The Mapping Of Value

	In this paper I shall be concerned with a mapping of value - in general terms the development of a scheme to help us distinguish one particular primary form of value from some other and the possible accommodations that could be constructed between primary forms of value.
	In a previous paper I noted the potential infinity of particular forms of value,  as opposed to primary forms of value, e.g. economic, monetary, survival, artistic, religious, personal, etc., etc. Our primary forms of value were listed as thematical, i.e. judgments concerning logic, mathematics, science, perceptual discernment, etc., aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, ontical, i.e. judgments in the determination of factuality, and trans-thematical, i.e. judgments that concern field-contrast and world-context(s), i.e. judgments concerning subjectivity, transcendental subjectivity, intentional objectivity (logical subjectivity), time, space, causality, etc. Moreover, each person could entertain a multitude of various degrees and permutations in the essential flavour attached to the specific construction of a particular distinct field of value. The basic intention of this paper is to deal with this subject in a systematic fashion through the use of a schematized format that recognizes distinctive natural forms of primary value creation. Although it has been claimed by myself elsewhere that the transcendental nature of all forms of value is the same the world of value as it is to be found in the world would ostensively appear to contradict this uniformity of fundamental presentation. Moreover, it was found, fortunately, that this endless variety of value that constitutes the meaning and meaningfulness of the life-world might be able to be reduced to six forms of primary value corresponding to six majors types of judgment. In this paper I will concentrate on how these six primary forms might allow us to find particular types of value within their midst or through some form of accommodation between the same.

Introduction

	In the background to this paper I will use the image of a currency to help bring to our attention various relevant features on this subject of value, the nature of value, different types of value and the value of that value we discover in our passage through the life-world, this world of dasein. 
	The very nature of monetary currency is, I believe, to be found in its convertibility. With a collection of paper or coins representing units of a recognized currency or the same amount noted on a piece of paper or computer screen we find we can trade this accumulation of credit for some form of commodity or service, or, some other form of currency. However, the translation of currency into an another currency is, to some extent, a perverse form of conversion. Essentially money is cash that can be converted into something else other than money, namely, a product or a service. Even if someone were to pay our debts they in reality pay indirectly for someone's direct or indirect use of a service and/or product. In the process they would most likely incur either our gratitude and/or their recognition of being under some form of an obligation. In this light the mere saving of money for the sheer purpose of saving is a corruption of the real intention intended in the primary use of money, namely, its substitution for some product(s) and/or service(s) at some future point in time.
	The point of this overall observation is to note that the use of money as a phenomenon necessitates certain social forms of recognition. Without that recognition along with the observances, or general social contracts, entailed and that currency as currency would immediately become worthless to the participants in that context. On the other hand through the vagaries of time a currency can, or rather, must acquire or loose some degree of its relative worth. An estimation of that real worth only needs our cashing in of that amount of money, or a proposal to that effect, to find out what power of conversion that currency might have at that moment of time at that point tested in that particular market place under investigation. 
	In this paper I would like to be able to relate various forms of value and at the same time be able to evaluate the relative worth of some specific instance of a particular value. In this task we will come to ask ourselves is this currency model applicable to this diverse field of general, particular or specific instances of value? Are we too materialistic in this financial vision of the world of value or is value of such a nature that correctly it can have no real price, suffer no finite evaluation?

The Transcendental Form of Value

	As argued elsewhere the being of value has one, and only one, transcendental form. As a process of judgment realizes an apparently successful conclusion a value is arrived at that is seen to satisfy the conditions demanded in the act of evaluation or appreciation. Such evaluation by its very nature entails the relationship between various parties and a recognition of the phenomenal distinctiveness of that relationship, indeed, the essential nature of relationships in general. The distinctive nature of an act of judgment therefore cannot be found in the midst of the judgment itself qua judgment but in the nature of its participating parties and the nature of their interaction or involvement. Primary value in this light considers the primary archetypal parties that could enter into such an engagement. From an analysis of intentionality that perceives both an object of the intentional act, an intender and the relational ground that relates these two phenomenal polarities within the intentional act itself we discover, in an internal process of reflection upon the relationship within itself, that our focus on any two of these duplicated tripartite parties or aspects realizes six fields of primary value as just previously noted. Recognizing that the primary intentional structure of the life-world is a tripartite interrelationship between a relational ground and the two polarities of an intentional object and an intentional ego we realize under such an examination the sense of world, self and object, or object-state, respectively. In a previous paper it was noted that the phenomenal characteristics associated with these three aspects or moments were respectively suspensional, synthetical and reductive. Moreover, it was noted that our phenomenal access was gained through putting in place a transcendental suspension and then subjecting the constitution of our phenomenal interest to hand, if desired, to either the overall relativity of a synthesis or the overall relativity of a reduction. The co-relativity of a synthesis w.r.t. a reductive analysis necessitates the cooperation of both in order to emphasize either one or the other. That in effect all three moments are in a state of resonance and it is only when some form of relative emphasis is placed upon one member of this triangle, or phenomenological circle, perhaps through an effective canceling of the other two members by each other, that a dominant flavour can be given to our research.
	Of these six forms of primary value, (realized through a theoretical-phenomenological interaction of the life-world with itself, i.e. reflected in upon itself), three are self-interrelated or mono-tonal in the nature of their interaction. Thematical value is generated through a object-state - object-state interaction, ethical value is an ego-ego interaction and trans-thematical value is a world-world interaction, i.e. various contrasting general aspects of a field-context or a world-context being placed under our consideration. Our three impure bi-tonal combinations consisting of an object-ego interaction constituting our aesthetics, an object-world interaction constituting our ontics and an ego-world interaction constituting our pragmatics. However, although the suppression of four aspects of our six factors, being a duplication of this tripartite division of the life-world, is taking place correctly all factors are involved in the formation of value. That being the case we must seriously entertain the nature of the accommodation of all six factors along with all the various combinations possible under such circumstances even though not all these combinations are significantly represented in our natural typology of value. Moreover, critical terms of reference demand that w.r.t. these primary forms of value, whether treated generally, taken as distinctively particular or constructed in a specific fashion, that we must not confuse one primary form with some other. Thus e.g. aesthetic criteria and language must not be confused with some other form of primary value, e.g. ethical. However, be that as it may, we must not regard these primary forms of value as completely incommensurable w.r.t. each other. Thus e.g. a theory of harmony in music could be used as the model for a theoretical appreciation of some ethical dilemma or situation. Such bridge building, however, must take into account deeper levels in the psychological organization of the psyche than primary forms of value creation especially in transcendental and/or psychological terms of reference. Thus in our noting these natural terms of reference between primary forms of value we must see ourselves abiding by this type of critical distinction that demarcates one primary form of value from some other. Hence e.g. we should not confuse logical considerations with pragmatical considerations, aesthetical considerations with ethical considerations, etc., etc.
	At this point in time let me now introduce this Schema, place it before you as a finished product even though its phenomenal ontology must remain at best provisional and qualified by the additional provision that at root all forms of value must have one, and only one, transcendental-psychological form of expression. The Schema is divided between a Scheme for the Distinctive Treatment of Natural Forms of Particular Value, and, a Scheme for the Accommodational Treatment of Primary Forms of Value. In the former particular forms of value are dissected in the region of the appropriate primary value and in the latter an accommodation of all possible primary combination are entabulated.

Provisional Schema For The Treatment Of Distinctive And Accommodational Forms of Primary Value

Provisional Scheme 
For The Distinctive Treatment of Primary Value

1.   Thematical Value

	Logical (Logical/Dialectical)

	Linguistic

	Mathematical

	Scientific

	Psychological
		Pre-cognitive Pyschological (Motor-Sensory, 													Affective)
		Perceptual
		Conceptual
		Transcendental

	Essential-Phenomenal

	Metaphysical (Transcendental/Non-Transcendental)

2.   Aesthetical

	Mono-Primary/Non-Dramatic (Static/Dynamic Orientation)

	Mono-Sensory (Visual, Aural, Tactile, Olfactory, Taste)
	Bi-Sensory (e.g. chocolate sculptures, textured fabric)
	Poly-Sensory (e.g. happenings, interior decoration))

	Poly-Primary - Non-Dramatic (Static/Dynamic)

	Bi-Modal (e.g. functional design, aesthetic cuisine)
	Poly-Modal (e.g. utilitarian interior decoration)

	Poly-Primary - Dramatic (Static/Dynamic)

	Bi-Modal (e.g. morality plays, ballet, advertising)
	Poly-Modal (e.g. operatic specatacle, religious events)

3.	Ethical

	Non-Otherness

	Mono-Personal
		Potential/Actual
		Pre-Current/Post-Current
		Inter-Psychological
	Inter-Personal
		Personal/Collective/Institutional/political - 					Personal/Collective/Institutional/Political
	Trans-Personal
		Divine (Personal/Non-Personal)
		Non-Divine (Localized/Non-Localized)

	Otherness

	De-Personal
	Non-Personal
	Inter-Personal
	Trans-Personal

4.	Pragmatical Value

	Mono-Personal
	Bi-Personal
	Poly-Personal
	Institutional
	Political
	International

5.	Ontical

	Potential (Systematic/Non-Systematic)
	Actual (Systematic/Non-Systematic)
	Trans-Potential-Actual (Systematic/Non-Systematic)

6.	Trans-Thematical

	Field-Contextual

	Causal
	Spatio-Temporal
	Dependent/Inter-Dependent
	Focalized/Non-focalized
	Relativity

	World-Contextual

	Causal
	Spatio-Temporal
	Dependent/Inter-Dependent
	Focalized/Non-focalized
	Absolutivity (epistemiological, ontological, trans-									schematic orientations)
	
Provisional Scheme
For The Accommodational Treatment of Primary Value

*
 *						T.	A.	E.	P.	O.	T-T.
  *

Thematical (T)										

Aesthetical (A	)									

Ethical (E)										

Pragmatical (P)									

Ontical (O)										

Trans-Thematical (T-T)									

Note

1.	The mono-tonal consideration of one category of itself is effectively meta-considerational, hence meta-thematics, meta-aesthetics, etc.
2.	Only combinations considered although permutations can represents distinctive inequalities of accent in our bi-modal pairing.
3.	The aesthetics of ethics/the ethics of aesthetics	can be subsumed under the title dramatics although the latter permutation is more concerned with the ethical consequences of the dramatical presentation.
4.	Some of these permutations/combinations will find no natural experience/language recognition.

The Currency of Primary Value

	In our comparative evaluation of value we might draw the conclusion that the greater the categorical distance between distinctive forms of value the greater the difficulty in our being able to evaluate such a comparison. Two paintings of the same period, the same genre and subject matter might more easily be compared than say two different art-forms, e.g. painting and music. However, if we see the aesthetic merit of an artwork as objectively determinable through the careful exercise of an open aesthetic reflection, being experienced as a certain degree of intensity equivalent to the degree of successful aesthetic resolution realized, then what obstacles are there to our objective comparative assessment of different art-forms? Returning to our currency model we can note the type of presupposition at work here that claims the aesthetic merit of an art-work can be effectively cashed out? Then in our comparison of any two or more artworks of what ever form all we have to do in the light of this model is, in our final assessment, merely note the relative worth of those art-forms by noting the intensity or quanta of aesthetic impact experienced. However, the world of phenomenal experience and this vision of experiential reality is, as our suspicions might well tell us, not quite as simple as this. For a start the world might be thought to be too rich to be given a determined finite value although some provisional relative evaluation might be able to be made. Then, again, we must wonder how our reflections can be adequate if the value of some artifact is seen in a different light from one person to the next, from one moment to another? Can we claim some sufficient degree of objectivity in these matters? Natural language would probably take this position in the affirmative? The meaning of the term or expression good may be good for you but it is also often suggested that it might be, or be most likely, that which is good for many others, if not quite all others too? The very suggestion that good art is experienced as good art suggests that others should be able, given an adequate degree of aesthetic reflection, to also arrive at the same basic degree of evaluation although the possibility will exist that we can either fail in the exploration of this affirmative, or, find that we cannot execute the impossible features of this type of pursuit(?) Then in our mutual verbalized confirmation of each other's opinions a cultural world of pressure pervades this life-world, this world of dasein in turn perhaps influencing the opinions of others or at least neutralizing the sway of unopposed opposing opinions on this subject. Resolution of this type of market place manifesting itself politically, or being politically manipulated, as the common consensus of public opinion.
	Consider the following situation. A panel of judges are reviewing a number of poems in a poetry competition. On the final short list is a long poem of great originality and workmanship and one brilliant haiku. The latter poem takes only a few seconds to read and contemplate. Is it any less a great poem for the fact that it is given such a fleeting temporal form? 
	Then again consider the situation where an artist sells their paintings for x dollars per square centimeter, charging so much for water colours, somewhat more for acrylics and a little more for oils. Surely the cost of labour should enter their calculations but should such a formula be equally applied, with such a consistent mechanical force, to all their production from the first painting they market to the last? What real artist would ever consider their production to be of the same invariable standard? On the other hand given some consistency in standard why not use such a formula to dispose of the vexed question of price. Price is also at the mercy of how well the market place is informed, how well a certain product or type of product has been marketed, what demand has been invoked and allowed to compete, etc. Situations might well arise where the product for sale, artistic or non-artistic, has great intrinsic value but is little sought after or perhaps has little intrinsic value but is for all that well sought after. In this latter regard the mechanisms of fashion might have more to say than the intrinsic worth of the product itself? In such a light the effective market price of the product may well reflect more extrinsic factors rather than an open objective estimation of its true intrinsic worth? So again cashing out the relative worth of an object-state as an artifact with value in our world of dasein may coincide neither with its intended value nor its possibly true potential value?
	Another suspicion at work might well be the idea that great art, e.g. has no price, is priceless, beyond calculation and is to be sought for the unlimited greatness of itself. A similar idea can be found operating in a number of other fields of primary value. A source for this prejudice might well reside in the manner we treat this sense of life-world as a living world of value. Treating all three moments in the intentional act, as already noted in the expression of the phenomenological circle, as equally and absolutely rich in potential value and that the depths of such value correctly has no dimension, then we would quite naturally pass from this perspective to the conclusion that the world, ego and object-state also have unlimited value. Then in regard to primary value we might like to speculate that some form of limitation now comes into play and that further subdivisions realize a diminishing return for our powers of appreciation or discernment. Such an insight might be at the basis of our horror in our confrontation of the idea that people could or should be bought for a price whether they be prostitutes, slaves or useful friends? It would be my opinion on this matter that the life-world as a world of life has an infinite depth or richness in its fabric but that primary forms of expression in their reflection of this unlimited tripartite world of world, ego and intentional object-state are generated with a degree of resolutional successfulness of a generally determinable quantum in influence. Further, as the meaning and meaningfulness of this tripartite world is generated through these three dialectical moments of world, ego and object-state it would follow that perhaps we should regard these three aspects of world, ego and object-state as equally infinite in their potential richness of realizable depth implying that in our examination of the world or some world of value, the life of the ego and the phenomenal presentation of some phenomenal event that an unlimited degree of value must or should be placed upon the same. That correctly we can only cash out aspects of the phenomenon that intersect with these six worlds or domains of primary value. Or at least recognize some relativity between instances of these six domains and their distinctive particular and specific sub-domains.

	In a provisional conclusion at this point in this paper we might like to consider the notion that in the world of value the world, the domain of the ego and the potential richness of the intentional object-state have no limits. On the other hand, however, our six forms of primary value can be evaluated and given a relative quantum of value in our current evaluation and appreciation. It would be my position in this regard that specific instances of particular primary forms of value can be so evaluated even though extrinsic considerations in the market place of public interest may distort, override, conceal or annul such relatively intrinsic considerations. That in effect some form of objectivity can at least in theory be discerned in thematic considerations, aesthetic considerations, etc. Let us now move on to the difficult question, given the assumption of a uniformity in transcendental value underlying all six forms of primary value, how various forms of primary value are to be accommodated. Already noted is the interaction of aesthetics and ethics in the realization of dramatical art-forms, e.g. plays, operas, ballet, etc. and the associated notion of the ethical propriety of an instance of some art-form or artwork. I would stick my neck our here to state that any art-form or artwork that seriously goes against the living force of the life-world would effectively undermine the integrity of that life-world and the appreciation of the aesthetic that can be found therein! However this qualification is not aimed at the content represented in a work of art but at the quality and direction of the intentions that would appear to obvious in its production or expression. The killing of the hero in a tragedy on this count, e.g., is not culpable as being anti-life or destructive of the life-world. However, a play e.g. that merely revels in wanton acts of destruction and senseless assassination would surely undermine its integrity and as a consequence the integrity of its aesthetic potential. Thus in the light of this discussion to date we might state that any form of primary value that is anti-relational, anti-relationship or disestablishes the facticity of relationships. On the other hand we might say that the degree to which an instance of primary value is a phenomenon in its own right, i.e. is self-referentially distinctive or independent in its apparent manifestation, that to that degree it has its potential infinity of value returned to it!

The Critical Accommodation of Primary Forms of Value

	Meta-considerations aside can we critically entertain an absolute distinction between primary forms of value when the intentional process of phenomenal experience is a tripartite interaction and not the duplication of such an interaction with an emphasis on a coupling of features and a suppression of all others? Given the uniformity of transcendental form need we maintain any real form of a real critical distinctiveness between these six forms of primary value and their distinctive assemblages of value?
	The answer to such a question must be a qualified yes and no. Yes, there can be no absolute distinction between various forms of value from the transcendental point of view. On the other hand from the point of view of primary value such a distinctiveness should be recognized and not confused. Moreover, the natural accommodations between primary values should be recognized for the potential value such a format promises to reveal to us.
	In the following comments let me merely reflect upon what might be meant in the interaction between two forms of primary value...

1.	Thematical Value & Aesthetical Value, v.v.

	Thematical value is the epistemological foundation for all other forms of value. In our experience of an artwork e.g. we first ask ourselves what information apparently intended (or simulated) is there for our senses to find or indirectly find out about? Aesthetical value therefore is the aesthetics of thematic material. Thus an aesthetic reflection upon this thematic material reveals something about the aesthetic potential of this thematic material confined within the spatio-temporal confines of the work of art (as defined through its thematic boundaries).

2.	Thematical Value & Primary Forms of Value in General

	As for 1. but substitute the relevant primary form of value in the place of aesthetic value.

	Hence for example with regard to ethical value...
	
	Thematical value is the epistemological foundation for all other forms of value. In our experience of an ethical situation e.g. we first ask ourselves what information apparently intended (or simulated) is there for our senses to find or indirectly find out about? Ethical value therefore is the ethical consideration of thematic material. Thus an ethical reflection upon this thematic material reveals something about the ethical potential of this thematic material confined within the spatio-temporal confines of the ethical situation (as defined through its thematic boundaries). Etc.

3.	Aesthetical Value & Ethical Value

	As already noted - the formation of dramatical works of art and the relevant subject of censorship, the ethical influence upon the aesthetic process in its establishing or dis-establishing the intended merit of the artwork. The possible consideration that art can play a positive role in the overall welfare of the individual in society.

4.	Aesthetical Value & Primary Value In General

	The aesthetic entertainment of primary material realizes and results in the judgment of that primary value. In activating the judgmental process primary value is realized in accordance with the resolution of dissonance appropriate to the domain of the enquiry.

5.	Ethical Value & Pragmatical Value

	Allowing our ethical judgment to spontaneously enact itself in the world effectively establishes our pragmatic response, responsiveness and responsibility in this intersubjective world of life. Therein the enlarged facticity of the relationship re-establishes itself as an ontical fact in the world with a powerfulness of presence in its engagement in this world in direct relation to the degree of its facticity. This degrees of being realizing the degree of unique relational impact this ethical situation has, through its participants, finding itself being presented to the world as a phenomenal event with apparent independent centers of activity.

6.	Ethical Value & Primary Value in General

	The ethical consequences of our value creation must eventually catch up with us. Through simulation deliberate realization is put in process along with the consequences of our actions and inactions, actions and reactions.

7.	Pragmatical Value & Ontical Value

	The appropriateness of our actions, inactions and reactions along with the actions, inactions and reactions of others in turn help establish our ontical facticity as an agent whose presence is lived out in this world of life.

8.	Pragmatical Value & Primary Value in General

	The appropriate sensitivity and responsiveness of the individual as an individual and as a individual member of a society is realized through an openness of that individual and society to be effective in this world of life, this world of dasein. E.g. in the artist's or performer's realization of a work of art the effectiveness of that realization is dependent upon the successfulness of their entering into this world in a pragmatic mode as an artist and/or performer.

9.	Ontical Value & Trans-Thematical Value

	The existence of the person is a fact, an actuality in the experience of this life-world. As a presence in this world this actuality necessitates facticity, i.e. the degree of relational interaction entered into as an agent involved as a presence in this world.

10.	Ontical Value & Primary Value in General

	All value is realized in this world, its facticity as potentiality being actualized through the process of being intentionally involved in this world. For the agent as a person in the world all value and being is realized through an ongoing involvement in this world and a realization of the differences that would impede the entry and passage of the same. Ontical being is realized through a resolution of that sense of non-being, as otherness, that would de-potentialize and de-actualize the phenomenal expression of that being as a process of phenomenal-being-for-the-person.

11.	Trans-Thematical Value & Thematical Value in General

	Whereas thematical value is realized through the gestalt focusing of our attention upon a trans-thematical background trans-thematical value is realized when our attention becomes redirected to the nature of this gestalt background to our-present-being-conscious. Hence the conclusion we must draw is that this type of accommodational value must be primarily phenomenological in its intent.

12.	Trans-Thematical Value & Primary Value in General

	Whereas thematical interest is effectively phenomenological in a reductive mode through its searching for, recognition and examination of essential structures trans-thematical interest is effectively phenomenological in the synthetical or re-constitutional mode. Trans-thematical interest into the expression of primary value is therefore effectively meta-appreciational in its intent, hence meta-thematical, meta-aesthetical, meta-ethical, etc. along with the critical potential and consequences of the same.

	Without being too systematic the previous twelve notes are the brief comments made by myself as an introduction to this subject of accommodational value. In the past an emphasis has been placed upon the distinctiveness of a natural demarcation in the hierarchical organization of the human psyche as investigated phenomenologically, albeit tentatively or provisionally. It seems to be the inevitable fate of a phenomenological programme that the terms of reference and the conclusions of its exercise are to forever remain in the basket of the provisional. Moreover, through an element of compromise, that selectivity that must pre-suppose the existence of an essential phenomenon for research, that essential consideration, e.g., can never be completely isolated from the intentional selectivity of that exercise of choice made by the active phenomenologist. However, this ongoing readiness to adapt to what then presents itself to hand must allow the phenomenologist in the long run to refine both the provisional nature of their research and the incestuous nature of their refined methodology vis-a-vis the phenomenon under research.

Conclusion

	In this paper a balance has been entered into in the tentative mapping of value, whether treated distinctively or through accommodation, whether conducted transcendentally, primarily, in particular and/or when specified in part or in whole. Under a Provisional Scheme For Distinctive Treatment of Primary Value a number of natural distinctions in the experience of primary value were noted. In this light were noted a variety of distinctions, e.g. non-dramatical versus dramatical forms of art, inter-personal forms of ethical, social and political interaction, an implicit organizational hierarchy in thematical forms of value starting with the logical and ending with the transcendental-psychology of judgment and its six primary forms (of thematical, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, ontical and trans-thematical) along with non-speculative metaphysical value that deals with the transcendental-logical implications of our transcendental-psychology. Speculative forms of metaphysics being the mistaken extrapolation of experiential forms of being. Under our introduction to an accommodation of primary forms of value through our Provisional Scheme for the Accommodational Treatment of Primary Forms of Value a new field of critical interest was introduced, namely, the nature of the interaction between primary forms of value. Under such a format was noted, e.g. the dramatical consequences of the interaction of the aesthetic with ethical considerations and the distinction to be made between art that enhances the process of living in this world of life and that destructive type of art that diminishes our sense of presence and involvement in this beautiful world of ours. The following observation was also brought to our attention that effectively the phenomenological nature of our research and the nature of the interaction between thematical and trans-thematical research was essentially the same.
	One of the metaphors at work in this paper was the currency model of evaluation. It was concluded that the sense of world, ego and an object-state all presented themselves with an infinite richness and depth in potential value and that their evaluation could not be treated to the restrictions of a finite calculation and estimation of worth. That in effect such calculation would by implication be not only inappropriate but misleading and highly dangerous for our appreciation of the life-world. However it was concluded that primary forms of value, and by implication all distinctive and accommodational forms, could be given a relativity of value that reflected to some degree their intrinsic worth. However, it was also noted that extrinsic features often obscured this realization of true or substantial value but that, again by implication, a carefully conducted phenomenological reflection should accurately reveal in time this degree of intrinsic value. Thus we could be easily forced to believe that various phenomenal instances of primary value could be reasonably cashed out and given some form of critical comparison even though the true phenomenologist would, through a transcendental suspension, always keep provisionally open the revealed nature and results of their critical research. That through a simulation of value, or i.e. a re-constitution of the phenomenon and its associated intrinsic potential for value, the phenomenologist could recognize and evaluate the relative worth of their involvement with that phenomenon even though from a transcendental perspective, whether logical or psychological in overall construction, infinite value is to be forever found in and through the life-world itself, this personal world of dasein.

				Noël Tointon, Sydney and Leura, 15.7.90. 

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