The Value Of The Other:

The Value Of Freedom And The Freedom Of Value

	In this paper I shall explore my vision of the interrelationship between four topics, namely, the various senses of the other or otherness; a phenomenological approach that allows us to appreciate a sense of the other; the phenomenological nature of value and the intimate relationship I perceive between these three topics and a fourth on the nature of freedom as a phenomenon I believe is, and can be, enjoyed in natural experience. This paper is the last in a series of twelve that explore a phenomenology of value and has been designed as a series of sections that will eventually surround, and lead into, my vision of the phenomenon of freedom; a concept I perceive as necessary for the phenomenological grounding of a philosophy that accepts both an authentic creation of value, and, an existential process of responsibility.

1.	Meeting The Pre-Constituted

	At some time in our lives, perhaps during our schooling, we would have been most likely exposed to the philosophical-like problem of the question as to which came first the chicken or the egg? Posed in a naïve form there can be no real solution. The expression which came first can not be answered in a sense of time that attends the birth and hatching of a particular egg. Moreover, its apparent intentional direction implies a sense of temporality that goes beyond not only the birth of one egg but many eggs and, by direct implication in the light of modern evolutional theory, to a time before either the existence of eggs, or, creatures hatched from eggs of any description.
	A more sophisticated version of this type of problem, with the same appearance in logical form, can be expressed through the question which comes first - analysis or synthesis? Again, as this pseudo-question is posed various senses of temporality are confused behind the expression which comes first? Of course, as it stands, we can see quite clearly that a process of analysis necessitates some state of affairs that can be broken up into smaller sections. On the other hand synthesis necessitates some prior analysis, or analyzed material, in order to constitute that act of synthesis, and v.v. Certainly, valid arguments can be erected to show that various parallel processes of treatment in the form of analysis and synthesis is a natural phenomenon for us to deal with in our daily lives regardless of our artificial schemes to isolate one of these correlative processes from the other? 
	On one hand reading a sentence must necessitate some form of analysis, and on the other, some form of synthesis must be involved in order for our being able to generate meaningful sentences in the first place (using words already formed, etc.).
	Recently, it struck me that the relationship between analysis and synthesis is, on phenomenological grounds, more complex than it first appears. To begin with we can circumvent the problem of temporal priority by assuming that experience is going to treat, whether analytically or synthetically, that which has already been constituted. Prior constitution is necessary in order for the mind to meaningfully meet with that which it desires to meet. Recognition implies both the thematization of that material to be recognized and the thematization of that intentional attitude that wishes to realize such a state of recognition. Cognitive consciousness, whether perceptually or conceptually orientated, is intentionally structured. Moreover, this structuring necessitating a duality, or tension, between these static-noematic and dynamic-noetic facets of the act of intentionality. This tension in effect also influencing the noematic-noematic cross interaction that must take place between a phenomenological-like description and a hermeneutical-like prescription or interpretation. However, the important point I am raising here is that a process of conscious treatment begins with the raw material of that already constituted!

2.	The Correlative Mirroring Of Process/Counter-Process

	Moreover, from previous work on the nature of transformational treatment of an initial product of consciousness it became my understanding that e.g., analysis was not meaningful without the parallel backgrounded contrast of the opposite process of synthesis, and v.v. Consequently, analysis is meaningfully undergone against the contrast of an implicit synthesis and v.v. The isolated treatment of a certain product to a particular style of treatment was impossible if the undoing of that treatment was not also possible and implicitly entertainable. Of course, much mis-shapen philosophy appears to be conducted without this necessary thematizational contrast, or at least a recognition for just such necessity. In our natural existences we all too often focus on the end products of our conscious processes and forget the formation and the provisional nature of those intentional goals. In our philosophical hat-wearing we must stand somewhat a little further back from those intentional end-points and investigate the formation and entertainment of those teleologically driven directions. Moreover, assuming those structures and functions that constitute that content in its process-formation necessitates various gestalt horizons already in formation, or being opened up, in order to discover a meaningful contrast for those functional-processes and/or their structured-products under the thematization of our scrutiny it follows that the associated conscious-intentional meaning, and meaningfulness, cannot be isolated from these appropriately associated background(s). This was previously given the succinct philosophical formularization in the dictum that there can be:

	No distinction without accommodation,
	no accommodation without distinction. 

	To be noted from an application of this dictum to an act of appreciative consciousness is the following. That when there is a complete inability to isolate or distinguish an intentional object or state from the appropriately associated gestalt background there is nothing, or no-thing, produced as a result. Effectively we have presented ourselves with a non-event, no logical-subject for meaningful discrimination. On the other hand too much isolation of the logical-subject of our investigations from its appropriately associated gestalt background, or backgrounds, again produces a non-event through the lack of an informative contrast for that excessively isolated logical-subject.
	Important dialectical implications of this last dictum are:
	That meaningfulness is generated in and through rela-			tionships, 

and... 

	That such meaningfulness discovered through themati-			zation can not be absolutely isolated logically from 			its context of introduction except provisionally. 

	Being philosophical should mean reconfronting our experiences of the phenomena under question and returning to them the dimensional depth of their re-simulated formation in order that the depth of our appreciation can be adequately enhanced in direct proportion to the richness of this reconstituted perspective. This process of appreciation allowing us to essentially comprehend the nature of the situation again currently to hand (which through reconstitution realizes the meaningfulness of those intentional structures as functions to be interpreted; i.e., allowing us to recognize and treat such pre-constituted material as structured-functions-that-already-be-there-for-us).

3.	The Correlative Mirroring of Intentional Objectivity

	The same type of correlative mirroring must also occur in our dealing with the intentional content of our conscious processes. Hence, if our process of treatment focuses upon a certain type of intentional object x then all counter-objects must assemble, in principle, in the hierarchical structuralization of the background field in order to supply the necessary degree of demarcational thematization desired.

4.	How Do We Face And Encounter The Pre-Constituted?

	This presents us with the partial problem of how do we confront the already pre-constituted nature of the contents, processes and horizons of our research? Because we are essentially dealing with the constitutional nature of our research rather than the so called realistic nature of our enquiry it struck me that what was called for was a transcendental suspension. In effect it was this third term or party that allowed us to analyze or reduce our synthetic constitution under investigation, and, to synthesize or reconstitute the necessary field of attention that must accompany either form of inspection in its orientation. Basically, the putting into practical play of an experienced transcendental suspension allowed us to enter into an examination of these two co-paralleling orientations of the analytical and the synthetical. This necessary requirement essentially forms a first dialectical moment allowing us to then focus on either an analytical orientation or a synthetical orientation. Through the moment of the transcendental suspension a second moment of analysis or synthesis can be focused upon. A third moment of an opposing transcendental synthesis or transcendental analysis to the second allowing us to redress the balance and therein returning us back to the now informed presence of the transcendental suspension. The transcendental nature of the transcendental suspension establishing the transcendental nature of those analytical and/or synthetical investigations.
	These moments are not to be construed as existing in a temporal dimension although without some form of suspension, or transcendental suspension, being temporally put into place that already constituted could not be brought forward into some form of intentionally driven awareness. Hence the following dictum: 

	Without suspension neither analysis nor synthesis.

	The implication following that: 

	A transcendental suspension ensures the possibility
	of a transcendental analysis or reduction and a 				transcendental synthesis or reconstitution. 

5.	On The Nature Of The Transcendental Suspension

	By dealing with the constitution of the product at the level of the constitution the suspension put in place is effectively a transcendental suspension. By suspension we could define it to generally mean a withholding of judgment. By transcendental suspension we will radically and specifically define it to mean a withholding of all non-constitutional evaluation or value judgment. Under such trans-phenomenal circumstances we can also recognize that a transcendental suspension is put in place when all spatial-temporal, causal and egotistical or logically subjective considerations are removed from our immediate consideration. More correctly such features are not removed but rather bracketed, paralyzed for the purposes of our immediate phenomenological attention. In a sense we seek to look-over or through such phenomenal presentations to constitutionally investigate the intentional space-time, function and subjectivity of that under examination rather than its apparent modality and entry before the natural attitude. This special type of consideration focusing on the essential nature of that experience to hand rather than its apparent flesh and blood in the world of experience.
	Moreover, a transcendental suspension is also in play when the structural-content and the functional-process are also in an internal state of ongoing balance and when the mind's cognitive attention is also dynamically shared between these two orientations of the structural and the functional. The mind's transcendental-cognitive orientation and interaction necessitating the suspension of the substructural affective modality through neutralization and transcendence of this affective level of mental orientation. Hence the following six conditions (and pre-conditions) for the thorough imposition and exercise of a transcendental suspension:

1.	Affective neutralization/transcendence.
2.	Bracketing value through neutralization/transcendence.
3.	De-phenomenalization of time, space, causation, ego.
4.	Balance of thesis and counter-thesis in content.
5.	Balance of process and counter-process activity.
6.	Balance between functional and structural modalities.

6.	Re-Consideration Of The Transcendental Suspension

	At this point in time let me summarize and re-state those points already brought to our attention. In this pseudo-debate between the priority of analysis over synthesis or v.v. the first point made was that we are already dealing with the pre-constituted and that this pre-constitution extended to both the thematization of that phenomenal state of affairs and the horizon under which it was to be viewed under or against. Secondly, it was noted by myself that an in-depth phenomenological investigation should uncover the fact that meaningfulness is generated through a dialectical-like relationship between distinction and accommodation held in a delicate state of balance. In effect, it was claimed, a process of analysis would be paralleled by a background process of synthesis and v.v. Thirdly, it was stated that the pre-constituted is met through a state of suspension and that if the essential nature of our investigation is at the level of the constitution of that under examination that such a suspension was in effect transcendental in character. The transcendental nature of a transcendental suspension was defined as a bracketing of all forms of judgment in terms of spatio-temporal, causal (or functional), egotistical or logical-subjective criteria. That the search was reduced to the intentional level of our constitution itself being basically put together and realized through such inherent intentionality. 

7.	Transcendental Suspension As Trans-Constitutional

	The transcendental suspension in effect exposes the intentional constitution of the phenomenon under investigation. To use an analogy it is a bit like reconstructing the film-script in the making of a certain film from a careful viewing of it. No longer are we to be caught up in the illusion of the drama but rather we must now focus our attention on the essential bits and pieces that constitute that film, e.g., dialogue, costume, scenery, etc., and which theoretically could allow someone else with the necessary skills, never seeing the original film, to make a close remake of the same. The metaphor suggesting that our interest is no longer to be occupied with value judgments dealing with matters of aesthetics, ethics, pragmatics, existential-faithfulness, factuality, etc. Further, our interest lies with the essential in terms of its generality rather than with any particular instantiation of the same. Practically, it is claimed that a transcendental suspension is a suspension put in place at the level of the constitution of that phenomenal state of affairs through a bracketing of all forms, or, at least the suspension of all forms of value judgment on the level of their phenomenal expression of that evaluation.

8.	The Other Versus Suspension, Value and Freedom

	In this paper I am going to suggest that there is an intimate connection between the processes of a transcendental suspension, the suspension of value judgment and the phenomenal experience of freedom in our daily lives along with a restoration of value that can be realized through our engagement with all senses of the other. Let me deal with the last aspect of our four-sided equation, namely the complex sense of the other.

9.	The Archetypal Phenomenological Relationship

	Assuming the intentional constitution of consciously entertainable mental end-products, the phenomenological presence of a sense of self; in effect a transcendental ego (that is both subjective and intersubjective in its aspiration) and an infinite world of field horizons we can see phenomenological meaning being generated through the manner that these three poles are allowed to interact with each other. These three virtual poles of fundamental intentional directedness forming the minimum requirements for the construction of a (simplistic) phenomenological perspective.

10.	The Archetypal Differentiation of Value Judgment

	Now, as outlined in other papers, these three poles of activity in their interaction with themselves or each other generate six type of value, namely, thematical, aesthetical, ethical, ontical, pragmatical and trans-thematical in form. It was also noted that from a transcendental perspective, meaning here in a judgmental trans-cognitive transcendentally suspended mode conducted in intentional terms of reference, that all forms of judgment have the same dynamics and mechanics in their phenomenological formation and can only differ in terms of those natures emphasized in this tripartite scheme. That in other words all forms of judgment have the same phenomenological form and only differ in terms of emphasis entered into between these three poles of intentional activity and constitutional formation. So with this in mind let me diagrammatically represent these six types of value-judgments in relationship to these three poles.

					   {c}

					Tr.ego(s)
			{b}                      {d}

 {a}   	Tr.object(s)			Tr.field(s)      {e}

					   {f}

{a} Interaction w.r.t. tr. object(s)...thematical value,
{b} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s) and tr.object(s)... 											aesthetical value,
{c} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s)... ethical value,

{d} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s) and tr. fields(s)...
								pragmatical value,
{e} Interaction w.r.t. tr. field(s)... trans-thematical 												  value,
{f} Interaction w.r.t. tr. field(s) and tr. object(s)...
								ontical value.

11.	Life-World As The Ground For All Regional Ontologies

	In this scheme the net relationship between the transcendental ego(s), transcendental object(s) and the transcendental field(s) or transcendental world would be defined by myself as the life-world. This absolute dimension is the simultaneous immanent and transcendent ground of the phenomenal. This ground, through the dependent virtuality of these three moments or aspects of Ego, Object and World, forming the necessary linkage between all forms of regional ontology. Recognition of this virtuality realizing an absolute-transcendental dimension or perspective and not a senseless absolutist treatment of this type of consideration.
	Moreover, it would be argued by myself, that the meaningfulness of each of these three polar directions or orientations in our intentional being is given through the other two polarities. As a consequence we can postulate a phenomenological circle, along the same line as a hermeneutical circle between parts and wholes, wherein the meaningfulness of any one of these tripartite aspects is derived through the other two. The point of this formulation is a recognition that meaning can never be derived from a non-relationally constructed context or i.e., pure self-referential terms of reference.

				
				    (Cultural Value)
						Ego

						*

		World						Object
    (Ecological Value)				(Scientific Value)

	Once these three poles are allowed to co-define each other we are now in a position, in accordance with the intention of this scheme, to study the nature of value judgment from a cognitive and non-transcendental point of view. Under the heading of thematical value we can list essential appreciation, logical and mathematical manipulation of the appropriate material, processes of naming, identification, etc. Under the headings of aesthetical, ethical and pragmatical forms of value we can note that there is an emphasis on aesthetical harmony, ethical harmony and practical (or functional) harmony, respectively. Under the heading of the trans-thematical we note matters that pertain to the field contexts engineered in the recognition and realization of that material sought. Lastly, ontical value is that type of appreciation wherein we come to experience the actuality, being or presence of a certain state of affairs to be as presented.

13.	A First Definition Of Authenticity

	Authenticity of being could be tentatively defined as:

	That style of living that is centered  in this vision 			of the life-world through the experiential imposition 			of a transcendental suspension. 

	This existential suspension being exercised in such a manner that each one of these three poles is allowed to interact and give meaningful thematization to the others without the introduction of a cognitive distortion or imbalancing in this generation of reflected self-meaningfulness.
	This mode of authenticity can be seen to be entered through an experience of the moment of transcendental suspension. Transcendental suspension opening us up automatically, and spontaneously, to the other two moments of analysis (or reduction) and synthesis (or reconstitution). In this manner we could speak of a phenomenological triangle between these three moments of suspension, reduction and re-constitution recognizing the point of this heuristic device in its informing us that we enter this second phenomenological circle, i.e., this phenomenological triangle, through the point of a transcendental suspension and none other. Coupled together our phenomenological triangle and our phenomenological circle constitute the meaningfulness of the life-world as a-world-of-life-for-us. The three directions that move through processes of resolution towards a harmony of transcendental subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, transcendental objectivity and transcendental contextuality (or worldness) representing those orientations dealing respectively with a world of cultural value, a world of scientific value and a world of ecological value.
	In a series of lightening strikes I have just put together a sketch of a systematic phenomenology of value. I cannot expect these dry bones to be fleshed out and brought to life in a few lines but would like to direct you to the previous eleven papers that precede this particular one should you be interested in following up these aspects of this overall schema.

14.  Meaning And Meaningfulness Defined Through Otherness

	Hopefully some light has been able to filter through this sweeping panorama just briefly outlined before you that will allow you to see that one its central purposes behind its reconstruction in this paper is to bring to your attention the necessary role played by the sense of the other in the meaningful constitution of sense itself.  Contrary to the arguments of some notable philosophers relationships are not constituted through conflict or dissonance but through the ongoing resolution of such difference. With this in mind let the following thesis be brought to your attention, namely:

	That all meaningfulness is generated through a rela-			tionship with that which is other to that which we 			wish to investigate. 

	Attendant upon this thesis is the observation that all sense of meaningful freedom is discovered through the medium or media of the various relevant senses of the other that give contrast to that relationship under investigation. This position is quite contrary to that type of position that sees the other as that which imposes its will upon us and/or that which is imposed upon by ourselves. Although this non-mutual imposition of will can certainly occur in an inauthentic mode of being the central core of our being must be authentic in so far as our phenomenological being must to some degree be centered and grounded in a world or life or life-world, (or world of dasein). Hence:

	All intentional being is centered in the authenticity 			of the life-world to some degree or other in its 				phenomenal expression.

	 Without this sense of the other there could be no subjective or inter-subjective locus of meaning that could experience a sense of being let alone a sense of freedom (which must be present to some degree in that experiential presentation regardless of its current authenticity or inauthenticity). In effect let us carefully note that: 

	It is through some sense of the other that there is a 			sense of freedom to be realized in experience! 

15.	A Typology Of Otherness

	At this point let me discuss the various fundamental types of otherness, i.e., basic regional ontologies, that this phenomenological model would suggest as collectively present in the course of our natural experience.
	As meaningfulness is generated through the interrelationships developed within our phenomenological circle it stands to reason that all senses of otherness, in their various fundamental aspects, can be demonstrated to occur therein. The three moments of this circle are Ego, Object and World. In greater detail these moments are - the transcendental ego or i.e., transcendental subjectivity and transcendental inter-subjectivity, transcendental objectivity of the intentional object-state in all its essential types and their variety, and, transcendental contexts or fields and their collective totality in a sense of transcendental world or worldness. As each of these moments can be treated in either a singular mode or a mode of multiplicity it gives six types of phenomenologically experienced otherness with respect to these three moments within this metaphorical circle. For reason of simplicity let us consider these three moments or poles of meaning as Ego, Object and World, albeit in a realm of phenomenal presentation. Under such a scheme we would consider that the Ego gains its meaningfulness through the contrast it receives through the complexity of  relationships it has with the poles of World and Object. Likewise, in turn World gains its meaningfulness through the complexity of relationships it has with Object and Ego, and, in a similar fashion, World gains its meaningfulness through the complexity of relationships it has with Ego and Object. Under such a scheme Ego has no self-determination other than that which can be found in its relationships with World and Object. Because no pole can be given a self-determination purely in its own terms of reference these three poles of meaning-contrast can for all practical purposes be considered as virtual.
	The life of the person is a delicate dance about a central point with the sharpness of a razor blade, in metaphorical terms of reference, about the collective center of these three poles of fundamental intentional directedness. Intentional objects gain their significance between the interplay of Ego and World as a collective field of context for that intentional object. As a consequence the virtuality of an intentional object implies that no intentional object can be directly experienced in itself because that object is correctly an illusion created through the interplay of those poles of World and Ego. Thus it also implies that Ego and World are in their own way de facto potential object of our intentional directedness. Otherwise, if intentional objects were the only objects of our intentional directedness how could we account for a sense of self and a sense of world?
	Likewise, using the same type of argument Ego and World must also be considered in this light as virtual. Such a philosophic arrangement can leave no room for extreme forms of empiricism, idealism, scientific supremacy, rationalism, mind-body dualism, logicalism, psychologism, etc., etc. 
	Further, not only is meaning and meaningfulness generated in such a scheme through the interaction of these three virtual poles of intentional directedness but also all sense of freedom, as a complex phenomenon; if it does exist, must also be generated within the ambit of the same transcendental machinery? Does such a phenomenon exist and if it does what phenomenal meaning and meaningfulness can it possess?

16.	Other People

	In this scheme, or heuristic device of a phenomenological circle just delineated, we can state that the significance of the Ego, e.g., is generated through its relationships with the poles of World and Object. With respect to Ego we could say that it experiences a sense of otherness through its relationships with those poles of World and Object. In other words its sense of contra-Ego is pro-World and pro-Object. Because the sense of Ego must be virtual it implies that to a certain degree the world can be experienced, albeit indirectly through Ego and Object and in the same manner the Object can be experienced, albeit through Ego and World. As a consequence a collective sense of otherness arises through the contrast a contra-Ego, contra-World and a contra-Object have with the collective identity thematized in the stream of phenomenal experience which is pro-Ego, pro-World and pro-Object. However, if the sense of Ego or i.e., transcendental ego, is considered with no distinction between subjective and inter-subjective senses then how would it be possible for the individual to acquire an individual sense of personhood and personality? I believe this must be done through a subtle splitting of the sense of Transcendental Ego into subjective and inter-subjective forms and a further subdivision of the former between a personal perspectives (through forms of phenomenal personalization) and non-personal perspectives (through forms of material embodiment). Just as we cannot consider the person in their presentation as a phenomenon to be a pure Transcendental Ego in like measure we cannot consider the person to be a pure subjective entity either (or for that manner as a mere intersubjective unit in a community of `apparent' individuals). In the genesis of our ideas about our selves we must recognize the intimate association we have with other persons and the effects this interaction has upon us in the thematization of our own individual sense of selfhood and personality.

17.	The Monadic Sense Of Community

	An invaluable tool for our understanding of this phenomenological genesis is a resurrection and reconstruction of the Leibnizian style of monodolgy as Husserl himself recommends at the end of his Cartesian Meditations. It is true that we see the world from our own perspective but at the same time this perspective is only possible through the interaction of a number of monodological-like levels of organization of the person as an entelechy in their own right within a potential community or entelechy of other similar monads within a psychic expanse wherein ecological, cultural and scientific value can be meaningfully, and hence intentionally, constructed and reconstructed for-us-by-us. However, for the sake of the argument if all that were to be accepted would that allow, by necessity or by accident, for the existence of a phenomenal world wherein freedom can be manifested as an experience for either the individual or for a community of individuals? In bringing this paper to a conclusion let us consider this question or philosophical problem - is their such a phenomenon as freedom, and if such a phenomenon is experienced is it correctly an experience of freedom qua freedom? We might feel free, feel free to make a certain choice e.g., are we really free to make that choice?
	As an expression the word freedom in its normal range of utterances appears to be meaningfully emitted and received. The philosopher and the phenomenologist must concede this point that we have a meaningful subject for investigation. Subjected to a transcendental suspension that suspends, among other things, existential, or i.e., ontical/factual considerations, we are forced to conclude that this expression does have significant content? 

18.	 A Second Definition Of Authenticity

	A phenomenologically constructed description at least in a possible world could describe, I believe, the essential features that would constitute such a concept. But does such a concept have a real currency and not a counterfeit existence in the world of normal everyday living as found in and through the natural attitude?
	As just previously discussed under the implications and consequences of our phenomenological circle it was noted that as not one of the three poles that constitute meaning and meaningfulness (within this heuristic device) could be examined in its own terms of reference then each pole could quite safely for all practical purposes be considered as virtual but, for all that, as both effective and perhaps efficient in its normal meaning giving role in combination with its two other polar companions. By virtue of this virtuality we find guaranteed a sense of freedom to some degree to be ever present in the creation of significance within that complex field of being or i.e., this world of life or life-world. Meaning and meaningfulness is forever being constituted and reconstituted in this world of life as it manifests itself as a stream of phenomenal being in a process of unfolding. This very fluidity through virtuality that allows experience to be considered and reconsidered, allows us to exercise a sense of choice, e.g., that can be neither deterministic nor completely erratic, random or chaotic. No doubt moments of crisis, catastrophe and chaos can manifest themselves (and in a sense guarantee an apparent form of freedom through the senses of the unexpected or the unpredictible). But, I would make it my primary argument, that it is the very ability to alter our intentional directedness and all the consequential behaviour and activity concomitant with that that allows us to exercise a sense of choice  and allied sense of free-will. Consequently we could define the degree of apparent freedom able to be exercised as being of that degree we are able to alter our intentional directedness, and: 

	That authenticity is exercised in that measure the			degree of free-choice is exercised in keeping with the 	teleological aspect(s) realized in our existential 			appreciation of the nature of that relationship, 

or i.e: 

	Authenticity is realized in that degree the potential 			for intentional redirection is actually exercised. 

	And if we are going to be charitable and admit this much then let us continue and question in what manner a sense of free-will appears to be exercised or at least brought to our apparent attention?

19.	The Exercise of Intentional Re-Direction

	The simple phenomenon of choice appears to involve both our ability to construct an intentional act through our redirection of our intentional processes, and, our ability to evaluate and appreciate that act and in the process, or retrospectively, monitor what facets would be thought necessary to initiate, control and terminate that self-dependent event. It would appear that to that extent that we can stand back from an act of intentionality is it to that extent that we might be able to say we are entertaining the grounds for the exercise of a free act of choice in the first place? Perhaps we must consider the features of an act of choice to be virtual in their own right and in the light of this virtuality as being seen to be neither completely distinct or distinctive nor completely accommodated. This tension between distinction and accommodation being continuously resolved through the realization of that intentional act, its concomitant behaviour, activity and consequences. No doubt in the conscious formulation of the meaningfulness of that situation the mind must be able to entertain, if only at the level of a background, contrary formulations of that phenomenal situation. Hence any deliberation a person intentionally, i.e., consciously, enters into is the consequence of a resolved state of judgment. In the mind's dealing with that which is effectively pre-constituted and its re-constitutional manipulation and unfolding the agent must enter into a process of judgmental deliberation. As previously explained our meeting with that which is pre-constituted necessitates the imposition of some form of transcendental suspension. It was argued that only through this moment in our phenomenological triangle that we could allow focal processes of treatment and contextual processes of anti-treatment to simultaneously occur and meaningfully contrast each other productively.

20.	The Spontaneous Productive Nature Of The Epoche

	I have argued elsewhere, in other papers, that in a phenomenological investigation of the process of judgment the act of judgment as a precondition needs the thematization of conceptual material, and, as an ongoing condition needs the imposition of a state of psychic balance that in effect is equivalent to  the experience of the experiential instantiation of a transcendental suspension. If we were to experience a transcendental suspension it is my belief that we would be going about a process of judgment that in no way differed from the initiation and exercise of a process of judgment. Other than the fact, of course, that in our carefully conducted phenomenological investigations we make sure that a transcendental suspension is put in place and kept properly in place, etc. I must point out that a phenomenological psychology just briefly sketched out runs parallel to a transcendental phenomenology although dependent upon the latter for its a priori being, for its very meaning and meaningfulness. I must stress that this experiential treatment of a transcendental suspension is not primarily a foray into a world of ad hoc psychology or a philosophy of psychologism!
	As judgment necessitates the balance of a dynamic equilibrium as an actively engaged transcendental suspension it follows that an authenticity of being takes place when in our phenomenological circle an ongoing balance between these three poles is actively engineered and obtained. Any disruption of this balance must re-introduce an element of the inauthentic, from which authenticity must be diminished in equal measure to the degree such a state of unbalance is introduced: 

	Concomitant with the loss of  authenticity is an equal 	loss of freedom. 

	Let me explain, and try to demonstrate, the significance of this simple equation of an equivalence between authenticity and freedom.

21.	A Third Definition Of Authenticity

	Meaning and meaningfulness as value is discovered, realized, revealed through the resolution and unfolding of the relationship through which such value is constituted and re-constituted in the ongoing disconcealment and concealment of the life-world. As defined previously the life-world is the collective ground that as an absolute dimension grounds the three poles of the Ego, Object and World and all regional ontologies generated there upon. All phenomenal relationships being constituted through the relationship of these three virtual poles. A particular relationship can be seen as the manner in which these three factors constitute a certain monodological-like organization from the point of view of that entelechy. As relationships can be treated as wholes as opposed to their participants parts and as we should consider the psychic impact of the whole to be greater (or at least different) we can consider: 

	That excess (or difference) of the whole over its parts 	to be that degree of authenticity and freedom generated 	by that relationship structured in the manner it was, 			is or is about to be so structured.  

	Moreover, its degree of freedom also reflects the degree of monodological organization imparted to that particular entelechy or provisional entity-in-process. Such freedom is founded upon, and not contrary to, the harmonious interaction of the parts of that relationship. Freedom does not mean that that phenomenological relationship as located through the harmonious interaction and resolution of its parts (to some degree or other) entitles it to be other than the manner in which it is so constituted and so expressed in the world of lived experienced. More precisely it means that that particular relationship is more ably able to be itself as it is teleologically meant to continually unravel itself, moment by moment, as a participant in the world. Freedom is not the ability to do the impossible but the realization of an ability to become what is possible for that which has that ability or potentiality.

22.	Freedom Grounded And Constituted Through The Other

	Accepting the fact, in accordance with our device of the phenomenological circle, that value is constituted through the centering of Ego, Object and World upon the rim of that metaphorical circle, allows us to recognize the absolutely important and crucial role all senses of the other or otherness have in the constitution of the meaning, meaningfulness and freedom of the person in this world of lived experience. Contrary to what some notable philosophers have said it is through the other that freedom is to be found! Moreover, it is through the inauthenticity of ourselves that our freedom is undermined or allowed to be undermined by some inauthentic aspect of the other. That in accepting this other heuristic model of the phenomenological triangle we can come to understand the intuition that it is through a transcendental-psychological suspension of all value judgments that we can come to deal with the pre-constituted and through our freedom therein authentically re-constitute all forms of lived experience in such a manner that is commensurate with our freedom to be as agents in the world of phenomenal existence. It is my belief that we can experience this sense of freedom just alluded to and that we do so many many times during that part of the day we enter into a state of adequate self-consciousness that is not spent merely calculating, plotting or manipulating the course of our relationships without regards to the implicit teleological ends of those relationships we inauthentically either seek (through some form of imperfect relational participation) to master or be a slave to.
	Lastly, let me reiterate, as a form of correction, that although I have mentioned on a number of occasions that a transcendental suspension can be experienced and can be given an essential psychological description and instantiation let me add that it is only because there is an absolute transcendental dimension a priori to a transcendental psychology that such a psychological description and experience can be given such a definite form. In this regard I perceive Husserl as correct and that philosophy in that sense can be given transcendental foundations even though their recognition can only be retrospective and provisionally distinguished in egotistical, objective and worldly terms of reference. These three aspects forming the grounds for a phenomenology of culture, science and ecology respectively although all three domains are secured on the transcendental science of the life-world and its artful interpretation - an existential facet of the relationship that automatically guarantees itself through the adequate thematization and transcendental suspension of our understanding of that relationship. Therein we discover the paradox that value and freedom are co-constituted through an open active suspension of all forms of value judgment and that from such a perspective we should come to recognize and realize through the value of the other (in all its various senses) the value of freedom and the freedom of value!
	In essence freedom is not constituted at the expense of the other but grounded and brought to fruition through the auspices of the other. Only in a self-loss of authenticity could the other be allowed to impose itself upon us, or, we upon the being of the other in its social aspect at the personal expense of that aspect of the other! Our fundamental freedom residing in the very ability to choose to intuit, if we should so desire, an appreciation of the current situation to hand, or the reconstruction or anticipation of some other; our choice to exercise that intuitive appreciation or judgment, our choice on how and to what degree we desire to see out an enactment of such practical decisions; or the replacement of the same by some other path of response; and, the choice on how and to what degree we might wish to reflect upon such a process of response. By these means we have the freedom to authentically or inauthentically purport ourselves in this world in keeping with the existential nature of our choice whether those options are contemplated, find our commission or omission, or just our detached reflection.

		Noël Tointon, Sydney and Leura, 15/12/90, 27/7/91.

A Re-Expression Now Follows Of This Concluding Discussion On Freedom In The Form Of A Short Paper Entitled:

The Value Of Freedom And The Freedom Of Value