quarters of their fraternity complied with instructions as requested. That this experiment should bring home to people how we need to carefully reframe adequate responsibility for our behaviour in and through and beyond the performance of our authored (and co-authored) actions and inactions. (17)

	Sadly, another moral can be drawn from this type of experiment. It would be relatively easy for many ordinary people to be groomed and put on an incremental incline or decline and by such stratagems get them to staff, e.g., concentration camps or do other unsavoury practices at the behest of an unscrupulous state. Here, in one simple experiment, we see “the banality of evil” that could so easily be unleashed. To prevent that type of scenario from happening, we all need to be alert and ever vigilant with ourselves as to how we set out to re-frame our ‘responsible behaviour’ with-others before-others! In this we need to see that critical-appreciation demands a process of re-alignment realized in and through and beyond an adequate process of an overall transcendental suspension! Merely affirming our initial positions or adopting the presented positions of others is not being truly responsible, and, that only through carefully conducted processes of re-alignment in a committed act of critical-appreciation can we refine this existentially attuned sense of responsibility. In this we must listen to those more insistent and persuasive ‘inner voices’ without clinging to a priori attitudes or the presented attitudes of others by letting our conscience speak for itself and re-present itself to-others with-others before-others by attending to this weight of ‘evidence’ that rises to consciousness in a form of harmonic consensus! (18)

	What else should we consider in this regard? And, how can we clarify this sense of a narrative we need to articulate for-ourselves and be prepared to possibly narrate before-others? In the next section of this paper let me articulate an integrated theory of truth that might assist us in our critically-appreciative reflections. (19)
							(Noël Tointon, Sydney, 14.10.09)
Section II – An Integrated Theory of Truth-Determinations

	Not only can the conscience of a person be seen as malleable through re-framing, but, all areas of the psyche can find themselves re-constituted rightly or wrongly. Ask people to imagine what it would be like to be lost in a supermarket as a small child and then ask them six months later if they had ever been lost as a child in a supermarket and more people this time will answer in the affirmative. It would appear that false memories, advertently or inadvertently, have been implanted. Then we have the classic case of the people being asked to watch a video of a basketball game and count the goals scored and who are so intent on counting goals they do not see a person in a gorilla outfit wander on to the court for a few minutes. If we fail to see what is before our very eyes and imagine things as having happened that never happened what hope is there for us in a quest to determine fact from fiction, right from wrong, etc? Recently, in this same vein, a friend told me how they had recounted a story to a friend of theirs to suddenly realize that this very story they were recounting had actually been recounted to them by this same friend they were now telling the same story as if it were theirs in the first place. Somewhat embarrassing for my friend but something they also found to be quite humorous, offering an insightful into the malleability of memory. Imagination, like all things, is a two-edged sword. (20)

	On the other hand, the world continues on for us. People generally remember our names if they need to, we remember who they are, acts of kindness are not forgotten and acts of unkindness may or may not be forgiven. In school the same potted versions of history are taught across the land. In universities histories are critically re-constructed but never completely re-written. Despite this malleability of the memory and identity, still, a vast continuity is reproduced for us be it culturally, bureaucratically, through a considerable uniformity of media, advertising, through the very use of a language that demands we know what words in sentences mean and understand the near infinity of genres of engagement that, as experiential-modules, allow us to live our lives in a manner as formed and informed by these very same genres of engagement. (21)

	In this in between realm of the psyche, between malleability and continuity, let us learn how to discern which aspects of current conscious, intentional experience are reproduced through a chaotic or malleable reconstruction of sheer re-iteration and which aspects of current conscious experience are reproduced through a continuity and conformity of mere re-iteration? To assist this process of discernment let me construct a relatively integrated theory of truth-determination and value-formation. This complex theoretical grid should be of some assistance to us if only to understand which aspects of experience only need to be currently focused upon and appreciated. In the form of a narrative, we could then focus on those more crucial aspects of experience instrumental to our current mission through this ability to home in on those significant and relevant aspects of such simplexity (as an integrated expression of such complexity). Through the necessary basis of the transcendental unity of consciousness, in the current light of our research, we would then only need to focus on those aspects of consciousness relevant to that task to hand. Hence this ability to appreciate key, relevant aspects of such consciously directed intentional formation. (22)

	To this end let me note the following headings: a harmonic theory (24-25); the tripartite nature of the overall transcendental suspension/overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension (26); the adoption and adaptation of Tarski’s semantic approach to truth determination (27-30, 32); an in depth ordered analysis (31-34); critical-appreciation through critical re-alignment (35); the concept of transformative treatment-retreatment (36-37); the dialectical focus on transformational strands by noting analysis and/or synthesis and/or continuity of identity (37); extension of an ordered analysis to context/meta-textual genres along with hermeneutical/historical considerations (as well as defective processes of sequentialization) (41); and, through noting an overall application of the above for narration through relevantly selective treatment (36-40, 42). (23)

	Information is conveyed through a harmonically constructed scheme. The determination of a question is arrived at through its resolution. That overall sense of resolution has three moments, namely, a prospective sense of background consonance (from which a rhetorical question can be posed), a retrospective focus on dissonant material (in the form of a metaphorical, provisional reply), and, a more immediate sense of resolution of the relationship between the former elements or aspects (along with a re-confirmation effectively through a process of iterative redundancy or bare-repetition). Information answers a question. Does this electric kettle work? We switch it on and find its works. Yes, it does! Translated through this tripartite scheme we could notate this as: Does this electrical kettle work? – Yes, it would appear to be working! – So, yes, it does work (through a confirmation/re-confirmation of this apparent state of affairs)! These same three moments, in accordance with my own research, are the basis of the overall transcendental suspension/the overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension. (24)

	Nothing has any meaning in itself or by itself. Hence this need for a harmonic scheme in which information is conveyed. That same information can be re-conveyed through a re-iteration of that same scheme. Matching the field of background consonance we have, respectively, meta-textual genres of experiential engagement and contextual considerations forming rhetorical considerations, i.e, asking questions (in the first dialectical moment of the process of suspension) and the sense of textual background (in the first dialectical moment of the hermeneutic circle). In contrast, and acting in a dissonant fashion we have respectively provisional answers supplied in a metaphorical format (in the second dialectical moment of the process of suspension) and a focus on relatively discrete textual considerations (in the second dialectical moment of the hermeneutic circle). In a resolution of this relationship between first and second moments we have respectively the existential confirmation or disconfirmation of the provisional answer as formerly supplied (in the third dialectical moment of the suspension) and in the non-textual resolution of the meta-textual-textual relationship we are presented with some degree of an existential excess of value (in a third dialectical moment of the process of the hermeneutic circle). Then, an appreciation of the same in its context of presentation/re-presentation then allows us to access an overall senses of the existential and the attendant form/s of distinctive value therein realized. This explanation above is formal in orientation. In an informal explanation we might say: the interaction between context and text realizes a sense of reply (with some degree of resolution that can flow over into an immediacy of response and thence to the existential tenability of its perceived responsibility). The technicalities of these heuristic devices can be examined elsewhere, suffice to say that they could be simplistically (mis)represented by contextual-question – provisional answer – resolution/response. Moreover, we should note that in my interpretation of the suspension, borrowing from the work of Edmund Husserl, the suspension itself, in turn, is suspended, etc., re-imposed, suspended again, etc., etc. That the relative neutrality of the overall suspension, through the balance of the narrated thesis and antithesis, etc., re-aligns our sense of positioning in the world. Hence my concept of critical-appreciation through ongoing progressive critical re-alignment, i.e., re-positioning (even if finally coincident, more or less, with our original positioning). (25)

	These three dialectical moment of the overall suspension/overall hermeneutical circle also respectively mirror hermeneutical considerations (meaning), phenomenological considerations (of sense [or location in our complex, multi-dimensional psychic mapping of the world], and, existential considerations (of meaningfulness). They also mirror a sense of the future, past and present respectively. From the totality of these moments an overflow of value is produced/re-produced. As noted in previous essays in this series of papers, value as an overflow is produced/re-produced (pre-conditionally) in and (conditionally) from and (post-conditionally) beyond every point in that relationship of origination, issuing equally from every point in that relationship in question (albeit with each point possessing its own sense of perspective in that relationship as form of a living embodiment with those participants/participating factors that constitute that relationship for-us). (26)

	Let me now note Tarski’s semantic approach to a theory of truth value (which, overall, I perceive as a sub-set of value-formation, but, which is also instrumental in each stage of a confirmed transformation). In the presentation say of a green apple we could ask is this a green apple? Simply, Tarski’s convention is this: in the meta-set S’, ‘S is green’ is true (T) iff S. In other words, in the set containing one green apple the proposition (meta-statement/proposition) about the same is true if and only if there is one green apple (in that set):

	P’ is true (T) iff P. (27)

	At the basis of this integrated theory of truth is this (analytical) fact. So each tripartite scheme S (as a proposition) is true if and only if there is S, i.e:

	S’ is T iff S (28)

	How do we apply this formula to a scheme. Let us return to our green apple. Translated we might say: In the context of that bowl there is one green apple iff the statement ‘there is bowl with one green apple’ as S’ is T if S (namely there is one green apple in that bowl. Now, how do we convert this statement into a tripartite scheme? (In the context of a bowl and in the light of an apple determination genre) S’ (there is one green apple to be found) is S iff (we can engage an apple in that bowl) as S, since S’ is confirmed as T through S. Hence the formula: (contextually dependent rhetorical) question – provisional (metaphorical) answer – (relatively non-provisional) confirmation. (29)

	This Taskian formulation is central to this integrated theory of truth-determination/value-formation. Let me now investigate how intentions are progressively constructed, ideally, in an ordered formation. (30)

	First we must start with something in order to progress with it. Let these core components, first order identities, be non-integrated essential concepts. E.g., roundness, squareness, greenlikeness, whitetlikeness, noiseness, etc. Now, in a second order we can integrate these components in an aesthetically oriented conceptual blend. E.g., white-squareness, white-noiseness, etc. The first is the application of a colour ascription to a flat square shape. The second is the metaphorical-like ascription of a colour to a noise understood as a mix of frequency hence ‘white noise’ even though colour normally cannot be ascribed to noises. On the other hand, we cannot have integrated essentials such as square-circles, green-noises, etc. Hence the latter cannot make a second order status like white-squares, etc. Once a concept is integrated it can be conceptually envisaged as an idea whose content is the integrated thought. A thought of a square-circle can only be entertained as a thought of a square-circle that cannot be conceptually envisaged. Then some thoughts can be perceptually envisaged, say a white-square. Then the factual-possibility of a white-square, say a white-square table-mat can be envisaged, say on this table now. Confirmation that there exists a white-square table-mat on this table now is to treat this fact as an actual fact. Thence our progression through the six orders. Experiential conception I also envisage as intimately connected with conceptual ideality (and hence our experience of de-ontological necessity in the injunctive-like performance of our duty). Moreover, perceptual envisualization is also treated as a pragmatical affair, with an interest in utility, benefit, etc. Then a fifth order examination of possibility is also a hermeneutical affair through both meta-textual genre-oriented and contextual considerations of the situation in question. Factual considerations effectively form histories in the manner as presented. That there is a green apple in the bowl on this table now is effectively presented as a mini-history or micro-history. The incorporation of the same (along with the tentative treatment of associated possibilities) in a narrative manufactures a history in the manner as thematized and narrated. (31)

	At the core of this transformation between the orders is this Tarskian formulation of a proposition. Initially prepared in a first order through a non-integrated set of essential elements we then integrate the same to form an aesthetically integrated combination. Conceptual entertainment as an integrated idea then takes on a de-ontological flavour when and where relevant in its idealization. Being able to perceptually envisage the same then adds a pragmatic aspect to our intentional constructions. Fifth order hermeneutic considerations of possibility then follow and in an historical confirmation of the same we then arrive at a provisionally confirmed sixth order fact. At the core of each of these transformations we invoke a Taskian formulation. Let me examine my understanding of this green apple in this bowl on this table I can see now. The conceptual element of appleness and greenness can be combined to form the concept of a green apple. A non-virtual green apple or a virtual apple could be aesthetically appreciated in a second order status. Through integration in a second order they can now be conceptually envisaged as an integrated third order idea (with or without de-ontological consideration, e.g., should I steal this lovely green apple if that green apple had sixth order status?). Fourth order perceptual considerations follow along with pragmatical concerns (such as, e.g., how do I go about obtaining or stealing that green apple given its sixth order non-virtual status?). From perceptual envisualization follows considerations of possibility and thence actuality or non-virtuality. Using a Taskian approach we can say that each next order is arrived at if that order can be found (through ordered analysis). 1 >> 2 iff 2, 2 >> 3 iff 3, etc. (32)

	We could also say that each order is structured between a field, that focused on, and, its relationship between the same. That it is this scheme that is progressed through the orders. Moreover, this linear formulation is correctly circular, and, even more correctly, all six orders can simultaneously be covertly or overtly activated or non-activated in our overall intentional formations. Overtly in the sense that it can be both thought about and is to be exercised or concentrated upon in an orientation centered on that type of investigation. Hence phenomenological, aesthetical, de-ontological/conceptual, perceptual/pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual considerations respectively. Furthermore, we can treat all judgments as being conducted in these ordered orientations either individually, in combinations or collectively. (33)

	There is another way to conceive of these orders. If we look at the gestalt field, also as the basis of harmonic theory, then we could nominate the field as the moment of World (W), that focused upon as the moment of Object (O) and the (experiential) relationship between the former as Ego (E). Then, through a privileging or de-privileging of these three dialectical polarities or moments will produce for us these six orders as just outlined. So privileging of Ego gives us a de-ontological sense of self-identity along with its conceptualizations and associated sense of necessity. Or, an interactive privileging of Ego and World gives us a pragmatic/perceptual sense of experience: let me tabulate these corresponding forms of privileging (+)/de-privileging (-):

E+ / W-, O- = De-ontological/conceptual concerns
		O+ / W-, E- = Phenomenological concerns
		W+ / O-, E- = Hermeneutical concerns
		E+, W+ / O- = Pragmatical/perceptual concerns
		O+, W+ / E- = Factual considerations
		E+, O+ / W- = Aesthetical concerns (34)

	In utilizing the ongoing overall transcendental suspension, and the suspension of the same, and the re-institution of the suspension, and its suspension in turn, etc., establishes for us an ongoing process of re-alignment. By such continual re-positioning we are given an ongoing opportunity to critically appreciate our prior intentional constructions, the nature of their value-formation and truth-determinations, etc., along with any sense of re-positioning that should arise therein. From such a re-positioning we are then in position to respond responsibly in our passage through the world with-others before-others. In effect, the suspension of such intentions to respond allows us then to spontaneously respond, hopefully, in an adequately responsible fashion. Throughout, our intentional formations are subjected to ongoing processes of transformation along with the transformative consequences of actively entering such modalities that are exercised in this performance. (35)

	In our understanding of processes of transformation we need to address the dialectic of the ‘continuity of change’, and, the continuing presence of such continuity despite a process of change. Let me introduce here a philosophy of transformation, namely, a philosophy of treatment or a treatment philosophy. The fundamental point to make in this understanding is the reverse of our Taskian approach to truth determination. Every process of treatment produces a treatment-product raised by one degree in meta-status. Whereas, in contrast, in a Taskian determination of truth we go from a higher meta-status falling by one degree. Then, that granted, when we deal with such treatment products we more often than not treat them on the same meta-level that originated from, hence a process of re-treatment wherein the treated product becomes a re-treated product on par with the initial product or pre-treated product. By such means we progress through the orders, nominate distinctions and objects, states, objectives therein; entertain operations, transformations to other states, distinctions or orders; entertain accommodations between the same; discern the formation of value, etc. As a critical tool, in treatment philosophy we should critically note initial products, treated products, re-treated products, treatment pathways and re-treatment pathways and all else relevant to a process of transformation (such as intended and unintended consequences, contextual considerations, relational transformations, etc.). (36)

	Furthermore, at the core of a transformational process, paralleling our three moments (in parallel between the overall transcendental suspension and the overall hermeneutical circle of comprehension) we also need to note processes of synthesis and/or analysis and/or continuity of identity. In practice, the contrary of any two of these moments or strands of transformation gives us an expression of the third. However, for convenience, we might need to only focus on one of these dialectical aspects. In existential descriptions forming existential descriptors and/or existential axes noting epistemological organization and changes in the same we can take a selective approach by focusing on what appears to be most relevant or more relevant. Relevancy can be defined through the relative comparative adequacy of the genres of engagement brought to bear on our situation to hand. Hence this simplification of focus through an attention to only the relevant simplexity that might need to be noted. (37)

	Taking all such considerations into account gives us, provisionally, an integrated theory of truth-determination and value-formation. A process refined through processes of critical-appreciation and its ongoing progression of re-alignment. All that needs to be now noted is the narration of such complexity, assisted by a recognition of its simplexity (realized through the transcendental unity of consciousness). Acceptance of simplexity implies that we need only focus on what is essentially relevant to our investigations. Moreover, such processes are generally already pre-negotiated for us. Even the complex interactions between genres of engagement are usually interactively pre-negotiated for us! (38)

	Let me now look at this complex set of strategies through the following lens. When we focus on identities in a first order we are interested in entering into processes of equation in order to advance to a higher order. At this level, with this intent upon equation we effective realize a correspondence theory of truth determination, albeit as but one aspect of an integrated theory of truth-determination and value-formation. On the other hand, once integration is achieved, its appreciation is then conducted in terms of aesthetic coherence. Thence a coherence theory of truth as a part of an overall integrated theory of truth determination, etc. In a third order, a priori necessity is experienced, hence an a priori-oriented theory of truth determination, etc. Pragmatic considerations then follow in our entry to a fourth order, thence a pragmatic aspect to an integrated theory of truth determination, etc. Then follows our hermeneutic considerations (of context and the adoption and adaptation of genres of experience). Thence this implication of ideal possibility embedded in a hermeneutic theory of truth determination, etc. Lastly, factual considerations implicate a semantic approach along Taskian lines as noted. Thus an integrated theory of truth determination and value-formation includes these various aspects of correspondence, aesthetic-coherence, a priorism, pragmatism, hermeneutic evaluation, and semantic approaches. Correctly, all six approaches need to cooperate before any form of truth determination and value-formation can proceed. (39)

	What are the pre-suppositional philosophical implications embedded in this approach and flow on from such a complex situation? For a start, how should we approach the experiential nature of reality if we are directly in contact with ‘reality’ and reality for-us is a simulation, namely, through retensional iteration/re-iteration, i.e., as a simulation of a simulation of a simulation, etc. In such a philosophy the only way to see the real is to see it as the relative richness of modalities actively engaged and the intensity of their engagement therein. In our overall assessment of this richness, in these two senses, we should find some intimation as to how ‘real’ that intentional re-presentation appears to us vis-à-vis its comparison with other re-presentations. (40)

	To complicate matter further, we should also note that although order-analysis in the form as just noted is oriented towards the definition of an intentional object, object-state, i.e., an objective, this same analysis can also be extended to context (or relevant contextual fields) and the utilization of relevant meta-textual genres. Then, continuing, we can also investigate the relationship in place between objectives in their relevant fields (both contextual in orientation and/or as meta-textual genre oriented) as a form of existential analysis. Flowing on from, and rooted in the same, we can then take up an overall existential analysis through our considerations of the value-in-circulation and its associated truth-determinations that devolve from the same. Such considerations, from the hermeneutic dimension, etc., also implicate historical considerations. Then, in the light of the latter, we can note theoretical work done on the nature of the historical process along with its examination of sequentialization and the types of sequential mistakes that can occur in such processes. (41)

	Hence, by taking these considerations into account, and focusing on what is apparently more relevant to our investigations should allow us to utilize this complex, comprehensive theory of truth-determination and value-formation through a focus upon the simplexity of that task to hand! (42)

Section IV – Adopting a Middle Path between ‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’

	As philosophers we need to know when and where to get on and when and where to get off! All too often a philosopher, and their school should it exist, establish a set of distinctions, usually promoted with quite valuable insights, however, too much of a good thing is not a good thing! Distinctions are dialectical! They cannot be absolutely drawn with the simple wave of a pen! Like all good things they only go so far. Let us take human identity, e.g. It is true when you walk along the street you are heading in the direction you are heading towards and you are not heading in the direction some other person might be heading when they pass you going in the opposite direction. Still, despite this obvious difference, for a start we should also note that humanity, shared by both of us, is not something that can be seen heading along a street. It is true that we have a distinctness of self-being usually better appreciated from our own point of view. Still, others can also sometimes better appreciate where we might be heading’ and hopefully remonstrate with us should that be necessary. Or, again, two speakers who can speak to each other share that language just spoken being members of that language community. Hence my recent distinction, or, rather, counter-distinction, or qualified accommodation, of that sense of our relational-embodiment in our relationships as lived. That we are embodied not only in physical bodies but also in the individual bodies of all our relationships to that extent those relationship are a fact, have a facticity above and beyond their mere material input. Distinctions make philosophical sense when they have important work to do and we work with them to that extent they remain viable. All too often, though, great philosophers insist on some profound dichotomy (in a sentence or two) and then spend the rest of their lives trying to overcome the all engulfing chasm between the same (in a torrential outpouring of text, such tomes being well-describes as ‘volumes’, etc.). Is there a philosopher who has escaped this charge? How brief their speeches and writing might be, or, do the many problems of the world demand a more productive, more nuances reflection than often hitherto delivered? (43)

	So whom should I accuse? Is there one philosopher that should not be put on this list of accusation? Plato insists on a division between ideal forms and their practical instantiations. Aristotle insists on a distinction between substance and form. Should Husserl have not also have talked about the suspension of the suspension? Shankara insists on an absolute distinction between Brahman and so-called reality. Buddhist logicians insisted on the primacy or privilege of particulars. Descartes demands two or three clear and distinct worlds (of the material, mental and Divine) whereas Leibnitz would proclaim the absolute separation of monads (who only appear to cooperate through a Divinely guided pre-established harmony). Having absolutely separated all monads Leibnitz then relatively reconnects them through the machinations of the Divine so at then end of the day do we need to believe him. If the reality of the world is there for us as that world of reality who cares if it is merely pre-established or non-pre-established? (44)

And the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, can he escape this type of charge? Should he insist on just emptiness? Is the ‘emptiness of emptiness’ no more nor no less than the ‘phenomenal reality of phenomenal reality’. Or, might the Buddhist doctrine of Two Truths escape this charge (with an identity between samsara and nirvana albeit from a non-absolutist, transcendental point of view)? I suspect that all philosophers are guilty here as charged. Furthermore, we have later interpretations of this philosopher in the schools of the Prasangika and the Svantantrika and we need to be careful as to what Nagarjuna actually appears to intend in and through texts that are generally accepted as good examples of his work.  We all have our Derridean blindspots despite the best philosophical will in the world. We all have blinkers and are blind in some form or other and it is for others to enlighten us in this regard. No doubt philosophers, professionals or amateurs, are just as human as everyone else. True to their profession, philosopher should return the favour and become ‘adequately’ critical of others in the hope that others can be skillfully critical of them. In the absence of ‘proper, appropriate and valid’ criticism how can they, themselves, proceed in a truly critical manner and refine their philosophical reflections? Through the use of adequate overall transcendental suspensions… by suspending all our notions… and defusing all absolutist claims by means of this ability to enter into processes of re-alignment. No absolutist distinctions can be upheld if it can be let go. Then, if its re-uptake remains in a metaphorical non-absolutist mode it can no longer not be subject to non-re-alignment. Thence our non-absolutist stance in the world and our existential openness to the richness of a world constituted by-us with others-before-others albeit from the distinctive non-absolute relativity of our own points of view! Forever as a work in progress, forever open to negotiation through re-negotiation with others! By operating on this middle path between extremes we may well put and place ourselves in a position truly receptive of the existential reality of that under examination? (45)

	Intentional practices in repetition become habits; habits in social dissemination become modes of thoughts; modes in sedimentation through use become genres of engagement; and, further socially oriented sedimentation of such practices such genres become institutions. E.g., the game of chess is now enshrined in a chess-world or chess-institution/s (which may or may not be regarded as being instantiated in and through and beyond a set of governing chess bodies, etc.). Now, I would like to point out that the existential health of such institutions, bodies, worlds, genres, etc., depends on their ongoing re-constitution in an adequate existential manner. Let me now revisit this topic along with a re-examination of how the critical, in turn, can be critically re-visited. To this end let me revisit these notions of relational-embodiment and the ongoing need for our existential re-negotiations with-other before-others in this context for an authenticity of value-formation in and through and beyond the spontaneity of value-in-circulation. (46)

	Just why can the absolute not be engaged from an absolute point of view, etc? Transformation treatment (and retreatment) will not allow this type of process to occur on the same meta-level of status. I can also present another argument from a gestalt perspective. (47)

	I am currently reading Shankara’s Tattvaboddha in Sanskrit. One of the four skills (sadhana) a person desirous of salvation and freedom should acquire is the skill of discriminating between eternal and non-eternal things (nitya-anitya-vastu-viveka), i.e., between the unchanging and that which changes. How might we critically examine this particular proposal (for the spiritual life)? Strictly speaking the eternal should not be able to be experienced by a limited mind (of the ordinary person). But, one could argue that the unchanging cannot be engaged with and consequently could not be known. But, the same type of argument could be leveled at the merely changing to the extent that there could be no thing there for us to even be able to engage with (if there were an absolute process of change that could be dealt with). Surely, we only know change or non-change in relative forms of expression and/or reception. We might say that the clouds are constantly changing whereas the nearby river, until it runs dry, is continually running. So, in normal experience, what we really encounter are things more or less ephemeral, or, more or less non-ephemeral, i.e., things that are either relatively ephemeral or relatively non-ephemeral. Neither absolute change nor absolute non-change are engaged, i.e., neither encountered nor recognized! Let me account for this fact from a gestalt point of view and then apply this understanding to this statement from Shankara to show that it only makes sense to read it in non-absolute terms of reference (despite or in spite of Shankara’s apparent intentions on this type of point?). (48)

	Phenomenological discrimination (of the phenomenal, non-mentally oriented or mentally oriented, subjectively oriented or inter-subjectively oriented) can only take place in intentional terms of reference. Three gestalt pre-conditions need to be met (in a dialectical relationship between the same), namely, an appropriate field (associated with the nature of the discrimination to be exercised in accordance with the rules of that genre of engagement adopted and adapted for this task to hand), a point of focus in that field coincident with the object, object-state or objective (of that task to hand), and an appropriate intentional subjectivity that can discern this relationship between field-and-focus (as three dialectical moments that mirror the overall transcendental suspension/overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension). Too much emphasis on any one of these three polarities is at the equal expense of the others. In other words, there can be no absolute focus and privileging of any one of these three moments since all three facets are needed in order to arrive at an appreciation of that point under focus. Some viable degree of contrast is needed with all three aspects for them to arrive at this degree of appreciation. Indeed, too much field – nothing to focus upon, too much focus – and there can be no meaningful contrast, and, too much subjectivity – there can be no meaningful engagement (through a meaningful encounter and meaningful recognition). ‘Meaningfulness’ can only be arrived at in and through and beyond the ongoing cooperation of these three aspects. Each aspect is a polarity, an impossible state of affairs to realize in itself. Even our awareness and appreciation of a prior process of appreciation demands the same tri-modal preconditions. Phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation, therefore, can only be arrived at through the non-absolute engagement arrived at through the ‘lens’ of these tri-modal conditions. No value, whatsoever, can issue forth when these three interconnected conditions are not adequately represented in our investigations (be that simulated and/or re-simulated, virtually or on-virtually, in some form or other). (49)

	How then should we interpret Shankara’s statement from a perspective of transcendental possibility? For a start, no terms can take on an absolutist complexion. Nor can any term be read merely through the impossible lenses of an absolute field, and an absolute sense of self or an absolute sense of that being focused upon! The working concept of the eternal can only be a relative one, i.e., appearing to be relatively unchanging, not absolutely unchanging. At the same time, the phenomenal process of apparent change itself cannot be treated as a process of absolute change! Absolute change (in an absolutist sense) and absolute non-change (in an absolutist sense) are both untenable being neither engaged nor encountered nor recognized! A relative-transcendental sense only means a trans-phenomenal form of appreciation from a transcendental(ly selective) point of view. Similarly, an appreciation of the relative-phenomenal sense only means a phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of the relative, non-absolute sense/s of the transcendental. There can be no absolute (i.e., absolutist) extreme vision or versions of either the transcendental nor the phenomenal-phenomenological. Obviously, we have already found the world working for us hence such viability can only imply a non-extreme sense of positioning. Thence, furthermore, the untenability of a priori positions, self-imposed and/or other-imposed, that are not allowed to change in and through and beyond re-alignment even if the result should prove to be relatively invariant with an original position or a previously arrived at position. In the same manner, Shankara’s statement needs to be meaningfully engaged, i.e., evaluated and valued (where by ‘value’ is meant the relative fullness of ‘sense, meaning and meaningfulness’; i.e., an existential excess or surplus of value). In such a frame of reference religious value needs to be re-interpreted (in order to be seen to possess sense, etc.). Moreover, value can only be seen to be preserved in and through and beyond a process of re-constitution in such a manner that continuity is preserved in and through and beyond its re-iteration. Indeed, through a complex harmonically resolved set of iterations. The relatively dissonant being focused upon through sheer iteration and its relative novelty (as text) in the consonance of the field (as both context and meta-text, established through mere iteration with very little change. Into this relationship an existential surplus of value is established through the repetition of a self-organized/organized pattern of bare-iteration wherein such value is expressed and becomes confirmed through the re-iteration of that same relatively invariant process of patterning. Concepts of absolute unchangeableness or absolute changeableness can have no viable place in a religious system or in any other system of thought. Such principles can only be guidelines, to treat them otherwise is to fool ourselves into thinking we have something meaningful and profound. Whether such treatment can salvage or not salvage the ‘religious thought apparently intended’ remains to be seen. However, as an optimist, I believe we should attempt to make as much sense of a religious text, as it can stand, should that be of concern for us, without complete deconstruction as that would be its true fate if it were to be overlooked and conducted through the illusion of an absolutist lens! Then, it that were contra to the intentions of its author so be it. However, religious thought has a large part to play in the formation of culture and its input, if desired, should be productive and not disruptive of cultural harmony in this regard (through such a rectification of thought along non-absolutist lines). Thence this need to adopt a middle path!! (50)

	This is an important point to realize, namely, that all things are realized through relations and that there can be no non-relational states of affairs! The religionist needs to realize this point since to do so would arm them with a viable defense against the problematic consequences of those who mindlessly espouse untenable forms of fundamentalism. Not that all forms of fundamentalism need be flawed. Getting back to basics, returning to the original teachings of a founder, prioritizing important concepts and modes of action, and similar forms of motivation, are all valid if validly constructed or re-constructed. However, to insist on fundamental ‘possibilities’ that can be neither engaged nor encountered nor recognized is to problematize religious practice in a manner that can have no therapeutic spiritual consequences, individually and/or collectively, and, can only lead to increasing degrees of a self-imposed inauthenticity being adopted individually and/or communally. Unwittingly, I suspect, certain formulations can all too easily be read along extreme absolutist lines of interpretation. Recognition of such impossible interpretations and their re-interpretation along more viable avenues of interpretation would stand that religious tradition in better stead. Returning to Shankara’s insistence upon the skill of discerning between the eternal and the non-eternal, between the unchanging and the non-changing, how might that be viably interpreted? Our experience of apparent changeability or apparent unchangeablility is to find in the world of experience that some things appear to possess a greater sense of continuity. Then, with that distinction in mind, we can metaphorically extrapolate the same to say the relatively unchangeable has a persistence of continuity in contrast to the loss of continuity in that which is more changeable. Metaphorical extrapolation, towards a longer sense of continuity versus a diminished sense of continuity, is absolutely viable, but, a sense of the metaphorical cannot be absolutely extrapolated since ‘likeness’ can never be an ‘isness’ except in satisfaction of identity (which is a different, non-extrapolated matter). That looks like Jack, and, is Jack is a tenable manoeuvre if and only iff ‘looks like Jack’ is Jack. On the other hand, comparative degree of changeability versus unchangeability cannot be logically converted into absolute changeability or unchangeability except by an act of fiat or defined analytically. Furthermore, mere continuity cannot be interpreted as mere unchangeability even though dis-continuity can be declared to be a complete process of change. The latter observation could also be disputed on the grounds that energy, e.g., can be neither created nor destroyed and, therefore, discontinuity is only continuity in another form. Similarly, continuity can be read merely as the inhibition of discontinuity and/or persistence of a form of change that established that form of continuity in the first place. Furthermore, phenomenal-phenomenological engagement demands that interaction be truly interactive and that can only accounted for in and through and beyond a process of relational change. Otherwise, what is not there for us may as well not exist for us! Through such reservation, dysfunctional forms of fundamentalism could not be supported in a viable religious context! (51)

Section III – Provisional Conclusions: Embodiment and Re-Negotiations?

	Through the rectification of dysfunctional forms of engagement less dysfunctional forms of existing-with-others can come into being. Indeed, in an optimistic light, such relative existential augmentation could be viewed as an incremental return to relative authenticity since there can be no absolutely dysfunctional state, etc. Equally, there could be no state of absolute authenticity. Such extrapolation is unnecessary since an adequacy of authenticity is all that need be achieved and maintained. In the light of these qualifications (of no absolute forms of authenticity/inauthenticity, the need only for adequacy, etc.) how can a process of existential augmentation be put in place? Through processes of re-alignment! Let me elaborate upon a series of provisional conclusions in the context of the findings that could be brought to bear upon this topic that could be extracted and developed in the context of this set of essays. I shall do this under the following headings of commitment through existential re-commitment(53); re-alignment through the use of the overall transcendental suspension (54); the implication(s) of an overall existential engagement (55); value-formation and truth-determination (56); relational-embodiment (57); existential re-negotiations (58); self-organized criticality (59); the economic consequences of value-in-circulation (60); and, a final, provisional, summary conclusion (61). (52)

	In our thought experiment (of an intended experiment of an apparent experiment) one of our findings was that responsibility should be realized by-us with-others before-others through a process of re-alignment. As noted: “we should become progressively re-aligned in such a manner that truly attempts to resolve the problematic nature of our ethical concerns through such a process of proper, appropriate and valid re-positioning.” In this process of existential re-framing of conscience and responsibility I came to the conclusion that we should not accept the a priori attitudes of ourselves or others: “…the untenability of a priori positions, self-imposed and/or other-imposed, that are not allowed to change in and through and beyond re-alignment even if the result should prove to be relatively invariant with an original position or a previously arrived at position.” In the light of such observations it would seem to be an imperative to transform any concept of commitment and perceive the need for a process of existential re-commitment as occurring outside a clinging to a priori-like attitudes and practices. That only through existentially oriented and receptive processes of re-alignment in our relationships, be they secular or religious, etc., that we can truly realize a process of existential re-commitment in keeping with the nature of our relationships through such attuned receptivity. How is this process of re-commitment through re-alignment to be achieved? Through the central emplacement of adequate overall transcendental suspensions! (53)

	How are we to entertain adequate overall transcendental suspensions? By exercising those strategies that induce that type of existential re-orientation. Through processes of enquestioning, maintenance of psychic balance, metaphoricalization of the situation-to-hand, promotion of an overall existential engagement, neutralization of relevant senses of position and positioning, existential augmentation, epochés or bracketing (local and/or global in extent), provisional disvaluation, etc., etc. An intensification of evaluation results from this sense of re-orientation, and, in turn, re-orientation towards and intensification of value-formation can be as instrumental in this type of existential re-directioning. A sense of the existential flows on from a productive use of the overall transcendental suspension (as an ongoing process of suspension, suspension of the suspension, etc.) and by learning how to experience this sense of existential augmentation we intuitively re-learn how to naturally manipulate this sense of existential attunement. By what ever techniques we learn to induce this orientation towards the relatively existential the consequent effect is to entertain a process of re-alignment in which we can enter into a new process of commitment through re-commitment. (54)

	What are the implications of a process of existential re-orientation? As previous argued in this set of papers, value rises in and through relationships and only in and through relationships. Moreover, value in the form of an excess is expressed through every point in a relationship at the same time, albeit in a manner that reflects the perspective of that point in that relationship. Only after such expression is the residue of such value able to be circulated (as texts or traces of texts, etc.). If I were to give you $100 as a gift, although the aesthetic nature of a one hundred dollar bill might be appreciated, still, it is what we can do with that small sum of money that interests us more. Indeed, it is its ability for transformation that interests us! A nice meal in a restaurant with a date. That expensive book you have been wanting to buy. A really nice pair of shoes for your job interview, etc. All these possibilities can be reviewed, and, one or more of these possibilities, of that same approximate value, could be obtained because of this gift being given and received. However, the true value of the gift is not just $100. The situation might arise when you find yourself being presented with a piece of paper that says the person giving you that piece of paper owes you $100 (for what ever reason). You do not immediately rush out and spend it. Two forms of ‘a promise to pay you $100’ but quite different in how we can exercise that promise. As a gift, the true value of that state of affairs arises in and through the associated relationship wherein a giver is gifting a gift that is received as a gift. At that very moment both the giver and the accepter of the gift have $100 but from that moment on the donor has given $100 and the recipient of that gift has received $100. Of course, as noted, no gift, correctly, is merely the gift itself since all reciprocity is reciprocal and occurs in a field of obligations, etc., etc. How this gift is ‘received’ and evaluated and appreciated, and, how the sum total of reciprocity, back and forth, between all the relevant parties, is to be evaluated is another matter and is most likely not one that could be easily reduced to a monetary value, if at all, etc. (55) 

	How is value formed and what is its relationship with truth-determination? Value-formation is the result of the emission of an excess of value in and through its associated relationship. In a certain sense the value formed is its ‘truth’ and the ‘value of that truth’ is the ‘truth of its value’. E.g., the value or truth of $100 is that it can realize certain fifth order possibilities, converting those possibilities into possible actual facts. Which fact or facts we chose being up to us and the circumstances of how those intentions can be exercised or not exercised. Obviously, the utility of having $100 means those possibilities circumscribed by a close similarity in value could possibly be exercised. $100 might buy a very good meal but it cannot buy you a $1,000 dollar diamond ring. It could be used as a deposit but that merely reinforces this type of point (that for the moment you have insufficient funds). Transformation is going to realize value in keeping with the transaction. Still, you might buy a rare book for $10 and find you can then sell it on for $1,000. True value need not be truly recognized, and, the value that can be realized is limited by the limitations of the economy it can be inserted into. If no one wants to buy that book for $1,000 then currently it cannot be considered to worth that much. On the other hand, putting that information into the marketplace that there is this $1,000 book that could be bought and through a wider degree of dissemination that event of a sale is realized then we can re-evaluate the value of that book to say it was worth that much for those involved in that transaction at that time of the transaction. Put into circulation, a $100 bill is treated as a promise to pay immediately the sum of $100’s worth of transactions if both parties are willing for that transaction or series of transactions to take place with that degree and manner of transformation. In this the economy determines to what degree and in what manner the range or scope of those transactions can be enacted. We have, e.g., the oscillating value of the Australian dollar versus the American dollar. Obviously, for most of the time A$100 is not equal to US$100. The degree and manner of conversion is therefore intimately linked to the associated economic relationship (and in many ways the conversion rate is a micro-cosmic reflection of the macro-cosmic relationship between these two countries in the context also of the overall world economy). In the same manner, all value is circulated in an economy in such a manner that that economy generally determines the rules for conversion, etc. Now, what is apparently circulated are circulated tokens be they texts or traces of texts or merely tokens with ascribed forms of value be that merely aesthetic, merely utilitarian, e.g., etc. So, we give the gift of a beautiful rock without too much economic value, or a spade knowing that the recipient is a gardener and in need of that type of spade, etc. Obligations could be seen as traces of texts, the obligational wakes issuing from the conversion and transmission, etc., of textual tokens, etc. Given the conservation of energy, how can we explain the surplus of value that is claimed to be put into circulation after its spontaneous emission (from every point equally in a relationship)? Through the thematization of such possibilities through the organization/self-organization/re-self-organization of current forms of value. E.g., a wooden bowl is created from which we can now drink from. Such organization is realized through a process of re-organization, namely, the piece of wood is carved in the shape of a bowl. Or, e.g., through the chaotic self-organized effects of an advertising campaign, suddenly a desire is re-directed towards that particular product. In this regard, fashion is very much a creature of chaos – desired today and not so desired tomorrow or even more desired on the following morrow. A fickle creature of desire when reflecting such an alignment desired and/or not so desired by that economic population in question. In all of this, truth-determination is instrumental and reflective of the transformations realized in that economically treated relationship! (56)

	What is the nature of that economic relationship? Is it possible to have a non-economic relationship? Only by definition! A relationship, correctly, is an economic field through a process of interaction. There could be no non-virtual relationship without such interaction and reciprocity. Hence this metaphorical sense of economic. Moreover, through the unity of value-formation and its expression and post-consequential circulation it follows that the relationship also acts as a ‘body’, as a body in which all the relevant participants are embodied as parties-so-interrelated. Because there can be no absolutistic adoption and adaptation of identity in any form it follows that such indetermination of identity allows different relationships to overlap, and/or de-overlap. Correctly overlapping and de-overlapping are both taking place in order to account for the relative activation or relative non-activation of a relationship in question. Indeed, by such fluctuations in the intensity of interaction that we are allowed to say parties are relatively engaging or relatively disengaging or relatively non-engaging. Hence relational embodiment to that extent a relationship is being relatively engaged by the parties concerned from the perspective of those relevant parties. Is this on a mutual basis or a non-mutual basis? Correctly, in the manner of the former, i.e., to that extent processes of interaction entered are relatively mutual. E.g., we could talk to a pet rock but we could not consider that relationship to be a true conversation (between linguistic equals, or near equals, in a certain language community). So, our relational embodiment with our pet rocks is more a physical one (of proximity, nomination of a rock as a ‘pet rock’, etc.). Perception and treatment of our relationships as forms of embodiment establishes, metaphorically, etc., a basis for understanding how we can possibly relate in the first place. Moreover, it is also an expression of the fact that value issues forth from a relationship from every point in that relationship equally and spontaneously, albeit from the individual perspectives of those (arbitrarily conceived) ‘points’ (also treated as ‘moments’ in a temporal dimension). So, all in all, relational embodiment, wherein we are immersed with-others, should be accepted in order to observe a medium for the possible existential augmentation of value in that relationship in question. (57)

	How is this embodied relationship with others engineered, augmented, existentially re-directed, etc? Through a process of existentially orchestrated re-negotiations! Indeed, such a process is already existentially operative and formative of an expression of value in keeping with the existential ‘reality’ of that relationship, i.e., in a reflection of its current richness of modes of interaction actively engaged and in terms of the relative intensity of that relatively integrated complexity of modal engagement. Existential augmentation operating within such a pre-conditional environment already in place in that regard. Hence a recognition of an incremental existential augmentation. Furthermore, we should also recognize that in the process of incremental augmentation we might also leave ourselves open for processes of a chaotic-like complexion (along with an acceptance of consequences of an unintended nature). How are these processes of negotiation existentially augmented. Through adequate processes of re-alignment through adequate process of transcendental re-positioning, i.e. in and through the adequate instantiation of overall transcendental suspensions. Such endeavours being assisted through relational attunement (either through transcendental reservation by one or more parties on the behalf of all other parties) or collectively in a mutually collective manner through the general appropriation of a general responsibility in this matter. A successful process of re-negotiation either promoting an excess of value-in-formation and/or at least inhibiting a process of declining value-in-formation. The existential hallmarks of such an engaged encounter usually speaking for themselves in that regard! (58)

	How are such processes of existential engagement best promoted? Through the careful installation of a relevant self-organized criticality. Then, small contributions can realize consequences of a much greater extent. Furthermore, through emergence, new dimensions of value can be thematized. E.g., in the carving of a wooden bowl we now have the means for transporting a liquid like water, a better device for drinking than that of our outstretched hands held together in order to drink from, etc. Such a productive or counter-productive transition being realized when small inputs make for a greater degree of transformation in value (be that of assistance in our projects or to their apparent detriment). (59)

	What is the exact nature of value-in-circulation? It is the ‘economic’ activities and consequences of our processes of interaction (along with convergent/divergent senses of emergent value/s)? That in existential augmentation this activity is relatively enriched through the auspices of the relationship in question in the light of an existential transformation through apposite re-positioning. Such re-positioning is only promoted through the existential re-alignment realized in and through and beyond the adequate instantiations of a series of ongoing overall transcendental suspensions! (60)

	That by such means, through existential augmentation, we can effect an equivalence between value-in-circulation and its corresponding truth-determination! That, through existentially attuned processes of existential re-alignment, theoretical, practical and critical discourses can be critically re-evaluated through our attention to such resultant re-positioning/s, a state of affairs that can only be authenticated through a continuance of that same process of open engagement. Hence an existentially augmented value-in-circulation and its associated delivery of its corresponding truth-determinations, and v.v. Thence, the expression of such value from each and every point, equally and spontaneously, in that corresponding form of relational embodiment, albeit from their own points of view, enhanced in delivery through existentially re-attuned processes of re-negotiation with-others before-other! (61)

  Noël Tointon, Sydney, 24.10.09.
Postlude

	Many issues, that have arisen in this series of papers, need to be further addressed! On a general level, the nature of the existential (as a third moment) and the overall sense of the existential have for a first time been investigated in a more direct manner. Rather than merely describe existential hallmarks and preconditions for the same the very dynamics of value-formation, truth-determination have been directly faced in theoretical, practical and critical terms of reference. However, what has here been started remains only a start! What remains, still remains as an ongoing work in progress! N. (62)

Appendix A (63)

Heuristic Scheme for the Selective Determination of Value-Formation

Judgmental Aspect

…-…
Cognitive Aspect

Orders 1st		2nd		3rd		4th		5th 		6th 

Pre-essential			De-ontological			Hermeneutical
Aesthetical-essential 		Pragmatical			      Factual

…-…

Affective Aspect
Impressional-Mood

…-…

Physiological Aspect
Sensory-Motor
…………………………………………………………………………………………..

Transformation
Treatment-Retreatment
Of…

Analysis  and/or  Continuity  and/or   Synthesis
Noting…

Distinctions – Operations – Accommodations – Transformations