The Value Of Freedom And The Freedom Of Value

A.	Introduction: The Phenomenon Of Freedom?

	The following paper is based on a longer paper which concluded a series of papers on the subject of value. In this paper I hope to discuss a number of my more recent thoughts on the subject of freedom. By these means I do not intend to resolve any questions on the nature of freedom, or free-will, but, rather plough the ground and in raising some dust, and in watching it settle, perhaps find myself being able to reformulate certain questions on this subject and in that type of attitude tentatively offer some provisional solutions in the form of an interpretation that might allow us to then phenomenologically clarify this area of philosophical concern in preparation for a more detailed phenomenological investigation. With this process of preparatory interpretation in mind I will end this paper, as a conclusion, with a series of controversial propositions whose clarification, examination, acceptance or rejection might conceivably contribute to this task of a preparation for a phenomenological investigation.
	Allied with this topic is also the pressing need for a practical clarification of the concept of authenticity in the hope that philosophy might be able to contribute to a resolution of that crisis in confidence that appears to have afflicted the cultural psyche of the modern world; a crisis in identity that, in my opinion, now affects the entire world and not just the European psyche. 
	Today, no respectable thinker could reasonably suggest that a certain set of values is the only set that should be entertained, or, that they be for that matter, better or more valid than some other set of values. On the other hand, however, common sense would seem to teach us that it is possible to selectively evaluate value responses in their associated contexts and determine, to some extent, the appropriateness of that response-process, i.e., intuit, or interpret, the relative authenticity, and effectiveness, of that response as it was seen to arise in its associated context. In this regard an ethical response demands some form of freedom for the person to be able to ethically respond, and, some ability that might allow them, and us, to determine the responsibility of that process of response? So with these pressing areas of concern in the background let me attempt this process of pre-phenomenological clarification.
	In this paper I will also attempt to demonstrate the manner in which the sense of the other grounds and constitutes this imputed phenomenon of freedom and that without this necessity of the sense, and presence, of the other there would be, I believe, no phenomenon of freedom. Moreover, the very phenomenon of phenomena itself would be an impossibility. That, in a certain measure, intentional indeterminacy actually guarantees the possibility of phenomena and the experience of this phenomenon of freedom?

B.	Encountering The Phenomenon Of The Phenomenon

	In a phenomenological investigation through an analytical process of transcendental reduction the essential meaning of the phenomenal situation is to be determined (at least in theoretical terms of reference). On the other hand, it is my understanding, that through a synthetic process of transcendental reconstitution the meaningfulness of the phenomenon is to be determined through some form of contextual interpretive appreciation of that essential meaning already arrived at in the prior analytical process of transcendental reduction. 
	However, in probing more deeply, hypothetically, it should be obvious that the theoretical, and practical, nature of this relationship between the analytical, or reductive, and the synthetical, or reconstitutional, is one of a mutual dependence. We should soon come to realize that analysis necessitates some prior form of synthesis in order to arrive at the analyzed material, etc., and, that in a similar converse fashion synthesis necessitates a prior process of  analysis in order to operate a process of synthesis or reconstitution, etc. That under these terms of reference neither of these opposing processes could logically be prior to the other; that their very meaning and meaningfulness is mutually thematized although this does not imply that our interest in these two correlative processes need be equal in the thematization of that interest. That in effect under these terms of reference neither a process of analysis in any form nor a process of synthesis in any form could initiate this necessary correlative process of analytical-synthetical interaction. Well we might ask in our investigations how is it possible, given this apparent impasse, for a process of analysis or synthesis to proceed?
	The answer quite simply is that thematization begins with the material all-ready-to-hand, i.e., the pre-constituted. That granted we now need to ask ourselves how this pre-constituted material is encountered? My resolution of this question, after some considerable thought, is that it is through the auspices of some form of transcendental suspension or epoche that the pre-constituted is able to be entertained and actively engaged in this act of transcendental reflection. Let me quickly give some reasons why I hold this position.
	On one hand as neither synthesis nor analysis could solely initiate this state of encounter , and, yet on the other, this process of encounter cannot be that far removed from either of these two correlative processes. In my opinion the obvious candidate for the initiation of such an apparent encounter is the phenomenon of the transcendental suspension, a suspension that I perceive to be developed in functional terms of reference through the ongoing balance of analytical/synthetical attitudes exercised in the noetic nature of that intentional process. In other words a transcendental suspension is inaugurated through an ongoing balance between analysis and synthesis as reflected through processes of essential reduction and contextual reconstitution respectively. In effect a hermeneutic(-cal) circle has presented itself, one based on three moments, namely, suspension, reduction and reconstitution; the apparent fiction of a process of initiation being entertained through the moment of suspension.
	Moreover, in my opinion, this transcendental suspension is also realized through an ongoing balance in noematic content through a parallel co-entertainment of the noematic thesis and its contrary counter-thesis. Let me elaborate upon this latter point.
	This concept of noematic suspension is modeled on the classical transcendental suspension wherein the factual status of the phenomenal presentation is bracketed by the phenomenologist; neutralized and overlooked. In this mode both the (factual) existence or the (factual) non-existence of the phenomenon are of no direct concern to the phenomenologist in their desire to investigate meaning structures/meaning functions.
	A transcendental suspension being also put into effect, in accordance with this understanding, when the noematic content of the intentional process of analysis-synthesis is put into some form of parallel counter balance. E.g., let the intentional object being determined be the non-imagined perception of an existing beautiful red apple.  In a state of transcendental balance we counterbalance this perceived state of affairs by entertaining a suspicion as to whether that intentional object, in its imputed representation of some form of a natural state of affairs, might not be the opposite of that intentional object under investigation. I.e., in this instance as non-existent, non-beautiful, non-red something (other than an apple) still under the balance and influence of that healthy suspicion postponing in the process all forms of judgmental determination in value one way or the other other than in an identification of the intentional factors and counter factors that structure and functionally maintain that temporary suspension. An overall state of transcendental suspension coming into effect when these two processes of noetic and noematic counterbalance are put in place and preserved for the time necessary to conduct our transcendental business. The trans-phenomenal, trans-constitutional and trans-intentional nature of that suspension establishing the transcendental nature of that enterprise (and our sole access to this transcendental dimension?).
	Hence, in accordance with this reasoning, the preconstituted is encountered through the auspices of some form of transcendental suspension which in turn is partially realized through a balance entertained between ongoing processes of analysis and synthesis, i.e., analytical reduction and synthetical-reconstitution. Of course once we have encountered the relevant pre-constituted material what we do with it is then our own business and the overall transcendental nature, or atmosphere, of our initial encounter need not be ostensively maintained. By implication I am arguing that the adoption of a transcendental suspension is a common and natural occurrence in our daily life and frequently assists  us in the encountering of the situations and relationships that constitute and enrich the passage of our natural existence.

C.	Archetypal Phenomenology

	At this juncture let us envisage, under the most simple conditions possible necessary for the development of a phenomenological attitude, what fundamental factors would be required for an adequate theoretically productive phenomenological investigation? In other words what minimum requirements would be necessary for the productive development of an archetypal phenomenology?
	The phenomenological attitude recognizes the functional-structural nature of the thematization of the intentional object as expressed through its noetic-noematic correlation. From the aspect of the noematic we can postulate an intentional object as a transcendental object. From the apparent unity of the intentional act of noesis we can postulate an intentional subject, or transcendental ego; and as all acts of appreciation necessitate fields of context, also necessary must be some form of contrast or regional ontology as an horizon which for the sake of convenience let us call a transcendental world. With these three factors of fundamental intentional directedness we have, I believe, enough material to establish an archetypal foundation for the process of phenomenological investigation. 
	At the same time through their opposition in informative contrast to each other there is grounded and constituted a complex sense of otherness - object as other than ego or world, world as other than ego or object, ego as other than object, world or some other transcendental ego. For the rest of this paper let me refer to these three fundamental aspects of intentional directedness as Ego, Object and World. Let me make quite clear from now on that reference to these three terms involves  a transcendental dimension, or perspective, which is trans-intentional and trans-phenomenal in orientation. By this is meant that their use does not directly involve empirical and cognitive terms of reference, i.e., as not involving a direct interest in factual, perceptual and/or conceptual terms of reference; our phenomenological interest, whether theoretical and/or practical in aspiration, being primarily concerned with meaning-structures and meaning-functions, i.e., consideration of sense.

D.	The Complex Sense Of The Other

	I have introduced these three fundamental polarities in intentional consciousness in order to establish how a complex sense of the other could be constituted in our archetypal phenomenology. However, in constituting the possibility for this sense of otherness we must realize that the converse of this sense establishes a sense of phenomenal proximity or non-otherness, i.e., the phenomenally familiar, to a certain extent our at homeness in the world, etc. Moreover, we must also realize that the very constitution of these three factors is developed in and through the contrast they offer each other. In other words this sense of otherness cannot be absolute or, i.e., completely isolated from this contrary sense of our-being-at-home with that naturally and culturally found to hand. This contrasting element of difference must be relative implying that we discover the meaning and meaningfulness of any one factor not through that factor itself but through the interaction supplied by its other two companions. That ultimately all meaning and meaningfulness is indirectly constituted through the auspices of all three factors (allowing us to provisionally accept the phenomenological description of the essential constitution of anyone of them).
	To adopt a complex metaphorical image the phenomenal and intentional being of the person is like looking into a mirror and seeing therein the semblance of a person involved in a delicate dance, a dance generated between, and partnered by, these three fundamental poles; this vision of the dancer reflecting these individual, and collective, senses of otherness. The correlative and mutual interdependence between these three ideal polarizations establishing the virtual but effective, and responsive, nature of the transcendental sense of the person as a person constituted in and through this dimension of the life-world. This dimension of the ideal interaction between Ego, Object and World generating the transcendental ground, or life-world, for all forms of regional ontology which in turn are generated through the unevenly treated and retreated complex interaction of these three transcendental poles in fundamental intentional directedness.

E.	The Phenomenon Of Value

	As all intentional experience is constituted in relation to these three poles of the Ego, Object and World the question naturally follows how is the phenomenon of value, i.e., a judgmental response, constituted under these terms of reference? I have given this type of question much thought and find that one approach in the answering of this question is to understand, and list, what distinctive types of value can be found and the nature of their possible relationship to each other. We might e.g., group value judgments under an open series of categories discovered through a reflection upon the nature of experience as it had on a day by day basis; an investigation perhaps best conducted through a reviewing of documents and listing the types of value noted, directly or indirectly, by those texts. In this regards we might note e.g., cultural value, political value, mathematical value, monetary value, aesthetic value, spiritual value, etc. In this form the list is virtually infinite. A method I have adopted for simplifying and unifying this otherwise open ended classification is to return to this tripartite archetypal phenomenology and in the suppression of one or two of those polarizations attempt to account for the dominant structural-function a particular form of value might be interpreted as possessing. By these means we should arrive at six fundamental classifications namely:

					   {c}

					Tr.ego(s)
			{b}                      {d}

 {a}   	Tr.object(s)			Tr.field(s)      {e}

					   {f}

{a} Interaction w.r.t. tr. object(s)...thematical value (or 
essential value),
{b} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s) and tr.object(s)... 										aesthetical value,
{c} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s)... ethical value,
{d} Interaction w.r.t. tr. ego(s) and tr. fields(s)...
								pragmatical value,
{e} Interaction w.r.t. tr. field(s)... trans-thematical 							value(or hemeneutical value),
{f} Interaction w.r.t. tr. field(s) and tr. object(s)...
					ontical value (or factual value).

	For example aesthetic value in general phenomenological terms of reference might be seen as the archetypal relationship between the transcendental ego and a transcendental object (considered either as a potential art object or state, or, as an object or state of nature). On the other hand thematical value might be seen as being derived from an archetypal relationship of correspondence between two or more transcendental objects. All types of relationship being seen as the ongoing harmonious resolution of all forms of experienced dissonance discovered therein.
	I don't wish to make this exposition too technical. Suffice to say that although we might be able to differentiate types of value through the suppression of one or two of these polarities ultimately all forms of value must have the same underlying transcendental machinery. I.e., from the transcendental perspective all phenomena have the same archetypal transcendental form derived from this interaction between Ego, Object and World.

F.	The Phenomenon Of Freedom?

	Again, with respect to the topic of freedom, if freedom is a clearly defined phenomenon it likewise must be constituted through the same transcendental machinery. By implication the phenomenon of freedom, if it is an authentic and distinct phenomenon, must find the guarantee for its existence in the intentional nature of consciousness itself! However, in the meantime, let us subject this possibility to a state of transcendental suspension, and, instead, concentrate our attention on how the process of the creation of judgmental value might be generated.

G.	Value Creation

	On this subject of value creation the phenomenon of judgment needs to be phenomenologically described and interpreted. However time does not permit me to give an adequate exposition of how I would go about this process of investigation. Instead let me offer my interpretation of this process by noting the following conclusions that I consider essential to this topic and relevant to the general theme of this paper.
	For a start,  in my opinion, judgment (metaphorically) takes place between, within, or from concepts, etc. Therefore the act of judgmental appreciation cannot be a conceptual process per se. In order to appreciate the conceptual interaction higher terms of reference are necessary, i.e., the putting in place of a trans-conceptual attitude and process. If we treat the function and structure of conceptual processes as on an intentional level of noetic-noematic correlation then it follows that the process of judgment is essentially trans-intentional although the content-results and functional-responses of an act of judgment can be cognitively treated as intentional(-ly directed) after an act of judgment has taken place, i.e., when an act of judgment itself, and its attendant sense of consequential resolution if present, is cognitively treated to a process of  conceptualization or ongoing re-conceptualization.
	Under these terms of reference we realize that the raw material for an adequately informed act of judgment is conceptual. [A number of questions also spring to mind from an acceptance of this type of position. E.g., how is an act of judgment initiated? How is such a process maintained? How does such a process provoke a judgmental response, and how does this process in the midst of this process deliver an adequate response?]
	Now, the way this question is set up it would seem to imply that the trans-conceptual nature of judgment is in effect trans-intentional, i.e., transcendental. 

[H.	The Nature Of Phenomenological Interaction]

	The pattern of the three moments between suspension, reduction and re-constitution can be cross-referenced with Ego, Object and World respectively, etc:

1. Polarity

		Ego			Object		World
   (-Object/World)	  (-Ego/World)	   (-Ego/Object)

2. Approached via 

		Suspension		Reduction		Reconstitution	

3. Temporal Orientation 

		Present		Past			Future

4. Temporal Status

		Spontaneity	Retention		Protention

5. Nature		

		Pre-constitutional		     Re-constitutional
					De-constitutional

6. Harmonic Status

		Resolution	 	Dissonance		Consonance

7. Relative Association

		Conceptual		Essential		Contextual

8. General Characterization

		Provisional	Descriptive	Interpretive					

9. Specific Characterization

		Skeptical		Constructive	Deconstructive

10. Gestalt Characterization

		Midground		Foreground		Background

	[At this point, as a digression, let me itemize, and tabulate in the form of a tripartite schema, the general aspects I believe to be involved, or linked, in an archetypal process of phenomenological interaction (and which constitute dialectical facets of the Transcendental-Phenomenological-Hermeneutical circle in its generation of the simulation of significance between these ideal polarizations of Ego, Object and World).
	Taken collectively these three divisions under Ego, Object and World, when considered as dialectical-like moments in this tripartite schema, effectively forms a phenomenological circle that is also transcendental and hermeneutical in complexion.
	E.g., in section 2.	we have the dialectical progression of transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution which not only creates the phenomenon of the constitution of sense but should also be used in the phenomenological determination of the constitution of that sense; of those meaning-structures/functions.
	E.g., in section 6.	we have the harmonic nature of these moments suggesting that the moment of suspension is associated with the resolution of relational dissonance.
	E.g., in sections 8. and 9. the hermeneutical orientation of interpretation can also be seen as a deconstruction of the constructive tendencies engaged in by analytical processes in the de-constitutional determination of essential description (which is conducted in the fore-ground of the gestalt field and which generates a sense of dissonant tension with the appropriate consonant field of its background. Analytical tendencies also being retrospective and retentional in temporal nature).

	However, it is not my desire to go over this schema in any great detail but merely to suggest how the various facets introduced in the brief exposition of this phenomenological circle, as noted in this paper on the subject of freedom, in accordance with my understanding, are indeed interrelated].

I.	Intentional Indeterminacy

	It is my belief that we should interpret freedom as the phenomenon of being able to recognize and realize the potential envisaged as being present within the ambit of a particular situation or relationship in which our encounter and involvement is also possible. Freedom is certainly not the possibility of being able to perform the impossible! 
	Now this ability to recognize the possibilities envisaged as being present in a certain situation or relationship and the attempt on our part to establish, or actualize, those potentialities must be an exercise of our free-will? Or is such an exercise merely determined through physiological-psychological and environmental-reactive causes and responses automatically initiated for us, beyond our real control, on our behalf?
	Our ability to entertain in parallel both thesis and anti-thesis, as demanded by the suspension of noematic content, might seem to suggest an ability on our part to freely entertain and freely transcend the intentional constitution of such propositional/counter-propositionally balanced conceptual material. Moreover, our decision to either exercise the responsive resolution of our judgment or withhold the performance of the same would also seem to suggest to us the experiential fact that this apparent phenomenon of freedom has a prima facie manifestation (and perhaps having, at least, bone fide credentials in this regard that must establish this phenomenon as an apparent phenomenon?).
	However, what truly establishes the possibility of freedom, to my mind, is the element of intentional indeterminacy that would appear to follow on as a natural characteristic and consequence of this tripartite schema. In our unavoidable involvement with these ideal virtual poles of Ego, Object and World that together transcendentally ground the very constitutional possibility of intentional constitution we find already pre-constituted the thematization of our sense of agency; a world; intentional directedness; the expression freedom, etc. Because we are not presented with a real, realizable pole of ego, or world, or object, an element of indeterminacy is built into the constitution of all intentional directedness. In a certain measure intentional performance is the resolution of this indeterminacy, or more correctly, the ongoing resolution of this state of relative pre-intentional indetermination. Resolution is not absolutely determined neither is it absolutely non-determined. The absolutely non-determinable nature of intentional structure and function allows the mind to realize a process of interaction and resolution in the first place. The complete determination of these three polarizational tendencies would not allow them to interact, let alone contribute to a process of judgmental resolution and its deployment of sense along with a concomitant sense of freedom.
	Inherent in this indeterminacy of interaction is a place for the modern theory of chaos. From time to time the person is not going to be able to predict the manner of their intentional resolution finally arrived at. The very directedness of intentionality implies some degree of intentional determinacy. But there will be also experienced those anomalous situations completely at the mercy of normally inconsequential factors that will then decide the resolutional outcome.
	Intentional directedness once observed generally allows us to interpret the intentional structure and function of that situation. This is not to mean that we will sometimes get it wrong, even for the person experiencing that process of intentional unfolding. This element of unexpectedness establishing the existential unpredictableness of the person and generally making for a more interesting passage through this world both for ourselves and for those in interaction with us.
	The implication of this concept of intentional indeterminacy also has, I believe, some important ramifications for the world of the legal profession. In my opinion legal culpability cannot be established through an investigation of the apparent intentional directedness adopted in a certain situation. Nor is it adequate to only investigate the transcendental nature of the apparent intentional object focused upon in that act of intentionality. What, in my mind, should be under investigation should be some form of appreciation that takes into account the authenticity of the responsive process that was finally unfolded and adopted. Authenticity looking at the appropriateness of that responsive process itself given the manner of its unfolding and not subjecting it to some form of external pre-judgment (in the form of laws and regulations, prejudices, etc., through a transcendental suspension of these potential inputs). 
	How do we realize this state of authentic appreciation? How do we critically appreciate, describe and interpret the essential nature of the responsive process; correctly appreciate, describe and interpret its contextual environment and impact, etc? By none other than the means in which the response was allowed in the first place to actively engage us and that is through the adoption of a transcendental suspension!
	I have come to the conclusion that the spontaneity of judgmental authenticity is realized in the moment of the present through the auspices of an informed transcendental suspension and that our reflection upon the gestation of such intentional directedness simply involves the re-imposition of a transcendental suspension given an adequate retrieval and reconstitution of the information originally utilized in the initial situation. Although I say this process is simple, at least in its final stages, the collection or recollection of relevant material is by no means a simple task; involving processes of interpretation and description, the critical assessment of verbal and textual reports, etc. However, this process of simulation, or re-simulation, is not an impossible one in relative terms of reference as we find ourselves being called upon everyday to become involved in such processes of re-description and re-interpretation, their critical assessment, re-assessment, etc. 

J.	Authenticity Through Transcendental Suspension

	I would argue that a judgmental process is initiated and allowed to be actively and effectively responsive by virtue of the unconscious or conscious exercise of a transcendental suspension. By such means judgment is exercised in the spontaneity of the present moment (given an adequate degree of relevant information to operate with), is initiated through the resolution of dissonance, in such a manner that allows us to investigate the pre-constituted both focally and holistically. 
	That in effect judgment is the resolution of a relational situation or relationship and that one measure of authenticity is the degree of ongoing harmony instituted in this process of relational self-revelation. Other measures, or indicators, of authenticity being the balance maintained between these three moments of Ego, Object and World (and the characteristics, etc., that fall under their tripartite schematization); the successfulness of harmonization; the appropriateness of the responsive process; the degree to which an informed overall transcendental suspension is instituted in its ongoing balance of noetic activity (between these three moments), the noematic content (between thesis and counter-thesis) and all pre-conditions that assist in the imposition and maintenance of that state of phenomenal bracketing; the degree of gestalt integration exercised by that sense of person; their ability to suspend prejudices, etc. Essentially, the imposition of a transcendental suspension allows the relationship or situation, in our cognitive-conceptual translation of the same, to reveal itself and initiate its own activity in a responsible fashion.
	That to a considerable extent, in my opinion, the experience of freedom also arises from an expanding trans-personal sense of involvement in the totality of a situation or a relationship, from the point of view of the relationship or situation, in its authentic existential involvement of us in that process of relational interaction (as a process of relating with).

K.	Conclusion

	To conclude I would like to propose, at the end of this section, a set of propositions on this subject of the phenomenological nature of freedom as has been argued for in this paper either explicitly or implicitly. Although I realize that some of these statements are controversial, or may sound a little strange, I believe they give us some ground to stand upon for a more detailed phenomenological description and interpretation of this imputed complex phenomenon. Perhaps, when the dust has settled, the terrain that presents this phenomenon of freedom might allow us to cultivate these insights and let us harvest those that survive the more detailed phenomenological scrutiny necessary to clarify this important field. Such an endeavour allowing us to reflect upon the practical consequences it might have for the non-philosophical person in their development of a philosophy of authenticity. In the process facilitating the style and substance of those responses adopted as they emerge as a person in the world of others, in this world of the Other. As suggested by this paper the other in all its various individual and collective senses constitutes our freedom, a freedom guaranteed by the indeterminate and virtual, but effective and responsible, nature of intentionality as it unfolds through the harmonious resolution of those situations and relationships experienced and shared in this world of human concern. 
	It is my belief that we experience this phenomenon of freedom throughout the day, everyday, during those moments entered into through suspension and not therein directly spent in processes of calculation for self gain through the manipulation of the other by ourselves, or, our allowing ourselves to be manipulated by the other in their misperceived exercise of a non-suspended self-interest. Although the possibility and realization of freedom is constituted through the relational being of the other, in all its various senses, this does not mean that our freedom need be imposed upon like that of a slave, or that we impose ourselves upon others like the master of a slave or group of slaves, but that, alas, such a possibility is arrived at only through our allowing ourselves, more or less, to fall into such a state of inauthenticity. Such a falling away from the inner freedom of our being being arrived at through various non-existential processes that diminish our enjoyment of this state of freedom to engage in a harmonious relationship with the world of the Other; a state of affairs wherein we loose the value of freedom and the freedom to generate authentic value; that experience central to all forms of value creation. This aspect of freedom, as a potential freedom in choice, always being exercised from the point of view of the circumstances of our current embodiment.
	As a conclusion let me therefore tentatively propose the following set of provisional propositions on the phenomenal nature of freedom:

1.	That freedom is discovered through the auspices of the transcendental suspension.
2.	That freedom is constituted through all individual and collective senses of the other.
3.	That the degree of freedom equals the degree of authenticity actualized in that situation or relationship.
4.	That freedom means the ongoing resolution of the relational dissonance experienced in our situations and relationships.
5.	That freedom is realized and actively engaged through the resolution of judgment.
6.	That freedom is guaranteed through the indeterminate nature of intentionality.
7.	That freedom is established in the harmonious unfolding and actualization of value in the experienced totality of our situations and relationships.
8.	That the freedom of response is realized, in direct measure, through the spontaneous activity enacted in an informed transcendental reflection entered and exercised through transcendental suspension, hence our recognition of the responsibility of freedom.

	 Hence the value of freedom to ensure for the person, in direct proportion, the harmonious unfolding of their situations and relationships, and, the freedom of value to self-determine, through the auspices of an informed understanding of a person's situations and relationships subjected to transcendental suspensions embedded in the enactment of judgments, the most appropriate responses for that person or persons to undertake given such involvement in those situations and relationships. That in effect freedom is to be valued for the existential value generated in the midst of such freedom!
	The person actualizing their freedom through their handing it over so to speak, through transcendental suspension, to an apparent self-understanding self-determination conducted by those situations and relationships through the receptive medium of our own being to be engaged by those situations and relationships. In the course of their spontaneous existential activity the person becomes an acter/actor in the world rather than merely reacting to the manner of its current determination. A responsible participation in the world releasing more value than that originally invested in that activity, that excess of value being experienced as our freedom to participate in that situation or relationship!

Postscript

	In re-reading this text it has occurred to me that in digging up this imputed phenomenon of freedom we might well ask ourselves whether we are dealing with many different types of freedom-phenomena or just many aspects of the same phenomenon, or, for that matter, whether such a field of observation is just an illusory artifact of our general consciousness?
	These eight proposition themselves reflect, to a considerable extent, the variety of perspectives that can be placed, as demonstrated in this paper, upon this broad field of experience. It is my understanding that the various strands brought to our attention in this paper can all be linked by a thorough understanding of the transcendental nature of the phenomenon of interaction. This necessitates a transcendental theory of relations; a transcendental-hermeneutical-phenomenological investigation of the phenomenon of (our experience of) relationships. Coupled with such an understanding we find the association of judgment, phenomenological theory and the implication of intentional indeterminacy, etc.
	That, metaphorically, in plowing this paddock we must ask ourselves whether we witness the reality, or the illusion, that one worm or a number of worms have been sliced in a variety of places in our cultivation of this topic. However, it is my intuition that after we overlook various type of freedom-from (e.g., hunger, sickness, etc.) we find ourselves presented with but one species and that within that species we are presented with but one specimen; a creature that will change its colour, but not its existential import, from one perspective to some other; an agile and versatile organism whose transcendental dimension establishes a unified linkage, and commensurability, between these various forms of investigational discourse.
	That this freedom-for e.g., choice, is grounded in intentionality; that judgment determines intentional indetermination; that resolution establishes such determination; that suspension allows us to enter this field of freedom by giving us the freedom to choose the contrasts that establish the limits of that choice, and, in which, through their continuous ongoing redefinition, allows us to appreciate and overcome the mere presence of our embodiment and enter the constituted and constituting perspective of the other; that in sharing in this sense of the other we experience a sense of psychic expansion, that in re-defining our personal point of perspective we enable our making this transition, or existential-shift, from being a reacter/reactor to that of an acter/actor... hence the value of the other and therein our finding the transcendental origins, or foundations, of our being that create the freedom of value in, and through, this value of freedom!

		 				 Noël Tointon, Sydney 24/8/91.

Ed: 29.9.99.