A Short Essay Written On The Completion Of This Fifth Volume

Could We Ever Truthfully Dislike `Good Art?'

	Could we ever, truly, dislike good art; or, even dislike that part of a bad, or poor, artwork that has some degree of artfulness in its imperfect construction and expression? In resolving this question, I believe, our philosophical understanding of the phenomenological nature of an artwork would be deepened. Perhaps, and this is said in all modesty, such an understanding might well be insightful in its in depth development necessary to establish the resolution of this issue?
	In the exposition and demonstration of this proposition in its broadest formulation; that no true artfulness could ever be disliked, I am arguing, first, that this artfulness is appreciated and that such understanding in itself once in place could never be disliked. Second, that any absolute dissatisfaction on our part is a result of either our non-understanding or misunderstanding of that artwork, our disliking the genre or cognitive content of that artwork, or, our simple over exposure to either its material presentation and/or works of a similar expression in that particular genre. In effect a reaction to an appreciation that is relatively under developed or over encountered. I would add, however, that an understanding of the artfulness of an artwork does not simply imply that our appreciation is going to necessarily alter the hierarchy of preferences all people have in their interaction with works of art in general. This territory, already sedimented through our pre-exposure to works of art conducted through the social and personal lens of our own cultivated cultural perspective, is definitely the distinctive domain of the individual and to a considerable extent reflects their overall education, their powers of reflection and the existential nature of that person to be as unique individual (in this world of life or life-world. The ongoing existential constitution of the expression of that person being grounded upon the infinite possibilities and potentialities of the individual-as-a-person-in-society pre-established by that absolute dimension of the life-world. This dimension being absolute by virtue of our trans-constitutional, trans-phenomenal and trans-intentional powers of appreciation of the relatively phenomenal in contra-distinction to an absolutist perspective that is either phenomenalized and/or inherently senseless in its communicated formulation and attempted expression. Included within this realm of the phenomenal is the relatively distinctive nature of the aesthetic and its overlapping regions of genre and extra-aesthetic factors and influences).
	An important point I would like to present here is the epistemological fact, as an observation on my part, that not all instances and forms of art have the same degree of (transcendental) accessibility, and, that our instantiated appreciation of this state of affairs is itself dependent upon the overall education of the person and the status of their current state of consciousness. Some works of art just do not have a public face. That being the case we must not dismiss such artistic productions as irrelevant, artless and only worthy of our dismissal on these grounds. Of course if a poet, e.g., intends their work to have a more presentable public image and they fail in this endeavour then we might consider their work of art as having failed in this regard. However, I am sure most poets, e.g., are considerably aware of this dimension to their output and take the same into account; either accepting that their work is going to have a wider appeal or is going to be left, hopefully, to the exclusive province of a circle of connoisseurs or similar.
	What exactly is entailed in this concept of (transcendental) accessibility you might wonder? (Well, for a start you can forget the word transcendental, it has for me a specialized complex phenomenological-philosophical sense implicating that level of trans-cognitive experience that deals directly with the center of judgment, and, by implication, all processes of aesthetics appreciation, as well as being essentially trans-intentional when intentionality is observed from a purely cognitive conceptual-perceptual perspective). Accessibility itself signifies just that, namely, the accessibility of the artwork to the individual and, by extension, to society given its publication and expression in some form or other. A lost work of art of course is completely inaccessible (in direct terms of reference) given that absent state of affairs. However, on the other hand, no work of art in its re-experience can be completely inaccessible on the grounds that the sheer recognition of the intentionally constructed nature of that phenomenon itself, as an artefact of human consciousness, is already witness to the commencement of our interpretation of it as a work of intentionality, as a possible work of art, etc! Not that aesthetic reflection is to be restricted to the confines of the world of art in complete isolation from the world of the natural, indeed, our appreciation of the satisfaction to be found with the latter, as a standard, is a good guide in our estimation of the aesthetic potential of the former. (Such an estimation being objectively evaluated within the transcendentally detached auspices of the aesthetic reflection; such objectivity being established through the balance put in place through the adoption of an informed and productive transcendental suspension or epoche).
	Factors external to the experiential accessibility of an artwork are our current state of psychological development, our collective aesthetic exposure to works of art and works of that genre and/or that artist or artists under consideration, and, the particular status of our current state of consciousness; the appreciation of the aesthetic necessitating a sufficient degree of gestalt-psychic integration of the person as a necessary pre-condition for the productive reception of this aspect of the phenomenal. Transcendental accessibility concerning itself primarily with internal factors; those considerations that constitute the intentional nature of that work of art and the psychological nature of its reconstitution and overall reception. 
	Essentially, the aesthetic power of the work of art is generally centered on some distinct level within the hierarchically structured psyche, as a rule of thumb, works of art becoming less accessible the higher their centering within this psychological organization actively involved in the constitution and reconstitution of that work of art. Although all works of art are appreciated on the (transcendental) level (of psychological organization) that conducts processes of judgment the experience and resolution of dissonance in the construction of that work of art is oriented else where in this organizational hierarchy. In direct proportion to the psychic distance between this material, or phenomenal, center of the work of art and its (transcendental) aesthetic appreciation the greater the degree of probability that is to be found under normal circumstances for the public to find aesthetic access to that work of art in its encounter by the public. E.g., a rhythmic work of art is generally more accessible than a work of art that depends for its aesthetic power on some refined and subtle level of conceptual exposition, e.g., as is to be found often in the poetic and musical content in the lieder of Hugo Wolf? Hence, e.g., the greater overall accessibility of music over poetry, and, rhythmic/formal forms of poetry over non-formal forms of poetry; the greater accessibility of representational forms of visual art over abstract forms of production, etc.
	An anecdote, and its phenomenological interpretation, might bring this observation, more clearly to the fore.
	One of my philosophical teachers interested in `commenting' on my position that `an appreciation of works of art need a prior exposure to the genre of that art form, and that some art forms are thereby less accessible to certain less equipped sections of the public' produced the following photo contained within a book retrieved, after long search, on the shelves of his considerable personal library. The book was an account of some apparently rather eccentric missionaries who had travelled up the Amazon with of all things an enormous old fashion, hand powered, gramophone player. Seated beside this instrument listening to a record was a native in full dress regalia in an obvious state of rapture; his eyes shut, his mouth open and his head slightly tilted back. The caption read something along the following lines to the effect that "the native was listening to Mozart's Symphony Number 39 in g minor."
	Well, it was obvious I had to go back to the drawing board in order to rework this particular, rather elitist, position of mine. It dawned on me that specific exposure to an art form, or genre, was not of itself a deciding factor in this access of appreciation. Rather, in my reinterpretation of this phenomenon, it was the aesthetic center of the artwork where its power is to forge and fashion an aesthetic response (through the transcendental resolution of the dissonance expressed on that level of psychological encoding) that primarily decided such an issue? In this light it struck me that the great rhythmic subtlety of that symphony was a door for that native Amazonian to appreciate that work, his own culture no doubt having developed an appreciation for such a level of subtlety. So the conclusion I drew was that this psychological center of the artwork established its general accessibility and that the (transcendental) aesthetic power of that artwork in some additional measure assisted this accessibility in direct proportion to the intensity and successfulness of that aesthetic resolution. By these means I had hoped I could still have both my cake and eat it? 
	A few years later, I might note in passing, a potted version of the first movement of this same symphony was prepared for the world of popular music and was to prove equally successful as a hit in the estimation of the public.
	In returning to the thesis of this essay I can now add the observation that not all forms of art are generally, and automatically, accessible to the public. Indeed, such accessibility is also a measure of openness on our part to a particular instance, or type, of art as a work, or type, of art in its own right. However, the-to-be-expected-approachability of some forms of art for a particular person is not real grounds for establishing that they truly dislike that particular work of art or that form, or genre. A statement to the effect that a particular work of art is disliked, I would argue, is not a statement that directly reflects upon the quality, or artfulness, of that artwork per se. Let me conclude this essay by attempting to demonstrate this point quite counter to the ostensive surface meaning of such a pronouncement.
	First, I must attend to my understanding of the nature of the aesthetic response. Using a musical model that envisages that a musical work, or a non-musical work of art, is structured through its ongoing resolution of dissonance I would like to argue (and have argued this point elsewhere) that the intensity and satisfaction of this aesthetic response is a direct reflection of this process of resolution. The immediate gestalt totality or initial flavour of the artwork presents itself through its experiential simulation and general repetition of component factors as a relative background of consonance within the boundaries of that work of art. On the other hand any introduced material that appears to be in contest, conflict, opposition, etc., to this already established background of consonance naturally presents itself as an area under conscious focus which in turn is experienced as a relatively dissonant foreground. 
	Second, the constituted interrelationship of the parts in that artwork to its totality, and, the same parallel structure (phenomenologically and hermeneutically) encoded in its aesthetically reflected upon re-constitution establishes (the relationally-oriented psychic experience of) the aesthetic being of that artwork and that both this relational experience and the experience of its aesthetic potential is intersubjectively re-experienced through the reconstruction of the distinctive resolutional pathways (structurally and functionally) provoked by that work of art.
	Third, all forms of resolution are experienced as pleasurable; a refined form of pleasure or satisfaction (experienced from a transcendental point of view). Hence the central argument of my thesis: that no work of art(fulness) could truly be experienced in the form of a process of aversion. To re-work this idea let me offer my interpretation of a person who might consider themselves to be averse to all, or some, forms of art.
	The ascetic, e.g., may be averse to their experiencing all, or some, works of art on the grounds that they interpret such an interaction as a diversion, not worthy of our time, as adverse to the spiritual well being of the individual for some reason or other... Yet, even here, I would argue, in the midst of this process of aversion their experience of a work of art as a work of art would be primarily experienced in a non-adverse form even if that non-adverse experience was then retreated to a process of aversion. That aversion would then be to their retrospective experience of aesthetic satisfaction and not the spontaneous experience of aesthetic satisfaction per se. If that process of aversion to their perception of the `deceptive' nature of art was thoroughly enforced then we would argue, quite naturally, that that work of art so interpreted or `avoided' was not experienced as a work of art at all. Consequently, their appreciation of that work of art would not directly be of that work of art hence their interpretation of that work of art is not a direct interpretation per se and thus this fact dis-entitles them to pass any comments, one way or the other, about the aesthetic nature of that avoided work of art, or their global or selective avoidance of works of art in general.
	Resolution is experienced as a form of relief; as a specific type of pleasure or satisfaction. By definition such an experience entertained in its own right, and not overridden by relatively external factors, could not be entertained in a contrary fashion! Hence the essential point of this thesis has just been demonstrated. 
	However, to conclude, and more difficult to explain is, the observation that the significance of the statement of the form that a certain person, or collection of persons, x dislikes a certain work, or genre, of art appears to mean just that must itself be explained in order to avoid our entertaining a contradictory set of ideas. 
	As indicated earlier our appreciation of an artwork involves the necessary putting in place of those factors, both internal and external, that establish our appreciation of an artwork. External factors concern our prior exposure to aesthetic experience in general (as entailed in the general psychological development of the individual), their general exposure to that genre involved and the status of our general consciousness; aesthetic reflection normally  necessitating a deeper state of concentration and attentiveness on our part as hinted by the temporal-spatial presence of art galleries, picture frames, pedestals, the up-raised baton of the conductor, etc. Internal factors involve the (transcendental) accessibility and the (transcendental) successfulness of that work of art (in its intersubjective ongoing provocative creation of dissonance and distinctive resolution of that dissonance). Thus I am forced to conclude a person's statement to the effect that they dislike a certain artwork or genre of art as it stands is essentially senseless involving either their over-exposure to that work of art, or, their mis-understanding or non-understanding of that work of art, and/or, their outright avoidance of that aesthetic dimension considered on its own terms of reference! That, truly, the artful aspect of any work of art could never directly be experienced in an adverse form. Of course this does not imply that all works of art are good or equally worthy of our attention, or, for that matter, that the preferences exhibited by some person, one way or the other, are not valid for that particular individual. But we should not transfer the current attitudinal configuration of our prejudices (as pre-judgments) directly to any work of art, or genre of art, as a comment on that work, or genre, of art per se. This concept of accessibility itself recognizes that not all forms of art are equally going to be, or remain, the attractive focus of our preferential treatment. On the other hand our excessive exposure to a work of art also does not entitle us to say that we now dislike a certain work or genre of art. Such a developed process of aversion is, correctly, our over-reaction to our over-hearing of that particular work or genre, which through familiarity now breeds our lack of a fresh attentiveness towards it, or, even, an outright rejection of its phenomenal re-expression. 
	Lastly, let me add, in the form of a qualification, that our current configuration of prejudices, as a form of pre-judgment, is the very ground upon which we come to appreciate and approach a certain work, or genre, of art, indeed, the only avenue open to us in this endeavour. However, our objectivity is re-established through the detached nature of that act of judgment (that is allowed to existentially develop its own receptiveness to the inherent potential for the resolution of dissonance entailed within the central transcendental boundaries of that act of aesthetic appreciation). However, once this process of judgment has passed the act of judgment is quite naturally converted into a judgment fossilized for the record. The reconstitution of the act of judgment allows us to de-freeze that delivered judgment hence the continual potential for a work of art to provocatively re-establish its aesthetic actuality through a re-experiencing of the resolutional pathways indicated by that work of art. For a person to meaningfully say that they dislike a certain piece, or genre, of art is merely to take a dislike to their prejudice towards that aesthetic object or state. That one person alone should find aesthetic pleasure from their aesthetic reception of a tentatively treated artwork is grounds enough for us to not hold the conviction that they might, instead, dislike that same object of appreciation. In this lies a good lesson that we should forever remain open to the world in all its existential richness despite the apparent objectify, or otherwise, of our appreciation and the inherent satisfaction that might, or might not, be obtained in our reflective experience of that object or state of our appreciation! 
	That, in essence, the artfulness of a work of art could never be experienced adversely however inherently unsatisfactory that work of art has been constructed and/or expressed, and, that our prejudices can only have an indirect say in our understanding, mis-understanding or our not wishing to understand, a particular work, or genre, of art!

Footnote

	Needless to say various further qualifications and comments would have to be added to ensure a more complete understanding of this topic. E.g., how could we discern an aesthetic dimension in the apparently uni-modal material presentation of an artwork? Moreover, to what extent can we draw some form of demarcation between (phenomenological) description and (hermeneutical) interpretation or prescription? What role can we discern for deconstruction in the midst of the aesthetic experience and its interpretation? Hopefully, such questions, and others, will be taken up in a series of essays that will form a volume on the subject of a phenomenology of the hermeneutical value of interpretation.

						Noël Tointon, Sydney, 1991.