Some Concluding Comments

	Throughout this paper, on the subject of our hermeneutic treatment of a text, I have stressed the important role that should be played by our (transcendental) appreciation of the use of metaphor in that text! An in depth appreciation of the role of such metaphor is essentially a transcendental appreciation of the structural-enfunctioning of that text. Similarly it was implied that the transcendental treatment of metaphor was equally the metaphorical treatment of the transcendental. That to all purposes a phenomenological exploration of either the metaphorical or the transcendental would, in my opinion, merely re-describe the essential nature of the other. With this critical equivalence to hand let me therefore, as a conclusion to this paper, redefine these two apparently non-interrelated fields of the transcendental and the metaphorical and therein giving a final, albeit provisional, thematization to our two topics of textuality and interpretation. 
	An understanding of the phenomenological nature of a text should obviously assist us in our hermeneutical appreciation of a text, and, our phenomenological appreciation  of the hermeneutical process should further philosophically assist us in this type of task. The real test of such pure research being its ability to be adapted and utilized in the hermeneutical appreciation of some text to hand that hitherto has presented problems in its interpretation. An ideal candidate for such treatment would, without doubt, be this very text itself, prior to its conclusion, and so let me where relevant let this textual supplement complement (compliment) this `text' in such a manner so as to highlight its highlights and bring before the spotlight those regions attention has perhaps wisely avoided or at least paid less attention to. In the process let me marginalize this text, discover its boundaries, test its limits and seek out its potential displacements, faultlines, fractures, cracks, inconsistencies, incomplete resolutions, blackholes, areas of blindness. Where many subtexts run in parallel, or in many directions, let me find one text to analogue them. Where I find but one dominant text let me parallel it with the perspective of a number of others in order to reinstigate the need for a differential contrast replete with the springing forth of the resolution that must flow from the relationship of such an interaction. Let me lean on this text, so to speak, and at least implicitly adopt this manifesto. Let me re-interpret this text and in the process re-produce a novel reading...

1.	Metaphor, treated as an intentional object, in its discernment implies a metaphorical field wherein such states are appreciated. Moreover, the appreciation of this relationship between the overt metaphor and its covert field necessarily involves the participation of an agent that can appreciate the metaphorical. A perceiver appreciates perceptions, a conceiver appreciates conceptions, a transcendental judger makes transcendental judgments, a feeler appreciates feelings, a mover appreciates motor responses, etc. Such an equation does not imply that such entities need be anything other than transcendental  fictions, or, transcendental egos operating via a set of modalities without the need for the absolute presence of an absolute ego. Such an equation also need not imply that the agent is merely a gathered assembly of miscellaneous entities going about their particular types of business although such a model may well model the degree of autonomy that the sense of person more often than not appears to portray. As argued elsewhere the transcendental Ego is defined by the simultaneous negation of both the transcendental (intentional) Object(-state) and the transcendental sense of World, i.e. as contra-Object and contra-World. The three terms of our transcendental relationship are all defined by their contra-polarities. On the other hand the experiencer of a metaphor must be able to have some form of relationship with a metaphor in order to be able to relate to the same. But the nature of this relationship, although involving some form of common ground (through the transformational invariance of internal relationships) it implies that, although related, the experience of a metaphor cannot be merely metaphorical. Certainly they must be constituted in some manner that is close to the nature of metaphor in order to be able to relate to the same, but, at the same time they cannot be equated with the nature of metaphor. The perceiver is not seen, the conceiver is not conceived, certainly not directly. Hence the paradox that the mover is not moved, the container cannot contain itself, etc. 
	Let us not countenance self-identities. Rather, let us enjoy the paradox for the moment and look deeply into its abyss in the hope of finding some way that this type of contradiction, or any other that presents itself to us philosophically, can be resolved. That the sense of self must transcend self. That all forms of closure cannot be effected without some form of permanent paradox. On the other hand provisional forms of closure can coexist with the open nature of the phenomenon to hand and allow us to provisionally manipulate such distinctions although, I might add, we must also be prepared for the fact that such distinctions will also manipulate us. So let us lean on the nature of metaphor a little and in the process note its essential characteristics without hoping to quantify or qualify the essence of such essential distinctions. This very impossibility must imply that the essence of (some form of) essence must be (some form of) a non-essence! In our scoping of the metaphor by the enplacement of it in a covertly manipulated metaphorical field let us realize that this very format, as with the nature of all formats, whether meta-textual or textual, cannot be completely closed. Indeed it might be to our advantage to ask whether our covert metaphors are being covertly meta-metaphored, perhaps our text under examination has a series of deeply hidden intentions designed to be unlocked in a specially preconstructed and uniquely controlled close reading of that text? Then again we might like to question our metaphors themselves and in this creative displacement enquire if other forms of metaphorical construction can through a supplementary light on the object of our current research.

2.	Metaphors are already implicit transcendental suspensions, a balance of the tension between the `is like' and the `is not like' central to the analogical structural-functions of such literary devices (considered in a broad philosophical sense as previously argued for). In a similar manner questions are also transcendental suspensions. The form of the questioning asking is p contained within S, i.e., Is `S is p', meaning, is `S is p' or is `S is non-p.'
	The implication can then be drawn that `to question the metaphor', `to metaphoricalize the metaphor', `to metaphoricalize the question' or `to question the question' is in effect a double transcendental suspension. What consequences will be unleashed when we suspend the suspension? Does it make sense, or, does it make sense as long as the enclosure of the suspension is de-enclosed in the suspension of the suspension? This is a very important type of question, or meta-question, to ask. Perhaps such a type of utterance is to ask for the unutterable and find only an answer that cannot be answered, or only answered silently; a bursting forth through the non-verbal experience of the world beyond the scope enclosed in a mere verbal questioning? 
	One way to view the suspension of the suspension is, I believe, to see the transcendental suspension, the sense of the text under suspension being paralleled by the anti-text (and the counter-texts), being allowed to naturally self-reconstitute itself and therein critically answer the questions, and overall sense of questioning, implicitly put into play through the initial process of suspension. In its own way the suspension of the suspension letting the suspension suspend itself and therein letting the forces in a pre-critical state of balance re-assert themselves in their own fashion in such a manner so as to critically re-simulate the simulation embedded in that textual-metatextual interaction.
	Can the metaphorical circumspection of the metaphor, the textual suspension of the suspension, through an irruption of meaning actually return us to the openness of the world, allow us to meet in the transcendental `flesh' directly with the transcendental life-world itself? The hermeneutical encirclement of the hermeneutical circle resulting in the simultaneous implosion of the non-text and the explosion of the trans-text, and, the simultaneous re-instatement of the hermeneutic circle and its fruitfully suspended appreciation of the relationship between the meta-text and the text. A dialogue between the visible and the invisible, a conversation between the non-silent and the silent?
	The verbal can only have meaning in reference to a defining sense of the non-verbal. The meaningfulness of the text necessitates its anti-text (and counter-textual perspectives differing from the apparent or dominant perspective that is currently in place, or, meta-textually reconstructed in its re-emplacement. With this necessity for contrast the gestalt nature of the text has already pre-prepared its transcendental suspension, and that being introduced, its transcendental suspension in turn. This powerful suspension of the suspension bringing the text through the re-simulation of its simulation of the non-text back directly into the real world, the world of potential actuality, actual-potentiality. All meaning and meaningfulness has this standard explicitly or implicitly embedded in its functionally-enstructured expression which in turn is relationally bedded down in the matrix of the relationship of all relationships, i.e., the-world-there-for-us. Actual actuality, or pure actuality, is just as inconceivable as potential possibility, or pure possibility. Every text must reflect the transcendental-existential nature of the world. In the spontaneity of transcendental  consciousness properly conducted, i.e., attended to through a properly enplaced and pre-informed transcendental suspension, etc., existential authenticity can never be completely lacking. The foundations of the foundations of the text are in this real world of patterned-flux, fluctuations of phenomena. The text itself is itself a phenomenon. Moreover the process of interpretation is itself a phenomenon. Then, again, interpretation is a phenomenon just as much as phenomenon are interpreted. Hence from the perspective of the transcendental our phenomenology is hermeneutical and our hermeneutics is also phenomenological. Hence `the interpretation of phenomena' is `the phenomenon of interpretation.' Authenticity in this process being put in place through the transcendental suspension of the transcendental suspension already in place in the heart of the metaphor, the metaphorical structural-functions situated and driving the process and content of our text. An overall process that through its overcoming of its implicit limitations opens the text out onto the simulated world of the non-textual, a world where there is no real distinction between the simulation and that simulated. Equally a transcendence of the text and the non-text, a transcendence of the meta-text and the trans-text (put in play through a transcendence of the trans-text).
	In essence the text cannot absolutely depart from the living world of reality (treated as a polarity in polar opposition to the polarity of the relatively non-real). At the same time the text must also reflect the entire epistemological hierarchy, the psychological structural-enfunctioning of that individual in accordance with its provisional schematization. In a relationship the essential nature of that relationship, its transformational invariance (of certain internal relational features), is holistically stamped upon that relational process and its products equally throughout the field of that relationship (varying only in the intensity of that self-expression and the nature of the perspective put upon that particular viewing of that relationship). Hence the intimate and unique nature of the relationship between the text and its meta-text, and vice versa, and, the trans-text and the non-text, and vice versa. Hence the intimate relationship between the simulation and that being simulated. These particular states, in their existential core, always being experienced directly. Hence the provisional nature of these extrapolations, and, at the same time, their necessary degree of closeness to an unspoken vision of reality.

3.	In the form of an apparent digression consider the following observation. Suppose one is thinking about doing a certain series of actions. But, then, upon further reflection, we find ourselves reconsidering this series of actions, coming quickly to the conclusion that our performance of the same is rather out of character, quite ludicrous, just something that we would not be seen doing, etc. We address ourselves with the remark, silently or in audible speech, "you must be joking," or, "you must be kidding!" Or words to that effect expressed in the second person singular.  
	How can we address ourselves in the second person singular? After spontaneously uttering this type of self-address we might then find ourselves saying perhaps,"I must be joking," or, "I must have been kidding!" How is it possible for the person to address themselves as "you?" In the same vein is it possible to address oneself in the third person? Or can we only `see' ourselves being addressed in the third person. "He must be joking," (referring to one's' self). But then we have that quaint word "one"  that does indeed allow us to refer to ourselves, albeit in very general terms - "goodness, how silly of me, one must be more careful."
	Superimposed upon the three polarities of our hermeneutic circle we might like to link these three persons in the verbal aspects of speech along the following tentative lines:

	First person	-   Transcendental (Intentional) Object
	Second person  -   Transcendental Ego
	Third person   -   Transcendental (Field as) World

	In this same light we might also like to note the following associated superimposition:

	First person	-   Intention to perform       -  Object
	Second person  -   Actual performance         -  Ego
	Third person   -   Third party interpretation -  World

	Let me explain. If we form the intention to perform a certain action, or a series of actions, then our orientation in the hermeneutic circle is towards the pole of the intentional object. Such an orientation is retrospective (and analytical, etc.). In some measure if we were to say "I intend to do x," in reality we have already thought about it and mean effectively `I have already decided "to intend x".' On the other hand the actual performance of the action x is a spontaneous exercise of the will performed in the then current continuous present. Stretching our schema we might like to perceive the public appreciation of action x as a prospective affair, something directed towards the future, finding thematization in the development of the future in this regard. This might explain why the person can address themself as "you" in a more spontaneous, suddenly realized form of insight? Or, retrospectively refer to themselves as "I," or, see themselves in the third person and address themselves by their name in a similar manner.
	Now, in the interpretation of a text dealing with situations we have the following three aspects in an interaction that upon inspection can spell out various forms of mis-interpretation. Various forms of interpretation can be marked out as unsuccessful, as inadequately based and incorrectly formulated, misguided, disconnected, prejudiced, etc. E.g., a third party believing that a certain person may have had a certain intention to perform x and did, or did not, perform x without that third party being certain about this possible act of commission or omission. E.g., a second party vision of the active self in its performance of a certain action (performed through acts of commission or omission), believing that a third party may or may not have observed, directly or indirectly, the performance of the same with, or without, the belief that such a performance was, or was not, deliberately pre-intentioned. E.g., a first person's intention to perform x with, or without, their current remembrance of having performed x with, or without, the presence of a general public belief that that person did, or did not, intend x and performed x (and who currently and correctly remembers the intention/action of x). Or, more complex accounts of the same resulting in various states of aspectival inclusions (e.g., my seeing a certain person looking, or not looking, at some other person looking, or not looking, at an object O and `obviously' thinking y, etc.). 
	We might say that if one, or more, of the links in this chain is faulty in its local appreciation then our global appreciation is more likely going to miss the mark, i.e., result in some form of mis-interpretation. Conversely, we might like to consider interpretation successfully performed as a hermeneutic process successfully conducted in a circular manner, i.e., as brought to fruition through a successful exercise of all three fundamental aspects of our hermeneutic circle. Are we entitled to believe in the possibility of a successfully conducted and achieved process of hermeneutic appreciation? And if by chance we achieved a correct outcome by faulty methods are we still entitled to claim a process of hermeneutic appreciation? Surely not, for insight is a process of insight; the thematization of a process of provoked appreciation into a state of self-demonstrated interconnectiveness? The process being just as important as the conclusions derived therein! Then again, `in the performance of the establishment of a text' and `in the performance of the reading of that text' can we apply this tripartite scheme in the hope that the three moments of the former might be intuitively perceived as coinciding with the three moments of the latter, or at least the net results of the former eventually appear to coincide with the net results of the latter? Should we claim that this form of reversibility, or co-incidence, is possible or merely that, given relatively non-chaotic conditions, reversibility is generally possible not only in theory but also in practice (but must not be considered to have taken place in absolutistic terms of reference). Personally, I believe that this type of approach has overall much to commend itself. The possibility of interpretation implies the prior potential for mis-interpretation, indeed, that the process of interpretation is basically a corrected, or self-correcting, process of re-interpretation that narrows the margin between interpretation and mis-interpretation. A margin that can never be minimized except analytically, i.e., defined out of existence. E.g., x is either `p' or `not p', but x is treated as not `not p', therefore x `is' p. E.g., the bill came to $80 exactly and that this amount was considered to be correct. That in our interpretation of the bill there exist certain rules that if followed would show us that the bill's total did indeed come to $80, that this amount was correctly calculated both in its interpretation and re-interpretation and that the avenue was open for other people to come to this correct interpretation. However, most forms of interpretation are not so definitive, i.e., that methods for determination are not so clearly determined leaving a margin of error both in its intentional production and in its possibilities, established provocationally, for its interpreted re-production.
	This model of interpretation/mis-interpretaton might be entitled the `I-you-them' model for re-interpretation. In the formation of a text, as a kind of intentional activity, these three aspects must find there incorporation. Meta-textual conventions establishes to some extent this dimension of the third person. The text represents to a certain extent the intentional formation that guided the distinctive nature of that process of deposition. The dimension of the second person being seen in the actual decisions eventually entered into despite intentional forms of indecision, indecisiveness, etc. It is not necessary, nor possible, for intentionality and performance to perfectly coincide. Intentionality in a verbalized form is sequentially derived whereas action stems from a holistic approach, apparent discrepancies between these two spheres manifesting themselves on these two different levels and leaving the text open to an easily set up state of self-deconstruction through a weakening of the resolve entered into between these two regions. A text cannot `suffer' an absolute resolution of its provocational tensions, etc. The anti-text implicitly giving contrast and material for this state of textual resolution demonstrated in and through the style of that text. 
	Let us now imaging we have written a text of some description or other and let us say, for the sake of arguement, that it is a letter. We have a break. After the elapse of a certain period of time we return to finish that text. Now we are in a position of having to interpret our own writing. Usually this is a privileged position to the extent that we can reconstruct what we were up to in the first draft of that document. But, ideally, we are in exactly the same position as someone else who comes to that text for the first time and is able to read the conventions and language adopted and adapted in the writing of that text. Although it may not be as meaningful for that person, or to the person or person to whom it is addressed, if that document can be read it is to that extent it is read. It would appear that in acts of interpretation there is a double hermeneutic circle involved in that act of reconstruction. Interpretation is essentially a re-performance of that text. If the situation involved in the deposition of that text involves these three parties and the situation of the interpretation of that text involves another three parties then it follows that an adequate process of hermeneutic appreciation necessitates an adequate appreciation of these six parties. Any defect in any one, or in any combination, of these six parties must result in a state of mis-interpretation. However, some simplifications in this example can be made. Assuming the meta-conventions of what exactly constitutes a letter, for the both the writer and the reader, are the same then our factors are reduced to five. Similarly for the reader to be a reader of their own letter we can futher reduce the number of effective parties to four. In this example the hermenuet is reduced to reading their own production and evaluating its formation and detail with the same intentions re-addressed making ammendments when and where necessary.
	In the example of reading a novel, or watching a film, the situation is certainly somewhat more complex. For a start the author is somewhere on a continuum with respect to these three voices; being either stationary or in motion up or down the same. The author may allow us to experience the intentions of one or more charactors. On the other hand the point of narrated reference may be in the world of the third person, albeit in a privileged position of witnessing actions suffered by those charactors or actors, but that need not be the case. To some extent the author is going to select for their audience just what exactly is going to be fed into these three spheres of the first, second and third persons and therein allow us to experience these states of mis-interpretation that must arise between these characters (in the `normal course' of their interaction, finding various forms and degrees of resolution) and between the author and their reader (along intentional and unintentional avenues, also finding various forms and degrees of resolution). The novelist, through skill or a lack of skill, deciding whether the final resolution of the novel is going to be definitve or open ended. In the latter situation the reader is left to determine the author's intentions if indeed the author had an opinion in this regard. Either weighting one of the possible set of outcomes and provocatively reinforcing it through prior incidents of that type or leaving the reader up in the air so to speak where the only form of final resolution might be to toss a coin so to speak. In any event mis-interpretation is diminished by a successful circuit of this double hermeneutic circle at the level of the text, what ever its nature, and, at the level of our reading of that text. When these two circuits reinforce each other we find, in effect, that the three persons of our text generally start to speak with one voice, or a series of non-openly-conflicting voices. That in effect our reading of the meta-text is in harmony with our reading of the text and that the text is harmoniously well-formed provocatively and adequately detailed evocatively, etc.

4.	Returning to the nature of metaphor (and our transcendental reading of a text) let me re-develop some of the important features that arise in this regard.
	Evocation, it was decided, was introduced as a field in that part of the hermeneutic circle that dealt with the presentation of fields. Metaphor, in its ability to re-constitute a model or simulation releasing this sense of evocation. Moreover, invocational forces at work in the intentional object assisting this process of productive thematization. Repetition of the same evocative structural-functions naturally producing a sense of consonance. However, all fields are introduced in the midst of meta-fields. It stands to reason, therefore, that the initial evocation of a field must be experienced as dissonant. However, in the repetition of the same evocative structural-functions a sense of consonance must eventually pervade that field of investigation. 
	Let me now ask the question what is the difference between the repetition of evocative structural-functions and the repetition of provocative structural-functions?
	Often, in an aesthetic text, the apparent intentions of the author are spelt out more than once and in the process reinforced. Moreover, in the provocational process the natural adoption of the most probable pathways for the re-accommodation of the evocatively presented, intentionally invoked intentional object (in the dissonance of its introduction) in itself also reinforces the apparent intentions of the author. Lastly, this reinforcement is further strengthened through the value released in a successfully de-encoded hermeneutical process. 
	Thus it would appear that the general intentions of the author are apparently stated by what they say in-textually in the form of meta-comments to this effect, what they might say ex-textually if asked, through their covert-overt manipulation of metaphorical structures, articulation of provocational pathways, repetition of these provocational mechanisms, the excess value and coherence of interpretations that appear to be consonant with the former.
	In the light of this list we can ask the following questions. How do we know that we have sufficiently appreciated this text, penetrated all its levels of polythematicity and marked off thematic shifts in polytextuality, forms of intentional parallelization of texts, etc? Similarly, how do we know that the code adopted was intended by the author of that text, or, in a similar light that what the author said should be interpreted in a more profound form? Perhaps the author stumbled on such profundity and may or may not have recognized this?
	In answer we might like to look at the text to see, e.g., if a code was intended, hinted at textually or meta-textually. Generally, looking through the text to see if other mechanisms reinforce this adoption of the apparently successful code chosen in this regard, looking also for an overall assessment that seems to clarify the psychic center (or centers) of that text, i.e., a definitive attempt has been displayed textually to locate this text in the world of discourse. making a distinction between codes that complement the overt text, supplement the overt text, re-write that text, etc. Supplementary texts giving a new perspective on our complementary text perhaps rewriting this balance. This balance being considerably altered in the deconstructive re-writing of that text. Codes that generally release little excess value being seen as more ad hoc in this task of de-encoded interpretation. Overt interpretations suggested by the meta-text not being considered as coded in this respect although, essentially, the same process is effectively in operation (between processes of overt-non-coded and covert-coded interpretational approaches).
	In regard to the parallelization of texts I would propose the following classification, namely covert and overt forms of parallelization. E.g., with respect to the latter we might note as often present in comic books, as a meta-textual feature, the use of speech balloons in parallel with the visual text, the use of non-verbal body postures, the exaggerated suggestion of emotion, use of colour codes and other devices the producer of a comic might entertain to reinforce the overall text (and also, sometimes, its unintended deconstruction). With respect to covert forms of parallelization let me note the necessary presence of anti-text/counter-texts in order to give the text a sense of demarcation through the necessary resolution of this demarcational tension. Their surfacing from time to time, or the implicit presence of the same, being necessary in order to reinforce this sense of demarcational resolution. These factors being left surfaced when this resolution is not satisfactorily achieved when either this textual process is not performed adequately (and the text tends to passively self-deconstruct) or when the text is leaned upon in processes of active deconstruction, e.g., marginalization, (the suspension of) transcendental suspension, application of counter-codes, the use of other devices that achieve this neutralization and/or disruption of this process of ongoing demarcational resolution. Irruptions of textuality occurring in the transformation of covert strains of textual parallelization become overt in their surfacing (through forms of textual, inter-metatextual and intertextual provocational preparation).
	
5.	To a considerable extent the mere convocation, or adding together, of textual themes/invocations or texts does not constitute the unity of that overall text/series of texts. Under provocation such an assemblage would quickly be de-constructed and even more likely destroyed. The unity of the text, and the textual process, is accounted for through the sequences of provocations at various polythematic and super-thematic levels in that text/series of texts, and/or, provocational tensions engendered polytextually and/or through processes of textual parallelization. Provocation introduces and defuses dissonance introduced into a text. A series of such processes, linked in some manner, establishing the temporal unity of that textual unfolding, or, unraveling. Then, if these sequences theselves were to be subsumed within a super-provocational figure the text would be further strengthened in this regard. One might say that super-provocational mechanisms establish the well-formed formation of that text whereas the provocational mechanisms merely supply the relatively well-detailed evocative material. With this super-provocational hierarchicalization of the text (along with possible forms of polythematicity, polytextuality and hierarchical parallelization) at play we might like to reconsider the role, and place, for a deconstructive reading of a text that manages to successfully displace that text some distance from its original sense of a psychic center in the open world of universal discourse.
	As discussed elsewhere provocation is a mechanism, perhaps the only mechanism, that conveys information (through the medium of some form of text). For a deconstructive displacement to directly convey a new slant upon the interpretation of that text it implies that the performance of this act of displacement must itself conform to the same archetypal rules, as general principles (not to be treated in an absolutistic fashion), that apply in provocational processes and super-provocational processes. With this insight to hand we might like to say, therefore, that the process of deconstructive displacement must itself conform to our three dialectical moments of harmonization, namely, consonance, dissonance and resolution. I.e., the preparation of a field of evocative consonance, the introduction of some degree of provocative dissonance, and, the resolution of this state of dissonance through its re-accommodation in, or re-writing of, that evocational field. This model of displacement implies that all forms of textual irruption must discreetly occur within a certain distance from the appreciated psychic center of that text prior to its deconstruction. This important implication having the further implication that forms of textual irruption may be spontaneous in appearance, non-premeditated, apparently novel, incommensurable, etc., these appellations are correctly mistaken. Displacement can never create, or re-create, itself in the complete and utter void (which in absolutistic terms of reference makes little or no real phenomenological sense in the first place). Only through the embrace of the relationship can the text manifest itself and displaced texts are no different in this regard. The conclusion being that textual displacement is measured, pre-prepared, discreet and in effect relatively quantumatized. I would also suggest, invoking a discreet passage in the unfolding of the temporal/spatial, that this process of deconstruction must also take place in terms of certain limits that effect the minimum and maximum terms of reference in the actualized-potential of that discharge in textual displacement, and the extent that such a discharge is also conducted in multiple units of that minimum quantity able to effect such a displacement (?).
	Although the dialectics of the process of harmonization are atemporal, or ahistorical, as a functioning process this state of harmonization must also undergo a temporal shift in its overall relativity with respect to these three poles of the hermeneutic circle. These temporal transitions also being in multiple units of actualized-potential in accordance with this just recounted quantum account. The sudden, spontaneous `appearance' of displacement finding a reinforcement of this image through the associated spontaneity of responses initiated directly through such an encounter. However, as displacement is a particular type of function it must make its historical presentation in an historical manner (even though as a polarity all co-moments must to a certain extent be simultaneously co-present, i.e., be immanent co-momentarily).
	Deconstruction, therefore, can never produce, or re-produce, completely incommensurable shifts in textual displacement. Commensurability, of a sort, being pre-established in the formation of such displacement. Displacements supplementing or re-writing the text in accordance with the degree and type of shift entered into. Hence irruption at the textual, textual/meta-textual, and, meta-textual/inter-textual levels in textual organization. The presence of a pre-informed transcendental suspension, and its suspension in turn, establishing the dialectics and transitions effected by this type of process. The demonstration of the necessary presence of the anti-text complementing our demarcational thematization of that text (this textual-antitextual relationship forming relatively invariant transformational grounds for the intercommensurability of counter-textual perspectives constructed/re-constructed in the depositional writing/reading of a text).
	Because sense is demarcated it implies that the constitutional formation of the text, to the degree it is thematized, is paralleled by its anti-text and potential counter-textual perspectives. It is obvious that if we lessen the degree of demarcation at some point in the text that the anti-text is going to surface and directly compete with the text. In a similar fashion a diminishment in the dominant perspective produced/reproduced in the text's formation/re-formation is going to see the development of the re-emergence of non-novel perspectives along with the potential for the emergence of novel perspectives. Appreciation is always aspectival, transcendental appreciation being a neutralization of the perspective adopted with its anti-perspective (whereas the critical transcendental appreciation is the suspension of a transcendentally balanced perspective?). When the dominant perspective is neutralized, for some reason or other, some other type of perspective must fill this relative void in order for some new form of appreciation to arise. In such a situation for meaning and meaningfulness to survive the text must be either re-formed or re-written within the re-domination of the previous perspective(s) or the development of closely associated counter-perspectives (on the grounds that displacement is never incommensurably developed).
	In order for the dominant perspective to maintain its continual presence through a process of resolution it is necessary for the anti-text within that perspective to surface to some extent in order to be re-submerged through the process of its textual resolution in this regard. In our leaning on a text, setting it up for deconstruction, observing its potential for displacement, seeking out its points for irruptive disruption this blindness on our part for the co-presence of the anti-text/counter-textual perspectives is somewhat remedied. Although texts are introduced through resolution it is ironic that full meaning and meaningfulness is discharged when this `dark region' of the text in the form of an anti-textual complement or a counter-textual supplement is also allowed to comment on that text. The dogmatic attitude is especially remedied when we realize that there is a complementary/supplementary place for the anti-textual/counter-textual reading. Indeed, in the vehemence of the dominant perspective the surfacing of a complementary position of the anti-textual brings a greater degree of sanity to that text. The `irrational' denial of the anti-text necessitating its re-surfacing in order to rebalance and regularize the nature of the resolutional process provocationally in play within that text. Hence the importance of the ironic commentary to restore a degree of sanity to the rational process of resolution, whereas, on the other hand the excessive attention to the text at the expense of the anti-text/counter-texts actually robs it of its rational interpretation, its potential for rational assessment. In this process of `overlooking' we are forced to `look over' this overlooking and by this distortion overcome this prior process of distortion in order to reinstigate a transcendentally suspended suspension of our reading of that text. In effect re-instigating a critical transcendental reading of that text. Counter-textual readings, properly conducted in a supplementary fashion, enriching our understanding and appreciation of the phenomenon of the non-text and its simulation/re-simulation of phenomena implicated, directly or indirectly, in the non-text.
	In the light of the previous comments we might like to examine the phenomenal nature of chairs as they are found in the world (of universal discourse). A chair could be defined as `an object for sitting upon.' But in the world of experience we find the meaningfulness of chairs to include a number of observed non-chair functions, e.g., discovering such devices being used to sleep in, stand on, eat on, as art objects, weapons, possible fuel for a fire, etc. Although the meaning of a chair is as defined its full meaningfulness includes many non-chair functions. To comprehend the usefulness of a chair in the world we must also take into account its open-ended non-chair potentialities. To the extent that someone insists dogmatically upon a certain correct reading of a phenomenon we should remind them of the dialectical nature of our appreciation of phenomena in general. Moreover, as a textual reading is in itself a resolution of a relationship between the textual and the anti-textual/counter-textual (in the framework of the meta-textual) we likewise should pay our respects to the demarcational grounds that constitute the identity of that phenomenon. To the extent that a resolution is not properly entered into then to that extent the discourse of that person is apt to deconstruct through the non-resolved presence of anti-text/counter-texts. In this the blindness of the author, in their intentionality, is made manifest through a deconstructive reading of their text in such a manner that in our leaning upon it (non-destructively) we find demonstrated those unresolved features that the author could not, or would not, deal with directly. These unresolved and resolved elements equally being part of the intentionality of the author to that extent that we can observed their imprinted deposition, their trace upon the fabric of the world. As those traces are inter-textually encompassed hence their ontological nature as traces upon traces. The socially instantiated aspect of the meta-text, through the adoption and adaptation of genres, imparting a social dimension to this whole province of textuality and interpretation.

6.	Metaphor has been interpreted, in the light of a transcendental phenomenology, as a form of complex transcendental reading involving the three moments of transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution. That accepted why not reverse this procedure and now view a critically conducted metaphorical reading of a text as a transcendental reading of that text and in the process throwing a metaphorical light on the (critical) nature of the transcendental. In a similar fashion a critical transcendental reading of the process of `asking a question' might also be used to supplement this metaphorically inspired approach(?).
	One important sense of the term transcendental has been to define it as the distinctive unification of the necessary conditions that establish a certain type of phenomenon as a phenomenon of that type. In my opinion the distinctive unification of these necessary conditions, as the pre-conditional grounds for the constitutional formation of that phenomenon, are completely revealed in the process of the transcendental suspension. The central point, between the text and the anti-text, locates the distinctiveness of that phenomenon in the general world of universal discourse, our intersubjective psychic map of the world as a verbally thematized subject for discourse.
	The sense of the expression transcendental has also been defined, by myself, as trans-constitutional, trans-cognitive and trans-intentional. If we define the structural-functioning of intentionality in cognitive terms as conceptual-elements-in-conceptual-processes, and all forms of definition must take a conceptual complexion, then it follows that a transcendental level of appreciation involves a trans-cognitive approach. At the same time is we perceive our appreciation of constitutional formation to be intellectually expressed in terms of conceptual-elements-in-conceptual-processes then the same conceptual complexion must apply. However, our appreciation of such cognitive structuralization implies the necessity for a meta-level higher by one degree, i.e., the transcendental level of trans-cognitive performance. Hence for the intentional to be properly appreciated trans-cognitive terms of reference must be available. Because we can appreciate the conceptual complexion of our intentional constitution, in its surface presentation at least, it follows that such appreciation must be transcendental in complexion, i.e., trans-constitutional, etc. (although verbalized in forms of transcendental-cognitive treatment when the trans-textual and the non-textual interaction becomes textualized). 
	Another important sense of the transcendental is revealed through the `interrelationship of the conceptual components of that type of phenomenal relationship' conceptually `simulating' the nature of the relationship as it is had in experience. This aspect prior to some form of conceptual renormalization must be in effect trans-conceptual. Hence intentionality in its cognitivity must be some form of conceptual mapping of the structural-functions of the (type of) relationship under examination. The transcendental taking a relational perspective on the constitutional structure and function of that intentional object-state under examination both with respect to an analysis/synthesis of itself and an analysis/synthesis of its place in the field of its invoked evocation. Hence a transcendental perspective must also be a relational perspective, an appreciation of the intentional state of affairs as a relational state of affairs. In my opinion this aspect is simulated/re-simulated in the provocational interaction between processes of transcendental reduction and processes of transcendental reconstitution. In metaphorical terms of reference this can be translated as the `relationship' between the repetition of evocative structural-functions and the (reinforced repetition of the) provocational juxtaposition of those evocative structural-functions. Evocative fields in the light of their invocative subject matter being revealed through processes of reduction, another aspect introduced and manipulated through the imposition of a metaphorical process (as treated in the  transcendental interpretation of the hermeneutical circle as developed to date).
	The imposition, manipulation and evaluation of the metaphorical process revealing a fourth aspect of the transcendental through the twin aspects of judgment and value-creation. The process of hermeneutical appreciation attempting a re-construction of this process of ostensively deposited and recorded value-creation.
	These four aspects of the transcendental process being revealed equally through our use of the metaphorical process. Hence my cross-identification of this complex sense of the transcendental with these aspects of the pre-conditionally necessary grounds for intentional constitutional formation, the trans-cognitive appreciation of the (surface) formation of intentional constitution, the relational appreciation of phenomena and the judgmental development of value-creation. Finding all these facets at work in the non-literal treatment of metaphor I believe I have demonstrated sufficient grounds for my identification of the metaphorical process with the transcendental process and vice versa. This equivalence allowing us to develop a transcendental reading of a text, as a phenomenon, through the critical mechanism of the imposition of a non-literal metaphorical treatment of that text. As has already been remarked such an examination is also an interpretive process. One implication of this equivalence implying that a critical metaphorical reading of a text is in effect a critical transcendental reading of that text complete with all forms of value that must flow from such a critically conducted investigation. That in a similar manner a critical transcendental-phenomenological appreciation of the essential nature of an act of questioning should most likely be able to also supplement our metaphorical reading of the transcendental?
	Having introduced the concept of the suspension of the transcendental suspension we might like to entertain for the sake of completeness what implications might follow if we were to reduce the state of transcendental reduction and reconstitute the state of transcendental reconstitution? Having noted how the suspension of the suspension critically releases the self-creation of transcendental value-formation from the effective paralysis of the (mere performance of the) transcendental suspension we might also like to see how the `reduction of the reduction' and the `reconstitution of the reconstitution' further assists the criticality, critical self-expression, of the transcendental process of value formation/re-formation. It would seem natural to suppose that the `reduction of the reduction' effectively undoes the reduction, or, at least sets limits on the extent, or depth, the reduction is to be performed. In a similar manner the `reconstitution of the reconstitution' would seem to imply the re-synthesis of the synthesis, i.e., its re-simulated protension, in effect the continual re-presentation of the presentation (otherwise the phenomenon under simulation would de-present itself). In some measure this double act of transcendental encirclement restores the very cognitive grounds upon which the sense of the transcendental is to be immanently grounded non-textually and transcendently founded trans-textually. That in effect the sense of the transcendental is both generated from a transcendent synthesis of cognitive material of the textual-metatextual interrelationship, and, re-invested in vocational terms of reference through the cognitive treatment of this excess of transcendental value formed in the midst of this process of transcendental trans-valuation (with its expressions of value associated directly with the thematization of identity, aesthetic production/reproduction, existential-ethical treatment of personal/inter-personal forms of interaction, pragmatic considerations of utility, considerations of factuality, and hermeneutic processes of trans-thematical re-construction).
	In effect a double hermeneutic circle has been put in place with the (trans-transcendental suspensional) balance of the trans-textual mirroring the reconstitution of the non-verbal experiential relationship of the non-textual with its verbalized treatment in a return to the level of cognitive performance exercised through the reduction of the reduction. A non-literal metaphorical mapping of a dialectical process that gives both a degree of autonomy to our poles of transcendental performance and a sense of collective, critical power to their overall sense of vocation (whether it be writing or reading in the broad sense of textuality as defined in our journal under the entries of our Second Day).
	To conclude this section let me examine more closely this concept of autonomy and whether or not the hermeneutic circle itself is a simulation, or even, for that matter, merely an artifact or transcendental illusion of our tripartite methodology?
	Originally my epistemology, in its schemtization, was linear in both a vertical and a horizontal metaphorical plane. On these two axes resonance was invoked with a recognition that in the movement of our orientation from a horizontal orientation to a vertical axis, or vice versa, we had to put in place on our horizontal axis, e.g., the Affective, Cognitive and Transcendental Aspects of our Schema, in order to effect this re-orientation, a point of modal equilibrium as well as establishing the full exercise of that particular pre-re-orientational Aspect. That established the pathway for this state of re-orientational advancement was now perceived as actually open even though, in another sense, all levels and aspects of the human psyche were operating, at the level of their backgrounds, to some extent. That the modal orientation of that psyche could be indirectly inferred by reference to textual reports, or some other form of indication, that suggested a certain level, or levels, was, or were, undergoing a relatively greater degree of epistemological activity. The greatest differential, across levels and aspects, in this regard establishing the effective modal center of that psyche for the period (the differential of that differential was relatively invariant).
	This point of modal equilibrium is now interpreted as the moment of transcendental suspension and is now provisionally given the same degree of autonomy as our moments of analytic-reduction and synthetic-reconstitution. But a state of asymmetry between these poles of the Object, Ego and World might suggest that the hermeneutic circle is itself more an artifact of our tripartite schematization. Let me elaborate. 
	Pure analysis cannot be performed, pure synthesis cannot be performed. On the other hand when these two previous moments are in a suitable state of balance a transcendental state of suspension is put into effect. Such a state of affairs can be realized perfectly if only for a point instant in time in our transition, via this middle ground, from one state to some other? On the other hand we can recognize the persistence of an analytical orientation or a synthetical orientation, besides a period in time that sees the invocation of an ongoing transcendental suspension. 
	Autonomy can be argued for but there does appear to be some degree of asymmetry between suspension and these other two poles. One way of resolving this apparent anomaly is to invoke the simulation of our hermeneutic passage across a space between the poles of Object (reduction) and World (reconstitution) at the level of their field backgrounds. We might say that across this gap our passage is discharged to the extent that, in effect, such a circular passage is vitually open (although not actually open). That the hermeneutic circle is itself simulated making our simulation of the non-textual a double simulation; a state of informational communication being put into effect when this gap is crossed whether virtually or non-virtually. Hence autonomy between these three poles of Object, Ego and World can be reinstated as well as simultaneously recognizing the asymmetry between them. 
	The actual exercise of a hermeneutic circle cannot be pointed out. On the other hand the simulation of a hermeneutic circle likewise cannot be exhibited. Although the existence and the use of such a device remains tentative in theory, and practice, the existence of such a device is practically inescapable in experiential terms of reference. Rather than an artifact of our intellectual thought processes such a device forms the relative foundations for such developments:

	No synthesis without analysis,
	no analysis without synthesis.
	Encountering the pre-constituted 
	through the transcendental suspension.
	
7.	At this point in this conclusion let me introduce a series of paradoxes, a series of soluble paradoxes, in order to throw further light on the dialectical nature of textuality.

i.	  A text is read the moment we stop reading the text!

	Our appreciation of the text's non-text is realized in our transcendental appreciation of the textual-metatextual relationship written into the manufacture of that text (if that text has a textual non-text). However, the spontaneous and non-calculative nature of transcendental experience demands that from a transcendental point of view we cease  to read the text in sequential cognitive terms of reference.
	Of course the paradox is a double paradox because our transcendental reading of that text necessitates cognitive material to suspend so the text is also read the moment we stop `stop reading' it...

ii.	  We do not read a text, the text reads itself, or, put another way, we do not interpret a text, the text interprets itself for us!

	We listen to a text when we listen to the conversation set up between the text and its meta-text. This relationship is metaphorically a potential series of conversations perhaps also involving polythematic, polytextual and parallel textual (para-textual) interactions besides, most importantly, a trans-textual - non-textual parallel convergence (the metaphorical contradiction here being intentional).
	In other words we do not, and cannot, read a text merely as it presents itself in the form of an inscription. But in overhearing the levels and layers, and other dimensional features, can we read a text. In this regard we effectively listen to the text talking to itself for us.
	A double paradox being present to the extent that some form of receptivity and participation on our part, as a pre-condition, is necessary in order (to activate the conditions for) this processes of interpretive listening.

iii.	  Only when we look through a text can we see the text, or, put another way, most of the text is invisible!

	Through the cracks in a text, through the interrelational space between words and themes, within the various senses of a word, etc., do we read a text. 
	But treated also as a double paradox we must also have noted those words and themes in order to have looked though these cracks in the deposition of a text and its meta-text.

	For the reader I have included a number of other puzzles that might help us think through the dialectical nature of the phenomenon of textuality:

iv.	Only a fraction of the text can be read but what can 	be read counts!
v.	  The visible meta-text cannot be seen, only the 				invisible meta-text can be seen!
vi.	  In a relationship with a text both the reader and the 		text disappear!
vii.	  The metaphorical center of a text has no absolute 			center!
viii.  A text is only read the second time!
ix.	  Each time the text is read a different text is read!
x.	In a collapse of the circular nature of the 
hermeneutic project there is nothing inside the
text nor outside it!
xi.	  No meta-text - no text, no text - no meta-text!
xii.	  The meta-text casts a shadow over the text!
xiii.  A text is not translated it re-translates itself!
xiv.	  A text is located through its anti-text, it locates 			itself through its counter-texts!
xv.	A text can only point, pointing to that which is non
text!
xvi.	  The voice of the text is silently centered in the 			text beneath its surface chatter!
xvii.  A text exists only in virtue of its non-text!
xviii. A quarter of the text is linear with a beginning and 	
an ending, a quarter of the text is linear with no 	beginning and no ending, a quarter of the text is 		circular with a beginning and an ending, and a 		quarter of the text is circular with no beginning 		and no ending!

8.	The extent to which a text-in-being-read is capable of simulating a relatively, and relevantly, coherent-harmonization of a simulation of its non-text to that extent we can claim that that text has the appearance of an inherent intersubjective hermeneutic-objectivity. In a text that is well-formed and is well-detailed we are invited, to the extent that we feel meta-textually welcome, to overhear, and then participate in, the textual-metatextual `conversation' of that text. In a transcendental suspension of the cognitive material of that hermeneutic conversation, and a suspension of that suspension, through a simultaneous metaphorical implosion and explosion of textuality, there is trans-textually simulated the simulation of the non-textual.
In an ongoing discovery of the `vocation' of a text we are `called' to `address it' in `its addressing of us' as its `reader.' In such an `address' we discover the `psychic location' of that text and any dis-placed re-location of that text discovered in a further complementary or supplementary re-reading of it. In questioning this conversation it converses with us in a questioning of ourselves. In hermeneutically making the text `ours' it re-appropriates `us' and re-constitutes us as `the reader of that text.' By these sleights of hand it has us believing that we read the text. Through the lens of our encirclement of `the encirclement of the text' we are shown through re-simulation, the meaning and meaningfulness of that text which is not `textual' but `non-textual'. In the world of the intertextual (i.e., the inter-metatextual) how else are we to make sense of the textual but by reference to what it is not, namely, the non-textual! Immersed in a world of relationships the objectivity of the real world, which can only be approached (as a text), anchors all forms of textuality, to some degree or other, within its embrace. Therein the text is given its apparent imprint of factuality, an apparent world of its own that can only stray so far in accordance with the nature of its vocation. A world that has a complex value that is created and re-created through the provocational nature of its re-construction. Through forms of evocative and provocative repetition, in a social world of discourse, the relatively subjective and the relatively objective meet in the inter-subjective objectivity of a world-of-life that, in its authenticity, is stamped with the degree of authenticity that is re-realized. In an authentic suspension of the transcendental suspension, etc., forms of mis-interpretation, in our intuitive suspicion, are mis-interpreted. In an ongoing rectification of mis-interpretation the three persons of our own world of conversation blend to form a triune sense of personhood with an ongoing harmonization of intentionality, vocational participation and intersubjective appreciation. In an overcoming of mis-interpretation we make our way through this world of textuality as both writers and readers of this world. As a `living text' we enter into a dialogue with the world of textuality by virtue of our intrinsic emptiness finding, through the holes in our being, the `whole of our being,' this wholeness being restored to us through the trans-textual appreciation of the non-textual; as a simulation simulating a simulation. Between the simulation and the re-simulation what `difference' could there be?
	By taking the transcendentally suspended pathway between the appearance of all forms of extreme, between the presence of all forms of polarity, we overcome the terrible dichotomy between all expressions of dogmatic absolutism and mindless relativism. In such an existentially `self-controlled' and `self-critical' state of affairs we find an overcoming of self and an overcoming of all forms of control. Only `in' our `freedom' can we discover the text, only through the text can we discover our freedom! 
	Freedom is discovered to that degree the whole can re-invest its provocational displacement upon the parts of its collective constitution. A structure that is only enstructured could not change, could not participate in change, could not experience change nor could be entertained as a possibility. Equally a function that is only enfunctioned could not function, etc. Even the apparently `pure' mathematical function only functions because it is meta-textually structured in its functional application. For a function to function it must be enstructured, and, for a structure to structure it must be enfunctioned. Even chaos is structured, absolute absence cannot be entertained just as much as absolute presence cannot be thought (either as a process and/or as the content of a process). Presence presenting itself not through its designation(s) but through the relationship between designations; between the holes in its own designation and between the cracks between interrelated designations. Freedom being experienced in the existential openness of the relationship currently chosen through our focus upon it and its focus upon us. Through the interaction between the immanence of function and the transcendence of structure our differences in orientation allowing `us', through the psychic center of our being as a being that finds its place in the world, to migrate. Such ongoing migration taking `place,' within certain limits, between these two poles of the textual and the meta-textual, between these two poles of the analytical and the synthetical, between these two poles of the Object and the World, etc. Our ability to migrate between poles constituting our freedom (when our intentionality to act is realized in our writing/reading and re-writing/re-reading of the world).
	Although this apparent, inter-subjective hermeneutic objectivity is simulated and re-simulated, etc., should we treat the text absolutely literally? In our literal treatment of a text would we not loose sight of its metaphorically grounded structural-enfunctioning? Loosing all sense of that text as a `text.' Surely the hermeneutic project, through a collapse of metaphor, would itself collapse with an absolute collapse of all sense. That, ironically, the search for absolute structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness can only result in an absolute loss of meaning and meaningfulness, a complete loss of all significance. The sheer insanity of absolute sanity. A prospect that, thankfully, can never be contemplated...
	
9.	In our experience the world can have no absolute (absolutistic) foundations but it does have relative foundations! All our experience of phenomena, the very phenomenon of experience, is functionally enstructured and structurally enfunctioned. In what way does the apparent formalism(s) of this text contribute to an existentially fruitful reading (and writing) of a text? Is not this search for foundations, this disciplined fascination for `method,' merely a form of madness that can never be fulfilled, a quest that can never be satisfied? A madness like the helpless anxiety of a drowning person clutching at passing straws? This last metaphor is indeed apt. But let me expand it a little to demonstrate what I more correctly intend by it.
	Passing straws cannot save the drowning person. The person who seeks the safety of relativism(s) will find their fleeting enterprise most surely escaping them like securing their life to the tenuous passage of passing strands of straw in a sea of scattered straw. On the other hand in gathering together these strands of straw to form sizable bundles we can then tie these units together and form, for a short time, the relative safety of a raft. By such means we can wait for, or, better, fabricate a more sturdy craft to take us to the distant shore which, like a mirage, can never be reached; an objective that has a value-for-us `in the getting there' and not in `the getting there.' The dogmatic absolute philosopher, on the other hand, is like a grandly attired person sitting on their bundle of hay content to let it drift forever upon the surface of the sea when any reasonable person would know that in a short time this whole enterprise must surely come unstuck, deconstruct and disintegrate. Better to seek the relative safety of our raft and in continually repairing it, and adding to it, build a better vessel to sail the high seas, letting the sea test it, but, in our reply, learning to overcome such relative limitations when and where possible! Seeking a passage, following the middle path, without drowning nor coming totally unstuck! Overcoming the fascinating variety of formalisms and relativisms that, as philosophical debris, float forever past us in this world by using both of these tendencies for `order and play,' in a transcendental synthesis, to fashion a provisional craft adequate to the task to hand. Founded on our digestion of previous (philosophical) texts and grounded on their continual, critical re-writing...

10.	Herein has been outlined the `meta-text' of our text. But now presented as a `text' what is the meta-text of this meta-textualized `text'? Must we chase a tail that chases a tail that chases a tail, or, will we forever go around in circles, circles within circles, circles without circles? Repetition forever repeating itself, repeating itself. Each time around never the same; never, never the same; never quite the same... 
	Hence our ability to thematize and appreciate a text along with our appreciation of its meta-text, its trans-textual relationship with the non-textual; the nature of its place in the world... An ability circumscribed within relative foundations discovered retrospectively and breached prospectively... Returning us to the openness of the real world of phenomena never that far removed, indeed, a world-of-life completely open to `our addressing of it' and `its addressing of us,' a transcendental world of presence discovered `through' its apparent textualization... A world of textuality whose place in the world is thematized, given a greater sense of dimension, by the overlapping inter-commensuration of the adoption of a number of relevant and fruitful perspectives re-producing a self-integrating multi-interpretation of the apparent ur-text under verbalized circumspection and the realization of non-verbal, direct experience of that `text'... All forms of textuality possessing an opaque transparency, a transparent opaqueness... The world of textuality including all things intentionally pointed to, all names, deposited traces of pointing, the traces of all encounters, the trace of all traces... The `simulation of an encounter' with the `encounter of its simulation' - an `experience experiencing experience' within a world whose reading is grounded on foundations that are founded on `non-foundations' as a text that writes itself, as a text that reads itself!