3.    Is Theological Difference an Illusion?

	In the first volume of essays I introduced the simple concept of a theological difference. Basically, this concept in generalized, hypothetical terms is the identification of a difference between ‘any vision of the world with a theological complexion’ and ‘any vision of the world with no theological complexion’. It was then argued that it was the task for a theologian to account for that difference in order to establish the nature of their topic. (519)

	Quite simply a theologically oriented religionist (theist) perceives the world as having a theological complexion whereas a non-theologically oriented religionist or non-religionist perceives the world as without that type of characteristic. It was argued that in any form of an envisaged theology that the Divine, in what ever sense it be defined or not defined, must have some form of a direct and/or indirect phenomenal-phenomenological interaction with the world otherwise “what does not exist for-us may as well not exist for-us!” Hence the use of this neutral word complexion as in, e.g., our hypothetical investigations into the possibility that the Life-World could have a theological complexion (along with the use of other ‘neutral’ expressions such as, e.g., the treatment of religious experience as numinous whether it be theologically oriented or not theologically oriented, and, a transcendental-phenomenological commitment to the continuous use of an overall transcendental suspension, etc.). (520)

	Now, in our hypothetical investigations the significance of the expression the Divine was defined as that whose epistemological organization is considerably greater than the psychic organization of an individual or community of individuals. This expression was chosen to maintain the neutrality of our hypothetical investigations. In other words to ensure that this type of philosophical research remains on a hypothetical level it is conducted under the auspices of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension, i.e., entertained as a possible possibility but not as an actual actuality! In essence, we are merely exploring the possible concept or idea of divine existence (in order to discover if such a concept has sense or could be given sense, i.e., has a psychic location in our cultural/inter-cultural mapping of ‘the world’ and is both internally non-contradictory (textually) and extra-conceptually coherent (meta-textually). Note: by epistemological organization is meant the complexity of hierarchically interrelated structural-processes necessary to replicate the associated complexity of the self-organization of that apparent identity/entity; a state of affairs whose nature and degree of modal complexity should find itself reflected in all processes of intentional interaction with it to some extent or other. (521)

	In earlier explorations we divined, in general, that classical deism or classical theism, as traditionally formulated, was not a viable presentation of this topic but that a process theology could present a suitable medium for our hypothetical explorations. That, in effect, this type of topic could only be (dialectically) entertained in a relatively non-contradictory and coherent fashion within such a theoretical medium. Suffice to say that my findings on this format of a process theology were that this topic there could be entertained in a relatively non-contradictory and coherent fashion, but that this concession did not necessarily lead in and of itself to the fact that such an enterprise was valid (without the necessary degree of adequate [transcendental] argumentation that would allow us to travel from ‘possibility’ to ‘actuality’ in some form or other?)? (522)

	Recently, I have argued that “truth” is “that in conformity with reality”. As it stands I believe this definition to be relatively non-controversial. However, how we might wish to interpret and apply such a slogan is without a doubt a problematic task for the philosopher. In my estimation this is not an impossible task to perform as long as the critical philosopher does not stray from the path of a properly, appropriately and validly constructed and conducted transcendental frame of reference. But, that type of concern is not the primary area of focus in this short essay and chapter. Suffice to say that ‘when we are living truthfully’ then ‘we are living in conformity with our vision of the world’. So, a theologically oriented religionist, a theist, should be a person trying to live in conformity with their theological vision of the world. Conversely, a non-theologically oriented religionist or non-religionist truthfully living in the world is a person who is trying to live in conformity with their vision of the world as a world that has no theological complexion. Assuming both parties are living authentically in the world we must ask the theologian how does this element of a world perceived with a theological complexion differ from a world perceived without this element of a theological complexion? Indeed, if both parties are taken as authentically leading their lives in their particular visions of the world we must ask does this theological difference make any real difference from an existential point of view? It is my hope that this paper will provoke a response to these two primary question that will allow me, and my reader or audience, to explore the nature of theological value  and seriously to contemplate what contribution if any a theological vision might add or detract from our living in the world with others…before others…? (522)

	These two primary questions, central to this paper, are: “What existential contributions, if any, does a perception of the world with a theological complexion make in the life of that type of religionist?” and, “Is such a difference real or merely an illusion?” Or, both questions re-phrased: “What is the nature of theological value?” and “Does such value make a real difference or only an illusory difference to our being in the world with others?” (524)

	In challenging the theologian to make sense of their topic, in the light of the above, three challenges are now posed for the theologian… (525)

	Ideally, in my opinion, this type of philosophical investigation should be conducted under the following three interconnected headings: 
First, can a relatively non-contradictory and coherent concept of the Divine be entertained as a possibility in the mind of a theologically oriented religionist in order for them to be able to live in authentic conformity with their vision of a world with that theological complexion? 
Second, what is the nature of this theological value as it is found in the lives of people who adopt a practical understanding of that vision of the world? 
Third, in a ‘closer reading’ of this theological difference would we find that ‘difference’ to be either real or merely an illusion?
So, although this will be conducted in a sketched out form, let us adhere to this plan and see if we can come to some form of a ‘final’ conclusion in this regard, if only from a philosophical perspective… in the process establishing the hypothetical viability of this topic for the theologian (even if we were to personally find no merit in this type of topic for ourselves). Hence the overall challenge of these three problematic issues that must be addressed by the theologian… and their congregations! (526)

The First Challenge

	To begin, we could concede this condition of a relatively non-contradictory and coherent belief in the Divine in order to proceed to the second challenge to be examined in our investigations. However, our definition of “living truthfully and authentically” is “living in conformity with that vision of reality”. If that vision of reality could not be entertained how could we entertain ‘their living in conformity with reality’ let alone ‘their living authentically within such a fractured vision of the world’. So, my hand is forced. I must show that such an idea, in at least a minimal form or format, is at least tenable from a hypothetical point of view. (527)

	In theological institutions, etc., churches and temples, etc., have existed and persisted in all cultures hence the existential manifestation and existential perpetuation of these artifacts along with their institutions that produced/re-produced such concrete intentional expressions essentially representative of this type of world-view. However, intentions may well be fine, still, living in conformity with reality necessitates that that reality could be lived with, i.e., could be met and engaged both in and through its integrity of form. Otherwise those intentions, as intended, might be situationally authentic the net result of those intentions acted out and engaged as intentional objectives would not be objectively authentic in principle by virtue of their absence or incapacity to function adequately (either through contradiction and, in this instance, through a non-coherence of those objective-states as intended). Full authenticity also demands a full coherence of objective, etc., regardless of whether it is actually met. A father can look for their missing son, and not find him, but, could that same father look for the ‘real’ Father Xmas knowing that a ‘real Father Xmas’ does not exist? On the other hand, his son might be ‘genuinely’ looking out for Father Xmas on Christmas Eve, not knowing that this character is only a mythical construct created by his culture. With all this in mind could that pursuit be in conformity with reality and authentic in that sense? Similarly, looking for the water in a distant mirage through ‘approaching it’ is an inauthentic affair? Certainly one that would be frustrating by virtue of this non-conformity with reality – there just is no water in that mirage as revealed in and through that mirage (by its phenomenal-phenomenological definition as a ‘mirage’). If water were found by coincidence then their relationship to that water was only realized accidentally. So, in the light of this objection, let me demonstrate, albeit in a sketch, that at least a minimal, relatively non-contradictory and (non-in)coherent concept of the Divine could be entertained. (528)

	Now, contrary to the impossible, contradictory nature of traditional forms of classical deism, genres of theological activity demonstrate that that form of intentionality has been able to effectively operate in the world (contra those defective theoretical re-formulations). Later in this paper let us look at this bewildering array of value in order to attempt to make some sense of its place in the world. However, at this point let me construct a process-version of the Divine that could be regarded as relatively non-contradictory internally to its conceptual (textual) construction and relatively coherent in the (meta-textual) social context of life in the world as lived… thereby establishing the possibility of the bare minimum necessary for accepting that this topic could be in a state of objective conformity (and thence in a state of objective authenticity, i.e., in such a manner that the intentional objective could be in an overall modal conformity with its objective reality mode by mode). (529)
	Imagine if you would the world and all the peoples thereon being embraced as a spiritual community and all human institutions therein likewise. From the infinite number of possible permutations and combinations that could be entertained among these elements let us envisage the emergence of a sense of ‘congregation’ without cashing out the simulation of this ‘entity’ in any form of a reductive materialism (whether conceived of as either ‘spiritual’ or ‘non-spiritual’ in nature through the imputation of soul/s, spirit/s, world-force/s, or, whatever, etc.). Then, imagine this sense of this simulated ‘presence’ being joined by other worlds in this galactic cluster that we live within and any congregations established thereon in a similar fashion and so on. By definition the epistemological organization of such a simulated entity would be considerably greater than that possessed by any individual person or community of persons and hence ‘Divine’. Such a conception is possible to conceive. It could be argued that such a conception is both, internally, not self-contradictory, and, externally, is non-incoherent (since as individuals we can interact to form organizations which in turn can interact with other institutions, etc.). Furthermore, from arguments invoking self-organization, quantum entanglement, the exhibition of a fractal symmetry throughout the perceived cosmos, etc., objections based on the limitations of time and space would not apply under such circumstances (as previously argued). Hence the overall possibility of this hypothetical and archetypal concept of the Divine, albeit as a minimum conception of a theological-like state of affairs(?). (530)

	Now, the following counter-objection might be raised: mere possibility surely does not establish actuality and hence ‘being in conformity with reality’ might need to encompass the rejection of such an envisaged state of affairs possessing that manner of epistemological organization. In which case reality might demand that we recognize that the world has a non-theological complexion, that we could not be in conformity with such a ‘world’ if ‘we were to authentically disport ourselves fully’ as equally, this ‘world’ would disport itself without a theological complexion?! (531)

	However, previously I have explored the phenomenal-phenomenological ‘fact’ “that neither pure possibility nor pure actuality could be either (ontologically) met or (epistemologically) recognized” with the implication that possibility cannot adopt a form of ‘mere’ possibility. Hence the qualified actuality of that (non-contradictory and non-incoherent) possibility in some form or format. Conversely, all arguments hinged on pure actuality (as in a classical deism or theism) become equally unhinged! This phenomenological recognition of degrees of reality noting both the presence and/or absence of modalities sometimes associated with that phenomenon to hand and the relative intensity of those features in their sense of presence and/or absence, etc. (all conducted without the imputations of corresponding entities whether envisaged conceptually and/or perceptually, metaphysically or non-metaphysically, etc.). (532)

	But, so much for theory since we could argue for all forms of speculative trivia and practical impossiblia whether spiritual or non-spiritual in nature such as the Devil or a horde of devils; gods enthroned on Mt Olympus and every other mountain top; gold mountains in the outback of Australia; a divinity under every tree, under every leaf, under every dead branch, under every stone, etc., etc! This type of argument, from qualified possibility to some form of qualified actuality, would need other premises in order to support certain types of proposition and in order to suppress certain other types of proposition (such as supporting, on one hand, the progressive integrity of goodness in the advancement of epistemological organization, and, on the other hand, disvaluing the existence of the relatively non-good through the progressive appearance of the relatively evil through the progressive absence of a corresponding degree of goodness as a direct result of a progressive loss of epistemological organization, etc.). (533)

	Then, there is the additional argument of the integrity of the Life-World. I.e., the Life-World can be neither pure chaos nor pure order but in a state somewhere in between. That being the case then it must possess this theological-like complexion, this de facto theological aspect, since the world is perceived as ‘one’ world both subjectively and inter-subjectively! That being the case we can then validly argue for this type of world-vision as being theological in tenor, albeit one that would need further qualification of both its conditions and pre-conditions; such qualifications being supplied by either the philosopher and/or the theologian (assuming that their arguments adopted and adapted to be valid both formally and non-formally). (534)

	But, let us concede this point... Now, let us consider in what form/s theological value is manifested in the lives of those who inhabit this ‘one’ World-of-Life? (535)

The Second Challenge

	But, first, we have a problem to the extent that we need to examine more deeply these phenomena of objective authenticity and situational objectivity, etc., since full authenticity demands that all (three) aspects of authenticity interact authentically! (536)

	The problem is this: If a certain person were to believe in the existence of the Divine and their vision of the Divine had no existence in the Life-World how authentic could that type of experience be given its lack of an objective authenticity. So, if one were to ‘authentically’ enter into a state of prayer or worship or reflection, etc., upon the Divine and that same sense of the Divine did not conform with reality then how could such intentional activity be fully authentic when obviously, under this possibility of existential conformation, such intentional activities could not conform to how things are in this World-of-Life? However, could such activity be still judged as authentic given the intentional desire on the part of the worshipper to be authentic in their act of worship, devotion, etc? (537)

	Objective authenticity is realized when there is a state of intentional conformity between the ‘intentional objective’ and the ‘object-state as intended’ on an overall modal basis. On the other hand, a situational authenticity is realized, in my opinion, when a thoroughly engineered, proper, appropriate and valid state of an overall transcendental suspension is being progressively entered into in and through the existentialization of the relatively non-existential within this phenomenal-phenomeno-logical vision of a theological vista as present in this ‘one’ World-of-Life. Surely, from a situational point of view, practicing an overall transcendental suspension must establish some considerable degree of authenticity despite, and in spite of, its conformity or non-conformity with the objective-as-intended. Witness the array of theological value about us in the Life-World from religious texts to religious buildings, from religious specialists to religious audiences in sundry fashions and sizes, etc., etc. Surely, the imposition and extension of a transcendental suspension (to the intentional objective, etc.) should de-ontologize the absolute credence given to a theological objective and therein salvage what authenticity is more happily resident in its situational environment? (538)

	This argument has some apparent merit – witness the ongoing dissemination of a variety of religious points of view along with a proliferation of theistic depositions upon the surface of the world before, around and behind our individual passages across this planet as we progress in our passage through this World-of-Life? However, as already argued, full authenticity could not be invoked without a substantial degree of objective conformity!? (539)

	Now, consider the following. Let us assume, for the sake of this argument, that there is this state of a situational authenticity (through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension) and a considerable degree of objective conformity (through an overall conformity on a modal basis) but that the Divine is just not constituted in such a manner, e.g., so as to hear and respond to the prayers of the faithful. Such a consideration has led me to propose the need also for a trans-situational-objective authenticity wherein situational aspects can be satisfactorily related to objective aspects and v.v. Obviously, if the Divine, e.g., were to be constituted in reality in such a manner so as not to be able to hear the petitions and/or aspirations of prayers made by the faithful then despite the objective existence of the Divine and the authentic use of an overall transcendental suspension religious experience in the performance of a situational authenticity a full overall authenticity could not be realized through the non-fulfillment of a trans-situational-objective state of authenticity! (540)

	These three types of authenticity demand their collective interaction. Indeed, they must co-occur (to some degree or other)! Moreover, they are in effect the three moments or aspects of the hermeneutic circle (and in this type of situation, part of the hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension). The intentional objective effectively defines the general nature of that type of intentionality by determining the general nature of that field. In that regard it is also meta-textual in orientation since it invokes the genre or genres of activity to be involved in that act of textual focusing. On the other hand, situational authenticity is effectively dealing with the particularity of that to hand as meaning, whilst, in contrast, the trans-situational-objective attitude is dealing with the specificity of that being engaged, i.e., its specific meaningfulness. Now, as dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle these three types of authenticity must co-exist because, in effect, they co-define each other. That being the case, then, although a particular attitude might not meet with its fulfillment there can be only a relative absence of that fulfillment. In other words, authenticity comes in degrees of realization, degrees of fulfillment and is never absolutely absent regardless of what manner of intentional object-state or objective is desired, regardless of the manner that that intentional act is engaged and regardless of the appropriateness or propriety of the relationship engaged between a situational authenticity and an objective authenticity. Fundamentally, all intentionality operates with some degree of authenticity, a core authenticity from whence intentionality is expressed (through an ongoing resolution of the relatively different and dissonant) and deposited upon the fabric of the world. Hence all intentionalilty with a theological complexion will be co-deposited in the world so let us now examine these deposited intentional traces with this type of apparent intent, as apparently operating in a theologically oriented mode of life, in order to discern the differential significance of theological value, i.e, in what manner theological value might be distinctively imprinted upon the text(ure) of the world in a manner different from all other forms of non-theologically oriented value? So, let us list possible candidates in order to separate the sheep from the goats so to speak.… (541)

	Let us look around the world and note the many instances of obvious theological value deposited upon the face of this earth and argue, one way or the other, for less obvious forms of psychological or psychic value apparently realized within this complex frame of reference (i.e., the theological mode of life as examined from a general point of view)…. (542)

	Without bringing any form of systematization to this task we witness churches and temples… religious specialists and congregations… religious texts and ritual paraphernalia… religious languages and concepts… sacred images in a bewildering variety of forms… all interpreted by the psyche from those ostensive aspects of interest adopted and adapted in dealing with such issues. To add to such an open-ended list what other items might the reader supply …? (543)

	There are also less obvious issues like religious claims of insight and enlightenment, inward mental states of religious experience, experiential concepts like salvation or non-salvation, apperceptive ‘perceptions’ of guilt, sin, spiritual ignorance, defectiveness, limitation, human finitude, etc., etc. Systematically, to that degree possible, how might one go about forming a more integrated approach to this variety of religious forms as found expressed under this broad umbrella of the relatively theologically engaged mode of life…? (544)

	After much thought I feel this type of task, of a relative systemtization of theological forms of value, could be better approached through treating all forms of theologically oriented processes of intentionality as involving some form of contractual-like behaviour. Obviously the adoption of this legal concept will need to be adapted in the light of a relevant series of qualifications and forms of philosophical, sociological, political, psychological re-evaluations appropriate to this type of endeavour. For a start, although the theist can be ‘seen’ seeing themselves enter into some form of a contractual relationship with their vision of the Divine, all interpreted forms of Divine input must be treated as supplementary to processes of human intentionality. From the interpretation of a Divine input in processes of human intentionality to the dogmatically assured speculative imputation of the Divine itself, directly and/or indirectly, all such treatment is erected upon the basis of a delivery of human intentional processes along with all forms of intentional deposits discerned as traced upon the world, both in parallel and sequentially. In such ‘theologically oriented’ intentional processes theologically oriented overlays could be seen to be as if carried or supported pre-conditionally by the religious intender, in other words, no forms of religious interpretation and/or imputation could be conducted without the necessary basis in intentional consciousness (and its textual/non-textual depositions). Second, all such contractual-like behaviour is conducted on the basis of an intentional economy wherein all forms of temporal and spatial asymmetry rule along with all forms of asymmetric power relations (whether treated in non-virtual and/or virtual terms of reference, as entertained directly or indirectly, etc.) along with all forms of non-divine/Divine reciprocity whether supplied and/or interpreted by human agency, and/or imputed to have been delivered by Divine agency… Furthermore, a conditional analysis (as opposed to an impossible classical causal philosophy) can be better used to examine pre-conditional states, conditional states and post-conditional states as they appear to co-occur in parallel or sequentially, etc., along with considerations of the type/s of conditions involved, etc.  (545)

	What other ways could we classify and try to understand, and possibly integrate, this type of phenomenon of the theological overlay in the life of a practicing theist? Personally, I find this contractual model a neat way of attempting to understand the various facets that appear to be involved in a theist’s engagement with their vision of the Divine. Such an analysis, or some other, being open to examination by virtue of its adoption and adaptation of cultural genres already to hand in that culture; points of reference always being found open to some form and degree of appropriation whether non-virtual and/or virtual; albeit less open to those ‘outside’ that culture by virtue of a certain degree of a psychic cultural-distance realized between different cultures to that extent they are found to be different, etc. Of course difference can only be experienced as different because of the existence of a comparatively accessible common ground upon which that sense of difference could then be experienced as difference-in-the-midst-of-non-difference! (546)

The Third Challenge

	Obviously, theological value is almost omni-present. This mode of life (or meme) through its rich variety of depositions has densely populated the cultural and inter-cultural life of this planet.  Now, on the behalf of the theologian, we must ask: “is there a real distinction to be made between that oriented towards a theologically created/re-created form of value and forms of value created in non-theologically oriented modes of life? I.e., can a real distinction be made between forms of positive theological value and forms of negative theological value? Can this type of comparison be conducted or should we perceive these two spheres of life as like chalk and cheese and, thereby, without any form of an intersection or dialogue? (547)

	An assessment of comparative evaluations could be representatively conducted (both synchronically in real time and/or non-synchronically through forms of virtually reconstructed history). For instance a ledger could be arranged in parallel to compare arguments and counter-arguments, replies and counter-replies, etc., that would represent/misrepresent similar or different ideological positions between these two forms of value (an approach that makes for a serious debate even more effective when opposing camps zero in on territory hitherto psychically overlooked by their opponents). For instance, a theist could argue that their passage through this World-of-Life is assisted by their faith in the Divine. But, in parallel, the atheist could insist that to live one’s life in a contractual relationship with ‘an entity that does not exist’ or with ‘one that they could not meaningfully interact with us’ was to lead a life of inauthenticity through an adherence to patterns of behaviour either at odds with processes of an objective authenticity and/or a situational authenticity and/or a trans-situational-objective authenticity. That, in other words such distortions of our being in the world could only result in processes of inauthenticity and all the non-existential consequences attendant upon a life led in such collective inauthenticity! But, then, a theist might argue – what about your need for salvation, your need for enlightenment, your need for spiritual transformation, etc? In this debate find themselves declaring that the atheist just does not understand through not having experienced the requisite faith and/or insight. But, in the form of a counter-objection, an atheist might sigh “so what”… and tell the theist, and their other religionists, that their so-called need for salvation, or what ever, is nothing more than an attempt to inauthentically resolve a sense of feeling psychically defective, an attempt to resolve a negative sense of identity morbidly induced by their religious philosophy and that life is better led without such anxieties. Far better to short circuit such culturally induced feelings of guilt, sin, ignorance, or whatever, and get back to living one’s life in the authenticity of the here and now and place no bets upon some future utopian state that may never be delivered, indeed, as they would argue, could not be delivered! Such valiant souls having no truck with any form of a Pascalian wager in this regard… But, would such a ‘debate’ have any point when either side can counter the other with interpretations favourable to their own points of view, and, is it possible, and productive, for such parties to debate such issues? But, then, some form of a debate does seem to have been taking place? (548)

	Let us, therefore, ask what ‘ground’ might be shared in common by such diverse parties… for how could a debate in any form be conducted without this precondition? Indeed, this notion of an absolute incommensurability between positive and negative oriented forms of theological value, I believe, can be dismissed for the following reasons! (549)

	Previously, I alluded to a de facto theological-like ‘ground’ being shared by all persons by virtue of their recognition that this World-of-Life is experienced subjectively and inter-subjectively as ‘one’ Life-World. If we do indeed live together in the ‘same’ world then we have, on these minimal transcendental grounds accepted, this witting or unwitting recognition of the emergent unity of the Life-World, then, to that same extent, in this regard, there could be no real difference between positive and negative forms of theological value! A remnant, residual degree of a positive theological-like value must necessarily be already resident in all instances and all forms of value be they supplemented or not supplemented by positive or negative forms of theological value from the acceptance or rejection of a more overt theologically-oriented point of view. Let me establish this thesis and note the existential ramifications that must flow from this re-interpreted perspective on the nature of our existence in this one-World-of-Life…. (550)

	We stand before each other and the other stands before us. We stand together in one world of living-before-each-other. Because we all stand before each other we must stand before each other in the ‘same’ World-of-Life. This ‘same’ World must be, in some degree or other, in the same manner or other, ‘one’ World! The epistemological organization of this emergent unity must possess a degree of complexity considerably greater than that possessed by any individual person or group or institution of persons. Hence its theological-like tenor! Of course, this minimal theologicalization of the Life-World is not going to offer the traditional theologian much comfort as it stands. Equally, such a conclusion might annoy a strict atheist. But, in my opinion, this middle ground is inescapable. The implication being that the existential nature of all relationships, being simulated/re-simulated, is as a living process of participation in this One-World-of-Life, a Living-World-of-Life whose collective life participates and reflects the deposition of an overall theological process. Am I correct in reaching this type of conclusion? (551)

Conclusion?

How else could or should we interpret this emergent unity of the Life-World other than as possessing an inevitable, minimal theologicalization? Surely, this One-World-of Life, by virtue of its greater degree of epistemological organization, must be treated as none other than as the Divine? No doubt a theologian would want to add to this minimal theological concept and convert it into a much more suitable religious concept. Hence they should accept these three challenges as opportunities to supplement this minimal formation of a theological concept as sketched in this essay. On the other hand, a non-religionist might want, conversely, to non-religiously re-interpret this type of perspective and only treat the world as an emergent ‘entity’ without sentience? But, without a doubt, both parties must separate on the same ground, diverge from this same intersection and then attempt to follow different paths in their passages through this World-of-Life. This logic would then dictate that the Life-World must informally describe and formally prescribe a qualified degree of emergent unity that would, dialectically, fall well and truly between the impossible extremes, on one hand, of an idealist’s tendency to conceive of the world as an absolute unity, and, on the other hand, the realist’s predilection for a random multiplicity. Indeed, in truth, this all-pervasive qualified form of unity would seem to necessarily impart to all forms of apparent identity, I believe, a qualified degree of interdependence that would allows us, as a person, to appear to move through this world along our ‘own’ paths and follow, to some degree or other, within reason, the formations of our ‘own’ destiny and fate in this World-of-Life… participating therein as ‘a’ community-of-beings, or, perhaps more correctly, as a congregation… and there to live out our ‘own’ lives in accordance with our ‘own’ degrees of epistemological organization as if ‘gods’ in our own right, as, if perhaps, theological participants in the drama of a process theology? But, before accepting such a conclusion, and converting it into a new premise, let us set out to re-evaluate just where and how do we stand with others before Others… in this World… and with What… or Whom…? Or, is it not the case that the living possibility of our interactions with others must establish the absolute fact that there can be no absolute sense of other… or otherness… or substance… or an absolute sense of self… and… no absolute sense of the Divine… only the non-absolute manifestations of a community already living its life as an apparent congregation… that, in effect, real theological difference was indeed an illusion..?? (552)
							    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 29.4.05.