On The Necessity Of the Intentional Object?!
A Critque of `Husserl' and `Derrida.'

Abstract Of Paper

I. 	The Nature Of The Problem To Be Dealt With By The Paper

1.	The critique of the representational model of reality is accepted as valid.
2.	Given 1. the proposition of one Life-World is asserted.
3.	Given 2. and given the proposition that all parties in a relationship must be in direct relational contact in order for there to be that relationship, it is proposed that the intentional relationship must involve a direct relationship between the intender and the intentional object (the latter being defined in a neutral fashion, i.e., left open as to whether it is to be defined as some sort of state, object content, feature, etc.).
4.	Given 3. it then follows that we have a problem as to the `nature' of the intentional `object' - if it is mediational then given the direct nature of the intentional relationship what need do we have for these surplus entities, and, if it is the `object as intended' how can it be re-constituted in consciousness by us for us?

II.	Resolution Of This Problem As Outlined By This Paper

1.	In an examination of textual deferment, after Derrida, it is argued that deferment only operates in meta-textual terms of reference. 
2.	To demonstrate 1. a dictionary, as a classical example of textual deferment, will be used to show how in practice it can not be used by itself to successfully differentiate and dessignate objects, etc. In the demonstration chosen we look at its ability to differentiate apples, oranges and mandarins from each other.
3.	Given the failure of 2. into this breach we invoke the Husserlian dictum "back to the things themselves." In an intentional mis-reading of this dictum `things' are defined as texts (on the grounds that through retention the simulation re-simulated is essentially a text). The hermeneutics of a `close reading' is invoked. However, although a metaphorical use of this rule may be found to be useful, in practice a close literal reading is something that cannot be put into effect. Hence the failure of a literal `reading of things as texts qua texts.'
4.	Given the failure of 2. and 3., and there being nothing else other than invocations of the occult, for a resolution of this dilemma we try a simultaneous suspension/suppresion of the appropriate co-responding texts and meta-texts. 
5.	However, given my explication of the unproductive and paralysing nature of the simple suspension a  `double suspension' is instead invoked, i.e., the suspension of the suspension. It is then argued that the successful resolution of this dilemma has been obtained.
6.	In the form of a conclusion it is argued that the intentional `object' is indeed mediational but in the ongoing suspension of the suspension of the same direct relational contact is then `immediated.' This aspect of the text being treated as `non-textual' by virtue of the parallel supression/deconstruction/suspension, etc., of the text and the meta-text.
7.	In the process of 6. criticising these mis-readings of Derrida and Husserl, indicating the need for a positive re-evaluation of both philosophers in the light of this indirect critique and therein creating the need for a dialogue between `post-modernist' and `modernist' styles of discourse. In the process reinstituting a sense of positive cultural continuity with the past rather than the current emphasis on a relativist, negative disvaluation of history, etc., as interpreted in a modernistic light, etc...

Introduction

	The proposition of a Life-World, through the character of its transcendental nature, is a direct critique of that still dominant world-view that insists on, one hand, a completely private, inner world of consciousness, and, on the other, a parallel realm of objects in a so called `external world.' The transcendental nature of this world-of-life, through suspension, collapses this dichotomy between an inner world of our thoughts and an outer world of objects. Moreover, the transcendental nature of this `bracketing of phenomenal experience' also suspends the equally artificial segregation of the world of the ego from its intersubjective enplacement in a complex social world of a community of egos.
	Given this critique of the natural attitude as expressed in and through this type of representational format it stands to reason that this transcendental realm of being is shared by this community of egos and that there can be in this regard one, and only one, Life-World. 
	Now, given that there is this one transcendental world of the Life-World and our experiential embodiment in just such a realm, it follows that we must seriously ask ourselves how our relationships in this dimension could not be otherwise than direct, albeit with a degree of clarity dependent upon our position, perspective and powers of appreciation, etc. If we actually stand in a relationship with a certain object x then it follows that we must be directly in a relationship with that object x otherwise that relationship is in some sense indirect and to that degree not a proper relationship.
	Futhermore, if we accept that consciousness is intentionally constituted, is intended towards some type of object, then we must seriously consider if  such an object as an `intentional object' is actually necessary given the direct grasping and contact made by our relationships in this one world of the Life-World?	
	By intentional `object' is meant any object, state, content, designation, or feature, etc., intended in an act of consciousness. I.e., when experientially dealing with some type of event that current relationship under focus is directed towards the co-responding party of that type of event. This definition is meant to be philosophically neutral to the extent that I don't wish to enter, in this paper, into any of the controversies surrounding just such a topic. However, I would like to point out that as certain intentional acts don't meet with their intentional objects, states, etc., as apparently intended, i.e., are never satisfied, never seem to reach or are found not to have reached their intended targets, it implies that to some extent intentional entities intended seem more to act as mediations for what may or may not satisfy their apparent intendedness. But, if the Life-World is `the one and only transcendental realm of being,' and, all conscious relationships therein are engendered in such a manner that all parties are in direct contact with one and another, i.e., actually in a relationship with one and another, it follows that all intentional objects as forms of indicators or mediators would be totally unnecessary. That, in essence, the `intentional object' could be none other than the `object itself as intended.' Hence the main title of this paper is, correctly, ironic in nature. The use of both the exclamation mark and the question mark indicating that this aspect of the title is not to be interpreted without the appropriate form of qualification as yet to be explicated in this paper!
	The sub-title to this paper is "A Critique of `Husserl' and `Derrida.'" On one level of analysis, through the use of the single quotation marks, it is my intention that these two philosophers in this paper be read, or rather mis-read, as symbolic respectively of `modernist' and `post-modernist' philosophers in general. This double critique of mine seeking, in effect, to overcome the impasse in cultural continuity created by the incommensurability created between such styles of philosophical engagement. This `critique' being a critique of both Husserl and Derrida, an exercise that assumes that there is some degree of merit to be found in both styles of discourse. On another level we might also like to view such a device of the single quotation marks as placing `this reading' of these two philosophers in a state of transcendental suspension in order to overcome the damage created by this type of attempt to force these type of provisional mis-readings. 

	To introduce this double critique let me briefly comment on the following sections that divide the various stages in my overall argument concerning the so called `necessity of the intentional object!?'

	In Section I I will examine the meta-textual nature of textual deferment. An experiement will be conducted to see if it is possible to use only a dictionary to distinguish in practice between an apple and an orange, and an orange and a mandarin?
	In Section II in the light of the failure of the meta-text to pin down in practice the definitive definition of a text, or set of texts, we look at a close reading of a text, in a literal sense, in order to investigate if this "return to the thing, or text, itself" can achieve this degree of practical appreciation of distinctive detail.
	In Section III in the light of this second failure, at the level of the textual, I will investigate if a mutual simultaneous suspension of the meta-textual and textual might instead achieve this for us.
	In Section IV I will attempt to argue that only in and through a double suspension of the text and meta-text, i.e., a suspension of the suspension put in place between the text and the meta-text, that this act of mediation performed by the so called intentional `object' can be performed in a non-mediated, direct fashion, i.e., establish our direct relationship with that `object as intended.'
	In Section V, in the form of a Conclusion, the more important consequences of this analysis will be briefly re-outlined along with an examination of the implicit ramifications this critique has for an overcoming of this impasse in cultural continuity grounded in this discontinuity between modernist and post-modernist styles of discourse.

Section I - That Textual Deferment Is Meta-textual In Nature

	In Derrida's explication of differance there can be no arrival at a transcendental signified only a continual process of displacement  or deferment. In my opinion this process of displacement or deferment can only take place at the meta-textual level of engagement in the reading of a text, i.e., only on that meta-level of textual reference that talks about texts, directly discusses their contexts, functions and articulates their apparently intended adoption and exercise of genres, invokes a reference to other texts or the dimension of the intertextual, etc. In this regard the use of titles, statements of intent, definitions, rules for the use of that text, etc., are primarily meta-textual in complexion. Being `about the text' they cannot be primarily textual even though these same aspects might be found textually presented in that text, e.g., in the form of a title, comments on how to read that text, etc.
	This aspect of the text being meta-textual in complexion cannot be textual per se. Hence in this displacement about the text, in its discussion `about the text,' it cannot be correctly textual even if printed on the very page being read of that text in front of you. Being `about' the text it cannot therefore be textual per se. 
	A classic example of a meta-textually oriented text is that of dictionary - a set of definitions about the names of various objects, states, entities, etc. But this type of text by itself cannot by itself actually differentiate and designate the nature of those items therein defined either in general terms of reference of on a more specific, particular level of indication.
	To demonstrate this impossibility let me show you how a dictionary by itself cannot practically differentiate the actual difference in general or specific terms of reference between two types of fruit obviously quite different let us say an apple and an orange, or, not so obviously different, let us say an orange and a mandarin.
	"The Concise Oxford Dictionary" defines an apple as a round, firm fleshy fruit of the rosaceous family. Now tell me is it not the case that most fruit are round in shape to some extent? Indeed, apples and oranges (and mandarins) are all round in shape. Moreover, most fruit are firm unless ripe or extremely ripe. Then all fruit have `flesh' in some form or other. And don't we have some difficulty with this concept of `flesh.' How can the `body' of a piece of fruit be treated as fleshy in content? Surely flesh is found on meat products? Do we need to tell vegetarians that eating fruit is eating flesh? Or is this `flesh' only `metaphorical' and, that being the case, how can any thing other than our `metaphorical teeth' be sunk into the same?! 
	The "Collins Dictionary" also defines the apple tree as of the R. family and in another entry defines the same.
	On the other hand the "Universal Dictionary" defines the apple as of the malus genus without defining the same - invoking no doubt a sense of the intertextual wherein this term, in its turn, can be found to be defined.
	Then again, while the "Collins Dictionary" defines apples as being `red, yellow or green' the "Universal Dictionary" defines the same as only `red and yellow.' Of course we must not forget that oranges before they ripen are green and then, again, when they ripen can be either red, yellow or orange.
	Other entries describe the flowers of the apple flowers as either pink or white. But what are flowers? What other plants also have small white or pink flowers also?
	With oranges and mandarins looking very similar this play of definitions gets even more ridiculous if left only on this level of continual displacement and deferment with out some form referral to the actual objects themselves. E.g., "Collins" tells us that `mandarins' are `like tangerines.' Then under the entry of `tangerines' we are told that this fruit is `like small oranges.' One must wonder, therefore, if for the literal minded that some `small oranges' might not be `mandarins, and v.v.'
	But all this displacement and deferment can be short circuited if we can just look ourselves and refer directly `back to the things themselves,' to echo that Husserlian dictum!
	The moral of this demonstration is this: textual displacement and deferment is essentially a meta-textual phenomenon, and, such a phenomenon by itself cannot differentiate and designate texts in a specific fashion despite the degree of detail defined in those terms of reference.

Section II - That `Close Readings' Of A Text Are Impossible

	The conclusion suggested in this failure of meta-textual definition to define a specific text, etc., in those terms of reference was to `just look' and `return to the things themselves!' In this next section of my argument let me demonstrate that a close textual reading of the phenomenon to hand will also fail to achieve this desire for identification and designation.
	In the adoption of this Hussurlian dictum of "returning back to the things themselves" I don't wish to discuss in what sense that motto was originally proposed. Time does not permit me to conduct this interpretive reading. The point of this exercise residing in my intentional mis-reading of this formula and showing that in those re-interpreted pure terms of reference there will also be a failure to establish this differentiation and designation of the phenomenon treated as a `text.'
	Let elaborate upon this concept of mine concerning the identification of the `phenomenon' with a `text.'
	Through retention the phenomenon constituted in intentional consciousness is effective re-simulated in time. Without this process of simulated repetition the phenomenon would not be able to be `fixed in time' so to speak before our attention. Hence the textualization of the phenomenal simulation, through retention, in order for it to manifest itself as a phenomenon-for-us. This concept of `simulation' being essentially an act of `re-simulation,' namely, a `simulation of the simulation' and not equally a `simulation of that which is not simulated,' or a `simulation of that which exists prior to that act of re-simulation.' This concept of `simulation' as `re-simulation' certainly not invoking a representational model of reality (rather a re-presentational model along with all the qualification necessary to reinforce the unitary and mutual nature of the Life-World, etc.).

Section III - The Paralysis Of The Suspension

[The suspension is effectively a parallel entertainment of information (whether that be written in textual, meta-textual and/or non-textual terms of reference). By virtue of its paralleling of information there is put into effect an act of paralysis. To remove the paralytic effect of this paralysis I have invoked the idea of the suspension of the suspension (thereby putting into effect the dialectical thematizations of the hermeneutic circle, etc.). This idea of ‘the suspension of the suspension (etc.)’ has been taken up in my psychological writings, especially in the context of psychosis where it has been defined as being trapped within the suspension. Different types of suspension, in states of psychic disorder, in different places within the epistemological hierarchy of the psyche re-producing different types of psychosis.]

Section IV - The Immediate Nature Of The Double Suspension

[The aspect of the existential mirrors the moment of the suspension qua suspension. However, all aspects and dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle can be defined as types of suspension. So the analytical has been defined as a metaphorical suspension, etc. However the existential moment should, on a relatively simple level of examination, be considered as  primarily ‘suspensional’ by virtue of its balanced cancelling of both the metaphorical conjunctive suspension and the rhetorical disconjunctive suspension as analysed elsewhere. This produces the sense of the non-textual. Moreover, a balance of all three moments of the analytically reductive, synthetically reconstitutive and the suspension of the same gives us then a sense of the ‘not textual’ wherein a direct relationship between the person, other persons, objects, intentional objects, states of affairs, etc can be ‘seen’ to take place, i.e., experienced as that directly encountered (as a simulation qua simulation). Further work needs to be done to explore this trully existential dimension of reality, the very experiential dimension of the life-world itself]

Section V - Conclusion: The Simulation of The Simulation

[All experience is as a simulation, a simulation of a simulation, because all textual phenomena are re-presented in order to persist in intentional consciousness through protention. Moreover, as all experience is directly entertained within the all embracing ambit of the life-world it implies that we can never experience the pre-simulated as it is only through simulation that we have access to such simulation! So, even though, the intentional object is experience directly it is as a ‘simulation of a simulation’ etc, and never as the ‘simulation of that which existed before simulation’, or, as that ‘which is just not simulated’.] 

[Consequently, although experience is directly entertained it is done so through the simulation of the simulation, etc. Therefore the intentional object, dependent upon our (non-transcendental/ transcendental points of view, allows us to conceive the intentional object as both mediated and immediated in the life of the intentional subject, etc.]

						 Noël Tointon, x.y.96.
 Partial re-edited, 25.3.02.