Day 13: Provocational Metaphor - Metaphorical Provocation

	Although intentionality is defined as that intellectual process directed towards an intentional object provocational structures re-direct the relative dissonance of such focus back towards the consonant nature of the evocational field that gave us such access to the differential demarcation of that intentional product. Because one important phenomenal aspect of metaphor is provocational it will be argued that provocation itself has metaphorical implications (as a prelude to understanding the metaphorical implications of the critical exercise of a transcendental-hermeneutical perspective). 

	There is a surface difference in meaning between the terms of dissonance and provocation, namely, as virtual forces operating in one or two directions or dimensions respectively. Dissonance can be defined through a web of connections as a force operating in one direction, as projective, disruptive, different, conflict creating, competitive, dis-ease, dis-integration, etc. On the other hand the expression provocation, as previously defined, has a forcefulness that operates in two directions, namely, projectively like the naive appreciation of dissonance as just noted, but also, simultaneously, in an opposing direction wherein a process of accommodation in some form or other is undertaken in order to resolve that sense of disruption caused by that embedded sense of dissonance. Provocation bearing not only its `seeds of difference' but also, as implicit `seeds of resolution' within itself, a pre-informed informational content that appears to suggest the most probable pathways for the resolution of that embedded sense of disruption. That the text, via this transformational mechanism, can then inform us to what is the meta-textual nature of that deposition, and, if apparently present, any informational content to be discharged therein. This content being in effect the productive `difference' left over after the projective, intentionally focused nature of dissonance is erased, or resolved, in its return to the accommodation of that field of consonance. Although it may appear that the status quo has been reinstated the background field is progressively enriched at a greater rate than that intentional object-state under focus in that field. Moreover, there will come a point in time, from time to time, wherein micro-additional changes in field thematization are going to promote conservative or radical intentionally focused thematizational clarifications or displacements in the ongoing appreciation of that under examination. I.e., micro-additional inputs are going to critically induce moments of insight along the lines of conservative, essential clarifications, or, radical, trans-essential shifts in meaning that will displace our focus into novel fields of discernment with a certain degree of commensuration interconnecting that transformational shift in appreciation. In the former we have a clarification of metaphorical- evocational focus. In the latter we have a provocative- displacement which through a process of transformational resolution takes us into relativity new territory. Both aspects are exercised co-jointly in our entertainment of metaphor although our current orientation might be more with one aspect than the other, i.e., e.g., focusing on evocational clarification rather than provocational displacement.
	Also to be noted in this gestalt modeling of provocative dissonance is the fact that dissonance can never exceed, equal or approximate the psychic mass of that background field (without creating a reversal in the relativity between these polar aspects of dissonance and consonance).
	Metaphor are to be seen as provocative, and, the process of provocation is to be seen as metaphorical in complexion. Let me elaborate.
	The nature of metaphor, in its application, is to stress that a certain specified or unspecified logical subject, an intentional object-state, bears a certain specified resemblance, or an unspecified and implicit relationship, to a certain type of logical subject. This comparison is controlled by the exercise of a covert meta-text whose appreciation allows the reader of that text to understand the overt metaphorical manipulation of the phenomenon indicated in the comparison. In essence the metaphor states on one hand that x is like y and at the same time is also not like y. I.e:

	x (=) y + -y [where (=) means metaphorically `is like']

	We might like to expand this along the following lines:

	Where `is like' = both `is like y' and `not like y', 
	such that y =  a series of discriminated phenomenal 			facets of y, namely, a, b, c, d, etc., (discounting all 	phenomenal facets where x has absolutely no perceived 			similarity).

	In a balance of this equation between likeness to a certain phenomenon and its simultaneous not-likeness a state of transcendental suspension can be experienced wherein there is an equilibrium between these provocative directions of dissonance and potential accommodation (back into that field through the collective, consonant re-formation of that background). Moreover, this re-producing of a state of differentiation is undone by this counter force of accommodation hence the provocative nature of metaphor. Conversely, as provocation has this same type of double structure, and can be analyzed exactly along the same lines as adopted in our dealings with metaphor, i.e., through our three transcendental moments of suspension, the projection of dissonance in reduction and the accommodational resolution of reconstitution in the critical context of a transcendental philosophy, it follows that for all practical purposes metaphor and provocation can be treated, in broad terms of reference, as identical. Hence the provocational nature of metaphor and the metaphorical nature of provocation. Thus in our reading of a text we can generally treat metaphorical structural-functions as provocative and provocational structural-functions as metaphorical construction. With this method we can now more closely mark off those parts of the text, through the use of this double definition, as relatively more metaphorical and provocative. These projective features of the text, through the foregrounding of dissonance, highlighting those metaphorical-provocational aspects allowing us to re-define style and re-confirm overall genre classification. Then, in a practical coming to terms with a specific text, or a series of related texts, we find ourselves in a better position to appreciate both the stylistic nature of that text and its associated meta-textual conventions (both general and specific in orientation). This sense of an internal dialogue between the meta-textual adoption, and adaptation, of genre and the textual style reappearing at the level of the text itself between the con-text and its evocatively distinctive in-textual fragments forming the detail of that text in the unraveling of its formation.
	E.g., in a fragment of written text that explicitly states that "the hero is like a lion," or there is an implicit suggestion to the same effect, we can mark off that part of the text as possibly assisting us in a determination of the style of the author or authors, as indicating to some degree or other the meta-textual conventions at work and indirectly the genre or genres most closely associated with that text. Then, this same reference can also be used to note a point of internal dialogue within that text and to pin-point one type of feature which, in a likely interconnected series (of provocational/metaphorical points)  in some form of linkage in accordance with the interpretive scheme, or schemes suggested and/or adopted, allows the hermeneuticist to investigate the most probable intentions of that author. Moreover, we can note that it is at such points as these in the text that the author is conveying information and in our noting the relationship between these points of author-reader interface that we are able to reconstruct, if that is possible, a simulated simulation of that text, i.e., a reconstructed re-simulation of its apparently intended intentional import. This task of re-construction being assisted by the text itself, in a measure that reflects the stylistic strength of that text and the depth of our transcendental inspection, when attended to in the light of a critically conducted transcendental reading. A reading that allows the perception of an internal dialogue to harmonize and coincide with an external dialogue put into virtual play between the author and the reader (as poles of egological focus in the non-textual world of lived experienced).
	Therein we hear the voice (or voices) of the author (or authors), a hearing that is heard when we cease to hear the text merely as it appears to be written, allowing our imaginations to be provocatively spoken to; taken metaphorically around that text, centered and allowed to enter its virtual re-simulation in accordance with the degree of appropriation currently in play. A hearing that hears the inaudible by virtue of the fact that the text is heard when we cease to attend to its surface chatter, letting the provocative structures give the text a textured relief through the resolution of the dissonant complexities embedded within those functions. This sense of resolution empowering both the text and the reader to interpret that text. This empowerment establishing the virtual relationships between the author and their text, the reader and `their' text,  and the resulting relationship(s)  between the author and `their' reader.
	Three qualifications need to be noted. First, we must not assume that intentionality could ever be absolutely univocal or monothematic in its textual expression. On a provisional level we can assume for practical purposes that our text might be monothematic in nature and univocal in its statements. Taken, however, beyond the limits of this provisional circumspection our text can only deconstruct through the bi-directional (multi-aspectival) nature of provocative-metaphorical intentionality. Second, the implication of our first point forces us to recognize the phenomenological fact that on theoretical grounds intentionality can never be absolutely definitive only provisionally adequate to the type of situation to hand. Third, that in a provisionally treated monothematic text there are no overt metaphors and that all provocative informational manipulation is conducted covertly between the meta-text and the text and not overtly within that text. E.g., in the communication of a telephone number all numbers differentiated in that field of digits are manipulated covertly. If the number was 666-6666 then we could say that this number is a meta-textual field of seven identical numbers that individually are neither 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 or 9. In an example like this the meta-text covertly sets a precise agenda that can be precisely re-set by virtue of this implicit standard of precision analytically set and expected. Such analytical precision cannot be so easily set in texts populated with overt metaphorical structures, i.e., in a non-monothematical text. That as a general rule the more polythematic a text the less precise is its intentional import, and, the less precise our interpretation should become. However for all that a well-formed polythematic text, e.g., a poem, can still possess a poly-dimensional center and sense of psychic location in our schematized world of total intentional discourse and its re-simulated re-experience.
	Having drawn a parallel between `provocation' and `metaphor' we can note the relationship these two facets, of the same intentionally constructed process, have in relation to the nature of our transcendental appreciation (when appropriately conducted in a critical mode).

Day 14: The Transcendental Treatment of Metaphor

	In a previous paper I discussed a number of mechanisms that generally allowed us to model the structural-functions of metaphor. A simplified version of this could be subsumed under a transcendental reading of the interrelationship between these points of reference. What exactly, then, is a transcendental reading and, more specifically, what is a critically conducted transcendental reading?

	For a start a `critically conducted transcendental reading' is, in accordance with my understanding, synonymous with a `transcendental reading' although, unfortunately, what passes under the rubric of a transcendental reading may not be critically exercised. Hence the necessity for the introduction of some clarity into this exposition (in an attempt also to define the controversial nature of such terminology). 
	To begin with a transcendental reading is approached, and entered, via the imposition of an ongoing transcendental suspension placed upon our otherwise, to begin with, normal, conventional reading of that text. In this task the anti-text and possible counter-texts are formulated, thematized and read simultaneously with this initial surface reading. Put in this light our sense of the transcendental indicates a trans-constitutional, trans-intentional and trans-cognitive (and trans-verbal) reading of those conceptual structures/conceptual functions. 
	In accordance with my understanding in such an attitude of suspension judgment is allowed to spontaneously arise of its own volition. Moreover, a transcendentally suspended reading is going to necessitate a suspension of all value structures embedded in that text. A critical reading will also necessitate a balance repetitively put in place between the meta-text and the text, the apparent author of that text and their reader, and our receptivity to a scheme where all forms of prominent psychological characterization are similarly put into a state of balanced play. Rather than paralyzing our reading of the text when we bring various perspectives to the text, and their counter-parts, the text begins to work for us opening us up to the apparent intentionality of the author (and ourselves as `hermeneuticists'). In such a state the calculative processes of cognitive consciousness are neutralized allowing a process of judgment to spontaneously `voice' itself. The sense of the simulation manifesting itself as a re-reading of the text provoked by that text. Provocation most effectively realizing resolution and the relational commitment between the author, text and reader and/or interpreter by virtue of this process of allowing the text to induce its own provocational communication of information. This induction, in a direct measure to the greatest degree of transcendental process collectively engineered by all these parties, giving a sense of spontaneous presence to this resimulation.
	Transcendental reduction concerns itself with the evocative sense of the simulation, a simulation entered ultimately by the non-verbal aspect of consciousness. Covert background metaphors operating on a mix of manipulated non-metaphorical meta-textually determined units of meaning with or without the presence of overt textual metaphors. The sense of the re-simulation being psychically located in our psychic map of the universe of unrestricted discourse. Evocation taking place on a number of levels in the psychic hierarchy of conscious experience. For a start the basic modality or modalities of experience are indicated (perhaps meta-textually). Then various levels of social and individual perspectives are adopted, with varying degrees of clarity, in order to intentionally frame the thought processes under investigation. The whole process of evocation being metaphorically much like the operation of a light house directing its light in a certain direction, with a certain coloured perspective, from a certain geographical position along with all the defining limitations imposed by these forms of restriction.
	Transcendental reconstitution concerns itself with the provocative sense of the metaphorical exposition, preparing the ground for the simulation of that analogued provocatively. The analogued format simulating the simulation, the re-simulation being simulated through the differential cracks in the significant manifold set up to intentionally deal with the cognitive treatment, writing and reading of that undergoing thematizational unfolding. Provocational resolution driving us around, and through, the thematization of that under re-simulation allowing us to focus indirectly on that to be focused upon.
	These three moments completing, in both directions and simultaneously, a transcendental-hermeneutical-phenomenological circle as previously noted.  A critical reading taking place in accordance with the degree our transcendental reflections enter into, and are maintained within, a centrally placed pre-informed transcendental suspension; a state of affairs characterized by certain existential hallmarks stamped, both experientially and productively, on this judgmental level of psychological organization.

Day 15: Metaphorical Treatment Of The Transcendental

	Metaphor has just been examined phenomenologically using a number of metaphors that model various aspects of the transcendental.  In the opposite direction to this transcendental treatment of metaphor we will now investigate the metaphorical treatment of the transcendental.

	In previous philosophical research, in various phenomenological investigations, I have attempted to examine (using various metaphorical models) the essential nature of, what I believe to be are, a number of interrelated psychological fields, e.g., the process of judgment from the point of view of the judgmental process itself, the experiential nature of the resolution of dissonance, the appreciation of harmony in general terms of reference, the existential appreciation of the relationship from the point of view of the relationship itself, the evaluation of value in trans-cognitive terms of reference, etc., etc. Overall, for sometime, I have been of the opinion that an equation could be formulated between these various facets of transcendental consciousness. Rather than limiting the sense of the expression transcendental to the necessary configuration for the possibility of a particularly distinctive type and/or instance of an intentionally structured-function entertained in conscious experience I have widened this term to include all forms of trans-cognitive, trans-constitutional and trans-intentional experience. Phenomenologically this experiential definition of the transcendental applies to the process nature of judgment, the experience of the relational, value, etc. That in essence these various facets are correctly aspects of the same overarching transcendental field, albeit, treated from a number of different cognitive perspectives. This permitted me to say that from the transcendental trans-constitutional point of view the sense of the transcendental = the essential nature of relational experience = the spontaneity of existential experience = the transcendental self-exercise of critical appreciation = the trans-intentional treatment of cognitive dissonance = the trans-constitutional resultant of cognitive productivity = the trans-cognitive, etc. To this grand equation we might also like to add the provocative nature of metaphorical structural-functions (essential to the very conveyance of a simulation of an act of communication). In essence the reference of these various senses from the transcendental point of view being the same, namely, various descriptions in cognitively formulated, metaphorical terms of reference of the transcendental, albeit, from a number of different perspectives or orientations, e.g., judgment, the relational, the process of harmonization, creation and evaluation of value, communication of information, etc. This equivalence accepted it then follows that we are allowed to investigate, and cognitively define, the nature of the transcendental in greater (metaphorical) depth. In this regard the transcendental as the grounds of possibility for a certain type of experience is widened to include the defining characteristics of transcendental consciousness from a number of intersecting perspectives that concern various central aspects of judgment, relationally oriented experience, the sense of the existential (provisionally defined as the extent to which the totality of a relationship is spontaneously allowed to make itself felt above and beyond the experience of its parts), harmony, provocation, value creation, informational communication, etc. 
	This grand equivalence also allows us to mark a text in such a way that lets us note, and utilize, those features as indicators that point to the intentional structural-functional construction of that text. This must be conducted, however, with the important qualification already alluded to that as meaning is relationally driven and entertained intentionally it must never be viewed as completely determined. All illusion of absolute determination, transparency, closure, etc., being either pre-constructed provocationally along analytical-like lines of determination, or, post-constructed, i.e., retro-re-constructed, provocationally driven, synthetically thematized interpretations also `recognized' along analytical-like lines of evidential determination. Either way analytically-oriented or synthetically-oriented informational states can only be provisionally entertained, and reconstructed by new terms of reference either directly, experientially driven or non-directly, non-experientially driven, in such a manner that the derivation of relational contrast is never lost. This dialectical generation of meaning through relational contrast always implies a certain degree of thematizational indeterminacy. Even the analytical pre-construction of identificational equivalence must be entertained under the same conditions, i.e., neither determined absolutely nor absolutely indetermined. The illusion of identity taken beyond these grounds of its dialectical generation resulting in a type of transcendental illusion unless re-treated under provisional terms of reference. In bi-modal terms of reference we might say that the polarities of the noetic-noematic can never be determined apart from each other. Then again, in a similar manner, the same applies to the use of signs in the non-absolutely determined roles of signifier and signified. Similarly in tri-modal terms of reference the polarities of Object, Ego and World (along with a sense of intersubjective Community) can be neither absolutely thematized nor absolutely non-thematized. Similarly, in the hermeneutic frame of reference a text can never be absolutely appropriated nor absolutely non-appropriated. That in essence no text can be absolutely commensurate nor absolutely incommensurate. That any text, textual or non-textual in nature, can always be translated from one frame of reference to some other but that the attempt, more often than not, may not be worth the effort pragmatically speaking.
	In intentional terms of reference the transcendental is defined as trans-intentional, as the relationship or correlation between the noetic and the noematic, or, as the relationship or correlation between the `polarities' of Object, Ego, and World (and Community). 
	When the transcendental is seen in this light as trans-intentional, etc., it allows us to realize that the structural-functioning of covert/overt metaphors in a text actually gives us a window onto the very functioning of the transcendental dimension (which, in each particular case, is centered in a process of judgment; not in the judgment that is delivered but in the act of judgment during the process of its delivery. Judgment once delivered is treated cognitively, encapsulated conceptually, no longer directly experienced, etc. Existential judgment being sought in the act of delivery and not in its post-judgmental cognitive treatment and its consequent non-existential distortion). Hence it follows, these sketchy and difficult arguments accepted, that a transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical treatment of metaphor, either in general terms of reference or on a situational basis, must give us some form of transcendental insight into the process of judgment under investigation. Conversely, a critical metaphorical treatment of the text or texts under examination is going to give us a transcendental appreciation of that text or set of texts. The transcendental complexion of this state of appreciation being reinforced by the spontaneity of an existential appreciation generated from a pro-relational orientation adopted in our reflections, transcendental access being opened up to us through the (re-)imposition of a transcendental suspension centrally placed and adequately pre-informed (i.e., arrived at through an ongoing, repetitive, counter-balanced thematization of the essential features of that under investigation). 
	Transcendental insight being provocatively driven and deposited metaphorically. Hence a retrospective transcendental appreciation can be re-generated by a critical reconstruction of the metaphorical processes that appear to have been at work in that process of judgment! Hence a transcendental reading of a text is possible in the performance of a critical-metaphorical reading (that attends to the covert and overt manipulation of metaphor conducted under the auspices of a transcendental suspension?).

Day 16: The Nature Of Philosophical Appreciation

	Philosophical appreciation necessitates a text or set of texts whether inscribed or not inscribed on the material fabric of the world. Therein there is a `critical' manipulation of metaphor forming an en-text, i.e., the treated textual encapsulation of the text under `philosophical' appreciation. The sense of the critical taking two forms, namely, that of a transcendental complexion (in an auto-critical, cognitive format) or that of a non-transcendental complexion (in a pre-critically determined cognitive format).

	In a previous paper `philosophy' was defined as the critical manipulation of metaphor. Now I would define two senses of the expression critical, i.e., transcendentally conducted and non-transcendentally conducted. The latter sense is the manner most forms of philosophical appreciation are conducted under. A certain cannon of implicit and explicit logical rules, regulations, standards, precedents, analogies, etc., are erected as the role models for the metaphorical manipulation of our arguments. In the former sense of the critical, namely, the transcendentally conducted, we adopt the former in so far as they conform to our transcendental criteria and re-organize them and instigate them under the umbrella of a transcendental  suspension (although a number of philosophies that claim to be `transcendental' may not exercise this necessary first step  in the transcendental transformation of their reflections and arguments). The role of the transcendental suspension is complex and in my opinion is implicated in each aspect of our equivalence, e.g., between judgment, relational experience, resolution, harmonization, existential experience, creation and evaluation of value, metaphorical experience, critical-phenomenological treatment, etc. 
	For a start the imposition of the suspension brings the constitutional structural-functions of that under investigation back to the primary field that allows the differentiation of that phenomenon in the first place, and, all subsequent discrimination of an essential-eidetic characterization of that type of intentional logical-subject. Secondly, a transcendental suspension allows the phenomenon to be treated as a phenomenon by a neutralization of all the fields of value that would normally, and naturally, characterize it. Such objectivity, as a form of disinterested-interest, allows us to discern the constitutional configuration and formation of that phenomenon through acts of reduction and reconstitution and thereby psychically locate that presentation in a schematized map of consciousness. In the process we locate intentional object-states, and find ourselves located, in a world of intentional experience, in the total world of unrestricted discourse. Such an appreciation also allows us to realize that meaning is generated relationally and therefore can never be absolutely definitive nor absolutely non-definitive except provisionally. Further more, it is my belief, that this state of suspension actually mirrors the process of judgment itself in so far as judgment being trans-conceptual must first suspend all concepts in order for the process of judgment to proceed. That in essence judgment is not a calculative process and can only proceed through a suspension of concepts in order to appreciate the trans-conceptual nature of the relationship between, within, or from those concepts under judgment. Hence the equation between the transcendental, judgmental, relational, provocational, etc.
	The appreciation of the structural-functional construction of a text can therefore be critically read in two different, but interrelated, senses. However, without the transcendental reading as a necessary corrective natural readings taken beyond the limits of their deployment must break down and ultimately produce only a degree of non-sense, self-contradiction, etc. A transcendental reading, as a careful metaphorical exposition, also allows the writer/reader to deconstruct particular contexts in order to complement (and through the deconstruction of counter contextual perspectives supplement) pre-critical readings of that text. Hence a transcendental appreciation of metaphor and a metaphorical appreciation of the transcendental allows the writer/reader to come to terms with that text in such a way as to re-write it critically within the transcendental limits set for the judgmental process of reading, a reading that can be fine tuned to take into account the most probable value construction intentionally placed upon that text by that text, e.g., i.e., a `composition' that is thematical, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, factual and trans-thematical or hermeneutical in interest, and, whether these forms of bias are transcendentally conducted or not transcendentally conducted. Then, depending on the polar autonomy imposed upon that text, we can note whether that text is scientifically-oriented (Object), culturally-oriented (Ego) and/or hermeneutically-oriented (World) in aspiration. Lastly, we can note, if relevant, whether the resultant that issues forth from a collective transcendence of these forms of polar autonomy either has or has not a religious-like dimension directly or indirectly implied within the overall character of that text. That the careful metaphorical treatment of a text can also deliver an appreciation of the value structures apparently inherent within that text.
	Any form of treatment initially results in a relational product, a resultant whose meta-status is elevated by one degree (relative to the meta-level of that section of the text undergoing treatment). Cognitive-conceptual treatment, of some particular form or other, then re-treats the treated product back onto the original meta-level originally exhibited by the pre-treated product. This process expresses, via this transformation of treatment-retreatment, a novel sense for that text which can be re-discovered by re-tracing the transformational pathways indicated by the text-metatext in this regard. In a critical reading of that text we must discern a difference between these pre-treated products, treated products, and re-treated products along with the nature of those treatment and retreatment transformational pathways that appear to be adopted by that text. The critical importance of this textual treatment is to realize that all products and pathways should not be confused, and, that a product might have the same meta-status it does not mean that that final re-treatment product is going to be either the same as the pre-treated product or identical to a product re-produced under some other form of transformational process involving different pathways. Products may appear to have the same meta-status and/or the same type of constitution if the resultant of a transformational process is involved in a different process-formation then identities may not functionally coincide or be relatively commensurate in perspective.
	The examination/re-examination of a text (or series of texts) results in an en-text, i.e., a conceptually encapsulated text whose final treatment realizes a text with the same meta-status as existed in its pre-treated state. Hence the habit for philosophers and/or critics to enter into the text, or set of texts, concerning the object of their research without adequately differentiating products, levels and pathways within a text, and, products, levels and pathways presented in their comments and the comments made by other people, their comments on these and other comments, etc., etc.
	All forms of appreciation are exercised under terms of reference higher in meta-status by one or more degrees. Transformational treatment then normally continues re-producing the text on a level on par with the meta-status of that explicit or implicit text or texts under examination. These manoeuvres are encapsulated in the text, hence the `en-textual' status of the philosophical text. Even if no initial text is directly referred to by virtue of the critical transformation put in place the ghost or semblance of a pre-treated text could be reconstructed. As argued elsewhere the critical character, and performance, of this philosophical process of critique can be either carried out in a critical, existentially non-distorted transcendental perspective, or, in a non-existentially distorted non-transcendental perspective. Hence the relatively greater en-textual status of a philosophic text along with the greater need for a more critically careful reading of that text. Moreover, by an examination of the nature of the judgments recorded in a text we can determine both the adequacy of its formation and information along with its existential status, i.e., as a text that is transcendentally delivered or non-transcendentally distorted (by reference to the presence or absence of a transcendental suspension, existential hallmarks, a critical openness to its sense of limitations, the valid manipulation of productive procedures, etc.).

Day 17: The Critical Nature Of Transcendental Appreciation

	It will be argued that transcendental appreciation, for a number of reasons, has a critical philosophical status that is normally adequate in the productive performance of our textual considerations on either a theoretical and/or practical level of commission.

	Transcendental appreciation is none other than that type of judgment that is exercised from the perspective of the judgmental process itself without the distortion of prejudices. Through a transcendental suspension of prejudices, as pre-judgments, the distorting properties of habitual perspectives, imposed upon our genres and their individualized application of styles, is counter-balanced allowing the text to relatively speak to us from the sense of psychic location exercised from the collective resultant of those positioned perspectives entertained and neutralized in and through those prejudices and their counter-textual balance.
	One task for the hermeneuticist is to determine the essential prejudicial flavour of the text under investigation. This can be determined from an appreciation of that text in its con-textual setting, and, the con-textual totality in its meta-textual setting. Such a complex determination seeking an evaluation of the prominent value-structural-functions operating in that textual/meta-textual environment. This necessary textual combination of the text and its meta-text setting up a virtual dialogue in which is exposed the main pre-judgmental concerns of that text. A determination of pre-judgmental determinants in perspective, overall attitude and individualized idiosyncrasies allowing us, in the form of a general pre-judicial code, to unlock the maximum import in this area of concern. 
	The determination of prejudicial value-structures/ functions allows the critical reader, through the art and science of the transcendental suspension properly constructed and exercised, to define the overall flavour and the individual perspectives adopted in that text or set of texts under investigation. Therein, to balance this knowledge with what actively opposes those perspectives, etc., allows us to establish this actively entertained sense of neutrality, in effect a relative suspension of the presuppositional ground that constituted that intentional object or text under the focus of our examination. This particular focus of our (critical) examination itself also being suspended in the midst of this intuitional process of transcendental appreciation. Consequently the text is allowed to re-evaluate itself through the auspices of its integrity with a re-creation of values intended and unintended for transmission by that text.
	In coming to an appreciation of the integrity of an intentional object-state, a series of events, a text or set of texts, etc., we can experience through the re-creation of that re-simulation the extent that that state allows itself to re-invest its relational excess in the body of that relationship. (This relational excess being defined by myself as its facticity; the extent that that relationship is a fact in the world above and beyond its materialized embodiment, its embodiment being that aspect of the situation that can be intentionally focused upon). En-textual appreciation being able to discern this re-invested integrity presented by the re-simulation of the total situation under the intentional focus of our differential demarcation. 
	An intentional translation of the provocational-like structural-functions of that text, or intentional object-state, subject to the de-distortion of transcendental suspension, allowing the situation in the transcendentally situated judgment to existentially declare its own distinctive expression of its integrity (or facticity). Hence, in part, the critical nature of transcendental appreciation. 
	Transcendental appreciation being critically exercised by virtue of its correctly conducted process instantiation, and, its critically pre-prepared informational content. Transcendental suspension ensuring first the thematization of those value structural-functions in order to then thematized their anti-textual complements and counter-textual supplements. Then, lastly, once this distinctive ground is thematized and neutralized the way is left open for its correctly conducted transcendental appreciation, transcendental suspension being actively assisted through a balance between active and passive processes of analytically and synthetically oriented modes of autonomous investigation. This process transcending the sheer manipulation of calculative, cognitive processes through the spontaneity of this actively appreciated integrity simulated and re-reinvested in the re-simulated psychic body of that under investigation (and subject to the focus of our intentional gaze).
	The critical nature of transcendental reflection operating collectively from a number of perspectives. First, our simulated re-creation of those prejudices discovered in a text, as a patent code, take us through that text under investigation, whereas, their suspension allows us to critically locate the psychic position of that text. The experience of such textual centering allowing us to also appreciate the extent that that text is provocatively well-formed and adequately detailed evocationally. Second, transcendental suspension of our sequential, conceptually-oriented `reading' of a text allows us to trans-constitutionally appreciate the nature of this current state of intentional formation and therein `read' the text from the position of its appreciated integrity. Third, in a critically conducted transcendental process of investigation a simulation of the text is allowed to entertain us in a virtual dialogue, the simulation of a conversation, which, if correctly contextualized in a simulation of its textual milieu, a state of affairs simulated in essence in its meta-textual expression, allows us to appreciate the apparent intentional status; i.e., its structural intent and functional import. Fourth, interpretive re-reading of the text, using patent or latent codes already developed, testing the transcendental merit of those strategies currently in play. Fifth, the text in simulation, correctly exercised in a total, ongoing state of transcendental suspension, effectively re-informing, re-defining and re-confirming this apparent textual status. Lastly, post-judgmental reflection on the status of the judgmental delivery worked for in our state of transcendentally suspended appreciation allowing us to determine its apparent existential and hermeneutical objectivity subject to the limitations imposed by the nature of those investigations and the nature of that investigated. If our text is corruptly communicated, ill-formed, lacks adequate detail, etc., then the quality of our appreciation must suffer accordingly. 
	Although the complex, critical nature of the overall process of transcendental appreciation as outlined above is argued for, as a prescription, on theoretical-like grounds what is also presented is a broad, phenomenological description of this state of affairs as, I believe, can be experienced phenomenologically in the performance of a state of judgment itself. That, in general, on both theoretical and practical grounds an adequately detailed and well-formed process of transcendental appreciation is critically productive of relatively intersubjective and objective processes of hermeneutic insight. Hence the critical nature of transcendental appreciation and its necessary application in our textual considerations! 
	That essentially a text is only read when we cease to read it! A soluble paradox that is `resolved' in the manner as indicated in this section of our exposition.

Day 18: The Dialectical Nature Of Intentionality

	From our analysis of provocation it was observed that intentionality was not just focused on the intentional object under current inspection. That in essence intentionality was exercised dialectically (in a number of perspectives and levels of psychological organization). The dialectical status of intentionality being reflected in the production and reading of texts.

	The relatively dissonant nature of the intentional object-state as an experiential process left to its own devices through inertia would lead to a state of complete and utter psychic disruption. But in the demarcation of that apparent point of focus meaning is delivered through a differential contrast, a contrast for one set up between the foregrounding of that intentional state and its backgrounding in a field of evocational presentation. In the simplicity of this model of dissonance we would have the complete collapse of meaning. As meaning and meaningfulness is apparently re-simulated it should force us to conclude that the one way model of dissonance is defective. In its place let us observe the provocational nature of intentionality, i.e., the relative dissonance of foregrounding is provoked to return to its field of evocational presentation. By this mechanism information is both communicated and/or stored. However, when we realize that an infinity of models, and schemes, could be erected to explain or analogue various perceived processes of consonance-dissonance-resolution it follows that the nature of textuality must, in turn, be infinitely rich in dialectically structured and functioning complexity. E.g., noetic-noematic correlativity is just one such perspective on this subject. In tripartite terms of reference we have also outlined an individual and collective noetic-noematic correlativity between Object, Ego and World (and Community). Further, our psychology also recognizes a number of levels in the organization of the psyche, namely, the Affective sub-levels of the Motor-Sensory and the Mood-Impressional, the Cognitive Aspect subdivided between the relative autonomy of the Perceptual and the Conceptual, and lastly the Transcendental exercise of judgment in various fields of value-creation and value-recognition. Needless to say with the introduction of prejudices and perspectives the picture indeed becomes quite chaotic. However, even chaos is structured and our recognition of important intentional axii can only help unlock this virtual sense of dialogue or conversation alluded to in the previous topic, etc.
	Re-instating these intentional axies opens up for us the text to our apparent inspection. Letting us realize the pre-judgments presented by that text and which in our recognition allows us to re-construct the intentional formation of that text.
	That in the final analysis this type of semi-informal research needs to be conducted appropriately in order to experience the apparent intentional status of that text. Not that we can ever be absolutely certain about the status of a text. At least, in applying our intuitively determined patent and latent codes of hermeneutical interpretation, we put ourselves in a position to experience the relative worth of such investment and its consequent flows of re-investment. All in all we should then recognize the intuitive art of reading a text through applying the most relevant codes, and, the careful maintenance of a critical existential process through the centrally placed imposition of a transcendental suspension.
	Hence the interpretive art of hermeneutics as portrayed in these few pages along with the science of its self-critically controlled exercise as performed under the auspices of an adequately informed transcendental suspension. The dialectical nature of intentionality reflecting itself in the simulated, dialectical re-generation of a text.

Day 19: The Dialectical Nature Of Textuality

	Intentionality was shown to have an infinitely complex dialectical origination and that this character of intentionality is reflected in the production of texts. That in the re-reading of texts this complex potentially conflicting interpretive structuring and functioning imprinted in their manufacture and entertainment had to be taken into account, and resolved, through the noting and re-imposition of various key dialectical formats. 

	As suggested in the previous section dialectical formats for the semi-formalized interpretation of a text can be subdivided between resonance states of intentional correlativity, psychological levels in orientation and individualized perspectives exercised in the adoption and stylized adaptation of genres.
	The first format indicated in its imposition re-realizes a complex field of value and therein expressions of value. Although value is realized through a suppression of one or two of the poles of intentional activity, correctly, because such a state of suppression can never be absolutely enacted it follows that, such a field can have only one nature and only a fluctuating complexion depending on the state of the interaction between these poles of relative autonomy. Hence all texts, in the light of the above argument, must be able to be evaluated in the terms of all six fields of value, namely, the thematical, aesthetical, ethical, etc., as well as a polar oriented scientific reading, a cultural reading and a hermeneutic reading. However, an appreciation of the meta-textual constitution of a text should help reveal in which aspect relatively greater levels of meaning are released. This rule of thumb implicating, and evaluating, the poles, levels and perspectives, along with their codes, apparently implicated in our appreciation of a text or a series of text. The utility of the format chosen being demonstrated in the richness and depth of detail released under the carefully controlled use of such a programme. Various application of this rule of investment successfulness indicating the relative merit of those adopted strategies (and the utilization of any codes therein.).
	Similarly, in the exercise of our psychological appreciation, that particular area or areas of the psyche found to release relatively more provocatively pre-constructed information being accepted as indicating the general psychic location of that text in this schematization of consciousness.
	lastly, the same type of appreciation is exercised in the reconstruction of various perspectives felt to be implicated in that text. In this task the application of various codes being evaluated as to the degree of interpretational value apparently released in their use. That those codes that appear to release more value than that invested in their initial imposition being accepted as relatively more likely to have been intended in the first place on either an explicit or implicit basis. A close reading of a text, and its meta-textual situation, generally revealing the patent codes intended for its interpretation. Some of those patent codes in the form of prejudices, in the form of pre-judgments, giving us a provisional entry to that text. That normally, only when a text does not appear to yield its meaning and meaningfulness that a closer inspection is called for along with a critical re-appraisal of the codes currently adopted or up for probable adoption. All codes having a meta-textual complexion by virtue of their formal manipulation of the text.
	Lastly, to be noted is the fact that although the application of meta-textual instructions, suggestions and codes may appear to give precise delineations of meaning and meaningfulness in a text we must always realize that all derivation of sense is determined dialectically. Resolution may or may not appear definitive its derivation is always dialectical and essentially indeterminate in a absolute frame of reference. A text, therefore, is always presented with its inherent limits in the depths of its interpretational access. This self-presentation of limits when broken, or surpassed, can only yield a break down in the sense of that text; the re-simulation of sense under these circumstances being in effect an example of a transcendental illusion. Before these dialectical limits are realized any non-transcendentally suspended appreciation of the text realizing a state of transcendental distortion in a direct relationship to the degree that our relationship with that text is non-existential and inauthentic. Then, our very access to the deepest meaning and meaningfulness of a text may be blocked to us through our being unable to find or apply these codes necessary for the adequate interpretation of that text.
	A consequence of the dialectical nature of intentionality is that in bringing a text to the limits of its re-generation is to invite its subsequent deconstruction in some form or other.

Day 20: Deconstructive Readings Of A Text

	Taking a text beyond its natural limits results in the recognition or non-recognition of the realization of a transcendental illusion and/or a subsequent deconstruction, in some form or other, of that text.

	Taking a textual description of a certain event in a certain location in historical time and space as non-provisionally and  absolutely correct in its interpretation and verification is to invite the realization of a transcendental illusion. Moreover, such a position is then open to the performance of some form or other of deconstruction depending on how this activity is to be conducted.
	A transcendental illusion is created to that extent a text is produced or read beyond the natural limitations inherent in that text and inherent in our powers of textual appreciation. We need not concur with apparent statements of fact. On the other hand expressions of a skeptical nature need not stop us from taking a closer reading of that text. Indeed, a transcendental suspension assists us in this very task, the passage of reflections under its auspices neither causing the destruction nor the paralysis of the productive formation/reading of our text.
	In the deconstruction of a text what is deconstructed is correctly this ghost of a transcendental illusion. By virtue of the dialectical nature of the productive formation/re-formation of a text any attempts to overpass these limits naturally inherent in this process must result in some form of illusion, realizing what could not be possibly intended. However, because texts are subject to the natural habit of provisional treatment, reinforced by the successfulness of this habit under normal empirical-like terms of reference, it follows that usually we take a text to say what it appears to superficially say without enquiring as to whether even our thoughts on this matter could be intentionally entertained in the forms or forms proposed by that text.
	For a start because a text is in a dialogue with its metatext it follows that the text can never be subject to a form of complete closure except provisionally and/or analytically and then only  on a superficial level of entertainment. Moreover, because a text needs its anti-textual complement and its counter-textual supplements in order to differentiate its demarcation of a collective sense and segmented portions of that overall sense it follows that even these various senses just noted cannot be subject to any form of closure except provisionally. Then, again, it follows that any form of privilege exercised in these dialectical processes of differentiation must also only be exercised on provisional grounds (realizing a process of deconstruction along the classical lines of its more traditional treatment). Thus, these levels of deconstructive depth understood, it follows that a closer reading of a text must take into its account the addition of both complementary and supplementary readings as defined in this paper). An understanding of the intentional import of a text necessitating a resolution of these various components in order to effect a provisional reading of that text in such a manner that facilitates its most meaningful reading (assuming that a well-informed and well-formed text is under investigation).
	Deconstruction merely reveals the dialectical nature of intentionality and its reflection in our textual appreciation. Just as a transcendental suspension neither paralyzes nor destroys a text likewise a deconstructive reading neither paralyzes nor destroys the text subject to this form of close reading. Rather, the emphasis should be put on the resolution of this aspect of textual appreciation, putting in place a harmonization of the text's deconstructive foundations. A text whose investigation is conducted within the inherent limits of its appreciation is accepted provisionally and without trace of a transcendental illusion.
	In this light we can now appreciate the fact that an author or a group of authors can never be the absolute master of their processes of productive textual formation (writing)/re-formation (reading). However, they can provisionally and effectively be master of their texts, in their productive formation and re-formation, if adequately formed and informed, treated provisionally and subject to satisfactory degrees of resolution. It is all very well to state that a text is always subject to deconstruction without also stating its necessary degree of prior integrity, an integrity realized through the inherent resolution effected in that textual performance delivered as a text. No text could be delivered without some prior degree of integrity and that this en-textual status for all texts is realized through the play of resolutional tendencies operating and encoded within its ambit. Such granted we now have positive grounds for the provisionally treated objective, and intersubjective, hermeneutic appreciation of texts! However, it should be recognized that this state of affairs is always realized in process and never as the end-point in a process of interpretive treatment!
	A deconstructive reading is put into effect when a text is supplied with its anti-textual complements and its counter-textual supplements plus or minus a de-hierarchicalized sense of privilege. Such a state of affairs is conducted in a state of transcendental suspension and in effect operates on any residual trace of a transcendental illusion projected by a non-provisional, absolutely treated surface reading of that text without the benefit of some form of resolutional treatment. That in essence a close reading of a text, critically conducted, through a provocatively performed resolution of that text, allows us to re-simulate, in provisional terms of reference, its most probable intentions, or at least more easily those intention that the text itself appears to make palpably more apparent.

Day 21: Can A Poetic Or Humorous Text Be Monothematic?

	Can a text with aesthetic pretensions, or ambitions of a humorous nature, be monothematic in textual presentation?

	Although all texts have an en-textual status by virtue of their meta-textual treatment/re-treatment a number of texts obviously operate (unless encoded otherwise) on a monothematic level of textual presentation. Now the problem arises can an aesthetic or humorous text be structured in a monothematic framework, i.e., on only one ostensive level of textual presentation?
	As just argued no text can be purely monothematic only monothematically oriented. However, could a text on one level of presentation have aesthetic depth or humorous aspirations without its replacement by another textual presentation through some form of comic textual revocation? 
	Could a poem be merely a list of details without some form of a subtext? Could a comic text amuse us without some form of textual revocation? My personal intuition in this matter is to answer these questions with a positive no! In order to defend this position let me make the following points.
	For a text to have value beyond a thematic level of identity, mathematical manipulation, and/or quantification, etc., a text must present the overt introduction of metaphor. The introduction of overt metaphorical structures into a text automatically adds an element of depth. As the text proceeds through the ambivalence of the `is like' versus the `is not like' the text is given both depth and a re-direction in textual perspective. Then, through the resolution of this state of tension the text also undergoes a state of transformational revocation reinforcing this re-direction in textual perspective. Thus in this manner the text refuses to be merely monothematic taking on depth and re-direction in perspective. The result of this introduction of a subtext and/or textual revocation is to see the text continually undergoing a process of deconstructive re-construction transforming an apparently monothematical text into a multi-textual text. Certainly in the humorous text we could introduce a necessary degree of bi-textuality letting the second section of the text simultaneously deconstruct and resolve this breach in monothematicity.
	Need a poem utilize then the overt presence of metaphor in order to generate some degree of aesthetic depth, or could this subtextual necessity be supplied metatextually in the unfolding of the otherwise monothematic text? I.e., setting out the whole poem in the form of a metaphor, letting the text metaphorically represent something not quite stated or alluded to in the text? Quite possibly but then again the text is not primarily monothematic in its presentation if the metatext is also to be ostensively read in the same fashion as its textual extension. An examination of these questions, I believe, giving us a greater degree of appreciation in how a text generates a sense of value (above and beyond the correspondence-orientated nature of thematic value). 
	The implication can be drawn that texts that present a certain type of non-thematic value, e.g., aesthetic, must be non-monothematic in presentation. Can the same type of framework be applied to ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical, factual forms of value? With regard to the nature of hermeneutic investigations it would appear obvious that a closer interpretation involves an appreciation of textual depth in so far as a certain level of text is transformationally treated, in accordance with its interpretive format, in such a manner that allows us to arrive at a `deeper' level of textual understanding. That in itself implies both the en-textual status of hermeneutic texts and their non-monothematic documentation of this overall process of interpretation. That interpretation involves a critical reading of overt/covert metaphorical structures and this by itself must also imply a non-monothematic reading of a text demonstrating some form of interpretation. 
	Correctly a uni-vocal monothematicity is an illusion as the text is always presented through the adoption and adaptation of a genre or mix of genres. However a text that is inscribed without the overt use of metaphors must be relatively monothematic. The relatively monothematic presentation of a poetic or humorous text that is successfully poetic and/or humorous implies the presence of a bi-textuality or some form of multi-textuality or multi-thematicity (if the text is not populated with overt metaphors polythematically).
	That, essentially, a text with aesthetic and/or humorous pretentions, to be successful, must, as a minimum, suffer some form of provocational development otherwise that text will develop no sense of depth in its attempt to create/re-create the corresponding form of value aspired to meta-textually by that text. The value of a text being derived from the relative richness and satisfaction of its provocational structural-functions discovered, and re-lived, through our close reading of that text.

Day 22: The Transformational Nature Of Textual Simulation

	By what means can we approach an understanding of how we come to understand a text? How does a text allow itself to be simulated in such a fashion that it can become a point of apparent objective focus in a field of apparent intersubjective communication? 

	Or, put another way, how does a text transform my continual re-appropriation of that text and re-create therefrom its virtual re-simulation? How could a simulation be re-simulated? Can we make a valid distinction between the simulation and that simulated?
	With respect to the last question we might like to invoke the analogy of a mirror reflecting what was in another mirror and so on. But does this analogy break down at that point that the initial reflection is always of something that itself is not simulated. Of course the first mirror might be reflecting nothing only some distortion built into the surface of that mirror being mirrored and only appreciated as such from the perspective of the second mirror, etc. Each mirror then adding its own contribution of distortion in so far that in this model only distortion is being mirrored?
	The model of intentionality, in its noetic-noematic correlativity, obviates some of these difficulties if it is remembered that the intentional object-state is only a pole of mental activity, metaphorically moved towards but never reached. Moreover, we should also note that a mirror may mirror someother mirror that mirror in turn must mirror that other mirror at the same time. Our perception of this fact is tempered by the limitation that we cannot check simultaneously that this two-way reflectivity is actually taking place non-theoretically by virtue of the fact that we must re-position our perspective in order to appreciate the reflection of the first mirror from the second mirror and then the reflection of that second mirror from the first, etc. 
	Interestingly, this latter aspect of our analogy also breaks down because it does seem to be true that the person can simultaneously engage in the observation of a double perspective, or for that matter, a multi-perspective or a series of perspectives. E.g., from the perspective of my embodiment in a social world I can from this point of view entertain something of the perspective another person appears to adopt in their perception and interpretation of the world from what I observe, logically reconstruct and what that person may or may not communicate to me on this relatively intersubjective topic. Indeed much of our social existence is predicated on this apparent fact of `our' existence.
	This invocation of a double perspective, the accumulation of a multi-aspectival `position,' might also explain how in our archetypal phenomenology different senses of the transcendental ego, intentional object and hermeneutical context, or world, can interract. Moreover, if these entities are treated as polarities, and empty of a substantial sense of presence, it opens the way for a state of relatively direct interaction that can be experienced between these provisional fictions.
	A simple phenomenological examination of an intentional object subject to the focus of our visual perception might better illustrate this sense of direct simulation implied in the previous paragraph. Imagine looking through a window at a series of small, fluffy-white clouds in the sky. We choose one of these clouds for a closer inspection. We find the center of our focus in this visual field wandering around the edges of this cloud, never keeping still, never absolutely in focus and obviously not quite taking it all in at the same time even though we `feel' we are looking at one small fluffy-white cloud in its entirety. As much as the rest of the sky itself is not under our direct focus in a similar fashion our total perception of the cloud also suffers from a certain degree of non-direct focus. Moreover, even the center of our visual field is not absolutely clear, how could a dimensionless point be focused upon? It would seem that the accumulation of the visual differences perceived between various noticed parts of that visualized object creates, or rather simulates, our experience of that cloud. Even though that cloud currently has a stronger sense of definity vis-à-vis the rest of the sky the center of our visual field is never absolutely focused and thematized. In like manner the polarities of the ego and world also suffer from a non-absolute, imperfectly thematized degree of focus. 	An identical self-relationship is correctly out of the picture. Even an appreciation of our `inner' mental states involves some form of a double perspective, e.g., a transcendental appreciation of the cognitive sense of ego, or, a conceptual treatment of the sense of transcendental egohood, an overall affective appreciation of localized impressions, a transcendental appreciation of our motor-sensory level of embodiment, etc. 
	What is implied is the fact that in perception there is never any real focus on an object or state, rather, our focus is on a simulation, a simulation that can never be totally focused `upon' in its entirety in the same moment of time. Moreover, this sense of simulation extends beyond that apparently under the scrutiny of our attention. The rest of the sky is also `felt' along with the manner of its presentation. If we look through a window in a single standing wall we `perceive' a `landscape through this window in a wall.' On the other hand if we were looking through a window in a room our simulation experiences the view through the window as being `through a window in a room.' In these two cases the total simulation of the view is different. One feels a view `through a window,' and, the other experiences a view `through a window in a room.' Even the space behind us is being simulated at the same time as the focused panorama under current review. Hence in essence even perception is simulated (how much more must this apply to our textual reconstruction of that apparently intended to be understood in our appreciation of a text?).
	It would seem, therefore, to be the case that in the focus of our appreciation in some field of endeavour that focus can never be perfect nor perfectly centered. Foreground is simulated just as much as the implicit sense of its associated background, that together both are being continually reconstructed, i.e. re-simulated. That focus can be more or less adequate it can never be absolute!
	Now let the following question be considered: How can two or more different objects in a field, or in different fields, be entertained simultaneously? It would appear that just as the simulation of one object is accomplished through its simulation the relationship between two objects, and the nature of those objects themselves, can equally be just simulated. But, then, how can one simulated object-state interact with some other object-state when neither could not interact with the other in their own right by virtue of a different field being necessary for each object? The solution here is to regard the relationship between virtual objects as taking place at the level of their backgrounds, i.e., there are no pure objects in themselves, that all interaction is itself merely simulated at this level of our appreciation. This autonomy between objects, or egos, or contexts (or worlds) being itself also simulated. That, essentially, the apparent interaction between these apparently autonomous intentional states is re-created through a transformational recognition of some form of identity difference entertained in parallel. But let me discuss this concept of transformation towards the end of this section.
	The same analysis can also be applied to our reading of a text. To begin with we must realize that pure textuality can never be appreciated. A text is read in its meta-textual environment, or more correctly, the apparent intentional meaning and meaningfulness of a text is simulated between these poles of textuality and meta-textuality. Hence an appreciation of textuality must be trans-textual. At the same time the immanent center simulated in this state of trans-textual appreciation must be non-textual. Moreover, as the phenomenon of any relationship must be between these poles of Ego, Object and World it also implies that the relational distance between these experiential polarities of the trans-textual and the non-textual can not be absolute. I.e., between the transcendence of the trans-textual and the immanence of the non-textual there can be no real sense of distance implying that in the state of textual simulation, or in the state of non-textual simulation for that matter, transcendent-structure and immanent-function coincide realizing a state of direct interaction, a state of interaction whose realization of directness is appreciated to some degree or other. 
	In our transcendental experience the relationship is experienced from the point of view of the non-verbal, i.e., a directly experienced experience of that experience. Under such terms of reference, in a relative collapse of the hermeneutic circle, the trans-textual simulation inside that circle (encircled in the hermeneutic circle) is a simulation of the non-textual situated outside that circle. In this state of relative collapse the `inside simulation' coincides with, and in effect comes to equal, that which is `outside' that of which the inside simulation is a simulation of. In the `directness' of the relationship, experienced through its psychic, phenomenal, phenomenologically-entertained center, the distance, or sense, between that simulated and its simulation breaks down. In this state of equivalence intentionality exposes its true form as the direct interaction between the virtual poles of the `signified' and that `that which is signified.'
	The simulated and its simulation has a correspondence with the concepts of that complexly signified versus its complex signifier. It will be argued that both of these aspects of `that being simulated' and its `simulation' cannot be absolutely differentiated. Moreover, although verbal meaning is derived by a chain of signifiers, and through the invocation of other similar metaphors, e.g., displacement, hermeneutic circles, etc., there is a sense in which that simulated and its simulation can be transcended through a  coincidence of the transcendent-structuring and the immanent-functioning and their effective equation when we enter into the relationship of these two correlative parties and become relatively centered in that relationship. It will be argued that this type of relational centering allows for a relatively direct appreciation of that relationship and that this type of experience is entertained in transcendentally-oriented states of consciousness which must perpetually inhabit all of our normal, wakeful existence albeit to some major or minor degree! That in effect the transcendental signifier is simulated and experienced in such a manner that the distance between the simulation and that simulated is overcome through the relative autonomy of critical transcendental consciousness. That to a certain extent, although verbal experience is `about' experience, experience is essentially not about that experience but `is' that experience itself. That an adequately exercised hermeneutic circle in its deconstruction of verbally-oriented experience allows us to recover the experience of that experience through a simulation of the simulation simulated therein. That with regard to textual simulations our transcendental entry into the metaphorical body of a relationship and our moving towards the psychic center of that relationship ensures an effective identification between the trans-textual and the non-textual. In this direct form of experience representational dichotomies are overcome and seen retrospectively in a critical philosophical light as derivative, degenerative, an impossible literalization of the metaphorical, mistreatment of polarities, etc.
	One implication of this philosophy of direct intentional states is the realization that there can be no direct relationship between simulated states of affairs be they objects, egos or worlds. Because simulated states have no real substantial self-existence there can be no real, direct interaction between these fictions. Hence the apparent autonomy between such `entities.' Interaction must be put indirectly into place through the field or fields that see the evocational presentation of those reified states of simulation. Hence, although, these poles of the Object, Ego and World can only be provisional fictions, their utilization in our perspectives upon the phenomenal world of experience must paradoxically create a sense of autonomy for intentional states that take on Object, Ego, or World-orientations. Stemming from this transcendental illusion must also be the apparent separations of `the realm of science' from `the world of culture' and `the sphere of hermeneutic interaction' centered on the moments of Object, Ego and World respectively. This state of apparent incommensurability being extended to the totality of the life-world of Object, Ego and World in either a religious orientation or a non-religious orientation, or, between both orientations. This concept of autonomy also giving rise to the apparent isolation of our six transcendental sense-fields of the thematical, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, trans-thematical and factual (or ontical). A transcendental orientation seeing no difference, and no absolute autonomy, between any of these polarized distinctions. Only in cognitive terms of reference can we make a useful, critical distinction in this regard. On the other hand, it should be noted, that as the sense of the transcendental is generated through the interaction and resolution of cognitive dissonance it follows that these polar distinctions, and allied fields of reflection and activity, cannot be completely dismissed as absolutely illusory either! Certainly not from the Cognitive Aspect in our schema of consciousness where, within those limitations, such distinctions have an important role to play in the thematization of intentional consciousness in general.
	Intentionally simulated meaning, in a transcendent-structural mode, and intentionally simulated meaningfulness, in an immanent-functional mode, is constructed and realized through the transformation provocatively enacted between two (or more?) similar frames of reference. Metaphorically similar but never identical (except in trivial, analytical constructions differentiated only in their temporal entertainment and re-thematization) the `sense of difference' differentiated between these two close systems provoking a `difference in sense.' In turn this creation of sense re-thematizing the field of its appreciation with an exponential increase in an evocational appreciation of detail. This concept of transformation being able to communicate information by virtue of its provocatively self-controlled sense of resolution, i.e., being able to dictate the most probable pathways open for the resolution of this form of inter-field dissonance.