A Phenomenological Investigation Into The Nature Of 
Inauthenticity

(As A Preparation To A Phenomenological Approach 
To The Theory And Practice Of 
Value Creation)

1.	Introduction

	In a previous paper I located the dimension of value, i.e. value-for-the-person, as being that created or re-created in a personal dimension of dasein to use the Heidiggarian term. Alternatively we could treat this personal dimension as a life-world to use the Husserlian expression, that dimension that transcends the artificial Cartesian worlds of thought or material being or the Divine that short-sighted and short-tempered philosophers have so quickly dissected out off or as apart from the world of lived experience. As people we are immersed in a world of living, a world that can be reduced neither to pure atoms of material existence nor an ideal realm of pure self-centered intentionality whether egotistical or divine.
	One notable component in the fabric or composition of this world of life is language, as witnessed by the miscellany of non-artificial natural languages that articulate and reflect the totality of lived experience, expressions in the experience of language that repeat and encapsulate holistically the polymorphous and highly complex dialectically structured nature of consciousness. 
	In the normal course of everyday experience the natural person finds little that is problematic. However, if introduced to a newly awakened sense of critical reflection that is philosophically unqualified and superficial then their analysis of the stream of constituted phenomenal experience will appear to harden before such limited inspection in the moulds of a segregated subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity producing `self-evident' ingots of the same form. But a carefully critical, yet rudimentary, analysis of the same should reveal to the powers of our reason the logical distortions in the fabrication of this limited philosophically bankrupt style of interpretation. On realizing the dialectical or trans-logical richness of the phenomenal world as being prior to our logical experience of it the critical phenomenologist then draws the simple conclusion that no dichotomic formulations, other than analytical or formal structures, can be asserted except provisionally. Consequently our experience and our perception of the same can not be drawn along absolute or pure logical lines of reference. Experience therefore demands our recognition of this logical contamination or control of the phenomenal accepting the necessity for the inherence of contrasts in the structures of all processes and products of consciousness as articulated through language. Put more simply it implies that we can not draw some distinction, e.g. perceptual, mental, physical, etc. without recognizing that that distinction's distinctiveness breaks down under examination at some point in the increasing mircroscopic detailing of its logical analysis. That essentially all meaning is thematized through relational contrast that demands neither absolute distinctive separation of that distinction from its context or background nor its absolute non-differentiation (in order to ensure some degree of distinctive difference in the first place).
	The sense of self or subject demands the necessary contrast of the non-subjective, namely, the sense of otherness, that complex world of contrast generated from the various senses of the person that can be theoretically differentiated in the theatre of human experience. The meaningful experience of a world of self as a personal world of the subjective demands the co-present correlativity of the sense of other, a complex state of meaningfulness split between the multiple horns of non-self existence either now or at some other time, that relationship with inanimate and animate states of affairs (including facets of our own bodies beyond our control), that other person or group of persons or, indeed, all persons considered collectively, other possible forms of consciousness sacred and non-sacred. I label these four possible areas in the concept of otherness  - de-personal, non-personal, inter-personal and trans-personal. Awash in these multiple rivers of meaning-contrasts the senses of otherness are juxtaposed by various senses of non-otherness and therein mutually thematized in thought and crystallized in and through the presence of language. Just as a river itself needs its banks to define the river as a river so too the banks of that river need the potential or actual presence of that river itself to define those banks as the banks of a river. The sense of the subjective would have no meaning without the meaning-contrast of the non-subjective. 
	The real problem, I believe, lies not in the questioning of a world or worlds of the other but in the nature of the contrast of other, in its full meaningfulness, with that which is not-other. We can perceive non-otherness as a return to selfness. The negation of self, whether a particular sense or a collective sense, realizes the appropriate corresponding sense of other. Whilst the negation of other, whether a particular sense or collective sense, realizes our returning back to the appropriate corresponding sense of self. Some philosophers would like to maintain that a sense of self has a priority in some form over the sense of the other. I would claim that the thematization of the sense of self is equally dependent upon a thematization of the sense of the other although the world of the other is perceived from the special perspective or relativity of the self. In effect consciousness is like the sharp edge of a razor blade that cuts equally between a world of the self and the world of the non-self or other. That both equally can be viewed as mysterious dimensions whose thematization can only be mutual and equivalent in the depth of their interdependent appreciations. Because self and other therefore define each other, the limits of one demarcating the other and vice versa, it is reasonable to treat this relationship as an identifiable state of affairs in its own right. This sense of the other in its full meaningfulness, or the other-self, is treated (in this paper) as equally identical to the concepts of life-world and dasein. Therefore if this relationship between self and other is entertainable it follows that the correlative of the same is also entertainable in some form and would be realized through the negation of this concept of the other-self, namely, as the not-other or the not-other-self. The correlative of the other-self being that region that contrasts this intimate bi-polar relationship between selfness and otherness. From this demand for meaning we realize the non-exclusitivity of the life-world, that such a realm is interdependently experienced to varying degrees as subjective, intersubjective and objective through the mutual definitional dependence or inter-dependence of otherness and non-otherness or selfness. In this type of philosophy here indicated it is my belief that the existential creation of value must be realized through the absolutely non-divisional non-fragmented treatment of this life-world, this-world-of-life-for-us. That in effect it is through the world of the relational that all value is existentially generated or grounded and therein given its stamp or seal of self-approval or authenticity.
	What meaning could dasein or life-world have if the sense of the not-other could not be experienced, if the not-existence of other or self could not be lived through? Could such a limiting concept be approached and by this excursion give us by proxy some intuition or intimation into the very nature of the not-other. But using the same argument structure that dictates that no meaning without an experienced contrast one could force the conclusion that as the senses of otherness and selfness and the sense of their interrelationship are equally and powerfully present in our consciousness hence an equal claim can be made for the correlative of this relationship between otherness and selfness. Thence if we can perceive the relationship between other and self (and the resolution of tensions therein) as dasein or as a life-world then this concept of other-self as dasein or life-world must itself stand in an informative contrast with the not-other in order to generate this state of meaningfulness as a distinct concept. In answer to the objection that not-otherness might have no meaning we must note that equally we can entertain no pure form, except essentially and/or provisionally, of any one concept therefore we can entertain neither dasein, life-world nor other-self in a pure form. That being the case it implies that our entertainment of not-otherness is not absolutely not-otherness, i.e. pure, therefore its logically contaminated correlativity is entertainable, albeit, through this limited or limiting form of the negation that exhibits its contaminated contrast, i.e. with other-self (with the same being seen as equivalent to dasein or life-world). If the concepts of dasein, etc. have any form of meaning then the concept of not-other must have an equal share or claim to such a status if only as an unthematized potential. It will be argued in this paper that those experiences as lived-experiences that realize the potential of the life-world can claim to be grounded in an atmosphere of authenticity whilst those experiences to that degree that do not realize the potential of the life-world to be lived-experiences are experienced with an accompanying sense of inauthenticity. It will be suggested that the experience of inauthenticity has a variety of surface flavours although as a phenomenon it correctly has one phenomenal form, namely as that experience, fully recovered through correctly conducted critical reflection, that accompanies and subjects an intentional act of will (along with the consequential activity of that intentional act of will) to a state of de-relationalization or relational diminishment. That in effect, e.g. the associated experience of inauthenticity of addiction, guilt, boredom, anxiety, mistrust, jealousy, etc., etc. all have one home in a world of the de-relational; of the valueless or value denying.
Let us therefore investigate this world of the valueless, this world of the not-other first, in order, by this round about path, we might arrive at some appreciation of that world of value in whose authenticity at the same time we can not completely escape. Recognition of this inescapable fact, that all being as being must to some degree be authentic being, leaves us with the further mystery of how we could disengage ourselves from a realm of authenticity (of mere being) to be inauthentic in the first place? Let it be mentioned therefore that authenticity or inauthenticity, with an existential priority with the former, are correctly orientations exercised by the person's intention as to how they wish to purport themselves in this world of dasein, this world of life pregnant with its own existential value creation or re-creation. 
	To summarize and expand upon this approach let us note the following points. Firstly, the subjective sense of self necessitates the correlativity of a sense of the non-subjective. This was noted under the heading of the other. Facets indicated in the constitution of the sense of other were summarized under the sub-headings of the de-personal, non-personal, inter-personal and, for the sake of completeness, the trans-personal. This classification will be re-examined later. Secondly, the sense of otherness necessitates the correlativity of non-otherness namely selfness. Entertained as a relationship the other-self was seen as equivalent to the concepts of dasein or life-world, that personal dimension of lived-experience that cuts through the artificial and limited distinctions of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and objectivity. It was argued that a comprehension of the concept of other-self implied some form of comprehension of the not-other or not-other-self. This latter concept was seen as a limiting concept which through a transcendence of the relational experience of otherness cannot be directly experienced as the concept of experience itself necessitates some form of relationship. It was argued that as a process direction it could be experienced as a diminishment or de-relationalization of the relationship under examination and that this type of experience manifested itself with a sense, a flavour or taste of the inauthentic. Thirdly, it was suggested that this sense of not-otherness could be approached and was met in such a manner through an experience of the sense of inauthenticity and that such an experiential-form generally underlies a number of non-existential or inauthentic states of affairs, such as e.g. guilt, fear, addiction, etc. Fourthly, it was suggested that as being is and that the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity was suggestive of degrees of being then correctly applied this conceptual polarity applied not to the act or fact of being but to the intentional manner of that conscious being, the chosen manner adopted by them as to how they would purport themself in this life-world. Fifthly, the issue was raised that in our approach towards inauthenticity an identity could be drawn as to the parallel and equivalent approach towards a realm of not-otherness. That in effect a study of inauthenticity must prepare us for a theoretical understanding of authenticity and the practical application of value-creation that must go hand in hand with such an appreciation. 

2.	On the Phenomenon of the Experience of Otherness

	In an introspective state of reflection a person might say to themselves... with this pair of eyes I can see, with these ears I can hear... with this mind I can think. These various mental sensation are mine, no one else can entertain them. For all that I know in reality all other sentient-like creatures could be very sophisticated robots, automata, machines that, regardless of their status, we probably believe can not share in our own personal experiences. In essence all these experiences are labelled with the very being of my own being. This privileged access allows the person to say with some conviction that they exist. 
	However does this privileged access, or point of view, allow the person to say that they have the same privileged access to a sense of self? I think not? For a start the sense of self is not a sensation. Moreover as the person constructs an interpretation of what they perceive or experience and place it and themselves in a world of time and space they must also equally recognize that they construct their sense of self. That in truth the sense of personhood is as just as mysterious as the sense of worldness. In effect a phenomenal stream of sensation and its constructive interpretation is sandwiched thinly between the polarities, on one hand, of a sense of self and, on the other, of a sense of worldness. The indutible-like nature of this phenomenal stream as an experience experienced allows us to neither devalue, or affirm, the construction of a world at the expense of a sense of self nor to neither devalue, or affirm, the construction of a self at the expense of a sense of world. As an honest philosopher the person must either equally deny or affirm or, better, suspend such an attitude. Like a two edged sword the stream of phenomenal experience must cut both ways. 
	Such an open mindedness would then recognize that its path through this thicket of entanglement is a thin one indeed but that its very lack of dimension encompasses all sense of dimension, is to itself all sense of dimensional being. Here we are face to face with the life-world itself, the very center to the relationship between a-life-of-being lived in a-world-of-living. One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the depth of self in our self-appreciation is equivalent to the depth of appreciation of a world that we entertain in our experience of that world, and v.v., albeit from the point of view or personal perspective of an apparent sense of self. Moreover, that the relationship between the sense of self and the sense of world is a very intimate one indeed. In our coming to an understanding of the phenomenon of inauthenticity, in our movement therein towards the not-other(-self), we need to develop some comprehension of what is meant by this existential term of the other. For a beginning this can be attended to under the following four sub-headings of the de-personal, non-personal, inter-personal and the trans-personal.

i.	The De-Personal Sense of the Other

	The inescapable fate of death and the fact of our conception and post-natal history naturally lead us to ask, perhaps lead us to question inappropriately, about the nature of our existence and the possible possibility of our non-existence. To some degree such a sober reality as the consideration of our non-existence could be considered as de-personalizing. "If life has no real meaning or limited meaning, or, life cannot maintain its acquired meaningfulness what value does this apparent fact have for us in the present?" In this possibility of negation, in this discovery that the world may be different or differ with the way we wish to entertain it gives us here our first sense of the other, a sense that seems to deny meaningfulness to the fact of our being or at least question the uniqueness of our current being as a person. In keeping with the de-personalizing potential of this aspect we can also entertain other hypothetical what-if types of situations, other possibilities such as e.g. could I exist at some other time outside the span of this present life-history, could I also be some where else at the same time, could I be some one else, is it possible that things in the stream of change could be otherwise, is this the only world we can be engaged in?

ii.	The Non-Personal Sense of the Other

	The self discovered in an opposition with the world gives us a another sense of the other. In this non-personal sense we discover a resistance to the being of our control and the control of our being. Such a facet is brought home to us when objects in the world, inanimate or animate or our very own bodies themselves, counter the wishes of our intentions or intrude upon the course of our existence. In this sense we discover a sense of the other that seems to limit and diminish or resist the established meaningfulness of our existence.

iii.	The Inter-Personal Sense of the Other

	In this sense of the other we discover the look and impact of the other person, other people or just people in general. From such recognition we discover our sense of being as a person too and our ability to be seen seeing some other person. From the presence of such inspection and cross inspection the person can derive an overall sense of positive or negative evaluation of self in keeping with their appreciation of this dimension. In this dimension the person experiences the caring, the indifference or intrusion of the other person or persons.

iv.	The Trans-Personal Sense of the Other

	In this second personal sense of the other for the sake of completeness we include the possible interaction with other forms of sentient being, sacred and non-sacred, e.g. divinities of some description or other, animals, etc.

	Collectively these various senses of the other combine to give us a complex sense of the other as psychically external to the being of our selves. However a richer sense of the other is arrived at when various senses of the self that structure the overall sense of self or psyche are opposed or fragmented, projected or noted as different. For example, a person might decide that to do an act a in situation x would have been the correct thing to have done but when a situation like x occurs and they find themselves doing act b and retrospectively come to the conclusion that b was wrong or inappropriate under the circumstances then they might come to see themselves as being other than that what they should ideally be. But being what they are and having acted as they have could then get to see this ideal self that they would like to realize for themselves, through the difficulty or impossibility of its realization, as in a sense an other or something beyond them. And similar dynamics and structures pervade the whole spectrum of the phenomenon of self. It would appear that a distinctive form of behaviour necessitates an appropriate corresponding sense of self as the initiator and/or experiencer of that particular type of activity. But that this distinctive sense of self is normally not realized at the expense of a collective sense of self. Let us briefly investigate this polymorphous phenomenon of self-perception or self-appreciation.

3.	A Phenomenology of the Sense of Self

	Seemingly thrust into a world of living the overall sense of self finds its interest and activity spread in a number of fields. A sound is heard, a face is seen, a movement of the hand, a meal to cook, work to perform, a gift is given, thoughts exchanged through speech or writing... The one person on retrospective reflection appears to be an assembly of diverse inner people each performing a particular type of task. Surprisingly these many servants find the time to talk to each other and communicate their particular contribution to the collective totality of those present. No doubt in a natural environment this integrity of personality is given a status that accords with appearances and in a natural language we find expressions that treat this apparent master of the household as a person, a soul, an ego, a transcendental ego, as normally a responsible agent, etc. Philosophically we can either accept these entities at face value, reduce them to some other form or non-form through a reductive analysis, integrate this phenomenon through some systematic format or suspend the type of evaluation we would otherwise like to construct. In this paper the sense of self represents a suspended or bracketed point of view. Such an open perspective has no ontological or epistemological evaluation or commitment offered as to the status of this suspended point of view. However in this case we add the following theoretical observation that as a field of consciousness is actively integrated with its integrity projected then a sense of self in general terms can be treated as the resultant integrity of a field of consciousness projected in some higher field of appreciation that realizes through such reflection that particular sense of self.
	These various senses of self also acting in counterpoint internal to the orbit of the psyche to re-express on a more sophisticated dimension or level of organization the resultant of these interacting points of view that individually find themselves placed in a particular kind of tension with some particular form of otherness. In such a light we can view the mental phenomena of conscience, self-feelings of dissatisfaction or successfulness, general dispositions and abilities, emotional and affective states of awareness, moments of insight, the ability to discriminate the relatively correct and essential nature of a situation and discern the most appropriate responses therein, experience the existential flavour, or, the authenticity or inauthenticity of a certain strain of decision making or some other self-defining process, etc. 
	It is obvious to myself that a phenomenology of the psyche needs to distinguish these various senses of self, note their interaction and overall accommodation in the collective sense of self-identity. Moreover, a general theory of self-consciousness is also called for in order to account for the general nature of these various forms of self-involvement. It is not appropriate in this paper to offer a schema that notes the phenomenological essentiality of these distinctive states of gestalt appreciation and to sketch out the manner of their collective accommodation. What is more relevant is an investigation into the general nature of those structures that support a sense of self in the first place. Through the light cast by such an apparatus we might be able to better model the nature of the relationship between a sense of self and the corresponding sense of otherness that contrasts it. Then we should be able to make some progress in our understanding of what might be meant in the general de-relational treatment of a relationship, in our psychic movement towards the not-other or not-other-self and our experience therein of inauthenticity.
	In our phenomenological analoguing of this general sense of self I would like to propose the following gestalt model.
	First, I believe, we must propose the possibility of a particular type of consciousness as a field of activity that is essentially distinctive in our phenomenological examination. In this field products of a similar nature are to be regarded as the results of processes of gestalt discrimination dialectically isolated from the background of that general field. Second, the fact of this discrimination must be appreciated against the background of a field of a higher order of magnitude or meta-field (that in a sense reintegrates both background-field and the projection of its relatively segregated products). Third, the integral totality of that original field is then projected in the meta-field as a subject for discrimination in its own right manifesting as a sense of self that was actively exercised in the original field of endeavour. In the original field the sense of self can not be directly focused upon, only in the meta-field can the sense of its discrimination be discerned in reflection reflexively, albeit through the projection of the essentially distinctive integrity of that field. It also follows that the distinctive sense of otherness that accompanies and contrasts the corresponding sense of self is in the light of this model an over extended projection of that distinctive sense of self in the higher meta-field, that correctly sense of other and sense of self are correlative members of the same process and that neither polarity can be either purely exercised or absolutely comprehended.
	At root in this theoretical model is the gestalt appreciation that meaning and meaningfulness are only generated through a process of relating, engendered only through the fact of the relevant relationship itself. In other words meaning is only entertained through the process of the relationship, through the process of its actively being able to relate between and to the relevant parties concerned. The nature of those products appreciated characterizes the nature of that field and v.v. Then the projected integrity of that working field is then in its own right treated as a mental state that takes on the flavour of that field. In this way we can see the relevant field concerned, in its projection in the meta-field, masquerades with a corresponding sense of self in keeping with the nature of its discrimination or activity exercised. In a perceptual field the seeing of objects generates in a meta-field the sense of a visual-seeing self. Continuing this process of meta-organization also allows us in turn to project this appreciation of a particular sense of self. Thus, e.g. a visual sense of self can be further accommodated in an empirical sense of self that is open to the perception of the phenomenon of empirical objects or states. Through these means an empirical sense of self can be constructed and in its domain of its appreciation have entertained therein some empirical-like object or state that can not only, when and where relevant, be seen but also simultaneously heard, touched, smelt, tasted, be tested for temperature, pliability, etc.
	If the products of discrimination in a particular gestalt field are entertained as other to the projected integrity of the overall field we now find ourselves in a position to appreciate the necessary interrelationship between such a corresponding sense of self and the relevant sense of its other or the nature of its otherness. Moreover, a projection of the sense of self itself is able to constitute a higher order of self appreciation that in turn organized the sense of self as an other to that higher order awareness, or meta-meta-self awareness. Thus it would not be too difficult in this complex model to come to some understanding of how an individual as a person could come to entertain such an appreciation from such a diverse seemingly fragmented base. In essence a more complex sense of self emerges from the interaction of a series of lesser selves, senses of gestalt self of a less organized degree in this psychological or epistemological hierarchy. As the expression and reception of language is assembled and re-assembled in this hierarchy of self-consciousness and other-consciousness it follows as a reasonable assumption that the successfulness of communication is dependent on a similar epistemological organizational structure between the constitution of the act of communication and the reconstitution of its successful reception. Would it be too much to presuppose therefore a fundamental isomorphism or symmetry between the being of one person and the being of an other, or for that matter, the general being of humanity itself?
	In no way is the simplicity of this model meant to belittle the complexity of this issue. The main point I wish to communicate in this section of this paper is that in the individual's relating between these various levels of self and their corresponding senses of the other and the world at large the individual as a person can not escape the fact that the very being of consciousness emerges from the internal complexity of its structured interrelationships. As the integrity of a certain field is necessary for the appreciation of its corresponding sense of self in the relevant meta-field we might well ask ourselves how the person as a person could possibly attempt to de-engage themselves in some inauthentic mode of being. Put quite simply how could the person purport themselves inauthentically?
	As a first order solution to this puzzle we must note that being absolutely inauthentic, or for that matter absolutely authentic, is an impossible extreme to conceive or to realize. What is at stake is that in our desire to be authentic or to be ourselves or too just be human that part of us that consciously entertains our active engagement is to be stressed or facilitated, allowed to function and not impeded in its exercise. Being inauthentic would therefore be in this account that desire actively engaged in by ourselves, by choice or default, that deliberately impedes, diminishes, or blocks our openness to our relational engagement in that matter that should be more truly to hand than our mere desire to suppress such an openness to ourselves. In a sense inauthenticity is therefore those decisions or habits that close us off from an openness or fullness of appreciation that should be entered into. Authenticity might then be cultivated in those clearings of being, to use the Heidiggarian expression, that we allow ourselves to open up, and in such we find ourselves being opened up to, the dis-concealed essential nature of the phenomenological matter to hand. In effect through the openness of ourselves to the greater totality and wholeness of the relationship itself we come fully face to face to the situation to hand in such a manner that we find ourselves within the essential-phenomenological ambit of its grasp. It is necessary therefore in our philosophical appreciation of this existential attitude of authenticity that we come to some understanding of the psychological nature of this type of commitment. An understanding that investigates the pre-conditions for its active involvement, the conditional nature of the process itself and the post-conditional consequences that might spontaneously or post-situationally be allowed to flow from such an open engagement. We can also investigate the structure of various states of inauthenticity in order to come to some comprehension as to how such states of affairs were negatively influenced, i.e. impeded, diminished or blocked to that degree of openness necessary for the reception of a relationship in its own terms of reference in the light of what would be most appropriate to the overall needs of the situation to hand.
I would doubt that any type of experience per se is inauthentic, e.g. guilt, but that in a context that allows us to recognize its inauthenticity we should be able to theoretically account for the manner the neutrality of the term could be coloured by such a state of affairs. E.g. it might not be wrong to experience some degree of guilt when we realize we have failed in some realizable moral standard that we would normally entertain for ourselves. People are not machines, our motivation is not always transparent to ourselves, our hierarchy of priorities not necessarily fully clarified at the time of our action, as a response, that synchronically and/or retrospectively we come to evaluate as 
correctly or appropriately as guilt-deserving. Now such guilt might be quite appropriate. On the other hand our appreciation of the situation might not be fully informed or for that matter our responsiveness might be disturbed or distorted in such a way that the feelings of guilt are inappropriately given to the situation to hand or a number of situations or all situations brought to hand. Then the response of feeling guilty is not a valid response in the sense that if the situation was fully realized and correctly appreciated then our approach to it would be in some other form, or, if the situation deserves to be treated in some form as one that is quite possibly guilt-bearing then the method of our arrival at that conclusion was invalid or inauthentic. Either way such a response was a distortion of our appreciation of the situation and in a sense given to it in a pre-determined fashion whereas an appropriate existential response would have been discovered or revealed in our intuitive appreciation of that situation in itself as it came to hand before our serious reflection.
	Thus we might come to conclude that inauthenticity is, firstly, the incorrect appreciation of a situation and/or, secondly, the incorrect response(s) brought to bear through an inappropriate bringing of our pre-conceptions and other factors that block or diminish the development of an active intuitive judgment conducted from the point of view of the relationship itself. 
	An awareness of the bad taste that follows in the wake of such mis-appreciation could either arise as the judgmental responses are initiated and acted upon or retrospectively when our critical inspection reveals an inadequacy in the process of appreciation and recognizes an inappropriateness in the manner of our responding to that situation. Our concurrent or retrospective appreciation of the situation taking on a depth that cuts across the superficial forms of that type of situation to reveal the relational uniqueness of that situation to hand from the point of view of that situational-relationship.

4.	On the Collective Sense of the Other

	As the collective sense of the other is that otherness in polar opposition to the collective sense of self it follows, from the arguments adopted in this paper, that it must be in the form of a projected fragmentation of the same meta-field of consciousness that actively supported this collective sense of the self. No collective sense of self - no collective sense of the other, and v.v. Moreover, it follows that the complete separation of the sense of otherness in any form is impossible for some corresponding sense of self is necessary in order to entertain it but as the excessive sense of otherness is at the expense of the same sense of self, as a projected excessive fragmentation of the same, it follows that it is not logically possible to conceive of a pure sense of otherness, nor is it possible to conceive of a manner in which it could be directly or indirectly comprehended. In exactly the same type of argument the pure sense of self in any form is equally impossible to entertain.
	Now as self and other are in an intimate relationship of correlative co-definition it follows that philosophically we cannot disentangle the same except provisionally or pragmatically. It also follows that our interest in the polarity of other-self, whether these polar aspects are entertained individually or collectively, on a particular basis, a general or collective basis, it follows that our interest is conducted in a relational mode of consciousness, i.e. at and on that level of consciousness that can entertain and appreciate relational considerations in relational terms of reference. To remove ourselves from this aspect of consciousness was to de-relationalize our experience of the relational and that this type of attitude was experienced as a movement towards the sense of the inauthentic. This de-relational treatment or de-existentialization of the relationship can be noted under the re-cognitivization of the following four headings, namely, space, time, ego and causality. In the existentialization of these four aspects there is a relative transcendence of their cognitive manifestation. In the de-existentialization of the relationship there is a limited re-cognitivization of the same. Space regains its geographical limitations, time regains its temporality through the sense of the historic in the form of a discrete past, present and future, sense of self is again egotist-ically re-constituted as self-limited in nature and the sense of the causal again appears to follow the determined nature of the phenomenal world of material and intellectual streams of change. On the other hand relational consciousness qua relational consciousness cannot be treated in effectively cognitive terms of reference. Not that the experience of cognitive terms of reference is inauthentic only that the experience of the relational in the terms of the cognitive realizes an ominous death of that relationship as relational consciousness cannot be reduced to its pre-conditional basis in the Cognitive. The relational reduced to its cognitive pre-conditional basis realizes only the de-actualization or de-existentialization of that relationship. In our treatment of the relationship as a relationship with content, namely as a distinctively determined sense of the other-self, we can provisionally treat it as either as a process in the act of a relationship or the productive content of that relationship. In an investigation of the psycho-pathology associated with the experience of relational experience we can investigate either the defective treatment of the content of that entertained relationship or the defective progress of the same treated as a process. In the next two sections of this paper let me briefly investigate these two aspects that assist in the realization of the sense of the inauthentic. Allow us to experience the oppressiveness of the de-existential, that diminishment in the freedom of our being as a being able to transcend the limited historicity of an agent whose sole appreciation of this life-world, this-world-of-life-that-is-lived-in-by-us, is merely logical and cognitive and has no depth. The person that authentically lives in a world of life must be able to transcend the limits of the logical and realize the phenomenal fluidity of this personal dimension of dasein. To do otherwise must set ourselves up to experience the flat and endarkened world of the inauthentic, a world that, at the very same time, must refuse to be lived out in such shallow unnatural terms of reference.

5.	Various Attitudes that Reject Authenticity in Content

	Any experiential or psychic movement towards the sense of the inauthentic involves our de-relational treatment of the relationally orientated experience. As the authentic could be defined as an experiential orientation towards the sense of the other-self it follows that the inauthentic as a denial of the authentic is a denial of this other-self interrelationship. Realization of the inauthentic, in our attitudinal treatment of the world of the relational, can be expressed in the following formula - the three denials, the two affirmations and the one surrender (the latter heading indicating the manner of the return to the spirit of authenticity, that re-centering of life in the being of the relational situation itself).
	As the world of the relational, the life-world, is defined as the other-self and the inauthentic is defined as the not other-self it should follow that the denial of the 
content of the authentic interrelationship between other and self realizes an attitude that effectively re-introduces the sense of the inauthentic. In the form of a denial this would take the following form, namely, the denial of self, the denial of other and the denial of the interrelationship between the same. In the opposite direction the affirmation of a self and/or an other is equally inauthentic in its intention. Only the affirmation of the interrelationship between the sense of self and the sense of other could be productive of an experience of authenticity and then, through the holistic greatness of the relationship as a totality greater than the sum of its participant parties, it follows that the affirmation of this interrelationship is effectively undertaken in the form of a surrender of the self to such a greater presence. 
	What form should such commitment or surrender of self take? Let us analyze this in the next section that deals with the experience of the process of the de-relational experience.
	In a denial of the self we open ourselves up to seeing no value in our being, becoming a person with no real sense of selfhood. From such an attitude could flow ideas of de-personalization, self-enslavement to a limited sense of self, forms of depression or boredom, self-mutilation, suicide, etc.
	In a denial of the other we open ourselves up to a de-personal realization of the sense of the other. In such a frame of reference we seem to effect a degree of selfishness equal to the degree such a world of the other, at least in an inter-personal mode, is denied (and further exaggerated, perhaps, in conjunction with an affirmation of self).
	In a denial of the interrelationship between the self and the other we paradoxically introduce a dichotomy or cleavage in the life-world and minimalize the natural reciprocity of this fundamental relationship. Mutual reciprocity is fundamental to the nature of the relationship whether considered in the light of its content or as a process. Once established a trend is put in place for the further fragmentation of the life-world that ensures the splintering of the sense of world into de-personal, non-personal, inter-personal and trans-personal forms of otherness along with the secular and sacred forms of alienation concomitant with the same. Then continuing this process of projection other senses of self internalized in the psyche become in turn projected and fragmented with a deeper and more complex form of de-personalization. Metaphorically this fragmentation and splintering of the life-world could be compared to the parallel tracks of a railway dividing, multiplying and then heading off in different directions with a loss of interaction. In such a world competing influences loose their power of mutual resolution and concordant reciprocity. Through such a lose of harmony the residual world of the relationship has its facticity diminished loosing in the process the beauty and richness of the existential. The facticity of a relationship is the power of the relationship in its being to be as a fact beyond the mere summation of its parts (through the ongoing resolution of the tension or dissonance found between those parties). In a movement towards the inauthenticity of the not-other-self the relationship looses the self-referential power of the relationship to act and react as a relationship in its own right and therein the freedom to define itself in the context of its surroundings or its at-homeness.
	These three forms of denial, the denial of self, other and their interaction, in effect distort the manner in which relational consciousness is to be allowed to function and, therein and thereby, to open us up to a recognition of the existential richness of the life-world. Equally distorting are the two forms of affirmation, namely the affirmation of self and the affirmation of the other.
	An affirmation of self by self realizes the construction of an egotistic world whose limitations in effect freezes out the inflowing and outflowing richness of the sense of an existential involvement in the world that the person as a person should have in their facing both the world and themselves. 
	Likewise in a similar fashion, an affirmation of the world at the expense of the personal dimension realizes the construction of egotistical-like institutions that manipulate and are manipulated by those `others' who attempt to dissemble behind the anonymity of the impersonal organization whose original intention and impossible raison d'être was probably instituted for the good of all the people or for the good of all the people concerned. 
	A healthy relationship between the sense of self and the sense of the other necessitates the balanced affirmation of the relationship itself under whose auspices the parties in that relationship would be taken care of by the power or facticity of that relationship in itself. The generation of the relationship as a living fact in the world is founded and generated upon the ability of the relationship to mutually resolve all relational dissonance, tension, competition, difference, etc. Through the greater ongoing enlargement in the being of the relationship itself as an existential fact, its caring and mutual balance between its embraced parties the correct attitude towards the relationship is that of an informed surrender to the will of that relationship, a surrender to the teleological unravelment flowing from the center of its existential presence caring for its self-existence and all the parties constituted therein.
	Let us now analyze the general psycho-pathology associated with the relationship when it is treated as a process.

6.	Various Process-Modes of the De-Relational Experience

	Using the artificial device of treating a relationship as a process with three process moments, namely, of the pre-process pre-conditional, the conditional as the process in process and the post-conditional as the consequences, etc. of that process we can provisionally treat it to the following philosophical dissection.
	In the pre-conditional phase we can note existential distortions in the relevant gestalt field and inadequate essential information of the situation to hand.
	In the process or the conditional phase of the process itself we can note factors of egotistic intervention that diminish, channel, obstruct, block,substitute, divide or divert the processes of that relational function from the existential course it would take if allowed to conduct its own exercise without the operation of these forms of interference. Allowed to operate without interference the course of the relationship, whether non-chaotic and/or chaotic in nature, would proceed in some modality consistent with the nature of its own self and the mode of its self-existence. The process nature of the relationship establishes the existential core of the institution of that relationship. All forms of transformation, revolution, change, rectification, etc. should be based on the grounds of such central authenticity of being. Likewise all forms of discrimination and judgment should be so conducted.
	In the post-conditional phase the consequences of the appreciation of the relational situation to hand must be allowed to be self-exercised by the relationship itself. That is the spatial, temporal, egotistical and causal effects and consequences of the resolutional nature of the ongoing being of the relationship should be allowed to be exercised by the power of that relationship on behalf of that relationship assuming an existential interaction by that relationship in its relationship to the life-world, as a ground and background, in its totality. Such commitment is founded on and generated through the existential being of the contained parties and the essential fact of that relationship to be a party itself in the mutual ongoing resolutional fabric that establishes a world in the course of its existential unravelment. As the course of these effects and consequences can be treated as a process in their own right the same factors in intervention can be applied as outlined in regard to the conditional phase, e.g. that diminish, channel, obstruct, etc.
	Having dissected these general features that prevent the person purporting themselves in an authentic manner or mode let us now briefly apply this analysis to various types of relational situations normally treated as inauthentic in order to test the merit of these proposals.

7.	An Analysis of Various Types of Inauthenticity

	In the following elementary analyses of classic types of inauthentic experiences only prominent or essential features will be noted in line with the previous analysis
(of the content and process-nature in states of inauthenticity).

i.	Guilt

	As noted before pathological guilt appears to arise from, or at least be reinforced through, the bringing to a certain kind of guilt-perceived situation the distortion of a pre-determined, pre-judged vision of the world. Correctly the relationship should tell us if the situation is internally and naturally guilt productive in this positive and existential sense of authentic guilt.

ii.	Self-Mutilation and Para-Suicide

	Self-mutilation would appear, on the face of it, to have negative value for the individual. But if the psychic gain comes through the demand for caring, and as a consequence of the act of self-mutilation the patient is subject to the intensity of the caring process along with the intensity of pain then we might see the whole situation as, firstly, an exercise in self-denial followed by, secondly, a vigorous denial of this self-denial through the applied caring that follows the act of mutilation and its being reported. As for the often repeated acts of para-suicide the same psycho-dynamics seem to apply? 
	In both types of situation the demand for caring is inauthentic. The process of genuine care is correctly two way and mutual, through the openness between the giver and receiver, and cannot be the subject of an objectifying demand.

iii.	Suspiciousness and Paranoia

	Psychotic considerations aside one could say that the presence of frequent unfounded suspicion that is not reasonable under the then current circumstances could be seen as as an unprofitable exercise by the self involving a mistrusted affirmation of the other and an unhealthy denial of their good or neutral intentions towards them? Lack of psychic integration through ill health, tiredness, insecurity, unusual surroundings, the barriers of language or disability being factors that foster the degree of suspicion that might naturally arise and indicate a disvaluation or relative denial of the self. Moreover, suspiciousness once manifested might be met by an equal and opposite reaction in others to the same effect...

iv.	Forms of Drug Abuse

	No doubt those altered states of consciousness that offer the individual a pleasant or interesting contrast in the course of their lives opens up the possibility for an addictive process. However, often the fact of the addiction is continued even after their adequate withdrawal from their drug of previous choice. Under those conditions neither the desire for its pleasant contrast or properties nor their avoidance from any adverse effects of withdrawal, if any, seem to have an effect on the desire to remain addicted. On the other hand, and the addictive properties of the drug not withstanding, the process of addiction itself, its consequences and context seem to give the addicted person a source of value. The busyness and intensity of the addictive lifestyle and its peer group reinforcement seem to point to an inadequate sense of a self affirmation along with the distortion of perspective, mis-direction, etc. involved in the process of value-creation.

v.	Aggression

	Idiopathic considerations aside aggression has a complex number of facets subsumed under its apparent exercise, namely, self-affirmation, other-denial, a sub-facet of self denial through a search for consequent punishment or self-destruction, improperly formed processes of conflict resolution through interventional forms of distortion, diversion, etc. that do not adequately meet the relational needs of the situation to hand. Not that aggression per se is inauthentic, under some circumstances it is necessitated no doubt through the faults of others.

vi.	Murder and Thrill Killing

	Murder is an obvious and extreme form of other-denial whilst thrill killing is also, it seems, a perverse form of self-affirmation. Through the death of the other there is a lose of contact with the other even though the potentiality of the consequences that might flow from that (actively or passively conducted) activity must remain.

vii.	Making Money as an End in Itself

	Money is meant to be spent, saving is merely meant to postpone this event. But `money can make money' and its accumulation can also represent a source of power and patronage, etc. The miser might be a person who seeks some form of self-affirmation through the index of money accumulated. The more rich they become the more important, intelligent, powerful, etc. they might think they are as a cause and as a result of the same?

viii.Addiction to Applause

	Being noticed and liked by others is a form of self-affirmation by others. A symbol of this affirmation can be found in the hand-clapping and applause. Satisfaction should be achieve through the process that ensured successfulness not from some secondary association with the former. Here we have a post-conditional distortion of the process of competition, derivation of success, self-approval through others, etc?

ix.	Workaholism

	Whereas in the addiction to applause the workaholic appears to suffer happily from an addiction to the process of their success or potential and expected success? In this we have an excessive form of self-affirmation, perhaps other-affirmation if the effort of their work is for others, self-denial through service, etc.? Through activity the person takes on an identity as the doer. If a prime source of value is derived through doing then it follows that the individual must persist in such activity in order to continue to gain such self-evaluation. Again we can note a number of defects in the perception of the process of activity, namely, distortion, mis-direction, etc.

x.	Pathological Lying

	Compulsive lying no doubt in terms that either affirm or deny the sense of self creates a sense of value for the person along a speedier path than along one that would allow the person to achieve such `respect'. As a habit it must create field distortions pre-conditionally, conditionally and post-conditionally.

8.	Conclusion

	As a conclusion to this paper I would like to note the manner I believe the experience of inauthenticity manifests itself to the intuition of the individual.
	Essentially the experiential state of inauthenticity is the cognitively treated appreciation of an act of judgment in the context of a distinct relationship that is not permitted to prepare itself, be self-enacted and be made responsible to the fundamental terms of reference of that relationship itself. Essentially through ego-interference the relationship is not allowed to metaphorically breath the existential air of the relevant relational situation and then through the understanding that should be found therein be put in a position where it can speak with its own voice. Under such circumstances there is no recognition of the power of the  facticity of that relationship as a force to declare its own existential self-revelation. Such a state is the defective or deficient functioning, enfolding or encircling of a central authentic state of affairs that in its outer region is not properly attended to in its pre-conditional preparation, i.e. the relational situation in our cognitive appreciation is improperly informed and subjected to pre-judgmental forms of distortion. Moreover, the relational process of its judgmental appreciation is not allowed to function spontaneously, that in effect the non-existential restrictions placed upon the relationship ensure that its consequential unfolding is incomplete, inappropriate or not acted upon in the intuitive light of that situation. Such  existential discrimination and understanding can only be heard when it is placed in a clearing of being and allowed to grow and manifest through its own efforts. Like a garden such an open clearing can only be indirectly attended to through its being watered and weeded, i.e. given what it needs for development and removed from those influences that would impede this field of existential growth.
	From moments of authenticity there is an enlargement of the ego boundaries laid down in the Cognitive, that level of the psyche that deals in perceptual and conceptual terms of reference. Through the transcendence exercised in and through relational consciousness there is an expansion of those limits that would otherwise be naturally imposed upon that person by the person. In this enfreeing, this expansion of self, authenticity is directly experienced rather than being left obscured both at the core of the personality and the center of the relationship, that part of the relational event that must always remain untouched by the imposition of inauthentic practice. Moreover, through the process nature of this existential unfolding the presence of authenticity is something that cannot be just desired but worked for, in a sense given but not taken. Then we may take delight in the existential novelty and appropriateness of the unravelling of those problematic questions that face us,  find an exhilaration in the disentangling of those knots of existence that perturb our daily lives, and in which and through which we must find ourselves in continual confrontation with a world of the other. A confrontation necessary for only through the resolution of the same can there be the being of being, the becoming of a being with a sense of self forged with a profoundness in its constitution through the existential foundations and enrichment of that constitution. Such relational reinforcement through successful resolution making for a happier home in this world, this life-world or world-of-living, this personal dimension of dasein. 
	Inauthenticity in the light of the preceding analysis is therefore most likely experienced as a loss of power or personal facticity, as a loss of the existential enrichment and self-revelation, as the taste of bad faith when a relationship is not given the true respect it correctly deserves, as a disintegration in the health and the overall presence of self, as an experience of an inappropriateness in our dealings with others and in their dealings with us, as a general disharmony both in our daily lives and in the manner we interact with our environment...
	Being authentic is defined in this paper as that dimension that experiences and expresses the general relationship between self and other. Inauthenticity must be some form of denial and/or affirmation that imbalances or distorts this relationship fundamental to the nature of personal being. The negation of the other-self is in effect the de-relational de-existentialization of the transcendence of self that is naturally located at the center of our relationship between the complexity of our self and the world with all its correlative senses of the other externalized and internalized therein. Inauthenticity is a creation of value for the self that is short-circuited, distorted, superficial, unworked for, undeserved, uncaring and indifferent of the true home of the-self-and-the-other-in-a-world-of-mutual-living, this pregnant life-world in its fullness of meaning forever about us, this very ground and background to being that effects the character and authenticity of our phenomenal constitution.
	The experience of authenticity or inauthenticity flows from and follows after the manner we wish to purport ourselves in this world. From that attitude that recognizes the sovereignty, direction and self-approval of the relationship is rediscovered a phenomenal existence lived in a stream of relative authenticity. Such an existential attitude is one that seeks an openness through various intuitive forms that ensure the adequate information of the relationship, the removal of field distortions, the induction of an authentic and self-critical spontaneity in the evaluational process and measures that retrospectively try to experience and exercise the existential taste of such consequent discrimination and value-creation.
	Between the horizontal-like poles of the self and the other, between the vertical-like poles of authenticity and inauthenticity we find ourselves allowed to wander in this world of the phenomenal. When we balance the former and bed ourselves down in the centrality of that relationship we then discover the positive transformation and meaningfulness of the latter, discover that realm or house of the authentic, that world of value that existentially reconstitutes our being-at-home in a world-of-living that becomes a living-world-of-life-for-us.

	Finally I would like to summarize the points raised in this conclusion by painting again in vivid colours the essential vision of this paper, namely, that inauthenticity is experienced as a loss of authenticity and that the existential restoration or recovery of authenticity is primarily the recentering of our being in and through relationally orientated consciousness that allows the relationship to be and act for itself. The center of our phenomenal being is located in the center of that fundamental relationship between the collective sense or senses of self and the collective sense or senses of the  other. The denial and/or affirmation of these parties and/or the denial of this fundamental relationship through some form or other de-existentializes the balance of such a relationship, and thereafter all other relationships, and therein to the same degree ensuring our loss of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity along with their concordant creation of authentic value for the individual as an-individual-in-society-in-the-world. The stream of phenomenal being essentially has no dimension and is given depth only through the constitution of that being through the existential development of this relationship between self and other. Paradoxical as it may seem it is only when that self as an ego can suspend itself and experience the necessary degree of transcendental detachment that it can experience a world of authenticity and its creation of authentic value for the person as an individual in a world of living, experience this world as a-living-world-of-value.

				Noël Tointon, Sydney and Leura, 30/3/90.