N.K.Tointon,
								14/1074 Botany Rd,
								Botany, NSW 2019.

Dear Bill,
		Wishing you a merry festive season and a Happy New Year.
	I must thank you for your criticisms of my last paper. Your comments have always been welcomed. I appreciate having someone to criticise my work as I rarely find someone who can grasp what I am apparently up to and where I might be heading. I hope you don't mind me briefly discussing two issues that arose during the discussion of my paper that came out of comments made by yourself, and, the recent resolution of another problem very briefly touched on by myself that day. 
	Those three points about to be discussed being, first, how can the immanent aspect of transcendental experience be accommodated if we accept some version of the `wedding cake model' (as aptly titled by yourself); second, in what manner is value a transcendental-phenomenon if the value of transcendental value is no-value, has no intrinsic value; and third, if my intuition is correct that an aesthetic text should be a rich text, i.e., poly-textual and re-invaginated, how can we account for the necessary need for these layers of richness in the light of my present account of poetic intentionality/textuality? The last point implying that `a poetic text cannot be a `poetical' text if that text is constructed on just one level of textuality?' i.e., e.g., as a text that is purely a description, or, a text that merely discusses a series of impressions, etc., regardless of however much that text may or may not conform to formal and/or informal expectations of what constitutes by convention the definition of a poetic text. But let me discuss the first two topics before offering my resolution of this last puzzle.
	It seems obvious that consciousness is hierarchically constructed whether on a neurological level or on higher levels of psychological functioning. Moreover, it is probably safe to say that in order to appreciate something we need to distance ourselves to a certain degree from that object subject to such appreciation. The plain is best seen from the mountain (and hence the topology of the wedding cake model). 
	Along the same lines, in gestalt terms of reference, we might say that the object under focus is appreciated in a gestalt field which must be in a state of greater organization than the constitution of any object focused upon therein. 
	However, we might like to add to this observation the following criticism - that in order to appreciate something our detachment can never be complete, or absolute, and therefore such detachment can only be partially performed. Appreciation at the same time must also be directly in contact with that very intentional object itself in order for that act of appreciation to be of that particular object-state under such focus. Of course this metaphorical language must be qualified through our treatment of that `intentional object-state' as only a polarity, as only a sense of directedness that can never actually be arrived at; that such an absolutely focused point of focus could never be actually arrived at in order to completely coincide with that apparent object of that sense of directedness (what ever its apparent overall modal constitution as, e.g., a dream object, a perceptual object, a concept, a judgment, an awareness of mood, etc.).
	That being the case this process of appreciation through detachment also must simultaneously need some form of identification and absorption with that sense of objectivity subjected to such appreciation. 
	Translated into my theoretical vision of the transcendental we must then recognise that in order to propose a `wedding cake model' this immanently oriented qualification of (provisional) identification and absorption must also be put in place. This is in sympathy with my idea that the transcendental dimension, as an orientation in experience, is entered and left via the imposition of a transcendental suspension. In balancing the transcendent trans-intentional with a parallel immanent process would also ensure the maintenance of this suspension. This would entail, I believe, a de-intentionalization of the particular modal facets of intentionality under which we are currently examining that particular text. In the next paragraph I will briefly discuss what I mean by these modal terms of reference, a complication in this argument that can be dropped for the sake of a relative degree of simplicity should you wish.
	E.g., in bi-modal terms of reference we would de-differentiate noetic processes from noematic content, etc. Invoking a suspension between these bi-modal terms of reference would give us a tri-modal schema of intentional objects, a sense of intentional subjectivity coinciding with the point of the transcendental suspension and the relevant intentional field associated with the nature of those senses of objectivity and subjectivity invoked. Treating objectivity as textual in nature and intentional fields as meta-textual in nature, i.e., oriented towards a sense of genre (form, etc.), and treating the point of suspension to a parallel transcendent and immanent mode of translation would give us tetra-modal terms of reference. Then, through a natural deconstruction of these modal facets by their complements (i.e., text by meta-text, the trans-textual by the de-textual, and vice versa) should give us a sense of the non-textual as a sense of `the phenomenal simulation entailed in that text;' a sense that allows us to appreciate a sense of the textual and though that contrast at the same time what the sense of the textual is not (even though the `textual' is dependent upon a sense of the non-textual and vice versa). By these means overcoming the meaningless position that attempts to reduce all traces of intentionality to mere forms of textuality.
	By entertaining a trans-intentional approach with a de-intentional approach we would maintain this sense of balance entailed in the imposition of the transcendental suspension. In aesthetic appreciation this aspect of experience allows us to become transcendentally detached from that under review and equally, at the same time, transcendentally absorbed in those proceedings. All in all, I would believe, a closer and more accurate interpretation of this type of experience. 
	Ethically, we could then continue, I believe, along the following lines and make a distinction between two types of detachment, namely, an authenticity in detachment through a balanced parallelization of transcendental detachment and transcendental absorption, and, the inauthenticity of a cognitive sense of detachment where there is no real sense of identificational concern and care for that object-state from which one has become intellectually detached from...
 	Now let me look quickly at my second point. We might say that all productive acts of judgment deliver a judgment with some form of value, e.g., aesthetical, political, mathematical, etc. We might also adopt the position that if the terms of that act of judgment are adequately formulated and properly conducted (through an act of transcendental suspension) that that productive delivery of value is also re-produced when those same terms of reference are appropriately re-simulated. But, what value has value itself? Since value is produced/re-produced in a state of  judgment what value can that value have in itself outside those judgmental terms of reference? That the process of judgment is necessary for the creation of value granted we then must assume that value in itself can have no value. Therefore, when I say `value is a transcendental affair' what  I must mean is that value is created from the polarity of the transcendental in its application of a judgment to those cognitive, non-transcendental terms of reference. Hence, correctly, value is a transcendental-phenomenon! Therefore, in this theoretical light we might say that authenticity in value-creation is arrived at when the productivity of a transcendental orientation is applied/re-applied to a non-transcendental cognitive domain of intentionality (as defined in my narrow sense). On the other hand inauthenticity in value-creation must come about through attempting to subject the transcendental orientation with pre-judicial, a priori terms of reference (in a state of non-transcendental suspension). Authenticity being restored in a balancing of those prejudices in an act of transcendental suspension, etc.
	Hence, value is a transcendental-phenomenon, a phenomenon in which value flows from a transcendental orientation to the non-transcendental orientation, and not vice versa.
	In negative theological terms of reference we might continue and declare this transcendental sense of value (as a rhetorical examination of the `value of value') as either `no-value, non-value, without value, empty of value,' or, as `being beyond a meaningful sense of value.' Personally I would adopt a middle path in this particular controversy and attempt a synthesis along the lines that transcendental value is equally both `without a sense of intrinsic value and as beyond value.' In non-negative theological terms of reference that value is a transcendental-phenomenon in its application of value trans-intentionally to and de-intentionally in an intentional framework and not vice versa.
	The last section of this letter is a problem that has puzzled me for some time, namely, if an aesthetic text is a rich text, i.e., poly-textual with a variety of textual strands (besides the two necessary theoretical levels of the text and the meta-text wherein that text adopts and adapts a certain genre or mix of genre), and is also re-invaginated, i.e, folded in on itself, then how can a text that lacks this in depth sense of richness be seen as aesthetic in both form and substance? The problem in practical and critical terms of reference being that if a text merely conformed to certain superficial meta-textual expectations of what constituted a poetic text and did that well do we have to concur with appearances and accept that that `poetic text' is also `poetical' despite this lack of richness in textual depth?
	I believe the resolution of this puzzle lies in a recognition of the fact that a text that adopts a relatively greater density of provocative mechanisms (through the repetition of the parallelization and juxtaposition of such processes) naturally gives itself a greater sense of poly-textuality, etc. Indeed, the very nature of the metaphor embedded in its sense of the rhetorical is already poly-textual between the tensions of the `is like' and the `is not like.'  Moreover, the very nature of the metaphorical structure and its sense of rhetorical function (as a process of questioning, adopting a certain meta-textual stance, delineating the meaning of gestures, etc.) must through the transposition of these levels of poly-textuality naturally create a sense of the re-invaginated through a metaphorical weaving of these strands of text.
	Hence a text that is not rich in provocative mechanisms or devices cannot develop that intensity of aesthetic appreciation created through the satisfactory ongoing resolution of those provocative processes and interactions. Therefore, an aesthetic text can never be aesthetical if it lacks this density of provocative richness and the satisfactory inter-action and resolution of that richness.

	Thanking you for your past comments and hoping this letter has had some interest for you. I am grateful for those comments and have modified my text to date in accordance with these qualifications as noted in this letter. Some of the ramifications of this more subtle position spilling over into other aspects of this examination of poetic texts as witnessed in my third point.
	Again many thanks for your comments, etc. Wishing you all the best for the rest of this festive season and hope you have a happy and fruitful new year.

	Yours friendly,
			     Noël, Sydney, 21.12.93.