Overlooking The Non-Textual Dimension Of The Text

1. Introduction

	To briefly introduce this paper I would like to work through the following sequence of images, which, in the form of an analogy, should, once decoded, quickly indicate both the major themes to be examined and their order of introduction.

	Imagine, if you would, that you are on holiday and you are going to stay with the relatives of a friend in a Welsh village, a coal mining village, and, that the time of year is in the middle of Winter. You are invited to visit one of the nearby coal mines. You are taken right up to the coal-face. In the process you pocket a small piece of recently worked coal, a piece of high quality anthracite, shiny black and slightly sharp to the touch. You walk back to the cottage you are staying in. The path is still glistening, on its shaded sections, with the dusting of a heavy frost. The wind is blowing strongly and the weather signs, in the form of rolling purple clouds, give more than just an impression that the rest of the day will soon be spent in the grips of a snow storm. Then, just as you catch sight of the place where you are staying, the first flakes start to fall. You enter, thankful a warm fire is on inside, and sit down to a gratefully received cup of tea made by your host who, without asking, pours you one from the metal teapot kept warm on the old fashion iron range.
	Now, as it happens you are a phenomenologist. You look at this piece of coal and ask your self what meaning and meaningfulness has just such an item. You stare at this piece of coal and soon come to the conclusion that studying it in this fashion doesn't really tell you very much about it. You remember the coalface where this piece was mined and in your imagination you redirect your investigation in this new direction. Again you come to the conclusion that the mere inspection of the very site from whence this piece of coal had its source in its turn doesn't cast much further light on either that coal-face itself or that sample of coal. In your mind's eye you re-surface from that mine. In wandering along the streets on the way back to the place where you are staying you note the social nature of this village. You see a series of grimy terraces and cottages, nearly everyone with their chimneys smoking, and you come to realize something of the sociology of coal and of its production through mining. Then you remember that welcoming warmth of this cottage, where you are staying, as you entered with the snow starting to fall outside. And that much enjoyed cup of tea.
	The moral to be drawn from an examination of this sequence of images is the following. First, the mere inspection of a piece of coal or any other item of interest under investigation is of itself not going to tell us very much if at all. Second, a mere understanding of its context, source and historical origins may tell us a little bit more the reality of the situation is such that their mere inspection in turn is not going to add that much more to our understanding of the meaning and meaningfulness of that object or situation of interest in this wider form of a so call phenomenological examination. Third, the meaning and meaningfulness of our `text,' and its `context,' demand our adopting an appropriate meta-textual point of reference with the implication of a sociological and hermeneutical dimension. Coal as a `text' and its coal-face `context' became properly meaningful for us in an understanding of the sociology of coal production and its delivery and utilization as a form of domestic energy, etc. Interpreting these social modes of use, certain appropriate strands of `meta-text,' allowed us to realize in what way coal acquired its meaning, and more importantly, its meaningfulness. Additional knowledge that coal `came from ancient swamps compressed beneath the surface of the earth and was essentially carbon' also only becoming meaningful when the social-conventional modes of science are in turn understood and therein, and only therein, appreciated!
	An awareness of text and meta-text, however, is not the end of the matter. Overlooked, is a third dimension, the non-textual dimension of the text. In our imaginary anecdote when we returned to that place we were staying at we directly experienced the nature of coal, as a text, without even being that too aware of the place coal played in this world of that coal mining village and in this house in particular. That house we re-entered was warm. Already waiting for us was a pot of tea. Thereupon, in such relative comfort, we could thaw out. Our thirst was assuaged with a pot of tea and no doubt, before too long, a meal will be made ready for us all thanks to the presence in this household of coal. In expediting our passage through the world the presence of this aspect of the facilitation of our existence was perhaps merely noted in passing allowing us to then move on and re-locate the center of our attention on some other matter that in its turn, in the harmonious unfolding of its sense of presence, will, without doubt, also be overlooked! Only when we meet, or re-meet, with some form of textual resistance does the sense or presence of text qua text re-assert itself in the form of some sort of partial, semi-transparent obstruction to our passage through this world! 
	The complex philosophical moral to be drawn from my explication of this anecdote is this that the phenomenologist does not deal with texts per se but their social modes of interpretation, that hermeneuts don't interpret texts but modes of interpretation, and, that it is in this `non-textual dimension of the text' that we experientially encounter, meaningfully, the reality of that to hand through a form of an overlooking of the phenomena of that text and its meta-textual modes of interpretation. That in a sense when we read a text we don't read a text, rather, we read through it! Overlooking the text, whatever the nature of its intentional inscription upon the fabric of the world, we directly engage in its simulation of a simulation, the meaning of its meaning, and therein, its meaningful meaningfulness-for-us in this world-of-life.

2. The Resolution Of A Profound Philosophical Problem?

	I must confess that for me the discovery, and thereafter an examination of the meta-textual dimension of the text, was a revelation. However, this semblance of revelation was quite eclipsed when I came to appreciate the full force of what, I believe, is effectively the non-textual dimension of the text. Moreover, this experience of the non-textual dimension also answered, and resolved for me, a philosophical problem posed by my desire to treat all forms of intentional inscription upon the fabric of the world as some form of text. In this extension of meaning, in order to confront some phenomenon in the world, whether psychically oriented or non-psychically oriented, a phenomenon must be textualized before it can be engaged experientially. As a textualized trace it can be replicated, subject to modes of retention and therein allowed to persist as a phenomenon-for-us otherwise without this simulation of the simulation, i.e., its re-simulation and retention that text could not be examined in a certain period of time or in certain periods in time whether phenomenologically or non-phenomenologically, whether hermeneutically or non-hermeneutically, whether existentially or non-existentially.
	Now, given this extension of the `classical sense of text' the problem arises that given our experience of all forms of intentional constitution involves a text in some form or other in what manner can the word `text' have meaning if all constituted meaning is textualized? Without some form of the `non-textual' how can the word `text,' in its extended sense, function appropriately when everything, in its intentional constitution, is already automatically textualized? Can we use this expression `text' meaningfully if we have no experience of that which by definition would be `not textualized.'
	The formulation of this philosophical question is itself problematic. Moreover, the resolution of such an uncomfortably posed question must also itself be problematic. Do we indeed have a problem in the first place? Need we interpret this new sense of `text' in a literal sense? Surely as a metaphor the metaphorical richness of its intent would be destroyed, and made non-sensical, if we forced the metaphorical, as a metaphor, into a literal non-metaphorical mode of explication. Then, it may well be that `sense' is textualized and `non-sense' is non-textualizable and that as a limiting condition the non-textual can be read as that region that cannot exist experientially, or cannot be properly formulated, in intentional constitution. Then, again, treating both the textual and the non-textual as contrasting polar orientations, as absolutely non-isolatable co-referential contrasts, that differential forms of textual treatment can give this semblance of a textual pole and a non-textual pole some sense of direction, characterization, etc. That various forms of differential treatment of the textual texture might also be able to enrich a sense of the textual/non-textual contrast?
	However, by experiential implication, all this speculation above about the nature of this problem and its possible modes of resolution can be circumvented by a recognition of our being able to experience directly a non-textual dimension of the text, i.e., in our engagement with a text we can engage through the medium of that text a simulation of its intended-intentional meaning and meaningfulness. That the intentional nature of that inscribed trace is read in such a manner that the nature of its original production is re-simulated. That a row of footprints in the sand is seen as `a row of footprints in the sand,' that a shopping list is seen as `a shopping list,' that a novel is read as `a novel,' etc. 
	In the following exposition let me treat in some detail these three aspect of the text, namely, the `textual,' the `meta-textual' and the `non-textual.' Finally, let me conclude this paper with a brief sketch of the critical ramifications this practice of `oversight' has for the treatment of texts phenomenologically, hermeneutically and existentially.

3. The Textual Dimension
	
	The first thing we must realize about the intentionally directed process of inscription upon the fabric of the world is that the process of inscription is never mono-textual. If we decide to walk along the beach and in the process leave a trail of footprints this trail of footprints is not the only text we have. The exercise of our intentions, whatever their degree of consciously engaged reflection, at various levels of the psyche leaves in its wake a parallel trail of `footprints.' These `traces' at higher levels of organization in the psyche may or may not be registered as memories capable of recollection or recognition. However, they still exist. In a similar fashion the writing of a shopping list exercises a number of distinctive textual traces, e.g., the invocation of the genre of the shopping list is re-engaged, then there is the actual list itself besides a memorization of the gist of that text, the fact that others might also find themselves in a position to read it, etc. This brings me to the next heading of the Meta-Textual to note that the same poly-textual parallelization of entracement also takes place on the meta-textual dimension of textual engagement.

4. The Meta-Textual Dimension

	We are all acquainted with texts in a classical sense of that definition, e.g., letters, books, poems, graffiti, etc. By analogy this sense can be stretched to include musical scores, painting, sculptures, movies, pieces of architecture, photographs, etc. On the other hand acts of perception, acts of memory, acts of judgment, etc., through the need for a process of textualization can be seen to fall under a non-classical sense of `text.' Both senses of `text' exercise the necessary implication of a meta-textual dimension through the adoption and adaptation of meta-textual genres. A genre or a set of genres is adopted and in that particular act that act of adoption uniquely adapts that genre or mix of genres to hand. Every thought we entertain subscribes to this process of meta-textual adoption and adaptation. And this aspect of intentionality involves an inter-subjective, social dimension assisted, and communicated when indicated, through the use of a public language however privately treated or mis-treated. To illustrate this dimension of the meta-textual let me recount the following anecdote wherein I first seriously confronted the full force of this aspect of the text.
	In interpreting Classical and Baroque pieces of keyboard music I have come to understand that although Romantic-Modern conventions seem to be adopted that is often not the case. E.g., time is counted differently, ornaments are often executed quite contrary to their literal denotation in the score, etc. Although the same conventions appear to be in use throughout these four periods of the Baroque, Classical, Romantic and Modern a non-recognition of the difference in their respective period-interpretations, along with all the exceptions that also entails, an inappropriate or defective reading of that text is going to result if not an outright misreading of that text. In a recognition of this facet of interpretation I realized the prior necessity for a meta-textual reading of that same text. In a performance of the text, i.e., a reading of the same, an awareness of the meta-textual dimension sets the stage for how well that text is going to be read. Without some appreciation of the meta-textual there could be no reading of that text. Moreover, without the implication of the meta-textual dimension there could be no process of textual formation in the first place. And this law of genre adoption and adaptation also applies to the `inscription' and `reading' of non-classical forms of textuality. E.g., the mere mental process of `thinking about something' demands the adoption of the  appropriate type(s) of `thinking about a certain type of mental object' a process inaugurated in and exercised through the use of the social dimensions of a public language. A number of distinctive levels of meta-textual formation also functioning in parallel in a similar fashion to the poly-textual, parallel formation of textual inscription. E.g., in formulating and reading of a shopping list the genre of `the shopping list' is invoked. Moreover, that act of inscription, regardless of the medium of that act of inscription, also implicates a number of relatively distinctive levels of meta-textual invocation. E.g., a shopping list is in `the form of a list,' and that a list is `a form of writing,' etc. 
	Let me make some comments, by way of illustration, on the meta-textual nature of this very text in front of me as I read. That last comment is, itself, effectively meta-textual in orientation, namely, as a meta-textual insertion into the text telling us how to read a certain section of text. 
	That, in a similar fashion, the primary nature of that last statement was effectively `meta-meta-textual' in orientation. This proliferation of levels and aspects of meta-textuality being subverted, effectively, by its relative entextualization, i.e., its deposition as text through a translation and transformation of its meta-textual origins through a simultaneous and parallel entextualization, in the process in-forming the formation of that text as a textual artifact.
	Titles and introductions, etc., are also essentially meta-textual in this regard. Then, often, the unexpected conclusions of a text, in so far as they mis-represent the apparent thrust of that text, also acting in this type of fashion. This brings me to note, the following (meta-textual) point. 
	The meta-textual dimension being `about the text' can not in this regard be textual per se even though ultimately its metaphorical, meta-textual `shadow' is deposited textually. To this extent the meta-textual must mis-represent that text. Hence an act of reading is essentially, in this light, an act of mis-representation. However, I would argue, that, in the appropriate mis-representing the mis-representation of that text this act of mis-representation is effectively undone. When the mis-representation is understood for what it is then through this act of de-distortion the text is effectively read in the manner it was apparently intended. Just `seeing how texts mis-represent themselves' can only distort our appreciation of textual engagement. On the other hand, the more this aspect of textual-misrepresentation is ignored the more that text in its production and/or re-production, and its appreciation, will subject itself to processes of deconstruction whether this is recognized or not. An interesting exercise in this regard is to investigate in what manner the meta-textual aspects of titles can be shown to give an ironic reading of their entitled texts. 
	Now, at this point, let us ask what is the nature of the relationship between the textual and the meta-textual? Just as strands of the textual in formation mirror each other, and, strands of the meta-textual do likewise, in a similar fashion, the textual and the meta-textual also mirror each other; of course not without their aspectival differences. In this light a certain text or a certain passage in a text can be given an overall parallel reading, parts of that textual complexion being relatively more textually or meta-textually oriented. E.g., the title of a text supplied by the author is effectively meta-textually oriented being `about' that text. On the other hand that title is also a part, as an artefact, of that text. In a similar fashion the introductory nature of the first section of an essay in telling us directly and/or indirectly how to read that essay is also effectively meta-textual regardless of whether that text is with or without a title, or sub-headings, etc.
	The nature of this relationship is essentially one of a form of repetition, a process of mirroring that oscillates between forms of merely exact repetitive re-formation and processes of a sheer, excitingly inexact repetitive reformation. The tension resulting from this mixture of conforming and disconforming repetitive formation setting up a state of internal dissonance. 
	A more sophisticated reading of this expression of `dissonance' is a recognition of how conforming and disconforming patterns of exact and inexact re-iteration respectively act together in a `provocative' fashion wherein the modes of possible resolution are also contained intra-textually, i.e., in that very trope or `resolving segment of text.' Not only is a dissonant section of text `dissonant' but it is also `provocative' in the sense that that not only does it set up some degree of textual destabilization it also indicates how that text is to be resolved in the process of its successful reading. The following analogy of mine might better illustrate this point. 
	Like a bull fighter waving his red cape in front of an enraged bull the motion of that cape also guides the direction of where the bull is going to head in the bull's provoked reading of that cape manipulated by this bullfighter. 
	Now, I would argue that it is through forms of accommodation set up between the textual, read as essentially dissonant through the unique, adapted nature of its textual orientation, and, the social conformity of adopted genre expectations of the meta-textual background that the information and harmonization of that text is going to be experienced. Put in the form of a simile the `textual key' is inserted into the `meta-textual lock' in such a manner that when they mirror each other that text can be metaphorically unlocked. A process replicated analogically on a number of distinct levels of textual inscription, reinforcing this release of apparent meaning and meaningfulness, and this sense of provoked movement in our being directed through that text.
	In my profession as a psychiatric nurse I am continually confronted by the phenomenon of the locked door. When the key is the right one, is not too worn or too often reduplicated, when the lock and the door function properly, the passage of myself through such a barrier is hardly noted. However, given some defect in this process of unlocking a door that door effectively bars me from continuing on in the direction intended. The current text to hand, in the form of a locked door, presents itself as a form of `textual resistance.' Whereas the harmonious unlocking of that door allows me to experience what I would like to call, `the non-textual dimension of that door.' That in the experience of such a state of harmony the simulation of the text is effectively re-simulated for us and in such a manner that the text is now no longer recognized as a mere text. Our textual engagement is no longer a(n hermeneutic) confrontation with the text as an artefact but with the entire text in all its dimensions, namely the textual, the meta-textual and, most importantly, the non-textual!

5. The Non-Textual Dimension Of the Text

	By `non-textual' is not meant the `not-textual,' some form of experience that has nothing directly or indirectly to do with texts. On the other hand this expression is not equivalent to that experience of the text as a `text,' or as a `meta-text.' What is implied is the experiential fact that in our successful engagement with a text there is a transcendence of the mere text, a transcendental experience of the text wherein the simulation of the meaning and meaningfulness of that text is directly engaged. Both the text and its meta-text are superseded, transcended, immanently de-textualized, de-contextualized, overlooked, etc. The exposition in this section attempting to give a number of reasons why, in my opinion, this aspect of the reading of the text appears to take a non-textual flavour.

	The artefact of the text is the means through which that text is to be read. Such a reading necessitates an appreciation of the appropriate meta-textual perspectives that will allow that text to engage us with a surplus of hermeneutic meaning and meaningfulness. Then, once the unlocked text re-simulates its apparent intentional formation text and meta-text effectively cancel each other out in the form of a suspension. Once the recognition of an adequate surplus of value is unleashed there arises a corresponding degree of `transcendental conviction' that in turn `re-cognizes' the apparent intentional formation simulated in and exercised through its original transcriptions. `Transcriptions' in the plural by virtue of the fact that textual formation is poly-textually co-transcribed. Moreover, the meta-textual dimension is equally polytextual in nature with a textual transpositional inscription of its meta-textuality imprinted on every level and facet of that overall textual production. E.g., the genre or mix of genres invoked in a particular text, whether in a classical sense or in a non-classical sense, find themselves reflected or imprinted on the form of that meta-textually informed text. Hence in poetry, e.g., a sonnet is not normally confused with a haiku, etc., because the distinctive meta-textual form of such genres is imprinted on the textual form of those texts. 
	The distinctive degree and style of harmonization of a text experienced in its formation is re-cognized in its re-simulated re-formation. This experiential flavour, reflecting the existential integrity of its formation, merely re-confirming the validity of its current re-constitution (or descriptions of its re-constitution already conducted after its original formation). Then, once this sense of integrity is re-constituted and appears to authenticate itself (poly-textually) through some form of recognitional surplus of value, the text in effect dissolves in an experience of its own apparently re-simulated re-constitution. With this diminishment of textual resistance the text qua text in effect dissolves for us in this sense of the non-text, i.e., in a re-simulation of its apparently intended intentional formation. Such re-formation being experienced through a process of re-cognitional re-formation reinforced through the interrelated facets of an hermeneutic surplus, parallel forms of re-cognitional unlocking, diminished textual resistance, the semblance of a transcendental conviction, etc. Not that we can ever be absolutely sure about how correct we are in our decoding of a text. On the other hand we can never be absolutely wrong in our acts of interpretational appropriation. Moreover, being relatively successful most of the time allows us to concentrate on those problematic texts that when, in turn, no longer become problematic for us, to that same degree, effectively dissolve for us, before us. E.g., once we have read a novel and have a reasonable understanding of it we no longer leave it to hand. We no longer need it to hand. In an instant we can recollect a recognition of it, as a re-cognition of it, because our understanding of it is now no longer merely that of a textual artefact to hand. 
	As I have already stated this apparent dissolution (/resolution) of the text is accomplished through a suspension of text and its co-responding meta-text. Through this third moment in the reading of a text the harmonization of that text is re-realized and re-discovered. In effect we have re-entered the hermeneutic circle through this point of suspension between the textual(ly dissonant sense of parts) and the meta-textual(ly consonant sense of the whole). Therein, through this re-creation of the simulation, the re-simulation of the simulation, the sense of the existential is given a semblance of voice, a semblance of substance, a semblance of presence and self-confirmation. But as this intimation of the existential is engaged in an ongoing unfolding of the text through its dimension of the non-text, and the sense of the existential is itself generated through a transformation of the non-existential then it follows that in turn there must be a balance, and suspension, between the senses of the existential and the non-existential, i.e., on one hand, the non-textual, and, on the other, the textual and the meta-textual (themselves in a state of suspension). 
	That a suspension between the textual and the meta-textual engenders a sense of the non-textual, that an ongoing sense of the non-textual is engaged when there is an ongoing existential suspension between all three parties. Put another way, to release ourselves from the paralysis of the suspension between text and meta-text a suspension of that suspension is engaged wherein the distinctive value of that re-engaged text is re-simulated. This double suspension effectively allowing us to enter and leave, at will, our engagement with that text.
	I labelled this third dimension of the text as `non-textual' by nature because in our ongoing engagement with a text when that text is appropriately and properly engaged it in effect dissolves for us, before us. Only when the text offers some form of textual resistance does the text experientially remain as some form of a textual artefact. Moreover, in a re-creation and re-cognition of that text the dimension of its re-simulation effectively sees, through the surplus creation of an excess of hermeneutic value, that which is in effect non-textual. Although this non-textual dimension is rooted in and through the text, once that re-simulation of the text is realized the text is then, in effect, eclipsed. Hence my ascription of the `non-textual dimension of the text.' 
	Overlooked, more often than not, is the fact of the meta-text! That a text is not a mere inscriptional artefact! Completely overlooked in theory, but not in fact, in the act of the reading of a text, is this third dimension of the non-textual! To conclude this paper let me examine the critical ramifications of this theoretical `overlooking' of that dimension of the non-textual.

6. Conclusion

	In the introductory anecdote of the Welsh Coalmining Village I attempted to show three necessary aspects in the reading of a text, namely, the textual, the meta-textual and the non-textual. That the mere inspection of a piece of coal, or a `text,' by itself was productive of little meaning and even less meaningfulness for the person conducting that rather superficial examination. Given a context, or a `meta-text,' the results of these widened terms of examination in a similar fashion fell short of what degree of meaning and meaningfulness one might normally expect to be delivered in our investigations. Our research only realizing its full potential when the implication of a non-textual dimension was also involved. In our anecdote this corresponded to the direct experience of coal in that house through the form of heat, a cup of tea, and later a meal, etc. In an enjoyment of this dimension the text is directly overlooked, indeed, the text must be overlooked in order to read that text, read through that text.
	In one sense of the word `overlook' we must be `looking over' the text in order to experience this dimension of the non-textual wherein that simulation of that text is allowed to re-simulate its intended intentions in keeping with the apparent nature of that text. Otherwise how else could we read that text?! Moreover, who is not guilty of overlooking this third dimension and simply think that they are merely seeing a textual artefact (and/or merely seeing its appropriate meta-textual modes of interpretational re-appropriation).
	In this paper, in my implicit criticism of a series of modern philosophers and philosophies, no names are named. Just who, in hindsight, is there who is not guilty of committing this type of oversight in some form or other? On one hand the text, the meta-text and the non-text are all overlooked in order to read a text, read `through' a text. On the other hand who has not been mesmerized by textual artefacts, or, perhaps by social-conventional modes of interpretation, the meta-textual dimension of margins or titles, the manner in which the meta-textual dimension of the text mis-reads its own text, etc., etc? To conclude let me re-iterate the following points that, I believe, should be drawn from this phenomenological examination of our engagement with texts.

	First, the close reading of a text cannot literally be that of a `close reading.' Close attention to details in that text, arguments in that texts, forms of provocative resolution, etc., by all means can be entertained but only through some form of an appreciation of its social-conventional modes of interpretation. Not though some form of a literal, close reading of that textual artefact as a mere text!

	That this applies equally to phenomenologist when they say they are `returning to the things themselves' as texts qua texts! No reading of the phenomenon under examination can be purely textual. Indeed, it is impossible for that text to be read in such a manner! That, in reality, phenomena are read as social-conventional modes of interpretational appropriation.

	Moreover, hermeneuts do not interpret texts per se! They, correctly, interpret only modes of textual interpretation already pre-interpreted! 

	And hermeneuts of a more theoretical persuasion, as `hermeneuticists,' can only engage an interpretive examination of the interpretation of those modes of interpretations already discovered and recognized to release a surplus of hermeneutic value for those hermeneuts already so engaged!

	That as existentialists an authenticity in the reading of a text is revealed in and through a realization of the transcendental dimension of that text wherein the immanence and transcendence of that text is harmoniously engaged through a suspension of the suspension that allows us to simultaneously enter and leave our engagement with that text, but with this difference, that our progress to and fro through that text is conducted in a transcendental dimension that generates and releases a sense of value whose value is itself stamped with its own self-determined, self-critical sense of authenticity! 

	That, in the final analysis, I would claim that an overlooking, or looking over, of the text is necessary in practice in order to engage a reading  of that text or series of texts, but, that, as critical philosophers, whether as phenomenologists, hermeneuts or hermeneuticists, or as existentialists, our engagement with that text in theory should not philosophically and critically `overlook' the collective integrity of the existential fact of these fundamental dimensions of the non-textual, meta-textual and textual. That our existential engagement with a text permits us to enter, and leave, the non-textual dimension of that text, the simulated simulation of its apparent intentional being, through the auspices the transcendental suspension, and the suspension of the same, thereby engaging directly the very transcendental nature of the life-world wherein we can directly engage the simulation of that simulation apparently intended intentionally in the textualized formation of that inscribed text. And this demands that we should not overlook, theoretically, this non-textual dimension of the text even though, practically, our engagement with a text demands that we cannot, currently, not be `overlooking that very same text.' Put another way, we might say that overlooking the text reveals the meta-text, overlooking the meta-textual overlooking of the text reveals the non-text, and, that an overlooking of the non-textual dimension brings us back to a realization that we are actually engaged in the direct reading of a text. That, an authenticity in the reading of a text is realized to that same extent that we are directly engaged with that text! 

	That in essence, to read a text: 
		
	To look at a text that text must be overlooked!

	[Further more, in this pursuit of what must be, through the exercise of a transcendental-suspension, a transcendental-existential `reading of a text' by experiential necessity there is implied: 

	That the reading of a text demands that the non-textual 	dimension of the text must equally be simultaneously engaged and dis-engaged!

	Otherwise: 

	Through the absence of the double suspension the reality of the transcendental illusion of the reading of a text collapses returning us to the mere presence of a text now no longer comprehensible beyond the experiential fact that it was once a text in some form or other!

	And what are the important ramifications of this Position:

1.	Phenonmena can be, indeed must be, directly engaged!
2.	There can be no absolutely self-contained inner realm of the mental!
3.	There can be no absolutely self-contained realm of the external world!
4.	There can be no absolutely self-contained realm of pure subjectivity!
5.	There can be no absolutely self-contained realm of the inter-subjective!
6.	Authenticity of reading is realized in a directly proportional degree that that reading is appropriately engaged transcendentally!
7.	Existential propriety being self-determined and self-	evaluated through the proper exercise of the transcendental dimension!
8.	Although authenticity of reading is engaged and realized through the transcendental purification of the textual experience, correctly, this is realized through the existential transformation of the non-existential, 	non-transcendental distortion of transcendental 	existential-material already to hand!
9.	Hence our permanent presence in `the world of life' or `life-world!'
10.	Thence our direct engagement with phenomena through a simultaneous transcendental reading of their textual, meta-textual and non-textual dimensions!

	That in practice and in theory the reading of a text demands an overlooking of that text in the existentially engaged manner as herein indicated in this paper!

	Moreover, just as the meta-textual positioning of a post-modern critique is able to critically appreciate the textual preoccupations of a modernist-oriented performance so too, in turn, can post-modernistic attitudes and practices be criticized from the `non-textual' trans-modernistic perspective. And that all three textual perspectives can be given an equal critique from the transcendentally-theoretical, and existentially-experiential, perspective of the directly-textual!]

						Noël Tointon, Sydney, 30.11.95

Appendix I - The First Draft Of This Essay (Uncompleted) 
- To Be Read As A Commentary On this Essay

	"Ne rien dehors le texte"

	I have a very general philosophical problem that I would like to share. As a phenomenologist and hermeneuticist  it my belief that a philosophical research programme demands the presence of a text in some form or other. Now, if all texts derive their meaning from other texts, what sense can be given to the expression `text' if the sense of what is not a text cannot be delineated and defined?
	In this paper I hope to engage in a mutual exploration of what might be meant by `the non-textual dimension of a text.' By `mutual' is meant `a sharing' of the problematic nature of this quest for the contrast with the non-textual that gives the sense of `text' its significance. This I intend to detail in two senses of the world `detail.' The first sense is that of invoking the richness of detail associated with this problem. The second is a general tidying up of this problematic area of concern in the hope that if the problem is defined correctly then a resolution of that problematic situation should then automatically follow, or at least the beginnings of such a process. In other words, if we can more correctly formulate the question then we should find ourselves in a better situation for realizing its resolution, or, at least recognizing if we still have a question that needs resolution.
	As just stated this problem may seem hardly problematic. Why my intimation of personal angst in this regard? First, I would like to share in a problem that has preoccupied my attention just recently. Second, it seems rather unfair to attack superficially the rather prevalent foundations of a philosophical world view without at least trying to give some relief and resolution from the apparent dilemmas entailed therein. Moreover, I now feel I am in a position to not only diagnose the nature of this problem but also to offer some form of a remedy, a treatment of the situation that I find quite illuminating, but, no doubt, a re-positioning of perspective that in its turn now poses a new series of exciting questions. If the answers we have previously accepted are now seen as problematic then it must surely mean that our relevant questions in this regard need to be re-examined and re-formulated. And it is in a productive re-formulation of those questions that my primary interest is indeed centered.
	In my grappling with a phenomenological examination, from a hermeneutical perspective, it now seems obvious to me that the former style of philosophical investigation can only deal with phenomena if, and only if, the simulation of that state of affairs is subject to some form of re-iteration. Without some form of retention in time that phenomenal simulation, regardless of either its ontological or factual status, can be neither investigated nor found to be present in order to be investigated in the first place. That can only mean that phenomena for the phenomenologist are essentially presented as texts, i.e., through re-iteration their presentation is as a textualized trace that then allows the phenomenologist to engage in their research. For all practical purposes, therefore, a phenomenologist must become a hermeneut in order to read the simulation of such phenomena, and, that the analysis of such a text must be little different from the reading of a text in the more normal, or `classical,' usage of that term. Herein resides our basic dilemma. If the philosopher, regardless of the style of their research, deals with a text, and only a text, then what might constitute a non-text, or the not textual, in order to give the sense of a text its correlatively controlled contrast. Moreover, if all phenomenal experience is textualized how can we differentiate between a `classical text' and a `non-classical text' besides finding some form of meaningful significance for the expression of `text' itself?
	A `classical text' might be considered as `some form of intentionally directed inscription imprinted on the fabric of the world.' E.g., the writing of a letter, a book, a musical score (and by extension) its performance, the painting of a picture, a sculpture, the construction of a house, footprints along the edge of a beach, etc. On the other hand a `non-classical text' would included such items as our current perception of the world, our memory of a certain moment in our childhood, the mere fact of our embodiment in a world of life, etc. But, as I would like to show later, this distinction, in the form of a non-arbitrary contrast, cannot be given an absolute degree of distinctive clarification. 
	Putting this type of question to the side let us float a little more deeply into this minefield of potential controversy. Let us ask ourselves the following point of clarification. If all phenomena are textualized in order to be read as phenomena, i.e., the simulation of phenomena, is it not possible to treat then all processes of textualization as a type of distinctive phenomenal process itself? That granted then how do we distinguish between `a hermeneut engaged in the interpretation of texts' and `a phenomenologist also engaged in the examination of the textualized traces of phenomena?' Between the `text of the phenomenon' and `the phenomenon of the text' it would appear that we have little difference other than a matter of emphasis and orientation. If two people grab a stick at either end it would appear that it makes little difference which end is grabbed if the object of the lesson is to grab a stick so to speak. 
	Moreover, if the nature of the life-world, because of its transcendental nature, demands that the nature of simulation can involve no simulation of that which is `not simulated' then implied is the fact that all simulation can only be a process involving the simulation of a process already involved in a process of simulation, etc. Through iteration, re-iteration, forms of repetition, retention, etc., texts are not only textualized but at various levels in their performance re-textualized, etc. The valid appreciation of the life-world, for a variety of reasons, can recognize no literal denotative sense in the use of such expressions `as the external world,' e.g. That being the case, then expressions like `an inner world (of pure subjectivity),' e.g., equally can have no sense. Simulation in the form of a text, therefore, can only involve the simulation of a process of simulation, etc. Although the transcendental treatment of a text must initially treat the text as a mere simulation, through the invocation of a transcendental suspension, the recognition of appropriate forms of textual authenticity will be recognized given an adequate in depth examination of those processes of textual formation. In effect, therefore, in the light of this exposition a phenomenologist must be an hermeneut, and, a hermeneut (or hermeneuticist) must be a phenomenologist. Both parties deal with texts. Again, we can ask what would constitute a non-text? For this expression text to have meaning we must be able to demarcate it from that which would be a non-text! To focus our appreciation of this dilemma let me invoke the following analogy.
	If we were fish, or rather philosophical fish, in the very midst and depths of a blue ocean of water how would we know we were in that medium of water and able therein to discern the very nature of that medium? 
	We might be able to infer that there must some form of medium or field of existence. Then we might be able to differentiate contrasts in the qualities of that medium, e.g., differences in pressure, light, salinity, etc., and discover its limits in the form of a surface and/or a muddy or rocky bottom. With such information would we be able to understand the phenomenological nature of water as water qua water? Would we be able to recognize what might be entailed in the contrasting concepts of what water is and what water is not? Surely a perception of contrasting differences would only discern for us those particular qualities of water able to be discriminated by us. On the other hand the perception of a surface, our breaking through that surface perhaps as flying fish, our being able to make contact with the floor of the ocean will deliver to us, upon reflection, some understanding could be developed of both what might be meant by what is watery and what would be considered as non-watery. If our experience only entailed what was watery by nature with no contrast with what was non-watery then surely that concept of the watery would have no meaningful significance for us. Of course as fish we might often bump into each other and therein develop some notion of what might be entailed in a concept of solidity and therein discover some contrast with that which was non-solid in nature. 
	The point of this analogy is that without a contrasting field of significance a concept in and by itself could neither exist nor be recognized (even if it should for some strange reason experientially pre-exist). Likewise all so called pure concepts, all named conceptual classificational structures that invoke this sense of absolute purity can be neither entertained nor recognized! So the problem still remains: an appreciation of the textual (and not just internally contrasting aspects of the textual) demands some form of an appreciation of what might be meant by the non-textual. 
	But this dilemma can be `detailed,' re-formulated and defused in the following manner. If we believe we already have some understanding of the concept of the textual then automatically we must also be able to differentiate this same concept from the concept of the non-textual. Then, once the sense of the textual is firmly established, and recognized, it follows that any differentiation of that sense of the textual can only, in turn, enrich our understanding of that concept of the non-textual with an implied indirect enrichment of what is meant in regards to the non-textual dimension of a text. So what I would like to say at this point is that we already must have some understanding of the non-textual dimension of a text not only in general terms of reference but also in regards to a particular text. It now behoves me to explain what the nature of the non-textual is in general terms of reference and how we might recognize its instantiation in and through a particular text.

Appendix II - Possible Modes Of Textual Differentiation

	The following hemeneutic guidelines can be used for the interpretation of a text, the appropriate nature of their use being reflected in the release of hermeneutic value, in the degree of value released relative to the degree of effort invested in the exercise of that hermeneutic programme.

1.	Text versus Meta-Text

	By various stratagems realizing the meta-textual dimension implicit in a text through a description/prescription of its form; genre/genres invoked, adopted and adapted; noting of titles, meta-textual insertions, conclusions; examining the role of meta-textual mis-representation, non-textual de-mis-representation of the text, etc.

2.	Textual versus Non-Textual

	Through an articulation of the hermeneutic surplus apparently realized in a critical-transcendental reading of the text.

3.	Text versus Context

	Through an examination of the (meta-textual) context of that text and any other form of context suggested by textual/meta-textual comments, etc.

4.	Context versus Con-Text

	An examination of apparent textual context and any other texts that appear to offer a meaningful con-text for a reading of that text.

5.	Text versus Para-Textual (Paraphrased) Readings

	An investigation of the nature of commentorial and paraphrased readings of that text or texts under examination in such a manner to demonstrate how such para-readings mis-represent that text or series of texts, etc.

6.	Text versus Anti-Textual Readings

	The use of anti-textual, contrary readings of a text in order to creatively highlight the meaning and meaningfulness of that text through the pointed use of analogical similarity and negative theological-like non-similarity, etc.

7.	Text versus De-Text

	The textual surplus derived through a non-textual reading minus its ostensive textual reading versus its ostensive textual reading. Examining in what manner the text apparently transcends the limitations imposed upon its mere textuality.

8.	De-Text versus De-Context

	An examination of the textual relationship between the non-textual and meta-textual dimensions of a text, etc.

9.	Trans-Text versus Intro-Text

	A transcendent-struturalist versus an immanent-deconstructionist reading of that text, etc.

10.	Text versus Subtext

	Demonstration and argument for a subtextual intention to the text through the appropriate use of meta-textual genre invocation, use of repetitional reinforcement of apparent intentions, etc.

11.	Pretext versus Pre-Text

	An examination of the pretext for the textual formation of that text and any pre-texts that pre-establish this sense of intentional purpose.

12.	Text versus Re-Text

	Re-textual readings in order to discover in what manner a re-reading of the text establishes an additional surplus of hermeneutic value.

13.	Pre-Text versus Post-Text

	An examination of how initial pre-textual readings and final post-textual readings texts apparently differ.

14.	Text (/Subtext) versus Hyper Text

	An examination of formalized meta-textual over-writing of a text, etc.

15.	Micro-Textual versus Macro-Textual Readings

	Macro-textual readings of a text establish an overall sense of textual character. On the other hand micro-textual readings qualify local readings of those macro-textual controls in the relevant segments of text. E.g., in the performance of a piece of music the overall speed indicated might be presto but in some appropriate sections of that text a qualification of that macro-reading might be called for, in response tempering that text with a certain inflected subtlety.