The Value of the Comparison
of Contemporaneous and Non-Contemporaneous Forms of Philosophy?

1.  Introduction: Title/Titles

	The title of this essay is “The Value of the Comparison of Contemporaneous and Non-Contemporaneous Forms of Philosophy.”

	Elsewhere I have argued that ‘titles mis-represent their texts,’ and, ‘that only when this misrepresentation is recognised as a mis-representation of that text is the title of that a text better appreciated,’ along with a better appreciation of the meta-textual nature, or genre, of that text.1

	A title is a meta-textual item incorporated within a text or associated with that text from outside the text. Being ‘about’ the text it cannot ‘be’ that text. Hence to the extent it passes for that text, or is read as being in essence that text, it will mis-represent that text! This ‘failure’ of titles to re-present their texts is a phenomenological feature embedded in the process of reading that I must ask the reader to verify for themselves in their own time. Suffice to say the introduction to this essay is not simply an introduction to this essay, but, rather, will be used by myself as an opportunity to introduce the reader to the concept of the meta-textual, that aspect of the text that effectively focuses upon that text and not so much the content of that text (as text qua text). It will also be used as an opportunity to introduce two additional sub-titles that I hope will better locate the intentions of this essay, announcing where this essay has come from and, hopefully, where it wishes to lead (rather than mis-lead).

	In this spirit of successful-failure, or, failing-successfully, in so far as titles are recognised as fraudulent, and, therein through a realisation that the recognition of such failure is then actually able to represent those texts, let me offer two more titles so that in the ‘literal’ space metaphorically ‘set up’ between these forms of address we might find a better focusing upon the motivation that moved me to write this essay. Of course, in time, coming to appreciate the limits embedded in our appreciation of a text through a recognition of such oversights encountered in that text. An encounter met through an engagement with the text wherein such provisional signposts (of the meta-textual, etc.) are transcended in and through a confrontation with the text itself, face to face, when, in truth, we cease to be confronted by that text the moment the apparent hermeneutic resistance of that text appears to dissolve. In this virtual state of increased transparency we meet and are met by an ongoing resolution of the tensions in that text through a simultaneous re-writing/re-reading of the very re-simulation of that textual space itself. 

	In this temporal arena of attention where texts are engaged, where we find a metaphorical light dancing between shadows and hearing heavy sounds seeking patterns of sense, let me declare this essay also to be:

	“A Personal Manifesto: An Endeavour to Find Philosophic Value 
					in the Value of Philosophic Comparison,” and,

“A Defence of Philosophy Re-Visited: Realising Authentic Voices of 
Engagement in the Post-Modern Era.

	Although philosophers are usually their own worst enemy the world of professional philosophy is under attack, an attack not so much from philosophers themselves but from the world at large as stage managed by other elites. As a result the world in general no longer seems to be interested in listening to this market place of competing and conflicting fashions. A world no longer bothered by the fact that ‘calculators in the corridors of academia’ are relegating philosophy to the provinces of an historical discipline with a status more akin to the fast disappearing Greek Department! Indeed so pervasive is this tendency that all forms of philosophy, professional and non-professional, are now finding themselves under a tacit state of siege - walled up in old-fashioned universities, side-lined to the back-wards of hospital committees arguing for ethical decisions already pre-determined, or, alas, as occasional, muted echoes buried in the busy confines of coffee shops...

	I, myself, have been ‘guilty’ of doing ‘historical philosophy;’ that is, comparing once contemporaneous forms of philosophy with each other, and worse, comparing the same with much more recent forms of philosophy. Are we to believe there is no real value in this type of pursuit? Is such a task only to be performed by idle curiosity? Is such a person who indulges in this predilection no more then than a perverse voyeur of insubstantial corpses, a purveyor of useless information, a waster of valuable public resources, a reckless squanderer of one’s own limited, precious time?!

	As my personal manifesto indicates this essay endeavours to find ‘philosophic value in the value of philosophic comparison.’ In this essay I hope to show that philosophy is essentially comparative, and, that such an exercise is valuable, can have considerable value. 

	In this search for philosophic value I re-visited by thoughts on a topic that many, many years ago I entitled “my primary defence of philosophy.” I reasoned then in this fashion:

	That to do something necessitated our knowing what needed to be done.
	That philosophy can assist us in better understanding this theoretical dimension. 
	That, indeed, only philosophy can truly help us in this reflective task. 
	Hence the role, and defence, of philosophy primarily consists in helping us to better appreciate the relevant theoretical, and practical, ramifications of that task to hand treated as a topic for philosophic consideration.

	Under the umbrella of such an august role the philosopher, whilst seated, walking or lying down, would contemplate the theoretical and practical fabric of their chosen task now currently to hand so to speak. With a transcendent gaze, and bringing years of honed philosophical acumen to bear, they would find the time to look down upon their chosen subject and by canons of reason judge how our understanding of this subject was to be treated to the appropriate processes of rectification...

	Now, how can this transcendent vision of philosophical practice be wrong? Whole schools of  critical thinkers, whole pods of philosophers, can be seen  functioning in society, year after year, without the public perceiving these individuals as people who consciously see themselves as specimens floundering, finding themselves left stranded upon the rocks of reality or the deserted sands of delusions..?

	But, let it be known that this attractive image of how the philosopher does philosophy, as it stands, is just wrong, is misleading, deluded and potentially dangerous for one’s mental health if the person should actually try to persist in adhering to such an impossible practice. ‘Think impossible things before breakfast’ if you must, but not afterwards! In this paper let me propose, instead, an immanent model of how philosophy is actually done, and how, in conjunction with a simultaneous transcendent aspect, in a state of balance, the process of philosophical reflection can take place in a constructive, self-correcting and critical manner wherein an insightful appreciation of the phenomenon or phenomena under investigation can be realised.3

2.  An Immanent Vision of the Philosophical Process

	The philosopher does not seek a topic and then bring their philosophical powers to bear upon it. Rather, it is the other way round! The philosopher finds philosophical points of view already present within the very genre of that under investigation. These points of view are already in some form of provisional resolution, a historically re-produced resolution felt by that philosopher to have a complexion that is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory in nature when engaged by that philosopher. Indeed, it is probably more the latter as the feeling of an unsatisfactory resolution is more likely to have attracted the philosopher to a review of that particular topic in the first place. Most of the time the world is not experienced as being problematic.3 It is already worked out for us. In many ways it’s a bit like driving a car where we assume the rules of the road have already been formulated. Once understood they then only become problematic for us with the introduction of a new rule not yet properly understood, the re-writing of an old rule or when we drive in a foreign country and know the rules are different.

	Only when historical forms of resolution no longer feel satisfactory to us do we then feel the need to reflect upon the same more deeply. However, even then the problem is addressed in traditional meta-textual terms of reference as found already embedded in the resolutional strands that constitute the particular ‘genre’ of that topic under investigation. The ‘genre,’ whether more theoretical or practical in orientation, is re-visited and re-adopted before being re-adapted if the need for some form of novel resolution appears to be demanded. Even then the shifts in resolution are not widely divergent being incremental by nature although there can come a point in time when one more small, slight, minute quantum of shift can then instigate a profoundly radical reappraisal of the paradigms thought appropriate to this type of topic. In this moment of chaos novel metaphor and rhetoric can emerge, come to the surface, transforming that genre under examination, that ‘form’ of philosophy under investigation. In such a transformation new ways of seeing are grafted on and overlay old ways of seeing and in the process, as a consequence, release relatively new attitudes and practices.4
	
	Although the transcendent prejudices of the philosopher prior to the examination of that topic (as forms of pre-judgment) create an aspect under which that genre can be approached, correctly, it is the philosophical viewpoints found within that topic that allow that philosopher to commence a philosophical examination. Moreover, it is in the discovery of the unsatisfactory nature of the resolution of the competing and conflicting philosophical viewpoints embedded in the historical sedimentation of that topic that probably provoked that philosopher into re-examining the already provisionally resolved constitution of that topic, albeit now experienced as relatively defective and unsettling. This is the starting ‘ground’ for the philosopher - a rediscovery of the philosophy that immanently constituted that topic in the first place along with an intuitive grasp of its ‘integrity’ or ‘sense of resolution’ however deficient that semblance of harmony is found in our current entertainment of the meta-textual form of that genre.

	We would, in the light of this exposition, be arrogant to now state that the philosophical enterprise is conducted without reference to the immanent constitution of that under investigation! The acts of philosophical appreciation and transformation begin in an immanent examination of that topic under consideration. Therein we discover the dis-harmony, or harmony, found in our re-experience of that constitution. Thereafter, from a re-experiencing the engaged flavour of that re-simulation we either feel the need or do not feel the need for a re-transformation of the form of that constitution. The ‘style’ of our philosophical transformations being reflected in the manner of how we go about re-resolving those re-experienced tensions. Satisfactory processes of resolution realising distinctive styles of philosophical engagement. Hence my dictum ‘ true style has real substance,’ i.e., a distinct sense of style is effectively experienced as substantial in its import. The harmonisation of a style, its ‘aesthetic,’ being reflected in the distinctive manner of the resolutional processes entered into. Those modes of resolution entered into establishing the style of that particular philosopher and the nature of their affiliations whether recognised or not by that philosopher.

	One of the implications that can be drawn from this exposition to date is the fact, as a necessary precondition for the emergence of philosophic value, that philosophy is primarily comparative! From an immanent appreciation of the constitution of the topic various philosophical viewpoints are experienced as interacting within that genre in various modes of resolution. The received constitution of our topic reflecting the historical sedimentation of these processes of resolution entered into in the relatively integrated fabric of that genre, unsatisfactory modes of resolution creating the need for new forms of comparative engagement. Hence we can now argue most strongly that the very being of philosophical engagement is primarily realised through interactive and transformational forms of philosophical comparison. Without processes of philosophical comparison there can be no processes of philosophical insight! Without processes of philosophical comparison and interaction as a necessary precondition there could be no philosophical forms of value! Indeed, in essence, the value of philosophical comparison is the primary ground for the very existence of philosophical value!5

3.  Can Different Philosophical Viewpoints Be Compared?

	One might ask that if different philosophical viewpoints are indeed different then how could they be compared? How do we compare chalk with cheese? Surely, different philosophical points of view could not be commensurate?!

	In this process of comparison we are aided by the fact that no individual philosophies are compared only the philosophical ‘form’ of those viewpoints. Moreover, it is the similarities in essential constitution that allow acts of comparison to be put into effect where, as a rule of thumb, it is the relative proximity between forms that directly establishes the potential productivity, or value, of such a comparison. 

	The ‘form’ of a philosophical viewpoint is those features essential to the distinctive constitution of that viewpoint, and, the distinctive manner of their interaction, resolution and overall integration. Hence the form of a philosophical viewpoint is the essential constitution of that viewpoint. Acts of comparison essentially involving the relationship of one aesthetic with another, the fruitfulness of this process directly reflecting the relative proximity of those compared points of view.

	Within a particular topic the meta-textual texture of that genre is constituted from the interactive comparison of the philosophical viewpoints already embedded and resolved therein. The philosophical comparison between various genres is nothing more than this same type of process, albeit a comparative interaction that takes place between genre rather than within. Establishing the possibility of the former in effect establishes the possibility of the latter.

	How then are various points of view actually compared whether within genre or between genre? To illustrate this process let me invoke a model for the harmonisation of dissonance. In classical music theory dissonances are ‘first prepared, executed and then resolved.’ In my understanding of the first phase a consonant background of relative similarity is introduced. Against this the introduction of relatively different material is executed. Then processes of resolution are entered into whereby upon those ground of consonance consonant features in those acts of dissonance are discovered and allowed to bring those dissonant structures back into that background field of consonance, albeit now a field also reconstituted in the light of those acts of resolution. In effect dissonances are discovered as being not absolutely dissonant, with implicit connections that can take those dissonant sections of the text back into that consonant background-field. Such a process realises the experiential appreciation of relationships, the relationship of those relationships (as tropes); in turn realising an overall sense of integrity in that genre along with our intuitive appreciation of the ‘integrity’ of that sense of integrity. Thus the very processes that internally establish a sense of genre can also permit their external comparison and interaction.

	The distance between two or more processes of resolution, in their entirety, being experienced in a text as the hermeneutic distance between those features. This distance reflecting, therefore, the overall interaction between background fields of consonance, types of dissonant activity, and styles of resolutional processes. And that all this is reflected in the meta-textual fabric of that topic and all such features that interact therein to re-produce that genre under consideration. The constitution of that topic being re-produced through the re-simulated re-constitution of that topic. The nature of this re-constituted re-simulation of constitution being ‘set up’ meta-textually through the very nature of that genre and our already recognised appreciation of that topic to be of that type of genre. Hence our recognition of genre, and genre proximity, allows one genre, and its distinctive features, to effectively comment on some other genre and its array of distinctive features. In this process of philosophical engagement explicit features in one proximal genre can effectively comment, offer a commentary, upon the same type of features hitherto not recognised in some other proximal genre, etc. Each therein acting as a type of mirror to the other and in the process illuminating the constitution of those other parties and vice versa. Such reflection releasing hermeneutic value whose degree of excess value is effectively related to the hermeneutic proximity of those parties. Our philosophic comprehension being assisted and deepened through such forms of comparative engagement. The presence of this virtual interactive commentary helping to enrich our individual understanding of those parties.

	The question still remains however, how is it possible for similar entities to be compared if they are only similar and not identical? How do we know they are ‘similar’ rather than being radically different if they are not the ‘same?’ 

	Briefly, the solution to this puzzle can be found in the following, in a concept of transformational invariance. In our field of the relationship entertained between various parties virtual or actual processes of transformation between one similar entity or state and another must leave some aspect of those entities involved relatively invariant. Moreover, this aspect of invariance need only be virtual, i.e., the nature of the relational similarity of one entity or state to some other from the point of view of the first party need only bear a virtual resemblance to the similarities found from the other points of view of all the other similar entities and/or states subject to the same comparative terms of reference. In this manner we can entertain the similarities between such different states as the ‘image of an apple,’ the ‘imagination of an apple,’ the ‘concept of an apple,’ the ‘fact of a certain particular apple, ‘ the fact that a some other apple got eaten,’ etc., etc. I.e., in our mental transformation from one entity or state to another the relationship of certain features to each other is preserved under that transformation. In the image of an apple we find a certain range of size, a certain range of shape, a certain range of colour... In the conceptual experience of an apple on a conceptual level we find a similar concept of size-range, a similar concept of shape-range, a similar concept of colour-range...

	I must apologise for stressing this very theoretical concept of  ‘transformational isomorphism.’ It just happens to be the case that most forms of comparison are entertained between unlike ‘types’ of entities or states even though internal to these ‘types’ degrees of isomorphism may or may not be found. This way we can account for, e.g., images of apples, imaginary apples, concepts of apples, facts about certain apples, etc., concerning ‘appleness’ even though none of these entities, or states of affairs, are either identical or even remotely similar in type! And in a similar fashion different topics, genres of topic, styles, philosophical points of view, etc., can be compared even if the process is relatively fruitless because of the relative lack of an appropriate degree of hermeneutic proximity (because the grounds for a meaningful degree of transformational isomorphism are not in evidence between the ontological natures of those states of affairs tentatively proposed for comparison).
	
	This concept of ‘hermeneutical proximity’ is not an easy one to define. It is also meant to cover a wide field of possibilities from similar types of philosophy to similar instances of a literary genre to the essential characteristics of any particular type of phenomenon regardless of the various possibilities for its textual expressions. ‘Proximity’ is metaphorically measured ‘literally’ at the level of genre in so far as the hypothetical transformation from the genre of one of the compared parties to any other preserves in that transformation a considerable degree of transformational invariance, that in effect these instances, or aspects, of genre were for all practical purposes essentially isomorphic.

	Under these terms of engagement we might say on some level or other of the psyche anything can be made commensurate with something else, but, that the fruitfulness of such commensuration is another matter entirely being dependent on a fruitful degree of hermeneutic proximity.

4.  The Phenomenal Value of Philosophical Comparison.

	For a number of years now I have been learning Sanskrit and recently have begun reading various philosophical texts in that language. One area of interest has been in philosophical texts of the early Yogacara Buddhist Tradition circa 500 A.D. One of the ways I have come to understand these very difficult texts has been to read them through the lenses of Modern and Post-Modern Philosophy using concepts and procedures found in texts of a more transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutical orientation. It is my ambition in two or three year’s time to write a series of monographs on this tradition using these types of approach in my re-interpretation of it, and vice versa. Until very recently translators have completely misunderstood the style of this type of text, with translations often cast in an idealistic mould quite contrary to the tenor of the texts themselves. 

	In these ‘mis-translations’ idealistic metaphors are read literally, criticism (in the form of a disvaluation) of the natural attitude is seen as a devaluation of the so called ‘external world,’ a transcendental-phenomenal approach to phenomena is seen as some form of a language game or worse, sophisticated philosophical arguments are dismissed as exercises in nihilism, soteriological aspects are ignored while the implication of a religious-numinous dimension is completely overlooked, etc. 

	Many times I have found reading this type of text through a transcendental-phenomenological lens, adapting the work of Edmund Husserl, e.g., to have been a very fruitful exercise, producing a ‘hermeneutic excess’ in so far as this type of commentary, or reading, produces and re-produces a sense of value far in excess of that initially invested in our reading of that text. Moreover, reading this type of text in the light of such a commentary I have found, in turn, fruitfully comments on that type of Western tradition used in order to re-read these non-contemporary texts. 

	The need to formulate a practical hermeneutic philosophy has forced me to forge for myself a personal manifesto that argues for value in this type of enterprise, and, searches for methods that assist us in releasing this degree of hermeneutic excess that would allow us to feel that we were actually entering into a successful hermeneutic appreciation of the texts that, hitherto, had been vaguely seen as the writings of a somewhat bizarre, alien philosophy.

	This paper, in effect, is one more attempt to come to grips with these problems of hermeneutic comprehension, commensuration, the value of the hermeneutic enterprise, the role of comparative philosophy, the merit of a simulated dialogue between authors that never met, or could have met, in the flesh, etc.  However, having proposed the importance of taking an immanent approach in doing philosophy we might well ask at this juncture how this approach could be exercised when comparing two or more different philosophies? Coming to the simple situation of just investigating a particular topic is one thing, entering into a comparative examination of different instances of philosophy at the same time is surely quite something else? Or is it? Even an immanent approach must involve non-immanent, transcendent points of view in order to review immanent strands of material prior to their accommodation in states of provisional resolution. That being the case is not this immanent approach then an ideological attitude adopted for the first few minutes, or seconds, before we slip back into a more transcendent style of philosophising, the transcendent style being satirically dismissed by myself earlier in this paper as more or less patronising, feudal, politically oppressive, elitist, deceptive, effectively impossible as it stands to put into practice, etc? 

	Surely acts of comparison must involve a transcendent, non-immanent point of view in order to actually compare these philosophical viewpoints extra-textually? This is not disputed by myself. Extra-textual terms of reference are indeed invoked in acts of comparison. However, acts of comparison must also have an immanent-oriented understanding of ‘that about to be compared’ in order for that act of comparison to have real content and present itself as a meaningful process and not one that merely attends to the empty form of ‘the mere act of comparison’ itself. Moreover, I would like to argue, without going into too much detail, that there must be a balance between these transcendent and immanent orientations. That when this balance is conducted appropriately the nature of our enterprise then takes on a more critical, transcendental rigour (wherein transcendent, analytical-reductive aspects and immanent, synthetic-constructive aspects are placed in an ongoing state of equilibrium, one of the conditions, I believe, to be necessary for the instigation of a critical, transcendental tenor within our research). 

	Trying to do philosophy purely in a transcendent mode would be an empty enterprise. Trying to do philosophy purely in an immanent mode would mean our travelling blind. Correctly, philosophy needs the exercise, and balance, of these two modes of philosophical activity. Such cooperation is mutually beneficial, indeed necessary through the correlativity of these two modes. Moreover, these two modes should offer a parallel translation of our investigations, albeit from their respective points of view, which, through harmonisation, realises the productivity and successfulness of our enterprise along with an auto-critical, self-verification of the resulting insights arising out of those investigations. Like the matching of a particular lock with its corresponding key the invariance of the realisation and harmonisation of the transformational isomorphism between these two interrelated poles of activity metaphorically unlocks the hermeneutic potential of that text releasing the phenomenon of value, a hermeneutic excess that exceeds the quantum of interpretative value initially invested in the reading of that text or texts, in the comparing of those texts, etc., through a metaphorical unlocking of that text. This harmonisation expresses itself through the very resolutions already adopted by and imprinted upon the meta-textual nature of the genre of that topic, our philosophical appreciation of that topic inviting us to experience and express a reharmonised resolution of that topic. And that to experience the re-harmonisation of our topic is to open ourselves up to a transcendental appreciation of the same! Because the aesthetic appreciation is a type of transcendental appreciation of the historically resolved constitution that constitutes that topic!

5.  A Provisional Summary for Later Philosophical Digestion

	In examining the ‘phenomenal’ value of this understanding of the hermeneutic process let me make the following points:

1.	An immanent approach to our topic finds a series of competing philosophical viewpoints, and their provisional resolutions, already embedded within the meta-textual complexion of the genre of our topic.

2.	Acts of comparison demand transcendent terms of reference initially.

3.	The marshalling of our prejudices, as pre-judgments, brings us, from a transcendent perspective, to the topic to hand whether it be treated simply or comparatively.

4.	The awareness and balancing of those prejudices is one of the conditions necessary for the instigation of a critical, and transcendental, transformation of our research.

5.	A balancing of our immanent and transcendent approaches to our topic also realises another of the conditions necessary for the transcendental transformation of our research.

6.	The transcendental transformation of our research taking place through a productive suspension 
of our reading of that text or series of texts under investigation.

7.	Our transcendental-phenomenalisation of our research demands an existential engagement with a text(ual treatment in some form or other of retrospective experience, in essence as traced out in the form of a textual simulation).

8.	That parallel texts, with a reasonable degree of hermeneutic proximity (from the perspective of genre), can act as a mutual commentary on each other, in the process revealing implicit features in the other text(s) and re-writing explicit and implicit features in the original text(s) (chosen as the initial template for comparison).

9.	The productivity of parallel readings is experienced as a value-phenomenon, the intensity of that experience of value released being proportional to the degree of hermeneutic excess realised.

10.	That hermeneutic excess is usually reflected in the hermeneutic proximity of those parallel texts assuming those texts are well formed (and with a content that is not meaningless).

11.	That when our comparative exercise starts to release no new forms of a hermeneutic excess it usually at that point that our investigations come to a halt and cease.

12.	The apparent objectivity, and intersubjectivity, of our investigations being realised through the discovery, and co-discovery, of a conformity in hermeneutic value released in the repetition of ‘similar’ acts of reading.

	These are just some of the observations that I would like to have studied in detail in this paper. But time does not permit me this luxury, only the time to harvest a small representation of this feast.

	To conclude let me merely add some further observations.

6.  A Non-Concluding Conclusion

	Without doubt our prejudices bring us to the topic chosen for philosophical research. These pre-judgments creating the possibility for our recognition of that topic as being a topic of that type of genre. 
	
	Then our philosophical prejudices are put to the side when an immanent appreciation of that topic is entered into. In this process discovering various different philosophical strands and strata and various forms of provisional resolution, in varying degrees of satisfactoriness, between these historically sedimented strands and strata.

	When the immanent strands of our topic are delineated, in their isolation and interaction, along with their embedded philosophical viewpoints, appropriate forms of transcendent comparative reflection are then called for. Our prejudices then being re-admitted, albeit in some form of an ongoing transcendental balance and suspension.

	Processes of insight, as acts of judgment, are realised through processes of resolution. The transcendental expression of this hermeneutic excess produced and reproduced reflecting the extent a properly prepared transcendental suspension was directly or indirectly engaged.

	Parallel transcendent and immanent treatment(s) of the text(s) in hermeneutic proximity assisting us in the release of a hermeneutic excess of meaning and meaningfulness.

	The authenticity or inauthenticity of consequent behaviour reflecting the degree the appropriate transcendental treatment of our topic was or was not conducted respectively.

	The intensity and nature of the value that was released in our hermeneutic enterprise either disvaluing or reinforcing our initial pre-judged readings of that topic or topics.

	That the release of an excess of hermeneutic value through its intensity and transcendental nature more or less critically self-determines the authenticity of the voice or voices through which that value is released. Producing and re-producing a sense of provisional authority, through the re-resolution of immanent material, that even in the apparent divisiveness of this postmodern era actually contributes adequately, under normal circumstances, to our relatively unproblematic passage through this world and its textualisation. In a sense reinforcing the expected patterns of narration, forms of narrative, that constitute the textualisation of our world, or, creating relatively new forms of narration in keeping with our re-appraisal of that relatively novel type of situation. 

	This release of value recreating the perceived phenomenalisation of the world, this phenomenal value both existentially enriching the experiential fabric of this world of life and the philosophical depth of our appreciation of this one lifeworld of experience, an intersubjective world whose appreciation, in essence, for all practical purposes, is already fabricated for us meta-textually (and therein re-establishes the effective unity of this lifeworld). 

	This release of value, in all its forms, reinforcing our current transformed reading of the world, either reinforcing or disvaluing those prejudices before their transcendental suspension once again, to some degree or other, when and where appropriate in the next act of judgment.  The reciprocity between the textual and the meta-textual transformed reading of the world unlocking this one-world-of-life in the intensity of its shared engagement. Hence the phenomenal value of ‘our’ reading of this one ‘world-of-life’ and the existential ‘grounds’ for our being able to both ‘enjoy’ this world and ‘share’ this world. Furthermore, as a consequence of this, we can also share both our ‘enjoyment of the world’ and our ‘suffering in this world’ with others through the open, existential embrace of this one ‘world-of-life’ as one ‘world-of-value.’ That the transcendental nature of this lifeworld is the source for all forms of value (because all forms of value are generated through relationships and our simulated experience of those relationships, and, the transcendental perspective alone directly appreciates this relationally derived sense of value).

	From this lifeworld, fortunately, there can be no escape, only an escape from those inauthentic visions of the world that impossibly promise an escape from our being responsible in this world. A world of life where we cannot but live together and whose transcendental authenticity is realised through the manner of our existential engagement therein. Our resolve reflecting the resolution of the voices that constitute the world of our collective conversation in our passage through this one-world-of-life...

	From these findings, if my reasoning is valid, I believe we should reach the following provisional conclusion that the very basis of philosophy is realised through acts of comparison and that all acts of a philosophical nature have a phenomenal value commensurate with the excess of hermeneutic value released in their being entertained through acts of comparison, a value, however, that cannot be equated withnor reduced to those acts of comparison. A value arising from the experience of this excess whose transcendental authenticity, or relative lack of authenticity, is reflected in the mutual manner of its immanent and transcendent treatment in the light of their reciprocal contribution to our transcendental appreciation of this one-world-of-life.

7.  Reciting Philosophical Texts

	Where and how do we find the ‘philosopher,’ as re-defined in this essay, at work in the world? In accordance with the re-vision of the philosophical task as sketched out let me indicate in what manner the myth of the philosopher has been turned around and more or less literally turned inside out.

	An authentic philosopher admits to rediscovering a complex philosophical exposition already worked out for them in the very midst of the philosophical topic they have chosen or feel drawn towards. They bring nothing other than themselves and their prejudices to this equation. What skills they have acquired are used to disentangle the strands and strata embedded in the historical resolutions that up till that point in time effectively mapped out how that type of topic was traditionally placed in a world of shared cultural value along with an intuitive understanding of how satisfactory or unsatisfactory this facet in our mapping of the world intuitively appears to them. What originality that philosophy might possess is now revealed in how successfully, or otherwise, they re-resolve the philosophical tensions already at work in this topic under interrogation. An originality that can never depart too far from what is presented to them and re-presented by them although, as mentioned, it happens sometimes that minute changes can have very radical and startling consequences. 

	The responsibility of the philosopher resides in their authenticity of response to the topic to hand. A response that is both provoked and directed by the text of that topic. In their listening to a text a certain voice or combination of voices in a chorus of voices is heard, or overheard. Out of this seeming sea of chaos a certain reading of the text is discerned, metaphorically ‘singing along’ with that text a rereading of that text emerges whose authenticity of textuality can be re-read by others through a recitation of that same text as declared, or rather declaimed, by that philosopher. The phenomenal world is not so much one long conversation as rather a symphony of voices singing in varying degrees of harmony. 

	And where does the singing philosopher operate? And who is this cantor whose voice resonantly overrides this chorus all around them?

	The philosopher is none other than any and every individual person in the world who can both reflect upon this world of life and their powers of reflection found to operate within it. In their confrontation with a text, what ever its nature, the nature of that text has to be appreciated. And the nature of this appreciation of genre is essentially philosophical if only by default, an awareness of the philosophical viewpoints that, through necessity, found some form of a resolution in the sedimented deposition of that text. A text cannot be written, or re-written, without this sense of intentional resolve. We may be hesitant in our walking through this world, it is only when we overcome that hesitancy that we then walk through this world! It is in our first walking with others in the directions already travelled that we can then head off in a new direction by ourselves. The nature of that passage determining how original the philosopher is in that text or score. Given that that passage is properly mapped out and appropriately scored, and, that we appropriately entertain and appreciate that passage meta-textually, a recitation of that passage should allow us, in turn, to re-read that philosopher and appreciate the skill, or otherwise, of their passing though this world of life.6

	The only difference between the professional philosopher and the ordinary person is therefore merely a matter of degree. However, the authenticity of either in their reading of this world, as presented through ‘texts,’ resides in the manner of their engagement with this world of textualisation. An authentic philosopher is a person who is truly engaged in their reading of this world, a person who can recover a world of value, a person who can immanently enter the mapping of this world and who in turn can re-map the contours of this world that they themselves have helped to create, re-creating for others through a recitation of these texts an exploration of the richness and wonder of this world and the enrichment that this aspect of the world can have for them as it appeared to have had initially for the author of that text.

	This tasting of the text is discovered through comparison, through a balance of analysis and synthesis, through a transcendental reading of that text, a reading of the text whose transcendental complexion reflects the degree to which that text in its engaged reading was subjected to a properly conducted ongoing transcendental suspension. Without spelling that out let me say that this is intuitively understood by the reader when that person finds in their reading of a text an investment of value that realises an excess of value beyond the degree of value that was actually invested in the mere act of that reading. A hermeneutic excess that rewards our authenticity of engagement, delivers the relative transparency of that text along with an apparent self-verification of our reading of that text, which, in the process, also proffers a sense of self-confirmation and self re-identification. 

	Doing philosophy, therefore, is a task that involves the recognition of genre, comparative appreciation of textual strands and strata, an understanding of their overall interaction and resolution, the discovery of how these tensions might find some other form of resolve and our discernment of the consequences that these form of revision have upon our incremental transformation of this world. All styles of philosophy therefore involve forms of comparative interaction. Formal exercises in this art of comparison helping us to perfect this art-form of philosophical practice regardless of whether those texts were deposited in contemporaneous, non-contemporaneous or both contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous terms of reference. That, indeed, without processes of comparison as a basis for philosophical comprehension there could be no forms of philosophical engagement, and, that all forms of value are released and realised though processes of resolution that emerge from those very same acts of engaged philosophical comparison! Philosophy, in this light, is an inherent skill central to our successful passage through this world, a discipline whose exercise and  practise should not, cannot be relegated to the intellectual margins of our cultural world. A pursuit whose perfection is perfection itself!7

							          Noël Tointon, Sydney, 3.7.98.

A Postscript in the Form of Endnotes: That Philosophical Consciousness is Beyond Comparison

	The above paper was read on Sunday, 12th  July, 1998 before the following people - Dr Luciana O’Dwyer, Dr Nicholls, Mary Harnett and David Richie. I am very grateful for their very perceptive criticisms. In the light of their excellent comments I have emmended the text in a few places and have added this postscript in the form of a series of endnotes.

1.	In so far as a title tries to present, and therein represent, a text it must fail in this impossible task. Because the title is not the text it can only be ‘about’ that text and not that text per se. Hence my adoption of a strong reading of this facet in the phenomenology of reading, arguing for ‘must be deceptive’ rather than ‘might be deceptive.’ 
	In this light the external association of a mere, arbitary title cannot attempt to represent that text. Equally, a non-univocal title fails by virtue of its equivocation in logical terms of reference. (E.g., in a title such as “The Trials Of Horace Rumpold” with a play on the word ‘trials’). Then, again, the title that tries to summarise a text must also fail by virtue of what is left out. Lastly, to quote the entire text as its title again fails because there can be no equivalence in meta-status.
	On this subject of titles I recently read the following anecdote in the “Sydney Morning Herald” 11.7.98: A certain European company was conducting a very expensive, and unsuccessful, advertising campaign promoting tins of baby food in Africa. On each tin the label pictured a smiling baby. Apparently the convention there was for what was in the tin to be presented on the label. Needless to say nobody bought those tins with a once smiling baby on their labels.

2.	The terms ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ must be read as correlatives and non-absolute in orientation. In the first term the intentional object is seen under a perspective or series of perspectives. Being ‘seen from outside’ that intentional object it is to be seen in this sense, and only in this sense, as ‘transcendent.’ Similarly, an ‘immanent’ reading is to be conducted from within the sedimented deposition of that topic. Correctly, from the point of view of the life-world, there can be no absolute senses of ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent.’

3.	Most of the time the world is not experienced as problematic but this does not stop the true philosopher from finding the entire lifeworld as problematic, as a mystery, something to be wonder at.

4.	The philosophical investigator covering, uncovering, recovering, re-discovering and even discovering forms of philosophical value.

5.	It must be noted that although I argue that all forms of philosophical value are found in acts of philosophical comparison the emergence of that value should not, indeed, cannot be made equivalent with nor reduced to those acts of comparison themselves. Correctly, philosophical consciousness is truly beyond comparison. In this regard philosophical thought qua philosophical thought is not calculative, processes of calculation being merely a precondition for the creativity and spontaneity in the existential emergence of that engaged act of philosophical reflection!

6.	Here I am down playing the role of the professional philosopher as being uniquely capable of doing philosophy. I am aware that many individuals do not seem capable of exercising this reflective potentiality. Hence their recognition of genre, the constitution of a particular topic, etc., merely by default as that already worked out for them conventionally, by their mere adoption of its apparent convention.

7.	Lastly, it should be reiterated that ‘philosophy is beyond comparison.’ Correctly it is born in moments of wonder, in an excess of value, in an experience of the je ne sais quoi of the topic currently to hand, in a transcendental dimension beyond the misrepresentation of language..! But this vocation become invoked and through that texts become deposited and sedimented in the muddy streams of language. Only coming to life once more through the proper recitation of texts, in their being re-sighted and appropriately re-sited in the transcendental dimension of the life-world, the epicentre for the formation and experience of all forms of value..!

	Hence my title to this series of endnotes forming this Postscript.