2.    The Exposition of Our Topic

	Our topic is the phenomenological exploration of a hypothetical theology in which is examined the possible significance of the theological concepts of identity, work and value. (134)

The theological concept of identity is the (hypothetical) formulation of what might be constituted by the embodied identity of the Divine; in part based upon the metaphorical concept of a parallel emptiness being involved in the constitution of personal identity (on the philosophical grounds that the parallel phenomena of consciousness and self-consciousness are but universal aspects of a single phenomenon as understood in the constitution [of the epistemological organization] of the constitution of any phenomenon - be it conscious or otherwise, etc). (135)

	The theological concept of work is the (hypothetical) exploration of the possible avenues such a religious concept might be found valuable in the religious life of an individual or community, etc. By ‘valuable’ is meant the manner such a concept is found to function that proffers a religious semblance of phenomenal sense, hermeneutical meaning and existential meaningfulness. Essentially, we are exploring how the concept of the Divine might function, or appears to function, philosophically in its appropriate religious setting(s) (from a general or specifically claimed perspective). (136)

	The theological concept of value is the (hypothetical) exploration of the possible meta-theological value such a concept of work possesses in the collective totality of our understanding of its various forms and formats involving these semblances of sense, (through theological identity) meaning (through theological work) and meaningfulness (as the theological value of the work of that identity as situated in its personal/social context/s under examination). In other words an exploration of the ‘value of the work (thought entailed by that theological identity through its relationships with the world)’ discovered or thought to be present in a particular philosophical, religious or ideological form or generalized format. (137)

	All research is to be seen as occupying a conventional frame of reference or a set(s) of conventional frames of reference wherein we explore, through the auspices of an appropriate, proper and validly conducted overall transcendental suspension (wherein the entire hermeneutic circle is subject to ongoing processes of balance), the phenomenal constitution of that under examination whether experienced/re-experienced directly (in an empirical-like frame of reference) or non-directly (in a hypothetical mode of operation). Our researching taking a phenomenological orientation through the imposition of this thorough overall transcendental suspension wherein we engage the constitution of that under examination as that apparent constitution qua ‘constitution that is apparent to ourselves subjectively/to us intersubjectively’. In this endeavour our prejudices as prejudgments are suspended not obliterated or ignored! The nature of prejudgments are allowed to constituting the nature of that conventional frame of reference under examination. Our encompassing phenomenological frame of reference recognizing these prejudices as ontological commitments and subjecting them as they appear to an act of transcendental balance through an invocation of their contrary prejudgmental form(s) and subsequent neutralization of their ensuing natural bias by this process of non-destructive bracketing. Indeed, the presence both of our prejudices and our recognition of the same are necessary before our research can be given this transcendental flavour through the thorough imposition of an overall transcendental suspension that realizes this recognition of the intentional constitution of that under examination. This is not some mysterious process in some esoteric form of intuition but merely a better acquaintance with what happens normally in the consciously formed course of our own lives each moment by moment as we interact and engage with things, others and our own senses of self…. (137)

	As previously noted our three topics of identity, work and value coincide with the moments of our hermeneutic circle that parallel the gestalt inputs of object, ego and world respectively. In this light we can now identify identity with sense, i.e., a retrospective phenomenological examination of intentional formation as it is involved in the presentation/re-presentation of an intentional point of focus upon an intentional object-state. Similarly, work involves the spontaneity of an existential orientation placed upon the realization of that meaningfulness to be found in the relationship as intentionally constructed/re-constructed. Finally, value concerns itself primarily with a prospective, hermeneutic orientation that involves a determination of the general meaning of that intentional process through an examination of its general constitution (through a determination of genre, form, format, etc.). All three aspects examine various aspects involved in the presentation and re-presentation of a relationship. At this point in our explorations let me examine what might be involved in such an investigation and the consequences it might have for an overall appreciation of our topic. (138)

	Too often people mistake metaphorical ways of seeing the world in too literal a manner! Metaphors are set up to make a point or a series of points. We should not be mesmerized by the manner of their pointing but, more importantly, we should concern ourselves with the object point to, or, rather, the objective being alluded to! All metaphors are insightful into the constitution of the world but they cannot be absolutely literalized and therein treated in that type of concrete mode. Furthermore, being context dependent we should not treat them in isolation. Then, being context dependent, through making them dependent upon their corresponding contexts we discover the degree to which they are proper, appropriate and relatively valid in their being exercised as limited analogical instruments and not as unlimited, literal concretely objectified analogical objectives. As such, such an investigation needs to recognize the limits naturally imposed upon it by the nature of its metaphorical mission, etc. In this light we need to completely readdress how one should understand, or, rather misunderstand the ingrained insight and philosophical habit that, for example, interminably asks us “to see beyond the appearance to the reality of the reality behind the same”. As just noted, metaphor often do have a limited, successful point to make in their pre-determined attempt to reconfigure our understanding of the world and create, therein, a better appreciation of the same. There are many occasion in which we should examine more intently the appearances we have before us in order to discern their true import, their true intent (that appears to ‘impel’ their intentional constitution). But, then, even though we may see faces upon the surfaces of clouds we do not normally think them to then possess personalities. Similarly, as our intentionality is spilt upon the world in our passage through this World-of-Life a closer examination of the same might bear different fruit than that deposited, in turn, from a mere superficial examination of the same. E.g., a certain ‘friend’ may be simulating a certain depth of friendship but warned by a true friend to look more closely we may well find ourselves changing our opinion about this so-called ‘friend’ from finding discrepancies in their account(s) of their behaviour, certain explanations of intent, etc., that hitherto had escaped our less perceptive notice. So, such a metaphor has some limited degree of usefulness. However, taken as a philosophical maxim it causes more psychic and psychological damage from its being treated so concretely! Let me be both honest and blunt – there just is no reality hiding behind the superficial surfaces of appearances! Moreover, there just is no ‘intrinsic reality’ in any form or format whatsoever be it appearances or in-depth non-appearances in the form of so-called ‘reality’ or ‘realities! But, let us firmly dismiss the latter - there just is no so-called ‘reality’ masquerading behind the surfaces of appearances except in the trivial sense as just outlined above (when a closer examination of what ‘there-is-to-hand’ then gives us a better appreciation of the nature of that which is ‘already to-hand’)! There can only be ‘appearances’ as phenomenal presentations subjected to phenomenological re-presentation, and, such appearances likewise cannot be treated, or, rather, mistreated, as intrinsically self-constituted in their own right! Furthermore, the sheer denial of an intrinsic self-existence is not the denial of a relational existence per se! In this phenomenological attitude towards the world both the intrinsic existence of an ego and the intrinsic existence of an object-state (and its corresponding field of operation) just cannot be contemplated! And by extension both the hypothetically treated existence of the Divine and the non-hypothetically treated existence of the Divine cannot be conceived in such an impossible mode whether interpreted epistemologically and/or ontologically! Let me examine why this type of phenomenal attitude cannot entertain this literal treatment of appearance(s) as a surface obstruction that normally, or abnormally, prevents us from a valid appreciation of this ‘deeper, inner reality’, and, why we cannot treat any state of affairs in an intrinsic mode be it either as a so-called ‘superficial vision of appearances’ or as a so-called ‘depth-vision of reality’. (139)

	In the pseudo-philosophical dialectical debate of change versus non-change there just is neither “something that can change” nor is there “something that does not change”. Both ‘change’ and ‘non-change’ are extreme metaphorically extrapolated positions that just cannot be thought ‘in pure thought’ let alone ‘recognized’ in the reality of phenomenal experience. As all phenomena are without intrinsic existence there can be no non-nominal logical subject that remains invariant in its passage through the Life-World be it self-oriented (in its demonstration of a consciousness and a self-consciousness) or non-self-oriented (through its relative absence of a consciousness and a self-consciousness). Without the subsistence of an invariant non-nominal logical subject there can be no process of change where the denominated subject or object is ‘subjected’ superficially to a process of transformation. On the other hand, in a conditional exposition and analysis there is “change” as a “process of transformation” where that process is both phenomenal and phenomenlogically entertained when phenomenally denominated. In other words ‘this set of conditions’ produces/re-produces ‘that set of conditions’, etc., without any appeal  whatsoever to a superficial transformation of an invariant logical subject, etc. In this process of conditional transformation it is the apparent process of conditional transformation itself (conceived non-intrinsically) that is the locus of change and not some entity intrinsically invariant to that process. In this light there can be neither a process of pure change nor a pure something that remains unchanged in the course of that transformation. To conceive otherwise is to literalize our metaphor of ‘change’ and swallow at the same time an impossible contradiction (that would not be such a patent contradiction if treated merely as metaphorical, relative, limited and provisional in the experiential extent of that phenomenological process of intentional treatment). In the “process of ‘denomination’” there is the “‘process’ of denomination”, and vice versa. Identity is nominal and need not be arbitrary or treated merely as an illusion. Of course there is the occasional perception of an illusion but to say that “the world is nothing but an illusion” is to rob such a proposition of all sense, etc., a state of affairs not easily (ap)perceived in the afterglow of the metaphor(ical shell) itself. An “illusion” is “not a non-illusion” if we rewrite everything in the world as an illusion. Otherwise what would be relatively illusory and what would be relatively non-illusory? As a phenomenon an illusion can only operate if most of the illusory process is itself non-illusory (just as when someone tells a lie most of what they say has to be true). If there can be no non-illusory state of affairs there, therefore, can be no illusory state affairs likewise. Without one there can be no other. And if there are only ‘degrees of illusoriness’ then there must be, equally, ‘degrees of non-illusoriness’! Hence the preservation of this relative status quo must be preserved in both the artificially separated spheres of the phenomenal and the phenomenological, and, thence, in any metaphorical treatment that uses any metaphor based upon that type of phenomenon. So, the phenomenon of the illusion is based upon some form of deception that itself cannot be a deception. In the same manner, a metaphor based upon the phenomenon of an illusion can make no sense if it’s now treated merely a pure deception – a state of affairs that can be neither mentally entertained (as a possibility) nor factually recognized (as an actuality). (140)
	
	In a feeble attempt to formulate an objection one might say that “as we only see the surfaces of objects therefore we are only presented with ‘appearances’ and not the ‘reality’ of that object itself’”? Such a proposition has a certain truth about it, however, in the reality of the Life-World all relationships are directly entered into! So, in a perceptual relationship we are directly interacting with that intentionally re-presented perceptual object-state itself. This is no superficial interaction but an intentional interaction with the intentional object as-intended itself (without the need for the metaphysical imputation of a non-intentionally constituted object-state being interacted with ‘indirectly’). True, it is only the surfaces of that object-state that are perceived when it can be validly perceived as a perceptual object-state. But, that is not the entire picture. Our interaction with that object-state is also intentionally oriented and in our direct relational experience of the same that is the exact opposite of being superficial (for how else can we ‘truly’ say we are seeing such and such an object-state, etc.)! We interact with that intentional object-state as an embodied perceiver directly engaged with the same regardless of its truly valid status as a perceptual-like object-state, or, as an illusory object-state, or, as a recollected object-state, or, as a denominated object-state, or, as an inferred object-state, or, as an imagined object-state, etc., etc. To say we only see the ‘surfaces’ of objects, etc., is to treat all object-states to this metaphor of the ‘surface’ and then to see our seeing as merely ‘superficial’. Extrapolating further we then envisage, metaphorically, that ‘reality’ is occluded and obstructed by our only seeing the ‘superficial’ now treated as merely an ‘appearance’. Then, ‘imprisoned’ in this ‘world of appearances’ we form the desire to truly engage with ‘reality-itself’ through informing ourselves that we should be dealing with reality not the merely superficial. Of course, this ‘desire to engage with reality’ is only a mis-recognition of the fact that we are already dealing directly with reality and somehow this ‘intuition’ needs to be re-discovered through this ‘seeing through the superficial surfaces of things’ to the ‘inner reality hidden behind the same’. Such a notion is an absolute nonsense. We have absolutely literalized only one aspect of visual perception and then extended it as a blanket to cover all processes of consciousness with a variety of consequences that can only disastrous. Then, even though we may say we are playing this rather silly game in a closer reading of the reality of the experience involved it can be shown that we could not be doing what we say we are doing! When we perceptually see something and that act of perception is conventionally valid then we are, in truth, actually engaged in seeing just that object-state as intended, albeit from out own point of view! Reality is forever directly engaged! There can only be one-Life-World for how else could we interact with each other in a world that, in part, can be pointed to if not for that very fact that we are already directly engaged with each other and our discernment of things in this world! So, let us no longer be trapped in this pointless exercise that totally misconstrues ‘reality’ as existing behind or beyond a world of appearances, and, that our engagement with this ‘reality’ can only occur when we ‘see beyond’ a superficial form of seeing! The metaphor of appearance has a small place in our visualization of the world and in our work involved in our being in this world, but, let us get use to this fact that what we engage can only be appearances and only appearances, i.e., phenomena as examined through our direct phenomenological engagement with the same! (141)

	Such an illuminating metaphor (of the superficial, etc.) ceases to be illuminating when it ceases to be a metaphor. There will be occasions when a ‘closer reading’ is called for, when an ‘in-depth look’ is needed. But, how close is ‘close’ when (transcendental) distance is also called for in our appreciation of the text (whether classical or non-classical in the intent of its intentional formulation). This ‘contradiction’ between ‘close’ and ‘distant’ being overcome through the appropriate utilization of the overall transcendental suspension wherein a psychic balance is put into effect through a balance of contrasting inputs, etc. (such as, e.g., aspects of the immanent and transcendent, etc.). Elsewhere in this extended essay let me examine the disastrous consequences that stem from such a distorted metaphorical treatment/treatment that involves a metaphysical distortion of the world (from both relatively spiritual and non-spiritual perspectives). Instead, let me note the implications that can and should be drawn in the hypothetical formulation of a possibly viable theology(?). (142)

	In our engagement with the world in this one-World-of-Life we, as conditioned phenomena, interact with other conditioned phenomena. Such ‘appearances’ are the phenomena that we deal with. It is for this reason that the transcendental phenomenologist argues that they deal with appearances and only appearances, i.e., that-which-appears-for-them! Indeed, that which cannot exist-for-us has no phenomenal/phenomenological existence-for-us. So, the so-called reality of a ‘hidden reality’ is of no concern for such practical persons. Furthermore, there is no absolute distinction drawn between the phenomenal and its re-presentational representation in and through its intellectual, i.e., conscious simulation re-created in its engagement from a phenomenological perspective. In general terms we can refer to phenomena. In practical, less theoretical terms of reference we are dealing more with a particularly-oriented sense of the phenomenological, i.e., the simulation of that phenomenal state of affairs as that being re-presented by-us for-us (when considered from either a subjective orientation or an intersubjective-orientation). Now, we should understand that this sense of the simulation is as a ‘simulation of a simulation’ and never as a ‘simulation of that not-simulated per se’ (before, during or after that act of simulation). Only through a ‘presentation of a presentation’, i.e., as a re-presentation, is the phenomenological entertained. Hence representation is only through re-presentation and never representation per se. Thence the phenomenological appreciation of the phenomenal, and, that the phenomenological process is itself a phenomenal process that can be represented through its intentionally objectified phenomenological treatment in turn. Thus, there can be no pure sense of either the phenomenal or the phenomenological – only the phenomenal-phenomenologically oriented process, or, the phenomenological-phenomenally oriented process (when we adopt a more reflexive point of view). (143)

	In the light of the above I would like to draw the following conclusions as apposite for a potentially viable hypothetically formulated theology. (144)

	The critical theologian just as much as the critical non-theologian is going to be dealing with phenomena. But even though they are going to be dealing with what appears in either general terms of reference or in particular terms of reference they are not dealing with superficial presentations/representations that occlude a deeper, inner reality! For them representations are ‘re-presentations’, i.e., ‘simulations’, but, as ‘simulation of simulations’ and never as ‘simulations’ that are ‘illusory representations’ of the non-illusory and non-simulated. For the critical theologian there can be no intrinsic existence in any form or format whatsoever! For such a critical philosopher neither the sense (etc.) of the relatively Divine nor the relatively non-Divine will be represented, i.e., misrepresented, in any impossible intrinsic mode whatsoever! In a philosophy devoid of metaphysical imputation they will argue for hypothetical and non-hypothetical formulations of the Divine without recourse to any notion of a non-conditional sense of an invariant self-existence, subsistence, etc. “As below – so above” could well be a motto for such a person (as long as one does not hypostatize this notion of ‘above’, etc., or treat it as anything other than metaphorical [although metaphor should also be recognized as metaphoring the world to some extent at the same time]). Such a critical specialist operates, therefore, without the baggage of such misguided metaphysicians, etc. The ramifications of this critical type of position(less-position realized through the overall transcendental suspension) extending to their formulation/re-formulation of identity, work and value. (145)

	Now, the critical theologian will find themselves dealing neither with superficial appearances nor occluded states of affairs. They will be dealing with phenomenal appearances in relatively hypothetical and/or relatively non-hypothetical modes of operation conducted within the open-ended embrace of a phenomenological presentation/re-presentation. So, the question must be asked can the Divine phenomenologically present itself as a phenomenon or set of phenomena? Let me explore this question from a relationally oriented point of view, i.e., from a phenomenological treatment of what it means “to be in a relationship”. (146)

	Phenomena are phenomenologically re-presented in order to be relatively fixed in intentional consciousness before our sense of a self-consciousness. Hence this iterative/re-iterative treatment of the phenomenal as a ‘simulation of a simulation’ rather than as a ‘simulation of that which is not simulated’. But, if everything is merely a simulation in this sense of a ‘simulation of a simulation’ what meaningful significance could this vision of simulation possess if everything were merely a simulated process (using the same type of argument just used by myself to dismiss any mistreatment of the world as a mere illusion, etc.)? If we appear to absolutely privilege this concept of ‘simulation’ what meaning would the expression ‘non-simulation’ possess in order to informatively contrast the former expression of ‘simulation’? The expression ‘simulation’ is informatively contrasted through our invocation of a hermeneutic circle of comprehension. It is a coded expression, in many ways, for the dialectical relationship and debate between the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘phenomenological’ along with the ‘phenomenon of the phenomenological’ and our ‘phenomenological treatment of the phenomenal’, etc., etc. The same sort of ‘debate’ and dialectical oscillation between the transcendental and the non-transcendental; the passive reception of information and the active entry, manipulation, collection, alteration and representation of information; the contrasts between the textual, meta-textual and the non-textual, and, their collective interaction in the semblance and ‘direct simulation’ of the not-textual, etc., etc. So ‘simulation’ as the ‘simulation of a simulation’ is never a mere simulation because it is both phenomenal and phenomenological, etc. Hence ‘simulation’ as the ‘simulation of simulation’ is just not a mere process of simulation, but, at the same time, it is equally not a process of simulation that simulates that which cannot be simulated. Into this space between the phenomenal and the phenomenological, etc., contrast is both found and re-created… along with this concept of the simulation as the phenomenological treatment of the phenomenal…. (147)

	Now, simulation can be both of the conventionally valid and the conventionally invalid. What cannot be dismissed is the overall validity of the phenomenological treatment of such a phenomenal process as a ‘phenomenological process’. Only when that phenomenological process is itself treated as the intentional object-state of a meta-phenomenological process can we start to assess the conventional validity of that process. So, I am not mistaken that I entertained as certain idea x. Only when I have intentionally objectified that process (x1) am I in a position to begin to ascertain the conventional validity of the same. Perhaps, e.g., I interpreted x = y but later discovered that that process of identification could not be upheld. Then, again, that process of evaluation itself could be reviewed and found wanting, etc. (148)

	Truth evaluation, thus, is never a non-conventional process! It is forever an evaluation of what is to-hand where what-is-to-hand is always viewed through a certain intentional perspective or set of intentional perspectives on a relatively meta-textual basis. So, thus, truth is always context dependent! That context determining what would be regarded as being true when those conditions are found to consistently apply (and where anomalies can be effectively disregarded or dis-valued?). (149)

	Entering into a relationship we experience directly the nature of that relationship. In a relationship we directly experience the simulation of the intentional object-states between which that relationship is simulated. In the intentional re-presentation of that relationship, the simulation of that simulation, we effectively entertain (and simulate) a ‘non-simulation’ or that which is ‘not a simulation of that relationship’ by virtue of the fact that there is this directness of interaction between those parties. Hence the directness of the relationship (experienced by its participants) establishes (through the power of the overall transcendental suspension) a sense of simulation that can be no mere simulation! The flavour of that relationship, the essential nature of that relationship, being realized through the resolution of the relative dissonance experienced within that relationship in that transcendental space-time between the enstructuring of the transcendent orientation and its process-enactment of the immanent orientation. Now, a relationship itself can be experienced ‘indirectly’ and ‘directly’. ‘Directly’ has just been accounted for through our direct existential engagement. ‘Indirectly’ is realized when the relationship is experienced from without that relationship itself; when it is simulated as an intentional object-state in the context of another relationship wherein the nature of that perceived is pre-determined (by the genres adopted and adapted as the nature of that context being focused upon). The difference between the direct and indirect experience of a relationship, in some respects, is essentially a matter of entanglement. In indirectly reviewing a relationship the same is effectively objectified and simulated as the intentional object-state to be experienced in such a viewing. However, in simulating the simulation a point is reached when through this act of non-simulation we are no longer objectifying the relationship but actually entering into its direct simulation. Under those circumstances we have become entangled in the direct constitution of that relationship. But, to what extent is that simulation merely simulated and not engaged in and through an act that is ‘non-simulated’ through the ‘simulation of that simulation’? E.g., x is in a relationship Rxy with y, and vice versa. Now, how can z entertain that same relationship Rxy? As things stand only an objectified orientation towards the general nature of that relationship can be understood indirectly through a selection of an assortment of genres that appear to be appropriate for the type of relationship x and y might be able to entertain both privately and publicly. But the relatively particular uniqueness of that relationship can not be entertained (in an unqualified manner). If, on the other hand, x and y ‘permit’ z to enter into a relationship with them then all three parties are now in a relationship Rxyz with each other. Rxy and Rxyz must bear some form of resemblance with respect to each other, by virtue of their common participants of x and y, they still cannot be identical. On the other hand, they cannot be absolutely non-identical and it is through this ground shared in common, namely the Life-World, that a relationship can be entertained to some degree or other in both a directly internal manner and an indirectly external manner. This one qualification accepted (that there can be no absolute sense of relational isolation) how is entanglement permitted in such a manner that all participant are able to simulate the flavour of their collective relationships? By sharing the same ‘time’ and ‘space’ of that relationship. In other words there must be an historical process of engagement through a coordination of coordinates that allow for this degree of an active participation in that shared relationship (whether it be between two participants, one participant with respect to aspects of themselves, or, more than two participants, etc). The spatial and temporal coordinates of that relationship must be able to coincide within the ambit of the associated realty of that relationship. So, e.g., I can shake the hand of a person in front of me because the conditions for the same are already present for that to take place. So, e.g., I can telephone a friend when that friend answers the telephone even though we are geographically separated, still, in the geography of that relationship, when we actually speak to each other by phone we enter the ‘space’ of that direct relationship by telephone in that same period of time. Similarly, when we leave a message on the answering machine, when that message is replayed to the appropriate person we have, in effect, ‘entered’ the same ‘time’ and ‘space’ of that relationship that involves a ‘receiving of a message’ despite these more apparent spatial and temporal discontinuities from a non-telephonic point of view. Hence entanglement is preconditionally set up when there is a ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ coincidence of coordinates in accordance with the spatial and temporal coordinates appropriate to the nature of that type of relationship. Furthermore, when the correctly denominated logical subjects also entertain that relationship then the conditional nature of that relationship is engaged when there is a recognition by those parties that that relationship has been entered into in the appropriate manner. So, there is no point in picking up the telephone receiver to phone someone if that phone is not plugged into the telephone network or the cell phone in use has no power, etc. (150)

	When, then, is this sense of entanglement engaged/re-engaged? When the necessary preconditions of that relationship are in place and the conditional nature of that relationship is actually being engaged. Only this conjunction of the preconditional and the conditional can adequately ensure the realization of the ensuing post-conditional (and thence reflect the hermeneutic circle in its entirety through its polarized implication of these temporal orientations of past, present and future respectively). Now, the relative absence of some of these conditions establishes only the relatively indirect version of that relationship (even though the nature of that ‘indirect relationship’ is itself directly engaged in terms of that indirect context of engagement). Hence the flavour of a relationship is simulated through the holistic imprinting of those features actually engaged in the body of that relationship as we entangle ourselves with that relationship in the light of the ongoing resolution of dissonance permitted to constitute that relationship (within the requisite level and kind of awareness to be necessarily found in our intentional consciousness apparently engaged in that particular type of relationship). (151)

	Through our embodied ‘grounding’ in the Life-World we have the potential entry to all relationships to be found with in the World-of-Life since this one-World-of-Life is constituted from the sum total of those relationships. Furthermore, this guarantee is open to us, in theory, since there can be neither a pure potentiality nor a pure actuality. On the other hand, permission to enter a relationship can only be ‘granted’ when the appropriate preconditions and conditions are to hand – this ‘entry’ being simulated through the simulation of an entry and the induction, therein, of such an entry through the simulation of that simulation. In this respect the ‘virtual’ becomes relatively non-virtual when the necessary preconditions, conditions are simulated. So, I can imagine what it would be for me to be on the other side of the street in a virtual mode. That virtual mode of being ceasing to be virtual when I walk across the street and take up a position on the other side of that street. On the other hand, I can only imagine what it means to be home if in arriving at my front-door I find I do not have a key that will let in through that locked door, or, when the door cannot be opened for me from either side, and, I have no other means of assess to my home currently to hand. In this regard, with respect to ourselves, we could then define the virtual and the non-virtual as a non-coincidence or coincidence respectively between a transcendental sense of a(n imagined sense of) self and the psychic center of our currently embodied sense of self. So, in the light of this definition, e.g., I am home when the transcendental sense of self coincides with my embodied sense of self and the latter is geographically located within the four walls of my residence. (152)

The essential nature of a relationship is holistically embraced within the experiential extent of that relationship through the simulation of that simulation. Because the nature of a relationship is constituted through the ongoing resolution of the dissonance within the consonance of the body of that relationship it follows that that essential nature must permeate the totality of that relationship. Hence the relational ‘time’ and ‘space’ of that relationship along with its essential character of its participants and the nature of its perceived simulation will be shared by all participants directly situated in that relationship, albeit from their own embodied points of view. I see the other side of the street from this point of view. Someone on the other side of the street would be seeing me from their own point of view… A relationship being entertained by virtue of a shared ground being non-virtually in place for those participating parties to that relationship. The simulation of an adequate degree of relational entanglement then allows us to penetrate the distinctive nature of a relationship directly to that same extent, albeit from our own points of view. An indirect vision of that relationship being intuited from the commonality of our embodiment in this World-of-Life. The parallel adoption and adaptation of genres of intentional activity giving us an access to that relationship in accordance with the nature of those degrees of coordination (and co-correspondence). A relatively full access being ‘permitted’ when our transcendental sense of self coincides with our embodied sense of self and the latter is immersed within the actual confines of that relationship non-virtually. Otherwise, the invocation of a repertoire of genres gives us only an initial simulated degree of access. Full access being initiated only through this relational entanglement simulated as the ‘full simulation of that simulation’ (and not the inadequate simulation of that simulation, or, the mere simulation of a non-simulation, or, the non-simulation of a simulation as set in what otherwise would be considered to be the appropriately constituted nature of that relational context). Only the full adequacy of conditions, pre-conditions and the necessary instigation of a stream of post-conditions will allow us to then retrospectively confirm our hermeneutic interpretation of the existential status of that relatively non-virtual/virtual state of affairs?). Now, let me apply this relational philosophy to the context of a theological-like re-interpretation of the Life-World in so far as a viable theology would have to insist on the phenomenal-phenomenological imprinting of the Divine upon the fabric of the Life-World, insist on our ‘entanglement’ with the same, and, insist on outlining the necessary means for the construction of a critical-hermeneutic awareness as to how one might ‘view’ this process of entanglement along with certain guide-lines for the critical evaluation of the conventional validity, or ‘reality’, of such reflections…. (153)

Applied to a theological position we note the phenomenal nature of the Divine… and, therein, its entangled nature. I.e., if the Divine is phenomenally engendered through the epistemologically organized being of the world how should we go about interpreting, hypothetically or non-hypothetically, the non-metaphysical imputation of a phenomenal tracing/tracing out of the same through the hermeneutic pre-development of the requisite repertoire of appropriate genres and our non-virtual induction into a direct, non-virtual appreciation of the same? (154)

	Essentially, the Divine can have no value for us if no sense of the divine can be found as that-there-for-us, and, in turn, any sense of our-being-there-for-it. Though the existential ‘directness’ of all relationships the nature of the relational process must be two-way process (but not necessarily established in symmetric fashion – just as the nature of the reciprocity between a mother and her child is asymmetrical, e.g.). Hence the necessary phenomenological implication of the Divine as a phenomenon in this sphere of the Life-World, and, thence its senses of an active tracing/passively being trace out in some vision or version of the presence of the Divine in the phenomenality of the Life-World (because in relational entanglement, i.e., engagement, there can be neither pure actuality nor pure potentiality experienced or found in such a relational process regardless of whether that participation implicates any sense of the relatively divine and/or the relatively non-divine). Without this precondition we would be wasting our time in this regard since if the Divine cannot be there-for-us in the phenomenal presentation of this world, either directly and/or indirectly, then it cannot be there-for-us (nor we-for-it)! Since the theologian insists on the non-hypothetical validity of this topic, then they must argue for just such an interaction (in some form or other). Hence this philosophical pre-condition of a ‘ground’ that argues for some form of a Divine entanglement, i.e., engagement, with the phenomenal presentation of the Life-World! The theologian must then argue for some form of direct and/or indirect entanglement with the Divine through our entanglement with the Life-World (since the latter is the relational ground for the interaction of all relationships). (155)

Because the Divine is defined as ‘that epistemological organization greater in degree than that which pertains to a human agent’ we should best look for this phenomenological tracing of the Divine in that spectrum of relational experience that is more organized epistemologically. Such a direction being that as discovered and re-discovered in and through our transcendental intuition exercised within our transcendental sense fields wherein the essential, aesthetic, ethical etc., are determined and in an overall sense of the transcendental in the collective sense of the judgmental per se. Hence this speculative, provisional inference of our being able to better find some sense of the Divine in, say, the beauty of fine music, the consequent gestalt integration of the psyche as enacted through a properly conducted ethical life, through appropriately exercised acts of contemplation, the practice of various spiritual exercises, etc., etc. But this hypothetical program needs to be fleshed out in accordance with an in-depth articulation of a theological program that either constructs a culturally based descriptive, particularized version of the same and/or a prescriptive, generalized vision of the same. Hypothetically, let me examine the nature and possible ramifications of this point of view. (156)

In simple language I am arguing that the Divine must enter somehow into the fabric of the Life-World to be a viable candidate for the establishment of a theological enterprise. In the light of my definition that the relatively divine is that which possesses a relatively greater degree of epistemological organization I would then argued that in the light of that spectrum of experience that is relatively more organized epistemologically the theologian might find themselves in a better position to argue for an interpretative stance that could then allow them and us to actively recognize how the Divine might actively trace itself upon the fabric of the Life-World and/or passively find itself being traced-out; both orientations being conducted phenomenologically, hermeneutically and/or existentially, etc? How might one, positively, be able to go about this type of research? As all research is better conducted through the more thorough imposition of an overall transcendental suspension (properly, validly and appropriately instigated, exercised and reflected upon) then surely it behooves the theologian also to operate in the same critical manner regardless of the success or failure of that type of enterprise? Indeed, they must operate in accordance with such guidelines until otherwise adequately informed (but since the nature of discernment is dependent upon the thorough exercise of the overall transcendental suspension the proper exercise of the same cannot be escaped either through performance or re-performance). Hence this important point (of doctrine) that only through the proper exercise of an overall transcendental suspension can there be any form of theological conformity between theologians both with respect to their peers and themselves, ourselves, and, hopefully, the reality of the Life-World itself! (157)

	This first principle that one needs to recognize is that the role of the overall transcendental suspension in specialized forms of discourse cannot be bypassed also implies the need for us to recognize two more dialectical, non-absolute principles: namely, a pre-conditional principle that recognizes the pre-conditional role for the need of a pre-judgmental prejudice for the formation of content as the material for an overall transcendental suspension, and, our adequate intentional formulation of the same in order to assist in the thematization of this content; and, a second principle that recognizes that the quality of our research is an ongoing progressively emergent affair that will appear to randomly develop both exponentially and chaotically, i.e., to a degree greater that that merely supplied from the input of our research and in non-novel and novel directions that will suddenly change with the accumulative addition of relatively non-intrinsically-crucial inputs. A third principle states that through (re-)iteration both the ‘intentional formation of the content of a process’ and ‘the intentional process involved in the formation and thematization of that content’, must be allowed to remain before intentional focus in order for it to be registered, or ‘fixed’, in the form of an overt thematization. Thence this observation of fourth and fifth principles that the quality of a discourse from the emergently increased quality of the field exercised by that specialized discourse will take, respectively, an apparently random exponential refinement and an apparently random chaotic re-direction in the course of the presentation of additional inputs and/or the re-presentation of the same from time to time. A sixth principle noting that there can be no reductive residue in our research only a progressively realized emergent residue, i.e., the excess value of that project realized in the evaluation of the progress of that project minus the mere addition of its inputs. This calculus can only be determined intuitively and qualitatively and not quantitatively (except in the comparison of the successfulness and/or failure of similar projects or set of projects {that have that have adequately outlined transformational ‘rules’ that allow one to compare one moment in the course of a project or discourse in that same project, or, that allow one to compare one project or discourse to some other, and vice versa [in a commutative appreciation of the commensurability of the history of that system or the histories of two or more systems that maintain that necessary degree of comparative transformational invariance]}). That an understanding of this non-reductive, progressively realized emergent residue of value is paramount in the course of this extended essay since it will be on those ‘grounds’ that our examinations of theological identity, work and value will be conducted. Effectively, I will be arguing for the phenomenological fact that the emergently increasing degree of value progressively realized in a critical fashion in a research project or discourse will allow that specialist to carve out for themselves in the creation/re-creation of that gestalt field a realm of research that cannot be reductively reduced (to any other form of discourse) and in the relational ‘space’ of that emergent relational residue the ability to both operate and to be operated upon by the emergent power of that field of endeavour (whose power directly reflects upon the integrity of its formation, re-formation, and, ongoing self-critical reformation!). Other discourses can still comment on each other but only through the critically conducted invocation of the proper, appropriate and valid transformational rules that allow the ‘commerce’ of such a ‘conversation’ to take place in a manner whose value is dependent upon the fruitfulness or otherwise of those correctly transacted comparative or crossed-relationships. (158)

	An act of judgment, of any form or format, is dependent upon content and the rhetorical suspension of the same. Content is obviously pre-judgmental in its disposition, i.e., prejudice. Such pre-judgment also locates us in a psychic mapping of the Life-World and in and through the determination of such location we derive phenomenologically reductive expression of sense. A rhetorical suspension, in the form of a dis-conjunctive either/or, is effectively the necessary, transcendental characteristics of a question whose form (and format) determines the act of judgment. “Is this good? Is this x? Is this beautiful? etc., essentially being “Is this good or not good? Is this x or not-x? Is this beautiful or not beautiful?” etc. How can one ask a question if it cannot be cast in the ubiquitous format of “It is either the case that x is x or not-x?” However, to ensure the overall transcendental suspension we must also articulate the balance of a metaphorical conjunctive suspension through an explication of the relatively implicit nature of metaphorical description. The invocation of content is dependent upon metaphorical ascription: x is like y, meaning, x is both like y and not-like y etc. Finally, the hermeneutic circle is complete when we also balance the rhetorical suspensions against the metaphorical suspensions. Our exit from a potential paralysis of being trapped within this circle of suspensions being arranged through the suspension of the hermeneutic circle itself. Then, in a dialectic of overall ‘suspension’ and ‘suspension of the suspension’, etc., of the hermeneutic circle itself we ‘psychically’ enter and leave the same, moment by moment, without being either trapped within or without. Through this dialectical progression the distinctive character of our research is progressively thematized, the critical character of this research reflecting the degree to which our principles were properly applied and the overall process is allowed to progressively reform itself. Hence a zeroth principle of the pre-conditional necessity of pre-judgmental material, and, the first principle of conditional necessity for the ongoing instigation of an overall transcendental suspension properly, appropriately and validly conducted with respect to this pre-conditional pre-judgmental material. (159)

	The application in the critical explication of a specialized discourse of our zeroth principle and first principle effectively unites pre-judgmental material with a judgmental process. The effective union of this content and process is the progressively realized emergence of an existential residue that cannot be reduced to neither pre-judgmental content nor judgmental process, nor, for that matter, the mere summation of these two type of inputs. Hence what is realized is the third principle of the progressive emergence of a non-reductive excess (experienced in the form of the not-textual textual experience in and through the element or aspect of an existential experience of the non-textual as discussed elsewhere). Effectively the Life-World is “‘the simulation of the world’ and ‘the world of simulation’” by virtue of this non-reductive excess which at the same time is not substantial in any absolutist metaphysical sense! (160)

	That the simulation of the simulation effectively realizes the re-simulated by virtueof its intentional fixing before intentional consciousness. Hence this third principle of (re-)iterative necessity (or both retrospective retension and future oriented protension when treated in a Husserlian sense). (161)

	A fourth principle noted that this ongoingly progressively realized emergent residue is produced/reproduced in a random exponential manner, i.e., the irregular realization of the emergent residue in an increasing exponential manner where iteration/re-iteration of previous inputs and additional inputs produce/re-produce an even greater emergent residue. The element of chaos contributing to the irregularity in exponential growth. (162)

	Similarly, A fifth principle noted that this ongoingly progressively realized emergent residue is produced/reproduced in a random chaotic manner, i.e., the irregular realization of the emergent residue in an increasing exponential manner where iteration/re-iteration of previous inputs and additional inputs produce/re-produce an even greater emergent residue but in a chaotically influenced manner. (163)

	A sixth principle merely noting that this progressively realized emergent residue was a non-reductive residue and whose ‘essence’ was lost to that same extent it was reductively reduced (with the implication that other emergent features like the concepts of existential excess, power, autocriticality, harmonic resolution, gestalt integrity, non/not-textuality, etc., cannot and should not be mistreated in such a mis-directed mode). (164)

	Now I would like to add two more principle to this list on how to critically conduct the explication of a discourse or project whether specialized or not specialized. (165)

	As a seventh principle I would like to note the implication of a mutual co-thematization of all aspects of a system involved in defining that phenomenological presentation in the context of its presentation. E.g., in the hermeneutic circle because ‘sense’ is defined as ‘not-meaning and not-meaningfulness’ there is the implication that the thematization of any one of these aspects essentially co-thematizes all the rest. In other words, the level of thematization establishes a similar level of mutual co-thematization. In our pursuit of theological identity, etc., there is the direct and/or indirect dialectical implication of theological work and theological value. Hence the import of this principle in the course of the exposition of this discourse (whilst maintaining our hypothetical point of view). (166)

	An eighth principle also needs to be noted, namely, the inherent possibility for the self-critical rectification, or auto-critical rectification, of any project when properly conducted in and through the proper, appropriate and valid exercise of an overall transcendental suspension. This general aspect of any investigation being noted as phenomenon that re-instigates a phenomenological re-centering of that phenomenon and insures the essential correspondence between our explication of that phenomenon and the phenomenon of its explication. This auto-critical effect is realized through the use of the overall transcendental suspension and is put into practice through the power of this progressively realized emergent residue; itself realized through the ongoing resolution of relational dissonance as experienced within the consonant totality of its contextual background. As a result, as a process of rectification, the phenomenon in question is essentially refined in our understanding and is allowed to progressively reveal the essential flavour of its simulated ‘self’ through the power of its own progressive residue to re-establish the distinctive value of its own sense of being an existential-being-in-the-world (without our needing to misinterpret this through the lens of an absolutistic metaphysics, etc.)! (167)

	To continue this hermeneutic preparation of these interrelated theological concepts of work, etc., I would like now to add four more principle guidelines, or principles, that will assist us in this research and help me to critically inform the directions we will need to take in order to properly evaluate this type of undertaking. Although, ostensively, this type of undertaking is the presentation of a critically presented theological discourse, albeit conducted in a hypothetical framework, and, therefore, a pursuit conducted in general terms of reference, the nature of this research is fully meant to be able to be applicable to the nature and content of any type of discourse, theological or non-theological, specialist or non-specialist in orientation. (168)

	A ninth principle notes that an integrating device is fundamental to our lived passage through this World-of-Life. Whether this is called ‘the’ Life-World or the mono-dimensional textual plane (either pre-disruption or through bifurcation and paralleled processes of re-integration and its treatment as relatively re-integrated in a post-disrupted state of affairs) as previously alluded to in paragraphs no. 101-107, e.g., or the very necessity of a theological dimension as argued for in both this volume and the first, etc. That, essentially, we can argue for some form of theological necessity in this regard, although, it should be noted, that this imputation of a theological dimension in the constitution of the Life-World should not be conducted in improperly formulated metaphysical terms of reference (since a transcendental illusion is acceptable but a metaphysical illusion is not!). Furthermore, this necessity is not a carte blanche for erecting a defense of some form of traditional or non-traditional theology without the adequate degree and appropriate manner of argumentation necessary for that type of interpretation of this ninth principle. Basically, an integration device with respect to the experienced unity of the world is a transcendental prerequisite for our passage through this World-of-Life regardless of the presence or absence of our prior theological commitments and the manner of our interpretation of this simulated ‘ground’ for our own simulated existence in the existence of its corresponding world of simulation. (169)

	A tenth principle notes that what ever the manner of our metaphorical treatment of this imputation of this sense of world-integrity, or our metaphorical treatment of any part therein of this semblance of a world, there must exist some positive degree of an existential excess produced/re-produced as a result. Putting metaphorical bits and pieces together will always produce the semblance of a metaphorical whole whose interpretative powers can never be reduced merely to its constituent components! Hence the necessary existence of this inescapable positive, non-reductive existential residue being present in any process of interpretation whether non-psychotic or psychotic in the nature of its formulation, exercise and consequences. However, the existential merit of such an enterprise needs to be determined through the exercise of that formulation, i.e., its application , and an examination of it existential consequences. Hence the formulation of our next principle. (170)

	An eleventh principle notes that the existential merit of a particular interpretative enterprise is determined through an examination of the manner and degree of the existential excess realized, i.e., found re-produced, through the appropriate application and appreciation of the consequences of that systematic point of view. Moreover, the quantification of that existential excess, in order to determine the degree of this existential merit, can only be achieved as a comparative process with other more productive and/or less productive systematic points of view. Hence our twelfth principle. (171)

	A twelfth principle states that the evaluation of the quantification of the existential merit of a particular systematic point of view, etc., can only be determined through its comparative evaluation, i.e., with respect to other systematic points of view, etc. Hence the evaluation of theological work, theological value, can only be conducted in comparative terms of reference with other theological and/or non-theological systematic/non-systematic points of view. The implication here is that we must evaluate parallel presentation/representations in order to be able to relatively quantify the merit any particular instance of a positive existential excess. In other words, an evaluation of the positivity of that excess, i.e., its value, can only be quantified in comparative terms of reference and that this implies the need for some form of an accommodation between parallel frames of reference effectively held in parallel. With this in mind, the theologian then needs to present a vision of their systematic point of view and demonstrate that its existential merit is considerable, i.e., markedly productive when compared to earlier, less productive versions of the same or other less productive visions that can be relatively commensurable for such purposes. However, in a non-quantified form of appreciation they can still argue that the acceptance of their vision of an integrating device (be it theological or non-theological, relatively systematic or non-systematic in scope) by arguing that its powers of integration are considerable and worth the effort of investing in that presentation (through its re-presentation). That, effectively, they will need to argue that their representation of reality is not only productive of an existential merit but is markedly productive in this realization of an existential excess. Hence, our need to recognize the intimate relationship between work and value (and identity as already argued for in our seventh principle). (172)

	No doubt other principles could be formulated. Let us do that when the occasion calls for those types of critical guidelines; calls for those relevant provisional types of perspective along with their associated limitations, qualifications, insights, etc. Now, I would like to explore a model of understanding that might help to make sense, hypothetically, of the concept of the Divine so far established in the course of these philosophical investigations as reasonable (and tentatively argued as probable in some manner or other?)? If the Divine is envisaged as having its ‘feet’ in the phenomenal world, i.e., as growing out of the phenomenal in a relatively epistemologically advanced manner, then the divine as an ‘institution’ could be perceived as some sort of relatively all encompassing mode of life that embraces a variety of modes of life that constitute what it means for us to be human in our interaction with others (along with what ever else is implicated in that vision or version of the Divine). What is envisaged here? If the Divine emerges from out of the relatively more epistemologically sophisticated then it would stand to reason that the Divine could (or must) evolve, emerge from out of that which is relatively more advanced epistemologically in the visible scheme of things. As an emergent entity-state it could not, meaningfully, be reduced to its relative material basis. In the same way we cannot reduce human institutions merely to the nature of the human person. Just as human institutions cannot be reduced to their essential raison d’être how much more so could the Divine not be reduced to human institutions if our hypothetical model is constructed on the assumption that the sense, etc., of the Divine emerges from the same. Just as the chess mode of life cannot be reduced to the rules of chess so too the sense of the Divine could not be reduced to its basis in any array of human institutions. That being the case how then could we envisage the nature of the Divine? The same way we approach human modes of life, i.e., through their engagement; through their indirect observation and direct participation. No a priori attitude is in and of itself going to do this for us (even though it could alert us as to how we should go about that form of engagement, what we should expect and how to interpret the same. With this dialectical balancing act in mind, between ‘the passively being pointing to for us’ and ‘the actively being pointed out by it to us’ let us proceed with this metaphor of the ‘institution’ to parallel mind, spirit, the Divine (albeit with all the qualifications that should be entailed). (173)

	I went to the markets today. The markets are an institution. A genre of behaviour, a mode of life with its own rules and its own general modus operandi. The concept of ‘buying and selling’ is not enough in and of itself to account for the complexity of rules  that surround any such institution associated with this type of practice in general or in particular. This collection of rules form an ethical-aesthetic of that institution; often a mixture of written and unwritten codes of behavioral expectations, etc. It borrows from similar institutions and they in turn borrow from that type of institution. So, we have been to a shop and know that, today, in a transaction we usually swap money for the item or items being purchased either actually through the use of money or virtually through the use of a credit card or similar. In the markets we find something similar is occurring. Other rules borrow from going into a shop, making a transaction, etc. We realize that we cannot just take an item without paying for it unless it is specially displayed with that message in mind such as, e.g., grapes or pieces of mandarin when placed on a plate for our sampling. Another rule is that we are usually allowed to pass in front of the stalls but not behind the counter. Again, that the price should be right…  no one has yet sold, I believe, million dollar cabbages, e.g. Careful observations and reflections will reveal a whole galaxy of rules, qualifications, limitations of behaviour in the form of an open-ended, yet comprehensive, code that, on the whole, is successfully adopted and adapted for and by that institution to hand as a mode of life, a system of practice. So, how useful is this concept of an institutional mode of life in paralleling the Divine as a ‘footprint’, e.g., upon the phenomenal being of the Life-World? Rhetorically speaking, if we saw the Divine ‘feet’, or, the Divine ‘footprint’, or, the Divine ‘nail-cuttings’, even the mere glimpse of the Divine shadow… would we recognize the same as being that of the Divine? (174)

	Certain provisional principles, I believe, could be tentatively extracted from this metaphorical concept. Let me attempt to outline how I would envisage using such a model. For a start, as a mode of life we could not expect its existential imprint on the face of the earth to be something that could be reduced to the mere logical essence of the raison d’être of that institution. So a ‘concentration of buying and selling’ may be the reason for the existence of markets this fact alone could not account for how they manifest themselves as an institutionalized mode of life. An institution could be metaphorically seen as having ‘a life of its own’ that could not, at the same time, be just metaphorical in its consequences. In a sense the markets can be seen as instituting themselves. The regulation of stalls and stall holders is controlled by a markets-committee whose powers could not be absolutely reduced to any one individual on that committee even if that committee was controlled by one key individual (since their death, and thence their removal from that committee, e.g., would most likely not impinge too much, I suspect, upon the life of that institution in and through the functioning of that market itself). The existential point I am trying to make here is this – that the ‘life’ of the institution itself has the power to create a non-reductive mode of life; is able, in some existential measure, to institute its own ‘existence’ through its instituting such parameters that assist the immediate continuation and direction/re-direction of its own existence. In other words, there is this sense of an active Divine instituting, in part, the course of that institutionalized mode of life. What becomes institutionalized is the institution in a passive sense. Now, as a principle, we might say that an institution can only survive if the metaphorical ‘core’ of that institution is existentially able to adaptively institute the course of that institute through the passage of its history. (175)

	But, an important objection here could be posed to the effect that this the course of the phenomenal world is deterministically pre-determined in its causation. That being the case, how could any agent, Divine or otherwise, intervene in the pre-determined course of its phenomenal being in this world? As argued elsewhere, an agent could enter into a re-direction of being in this world though an intervention that occurs through chaotic points of opportunity, bifurcations in the simulated matrix of time-and-space, that would allow for this sense of a non-causal like transformation of an institutionalizes state of affairs (through instituting the definitive adoption and adaptation of possible alternative pathways in keeping, to some degree, with the ambitions of that institution). Obviously, in such a scheme this non-causal like sense of intervention would not actually be breaking any physically ‘laws’ associated with phenomenal being-in-the-world, only ‘choosing’ pathways more in keeping, existentially, with that particular mode of life (in and through the cusp of these opportune points of bifurcation). Adopting this hypothetical modelling of the Divine institution, as an active instituting of the Divine in this Life-World, we can make a number of reasonable assumptions in keeping with the metaphorical nature of this model. E.g., the emergent totality of the institution has the ‘power’ to enact or effect the course of its own history to some extent or other (within the limitations set for it by the phenomenal nature of its epistemological organization). Then, what is passively effected is an institution in an institutionalized sense, i.e., as an institution deposited upon the fabric of the world in some intentional-like manner. That, such intentional deposition could be interpreted given both the access to such a text and the means for interpreting such an ‘apparent’ intent as an apparent ‘intent’. This sense of ‘appearance’ only coming to life through its being re-enacted, virtually, by us through this application of a phenomenological-hermeneutic-existential re-living of that intentional process. I see footprints on the beach running off into the distance and can see, in my mind’s eye, someone walking along the beach before me (in both time and place). Could we do the same thing in our investigation of the Divine. Or, are we forced to walk away from such a process of investigation by the magnitude of this task, the sheer improbability of ever being able to conduct it, the impossibility of ever understanding the very nature of Divine intent? Even if it were to hit us in the face could we ever recognize this sense of institutional power? Well, many theologians claim that we can do this task so let them explain to us how they might do this type of task, Then, as critical philosophers, without non-transcendentally suspended ontological commitments, etc., proceed to explore such material, such claims, etc. For our part what might be gained from this model of a Divine institution seen as an all-embracing Divine model of life? (176)

	As previously argued, our research would have to investigate all senses of an emergent institutionalization that might be regarded as Divine in origin and/or activity and/or aspiration. Then, again, let us allow the prejudices of our theologically inspired friends to supply the material for this type of critical investigation. Then, from an overall philosophical point of view, let us examine what work, etc. such a proposal or set of proposals has to offer us in this regard? Our adoption and adaptation of the principles just previously outlined, hopefully, helping us to go about this type of task; the fruits of such a project needing to realize a value above and beyond that merely supplied by such modeling at face value. As previously shown, all metaphorical modeling of the world is productive of an existential excess to some degree or other – that much is not in dispute. But, what is in dispute, or should be in dispute, is the degree that such an excess is found to substantially manifest itself with. As a comparative exercise, at the end of the day, merely being beyond being charitable in this regard, just what is the dividend to be gained from such critical research? Does the concept of the Divine have any worthwhile theological work to perform in its assistance of an individual and/or in the assistance of an institution in their passage though this World-of-Life? In essence, does such work work? I.e., what is the value of such work, and, what transformation of identity ensures from such a philosophical understanding of such a religious position in the course of its being adopted or in the course of its adopting of us (or in the course of its already having adopted us)? Again, let us explore more deeply what critical guidelines would be needed for this mutual interaction of Divine work, Divine identity and Divine value, and, our relatively valid appreciation and existential experiential realization of the same? To say it boldly, “if the Divine were to ‘hit’ us?” how would we know both in theory and in practice that such an event had occurred and was manifestly Divine in nature? (177)

	The fundamental problem here is “what is the relational nature of Divinely oriented interaction?” Indeed, “what is the nature of the relational, and, what aspect of the relational might be Divine in orientation?” It would appear that we might just have a theoretical shortcut to work our way through this type of investigation. Let me elaborate in greater detail what might be the results of this type of a more fundamental approach to this important question – how might the Divine manifest itself in the world and how might it manifest itself before our very understanding itself (assuming that this process of reflection is an achievable objective?)? (178)

	Our research, essentially, but not metaphysically, can be rendered down to these considerations – what is the nature of the relational and what about the relational might allow for the Divine to manifest itself (since a relationship with the Divine in some form or other is a necessary given for the theologian who must argue that the theologicalization of the Life-World must have merit, work and work to a degree greater than the mere supposition of a Divine Reality. (179)

	The task before us is to explore the nature of the relational as it impinges upon our epistemological being in this world with other, with other institution and with any hypothetical and/or non-hypothetical sense of the Divine as a Divine institution. So let me proceed along this line of research and explore just what value might lie in store for us in this task? (180)

	Towards this end first let me rewrite this metaphor of an ‘institution’. To begin with institutions are never directly seen. The institution of a hospital, e.g., is never seen. What is seen is the net effect of that institution upon the fabric of the world in the form of a building or buildings, a variety of services, a variety of staff, a variety of patients, a variety of visitors... These are traces/traced out upon the fabric of the world. But, if the institution per se is not ‘seen’ then how do we know of its existence? We might say that an institution is more ‘felt’, i.e., intuited either directly or/and indirectly. Directly, we experience that institution from our own point of view(s), i.e., as patient, a staff member or visitor, etc. Indirectly, we see a building/s being used (or being built for that purpose), a variety of staff, patients and visitors, etc. Different people experiencing a different take on that institution as it manifests itself to them and they to it ; in the process allowing themselves to self-censor or not self-censor their behaviour in accordance with that comprehensive collection of written and unwritten rules. An institution being able to exercise a portion of that ‘power’ by positive-rewards and/or negative-restrictions on behaviour. But, all individuals are also to some degree autonomous beings in their passage through this world-with-others and when an institution positively recognizes this individual autonomy there is also realized an existential spontaneity of power ‘donated’ to that institution through those individuals functioning in a productive-harmony within that institution at the same time when there is a active recognition of this existential autonomy. So, we might say that the power of an institution arises from the point of view of that institution itself and through the autonomy of those individual participating within that institution. Is there an absolute difference here between these apparently different types of power that have these different orientations and origins? No, because we cannot draw an absolute line between the individuals in that institution and that institution itself because the identity of those individuals in part already reflects, to some extent, that complex constitutional arrangement. What we can determine (directly or indirectly) is the comparatively determined authenticity of that institution qua institution and the individual authenticity of those individuals in their overall functioning within that institution, etc. This power being that existential surplus of value created/re-created within those nominated institutional relationships, etc., and, therefore, how we and they navigate the relational complexity of the Life-World is also the source of an additional layer(s) of power to be found imposed upon the variety of subjects and objects that constitute that relevant domain as they experience an infusion of power and/or a diffusion of power (as noted in the appropriate discourse/s concerning the same). Or, to put it another way we have a sea of power-relations between individuals within/outside institutions, between individuals and institutions, and, between institutions thmselves, etc. A sea or nexus of power that constitutes and is constituted in turn through actions and reactions, actions and consequences, etc. (181)

	Now, if the ‘etc’s’ as utilized above were an invitation for the Divine to also enter into these overall power equations how would we know? As the epistemological organization of the Divine is arguably constituted through the epistemological organization of its embraced objects and subjects could we not suppose that this emergent sense of the Divine is already operating at the level of the relational per se? If so does it make a difference? Could it make a difference (in this focusing on this principle of theological difference [as previously discussed]) (in this micro-analytical level of examination) (that would allow the theologian to assert a positivity in value for the functioning existence of The Divine?)?  Or, again, if theological difference does make a difference how would that difference be recognized (in lieu of an interpretative map that would assist us in this task)? (182)

	Let me return to this model of the institution in general and the markets in particular. As already argued, the markets per se are not seen but, certainly, experienced when in a direct relationship with the same, i.e., when not in a non-direct relationship (such as when, e.g., a person is told about the markets M without having experienced the same directly). How do we account for this state of affairs? We see what is seen, we experience what is experienced, what is experienced is not necessarily seen? We can make a distinction here between the markets in a material sense and the markets in a non-material sense (which could be ‘read’ as in a spiritual sense as long as we do not mis-interpret what is meant here, namely, a sense of the relational). Now, what is non-material, i.e., relational in orientation, cannot be seen but can be experienced through our being in a direct relationship with it (although all relationships are, rightly, direct in their engagement with their nominated objects and/or subjects). Now, if that is the case how is that we can say “we are going to the markets (if the markets as a relational ‘entity’ cannot be ‘seen’)?” In its institutionalization the markets carves out for itself a material footprint in this phenomenal world. We see various building, produce, vendors and buyers, etc. But this organization is intentionally organized and that we do not see but can experience directly (by being on the board of directors or its equivalent) or indirectly (by visiting the same and possibly making a purchase or series of purchases). As problematic as all this may seem it can be easily resolved by realizing that all forms of analysis or synthesis or correspondence (as in associating a name with a mental image or another name or description, etc.) involve a relational treatment of the totality-particularity of that situation under examination. This type of treatment I have previously examined under the rubric of a treatment-retreatment transformational philosophy or a meta-transformational treatment philosophy, etc., or, more simply, as a transformational philosophy. The rules are relatively simple to grasp (when applied to an elementary type of transformational situation). Basically, in a process of treatment (defined as analytical, synthetical or co-referential) a product is realized that is higher in meta-status by one degree. That treatment product can then be re-treated back to the initial meta-level through a reversed process of re-treatment (in which this first rule is reversed, i.e., the retreated product is now one degree less in meta-status and thence on par with the initial state of the pre-treatment product). This is accomplished, epistemologically, by virtue of the fact that processes of analysis are the inverse of processes of synthesis and v.v., and, that co-referential processes can be retreated commutatively. E.g., if bricks can be seen as making the primary fabric of the building (in which we have the operation of a market) through a process of synthesis, then, at the same time, the bricks in that same building already built can be seen through a process of analysis. These processes inversely mirror each other hence this rule that a process of synthesis can be reversed in some manner or other in keeping with the nature of that process, a process of analysis, and v.v. Similarly, a reversed co-referential process will undo a co-referential process assuming an adequate degree of commutation can take place between the same (through the preservation, likewise, of an adequate degree of transformational isomorphic invariance). (183)

So, this building is made from bricks, and, from this building, in its demolition, we could find ourselves being left with a pile of bricks. The commutational expectations here demand that our relational treatment can be re-treated back to the same level of meta-status. The critical consequences of these manoeuvres is that we need to be clear as to what pathways of treatment and/or retreatment are involved and what products are realized along the way. Knowing these ingredients allows us to exercise a degree of critical clarification in our discussion of the same and defuse, as a result, a number of controversies that confuse these various transformational elements among themselves or with elements that arise in differing transformational processes. Let me now deal with the problematic issue of how a process of treatment must differ from a process of retreatment. Surely, a process of treatment in its essential phenomenal nature would be the same as a process of retreatment and, therefore, we would need to ask why do we not end up with products of higher and higher meta-status even though we do not find ourselves soaring to such unbelievable heights in an unthinkable abstractness. Hence there must be this parallel degree of commutation wherein a process of treatment can, theoretically, if not practically, be reversed, in terms of its meta-characteristics, through a retreatment of the same. How is this done? How is this feat engineered epistemologically? Simply, through a mental reversal of the meta-direction of that original treatment process!  (184)

This process of retreatment can be accomplished through a process of simulated time reversal relative to the treatment process. As already noted synthesis is the inverse of analysis and v.v., and, the co-referential is reversible. (185)

	The point of this digression is to note that a relational state of affairs can be entertained through a process of treatment, e.g., analytical, synthetical or co-referential in orientation. Orientation by virtue of the fact that no process of treatment can be entertained without a parallel process of retreatment being entertained. Each one only makes sense in the contextual light of the other(s). So, the idea of the markets as a relational entity (through the organization of buildings, vendors, etc.) is, in practical philosophical terms of reference, both a relational state of affairs and a materialized version of the same. It is the former that we cannot ‘see’ and that this relational state of affairs cannot be reductively reduced merely to its material basis without some relational loss of meaning, indeed, the loss of relational value being equal to the degree of that reduction actually engaged. Obviously, the markets have an imprint upon the fabric of the world, but, to just ‘see’ that would not allow us to understand the overall relational integrity of that type of organization! (186)

This model, to this extent, seems to be an apt metaphor for the epistemological imprint upon the fabric of the world of the Divine defined in and through this greater degree of epistemological organization. Indeed, in light of this metaphorical approach to such a ‘reality’, we should not expect to directly see the Divine in and through its epistemological organizing but only that intentional-like imprint upon the fabric of the world left by the same. On the other hand, a direct form of experience is left open as a possibility if a number of transcendental pre-conditions and practical conditions were to be first fulfilled. At this point in time let me now investigate this relational nature of the Divine, albeit in hypothetical terms of reference, in the hope that we can investigate this type of possibility of Divine experience (i.e., our experience of the Divine [as a subjective genitive], and, its experience of us [as an objective genitive]?)? Our direction of approach in this philosophical task will be through an examination of the nature of the relational and the possible implication of the Divine in and through such a medium (and hence the recognition of a hermeneutic grid that would then allow us to make that type of interpretation [if such were both conceivable and adequately realizable in fact?]?)? (187)

	In this dialectical contest and harmonization between the relatively material aspect and the relatively non-material aspect an absolute reduction to the material realizes only an absolute lose of value! Similarly, in reverse, an absolute contra-reduction, or synthesis, to the relative relational totality (being a nominated ‘fiction’ since all relationships are context dependent and bound in more expansive aspects and levels of relationships) in turn produces only a complete loss of value that can no longer be instantiated as that-there-for-us in and through our interdependence with that particular, focused upon relational state of affairs. Indeed, value is only realized when it is able to discharge itself upon the fabric of the world (through a process of an interactive power relation that adequately manages to resolve all senses of resistance presented to it through the relative materiality of its phenomenal basis in this world-as-engaged). Then, again, reduced purely to the intentional(-like) imprint of that discharge, equally, it could not allow itself to be read through our inability to re-simulate its simulated sense of being as that re-lived. In this complex insight we are here presented with this close relationship between value, power and our knowledge and appreciation of that value as a value qua value (to be valued/evaulated). Put as simply as I can express it, let me sum up what is being uncovered here, namely, that power is realized through this dialectical relationship between the relational aspect and the non-relational aspect, and, that there is this equality between power, value and our knowledgeable appreciation of the value of that value. (188)

	Returning to our model(ling) of the Markets we could say that the power of this institution is realized through the relationship between the ‘relational markets’ (in its organizational instituting of power) and the material sense of the markets (upon which this power is instituted); on the understanding that both ‘relational’ and ‘material’ aspects are here idealities that, in absolutistic terms of reference, can neither possess an epistemological being in thought nor be ontologically recognized in-the-world by-the-world. (189)

	Embedded in this insight is another! Although we need to enter the transcendental suspension to enact an intentional process of judgment and therein, through the trans-intentionality of judgment, to enact the intentional process itself we can say that the resultant or resulting process of en-action produces/re-produces a power relation that cannot be transcendentally balanced! In other words, even though power relations will be born/borne in the balance of the transcendental suspension their entry into a relatively non-transcendental frame of reference cannot be born/borne in a state of balance between that passive ‘being imposed upon’ and the active ‘imposing upon’ except superficially. An enacting of power might seem to suggest, in a certain situation, some form of balance between these passive and active senses of empowerment one should realize that at no stage can there be their effective equivalence. Power is pre-conditionally created in and through a transcendental suspension (or its equivalent), however, in the discharge of that intentional(-like) reshaping of the lived-world power relations can never be equal (except superficially). Thence power has the power to ‘more impose upon’ or ‘be more imposed upon’. In contrast, relative authenticity or relative inauthenticity is not in question here in this serious debate. The degree to which action is intentionally pre-determined authentically is the degree to which it is a response to the psychic centre of its embedded relationship as it interfaces with the relatively material aspect of its being in the world. Although, again, a relationship cannot be enacted absolutely from its central point of its ‘being in this World-of-Life’ degrees of an authenticity and degrees of an inversed inathenticity can be inaugurated through better degrees of approximation to that sense of centre – the degree to which that relationship is allowed to initiate the nature of its own response be it passively oriented or actively oriented in overall terms of reference. Let me restate these important points. (190)

	The relational aspect is powerful through this relational excess of power available to it through the integrated phenomenal being of that relationship. On the other hand, if that power cannot successfully meet and engage the material resistance of those participating objects and/or subjects then that power is effectively disenfranchised, impotent (and remains merely virtual in its extent?). Without the adequate instruments of power such ‘power’ would be effectively emasculated and ineffectual. Furthermore, the material in its mere inertness is also totally ineffectual without this aspect of the relational. Hence power can only express itself through successfully engaging the resistance of its material aspect as encountered and engaged. Thus, normally, we can both go to the markets and trade therein. Such power, and its ubiquitous sharing of itself, in and through ‘its being impinged upon’ and ‘its impinging upon’ re-institutionalizing itself as a genre of activity (both on a general level [‘in our going to the markets’] and on a specific level [as that market and its particular modus operandi, etc.]). (191)

	The questions “what is the nature of resistance?” and “what is the nature of power” and “what is the nature of their interrelationship?” needs to be asked. In the hermeneutic circle we know each polar aspect can be defined through the negation of the other two aspects. Can power and resistance be defined in a similar inverse, reciprocal manner? To some extent ‘resistance’ could be defined as ‘that which obstructs power’, and, ‘power’ could be defined as ‘that which overcomes obstruction’. Furthermore, instantiated power seems to be none other than a ‘harmonization between these two dialectical aspects of power and resistance’. Would I be correct in this assessment? (192)

	Another way of seeing ‘power’ is to define it as an enacted differential; in other words – ‘as the activated overcoming of a difference between levels of power’. ‘Power’ is ‘the expression of the relationship’. These various definitions only working on the assumption that we invoke a circular hermeneutic like modeling of reality, or similar, and, that all meaning can only be contemplated through the invocation of such structural-processes involving the harmonic resolution of these power differentials. On such a fundamental level of comprehension the ‘meaning of power’, effectively, is a contra-gram, namely, the ‘power of meaning’. In other words, these terms like ontologically oriented ‘power’ and epistemologically oriented ‘meaning’ are virtuously synonymous when these orientations are conveniently overlooked or adequately accommodated. Treating the hermeneutic circle as occupying the dialectical region between the epistemologically oriented and the ontologically oriented aspects of the trans-ontological-epistemological, i.e., the Life-World, should assist us in this process of a meaningful interrelationship of meanings. So with this in mind let us see if this avenue is a fruitful and valid one to take in this research? (193)

	Through the epistemological organization of the relatively ontological we are presented with a relationship, itself the result of a harmonization of dissonance, i.e., none other than ‘resistance’. The existential surplus of value that emerges through this harmonic process is, then, none other than ‘power’. Through the ongoing process of harmonization, power is continually emergent (moment by moment) for the ‘real’, i.e., ‘non-virtual’, duration of that overall process that realizes the non-virtual existence of that relationship. The intentional-like direction of that power, effectively, is then re-invested in the ontological direction of its material basis in and through which resistance is ‘experience’, effectively ‘resolved’ and, thence, ‘re-experienced’ through an ongoing process of re-resolution. So, power is material oriented whilst resistance is resisting when, and only, when, it is impeding the flow of power, i.e., altering or transforming the expression of that power and thence the nature of that relationship. But, in this game of dialectical precedence, the resolution of dissonance, i.e., resistance, realizes that particular relationship and the emergence, therein, of its power and so on…. (194)

	In such a scheme the hermeneutic circle of comprehension is no longer a mono-dimensional affair (on a horizontal level of metaphorical explication), but, rather a three dimensional matrix with each dimension being ‘ruled’ by one of these three dialectical moments of resisting dissonance, a non-resisting background, and, a harmonic power; the product of all three moment or dimensions realizing the living expression of that relationship (and thence, therein, a sense of time). (195)

	Let me now examine a variety of power relationships. For a start what would be the difference between, say, someone chopping wood and the relationship between a boss and their workers. In the prior example we have someone chopping wood. Resistance would be met when the axe hits the block of wood about to be chopped. Successfully overcoming that resistance would allow us to chop that wood. In the opposite direction the sharpness of the blade of that axe would be incrementally reduced. Here, the instrument of power is the axe. If we were, instead, to slice a loaf of bread or take a portion of a jelly on a plate an axe in both cases would not be appropriate. Similarly, a knife or a spoon would, most likely, be of no use in our chopping wood (even though phenomenologically, as a general genre of activity, chopping, slicing and scooping are akin). Therefore, we might conclude that in our domination of things resistance is met, and successfully met, when the appropriate instruments of power are applied in an appropriate manner in accordance with those meta-textual expectations. However, in our relations with others what are the usual instruments of power in the communication of our desires to others? Undoubtedly words, or their equivalents (as in e.g., signs, etc.). Here we have a more complex situation. On the level of language comprehension we have a process of interpretation – when, metaphorically, resistance ceases with adequate recognition of meaning. Now, since power is experienced in and through our relationships it follows that in the communication of our desires, say between a boss and their workers, it can not devolve purely from those subjects themselves. The model of the axe is, in this scenario, rather heavy handed but still apt. One wields the axe and the wood is chopped. One might say that in some measure power is channeled through the axe. The person imposes upon the block of wood which, obviously, is imposed upon. But, all this here can only be mediated by the axe since the person per se could not impose themselves in that manner without the use of that axe. In turn the wood imposes itself upon the blade of that axe which in turn is further blunted through its use as an axe. In contrast, the boss can only impose their will upon their workers with their consent in some form or other. As slaves they may need to be coerced. But, still, they could refuse to ‘cooperate’. In a monetary economy our workers may need to be financially rewarded. Hence, the successful transmission of power can only occur when the preconditions are in place for that type of relational process. Without successfully overcoming all forms of resistance there can be no non-virtual power relation. Both examples illustrate the fact that power is realized in the relationship and through a period of process. The mere imposition of force cannot achieve our goals because the appropriate instruments need to mediate this process. Because power is experienced and realized in and through the relationship implies that power must devolve from the relationship itself and this is realized through an existential excess that is able to be transformed into some other form of a deposited existential excess. Thence power traces itself out upon the fabric of the world. Furthermore, power can never be, therefore, purely imposing nor imposed upon but an amalgam of both in keeping with the nature of that relationship between those subjects and/or objects and those appropriate instruments of power that mediate those power relations (be they operated by intentionally directed subjects or directed by objects with an intentional-like sense of a para-epistemological-like degree of organization [as in, e.g., a discharge of lightening]). Traditionally, power is seen in negative terms of reference as merely imposing. But, power has the power of being creative since there can be no form of negative destruction without the positive creation of some other state of affairs – always the re-arrangement and transformation of one existential surplus of power for some other. Indeed, power is the expression of this transformation. (196)

	Power relations are the successful expression of an overcoming of resistance whose material nature characterizes the nature of those involved relationships since the relationship itself is the result of the resolution of the dissonance between those participating subjects and/or objects in the presence of the appropriate instruments of power mediation. The successful intentional and/or intentional-like discharge of force in their respective power relations distinctively deposits itself upon the fabric of the world. With the correct hermeneutic grid the nature of that deposition could be re-traced out to some degree or other assuming that no text can be absolutely opaque (or absolutely transparent for that matter). In the situation of the chopped wood we have chopped wood. Seeing chopped wood we assume that it has been chopped. In the complex world of the workers (as an example of the greater degree of complexity in and between human agents and/or institutions) this process of tracing becomes more compels. Still, in our recognition of (non-intrinsically substantial) agents, etc., and the imputed appropriateness of certain genres of activity and their corresponding instruments of power in the light of their distinctive tracings upon the fabric of the world we might well be able to reconstruct the transformational course of such interaction and in the process judge the ‘successfulness’ of these simulated/re-simulated forms of mediation and re-construction, etc. At some point in our hypothetical theological investigations we will need to examine to what extent we may or may not be able to discern the nature of the interaction between human agents and/or institutions and the invocation of some form of Divine agency arguing, with relevant qualifications, that the nature of such power-relations in essence, phenomenologically (and not metaphysically) are the same both in theory and in ‘fact’ (in practice and in our critical evaluation of the same) (given the adequate demonstration of the Divine itself as a ‘fact’ in the overall complexion of this World of-Life to those people who accept that mode of life, discourse, épistèmé, etc.). (197)

	What is the nature of transformation? Could such a process, as the nature of all processes, be merely appreciated as a change or set of changes in information? (198)

Let me examine first the following situation where a society invokes the use of a computerized device, a judgment-meister, to cast its definitive approval or disapproval on the making and executing all important judgments. A judgment-meister, in this anecdote or analogy, is a computerized device that with A.I. is believed able to super-intelligently assess the merits of each and every situation described to it and in the answering modalities of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ deliver its judgment which is to be considered ‘final’ by that society (even though that device may or may not ‘remember’ the modality of its answers given to specific questions). But unknown to that society is that these machines have a pre-set mechanism with three switches: A, B and C. The use of the A switch engineers an alternating ‘yes’ and ‘no’, ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to each and every individual question posed for its ‘assessment’. The B switch is an A.I. assessment using experientially enriched, re-programmable algorithms, processes of cross-reference and re-evaluation, etc. The C switch, on the other hand, merely answers with a ‘judgment’ determined completely at random. Now, let me ask how do people finally find themselves reacting to such a form of counsel (in this scenario envisaged as being adopted compulsorily [until such a time that ‘machine’ changes its ‘mind’])? W.r.t. A, people would in time phase their question (in a positive or negative rhetorical modality) with their expectation of what that machine’s answer would be as it alternates between “yes” and “no” and in the light of what they think the answer should be (once they have observed the unwavering regularity of its alternating responses).  In the third situation they might, eventually, decide to ignore the advice or wait till they get the right decision desired by chance (since it cannot be consistent with its own responses assuming no long term memory of the same). In the second situation, B, they will eventually evaluate how effective such a scheme was and whether it had improved in time (as claimed by it A.I. proponents). This anecdote hypothetically modeling power-relations in both Divine and/or non-divine-like scenarios. (199)

	In many ways this spectrum of possibilities and responses maps out how power is perceived – both initiated and received. A fourth alternative perhaps completing the picture, namely, a desire to not make a final judgment; a temporary postponement or a continual deferment of such a decision for whatever reasons (whether intentionally discerned or not discerned). (200)

	Power is the putting into effect a state of transition, a process of transformation. I would like now to explore this topic in some depth. It is a subject that is not without its misleading myths and metaphors, its metaphysical imputations and mystifications. Not that this author, too, can escape such a charge, but, perhaps collectively we could forge some progress in this area (through the dialectical challenges of constructive debate?) and make some real, insightful progress? In these investigations I want to see how our three themes of identity, work and value are related to power and knowledge, etc. So to this end let me note the following series of points. (201)

	Some philosophers have stated that power is not just negative but also positive in scope. As Foucault noted, the prison system was/is also ideologically proposed as the means to reform its inmates of their criminal, or deviant, ways. Hospitals are conceived as a place to cure people of their illnesses. Prisons have been constructed, ideologically, along the same parallel lines, namely, as an institution to ‘cure’ people who criminally deviate from normal, law-abiding practices. Currently, it’s a general perception that prisons fail to normalize, if not actually exacerbating, those criminal tendencies (through their function as “universities of crime”, etc.). Obviously, incarcerating a person is using repressive means. What positive things, then, could be said about such an institution we could well ask? Some have stated that their use on a grand scale actually does lower crime statistics by taking such ‘ill-intentioned’ people out of the system of normal everyday life. Others might state they are just as much part of the problem for a variety of reasons. One ‘positive’ aspect of such an institution is that the very ideology behind their construction and utilization actually creates the very discourse used in discussing this topic. That types of power create their own types of discourse. How, then, are we to critically approach a topic when the very ideological power that created that type of discourse has ‘infected’ its very manner of examination? As I have stated elsewhere we should be grateful for prejudice as such prejudgments give us the necessary material for a process of transcendental appreciation through the adoption and adaptation of an overall transcendental suspension. Of course whether that type of critical task can be satisfactorily conducted and completed is another matter; something that we will have to look at later in this essay. For the moment let us assume that we do have some powers of critical reflection (as would seem to be the case from a common sense point of view since our survival in the world would seem to be predicated on that ‘fact’). What other ‘observations’ can we note from this brief assessment. Reflecting ideology and re-constituting its continuance we could also say that power is omnipresent. The mentality that envisages the curative powers of carceral institutions also extends to the incarceration of psychiatric patients… and thence to nursing homes for the elderly… to detentions centres for aliens be they bona fide refugees or economic migrants, etc. In this regard we get parallel discourses; commensurable discourses based on commensurable metaphors and a less distinctive overlapping of power-relations based on other styles of manoeuvres, rituals and resolutions, etc. But, primarily, power is realized through relationships and in this regard as relationships are realized through the ongoing resolution of dissonance so, too, power is realized through the processes of resolution that constitute and re-constitute the centres of relational being in this world, this World-of-Life. Indeed, this World-of-Life could be defined as the net resultant of all relationships which, in turn, is the resolution of all relationships with respect to each other in and through this Life-World. Relational power devolves from the centre of its relationships and the relationship those relationships have to each other both virtual and non-virtual in compass (although correctly the world of relationships resides in the complex, chaotic region between these extremes of the non-virtual and the virtual). Hence the omni-presence of power. So power could also be defined, provisionally, as the effective diffusion/infusion of power through relational resolution that constitutes that relationship and re-constitute its effective continuation. Because the essential nature of a relationship is phenomenologically, and not metaphysically, diffused/infused over the entire extent of that relationship, and, power is realized through that defined sense of resolution hence the omni-presence of power within that relationship (and, that the same applies to the net relationship of all potentially perceived/conceived relationships through their effective power realized in their relational spheres of influence being commensurable with all other relationships to some extent or other through the overall integrity of the Life-World). In this complex concept of omni-presence what is entailed here? (202)

	For a start, for us as subjects we experience power through being a subject. But in this we must not confuse subjectivity and subjugation. The world is a world of subjects and objects and that we should not draw too hard a distinction here since as human beings we are also embodied individuals and hence both objects and subjects to ourselves and to others. Moreover, we inhabit institutions and institutions within institutions, etc. An insight here that might radically simplify this complexity is the observation that all identity possesses some degree of epistemological organization and it is through the resolution and re-resolution of the same, in the ongoing re-constitution of its identity (and therein imparting identity to its participants, and v.v.) that allows us to discursively discourse on such identity in its omni-present sea of power-relations being intentionally located (and selectively re-located through transformation) for us in the midst of the same (in accordance with the current manner of our comportment in our passage through this World-of-Life). This inter-linking theme of epistemological organization intimately relating us to our theological topic (through our previous definition of the Divine, as that epistemological organization whose degree of organization is radically greater than that of our own psychic degree of organization). Now, we just need to firmly note that power as an existential excess is delivered through this process of resolution and that that resolution, as an essential phenomenon, is equally distributed through out the space (and time) of that relationship. Hence this concept of the omni-presence of power-relations. (203)

	What else can we say about power-relations from a critical perspective (realized in and through the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension and its examination examined theoretically, practically and critically)? (204)

	Power is both a complex condition and effect of the exercise of intentional processes since the same must be experienced in some manner or other for us to be able to discourse about the same, engage its technologies and/or evaluate its programmes. Because power is experienced therefore its intentional implication. What does not exists for us just does not exist for us (in our psychic mapping of the Life-World). In the situation of its non-discrimination it just is not there for us even if its eventual recognition is realizable and the grounds for the same are already in existence. Once the intentional field discerns that type of power then that type of power is then there-for-us. Once some form and degree of recognition is achieved then that type of power is then able to be discriminated both subjectively and intersubjectively (since no genre of activity exists without some form and degree of an intersubjective meta-textual form of discrimination). The point of this last definition being that power is both active and passive, acting and being acted upon, simultaneously (moment to moment) and never equally (except in provisional, practical terms of reference when some form of equality in power-relations can be met over a period of time). This effective inequality establishing the very power-relational spectrum (in the first place) of that relational situation from the phenomenologically essential perspective of the same both with respect to degree of intensity and orientation (between a changing pattern of active/passive mix of impositional processes). A relationship demands some form of reciprocity but never an equal process of reciprocity (since the latter is the sheer ‘death’ of that relationship like paying our bills [without leaving a tip]). Although born in the transcendental suspension power irrupts from the breaking of the same. This necessary mix of unequal active and passive processes therein ensures our engagement/dis-engagement in/from that relationship hence no one can declare any relationship to be perfectly free nor without any degree of freedom! All relationships are negotiated to some degree or other, even if sometimes ineffectively, even if forced upon us by virtue of this fact that we can resist their implementation, either successfully or non-successfully, since their implementation will be met in an overcoming of resistance in some form or other in the course of the constitution of that relationship and all changes conducted therein. Even in extreme torture our very physical being (being there) is a form of resistance since all processes are just that – processes! Processes as processes cannot be conducted instantly (even though actual events may seem to take on that form, they still are only instances within a preconditionally pre-established course of events whose ‘intentional’ motivation is either insightfully recognized and/or not recognized, etc.).  (205)

	How is power expressed? How is it to be understood? What is the link between power and knowledge (if any?)? As stated power is epistemologically organized hence its implication of the intentional. However, at the same time, because power is realized through the centre of our relationships through the ongoing resolution of dissonance, met through resistance, and the non-reductive nature of its nature as an existential excess, we cannot conduct an(y) intentional analysis except superficially and as a supplement (that may or may not supply an additional degree of relevant understanding). Then, again, we have the play of an empowering in front of us and it is in its exercise that we should concentrate our attention upon (and not through some form of a digression through some futile processes of intentional reduction [in an attempt to examine the spectral trace of an impossible to obtain metaphysical imputation]). Between the rational and the non-rational, between the rational and the irrational, power is exercised in and through moments of chaotic bifurcation (otherwise we are no more that the net result of the interaction of all translational forces imposing themselves currently upon us – which can never be the case except in our death). We are no more machines or robots then, nor mere creatures dancing beholden to the pure play of chance! Because power is the result of resolution of dissonance, competition, difference, resistance, etc., and issues forth in an infusion and/or effusion of an existential excess therefore it cannot be reductively analyzed except superficially, as a supplement, a marginal comment, as a speculative hypothesis that may or may not be useful in the course of our current intentions (treated in a non-intentional modality as both directions or goals set by and setting the nature of that discourse or mode of life wherein its value is constituted and continued through ongoing re-constitution, etc.). Power is effected in and through an overcoming of resistance. Resistance can never remain the same in its interaction with power therefore our interest lies in transformational processes of ‘becoming’ rather than mere ‘being’. Therein lies our freedom to resist the imposition of power and resist, in turn, imposing power. Moreover, through an overcoming of current limitations we experience an even greater sense of freedom through an existential expansion of that surplus of value wherein we discover that sense of freedom in the first place. Such power enlarging its associated range of discourse or mode of life, and, extending ourselves into new or relatively novel modes of life through an overlapping of that power and its ability to initiate us into relatively new genres of activity through an extension and re-definition of old genres, through genre hybridity and our engagement with new genres through their appropriation in the light of our current repertoire of genres and their eventual self-critical re-establishment through active and passive forms of reflection and exercise…. (206)

Reflection upon instances of power can only reveal at face value the nature of their presentation/re-presentation. However power can never be represented (since, for a start, the representational model of reality has no ‘real’ reality!). Power is only effectively appreciated through being lived and/or re-lived – to do otherwise is to mis-represent it. Therefore, we cannot be absolutely rational! To appreciate my own behaviour would necessitate an appreciation of that current appreciation, etc. To conduct ourselves in a process of absolute appreciation would equally, i.e., absolutely, divorce us from the contents of our appreciation. Thence there would be nothing there for us to appreciate. So an absolute rationality is an impossibility! Then, partial appreciation is to mis-represent the same (and necessitate a process of de-mis-representation through the critical self-presentation of the same wherein the mis-representation of the mis-representation is eventually appreciated in effect or provisionally in the course of time through living/re-living its simulation/re-simulation). Being rational in a limited sense is of course a natural possibility as long as we recognize that there can be no absolute rational reduction and exposure of our intentional acts. Indeed, as intentions are formed through the ongoing resolution of relatively dissonant, or resistant, intentional preconditions, it follows that a simulation or modeling of similar types of processes will then re-engage us in an active process of insight into the nature of those intentional disposition as both actively met and exercised, and, as both passively engaged in the course of which we find ourselves being exercised; finding for ourselves the manner of the overall resistance that is exercised by us and upon us in the course of that type of engagement. This partial, but usually effective, determination of our intentions presents us with an opportunity to face a number of other problems in a similar vein. E.g., as relationships are themselves embedded in a sea of relationships and they in turn are context dependent, how could we intuitively appreciate any relationship given this complex embedding of the same in the bewildering complexity of the totality Life-World (that could not be computed in a calculative mode in any form or format!)? Or, how could we ever ascertain the integrity of a certain phenomenon when its complexity and integrity is overwhelmingly rich and seemingly beyond the limits of comprehension and thence its discernment. Or, again, how could I intend to initiate and discern a certain intentional course of action when my intentional disposition to discern itself necessitates an intention to discern the discerning of the same, etc., etc? (207)

Correctly, all intentional deliberation is a process and, as a process, is conducted within a certain period of time. But, forming an intention to think x or do y is the result of a resolution of the necessary preconditions that would allow us to thing x or conduct y. Intentions (as intentional object-states) are never intentional (in terms of goals or ambitions, etc.). Intentions in the first sense are the result of resolutional processes whilst intentions in the second sense are the problematic territory as pre-conditionally thematized (in the first sense). In this light intentional object-states are conditional and the result of the resolution of preconditional intentions. The power of those realized intentional states then acting as a power to reconfigure those pre-conditional aspirations, and v.v., etc. How then can we meet with any phenomenon since its proper comprehension could only be comprehended in its total comprehension which could only be obtained over an infinite period of time and hence in and through a state beyond computation? A resolution of this problem, and these types of problems, devolves around the recognition of the difference between phenomenological essences and metaphysical essences and invoking the use of the former and adopting a rejection of the latter. Metaphysical essence involves the imputation of substance/s and their like with an intrinsic nature (a concept that I have previously argued as having no real epistemological/ontological content except in a peripheral metaphorical sense as a mere metaphorical residue or shell through the persistence of metaphorical connotations even after the recognition of the destruction of metaphorical denotation). On the other hand, phenomenological essence can be thematized through a recognition of the essential nature of the resolution that establishes that essential flavour of that relationship under examination (in and through the power of metaphor to systematically metaphor the world and our own sense of place within the same). Hence our ability to simulate a relationship though a reconstruction of that essential flavour. By establishing the essential nature of its preconditions we can the re-establish the essential nature of that relationship as a conditional experience, and v.v. This mutual process, as a process, then being able to refine our understanding of the nature of that relationship being simulated or re-simulated through its incorporation within the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. This essential flavour is experienced, hence, through an engagement with the simulation of the power and integrity of that relationship to re-construct itself in non-virtual ‘real’ time or in a relatively virtual time (and that orientation is conducted in ‘real’ time) and is realized throughout the scope or range of that relationship as engaged from anywhere within its psychic embrace. By such means meeting the essential phenomenological integrity of that relationship in each and ever factor of that relationship along with the entire relational context of that relationship at the same time. In effect an essential snapshot or crystalization of the totality of that relationship as embedded in its relational context which once appreciated merely re-confirms our already thematized understanding of the essential nature of the same. Hence our ability to non-absolutely discern the totality of a distinctive relational state as a relatively distinctive state of affairs. Hence our ability to essentially understand the transformational progress of that distinctive state of affairs, and, thence our ability to actively thematize our overt intentions (both as conditional intentional object-states and as pre-conditionally formulated intentional goals or aspirations). Power to act and be acted upon involving processes of intentional re-direction achieved through chaotic moments of opportunity as previously outlined. Furthermore, as power is generated through a discharging of the transcendental suspension (correctly seen as approached in a trans-epistemological-ontological frame of reference) we experience the integrity of that relationship through the tracing of that transcendental suspension and the power of that relationship, in our interaction with it, through loss of equilibrium realized in its irruption from the same. Hence power can never be impartial. On the other hand, its contemplation must be to some basic degree as it is conducted through the auspices of a pre-conditional overall transcendental suspension. Power-relations reflecting both the residual integrity of the relationship and this impartial irruption of power through the distinctive and unique breaking of this suspension. Hence power contains within its embrace a (pre-conditional) dialectical ‘sameness’ and (a conditional) ‘difference’ that therein constitutes the course of all processes of identity and self-identity in its appropriate relational context (without any recourse to any form of non-nominal metaphysical imputation whatsoever!)! (208)

	Through the dialectics of the hermeneutic circle parts and wholes, difference and sameness, apparent change and apparent continuity, etc., are constituted, integrated and re-constituted in experience, indeed, constitute the very experience of experience itself. Between the polarities of the Epistemological Aspect and the Ontological Aspect in our thematization of the Life-World processed of hermeneutic harmonization constitute the simulation of experience and the experience of simulation. Through ongoing processes of transformation in and through such harmonization experience is forever simulated/re-simulated as neither absolutely atomic in nature nor completely molecular or systematic in scope. Hence our engagement with phenomena must always be as a simulated process of encountering wherein the ‘what is to be encountered’ is forever a dialectically harmonized expression of ‘identity-in-the-midst-of-non-identity’, or, equally, ‘non-identity-in-the-midst-of-identity’. The ‘material’ of phenomenological experience forever dealing with such an integrated mixture of integration-versus-non-integration/non-integration-versus-integration. Transformation implies, demands, this dialectic between the poles of apparent continuity and apparent discontinuity. Thence the conveyance, realization and expression of information. As power is expressed through transformation and it is claimed that there is an equivalence between the power and knowledge how would we go about arguing for this claim in the light of this theoretical discourse as hitherto developed? First let me discuss the following postmodern ‘observation’, namely, that facts only become ‘facts’ through ratification in the light of the discourse that nominates those fact to be ‘facts’. (209)

	A positive aspect of power is the power of that power to nominate what objects of that discourse are the objects of that discourse. Therein exhibiting the power of that discourse to nominate what counts or does not count as truth in that field of discourse in addition to what are the other object-states of that field. Hence the power of the currently dominant ideology in a certain society to nominate what are the pre-conditions for the recognition of ‘truth’ (as it sees fit to state them). However, such truth should always be regarded as provisional and partisan in the hope that citizens can better evaluate the merits of a certain situation through a variety of apposite perspectives in the hope of discerning the relatively real. Later in this essay let me discuss how such a program that seeks an authenticity in its theoretical, practical and critical evaluations of the situation to hand is or could be achieved (through the appropriately exercised and properly informed adoption and adaptation of an overall transcendental suspension). Noting that our evaluations of that situation can take the form neither of a ‘process of an absolute harmonization’ nor a ‘process of an absolute dis-harmonization’. So, in accordance with this general understanding a discourse declares ‘progressively’ what objects are suitable objects to represent that discourse and thence what objects, by default, are true or not true in that field (through their divisions into such rigid categories or less rigid classifications that characterize certain types of values such as good, true, beautiful, valid, appropriate, useful, etc., etc.). (210)

	Now, to qualify this ideologically selective version of truth, in a contemporary ‘observation’, we can note that objects have the (often annoying) habit of occupying simultaneously various discourses and counter-discourses (and this is reflected in the nature and use of natural language). So, e.g., the American flag has a certain ‘truth’ in the Republican discourse, and, at the same time, it has a certain ‘truth’ in the Democratic discourse which does not mean that these ‘truths’ are necessarily neither non-identical nor identical. That, through adopting the critical perspective of the overall transcendental suspension and the multiple adoption of a number of perspectives we can head through their exercise to a position that is better able to discern the relatively real and not allow ourselves to be merely truth discerning in a limited, habitually reflexive, ideologically driven manner!? (211)

	That being so, if granted, how are we then to equate truth with power and vice versa? I would like to do this, first, through an examination of insight, what exactly does it mean to be insightful? (212)

	Insight may well be cashed out as ‘in-sight’ - seeing insightfully inside a certain situation. Looking into a certain state of affairs what sorts of ‘seeing’ seem to be involved? Say we are looking through a small book of autographs. To begin with each autograph is as much an autograph, apparently, as any other autograph. Then, for the sake of the argument, let us say we note the four autographs of the Beatles on one page. No longer are these four autographs now viewed as mere autographs like all the rest. We suspect that they are indeed autographs of the four Beatles and, if that is correct, will be worth a large sum of money. Flicking though this same book one then also notices the autograph of an obscure novelist whose works you are very much taken with. This autograph you really value more even if not as valuable, you well suspect, as those of the four Beatles. To begin with your inspection of this small book validly recognizes it to be of the genre of an autograph book (even if all of them were faked to look like individual autographs signed by their stated individuals, or, merely signed by an auto-pen). Then, in a moment of insightful-like recognition you realize that some of those autographs are of very famous people and should be worth a considerable sum of money. Then you realize that one of the other signatures is of a person most admired by yourself but probably not worth much in financial terms yet would be much valued by yourself. The person who owns this book of autographs sees your appreciation of this particular author and decides to offer you a choice of the page with the four signatures of the Beatles or the page with the signature of your favorite author. For you this is not a difficult choice and you accept the latter page. In this anecdote I have modeled, I believe, the mechanics of insight (at least in part). Let me explain. (213)

	Insight seems to imply the seeing ‘something’ as ‘something else’ in a certain situation. Indeed, that situation becomes more certain in the mind of that individual because they now ‘know’ that x is now y, etc. Essentially, there is a re-interpretation of that situation in that process of insight. The situation remains the same but in part or in whole becomes re-valued through that process of insight. Now, I would argue that what happens inside our evaluation of a certain situation can also take place in our evaluation of the evaluation itself or between evaluations. In ‘looking at’ a certain situation we then find ourselves looking at it as a something else through this process of ‘looking as’, i.e., e.g., seeing x as y. This process of re-interpretation is, effectively, a transformation of our previous interpretation(s). Hence, the re-interpretative power that is brought to bear upon that interpreted situation along with the interpretative power released as a consequence of that transformation. That, an interpretative power is brought to bear upon a certain text or textual fragment, and, that a certain power is released in the ‘apparent’ successful realization of that re-interpretation. That power-differential unleashed being always greater than that invested in this transition, but, the degree of power released, in an excess to that invested, declaring the relative power of that re-interpretive insight. Interpretative power releasing re-interpretive power – knowledge, and, knowledge releasing re-interpretative  power… hence my modeling of the phenomenon of insight….. (214)

	What then is the insightfulness of insight? Or, how is insight insightful? Why, e.g., in a psychosis is there a lack of insight but not necessarily an absence of insight? Put the other way round, an insightfully appreciated phenomena is occasioned through the appropriate and proper invocation of an overall transcendental suspension through a suspension of belief and not the suspension of disbelief. It would seem, therefore, that an adequately functioning overall transcendental suspension is the clue as to how insight is allowed to effectively operate! In this light I would like to propose the following solution to this problem, namely, that an insightful perspective is engaged when the relevant rhetorical questions are asked. Then, through the re-introduction of an overall suspension both those rhetorical questions and their metaphorical responses elicited are returned to a state of an integrated dynamic overall transcendental suspension. The existential excess promoted by such an approach producing that state of ongoing insightfulness along with the intentional appreciation of all appropriate and proper responses that would need to be called forth as a response as to how that situation should be re-approached. Let me look at this more closely. (215)

	How do we know what rhetorical questions should be asked? By inspecting the experiential field all prominent anomalies therein should be noted and evaluated and prioritized for rhetorical treatment, etc. By anomalies is meant those aspects of the experiential field that stand out as relatively different from the relative consonant normality of the overall tenor of that specific field as incorporated in that general overall field of experience. Let me demonstrate what is meant here. Let me begin with a very simple example. Let me say I have been sitting cross-legged on the floor at a friend’s place watching an absorbing movie on a DVD. I notice some twinges in my legs and a feeling that my feet have gone to sleep through a restriction of the blood supply caused by staying in the same posture for too long a period of time. I automatically shift my posture and push my feet to the front whilst still seated on the floor. A short while later I note this feeling of ‘pins and needles’ has now been substantially reduced and my full attention returns to this movie we are currently watching. Although watching this movie has absorbed a greater degree of my attention still my consciousness was alerted to an increasingly uncomfortable feeling in my legs as a result of maintaining the same posture whilst seated on the floor. To alleviate this sensation of discomfort I merely shifted the manner of my being seated there. I have, in effect, operated insightfully. A particular sequences of various experiences has occurred here. First, I am enjoying the fact that I am  watching an absorbing movie. Second, although most of my overt attention is focused upon my watching this movie an anomalous experience was noted, namely, an uncomfortable feeling-sensation in my legs and feet. Third, I merely shifted my posture and those anomalous experiences dissipated. Even though most of my overt attention is concentrated on watching this movie that experience is not noted as anomalous. However, an anomalous experience surfaces in this sensation of discomfit with my legs and feet. In response I merely shift my posture and this anomalous experience recedes. In my estimation, we merely need to do the same sort of thing in order to have insightful experiences or at least discern the relatively real and discover those possible responses that are thought and/or felt appropriate to that type of context. Let me now look into a more complex type of situation. (216)

	I am walking along the street and I notice that people seem to be looking at me in a rather strange manner. Most don’t want to look me in the face and I notice they are looking at each other after I have passed and are laughing among themselves. All rather disconcerting. It’s a cold Monday morning, the birds are singing and the sun is shinning and everyone on the streets seems to be in a rush on their way to work. In my unease at these strange responses that seem to implicate something strange about myself I suddenly notice that although I thought I was wearing my dark blue pinstripe suit I had actually forgotten to get out of my dark blue flannel pyjamas with imprinted pink teddy bears and in the dark thought I had already changed. I didn’t know where to look – fortunately, I am only one block from home and quickly head back to change. Again, I have this anomalous experience of how people seem to be reacting towards me. This makes me wonder why and in the process I discover my sartorial oversight. In response I head back home and change. This time the anomalous experience is the strange manner people seem to be looking at me and how cold it seems to be this morning. To remedy the situation, to ‘normalize’ this anomalous sense of experience, I need to rhetorically ask myself the right sort of questions. Noting the anomalous nature of that experience is a first step on this path to the asking of the right questions. The payoff being the eliciting of an appropriate response and a ‘nomalization’ of our overall experiential field of experience. In effect, making a return to an overall experiential field without having to continually divert our attention from the same to note the appearance and non-disappearance of major anomalies along with their automatic sense of an ongoing intentional re-focusing on the nature of that anomaly (be it in overt consciousness or covertly in pre-consciousness, post-consciousness, parallel forms of consciousness, etc?). Better, usually, to attend to such anomalous experiences and nip them in the bud, so to speak, by seeking, as early as possible, the best probable course for their remedy. Unfortunately, the persistence and the relative non-removal of anomalous experiences in a psychosis perhaps create the situation where they can only be better dealt with through their being continually over-looked; a type of phenomenon assisted by the nature of this illness in so far as a literalization of psychotically mis-interpreted phenomenal content may be adopted as the ‘obvious’ reading in order to explain the same.  (217)

In this model I am suggesting that anomalies somewhat bring themselves to our attention with a little help from other aspects of the psyche. Then, when relevant intentional preconditions meet the relevant intentional conditions an existential excess is formed whose insight, and our insightfulness into the same, is met along with the recognition of the need or otherwise for a response or set of responses in that particular situation. How do we know in this type of process that we are asking the right rhetorical questions? From experience we have acquired a repertoire of responses as possible courses of behaviour in certain situation-types. Moreover, from the existential excess generated in thinking about possible responses and our actual choice of a particular response process we find from an evaluation of the relativity of that existential excess the relative merit of that process of ‘insight’ and the general appropriateness of our response. Obviously, possible and actual responses that produce/re-produce a greater degree of an existential excess in overall value better deserve our attention. (218)

	Now, in the situation of a psychosis how should or could the person re-establish a more valid sense of their being-in-this-world-with-others? Hypothetically, there is this need for exercising this sense of an appropriate rhetorical enquestioning or interrogation of their current situation along with getting them to noting all relevant anomalies and how they might be best dealt with. However, I have found from experience the forceful bringing to the attention of a psychotic person of their misinterpretation or lack of interpretation merely results in a misunderstanding of your motives, etc., although often with a covert demonstration that some part of their psyche is not being fooled by their suspension of disbelief along with their concrete literalization of their current metaphorical thinking in their inappropriate response or set of responses to that (type of) situation. I suspect that without recourse to medication there is little one could do to overcome this distorted factory of delusional thinking (although the severity of this type of illness might be ameliorated through the adoption of relaxation techniques, a general diminishment of anxieties and a less confrontational means of insight production or an indirectness in the provocation of insight?)? (219)

	I have argued that the nature of the discourse produces/re-produces the nature of the (intentional) objects(-states) characterized by that discourse. However, this cannot mean that the objects nominated and defined by a certain discourse cannot be trans-discourse oriented. The same landscape can be seen by a geologist, a real-estate agent and an artist and each can insightfully view it in the manner that they have developed through the profession of their vocation. Furthermore, each individual can also learn to see that same ‘object’ through someone else’s professional and/or non-professional discourse. Hence the existence of that (intentional) object(-state) is not necessarily completely dependent upon a certain discourse and that, thence, neither its existence nor its truth can be so absolutely defined (except non-naturally or artificially). Indeed, it is through transformation of that object-state in a discourse, set of discourses or super-discourses, etc., that allows us to discover the dependent nature of such ‘truth’. Because all characterization, all truth and all forms of valuation are realized through and from frames of appreciation it follows that such appreciation can only be representative and thence mis-representative (being ’about’ the [phenomenal] text in question). On the other hand, understanding the mis-representative nature of representation also allows us to appreciate to some non-absolute degree in what manner such representation is actually mis-representative and thence to that degree as not so mis-representative as it was first received in interpretative accommodation. Hence interpretation must be a process that occurs in time even though ‘insightful instances’ within that ‘stream’ of intent will be experienced in and through a non-calculative sense of the ‘moment’). Transformation, therefore, correctly proceeds through an existential sense of the non-historic, living-present between a dialectic of the sameness and difference, between past, present and future, etc. An ongoing process of insightful moments that reconstitute the course of that phenomenological process of interpretation and thence our insight in the re-constitution of that course of transformational re-direction. In essence we start somewhere, notice anomalies, ask rhetorical questions in keeping with the apparent nature of those anomalies and their discourses, find provocatively induced responses and non-critically/critically reflect upon the same, etc…. (220)

	With this better appreciation of the nature of insight let me now return to this question “what is the relationship between power and knowledge?” In my anecdote of the autograph book we sequentially come to an understanding that we have a book… a book of autographs… that some autographs are valuable… that some autographs might be more valued for their importance for that particular individual reviewing that book rather than their commercial value in the public arena, etc. Insight is a progressive affair! However, in recognizing each step in this hierarchical sequence of insights we should note a number of distinctive features that are held in common between all insightful processes of discernment, namely, the necessity of each step as a presupposition for the next, and, very importantly, a change of phase in our transition from one level of insight to the next, etc. Let me elaborate. To recognize the autograph book as an autograph book we must first recognize the autograph book as a type of book. Then, to recognize various signatures of certain famous people to be by various famous people we first have to recognize the signatures as signatures qua signatures. Then, in our evaluation of those signatures we must recognize what constitutes in this case something as of more value to us. Each step in this hierarchical sequence is dependent upon that which is presuppositional. A famous autograph demands that it be an autograph and truly an autograph of that person (and not something merely simulated in order to deceive). Once each step in this hierarchy is suppositionally confirmed or taken at apparent face value we are then able to move on to the next step in this sequence of insightful increments. Our recognition of such a supposition now needing merely a re-confirmation of that confirmation and never a new confirmation since our confirmation has already been confirmed hence additional inputs in this direction can only re-confirm that supposition already treated as confirmed. Even new avenues of suppositional confirmation merely re-confirm our already having arrived at this level of confirmation. In contrast, new avenues of supposition can de-confirm our current confirmation already in place (and hence this asymmetry between non-radical act/s of re-confirmation and those radical act/s of dis-confirmation should the latter be able to establish themselves in this regard!)! Hence once confirmation is established and no act of dis-confirmation is present we are presented with the establishment of an insight into that topic being simulated for our examination. Thus the insightful shift from one stage to the next is transformational in nature and essential in a phenomenological sense (and not in the metaphysical). Re-confirmation merely re-confirming the essential-understanding-already-to-hand. So a process of insight is realized at each stage we distinctively move in our sequencing of this hierarchy of evaluation. The essential flavour of each transformational transition invoked merely requiring a re-constitution of what is already being re-constituted hence we have, in between, these radical stages of discontinuity at each stage in this process of insightful sequencing. Overcoming these radical shifts in value is the very sine qua non of the insightful process! A sequence of processed-transitions put into effect through the ability to definitively seize these chaotic, non-calculative moments of opportunity that allow us to make those very same transitional steps in our simulation/re-simulation of that under investigation. These sequential steps re-defining, in part or in whole, our current simulation of that under such examination through this process of insightful constitutional/re-constitutional construction/re-construction. Bridging these discontinuities is experienced as a process of insight! These moments of bridging being just that ‘moments’ since the transition is chaotic, i.e., discontinuous! Hence the invocation of ‘moments of opportunity’ since it is only through such bifurcations that the crossings of such discontinuities are established experientially. Although engineered pre-conditionally through intentional calculation the discontinuous transition from one distinctive (period of) moment(s) to the next (period), correctly, is a non-calculable affair when viewed from a relatively rational, deterministic, linear point of view. These discontinuous transitions being treated as moments of insight. (221)

	Insight, therefore, is a process that allows us to distinctively engineer/re-engineer these sets of discontinuous transformational transitions that re-define in part and/or in whole the overall totality of such a complex (set of) sequential strand/s in the light of appropriate and proper rhetorical questions/metaphorical answers that assist us in this thematizing that project currently to hand. As a rule of thumb we might say “that our sight merely sees what is already there whilst our insight helps us to see things that weren’t seen or seen clearly before!” Hence, approximately, ‘sight’ is achieved through recognition and ‘insight’ is achieved through re-cognition. To qualify this distinction we need to note that both insight and sight, correctly, are mutually dependent upon each other. Hence, we can provisionally conclude at this point, that this equation between ‘power and knowledge’ is an experiential ‘fact’ in so far as that power has the power to effect these discontinuous insightful transitions through the realization of such non-continuous transformations conducted in and through these chaotic moments of opportunity. In this regard we could say that “power is the means to knowledge” and “knowledge is an end realized through such power” whilst “knowledge then also has the power to relatively re-confirm (or dis-confirm) those same re-constituted sequences that constitute/re-constitute that particular, distinctive insight”, etc. Only through a simulation of those transitions can insight be insightfully manifested, and, thence, reconfirmed through a re-confirmation of that same distinctively realized set of sequentially adopted bifurcational options! Insight being progressively realized and re-thematized by following such a distinctively mapped pathway – hence the intersubjectivity of insight through ‘our’ following the same (set-up, provocative) path must, as a process, realize the same insightfully answered set of rhetorical questions (when properly and appropriately conducted in and through an overall transcendental suspension without recourse to the import of any form of metaphysical imputation whatsoever!)! (222)

	The important question was earlier raised “how in this infinitely complex world can someone, as an intentional subject, ever find themselves in a position to effectively appreciated this same world despite all this infinite complexity of which even a fraction is beyond calculation, (etc.)?” My reply to this rhetorical gambit, at this point in time, is to declare that not only has the world put us in a position to appreciate the same in that same manner to which we find ourselves being able to contemplate through an essential snap shot of this world, but, that, at the same time we are effectively set-up through the very constitution of our currently dominant intentional relationship vis-à-vis the world of all other relationships and, therein, essentially snap-shotted at that same time into this understanding of the world. It is as if we are riding the crest of a wave on our surfboard of intentionality and that the confluence of the world-for-us at that point in space and time and identity is expressed through that very same wave. Relationships are the result of the ongoing resolution of the totality of dissonance both there in that relationship and both there in its emplacement in the world of all other relationships. The resolution realized being a result of all the factors there that allow us to be and be able to appreciate that particular relationship in the first place. So, not only do we get an essential snap-shot of our relationship in that relationship in its relationship with all other relationships, but, we are also essentially snap-shotted into an understanding of that relationship at the same time through being projected and thrown into the being of that relationship at the same time. Therein we experience a near-equivalence or harmonization of the epistemological with the ontological. Through this equivalence of an ontological perspective/s or (Ontological Aspect) and an epistemological perspective/s (or Epistemological Aspect) in the trans-epistemological-ontological nature of the Life-World we find, therein, a natural equivalence between “‘ontological power’ and ‘epistemological knowledge’” and “‘epistemological power’ and ‘ontological knowledge’”! Hence, in broad, overall terms of reference this equivalence between power and knowledge (and its extension in a more specific sense between localized ‘modes of life’ and globalized ‘ideologies’, and v.v. along with the ‘seepage’ that seems to occur between the non-absolute polarities of the relatively particular and the relatively general). (223)

	At the intersection of the epistemological orientation and the ontological orientation, in intentional consciousness, in its total configurement in the Life-World, there is an equivalence of power and knowledge. This is experienced in and through the simulation/re-simulation of the overall transcendental suspension, but, at the same time, is lost in and through an irruption of a complex mix of power-and-knowledge realized through a de-suspension of the same and, therein, experiencing this loss of that semblance of a psychic balance. Hence the differential of power-relations awash in an integrated ocean of swirling seas each replete with their own existential excess, mode of life; associated discourses, technologies and programmes, etc. In the intentional discharge of intentionality we are re-located in a sense of world, in sense itself, i.e., in our overall complex psychic mapping of the Life-World as adopted and adapted by us. This semblance of translation also has transformational consequences. Furthermore, by the very dialectical nature of the constitution of our identity, although this semblance of translation may appear to be uni-modal, correctly we are forever a complex, broad spectrum configuration of intentional actualizations and potentialites. Hence the forever unique configuration of the psyche at any one moment in time. In this sense of translation within this psychic mapping of the Life-World we then find our experience of meaning through our conformity with genre, societal peer pressures, conventions, major and minor ideologies, etc., in conjunction with the unique character of our primary sense of psychic location (in sense). Hence the unique flavour expressed through the complexity of that semblance of meaning (despite its primary location in generalities, universal agreements and an overall sense of consonance derived from this orientation of genre-conformity). Lastly, the relationship of sense and meaning though a suspension (or, i.e., a psychic balancing of two or more parties) realizes a simulation of an existential meaningfulness in the light of its irruption from a state of an overall suspension. Now, in parallel to this scheme, we have theological value (in our hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension) mirroring the same third moment of the existential, namely, theological meaningfulness. On the other hand, sense, meaning and meaningfulness co-determine a sense of overall value! Along the same lines, therefore, we can talk about an overall theological value when theological meaningfulness is conjoined with theological sense and theological meaning, i,e, when theological identity and theological work are co-considered with theological value in and through an overall theologically oriented transcendental suspension. (224)

	In a disruption of, and an irruption from, the overall transcendental suspension (in both its epistemological and ontological parallels/conjunction(s)) we get a difference in power, i.e., a differential power-relation. But, we should ask, a differential of what; a difference in what? A difference in power – thence its differentiated nature. I.e., a difference in the nature of that particular field of power. Since that difference can only operate in that specific field it follows that this nature must be that power integral to that field and mutually shared, therefore, between all the participants of that relational field. Hence power-relations are a differential within the ambit of the integrated nature of that relationship. This mutual ‘ground’ or ‘aspect’ of the relationship being its integral-power-relation. So, a power differential is expressed within the medium/media of  a power integral/power integrals. (225)

	Now, this differential aspect of the overall power-relation must be experienced as dissonance; that which is relatively different (and hence this difference in power ‘experienced’ between any two participants in that power-relationship). It follows that dissonance in a relationship must meet some form of resistance. Without resistance it effectively has no place in that particular relationship under examination. On the other hand, too much resistance and it is blocked from expressing itself as a power-differential. Effectively, therefore, dissonance must overcome such resistance without being overcome in the process, or, over-coming that resistance in such a manner that there is no sense of resistance through its over-passing or merely passing through. ‘Overcoming’ in this fruitful sense is, effectively, the harmony experienced by those participants and whose intensity is equal to the facticity of that relationship, i.e., the degree to which the relationship is experienced as greater than the mere sum of its parts in and through this semblance of an existential excess. Harmonization, as a process, therefore, effectively establishes the relationship and it does so through this dialectic between being overcome and overcoming without merely over-coming/over-passing that locus of resistance. This manifestation of the relationship is its simulation through re-presentation and thence its sense of an ongoing re-simulation (of itself as a simulation and never as that which is pre-simulated or non-simulated). Thus a proper examination of a relationship, whether in general or particular, must take these three moments of the hermeneutic circle, namely, of resistance/dissonance - integrational-consonance – effective-harmonization, into account from the point of view of that relationship itself, i.e., its point of view either directly participated in or virtually re-constructed for-us by-us non-directly. Now this point of view, or centre, of the relationship is none other that the essential-phenomenological nature of that relationship and this is experienced as of the same nature or flavour equally throughout the entire field or space or ambit of that relationship. The extent of a relationship being wherever it has the same sense of a relational dynamic, i.e. ‘participates’ in the same relational dynamics (and making no absolute distinction between space, time and identity as experienced within that relationship). (226)

	In a relationship our experience of it is direct (otherwise there would have been no relationship). The same relationship can be referred to indirectly and thence virtually when our participation is external to the ambit of that field. ‘Knowledge’ of that field is effectively reconstructed for us and hence represented. But, there can be no representation, only re-presentation! So this sense of the indirect must itself be experienced directly! All this being the case, that being granted for the sake of this argument, in what manner could we tell between the real and the unreal? At such an absolutist level there can be no such distinction – only a distinction between the relatively real and the relatively unreal, etc. How, simply, is this achieved? Through the determination of the existential characteristics, etc., that characterize that type of discourse, technology, programme, etc. The relatively real being effectively able to harness a greater degree of this semblance of an existential excess that, ultimately, resists an excessive degree of reduction. A painting is never merely flecks of paint on a canvass, board or piece of paper, etc. Thus the non-virtual dimension of a painting can never be purely equated or purely non-equated with the virtual dimension of that painting as landscape, portrait, abstract analogue of the emotions, etc., etc. So then how do we determine and differentiate these two dimensions of the relatively non-virtual from the relatively virtual? And what relationship do they have to any sense of the hyper-real that might be argued for? (227)

	When we directly participate within that relationship we experience it directly and thence as a re-presentation. When that relationship is experienced indirectly through its reconstruction thence its representation. The contents of our relationships are always experienced directly. Hence a relationship is fully virtual when it is more or less represented and that representation is then re-presented in an (actively engaged, conditional) intentional consciousness. Without an exact, absolutist sense of the real there can be no absolutist sense of the virtual and/or unreal. And in the same vein, there can be no absolutist separation of the hyper-real or its experiential equivalent from the relatively real and the relatively virtual. So the ‘real’ no longer threatens to irrupt into or within the relatively virtual or non-real as it has already irrupted within the same in that non-absolutist form! Similarly, all senses of the hyper-real cannot be immune from non-absolutist versions of the relatively real and the relatively virtual. Let me examine this in a more concrete manner through an examination of the following example. (228)

	I see a painting. Immediately, more or less, I see also the virtual dimension of this world set up to be simulated by that painting in and through my understanding of it as a genre of “the painting”, say a riparian landscape. I see the paint and I see the river and the river-bank. To see the picture as a picture I must still be seeing the flecks of paint from which this relatively virtual image is constructed. I shut my eyes and now imagine myself wandering further along that river bank past that section of river represented in that picture. I now no longer am in need of that picture as what I am experiencing is off the canvass so to speak. We might like to refer to this extra-virtual realm of experience as hyper-real. Now, I would like to argue that all three dimensions of the relatively real or non-virtual, the relatively virtual and the relatively hyper-real all phenomenologically co-inhere in our experience of that simulation in and through its re-simulation in accordance to how we view or not view that painting as a painting qua painting. So, both the Gulf-Wars I & II may be reviewed/re-viewed as hyper-real this additional point of view in no way removes them from the relatively real and/or the relatively virtual. To refuse to say no one ‘real’ died though would, of course, be obscene! Indeed, all three dimensions would appear to overlay that simulation and find themselves called forth in the same manner in keeping with the nature of their being approached. So, we see the paint, the painting and we can imagine the picture without the painting being present. Let me now parallel these three dimensions with the concepts of emission, current and system, and, the concepts of resistance, genre and as an existential mode of life. (229)

	Let me explore the following parallels. The paint could be seen as an emission. It is flicked on to the canvass or the substrate of the picture-to-be. There we meet with resistance. Dialectically overcoming that sense of resistance allows us to experience the current between the painting as a picture and the painting as mere pigment or paint. Then, when we look into the nature of the relationship between the particular resistance of that work and that work in the light of its apparent invocation of genre we ‘now’ start to experience it as a system of meaningfulness whose significance can be reduced neither to dissonant emissions nor to a consonant genre, set of genres or hybrid genres, etc. Through such harmonization we experience the ‘apparent’ existential excess set up to be enjoyed within our relationship with that picture. Subjecting all three parallel modes to a state of an overall transcendental suspension allows us to experience the power-relationships that appertain to our experience of that particular painting in the ‘light’ of our specific relationship with it. We may be moved, we may want to criticize it, we may want to buy or appropriate it or even destroy the same (in an act of aesthetic vandalism for what ever reasons mustered to promote and/or defend that type of destructive action). But, such analysis is artificial to the extent that each of these types of co-examinations essentially and mutually co-define each other negatively. That, e.g., the semblance of a power-differential experienced through an overcoming of dissonant emissions can be defined through its joint negation of genre and harmonization, etc. Furthermore, and the main point I would like to conclude with at this point in these investigations is as follows, that the existential fact that these three dimensions must also invest themselves in the formation of each other and in this matrix of active and passive interactions, and, non-virtual, virtual and hyper-real contributions to our phenomenological engagement within our relationship with that state of affairs, we must witness there before the same and therein that there is a realization of a non-reductive excess of value that truly authenticates that experience for us to that same degree that we can significantly experience it directly in all the power of its phenomenal known-being/being-known as a simulation/re-simulation there for-us by-us! Let me elabourate on this concept of a mutually collective investment of the non-virtual, virtual and the hyper-real aspects in our engagement with that phenomenally simulated/phenomenologically re-simulated state of affairs. (230)

	We have no access to any form of reality as defined in a representational frame of reference. Therefore, we have no way of representing a so-called ‘real’ reality from a non-real virtual reality. Hence my use of the contrast between the expressions virtual and non-virtual, and, my not defining the virtual as non-real. The implication here is that there is no absolute contrast between virtual and non-virtual hence my more accurate use of the expressions relatively virtual and relatively non-virtual respectively. They co-define each other dialectically, i.e., negatively (in a collective sense, i.e., as not a, not b, not c, etc.). My use of the expression hyper-real is defined in the same dialectical framework. Hence the relatively hyper-real could be defined as both neither the relatively non-virtual nor the relatively virtual. This allows me, furthermore, to see the hyper-real as that existential excess and that in turn as that which is effectively created/re-created through the negation of both the relatively non-virtual and the relatively virtual. So, the hyper-real may be treated as the suspension or dialectical negation of the relatively non-virtual and the relatively virtual. Hence, there can be no pure sense of the hyper-real, etc. Thence the hyper-real can never be entertained without some form of a reference to the non-virtual, etc. We should also note that because the hyper-real re-writes the non-virtual text and/or the virtuality of meta-text therefore, essentially, it co-authors this sense of re-writing… Hence this observation that co-authorship is centred in and through the power of the existential moment to re-write all forms of textual deposition produced/re-produced either by others or one’s own self or texts already co-authored (and thence a tendency for such texts to ‘apparently’ set about writing/re-writing ‘themselves’). (231)

	In the spectrum of religious experience there appears to be a wide gamut of different types of experience. Now some people have claimed that experiences of the divine are neurologically centered in a specific area of the brain centred upon a few thousand or so neurons. Maybe a small collection of neurones does account for or facilitates this type of experience? However, the experience of the divine, in what ever form or forms, cannot and should not be reduced to the mere existence of the same, i.e., this collection of neurones. It would be ludicrous to say that my perception of the world is merely the stimulation or otherwise of a bunch of neurons normally associated with sense perception! And, furthermore, even if certain types of religious experience, including theologically interpreted experiences, were to be so entertained without some form of a representational ‘reality’ the existential excess of value associated with that type of brain function itself should not be so reductively treated in any form or fashion. Absolute reduction realizes an absolute loss of value! Now, one could propose a model that accounts for all people necessarily possessing some sense of an ‘integrated psychic interaction’ in their passage through this ‘one’ World-of-Life and, that some people possess a sense of the religious through their being able to reflect upon or experience more ‘deeply’ the same? All people go through this world with a built-in sense of the world as an integrated arena. That therein, for some individuals, I would like to speculate, they are able to experience directly or indirectly certain types of religious phenomena by virtue of their different or differing reception of this same or similar type of mechanism? I have previously referred to this aspect of the psyche, that experiences this sense of harmonic integration, as therefore needing some sense of an integrating device that relatively grounds the world-of-experience in the semblance of a universal-like matrix of possibilities within the one world(-experience) of the Life-World. My main point here is this. That to reductively dismiss any form of religious experience as merely a bunch of neurons operating in some small network of the brain will completely miss the point here. The existential richness of this type of experience, or any other type of experience, may or may not have a reference or set of references, these facts or otherwise in no way allows us to merely dismiss the apparent ‘reality’ of any type of interpreted religious experience qua religious experience. The value of this type of experience, and all other types of experience whether religious or not in orientation, cannot be absolutely reduced to the neurological without an absolute loss of (non-neurological)value in the process. Furthermore, the religious dimension, quite apart from any form of a representational reality or non-reality, has its own ‘lived’ phenomenological reality and, therefore, is in no need of the divine in any form for its existence. To put it bluntly, theology has no need for God! Hence our already demonstrated ability to investigate and discuss this topic hypothetically! Obviously, if it could be argued and ‘proved’ that this topic was merely an artifact resulting from the impossible treatment of a metaphysical imputation (of the Divine) then such a finding must be considered irrelevant to the fact that such a topic already exists! Therefore, theology itself has no need for either the existence or the non-existence of the Divine. But, then, it has been my argument all along that there can be no valid metaphysical imputations hence the viability of this topic can not be questioned or called into question through any form of metaphysical research based upon the imputation of metaphysical imputations when by their very nature metaphysical imputations as metaphorical devices cannot be mistreated literally and therein cannot be subjected to such an imputational process that would demand their literalization in either positive and/or negative terms of reference! On the other hand, a theologian, obviously, wishing to argue for the viability of their topic, must do so by other means! The apparent viability or non-viability of these avenues or modes of research will be looked into in the rest of this extended essay. At this point let me merely note the speculative observation that all people have and need a sense of the world as a world to find themselves operating within. Hence this necessary need for the presence of an integrating device that allows the individual person or a group of persons or some institution to experience this sense of global continuity through the experience that sense of integration, i.e., some automatic-like epistemological reflex that continues to remind us of the fact that only though a sense of global integration can we find for ourselves any sense of identity, etc., in ‘this’ world! Then, and this is speculative (as an interpretation of the fact that not all people find themselves to be religious despite necessarily possessing an integrating device) that the mere possession of an integrating device is not sufficient to find oneself possessing some sense of the religious, but, that, through deeper processes of reflection or similar, various senses of the religious can then find a sympathetic environment in which to operate! Of course reality is much richer than this simplistic vision and one must avoid or resist even making this division as a ‘fact’ set in observational and cultural concrete! (232)

	Is my interpretation of this observation merely a convenient form of supposition to explain away the fact that some people are just not religious in their confession while others are religious along traditional and/or non-traditional orthodox and/or non-orthodox modes of religious life in their public/private profession of a faith (of some definitive and/or non-definitive kind or other)? I believe this observation to be valid. However, my phenomenological interpretation of this descriptive state of affairs must remain a provisional style of interpretation. On the other hand, I believe I can argue for the necessary presence of this sense of harmonic integration, as an integrating device, through the very function of the hermeneutic circle itself (treated as a metaphor that indeed non-literally ‘metaphors’ the world of experience!?)? (233)

	A relationship to be there-for-us necessarily implies that it be experienced, or, at least, can be experienced. This involves its epistemological implication. But experience can never be purely epistemological nor purely ontological. Therefore, correctly, a relationship is primarily in the province of the trans-epistemological-ontological, i.e, the Life-World. Correctly, therefore, all metaphysical questions and investigations should be located wholly and totally in the same. Now, all relationships are realized in and through the ongoing resolution of dissonance (as understood through the three ideal dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle). This implies that a relationship must present itself phenomenally as an integrated state of affairs to some extent or other. This current degree, or average degree, being in effect the current facticity, or average facticity, of that relationship. In psychic terms of reference it is the extent that the relationship is experienced as greater than the sum of its psychic parts or participant (this existential excess then being re-invested in the overall ‘body’ of that relationship equally throughout its sense of relational ‘space-time’ and continuity of ‘identity’ as realized through its continuing sense of relational resolution). In the light of the above it follows that a relationship is experienced as an integrated state of affairs to some extent or other. Furthermore, as all relationships are contextually interrelated, being in turn interrelated and interacting, it follows that overall the Life-World is experienced to some extent or other as integrated, i.e., as ‘one’ World-of-Life. Hence an integrating device, culturally created there for us as a method of understanding this psychic unity of the world to some extent must also reflect the unity that is already there for us to experience. This sense of coincidence is not to be mis-understood along representational lines. Instead, this coincidence is rather the experienced preservation of a relatively central core of transformational isomorphic invariance in the midst of its relatively superficial transformational discontinuities. By relatively superficial is meant here those features that are not preserved in the course of this process of transformation. Invariance, and the experience of the same, is not to be misconstrued as the actual substantial preservation of nominal identity or any other form of identity be it metaphysical or non-metaphysical, trans-nominal, intrinsic, self-existent, spiritual, physical, psychical, etc. This preservation of identity only being invoked on the transformational continuance of form, configuration, integrity, appropriate application of nominal identification, etc. Hence, the trans-relational integrity of the world is recognized through the schematization of the Life-World, i.e., as adopted and adapted through the use of an integrating device. Such a device being ‘interpreted’ in and through a theological perspective in a theological light by the theologian, etc. The possibility of this type of interpretation has already been established (in Volume I). The validity of such a manoeuvre, however, has yet to be properly assessed philosophically. Being primarily a metaphysical topic this type of examination demands that a metaphysical exposition be validly formulated in order to successfully conduct this type of investigation!  As just noted, a properly constructed metaphysical exposition needs to be properly located, i.e., in a relational philosophy whose theoretical discourse is properly formulated, whose practical application is appropriately approached, and, whose critical program is precisely attuned to the current state of play. Hence the metaphysical appreciation of a particular topic, theological or non-theological in orientation, must attune itself to the continuities and discontinuities between these three spheres of philosophical operation in the light of this position that argues for a validly constituted metaphysics based on a validly constituted appreciation of a relational philosophy, i.e., a philosophy that correctly understands the dynamics of relational formation through transformation (and the non-intrinsic preservation of nominal identity through the demonstration of a qualified transformational isomorphic invariance). (234)

	Now, the argument for the theological treatment of an integrating device could conceivably fail which would leave the proponent of such an approach with what, in effect, would be no more than a theological placebo. The argument proposed for some particular and/or general sense of the Divine might be successful on a psychic level what the theologian in reality is left with is none other this theological illusion – a device that might make people feel warm and fuzzy, safe and secure, and, on balance, better or worse persons in this World-of-Life, but for all that an illusory objective with no self-sustaining sense of reality. So, how is the theologian to argue for the valid appreciation of their topic assuming that this topic has a valid coincidence in the ambit of the Life-World? Without a doubt this must be performed, if it could be performed, upon the ‘grounds’ of a relational philosophy, i.e., a properly, appropriately and precisely formulated metaphysical philosophy (as argued above)! What, hypothetically, would this entail? (235)

	Engagement with an illusory objective, one might say, is either contemplated knowingly or unknowingly. I see a mirage and I see that water-like phenomenon in the distance as just that, namely, this mirage. Here, an illusory objective is knowingly engaged. Assuming that all phenomena are constituted/re-constituted by us we could propose on the model of insight as never absolutely insightful nor absolutely insightless (as per Gadamer, e.g.) that this dichotomy between knowingly and unknowingly entertaining an illusory objective is wrongly conceived! That there can only be degrees of intentional knowingness or intentional unknowingness, i.e., the forever present ‘presence’ of insight to some degree or other. However, in situations where there is a marked degree of insightfulness or insightlessness for all practical purposes there is, indeed, only insightfulness or insightlessness. Of course, that overlooks those situations where our current, apparent insightfulness or insightlessness is being undermined by our co-insightlessnes or co-insightfulness respectively. Intentional consciousness is never absolutely transparent nor is it absolutely opaque. All we can say is that with improved intentional comprehension we might just arrive at a position where we can find our selves being able to accurately determine the ‘true’ nature of our investigated phenomena. In the light of this preamble we could say that in having a divine-like experience, if one was interpreted in that type of mode, that our insightfulness could never be absolutely posited nor negated in that regard! In experiencing a mirage we can say that the experiential reality of the experience qua experience is just as real as our experiencing any other type of experience. At face value that is true. On the other hand, our experiences are intentionally constituted in the light of our currently realized degree of gestalt integration. E.g., in dream-like state when we possess a relatively greater degree of psychic integration our dream imagery reflects this relatively integrated state of affairs and appears markedly real and less surreal although not as rich in detail as it would be as in an alert non-dream state of, say, a closely scrutinized perceptual experience. In such a state of vivid dreaming we find ourselves being able to determine that our dream imagery is being constituted by-us for-us and that it is just that - dream imagery. On the other hand, when we experience a less integrated dream-like state of affairs our imagery equally reflects this diminished sense of reality and is experienced as surreal, which in turn, strikes us as being surreal and, therein, as less real. It would appear, therefore, that in the dream state we continue to possess the ability to directly determine the reality of our constituted dream imagery (as in a state of vivid imagery) or to indirectly determine the same by default as also ‘not-real’ (in its portrayal of intentionally-constituted dream-content being unable to maintain some degree of a non-ego-directed isomorphic transformational invariance upon waking). The upshot of this analysis would suggest that the transformational reality of our intentional constitution is, forever, potentially able to discriminate between the reality of the appearance and the appearance of reality. In waking, e.g., our dream imagery has the tendency to dissolve and, therein, is found to possess no satisfactory isomorphic transformational invariance through such disruption of its lived-continuity that was being maintained before that transition to wakefulness (and which, in turn, in part, seems to characterize the same). Even though such imagery may be revisited in our attempting to re-call a dream experience it is not had to the same degree of vividness and that this counts against our treatment as non-dream-like in its intentional constitution in the first place (even if large fragments of our dreams are rooted in the directly engaged reality of our non-dream oriented coursing through this World-of-Life). So, all things being equal, we might like to assume, nothing to the contrary, that even in non-dream-like states of consciousness we should be able to differentiate between the relatively non-illusory and the relatively illusory. Can we extend this position to include, theoretically, our precise critical appreciation of religious-like phenomena? If so, how do we determine, in the terms of a theoretical discourse, between the religious experience with authentic content and a religious experience with inauthentic content – this determination, as implied, hinging on the non-ego-directed intentional persistence in its core-isomorphic transformational invariance? (236)

	Such a discussion is hinged, or becomes unhinged, on a discussion of authenticity, just how are authentic experiences constituted in intentional consciousness? Here we must fall back on our considerations of a validly formulated Relational Philosophy. Such a philosophy has three interrelated perspectives, namely, an experiential epistemological perspective, an ontologically presented/re-presented perspective (realized through the constitution/re-constitution of intentional objectivity), and, a trans-epistemological-ontologically balanced sense of perspective (whose valid constitution realizes a properly constituted metaphysical dimension). Correctly, authenticity necessitates the implication of all three dimensions in experience, indeed, the maintenance and exercise of a balance between all three since they co-determine each other. The parallel model here is that of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Now, ruling out the impossible to realize and recognize states of absolute authenticity and absolute inauthenticity we must now ask what is that characterizes one intentional state of affairs as more or less authentic than some other intentional state of affairs? A short cut in the resolution of this question is to look closely at phenomena that are experienced as relatively more authentic in their presentation and re-presentation. (237)

	E.g., we have the classic incident in the Chinese philosopher Mencius where we read about what might normally happen when we observe a nearby child about to fall into a well or some other body of water. Most likely we automatically find ourselves impelled to move to that spot to quickly pull that helpless child out of that body of water before it drowns. We don’t enter into some sort of complex calculus that asks what reward I might get for this rescue, what opportunities might prevail in meeting that child’s parents, do I prefer to continue what I am doing or should I rescue this drowning child, etc., etc? If such a rescue is within our means we (near) spontaneously rescue this child without calculating what benefit or, even, disadvantage, there might be in store for us through doing this ‘good’ deed. Indeed, this act appears to be driven de-ontologically through a sense of duty and not through some form of a calculative calculus! It is as if the situation itself impels us to intercede on the behalf of that helpless child and ensure its rescue (something we might hope would happen to us if it were us in a life-threatening situation or situation of real-need). Then, in the successful completion of this mission we experience the same as its own reward! Even if we were to fail we would feel that we had done our duty, had tried to do our duty to the best of our ability (and that we should not too harshly criticize ourselves should we fail despite our entering into our very best efforts in that regard. That, equally, others then have no right to criticize us should we fail if this failure was able to be co-evaluated as ‘authentic’ both in its aspiration and its exercise). What might we learn from our reflections upon such an anecdote? (238)

	For a start, it would appear that authenticity is being in tune with the nature of that relationship. We see the child falling into the water, we see the child drowning and we ‘feel’ the need to rescue that child immediately!  That instant we move over to the edge of that body of water and haul the child out making sure they are then breathing, not going to fall back into the water, are soon properly dried, soon returned to their parents or guardians, etc. We don’t act on our own behalf. It seems we act on the behalf of that child, or, more correctly, we seem to act on the behalf of that relationship itself that we have with that child even if they were unknown to us by sight or name. To do this implies that we must be, somehow, in tune with the nature of that relationship we currently find ourselves entertaining with this child. Therein, we then act on its behalf through the sense of an imperative experienced in and through the very centre of that relationship! It is the recognition, preservation and extension of that existential surplus of value experienced in and through the centre of that relationship that forces us to act. In doing so we both maintain and augment a sense of existential harmony (within-and-between-ourselves-with-others[-and-the-world] in this World-of-Life). Through a preservation of that relationship there is a preservation of this helpless participant in that relationship, and vice versa! We don’t operate according to some set or canon of principles one of which states that we should rescue drowning children. No, we simulate the plight of this child and experience it as our own. Therein, we feel the imperative that this child should be rescued immediately! This relationship impels us to act on its behalf and, therein, preserving that relationship and its participants. Thereafter, harmony is restored; with the world being a ‘richer’ place because of that ‘selfless’ act of salvation. Just what observations can we make or expect to make in the light of this example? (239)

	We have here a number of metaphors, etc., that need to be looked into. E.g., what exactly is meant by the ‘centre’ of a relationship, the ‘body’ or ‘space’ of a relationship, sharing and participation in a relationship, etc? There is also the question of what is meant when I used the expression ‘it would appear that authenticity is being in tune with the nature of that relationship’ – just what is implied in this concept and metaphor of ‘being in tune’? (240)

	Let me explore the following model. In our re-construction of a certain situation we essentially attempt to re-present the initial presentation. Then we attempt to experience if these re-constructions maintain some degree of transformational isomorphic invariance in our entertaining the various transformations that connect them. In this process of reconstruction we attempt to evaluate the simulated/re-simulated transformational mutations therein presented/re-presented in order to ascertain to what degree, if any, there is a link between the same through some form of a preservation of a core transformational isomorphic invariance. By this approach we can then intuitively link the said phenomena as a connected phenomenon. Being able to do this linkage would then allow us to attune ourselves to an understanding of that relationship through our being ‘in tune’ with the same. Now such a process of reconstructive reflection can concern itself with the simulation of current presentations and/or the simulations of past re-presentations. By these means we can also critically re-evaluate in precise detail the concurrence between current judgmental processes with themselves and/or retrospective judgmental processes (and/or even prospectively simulated judgmental processes). So, by these means we can determine our current degree of authenticity through a meta-judgmental evaluation/re-evaluation of a judgmental process (regardless of its time orientation) along with an estimation of past expressions of authenticity or otherwise. Obviously, the full engagement of the hermeneutic circle is necessitated to that extent necessary to adequately appreciate that objective under investigation (be it retrospective, current and/or prospective). Furthermore, we must bring to this situation of simulation/re-simulation all essential features that radically impinge on these investigations. So, in evaluating a past legal judgment, e.g., we would need to be in receipt of all essential information pertinent to a reconstruction of that legal situation. Hence ‘essential’ is defined with reference to that general or particular situation to the extent that input is considered as essential if the addition or subtraction of such an input radically re-constitutes the nature of that judgmental process and its delivery of judgmental content in the form of a delivered judgment. In reverse, we can argue that authenticity of process (and delivered content) is realized when the essential information to hand is appropriately utilized in the course of those deliberations, etc. Whether constructed and/or re-constructed authenticity is in evidence when and only when a properly, appropriately and precisely detailed process of evaluation/re-evaluation is or was being conducted within the auspices of a fully engaged overall transcendental suspension. Then, through a validly conducted suspension of that suspension the resultant expression of the ensuing power-relations should demonstrate some degree of an existential attunement with the nature of that relationship as constructed/re-constructed! In this essential construction/re-construction of the participants in that relationship, and the simulation/re-simulation of the overall interaction between the same appropriately set within an understanding of the relevant context of that interactive space a sense of the relational is critically simulated/re-simulated. Our simulation/re-simulation finding a critically adequate degree of attunement when we believe an essential construction/re-construction of that relational situation has been put into critical effect. (241)

	Obviously, in our critical research we must be dealing with an adequate presentation/re-presentation of such simulated constructions/re-constructions! In this act of interpretation we are saved by virtue of the hermeneutic fact that our interpretation/re-interpretation of any textual situation whatsoever can be neither absolutely opaque nor absolutely transparent. In this translucent world of the hermeneutic meta-textual our degree of conformity, coincidence, etc., can either improve towards the polar-direction of the relatively transparent or become corrupt though its movement back to the polar-direction of the relatively opaque. Hence this concept of attunement also witnesses this sense of a fluctuating degree of experiential conformity or non-conformity between our constructions/re-constructions as presented/re-presented. Furthermore, we become more attuned to outcomes through finding a coincidence in and between the same as exercised currently and/or retrospectively (and/or prospectively) in the ‘progress’ of our simulations/re-simulations. Allowing ourselves to become existentially receptive of such existentially derived forces further attunes us in our direct and/or indirect interaction with the same. Such irruptions occurring in and through the centre(s) of those relationships and therein defining the same. The psychic ‘mass’ of a relationship presenting/re-presenting its own sense of a psychic centre, and, each participant also acting as the same through its imposition upon other participants in that relationship and/or through its being imposed upon by other participants in that relationship (through those artificially discriminated facets of that relationship). Hence attunement is realized and expressed though the simulation/re-simulation of an overall transcendental suspension and the simulation/re-simulation of the power relations that irrupt from the same in and through an essential re-construction of that simulated/re-simulated state of affairs. The degree to which there is this attunement therein giving us an estimation of the existential coincidence and authenticity of that relational situation under investigation. This expression, as delivered, relatively critically and/or uncritically, finding for itself this ability to become more attuned in our investigation or less attuned (through a loss of critical rapport, etc.). (242)

	All value is expressed in such a manner that stamped upon its delivery there is some degree of an appreciation to some degree as to what type of value it is and to what degree this value is being promoted (rightly or wrongly) by legitimate and/or illegitimate means. In this the core value of such a project is always relatively authentic (for without the continuance, through disruption, of this relational core that relationship to the same extent would collapse historically, etc.). Hence our recognition of the authenticity of a relational process is realized though the recovery and recognition of this central region of the relationship. Hence, again, this process of attunement is realized in and through this process of recovery and recognition. Why? Because a relationship comes into relational existence in and though the ongoing resolution of relational dissonance in the consonant context of that relational field. That though such harmonization the core of that relationship is placed in this state of harmonization. Hence our experience of authenticity is a simulation/re-simulation of this relatively essential core-aspect of that relationship and this manifests as its psychic centre. Attunement being realized through recovering, recognizing and refining this core-aspect of that relationship, i.e., through this semblance of the thematization of an intentional focus. Our direct participation in that relationship arising in non-virtual time and non-virtual space when our non-virtual identity or set(s) of identities is subjected directly to both its active sense of imposition and passive sense of being imposed upon by the existential collectivity of the same. In other words, our direct participation in a relationship is realized when there is a non-virtual participation is simulated in our current simulation of that relational situation through this process of non-virtual attunement. E.g., when I am talking to a friend on the telephone I am in a direct relationship of this kind with them. When we end our relationship we are then no longer on the telephone with each other. Or, if I later recall that telephone conversation I am then only in a direct relationship with that virtual reconstruction and not with that person who had telephoned me. And the same for any other relationship be it physical, visual, recollected, etc., etc. (243)

	Let me now re-visit this problem of the apparent discontinuity between the psychic balance of the overall transcendental suspension and its partial, non-impartial irruption of power through the form of an unbalanced state of power-relations: - just how do we move from a state of balance to a state of unbalance in a moment of time, in the metaphorical blink of an eye? (244)

	First, I would like to propose that discontinuities occur in moments of opportunity. Indeed, define the same. That, effectively, all moments are to this extent discontinuous. A moment arising through the discretionary nature of relational production/re-production. By this is meant, that in the course of a particular relational process that the same should be metaphorically treated both as a relational strand and as a relational sequence. Continuation of transformational isomorphic invariance effectively constitutes/re-constitutes a continuance of identity. Then, moment by moment, that metaphorical strand is effectively re-continued through its sequencing and thence allows the same to adopt and adapt micro-incremental shifts in the direction of that continuance of identity. Furthermore, the ‘moment’ at that level of encounter being defined epistemologically as that smallest increment in that sequencing that must escape that examination’s level of awareness (be it in intentional terms of reference or non-intentional (non-conscious) terms of reference. The smallest increment possible being defined by Planck’s constant. The largest increment possible being defined in conscious terms of reference as that limit beneath which intentional formation can be neither known nor recognized as taking place in a process of transformation. (245)

	Second, I would like to note that in my opinion this state of suspended balance is disrupted through a disruption of a system – an irruption from its systematic nature. This can be treated as either Epistemologically oriented) in aspect, Ontologically oriented in aspect, or, more correctly, Trans-Epistemological-Ontological in orientation (and therein then fully coincident with the Life-World).  Disruption of a system produces/re-produces either a current between two relational participants or an emission through the ensuing relative isolation of one of those relational products from that initial system and/or any ensuing inter-mediatory-current. (246) 

Third, the facticity of that relationship, its existential excess is then imparted to that inter-mediatory-current and/or any ensuing emission in part or in whole with the result that that current is enabled and/or that emission is able to be discharged. In the light of the same, both an intention and a physical particle (wave or wavicle) are treated as the products of a discharge. By these means the imparting of that existential excess, in part or in whole, to that current and/or emission is conducted in the space between those moments before disruption and irruption. Indeed, disruption creates/re-creates this sense of imbalance and thence this sense of a discharge through that ensuing process of irruption (where, after, the reverse process may or may not happen, namely, a return to the overall transcendental suspension. In not being returned to a state of such ‘psychic balance’ we then find the disruption of that relational identity through the discontinuance of the transformational isomorphic invariance that would have ensured the continuance of that identity? On the other hand, return to a state of an overall transcendental suspension ensures a continuation of identity?). (247)

	Fourth, disruption/irruption can never be absolutely achieved hence our insight previous noted of the integral nature that, in part, remains preserved as an integrated facet in the process of discharge. Indeed, even though a relationship may be disrupted and irrupt into a state of current between two participants or the relative isolation of emissions this never entails the complete disruption/irruption of that relational context (since relationships are nested in meta-relational contexts, etc., and thence remain within the context of the Life-World!). Hence power-relations are a differential within the ambit of the integrated nature of that relationship, i.e., a differentiation of that integral state of affairs. (248)

	Fifth, that the value of the relational situation arises though the metaphorical ‘surface’ of its productivity as there can be no transcendent sense of a hierarchically enstructured sense of order since the same is effectively cancelled by an opposite de-hierarchically dis-ordered immanent sense of materiality upon which is apparently imposed intentional and/or non-intentional ‘form’ (through discharge) (in the formation of that ‘overall’ sense of a transcendental suspension). Instead we are presented/re-presented with a simulated sense of a differentiated hologram ‘through which’ that which is encoded there is simulated/re-simulated given the appropriate field to conduct this sense of construction/re-construction. The relatively transcendental is dependent upon the relatively non-transcendental and v.v. Similarly, all concepts are correlatives should be treated in same fashion, such as the sense of the transcendent text and the meaning of the immanent meta-text (along with their union in the overall transcendental suspension and their creation of an existential surplus of meaningfulness) (that dialectical matrix then collectively ensuring the formation of relational value in this simulation/re-simulation of an associated overall transcendental suspension). (249)

	Sixth, thus the chaotic complexity of this problem between momentary balance (through an overall transcendental suspension) and the next moment of an unbalance state (through the disruption of the same) is the result of the dialectical oscillation between moments through disruption-irruption on a relatively superficial level of surface (since there can be no absolute process of either dis-integration or re-integration). Hence the process of relational transformation…. (250)

	Seventh, into this vision of a (discreetly quantumatized) power-differential irrupting into existence across (or between/within) an illusory, momentary differentiation of that integrated medium we must ask ourselves in what manner does resistance enter into this picture? Obviously, too much resistance and no power-differential can ‘actually‘ come into play. Then, obversely, no resistance and that power-differential is unable to make itself apparent in that relational field. Resistance, therefore, controls the manner of the appearance of that power play and the range of its permissible expressions. As a necessary requisite in the formation of a translation or transformation of power, resistance therefore defines the manner of that field. E.g., you walk to work and you have a hill to climb. Say you are getting on in years and this hill is very, very steep. There then comes an age for you in which you just can no longer climb it. This steepness can now no longer be resisted. Then, again, imagine, you take a cable car to the top and in coming home as you walk down this hill you accidentally stand on a patch of road that has been contaminated with an oil spillage. The footpath now proffers very little resistance and you suddenly find yourself going down the rest of the street at a speed that is just untenable for your safety with the inevitable crash further down. To walk this street you need the appropriate range of resistance to be in play! Otherwise you cannot ‘walk’ it! Translating this anecdote we can treat relational dissonance, the text, as that element or aspect of the textual experience/relational experience that is effectively resistive. The relationship of reading that text is realized through overcoming this resistance, a process that is achieved through the ongoing resolution of that dissonance. A process realized moment by moment and which then imparts the illusion of a sequencing and thence the existence of a continuous strand of continuity (rather than, more correctly, on a relatively superficial level of the relationship itself, the illusive appearance of a strand made up of a continuity of continual fragments moment by moment [as defined by the nature of that medium of that ‘strand’]). (251)

	Obviously, this modeling of the superficial discontinuity between relational moments need not be a deeper state of affairs assuming the preservation of a deeper level of relational interaction which establishes its integral sense of a strand or medium (and which would then call for deeper levels of momentary sets as defined by the nature of those levels of organization able to be thematized in those regards). Relational identity, we should note, being lost at that level there is this loss of apparent integrity. When that loss is not apparent we then need to take into account the role that that level of communication of information is being undertaken given this moment by moment registering of information that takes place in that medium or the relational field/that media of hierarchically constructed relational fields. The appreciation of information being simulated/re-simulated when the nominated field conditions allow for this process of interaction. So through sequencing we have a linear perspective in our appreciation of information. At the same time, this appreciation, moment by moment, must be appreciated also in a non-linear fashion, i.e., chaotically, momentarily and in a self-organized fashion either simulated at the same time or re-simulated at a later time. I would like to make this my eighth point in our coming to understand the momentary disruption/irruption of the relationship in and through this metaphor of the suspension of the suspension (and the restoration of the relational in and through, in turn, the suspension of the same, and then, again, its disruption/irruption, etc., etc.). (252)

	As a ninth point I would like to make one final point to resolve this puzzle of how the overall transcendental suspension can be in place one moment and in the next is disrupted. The problem is more apparent than real. Because all moments of the hermeneutic circle are in place to some extent in order for the overall transcendental suspension to be in play it follows that we have their effective co-presence. Now, what I am going to argue is this – that through a minor degree of disruption there is a minimal, but distinctive, shift in the channeling of a minute portion of the overall existential excess discharged through the dissonant mode (either as an emission or a current). Furthermore, even in the advent of the disruption of that relationship this process is never actually one hundred percent disruption/irruption. Of course it stand to reason that if the disruption/irruption approaches such a large percentage that, effectively, it is the historical end of that particular relationship. So, the point I am making here is that all moments are co-present, and, that through a micro-disruption of the overall transcendental suspension there is a discharge of power utilizing the existential resources of that hermeneutic circle to generate the same.  Furthermore, through micro-oscillations in our orientation towards these moments the artifact of these moments themselves are created/re-created through simulation. (253)

	What are some of the implications of this complex, chaotic vision of the relational process, and, what implications could be drawn with respect to the hypothetical treatment of our theological topic? (254)

	We have here a model for understanding the relational dynamics of relationships that echoes the dictum “as above so below, and v.v.” Taking note of an emphasis upon the “v.v.” all theological forms of interaction should then be understood as being in no way different from non-theological forms of interaction when examined from that general point of view (whether considered hypothetically or non-hypothetically). With this important limitation in place what could a theologically-oriented discourse say within those boundaries when examining theological intentionality, theological activity, theological interaction with the relatively non-theological, and, non-theological interaction with the (non-metaphysical) imputation of the relatively theological? Let me conduct this hypothetical examination under the following headings: identity, time, space, divine intentionality, divine intentional activity, non-divine intentional reception (of that interpreted as theological in orientation) and non-divine intentional response (to that interpreted as theological in orientation)… The key to understanding this list is, first, a recognition of the metaphysical fact that all relationships (regardless of their actual or possible theological and/or non-theological implication) are negatively centred within the limits circumscribed by a relational metaphysics, and, second, are positively inscribed within a creative understanding of identity as engineered within the co-mutuality of the hermeneutic circle of both that which is comprehension and that which is to be comprehended (in and across these three dimensions of the Epistemological, the Ontological and the Trans-Epistemological-Ontological [i.e., the Life-World])…. (255)

	In my examination of these headings we shall start with identity. Now, as identity is co-defined negatively through the dialectical interrelationship between time and space it stands to reason that it can be neither time nor space. If for these two expressions of time and space we translate them, respectively, as particularity and universality then it follows, if this substitution is correct, that identity can not be positively referred to through the specific particularity of that identity. Giving the space-time coordinates of a specifically referred to identity will not identify it, only locate it, its unique existential descriptor, in spatial and temporal terms of reference. Thus it follows that identity cannot be identified merely through any sense of its particularity. Of course if we know where it is and when it is there then we might be able to travel to those coordinates, or have someone else do that for us by proxy, in order to ‘inspect’ what that specific entity or state might be. Hopefully we shall have some inkling of what we are looking for in this task. Because if we don’t we shall not know what we are looking for! Hence the implication of universality in the hermeneutic process already underway in the determination of the same. (256)

	This point that the adequate identification of identity needs both negative and positive points of definition is a profound philosophical ‘observation’, or, more correctly, a simple observation with profound implications! Too often people have assumed that knowing the time-space coordinates of a certain state of affairs would tell us what that state of affairs is! But the same only locates that state of affairs and therein does not define it positively (beyond mere temporality and spatiality). At the same time knowing type will also not do this for us unless we can answer the question how is that specific identity identified when the universal polarity itself is not specific in this matter (specification). Again, merely supplying both the temporal-spatial coordinates and type will not do this for us! Identity can only be positively identified through a directly engaged process of identification and this involves the existential fact that only through our own embodied identity can this feat of identification be truly achieved! It is as simple as that – only through our own embodiment can we positively and truly identify a certain identity through our direct relational engagement with the same (in some particular manner or other be that virtually or non-virtually). Thence our re-presentation (not representation) of that state of affairs is realized though the nomination, in part, of its existential descriptor, i.e., a phenomenological-essential mapping of that identity in such a manner that we can refer to that object(ive)(-state) through a simplification of its identity to that degree conducive to its articulation. Thus, it logically follows, that identification can only take place if in and through our own embodiment we can find some aspect of our own identity that allows us to interact and interrelate with that identity that is not ourselves but which we can interact with by virtue of this shared commonality (whether that be simulated virtually or non-virtually). So identity is negatively arrived at through a negative co-mutual suppression of particularity and universality in conjunction with a positively determined sense of identity through some form of a sympathetic interactional coincidence between that identity under evaluation and that very aspect or set of aspects embedded and thematized within the ambit of our own sense(s) of self that allows us to ‘directly’ enter into this state of rapport. (257)

	Now, the ramifications of this philosophical observation and principle are immense! For the Divine to meaningfully interact and intersect with the non-divine, and vice versa, implies that some part or aspect of the Divine must be co-present in the non-divine, and vice versa. Metaphorically, one analogical avenue the theologian might wish to adopt in order to interpret and utilize this principle could be obtained through the invocation of the imputed ‘theological fact’ (for it to be a theological fact) that the body of the person, in some measure, is contained within the heavenly body of the Divine, and vice versa. Or the same type of state of affairs could be arrived at through the adoption and adaptation of other metaphors along the same line of approach, namely, substantiation (or instantiation) in some form or other; by such manoeuvres also arguing for continuity and survival of identity, personal and/or non-personal in nature, by similar means. In essence, we are merely cashing out an early dictum to the effect: that the Divine must (phenomenologically) be there for us otherwise they may as not be there at all! But let us not dwell too long on what speculative route a theologian might better utilize such a transcendentally necessary principle in the advancement of the domain(s) of their theoretical discourse(s), etc. Let it be said though that for a theology to possess a full value (in sense, meaning and meaningfulness) it must adopt and adapt itself to just such a principle! Hence its transcendentally necessary implication in the formation of theoretical theological discourses, practical theological technologies and critical theological programmes. (258)

	As just noted identity cannot be reduced either to universality or particularity, nor for that matter to a combination of both. On the other hand, through the dialectics of the hermeneutic circle, identity can be determined through a joint negation of these correlatives of universality and particularity. This 'negation' also being made positively meaningful through the very resonance identity has within and through our own sense of embodiment (since the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ cannot be dialectically disentangled absolutely). This overall resonance echoing its sense of sense through that part of our embodiment that is most prominent in our interaction with it as determined through its epistemological organization as mapped within our psychic mapping of the Life-World. E.g., I am walking across a field and find a small rock in front of my right foot and give it a small kick with that same foot. The materiality of my foot comes into contact with the materiality of the rock hence the rock is registered at this level in my mapping of the world. Therein it is registered as an object that could be kicked since its inertia is not judged as high as that of a small boulder (which would hurt my foot if I were to kick it hard enough in order to propel that more sizable rock). E.g., I am thirsty and go to the kitchen find a cup and fill its with water from the tap. The materiality of my hand enters into a relationship with a cup. Now, the cup is recognized as intentionally designed as a fluid container from which one can also drink. This recognition of an intentional design stamped upon the cup allows me to register it as an artifact made by some other person for the purpose of drinking. So, a cup in the hand is not registered in the same simple manner as the rock was by the foot, both items also being physically connected with the body through utilization of the visual sense field and a sense of touch. The cup has a higher set of resonances within the epistemological hierarchy of our own epistemological organization by virtue of our valid recognition of its intentional design (as a container whose primary purpose is to be drunk from). E.g., I am watching television and I see the current Prime Minister asking his viewers to trust him. Even though merely an image projected on to the slightly curved surface of a television screen I recognize the 'presence' of another sentient being (through being ‘faced’ by the same, etc.). In my psychic mapping of the world I recognize this person as the Prime Minister even though I have never met this person. I am aware of the television screen, the image of a person’s face projected upon its surface, that this person is the current Prime Minister. I am also aware that this person is not actually in this room where this television shows me this person talking to his viewers. The absence of this person in this room reinforces this fact that they are only being represented even though it would be possible for the PM to be in this room at the same time watching a recording of his own speech. Here we have a complex situation with a set of resonances and non-resonances within our complex interpretation of the Life-World. The two dimensional surface of the television is read as presenting the image of a person, etc., who is also not in this room as we find we cannot engage this ‘person’ in their full modal richness that we expect to encounter in our engagement with a person-before-us. It is through our comprehension of the value of those complex sets of resonances (and non-resonances) that we master our passage through this World-of-Life. Hence by such negative and positive means identity is simulated and re-simulated. Thus through presentation and/or re-presentation value is represented by-us to-ourselves and by-us to-others before-others, etc. By such means the Life-World is progressively thematized. In our last example the image of the PM was seen in this room even though the PM himself was not in this room. At the same time those coordinates that spell out the 'presence' of the image of the PM and the 'absence' of the PM cannot be used to nominate the specific nature of that identity though its ‘mere particularity’. Only through an interpretation of the resonances experienced in and through our own reflections upon our own embodiment in its engagement in this World-of-Life can this process be positively prevailed upon to do this process of positive identification for-us (although, correctly, we cannot draw an absolute distinction between negative and positive forms of identification as they too co-mutually define each other). At the same time the mere denomination of universals, equally, cannot interpret this world for us in its indentificational specificity. It could be argued that the current PM belongs to a set containing one unique member. Our recognition of that image of the PM allows us, in the context of this theoretical understanding, to interpret that image as being of the PM himself through a process of re-cognition. But the mere recognition of the PM's image cannot be utilized by us to establish his actual presence in this room since he is not actually present in this room even though his image was seen on that television screen and his voice could be heard repeating itself in this entreaty with the viewers to trust him (because a full model complement of richly articulated modalities, expected in this type of situation, associated with his phenomenological imputation are not currently to-hand in this type of situation). No, what is vital here is this third complex element of positively-oriented resonance in and through our own sense of an embodied identity that allows us to fine tune these dialectical interactions between particularity and universality and therein realize this 'second' co-mutual, dialectical sense of an identificational specification! Hence, we should conclude, that, correctly, specification cannot be understood in dialectical isolation from the dialectical interaction(s) between particularity and universality, and v.v. Thus, this third element must already be co-mutuality built into our reception of the dialectical interaction between the sense of the particular and the sense of the universal and this can be recognized in the concept of specificity, i.e., a particular-something (of a certain type). Of course, as argued, this cannot be accomplished without recourse to the medium of our embodiment and our interpretation of its complex set of resonances and non-resonances. The dialectical thematization of this complex sense of identity implying that there can be no pure polarized forms of particularity, universality and specificity - a fact recognized in the Buddhist concept of emptiness wherein all value is dialectically derived through dependence on a complex set of factors whose identities, in turn, are mutually co-related in the thematization of their simulation/re-simulation, etc. This progressive dialectical complexity of meaning already being there for us to some degree since it is only through a refinement of the same that we find ourselves essentially ‘snap-shotted’ into seeing this desired essential ‘snap-shot’ of the world as interpreted by-us (before the actual or virtual sense of 'others' through the implication of the intersubjective dimension of the meta-textual). The evidence for this being found in this specific re-arrangements and/or transformations of this World-of-Life. (259)

	Let me now look into the temporality of particularity and the spatiality of universality and how a complex sense of the spatio-temporal is intentionally thematized (as a preparatory investigation in order to later apply this understanding to the hypothetical treatment of the transcendental possibilities/impossibilities of our topic, namely, the imputation of non-metaphysically interpreted theological existence). (260)

	Earlier I linked particularity with the orientation of the temporal (in general) and universality with the orientation of the spatial (in general). As I have already argued time and space co-relatively define each other. Furthermore, as the mere ascription of spatial-temporal coordinates cannot define the existential sense of presence of a certain phenomenally/phenomenologically distinctive state of affairs it follows that this existential sense of presence must also co-relatively define the sense of the spatial and the temporal (along the same lines as operate in our heuristic of the hermeneutic circle). Then, if the psychic energy of that subjective state of appreciation of that distinctive state of affairs is relatively stable then it follows that an increase in one of these correlativities must mean a decline in one or both of the other two correlativities, and v.v. This level of psychic energy is the degree to which that subjectivity is epistemologically organized in its actual current state of being-becoming and is equal to its degree of gestalt integration. This level of intentional awareness is, in turn, stamped upon the current quality of all intentional productivity in such a manner as to reflect that current level of gestalt integration. To complicate matters slightly we also need to note that even though intentional focus engenders a de-spatialization and focus upon (the differential flux of) the temporal a sense of retrospectivity is also engendered, i.e., the sense of the historic past. Inversely, an increased intentional emphasis upon the intentional field invokes the sense of the historic future through the anticipations of meta-textual genre expectations. Then, through a balanced suspension of these two historic orientations we realize an historical sense of the present. An overall transcendental suspension of all three historic moments then producing/re-producing an existential sense of the living present…. (261)

	By understanding these interrelationships between the focalization of the temporal, the de-focalization of the spatial and their balance in a sense of the existential, and, noting their parallels with historical senses of the past, the future and the present respectively, all within the confines of the current intentional economy, we are now in a position to theoretically quantify and qualify that intentional economy (as defined through its degree and manner of gestalt integration) even if only three of these four factors were able to be accounted for (those four factors being the totality of the overall state of gestalt integration and the three micro-privileged moments of that intentional economy that parallel our treatment of the hermeneutic circle, etc.). Now, if we were to correctly assume that this totality of the hermeneutic circle, as represented in this current state of affairs being entertained, is greater than the sum of its parts then we can safely assume that this non-reductive excess is indicative of this degree of actualized gestalt organization and from this what degree of input and the manner of that input with respect to the existential nature of that non-reductive sense of an existential ‘presence’ is being simulated/re-simulated. All sense of identity being thematized through forms of interaction engendered in and through the nature of our own being. So, through our being embodied we can interact with rocks, cups, sentient beings, etc., etc. These same dynamics operating in all processes of imputed theological existence and, therein, allow the theologian to transcend (all) hypothetical barriers (in a theological treatment of Divine ‘presence’) should the occasion be found to present itself to that degree of relational conciseness. At least allowing us to recognize the intimate link between identity, the spatial and the temporal, etc., and, at the same time, their distinctive dialectical differences despite their transformational treatment within this heuristic device of the overall transcendental suspension/hermeneutic circle.  (262)

	If these differences are generated from within this hermeneutic circle how can they be real differences, or, difference experienced as real? How is a sense the past differentiated from a sense of the future when the only time we can truly experience is only that of the ongoing existential present as entertained from within this hermeneutic encircling from which it would appear we cannot escape (in order to just appreciate the nature of these phenomenal confines?)? (263)

	In and through the overall transcendental suspension we find ourselves experiencing the relatively non-transcendentally suspended though privileged forms of disruption, these forms of disruption being, themselves, types of suspension that constitute the overall transcendental suspension that constitutes the apparent totality of the hermeneutic circle. From (processes of micro-)disruption we experience their distinctive sense of irruption and thence the deviation of our intentional observation of a semblance of the past, etc. That from such small degrees of distinctive disruption we have a temporary re-colouring of intentionally re-directed consciousness through such micro-disruptive acts of privileging, and v.v., opposing forces a few ‘moments’ later re-storing equilibrium with that type of distinctive process or processes being repeated whilst the overall manner and level of epistemological organization collectively calls for that distinctive period of intentionally directed privilege to be retained. On a more specific level, finer tuning of these mechanisms will focus on finer levels of specificity as in the textual re-calling of memory traces or the meta-textual anticipation of genre expectations, etc. By such means a progress of intentional consciousness is able to make it rounds with varying degrees of autonomy in and through an apparent interdependence of simulated and/or re-simulated states of affairs but in such a manner as to never escape their dependence upon those factors that establish those distinctive traces in and through the semblance of intentional consciousness. By such distinctive processes of intentional dependence, i.e., intentional emptiness, i.e., phenomenal simulation, we find ourselves to that extent in direct relational engagement with those intentional objectives to the same extent this semblance of interdependence is able to rise above and beyond the semblance of a mere dependence. Hence the semblance of our freedom is guaranteed both through the overall transcendental suspension and the distinctive intentional disruption of/irruption from the same! This ‘semblance’ of freedom is realized by virtue of the fact that there can be no absolute intentionally-subjective boundaries despite relatively absolute centres centred in our phenomenal-intentional experience of an embodiment as an embodiment-within-this-World-of-Life! A relative degree of freedom is guaranteed through entering the relatively neutral objectivity of the overall transcendental suspension; through the existential merit that is realized in our direct engagement with intentional objectivity; and through the intentional power realized in and through these privileged micro-disruptions in our intentional economy along with an ability to empathize from a relatively intersubjective point of view in our engagements with others (through the directness of interaction with others and the implication of an intersubjective meta-textual dimension), etc.  (264)

The historical (experience of time), therefore, is experienced through privileging. All distinctive types of phenomenological experience are experienced in the same way. Micro-disruptions of an adequately informed, overall transcendental suspension allowing an ongoing existential excess to be channeled in such a manner so as to inform the phenomenal relationship selectively entered into as an intentionally constituted experienced configured to some extent in a critical fashion (the measure of which is determined through a meta-determination of the same, i.e., through making that process itself become the intentional object(ive) of our intentional discrimination in turn); the critical nature of all processes reflecting the sum total of organization engaged in that type of field  through our ongoing thematization of the same (and hence the relative rationality of this process is guaranteed to some extent by virtue of the existence and ongoing refinement of this thematizational ability) (but not as a process that can ever be contemplated in an absolute frame of reference). (265)

	All processes of relational engagement, although simulated intentionally, are conducted directly by virtue of this intentional-phenomenal emptiness. Because distinctive intentional states are experienced as distinctive(ly centred) phenomena we dialectically are given something with which to apparently operate with but which, through an absence of absolute boundaries, allows us to also simulate our direct relational engagement. If phenomena were not ‘empty’ there could be no forms of relational interaction whatsoever! Thence the manufacture of identity (through the process of thematizational identification be that in subjective, intersubjective and/or non-subjective modalities). Furthermore, through direct engagement we must be able to enter into an apparent interaction with the same when our field of engagement coincides to some extent or other with the apparent objectivity of those distinctive states of affairs. Thus, to this degree, we must be directly engaging those intentional objectives because if there were no location in that field of engagement there would be no engagement in the first place. Furthermore, therefore, such engagement must encounter an intentional core to some extent because to do otherwise would mean that we were not encountering such objectivities in the first place. Hence authenticity can always be found in this degree of intentional coincidence with the simulated intentional objective because engagement is always with that object as engaged even though our appreciation of that engagement might be minimal. At least, once we are intentionally aware, through thematization, of the nature of that objective, it follows that our core appreciation of that objective must be valid. The problem being only to what degree our interpretation/s, etc., maintains/maintain that degree of validity. The reception of a distinctive state of affairs is effectively grounded on this core authenticity of engagement since to be relationally engaged means we are already engaged in some manner or other to some extent or other. Only through ongoing processes of re-thematization, critically conducted, will we be able to answer our search for a degree of validation that goes beyond the mere recognition of an engagement. Of course, the critical tenor of those investigations (critically or non-critically conducted) can only be engaged through an ongoing process critically conducted, but, entertained in such a manner as to never exceed the critical fine grain of those investigation already realized, i.e., the degree of thematization progressively realized in our encounter both with that intentional objective and that type of intentional objective (since the existential richness of our appreciation can never exceed the corresponding existential richness of that field of experience already in situ. Within those limits (between absolute non-identification and absolute identification) an expansion of our appreciation of this core (in our essentially ongoing coinciding appreciation of the same) realizes a process wherein our current understanding undergoes a process of existential refinement or existentialization, i.e., a progressive phenomenological re-alignment and coincidence with that phenomenal identity in this process of re-identificational identification. (266)

What implications does this type of position hold for our research? For a start we must dismiss the nonsense of a reality masquerading behind appearances! Phenomena are constituted between the polarities of a transcendent polarity (experienced through a [micro-]privileging of intentional focus and its accompanying sense of structure) and an immanent polarity (experienced through a [micro-]privileging of intentional de-focusing and its accompanying sense of a differentially appreciated process through its differential (re-)iteration in the appropriate field of examination). Hence phenomena are fully established on the metaphorical surfaces of their presentation/re-presentation. Thus, it follows, that a more insightful investigation must investigate more fully those ‘surfaces’ as they are found to be presented there-for-us before-us! A more successful investigation, therefore, must critically engage itself with ‘deeper degree of appreciation’ not a ‘deeper penetration of the phenomenon’. ‘Deeper’ in this sense must not be treated literally as an uncovering through delving further into the phenomenon itself as if that phenomenon in its imputed intrinsic nature was opaque, distant and multi-layered in its mysterious depths. Rather, the metaphor should be turned on its head and we should delve more deeply within our own epistemological organization, through critical preparation, exercise and reflection, in order to more fully engage that phenomenon. The phenomenon in its full richness of detail is already imprinted (and not impressed) upon the surface of its presentation without depth. In our engagement with it’s surface our re-constitution of that phenomenon can only be re-constituted to that level of richness already constituted by-us for-ourselves. Intersubjectivity presenting itself through meta-textual input as a necessary feature in our constitution/re-constitution of phenomena (through this necessary facet of the hermeneutic circle)! (267)

	What are the ramification of this ‘superficial’ view of reality for the theologian? That, the Divine, must already be ‘superficially’ imprinted in the constitution of phenomena iff and only the Divine has an existence in phenomenal terms of reference within this World-of-Life! Otherwise the theologian has no topic. But, assuming they do, and that possibility has already been established, then they must attend to how phenomena are presented in order to interpret the same. In theory, how is such a task to be conducted? Through insight in all senses of that expression! I.e., through proper critical preparation, through appropriate critical exercise and through valid critical reflection. By such means the value of their topic would be thematized. Assuming the nature of their objective (as an intentional object-state) is self-realized through increased epistemological organization it stands to reason that through increased epistemological organization of our own psyches we would, at least theoretically, stand a better chance of finding the necessary degree of rapport that would let us establish the experiential existence of our topic as that-there-for-us should that state of realization be obtained, found to be obtainable!? Such a programme, correctly, being critically developed by the theologian themselves along with the critical exercise of their associated theoretical discourses on this topic and by what means, by what technologies, one might obtain theological realization through such critically informed practices (?). But, this is, without a doubt, more aptly the province of the theologians themselves. (268)

	Let me now investigate the ramifications of this ‘superficial’ point of view, that reality in its full richness of being-becoming is imprinted in all its detail upon the surface of all phenomena regardless of what identity is or is not under examination. Hypothetically, how is such value to be engaged and how is the authenticity of our engagement to be evaluated? (269)

	All value is appreciated through the appreciation of both the invocation of privilege and the invocation of an overall transcendental suspension of that matrix in which those privileges are exercised (through acts of mirco-disruption/irruption). One method for the ascertainment of privilege is through an ordered analysis (as discussed elsewhere via pre-essential essential judgment, essential aesthetical judgments, deontological ethical judgments, perceptual pragmatical judgments, potential factual hermeneutical judgments, and actual factual ontical judgments through, respectively, the relative suppression of intentional ego and intentional field, intentional field, intentional object and intentional field, intentional object, intentional object and intention ego, and, intentional ego). Now, a number of relatively incommensurable positions arise in our attempting to cross-interrelate two or more relatively distinctive ordered perspectives, such as, e.g., deontological-ethical value with pragmatical-ethical considerations, etc. These relatively incommensurable types of mis-relational interaction being resolved on a ‘deeper’ basis through an overall transcendentally suspended basis – a ‘deeper’ level of accommodation being guaranteed by virtue of the fact that all processes of judgment utilize the same transcendental dynamics/mechanics. Hence the point made in the first sentence of this paragraph that value is appreciated through both the appreciation of privilege (whether ordered in its nature or constructed in some other frame of reference) and the overall transcendentally suspended basis of those acts of micro-privileging. Because all forms of value have the same transcendental dynamics/mechanics it follows that all expressions of value can be analyzed through a qualified ordered dissection realized through a re-simulation of the appropriate sense of privilege or ordered-bias that would allow us to re-simulate the same either virtually and/or non-virtually. Furthermore, on a deeper level of ‘analysis’ (correctly, more ‘synthetic’ in nature) an inter-ordered analysis sets out to investigate how these ordered distinctions can be accommodated individually and/or collectively – a process that, effectively, sets out to simulate the simulation that intuitively has already paralleled the natural accommodation between these ordered fields of judgment by virtue of the fact that all judgment has the same transcendental basis (being generated within an overall transcendental suspension between the ideal polarities of intentional Object, intentional World and intentional Ego). In essence, re-living the creation/re-creation of that expression of value in either relatively non-virtual and/or virtual terms of reference. E.g., I see a red patch moving across a paddock and realize it is a tractor when I put my glasses on. Here I am making both an interpretation (of a set of pre-essential/essential quantities and qualities) and a factual assessment of the same. In this instance also noting the beauty of this scene. The same (configured set of ordered features) being re-entertained in virtual terms of references when I recall, in memory, this particular situation a number of years later. Because “all forms of value have the same transcendental dynamics” it follows that all forms of theological value must be entertained in the same transcendental terms of reference. Effectively, through a living/re-living of that situation, but, in a form that can be appreciated from the particular hermeneutic-theological frame of reference adopted for that task (as developed and articulated by a theologian [regardless of whether they be a professional or non-professional in this respect]). (270)

	Now, let me look into this hypothetical topic of Divine intentionality in regard to both its possible formation and possible modes of expression. First let me say that I have no direct first hand knowledge of this topic other than to note the following guideline: as the Divine must directly and/or indirectly enter into some phenomenal-phenomenological association with this World-of-Life (for if it did not then it may as well not exist for-us as it would not-exist-for-us), that because there can be no absolute distinction between the Ontological Aspect and the Epistemological Aspect it follows that Divine intentionality must be basically configured in the same way non-Divine intentionality is configured – the only relatively real difference being qualitative (through the implication of  different levels of epistemological organization and different types of intentional objectives that could be engaged in those emergently distinctive terms of reference) and not structurally (or ‘materially’ in some defectively imputed metaphysical mode invoking forms of intrinsic existence, etc., that are quite different from other forms of metaphysical imputation since all forms of independent metaphysical imputation non-relationally based have been ruled out)! It also follows that the relatively Divine could not be there-for-us if it did not implicate our intentional inclusion in the very structural-functions of the same. Thus, the intentional nature of the Divine must qualitatively reflect the intentional formation and expression of the relatively non-Divine, and v.v. In other words, we may not think divine thoughts and the Divine may not think relatively mundane thoughts there is no absolute distinction that can be made between the two, either with respect to intentional formation and/or intentional expression. This necessity is transcendental in nature. I don’t need to know this, only, in one’s knowing anything, this pattern of intentionality follows regardless of the divine or non-divine status of that subject. Hence the re-interpreted paraphrase: “As below - so above!” (271)

	In essence, taking the above guideline to heart, we need only investigate, hypothetically, the nature of intentional formation and expression to be able to generally configure what is necessary in conceptually dealing with these five heading of Divine intentional formation, Divine expression, non-divine intentional reception, non-divine intentional response and the realization of consequential change for both relatively Divine and relatively non-divine parties. Therefore let me look at this subject of intentionality in general terms of reference without loosing sight of the fact that, effectively, there is a relatively non-commensurable qualitative difference between the Divine and the non-divine (a qualitative difference on par, metaphorically, to that between a Mother and her infant child, but, one that still does not, and cannot, rule out, hypothetically, a true reciprocity of intentional interaction). At the same time a viable theology cannot declare this relatively incommensurable ‘difference’ to be an absolute one! (273) 

	For an intentional act to have occurred a change of state in some form or other must take place. An intentional act is essentially a state of transition, a transformation of a certain state of affairs and its distinctive rearrangement. That distinctiveness taking place at the same level of epistemological organization that registered this act of intentional discharge. This discharge taking place through an ongoing act of intentional resolution. Hence this process of transition occurs in that space of time that act of resolution is entered into. Thus an act of resolution takes place in time in such a manner that its measurement must occur, theoretically and/or practically, in x moments where x is a whole number. On the other hand, the chaotic precursors to this ‘act’ of intentionality must be initiated within that same sense of the moment, i.e. as a fraction of x. So, if perceptual awareness of perceptual change in the perceptual field occurs within, let us say, approximately one twentieth of a second, then its chaotic instantiation as a process of transition must occur within that sense of the moment, i.e., within a fraction of that moment; which in this situation could be defined as a fraction of an experiential moment of approximately one twentieth of a second. Because such change is registered over the space of one or more comparative invocations of the appropriately associated sense of the moment the process effectively appears to have been spontaneous and is registered accordingly. A process of change being registered as occurring over the space of that transition, i.e., in y number of moments. On the other hand one can extrapolate and philosophically impute that a process of change must occur between these moments as long as that process appears to maintain a state of transition and the ‘same’ process of transition, i.e., appears to maintain some sense of continuity. Hence I am not arguing for processes of absolute momentariness nor am I arguing for processes of absolute non-momentariness, i.e., change is realized either within the space of a moment or appears to evolve between the space of a moment in and through a series of moments till that time that distinctive process of change appears to have ceased or has taken on a new complexion. Thence the dialectics of change – a process initiated chaotically within the space of a moment within a moment or between a moment that either continues or is discontinued. Essential to this argument being the recognition that chaotic transitions occur within the space of a moment, i.e. before the full term of that moment and, therefore, ‘appear’ as ‘spontaneous’ (since our ‘measurement’ cannot enter in finer detail into, between or, i.e., ‘within’ the space of that associated moment). (274)

	An act of intentionality, through a discharge of resolution, effectively establishes a sense of relationship through this arc of the hermeneutic circle whose three ideal moments are consonance (field), dissonance (of the intentional objective) and resolution (of the relationship that re-establishes the rapport between the relative extremes of the first two moment. The persistence of a relationship therefore implies the ongoing persistence of these aspects of consonance, dissonance and resolution ‘within’ the momentariness as indirectly displayed on this level of epistemological organization. Now what does it mean for something to be described as intentional? Let me now explore this aspect of our research through looking at a number of comparative models. (275)

	How epistemologically organized does a certain state of affairs have to be before it is appropriate to classify it as intentional (and thence as a phenomenological phenomenon). Let me explore an increasing complex set of models till we find the right degree of complexity that might generate this semblance of a simulation of the intentional. Imagine a light switch. We turn it on and the light bulb immediately shines. A simple switch does not seem to match the degree of complexity necessary for an intentional process to be registered as such. On the other hand, the involvement of a human who acts as the switcher does seem to implicate the necessary degree of complexity, but, of course, is not acceptable as we wish to illustrate the role of the intentional act and not merely re-invoke the same. So, let us flesh out this analogy of the switch until we arrive at a picture complex enough to capture the essence of intentional formation and exercise, etc. Let us invoke next a thermostatically controlled switch. The temperature rises, the switch is turned on and the cooling airconditioning is turned on as a result. Then, when the temperature drops the cooling airconditioning is turned off. How more successful or unsuccessful is this analogy? Intentionality is directed towards an objective with the remembrance of the same. Somehow or other a key characteristic of intentionality is this element or facet of remembrance through which this process of intentional change remains experienced, if only virtually, after this process of change may have stopped. In our example, the switch is turned on and off but the system as a whole is not aware of what state it is in, namely, on or off. To some extent it could be referred to as like a reflex. Tap the knee and the leg involuntarily shoots forward. In order to ‘remember’ this differential between ‘before the reflexive event’ and ‘after the reflexive event’ we need to invoke a more complex level of systematic organization – almost a set of reflexes within a hierarchy of reflexes. In some manner or other we need a system that can entertain both states of affairs at the same time and then can recognize, as well, which state has eventuated. In this light we might like to refer to intentionality as ‘a process of registering within a process of an awareness of that en-registering’. However, this would only mirror a relatively passive understanding of intentionality. Intentionality is also that which ensures a process of intentionality takes places, is discharged! That, somehow or other, it is also a process that enacts the process that becomes registered. Incestuously, it apparently enacts its own apparent activation all within an apparent memory of the same. In a complex tracing out of its ‘presence’ it somehow registers its own enregistering and then also resolves that this process ‘to be registered’ takes place to that degree it is able to instantiate the same. Let me now look at models that might mirror this aspect of reflexivity. (276)

	Imagine a matrix of 3 x 1, whose elements are a, b, and c are so engaged in the following manner, namely, a iff and only iff a, b iff and only a & b, c iff and only iff a & b & c. Let only these various situations be mirrored in that matrix of elements that obey those hierarchical pre-conditions. Moreover, let these elements take only the values ‘1’ or ‘0’ and that if a is 1 it implies that an intentional act i took place in pre-intentional terms of reference. If not it would score 0. Next is b where if level b registers 1 it implies an interpretation of a perceptual act has now occurred/is taking place (and assumes the presupposition that a = 1). Next is level c where 1 implies that this perceptual act and its interpretation are both entertained along with the activation of that intention in the form of a response (and assumes the presupposition that both a = 1 and b = 1). This implies that our matrix can only take the following values:

c		0	0	0	1
b		0	0	1	1
a		0	1	1	1

	This matrix has the possibility of only four possible complex states to be in, namely, no recognition at all of a certain perceptual state of affairs, etc.; basic perceptual input only; perception and its interpretative thematization; and, perception, interpretation and an active awareness of both perception and interpretation both during and/or after the event of the activation of the response itself. This last possibility mirroring more closely, in my opinion, the complex nature of intentionality. This complex picture also taking into account the sense of intentionality as a pre-conditional sense of aspiring to a certain end, a conditional sense of intending a certain intentional object(tive), and, a post-conditional sense of establishing a radical difference in the world through a transformation within the Life-World (i.e., the world in both epistemological and ontological orientations) – hence our concern to also investigate the realization of a consequential analysis (of the response/s enacted through this process of intentional transformation). Obviously, these three basic levels of intentional function implicate three different levels of epistemological-ontological organizational interdependence. It is my opinion that these different levels of epistemological-ontological organization could be paralleled by the hermeneutic circle treated in a vertical sense – hence a lower level of intentional perception concentrating on the moment of dissonance, a middle level of intentional interpretation, and, a third and higher level wherein there is an intentional involvement of a sense of ego, etc. The same hierarchical enstructualization also noting this same tri-partite parallelization between pre-conditional, conditional and a post-conditional aspects (that saturate the intentional performance). (277)

	The full complexity of the ‘intentional act’ would appear, therefore, to involve both this dialectical complexity between the distinctive senses of perception, cognitive interpretation and judgment whilst also entering into an accommodation with these moments of the pre-conditional, the conditional and the post-conditional. Again, this is to be modeled by invoking the hermeneutic circle (in both vertical and horizontal aspects) (on all three levels of our matrix modeling) and insisting that only through saturation, in some form or other, to some degree or other, that the discharge of an intentional act is realized through the necessary dependence (and semi-interdependence) of these three dialectical moments upon the constitution of all three moments within this intentional matrix and its accommodation of all three. (278)

	Now, let me argue that a consequential analysis would demonstrate a relatively comprehensive method for creatively dealing with this problematic (what is an intentional act [where the appellation ‘act’ should be treated more as an analogy?]). (279)

	As just argued an intentional process of transformation is a process with a memory. Somehow we need to remember both what was ‘to hand’ and what was intentionally desired to be ‘now to hand’ and what eventually was realized as ‘coming to hand’. In this light an intention(al act) is a remembered tracing. The intentional process involves a sense of differentiation in order for a process of transformational change to take place and a sense of integration in order to appreciate this transformation as a transformation of that which was relatively pre-conditional and relatively invariant within that process of transformation. These inter-dependent aspects of differentiation and integration giving us a semblance of a ‘differentiated-integration’ and an ‘integrated-differentiation’. Furthermore, a transcendental suspension and balance of these two transcendental suspensions just noted effectively establishes the dynamics of our hermeneutic circle… a balance of all three establishing our overall transcendental suspension. (280)

	Intentionality is essentially realized through chaotically induced processes of transformational re-organization. As previously argued, chaotic transformation happens metaphorically within the relatively appropriate moment and/or between each of a series of moments in the transformational maintenance of that type of transitional situation. The appellation of an ‘act’, therefore, is best treated as only analogical – a process of chaotically induced self-organized re-organization therein produces/re-produces this semblance of a simulation of an intentional act(ivity). As a result, an investigation of an intentional process must take into account the implication of a consequential analysis (since the transition to that intention is the result of this process of concrete change). Furthermore, the reflection upon the same must involve our investigating the same type of a re-alignment between simulational processes and not searching for some form of an alignment with something prior to this process of simulation outside this intentional nexus. Of course, in our passage through this world the subjects, objects and states we find there are implicated, to some degree, in our re-simulation of the same (but never as our encountering a representation of a non-simulated form or pre-simulated form). In effect, a consequential analysis will note these differentiated-integrations and integrated-differentiations as a series of consequential shifts (realized through self-organized chaotic processes sequenced pre-conditionally, conditionally and post-conditionally). In effect, we are dealing directly with the existential specificity of that relationship under such focus as realized through these processes of simulation and/or re-simulation (all processes of reflection effectively dealing with the latter). (281)

	How is a process of consequential analysis best conducted? By the focusing upon this aspect of the existentially specific in and through those re-performances of those acts of re-simulation that allow us to deal directly with that under such reflection. The directness of relational engagement allowing us to deal directly with that under such thematizational evaluation. By what means is such a re-simulation allowed to engage our intentional awareness? By invoking micro-shifts in the intentional pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions of that situation the chaotic nature of that engagement is intuitively finessed in our directly engaged awareness (regardless of whether that situation should be judged as relatively virtual and/or relatively non-virtual in complexion). By such micro-shifts in reconstruction the chaotic complexion of that under investigation is intuitively assessed as well as establishing our direct alignment with those re-simulated objectives. Hence authenticity could be re-defined as an existential re-alignment in our directly engaged reading of those phenomena. How is this fine-line walked? Through the critical imposition of the overall transitional suspension wherein perceptual matter, interpretative reading and intentional activation and their parallels with pre-conditional intentionality, etc., are allowed to fully play themselves out in and through critical processes of re-simulation. A process that is not mysterious; as this is what we normally do, moment to moment, throughout the course of ‘our’ day. (282)

	This model of intentionality (equally applying to all non-divine/Divine intentional-like processes in both epistemological and/or ontologically oriented perspectives treated as phenomenological-phenomena) invoking a chaotic understanding of transformation; recognizing the differentiation and integration of the intentional process (through time and space, or their epistemological equivalents); and, noting these distinctions between the non-intentional aspiration (in the conditional sense) of the pre-intentional intention, the conditional sense of the intentional as that intending towards an intentional objective, and the post-intentional consequences of post-conditional changes of state realized and/or enacted in a relatively contextually invariant perspective whilst maintaining their sense as an integrated-differentiation, etc. (283)

	Suppose, for the sake of argument, we had an array of a mixture of particles some of which are collectively and pre-conditionally primed to chaotically change state in a self-organized fashion. Then that transition momentarily takes place, i.e., within the space of that associated sense of moment. Could such a change of state be referred to as intentional or intentional-like? What, analogically, is necessary for us to seriously treat it as intentional or intentional-like? Could this sense of the intentional be assessed from the consequences realized in that chaotic state of transition? If so would this not imply that not only must a state change its sense of self-organization but also consequentially re-organize that which is not immediate to that system but that which could be considered as contiguous to it. E.g., I see an apple, think about reaching out for it on the tree and picking it… this pre-conditional intention then being conditionally acted upon with the post-conditional consequence of not only touching that apple but also being able to pick it off that apple tree and finding it in my hand. This apple in my hand being seen as that ‘just picked apple’ and not merely as an ‘apple in my hand’. Hence a consequential analysis would need to note how pre-intentional intentions are translated into a post-conditional differentiation of that current situation (which in this scenario is both “‘one apple tree minus one apple’ and ‘one hand plus one apple’”). Now, as not all conditional intentions can be realized we need to note what modal expectations are actually met on a situation by situation basis. In the last instance we note that our apple simulation is modally richer than a mere dream apple simulation as this apple, in having been eaten, has now substantially reduced my prior sense of hunger. Thus a consequential analysis also needs to note this modal differentiation between the pre-conditional and the post-conditional as well as the moment or moments in which this transition was allowed to come into existence. An integration of characteristics over this period of transition establishing a continuity of identity – so that picked apple is the same apple that was on that apple tree being this one picked, etc. In the denomination of the existential differentiation and integration of the existential descriptor of that apple-in-the-situation-of-its-being-picked in our phenomenal, non-metaphysical imputation of that apple what needs to be noted and what can be discarded from such phenomenological-phenomenal descriptions? As that apple phenomenon is read as an ‘apple’ surely our interpretative set of appropriate modalities brought to bear upon that situation of ‘picking an apple’ discriminates exactly what is necessary and relevant in that act of hermeneutic appropriation? So, I see the apple and it is picked. The intentional act being embedded in ‘this seeing and picking that apple’. Furthermore, if the apple is seen as a beautiful apple then it is seen as a ‘beautiful apple’ too, as ‘edible’, as ‘red’, as a ‘Jonathan Smith’, etc. My recognition of that apple as ‘an apple picked by me’ must also be intentionally ‘seen’ even though I can no longer directly see myself as having just picked that same apple (since it has already been picked by me!). The hermeneutic circle and its three senses of historical time coalescing in the relational moment (and their retained re-production) to give us the direct simulation of that simulation. The simulation maintaining its fully saturated simulated reality when all modal expectations are satisfactorily engaged in our engagement with that simulated objective. So a ‘dream apple’ can only satisfy a ‘dream hunger’ and not a ‘non-virtual hunger’. Whereas, on the other hand, a ‘non-virtual apple’ can satisfy a ‘non-virtual hunger’. A consequential analysis therein differentiating (all differences in modality) and integrating (all non-differences in modality) in our investigative examination of that intentional-object(ive)-state under examination (whilst taking at phenomenal face-value all modalities as they are found to relevantly present themselves as hermeneutic pre-conditions for our being able to read that ‘text’ in that same manner as currently desired). Our consequential analysis also recognizing all essential chaotic conditions that must necessarily be to hand as they find themselves realized in this intentional transition before, between and after this act of intentional appropriation (considered both literally and figuratively). Our hermeneutic reading of that act, however, does not remotely imply our need to be able to explain all reasons for why this chaotic situation progressed in the manner it did or did not. In understanding the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of ‘picking of an apple’ I do not need to know a detailed anatomy and physiology of this type of phenomenal situation, I certainly don’t need to know its neuro-physiology nor an advanced understanding of the molecular nature of arms and apples, etc. One can safely impute, however, that a consequential analysis that notes an act or series of acts of intentional differentiation must involve the intentional resolution of a self-organized chaotic system that allowed that intentional act to take place in the manner that it finds itself differentiated – that situation being correctly assessed and appreciated when our relevant phenomenological understanding is in a phenomenal alignment with the very-nature-of-that-phenomenon-under-examination. Such alignment being re-presentational and not representational in character! By such means re-continuing our awareness, to that degree already possessed, as to its historical lineage (e.g., as that apple just picked, etc.). Such knowledge also further assisting us in the future enacting of a similar type of phenomenal situation (through an enrichment of that genre of performance in the context of a ongoing exponential-like enriched inter-relational thematization of its detail, powers of appreciation, skill of performance, critical awareness of the same, etc.). Knowing I can pick an apple and practically knowing what a pear is I am now equipped to pick a pear on a pear tree should that situation ever present itself…. (284)

	Translating this understanding into a hypothetical theological arena what could we say about the transcendental nature of divine intentionality (regardless of the existence or non-existence of the relatively Divine)? (285)

	Intentionality is not just a chaotic change of state but also the extension of that chaotic system as a consequence of that change of state. Moreover, it is also a directed extension of that system and one that is both differentiated and integrated within that overall system of appropriation. This tracing of its intentionality being re-productive and not reproductive. In this light we might say that the swinging of a pendulum is not intentionally oriented even though the initiation of its swing could well be (and which by the above definition must be considered as intentional). So, the mere rotation of a planet or the mere revolution of a planet cannot be treated as intentional in orientation. On the other hand, perturbations in that orbit could well be treated as relatively intentional-like to some extent or other. Of course such phenomena, or such phenomenal irregularities, could hardly be considered as intentionally directed in a subjective sense? In comparison could a computer array (or an array of computers) be considered in such a light as intentional? Or is the point of this comparison to note that intentionality is correctly an emergent phenomenon and as humans emerge from embodied-brains so might divine subjects emerge in turn from societies of human agents and/or cosmological expanses finding themselves operating in a similar fashion but on a relatively larger, more complex scale of operation. The phenomenon of self-organization chaotically integrating that ‘phenomenological-subject’ despite what ever physical constraints would appear to otherwise impede the transmission of information by non-chaotically-oriented means. Indeed, such a possibility, as the ‘apparent transmission’ of knowledge by self-organized states undergoing processes of transition, has already been successfully argued for if only on the hypothetical grounds of possibility. Thus with this possibility accepted let me now investigate hypothetically our first four headings, namely, Divine intentional formation, Divine expression, non-divine intentional reception and non-divine intentional response in the light of our fifth heading of a consequential analysis. (286)

	To assist this hypothetical investigation let me first explore these concepts of the intentional-like extension of a system and the discharge of intentionality in the context of a relational system. In looking around my study I perceive my shelves filled with books and various other objects placed about the room. All of these objects have been placed there intentionally as I know I have put them there myself. To some extent I have defied the direction of entropy and have created a system with a greater degree of local entropy or order. These placed objects themselves are already, in the main, objects that have been intentionally processed and in turn also possess a greater degree of entropy or order. Now by increased degree of order is meant an increased degree of organization which is always relatively epistemological in nature although in this situation this increased degree of epistemological organization present in this room is effectively negligible in any sensible evaluation of this particular epistemological scheme of things. However, such items do assist, by extension, my functioning in this room as a person who may need to access those books and objects (such as my computer, etc.). In this light these objects act as an extension of myself (and act like a non-onboard memory which only need to be properly and appropriately accessed to function in that manner). In this light we might say then that the discharge of intentionality can effect and instigate a greater degree of local entropy. Of course it can also do the opposite. In a moment of enlightenment, either reality based or non-reality based, I could suddenly decide I no longer have any need for books and throw them out on to the street and in the process disrupt and decrease the local entropy of that room by such intentionally directed behaviour. Hence a definition of intentionally directed extension through the discharge of intentional activity must included an aspect that takes into account the otherwise non-accountable ‘non-intentional’ differentiation in the entropy, order, epistemological organization of a localized environment. So, a room by its very nature cannot accumulate books, therefore, the accumulation of books in a room is the evidence of intentional behaviour in some form or other. Again, the lose of books from a room would also be evidence of intentional behaviour given the same interpretative frame of reference. Extension, in such a scheme, therefore being defined by default as that emergent residue that cannot be accounted for along non-intentionally oriented lines of approach. So a tornado goes past my open window and scatters some of my books on to the street – the manner of their scattering being read in that context as non-intentionally oriented (unless one wants to give an animistic/divine interpretation to such natural phenomena). So, we must now ask under what circumstances could we transcendentally argue for the intentional presence of a divine force entering into the natural world? Or, rather, correctly, that this is the province of a theologian to the extent that they flesh out such transcendental guide-lines in their interpretation of such an ideal situation type? On the other hand, to the extent they can operate transcendentally implies that this aspect of their research and investigations cannot be their province and their province alone! In this tentative light let us cautiously continue without privileging our ontological commitments either for or against that type of proposal. (287)

	There is this problem – how do we differentiate what is relatively intentional and relatively non-natural from that which is relatively non-intentional and relatively natural, e.g., placing books on a bookshelf versus the growing of a crystal of common salt in a solution of saturated brine? The problem being  - how do differentiate the intentional, and non-naturally deterministic from the non-intentional and its being determined by simple causal laws of nature without appealing to some form of a petition that determines what is natural and what is non-natural in the light of our need for a distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional? By invoking the qualification of ‘relatively’ intentional, etc., it would appear we can more or less dismiss this distinction of the natural versus the non-natural by appealing to some degree of intentionality on all levels of phenomenal presentation despite its comparative degree of epistemological organization. So there is some degree of intent in the crystal being grown in that brine. On the other hand, there is a greater sense of intent in the actions of myself placing those books on my bookcase or taking them from that bookcase. The characteristics of intentionality expected being those appropriate to the degree of epistemological organization implicated in such seemingly determined actions. So, e.g., I try to order my books on my bookcase alphabetically or by topic or by ease of access or by order of acquisition, etc. So intentionality is an extension by discharge through the resolution of dissonance in a manner in keeping with the levels of epistemological organization appropriate to the nature of that process of a self-organized change, etc. A consequential analysis noting the degree and nature of the existential excess delivered in and through such a self-organized transition. So, the crystal sits there in the brine slowly growing bigger and my bookcase is a witness to an assortment of books coming and going usually as a result of my own interventions in this regard. Of course, if all processes can be labeled as intentional or intention-like in nature we must ask what exactly in ‘non-intentional’ or ‘non-intentional like’? In this regard perhaps we can re-define this naturalistic/non-naturalistic differentiation of inputs by noting that all processes in a state of process that are ‘linear’, ‘non-chaotic’ and completely calculable (in theory if not in practice) must be ‘natural’. On the other hand, all processes not so described to that same extent can be treated as non-natural and relatively intentional in orientation whilst such epithets are scoped by the levels of epistemological organization implicated in our current investigations. (288)

	Why this importance placed upon consequential analysis? Because intentionality is perceived as a change of state in a self-organized chaotic system that ‘change of state’ must have consequences that arise from this change of state, indeed, the very act of such intentionality is a direct result of this discharge, extension of relational resolution effected through that chaotic transition or series of chaotic transitions. Understanding the causal implications of this state of self-organized transition, whether on an ontological level of analysis or on an epistemological level of analysis or on a combined ontological-epistemological frame of reference, implies that we cannot escape the consequences of such a transition brought about through that very transition itself (regardless of their quantitative and/or qualitative assessment and implication of natural, subjective and/or Divine senses of subjectivity). Moreover, consequential analysis can be adopted as a common denominator to our four hypothetical headings of Divine intentional formation, Divine expression, non-divine intentional reception (of the Divine) and non-divine intentional response (directed towards the Divine). (289)

	In some sense we are what we think – that the nature of our intentional being is in some measure a reflection of what is intended, albeit with some qualifications. E.g., a good person is able to interact with a person who is not so good not because the former person is not perfect but by the mere fact that both people are persons. The discernment of the more appropriate common denominator should be of the more appropriate common denominator. E.g., mother and infant child are able to both interact by virtue of the fact that they are human and bonded in their particular relationship with each other. To say the mother was once a child and therefore should be able to understand her charge is to miss the point since they have a relationship together in the here and now. However, most relationships are between entities or states that have little in common! We are not our intentional object[(ive-)state]s! How do we account for such relative incommensurability (between various intentional states and subjectivities) and apply this understanding to the hypothetical intentionality of the Divine? I have resolved this particular philosophical problem in the past by invoking an isomorphic invariance between the participating features of that relationship from their own perspectives and the resultant interaction when these perspectives have been combined under the auspices of a meta-transformational treatment-retreatment philosophy. So, e.g., the person as an intentionally formed concept of their own subjectivity is then able to interact with those intentional objectives currently in play, and v.v., and by extension, the conceptual subjectivity of others. Furthermore, as a transcendental prerequisite, the implication of a meta-textual dimension implies the indirect ‘presence’ of the intersubjective ‘other’. Thence, by extension we can also ask to what extent divine intentionality must also possess this element of the meta-textually intersubjective and to what extent this must involve other senses of the relatively divine and/or the relatively non-divine too?! That accepted, what else can we say about intentional formation? As an emergent process we can only have an adequate experience and understanding to that level of experience and understanding understood by ourselves. All else can only be metaphorically alluded to, etc. Such a position is also positioned on an account of the Life-World that accepts that all things have no absolute intrinsic nature but, for all that, still possess a conventional nature. Thence, on account of this lack of intrinsic existence and intrinsic self-existence there can be no absolute boundaries between object-states and/or subjective-states. Furthermore, all processes of identification are realized in unique relationships that therein impart to those identified states and subjects their individual flavour. So, relationships have a centre but no absolute boundaries. In the dialectics of the hermeneutic circle this outpouring of interactive identity is only limited by the intensity of the ongoing interaction entered into in that particular relational aspect of their-being-in-this-World-of-Life. The overlapping of these relational worlds imparting a complex identity to those senses of subjectivity and objectivity. Translated to a Divine point of view we might say that by extension Divine intentional identity would be configured in a similar manner, and, that Divine identity could overlap with human intentionality to that extent it was brought forward for reflection by the same. That the same could be guaranteed, if only covertly, by the fact that the Divine emerges from a folding over/de-folding over of human agents, other forms of agency and the very world(s) in which those forms of subjectivity and objectivity operate. Of course, obversely, to the extent that the Divine is relatively non-commensurable with this world and its realms of agency, human and non-human, then too it must remain a mystery to the same being only approached through analogies (although the metaphorical also has the power ‘to metaphor’ and therein also reveal something of the same given the intellectual capacity to appreciate this aspect of such revelation?). But let us concentrate more on the nature of intentional formation itself and what this understanding has for our conceptual appreciation of the hypothetical nature of the formation of Divine intentionality. (290)

	As previously argued intentional formation involves a relationship between the intentional treatment of objectivities and(/or) subjectivities in term of their appropriate common denominators, i.e., their relatively invariant co-isomorphic features possessed in the formation of that relationship or set of relationships  relevant to the relationship(s) under examination. Moreover, in the light of the above, we can say that in a qualified sense subjectivity reflects that nature of such co-isomorphic aspects of interaction available to it; be they ‘experienced’ by the relatively Divine or the relatively non-divine. Then, as also argued previously, we can state that the process of intentional formation, be it Divine or not divine in origination, is the consequential result of a chaotic transition in state set up to discharge itself in that type of process as ‘intentional’. In effect Divine intentionality demands this sense of chaotic transformation in its own sense of embodiment to that which metaphorically corresponds to what happens in our own sense of embodiment. So, this very question would then need to be properly asked and appropriately replied to by the theologian in this regard, indeed, namely, what form of embodiment must a viable sense of the Divine possess? That granted we can now tentatively ask “how is intentional formation expressed by the relatively Divine (once this [transcendentally necessary] concept of divine embodiment is granted)?” (291)

	To summarize: intentional formation of the Divine, as would be present to us in this world-of-Life, in the light of the above reflections, would be dependent upon a number of preconditions, namely, an open broad spectrum understanding of embodiment; an embodiment ‘within’ and ‘through’ a certain state of affairs whose complexion is chaotic; relatively more sophisticated in its epistemological organization that that possessed by ourselves; and whose nature would dialectically reflect the nature of its intentional objectivity. In an examination of this last aspect let me tentatively explore the transcendental territory of the intentional expression of the Divine (in those necessary, general, hypothetically possible terms of reference). (292)

	To what extent does the intentional subject reflect the nature of their intentional objectivity? This reflection is dialectical in nature – i.e., intentional subjectivity is both a reflection and not a reflection of that intentional objectivity entertained by that subject (as should be notated in their existential description expressed hypothetically through their existential descriptor which can only in part represent/mis-represent a minute fraction of the unique sense of that specific identity). In our understanding of the dialectical nature of identity we must both “eat our cake and have it!” In effect, what ever is specified in good faith must be qualified. Let me illustrate this natural complexity of identity as engage in the Life-World recognizing that all simplistic ascription of identity and the thematization of its valid phenomenal-phenomenological imputation in conventional terms of reference essentially overlooks the dialectical nature of that process of identification. Let me clearly illustrate this inescapable dialectical ineluctibleness of all phenomena. E.g., I like to drink coffee, so, that makes me a coffee drinker. But, when I am feeling ill I have often found my desire for a few cups of coffee that day is completely lost. Then, when I am feeling really ill my desire for tea goes as well along with an appetite for a hearty meal. So how can this be? – How can I be both a coffee drinker and not a coffee drinker? Of course the dialectical sting in this problem could be defused by saying that sometimes, if not most of the time, I can identify myself as a coffee drinker and at a few other times I will see myself as adverse to its bitter taste. But, then, if this type of scoping was conducted in regard to every form of identity, every form of intentional objectivity that could be entertained by myself, what informative function would such a complex process of identification have in its ‘definition’ of myself. Maybe in the light of this complex description, like being on both sides of the net in a tennis match, I am merely a bundle of prejudices and privileges, preferences and a definitive set of provisional descriptions that would under no reasonable circumstance could ever truthfully describe myself (like misrepresenting my country of birth, obvious gender, acquisition of certain skills and all those features currently judged inapplicable to describe me/ascribe to myself such as e.g., speaking fluent Chinese, having visited America, having assets worth one billion Australian dollars, etc., etc.)? But, then, would it not be right to say that I am not merely a very complex description, something that can be reduced merely to a set of descriptions? Again, because now I might desire a very strong coffee this very morning this does not imply that I will desire the same just before retiring tonight? On the other hand, our dialectical relationship with our own intentional objectivity cannot escape this process of simultaneous identification and non-identification. I might desire to drink some strong coffee now that does not make me ‘just a coffee drinker’ (since when I am sick I do not like to drink the same!)! But, on balance I am more of a coffee drinker than a non-coffee drinker – certainly not being a coffee drinker before retiring for the night as I have found it keeps me awake all night! But a drinker of coffee till just after the finishing an evening meal that is not too close to my intended hour of retiring. So, there is some merit in this style of interpreting this dialectical description? No! What is implied here is that I am both the same as the intentional objectivity as intended and not the same as that intentional objectivity as intended at the very same time, moment by moment! Matters of time and space, existential uniqueness, relevance and accuracy of historical context have nothing to do with this vision of the dialectical (in terms of a process of resolution in terms of a qualified scoping of the oppositional factors contributing to that state of an apparent dialectical contradiction). I am arguing that I am both the same as the nature of those intentional objectives experienced by me as an agent and, at the same time, etc., not the same as those objectivities in those intentional process that re-produced such ‘objectivities’. In this asking for my cake to eat and hoping to still have that piece of cake on my plate after eating it surely we are asking for the impossible? Yet, is it not the case that in a transcendental suspension we can entertain both negative and positive positions simultaneously in a certain context in the same period of time. Would it not be the case that when I ask a well-form and meaningful question I am entertaining what both might and might not qualify in the proffering of the answer to such a problem? “Is this a cup of coffee?” placed before me correctly reads “is it the case or is it not the case that this is a cup of coffee placed before me?” “Is this cup of coffee still hot?” – could be read as “is it the case that this cup of coffee can be considered by myself as still hot or not hot?” Answering the second question with a “yay’ or a “nay” in effect answers the first question in the affirmative (since the second question is presuppositionally dependent upon an affirmative answer to this first question). Feeling that cup or sipping from it should put us in a position of being able to answer that second question – “yes, it is still hot but not that hot that I cannot yet drink it” or “no, it is now too cold for me to drink this cup of coffee as I do not like to drink it when it is tepid or cold.” In a disjunctive suspension of the either/or, as entertained in the asking of a question, we must be able to entertain the dialectical nature of that disjunction. The same type of dialectical situation arising in the formulation and/or interpretation of a well-formed metaphor(ical analogical parallelization of the world)? Metaphor operating through the exercise of a properly formed conjunctive suspension (where ‘like’ is treated as ‘both like and not like’).  That granted, then we must ask how could we possible think? Or, knowing what we do about the dialectical nature of the hermeneutic circle, perhaps we should ask how could we apparently be seen to think outside this dialecticalization of the Life-World? Again, this dialecticalization granted, how are we to understand our relationship with the entertainment of our own intentional ‘objectivity’ in so far as I have argued that they both dialectically define us and don’t define us? (293)

	Importantly, let us deal with this question - what relationship is borne by the simulated nature of our intentional objectivity to the nature of the Life-World itself? Is it not the case, through the collapse of the representationalistic ‘hyper-empirical’ ‘non-vision’ of the world, that because there is no so-called ‘inner world(s)’ and no so-called ‘outer world(s)’ then would it not be the case that we have an absolutely direct relationship with this one-World-of-Life through those very objective acts of intentionality themselves, that in essence, we should rhetorically ask “is it not the case that those intentionally entertained objects in this World-of-Life are those very same objects in this World-of-Life as entertained by-us?” (294)

	To some extent the Life-World should be viewed as an all embracing, open-ended hermeneutic circle (indeed the ‘mother of all hermeneutic circles’). Furthermore, all polarities perceived in and through such a ‘fundamental’ structuring of our epistemological and/or ontological privileging of experience should be treated as only ‘ideal’, i.e., conventionally valid, to the extent that they can be conventionally evaluated, and, as absolutely non-existent, whilst, at the same time, characteristically manifested through an existential excess that cannot be reductively reduced to either the non-transcendentally non-absolute nor the transcendentally absolute or any other form of privileging (through the emptiness of all phenomena whether ‘viewed’ from so-called absolute points of ‘view’ or so-called non-absolute points of ‘view’ [or an existential conjunction/dis-junction of the same]). With such qualifications in mind one should therefore realize that it is through this existential excess that the World-of-Life is a world of simulation maintained in its apparent continuity through re-simulation to the extent that such a process of re-iteration still applies. So, as re-simulation is only a simulation of simulation we can entertain no form of a pre-simulated ‘reality’. That reality-that-is-there-for-us is forever an edition, a re-edition and never something ‘pre-edited’! Such processes of realization in their judgment may be experienced momentarily and immediately in reality such an effect is an artifact of a process of comprehension hence mediated immediacy or immediate mediation. Because there can be no external worlds, etc., therefore all experience is experienced in a direct fashion. Furthermore, through engaging this existential excess and the fact that it is constituted by-us for-us in and through the necessary transcendental implication of the ‘other’ and its automatic utilization there of the meta-textual invocation of genre, etc. Hence, our relationship with our own intentional productivity is both dialectically constitutive of our own egological sense of being-in-the-world-with-others. The centre of this egological sense of self coinciding with the overall psychic centre of ‘ourselves’ as a complex embodied agent in this World-of-Life. The existential descriptor of this living embodiment being unique through the uniqueness of an overall psychic centre despite an absolute lack of boundaries and an absolute sense of being-with-others in a world that can never be absolutely transparent but which, for all that, can never be opaque! Thus, in this dialectical fashion our intentional productivity both constitutes us and does not quite constitute us! That, in the final analysis/synthesis, the ineluctable expression of our ‘own’ self, as engaged in this world, must equally escape us (through the emptiness of all phenomenological-phenomena and the non-reductive nature of this existential excess that has already edited this world for us….). (295)

	What are the ramifications of an acceptance of a dialectical state of affairs that cannot be defused through a qualified scoping (through the invocation of temporal qualifications, spatial segregations, shifts in perspective, etc.)? We are what we think and we cannot be identified merely with what we think! We can be identified with our intentional objectivities (since in our phenomenal-phenomenological constitution we find ourselves reflected in that constituted process and thence their constitution of us by virtue of this process of constitution by-us) and, at the same time, we cannot be identified with the same through the inability of merely conducting a process of reductive identification (along with a loss of ego-identification). Through an inability to make an absolute identification, effectively, we are left with a dialectical residue, i.e., a dialectical difference! Furthermore, through an inability to conduct a process of absolute reduction (i.e., analysis) or synthesis, effectively, we are also left with a dialectical residue, i.e., a dialectical difference! A qualified identification can be made but not an absolute one. Similarly, a qualified reduction or a qualified synthesis can be conducted but never in an absolute form or format! In practical reality, it would appear, the existential richness of reality cannot be intentionally ‘captured’ and ‘expressed’ through mere processes of reduction, synthesis and/or identification. By declaring ‘x is a’ and qualifying this by stating that ‘x is not just a’ with the implication that ‘x is also not-a’, without any form of a qualified dialectical scoping, we are essentially witnessing or recognizing the ineluctable reality to ultimately defy all processes of absolute reduction, synthesis and/or identification. That, practically, the territory of the overall transcendental suspension cannot be absolutely defined even though its can be ‘lived’ in the full existential richness of its phenomenality, i.e., experienced as a simulation of reality in and through the reality of its simulation (through re-simulation). That this dialectical difference can be defined as that ineluctable reality that cannot be defined after being treated to an overall transcendental suspension (and that treatment ‘in turn’ subjected to an overall transcendental suspension, etc.) . As the full suspension is essentially the combination of affirmative and non-affirmative suspensions it could be ‘defined’ as:

d.d. = “is ‘both x is a and x is not-a’ & is not ‘both x is a and x is not-a’”. (296)

	As an overall suspension has been defined as a combination of a metaphorical conjunctive suspension and a rhetorical dis-conjunctive suspension perhaps the above should more correctly be read along the same lines, i.e.(?):

	d.d.1 = “‘x is both a and not-a’ & ‘x is either a or not-a’”. (297)

	Is there a real difference between these two equation in the light of this topic of dialectical difference? To the extent that what ever formula is adopted it is the case that neither can absolutely define this dialectical difference? On the other hand, this semblance of difference can only be intellectually approached whereas in our engagement with reality (through its engagement with us) it can be existentially lived and, wherein, through its total appropriation of ourselves, it can display itself through us, through the passage of our existence as we trace our course across this World-of-Life! Would it not be correct to say that through the apparently unique facticity of the relationship, also as an embedded relationship, that this resolution of the relationship that re-produces that relationship itself expresses this sense of being embodied in that exact manner, albeit from its own unique point of view in this World-of-Life? (298)

	The ramifications of our recognition of dialectical difference are vast! For a start we are given a philosophical perspective that accepts the fact that emergent reality cannot be reductively dismissed! Indeed, through such dialectical immaterialism we are proffered the means for accepting and recognizing that this world also has a spiritual dimension wherein emergent ‘realities’ are allowed to operate without their reductive disappearance and, thereafter, being conveniently ‘overlooked’. Of course, how such a ‘dimension’ is cashed out is something to be left to the philosopher, theologian, etc. (299)

	 How can we visualize this ‘dimension’, this sphere of the dialectically immaterial, this ‘realm’ of the possibly spiritual? One could refer to intentionality as the discharge or extension of a process of resolution realized through a chaotic change of state put in play through a chaotic transition or set of transitions in and through the embodiment of that intentional subject. Hence our concern for a consequential analysis of the intentional process in its appropriate context (as determined through processes of re-presentational representation). Non-intentional processes being perceived and interpreted as the persistence of fully determined laws of nature (that ideally could be expressed through linear equations), or, as processes of physicalistic or materialistic inertia wherein static frames of reference persist unless disrupted and non-static frames of reference ideally persist in a linear fashion unless also perturbed. In our passage through this World-of-Life one would normally assume a level playing-field without any forms of chaotic disruption until chaotic and/or intentional forces perturb this idealistic, simplistic interpretation of the so-called natural world, a relatively ‘unruffled’ world that cannot escape its encampment in a chaotic world. (300)

Let me illustrate what is taken for granted here – a non-complex world that one could regard as home and be happy to live there despite putting our reasonable fears to the side and suspending both our fears and our reception of this world as ‘unshakable’. Imagine, if you would, that we were playing a simple game of billiards or pool. In this situation it is taken for granted that we expect the balls to follow fully determinate rules of physics and subjected only to inevitable processes of resistance (despite these manoeuvres being intentionally engineered by the two protagonists). Imagine our surprise if these balls were to speed up, or pass effortlessly through each other, or were found bifurcated into a set of balls that recombined moments later, or slowed down when moving towards the centre of the table, or stopped suddenly, or went backwards for a few moments, or jumped up off the table or like draughts jumped over each other for no obvious reason, certainly not in a fashion intended by those players. (301)

	Let me now examine briefly the relationship between dialectical difference and theological difference. The latter was defined as the difference between a vision of the world (read Life-world) as possessing some sense of the divine and a vision of the world without any vision of the divine. However, from this simple concept it was given a dialectical interpretation to the extent that it was argued that there can be no vision of the world without some residual sense of the divine. The mere ‘perception’ of the world as ‘one’ world, e.g., supplied enough grounds for a theological interpretation to be plausible, i.e., possible. From the ‘mere’ plausibility of such an interpretation we then dialectically argued for a residue that could never reside in a purely potential frame of reference hence its actualization in some form or other. Effectively, we are adopting here a dialectical argument that states no potential interpretation of the world can be treated as merely potential and therefore must be actualized in some form or other to some extent or other. The sting, however, is in this qualification since the world could be interpreted as possessing only a residual sense of the theological without any real religious significance or consequences for the religious person. In a similar manner I have argued that in a dialectical frame of treatment we do not allow ourselves to merely reduce our interpretation to a simple, non-ambivalent form or format, i.e., therein denying the possibility of a merely reductive, synthetic and/or identificational stance or practice to be adopted except in highly qualified and biased conventional terms of reference, in effect ‘overlooking’ such qualification or the real need for the same in our simplistic, idealized treatment of the world. In both investigations we have positively invested these regions of the dialectical difference and of the theological difference with a rich, existential domain of significance that can be experienced directly (to some extent or other?) but which cannot be directly alluded to intellectually (since to represent its re-presentation would be to automatically mis-represent the same [as argued on numerous occasions elsewhere] until some degree or aspect of that mis-representation itself is recognized as a mis-representation {through its own mis-representation in turn, etc.}] ?)! (302)

	Intentional expression is the realization of intentional objectivities. Conducted in and through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle, from the point of an overall transcendental suspension, intentional expression must also involve the ongoing realization of a sense of self in keeping with the nature of such objectivities. E.g., I see x means I am also a person who can see x-type situations. The inference of this genre of ‘x-type situations’ also implies the imputation of an intersubjective aspect or dimension. As intentionality is only realized in a field of consciousness the imputation of a field context is a transcendentally necessary feature and hence implies the transcendental necessity of an intersubjective dimension since the latter can only be established in the context of an intersubjective process of interaction. With this transcendental argument to hand should we not insist, hypothetically, that divine intentionality must follow the same transcendentally necessary process-patterns of subjective-intersubjective enstructuralization, etc? Assuming the necessary phenomenal-phenomenological instantiation of the divine in some manner or other to some degree or other implies that the divine, as the Divine (through its greater degree of epistemological organization) must implicate the imputation of an intersubjective dimension, i.e., as implying that the dimension of the Divine must also be intersubjectively divine in some manner or other to some degree or other. The apparent and given unity of the Life-World (in some manner or other to some degree or other also) implying that the Divine can never be absolutely self-integrated and isolated, hence, in this respect, the theologian, etc., must confront the transcendental necessity of a theological polytheism, albeit qualified since the transcendental unity of the Life-World must equally rule out absolutely independent, non-dependent theological entities as well! How such qualified identities overlap or not is a problematic issue that should be left to the theologian, etc., to formulate and examine although it should be argued that such an issue must be approached in and through a dialectical perspective. However, in such a perspective, in the light of the apparent, non-absolute unity of the Life-World, an absolute polytheism as a philosophy cannot be tenable! That, equally, an absolute monotheism is equally untenable! The ramifications of dialectical difference (in the sphere of theological difference) being considerable, as already noted, being also a critical, controlling force in the investigative formulation and examination of a potentially viable theological-philosophy. (303)

	Hence intentional expression, on the level of Divine intentionality, must involve the positive non-metaphysical imputation of a qualified theological polytheism and the negative imputation of  non-metaphysical, non-absolute theological monotheism. Furthermore, the same kind of transcendental argument(s) also implies that Divine intentionality must also entertain, directly or indirectly, other non-Divine subjects, namely, people on the grounds that a religion can only be transcendentally viable if and only if the Divine-is-there-for-us. That through non-absolute non-reciprocity, i.e., the invariable reciprocity of all relationships in some manner or other to some extent or other, the Divine must also be able to entertain other forms of subjectivity such as human subjectivity, etc. Furthermore, the necessary presence of a transcendental field also implies the necessity implication of non-subjectively oriented components and hence the necessary implication of non-subjective aspects of the world. All such processes of interaction finding their resolution and intentional formulation, etc., in the non-absolute unity of the Life-World! How these processes are to be put into effect and formulated, etc., again, being the province of the theologian, philosopher, concerned lay-person, etc. (304)

	Given, hypothetically, our current position just argued for with respect to Divine intentional formulation and Divine intentional expression and the involvement of the latter with human agency in some manner or other to some extent or other the theologian, etc., now have hypothetical religious grounds for investigating reciprocal processes of theological interaction. Let me now sketch out, in general hypothetical terms of reference, some of the issues associated with this type of topic involving non-divine reception of the Divine and the non-divine response towards the same. These investigations tentatively exploring the general nature of the hypothetical dimension of (an imputed) theologically-oriented religious experience. (305)

	Let me now briefly outline a hypothetical ontology of intentional objectivity from the point of view of the relatively Divine. In the light of the above this ontology should recognize, if only hypothetically, the following possibilities, namely, objective representation/re-presentation of the relatively Divine, the relatively non-divine and relatively non-subjective, non-agental forms of objectivity. With the first category we need to note the hypothetical sub-possibilities of Divine self-identity, intersubjective forms of Divinity, Divine institutions and relatively basis/bases of the ‘Divine Assembly’, etc., i.e., all aspects of Divinity considered both collectively and pre-conditionally, etc. W.r.t. the category of the relatively non-divine we should include individual non-divine agent, non-divine, non-human forms of agency, and all institutions developed by the former two categories. Lastly, w.r.t. non-agental forms of objectivity we should note specifically focused upon particular forms of non-subjectively oriented identity, and general forms of non-subjectively oriented identity (as genres of activity, objectivity, etc.). Next, we should note the hypothetical implication of epistemological privileging, ontological privileging and a collective epistemological-ontological privileging as found involved in our articulations of the current styles of objectivity being focused upon. Lastly, we should also note a conventional-absolute distinction along the lines of a relative non-transcendental approach versus an absolute (non-absolutist) transcendental approach. Let me now briefly examine these various hypothetical categories of Divine objectivity, i.e., the possible types of intentional objectives that could be entertained by the relatively Divine. We should also note the qualified, non-absolutist interpretation of intentional objectivity to the extent that we should recognize the sense of the non-intentional facets of intentional objectivity since objectivity is but the privileging of one out of three poles of polar-discrimination that also dealing with aspects of subjectivity, field-contextuality besides aspects of objectivity. Moreover, intentional objectivity should also know its ‘place' in the total scheme of things since it can only be ‘extracted’ and ‘focused’ upon in the collectivity of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension in and through its ‘identity’ with the Life-World itself (regardless of whether we note or do not note a theological complexion in our philosophical dealings with the same!). (306)

	This scheme may seem arcane but in its attempt to be both relatively exhaustive and open-ended I have sketched out the various options a theologian would need to argue for or against. In this scheme we ‘look’ at intentional objectivity from the point of the Divine, albeit, of course, in hypothetical terms of reference. Essentially we are looking at three basic categories, namely, intentional objectivity that re-presentationally represents forms of divine agency, non-divine forms of agency and processes whose content need not be interpreted as agental or subjective in any significant sense. All else is a qualification of the same. Qualifications taking the three basic styles or forms, namely the form of that which is content-oriented (within these three basic classifications as briefly noted above), aspectivally-oriented with respect to epistemological and/or ontological framing (in the context of the phenomenological-phenomenal spectrum), and, critically-oriented (with respect to a non-transcendental and/or transcendental ‘reading’ of that apparent situation). Let me examine our first perspective in some detail. (307)

	In our first style of a content-orientation we examine, in general terms of reference, certain possible types of intentional objective as entertained hypothetically from the point of view of Divine agency (considered in general terms of reference). Our three basic classifications, as noted, dealing with a variety of divine agency in some form or other, a variety of non-divine forms of agency, and, a variety of non-agentally construed forms of objective identity. Objectivity could be defined as that intentionally focused on and distinctively discriminated therein in that degree of internal and/or external modal richness as both found and as called for (genre-wise). With respect to the first class we could summarize a relatively exhaustive, open-ended list by noting the following sub-categories, namely, Godhead, self-identification, intersubjective forms of divinity and divine institutions (through the congregation of various forms or aspects of divinity [e.g., the Gods of Olympus, the Trinity, etc.]). With respect to the second class we could summarize a relatively exhaustive, open-ended list by noting the following sub-categories, namely, non-divine human institutions, non-divine human interactions, non-divine non-human forms of subjectivity. With respect to the third class we could summarize a relatively exhaustive, open-ended list by noting the following sub-categories, namely, topics that are ahistorical versus historical; past, present and/or future; micro-physical and/or macro-physical treatment of events, etc. (308)

	Our second style of qualification concerns aspectivally-oriented information with respect to epistemological and/or ontological framing (in the context of the phenomenological-phenomenal spectrum). To put it in non-refined language  - are we dealing with physical and/or mental states. To some extent one could go through a dictionary and sort words into either physically or materially oriented language items and/or non-physically or mentally oriented language items. E.g., the tenor of this paragraph is markedly towards the latter with our preoccupation being with the intentional constitution of intentional objectivity (whereas any mere concern for the latter would more likely be materially oriented, i.e., concentrating on the object-like nature of intentional objectivity). This is an important distinction and stops us from confusing these two distinctive, but obviously interrelated, spheres of operation (being unified through the operations of the hermeneutic circle, the [non-metaphysical imputation]of a qualified dialectical (self-)unity of the Life-World, etc.). (309)

	Our third style of qualification concerns critically-oriented information with respect to how we write out our representation of such phenomenal-phenomenological constitution as interpreted as being found under our currently presented and/or re-presented review. Essentially, we are discerning such constitution as found to hand from either within a critically conducted transcendental suspension or a relatively non-critically treated transcendental suspension wherein pre-judged forms of privilege (appropriately and/or inappropriately) bought to bear upon that represented constitution under review are not counter-balanced, etc. A critical perspective, as conducted under the auspices of an appropriate, proper and valid overall transcendental suspension, allowing the constitution of that under review ‘to better speak for itself’. A critical reading presenting a transcendental reading of that phenomenal-phenomenological situation under review. (310)

	These three styles of qualification effectively present three overlapping aspects on the execution of our research. Although they can be focused upon individually, correctly, they are in effect co-present. The overall transcendental suspension is forever present to some degree or other regardless of whether our research is conducted in the natural attitude or critically in the transcendental attitude. This implies that all forms of conventional reading has some degree of validity, and an (existential) authenticity, by virtue of this (phenomenal-phenomenological) transcendental core (in the constitution of that objective or set of objectives as interpreted in their context of phenomenal-phenomenological presentation/re(-)presentation). Hence the natural attitude is also the conventional attitude through being the specification of meta-textual conventions (and as such is either valid or non-valid, in part or in whole, in those conventional terms of reference). It also should be noted that no transcendental reading could be conducted without reference to the conventional, and vice versa! Hence a doctrine of two truths must be co-mutually invoked at this point in this regard, i.e., a more basic transcendental reading in conjunction with a relatively non-transcendental natural or conventional reading. In this practice there is an obvious allusion here to Buddhist philosophy as expounded by Nagarjuna, etc. However, such an allusion need not be noted on the grounds that a recognition of the pre-conditional necessity of prejudgments/prejudices to act as the ‘material’ for transcendental reflection within the exercise of the overall transcendental suspension co-mutually demands this co-mutual paralleling of the conventional and the transcendental. This topic will be examined in closer detail later in this essay when dealing with the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of truth and authenticity as it applies to all forms of discourse, practice and critique regardless of their intended theological complexion or non-theological complexion. (311)

	Let us now examine the third and fourth of our hypothetical categories dealing respectively with non-divine intentional reception of the Divine and non-divine intentional response directed towards the Divine. As a first observation we could note that the subjectivity of the Divine treated as an intentional objective need not imply the existence of the former. A child, in trying to unravel the place of a pagan influenced concept of Father Xmas might confuse the nature and reality of such an entity and believe that one could direct ones prayers and petitions towards the same. The child forms the intention that one could direct ones prayers and petitions towards the same and duly does so. Later this child discovers, to their dismay, that Father Xmas was only a myth devised by adults to delude children into thinking, among other things, that gifts from their parents, etc., were given by this mythic character, etc. Here we have a concrete example of the problem of reference. How could Father Xmas be the intentional object of a child’s intentions and yet not exist (outside a world of mythology). Then, again, why should it be a problem? People are always forming certain expectation to find that many of those expectation are not fully met. So, in the light of our topic, how are people going to know when they pray to the Divine that they have an actual object to direct their prayers and petitions to, and, that the same will be received by the Divine and acted upon…? (312)

	They don’t know… indeed, need not know! The existence of the intentional objective, namely the Divine, is irrelevant as an ingredient in the process of petition and/or prayer! A neutral bystander might even surmise that any apparent success of such a procedure may well arise from the intentional subject being able to form a clear idea of what they particularly need and therein setting themselves up to more likely meet with its successful engagement through its facilitated formulation, recognition and realization. Thus, one must accept the fact that the reality of the presence or absence of the Divine is essentially irrelevant in the adoption and performance of this type of practice. So, not knowing for sure that the Divine exists, could be an intentional objective that can be petitioned or prayed to and is capable of answering those petitions and /or prayers, one must wonder why the religious person who adopts this type of religious practice often feels it worth their while having performed such a process. As already noted it may well be merely a successful method to assist us in the formulation of our intentional needs and in the process assist us in meeting eventually with the same. Whether the end-objectives of those reasons that motivate this type of practice are met or not it still behooves the theologian acting on the behalf of this type of religious person to ask “is there a Divine ‘entity’ who could receive the emission of those prayers or petitions, etc?” The critical philosopher or theologian, on the behalf of these people, asking “does the Divine exist and what form or forms does it manifest its sense of ‘self’ in this World-of-Life. Indeed, what evidence is there that the Divine could, e.g.,, receive messages in the form of prayers and, then, find themselves in a position to positively act on the same, etc? In effect, what evidence is there for this imputed phenomenon of Divine intervention, etc. In our examination of the reception (of the Divine) and response (towards the Divine) (and the general concept of providence) let me tentatively explore some hypothetical models that the theologian, etc., might wish to adopt and elaborate in their thematization and clarification of these theoretical aspects of this kind of religious practice. (313)

	For a start, how can something that possessed a higher degree of epistemological organization and exercised a degree of subjectivity in keeping with such characteristics also positively enter into the world in such a manner so as to change the course of history in an intentional manner? Very easily! Ourselves as such entities move through the world in such a manner. When I walk the dog we have an instance of this disparity in epistemological organizational status. Another example would be that of a mother and her nurturing of her infant charge. How can such relationships be accounted for given their considerable degree of disparity? One mechanism that could be invoked is that of a responsive empathy finely attuned to the needs of the less epistemologically organized party or parties by the party or parties of higher epistemological status. Here, under such circumstances, it might seem that a certain proscribed freedom is given to the lesser party to manoeuvre within those circumscribed limits. E.g., in walking the dog I might detach the leash from their collar on the understanding that the dog will safely enjoy this degree of increased ‘freedom’ within certain pre-defined limits. In the park the dog is allowed to wander but is not allowed to leave, e.g. This practice having been consistently reinforced the dog soon knows that limits are being pushed when they start to head out of the park because when you yell their name, or whistle, they immediately ‘correct’ their trajectory and return to the ‘confines’ of the park. (314)

	In trying philosophically to understand the relationship a loving mother normally has for her infant charge we need to note phenomenologically what practices are adopted and adapted that allow this disparity in epistemological organization between the same to be, in time, effectively overcome. Usually, this is no philosophical problem for the mother. In being a mother she loves the child and through that loving empathy successfully nurtures it. Now, one interpretation of a resolution of this artificial problem is to argue that both mother and child, in the epistemological organization of their being, on more basic levels of organization are equally rooted in this same World-of-Life. Both are embodied and similarly embodied. What differences there are being only differences in human potential; differences that at that very moment of time are currently being diminished or found headed towards a time when they too will most likely be overcome in a later stage of development. Between both these types of phenomenal entity, ‘mothers’ and their ‘infant charges’, there is only a difference of epistemologically organized potential and not an absolute difference in distinctive ‘actuality’. Indeed, the more basic constitution of their psyche being organized in an identical fashion. Within such a commonality such potential differences in degree, as present and expressed on higher levels of epistemological organization, being progressively diminished through the ongoing nurturing of those children. Those potential differences, thus, being progressively diffused through the ongoing development of those similar faculties and through the social acquisition of similar skills that propel the child through those stages on the path that allow them to reach a full adulthood and thence the relative independence that goes with that degree of epistemological status. This successful process of nurturing taking place in a similar epistemological environment that both allows for the mother to loving empathize with her charge and for her charge to equally bond with their mother on the basis of this common denominator, namely, the same fundamental manner that both are projected from a natural, materially-oriented world into a conventional, socially-oriented world of a being-with-others before-others. In effect, a process of transformation, despite an inequality of power and status, that is allowed to occur on the same pre-conditional grounds of our being rooted in this one shared World-of-Life within, normally, the same basic dispositions of our embodiment. Furthermore, the powerful presence of certain genres of activity in this social world normally ensures that this degree of developing equality is usually both striven for and realized. (315)

	Another way of understanding the overcoming of this disparity in epistemological organization between parties possessing radically different degrees in epistemological status is to perhaps invoke a metaphorical concept like a substructural induction downwards and a teleological upwelling upwards (where these terms ‘up’ and ‘down’ merely parallel the relative degree of epistemological complexity currently enjoyed or suffered by those disparate parties). E.g., the wind ripples the surface of the lake, induces a wave-like motion to ripple across its surface. Seeds and shoots seek the light and move upwards towards the same without any real teleological understanding as to why this intentional-like ‘behaviour’ is adopted, in the process also branching outwards to capture even more of this sunlight. I would also like to invoke here a third metaphor that covers this disparity from both points of view, i.e., that between the minor and major parties, namely, that of a two dimensional shadow being cast by a three dimensional body upon the two dimensional surface of that shadowed surface. The shadow somehow encapsulates the three dimensionality of the body causing that shadow. In effect, the shadow isomorphically ‘translates’ the three dimensional character of that body into two dimensional terms of reference. Hence an imperfect isomorphism is allowed to function between the ‘three dimensional’ body and the ‘two dimensional’ surface by virtue of this ‘translation’. Let me now briefly examine these three metaphors that might offer the theologian a method for explaining how this epistemological divide might be traversed by both parties, i.e., the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine. (316)
	
	Intentionality, or intentional-like behaviour, as previously argued demands a chaotic transformation in the embodiment of a certain state of affairs that duly expressed that change in intentional pre-disposition. Hence the need for a consequential analysis that can recognize these necessary chaotic transitions that underpin this process of ‘intentional transition’. Hence also the need for an interpretative frame of reference that can recognize these intentional transitions as qua ‘intentional’ or ‘intentional-like’. In this context induction acts downward on lower levels of epistemological organization, and, upwelling acts upwards. Both process directions only being effective in their sub-induction or super-projection of ‘intent’ given the necessary chaotic preconditions that will allow these processes to take effect on the differential grounds of such chaotic re-positioning. As an analogy it is bit like a fighting force, inferior in numerical strength, on finding the guards protecting the encampment of the larger force to be asleep, used their successful, undetected infiltration of that encampment to sack and successfully rout that encampment. In other words, when the preconditions are appropriate a chaotic transition can then be instigated. Similarly, our use of these two concepts of induction and upwelling being constructed to operate in a similar manner. (317)

	In our analogy of the shadow we are constructing a model for viewing the presence of the Divine presence, however, such ‘evidence’ can only be evidential when validly inserted into an interpretative scheme that can identify that type of phenomenon and thence interpret that aspect of that phenomena in keeping the with nature of that discrimination. Such interpretation can be regarded as conventionally ‘valid’ when it properly and appropriately conforms to the descriptions/proscriptions as demanded by that interpretative scheme. On the other hand, whether such ascriptions of Divinity are universally valid, across a number of validly constructed interpretative frames of reference, remains to be seen, in effect, demanding ‘extra-territorial’ terms of reference in order to accomplish that transition in understanding(?). (318)
	
	Another image has also been implied when we examined the asymmetric power-relations between mother and child, namely, a commonality of embodiment and, therein, an equivalent sharing of a basic instantiation in this World-of-Life. In a theological frame of reference it would be a bit like saying that in the ‘metaphorical body’ of the Divine there is, on a more basic level of being in this world, some degree of a mutually shared isomorphism upon which to base some degree of rapport and influence? (319)

	For the theologian, religious philosopher, concerned congregationalist, etc., the interpretation of evidence as evidence of the Divine is a bit like looking for an unlit candle in the dark without being able to make contact with the same that would allow us to determine the presence of that candle by other means such as touch, smell, induction, testimony, etc. It is as if there is a double black box phenomenon in play. E.g., when I lift my arm up and touch my nose I obviously know how to perform this intention both virtually and non-virtually. So, I think the thought of raising my arm and I then raise my arm as a consequence of this intent. But, I have no idea of the complex neuro-physiology involved in the commission of this intentional act. Still, this does not stop me from visualizing and completing this intentional act. On the other hand, we seem to be doubly divorced from being able to determining the reality of our religious interpretations since not only is the nature of the Divine seemingly unknown to us; all evidence of the same is equally inoperable since we have no knowledge of what the Divine is that could then allow us to make progress in this direction? Yet, the pursuit of the Divine is not a task that lacks value (as these investigations have already shown). So in the definitive resolution of this ‘paradox’ let us continue in our investigations and determine if the theological type of project works/does work and re-produces a degree of value considerably beyond that invested? Still, I raise my arm and yet don’t know how this is achieved, only that I know how to raise my arm. So, although a detailed understanding of the full complexity of the world must forever escape me some of the integral simplicity seen in this world can still be revealed to me. Indeed, this is how metaphor operates (through a differentiation of same-and-similar in the context of an integration-of-the-different).  So, perhaps we have here a possible avenue of approach to this extent that through the use of analogical devices not only is the nature of the world revealed to me, but, that the nature of the Divine might also reveal itself/be revealed in some manner or other (through the metaphoring of metaphor?)? Hence the need to re-examine the symbolic power of relatively integrated symbolic constructs in an attempt to evaluate to what degree they can also mirror a richer existential appreciation of a shared phenomenal-phenomenological reality. Like shadows these devices, properly and appropriately set-up, could reveal an isomorphically invariant translation of the same capable of being comprehended in conventional terms of reference, albeit qualified to the extent that those representations, in process, are accepted as always mis-representing the same whilst that process of mis-interpretation, in turn, is mis-interpreted, validly re-presented (and not merely represented in valid conventional terms of reference whose validity is merely pre-constructed along a priori lines, etc.) through further ongoing processes of dialectical mis-(re-)presentation. Essentially, we are arguing here for a sensitive, open-ended philosophy that discerns and evaluates such interpretations from the points of view that realizes suitable existential surpluses of meaning and meaningfulness in their theological settings. In this, task therefore, the theologian needs to demonstrate that the work done by their re-interpretive theological schemes actually does theological work to the extent that a surplus of value is much greater than that being invested in such schematic constructs. (320)

In this brief discussion (on a theoretical understanding the nature and possible evidence of Divine intentionality) I have outlined some metaphorical mechanisms including the ‘careful’ use of metaphor itself, in general terms of reference, in which this type of discourse could be situated along with a sketch of some the considerable difficulties attendant upon such a task. Whether such a discourse is validly possible in the ‘reality of reality’ is another matter being more a topic the theologian needs to pick up and run with…. (321)

	As noted in the previous paragraph, however, such a discourse is still possible to conduct! That being the case such discourse, when properly, appropriately and validly conducted, is therein allowed to discourse on these concerns of theological identity or theological sense, theological work or theological meaning and theological value; collectively pooling such efforts in a critical search for theological Value as realized in the investigative course of its theological research. In this regard, on this topic of Divine intentionality from a hypothetical point of view, in the light of our tentative, transcendental research on the possible phenomenal-phenomenological nature of such a concept, we can summarize the following points, namely, that intentionality, Divine or otherwise, depends upon a chaotic transformation of embodiment with causal consequences best interpreted through the lens of a consequential analysis. Furthermore, the creation/re-creation of such an interpretative frame of reference needs to be constructed/re-constructed in such a manner to demonstrate a theologically-oriented dividend much greater than that merely invested in that type of enterprise. To this end such research also needs to properly attend to a dialectical dimension in the very formation and interpretation of the same since in any attempt to theologically interpret the world there is this demand, as with any other critical approach, to more closely observe this dimension of the dialectical as it enters into the formation of a validly conducted, critical appreciative understanding of our phenomenal-phenomenological being in this World-of-Life. To this end let me return now, therefore, to a more detailed examination of this dimension of the dialectical and its associated concept of dialectical difference as previously introduced. (322)

Let me now re-examine dialectical difference in a more systematic fashion! In this process let us ask what is it, how does it manifest this semblance of difference, why does it manifest the same, why do we ignore this more ‘fundamental’ world of the dialectical, what are its ramifications, what are its ramifications for theologians and their congregations… and for the non-theologically inclined? (323)

	Some people are of the opinion that the Law of Contradiction by itself establishes logic, i.e., x is either a or –a. But how do we know that x and a-likeness are compatible? Ask the bachelor “if he killed his wife?” and he can truthfully say neither “no” nor “yes”! To determine logical inherence, presuppositional compatibility of identities, predicates and relations, etc., we also need to invoke the equally ‘fundamental’ Principle of Identity, i.e., x = x (which being of type x-ness is compatible with a/-a); effectively, x = x iff x’ (i.e., identity x is truly equal to identity x if and only if the meta-textual translation of x is x’, i.e., where x correctly belongs to the class of x-ness). Moreover, ascriptions of a or –a can apply to this identity x iff x + a or x – a (i.e., x is x if and only if x either includes the ascription of a or lacks this same ascription of a; in other words: x = x is T iff (x +a/x – a)’. Here we have a semantic meta-textual tautological description of the truth of x on the grounds that x either possesses the characteristic of a or does not currently possess the same characteristic. Let me demonstrate this (dialectical) interaction between these Principles of Contradiction and Identity. (324)

	E.g., x is a cat that possesses either a (white fur) or –a (fur that is not white). Therefore x is a cat iff x is a or x is –a, i.e., x is a truly cat is T iff (x is a/-a)’. What we can see here is that these two principles effectively co-define each other. Supply identity and you have already invoked the Principle of Contradiction. Invoke the later and you have also invoked the former. Moreover, a semantic interpretation of truth also implicates a tautological ‘definition’ of ascription. Through this Principle of Identity we have the grounds for a scoped dialectics, e.g., my cup of coffee is now quite hot but soon will be cold (invoking a temporal scoping). It was on that table but I have now brought it out to drink on the balcony when it has cooled (invoking a spatial or geographical scoping). I had tea in this same cup for breakfast but now it has coffee (invoking a scoping of different identities at different times), etc. Moreover, we can also dialectically treat identity being careful to define each item. E.g., x is a cat and therefore is not a dog, but, being only a picture of a cat it is, therefore, not a real cat, etc. (325)

	The point of the above machinations is to show the dialectical nature of the interaction between these two principles and their co-mutual interdependence. Without a Principle of Identity contradiction cannot operate (even in merely general terms of reference since here we still possess the form of identity). Similarly, without a Principle of Contradiction identities could not be defined! However, the dialectical interaction indicated is only on a scoped level of interaction. E.g., the coffee in this cup ‘is’ both hot and cold but at different periods of time, etc. Now, I would like to demonstrate the ever present sense of a non-scoped dialectics on the level of the phenomenological formation of identity itself which is overlooked and substituted by shortsighted interpretation in this pursuit of a superficial logic that attempts to give a logical precedence or priority to either the Principle of Contradiction or the Principle of Identity. Let me explain what is meant here in our examination of the essential-phenomenal-phenomenological nature of logical experience (without resorting to a psychologistic interpretation of the experience of the logical through a reduction of the same to some form of psychological experience). (326)

	Various models can be invoked to describe (and prescribe) the phenomenology of meaning, e.g., the invocation of gestalt fields, the invocation of a hermeneutic circle, the implication of complex tautological semantic fields of meaning differentiation that cannot be conducted through absolutely definitive forms of demarcation…  (327)

	On a number of occasions elsewhere I have argued that in a gestalt field there is a dialectical relationship between that being focused upon and that background field being focused upon in the focusing of that focus. But, foreground is not background and in our phenomenological discernment of identity we are dialectically demarcating between the same. So if x is being focused upon then we are not focusing upon the background field of –x against which x acquires its sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e. its discerned value, etc. So, e.g., a cat is seen and in being seen we ‘see’ it also as not not-cat. So the cat is seen because the non-cat-ness is not seen and characteristic of cat-ness are also observed, say, the observation that this cat possesses white fur. But this process of demarcation is not an absolute affair because focus depends upon that being focused upon and that is supplied by the background field. The ongoing dialectical relationship here is this: focus is on the background field which cannot be absolutely differentiated from the area under focus. Too much focus and there is a loss of contrast. To much contrast (in our de-focusing ‘focus’ upon the background field) and there is nothing in effect being focused upon (in the foreground)! Hence:

		Nothing differentiated - no differentiation,
		Sheer differentiation -   nothing is differentiated!  (228)  

	The same thing could be translated to or from the context of a hermeneutic circle where value is determined through the relationship between parts (that under focus), totalities (that background field under general focus) and their (suspended) interaction (realized in and through this relationship between parts and wholes). (329)

	Value, thus, is determined dialectically, i.e., between relative parts and relative wholes, between that focused on and that in which there is this field of focus. The ramifications of this insight are immense and are ‘contained’ in a Principle of Dialectical Difference. (330)

How should we express this concept of dialectical difference? Adopting a first position of expression we can begin by stating that this principle is essentially formularized as: x is both x and –x; x is both p and –p; x is both r and –r, etc., where x is identity x, p = predicate p, r = relation r. In other words: a certain phenomenon P1 (in a first formulation) is both the sum of its expressions {x, p, r} and not the sum of {x, p, r}, i.e:

P1 = {x, p, r} + (-{x, p, r}) (331)

	However, this dialectical difference is more a dialectical excess since through emergence it is that ineluctable je ne sais quoi that we meet with in our engagement with a certain phenomenon and that all phenomena find themselves constituted with. Hence the adoption of a second position of expression, namely, a certain phenomenon P2 (in a second formulation) is that phenomenon P (in its excess) minus P1 (our first formulation of the same):

		P2 = P – [{x, p, r} + (-{x, p, r})] (332)

	But, again, we need to re-evaluate this formulation in the light of the fact that value is born in an overall transcendental suspension and therefore all processes of integration need to be differentiated and v.v. Hence a certain  P3 (in a third position of formulation) is the differentiation of P2, i.e:

P3 =  dx.P2 (333)

	So, in the light of the above what exactly then is this dialectical difference or, i.e., this dialectical excess? Should we not read, symbolically, as that P minus P3? I.e., a certain phenomenon in its full phenomenality minus its dialectical differentiation of its dialectical integration? I.e., in a (provisional) fourth position of expression:

		d.d. = P – P3 (334)

	Thus, although we are dealing with this phenomenon of dialectical difference we should also realize that this sense of difference is emergent and residual and not residual as found in a reductionistically oriented frame of reference. Indeed, quite the opposite is being explicitly implied! This dialectical difference is that dialectical excess that is engaged in our meeting with that phenomenon or set of phenomena that cannot be reduced to merely the difference between P as both x and not-x, etc! E.g., I am both my intentional thoughts and not my intentional thoughts and a certain something else that cannot be definitionally defined except through default or posited-negation, etc! That only by a process of ongoing dialectical treatment do we find ourselves heading towards the encountered ‘presence’ of that phenomenon under review (despite, and by virtue of, its intrinsic absence or emptiness). Hence we have here the equal existential presence and existential absence of that phenomenon under investigation (be those investigative terms of reference critical or non-critical in nature, transcendental or conventional, etc.). That, effectively, only through a process of ongoing recursive mis-representation is the simulation of that phenomenon effectively the re-simulated comprehension of that phenomenon in question. Of course, infinite recursiveness would never allow us to absolutely re-simulate the simulation hence the re-produced phenomenon can never absolutely represent that phenomenal simulation/re-simulation. However, our passage through this World-of-Life does not need this degree of apodictic precision in the re-production of our phenomenal-phenomenological presentations/re-presentations. In this we are ‘saved’ through a recognition of the essence of the phenomenal-phenomenological character of that phenomenal situation under review. In our direct engagement with the phenomenon to hand there is always this ongoing process of rectification in our coming to understand what we are dealing with. But like a process of communication this process of rectification is also a process conducted in and over a period of time. There being a need for us, in our passage through this Life-World, to mindfully be aware of these dialectical nuances in our appreciation of the phenomenal without also loosing or missing the immediate, overall, essential import of that phenomenon (since already stamped upon its phenomenological being, in our encountered reception, is an essential imprint where this sense of dialectical difference as a dialectical excess can be met and, in time, more fully engaged [teleologically] if not absolutely)! The point to be made here is that we are already on this path of an encounter and hence no phenomenon can be absolutely incommensurable just as no phenomenon, equally, can be found in an absolutely commensurable fashion! The pleasure of that metaphorical ‘journey’ being found, hopefully, in our passage between these two impossible polarities, moving from the former towards the latter! (335)

	As just argued above ( in paragraphs 324-330) I have been stating that a dialectical dimension is already present at the very centre of the logical itself. This can be translated into an epistemological dimension through a gestalt interpretation or an interpretation through the dialectics of the hermeneutic circle (without excluding a number of other models of explanation as to why we have the inescapable semblance of the dialectical as a relative foundation of the logical). In an ontological setting the same dialectical indeterminacy can be found in the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, the probabilistic functions of quantum mechanics, in the ‘perceiving’ a non-absolute determination of identity (itself a consequence of dialectical difference), etc. (336)

	Another way of approaching this topic is to realize the implications of representational theory, i.e., that representations must also mis-represent that of which they are meant to be a representation of (and not just as a mere re-presentation [even though the simulation of simulation through the re-presentation of presentation/re-presentation must to some extent also be a process of mis-representation, despite error correctional mechanism, which through continued mis-mis-representation, etc., in effect will defuse this tension of this sense of a representational difference {between the presentation and its ‘final’ re-presentational ‘representation’}]). If ascription x represents X (regardless of the phenomenological nature of X) that ascription is essentially ‘about’ X and, therefore, ‘is not’ X per se. This stands to reason as x is an ascription and X is that ascribed by x. Hence this dialectical difference in so far as x is both X and not-X. Similarly, X is both x and  not-x. Processes of identification, analysis and synthesis (regardless of the nature of those transformational operations) will all invoke this sense of a dialectical difference. However, through processes of meta-transformational re-treatment, mis-representational treatment/re-treatment, other forms of error correction, or just sheer overlooking or short-sighting of this process we find ourselves naturally assuming a conventional attitude re the same. Let me demonstrate this type of process. E.g., x represents X means we treat x as if it were X. In effect, we overlook the fact that x is only an ascription. Or, e.g., the title of a poem p represents the thematic nature of a poem P. But how can a title represent a poem when being about the poem it cannot be the poem per se. To illustrate this let me discuss the following title of my own poems. It was titled “The Professional Psychopath”. The poem was about a psychopath or sociopath who trashes the car of a friend for the sheer fun of it. Throughout the poem there is a refrain at the end of each verse “just a tramp passing through, a tramp making a pass and then just passing through…” At the end of the poem the first psychopath meets a second psychopath, they have an argument and the latter stabs the former with almost the same refrain, as noted, just slightly altered, ending that poem. Rhetorically interrogating the title of this poem we should ask “who is the professional psychopath?” referred to in that title. The answer should be that it was the second psychopath who was the professional psychopath not the first even though most of the poem dealt with the first psychopath. We only ‘meet’ the ‘professional psychopath’ in the last verse and hence more correctly (in the light of this suggested re-interpretation) we re-treat the first psychopath as ‘professional’ only in an ironic sense. By this process of interrogation we determine the nature of this mis-representation through re-entitling our understanding of it (and therein re-continuing this process of mis-representation). Why “professional?” What was the poem really about? A study in psychopathology? Merely the vehicle for a tricky title? And so could we ever arrive at a final interpretation..? Do we need to..? Surely our enjoyment in poetry is discovered ‘along the way’ and not in finding some final determinate interpretation as if in some Agatha Christie novel we need to know “who dunnit”…? (337)

	In this anecdote about this poem it was only after I had titled it did I realize that it could be understood in an ironic fashion as noted above. When I had titled that poem I was thinking about the first psychopath as the ‘professional psychopath’ and only in reflection on the mis-representational nature of titles did I realized its ironic potential. Indeed, that all ‘good’ titles have this ironic potential for mis-interpretation promoted in a addition to the mere fact that titles, by virtue of their very nature are titles ‘about’ the poem or text they entitle and not ‘that poem or text itself’ per se. Now, would this be the case if the first line of the poem was merely quoted as once was the practice in the citing of ancient texts? Yes! This mis-representational status is inescapable if not insurmountable. Just as titles are meta-textual additions to the text so too the beginnings of a text introduce us to that text and in this process of introducing us to its arguments, reasons for existence, setting the stage for its contents we find ourselves in exactly the same kind of situation, namely, find part of the text also acting ‘outside’ that same text in its entitling, introducing us to the nature of its textual existence (as an instance of a certain meta-textual genre, etc.), etc. The same applying to definitions inserted into a text and the formation of conclusions, codas, etc. Even the mere appendage of a first line as a title cannot escape this dialectical state of affairs when part of the text qua text is also operating outside that text (as a title, explanation, definition, conclusion, acting in a self-referential manner, joking about itself, commenting on its own textuality, etc., etc.). Hence this dialectical dimension and our experiencing of this kind of dialectical difference when, e.g., a title is both received as ‘a part’ of that text and ‘apart’ from that text in its role as a meta-textual insertion or appendage, etc. A title, e.g., is both ‘a part’ of that text and a meta-text standing ‘apart’ from that text to the extent that it is also ‘about’ that text. Being between these two aspects of textuality, the textual and the meta-textual, it arises through emergence as a dialectical difference, i.e., that which cannot be reduced to either the text or the meta-text nor their mere summation (since through emergence a new world is non-reductively realized through this gap between the textual and the meta-textual, etc! Indeed, as argued elsewhere, the non-textual experience arises from the relationship between the textual and the meta-textual and that, collectively, this realizes through the overall transcendental suspension the not-textual – in effect, acting as a bridge/bridging between ‘the world of the text’ and ‘the text of the world’)! (338)

	‘Reading’ this dialectical difference, indeed, our engagement with the same being the very act of reading itself, allows us to metaphorically view it both as an absence or difference and as a presence or excess! Hence its dialectical nature! Contrary to the mis-interpretations of certain post-modernist thinkers there is not just a process of sheer deferring but also a process of continual affirmation despite this equal ongoing annulment of that semblance of affirmation since deferment must be the deferment of something. That something too cannot be a mere some ‘thing’ since in its annulment absolute presence is denied just as much as absolute absence. Deferring is also a deferring to, in effect, a deferring to its own deferring. The experiential resultant of this process of dialectical deferring and affirming, deferring and affirming, etc., being the simulation of that simulation, i.e., the (e)valuation of that under such scrutiny. It is as if what is said is crossed out and that crossing out is crossed out in turn, even, at that same moment in time…! (339)

	In this affirmation of negation and this negation of affirmation is born the transcendental suspension. Through the balance of rhetorical questioning and metaphorical answering is born an overall transcendental suspension. In this state of balance and dynamic equilibrium is born the middle path, that dialectical path that takes us through the extremes between the extremes, since extremes are born as co-relatives and through their mutual interdependence neither extreme could be removed without destroying the illusion of the other. But wouldn’t this path of perfect balance be merely a recipe for perfect paralysis! Undoubtedly, if it were not for the fact that this suspension itself is, in turn, also suspended in and through the very act of repeating the very act of the suspension itself, from moment to moment, indeed, defining the very phenomenological limits of the sense of that ‘moment’ itself! In the suspension of the overall suspension intentional power is given both its semblance of existence and its intentional direction along with an asymmetrical sense of inequality as it discharges itself outwards from the apparent centre of that relationship. Although born in the overall transcendental suspension, power is a distinctive inequality expressing itself in and through our relationships. No power relations are symmetrical except perhaps in a rough approximation in a process of evening out if that is ‘called for’. But this obvious asymmetry is still manifested upon this symmetrical basis wherein a full reciprocity of forces creates and re-creates an overall suspension and whose resolve is then marshaled to be released as it manifests itself as that relational sense of resolve as expressed by that relationship in and through the psychic centre of that relationship through the disruption of that reciprocity. All relationships manifest with a semblance of a centre, contextually centred within a hierarchy of centres, and without true limits from each and every one of these centres, radiating power characteristic of each characteristically distinctive nature, to the ends of the known world even though that power itself is manifested with an effective sense of boundary through the resistance that relational environment has to the intentional-like outpourings of that relationship. This manifestation of power being more correctly read as ‘intentional’ when the epistemological organization of that associated relationship is as complex as that possessed by a conscious being, and, when experienced in a reflexive mode as complex as a conscious being, and, whose expression of power is as complex as a conscious being enabling that semblance of agency to act as an agent in this World-of-Life through the dialectical richness of being so obviously manifested in this sense of power therein expressed and received as such by others. Such a pattern being extended to mirror divine agency whose apparent non-intrinsic discharge of power equally traces itself out as causal consequences through the chaotic re-adjustments as enacted through the apparent centre(s) of its embodiment. The only ‘real’ difference, hypothetically, between the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine forms of being being expressed through a qualitative richness of dialectical difference manifesting itself as an excess of power. Only the richness of this dialectical excess privileging what is relatively Divine from the relatively non-divine. But, so much for theory as conducted within these parameters (for the real problem resides in the question “how is the theologian, etc., to discern from selected tracings traced out upon the world that the same are Divine in origin?”)!  (340)

	Let me now investigate a more precise formulation of what is entailed in this central concept of dialectical difference, and, what ramifications does it have in the context of a hypothetical, embodied sense of Divinity in the process paying respect to our theological concepts of identity, work and evaluation? (341)

	In a representational philosophy the representation of a textual and/or non-textual (re-)presentation is effectively a mis-representation by virtue of the fact that it is ‘about’ the text and not that text per se. Our coming to understanding how that textual representation misrepresents that textual state of affairs ensures that we are on the way to a defusing of that state of misrepresentation. In this process that which is ‘a part’ of that text is also ‘not a part’ of that text, and, also, in being ‘apart’ from that text is also ‘not apart’ from that text! Into this double dialectical difference is generated the emergent value of that textual-meta-textual relationship, namely, that which releases the existential meaningfulness of the non-textual, etc. So in the light of this analysis we could say of a title, e.g., that it is, altogether, a part of that text, not a part of that text, apart from that text and not apart from that text. That, between these dialectical modes the value of that textual aspect is dialectically generated. That into this dialectical ‘space’ is generated this aspect of textual value, namely, its textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness (the simulation, respectively, of its particular psychic location in our cultural/inter-cultural mapping of the Life-World; its general, meta-textual genre-orientation; and, its specific existential description). From the ongoing overall transcendental suspension of the hermeneutic circle and its ongoing momentary discharge of that same suspension is simulated the simulation that forms/informs that current process of intentionality. Into and through this dialectical ‘space’ we move through ‘the simulation of the world’ and ‘the world of simulation’ without reference to a so-called ‘external world’ or its conscious ‘representation’ in an ‘internal world’ of the ego! The semblance of ego is embodied not dis-embodied! Ego is only a privileging of a privileged perspective, namely, that perspective entertained by the subject by virtue of their embodiment. But the self is both ‘apart of this world of simulation’ and ‘a part from this world of simulation’, or, more correctly, ‘apart-in-and-a-part-from this World-of-Life’. Indeed, this dialectical relationship of the apart/a part as ‘an-apart-in-and-a-part-from’ the world of simulation and the simulation of the world forms/informs the very nature of the Life-World itself (for-us), being the non-foundational, dialectical ‘basis’ for the same! However, we treat the end-products of our conscious lives, when apparently ‘present’, as if absolutely transparent to perception and/or reflection when we, in truth, can only do this through an over-looking or short-sighting of the same! Truly, our being in this World-of-Life is a dialectical affair! The point of this argument being this – that our intentional existence(-with-others) is a dialectical affair and that we should neither have ‘over-looked’ this nor be ‘short-sighted’ about the same! That, in any examination of the world this understanding of the dialectical is central to our passage through this World-of-Life, and, that our appreciation of the hypothetical theological complexion of the same Life-World would proceed, indeed, must proceed precisely along this same avenue of the dialectical! So, in this light, let us look more closely at this dimension of the dialectical. (342)

	As the dialectical is generated between the ‘being-apart’ and the ‘being-a-part’ then, perhaps, this middle ground might be better represented by being ‘seen’ as that distinctively-accommodated in this dialectical ‘space’ as ‘a-part-and-apart’ within this dialectical matrix of the Life-World. Now, from this dialectical ‘space’ in [the inter-momentary gestation(s) of] its dialectical ‘time’ an existential excess is created/re-created. In regards to this we might say, on one hand, that its semblance of ‘dialectical presence’ is realized through our short-sightedness, whilst, on the other, that its semblance of ‘dialectical absence’ is realized through our over-looking of that phenomenal situation, but, that, despite such superimposition of being and/or misrepresentation of absence, a richness of being is entered into whose semblance of power is both provocatively active and(/or) passive. Face to face we encounter the ineluctable that both shapes us and is shaped by us. In our encounters in this World-of-Life we are equally constituting and being constituted by this parade of ineluctable expressions of the world-as-found-there-for-us by-us. Thrown into this dialectical dimension we meet and we are met through this dialectical world of distinctions-in-accommodations (within distinctive accommodations) by a richness of being that can be neither reduced to its apparent parts nor their apparent totalities. Truly, with an ‘open mouth’ (and sometimes by the skin of our teeth) we grasp the world and find ourselves grasped by the same. How beautiful this rose I see there before me, how breath-taking that distant landscape, how amazing this painting on the wall, how simple and complex that poem just read, how profound this person who befriends us, how elevating those loving souls who love us and with whom we find an equal, unfeigned reciprocity of deepest affection…. (343)

	Why these epithets of over-looking and short-sighting? As just noted we  ‘over-look’ this dialectical dimension of the ‘dialectical absence’ of intrinsic being to be found in our phenomenal-phenomenological presentations/re-presentations. As also just noted we ‘short-sight’ this dialectical dimension of the ‘dialectical presence’ of ‘presented being’ as distinctively manifested in our phenomenal-phenomenological presentations/re-presentations and in the process impute, reify and concretize the end-products of our intentional activities as such. But, by virtue of our dialectical being in this world we can neither short-sightedly impute being (in a material mode or in a non-material subjective/inter-subjective set of modes) nor over-look the dialectical absence at the centre(s) of all ‘our’ relationships. Then, again, taking a middle path, we should also recognize (through re-cognition) the wonderful existential richness of value to be found in all our relationships, a state of play in some relationships we will find more rewarding than in others relationships by virtue of who we are, by virtue of who we become. A richness of value that is not found intrinsically in the objects/subjects per se as engaged in our relationships, but, as a source of value at the very centre of our relationships upwelling from the apparent core of those relationships themselves (as simulations qua simulations)! This dialectical vision of the world is a ‘vision’ of the Life-World. Now, objects discriminated in a certain sense-field are seen but the that field itself is not so much as ‘seen’ but more ‘intuited’ from seeing those objects again, and again; looking for them and not finding them; and, from the very possibility of being able to seek and find what we may or may not be looking for in this world-with-others… Between objects at the same time we find this sense of space, this sense of ‘world’. Beyond this sense of an in-between-space we find a greater sense of space… All around us we can extrapolate this field of experience, and other fields of experience and in turn locate them in this over-arching meta-field… and so on… till we are left with a concept of world and, thence, an open-ended, dialectical sense of ‘the’ Life-World… In this world we both passively wait and also actively set out to be met and to meet that which we engage in this World-of-Life… Then, through a metaphorical ‘over-folding’ of experience in this living-World-of-Life we encounter a richness of being-becoming that cannot be properly appreciated as anything other than ‘ineluctable’… Excavating this field-of-being-in-the-world we encounter an authenticity of being that cannot be anything other than mysterious, the profoundest of mysteries… In and through the overall transcendental suspension this world-of-treasure is encountered and met in keeping with the manner of its exploration (and its ‘exploration’ of us)… In an authenticity of engagement we are met and meet an authenticity of engagement… However, in and through this core requirement of an overall transcendental suspension the existential core of all engagement is existential in tenor… Only through over-looking and short-sighting, in measures equal to the same, is our vision of the world distorted, and, conversely, in equal measures, not distorted accordingly through the re-imposition of an appropriately pre-informed, properly conducted, overall transcendental suspension whose operation is operated in a self-critically valid ‘open’ manner of exposition… But for all our insights and lack of insight, the Life-World ever remains for-us a land of mystery, an ineluctable realm of surprise, a veritable kingdom of delight and, also, alas, a domain of despair…! (344)

	Being embodied we must suffer the limitations of our being-situated-here-in-this-World-of-Life. Hypothetically, even the Divine must ‘suffer’ the very limitations of their being-in-this-World-of-Life. On the other hand, we are not just ‘a part of this world floating apart from this world’, no, indeed, we are too, dialectically, not just ‘a part of this world floating apart from this world’. So, despite our limitations from the perspectives of our embodiment we, too, are equally not just our mere embodiment in this world! Hence, being an immanent part of this total sense of world we are equally able to transcend those limitations of merely being in the world as a mere ‘part’ therein, albeit, in our transcendence, with another set of qualifications and limitations imposed upon that sense or semblance of freedom, etc. Although rooted in a body of embodiment I have the transcendental freedom to experience the world also from a non-embodied perspective (albeit one ever related to our currently being embodied). From this side of the street I can imagine ‘what it would be like for me to walk down the opposite side and then to look across the street to see myself on the other side where I am currently embodied.’ Although an object in the world nothing is a mere ‘object’ in this world dialectically! In keeping with the dialectical nature of my being-in-this-world I have a certain degree of existential freedom to change course, veer in a new direction, follow new objectives, envisage new intentionalities, etc. Without ever really knowing how, or needing to, I can hold my arms out and take hold of my bike and sitting myself upon it ride off to some not too distant park to read a book not read before, admire the passing clouds, partake a pre-arranged picnic with a friend and discuss topics never before broached, or, to just share an enjoyment in the silences that link all our conversations…. (345)

	If I can find beauty in one grain of twinkling sand how much more rapture can I find in an open-ended sense of world? If the existential totality of the world is as ineluctable as a freshly opened rose bud how much more of a mystery must this same world be in itself as an open-ended totality? If the Life-World is the dialectical ‘ground’ of this source of wonder how wonderful must this world be in the totality of its ineluctableness, its je ne sais quoi? And if the world is found to truly possess a theological complexion what wonder might be found in its Divine ineluctableness? Then, again, if the world is merely seen as an integrating device, as it is, then in its sheer integrity what difference could there be for-it and for-us between the mere ineluctableness of the world and the sheer ineluctableness of the world as ‘seen’ from a theological perspective? Is there not a dialectical principle at stake here, namely, that the dialectical richness of a world arises through the dialectical richness of its accommodation-of-distinctions and not from its mere accommodation nor its mere totality or summation of those apparent distinctions (as viewed in the context of that integrated frame of reference)! The dialectical is both accommodation and distinctiveness, i.e., an integration-and-differentiation of the world! So, in the light of this principle, we might opine that the ‘infinite’ complexities of this world in its simplicity of integrity is no different from the same ‘world’ treated in a theological perspective (and that this tentative ‘fact’ is only subject to the following condition, namely, that the sense of the divine reflects its overall degree of epistemologically organized complexity, and, that the Divine is realized when this degree of complexity far exceeds that of our own sense of psychic organization!?)! That, in essence there is no ‘real’ theological difference as no absolute distinction could be drawn between the relatively non-divine and the relatively divine since the complexion of the Life-World must be both theologically and non-theologically oriented from the hypothetical point of the Absolute (which not being realizable by ‘something’ or ‘someone’ equally rules out an absolute theology from an absolute perspective!?)!? (346)

	How should the theologian, etc., approach this central controversial issue – that the Life-World through its acting as an integration device must possess a theologically-oriented complexion to some degree or other in relative, conventional terms of reference!? Theoretically, this controversy should be easily resolved - by merely demonstrating through an appropriate, properly conducted, valid interpretation of the world-of-experience that this theological imprint is already traced out upon the fabric of the world! If this could be done, how should this type of investigation be conducted? By noting the dialectical nature of intentionality and therein discerning the same as imprinted upon this ‘fabric’ of the world and thence determining that the intentional origination of the same is more epistemologically complex than that of our own intentional tracing upon the world, and, since the overall integrity of the infinite-like complexity of the world is already imprinted upon the very worldly fabric of the world it follows that the theologian must then be able to re-link this type of interpretation with their observations of the same and by what ever stratagems firmly establish the overall merit of their proposals to be in a reasonable degree of an excess to that psychic capital originally invested in this type of enterprise by the same theologian or theologians…? Quite simple really! (347)

	But so much for theory! This type of task could easily degenerate into sets of vicious circularities where what becomes reinforced is merely our prior ontological commitments and epistemological convictions that would have been better kept subjected to, and checked by, the dialectical openness put in place through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension! It would be with much trepidation that I would want to even imagine myself assuming the mantle of the theologian in order to perform this type of task! However, let us take a less direct route in approaching the theoretical philosophy behind this central theological controversy by indirectly looking at what might be dialectically implied in our hypothetical investigations of theological identity, theological work and theological value in the hope that this type of traditional cul de sac could be left rather than merely re-entered..!? Thereafter seeking and following those possible avenues of approach that appear to offer themselves as viable routes to establishing this type of objective, an objective that should to some extent concur theoretically, practically and critically. As argued in these current investigations it would appear, theoretically, that the pursuit of our theological investigations is one that is transcendentally left open to us by means of the establishment of the possibility of the same and that the non-establishment of the mere possibility of the same ‘must’ imply the viability of this pursuit to some degree or other (wherein we still need to determine if this element of the theological that is established or could be established is significantly significant and not merely just inadequately significant for the purposes of a committed theologian, traditional or non-traditional in orientation!). Furthermore, through an appropriate contextual preparation; through a proper application of transcendental technique(s); through a realization of a valid validation of the overall process, both in detail and systematically; through the entire process being entered and left through an ‘open’ overall transcendental suspension… the pursuit and engagement with the object(tive) of our topic has its determination, in practice, guaranteed to succeed, to some degree or other, since our hermeneutic engagement with any topic always takes place between a state of absolute non-commensurabilility and a state of absolute commensurability! Of course, whether that degree of engagement ‘successfully’ entered into is meaningfully significant is another matter to be considered. Lastly, from a critical perspective, theoretical and practical considerations should be able to dialectically combine to ensure, through a self-critical emergence, that a self-critical degree of criticality is actually observed. Again the degree to which this arises, and the utility of the same, remains a moot point…? (348)

	So, from a dialectical perspective, let us examine the entire topic of theological Value in its generality in an effort to determine first what forms of theological evaluation are philosophical viable (and theologically viable in the context of a religious frame of reference)? As already discussed theological Value is that which emerges through the philosophical (and theological) interaction of theological identity, theological work and theological value. (349)

	In the course of this extended essay I have argued that theological identity must be embodied, epistemologically organized to a degree greater than that of our own epistemological organization, cannot be absolutely unitary or monolithic nor absolutely diverse and polytheistic in complexion. I have argued for the hypothetical viability of these dialectically non-extreme options. In a dialectical setting I have also argued for the intentional activity of such an ‘entity’ as dependent upon the same chaotic causal conditions that underpin intentionality in general. This ‘fact’ implying that a consequential analysis is called for in examining the imputed intentional traces of the same? That, effectively, a validly formulated relational philosophy would insist, hypothetically, that a valid and viable theology could only be conducted in a context of a dynamic process orientation hence the transcendental need to recognize the central importance of a process theology in the construction of a potentially viable theology! (350)

	In the context of theological work the relevance of a theological system needs to be determined in order to ascertain the merit of that frame of reference in its religious setting. First, one might think, that such a frame of reference must work; a state of affairs that is established through the theoretical competence discerned in our philosophical examinations of its speculatively re-constructed theological identity. Then, second, we need to establish the manner that that frame of reference works in practical terms of reference. Unfortunately these two areas of concern need not be connected! The imputed theological object approached as a theological objective need not connect and coincide. Children are set up to believe in Father Xmas but Father Xmas is only a mythical entity. Such beliefs in Father Xmas work and have work to do but no (non-mythical) intentional object coincides with that intentional objective! In a similar fashion we need to note that theological work can still be exercised by a theological objective that need not posses a theological object or state, etc. Thus, our examination of theological work must first concentrate on this sense of determining the work of that theological objective or set of objectives before critically ascertaining the validity of that imputed object or state. (350)

	The critical and self-critical aspects of this type of project undoubtedly are the most difficult aspects of this type of research. It is at that point that we leave behind the hypothetical bracketing of our research whether that be purely a fiction or a methodological device for rigorously ensuring that our research maintains a transcendental complexion. The critical critically conducted, i.e., from a transcendental perspective, ensures that the critical is effectively self-critical in nature! But, through the breaking of the overall transcendental suspension and its intentional discharge back into the natural world we can no longer maintain this fiction of the hypothetical except through ensuring its ongoing continual critical return to the perspective of the overall transcendental suspension. In being allowed to prove itself the theological system in its critical transcendental treatment in effect performs this task through the power of that system to self-critically rectify itself in such a manner that the experienced value of that process is found to be considerably greater than that merely invested! Moreover, it should be allowed to re-construct itself in an evolution of self-rectification wherein the competence of that theological system is augmented and not diminished! In the process discovering the power of that theological system to self-critically conduct itself and therein further augment the competence of that system (unless through re-construction it is effectively deconstructed and therein dismantled and not re-incorporated!). But all this needs to be demonstrated in and through the adoption and adaptation of critical practice in a manner that is both subjective and inter-subjective (making available to the understanding of others therein presuppositions; current suppositions as premises, arguments and conclusions; the demonstration of the apparently demonstrable ‘actual’ consequences of a consequential analysis re the same, and, along with an ‘indication’ of the overall existential detail and flavour of that systematic presentation?)! (351)

	Next, as a digression, I would like to look at a technique for examining the odds as to whether a theological enterprise is a potentially viable project or not (and therein intuiting to what extent theological work is conducted for some people who affirm that type of world view). Often before elections polls are conducted whose accuracy sometimes leaves much to be desired (especially in elections that are correctly too close to call). Now, it has been observed that when people collectively place a bet on election outcomes the odds usually are a better indicator of the winner of that election whilst changes in those odds similarly better reflect trends in the same prior to that election. It is almost as if there is a mirroring process at work that through the collectivity of decisions being made closely reflects the actual decisions about to be made along the same lines (but by a greater number of voters)? It would seem that the adoption of a theological point of view by a large segment of the population might also indicate not so much, if at all, the validity of a theological object (and that theological object as a theological subject) as the validity of the theological objective for those people who are so inclined in that religious direction. That, for a large segment of the population, the theological objective is a general enterprise which possesses actual theological work, i.e., produces/re-produces a positivity of value, or, at least, an ongoing positiveness of value as judged by them for what ever reason…. (352)

	Now I am not suggesting we should take a gamble and make a bet on the existence of the Divine,  or the non-existence of the Divine. I am suggesting that for a large number of people this type of world-view figures prominently upon their horizon. Addressing this observation we now need to come to some form of an understanding as to how this type of positioning in the world ‘works’? Let us, therefore, examine this topic of theological work in order to examine how this type of attitude functions in this type of religious framework. (353)

	As already noted a theological objective need not find a theological object (or state or subject). So, the emphasis here is not on the validity of this type of life-interpretation. On the other hand, as it figures prominently in the life of a large number of individuals and communities let us see if we can make some provisional assessment of why and how this type of interpretative frame of reference ‘works’? As a first step in this direction we could take a number of religious tracts belonging to one particular religious group and statistically observe what practical themes are present in that literature. Furthermore, on a deeper level of literary analysis we could also interrogate the types of metaphor apparently used there, in the process attempting to understand the nature of the rhetoric involved and the manner these genres of activity are adopted and adapted in that type of setting. In observing the function of genre we can also observe those religious practitioners in their course of their daily lives and directly enquire of those religious professionals and/or non-professionals where these interviewees are prompted through questions to give explanations of their religious behaviour and/or left relatively ‘unprompted’ through the seeking of a relatively ‘unprompted’ set of self-explanations as to the reasons why certain practices are performed and/or indirectly through sheer observation observe the degree of harmonization between textual beliefs and apparent religious practices (in the light of any attempts noted to resolve apparent inconsistencies that might be present within or between these accounts, observations, interpretations, self-interpretations, self-reflections, etc.). In this provisional exploration let us (fall back upon the work of others and) merely note a variety of themes we might expect to examine in the course of this  type of research. (354)

	One way to approach this topic might be to explore various religious schemes already produced by that religious group under investigation and prominently promulgated by its religious professionals or spokepersons. Then sorting these themes into type we then need to note what ever practices seem to be aligned with the same. E.g., in a Christian setting we might find concepts like sin, the fall, redemption, and along practical lines an insistence upon a certain morality and religious attitude towards life, the use of certain sacraments, and other practices like church services, etc. Outside a more public setting we might also like to add certain practices that are emphasized along more private, individual lines like perhaps prayer, making of offerings, the use of religious literature, religious implements, etc. E.g., in a Buddhist setting we might find concepts like ignorance, the perceived role of desire, certain soteriological concepts like nirvana, and along practical lines an insistence upon a certain morality and religious attitude towards life, the use of certain rituals, and other practices like chanting, etc. Outside a more public setting we might also like to add certain practices that are emphasized along more private, individual lines like perhaps meditation, making of offerings, the use of religious literature, religious implements, etc. (355)

As a general philosophical observation what might we note? From previous research I would like to make the following suggestions. First, certain themes are more prominent than others, e.g., the concepts of sin or ignorance, the importance of morality, the need for redemption or some other form of soteriological deliverance, etc. Indeed, I have noted in the past how religious frames of reference often set out to induce a sense of the negative, a sense of personal disvaluation, and, then, offer a set of religious practices that will help the individual to overcome this prior induced sense of a negative self-evaluation (further reinforced, both negatively and/or positively, through other-evaluation, the religious opinions of others understood in general or in particular when specially directed at an individual or set or class of individuals). In effect, this cognitive ‘rift’ between perceived religious ‘reality’ and religious ‘ideality’ is both induced and reduced by that same religious frame of reference; a process of personal re-constitution that is rarely, if ever, ameliorated; a set of parallel beliefs and closely ‘fitting religious practices that psychically carve our the apparent raison d’être of that religious point of view. The process of conversion, in my opinion, often seeming operating about this fulcrum between this induced sense of a negative deficiency and some degree of a positive fulfilling of that same sense of religious need. Second, there is often a hierarchy of negative forms of dis-valuation, i.e., processes that devalue the individual religiously. Then, to reduce these induced points of anxiety each aspect of this hierarchy often has an individual set of resolutional religious techniques also arranged in various hierarchies of efficacy, importance, in the manner of their current promotion, etc. Furthermore, these processes of resolution, although harmonized to some degree or other, cannot not be treated as perfectly consistent either with respect to each other individually or collectively. The use of deconstructive techniques further highlighting these relative degrees of discontinuity; often revealing sets and strata of beliefs and practices quite at variance with themselves and each other. Third, we have here, essentially, very systematic, complex parallels between beliefs and practices that cannot be absolutely harmonized and on occasions take on chaotic points of view at moments of bifurcation. Thus, the transformation of religious beliefs can never be a completely linear process of development. Fourth, an assessment of religious functions should be attempted through an overall transcendental suspension of the relevant material to hand and never taken at face value. In this regard the observer of a religious frame of reference, despite their active transcendental neutrality, to what ever degree found present, through the adoption of an adequately functioning overall transcendental suspension, will find themselves automatically noting both positive and negative forms of evaluation; the latter non-augmenting that religious frame of life, indeed, diminishing it, through their exercising a set of over-ontological commitments and/or excessive epistemological convictions (through the non-prominent exercise of an appropriate overall transcendental suspension). In this light, one should note the often bewildering array of religious attempts to harmonize these various disparate elements with only varying degrees of success – relatively unsuccessful states of affairs that are often glossed over by those religious adherents. Lastly, one should also recognize that explanations of religious reasons for certain religious practices and the utilization of those practices themselves are more often than not not very adequate, consistent and/or practical. As a species of ‘rationalization’, as an explanation qua explanation, they never quite explain ‘why’ when the in-depth motivations for that type of religious frame themselves are not properly accounted for. Indeed, can never be properly accounted for and only adequately or inadequately exercised on the grounds that no process of rationlizational ‘representation’ can ever properly represent that religious process of re-presentation (along the same lines as previously argued for with respect to processes of representational mis-representation, etc.). These cracks, uncrossed rifts, mis-directions, fabrications, grand-narrative ‘fantasies’, etc. often revealing more by default than through the very exercise of those processes of religious rationalization. On the other hand, to counter-balance this ‘insight’ (of an intuitive awareness of an explanatory inadequacy) the use of mythological treatment and other forms of dialectical-process can act as a powerful, creative, symbolic process of religious affirmation which, like all mentally directed processes, will possess some degree of existential authenticity (often neutralizing and outweighing the mere, often inadequate, impact of those mere processes of apparent religious rationalization considered in their relative isolation). The dramatic panoramas of such religious vistas often centering those individual and their communities in this type of ‘restorative landscape’. With this in mind let me, therefore, briefly focus our investigations on this ‘mythological’ aspect in order to examine the typical function of theological work, or, at least from this type of theoretical point of view? (356)

	Religious metaphor are often woven into the rich tapestry of religious myth. Usually, the mere itemization in religious themes of religious beliefs and their paralleled invocation of indicated or dictated performances in religious practice we would find totally inadequate presentations of rationalization. On the other hand, in the context of a mythic weaving along with a suspension of disbelief we find that those religious people themselves no longer left so overtly unconvinced about the nature of those beliefs and practices although, we should add the interpretative-observation that some degree of inconsistency is still felt internal to that ‘system’ which in turn re-fuels that mythological explanation, or additional mythological explanations, or the continual need to re-affirm one’s commitments, etc. In an aphoristic vein one might say “that for the religious person only through their believing the impossible is it possible for them to be religious (whether that be before breakfast or some other time !)”  As a richly symbolic, dialectical construct with ritual and experiential ramifications how is a religious myth translated into a functional process that performs some significant degree of theological work through its invocation of its positive theology? (357)

	Myth to various degrees is a microsopic mapping of the macrosopic world albeit ‘coded’. To interpret the myth as one who is ‘inside’ it one would need to be ‘initiated’, i.e., ‘given access’ to this code. Now, some mythic structures are more immediately transparent than others, i.e., the apparent meaning being modeled is intended in a one to one ratio, i.e., between the religious elements there is some form of a non-complex correspondence. E.g., in  a Christian setting it might be interpreted that the apparent death of Christ is a sad event but that in his overcoming death we too, through him, can overcome death and that this ‘event’ is, therefore, a joyous one in which we too can share (if certain pre-conditions and conditions are met). On the other hand, mythic structures are usually symbolically complex and the mythic events portrayed can be given a variety of interpretations not necessarily inconsistent with each other, indeed, they can operate in a number of different fields of endeavour at the same time (e.g., spiritual, moral, soteriological, etc.) without obviously augmenting or diminishing the effect of each other. However, at the same time these parallel interpretations must conflict with each other to some degree or other whether obvious or not and necessitate, when more noticeable, certain meta-procedures to overcome the tensions created therein (and the then inevitable presence of interminable commentaries trying to defuse or insulate us from such tensions). Then, again, as an observation or reflection I would like to say that it might well be that there can be no ‘faith’ if the believer cannot accept a patent paradox or some form of a perplexing aporia, etc. It could be rhetorically state that “your faith is just not strong enough if you cannot hold the contradiction fast in a suspension of belief!” To make symbolic matter even more complex is the fact that there are usually a plethora of such blatant inconsistencies at the centres of these mythic complexes that through repetition of certain religious procedures eventually become accepted and indirectly entertained as ‘mysteries’ of the Divine, etc., and not the patent absurdities they so obviously appear to ‘non-believers’. But lest one thinks this intellectual skullduggery takes place only in the sphere of religion one needs to think again as the political world, e.g., is also redolent with the same in so far as certain political myths are just that – not much more than mere myths; convenient fictions, devices that tell a certain story with a certain moral without any deference to an accurate depiction of the historical or the nature of existential truth or the ‘real’ intent behind such frames for the induction of certain forms of motivation may well pass themselves off as propitious when the benefits of such a device are subverted and diverted elsewhere being more ‘intended’ for other more less obvious, covert purposes, etc! (358)

	To what extent is a mythical structure possibly a mere mirror to the (supernatural) nature of the religious, the Divine, etc? As a rhetorical question this is important in order to determine if mythic structures could function as translational devices between these two realms of the secular and the sacred, and v.v. Now, it has been remarked earlier in this extended essay that as the characteristic of the Divine is a degree of epistemological organization a considerable dimension or two greater than that possessed by ourselves; in that light we should not be looking for the Divine in a material mode (except perhaps in the form of a deposited intentional trace that by some hermeneutic stratagem can be re-cognized through the assistance of that interpretative scheme wherein a greater degree of existential value is released than that merely invested in this type of interpretation??)! As wonderful and as beautiful the universe may appear to sight, as seen through scientific instrument and to our imaginations… in this material ‘direction’ we would be, theoretically, moving away from the Divine qua Divine. Hence the question can be formed what is the sense of this ‘direction’ that might allow us to directly appreciate this epistemological integration of the Divine or, failing that, allow us some less direct form of ‘access’? A possible candidate that might direct us towards this ‘direction’ is a broad understanding of the mythic, i.e., seeing mythic implementation as the living out of a cosmic map of the psychic universe through a ritualization of that mythic ‘roadmap’. Here the important implication often implied is that ritual enactment of the myth, through some form of analogical re-alignment, will allow the devotee to be ‘contacted’ by the Divine in some form or other, and v.v. I.e., through the microcosm mirroring the macrocosm in some process of mythic re-enactment, etc., religious experience is induced, promoted, revealed, translated, expressed by proxy, empathetically re-simulated and/or provoked, etc. But what could the religious aspirant truly hope for in this regard (in terms of theological work and/or a verification of the validity of that intentional objective versus its intentional object [state or subject])? (359)

	In some measure, all modeling of the world is correctly a modeling of the world! Metaphors truly metaphor to some degree or other. Of course whether that degree of coincidence is significant and validly interpreted would always be a controversial issue. All we can say is that, on that transcendental grounds, metaphors must model the world to some extent and cannot be completely divorced from the same. However, the significance of such modeling is another question. On the other hand, the existential excess of such structures (especially when ‘lived’ and ritually enacted) can overcome this potential poverty of numinous representation and induce a degree of the ‘ineluctable’ apparently resident with(in) that symbolic structure through the emergence of such significant meaningfulness. Still, the degree to which theological value is projected and validly projected, and opens itself up to being validly interpreted, remains a moot point that I will happily leave for the theologian to wonder about. Yet, on transcendental grounds, all metaphor will mirror the world to some extent! It only behooves the theologian, the philosopher or congregation/s to ‘purify’ this metaphorical representationalism and declare to what degree and in what possible manner for-them, that the theological actually colours the complexion of the Life-World (albeit in existential terms of faith, and, as a declaration kept transcendentally suspended and hence left as a provisional, but potentially productive, state of affairs). Suffice to say that there are valid philosophical grounds for this theological manoeuvre even though our attempts to do this may not amount to much (because of our limitations in this sphere of reflection and/or the minor degree this theological complexion may actually be found to be present in the intentional constitution of both this world and our vision of the same?). (360)

	In the light of the above discussion I would like now to construct an argument on transcendental grounds whereby through re-simulated affinity an actual resonance between the relatively macrocosmic and the relatively microcosmic can indeed be regarded as taking place or could take place. (361)

	Metaphor are not just literary devices! As a moment in the hermeneutic circle of comprehension our understanding of the world cannot do without this type of import. Myths are but complex metaphor. Through re-living and re-enacting that mythic world  is it possible to actually re-align ourselves with the imputed object(ive) of that mythic system? Let me adopt a religiously neutral example to illustrate both this intention and problematic (behind this philosophy of re-attunement, atonement/at-onement, re-alignment or resonance, etc.) – a broad spectrum of ideas often invoked, rightly or wrongly, when dealing with questions re the nature of prayer, meditation, theurgy, casting of spells, occult practices, astrology, ritual enactment of sacraments, etc., etc. (362)

	When I listen to the music of J. S. Bach or read a novel by Patrick White or watch a play by Shakespeare or enjoy a painting by Monet, etc., etc., am I actually communing with these dead artists? I know all these artist to be now dead. Yet, a great work of art seems to holographically encrystalize the very greatness of these artistic individuals. In re-simulating their great works of art I am finding myself encountering the artistic essence of these great artists. Now, a photograph captures the gestalt likeness of a person from and through the angle of the lens. Can we claim these essential snap-shots of these individuals in some sense also mirrors these personalities in a similar manner. Then, when we look at a photo can we say we are in touch, in some profound sense, with the individual therein photographed. Even if that individual is now dead? Is the temporal dimension also a block on this path to virtual ‘meeting’ of these individuals? Furthermore, would not spatial non-contiguity also deconstruct this intuition that we can encounter the artist through their work of art and better encounter them through more than one work of art? (362)

	In my opinion these obstructions to an actual encounter need not obstruct a virtual encounter. Moreover, through an invocation of emptiness of substantial existence we must not regard any individual entity (non-Divine or Divine) as ensouled in spiritual matter when their sense of personality and presence can never be reduced to that type of material dimension. Embodied – yes! Dis-embodied – no! Materially ensouled – never! This emergent sense of ‘person’ defying reduction and therein death and dissolution. From a positive nihilistic point of view there just is no material sense of a person there despite their unique embodiment. In this regard the dialectical difference between the actual and the virtual is a psychic state of zilch; there just is no real dialectical difference between the actual and the virtual since we all live in the Life-World and therein find ourselves presented/re-presented in and through a concatenation of modalities. What is ‘real’ or ‘actual’, i.e., ‘non-virtual’, is our consideration of the number and manner of modalities that should be present with a certain phenomenon, in our phenomenological expectations, and whether that number and manner is conserved. Now, all this emergent identity accepted, can we rule out an encounter with the same when this type of engagement has no spatial-temporal contiguity or the existential descriptor rules that out in non-virtual terms of reference? Surely, we telephone people from time to time so spatial contiguity is not necessary in our engaging with another person. Can we argue also for a virtual ineffectiveness of a relationship from the point of view of a temporal non-contiguity? In reply I would argue that people can leave messages on their answering machines and send each other letters that take time to reach their intended destinations. But what if those messages or letter could not be received by the intended subject of such dispatches through the death of that individual being addressed? But people write wills that ‘speak’ to us after their death… on the grounds of a universal reciprocity is it possible for us to address them despite their death and our either knowing or not knowing that fact of their demise…? (363)

	All relationships are power relationships and hence unequal in the disposition of their powers. Furthermore, all relationships are reciprocal to some degree or other. So now we have no virtual obstacles in our ‘meeting’ with whomsoever or whatsoever it is that is intentionally desired on our part to so engage whether they be here or there, now or then, dead or alive! Of course the quality of some of these ‘possible relationships’, i.e., virtual relationships, may well leave much to be desired (since only a small fraction of relationships remain effectively ‘open’ to us and in the process those ‘less open relationships’ may well be found to effectively consume more psychic capital than that released as an existential excess in keeping with those more productive relationships that remain experientially ‘open’ to us)!? But relationships are not the property of their individual participants but an expression of that shared encounter itself, and, being expressed from the psychic centre of that relationship, what ever its nature, it follows that that relationship cannot be expressed other than from the centre of that relationship and not directly from the individual elements that orbit within its confines. (364)

	At this point in this complex argument I will need to re-examine what is meant by a relationship and what is meant by the distinction between a virtual relationship and a non-virtual relationship (rather than nominating the latter as an actual relationship on the grounds that there can be no pure, absolute actual relationship). For a start a relationship is the relationship between two or more participants, or, the relationship one participant has with respect to itself through a consideration of itself from two or more points of view. But, as the Life-World is the (intentional) ‘grounds’ for all relational experience how could there be ‘this relationship’ and ‘that relationship’, etc. (when there should be only one relationship, namely, the Life-World in its open-ended entirety?)? However, we have a clue to resolving this difficulty here in noting that an identity can have a relationship with itself when viewed from a different point of view. In other words the element of the ‘intentional’, in some form or other, is crucial in determining the nature of the participants of that relationship and thence the nature of that relationship, or, the nature of the aspects invoked that will constitute that nature of that self-relationship. Next, we can now differentiate a virtual relationship from a non-virtual relationship by noting whether a full compliment of expected modalities is present or not in keeping with the phenomenal nature of those intentional objectives invoked by that act of intentional discernment, i.e., intentional objects, subjects and/or states. Lastly, we need to note what phenomenal modalities are expected and actually found to be present, i.e., determine to that degree necessary the validity of our phenomenological assessment of the phenomenon of that engagement with respect to the relevant modalities, modes of presentation, and identification of the logical subjects imputed therein. (365)

	Re-continuing our argument we are now in a position to deal with these questions of discontinuity in our appreciation, e.g., of an artistic artwork and its essential snap-shot of it assumed author or authors (this argument being an introduction to this non-absolute non-commensurability of all possible forms of intentionally-directed relationships, i.e., our absolute access to any relationship whatsoever once intentionally focused upon on the grounds that there can be no form of an absolute incommensurability between any conceivable elements in a relationship [without, at the same time, necessarily invoking a significant degree of an existential excess of value realized in this process]). (366)

	Because a relationship comes into existence for-us through its intentional formulation, and, because of the relational emptiness of all identity, i.e., the dependence of all identity upon the conditions of its production, it follows that as we are participants in this same World-of-Life we cannot have an absolute non-direct relationship with that as invoked. However, the relational quality of that relationship is going to reflect those modal expectations and any deficits therein. (367)

	One more distinction needs to be noted here. When we view a photograph we are encountering an essential snap-shot of the subject or object of that photo as an intentional trace now indirectly ‘traced out’ on the medium of that photo. In this we are not encountering an embodied version or vision of the said subject or object. Only a proxy re-presentation of the same. Does this make a real difference? From a dialectical point of view the answer is no! On the other hand, in qualitative terms of reference, the answer is sometimes, though more often than not it does make a difference. So, in this regard full embodiment is met when the encountering engages a full compliment of expected modalities, i.e., a non-virtual presentation/re-presentation and not a virtual representation. However, in the light of an absolute non-difference of a dialectical difference between the virtual and the non-virtual even this relative difficulty from a dialectical point disappears! How do I explain this relational fact? E.g., what is it about a photo that when it is looked at lets me actually ‘look at that person’ directly, albeit, in a near-virtual mode of being with that person in that photo? For a start, because experience has an historical component it must also possess a non-historical aspect to give the same that meaningful sense of contrast. Because they must co-inhere with respect to each other, through their mutual epistemological co-relativity, etc., it follows that there can be no-absolute difference between the same from a dialectical point of view. Furthermore, as all relationships are centred and thence radiate from those centres in this one Life-World throughout all time and space, in all its discernable emergent aspects, it follows that all intentionally discerned relational elements must also overlap all other intentionally discerned relational elements in this one-World-of-Life even though the various powers of those elements will be effectively obstructed by virtue of the relative resistance of that World-of Life to some considerable degree or other (in its presentation/re-presentation of realities more powerful and closer to ‘home’ so to speak) but for that never actually obliterated in this World-of-Life even when the historical locus of such a dispersion is itself historically dispersed. So, some degree of a direct ‘actual’, i.e., non-virtual, encounter is ‘actually’ encountered (through this all embracing unity of the Life-World). Still, looking at a photo of a person who is dead or miles away is not going to permit that person to directly ‘talk to us’ even though the simulation of their ‘voice’ can itself be simulated with some degree of a coincidence! Still, dialectically, that is not absolutely ruled out! Our engagement with the representation of that person, i.e., the photo, will still ensure all modalities of engagement remain hypothetically present even if not in a practically effective form or format, e.g., from the photo we already ‘perceive’ that this person is a male, of such and such a race, with at some stage such and such hair or lack of, etc., etc. If that person were to enter that room then and there we would, in all probability, recognize them. Then, again, we would also more than likely recognize them in other photos (especially if gathered together in the same album), etc. Because the ‘presence’ of a person is not materially limited despite the natural limits of embodiment it follows that the act of intentional focus must bring us into that presence to some degree or other through the unity and radiation of relationships from the centres of their existence, virtual or non-virtual in nature. Moreover, as no virtual relationship is absolutely virtual, i.e., modal-less, it follows that to some extent all relationships are direct to some extent or other even if that degree of directness is more or less absolutely insignificant for current practical purposes! Then, again, through intentional traces like photos and artwork, etc., our engagement with those subjects is vastly augmented in relative terms of reference. Again, in and through an overall transcendental suspension of our experiences of representations directly or indirectly authored by the same person we arrive at a position to both virtually and non-virtually, to varying degrees, experience the simulation/re-simulation of an engagement with that person albeit in those representational terms of reference. (367)

	Let me now continue this argument on the creation/re-creation of a relational degree of rapport through this type of concept of a re-simulated re-alignment, attunement, etc., (noting the possible theological consequences of such a broad concept). For a start, I now need to demonstrate that a metaphor mirrors the world and that a mythical system is as a complex set of metaphors must dialectically do the same, i.e., mirror the world and that that mirroring is directly experienced through a re-living, re-enactment of the relevant complex (set of) metaphor(s) embedded in that mythical system. Now, just as we constitute ‘what is in relationship to us’ so that ‘which is in an intentionally formed relationships with-us’ must too, simultaneously, re-construct us in the ‘image’ of that which is encountered and is to be encountered. Hence metaphor, myths, mythical re-enactments, etc., not only constitute us they must also re-constitute us in their likeness, and v.v., albeit to some degree or other and never absolutely (nor non-dialectically)! That, in and through this dialectical constitution/re-constitution of identity our engagement is also constituted/re-constituted to that mutual degree of rapport that is found ‘open’ to us and is able to be ‘taken up’ in and through this simulated/re-simulated process of creation/re-creation. In a sense, in the Life-World, “we stand before everything and everything stands before us,” but, what we get ‘to see’ is only what we are ‘permitted to see’ through what we already ‘re-cognize’ as ‘opened-up-there-for-us-to-see.’ All this is both in keeping with our epistemological powers of appreciation and those intentional objectives considered relevant to us at that moment of time. (368)

	At this point in time, in the light of this concept of ‘resonance’, let me re-model and re-configure our vision of the ontological aspect of phenomenal-phenomenological reality. Then let me return to re-ask what, most likely, would be the theological ramifications of this re-modeling given those types of parameters. (369)

	To do this I will enter into the following diversion or digression (which the reader is welcome to bypass should they wish). I would like to put in the form of a number of questions some of the puzzles modern physics will need to deal with in order to actually define its topic given that if its accepts the ‘existence’ of both dark matter and dark energy and believes that they collectively constitute 94% of the physical constitution of the universe then it behooves them to fully clarify the phenomenal natures of these mysterious aspects of the world! Tantamount to a scandal is this accepted ‘fact’, then, that physicists can only currently account for less than 6% of the physical world. But to complicate this disgrace is the fact that physics also needs to confront a whole raft of other issues, a number of these issues motivating this list of questions I am about to formulate. I do this for a number of reasons. Although asking these sorts of questions in the past has been declared to be an exercise in folly and no more than a path to confusion without salvation today we are in a better position to actually ask them; to clearly formulate these questions and expect some degree of a resolution of the same in some form or other. I have always held the belief that to clearly and adequately formulate a question is halfway to understanding what type of solution one needs to look for in a resolution of that type of inquiry; if only to recognize what sort of solution would count as its resolution, or, to recognize that there is no solution, or, that we are in no position to currently determine its definitive thematization, etc. In formulating these problems and proffering some pathways to their resolution I am not attempting to answer them, however, in the use of the methods adopted by myself in approaching these perplexing issues I am suggesting the possibility of a new way of seeing how the material-oriented world is constituted and how we might view our place within it, and, in that light, set out before the theologian some proposals as to how we might view what might be entailed in the Life-World if the ‘complexion’ of the same is treated from a theological point of view. (370)

	In my dealing with these questions I am going to assume that they are all inter-linked. I will adopt a relational philosophy, i.e., a relationship is realized through the ongoing resolution of relative dissonance in a related field of context, moment by moment, even though the sense of the ‘momentary’ is an illusion dependent upon the transmission and reception of the relevant information in the context of that informational system. My approach will also be a dialectical one constructed from a non-scoped point of view. I would also like to appeal to a principle of economy along with a perspective that assumes that there are many ways of reasonably explaining the same phenomenological constitution of a certain type of phenomenon by invoking the same or different metaphors, but, that being a phenomenological description of the same phenomenal state of affairs implies that these different descriptions can be transmuted into one or any of the others by various transformational rulings that will allow these different perspectives to be accommodated (hence the concept of co-mutually dependent transformational mutations) at the same time implying an absolute emptiness of relational identity (i.e., the non-existence of a substantial, intrinsic, self-existent materialism). (371)

	To this end I would like to propose the following list of questions (without any particular regard for their order of introduction) (these questions essentially taking a skeptical position and from this overall transcendental suspension fundamentally re-asking what, why, how, etc.):

1.	What is gravitation?
2.	What is space?
3.	What is time?
4.	What is matter?
5.	What is energy?
6.	What is mass?
7.	How does the microcosmic relate to the macrocosmic, and v.v?
8.	What is dark matter (if it were to exist)?
9.	What is dark energy (if it were to exist)?
10.	Can we envisage a theory of everything?
11.	How does gravitation relate to the other three forces?
12.	What is inflation?
13.	What happens as the cosmos evolves?
14.	What happens at the very beginning of the cosmos (and before?)?
15.	What happens to a black-hole through time?
16.	What happens to the information that enters and/or is already inside a black-hole?
17.	Why does nature abhor a point?
18.	Why does nature abhor a vacuum?
19.	Could quarks be separated?
20.	Is it possible to go faster than the speed of light?
21.	Is time, etc., momentary and/or continuous?
22.	How is physical identity constituted?
23.	What constitutes resistance to a particular identity?
24.	How are apparently distinctive relationships engendered and interrelated?
25.	How is the vacuum constituted? (372)

Let me first look at Question 17: Why does nature abhor a point? The absolute concept of a point is a fiction! If matter descended to shrink towards a point it would take on an infinite density and on route to this impossible state of affairs would become a black-hole (or, with respect to a particle of matter or a small quantity of the same a ‘white-hole’). But the material world does not collapse before our very own eyes so we must ask what stops matter from collapsing towards the singularity of a mere point-like state of affairs? Obviously there must be a force that impedes or resists this ‘desire’ of matter to congregate in a greater, more point-like state of existence! Imagine, if we would, three quarks dancing about each other within the identity of that particle as constituted by those quarks, e.g., a proton or neutron. Something must be stopping the gravitational forces of those quarks from collapsing towards an infinite singularity? Now, let us imagine that the cosmos has just been brought into being a fraction of a fraction of a moment ago. It is envisaged as a sea of quarks and in an ordered state called a Bose-Einstein Condensate or its cosmic equivalent! Now let us invoke that same force that stopped our previous three quarks from collapsing inwards… however, in this situation we get an inflationary scenario and as a result a rapid destruction of that condensate with this quark soup being transformed into a material universe. So, what is this force that stops matter from collapsing? What must this force be that counteracts a gravitational collapse – an anti-gravitational force? Perhaps? Then, again, is it no more that merely the seeking of a less dense region of space by a relatively more dense region of space in which case what type of force need we invoke other than some form of a differential between these connected/self-connecting regions of space in that regard? (373)

	Why does nature abhor a point? In becoming more point-like more energy needs to be supplied if it doesn’t already come from within that state of affairs in order to increase that relative density. Imagine if you would, too, a material process of contraction continuing to become more and more point-like and more and more dense as a result. The apparent point is turning/turned, whirls through a folding over of time-and-space in and around itself, ripping at the fabric of the world… centrifugally throwing itself back into the world from whence it came… loosing energy in the process… refusing to become an infinite contraction, instead, finding a state of dynamic equilibrium in various forms on various levels of epistemological organization..!? (374)

Now, let us look at Question 18 “Why does nature abhor a vacuum?” and Question 13 “What happens as the cosmos evolves?” Let me state a tautological principle of relational necessity: “To be in a relationship with this world necessitates a relationship within this world!” To go beyond the limits of this world is to start to cease to be a part of this world (hence: “not apart, only a part!”). At this point let me introduce three close, connected, dialectically interactive ways of seeing the historical formation and destruction of relationships. When we have three or more elements interacting we can treat this type of interaction as a system. The relatively internal dynamics of a system cannot be calculated except in a few clearly defined situations, or, merely treated through approximations. Three body relationships defy computation unless configured in a linear, non-chaotic type of situation (e.g., three-bodies rotating about the same point equidistant from each other on the same plane and circumference of a circular orbit). Successfully disrupt any type of relationship and you will get either new systems, currents between two parties and/or emissions (when that system or current is broken down to release one, or more, relatively non-interacting particle/s). However, systems, currents and emissions are dialectically and mutually co-determining. Correctly, we can only describe a certain situation as being dominant in one or more of those types of transformational readings but never absolutely! So, e.g., light is relatively and effectively a current (unless we treat it from the relative discreteness of a ‘photon’). So, e.g., the radioactive release of an alpha particle (an ionized form of helium) is effectively an emission despite the emission being also a system in its own right (entailing four particles – two protons and two neutrons). So, e.g., the nuclear fission of U235 into two new elements are relatively and effectively the creation of two systems even though both parties could also be treated as emissions from the point of view of that initial state, etc. (whilst through some minimal degree of relational entanglement emissions can also be treated as currents, etc.).  In the same vein the world, as an integrated plane of being, if it were to be radically thinned out, according to my speculations here, would react in some form or other to this diminished status of being-in-the-world through the increased creation in this relative vacuum of virtual particle pairs, and, therein, increase, and rapidly escalate, the effective gravitational interaction between these relatively disparate elements of that sense of world and thereby reverse that radical loss in the relative density of that gravitational interaction (to some extent engage the opposite processes to that of black-hole formation even though, eventually, a new singularity would be formed, namely, the new formation of the cosmos through a new big-bang and its creation/re-creation of a new universe?)!? That tenuous sense of world would then appear more massive and, as a result, might be able to reverse that trend of diffusion and re-instate a process of increased relational interaction (and contraction towards the state of a singularity). Should we argue for this type of affairs that appears to break the laws of (the) conservation (of energy) where it would appear to be gaining something for nothing? Or, is the constitution of the vacuum under such extraordinary conditions more capable of making itself felt by a few more orders of magnitudes than that realized under normal circumstances (and so we would need to ask, w.r.t. the constitution of the vacuum, i.e., Question 25, how do we account for its constitution in terms of virtual particle formations [a state of affairs whose mathematical treatment has yet to be properly analogued]?)? (375)
 
	The first six questions are all interrelated. However, the current theoretical treatment of these aspects of reality still needs to be totally re-thought. Perhaps the manner of answering the seventh question, how the microcosmic is related to the macrocosmic, and v.v., might help us to do this since the present rift between Special Relativity and General Relativity has still to be closed (in a linkage of the quantum level of coherent interaction with the non-quantumatized level of non-coherent interaction). To this end we need to quantumatize all such aspects prior to their interrelation. E.g., in my opinion time is in some form of an inverse relationship to space, and v.v. Is there a third way through this disconnected landscape, perhaps one based on a deeper appreciation of the chaotic nature of interaction (as discussed in my recently previous treatment of intentionality?)? Then what is the connection between non-gravitational energy and gravitational energy (i.e., what sort of metaphor, model or matrix could be invoked to mirror these two realms of interaction or act as some form of a transformational translation?)? (376)

	Looking at Q8 & Q9 I suspect that both are some how linked to inflation and gravitation as it is currently understood. For a start, I don’t think dark matter actually exists per se. On the other hand we have a phenomenon here that operates in the range of gravitational flux as found just outside the solar system and between stellar bodies but not on the edges of space in the intergalactic medium nor under the intense flux associated with an inflationary scenario. I would conjecture that these four different sets of conditions might well be interlinked by how, among other things, gravitational forces react under such different circumstances. Even if different forces need to be invoked in one or more of these four sets of conditions an understanding of the (transcendental) nature of interaction might well argue that underlying such difference in detail the same types of mechanisms are operating (but with the use of different constant-constraints, different exchange vectors, etc?)? (377)

	W.r.t.Q10 my approach is to adopt a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’. ‘Yes’ – we can construct limited theories of everything, but, ‘no’ – we cannot construct an absolute theory of everything! The same applying to theology or any other systematic form of theoretical, practical or critical construction. Essentially, meaning is always contextually derived. Without a wider context, either implicit or explicit, that context under focus could not be appreciated. Since meaning is always contextually situated it follows that there can be no mere essential formularization of text since its appreciation is always meta-textual, etc. So, even though we might think we are left with a mere formula that formula itself is actually inserted in a systematic interpretative framework that must remain ‘open’ since closure demands meta-meta-textual treatment of the meta-text, etc! End of story – a formula of everything is therefore an illusion! On the other hand, a trend that allows those reductive formulae to link a larger number of formulae remains a viable option as long as non-closure is invoked! Indeed, to make sense of such super-formulae implies, at the very least, an implicit non-closure in order to be able to interpret the same if this is not explicitly signaled! (378)

	Q11-Q14 have already been alluded to. W.r.t. Q15 & Q16, re black holes, we need to consider to what degree they too can be quantamatized, to what degree they preserve information, become coherent or non-coherent, to what degree there is some form of a quantumatized evaporation (in the form of Hawking radiation, etc.), etc? (379)

	In Q19 the question is asked – can we separate the two quarks that constitute a meson or the three quarks that constitute a proton or neutron, e.g., etc? On a deeper more broad philosophical basis we might well ask can we really separate any constituents in a systematic structure and produce structures that are no longer systematic? On an intuitive basis I would hazard a guess to the effect that this is a state of affairs that cannot be ultimately achieved? In this light even an emission still preserves a degree of systematic structure in some form or format? Similarly, a current is a form of quantum entanglement that preserves its systematic origins. So emissions and currents are systematic consequences of systematic breakdown without a loss of the preservation of ‘system’ in some form or format. One way to deal with this contradictory interpretation of systematic breakdown, as either apparently relative or apparently absolute, is to invoke a form –format qualification, i.e., in the breakdown of a systematic form systematic context is preserved at the level of a contextual format, etc. So, e.g., family members (form) may die off still there is, normally, the preservation of the society (format) in which they were formed. So, on one hand we accept the possible break up of a system but not absolutely at the level of its context. Now, the question must be asked, are quarks context related in the sense they can be removed through annihilation but not separated when they also both define each other and the system as its context. The proton, e.g., is then the context-format for the quark-form in which case this ‘strong’ element of dependence cannot be disentangled. In a similar vein we might be able to say that emission products like, e.g., electrons, remain entangled until captured by new systems? The strong element of dependence masquerading as a force with its own distinctive exchange mechanisms, i.e., gluons w.r.t. quarks and entanglement-currents w.r.t. to emitted electrons? In this we can say then that the breakdown on the level of form demands the preservation of format, and, format can never be subjected to breakdown!? However, form in its dependence upon format also implies that neither party can be treated as absolute, only relative w.r.t. each other! Hence there can be no absolute preservation of format since every context is itself contextually situated in a meta-context, etc., all within the open-ended embrace of the Life-World! (380)

	In Q20 we ask is it possible to go faster than the speed of light? Of course what is important here is to ask what is it that is subjected to the limit of the speed of light? Light itself is never constant in so far as it passage through space is effected by the gravitational differential across which it traverses along with the refractive index and nature of that medium; slowing down through water, faster through air, practically the maximum speed of light when traveling through interstellar space… Matter on the other hand can only move close to the speed of light but never reach this limit since it would take an infinite amount of energy to do so, which not being available implies that no material object or particle could ever travel at the speed of light if light were to traverse the same path traveled by that object or particle. Since light slows down when traveling through water and speeds up on its exit in air we could well ask what are the restrictions experience by a light beam in its passage through the vacuum structured through the momentary creation and dissolution of virtual pairs of particles, etc? If the vacuum structure of space could be neutralized by some means or other would that not imply that the speed of a light beam passing through such space would be accelerated in a direct proportion to the degree that that vacuum structure is relatively cancelled (rather than merely self-cancelled through the pairs of virtual particles canceling each other out?)? Of course such a scenario would also have immediate consequences for matters for time consideration and the preservation of symmetries between charge, etc. However, my intuition tells me that operating on a level of virtual reality, defined in terms of the behaviour of virtual-particle phenomena, there would be no real absolute interference in realization and re-realization of historical time sequencing (since its reception could only take place in virtual terms of reference in so far as the simulation of historical time is concerned). (381)

	In Q21 we are dealing with the dialectical nature of time, etc., in the constitution of identity, etc. As argued, we have a quantumatization of all aspects of phenomenal (and phenomenological) reality. Hence its ‘simultaneous’ continuity and discretion. (382)

	In Q22-24 we are dealing with maters of identity and the process-preservation of identity. This, too, needs to be seen as dialectically constituted. In effect, identity is re-constituted moment by moment and by this sense of process re-continued. As previously argued, identity is constituted in the contextual(-format) of relationships, i.e., through the ongoing resolution of relative dissonance. Hence its dependence upon chaotic conditions in the constitution and re-constitution of its characteristic semblance of phenomenal-phenomenological presentation/re-presentation. Phase changes in the processed constitution of identity being chaotically inaugurated, e.g., in the transition between water in a  liquid form and its transition to ice. Maintenance of the pre-conditions for phase continuity ensuing a preservation of identity in that phase. So water remain in a liquid form as long as it is not tuned into steam or ice, etc. the apparent preservation of those phase pre-conditions and the exercised extent of the same establishing the preservation of that current identity. So, e.g., water in a bowl remains liquid water in that bowl as long as it is not frozen or boiled off or poured out of that bowl, etc. Now, I have argued that a relationship is centred at the centre of its relational matrix and extends infinitely beyond that apparent sense of centre. However, two restrictions are operative in this modeling of identity, namely, no centre can be absolutely centred (as noted in Q17) nor (in a paraphrase of Q18) can it actually extend beyond its phenomenal-phenomenological limits. Hence no identity has an absolute centre nor can its semblance of phenomenal-phenomenological being remain limitless! Hence distinctive identity has the semblance of distinctive limitations, characteristics and boundaries placed upon the phenomenal-phenomenological semblance of its presentation/re-presentation. Hence its representation needs to conform to this apparent sense of a centre (in its psychic location in our mapping of the Life-World) and the realization of those limiting conditions that characterize its current phenomenal-phenomenological manifestation in this World-of-Life. So, e.g., the individual person is centred in the world in accordance with their existential descriptor(‘s historical representation) of that individual and is embodied in a body in conformity with that existential descriptor(‘s historical representation) of that individual as an embodied agent in this world. Two concepts can be invoked to ascertain the partial stability of apparent identity, namely, apparent external resistance and apparent self-constitution (along with the collective-interaction between the same). The expression ‘apparent’ indicating the non-intrinsic nature of that phenomenal-phenomenological expression of identity. Essentially, we are dealing with relatively internal and external factors that constitute and preserve or transform current sense/s of identity. This understanding of embodiment has important ramifications for our treatment and understanding of the parallel concept of divine embodiment. Let me now examine these ramifications in the light of the above. (383)

	We, as a person in this world, are given an embodied form because the net resultant of forces in this world establish the same and currently preserve the semblance of the same. Our body maintains its sense of being a body through various mechanisms that establish, preserve, repair and not disrupt that current form of embodiment. Via this degree of integrity that apparatus of the body is given a sense of center in this world about us. Furthermore, its identity is checked by internal and external factors. Internally our bodies only go so far. Externally, the world impinges upon that body and also checks the range and nature of its manifestation in this world. E.g., radically increase air-pressure and that body would shrink accordingly, or, radically decrease air-pressure and that body would expand accordingly. In both situations integrity is maintained until compromised. Furthermore, we are embodied-in-a-world-before-others. On the other hand, in a dialectical contrast, the influence of our embodiment extends beyond our embodiment into the world theoretically in an unfettered form. On the other side of the street I can wave at a friend, talk to them on our cell-phones, write them a letter, possibly send a souvenir of our friendship on a space craft set on a course beyond the solar system, etc. How does this centring of identity, the necessary contextualization of embodied identity and the potentially infinite extension of its influence effect our conceivable interpretations of divine embodiment? Would not such ‘talk’ about divine embodiment imply a centring of Divine agency, a natural limitation upon Divine embodiment despite the potentially infinite extension if its influence in this World-of-Life? I believe the theologian on these types of issues concerning divine identity would have to concur lest they open themselves up to charges of an incoherent and impossible theological constructionism. In many regards, unless treated metaphorically, classical theism has set itself up to be complete deconstructed! That type of impossible project as constructed and projected by its theologian supporters, as a result, cannot serve the religious interests of their congregations. Assuming that a religious life can have an important role in the life of the individual and community then it behooves theologians to construct a theology that can support those aspirations. I am not being dogmatic here, only practical! If you are a religious person of a theological persuasion then one trusts that your theological perspective on life can do the theological work intended for the same! Hence the raison d’être behind these philosophical investigations – assuming a theological perspective on life is conceivable how should it be conceived  that allows it to do constructive theological work for that individual and any possible community of such like-minded individuals? (384)

	Our last question, Q25, is a philosophical mine-field in its own right. Just as the role of something (and its immediate concept of ‘substance’) has a problematic history equally the emptiness of nothing (and its immediate concept of ‘vacuum’) also has a problematic history and future. A first point that can be made is that both ‘something’ and ‘nothing’ (substance and vacuum) should not be seen as possessing any form of an intrinsic existence. Indeed, they should be seen as correlatives, concepts that mutually co-define each other, by default, without actually defining an ideal, separable polarity, i.e., a some ‘thing’ or a no ‘thing’. In this light then, ‘something’ is ‘the relative absence of absence’ and ‘nothing’ is ‘the relative absence of something’, or, for the word ‘absence’ one could substitute the word ‘presence’ in a contrary sense, i.e., ‘something’ is ‘the non-presence of absence’, and, ‘nothing’ is ‘the presence of absence’, etc. Epistemologically these parallel concepts of ‘something and nothing’, ‘presence and absence’, ‘substance and vacuum’, etc., depend upon each other for their conceptual functioning. The invocation of the relevant metaphors should not mislead us, should not be treated literally! E.g., metaphors behind the concept of ‘matter’ should not assume a literal reading of, e.g., ‘a complete filling of a certain space’, etc. For instance, although water can be made to fill a glass container to the very brim we must not assume that that space is now completely filled. Let us say that water in the glass is quite hot and into it we carefully add a certain quantity of fine castor sugar making sure we do not spill that water over the sides of that glass as that sugar quickly dissolves without displacing that water. Here something has been added to something else without that something else overtly signaling that this has occurred after this event of its insertion of one form of matter into another Alternatively, merely removing the air from a closed container does not make a ‘pure’ vacuum and even if that vacuum were less dense than what might be encountered in deep space physics has shown that the vacuum is still structured, practically possesses a certain energy (even though, theoretically, current physics cannot properly account for that practical value?), is ‘perceived’ as a certain volume of space itself treated as a swirling sea of virtual particles rushing into and out of virtual existence in such a manner so as not to overtly transgress laws such as the conservation of energy and principles such as Heisenburg’s uncertainty, etc., etc. Philosophically, the point I would like to make is this: that neither ‘something’ nor ‘nothing’ can be intrinsically defined (as self-existent, self-subsistent, etc.). In other words, metaphors may be both necessary and useful in our navigation through this-world-before-others they cannot be treated literally either epistemologically and/or ontologically. Likewise, the theologian needs to exercise the same degree and manner of awareness in the formulation of their theological constructs. Hence my reflections on the nature of embodiment, limitations upon the same, the extension of power/s beyond those confines, the need for a field of genre-related activities, etc., and a possible community of similar agents involved in the establishment of such genres, etc. In terms of theological identity, work and value at least these recommendations need to be taken into account, and argued for either positively or negatively, in order to construct a potentially viable theological scenario(?). (385)

	One of the key concepts of physics, in my opinion, is the concept of information. Space, time, energy, mass, gravitation, forces, virtual/non-virtual particles… are all expressed in and through concepts (metaphorically generated in certain genres of rhetorical application) that define identity, and therein, information. As argued, value (in its non-theological sense) is the emergent conjunction of textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness. The net summation of this dialectical interaction, within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension, is the value of that situation under examination as simulated/re-simulated. The realization of that value is then a representation of the same! Seen in this light information is then the value realized though the dialectical intersection of these three co-defining ideal poles or polarities. The nature of that dialectical interaction being non-scoped as discussed previously. Now, as this information is representative and represents the simulation/re-simulation of a focused situation under examination it follows that transformational rules can be applied to the same in order to allow us to translate our understanding of that situation from one perspective to some other providing transformational access is open to such a such shift in perspective and that that process of transformational translation is properly and appropriately conducted, i.e., conducted in a valid manner (in accordance with the nature of that transformational process). However, as representation is essentially mis-representative it behooves the person conducting this process of translation to conduct a supplementary process of de-mis-representation in our treatment of this same situation. By such means our presentation (in its phenomenological retention) is allowed to move more closely towards the ‘simulation of that simulation’ (a process that should not be treated as a ‘representation of that which is pre-representational to that simulation’!). In this light what can we say in general about the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of information? (386)

	Now information is communicated and this is conducted in the ‘space’ between the re-presentation and the representation being communicated. The representation to be communicated is itself re-presented in being communicated. Hence the dialectics of representation/re-presentation. Moreover, being a representation of a presentation/re-presentation it follows communication is essentially ‘between’ the ‘re-presentation of the representation’ and the ‘representation of the re-presentation’. Effectively, this occurs because information is an essential snap-shot of the situation being represented (holistically, a simple snap-shot of that complex relationship between, dialectically, that being represented, its being a representation of re-presentation, its being a re-presentation of a representation of that relationship, etc.). Only through a communicative relationship of the relationship of that being communicated is there, therefore, an act of communication. Hence that communicated is the textual in its to be communicated meta-textual contextual setting, i.e., as both a communicative genre of activity dealing with representation, and, in its actual context of representational re-presentation. In the former it is more the general character and content of that message as a message qua message, whereas, in the latter, it is the actual act of emission in its actual context of being emitted. But, once we recognize a message as a message it has already been emitted in the context of its emission even if the message is not received by the intended receiver. In this we must also perceive the message in its transmission as both intentionally structured and intentionally directed (even if the intended recipient is no longer in existence or never was in existence or never came into existence in order to receive that message). Furthermore, the reception of a message intended as a message implies the receiver must be in a position to recognize and interpret that message as a both a message and as a message possibly intended for them if it was intended for them, or, at least, as a message that could have been intended for them if recognized as a message). Lastly, meta-textual considerations imply the requisite transcendental and non-transcendental machinery be in place in order to receive and recognize that message as a message qua message. All of this has ramifications for our coming to understand the concept of theological work! (387)

	In theological communication, hypothetically, we need the intentional act of emitting a message by the relatively Divine and/or the relatively non-divine, the reception of that message by the other party, and, its recognition as a message from either the relatively non-divine and/or the relatively Divine. In this process communication is either effectively ‘direct’ and ‘internal’ or effectively ‘non-direct’ and ‘external’. E.g., if I want to move my leg I form that intention and let it discharge itself to that effect. However, if I am paralyzed from the waist down I can still discharge that intention indirectly, e.g., by asking someone to assist me in that task and letting them move my leg for me. In the widest meta-textual sphere of influence conceivable this distinction is essentially overcome. However, in restricted embodied terms of reference we need to note the relativity of this type of distinction! In a theological sphere of concern, if the emitter and the receiver are considered as contained within the same epistemological organization then communication is effectively ‘internal’ and ‘direct’. On the other hand, if communication is experienced as between forms of embodiment then that type of communication is effectively ‘external’ and ‘indirect’ in the terms of this context (even if the necessary relationship between the emitter and the receiver must, itself, be experienced in a direct mode of interaction [since all relationships are directly engaged even if their represented content is only indirectly ascertained]). In the latter we effectively have a coming to consciousness, or its Divine equivalent, of that realized between forms of embodiment. In the former we have a coming to consciousness, or its Divine equivalent, of that within the same overall form of embodiment. In either type of situation the message is found and left repeated through various process of repetition and through a dialectics of repetition a message is re-formed and eventually received as such. Only through a hermeneutic circle are sense, meaning and meaningfulness transcendentally capable of transmitting information, i.e., value, and being able to receive the same as a message qua message. The dialectics of emission/transmission/reception depend(ing) on the functioning through the relationship engendered between the consonance of mere repetition, the foregrounding of dissonance through sheer repetition and re-iterated patterns of bare repetition (as discussed on numerous occasions elsewhere) that establish an iterative reinforcement of perceived intent, etc. There, in the light of this theoretical discussion, the theologian needs to take into account emitter, medium of reception and receiver along with an intentional ability to communicate and be communicated with. Of course there is one short cut here and that is to deny or ignore the element of a Divine emitter, Divine (meta-textual) medium and/or a Divine receiver and see theological communication as only an illusion in this regard. Needless to say the committed theologian will reject and/or disregard such an alternative reading that invokes only a non-theological translation of this value in that type of ‘theological enterprise’. On the other hand, such considerations must remain open for the philosopher whose intentions in this regard are transcendentally neutral and non-transcendentally committed. In our hypothetical research, in this regard, we have adopted the latter position (regardless of the fact whether we might have or might not have a non-transcendentally committed theological attitude in the natural coursing of our lives as spent passing through this World-of-Life)! Let us assume, in balance, that a theological attitude transcendentally adopted and adapted does have theological value to the extent that such institutions have existentially persisted through the course of history (and found to be experienced as ‘valuable’ for those people so inclined to favour that type of orientation). Furthermore, let us assume, that even if the Divine Objective was a theological illusion without a Divine Object (as a [Supreme] Divine Subject and/or set/s of Divine Subjects) that such a ‘discipline’ still possessed existential value for those who have adopted such an attitude. However, let us re-focus our hypothetical attention on what would be transcendentally necessary and non-transcendentally necessary for theological communication to arise and for a positive theologically oriented value to arise from the such overt engagement and/or covert interaction. Since I have shown that the idea of the Divine makes sense and in making sense must have some form of an instantiation in this World-of-Life before-us for-us it follows that this aspect of our topic, namely, Divine communication, should be approached and indeed can be approached. But, let us continue to make our approach towards this aspect of our research from a hypothetical point of view, without epistemological and/or ontological commitments by virtue of our keeping in place an appropriately, properly and validly exercised overall transcendental suspension! In this process let us weed out what is sense from nonsense as a cereal farmer might separate the grain from the chaff. To this end, therefore, let us set out to see if this aspect of this topic has both existential merit and objective value, and, that the apparent work of the theologically ‘inspired’ is more than the mere sifting of sand; when and where the sheer repetitive shifting of the same could supply no real nourishment for those religious souls other than that which arises from the theological project itself despite its objective being no more than an illusion…? (388)

	For the sake of following through this argument let us ask, rhetorically, if the Divine were to show itself/themselves how would such a ‘showing of itself/themselves’ be recognized as such? For us to be able to do this, find this manner of recognition to a degree satisfactory to this attempt of both recognizing and interpreting the ‘apparent’ Divine message, what is transcendentally necessary for this type of task to be critically attempted? Undoubtedly, we need to have a functional genre of activity that allows us to both recognized ‘Divine messages’ and interpret them in the manner as imputed to have been intended; therein hermeneutically ascertain that, indeed, a degree of value considerably greater than that merely invested in this act of interpretation, etc., has been realized in this process of interpretation (in accordance with hermeneutic theory). That being the case, if it were to be the case, then I would argue, on hypothetical grounds, that this is no different from our ability to both recognize an ‘ordinary’ message in the course of our daily life and to engage with its text in order to determining its probable, seemingly inteded, intentional significance. Where a ‘difference’ must appear is in the manner of its communication to us and in the adoption and adaptation of the medium or media chosen to conduct this exercise. We don’t normally turn on our television sets to tune into the Divine. We don’t normally walk across the countryside to tune into the Divine even though the brooks may be babbling and the trees can no longer stand silent before the wind. But let us turn the point of my humour here around and ask ourselves: “might not the medium be the message and the message the media?” I.e., as the Divine both can be defined as considerably greater in its epistemological organization than that of a human or human institution and as ‘that’ which ‘must-be-there-for-us’ could it not be the case that in its emergence from this basis in ‘our’ world that the Divine could inductively imprint itself, in turn, upon lesser forms of epistemological organization, like us, from which it emerged, namely, in part, from our very own being and in our very being-before-others-with-others? Being from such an epistemological basis as this in the first place it would then be quite reasonable to ask, given this complex argument, is there or is there not evidence for the same? So, the Divine may well have already shown itself/themselves to us but we, the poor ‘worms’ that we be, have not yet been in a ‘position’ to recognize the same? But, surely, being able to conduct this type of philosophical investigation must mean we are already in some sort of a position, in the light of that positioning, at least to begin to evaluate the theological merits of such an attitude towards this hypothetical, phenomenal-phenomenologically imputed complexion of the Life-World (‘that’ which already has been argued for as ‘existing’ in the world to some extent or other in some manner or other that may or may not be adequate to the causes and commitments of traditional and/or non-traditional theologians?)? Such an argument arguing from an internal semblance of communication. On the other hand, a theologian, on the grounds of the limitations of all forms of embodiment and a natural ability for the relational significance of relationships to theoretically infinitely extend beyond the mere limits of that embodiment itself (and only being obstructed through relational forms of resistance), an external semblance of communication could also be argued for? Furthermore, it could be argued that the genre of theologically inspired reflection and activity in the world may well already be capable of helping us to a recognition of what might be expected in an act of Divine showing or revelation and Divine communication (both aspects being considered from a reciprocal point of view)? So, it behooves the philosopher, the theologian and/or their congregation/s to start on this type of traditional ground first, either in general terms of reference or specifically w.r.t. an already well-thematized tradition, in order to appreciate the current and future merits of this genre of activity already pre-established for us to some extent or other. I am not saying here that this is adequate for this type of critical evaluation that I have in mind. On the other hand, we can start no where else! In this task, therefore, we must share this traditional religious ground and adopt and adapt the same to our tasks to hand; our only freedom of choice being to choose wisely (or sympathetically, perhaps inter-denominationally) and to conduct and re-direct our investigations thereupon in the most re-productive and creative manner as found open to us in and through the exercise of a thorough, critically exercised, overall transcendental suspension! To this end let us now begin… having already made a tentative, provisional beginning on this somewhat slightly firmer ground…? (389)