IV. A Dialectical Reading of Value: 
Harmonizing Phenomenal Circulation with Transcendental Non-Circulation*

0.    Introduction

	In a fourth paper on the ‘circulation of value’ I would like to establish the case for a double or parallel dialectical reading of the phenomenon of value-formation. In the previous paper I argued that there was dialectical difference (or gap or rift) between a necessary phenomenal-phenomenological circulation and its momentary, spontaneous, re-self-organization of state that (from a transcendental point of view of the relationship qua relationship) could not be circulatory in nature. In resolving this dilemma, in squaring the circle so to speak, I argued there were in effect two different points of view here with different readings of that phenomenon of value-formation. In this paper let me attempt to harmonize them (in and through a transcendental-phenomenological reading and in the process critically re-define what is implied in exercising a transcendental-phenomenological method). (1)

	In this paper, what is the new dilemma that is under review? In the previous paper I came to the conclusion, more or less, that from the point of view of the relationship itself we effectively arrived at a transcendental point of view. Such a perspective was momentary, spontaneous, re-self-organized, chaotically determined (in both senses of that expression), simultaneously effective at every point in that relationship equally in every realized event of bifurcation (i.e., re-self-organization). However, from the point of view of the relational participants we arrive at an economic model wherein circulation is the prerequisite for value-formation. That in and through circulation an investment is productive/reproductive of an existential excess that is re-invested in the relational body of that relationship and which is left behind as an existential residue. This residue could be understood as a (poly-textual) textual deposition upon the fabric of the world through processes of relational re-self-organization. My new dilemma is this: how do we formulate a reading that can harmonize these two types of reading in a critical format whose deeper insights will augment our process-understanding of phenomenal events be that from economic points of view or philosophical points of view, etc. (2)

	In order to explore this possibility I would like to first demonstrate a set of arguments that might establish this possibility and the possible successfulness of such an approach, i.e., can we practically and usefully run double readings in parallel? Second, how might this type of task be put into practice? Then, what benefits, if at all, might devolve from this type of dialectical approach? I will end this paper with a provisional conclusion and indicate what ramifications and areas of concern appear to flow on from this type of project. (3)

*Link to latest version of paper on Homestead Homepage Site (circulation4.rtf).

1.    On the Possibility of Parallel Readings

	A mountain can be viewed close up, from the distance and from the sides or the top of the same. Here, we can quite easily run parallel readings because we assume we are dealing with the same object of reference albeit from different perspectives. It is assumed that we can connect all these perspectives and, in effect, run a type of transformational position wherein we can move from any one perspective to some other merely through a commutative type of transformational transition. We might say “if my feet were here I would see this mountain in such and such a manner and if my feet were over there I would see the same phenomenon of the mountain albeit from that difference perspective.” That, in essence, all perspectives were part of one transformational set and only one transformational set. In other words, in practical terms of reference, all these different types of seeing this mountain can be experienced by the same person by merely walking to the appropriate place on the landscape that includes their being able to view this same instance of mountainous terrain (even though this infinity of points cannot all be totally accessed even though most would be accessible potentially). (4)

	When we conceptually review a certain relationship between certain subjects and/or objects in a certain relational context or set of contexts are we entitled to a relatively open, relatively unhindered form of transformational access to the same? Here we are already moving into problematic territory. For a start, is it not the case that being in that relationship would give us a different perspective upon that relationship to one we might form if we were outside the same? Consider the following: a and b are a married couple. Now an individual c could interact with this couple as a mere observer, as a friend, as a family member, as a lover of either a or b or both, etc. We could safely say that each of these different identities for c would result in a different type of perspective upon that couple a and b. The question that now could be posed is to ask does the person c in these various guises of relationship see that couple a and b in the same light? Are these views individually and collectively commutative? Do they all belong to one transformational set or could a meta-set be constructed to include these domains whether they overlapped or not with each other? (5)

	It is the case that c’s perspective is directed towards the couple ‘a and b’. However, these infinite varieties of perspectives are neither necessarily commutative nor accommodative through transformational interconnection. The relationship between a & b is a direct relationship for both a and b. On the other hand relatively private aspects of this relationship between a and b are not directly open for person c. Furthermore, that being the case, forms of accommodation cannot be reached between these polymorphic, non-commutatively symmetrical fields (other than the imputation that the relational participants are the same, when they are the same, in this artificial relational construct of the totality of possibilities between these three persons [in an infinite variety of settings or contexts]). On the other hand, one could also argue still for a residual relational setting which includes all three persons in their collective economic environment. What are the implications and ramifications of this example of relational poverty or circumscription? (6)

	For a start, one should narrow our focus down to the participants that directly appear to relate and interact in a certain defined relationship. By ‘direct’ we could invoke that aspect of a relationship that, essentially, is commutatively symmetrical. E.g., in a certain mutual act of perception a can see b and b can see a in a certain period of time around a certain point in space. Here we can invoke a shared perceptual relationship. Then, such relational circumscription granted, would we be able then to run a parallel, dialectical economy between a transcendental relational reading of that mutual (visual) relationship and its phenomenal-phenomenological economy or economies (when we have invoked a number of apparently mutual fields of interaction)? Given a mutual degree of relational circumscription I believe we should be able to do so. Let me examine this possibility. (7)

	Obviously, a cannot claim to see a through the eyes of b, and v.v. Yet a can tell b that they see them, and, b can tell a that they see them. All things being equal and nothing seemingly out of place both parties can assume this to be the case. They can confirm such ‘readings’ by waving to each other and then thinking, yes, they really do see me. How is this position altered if both a and b are seen seeing each other by another person c who can see these prior parties and, in turn, is seen by c? As long as all parties see each other, and can verbally confirm this fact for each other then the relationship is merely enlarged in terms of its participants. However in these more complex relationships b and c cannot see through the eyes of a, and v.v. Textually there is an asymmetry here although meta-textually through an inter-subjectivity of genre (of seeing another person) there is an asymmetry in that regard. The meta-textual dimension allows us to understand what it would mean for a to see b and for b to understand a’s signaled ability to indicate that they have been seen, etc. Now, as argued in other papers, the relationship between textual and meta-textual parallelisms is productive of the third moment of the non-textual in the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Then, stepping outside this circle, so to speak, realize the transcendental moment of the not-textual. Thence the associated phenomenal-phenomenological readings must be in some form of transformational coincidence with their ongoing transcendental readings, indeed, that all associated readings in this regard are merely readings extracted from the same experiential matrix of engagement (between those imputed subject/s and/or object/s in their imputed associated fields of engagement). That granted then properly formulated and formed ‘readings’ that are mutually coinciding (in the same field/s of engagement) must be unified by those imputed references within the transcendental unity of the Life-World (that guarantees such possibilities). However, at least one problem remains. If all relationships are directly engaged (by virtue of our being in that relationship) then how is it not possible to directly engage, e.g., what is seen by a through the eyes of a, thinks the thoughts of b as intentionally entertained by b, etc? How is it not possible to claim absolute transparency from any point in an engaged field given that communication to that effect, in part or in whole, is communicated spontaneously and equally from every point in the requisite relationship under examination (in accordance with our non-classical model of communication as a process of re-self-organization)? Because absolute transparency is impossible to realize intentionally (since intentionality is only the ongoing resolution of intentional dissonance or difference and such harmonization cannot be an absolute affair [given that harmonization necessitates some form of resistance to-be-overcome, and, the process of over-coming cannot be absolutely overcome without ceasing immediately once one completely overcame what was to be overcome; i.e., as stated, harmonization is not an absolute affair!]). Furthermore, through intentional limitations, object/s and/or subject/s cannot be absolutely appropriated be that directly or indirectly. On the other hand, in a relationship recognized as such there can be no absoluteness of opacity in intentional content! If you are thinking something and seeing something then you are thinking something (as an intentional object) and seeing something (as a perceptual object). That thematization may not be able to proceed further, still, once cognized it can only be cognized in more detail until such a time we have relatively confirmed our reading of the situation-to-hand or realize a relatively radical re-interpretation of the same. That ‘body of water on the horizon’ looks like ‘water’ which on further inspection proves either to be or not to be a non-virtual body of water. All this granted, if all relationships are directly engaged why is not possible to see and think as if telepathically with another person, indeed, with all other persons, and even all other objects be they rocks or mountains, stars and galaxies, e.g., etc? I am, e.g., currently engaged in perceiving a person who is looking at a flower very closely. I can see this person and I can see the flower they are apparently engaged with perceptually. Still, I cannot claim to see what they see (and directly think what they think). Does this matter? If I am directly in a visual relationship with person x who is looking closely at a flower why is it the case that I cannot directly see what they are seeing? If all relationships are directly engaged how is it that I cannot directly engage also those relationships directly engaged by others? In other words, how should I define an indirect relationship? By noting those relationships that are non-commutative and asymmetrical. In effect, noting imputed relationships that are obstructed or obstruct our direct perceptions of the same (with such perceived ‘obstruction/s’ being non-obstructively noted meta-textually [through inter-subjectivity of genre]. E.g., object x is seen by a from point p’ and that same object x is seen by b from p’’ therefore the ‘seeing of object x by a is not the same seeing of object x by b’! Therefore the relationship is non-commutative and hence equally non-symmetrical for both parties (through a difference in perspectives and non-commutation). On the other hand, through non-absolute opacity a similarity of relationship can be entertained by both parties in respect to their being able to view that same object x, etc. Furthermore, non-absolute co-formulation of field/s (of interpretation) and intentional motivation (of interpretation) ensures a non-absolute coincidence of readings between these parties (and the same party once retentional disruption has taken place). Still, given adequate formations of genre, adequate intentional motivation, etc., a degree of conformity can be communicated indirectly between the interacting parties privy to that type of particular field under investigation. Such intentional patterns of intentional conformity taking place between the extremes of absolute opacity and absolute transparency. Our ability to co-interact between and within such extremes indicting a degree of mutual re-self-organization of communicative exchange. I can see x and you tell me you can see x and I see you apparently looking at x implies a degree of mutual communicative conformity in regards to this apparent co-perception of x. The social, inter-personal reality of this type of situation being reinforced through reinforcement of intentionally expressed observations and comments, etc. Thence our mutual communicative interaction in this regard to that extent we both concur that we both appear to see x as x’, an intentional object-state that is x-like in its co-engagement by both parties (and thence the semantic truth of this situation to the extent we agree x iff x’/x’ iff x). Now it follows that this communicative co-understanding granted then in that relationship of understanding an ongoing spontaneous, momentary transcendental appreciation of that co-communicated relationship is co-incident with its perceived circulation of value (of its phenomenal-phenomenological content). Let me argue for this conclusion and note the philosophical concerns we might wish to co-express in that regard and unpack the ramifications of this type of position. (8)

	I have argued that between the impossibility of absolute opacity and the impossibility of absolute transparency that some degree of intentional content can be co-authored and mutually entertained in the mutuality of a communicative act of co-understanding. That granted, I would now like to address the question of the possibility of a mutual co-understanding of an intentionally focused upon relationship and its associated value-formation, i.e. can we co-determine the truth value of a certain relationship shared in a mutually communicated act of simulated/re-simulated value-formation. I.e., can there be mutual transcendental/phenomenal-phenomenological readings of a mutually engendered relationship? In essence – yes! As a process - realized in and through time, and, subject to a mutual process of mutual appreciation in such a manner as to co-reveal a relative conformity of truth value. That, furthermore, where and when relevant, this process of mutual engagement can be existentially augmented (in an authenticity of being-with-others). (9)

	Quite simply, all that needs to be done is to show that the entertainment of a relationship establishes a degree of mutual territory to complete this type of double reading, and, that without this appreciation of the relationship there could be no appreciation of the economics of that relational content, and v.v.! (10)

	Our appreciation of a certain relationship must be a relationship between something and something else (if only between aspects or perspectives in (a) certain object/s and/or subject/s or set/s of the same). A relationship must have perceived relational participants. Perceptions of either, the relationship or its participants, cannot be absolute demarcated because their dialectical interactions establishes the associated ‘external’ relationships and their ‘internal’ economies. How is our intentional focus to shift from one to the other, etc? Through the imposition/re-imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, etc., within the confines of simulation/re-simulation of the ‘same’ relational field in question. In meta-appreciation we realize the field in question and through appreciation of that field an appreciation of that relational economy is realized. And here is a clue as to how we are able to switch our focus from the relative externality of a relationship to the relative internality of the economics of its value-formation. Indeed, we can also note that a mutuality between meta-field/s of appreciation and field/s of appreciation allows us to perceive both the ‘internal’ value of that field and the ‘external’ field of that value. To achieve this we merely privilege, non-absolutely, either the meta-field of appreciation or the field of appreciation by oscillating between an overall transcendental suspension or a suspension of the same, etc., without disrupting this point of balance between both. (11)

	Theoretically, we can appreciate the relatively external relationship in question and its relatively internal economic content, and, subject the former, in turn, to a process of appreciation, i.e., meta-appreciation… reducing the relatively external field to a relatively internal economic input. Suspending the same returns us to the situation of the appreciation of a field in question. Thence our oscillation between relatively external fields and the relative internality of economic content is merely a matter of appreciation/meta-appreciation and their reversal through de-appreciation/de-meta-appreciation, etc. I would argue that this doubling is instrumental in the very formation of intentional subjectivity, and, hence relatively non-problematic in this regard. I.e., by being a subject we are able to both appreciate and meta-appreciate the relationship between texts and meta-texts (and their mutual relationship of a relatively non-textual nature). Then, our appreciation of the non-textual relationship between textual points of focus and meta-textual fields is instrumental in our subjective appreciation of such economic content. (12)

	What is the net result of such oscillations of focus/non-focus? The experience and deposition of an ongoing existential excess! Dialectically there can be no relational communication without the expression and appreciation of relational content within its associated economy of presentation/re-presentation, and v.v. Thence the necessary co-formation of parallel fields of relational communication! What philosophical concerns might one have in regard to this, and, what are the philosophical ramifications of this recognition of an existential excess in value-formation? (13)

2.    Provisional Concerns and Conclusions

	Various concerns might be voiced or resurrected. The resurrection of external world/s of ‘objectivity’ and internal world/s of subjectivity is to fall back into a natural attitude that cannot be run philosophically. As a metaphor the use of ‘the external world’ in the non-philosophical world need not be experienced as problematic in this regard. However, under critical philosophical examination this metaphor breaks down and generally renders the philosophical world of critical discourse a great disfavour through persevering with its impossible tenure. Similarly, the absolute disconnect within and between so-called ‘internal world/s’ is equally invalid in all forms of adequately critical philosophical discourse. We communicate with others and, therefore, absolute internality must be an absolute fiction! No doubt numerous concerns could be voiced. Such question finding resolution either through clarification of this exposition in a transcendental-phenomenological philosophical style of practice or seriously meeting such criticisms through a critically exercised modification involved in the manner of its formulation and exercise. On the other hand, moving beyond the voicing of our concerns, either hypothetically or non-hypothetically, the ramifications of this existential treatment of the Life-World should be seen as not other than as profound! E.g., there is the deposition of an existential excess as an existential residue which as a fact can only counter the completely negative nature of a relatively directionless Postmodern discourse be that deconstruction, destruction or mere distraction. As a consequence, questions of existential augmentation can now enter our investigations of value along with the facilitation of their economic realization, along with the introduction of the psycho-dynamics of transcendental reservation, explanations for the limited preservation of existential descriptors and existential axes, etc. (in our addressing philosophical and existential problems of identity, communication, appreciation of complexity and determinations of resultant truth-values, etc.). (14)

	In this understanding, to date, there is now no place for the necessity of an ideal realm of reality that underpins the meaning and meaningfulness of this world of the here and now. Similarly, essence need not be determined in terms of essentially inherent patterns of value-formation embedded in an absolutist, substantial mode. A tree is no longer, nor ever was or could be, a tree by virtue of an ideal form of a tree or a be a tree by virtue of some absolutely inherent unchanging tree substance. A tree-phenomenon persists in and through time for a certain period of time by virtue of its current integrity and the maintenance of its physiological preservation. A tree-phenomenon persists by virtue of its relatively internal and relatively external prerequisites involved in that type of existential descriptor. Correctly, it is a relative concurrence of those harmonized pre-conditions that allow it to enter into phenomenal-phenomenological existence-for-us and to leave its mark in the form of an existential surplus of value, the simulation/re-simulation of that integrity, etc. (15)

	It is in reconstituting a critical understanding of our engagements within the transcendental expanse of the Life-World that we find a non-reductive residue of value produced/re-produced within those relationships under investigation. Postmodern examinations (and privileging of the meta-textual) has to date generally been unable to recognize this existential aspect of experience. Similarly, a Modernist preoccupation with texts has also been unable to recognize this existential aspect of experience. Then, from the recognition of an overall transcendental suspension and overall hermeneutic circle of comprehension along with a double reading of the phenomenal-phenomenological/transcendental we should be able to carve out for a post-postmodern Contemporary era a more viable philosophy of value noting both its economic formation and non-economic communication, as well as noting the distinctions and accommodations between different forms of value, be they relatively simple forms of ordered value or relatively complex forms of ordered value (as noted and examined elsewhere). 

							    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.4.09.

Postscript

	Where now are we headed? In future papers I would like to look further at this double nature of the transcendental-phenomenological method, clearly articulate its key ingredients (in the light of this recent work on value-formation), establish the rescue of philosophy from the current throes of Postmodernism through examining this concept of an existential excess and it deposition as an existential residue, and, present a short paper “on the circulation of value” that succinctly summarized the innovations and re-directions that flow on from all senses of current re-positioning…, N.