On this theme of communication I would like to offer the following reflections. I have a calendar with views of the universe as taken by the Hubble Telescope. On the page for December we have two small, rather dense looking galaxies about to collide that look like two playful mice with long thin tails. Other than these two mice, the rest of the space about them looks a very lonely place. Then, in thinking, you realize that these mice-like galaxies probably have billions of solar systems in each of them and they probably have already collided. What devastation might be ensuring at this very moment in time from these two galaxies merging into one? How many planets with life-forms, and even cultures, in these two systems are at this moment being torn apart. Then, in the empty loneliness about these two playful ‘mice’ I suddenly realized that many, if not most of the small points of light were equally universes in their own right being not really point-like ‘stars’ but blurred shapes possessing a variety of forms from wheels to ellipsoids to amorphous smudges. My feelings of loneliness magnified to think that none of these galaxies could possibly communicate with each other, and, that even communication within these distant galaxies would be practically denied their residents just as we in our own galactic cluster seem to be denied the ongoing existential richness and reciprocity of communication in the fullest sense. That, within each and every galactic system communication for all practical purposes was, if not impossible, at least impossible to obtain in a dialogical frame of reference. What are the obvious implications for a theological-like perspective given this cosmological tyranny of both time and space? (390)

	It would seem that very fabric of space-and-time, while supporting communication at close quarters, is, itself, ostensively an obstacle to communication across distances greater than the dimensions of our solar system. The fundamental limit here is that of the speed of light and the amount of time we have as human beings and as members of various human institutions that are able to outlast the live-spans of its members as an intact institution. Now, I have already argued that systems could ‘communicate’ chaotically, i.e., through chaotic preconditions a change of state could take place within the entire system more or less instantaneously, i.e., within the confines of the relativity of a moment (as defined by the nature of that system). Here such ‘information’ would be the time of this change of state and what that change of state actually entailed. I have argued that this model models intentionality, i.e., as a chaotically re-constituted state of affairs that to some extent is aware of such transitional occurrences, through re-iteration, in the consequential re-direction of intentional focus realized in such an ongoing process of transformation... On this model I have proposed a hypothetical parallel between non-divine intentionality and Divine intentionality. Similarly, entanglement could allow for a ‘communication’ of information across vast distances, again within the space of the moment, through the collapse of that state of entanglement and the expression of its pre-determination or momentary determination of asymmetry of outcomes (in the asymmetrical products of its chaotic transition from a state of entanglement to another state of entanglement or relative non-entanglement). Even though essential information about the nature of a relationship is spread throughout its sphere of influence equally from each point within that sphere of influence, theoretically, the same radiated beyond that relationship to be only effectively resisted through this apparent tyranny of time and space. To some extent the practical sphere of influence of a relationship is controlled by the fabric of time and space itself. Alter the apparent constitution of the same and you alter these dynamics. In looking at this wonderful photo of these ‘two mice’, in its representation as a simulation of space, I found within the course of this simulation I could effortlessly redirect my attention within its simulated vastness almost without effort. If this area of the cosmos was treated as a ‘simulation’ by Divine intentionality could it too, effortlessly, redirect itself within its embrace. Now, as possible state of affairs (this shifting of our attention from one area of space to some other, albeit represented) could we now not argue for the possible-actuality of this type of state of affairs to some extent or other on the grounds that there can be no pure potentiality?  But, since when is the traversing of a map equal to a voyage, or, in the same vein, the looking at holiday photos equivalent to actually having been there on holiday? No, to argue along these lines and invoke a full resonance between simulated frames of reference and a meeting with a full modal compliment of that properly invoked and would be actually visited, as would be expected to be met from  meta-textual point of view, we would need to propose mechanisms that might allow that degree of an actually-simulated-form-of-a-transitional-engagement to occur either in those simulated terms of reference or the terms of reference of that being comprehensively engaged, albeit simulated to some degree or other? To this end let me propose the following thought experiment. In Q20 I asked is it possible to go faster than the speed of light? We could certainly conceive of such a possibility but in a normal space-time frame of reference physics has seemingly ruled this possibility out. If we were to understand why there is this physical limitation perhaps we might be in better position to understand in what manner it might be surpassed, re-negotiated, or simply by-passed. I would like to conjecture, purely as a speculation, that it its the fabric of time and space itself that ensures this limitation. Moreover, the theoretical speed of light, in its ideality, is never actually reached, it would seem, but only approached and approached more closely in those situations where there is less of this space-time ‘fabric’ to obstruct this degree of an ideal realization. So, e.g., I might observe or interpret light as moving faster outside this solar system between stellar systems, and, even faster in the vast regions of space between galaxies, and, far away from galactic clusters, etc. Of course these differences will be infinitesimally minute in comparison to the type of situation when light passes much more slowly through, e.g., water or some other transparent medium. Where is this leading? I would like to propose the following possibility, namely, the hypothetical ‘neutralization’ of the space-time medium as a mechanism for the diminishing of the effects of this space-time fabric; itself reflected in the vacuum energy of that volume of space-time under consideration. Just as we can influence the localized expression of this fabric by adding material influences as would be witnessed, e.g., in increasing the relative index of refraction, etc. through increasing the density of that transparent medium. By a process of reversed-extrapolation this should allow light to pass through that volume of space at a faster rate. However, the trend would seem to point to an even closer approximation of the theoretical speed of light itself and not some faster speed. How, then, is this limit to be overcome rather than merely more closely met? It is at this point that I would like to explore this model of neutralization; a modeling that might assist us in the formularization of an effective model of communication across vast distances of space currently rendered impractical for communicational purposes? For a start how could this theoretical state of neutralization be achieved? If we envisage space-time on a microcosmic level as a veritable irruption and dissipation of virtual particles, moment by moment, indeed, defining the nature of the relativity of that moment, in accordance with the type of position it has in that space. Then, if we were to alter the rate and/or composition of that flux then we may well be able to alter, for a start, amongst other things, the actual speed of light as it passed through that special medium relative to that time-space ‘outside’ that special medium? Indeed, might not the very simulation of space, itself, be therein re-simulated, albeit in accordance with those new conditions; those new relatively differential coordinates imposed upon it? Perhaps the very phenomenon of space-time itself could be simulated along with its assortment of phenomena therein (and merely simulated and not, therein, set up in such a manner so as to causally interfere with the ‘actual’ time-space of which it is, apparently, a merely simulated representation when if it were to be otherwise it would act as a simulated re-presentation of causal phenomena that could then be re-written retrospectively and thereby contradict the apparent inviolability in the time direction of causal functions?). Philosophically, this asymmetry of causal relations would seem to be a given both transcendentally and non-transcendentally (i.e., empirically, etc.)! Indeed, it would appear to defy the very nature of intentional directedness among other things! However, in and through a process of neutralization, perhaps by supplying some sort of potential difference in these four axes of coordinates, we could re-simulate time and space as it might appear from elsewhere? Just as a live broadcast on television can re-simulate a certain phenomenon somewhere else. Then, we need to entertain what might happen if we simulated portions of time and space that contain objects already within those confines and/or the introduction of certain objects? And what might happen when we alter those conditions and potential-differences, etc? Or, we might find that special segment of time-space itself is propelled in and along a path across the relatively normal, non-special presentation of space and/or time. To conclude this series of speculations what are the implications I would like to envisage there? For a start, the above, if it were to run in accordance with the use of metaphors as suggested and possible scenarios as presented, it would imply that communication could be effected if one or more parties were privy to this simulation of some other area of time and space? Could there be a reciprocity of information here? Or could this only occur if both parties were simulating each other’s region of space? That, therein, and there between, if both parties were able to establish a virtual process of actual dialogical communication then could not a real process of information/information processing be envisaged as proceeding? The introduction of information into that simulation might imply its transmission if laws of causality were not interfered with? Of course, this type of simulation is dependent upon the nature of its constitution and we should perhaps leave this thought experiment at this point to merely offer the possibility of its possibility and that its coupling with chaotic forms of entanglement might allow this tyranny of time and space to be overcome if only virtually?? The theological consequences (and non-theological consequences) of such a scenario would no doubt be profound if they could be followed through in a non-theoretical fashion? But, I am merely suggesting a select set of hypothetical possibilities here. Indeed, these suggestions of the manipulation of time and space in order to transcend this non-absolute dichotomy between the actual and the virtual could well be used by theologians, etc., to re-formulate traditional concepts of omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc., even though that which is phenomenally limited in time and space will remain as a limited phenomenon in time and space despite what input may or may not have been contributed to it by Divine and/or non-divine forms of being-in this-World-of-Life!? Indeed, as all intentional and intentional like expressions of power must be limited it follows that even the power of the Divine, hypothetically, must be treated in the same manner, i.e., as limited in its (transcendent-immanent) expression, albeit, hypothetically, as manifested on a greater level and in a greater depth of epistemological organization (which should find itself reflected in such and in any relatively valid interpretations of the same, or, i.e., in its core interpretation this degree of validity must also be existentially present!)! (391)

	I would like now to explore how, philosophically, the relational process of interaction could be modeled (and eventually formulate a universal model for all types of relationships and the processes whereby relationships themselves, in turn, can both be discerned and integrated in their interaction within the open-endedness of the Life-World). For the sake of ‘simplicity’ I will initially do this on an elementary-like level between two particles/participants, i.e. as in a current as previously defined, and, between three or more particles/participants, i.e., as in a system. First let me model something like gravitation (under normal conditions) that appears to follow a simple inverse power relationship between parties; either through processes of attraction or repulsion, and, then, quark/gluon-like types of interaction where there is no inverse power relationship as experienced in the former type of situation along with the apparent impossibility of an absolute isolation of participatory identity (i.e., asymptotic freedom). These distinctions among themselves (and this distinction between a two-party current and the three or more party system) are, correctly, artificial distinctions as also previously noted. A one particle/party emission being formed in the disruption of a current or system and the production, therein and there from, of a relatively separate particle or party (plus the conservation of systematicity). But, as just stated, there can be no absolute distinctions of emission, currents and systems as all three orientations are transcendentally and non-trans-cendentally contextually situated in the nested contexts of meta-systematic terms of reference, etc., etc! 

	An important contribution of Einstein’s was the modeling of the time-space continuum as a warping of that fabric. Moreover, physics also envisages a force as being distributed, at a distance, through the exchange of a certain vector, i.e. through the medium of an exchange mechanism, usually in the form of an exchanged ‘particle’. Now, for the sake of my argument here, and for the sake of simplicity, let me argue that we only have two types of forces, namely, ones that are attractive and ones that are repulsive. How, we might ask is the mere exchange of a force-vector going to achieve this type of influence, i.e., create either a state of attraction between two particles/parties or a state of repulsion? Indeed, furthermore, how is this apparent interaction at a distance effectively put in play? I would like to better model this by combining these two models of the ‘warping of the fabric of the space-time continuum’ and the ‘involvement of exchange vectors’. Let me construct this metaphorical visualization through noting the following set of sequences.  First, envisage the time-space continuum as a field whose overall flux density is a reflection of those parties that inhabit it. Second, let us artificially isolate that field and only consider that field as being in existence between two, and only two, parties. Third, in this interaction let us envisage both parties as exchanging the same type of force vector. Fourth, let us see the density of that field as a reflection of the interaction of these two particles (without overtly focusing on the nature of that medium itself from the perspective of the phenomenal nature and density of the flux of its vacuum energy). Fifth, let us envisage these exchanged particles as canceling each other out. Sixth, as a result let us envisage the nature of that field registering a potential ‘drop’ created between those two parties through a canceling of that same degree of vacuum energy put in play through the canceling of those exchange particles. Seventh, let us envisage as a result of that potential drop being experienced between those two parties an ongoing resultant shifting of those two parties closer together in their ‘orbits w.r.t each other’. For convenience let us treat one of those parties as considerably more massive than the other and that as a consequence we have a solar system-like formation with the less massive particle effectively orbiting about the more massive particle. Eighth, as a result of this potential drop or difference between these two parties they move closer together, etc. (e.g., like water going down a bath plug). In the opposite scenario the exchange vectors don’t cancel and we have a differential density of gravitational interaction between these two parties greater than that of the surrounding space. As a consequence, e.g., like falling down a hill, the opposing forces seemingly propel these two parties further part. So the role of the exchange medium in both situations is to alter the differential density of the intervening field be that in an attractive mode through a canceling of the intervening medium, or, in a repulsive mode through an accumulation in the relative density of the intervening medium. Hence gravity, e.g., operated through an apparent partial cancellation of the intervening medium of space-time, and, e.g., two electrons find each other repulsed through the increased density of the apparent field flux created between them. (393)

	Now, in the interaction of the strong force within the nucleus of an atom we don’t have a straight out inverse(d) power relation, a relationship that involves asymptotic freedom (in a bound context). In this type of situation it would appear that we have an exponential force increasing with distance but then suddenly collapsing after going beyond a certain limit; that at no point on this distribution curve do we find a segment that acts in an inverse-power relation. It is almost as if there were a super glue that not only tightly keeps compressed those parties subjected to that particular force but also ensures that no party can have an actual, isolated state of separable existence. Now, gluons have been proposed as the necessary theoretical cement or ‘glue’ between quarks. It is almost as if a rubber band or a series of rubber bands were keeping together a certain state of affairs. Any serious disruption of that system merely creating a new system or a series of new systems and certainly neither a current nor a set of currents and/or an emission or a set of emissions in keeping with the theoretical nature of quarks and/or gluons. In this type of inversed situation, where an equilibrium has been reached wherein a system has a certain bound energy that cannot be disrupted by a force not equal to the same, how are to envisage this archetypal type of situation? Seemingly, the further apart we pull this system the more it absorbs that energy and that which is defined by that system cannot be redefined outside it. On the other hand, systems can be disrupted but only, I would add, by creating new systems, and, sometimes the redirection of currents and/or emissions outside the conservation of systematicity. How might we model this form of systematic conservation? (394)

	To answer that question I would like to propose a similar model to that as envisaged to have theoretically occurred between a current situated between two parties attracted to each other. In this instance, however, it is as if this contracting glue wants to ensure that this system of particles is permanently kept bound in that form. Producing, therein, a state of equilibrium (realized through the interplay of some other force or series of forces that stop matter, under relatively normal circumstances, from contracting to a black-hole or similar). But, of course, as noted, there are differences. How, in the light of this discriminating rubber band theory, can we model exchange mechanisms. Furthermore, should we be making a distinction between a current (and/or entangled emissions) or systems (both considered from internally/externally oriented perspectives)? (395)

	So, how do we model the nature of this type of typical exchange mechanism in either situation (without asymptotic freedom but with only a bound freedom, and, those situations that demonstrate an asymptotic freedom but in a totally bound context)? To this end I would like to tentatively propose this provisional solution. From an external point of view let us suppose an outer cloud of particles is created (and not cancelled out [perhaps gluons?]). However, internally another cloud of particles is created and canceled out [perhaps quarks?]). As a net result we have a pressure to collapse the outer cloud onto the relative vacuum created in its centre? Hence this crude modeling of the strong force as an outer cloud of non-canceling exchange vectors which ensures a contracting onto a relatively internal vacuum created by phenomena that effectively cancel each other out. Of course, I only propose these models as models and not in any absolute literal sense! It may well be that the vacuum as a medium itself could perform this same type of function as achieved through the imputation of that outer cloud of relatively non-annihilating factors (in their character as repulsive elements and hence this inwardly contracting differential). Or, is there a more elegant solution here? (396)

	Let me now look more widely at this phenomenon of asymptotic freedom. In the ground state, so to speak, a system has contracted to its lowest energy levels. It can contract no further, and, to ‘expand’ needs to be invested with the requisite degree of energy to engage such with out ever being able to break that relationship that remains in the form of that relationship; the only other option being the transformation of that system into some other system via that process of transformation that may or may not exhibit asymptotic freedom. It seems to me that this concept might also be able to explain why light is not treated by the fabric of space-time as a material entity even though it has a gravitational moment, i.e., is effected by gravitational fields, etc., when light passes the sun, e.g. Perhaps the energy of light is contained within the dimensions of the Planck moment (as a Planck particulate), i.e., within the Planck dimensions of a moment in space-time? Within that event horizon it effectively cannot be observed! However, through quantum fluctuations, akin to Hawkings radiation, some information leaks beyond the Planck dimensions of that ‘momentary’ particulate; enough to allow it to register as a particle/wavicle of light in this world of observation. That, in some measures, all relationship in their relational uniqueness demonstrate to some degree or other this aspect of asymptotic freedom, but, through quantum fluctuations some degree of information is shared with the world relatively external to that relation space shared by its essential constituents (in a non-scoped dialectical-like process of not-being-seen/being-seen). In the example of light, and all forms of non-materialized energy, the internal dimension of the particulate taking the form of a quantum loop or string, etc? (397)

	With this modeling to hand, let me now examine the theoretical dynamics of a relationship assuming these principles that the relationship cannot be absolutely reduced to its relational constituents, that the centre of a relationship/relating parties is relative, that all relationships have a psychic sense of centre, that all relationship hypothetically extend to infinity despite the limitation of exchange mechanisms and being often hijacked by intervening parties whose collective resistance also re-defines the effective phenomenal limits of those state of affairs. (398)

	One of the reasons I have constructed this complex modeling of interaction on a primitive level is to understand how it might operate on a less primitive level, say between persons, and, by extrapolation, as might occur hypothetically between the Divine and the non-divine, and v.v? So, what are the essential points that are preserved here regardless of the level of epistemological organization involved in the expression of the relative complexity of those parties themselves? (399)

	For a start, let me say that it is the nature of the exchange mechanism/s that defines the nature of that relationship. So, in accordance with my previous modeling, in a gravitational interaction between two parties the exchange vector is a graviton (i.e., a momentary series of gravitons emitted by both parties in accordance with their effective mass) through whose repeated mutual canceling is realized a potential drop in the relative constitution of that localized space-time continuum that, in effect, brings those two parties continually closer in their crossing that localized and differentially re-constituted space-time continuum. But, can this model even remotely be applied to that of human relationships, e.g? If so what exactly is or are the exchange mechanism/s between two or more people? Without doubt, this is the reciprocity of gift giving, etc., along with an already demonstrated recognition and/or intuitive awareness, to some degree or other, of a capacity to mutually/non-mutually interact in a productive fashion with each other by those parties from the individual/collective perspective of those parties. E.g., two friends enjoy each other’s company. Indeed, they add to their identity through this interaction as ‘two friends’ in their being able to stand before each other in the relative uniqueness of this particular orientation. The various natures of the exchange mechanisms here would be gifts, recognition of obligations, an individual/collective recognition of the non-mutual/mutual productivity of such an engagement, etc. Basically, as there is always an inequality of power relations between any two individuals it is the successful mediation and resolution of that unique power differential that establishes/dis-establishes this relationship and its preservation/non-preservation through time. That to understand this we need to invoke our current understanding of harmonic theory, i.e., an ongoing relationship is realized through the continual resolution of the relative dissonance defined through the asymmetrical nature of those implicated power relations in the relative consonant contextual totality of that relational field as that apparent relationship itself as it too is mediated within the context of the Life-World. Let me now examine this complex understanding more closely…. (400)

	Various phenomenological observations on the nature of relationships can be drawn, rightly or wrongly, and, extrapolated, provisionally, as principle features in the constitution of a relationship in general. In time we should be able to weed out those feature that are not invariantly present in a certain of type of relationship or in a relationship treated from a general point of view. In the light of this type of research project I would like to make a number of suggestions as to possible candidates that fulfill this criterion of being invariantly present. As a relationship is effectively a transformational process I would also like to focus on those features that ensure the instigation and preservation of that type of functional aspect. Then, with such work to hand the relational philosopher could then take an even more abstract-theoretical turn by attempting to understand what are the common features that thread together and theoretically integrate such work under the umbrella of an integrated relational philosophy. Indeed, an explicit or implicit understanding of a relational philosophy is going to underpin the effective, critical functioning of any form of philosophical endeavour and our reflections upon the same! By these means establishing this comparative examination of physical relationships vis-à-vis interpersonal relationships, and, by extension, personal/interpersonal relationships vis-à-vis some semblance of the theological (regardless of the ontological status of that sense of the ‘theological’) (and what possible relationships might be able to be entertained between the sense of the Divine vis-à-vis themself/themselves?)? But, first, let me conduct this type of creative comparative analysis between the theoretical physics and a phenomenological appreciation of interpersonal relationships. (401)

	A sign of the existence of a relationship between e.g., two people, is the positive presence of an observation of gift-giving between those two individuals ( through “the presence of presents”). On a physical level the existence of relationship is indicated through the operation of an exchange mechanism in some form or other. Can we draw a comparison. From moment to moment a physical relationship persists through the ongoing nature of this exchange mechanism. E.g., the interaction of gravitons continually creates an appropriately warped, and continually re-warped, semblance of space-time fabric and therein its topography accurately reflects the nature and distribution of the matter and material-like vectors of that locality that have collectively interacted to produce and re-produce through this process of transformation this localized integration and expression of space-time. Now, I have argued on numerous occasions elsewhere that it is only through the ongoing resolution of the relational differences within the commonality of a  relational field that there is re-produced the ongoing semblance of a ‘relationship’. If a primary mechanism in the formation of a relationship between two people is this process of gift-giving how is the relationship to persist in the absence of a stream of gifts moment to moment? And to what extent is gift-giving a process of reciprocity and met in a reciprocated flow of gifts? Surely, we could envisage the scenario where a variety of gifts are given but are just not seen to be accepted, for what ever reasons, by the second party. But, of course, the deeper problem here is how do we interpret an act of giving as an active trace of the presence of an active relationship when gift-giving cannot be a perpetually re-iterated affair and never a continual/continuous process. I would like to draw a corollary here between non-virtual and virtual dimensions and their parallel to the senses of a non-potential orientation and a potential orientation. Gift-giving is never just the giving of a gift but also the imposition of an obligation a set or series of obligations and/or the recognition of an obligation, a set or series of obligations, etc. The recognition and acceptance of a gift is the recognition and acceptance of a meaning-complex whose constitution in the Life-World is greater than the mere token of that complex, namely, the gift. Indeed, it is also possible to trade obligations without the actual exchange of material tokens (other than signs of an agreement arranging such transfers). So, the nature of exchange in a relationship, indeed, the transformational instigation and/or continuation of that relationship is achieved through a process of exchange between presented tokens and/or obligations, and, that no token is given/received without some semblance of an interpreted co-presence of a sense of obligation (even if that ‘obligation’ is downplayed or rendered as that ‘without obligation’). Not that this interpretative element is necessarily isomorphic and co-mutually interpreted by the donating/receptive parties; just as no process of interpretation is either absolutely commensurable or absolutely non-commensurable (with the apparent ‘intentions’ of the transmitting party)! What ever is donated and/or traded, tokenwise or obligationwise, we might like to view these two aspects of a relationship, namely tokens and obligations, as mirroring these two interconnected senses of the non-virtual versus the virtual. Indeed, that through their collective flow we can argue that the relationship is allowed to come into relational existence and find itself preserved in some historical sense of time through a re-constitution of the interaction of these two dimensions in the overall process of exchange. Moreover, without taking a literal, metaphysical interpretation of cause and effect, we might say that the presentation of relative tokens act like causal-preconditions and that relative obligations act like causal-conditions or causal-consequences and that this latter dimension of the relatively virtual has the potential power through its transmutation into the relatively non-virtual (or ‘actual’) of instigating, transforming and preserving that relationship (until such a time this unique continuity of that particular relationship needs to be reiterated or finds itself disrupted). So, and thankfully, gift-giving is not a continually continuous affair – the obligational dimension promoting/de-promoting this semblance of a relationship. (402)
This semblance of a relational dimension is an indication of the presence or facticity of that relationship, i.e., its existential excess; the degree to which it is a relationship above and beyond the mere summation of its materially oriented components. This dimension is transformational in orientation, i.e, is instigated and augmented/diminished through the ongoing exchange mechanism/s of that relationship. Because a relationship is both internally produced/re-produced, i.e., re-simulated, through the dynamics of that exchange mechanism, and, because a relationship is always situated in a complex relational context (that is just not like itself) it follows that these internal and external aspects of the relationship, not being the same or identical, must imply a necessary complexity of exchange mechanisms in order for it to distinctively present to-itself and to-us as a phenomenon-in-the-world; this complexity being re-presented phenomenologically in our understanding and appreciation of the same. Hence this need for a pluralized complexity of exchange mechanisms in order for it to be appreciated as ‘a’ relationship-before-us in the transcendental medium/media of the Life-World! (403)

	At this point I can re-introduce my concept of relational resistance by noting the nature of the exchange mechanisms as a complex internal economy in an interaction with a complex external economy within the ambit of the empirical world (as constituted in the Life-World). So, by default the nature of that which resists that relationship is already embedded in the nature of its exchange mechanisms. E.g., if a relationship between two people is an occasional occurrence between those parties, merely when they happen to be present together, it follows that that relationship is only effective in those limited terms of reference. So those parties, in this type of instance, are more like acquaintances rather than friends. Thence geographical separation is enough to temporarily or permanently sever that relationship. In the same vein, because of this virtual-obligational dimension we might note the following maxim: “that a relationship is in ‘evidence’ when there is gift-giving, but, the ‘strength’ of that relationship is only in existence to that extent in regards to what those parties actually would give up, or sacrifice, on the behalf of the other (or, more correctly, the relationship itself).” In the light of this phenomenological-like observation we can perceive the resistance of a relationship as the psychic boundaries beyond which it is neither operative nor effective. Just as when acquaintances are geographically separated those parties effectively cease to be ‘friends’ whereas friends will maintain the relationship in some form or other by some means or other (whether those tokens of continuing affection be by letters or a yearly Xmas card, or some other means, etc.). (404)
	
	Let me now look more closely at relational reciprocity. I have always stood by the maxim that a relationship is always reciprocated, that there is always a two-way process of interaction between all the parties (directly or indirectly). But, by at the same time, each individually treated power-relation within a relationship can never be co-identical and co-equivalent to any other in that relationship or any other in the same moment of time. Of course presentation of tokens and/or the interpretation of current or prospective obligations may from time to time appear to be approximately the same the point I am making is that there is never an absolute matching of power as perceived through the lens of any one party w.r.t. the lenses of any other. The only time there is an equality of power between parties in a relationship is at and after the apparent ‘death of that relationship in historical time (which, through the non-effectiveness and non-operation of that now historically defunct relationship proves my point by default!). What, instead, is to be better understood here is how mutual is a relationship from each perspective of the metaphorical lens/es of the parties in that same relationship? This assessment is to be existentially determined through a transcendental appreciation of the re-simulation of that relationship from both a collective point of view and from all individualized points of view as would appear to be had by the participating parties in that same relationship; a process of sampling conducted as a transcendental determination through a re-simulation of that relationship/s in the context of an appropriate, proper and valid overall transcendental suspension (as discussed elsewhere). In an existential appreciation we essentially appreciate to what degree the relationship is in existence from that particular point of view above and beyond the mere material input of those participating parties. By ‘transcendental’ is meant our phenomenological appreciation of this relational, relatively non-material dimension, in question as conducted in and through the critical auspices of an overall transcendental suspension conducted from an appropriate external point of view, a proper internal point of view and from a valid interrelationship between these internal and external points of view (relative to the apparent relational extent of that relationship itself). In this critical process of empathetic re-simulation of the relationship we effectively intuit to what extent it is in existence above and beyond its mere material imprint in this world as we-stand-before-it, as we-stand-before-others, and, as it-appears-to-stand-before-us. Through this simulation of the relationship and our intuitive assessment of its historicity and the direction of its ongoing historical resolution of relational dissonance we therein come to discern the overall balance between its inathenticity and authenticity of its being-in-this-World-of-Life though our being able to essentially sample this phenomenon (through re-simulation) and therein appreciating the essential nature of that micro-representative representation of its-being-in-the-world. Therein, forming this appreciation of this phenomenon from the apparent conjunction of its own point/s of view and our own point/s of view from within the transcendentally balanced perspective of our ‘relationship’ with that relationship. As previously noted, a relationship is in existence both internally and externally through the current exchange mechanisms that operate both internally and externally! Thence our ability to sample the representation of that phenomenon and appreciate to what degree it is a uniquely integrated phenomenon-there-for-us. For example, how do we experience the phenomenon of a broom. By engaging in a process of sweeping and therein experiencing this primitive phenomenological repertoire of ‘sweeping’ we enter into an understanding of what constitutes the meta-textual dimension of the genre of a broom. Now it stands to reason, that if the broom-head became disconnected from its handle it could not function as a sweeping implement to the same extent and in the same manner as when it was read as a ‘broom’. This augmentation of our human existence though our knowledge of brooms is usually something that facilitates our passage and existence through this World-of-Life. By such means we experience through re-simulation the potential existential excess that can be engaged when we enter that particular relationship in an appropriate manner through a correct ascertainment and operation of the implicit genres of activity signaled as resident in that particular relationship. Our appreciation of a relationship bearing the requisite fruit when we appropriately, properly and validly recognize and exercise these signaled genres of activity. Of course our appreciation and overall assessment can be conducted in virtual terms of reference if we are already cognizant of those implicitly resident genres of activity. E.g., a nicely made broom can be appreciated as ‘good’ broom without having to use it just as a beautiful Chippendale chair in perfect condition need not be sat upon to properly appreciate the same, etc! So, how is reciprocity instigated and maintained in a relationship? Through the requisite interrelationship between non-virtual and virtual dimensions that essentially characterize that relationship and establish its existential facticity! Now, as the core relational dynamics of a relationship are always existential our determination of the relational authenticity of a relationship must be an appreciation of the overall harmonious interaction within that relationship as intuited from a more global perspective.  But, as a relationship is unique and that uniqueness is only truly appreciated by its participating parties how can we, who are relatively outside that relationship if not a participating member therein, find ourselves in a position to appreciate the same? Through our being immersed in the uniqueness of the Life-World itself as all relationships are resident therein we too can find this manner of potential access to any relationship by virtue of this degree of an open transcendental membership, albeit from the limited perspective of where we currently stand in this World-of-Life. Moreover, through the existence of external facets a relationship can also be appreciated through a meeting of those external factors of its overall exchange mechanisms and the interactions they share with the exchange mechanisms internal to the constitution and re-constitution of that relationship. Hence our direct and indirect access to a relationship despite the limitations naturally imposed through the very nature of our being-embodied-in-this-world. That our ability to be able to ‘interrogate’ a relationship reflects our ability to empathetically re-simulate that relationship although no relationship can be either fully naked or fully clothed before us even if we be fully paid up members of that relationship as internal participants in its constitution. Now, as such ‘witnesses’ how are we to establish that reciprocity is not just a theoretical prescription and is always an invariant facet in the actual phenomenological constitution of any relationship (be it subjective or non-subjective in orientation, etc.)? In other words, how do we establish the invariant necessary presence and persistence of a true reciprocity between all participating elements of a relationship? By establishing this fact of the intuited sense of ‘participation’ since the process of participation, whether non-virtual or virtual, whether internal or external, whether direct or indirect, etc., has to be in place first for that relationship to be a relationship, i.e., for its participant to be engaged with each other within that relationship in some form or manner! Moreover, for a relationship to be in existence it must psychically be in existence above and beyond its mere materially-oriented footprint as traced out upon the space-time fabric that constitutes that particular phenomenon in the phenomenological reality of this world of embodiment despite all the limitations placed upon us by time, place, other people, and our own limited sense of self, etc.  (405)

	How are we to now establish that reciprocity, in some form or other, is a permanent fixture of the relational landscape? Through a realization that the sense of the relational is realized, from moment to moment, through the ongoing resolution of the relational dissonance that constitutes the non-scoped dialectic of that relationship as both identical with its participating factors and as not identical with these participating, relatively material elements. This ongoing resolution of relational dissonance transmuting those identities as ‘identities participating within a certain relationship, series or set/s of relationships’ and therein permits us to engage those ‘relational identities’ phenomenologically since without this re-produced and re-simulated semblance of significance there would be no relationship-there-for-us to engage with either directly or indirectly! Hence, our engagement is guaranteed by virtue of our appreciation of a relationship-being-there-for-us! That, our phenomenological awareness of the presence of a relationship guarantees our appreciation of that relationship to some extent or other but does not guarantee the truthfulness or validity of that appreciation especially since our engagement is a process conducted in time. Just as “communication is a process in time” so too our thematization of apparent truth values of that under examination is also limited by the limitations imposed upon the nature of our current embodiment in this World-of-Life. Being a process the determination of its truth value(s) must also be a process and hence open to mis-interpretation especially in its initial representation/s of that re-presentation, although, in the goodness of time, our ability to be critical has the forever provisional possibility of our being able to re-engage in a process of truth rectification. But let me discuss this critical feature of the relational process in more detail elsewhere. (406)

	In the form of a thought-experiment, or something similar, let us try to visualize what the bare minimum of conditions is necessary for the functioning of a relationship, and, for our coming to an understanding of the internal structure of that relationship from an external point of view? (407)

	A relationship must be a relationship between something and something else. But, this relationship can only occur through an exchange mechanism hence the implication of three parties in the internal relationship of a relationship! Hence this tripartite precondition. Thence the ‘operated upon’, the ‘operator’ and the ‘active operation of the same’ by virtue of what exchange mechanism/s are present to accomplish this semblance of an operation. This tri-modal set of preconditions establishes the internal relationship of that relationship. For that relationship to be experienced as a relationship by us, who are relationally external to it, implies an additional set of preconditions, namely, the previously noted relationship treated from a relatively external point of view, our own sense of embodiment (able and capable of entering into that type of relationship) or some other second party, and, the exchange mechanism/s that enjoin that internal relationship before our relatively external interaction with it or with that second party! Hence this six fold set of preconditions! Each of these six states, to some degree or other, because of their being constituted within the same relational bounds/boundaries, should be able to be re-written in terms of each other via transformational rules that allow us to re-constitute the same simulated form from that re-simulated point of view. Furthermore, because of the constitution of significance is arrived at from relatively internal and external points of view it follows the necessary implication of the hermeneutic circle from those relatively internal and external points of view. Although I have argued that to treat the world for each person as if it were constructed across an almost irreconcilable chasm, dividing an internal sense of self from an external world of otherness and others, as a metaphor this modeling of the world has obviously been very successful. However, treated literally by hordes of totally misguided philosophers and you end up with a recipe for nonsense wrapped in interminable commentary as they try to wriggle out of this trap of their own devising in order to extricate themselves from its impossible dichotomies (that should be discounted through their counter-intuitive impracticalities as interpretatively discovered in, and contrasted with, lived experience. But metaphors cannot be treated literally, a fact of life that the professional philosopher should be only too well aware of! On the other hand, in trying to understand the internal dynamics of a relationship and the fact that all relationships are also situated in a relational context let us re-examine this type of contrast between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ as long as it is understood that these two ‘orientations’ are transformational orientations and not absolute differences in perspective, etc. That clearly understood I would like now to introduce and re-work a former tool, developed by myself, called ordered analysis (in the context of an ordered philosophy). Initially, it was developed for distinguishing and integrating processes of thinking when we deal with various types of existence, such as, e.g., square-circles, red coloured oranges, ideas of an orange, the perception of an orange image, the possible fact of an orange and the actual fact of a particular orange having existed in my lunch box at a particular moment of time… I argued that to think an actual fact one had to think all five prior steps in this process (in order to enter this sixth order and its appreciation of the interpreted factuality of its apparent factuality). A revolution in this analysis occurred when I stopped treating these orders in a linear fashion, and, instead, treated them as transformationally interconnected possibilities in a circular fashion [superimposing this six-fold process onto the threefold divisions of the hermeneutic circle in order to realize six relatively fundamental types of judgment even though the transcendental basis of judgment depends on all six forms and that only some degree of privileging, or the relative suppression of the three poles of our hermeneutic circle, allows us to re-shape the ensuing processes of judgment along the lines of the essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual (in such a manner as to parallel that ‘linear’ list now treated as circular)]. Now, as the first three categories of this complex style of analysis relate more to thinking we could treat them as relatively ‘internal’, and v.v., w.r.t. the second set of categories that deal with perceptual space and potential/actual factual states of judgment and hence a sense of the relatively ‘external’. So, now, let me re-visit this philosophical tool and see how these six-fold pre-conditions/conditions as just noted above can be fitted into this (type of) mould? (408)
	
	After some thought I would like to attempt the following ‘fit’. First order considerations would take pre-integrated components/facets as non-integrated participatory ‘material’. Integrate them in an internal field and we find our second order of analysis. Invest that interaction between first and second orders with the necessary third party of an exchange mechanism or set/series of mechanisms and you will arrive at our third order of analysis. Treat this internal entity as invested with an external exchange mechanism or set/series of mechanisms and you arrive at our fourth ‘level’ of ordered analysis. Treat that relational context in its ideality of type as the next level of analysis and you arrive at our firth order of analysis. Lastly, thematize this potentiality of type as that historically thematized and you end up with our sixth order of analysis wherein we appreciate the apparent factuality of factual-like presentations. Now, the remaining ‘problem’ is this – can we treat this necessary progression (in thematizational complexity) in a circular sense? Obviously! If we need internal dynamics to establish the ‘material’ to-be-situated in an external sense of world then none of these divisions can be absolute and dichotomous. Thus the much celebrated divide between the so-called ‘internal world’ and ‘external-world’ necessarily presupposes (among many other thins) these six orders, etc., and thence there can be no more of gulf than the impossibility of their being no distance between an image seen in a mirror and what that image is an image of when also seen by that same observer! Treated both as distinctive transformational process-descriptions and as transformational stages prescriptively set in a certain pre-ordered sequence it follows that a ‘full’ phenomenological appreciation of phenomena necessitates the development of all six stages in this pre-conditionally structured scheme. With this newly re-developed tool to hand let us explore a number of questions relating to the phenomenological constitution of our experience of phenomena and the reality of those types of experience. (409)

	For a start can internal exchange mechanisms be the same as external exchange  mechanism? In other words can we collapse a third order perspective and a fourth order perspective back into each other? I believe the answer here is no! Even if the internal exchange mechanisms and external exchange mechanisms utilized the same type of exchange medium or media because of the nature of the work to be done there can no true equivalence because of this actual difference in the direction of orientation in the performance of that process of exchange? Internal dynamics cannot be the same as external dynamics whilst, at the same time, the sense or orientation of the internal cannot be absolutely non-accommodated with the sense or orientation of the external. E.g., a certain male in seeking to express his wish for marriage buys a diamond ring from the jeweler to give to his intended fiancé. The exchange mechanisms entered into, from the significance of a semantic point of view, between that male and the jeweler’ are quite different from that between the ‘boyfriend and his fiancé’. In the first money is exchanged with the diamond ring, and, in the second case, the promise to marry is exchanged with the diamond ring. Even though in both situations the same diamond ring is exchanged the significance of both relationships is quite different! From the perspective of the more meaningful relationship for that boyfriend, namely that relationship between his fiancé and himself, we might consider his relationship with the jeweler as being relatively external to the same. So, even if the jeweler, as a friend or relative, were to give that diamond ring as a wedding gift to that guy about to propose marriage, the nature of these two relationships can never be identical even though in this new situation no money has been traded and the only token to have been transferred is that same ring! Then, if a thief came along and stole that ring, again, that ‘relationship’ would be different just as, in a dispute, that ring were returned by the fiancé, or, in the event of her non-acceptance of that proposal of marriage she must return that same ring. Of course, the object lesson here is also the fact that the same overt medium or media of exchange does not necessarily imply the same type of relationship is being established since internal dynamics and external dynamics must be invoked to fully account for our representation of the same! (410)

	Now, this model tentatively accepted, how can we prove our claim that these six pre/conditions are truly circular and commutatively mutable through transformation. E.g., might we not have merely two circular processes of the internal and the external and never the twain do meet? For a start we live in the transcendental unity of the Life-World! That accepted, we must accept the proposition then that no relationship is absolutely unique, only relatively unique! That, once we have interrelated with the relationship under examination we are then in a position to determine the inner nature of that relationship with which we are currently involved, in theory at least. Just as in hermeneutic theory a text is neither absolutely incommensurable nor absolutely commensurable it follows that in our relational examination our ‘interpretation’ of that under examination is forever located somewhere in between. Of course limitations may well be present that will effectively resist our relative intrusion, still, in theory at least, there must be some openness in this respect! Even if a relationship is with that which no longer exists we can still examine its traces and from a holistic appreciation of the same determine to some extent the essential nature of that deposition; be it intentionally initiated or non-intentionally initiated originally. Again, theoretically, if we are in a position to ask a relevant question about that relationship then it may well be that we are also in a position to decide the same (even if we also recognize that currently we are not yet in a position to do this). (411)

	Interestingly, the topography of the interaction could also, metaphorically, be a figure of eight, i.e., an internal loop and an external loop with the interaction taking place between internal exchange mechanisms and external exchange mechanisms (with such processes of exchange taking place also in both spheres of concern) (which also re-introduces a degree of linearity  between these two loops?)? (412)

	At this point I would like to explore this concept of an exchange mechanism in more detail. I am intrigued by the possible asymmetrical role of intentionality. Let me explain. Let us look at the internal relationship of a broom. In its external use the dictates of genre are such that we utilize the broom as a sweeping device. Now, one broom-head and one broom-handle make one broom when intentionally put together by the maker of that broom. But in this relatively internal relationship between broom-head and broom-handle what exchange mechanisms are in play? Are there any? Would glue or nails or pins or a carefully crafted pre-determined fit in any way be seen as a possible exchange mechanism for the coming together of the relationship between these two components of a broom. I don’t think so. It would appear that in the intentional act of making a broom an external relationship to that potential broom applies itself in such a manner that the broom-head is assembled with a broom-handle and hey presto we have a boom. This asymmetry between a two-part internal relationship and three-part external relationship would seem to be the hallmark of an intentional relationship? In this situation what are the three parts or aspects of that external relationship? One person, broom materials and the intentional energy/activity involved in its assembly(?). In an another example let us look at an arranged marriage where the parties neither see their intended spouses nor have any say in the procedures of their marriage. Internally we have only two parties in no form of an relationship other than that as imposed externally in the social setting of their respective families and according to custom. In the goodness of time they may well come to love each other and form a mutual, ‘authentic’ tripartite internal relationship, one that would then persist regardless of external factors that attempted to either promote or disrupt the same short of extreme measures to assist that promotion or disruption. Again, we appear to have here an instance of internal-external asymmetry in the number of basic relational pre-conditional/conditional factors? Indeed, an indication of an intentional act, namely, in this instance, the arranged marriage between two relatively disinterested parties. As a result, in general, we get the formation of a transformed state of affairs between two (or more) parties brought together by the intentional activity of an external relationship. Exploring this possibility of asymmetry further let us look closely at the following situations. Suppose someone sets out to break a broom. The broom cannot do this itself. The resulting process realizes these two separated pieces of the broom-head and the broom-handle. The absence of exchange factors would appear to indicate that this occurred in an externally related act of intentionality (as per my provisional definition of the intentional previously alluded to). In the breakage of the broom we have a process, i.e., a process of transformation. The broom itself cannot do this therefore it must be supplied externally. Hence the presence of an intentional act in the course of this transformation. Once this breakage has occurred and nothing else relevant occurs it implies that we then have the ‘termination of that intentional act’ as per this additional definition, i.e., ‘that when transformation ceases in an asymmetrical relationship then the application of that intentional act has also ceased’. Now let us look into the following situation. Say we have two monkeys with flees that are being irritated by the same. But neither monkey by themselves can remove their own fleas. From the monkeys’ point of view this relationship between them and their fleas is no real relationship. There are just no exchange mechanisms in play adequate enough to support the contention that this state of affairs is either desired or enjoyed. From the point of view of those fleas the opposite may be the case. They digest blood and in the process defecate their waste products. On the other hand there is a solution for those monkeys. Monkey A can have their fleas removed by monkey B, and v.v. Here we have a trading of obligations; more or less along these lines, “you remove my fleas and I will remove your fleas”. Again our definition is functioning both statically and actively (in the course of this transformation from possessing fleas to possessing none as they perform this flea removal exercise upon each other). Back to the broom – when we are no longer manufacturing the same would it not be the case to assume that what we are left with is a residual relationship? Of course on a molecular level of analysis we have the world of chemical interactions and beneath this level of epistemological organization miscellaneous nuclear forces, gravitational interactions, etc. So, on a very basic level of analysis we might assume that the relationship ‘within the internal world of the broom’ has also persisted in a non-intentional manner, whereas, on a conventional level, it remains merely a residual relationship unless actively being used in acts of sweeping (even though internally it still remains a residual relationship)? (413)

	In the above examples there are a number of principals we should perhaps recognize! Namely, first, active or passive asymmetry between relational factors results in merely a relationship by default; merely through the contiguous nature of the parties as they are found in their shared geography. Such asymmetry is an indication of a partial relationship where there is a relative non-interaction of those geographical parties in that same period of time - a lack of current transformation indicating either a remnant relationship or a residual relationship. That in a mere relationship, a partially non-inter-acting relationship, where in a certain relational perspective (defined by the degree and manner of its epistemological organization) when we are effectively presented with only two facets of a relatively internal relationship, i.e., without the effective presence of an active and interactive exchange mechanism, a remnant relationship is one in which those two relational stages are present without an effective exchange mechanism in such a manner that those ‘participant’ are merely contiguous through non-intentional-like historical processes, whereas, on the other hand, a residual relationship is one in which those two relational stages are present without an effective exchange mechanism in such a manner that those ‘participant’ are contiguous through intentional-like historical processes. The differentiation of the intentionality here revolving about an intentional test that interprets that situation as being either historically assembled without intentional-like processes of re-direction or as only being possible through the utilization of such intentional-like processes of re-direction. That determination of a symmetry/asymmetry is a contextually dependent consideration (since, e.g., from the perspective of the fleas, they and the monkeys are in a relationship by virtue of the former’s transformation of blood cells from the latter, the same being used as a source of food, whereas, from the same simulated point of view the relationship between the monkeys and the waste products of those fleas could be seen as a residual relationship, and, thence, in its own fashion the relationship the fleas have to this food source upon the fur of the monkeys is essentially intentional, or rather, intentional-like!? Again, in contrast, on molecular and nuclear levels the remnant relationship of the waste products of those fleas left on the skin and fur of those monkeys should now be treated as tripartite and non-intentional-like, etc, through chemical and nuclear reactions, etc.). Thus, do we not have here a successful definition of the presence, at some point of time, of intentional-like activity when the co-relevant internal relationship is asymmetric and essentially bipartite, and, this use of the intentional test interprets the ‘textual translation’ of that under examination as not possibly self-arising, i.e., as only arising through the intervention and re-direction of intentional-like processes? (414)

	In the light of the above distinctions between a remnant relationship and residual relationship let us look at the following examples. First, we have a cardboard tube packed with gunpowder and length of fuse. In this situation the participating elements have been bought together intentionally, i.e., under no conceivable situation could this assembly have arisen in any other way except through processes of intentional-like redirection. So we have a non-interacting partial relationship in the form of a residual relationship. Now, light that fuse and the situation changes. We now have an interacting assembly of elements about to explode through detonation by that lit fuse. This relatively internal relationship is now no longer partially non-interacting since at the level of its intentional design we have an explosive interaction through operative exchange mechanism releasing the impact of the ensuing explosion. In a second situation let us imaging we are at the beach and about to eat a freshly cut sandwich. It has just been placed on our plastic plate when a gust of wind deposits a thin film of sand over this same sandwich. Here the partial relationship between the relatively non-interacting sandwich and this wind blown sand could be described as a remnant relationship since the sand was deposited by relatively non-intentional-like forces. Of course the sand could have been put there by someone, if someone was present who could do that, but, in this instance, I saw the sand suddenly blown along the beach fall upon my freshly cut sandwich. Now, some people would see that as bad luck or as bad planning on my part. Then, again, others of an animistic persuasion, might interpret this situation as ‘willed by the gods’ or something similar. So, how do we differentiate between intentional and non-intentional processes, and, intentional and intentional-like processes?  For a start, there must be some degree of difference(s) otherwise we could not use those or any other distinctions. The world cannot be just the result of intentional or intentional-like forces. Then, again, can we describe the blood sucking designs of fleas as intentional-like in orientation? A distinction to be useful needs to be just that, namely, a ‘distinction’ since the apparent use of a pseudo-distinction that makes no real distinction is not a real distinction! Then, again, let the  frame of reference decided upon make this distinction for us as long as a real distinction is allowed to operate. If you see the habits of fleas as intentional-like in orientation then so be it. Or, if you do not consider the behaviour of fleas as directed in an intentional-like manner then, again, so be it. Just advance a real distinction and be relatively consistent with its use, and, alert the reader when you are using same or similar expressions in an altered sense, etc. (415)

	What are the theological ramifications of this type of relational analysis? As the Divine, when treated as a theologically viable concept, must have some form of a relationship with the world and all therein it follows that the same, this hypothetical type of relationship, being in a process of transformation, must adhere to the same mechanics and dynamics of our relational philosophy! Then, assuming the Divine exercises some form of divine intentionality, it follows that this ‘relationship’, both with them and their relationship with us, must conform to the same guidelines and limits as demonstrated in a properly constructed relational philosophy; albeit one treated in general terms of reference and/or specifically when theologically detailed by a theologian et al. Although this specification of detail is the particular province of a theologian as a critical philosopher we also can examine such speculative demonstrations and critically evaluate, in general terms of reference, the probable viability of such proposals. At the very least helping us to weed out those non-viable proposals that infringe upon the structural-processes obviously inherent in a coherently thematized relational philosophy, etc. As already noted throughout these essays we need to take seriously onboard my general criticisms of an patently imperfectly constructed instances of classical deism, as in, e.g., their impossible treatment of the Divine as absolutely wholly Other, etc., or, when formulated in some other mistreated metaphorical sense, etc., that runs counter to our current understanding of a relational philosophy, etc! To this we can add unreasonable prejudices against an embodiment of the Divine; a non-absolute, ongoing unification of presence and conceptions of the Divine that involve no limitations on the exercise of power by Divine forms, etc; along with blatant forms of mistreatment of metaphors through processes that involve their excessive non-metaphorical literalization, etc. (416)

	Of course, the above criticisms accepted, the theologian must then wrestle with the following questions: is our relationship with the Divine, and v.v., the province of an external relationship through an engagement with forms of transcendence, or, the province of an internal relationship through an engagement with forms of immanence? Or, more correctly, in my opinion, is the hypothetical possibility of such a relationship only demonstrated through an overall transcendental suspension wherein there is an ongoing dynamic equilibrium and balance between these orientations of the transcendent and the immanent? As the practice and appreciation of judgment is conducted through the auspices of an overall transcendental suspension then surely it should follow that any form of an engagement, coupled with some form of an appreciation of the same, must arise through just such a moment of balance despite any inclination to retrospectively re-treat our interpretation of that type or types of experience through the lens of a transcendent and/or immanent point of view? Undoubtedly, such re-treatment is valid within genres of literary and religious activity as long as we regard such constructions/re-constructions as forms of re-treatment; i.e., processes of interpretation trying to make historical sense of such ahistorical-like moments of transcendental experience. In some measure returning existential significance to the re-simulated insightfulness of metaphors as long as such devices are not treated too literally (despite the almost inevitable tendency of institutions to make dogmatic assertions to the contrary that may try to undermine the attempted re-creation of those moments of transcendental experience perceived as sacred; i.e., experience perceived and treated as occurring in a sacred sense of time and space, and, as occurring in a sacred sense of person and place or context?)! (417)

	Because all relationships have these two aspects of the relatively internal and the relatively external we must now ask ourselves if theological constructions should be viewed entirely through either lens or only through both lens (simultaneously or co-synchronically, i.e., regarded as ‘simultaneous’ but analyzed separately)? Because a relationship to be in a relationship must be in both an internal relationship and a situated internal relationship it follows that, correctly, our review of such constructions should entail both an internal review and a external review, and, a review of the consequences of such an interrelationship between these two aspects. Thence the need for a dialectical appreciation of these aspects considered both separately and jointly. Indeed, this dialectical awareness offers us a critical mechanism for reviewing all types of relational experience be they in type religious or non-religious, theological or non-theological in orientation, etc. What is entailed here in this critical observation on the nature of relational experience? (418)

	In type the nature of religious experience apparently seems to fall under various traditional (and non-traditional) categories, e.g., non-thematized general intuitions (such as the experience of the ‘religious aura’ surrounding a religious building or icon, etc.), thematized intuitions (such as, e.g., a more definite experience and interpretation of the former), chanting aloud and silent prayer, meditation, forms of revelation, and, contemplation of the (theological-like) unity and integrity of the Life-World, etc. This list is both hypothetical and provisional. So, e.g., in the Biblical account of the Burning Bush and the ‘voice of God’ was heard how would that type of experience be classified in the light of the above scheme? For a start it could be interpreted as revelatory and external, i.e., there was the divine sound of a voice and it was heard with real physical ears. On the other hand, it might be interpreted along internal lines as, e.g., that there was the revelatory intuition of a voice although it was heard internally, i.e., with the mind or spirit or soul but not the physical body per se. Now, as a rule of thumb I would like to say that we should be suspicious of religious experience being interpreted purely in either an internal mode or an external mode. All experience is situated experience! There can be no pure internal experience nor pure external experience. The Life-World transcends such dichotomies. What are the ramifications of this theoretical observation (in this fact that we can make no absolute distinction between the internal and the external!)? (419)

	One might object that 	if Moses saw a burning bush, that in seeing that ‘bush’ he must have been seeing purely in an external mode (in the same manner so-called empiricist and representationalists insist that what is seen is ‘external’ [to our sense of embodiment, etc.]). Moreover, as we ourselves are not on fire when reviewing that bush, as Moses might have, then that relationship must be external! But the bush-ness of that bush and the fire-ness of that fire are not seen externally! The internal is the recognition of type, of potentiality, of possibility… a recognition of genre activity wherein the possibility of doing x, perceiving x, etc., are envisaged and exercised in that type of experience and its appropriate reflections in both passive and active senses of intentional involvement. In the Life-World there is neither a real external world nor an ideal internal world – only their mutual cooperation; albeit with a non-critical emphasis on one or the other, or, in a critical overall transcendental suspension, on a mutual equality of both aspects or modes of being relationally sited. Furthermore, a critical mode of construction and/or re-construction demands the invocation of an overall transcendental suspension in order to allow the representation to critically re-present itself! So let us conclude, at least in the critical re-construction of a reported experience, religious or non-religious in orientation, that our choice of a critical perspective demands the invocation of our re-constructive research in and through the transcendental auspices of an overall transcendental suspension properly, appropriately and validly conducted! Consequently, let us do away with such talk of ‘external worlds’ and/or ‘internal worlds’ even though we accept this relative boundary between that internal to a relationship and that external to it. (420)

	Should one conclude, therefore, that a critical re-construction of religious experience, and experience in general, should be conducted through the invocation of an overall transcendental suspension? Yes and no. Overall such research should be conducted from such a critical perspective, in essence the only critical perspective. On the other hand, to exercise and finesse the distinctions made within the hermeneutic circle one needs to advocate a set of shifting biases that in themselves are not overtly conducted in a critical manner but in their collectivity ensures a certain degree of criticality does enter their re-calculated equation? Thus, in the light of this observation all types of religious experience, and all types of non-religious experience too, need to be in some form of an overall collective harmony between these sequentially invoked, dialectically treated facets of the internal and the external. Hence all forms of experience need to be ultimately reviewed from the transcendental perspective of a harmonized balancing of all contrasting modes (be they transcendent or immanent, internal or external, real or ideal, textual or meta-textual, etc., etc.)! In such a light let us also equally dismiss all talk of a pure realm of internal religious experience et al. (421)

	The same applies to the externalities and internalities of a relationship. When a number of parties get together and agree on a certain course of activity there can be a series of unintended consequences that may or may not have been intended upon some third party, that, in turn could be consequentially relayed to the parties internal to that relationship. These considerations take into account this (legal and economic) concept of externalities.  Similarly, non-anticipated and unrelated consequences can also impinge upon the internal dynamics of a relationship; either influencing the evolution of that internal-oriented structure or leaving it relatively unchanged; the evaluation of this additional input being favorable, unfavorable, or neutral in its overall calculus. That, effectively, the internal relationship arises through the harmonization both arbitrated and non-arbitrated within that relationship by those parties. Hence this contrasting concept of internalities.  Furthermore, increasing internal orientation re-/produces the increased sense of the currently virtual, whereas, in contrast, the increased emphasis upon the relatively external is to effectively miss its meaning and existential meaningfulness through an over-concentrated focus upon that relationship in a limited concrete sense, etc. Thence, we must assume that it is impossible to conducted any form of research purely in internal or external modalities, and, to conduct that research in a critical manner one must read that type of experience through both orientations in and through the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension. Now, I would like to extend that argument to the extent that an appreciation of ‘religious experience’ must be conducted in transcendental terms of reference, i.e., in and through the auspices of an overall transcendental suspension which itself is equally dependent upon both the sense of the transcendental and the non-transcendental (i.e., the empirically oriented), etc! That, ideally, the religious experience that is not ‘rooted’ in reality is not rooted in ‘reality’! Thence this tentative, critical guide that reports of religious experience not properly constituted in transcendental terms of reference should be correspondingly, to the same extent, de-promoted, discounted, etc. On the other hand, one should also recognize that no experience can be constituted in terms that are absolutely divorced from this element of the transcendental dimension. Discrimination essentially hinging on our ability to appreciate to what extent this dynamic balance between the transcendental and the non-transcendental was actually entered into. By implication I would also argue that religious-like experience cannot authentically arise in those transcendental terms of reference unless instituted in the pre-imposition/ongoing imposition of a transcendental suspension!  (422)

	Our navigation of the Life-World it is effectively conducted through the harmonization of, and between, the internalities and the externalities that are thrown our way. To understand this process of the arbitration of our passage through this transcendental sense of World let me look more closely at what is meant in these concepts of the internal, internalization, internalities, the external, externalization, externalities, arbitration, production/re-production of intentional authenticity, etc. (423)

	In the ontological sphere we have the internal orientation of a relationship and the external orientation of its relational situatedness. However, when we take an experiential, epistemological perspective that made part of an intentional relationship is effectively internalized within the experiential confines of that epistemologically simulated relationship. To confuse matters more these four perspectives of the internal and the external and their respective internalizations may or may not be, in part, open to transformational processes for the subject entertaining that particular relationship or type of relationship. E.g., subject x is in a relationship of friendship with a certain person y. These two friends are in the Blue Mountains looking at the landscape in the valley below them from the lookout at Echo Point. Now, x sees this landscape and y also sees the same landscape even though x cannot exactly see what y is seeing, and v.v (since neither can see through the other person’s eyes). But, that is no problem as both friends are involved in an act of looking at the landscape from the same lookout in the same period of time and in this mutual act of looking-at-the-landscape are discussing particular features of it like the appearance of Mt. Solitary directly opposite them. In this they are effectively involved in a relationship of looking-at-the-landscape-together. This is a generic genre of activity understood by both parties. In their conversation it would appear to each of these two parties that the other party knows what to do in this type of situation and they effectively communicate to each other that they are both currently involved in the same type of activity whilst looking at the same scenery. Using our previous list of categories what can we say about this process in the light of the same. Each person is involved in a direct relationship with the landscape through observing it. Both people are mutually engaged in this process with each other and hence the internal aspect is this relationship of these two friends admiring the landscape. Now, in experiential terms of reference this type of experience is not only possible for them to experience but that they are currently experiencing the same in terms of its direct thematization of detailed content. So, the internalization of this relationship is open to these two parties by virtue of their internal participation in this type of relationship. This detailed participation facilitating a thematization of detailed content implying they are privy to the internal aspect of this relationship in an experiential perspective. Thence they are experientially internal to this relational type of experience in such a way that they have moved beyond the simulated experience of type to the simulated experience of detail (albeit more closely in type the finer our understanding of such detail). In their internalization of the internal dynamics of this relationship they are subject to the internalities of this relationship – may be in the form of colourful bird flying past, etc., etc. Similarly, the contractual consequences of their intentionally directed mutual actions could have consequences currently unknown to them since, as it happens, as these two persons have become so rapt in this vista they have temporarily forgotten that they were meant to have met a couple of friends fifteen minutes earlier at a restaurant just up the street and who are now waiting outside these same premises. But, fortunately, one of the parties remembers this prior agreement and tells their friend that they had better quickly catch a taxi in order to get to this same restaurant. They do this and find their two friends still waiting. They are very happy to see x and y arrive even though they were kept waiting for the twenty minutes. Their two friends x and y apologize. In this apology they state that they were at Echo Point looking at the sublime landscape and had forgotten they were suppose to meet up for lunch, fortunately remembering before it was too late. Interestingly, in x and y recounting what they saw they were expressing to these other friends what was internal to that relationship as had between x and y, i.e., these other parties are simulating from an external point of view what is being communicated to them by x and y. Then for x and y to express this vision of the landscape they are effectively externalizing the same, i.e., projecting it as a non-experientially present presence from an ontologically oriented point of view (in their invocation of the same as an intentional object in its externalized objectivity). Now, correctly, none of these modes can be treated as absolutely separable from any other mode although that does not imply, at the same time, an absolute openness and equality of access in a process of transformationally simulated acts of entry. By this is meant that because we cannot invoke absolute modal distinctions here it does not also mean that we have an equality of transformational access in our passage from one modal orientation to some other. This brings us to the concept of the arbitration of our passage through this World-of-Life. First, though, let me define the concept of internalities. Internalities are pre-intentional features of our intentional processes as engaged in internal and internalized relationships. Being in existence prior to an act of intentional thematization they are effectively pre-intentional to this process of thematization. Being pre-intentional they are effectively beyond our control (although not absolutely beyond our control by virtue of our ability to intentionally ‘appear’ to select and engage the same). Because our thematizational simulations emerge from this pre-intentional ‘material’ it implies that we cannot be in absolute control of our processes of intentional formation. Thence our navigation through this world must be with pre-intentional internalities, post-intentional externalities and thence the relationship that emerges between the same. Thus arbitration must come into play through these three interrelated dimensions as entertained through an ongoing harmonization of the same. This process of harmonization effectively being established through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, or, in other words, enlarging upon the presence of an inherent overall transcendental suspension that must already be present for that process to be already recognizable as a distinctive, coherent intentional process – i.e., in and through resolutional processes of pre-intentional internalities realizing internal/internalized intentional states of significance; in and through resolutional processes of post-intentional externalities realizing our intentional appreciation of intentional consequences either advertent, or, more likely, inadvertent; and, in and through the navigation and harmonization of pre-intentionally treated internalities versus post-intentionally treated externalities as they overlap on the experiential thinness of our path(s) through this World-of-Life; a thinness pointedly refined through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension which, paradoxically at the same time, produces/re-produces the immense existential depths of our simulated/re-simulated World-of-Life (by virtue of this harmonization and plurality of transcendental access as we move from one internal relationship to the next through processes of intentional internalization and/or externalization, etc., and, through the natural re-productive, exponential-like magnification of a ‘folding over’ of experience through the ongoing interactions and enrichments of that appropriate field of experience through the re-engagement of that type of experience as entered into in time both non-virtual and virtual, both treated relatively non-reflectively and reflectively, etc.)! An authentic experience, whether religious or non-religious in orientation, being experienced through the appropriate thematization, experience and resolution of these various interconnected modalities. To re-clarify the complex simplicity of the above let me put in more concrete terms what is implied in such processes of harmonization. (424)

	X sees this landscape through their pair of eyes. Y sees this landscape through their pair of eyes. How does x and y know that the other is looking at the landscape in a similar manner? Both people are in the same place and time. Both are conscious subjects in a state of apparent consciousness able to visually experience this landscape spread out before them from this famous lookout in the Blue Mountains. Both parties experience the other as a ‘person’, and, both seem to be exercising a genre of activity known as, in effect something along the lines as ‘let us look at the landscape’ and because this is a ‘wonderful landscape’ let us look at it and discover this sense of ‘wonder’, this sense of being out of the ordinary. The relatively internal mutuality of this relationship is established for those two parries through communication and therein effectively simulating their engaged encompassment in an internal relationship. Still, how from a pre-learned experience of type can we move to a state of definitive experiential detail that would be found encompassed within that instance of type? Such a state of affairs can prevail when all the necessary preconditions are met (as determined through time, space, subjectivity, consciousness, similarity of hermeneutic perspectives, etc.), and, we realize transformational access is available because there is no absolute division between ‘type’ and that therein appropriately ‘typed’. Furthermore, the transcendental phenomenologist, hermeneuticist, existentialist, etc., cannot accept an absolute dichotomy between individual expressions of subjectivity from the inter-subjective meta-textual point of view; the experiential unity of the Life-World; the ‘substantial’ emptiness of the non-exclusive relativity of subjectivity, non-subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, etc! By what means can we demonstrate this particular pseudo-dichotomy between relative type and relative instances of the same?  Well, we know what the colour ‘red’ means and we can point to our use of this concept by pointing our red patches on a painting, e.g. So, an interrelationship must exist between the same even though redness is not directly seen per se. Therefore there can be no absolute dichotomy between the ‘internal’ discernment of a universal and its apparent ‘external’ particulars. A hierarchy of type essentially overlaps our search for a common ground upon which we can find some degree of common ground. So two friends, one male and one female can understand each other by virtue of their humanity, a similar culture, the medium of the same language, being in the same place at the same time, being able to discuss what perspectives are being adopted in the exercise of whatever genre of activity is being currently invoked, etc., etc. Hence, through such an overlap there is always some degree of common ground between two or more parties even if there are inevitable moments of misunderstanding, etc. But, by the way, this merely proves the point being made – that misunderstanding is just that a ‘mis-understanding’ in part of what must already be the better understood, as the more understood. So, we might misunderstand what is said in a letter but we do not misunderstand, usually, that that letter is a ‘letter’, as a letter addressed to us, e.g., etc. Since processes of communication are processes it also follows that processes, as processes within processes, will be misunderstood from time to time since comprehension takes place in and over a period of time, yet, however, through language, etc., we can still check (and compensate) and therein redefine such apparent processes of thematizational re-alignment.(through a variety of error-correcting mechanisms, etc.). So, e.g., we re-read the letter, give them a ring, write a letter asking them to explain, dismiss it as a literary mistake, think of it as a reaction of misunderstanding of what we might inadvertently have said or misconstrued as what they think we might have said, question the authorship of that document, etc., etc. (425)

	The parties immediately privy to a relationship are relatively internal to it(s external relational situatedness). Their experience of that relationship is the result of an internalization of that relationship. Communication of that relationship is realized through its externalization. Internalities are pre-intentional forces effectively, but not absolutely, beyond the intentional control of the relative subject. Externalities are the relational consequences that arise beyond the internal dynamics of the relationship under examination and are effectively, but not absolutely, beyond the intentional control of the participant subjects of that relationship in question. We, as subjects (on the behalf of ourselves, others or institutions) arbitrate this World-of-Life through a harmonization to that extent possible on an intentionally viable spectrum between pre-intentional internalities and post-intentional externalities. Authenticity is the existential consequence of conducting this passage through an ongoing re-centering of it in and through an overall transcendental suspension (maintaining an appropriate ongoing psychic balance between the transcendental orientation and the non-transcendental orientation). Internal exchange mechanisms establish some degree of existential harmony of the relationship internally. External exchange mechanisms establish some degree of existential harmony of the relationship externally. Although similar types of information may be exchanged both internally and externally it is the nature of that relationship that decides the nature of that exchange mechanism (even if the exchanged medium or media are exactly the same between the relatively internal and relatively external, and v.v.).  (426)

	Applied to a theological context our analysis of the imputed theological relationship should take into account the above features of the internal, etc. Moreover, our critical treatment of this topic would be a reflection of that extent our theologically interpretative constructions/re-constructions are conducted and centred in the exercise of an overall transcendental suspension. Therefore, considerations of theological identity, theological work and theological value should be conducted in this type of transcendentally balanced perspective or noted as deficient in just that regard! Hence traditional and non-traditional types of religious experience interpreted as theological in orientation need to be sampled and transformed into a representative measure of the same in order to evaluate to what extent they are in conformity with this transcendental standard of an adequately working overall transcendental suspension, etc. Hence seemingly religious experiences like, or entertained by, prayer, revelation, contemplation, intuition, mediation, etc., need to be evaluated (whether first hand or second hand) by reference to this dimension of the transcendental as revealed through an overall transcendental suspension (both in its received practice and in a reflection upon the same)! Hence the authenticity of religious experience can be so ascertained but not, I must quickly add, in the terms of reference that concern the interpretative conformity of content with its co-related imputation. So, religious experiences interpreted as of the Divine could be directly (when first hand) and/or indirectly (when second hand) be regarded as relatively authentic or inauthentic but cannot be interpreted in the terms of reference that regard it as being from the Divine per se! To put that type of program into effect the theologian or theological-philosopher would need to establish other hypothetical ‘grounds’ for extending such a supposition. On the other hand, such a project cannot be absolutely ruled out on the grounds that the concept of the Divine has been shown to be viable project if critically conducted (in the light of our explorative research to date). However, in contrast we also have as yet to fully establish what work a theological project motivates and is motivated by and the viability of that type of frame of reference to actually perform work whose value is both authentic in its creation, exercise and consequences, and, actually does do ‘existential work’ for those who subscribe to that type of religious vision in their religious treatment of the Life-World… therein being found to be of value, valuable, etc. Therefore, let us proceed to carefully examine this theological dimension in the interpretation of religious experience… asking ourselves just what is the apparently predominant point, if present, of such a project in our re-interpretation of the Life-World, or, from a more complex point of view, what is the cluster of factors, and their interaction, that drive a theological re-interpretation of this World-of-Life (in specific or general terms of reference). Then, from this thematization of the type of work done in a theological system we should find ourselves in a position of being able to determine the types of theological identity being portrayed therein through such functions, and, from an appreciation of the nature of that understanding of theological work we should also find ourselves in a position to appreciate the nature of the theological value being created at the centre of such systematic structures; relatively systematic by virtue of their constructive nature in this theological re-interpretation of the Life-World. (427)

	Value, whether theological in orientation or non-theological in orientation, is the creation and/or re-creation of an emergent output greater than the mere summation of the contributing inputs prior to this process of transformation. Negative value, should it exist, being the creation of a relative deficit through the consummation of positive value in the course of that transformational process. From a materialistic point of view the economy of the world is a negative one, hence the concept of entropy. However, from the psychic perspective of the Life-World all processes of transformation are productive of positive value, i.e, a value in excess of that originally invested in that process of value creation through the necessary imposition of an overall transcendental suspension to some degree or other along with the emergent productivity that arises through the synthesis resident through such an imposition. However, it is the quantum of this existential excess that allows us to determine if it is existentially oriented and that a relatively authentic process of trans-valuation has taken place or not! First, let me explore, systematically, the interrelations between these various definitions. (428)

	An emergent output can only arise through the phenomenal-phenomenological involvement of (a sense of) subject (even though from an ultimate point of view all forms of subjectivity, objectivity, inter-subjectivity, i.e., all forms of emergent processes of evaluation, are ‘intrinsically’ empty). However, be that as it may, an emergent output, in what ever form it is taken, can only be realized as an emergent output on the same intentional level of its production/re-production (as a simulation/re-simulation through intentional re-iteration). Thus there is no contradiction with the scientific concepts of entropy and the preservation of energy (and other symmetries, etc.). E.g., a broom is put intentionally together as a broom in the constitution and, thereafter, the re-constitution of the genre of broom sweeping. Its emergent value is realized by the agent who either makes that broom and/or who uses it in order to sweep. The value of its existential excess is realized in and through the extension of the power-the-individual-has in this World-of-Life through association with this device. This use is dialectical in that the broom user may either use this device as a broom or creatively for some other purpose, say, e.g., the removal of cobwebs from the corners of the ceiling or for poking at ripe apples on a tree or as a crutch or walking stick, etc., etc. This device can also be used in a dialectical sense of association either as someone employed to make brooms but not necessarily to use them and/or someone who actually uses a broom as a broom, i.e., utilizing that device for its primary intentional purpose as a sweeping device. The consequences of association can also radiate out into the world through the benefits derived from its commission and sale and through the consequences of its use such as a sanitary and more aesthetic place of residence, occupation, etc., etc. This radiation of value (in the forms of benefit, power, consequential changes, etc.) ‘spills’ over into the world on its intended level of intentional performance with secondary radiations into all other levels of epistemological organization, such as e.g., a cleaner environment with the use of a broom along with the ecological advantages and disadvantages attendant upon its wake, etc.). Now, the measurement of existential emergence of value has two forms of relativity – mutual and non-mutual. E.g., say we lived in the year 1600 in Europe and after making a pair of stocks I were to declare my neighbour to be both an adulterer and a blasphemer and therefore someone who should be put in these same stocks as just installed on the Town Square. With my neighbour duly ensconced in these stocks I am now exercising relatively more power in the world by virtue of my neighbour being locked within the same. On the other hand, if in making these stocks I am rewarded financially by the Town Council who commissioned me to make the same I have benefited from making this device without their use necessarily following from their installation. This form of benefit can be defined as mutual, i.e., not directly at the expense of someone else. If, on the other hand, the Town Council thought I was overcharging them for making these devices and I was paid half of my asking price and, at the same time, were to be locked up for a day in the same I could be said to be both mutually benefiting and ‘non-mutually’ suffering from the same. The primary points I would like to be making here are these: that existential value emerges on its primary level of intended epistemological organization and from there radiates throughout this entire World-of-Life. That this positivity of value is not at the expense of scientific concepts of value since its primary value radiates from its intended level of epistemological organization (and not in a reductive scientific sense). However, we still need to qualify this last point. In order to make a broom, or, equally, to destroy it, a certain degree of intentionally directed energy is expended in the transformation of that state of affairs. In an intentional economy (situated in the natural economy of the scientifically treated ‘world’, itself/themselves, in turn, being situated in the all encompassing economy of the Life-World) existential value emerges from the consumption of the other intentionally directed energies necessary for the production/re-production of that intentionally transformed state of affairs. As already argued, an intentional excess will arise from whatever set of intentional acts are entered into, but, to what degree and in what manner is dependent upon the nature of that realized excess. So, smashing a broom, in an expression of anger, e.g., might realize a certain degree of value as intended, in the long run I might have to acquire a new one or spend time mending the old one. Hence the value or merit of an existential excess is time dependent, needs to be continually reconstituted and any value released may be diminished over time through our re-assessment of that re-perceived sense of ‘excess’, or, be realized to a degree that barely merits the epithet of ‘excess’. Thence our interest should be on the degree and manner of that existential excess found to be expressed and not the mere fact of an excess per se! Lastly, it should be noted that this transformation of a certain state of affairs need not be commissioned with a direct or overt imprint in or upon the material-physical world. E.g., I could be about to play game of golf with a friend who is very good at this game and we could decide upon a quite unfavourable handicap for my friend therein giving me a considerable advantage if I am able to avail myself of it. By such means making for a more interesting game by reinvesting this element of competition and relative equality of players. Here this ‘re-interpreted’ state of affairs is not directly imprinted upon the world and demonstrates my point that the existential excess is primarily present/presented on and about its primary level of intentional focus in an intentional economy of our living-in-this-World-of-Life…. (429)

	So, an existential excess is primarily expressed upon, released on and radiated from its primarily intended level of epistemological organization in intentional performance. Moreover, this expression is apparently augmented when more closely attuned to its intended manner of intentional expression, i.e. when in conformity with its apparently intended genre of activity in this World-of-Life (this re-perceived degree of relative efficiency confirming to that same degree our re-perception of its associated genre of performance and therein hermeneutically assisting us in this task of interpretation)! In the light of these two philosophical observations of the re-perceptions of intentional location and manner of performance how should one attempt an appreciation of the existential value or merit of a theological system whether in general or in regards to a specific instance of the same? I.e., how do we determine the degree, nature and manner of the existential excess delivered by such a system both intentionally and unintentionally? By degree is meant the observation of the relative quantum of value seemingly released above and beyond that merely invested in its performance. By nature is meant the primary sense or location (and associated secondary locations) in our psychic mapping of the Life-World as noted in terms of their epistemological organization. Closely associated with this mapping is the meta-textual implication of its intended genre or genres of activity, i.e., the manner of its performance. It goes without saying that a theological system must produce/re-produce an existential excess. As already noted it is the relative quantum of such an excess that is of more importance along with our noting the phenomenally distinctive manner of that expression. In our determination of these aspects of degree, manner and nature we will be met by a variety of various problems or difficulties. Such determinations can only be reasoned intuitions and as such can only be argued for, demonstrated through illustration, and finally met, hopefully, through some degree of consensus, etc. This degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction no doubt can also be found being expressed by proponents of those views themselves; observations of such to which we need to approach objectively and neutrally through a succession of overall transcendental suspensions of the same. In this our prejudices set the territory but it is our ongoing overall transcendental suspension of this ‘material’ that, hopefully, will be able to rectify such necessary, preconditional, partial approaches towards the same!? So, let us examine these ‘difficulties’ and see if they can be overcome or bypassed in the type of phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential program intimated through the above? Such a program being phenomenological through the treatment of that phenomenon as phenomenological through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension; as hermeneutical through the appropriate determination of genre/s of activity apparently involved in the performance of such a system; and, existential through an intuitive appreciation of this fact of the recognition of an existential excess and a determination of its relative existential merit… these three facets then collectively interacting in a manner that either reinforce each other or disestablish each other…. (430)

	In dealing with a theological system in general, or with a specific example or facet of the same, we have a number of difficulties to attend to, namely, to begin with, how do we determine the primary location of its intended exercise in this world-of-Life? In the overt expression of a theological religion we see temples or churches, etc., we see rituals and services, etc., we see religious professional and nonprofessionals, etc., we find expressions of a morality, ethical injunctions, exhortations on how one should live one’s life in a certain prescribed manner, etc., we see a diverse religious literature and a complexity of religious paraphernalia, etc. Given this diversity of religious expression where can we locate a primary sense of location? Furthermore, with different sects and different adherents, within and between the same, displaying different mixes of religious practices in the same religious tradition how do we determine a primary sense of location? As this may differ from time to time and from place to place for different people in different ways we should perhaps determine all possible secondary candidates and only determine later, if necessary and practicable, a primary sense of location. Determining a sense of overall primary location through an intuitive determination of the mix of factors present subject to what ever qualifications relevant that limit that type of determination. What is important here is our ability to determine what locations are present and to be able to provisionally determine to what degree they are being exercised with respect to each other? So, e.g., w.r.t. to a non-theistic Buddhist congregation we might note the presence of chanting, rituals, reverencing of images, meditational practices and observe exactly the same types of practice in a theistic Christian congregation. As a result of the recognition of this difficulty of being able to determine this quest for a primary location I am led to propose the provisional category of spiritual whose location is collectively ascribed to the  transcendental Judgmental Aspect of the psyche. Because this category collectively subsumes all (six) types of (ordered) judgment (such as aesthetical [in matters of ritual, e.g.,], ethical, hermeneutical, etc.) implies that it exactly coincides with the Judgmental. Furthermore, as all judgment is between, within or through concepts, it follows that its essential phenomenological nature must be trans-conceptual in orientation, i.e., transcendental in orientation (as used in that context or sense). Now, this sense of the ‘spiritual’, through the ongoing imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, is effectively recognized and recovered in the same manner, i.e., through the ongoing imposition of a critically prepared overall transcendental suspension properly, appropriately and validly exercised. It also follows that such authenticity, to that degree initiated and/or recovered, is a reflection of this sense of the ‘spiritual’ initially practiced and/or recovered through its re-simulation. Furthermore, it follows that this ‘authenticity’ and sense of the ‘spiritual’ is independent of whether religiously motivated practice is or is not in progress, or whether the former is theistically oriented or a non-theistically oriented. Moreover, the sense of the spiritual also demands that these different judgmental facets should be in a state of balance with each other without the preference for or privileging of anyone at the expense of the others (in order to ensure the thorough imposition of an overall transcendental suspension). In a holistic appreciation of the processes of judgment and our critical instigation and/or determination of the spiritual status of that under examination in our investigations we can them note the secondary implication of various (ordered) judgmental factors such as, e.g., aesthetic facets (as in ritual concerns, e.g.), ethical considerations, spiritualistic re-interpretations of history (in concepts of providence, karma, etc.,), etc., along with their interaction, etc. This conglomeration of judgmental practices synthesizing a sense of the spiritual from an overall sense of the ‘transcendental’ as it permeates all forms of judgmental appreciation of the world from the perspective of the authenticity of those processes being, in turn, an exact reflection of the instigated overall transcendental suspension and/or the recovery of the same. Thus the difficulty of determining this primary sense of location in our appreciation (of the religious etc.) is obviated by assuming a set of not equally weighted features becoming equally weighted to some degree or other in their location/re-location in this aspect of the transcendental, i.e., trans-conceptual territory of the Judgmental Aspect (through the essential implication of ethical, interpretative, pragmatic concerns, etc., along with the need for their collective transcendental suspension). Theoretically and/or practically we also need to ascertain, if only provisionally, to what degree such a system is productive of a transcendental excess, i.e. determine its existential merit; the degree to which that system is currently able to be productive of existential value above and beyond that merely invested in its formulation and exercise. Again, we need to determine some sense of an intuitive appreciation of the relative quantum of value that appears to be released through seriously exercising such a systematic presentation? This could be done either first hand and/or second hand, i.e., from the point of view of a serious adherents being observed and/or interviewed or our serious adoption and exercise of such a point of view, or, the mere observation and /or noting second-hand reports about the same in historical and/or contemporary accounts. So, e.g., one might note, through direct observation, that evangelical services appear to be more emotionally intense than more mainline, traditional forms of Christian expression and that to this degree we have a difference of phenomena? On the other hand we might note a greater ritual density being found in the latter and duly note an additional difference in style between these two aspects of Christianity. From the above we can see already some of the difficulties that must present themselves to the serious phenomenologist examining such religious phenomena. However, on the other hand, these difficulties need not be insurmountable if we accept that our results are provisional and forever a work in progress – not that we cannot come to serious observations and conclusions along the way. This provisional method accepting that the determination of primary location can be, more or less, achieved through noting the clustering of secondary locations and apportioning some primary predominance of one or more of those clustered features or discerning an emergent interactivity of their overall interaction (as in this provisional proposal of a collective sense of the spiritual and, therein, determining a sense of location in this semblance of the ‘spiritual’ when demonstrated as occurring in this aspect of the Judgmental). This (re-defined) expression of the sense of the spiritual is to be understood as being discerned as existing in and through an overall transcendental suspension; that such a state should not be ontologized through the disruption of the overall transcendental suspension through the preferential treatment and imputation of an ontological sense of the spiritual in some material sense, say along the lines of a refined existence in the form of some kind of ‘unchanging spiritual matter’. Equally, that this state should not be epistemologized through the disruption of the overall transcendental suspension through the preferential treatment and imputation of some unchanging idea say in the permanent, unchanging Mind of the Divine, etc. Of course a theologian is welcome to do what they feel they must, but, as far as our research program is concerned, let us stick to a tentative, provisional, hypothetically-oriented domain continually subjected to the critical imposition of an overall transcendental suspension, etc. Then again, in contrast, let us not perceive or re-perceive this sense of the ‘spiritual’ as a mere social construct since I am also arguing that we have here an existential excess that spills over into the reality of worldly experience just as the ‘ethos’ or an era or the distinctive ‘spirit’ of a culture finds itself stamped upon all distinctive production/re-production that was made in and appears to iconographically reflect well upon that era or culture. That, in the same manner, the distinctive, intentionally deposited products of a person, through their textual deposition, must equally reflect, in an interpretative re-construction, to that same degree, that that person is being relatively authentic or otherwise; that in this process, to the same degree, being ‘spiritual in orientation’, they will leave an intentional residue that reflects upon themselves in the same light to that extent they come across as a distinctive person, a person with an original sense of personality (through an ongoing sense of psychic resolution), replete with an interesting and rich story to tell, as a person able to act existentially and authentically through the refined and receptive ‘spiritual-like’ exercise of the overall suspension, etc. (431) 

	In looking into the phenomenological nature, etc., of religious phenomena what types of features should we expect to see? Then, in a reversed direction, in what manner do these various features impart some sense of value (for their practitioners) – produce/re-produce an existential excess, and, express the semblance of an existential merit of psychic ‘interest’ above and beyond that psychic capital merely invested in that (type of) process? To this end let me list some of the general features of a theological system frequently found present in that type of (meta-textual) construct, albeit one that leaves (like all constructs) an intentional footprint (in the form of an overall text /a series of parallel text[ual deposition]s). Then, let us investigate how the performance of such practices assists in the realization of this existential excess and the comparative relativity of its existential merit…. (432)

	In a determination/self-determination of this sense of ‘spirituality’ we need to develop an increased sense of intentional self-transparency, or, rather, translucency, in order to either ascertain the ‘spirituality’ of others and/or of ourselves. In effect, motivation needs to be both privately discerned and publicly demonstrated in order to ascertain the intentional coursing of others and the intentional coursing of ourselves since this semblance of authenticity, this radiation of an existential excess is directly engineered/self-engineered through this ongoing harmonization of ‘our’ intentional lives in our experience of  this sense of ‘resolution’ whether experienced firsthand or secondhand. An increased semblance of the spiritual cognizing and/or recognizing (a) more insightful attitude/s within this World-of-Life along with all other existential hallmarks like spontaneity, ongoing resolution, propriety, appropriateness, apparent validity, self-validation, etc., along with a ‘selfless’ enlargement of the very theatre of the self itself (without its ego-directed manipulation/s, etc.). (433)

	Do we need to “either ascertain the ‘spirituality’ of others and/or of ourselves?” My answer to that question is “yes!” For how else are we to determine this vision of authenticity, this element of the existential that characterizes those relationships that are constituted for the psychic benefit of themselves in their coursing through this World-of-Life and not just their participating members per se. In essence, participation in a relationship is constituted in an authentic manner when relational ‘resolution’ is entertained in and through the psychic centre of that relationship both w.r.t. that relationship ‘within itself’ and ‘without itself’ in its relational context in this World-of-Life. A relationship that was purely for itself is just as inauthentic as a relational participant being purely for itself. In and through the adequate exercise of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension these existential characteristics of a properly constituted relationship are both exercised and recognized! The quality of our passage through this World-of-Life is testimony to our ability to both chart an adequately directed existential course and to recognize the same in others! It behooves us, therefore, to transform our relationships in this direction of the existential transformation of the relatively inauthentic, non-existential, etc. This existential transformation being facilitated through the auspices of an adequate overall transcendental suspension both in regards to this style of resolutional performance and towards an existential recognition of the authenticity of others, the manner of their resolutional performances and the consequential relative authenticity of texts deposited in their wake (as evidence of their passages and their ‘performances’ therein). But, we might now ask, what relevance has this to our theological investigations? For an authentic theology to be formulated and exercised, to be expressed and performed therein, we need to be in possession of these concepts that will allow us to recognize and determine the existential value and merit of such performances and/or their textual depositions (as witnesses to such performances). An authentic theology being one that discharges its theistic vision of the world in an authentic manner, i.e., with a relatively excessive excess of existential value and merit for all of those parties that participate within that vision of the Life-World. What is not meant here is that the imputation of the Divine is to be taken as absolutely valid! We can still have an adequate theology in this sense as intended even if the Divine did not exist or should ‘die’ in the interim. In a similar manner we should judge a non-theistic religion or spiritual code of practice, an adequate psychology or psychiatry, an adequate politics, etc. To this end let me therefore pose the questions what is the difference between the saint and the mad person, what is the difference between mystical experience and psychosis, the pursuit of one’s passions and pathological-like addictions to modes of life that become relatively inauthentic expressions of life… just how do we find an existentially valuable and authentic passage for-us through this World-of-Life? In this light, let us set out to pin-point exactly why a religious person or institution, or any other type of person or institution, is not being authentic when it insists people, e.g., should be burnt at the stake, etc; cannot accept this wonderful diversity among people and institutions; believes a person or race should be exterminated; when it excessively rails, disparages or commits themselves to doing worse against another theistic vision of the world or against a non-theistic vision of the world, etc., etc. (434)

	My short answer to this question “how do we differentiate between relatively authentic behavioural trends and relatively inauthentic behaviour trends?” is to ask “to what extent is an adequate transcendental suspension being exercised?!” But, even though we have a short and unambiguous reply given here what that response might more exactly mean needs to be carefully visited in detail lest this simple ‘slogan’ be subverted by an inauthentic ideology or merely made defective through a deficiency or deficit of critical reflection! (435)

It strikes me that in some sense the divide here is not a dichotomy but one of attitude or mere attitudinal direction: if you possess a sense of proportion and a sense of playfulness along with a desire not to see everything too seriously then one is safe to that degree one is able to put that attitude to life into practice! The psychotic views things too seriously, too literally! In the same manner both the ontologically over-committed individual and/or the epistemologically over-committed individual regardless of whether their intentions were for good reasons or bad reasons! The addicted person, whether addicted to drugs or objects, habits of life or passions, must discover some sense of proportion. Life cannot be just drinking… or sex… or collecting object d’art… or just making money… Nor can it just be doing some or all of the above, etc. So what is the dividing line between a wholesome passion for something and an overwhelming addiction to that same particular something?! This is where our insistence upon the transcendental suspension comes into play. We must develop a sense of proportion – we cannot just devote ourselves to a select set of modes of life and find ourselves addicted to their contents and practices! By invoking the attitude that everything is like an illusion, a game, a practice to be performed with an air of playfulness, as if a simulation… we are effectively putting an overall transcendental suspension into effect! Perceived in this manner our passions become something we can disengage our sense of ego from – on one hand we can enjoy such passions, and, on the other, we can also leave them well alone when the time calls for that form of disengagement! Treated as a ‘simulation’ we can both enjoy that passion and at the same time not take it too seriously, especially when our passage through this world with-others calls forth for our disengagement with that to-hand, and, therein, at the same time, should be heard calling us forth in some other more deserving direction! All these pragmatic attitudes (of the simulation, seeing a mode of life as a game, etc.) are both causes and consequences of the imposition of an overall ongoing transcendental suspension. Seeing the world as ‘like an illusion’ is not perceiving the world ‘as an illusion’ pure and simple! By accepting the metaphor as a metaphor we enter the dialectics of a simultaneous acceptance and rejection, etc., the very hallmarks of an overall transcendental suspension, etc. By entering the overall transcendental suspension we are put in a position to both enact and/or recognize the transforming nature of the overall transcendental suspension. That this state of affairs is resident at the core of all phenomenalogically entertained processes in some form or other. It is certainly resident at the core of processes of identification, etc. But relative authenticity is not dependent upon such content and the mere fact that the core region is constituted in and through an overall transcendental suspension is not sufficient in itself for us to establish the relative nature of its existential merit, i.e., the degree of its current state of authenticity. The relative merit of such factors only arising through an assessment of the extent the authentic has been allowed to speak above and beyond its mere materiality of being. Authenticity is effectively the existentialization of value itself through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential – when that relationship allows us and is allowed to promote itself without that promotion being promoted merely for the sake of its participant members or merely for the sake of that relationship itself as it and we pass through this World-of-Life, this Life-World [as this world of existential value and the existential merit of such value which constitutes the very simulation of this semblance of a world through this continual all-pervasive power, deposition of and resistance to such and existential overflow of  such value!]! And here we need to discern the authenticity of the relational context itself and not just the mere ‘authenticity’ of the relation within itself nor the mere ‘authenticity’ between and within the members of that relationship! The imposition of an adequate transcendental suspension ensuing that we discover and invoke the authenticity of the harmoniously situated relational context itself and not just from the point of view of the relationship per se…. (436)

	Let me now examine how and why we should examine the existential spirituality of others in order to ascertain the current spirituality of our own passage through this World of-Life and intuit how we must learn to adapt such a path when the relative absence of an adequate degree of authenticity presents itself… since we must learn to live in this same one-World of Life.?! Fortunately, the world may not be perfect it is not absolutely imperfect! Good grounds in general, therefore, for a realistic optimism… if only for the long-term (if such optimism in a particular or specific situation is existentially ‘called-for’). Thence, good grounds for working towards the existentialization of the future and a de-de-existentialization of the present regardless of the current adversity, or non-adversity, of our immediate condition!! (437)

	The promulgation of a theology, or any form of ideology, by a group of individuals that insists, e.g., that certain other individuals in that community or society should be burnt at the stake (in an auto-da-fé) or dispatched by some other means with a similar end in mind should be recognized as a type of practice that must be regarded with the utmost abhorrence. Posed as a philosophical problem we must ask how is this type of situation to be discerned as inauthentic, and, with that discrimination to hand, how are we to diffuse and dissipate the political dynamics behind that type of situation in such a manner that we effectively prevent it from being allowed to occur?! Placed in this context, with such extreme contrast, we should perceive a need to both determine the authenticity of current practice of one’s own self and of others, and,  to appeal to others in the hope that they too can perceive this same insightful appreciation of that being focused upon, that, then, others too can lend their voice to a rectification of that situation… this transformational rectification of relatively inauthentic behaviour hopefully creating a chain reaction that reverses such inauthentic trends. Too often our voice is never raised in protest, and often, when our voice might be raised, it cannot be heard! So, a full program that treats the rectification of inauthenticity must both halt and reverse an inauthentic trend and do so in a manner that is existentially transparent to both self and others! All this is achieved, and only achieved, in and through the utilization of an adequate overall transcendental suspension! By the exercise of such means we intuitively appreciate the authenticity of a certain situational practice (in general terms of reference and/or in more particular terms of reference). In this process of non-virtual or virtual interaction we need to determine the authenticity of our own self-involvement and the general, relevant involvement of all others implicated in that situational context, then, determining such appreciation we need to demonstrate that insight to both those directly involved or indirectly not involved, but close enough, to positively effect a transformational process of re-authentification. Furthermore, the application of this program would be across the board since authenticity is forever a work in progress! Authenticity effectively ceases the moment it stops being reconstituted. As an ongoing project it should be without discrimination as to its intentional object. On the other hand, exercised through an adequate overall transcendental suspension it should also be delivered without an inauthentic sense of ego-manipulation unless that relational-situation and/or relational-context calls for that type of ego-involvement in order to apparently act on the behalf of the same! (438)

	Even in the formulation and dissemination of a theology we have the important need to ascertain its current existential merit and appropriately act accordingly! How is such insight to be achieved and exercised? (439)

	The simple answer is that as discerned through the overall transcendental suspension adequately exercised! A more complex response might invite us to inspect how that critical state of affairs is arrived at and realize, therein, in what manner a sense of the spiritual is being fostered, undermined, rectified and critically re-appraised. To this end I would like to propose the following definition of what is implied in this broad concept of the spiritual. Using an observation noted in paragraph no. 431 of an equal weighting between various facets of our judgmental faculties (our six orders, three aspects of the hermeneutic circle, between the epistemological and the ontological orientations, etc.). In this light we could tentatively propose that the degree of overall existentialization, i.e., authenticity, is equivalent to the least developed of those facets since a (dynamic) balance between these facets, is only in place to that extent. Consequently, a process of overall existentialization, i.e., re-authentification is to that extent that that quantum of thematization is augmented and amplified. The maintenance of that realized degree of authenticity being dependent upon the maintenance of the same. The question that now needs to be asked is how do we ascertain this quantum of authenticity and any temporal changes in the same? As an intuitive process it cannot correctly be rationalized except metaphorically. Essentially it too is a judgment, a meta-judgment, since it must critically appreciate the effectiveness of a prior or ongoing process of judgment. Hence, in this regard, we might like to perceive those relevant powers of discrimination as arising through critical reflection subjected to the same processes of critical reflection. Is this possible? Yes, of course, through processes of re-iterated retention both of that subjected to reflection and that subjected to meta-reflection (and there between entertained in a state of mutual, simultaneous and paralleled forms of a crossed interrelationship). Regardless of our philosophical and/or religious persuasions these sorts of critical and meta-critical processes are ones we construct every conscious moment of the day and have already refined (as a genre of activity) through reflection and re-iterated co-reflection. In such a process we are essentially appreciating the degree to which the problematic of both the relational situation and the relational context are harmonized together. Harmonization being experienced, among other things, as a sense of ongoing relief; goodwill; lack of bad-faith; insightfulness; existential surplus; an existentialization of the relatively non-existential; an act of harmony; a mutuality of response; an ‘effortless’ emission of power; as the creative carving out of an emergently cooperative space and time, etc., etc. (440)

	Theoretically, such an examination seems to be quite clear cut – you conduct an adequate overall transcendental suspension and you will find your way cleared before you. Unfortunately, the world is not so transparent. Translucent – yes! But, not absolutely 
clear cut and self-evident! So, how do we deal with such questions of patent inauthenticity and forms of inauthenticity not so obvious but perhaps more insidious in the long term. That important question, correctly, is not the direct object of enquiry in these investigations. However, let me offer some reflections along those lines that could be taken up elsewhere. For a start, the intellectual demonstration of the inauthenticity of a certain situation will not of itself be able, usually, to effect a reversal of that inauthentic trend that produced that inauthentic type of situation. Similarly, intellectual deconstruction, etc., just does not do justice to the injustice of this type of situation. In a poisoned atmosphere of propaganda where every half-truth is allowed to masquerade as absolute truth and every type of lie is indulged in without the blinking an eye how can an intellectual argument win when the waters are so muddied and the factual content is inadequate at the same time to form the adequate basis for an informed judgment. No, other rhetorical means must be utilized! But what? I can only suggest a few – poke fun at the incompetence of your lying opponent; ridicule their simplicity of argument; use legal means when available, effective and appropriate; establish an emotional argument in your favour; clarify your objectives; encourage others to adopt the same game plan; marshal all your forces to the same ends; utilize the internet on all levels of psychic deployment and harness (therein) the ‘voice’ of the silent majority if available, or, create that ‘majority’ and then demonstrate its evidence of self-expression beyond the original medium utilized in its development; publish dossiers of your opponents dirty tricks, etc., and update them with more examples of their repetition and thereby let your opponent appear more and more like a cliché or mere parody of themselves; re-use the tricks of your opponent in an existential manner where proper and appropriate; appeal to the innate honesty of people in general; and overall, re-educate people and advance their general level of consciousness in these matters… Probably the most important technique would be not to be seen to merely react to your dishonest opponent but set out a viable, clearly formulated, distinctively different program and subtly re-iterate the same in a manner that effectively demonstrates both your intentions and the integrity of your discourse (at the relative expense of your opponent!) throughout the entire range of media! (441)

	Realizing that the current existential merit of a system may well undercut itself through an exposure to inauthentic trends let us now ask ourselves how do we determine the merit of a theological system in general and in particular? (442)

	To adopt a Biblical quotation we might say: “You shall know them by their fruit!” Or, to adopt a Buddhistic point of view, we could conduct a consequential analysis. In actual (relatively non-virtual) and/or virtual terms of reference we could investigate, through simulation/re-simulation, the alteration of final products through the selective fine tuning of initial inputs (in either historical and/or ahistorical/non-historical terms of reference). In other words, through selectively fine tuning inputs we can observe probable outputs (or re-observe non-virtually treated processes); noting in the process certain key chaotic transitions wherein small input adjustments realize vastly different relative output scenarios. E.g., in the forecasted mapping of weather you know you have a potentially chaotic weather system when minor adjustments in inputs produce (a sequence of) vastly difference scenarios. So, with this vision of reality in mind we need to note that under some situations minor inputs (or absences of input material) can realize vastly different sets of consequences, whereas, under other less sensitive circumstances, the same types of inputs (or absences) would barely, if at all, register any perturbation at all from a consequential point of view. Thus, e.g., in reviewing the ethics of a certain sequence of relational inputs, our attention must focus on both ‘text’ and ‘context’, and, more importantly, upon their potential courses of interaction. In this light a consequential analysis being cast as a difficult affair to project although aided and abetted through the importation of local knowledge, i.e., the importation of closely observed, finely tuned meta-textual genre functions, albeit in an awareness of context that recognizes the potentially chaotic nature of that system, in other words, the nature of its limits and the nature of our own limits in our non-virtual and/or virtual manoeuvrings within those frames of reference. (443)

	Now, conducting an overall transcendental suspension of our intellectually thematized projects is a waste of time if one is also not aware of the nature of our expectations to be realized from those investments of intellectual capital! In this we need to be painfully aware of the overall style those projects are being investigated under, i.e., do we expect our expectations to be closely met or are we only open to the projection of radically new opportunities. In this we need to closely attend to a balance between seeking a confirmation of our expectations and an openness to a non-confirmation of the same in the light of newer possibilities. A balance needs to be properly, appropriately and validly set in this regard! By properly is meant the essential thematization of expectations one might reasonably expect to find or be met by. By appropriately is meant an openness to both the non-essential expectation that expectations are not met and an openness to radically different expectations being thematized in the process of such reflections. By validly is meant an ongoing balance is met and realized between essential (and relatively non-contextual) considerations, and, non-essential (essentially discovered) contextual considerations. Adherence to the former realizes a static, stasic style of operating in this World-of-Life, whereas, an adherence to the latter realizes an overly dynamic style of operating in this World-of-Life. It is true that no process of reflection could be conducted without some form of an expectation of what is to be ‘discovered’ in those reflections. Then, again, no process of reflection should be conducted only in the expectation of merely re-confirming one’s prejudices, one’s pre-judgments, in that matter. In the same way theological investigations should be conducted neither in a strict stasic fashion nor in an overly dynamical fashion whose emphasis is merely upon the novelty of discovery. Without a basis in expectations the latter, extreme type of reflection cannot be focused upon! Then, merely seeking the mere re-confirmation of one’s prejudices is inauthentic! No, a balance must be entered into between these two styles of operation that must already be operative in our investigations in order to both make worth while such a pursuit and to be able to remain focused therein! But, human nature being what it is, in a consolidation and privileging of its habit of habituation, let us adopt, as a corrective process, a more dynamic approach in order to overcome this usually more dominant inauthentic tendency! On the other hand, let us remain focused on the task to hand and not become too distracted through processes of sheer unproductive play; at the same time, it must be added, never disparaging this necessary element of play (when conducted in and through the open-balance of an overall transcendental suspension). (444)

	Recently, I have been working on a short text on the nature of truth; trying to summarize my own understanding on the nature of this subject in the light of recent insights into the unequal nature of power courtesy of Foucault. It was written in sixty verses of two lines of loose iambic pentameter. For two or three days I resisted the desire to write a commentary on this text. Now I must resist the desire to write a commentary on the commentary. However, what is about to be written, essentially, is a monograph on some of those themes there that need to be carefully re-interpreted. One of those themes is on the adventitious nature of that which is not truth, not being truthful. E.g., we tell a lie and we must speak the truth first. Then, in some subtle or not so subtle manner we alter some small portion of it in order to tell a lie which can, ultimately, have consequences out of all proportion to the intrinsic damage done to that which is relatively truthful in orientation. That to recover the truth, basically, we need to clarify and refine those elements that are being relatively truthful from those that do not conform to reality as currently understood. In this act of ‘purification’ we recover the truth. However, this is too simplistic a vision and holding to a literal interpretation of this metaphorical scenario may well be just as damaging as lying (not that lying in and of itself is necessarily defective since meta-textully it may well be ‘called for’ in various types of social context in a spirit of authenticity). As stated in the Volume I, and I am paraphrasing, “the authentic is realized through the existentialization of the relatively inauthentic and never through the (impossible) existentialization of the relatively authentic!” The inauthentic and the authentic dialectically ‘need each other’. Without a beginning in relatively non-existential prejudice we have no point of departure either in the coursing of our daily lives or our researches. So, the realization of the relatively truthful is realized through a clarification of the relatively non-truthful but never in its absolute separation or destruction! Adventitiousness, essentially, is a matter of dialectical relativity. Let me elabourate. (445)

	If a viable theology can be formulated it must be done within a frame of reference that understands these distinctions between the relatively true and the relatively non-true, the relatively non-adventitious and the relatively adventitious, the relatively authentic and the relatively inauthentic wherein the former is realized through an existentialization of the latter… A theological project is one that is deliberately formulated on one or other or all of three levels of discourse-formation, i.e., in general terms (dealing with the ideality of the theological project), in particular terms (dealing with the specification of type) and in specific terms (dealing with the detailed specification within the parameters of that type of theological object/subject/process, etc.). In the course of our research my concentration in our first volume was on an attempt to establish the meaningful possibility of performing this type of project, whereas, in this second volume, my attention has been on those parameters that ensure the viability of the actuality of this type of project in general terms of reference. Let the professional or non-professional theologian concern themselves more with the discursive natures of the two latter levels of discourse-formation. At some stage, however, the general theologian must seriously entertain theological type if only as possible, hypothetical exemplars of their more general research. To ensure the viability of this type of project let me now look into what is called for in their truth evaluations, i.e., an appreciation of their possible and actual truth-status (to the extent that that is possible in hypothetical terms of reference). In this endeavour, in the light of a relatively systematic theory of truth-appreciation, let me now proceed. (446)

	Within the overarching ambit of a semantic theory of truth various levels of truth-formation need to be established in order to proceed to more developed, emergent levels of truth formation. This is the basic premise of an ordered philosophy wherein we must first develop a sense of the pre-essential essentiality… then an integrated aesthetic essentiality, a conceptual ethical reference to a sense of self, a perceptual correspondence of the same conducted in a pragmatical frame of reference… then a hermeneutical appreciation of possibility (pre-established through the viability of genres of activity)… and finally, a factual appreciation of the imputed actuality of certain factual-like states of affairs within certain stated factual contexts, etc. (and thence establishing relatively viable histories of the said events). This could be illustrated by the epistemological-ontological differences of the following… a non-integrated concept of a square-circle; a conceptual thought of a square; the actual conceptual entertainment of squareness; the perceptual recognition of a square; the entertained possibility that a square shape is still on a particular blackboard; and the fact that there is still a square shape drawn on that particular blackboard a day later. Of course, our general theological project is not going to concern itself with a sixth order as a confirmed fact (even though, ultimately, the hypothetical examination of possibility must concern itself with a fifth order of status, and, by implication, the actuallized-possiblity of a sixth order status in some dialectical/non-dialectical sense). (447)

	Each transition in this series of truth-transformations, from one order to the next, concerns itself with certain distinctive types of suspension as argued in my vision of the formation and full-functioning of the hermeneutic circle. However, there is this philosophical problem – if the hermeneutic circle is a full circle and these orders are superimposed upon the same (their relative degree of emphasis arising through mirco-acts of intentional focalized emphasis/de-focalized suppression) and there are many types of intentional states that must fail to see out their full transformational progression through these six orders (as in, e.g., an adult trying seriously to entertain the factual actuality of Santa Claus) or even from the second order onwards (as in, e.g., trying to entertain an ‘integrated’ square-circle thought, etc.) one must ask how the hermeneutic circle could fully function given, on many occasions, these intentional gaps? In other words, because these six orders are superimposed upon the three ideal dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle, and realized through their relative promotion/suppression, there must be many types of intentional processes that could not fully invoke that same hermeneutic circle because all six orders could not be invoked? As things stand one might well think that to be the case but let us, e.g., look phenomenologically closer at what apparently is involved in an educated adult hearing a story about Santa Claus that purports ostensively to be biographical and factual. The story is told in a realistic mode so as to impress upon children, who do not know (or who well may know) the factual status of Santa Claus, that this heroic ‘mythological–like’ character actually is a ‘real person’. Even children and people ‘in the know’ can still enjoy this situation in the light of this type of interpretation. In effect, everyone who hears this story has to suspend their disbelief and imaginatively promote their apparent belief in the existence of this character in order to envisage the ‘unravelling’ of this story (hopefully well-told). Yet, however ‘well-told’ this story might be there are discontinuities, inconsistencies, etc., that give it away (and effectively deconstruct it); e.g., Santa Claus is overweight so how can he get down the narrowness of most chimneys, or, how does Santa Claus gain access to houses that have no chimney, or, how could he visit one billion plus households in the space of a day, etc? Still, on the other hand, in our mere entertainment of this possibility of Santa Claus’ status taking on a sixth order level of factuality, or even as a mere possibility, this is more than enough for that intentional process per se to take on a factual status as an historically lived-process. So, even though the content failed this transition from the fifth to the sixth level of ontological-epistemological status the intentional process itself always took on that status, having been historically entertained intentionally by that subject, hence the hermeneutic circle is always fully operational despite, and in spite of, the status of the intentional content being simulated/re-simulated in cognitive-judgmental consciousness(es). (448)

	This concepts of the semantic clarification and semantic purification of truth determinations can perhaps be better illustrated in the following. Say, for the sake of argument, a friend tells you that there is a pot of gold in the next-door neighbour’s garden. How does one determine the truth of this apparent claim? Perhaps, after asking exactly where in this garden this pot might be, we might inquire how the apparent claimant comes to know this declared fact? Traditionally there are three avenues, namely, sense perception (you saw the pot of gold being buried [but it may not be a pot of real gold?]), inference (you know your neighbour has a pot of gold and with war being declared you assume the noises in the garden heard after midnight were this neighbour’s attempt to bury it?), or, you were told by that neighbour or someone else that there is pot of gold there (and although you might trust this person reporting this claim still you must wonder how they have come to know this, etc.). On closer inspection of these avenues for valid truth determination it should strike one that they cannot stand alone and, indeed, must stand or fall together. With this observation to hand one must assume that truth determination depends on all three! So, in situations that call for this determining of the truth we must see the harmony between all three approaches. Now, clarification could be seen to work like this: “Is there or is there not a pot of gold in the next-door neighbour’s garden?” does not call into question the fact that there is a garden next-door! Clarification must not concern itself with this presuppositional basis of a neighbour, there possessing a garden, etc. Once the presuppositional basis is accepted then our clarification is conducted upon it unless new conditions induce in us the need to revise our opinion of just what is accepted presuppositionally, etc. So, in this process of clarification we recognize the full sense of our propositional presentation without semantically purifying this propositional complex in terms of its truth determinations except presuppositionally. We believe there is a garden next door but whether it has a pot of gold in that garden is neither here nor there at this stage of this process (of clarification). Then, let us say we use a metal detector and sweep that back-yard in question. Sadly, we find no pot of gold. Now, in the light of this careful investigation we can say that it is most unlikely that there is a pot of gold in the top five feet of that soil. Any deeper, we believe we would also have found evidence of a deeper excavation at some time or other, and, we found no such evidence of such a recent or not so recent excavation. So, the revised truth of the matter is that there is no pot of gold in that garden. This truth is stated: in that garden there is no pot of gold. Note, however, that this particular ‘truth’ is still dependent on the clause ‘pot of gold’. Our research in the world works on this ‘sorting of the goats from the sheep, sheep from the goats’. The purification of our truth determination in this respect necessitates the propositional continuance of that no longer proposed, albeit in a negated form. The total process of truth determination works just like that – the establishment of a presuppositional basis and then a further clarification of the non-presuppositional basis in such a manner that our presuppositional basis, in time, is further enlarged and consolidated by semantic purification by the insertion of truth claims now considered valid. But, truth determination is a progressive affair. This neighbour took me inside and showed me a pot of gold that he had retrieved from the garden the day before I conducted my search. Having asked him the day before if I could use my metal detector on his garden he though it wise to remove this pot of rare gold coins (his superannuation he claims), but, being old and trusting me let me in on the secret in the advent of his dying unexpectedly and his wishing me then to have them… So, there was a pot of gold in that garden after all… truth, without doubt, is a tortuous affair! Indeed, truth is not realized in some second-hand, indirect fashion. Truth is never seen by looking but as that as seen ‘shown’ through inner reflection. Then, as a consequence, the truth that ‘has been seen as shown’ is in a position to reconstruct how we are to re-see the world and re-find our sense of place therein…! (449)

	The reader will now probably ask why all these digressions (and, in ‘reply’, all these continual acts of deferment)? The deeper appreciation of the phenomenon in question is always a circular affair! Only through such continual acts of deferment can we hope to get closer, and deeper, to a more insightful appreciation of that phenomenon in question. With the increasing richness of our field(s) of endeavour all forms of response, be they traditional-like answers or further questions, etc., there comes a point when small additional rhetorical and non-rhetorical increments induce/re-induce a degree of epistemological re-organization that is essentially productive of significant processes of insight. And this is the crucial point I would like to make. For our research to be productively ‘insightful’, and to recognized ‘insightfulness’ in parallel to our own (theological) projects, and, discriminatively appreciate their relative authenticity or non-authenticity, we need to possess a more sophisticated ‘model of truth’ that can account for these various illusions and non-illusions of an insightfulness on their part and on our part (in our appreciations of their intrinsic value and valuableness). Hence the tortuous nature of these interrogations, hopefully only conducted on a metaphorical level of discourse…. (450)

	How then is insightfulness to be both recognized and discriminatively approached and appreciated? How can we appreciate the apparent insightfulness or lack of insightfulness on the part of others? Let me now address these types of issues in some depth. (451)

	In the context of a theological project, e.g., what are we to treat as evidence of an example of apparent insightfulness? Purported insightfulness is always represented as a reconfiguration of a current genre (or set of genres) of activity to hand (for the members participating in that claimant’s particular culture) that is claimed to be both productive and re-productive of a distinctive degree of insightful re-configuration (of our way of seeing the world) that is both productive and consistently re-productive, both qualitatively and quantitatively, of the same form of an existential excess, i.e, its specific significance (with implicit and/or explicit existential ramifications for that individual who is able to perceive and recognize this particular insightful-producing reconfiguration of the world… and their place as re-configured and, thence, re-positioned within it…  As a provisional definition what is being stated here? (452)

	Genres of activity are those strategies currently to-hand through being intersubjectively made available as meta-texts for adoption for and adaptation by the members of that associated culture regardless of whether that culture in question is reviewed either from an institutional, national and/or international point of view, or, considered synchronically from the perspective of its membership or diachronically by interpreters of that culture. The major point here is that these genres of activity are already to hand and thereby only needing to be re-adopted and re-adapted when the relevant type of situation calls for such appropriation. Now, what is claimed is that when these genres are re-adopted and re-adapted they are claimed to be both productive and consistently re-productive of effectively the same insight arrived at through their ensuing re-configuration of how the world is/should be seen. This is put into effect first, through the world being first seen in accordance with the embedded metaphors/metaphysics/picturing of the world already resident in those to be appropriated genres of activity; second, through being ‘set-up’ by that complex configuration; and lastly, by the ensuing re-occurrence of the mode or modes of resolution set up to be adopted/adapted by that process of ensuing insightfulness therein realized in that ‘controlled’ process of resolution. So, a certain level, manner or degree of initial insight is assumed which is then treated through the manner of its re-configuration in order to produce, and re-produce, an existential excess in the form of a re-configuration of that originally naïve complex pre-adapted world-view already implicit/explicit in the appropriation of that genre of activity. In our current research that genre is the topic of theology in general terms of reference. In a particular type of theological frame of reference that would be the current theology-type-taken-to-hand, or, the more focused selection of a specific instance of an already pre-constructed theological system. Insightful treatment is realized and expressed though some form of a recipe or insightful inducing procedure. Such ‘insight’ therein realized then ‘existentially’ re-configures our current appreciation of the world in such a manner that essentially and consistently the same insightful pattern or patterns are both produced and re-produced. Therein a sense of an insightful difference occurs as that difference between initial insights and their treatment (and re-treatment) in the form of a provisional insight or final insight; if a finally arrived at final sense of insight is treated as currely definitive, albeit provisional; being an experience of difference realized as different both quantitatively in degree and qualitatively in manner. The resultant existential excess reinforcing these shifts in sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., value, and, therein re-positioning the individual or group subject to the same existential sense of re-direction. Essentially, a process of revaluation and re-evaluation have occurred with existential ‘consequences’ perceived as greater than the mere dynamical and mechanical shifts behind such re-positionings. Just as a lie entails some minimum intentional re-positioning of the intended victim of that subterfuge yet entails intended and unintended consequences of a dimension greater than the structural shifts entailed in the lie itself so too the realized process of insightfulness is claimed to be of a dimension not truly commensurable with the mere exercise of that recipe claimed to be insightfully productive. Now, utilization of a recipe, or set of recipes, may well not be productive of an expected insightfulness on a first attempt. It may well be claimed that because of the perceived incommensurable difference between the pre-insightful state of expectation and the realization of that insightful expectation that other factors must be in play, like, e.g., the so-called metaphorical ‘hand of the Divine’, etc. The again, it might be claimed that only a true believer, those pure in heart, etc., will be welcomed to this fold of those who have successful experienced this type of insightfulness. Often this type of text tells us that the insightfully inductive process must be repeated many times until such insightfulness is arrived at. Here we have some psychological insight into the mechanics of such a process. It would seem that any process of insightfulness, divine in nature or otherwise, is the result of a re-iteration of a new way of seeing the world that in realizing this re-configurational shift is then productive, and re-productive, of the expected or hoped for insight. That, such a shift is first psychologically desired through the creation of a sense of lack and that into this void or cognitive rift this insightful procedure is cast as the remedy for this experience of personal or spiritual deficiency. Then, without needing to claim the ‘hand of the divine’, or even its denial, we might like to view the insightful process also from a chaotic point of view; i.e., that incremental shifts finally cause a relatively radical chaotic re-interpretation of the world with an ensuing experience of the semblance of a new insightfulness, yet, at the same time, such ensuing novelty cannot be absolutely claimed since such insightfulness is also ‘recognized’ as this desired for insight regardless of the nature of its differentially realized/re-realized ontological content, epistemological processes and their collective conformity to reality as both previously and currently understood. In other words, insightfulness, rightly or wrongly (in critical historical hindsight), is a process that results from the incrementally shifted re-configuration of world-view with the experience of a resulting existential excess that appears to reinforce the validity of that associated shift or re-positioning in our phenomenal-phenomenological appreciation of the Life-World. And so it is… Without these re-adjustments in reality, or, rather, our appreciation of reality, we would still be living in caves with stone tools in our hands assuming we have the wits about us to appreciate these concepts of ‘shelter’ and ‘tools’, etc., (as genres of activity already to hand). (453)

	Our provisional definition of insightfulness is therefore something a bit more than the mere confirmation of a truth already insightfully acquired. Rather, it is akin to the discovery that a lie has been perpetrated and that things no longer appear at face value as initially presented by the exercise of that lie. The resulting shift in this re-vision/revision of the world re-positions us therein with consequential ramifications quite different to those entailed prior to this re-appreciation of this prior sense of world. In this state of affairs a certain possibility becomes recognized as an actuality; a mere intellectual re-positioning becomes, in some form or other, rightly or wrongly, something more than that mere intellectual re-positioning. This sense of a re-vision of the world psychically takes root more deeply although in some sense the intellectual re-positioning is necessary in order for that person, group or institution to be able to recognize what then takes root on a deeper level of being (in our being-in-this-world-before-others and in our being-in-this-world-before-others-who-have-already-made-this-so-called-insightful-transition). Hence this provisional definition and its emphasis upon the re-configuration of genres of activity and their ensuing existential-like re-configuration of our perception of the world of a magnitude greater than that invested in this very process itself… along with this element of a recognition made re-cognizable… To this extent the process of insight can be de-mystified. On the other hand, this element of reconfiguration in our seeing/re-seeing of the world is often quite naturally treated as mystical-like given that the existential-like consequences of such a process of re-cognition may well seem to bear little resemblance to the quantum of psychic energy originally invested in such a process both quantitatively and qualitatively. (454)

	Let me now attend briefly to the question of how we might appreciate the claimed insightfulness of others? This is a vexed topic for the philosophical or religious critic on a number of interrelated grounds. E.g., when a certain insight is apparently experienced what can we, the person who experiences that insight, claim on its behalf? Then, if not having experienced that so-call insight what could we say about it not having experienced this so-called insightful process and thereafter directly experiencing the ensuing transformation of that individual’s sense of a consequential re-positioning in this world? Then, on the other hand, such claims ask to be treated seriously and by doing so we must assume that we are also on some form of an intersubjective ground here, however tenuous, despite this separation into ‘sheep and goats’ or ‘goats and sheep’ as the ‘other’ might be regarded by these apparent insiders versus relative outsiders? Let me look more closely at this sense of a common ground that insiders still appear to appeal to in their ‘calling’ of outsiders to join them…? (455)

	This ‘call’ to the relative outsider by the relative insider is usually conducted as a claim with a certain number of options or sub-claims. Let me list what appears to me to be some of these micro-claims conducted within the collective embrace of the overall claim. First a certain re-treatment of the world is outlined usually, but not always, through the negation of some public, generally understood and generally accepted claim about the world (that normally would not be called into question). This re-treatment is then argued as confirmed in this process of insight. The essential significance of that insight, it is argued, if one were to correctly follow the correct procedure in order to establish its instantiation, and all things were to be favourable, is asserted to be more or less the same on both its iteration and its re-iteration. Furthermore, it is claimed to be intersubjectively accessible for those who find themselves in a position to receive it. Lastly, its pre-recognition and recognition to some extent must also be able to be established if not already pre-established. With these types of factors in mind let me now try to assess how such claims might be treated subjectively and intersubjectively. (456)

	The truth of any claim is to be established in establishing its conformity with reality. This objective is the easy part – how one establishes the nature of this conformity, that is the difficult part. No doubt in some sense this is easier for the subject if they themselves actually experience an insightful moment or period of time. On the other hand, our powers of appreciation may not be adequately operated under those transcendental terms of reference in which case the intersubjective mode should be properly investigated. In either investigations we should be looking for the sense of an existential difference made between the treatment of the world and its insightful re-treatment! Our examination of that existential surplus and the significant consequences that ensure alerting us to its relative merit or absence of merit in its acting as an insightful re-treatment in its focus upon the relevant sensed of world. Moreover, the temporal dimensions of that sense of merit should also be examined when and where possible: does the merit of that insight need to be re-realized through the re-iteration of its accompanying insightful procedures or is that merit relatively permanent in its consequential re-positioning of that individual or organization, etc? Basically, just how ‘good’ is that claim and just how ‘good’ is its consequential merit as subjectively/intersubjectively perceived through time…? (457)

	Leaving aside this interesting and complex topic of insight, and its relation to truth and the apparent ‘conformity’ of our interpretations/re-interpretations of reality, and its subjectively and intersubjectively perceived merit, etc., let me now visit an unusual philosophical problem, the problem of infinite emergence. (458)

	When we assemble the two major parts of a broom we end up with a new entity, namely, a broom. Even if we merely had the broom-head and were to use it to sweep our arm in this situation is now effectively acting as that broom handle. With a broom our passage through the world is facilitated in this respect, we can now sweep our way through the world with a greater sense of facility hence the emergent utility of the broom. Now, is the broom merely the sum of its parts or is it something else above and beyond these mere components? If you accept the first view then you can have no concept of a world since all there is for you are bits and pieces. On the other hand, if you adopt the latter view then we have the problem of infinite emergence, namely, in each and every relationship, and they are infinite in number, if there were to be an incremental addition to the total being of the world in each of those relationships then even the most minute incremental increase summed infinitely would realize an amount greatly in advance, indeed, infinitely in advance of what there was originally with the result that the world as we know it would have descended into an infinite ball of exploding light as like that envisaged in the so-called Big Bang…. (459)

	Another way of envisaging our critique of this reductive style of inventory as overlooking relatively novel forms of emergent identity that emerge within the confines of this Life-World is to note the implicit crticism in the following reductively oriented inventory. Let us say we conduct an inventory of the world starting with all hydrogen atoms on and up to the isotopes of all oxygen atoms. Where in this type of inventory are we to subsume water molecules since the mere inventory of hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms, already conducted, is not going to find for us, theoretically, this type of emergent entity, namely of molecules of water (h2o). Indeed, how is it possible in this reductive model to account for the normal nature of water to be found as a liquid when both hydrogen and oxygen by themselves under room temperatures remain as molecules of a gaseous nature?! (460)

	Obviously, we must take a dialectical point of view, i.e., in some manner or other the world is an emergent entity greater than the sum of its parts, but, at the same time, not an entity excessively in advance of the being of the mere sum of those participants. To some extent we have a double problem: the world can neither be the sum of its parts nor that infinitely greater than the mere sum of those parts, nor, that which is not not much greater than the sum of those parts. I have two ways of defusing this problem, namely, a phenomenological investigation of the dialectics of parts-and-wholes, and, a realization that power is realized in and through a limited, harmonized, diffusion of resistance. But, first, let me look more closely at this philosophical problem which, obviously, must only be a philosophical problem… thankfully.  (461)

	If the world is merely the mere sum of its participants then there can be no sense of world since it is not already accounted for. Or, if the world is an additional feature in that sum what relationship is borne then by that mere addition. On the other hand, if the world is to be treated as a uniquely describable entity and is realized through emergence then it cannot be reduced to its emergent material from whence it was realized. Or, if a world is treated merely as a meta-concept what conceptual reality would it have in conceptual terms and thence their translation to a perceptual frame of reference though the empirical instantiation of that conceptual frame. Then, if the world were to arise emergently from each and every possible relationship to what extent could it do so proportionately assuming that any incremental addition to the being of any possible relationship must cause the collapse of the world as we know it..?! (462)

	A small infinitesimal addition, however minute, infinitely summed could form no finite, non-infinite proportion to that original mass of being… and the world would cease instantly to be as we know it! Should we assume there are an infinite number of possible relationships in any unqualified world frame of reference even if it were to possess only a finite number of members? Yes! Let me demonstrate with the following illustration. Let us say our world has four atoms… atom 1 joins with atom two 2 in a relationship 1 to form a molecule; atom 3 joins with atom 4 to form a molecule in relationship 2. Then there is the relationship between relationship 1 and 2 say relationship 3. Now relationship 1 can have a relationship with atoms 1-4, and with relationships 1-3, etc., and so on in an infinite series of unlimited cross-relationships that must develop given no meta-level restrictions (such as, e.g., only meta-entities of the same meta-status can interact relationally, and/or, only meta-entities with a difference in status by one degree can interact, and/or, only entities in the first level of meta-status in the effective object-level can interact, e.g., etc., etc.). Without such limitations the number of emergent interactions must be infinite in number. Even if the number of entities of the same meta-status were large but limited and the number of relationships were restricted to the same meta-status advanced by one degree the number of relationships would be exponentially greater than the number of members situated in that world. Easily there would reach a point when the world of x+1 initial participating factors would be considerably greater than that same world consisting of only x initial participating factors. So, even with reasonable restrictions, in a world with a ‘relatively large number of factors that same world through emergence would cease to be as it was known by any intentionally aware phenomenal agents therein! But, again, obviously this cannot be case so how do we dialectically defuse this apparent problem?! (463)

	As noted previously I have two ways of attempting this task. Let me call these two solutions the dialectical identity solution and the diffusion-through-resistance solution. In the first solution I adopt a more ontologically oriented perspective to show that the identity relationship between parts and wholes is essentially one between parts-and-wholes, i.e., there can be no pure, absolute distinction between these two orientations of part-likeness and whole-likeness, etc. In the second solution I adopt a more epistemological orientation to show that relational power is defused from its point of origination through a harmonization of resistance; that it is this sense of resistance that a sense of world arises, and therein its actually being ‘known’; being ‘known’ between this open, but thence limited, nexus of relationships that constitutes some sense of a certain view of the world therein as that ‘being experienced now ‘between’ that-as-experienced and that-to-be-experienced’, and, thence, that sense of ‘world-as-known’ by virtue of such experiential-resistance. Such resistance being experienced both ontologically and epistemologically, i.e., as a diffusion of power as it radiates through this epistemologically organized World-of-Life, and, that our very act of knowing ‘it’ is also erosive too of that same distinctive sense of power as realized as that radiated from its point/s of origination from whence there is this continual, ongoing semblance of identity [in spite of, and by virtue of, the fact that phenomenal-phenomenological reality can have no absolutely permanent substantial material or form]. (464)

	This first solution has been effectively pre-established for us in my vision of a transformational philosophy as has been examined under the rubric of a treatment(/re-treatment) philosophy. In that technical frame of reference there is no ontological or epistemological preferencing of initial pre-relational products, relational processes of treatment, treatment products, processes of relational re-treatment (back to those initial levels of meta-status as found associated with those initial pre-treatment products) and re-treatment products (that have been returned to those initial levels of meta-status associated with those pre-treatment products), etc. There, a simple rule is applied that all forms of treatment result in a treated product higher by one degree in meta-status, and, that, in reverse, a process of re-treatment can result in a ‘final’ product whose meta-status is regarded as the same as that which belonged to its pre-treatment products. This type of analysis being essentially dialectical in so far as it sees, and assumes, that processes of analysis are overtly/covertly mirrored by processes of synthesis, and v.v., and, that processes of identification are overtly/covertly mirrored by processes of de-identification or anti-identification, and v.v. That, effectively, all processes are mirrored by anti-processes hence the dialectical manufacture of all forms of identification through simultaneous, parallel gestalt processes of mutual differentiation and mutual integration, i.e, all forms of significance are relationally entertained as the integrated-differentiation, or, differentiated-integration, of the relevant field/s of intentional activity. I.e., that there can be no phenomenal-phenomenological process of overt/covert integration without a parallel process of covert/overt integration, and v.v! Hence our identification and focus upon apparent parts as apparent parts-in-a-necessary-relation-to-a-certain-‘whole’ (where that ‘whole’ is either explicitly stated or implicitly discoverable from an examination of the context of that part/those parts), and, v.v. w.r.t. apparent wholes from an examination of its context of ‘parts’ (that must constitute their equally pre-given sense of being a series of ‘parts’). Hence the dialectics of parts-and-wholes. Furthermore, the dialectics of processes of relative treatment and re-treatment realize a situation where ‘parts have an effect in the context of a whole’ and ‘wholes can have an effect on parts’ on the same level of meta-status. However, this solution only dialectically prepares the ground, so to speak, for an epistemological solution wherein the ‘world’, on all levels of synthesis and/or analysis, can be appreciated, i.e., ‘known’, as greater than the sum of its ‘parts’ but not as that much greater than this sense of emergent greatness; which otherwise would cause the immediate collapse of the world-as-we-know-it! (465)

	The emergence of emergent power in this world radiates its sense of power in such a manner as to suffer a diffusion of that sense of power through that sheer process of radiation. In other words power diminishes through a psychic sense of distance. Moreover, in its interaction with the larger world and our interaction with it there is also a progressive diffusion of power proffered through resistance offered by the fact that no parts can merely be a pure participant only in that particular type of relationship or specific instance of the same. By virtue of the radiating existence of all other relationships all apparent parts in a relationship must ‘resist’, to some extent, the nature of that relationship by virtue of their belonging to other relationships, possessing difference in that relationship, etc. Hence the inherent dissonance of all types of participants towards each other and the qualified integrity of that relationship (and all relationships); the integrity of that relationship only being arrived at through a continual harmonization of this dissonant sense of difference. Power diminishes, therefore, both though psychic distance and through this sense of psychic resistance to the extent parts are not just pure, simple participant in each individually allotted relationship. Participants, thus, resist the partial emergence of their relationship, and, therein, must resist other participants despite the fact that no participant and no relationship could be treated as absolutely substantial, etc. This emptiness of absolute identity having no place in (our understanding of) the Life-World. On the other hand, all sense of world-likeness arises by virtue of the experience of resistance within that sense of world, indeed, by virtue of that resistance that that experience is experienced! I.e., in the radiated world of power-relations there can be no experience without resistance, and v.v.! (466)

 	This solution, I must confess, also mirrors my attempted solution to that problem in physics as to how we determine the theoretical magnitude of the vacuum pressure (on a micro-level of interaction) and the cosmological constant (on a macro-level of interaction)? Current theoretical estimates being currently out by a magnitude of the order 10120! Known as the “greatest fudge factor in the history of Physics”… in so far as I perceive that excess being consumed through processes of radiation and resistance, etc! Looking more closely at this concept of (psychic) distance one should also note that radiation on to a higher level of epistemological-ontological organization also results in a loss of effective power by virtue of the relative diminishment of that sense of power as a result of its entry into that relatively vaster, more expansive (psychic) level of (less) (experiential) containment. With the emergence of identity a greater level of organizational freedom is entered into with a resulting degree of consequent diffusion. However, to confuse the issue is the (experiential) fact that with re-treatment that enlargement of power through emergence is re-imposed upon the re-treated products in such a manner so as to make it practically impossible to differentiate them from their pre-treated status (both quantitatively and qualitatively?) without to some extent further processes of treatment via either synthesis or analysis. Moreover, emergence seems to dictate an ideal size per type in such a manner that an excess of energy is (more often) made available in the synthesis and integration of components that don’t realize a product relatively equal to or greater than this optimum level of enrichment. Conversely, states greater than this optimum size in type (are more likely to) release an excess energy when reduced or analyzed. Because ‘being’ can be neither purely actual nor purely potential it follows that (contra-possible) identities in a multi-universe can cancel each other out (just as when walking along the street the possible fact that I could be two feet further in front of myself is exactly counter-balanced by a similar factual possibility that I could be two feet behind where I am at this moment in time). The ‘ripening’ of identity is almost as if all other possibilities find themselves eliminated by virtue of this grand cross-cancellation? Then, what identity is actualized relatively is the result of this process of maturation wherein through an ongoing process of re-treatment (of the treatment of pre-treated products) the difference between pre-treatment and post-treatment, i.e. re-treatment, is effectively neutralized and practically made non-observable? However, through suitable process of re-contexting/de-contexting of that relationship, its materialized instantiation under examination should reveal something of the matrix of its realization and the (set of) differential(s) therein through which that relationship was able to re-treat itself back on to its initial level of meta-status. Arising though this potential the excess of value that results from its actualization is re-cycled in the next moment of its emergence, etc. The emptiness of identity almost demanding this sense of (psychic) resistance in such a manner that identities of a similar nature will resist each other in the same or similar fashion, e.g., just as a handshake must be with another shaken hand…. (467)

	Having noted and attempted to resolve this philosophical problem of infinite emergence what philosophical ramifications can we attempt to draw from our understanding of this problem and our work to date? No less than the now apparent fact that the residual integrity of the Life-World, in the form of a fait d’accompli, presents us with a de facto theology whether we like it or not! Perceiving the relative unity of this World-of-Life inescapably presents us with this de facto theology, namely, that the additional integrity of the world as a relatively integrated relational space for the actualized existence of relationships demands that we at least recognize its minimal theological complexion! Of course a committed theologian may well feel that this minimal requirement of the world to exist as a world-there-for-us cannot be given a more adequate theologically complex complexion in keeping with their traditional and/or non-traditional theological commitments. But, then on the other hand, the committed atheist must also be annoyed that this necessary, minimal theological requirement of a theological complexion in the existence of a world-there-for-us can also be so adduced! So, how is this argument for the necessary, minimal, theological complexion in the constitution of a world-there-for-us to be articulated in a critical philosophical fashion if, indeed, such a controversial argument could be run? (468)

	Given that the world cannot be just an item in a hypothetical, reductive cataloguing of the world, nor, as dialectically separated from this complexity of such discriminated content (regardless of the hermeneutical nature of the manner of our analysis, etc.) it follows that this emergent integrity of this semblance of an integrated world-there-for-us must also be simulated/re-simulated in all forms of relational treatment of this sense of world. Therefore, this residual integrity must also be stamped upon all processes-and-content of relational pre-treatment/treatment/re-treatment. In other words, this minimal requirement of a residual world-integrity must (also) be relationally stamped upon all phenomenal-phenomenological production in this one-World-of-Life! Because we inhabit a world that appear to be a world, indeed, this same world-for-all-senses-of-otherness it follows that this same world being greater than the mere sum of its parts must be relatively divine, indeed, by virtue of its self-organized complexity (as evident in our astrophysical and micro-physical researches) it follows that that sense of the divine being greater than our own very limited, epistemologically organized sense of identity… that that sense of the divine must be Divine (as previously defined) (although not necessarily following or being consistent with any form of a traditional and/or non-traditional theological system!)! But, so much for theory! – let us now ask “just what relevant existential ramifications could this type of philosophical ‘insight’ have for the non-religious person… the religious person… and the theologically-inclined religious person… if at all???” (469)

	Let us, therefore, now focus on the existential ramifications of theological difference especially in the light of this claim for the necessary existence of a minimal de facto theological complexion imposed/superimposed upon the non-absolute, open-ended ‘integrity’ of the Life-World. Does theological difference indeed make a difference from an existential perspective on how we live our life in this one-World-of-Life? Continuing our general investigations let us explore the possible merits, both positive and negative, of a ‘perceived’ theological complexion imposed/superimposed upon this phenomenal world as lived in our phenomenological lives both from the perspective of either an explicit theological treatment of this world and/or its necessary de facto implicit treatment as just argued? (470)

	In the light of theologically inspired institutions, and theologically oriented religions in general, an existential claim for the persistence of such a frame of reference can be successfully made by virtue of their persistence and ongoing re-constitution through time! On the other hand, what exactly that existential value is or existential values are, no doubt, is a controversial issue needing much research, valid argument and critical appreciation conducted in an open arena of non-prejudicially distorted consensus. However, in the light that there are also many people, and institutions, that are either neutral or antithetical to a religious perspective, whether theologically inspired or not so inspired, we must also ask does this existential ‘difference’ make a real difference, or, posed the other way round, is it the case that because there is always the persistence at least of this minimal de facto theological complexion in our cultural and personal treatments of the world that such a ‘difference’ does indeed make a real difference regardless of the existence or non-existence of our religious commitments and whether the latter are overtly or covertly theologically inspired since our-being-in-this-world could not be otherwise, i.e., our being-in-the-world must be either overtly and/or covertly inspired theologically to some degree or other? Indeed, how otherwise could we be in ‘the’ world, in this ‘same’ world, if it did not possess this minimum degree of a theological-like perspective stamped upon its apparent integrity both as a fact and as an article of faith (since on waking, and each moment of the day, we assume that, basically, we are still in the same world and that we are still the same person despite change, by virtue of their continuing re-constitution as one-within-the-other before the continuing constitution of others at least till our death/their deaths. That, in essence, transcendentally we could conceive of no other frame of reference other than the sheer existential facticity of this Life-World as this one-World-of-Life, indeed, as this One-World-of-Life?! (471)

	First, let me look at this argument that argues institutions existentially persist through time by virtue of their existential merit, i.e., that no institution will persist in time if it does not fulfill an existential purpose, maintain an existential core of authenticity in its ‘life’ in this World-of-Life. (482)
	
	An immediate counter-objection could be raised: both the Nazi regime under Hitler and the Catholic Church in the Inquisition were institutions that murdered people it found disagreed with its policies or because policies existed that could not tolerate the existence of such individuals they absolutely devalued or progressively disvalued… Surely, in the light of such inauthenticity, such institutions should have ceased to exist. However, institutions have a variety of purposes and the existential merits of these other relatively more authentic objectives could see out the persistence of such institutions. Moreover, from the accumulated institutionalization of the world such institutions are not going to immediately ‘die’ but would at least run down if not authentically re-constituted since through their very being they must be existentially operating in their very core by virtue of the fact that they already have existence and an ongoing re-constitution of existence in and through this world. So, inauthenticity may weaken an institution it does not necessarily imply that it will be fatally weakened. In the light of these observations, we can ask should institutions judged inauthentic be allowed to persist or should they be existentially transformed through an existential transformation of those non-existential non-core aspects of their being and, therein, enlarge the authenticity of their imprint upon the world through such processes of restorative authenticity? Because institutions are inescapable such types of decisions should be faced since non-core inauthentic institutionalization is just as much a fact as authentic institutionalization in each and every institution and the fate of such institutions is either to be transformationally re-invigorated (spiritually) or allowed to run down and ultimately die (in their death of this non-material/immaterial sense of the ‘spiritual’ as that aspect which is relatively authentic). But should such a decision be ‘yours’ or ‘ours’, i.e., conducted without direct relationship with that institution or in a direct relationship with that relationship on the behalf of that relationship? Our existential reflections arguing that the authenticity of such decisions must reflect the latter orientation, i.e., existentially ‘self-conducted’ on the basis of ‘our’ relationship with that relationship as instituted in the world! As examples of the range of possibilities in this type of matter we have the Nazi regime being brought to an end, on one hand, and, on the other, the continuing re-constitution of the Catholic Church and its stronger, more coherent stance on the assumed ‘sanctity of life’. Still, one must ask in what sense a history of inauthenticity must mar any institution if this inauthentic history is not properly addressed (through a recovery of memory and a rectification response both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that institution?)? (483)

	How is it that such an argument can be run (on the claim that an institution persists as long as its core is authentically re-constituted through time)? Is it not the case that merely through the sheer persistence of power an institution maintains its own existence in this world, i.e. through the very institutionalization of that institution (as an existential excess in this world, i.e., as a fact greater than the mere sum of its parts?)? Implicit in such a claim is the fact that institutional persistence is maintained through an ongoing resolution and harmonization of dissonance, i.e., those factors that would otherwise disrupt that institution - resolve those disrupting factors and that institution must persist until such a time that dissonance is not effectively resolved and ensures the realization of the actual–non-existence of that institution through the ensuing fatality of such non-effectively addressed disruption. Simply, an institution is in existence once it is in phenomenal existence and phenomenally addresses successfully those factors that would otherwise disrupt it. Disrupt the disruption and you have the persistence of phenomenal identity (once phenomenal identity is phenomenologically established). But if all identity is empty (in the Buddhist sense) how could there be ‘an’ identity in the first place as that logically nominated, correctly or incorrectly, has neither an absolute ontological existence nor an epistemological reception? Indeed, how could an absolute nihilist also be a non-absolute relativist? Or, how else could it be otherwise? (484)

	What is ‘given’ is the simulation of a ‘world’ and, therein, a world of simulated relationships. No component part of a relationship nor that relationship itself is absolutely independent and unique in this relational sense of world. Since no relationship is independent of all other relationships therefore their collective constitution, therein, of this sense of ‘world’. Then, alternatively, no relationship is absolutely dependent upon this sense of world by virtue of its simulation of a sense of identity through interdependence given its different relational perspective/s upon the world manifested from the relative uniqueness of its own point/s of view. Into this sea of significant value, awash with the excess of its existential surpluses of significance, both ontological and epistemological, identity is simulated/re-simulated. In this dialectical ‘mix’ there can be neither ‘parts’ nor ‘wholes’, nor can there be mere ‘parts-in-wholes(-within-greater-wholes)’ since parts are manifested as ‘parts’-in-the-context-of-parts-and-wholes, and, wholes are manifested as ‘wholes’-in-the-context-of-parts-and-wholes. Such simulation/s-re-simulations/s cannot be treated as separate, independent imputations despite the phenomenal-phenomenological appearance of non-dependent identity. Since identity is ‘confronted’ within the contextual-aspect of its own relational world it follows that such apparent ‘identity’ is given in accordance with its own relationally generated sense of being. By reference to its overall modality of presentation is the nature of experiential time-and-space selectively opened up for us to experience the phenomenal-phenomenological simulation/re-simulation of the same. So shadows are seen as shadows, trees are seen as trees, and, people are encountered as persons or groups of persons or as institutions run by people. The phenomenal-phenomenological reality of a presentation/re-presentation being presented in and through its phenomenal-phenomenological representation as particularized in and through the specification of those modalities as found presented in that presentation/re-presentation. The truth of a presentation/re-presentation being generally discerned through its apparent conformity or non-conformity in type with the represented reality of those associated modalities, and, in specific terms through the non-non-conformity of its factual specificity to the extent this non-general aspect can be discerned directly and/or indirectly. So, e.g., a ‘real’ apple phenomenon must possess the mix of modalities associated with real ‘apples’, and, there exists a unique temporal-spatial specification that presents one and only one apple phenomenon as a fact (that, therein, conforms to its existential descriptor both modally and factually). Hence conformity is on an 1:1 inter-modal basis (and not through the correlation of an apple imputation with its ‘represented’ apple correlate – such an impossible position being neither empirically ascertained phenomenally nor phenomenologically experienced!)! (485)

That, ultimately, phenomena are simulated/re-simulated phenomenologically by virtue of slight perturbations in ‘their’ and ‘our’ hermeneutic appropriations in and through micro-acts of de-centering in ‘their’ simulated/re-simulated manifestation/s and in ‘our’ phenomenological experience/re-experience of the same. And this is always experienced directly through the ambit of that selectively receptive relationship. By virtue of this virtual difference, these micro-perturbations in gestalt emphasis, ‘parts’ become discerned and ‘wholes’ become discerned in the appropriate contexts of their associated relationships – unleashing a sense of power that arises in and through our relationship with this same aspect of this phenomenon of reception being in keeping with the manner of the presentation of that relationship. So, e.g., in a prison cell the prisoner is detained in quite a different fashion to the door, floor and the walls of that cell. Although a prisoner can be beaten, and the walls can be beaten by that prisoner, only the prisoner could be painfully interrogated by virtue of the fact that only a person can experience pain and, therein, in that type of process, the act of torture. Without our powers of recognition the type of relationship that needs to be discerned, in order to be discerned if present, is not experienced as being discerned in that regard…. (486)

	By ‘perturbations’ what is meant? Through micro-acts of apparent de-centering in the ‘experience’ of difference there is set up in phenomenal-phenomenlogical time and space along with the re-ordering of experiential emphasis, and, therein, the power of that interaction both passive and active in complexion across all relevant modal differentials as simulated/re-simulated therein! All semblances of power, whether relatively emitted or received, being perceived through this dialectical experience of difference hence the co-existence of a relativity of passivity and activity across and between the same. Hence in this dialectics of power-relations there is always manifested, on a momentary basis, a changing presentation/re-presentation of power experienced actively or passively, and, the necessary co-existence of the same in the dialectical relativity of power-relations. So it is that ‘something’ can be seen to actively act on something else or itself; such aspects hence to be designated as the relatively ‘active’ or ‘passive’ aspect/aspects or party/parties in that specific relationship even though through resistance there can be neither pure passivity nor pure activity (and thence this passive-active concept of resistance). Thus, even though the semblance of all forms of identity are empty of absolute nominal specification still identity can be manifested when experienced through our experiencing/their experiencing a degree of resistance to the manifestation of that relational-power-play. Our relationship persisting through phenomenal-phenomenological time and space by virtue of an ongoing adequacy of resolution in that presented sense of dissonance as the lived in and through the background consonance of that relationship – the very relationship itself bearing witness to this sense of a resolute resolution as realized in and through the psychic persistence, through re-iteration, of that relationship as being currently lived-before-us! The dialectics of relationships allows us to experience these presentations/re-presentations of apparent ‘parts and ‘wholes’ but does not allow us to make representative imputations of the same phenomena (except in provisional, limited conventional terms of reference)! No truly critical philosopher can operate without this distinction between the relatively-absolute and the absolutely-relative (since one must argue that there can be no relatively absolutely-absolute point of view through the impossibility of the existential transformation of the relatively existential, and, for the same reasons, the impossibility of the relatively relatively-relative through the impossibility of the non-existential transformation of the relatively non-existential!). (487) 

	Now, a philosophical problem presents itself in our concept of treatment: if all processes of treatment realize the simulation of a relational entity advanced by one meta-degree should it not be the case that processes of re-treatment, as distinctive processes of ‘treatment’ in their own right, also realize a relational entity advanced again by one more meta-degree? So, then, how would it be possible, e.g., to live in houses built by architects when such constructions should only allow entities advanced by two meta-degrees to enter their premises? Obviously this is a psuedo-philosophical problem to the extent that experience definitely contradicts our theoretical consequences in this regard? So, how can we account for the fact that processes of re-treatments are a reversal of processes of treatment from a perspective that notes the appropriate meta-levels theoretically and critically associated with transformational processes wherein pre-treatment products are subjected alternatively to treatment and re-treatment, etc? (488)

	A simple solution is realized in this puzzle when we insightfully ‘discover’ that all forms of identity and treatment are dialectically cross-referenced to the extent that no form of identity can be treated as either absolutely independent nor absolutely non-independent, hence the simulated/re-simulated manifestation of the relative interdependency of identity and its dialectical manifestation therein of identity along with the specific nature of our interaction/s with the same! So, e.g., hands are shaken and speeches are made… and hands are not made and speeches are not shaken (except metaphorically)..! Hence treatment is dialectically balanced by re-treatment, and, from their micro-differentiated semblances of ‘disruption’ is aided all senses of differentiation and, therein, all semblances of power and experientially associated forms of resistance in and through which the associatively realized relationship itself is progressively resolved in and through the harmonization of the very existence of that relationship-as-perceived-by-us (and its ‘own’ processes apparently involved in its ‘self-perception’ of itself from its ‘own point/s of view’), etc…. (489)

	Put simply, the resolution of this philosophical puzzle is thus: all identities and their interactions are simulated (in and through our experience of the Life-World) immediately and directly in their contexts of presentation/re-presentation as re-presentative-presentations and never as imputed-representations. Thus, all forms of identity (in this simulation of ‘parts’ and as ‘wholes’) is dialectically realized without an absolute sense of dimension between the senses of the phenomenal and the phenomenological, i.e., in this one-World-of-Life, and, hence all processes of treatment are mirrored by inversed processes of re-treatment wherein all forms of an existential excess must be re-invested in the simulated matrix of that presentation/re-presentation. That, only the semblance of a disruption of this status quo allows us to relatively isolate provisional identities within the ambit of provisional relationships, etc! Hence the non-imputed appearance of phenomena in our selectively focused/re-focused phenomenological interactions within this World-of-Life. All micro-acts of disruption being simultaneously undone, moment by moment, by anti-micro-acts of disruption – all simulations of power and resistance therein necessitating continual acts of re-constitution in order to both conserve and vary such provisional differentiations… thus the emptiness of all identity since that which does not change cannot be related to and neither could it relate to us! (490)

	Why?! Because all modes of presentation are essential snap-shots of the Life-World as received in and through a ‘natural’ overall transcendental suspension whose sense is perceived through the distinctive manner of that suspension. So, if we are dealing with a certain state of affairs of type A then as it is not any other type of states of affairs, namely, ~A,  its sense is determined through just that type of suspension between A and ~A. Similarly, in that state of affairs A we invoke certain genres of activity in the same manner and all distinctive entity-states, operations, accommodations, and relational resolutions (i.e., transformations) therein, etc. By such manoeuverings the distinctive manner of the presentation under examination is simulated/re-simulated, etc. The distinctive nature of those invoked suspensions characterizing the distinctive nature of those investigations. Here we have no absolutely centered suspension, only an overall suspension whose mid-point declares the sense of that presentation/re-presentation. This qualified overall transcendental suspension defining the overall sense of that overall act of intentional focus. A general, particular and/or specific sense of focus/foci that defines the nature of those acts of simulated/re-simulated appropriation/re-appropriation. Hence our ability to create/re-create a qualified overall transcendental suspension despite the fact that no system can be in a state of absolute equilibrium. The qualified resolution realized locating the sense of those undertakings from that point or points of partial, qualified equilibrium. The (existential) ramifications  of this type of position are vast and complex. This topic will need to be taken up elsewhere. However, this fact that no system is in absolute equilibrium does not disqualify us from being present in one-World-of-Life… (491)

	That in essence, if the transcendental perspective could be viewed from a transcendental perspective, by virtue of the absolute nature of phenomenal-phenomenological reality, through the ever-present existence of the overall transcendental suspension, it would be such that all meta-levels and all forms of distinction would be found to be entirely absent from that (metaphorical and relatively non-spiritual point of view) point of view. Hence a phenomenal-phenomenologically constituted metaphysical concept of sameness! Hence, also, the perception of treatment-processes in a relative, conventional frame of reference must be mirrored by counter-processes of re-treatment in order that this transcendental status arrived at through the all pervading, ever-present sense of an overall transcendental suspension be maintained, albeit expressly manifested through a qualified sense of formation (by virtue of the qualified nature of the adopted and adapted sense of those simulations/re-simulations). Thence the emptiness of all existence from an absolute point of view by virtue of a continual canceling of all forms of existential identity (thematized in relatively treated frames of reference) through their completely mirrored re-treatment (on this same ‘non-dimensional’ dimension of the Absolute). However, in a relative, non-absolute perspective there is a progressive thematization of identity be it in a frame of reference that is either ontological and/or epistemological in orientation. Such thematization realizing that point in our phenomenal-phenomenological reception beyond which there is only the re-confirmation of what has already been eidetically confirmed, i.e., its sense of identity, etc. Thence the simulation/re-simulation of phenomenal identity in the phenomenological re-constitution of the simulation/re-simulation of that same identity. (492)

	Furthermore, because identity of a certain type or genre can only be thematized in the appropriate gestalt field or fields it follows that such relational identity must be truly dialectical in its formation and hence completely mirrored in the simulation/re-simulation of that identity in a relative frame of reference, i.e., from a sense of perspective that is aspectival in orientation, and, that that overt orientation too must be counter-balanced through the parallel presence of its covert contrary aspect/s. Thence the emptiness of identity, the non-dimensional mirroring of counter-identification, absence of difference from the perspective of the Absolute, this critical metaphysical concept of sameness or absolute non-difference, albeit in a perspective determined by sense, etc. (493)

	This solution, however, now leads us on to ask a question why does a process of treatment result in the theoretical appearance of a treatment product or products that is or are higher in meta-status by one degree? Why, theoretically, all processes of treatment, be they analysis, synthesis, identification, counter-identification, realize a product that is relatively relational in orientation? Because, intentionally, in its properly associated gestalt field of presentation/re-presentation, what is realized must be a relation or set of relations that cannot be ‘focalized’ within that field by virtue of their occupying a non-focalized sense of ‘space’ within that field. How do I see that my left foot is similar (in a reflective axis) but not identical to my right foot in its overall sense of symmetry. This dialectical space is relational, i.e., that space ‘between’ my left foot and my right foot. Such a space cannot be perceived only conceived (since I cannot clearly see my left foot if I am perceptually focused on the right, and v.v.)! So, our intentional attention has taken a more relational orientation, indeed, a meta-textual orientation, and hence its rise in meta-status by one degree. Again, how do I known that my concept of ‘my left and right feet’ is similar to my concept of ‘your left and right feet’ – by virtue of the fact that these psychic meta-textual entities are advance by one more meta-degree and therein, on those terms of reference, we find a degree of transformational isomorphism in our intellectual transformation from one concept (of my feet) to the concept (of your feet) – hence their meta-meta-status or i.e., a meta-status of two degrees. But, my feet are firmly planted on the ground as are yours and by processes of re-treatment we arrive at this same ‘insight’ hence re-treatment brings us back to where we began – our feet firmly planted upon the ground! On those same terms of reference experiencing the causal consequences of such relative formations/re-formations! Furthermore, the very determination of the sense of those investigations being determined through a qualified suspension can only be achieved through a mirroring of those acts of focus/de-focus and hence the necessary, explicit/implicit mirroring of treatment by re-treatment, and v.v., etc.(494)

	So, how do we account for a causal philosophy in the light of the above?! (495)

	The philosophical problem of causation is a complex problem with an open-ended set of questions, such as, e.g., “if all is empty how could there be causation?” “how do you account for the relationship between cause and effect (“since if the cause occurs at the same time as the effect what difference is there between that cause and effect?” and, “if the cause and the effect are not connected why is the effect regarded as caused by that cause?”)?” “how can you account for the sense of cause in a chaotic situation (in a moment of chaotic bifurcation)?” “if from an Absolute point of view there is only sameness how could there be change without a sense of difference?” “if all is cause what causes the cause of that cause, etc?” etc. Rather than try to resolve all these questions separately let me, instead, sketch a causal philosophy that addresses these issues collectively. (496)

	A Buddhist solution that appears to be adopted by the philosopher Nagarjuna is to perceive causal-processes as not based on impossible metaphysical imputations of ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ but to see causal-processes as an expected concurrence of this (type of) situation with that (type of) situation in such a manner that their connection is treated as evident through processes of iteration/re-iteration, all controlled by various types of conditions, and that all pre-conditions/conditions are the same in the demonstration of each event. So, e.g., I take an apple from the bowl and let it drop and it will drop. And I can do the same to each of the remaining apples in that bowl since the same pre-conditions/conditions are in place (namely, the preconditions of an apple being held above the ground, and, the condition of my letting it go along with the assumption that all things are equal between these events of ‘dropping’). Hence the formula: “if this – then that”…. (497)

	The metaphysical concepts of cause and effect are only metaphors that have a non-philosophical currency in a conventional context as approximations only. Metaphors cannot be treated literally, yet, metaphors can still metaphor reality through some form of representation, albeit as ‘lived’ in and through the hermeneutic circle (where the moment of the metaphorical[ly reductive] is only one of three moments in that frame of reference). Only through an overall transcendental suspension in and through the context of the hermeneutic circle, along with its three historical time orientations, can a sense of cause and effect be simulated (e,g, in perception)/re-simulated (e.g., in memory). (498)

	Still, if the entire Life-World is just one all-pervading overall transcendental suspension, albeit qualified in our sense determinations, how could we account for the reality, or illusion, of change? Without a sense of difference how could there be the simulation of change? However, difference can always be accounted for from the invocation of a difference sense of perspective and/or set/s of perspectives in our consequent recognition of our ensuing situatedness in the phenomenal-phenomenological reality of the Life-World (in the ‘light’ of such an aspect/set of aspects)! Once this type of difference is set up then an associated sense of difference automatically prevails, a sense of situation that must proceed in keeping with the nature of its consequential phenomenology. So apples removed from a bowl can be dropped onto the table or floor or back into that bowl. Apples dropped beyond a certain height are damaged, etc. But all this discrimination must occur in their appropriate fields of presentation/re-presentation normally in keeping with the nature of their modal representations. If identities were constituted in unchanging units there could be no consequential change. Emptiness recognizes the absolute fact that the relative perspective from the absolute point of view can entertain no unchanging substrates, etc., even if the preservation of identity were dependent upon some form of a relative substrate such as, e.g., DNA, a computer disc, the brain as a basis for memories, the concept of a limited sense of soul, etc. Just that no absolute substrate or any other metaphorical-metaphysical mechanism could be invoked nor need be invoked in order to absolutely explain what, under absolutist terms of reference, would be impossible to explain! What are the ramifications of this type of position? (499)

	That there can be no metaphysical imputation of causal entities! That a concept of the ‘spiritual’ demands a concept that recognizes a sense of process subjected to a process of relative existentialization in order to re-constitute a relatively preserved sense of the authentic and augmented as an evolved sense of the authentic ‘discovered’ through insight as appropriate to the relational nature of that situation, read ‘its spiritual nature’, as read in its situational context within this one-World-of-Life. Hence the recognition (in a relative-absolute and/or absolute-relative perspective) of a consequential-conditional analysis (in distinction to a naïve causal philosophy of causes-and-effects) albeit subject to the qualification that there can be no absolute non-intentional/intentional positioning (through a recognition of a chaotic indeterminacy in both an ontological sense of orientation and an epistemological sense of orientation)! That change is guaranteed by virtue of the non-absolute equilibrium of each qualified overall transcendental suspension invoked in our determination of sense Just as from an ontological orientation a sense of perspective necessitates an off-centering of the presentation/re-presentation and thence an inherent sense of disequilibrium despite the qualified equilibrium in place through the continual, momentary re-iteration of that distinctive sense of identity, etc! (500)

	Let me now systematically sketch this conceptual-scheme of a causal-conditional philosophy as just articulated and which will form the basis of consequential-conditional-analysis (with all the qualifications implicit in such an undertaking). (501)

	The theologian needs to consider three types of causation, namely, the causation of inanimate and animate things in general, the interactions and initiations of persons, and, the hypothetical nature of Divine causality (and identity, etc.). Divine causation cannot be dismissed by religious commitments that demand the ‘fact’ that the Divine transcends, must transcend, the causal. Even if that were to be the case the Divine must still phenomenally-phenomenologically be found to enter into the processes of this world in order to possess a sense of positive value for the person in the here and now! Classical deism, or classical theism, fails us in this endeavour - in its dusty and draughty halls we can find no deep, consistent, meaningful sense of religious value in the world except as a metaphor, albeit of a rather clichéd habit. On the other hand, our progress in this field so far has followed the avenue of a hypothetical process theology and has rewarded us with a degree of success that strongly suggests that this topic, carefully and critically conducted, not only has sense but can also be found to have a positive degree of value for the theologically-oriented, religious aspirant (although to date, the full existential ramifications of theological difference have yet to be properly explored)? I would also like to argue that, although our phenomenal-phenomenological investigations of a general causality might have three domains to operate in, as noted above, in the Life-World there is, and can only be, one and only one type of causal process since we must all inhabit the same World-of-Life, namely, this one-Life-World! The phenomenal-phenomenological ‘integrity’ of the world-as-lived demands that it operates from the same manual, same rule-book, so to speak (metaphorically)! So, with the above background in mind, let me construct a sketched out version of a causal-conditional philosophy that can serve both our non-theologically-oriented set of phenomenological investigations and provide us with the possible form and format for a hypothetical theologically-oriented phenomenological set of investigations. So, for the moment, let me make no differentiation between these three domains. Then, let me introduce the element of intentionality followed, eventually, by the implication of a divine teleology, etc; our proposals being treated and accepted as both provisional and exploratory…. (502)

	Different identities are apparently manifested in this world through inter-dependence, indeed, through their crossed linkages and causal chains, constitute the very phenomenal-phenomenological ‘space’ and ‘time’ of the world itself and all found therein (regardless of whether, ultimately, it be open-ended and/or limited in extent and its contents be only directly and/or indirectly related to the spatio-temporal). To get our minds dialectically around such complexity let me construct the following model as a guide to our understanding this concept of interdependence. Here, I am not arguing for either the absolute dependence of phenomenon upon each other or the absolute independence of phenomena. I am insisting on the middle ground here of the interdependence of identities rather than their complete dependence upon or independence from all other phenomena. Similarly, in this sketch I am insisting on the dialectical interdependence of all causal phenomena otherwise we fall back into a hopelessly confused world of causes and effects (along with the problems over identity as to whether causes are exactly equivalent to effects or not exactly equivalent to effects.). However, if all identity is empty what allows one phenomenon to arise in contrast to some other, or, what allows any one phenomenon to even manifest with some sense of phenomenological distinctness? In other words how is identity simulated/re-simulated given this absence of an unchanging absolutist ‘substance’? Just how do we walk this tight-rope over this middle ground of an apparent interdependence between the bankrupt concepts of absolute dependence and absolute independence? Let me put it to you this way: phenomena only have an apparent sense of centre, a sense of centre arrived at through a de-centering of their causal context/s of presentation/re-presentation. In reaction provisionally delineated phenomena apparently then attempt to re-centre themselves. Authenticity being re-defined in this complex world as that occurring through a relatively authentic process of de-centering and a relatively authentic process of re-centering. In the process of de-centering/re-centering there is realized an existential surplus of value that, through re-treatment, re-invests the apparent integrity of such relatively interdependent generation of identity. These flows of power and resistance further producing/re-producing these semblances of interdependent identity. A metaphor can be heard in this regard: it is as if things find their voice through singing which means they just cannot sit there and do nothing. Similarly, they are heard and taken at ‘face-value’ as voices-to-be-heard. So, identity is recognized and thematized from the both the side/s of the phenomenon itself and its phenomenological perceiver/s. Being in ‘one’-World-of-Life all relationship are entertained directly, albeit in and through their manner of presentation/re-presentation. So when I see a friend and hear them speak I am directly engaging this presentation of an off-centred/de-centred nature along with their evident power to be as agents-in-this-world along with the resistance I meet in this engagement, etc., and v.v. But, when I think about this friend who is no longer present before me, my direct engagement is now only with my imaginative re-presentations of this previous fact. That, engagement is only entertained in and through the selection of modes of apprehension adopted and adapted in that encountered situation of interaction. That, normally, the sense of reality is reinforced by the quantity and quality of these modes as directly apprehended in that situation or event of interaction. So, although the Life-World may operate through the pervasion of an ultimate, overall transcendental(-like) suspension the appearance of interdependent identities is directly realized through an off-centering of being conducted from all phenomenal-phenomenological sides of that apparent interaction. Now, let us add a more prominent intentional flavour to that recipe for identity/identification, etc., of the phenomenal-phenomenological appearance of identity, especially in those interactions between intentional identities. (503)

	In processes of dynamic interactions, normal wisdom might suggest that changes of causal direction are entertained by one or more of those parties involved in that causal situation, all of those parties, or, by other parties not immediately involved ostensively with the processes of causal flows already under examination. How is it possible for one or more of those parties, whether present or not present ostensively in that relationship, to apparently initiate changes in causal direction? Again, the primary metaphor I would like to adopt, and adapt, is that of an ‘off-centering’ or a ‘de-centering’ of the relevant relationship/s. Indeed, the initiation and/or experience of change can be metaphorically ‘shown’ to have its primary location in an off-centering, and consequent off-setting/upsetting, of the relationship/s involved; that it is only though an apparent relationship in the first place that there can be the apparent ‘initiation’, and ‘experience’, of an evident change in causal direction! Let me explain. The evidence of a relationship is the degree it has a factual basis, its facticity, in this world-as-lived, i.e., the extent the relationship is in a state of an existential surplus above and beyond the mere summation of its apparent parts. This sense of resolution, intentional resoluteness, is dictated by the successfulness of the ongoing harmonization of the relative dissonance within that relationship that ensues from this intervention of a de-centering/off-setting of the apparent relationship, etc. The relationship making its phenomenal-phenomenological ‘appearance’ by virtue of this dialectical oscillation between de-centering and re-centering! Both modes being more correctly treated as dialectical in scope (i.e., by not being taken literally as alternations merely sequenced in time and space, etc!). Hence for there to be a re-centering there must be a de-centering of (our) being in the world. Thence an authenticity of being in the world also necessitates not only an authenticity of re-centering but also an authenticity of de-centering! This model applying to all forms of causation whether implicating non-intentional forms of existence, intentional agents or the possibility of divine agency. The only factor that separates these ‘modalities’ being merely the quantitative and qualitative richness of modalities present in keeping with the phenomenal nature of those interacting parties in question, i.e., the (provisionally assumed but non-imputed) nature of that modal complexion in keeping with their relative degrees of epistemological organization present in the constitution of all those parties and their interactions. In this light let us now examine the apparent phenomenon of intentionally directed/re-directed processes of causality (and their involvement in a teleological frame of reference on the grounds that an intentional process is not only directed towards an intentional object-state or objective but also operates with an apparent sense of an intended purpose or as a set with such deliberative-like intentions?). (504)

	Billiard balls change direction on a billiard table, assuming it is effectively flat for the normal course of a game, when they bump into each other or into the cushions on the sides of the table (unless the player intervenes and re-directs the course of their existential descriptor outside these parameters). Such redirections normally follow simple laws of reflected displacement, resistance, etc., and roughly follow linear equations. However, most physical processes are non-linear and chaotic in complexion and even ostensively linear equations have some degree of a (set of) non-linear component(s). Even on a billiard table equations cannot be merely linear and must involve a certain degree, however minimal, of a non-linearity. E.g., if a billiard ball is directed directly at the cushion and there is effectively no spin on that ball how can we theoretically calculate in which direction it will head even if only with the slightest deviation one way or the other? We can only make a guess that reflects the probable probability-function to hand, which in this example, all things being equal, should be 50% to the right or 50% to the left with a general distribution of a deviation of only a few degrees at most from the exact centre. Broadly speaking such motion is basically translated from the descriptions of the motions to hand. Similarly, would be the emission of a force vector be that on a narrow axis or set of axes, e.g., in the non-bound neutron’s threefold pattern of decay to a proton, electron and an electron-neutrino, or, the symmetrically or non-symmetrically instigated pattern of an explosion initiated through a change of chemical state. In an intentional re-direction of motion we could adopt the model of a channeled explosion of surplus energy? E.g., nervous energy is redirected to my right arm in order to lift it in the air and hopefully catch the sight of the teacher. What metaphorical/pre-conditional aspects could be considered to be present in order to constitute the modus operandi (and raison d’être) of this metaphor? Surplus energy to be availed of when that situation is called for; nervous pre-re-direction and ensuing re-direction of that psychic energy and a pre-conditional development of a set of manoeuvres that allow the agent to re-direct such patterns of energy; an assessment of other factors that augment or diminish this type of topic conducted in this phenomenological fashion; ensuring that all other facets will not impose too much resistance upon this precarious state of affairs. Then, when conditions are right, the appropriate pathways and mechanisms ensure the intentionally desired action. But, on a deeper level of analysis how is all this to be properly ascertained? And which comes first - the intentional experience of consciousness along those lines or the formation of the intention first and then its response, i.e., do the brain processes of deliberation both inform the act of motion and our consciousness as to our intentions along those lines? Electroencephalograms usually signal to an observer when a process of definitive deliberation has taken place a fraction of a second before that intention has actually risen in conscious awareness and the subject is able to express that fact. So, let us place no bets here and, instead, treat intentional consciousness as in a dialectical state of an interplay between brain-states and processes of conscious awareness with a preference of precedence being place on neither one nor the other. Obviously, a subject has some control over their intentional deliberations, and, equally, the brain chemistry, etc., has a role to play in this dialectically driven type of process. Nothing is to be gained by merely echoing one’s philosophical prejudices in this matter and declaring oneself to be either an idealist or a realist by privileging either the mind or brain respectively! The worthy transcendental phenomenologist uses such prejudice as a place to begin their investigations and not as a place to end them and, therein, prejudge what is obviously a dialectical state of affairs (as it is the all-pervasive nature of reality to be non-linear, dialectical and chaotic when properly, appropriately and validly appreciated in its phenomenal-phenomenological depth)! That granted, what light does this model of a ‘channeled explosion of psychic energy’ throw on intentionally directed/re-directed patterns of causal behaviour? Does such a model account for the formation of the re-directional intentional disposition in the first place? The hermeneutic circle in its ‘second moment’ invokes the rhetorical formation of a question. In this both possibilities are entertained in parallel and this process characterizes the type of transcendental suspension that forms the basis for the asking of a question. Say, e.g., do I want to raise my hand and catch the sight of my teacher in this large classroom? “‘Do I want to raise my hand?’ or ‘do I not want to raise my hand?’”? Because this question has two halves also in the form of a question we get a complex four-way pattern of “‘Do I or do I not want to raise my hand?’ or ‘do I not or do I want to raise my hand?’”? The rhetorical is essentially a proliferation of cascading questionings – and the means for their resolution is to suspend both these questions and their possible answers. Intentionality is formed through resolution, the harmonization of dissonance within the consonant totality of the appropriate field all within an emergent psychic disposition of the epistemological organization that represents that particular individual, which in turn, is culturally enclosed with a community of intentional subjects that represent that cultural community and any sense of the inter-cultural that must also be present (within the relatively prescribed interdependent autonomy of that individual). Intentionality dialectically thematizing intentional motivation, and v.v. The adoption and adaptation of genres of activity giving us short-cuts as pre-formed and acquired solutions to particular types of intentional problems; short-term reflective acts of deliberation dialectically engaged with longer term intentional motivation(al dispositions) to oscillate between and within an overall transcendental suspension and, therein and there from, to realize the distinctive adoption of a re-defined pattern of behaviour as that realized as a response to such perceived/re-perceived needs for a possible process of redirection in this World-of-Life. The suspension, any type of suspension, is by its very nature a chaotic hovering on the cusp of a state of affairs that is open to various bifurcational possibilities. (505)

	As argued elsewhere, the dynamic nature of a transcendental suspension is realized through the suspension of the same, etc. But, in a more metaphysical-metaphorical framework one might be able to argue that the simulation of the world and all therein engaged is merely suspensions within suspensions within suspensions, etc. That, ultimately, the all-pervasive, ‘overall’ transcendental suspension can never be disrupted only perturbed in less emergent aspects of its epistemological organization, and, that there is this realization that all subtle perturbations will effectively be self-rectified by other perturbations that will effectively de-perturb all apparent micro-perturbations of that sense of an overall suspension itself. In other words, all apparent perturbations are de-perturbed in such a manner so as to ensure that this sense of a qualified overall transcendental suspension is never lost and that this is achieved by, among other things, parallel processes of de-perturbation, etc. Just as virtual particles can, at least theoretically, come into and out of existence within the Planck-extent of that same moment in time and space so too the Life-World is arranged in a similar manner as one unlimited, transcendental-like suspension (in and through its horizons with respect to us and beyond us) that automatically re-arranges itself to restore any self-perceived sense of dis-equilibrium, etc. That our authenticity of being is such to that same extent that we can mirror this sense of a restorative re-equilibrium. Our transcendental re-alignment with the world being our qualified re-alignment with reality and hence through such authenticity of conformity our truth of being in the very being of our truthfulness with reality. Such spiritual alignment painting a bigger picture than the sheer adherence and addiction to mere principles, but, instead, a responsive commitment to live within the ‘spirit’ of this existential ‘law’ and not some partisan perspective pre-cast upon the same! In every ethical situation, e.g., more than one ethical principle could be bought to bear upon the course of our deliberations. All principles stand in a state of conflict with each other to some degree or other. It is only through their harmonization in the light of the particular relevant facts of the ‘situation-to-hand’ that this semblance of the spiritual is existentially invoked and realized! Hence this allusion to the ‘spirit’ and not the ‘letter’ of such transcendental imperatives, responsive demands that arise only in and through the adequate functioning of the overall transcendental suspension. These processes of harmonization transcending mere processes of calculation although not without their pre-involvement as the material for such existential transformations. This harmonization of the Life-World tending to this garden of relationships in the world (as relationships between the apparent simulation/re-simulation of selectively perceived parties, aspects and components all within their context of that relationship, and that relational world too within the world of relationships itself, namely, the Life-World). Harmonization operating in two dialectical directions, namely, that via the interpretation/s of a situation, and, its response/s to that interpretation/those interpretations of that situation. Hence the metaphysical-like conjunction of ‘being’ and ‘mind’ without the absolute imputation(s) of either party! The same is reflected in the very nature of the intentional process, i.e., an intentional-like direction/re-direction towards an apparent intentional objective (regardless of its particular ontological nature/s), and, an intentional frame of reference implicating both a sense of field and the appreciation of a corresponding sense of self without the absolute imputation(s) of any of these three parties! That all considerations of divine agency must move within the same transcendental standards, as the scoped ranges of transcendental possibility pre-figuring reality (without, of course, any form of priority being ultimately given to either transcendental possibility or transcendental actuality!)! By the announcement of these transcendental observations I have already pre-figured the transcendental limitations under which a process theology must operate in order to remain coherent, in possible conformity with reality, and viable, etc., in the discomfiting disconformity of a theoretical theology, a practical theology and a critical theology all within and under the auspices of a hypothetical theology regardless of whether it is (ideologically and existentially divided between) ‘yours’ or ‘ours’. With such observations let me now sketch out how a distinctive sense of divine agency might be accounted for within this type of hypothetical framework (in order to complete this first provisional explication of our dialectical discrimination between agency and non-agency, and, divine agency and non-divine agency)? (506)

	To prepare the ground for this type of hypothetical modeling let me first deal with the reflective observation that the nature of the world is, on one hand, superficially chaotic or non-chaotic and, on the other, more deeply chaotic in nature and never simply non-chaotic! In other words, the semblance of the world never occurs within a system of equilibrium but in a system of non-equilibrium between various equilibrium-modes that in themselves can never be reached or obtained (even ideally). That granted, what implications does this have for the transcendental concept of an overall transcendental suspension that overarches both the epistemologically-oriented mode and the ontologically-oriented mode (and the reality of all the possible permutations in between)? Indeed, is it possible to run a transcendental philosophy under such conditions when the ‘natural’ condition of the Life-World is one of disequilibrium? I believe we have a theoretical solution here that also casts some light on the nature of intentionality, a solution essentially prefigured in my earlier concept of off-centering? In some general sense the way of the world, and the manner of our current intentionality, is always in a special, qualified state of equilibrium where what is realized is the exact ongoing balance of all forces, non-intentional, pre-intentional and/or intentional at that moment of time and in and through that uniqueness of all pre-conditions and conditions that define the apparent existential descriptor/s of all the moments encompassed by that apparent state of affairs both individually and collectively, both temporally and spatially in both non-virtual and virtual points of view. That, in essence, the moment is in a state of intentional atunement when through a simulated/re-simulated balance of all apparent forces the existential nature of that moment can be uncovered or recovered. Hence the role of the overall transcendental suspension can be uncovered to recover what essentially is a non-calculative simulation/re-simulation of that under examination, and, that by such means intentional states of affairs can also be initiated in simulations/re-simulations, etc. That, the very nature of any moment is expressed and/or ‘captured’ by this sense of a dynamic harmonization conducted through ongoing simulation and/or essentially recovered re-simulation despite the fact that the system in question itself is not in a state of dynamic balance other than as a computational system in which each and every moment is computed through a set of micro-acts within these moments but never between the same and in such a manner so as to define the nature of that relevant sense of moment. So, as this ‘clock’ ticks a micro-act of computation is completed which internally defines the nature of that ‘apparent’ moment. Yet, in the over all scheme of things there is no state of equilibrium other than in and through these expressed moments whose nature is either non-intentional, pre-intentional and/or intentional (although a good argument could be erected to show that there is no ‘real’ difference between these three modes of internal harmonization). (507)

	What I am struggling to say here is a number of things. To begin with I now recognize that there is no overall transcendental state of equilibrium because the natural state is chaotic, but, despite that, each and every moment, treated either individually or collectively, is an expression of a qualified type of suspension - that the very nature of that moment or system of moments is nothing more nor less than the completely balanced equilibrium of factors that realized the unique, qualified expression of that moment or set/system of moments. That, in the same light the general nature of intentionality can be read as an expression of that internal state of ongoing equilibrium in the context of an external state of non-equilibrium and which is effectively expresses itself as a momentary discharge whose apparent extent can be both momentarily and/or sequentially conducted. The collapse of any absolutely distinctive distinction between the epistemological orientation and the ontological orientation accounting for acts of intentionality both physically embodied and mentally ‘endorsed’ (without giving an absolute priority to one or other orientation as to the absolute initiation of the same). That in the light of this modeling of reality we now need make no absolute distinction between momentarily/sequentially treated ‘processes’ of agency and non-agency, and, ‘processes’ of divine agency and non-divine agency. Of course a distinction is present in and on the level of expression in so far as the nature of that expression must reflect the level of epistemological organization upon which it is expressed. Thus, in accordance with this hypothetical vision of reality divine intentionality would reflect its divine origination, i.e., the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of its relatively advanced epistemological organization. On the other hand, because this vision of the Divine is also embodied that expression would also reflect all levels of its organization in that respect and so also appear in part as relatively non-divine in nature. Thus, an examination of an ‘apparent instance’ of divine expression would reflect not only its full embodiment but also its highest levels of epistemological organization. However, without the appropriate hermeneutic mechanisms in place such higher levels of epistemological organization would be overlooked, remain non-recognized, be mis-recognized, etc. So, the task of the theologian in this regard is to construct a coherent, relatively non-contradictory set of hermeneutic ‘rules’ for the realization of this type of interpretation (should it be adequately demonstrated, etc., by them that this type of theological value can be discerned and not merely equated with our focusing upon merely emergent cultural artifacts [even though such interpretations must be conducted in and through cultural frames of reference accessible to both the theologian and their congregation or audience, and, equally, their critics both contemporarily and retrospectively]?)? (508)

	In the light of the above let me now define the relatively intentional (as opposed to the relatively non-intentional, i.e., the embodied and/or the non-embodied) as the apparent ability to initiate a course of action contrary to its embodied positioning. So, e.g., a person leaves home and on remembering that they had forgotten to take a certain some thing with them return home to collect the same. This ability to strike out in a certain direction and then alter course is a sign of intentionality (as long as all external factors that might induce such a change in course can be ruled out). On the other hand, the emission of an electron from a radioactive compound is not in and off itself an intentional act since the emission once emitted cannot change the course of its causal unfolding. All changes in its course being observed and accounted for as external in nature. Could this model be extended to analogue the possibility of divine intentionality? There would seem to be no problem here from a hypothetical point of view. However, it would be up to the theologian to demonstrate how this type of process deposits itself upon the fabric of the world and could be recognized as such. So, let us give them that task and continue in these general more hypothetical investigations. (509)

	Without attempting to speculate upon the possible nature of theological oriented forms of causality let me just re-note the possibility of Divine processes of intervention, providence, etc., through those bifurcational moments as they occur moment to moment. Indeed, one should recognize that each and every moment is chaotic in complexion and intentionality has the habit of changing the direction of a process through just that form of intervention! At this point let me leave the hypothetical and practical details of such a possibility to the theologian and their congregations to speculate upon, etc. (510)

	At this point I would like, for the sake of argument, to concede that the concept of the Divine could be entertained as a third order idea, i.e., is able to be entertained cognitively as dialectically coherent and relatively non-contradictory concept iterated/re-iterated as an idea (in and through a series of idea-moments). But, such a concession granted, I would like to find the philosophical theologian able to argue for their vision or version of the identity of the Divine, i.e., a determination of its sense (as entertained by themselves)! Indeed, just what is this sense of the Divine yourself as a theologian is arguing for? Moreover, as significance is invoked/re-invoked, by yourself, through the hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) let us also clarify the other two moments of the same! I.e., the meaning of such an ‘institution’ and the existential ramifications possessed by such in the lives of the individual and community…? (511)

	In the next chapter of this extended essay, as a short independent essay in its own right, I would like to recapitulate a general outline of some of my arguments by conceding (on the behalf of the theologian) that the possibility of Divine existence is a coherent and relatively con-contradictory concept, but, that from such a ‘position’, insist that the same theologian should be able to demonstrate an argument/set of arguments for the viable interpretation of a positive theological sense of value, i.e., demonstrate that there exists a sense of an existential difference that follows from the ramifications between a positive theological difference and a negative theological difference! If ‘truth’ is ‘that in conformity with reality’, and, ‘living truthfully’ is ‘living in conformity with that vision of reality’ then it follows that the theologically oriented religionist should live in conformity with their vision of reality. However, if an atheist who lives truthfully in conformity with their vision of reality lives in conformity with such a vision, and, both parties are practicing and realizing an authenticity of existence let us ask what difference in existential ramifications might occur between these two different sorts of parties. In other words let us ask what ‘real’ difference does a theological vision of the world make, and, what is the differential value of a positive theological vision of the world? In this challenge to the theologian from a hypothetical point of view let us see if this type of question can be properly answered, if only hypothetically? (512)

At the same time let us note these three fundamental challenges to the theologian! That, without an adequate reply we must consider the theologian as having little or no real topic to operate with in this regard. First, what is the nature of Divine identity (being argued for by that particular theologian), i.e., what is its sense? Second, just what meaning is found in the adoption of a positive theological difference? And, third, does that difference actually make a real existential difference in the life of an individual or community of like-minded individuals, i.e., can we determine its existential meaningfulness? (513)

Collectively, we also need to ask can Divine intentionality be definitely demonstrated in our coursing through the Life-World (by noting what interaction there is between theological sense, theological meaning and theological meaningfulness, i.e., as realized in theological value, as conducted through the hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension [in accordance with culturally defined genres of theological activity adopted and adapted in the light of the nature of those theological investigations being conducted and, thence, critically appreciated and re-appraised])? (514)

In the dialectical ‘space’ between these three question let me sketch out a series of arguments and questions in the form of a short paper (as our next chapter in these hypothetical investigations) and therein deal briefly, in outline, with these considerations of sense, meaning and meaningfulness without drawing any absolute distinction between these hypothetical facets of a hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension? Our preoccupations there being a brief delineation of Divine Identity, Divine Work and Divine Value which, mutually treated as a system of evaluation, mutually informs their collective Theological Value.  (515)

	Theological value must exist (as defined above)! Theological institutions have persisted through time in all cultural milieus. But what is the value of that value? And does such value persist and cut across all forms of existentializational institutionalization regardless of whether they be theologically inspired or non-theologically inspired? Since, as already argued, an institution can only persist in time through the existential preservation and transformation of an existential core operating relatively authentically in that culture milieu. Let us, therefore, continue to critically investigate such questions and discern what is the existential nature of theological value, and, if a positive theological difference indeed can be discerned and demonstrated…? (516)