One More Post-Textual Conclusion In The Form Of An Epilogue

	Human experience is essentially linguistic. (Gadamer)

	The full meaningfulness of this statement, and other statements of similar import, is that we must also understand the meaning of the anti-textual expression non-linguistic in order to make sense, through demarcational differentiation, of this textual-expression linguistic. Indeed, it is tempting to write all forms of reality in the overarching form of a `text' of some description or other. Distinctions drawn under the heading of the Second Day in this Hypothetical Journal illustrate this tendency. But the word linguistic would have no meaning if everything was reduced to some form of a text. Hence the following double hermeneutic insight that human experience is essentially linguistic and non-linguistic, i.e., that experience is subject to interpretation; as an interpretation of that experience subjected to interpretation. This insight has been articulated through my concept of the non-textual (and its accompanying concept of the trans-textual). Let me recount the following incident with which I hope to illustrate this necessary element of the non-verbal in its centrality to the meaningful speech act (and all other forms of intentionally formulated expression that involve a textualization of experience).
	A short time after having mastered the art of riding a bicycle I was cycling along a street early one morning when, suddenly, a careless occupant of a car opened their door across my immanent flight-path. With split seconds to spare I managed to just avoid the door and the considerable damage that would have been done to all parties concerned. As I past this surprised motorist, cum pedestrian, I was literally speechless. Words absolutely failed me. I could not find an expression that transmitted what I wished to say in that instant of passing that thoughtless person. I wanted to swear at them, tell them that they should have been more careful and to be more careful in the future, to look before getting out of their car, etc. Some seconds down the road I found a rough equivalent in the words Heh! Look out (you expletive deleted). But this expression, or any other for that matter, is merely associated with this type of experience, in its successful performance becoming merely a learnt response, a way of speaking under such circumstances. Indeed, the next time this type of experience occurred, only a short time afterwards I am sad to say, I was not so speechless in my attempt to verbalize a response. By the time this experience had repeated itself for the third time I was able to yell my set piece exclamation in a broadside riposte exactly  as I past these now mutually terrified participants in the drama of this ongoing re-educational programme. 
	Let me now reflect upon, and analyze, this experience of speechlessness. Although I could be described as `verbally paralyzed' I believe such a response, or rather the lack of such a response, was more the result of a lack of a single expression that could transmit for me what I spontaneously felt in my rapid intuitive appreciation of this situation. My avoidance of the car door indicates that I was not physically paralyzed. Rather, it appears to me, that essentially I lacked, at least initially, a verbal response that fully conveyed the complex sense of intentionality that I wished to impart to the perpetrator of this type of situation. I certainly understood what I wanted to say. However, meaning, and meaningfulness, cannot be transmitted in an instant without some form of adequate preparation (along provocational lines as discussed in this journal). But, then, even if I had articulated fully what I would have liked to have transmitted to this type of person, let us say in a civilized exchange of opinions by the side of the road after such an incident, I don't believe that my overall sense of intent would have been communicated unless the integrity of that intent was re-simulated adequately. An adequate comprehension of that sense of overall intent must be experienced in a holistic fashion and not merely through a re-simulation of its sequentially delivered transmission. Such integrity is re-realized in a non-calculative mode, in a type of intuition that is sudden, although pre-prepared, effective and essentially wordless. Repetition of this type of intuition can then be named, descriptively dissected, collectively reassembled in a pre-prepared provocatively controlled re-simulation, but, again, only re-experienced in a totalistic non-verbalized fashion, or rather, in a transcendental transcending of its verbalized shadow. A text was read, namely, our appreciation of the situation, but, our understanding of that situation in essence defies all words, cannot be merely reduced to the linguistic, or i.e., the `textual' in some form or other. Thus we may wish to reduce all experience to the textual, as a text in some form of interpretation or mis-interpretation, in essence the core of such textuality must be non-textual (experienced trans-textually). Moreover, such experience cannot be reduced to the status of being merely some form of textualized experience. Indeed, one might say that it is through the cracks of its textualization that the non-textual experience, in its centrality, is experienced and re-experienced, etc., i.e., simulated and re-simulated. Such experience being articulated through its articulation; between the holes, between the cracks, etc., found in its textual encapsulation. Although dependent on the illusion of such entities like words or elements, experiential bits and pieces, etc., correctly, the sense of all textuality must escape its textualization even though the appearance of sense itself, as a phenomenon, is absolutely dependent upon such textualization! 
	The fact that in reflection or recollection we can spontaneously experience, or re-experience, the instantaneous totality of some text is evidence, I believe, that the sense of a text is itself fundamentally non-linguistic even though the text of that sense is linguistically deposited and linguistically retrieved when taken up in pre-interpretive acts of pre-reading. The actual act of reading itself being essentially our reading of its evocational structures in and through their juxtaposition realizing an ongoing series of pre-prepared induced insights in our thematization of that text. Our overall appreciation of that text taking the same format but from the perspective of a successful understanding of our already pre-developed pre-understanding of that text. Hence, an appreciation of texts cannot be reduced to a matter of their mere textuality itself. In some ways the development of a final understanding of a text can be arranged without the presence of that text actually being there at that moment of its provocative totalization. Thus our experience of experience is wordless, but, our account of such experience is textualized. That these two aspects go together like hand and glove but in such a way that, under normal circumstances, they never become confused. We shake hands with an outstretched hand and never mistake the trace, or outline, of a glove for the presence, or presentation, of the former.
	Can this presence of the text, as a read phenomenon, ever be fully approached and should this act of an approach only be conducted from the perspective of only one perspective? That a text can have only one reading, and, that that reading can only be conducted from the correct aspect of its intended perspective for interpretation?
	A text can never have one perspective in which, and only in which, it can be read. The perspective of the meta-text sets up an appropriate perspective for the reading of a text. Hence already we have two perspectives, namely, the meta-textual perspective for the adoption, and adaptation, of another perspective for the attempted reading of that text. And how do we know that that interpreted textual perspective is the final perspective for the deepest intended reading of that text. Then, again, a textual perspective necessitates an anti-textual perspective and at least one counter-textual perspective for an ongoing reading of that text. And what simple text could be given to a metaphorical reading of a text, a metaphorical reading of that metaphorical reading, etc. Then there is the phenomenon of finding that a text can be read from a number of fruitful perspectives that release more value than that merely invested in their enactment. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that a text is multi-faceted, and, that our appreciation, when and where necessary, should and must follow suit. 
	The text is centered in the text but our encounter of that text must approach that apparent center from the adapted adoption of an approach that can only go so far. The usefulness of that text is in its successfulness in taking us towards an encounter of that text; the proximity realized and the fruitfulness of that encounter. But no reading of a text can escape the reality of its textual embodiment in the world, in a world of various degrees of simulated potential-actuality centered in an intersubjective-objective world of discourse. Moreover, all readings are anchored upon the phenomenality of that text; that text as a phenomenon in the world, in this world-of-life. Because we can never completely coincide with the center of a text, and because the center of all texts is a fuzzy non-point-like region it implies, metaphorically, that the absolute phenomenon of the text must forever escape us even though the simulation of that phenomenon is probably adequate to the interpretive task to hand. That although a text is always open to its being appropriated it can never be absolutely appropriated!
	Should a reading of a text, therefore, be fragmentary, multi-aspectival, provocative, deconstructive, unfinished, something that can forever be worked for, never realized in a definitive fashion, etc. The answer to this question must be a qualified yes! Qualified by virtue of the fact that when a text ceases to release further value we normally disengage our attention from such a task. That a reading need only be adequate, and, that an appreciation of such adequacy can never be reduced merely to a matter of opinion or to some relativistic position without definitive content whose performance alone is to be enjoyed. Remember, the textual text is the result of the resolution of the author or authors in their intentionally driven construction of that text. The phenomenal nature of resolution has an appearance of intentional definitiveness. It cannot be merely arbitrary or free-floating in a world of textuality. Resolution is the resolve to see enacted, or re-enacted, the resolution of a series of resolutions that resolve the enactment and/or re-enactment of that text. A text is located in textual space. It is deposited in time. But the text is read ahistorically and appreciated from the textual space of the trans-spatial for how else are we to metaphorically appreciate its position in textual space. Hence the reading of a text invites a multi-perspectival reading of its textualization. What determines the fruitfulness of our putting this text in perspective is the value released from that particular reading. Because all readings of a text, however far fetched, are centered upon the embodiment of a text, all readings are potentially fruitful to some degree or other, but not necessarily fruitful, to the same degree, in their intercommensuration. The same situation applying to the intercommensuration of one text with another, or, between one meta-text and some other meta-text, between meta-text and its intended text, etc. Each perspective emerging from the definition of a perspective allowed to emerge from some other perspective, all perspectives thematizing a field of potential perspectives; thematizing an integrity realized in an intersubjective world of discourse, an integrity that finds itself reflected in the `integrity' of the psyche and that `integrity' of the discourse itself.
	Interpretation involves the use of a code or a series of codes. If we already have some understanding of the text then our discovery of its being encoded necessitates a reversal of the code's meta-textual mechanisms in order to de-encode that text. Retrospectively the `successfully' de-encoded text is recognized through the release of additional value through the de-applicational reversal of that applied code. Prospectively a code can be recognized by virtue of a textual-metatextual parallelization of manipulated structural-functions. The reversal of the code de-encoding the coded deposition of that text. Like the (meta-textual/textual) key in the (textual/meta-textual) lock the application of that key, by turning it, feeds into our hermeneutic circle (through additional relationships established between the presented text and the overall meta-text) realizing and releasing various forms of surplus value contributing, through cognitive re-investment, to a greater degree of textual depth and organizational integrity. Codes upon codes, texts within texts. A hierarchy of interpretational fields, each distinctive level and perspective relatively founded on the relatively less controversial.
	The application of a reputed code that illuminates a text with more or less the same degree of value invested in its imposition indicating either a mis-application of that code or, more likely, a code apparently not intended by the author or authors of that text. Parallelization establishing the possibility of a code, the successfulness of a de-encoding process establishing the relative merit of such an imposition. The imposition of a de-encoded encoding that satisfactorily releases surplus value not ruling out the possibility that there exist other forms of code held implicitly in that same text. Intercommensuration between the fruitful application of a number of codes taking place by virtue of an interaction between the phenomenal embodiment of that text (in and through its current presentation/re-presentation) and its isomorphic reflection upon these proposed counter-textually encoded perspectives. The re-simulation of an increased organizational synthesis establishing the integrity of that text and the integrity of the intent necessary for its textual entextualization. The integrity of this organizational synthesis establishing the relative degree of its successful de-encoding, i.e., its interpretation. Interpretation being essentially an ongoing process of re-interpretational rectification of textual states of relative mis-interpretation. The currently successful application of a code shifting, or displacing, the apparent psychic center of that text in the total world of possible discourse. The successful de-encoding of a text increasing its organizational depth, integrity, overall formation, detail, structural-meaning, functional-meaningfulness, etc.
	Fragments of paint can paint a picture. Fragments of text can paint the picture of a text. Fragments of readings of a text must give the picture of that text greater depth. Those readings that release more value than that value invested in their being painted painting a better picture of that text. When a text is painted in finer detail there comes a point when we cease to notice its greater detailization. It is as if the painting, in our carefully conducted perception and interpretation, is either viewed as unfinished or is treated as already finished. Either way, once we have completed this type of inspection, we then move on in this gallery of textuality and review some other instance of a text. A well-detailed text giving us an adequate appreciation of its evocative material, a well-formed text allowing us to satisfactorily experience its successfully provocative juxtaposition of evocative material and the thematization of the resolutional processes realized therein. A well-presented, well-balanced `balance' between these two aspects simulating a picture of a text simulating a picture of a text simulating a certain picture of a text simulating a certain picture of that text..!
	If the simulation is a `simulation of a simulation,' i.e., a re-simulation through protension, how are we to meet the so called `real world' and therein `truly' meet each other in this world? Is the simulation of a simulation a restoration that restores the `simulation' to `that of which the simulation is a simulation of?' No! The simulation is never that far removed from our collective vision of reality. Through the double hermeneutic circle the suspension is suspended, etc. Therein the simulation of the simulation is released from its being apparently a mere simulation by virtue of its non-simulation, i.e., the `non-simulation' of the non-textual. The simulation of the `text' cannot be a simulation because the simulation is non-textual. Through the suspension of that suspension the non-textual is not simulated but realized, or, rather, re-realized (through some form of insightful recognition). Because realization is `realization-by-a-reader-embodied-in-a-world-of-realization' it implies that an act of realization is simulated by the life-world in a world-of-life. `Reality' is forever pervasive in experience, always the touchstone transmuting the value of experience in accordance with its natural value realized transcendentally through the relationship from the point of view of that relationship (in a world of the relational). The life-world as shared in the relationship of all relationships, both in its actual-potentiality and its potential-actuality, holotextually imprints itself on the fabric of all textualized deposition. Through all texts, through all fragments of text, stands a vision of the world, in accordance with the degree of field-preparation, forever realized through the simulation of its simulation; a self-declared vision realizing itself as that self-declared vision that is both the illusion of reality (non-transcendental) and the reality of the illusion (transcendental). In the center of the act of judgment there is to be found an existential relationship realized through an ongoing transmutation of the non-existential. The vocation of the world entextualizing itself (holographically), the vocation of the text to re-enworld itself through simulation. Like the picture that paints itself, the painting that pictures itself. A text that simulates the simulation of a simulation never that far removed; never, never, that far removed; like a circle that encircles itself; a text that can never completely entextualize itself! Hence our eternal access to `the realization of the simulation' and `the simulation of that realization;' a simulation of a simulation as a realization of realization itself! 
	In investigating the philosophical consequences of the `simulation of the simulation' (as the realization of realization itself) I am trying to adopt more than just a mere pragmatic theory of truth. A middle path between dogmatic formalisms and mindless relativisms cannot be just merely pragmatic. We are not shifting ourselves from the world of darkness towards the light of absolute truth, or, from the world of potentiality to a world of actuality, rather, we must recognize that we already inhabit a world of truth, a world involved in an ongoing re-discovery of truthfulness and re-realization of a greater degree of truthfulness, etc., re-evaluating the complex value of the textual presentation currently before us through our dialectical engagement with that `text' in its conversational engagement with itself (regardless of whether our `text' is textual or non-textual in complexion). All performance is founded by and grounded upon a socially pre-determined world of conventional reality. Moreover, in our attendance to (the intentional Object or Objects under review as) the `phenomenon itself' in its relationship with a World, that in essence must be its own overall guarantor, factuality is spontaneously determined in keeping with the nature of its own productive performance in that world of relatively intersubjective-objectivity. Truthfulness is continually re-experienced directly and/or indirectly in a world of authenticity through the performance of our participation, and our participation in our performance, as a social being in a world of being, becoming in this world of intersubjective-objectivity a being continually in touch with reality to some degree or other. Even the most insane person is still grounded in this world in whatever form it might be mis-interpreted by them. The very fact of its being mis-interpreted, being a mis-interpretation, guaranteeing their still being `a being in this world of social being' however difficult as a person they might find the passage of their performance as a `social being' in this world of social being. 
	Can we present other arguments for taking a middle path between absolute formalism and pragmatic relativism? For a start we should recognize, I believe, that there are a number of different type of evaluation, namely, thematical, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, trans-thematical, factual; scientific, cultural, hermeneutic; religious and non-religious forms of holistic valuation along with various permutations and combinations of the former. The `pragmatical' cannot be elevated above these other forms of value; any privilege granted to the pragmatical must also be given to any other transcendentally based form of valuation. In this respect, from the transcendental point of view, authenticity has no special boundaries or privileges in this regard. This stands to reason as other forms of evaluation equally work for us (pragmatically) under their own cognitively appropriate terms of reference. The problematic nature of philosophical examination in this regard stemming from the fact that philosophical problems are more the artefacts of our `textuality' and the adoption of coresponding modes of `textual interpretation' that reconstruct, but inadequately appreciate, those limited terms  of reference.
	The philosophical problems that confront a philosopher can be re-constructed from a reading of their textual deposition in this regard. Those problematic regions can be re-lived and then rethought afresh. But more often in our examination of such textual deposition we do not fully appreciate the textual terms of reference that allow those apparent problems to manifest themselves, and, following on from such faulty foundations find ourselves unable to fully appreciate philosophically `the reality of their illusion' and `the illusion of their reality.' In our reading of a text we need to formally deal with both the text and the meta-text; at least be able to articulate our intuitions and suspicions on this territory. Then, we need to adopt a transcendental perspective on this region of textuality and in a critical transcendental translation re-write the former in such a way those former problems meet with their non-solution, solution, resolution or dissolution (although non-solutions and solutions should be discerned in critical pre-transcendental forms of treatment through a recognition that the problem either has no solution or has a solution in terms of that textuality constructed and re-constructed). Resolutions ensuing from the dialectical treatment of `polarizations,' whereas, dissolutions are realized in a critical re-writing of the terms of reference in a transcendental, non-literal, metaphorical format adequate to this task of over-coming the distortion(s) inherent in the construction and re-construction of that type of text as evidenced in its pre-critical format. In this regard it is interesting to note that the adequate re-construction of a text is only the first step in a process of interpretation, an appreciation of its textuality necessitating higher, transcendental terms of reference (for how else are we to `judge' the adequacy/inadequacy of those textual terms of reference in a resolution of that text's philosophical problematicity. A more formal approach also dealing with the articulation of the meta-text, anti-text and counter-textual perspectives necessary for an in depth appreciation of that type of text. An adequate appreciation of that type of text allowing us to provocationally accommodate and/or re-write its textualization in such a manner so as to clarify and then resolve the nature of its problematicity.
	In what way then does this middle position, and the exposition just outlined on the resolution of philosophical probelmaticity, allow us to differentiate between the factual-like world simulated in a novel and the unfolding of the drama of human history as might be outlined and argued for by a competent historian. For a start we must dismiss this Aristotelian tendency to work from the potential to the determination of the actual. The world of reality can know neither a pure world of potentiality nor a pure world of actuality. We are already immersed in this polar continuum, although either pole can be moved towards it can never be reached (except in an arbitrary manner pre-defined analytically). Pure actuality could not change, pure potentiality leaves nothing to change (even if that object subjected to change is only a place holder conveniently packaged in such a manner that it cannot be absolutely unwrapped reductively. For all such forms of mis-treatment eventually demand more energy, or value, than that released or re-leased). Moreover, that being the case we may work from the determination of the actual to the potential, or vice versa, our passage is always a migration between these two shores without our actual arrival on either bank. That being the case we have good reason for then finding, and insisting, that our social being in this world, in its more central aspects of being, is grounded on the existential authenticity of the reality of this world. That in our careful reconstruction of its non-textual and/or textual textualization, conducted authentically through a carefully conducted transcendental reading, there comes a point when we can re-cover, or re-uncover, the degree of authenticity that went into the depositional performance of that text currently under interpretation. In its depositional re-performance its degree of authenticity is re-revealed through the excess in value discovered in and through such re-self-declaration. This excess in value taking many complex forms from thematic correspondence to aesthetic coherence, from ethical resolution to pragmatic solution, from hermeneutic trans-thematical semantic advancement to directly re-experiencing the factual force of reality in our embodied relationship within this world of the relational.
	Hence the world of the novel is enjoyed as a subset of this world whereas the history outlined by a reputable historian is seen, and re-experienced, as a vision of this world, albeit as an interpretation of the same. In our reconstruction of a text there is developed a point in the depths of our investigations that informs us of the authentic or inauthentic nature of our text. Until such a point is arrived at in our text's re-performance our interpretation is left in a state of suspension without the suspension of the suspension being actually able to self-deliver this degree of self-confirmation. 
	Authenticity re-experiences this excess of value before its re-investment into our conceptual, linguistic thematization of the re-deposition of that text currently under investigation. In `the simulation of the simulation' the reality of non-linguistic experience is directly re-experienced.
	From a train window the rushing vista of the countryside is not immediately translated into a series of propositions. Time itself is against us in the performance of that type of pursuit. Only when we focus in on some detail is there a shift in the nature of our ostensive being from a non-linguistic agent to a linguistic agent. The poverty of language only being able to circumnavigate and/or show the reality of the linguistic as the non-linguistic. Indeed, most of our lives are spent in a simulation of the simulation, in a direct engagement with the reality of the non-linguistic. A reality that in our authenticity declares the authenticity of that under investigation to the extent that we find ourselves in a position to re-realize, or i.e., recognize, the import of that situation in its complex evaluation of that situation's value for the author/reader.
	Words are formed in a public language. Our verbalization of experience is a direct translation of the non-linguistic's structuralization (as generally imposed phenomenologically upon us) and as re-experienced in its functionalized re-performance. Hence, in a recognition of the non-linguistic core of experience, let me re-express the quotation alluded to at the start of this Epilogue:

	Human experience is essentially non-linguistic and (this is subject to) linguistic (treatment).