A Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Process and its Content

      In this paper I shall attempt to conduct an introductory phenomenology of the aesthetic experience as I perceive this distinctive type of consciousness to be structured. I have two ulterior motives for this exercise, namely, to determine how one field of artistic endeavour can relate to other forms of art, and secondly, to discover if and indicate how subjective, intersubjective and objective aspects of the aesthetic might relate to each other? Either question is not without considerable historical controversy and this guided phenomenology of mine is my contribution to the possible eventual reconciliation of such disputes. If a problem is clarified and well formulated and all relevant information is assembled, then surely we are in a position to enter into the resolution of the same?! At least until such preparation has been conducted we should disengage ourselves from this type of unsatisfactory debate that has an incompleteness in its terms of reference.

      When wandering across the countryside in a relaxed frame of mind attending to the sensory display that nature so richly places in store for us I find I take much delight in the seemingly infinite beauty of its natural processes. Even in the city where nature is so unkindly removed or channeled into parks and reserves the sight of one tree alone restores this vision of the naturally beautiful. For myself the artwork of a great artist and some natural object both given to an equal degree of aesthetic reflection yield an aesthetic delight that equally absorbs me and releases me from a mere material entertainment of the same. However, whereas nature always satisfies the conditions for the experience of this experience not all art has this same effect upon me and I suspect much art is either not easily accessible to such reflection, or more probably, is that which pretentiously masquerades as artistry. A foretaste that promises, but in the end fails to deliver, the goods expected of such a contract it seeks to enter ourselves into as unsuspecting witnesses to its implied merit.
      The comparison of art and nature is a profitable field to explore. Under its influence we may ask ourselves the question "what is the nature of that harmony found in nature and that expected to be found in art"? An examination of this question, I am sure, would divulge something of the nature of the aesthetic content discovered in aesthetic reflection and delineate what is meant by this term harmony assuming that there is a relationship between harmony and the aesthetic.
      In music harmony is often expected, on a priori grounds, to be the same from one historical period to the next, yet, when we examine the rules of one period we invariably find that some of those canons to be contradicted by those that belong to some other period. It would appear therefore that to philosophically examine harmony we would need to acquaint ourselves with what would be meant by the harmony of harmony, examine the essential nature of harmony that transcends those restrictions that are historically and fashionably placed upon it. Moreover, an appreciation of the inner substance of musical genres and styles might in the end also allow us to understand what is meant by the natural term art?

      Let us for the moment imagine a tree, any type of tree. Many forces of nature work upon this type of object - there is gravity, sunlight and growth, prevailing winds, environmental pressures from both man and animals, etc. Yet in the final account the tree has balanced all these competing dialectical-like forces and has survived. The tree has centered itself and arranged itself in such a way that in our reflection upon it all its parts are experienced to be in a harmonious cooperation with each other and that the net total of these particular structures; translated as virtual conceptual-like forces within the overall concept of the object under examination, is effectively zero. It stands to reason that if these dialectical-like forces were left unbalanced our tree would either move, fall over or collapse. Extending this observation to some particular artwork for examination we might state that any apparent forceful components within its crafted construction left unbalanced will psychically disturb; and possibly tear apart, and diminish any aesthetic impact it might possess for us if it were to arrive at such a state of dynamic balance. This feeling of disintegration through imbalance seems to correspond to the experience of dissonance and any resolution or successful accommodation of that dissonance would be received with a sense of relief; dissonance left to its own devices being felt in the psyche as some form of inner discomfort with a sense of uneasiness, which, under extreme conditions may even resemble or induce pain. Reflection on this type of experience realizes for us that dissonance comes with a degree of intensity and that psychological processes that try to reintegrate it with its context, when successful, are decisively received with some measure of enjoyment that, moreover, may also come to find social recognition and approval that confirms for the individual that their intuition and judgment into this state of affairs was indeed valid. The resolutional structure that underlies this type of value judgment in my opinion underlies not only aesthetical appreciation but also ethical and other fields of judgment and may even underly the very process of judgment itself regardless of the nature of the contents that this type of process concerns itself with.
      What I am suggesting here is that an analogy can be drawn between natural harmony and artistic creativity. That when we reflect upon the dialectical-like forces; or their simulation, at work in an object or state under examination we find that from the object or state that successfully resolves this collective state of tension that the resulting harmony ensuing from such an experience is aesthetically entertained regardless of whether that content was natural or man-made in origin. Applying this insight to the field of art in general explication of the ramifications of this model would suggest that any type of successful artistic endeavour would involve the adequate formulation of an aesthetic context, the introduction of a degree of dissonance and the successful resolution of that tension between the background of context and its contrasting dissonance. I would hope that a phenomenological examination of these structures beneath and moments in this aesthetical process of reflection would confirm my own phenomenological understanding of this matter and as a consequence demonstrate the essentially distinctive nature of the aesthetic process and reveal the necessary demands and conditions it places upon the contents of this process for an aesthetically positive response to arise regardless of the type of artistic field focused in upon.

      Let us now move from the nature of and the conditions placed upon the content of an aesthetical process to the essential nature of this process itself. Let me draw a second analogy that might assist us in this examination.

      Imagine our entrance into an art gallery and that we find therein in one room an exhibition of picture frames and picture frames alone!
      Now normally the frame around a painting acts like an aura that often surrounds an artwork, a clue, in this case visible like the painting, that seems to demand from experience that we attend to its encapsulated spatio-temporal confines with a special degree and type of attention appropriate, by implication, to good works of art. Picture frames are like the pedestal beneath a sculpture, a conductor's upraised baton, or the very atmosphere of an art gallery itself. The general import of an aura is that it signifies the need for the person who wishes to explore its confines that a change in consciousness is necessitated and that this change is not only a change in degree of intensity but also a change in kind. The person is prodded into changing their attitude and invoke a state of aesthetic reflection that involves a certain degree of deeper concentration on the part of the spectator.
      I would speculate that the artist through their works of art appear to want to take our attention from the rest of the world and center it upon a part of their psychic being, namely their artwork, and hope we find a positivity of value
therein and by extension a positivity of value in them. This desire for value, however, cannot be satisfactory if it was to be one way. The aura of an artwork seems to promise more than it takes. When good art is received well a chain-like reaction appears to take place whereby our reflective concentration brought to that under examination is effortlessly promoted beyond the degree invoked  at its introduction. This promotion of our concentration is experienced as a refined form of pleasure, as a sense of greater psychic integration and well-being, as a sense of energy that passes beyond the aesthetic process to flow through our own lives, advancing our own processes of creativity to help facilitate our general being-in-the-world.  
      A phenomenological examination of processes of aesthetic reflection must uncover, I am sure, those points that I have here briefly alluded to. Firstly, that processes of aesthetic reflection invoke a change in the general degree of concentration than that involved in our normal moment-to-moment flow of consciousness. Secondly, that this change also involves a change in the kind of consciousness concerned, directing consciousness from a non-aesthetic mode to an aesthetically orientated modality. Thirdly, that aesthetic reflection whose content involves the successful interaction and resolution of the parts that constitute the object or state under examination would be found to be well received and supply or induce as a consequence of such harmony a concentration and integration of consciousness additional to that invoked at and for its initial reception. Lastly, that marked positivity of aesthetic content induces through correctly conducted aesthetic reflection a general advancement in our overall state of psychic well being.
      If by chance we did happen upon an exhibition of picture frames and found each and every one of them on display to be exactly the same then the promise of an exhibition would fall completely flat and we would no doubt come to suspect someone was playing a joke upon us or making some political-like statement about art galleries or art in general. Certainly it would most likely catch our amusement but our attention would soon take itself quite quickly somewhere else more absorbing and more profitable for it to spend its time. Few people would be tricked into thinking they were seeing good art through the fact that they would find their investment of interest had little self-sustaining dividend for its reward.
      Our phenomenological investigation of what would constitute good art therefore has indirectly approached this question from two distinctive directions. Firstly, we tried to determine what constituted the aesthetic structure of the content of an aesthetic process of reflection, and secondly, we tried to determine something of the essential nature of the aesthetic process itself. An understanding of the essential nature of the aesthetic process and its content coupled with an understanding of those factors and conditions that promote both this process and its content must in effect realize for us those elements behind and beneath the constitution of good art. As determination of aesthetic merit is an act of judgment let me explore a third comparison; or analogy, namely a court of law, in order to cast some further light on the nature of judgment.
 
      Imagine a court has been convened complete with judge, jury, lawyers, defendant, etc. Let us ask ourselves what is the nature of legal judgment in its relationship to the reputed act of wrong doing that came to set its proceedings into motion? 
      A first point can be noted that it is most unlikely that judge or jury or lawyers, etc. were present at the scene of the crime to see for themselves what actually happened. It follows therefore that a final legal judgment is an overall judgment of various processes of judgment of indeterminate validity made and reported by a number of individuals. According to these terms of reference the judge in their final findings can only state that in their esteemed opinion that such and such did, or did not, occur by, or not by, so and so. Legal judgment is therefore in reality a type of meta-judgment, a judgment of various judgmental-like processes reported by a number of individuals. The role of the judge is to harmonize these various accounts and discover if they were in a position to make some final-like decision.
      In a similar fashion aesthetic reflection reviews a number of judgments made by the psyche on various levels to determine the aesthetic merit of that under examination. The mind when confronted by a painting, e.g., has to determine what sort of picture it is, what colours, shapes are found therein, what thoughts and feelings they have about it, etc. and from this forest of micro-judgments arrive at some decision as to the aesthetic value of the content under review. It would appear therefore that the aesthetic experience is primarily determined at the level of judgment itself and can have no direct relationship to non-judgmental states of consciousness. It would follow therefore that judgment is a state of consciousness that is relationally orientated, a process that deals with the relationship of various relationships; namely judgments, in their relationship to each other and to their totality.
      To unravel some of the implications of this type of position let me propose a fourth situation for the imagination, in order; by analogy, to arrive at some form of phenomenological insight.

      Imagine the following situation - a world of people who somehow take an artistic delight in sticking pins into themselves through some form of ballet or self-imposed ritual in private or in public. Now, at the level of feelings they each experience painful stimuli from the site of each inserted needle. If their consciousness of pain was involved primarily in the experience of pain then equally they could not be entertaining their situation aesthetically. Similarly, if they were entering into a judgment upon their painful experience as a painful experience then again they could not be experiencing their situation aesthetically; i.e. reviewing their estate under the light of an aesthetic reflection. Moreover, any perceptual or intellectual comprehension of a non-aesthetic judgment would again be non-aesthetical in nature. Aesthetical judgment must be primarily aesthetical judgment in modality in order to be distinctively aesthetical. However, as non-aesthetical judgments are merely the raw material for the aesthetical process this implies that some sort of balance must also be in existence between the modalities of the non-aesthetical and the aesthetical modality. The presence of the non-aesthetical modalities alone - would result in no aesthetic process, the presence of the aesthetical process alone without the reception of content would result in an empty aesthetic experience. Thus simultaneous involvement with the non-aesthetic and detachment from the same must be in evidence before the generation of a productive aesthetic experience.
      This involved detachment, paradoxical as it may sound, reflects the fact that the appreciation of a state of affairs naturally involves a higher order of awareness of a lower order awareness. Similarly in the person's treatment of the artwork in distinction to that which is not the artwork; i.e. in effect an open-working concept of themselves, a similar state of relational involvement and judgmental detachment is called for. In other words at the level of conception the person as the spectator must entertain the aesthetic experience as a balance between a sense of the ego and an understanding of the artwork as an artwork.
      It stands to reason that if any modality other than that of the aesthetic is given an overall prominence that the mind would quite naturally have its attention diverted elsewhere, away from the aesthetical. Thus it follows that ongoing balance is not only to be observed in the formal structure of the artwork, i.e. in the aesthetic content, but also in the process of the aesthetic experience as a process. In effect balance not only pertains to the structural resolution of dissonance in the body of the artwork but also to the experiential structure of the aesthetic process. The implication can be drawn that with respect to the process of aesthetic reflection all polarities of consciousness intrinsic to its function subservient to the aesthetic modality must be in a state of ongoing balance. It follows therefore that the pre-aesthetical material must be put into a state of ongoing equilibrium as a precondition for the process of aesthetic reflection to take place. A state of balance must therefore pertain to the emotional content of the artwork, its conceptual and perceptual entertainment, value judgments other than the aesthetical, sense of self, cognitive appreciation of the artwork as an artwork,
etc. 
      In hindsight we can state that the aesthetic process is entertained when this condition of psychic balance is entertained along with a sense of absorption and an element of transcendental detachment. In retrospection an analysis of linguistic reports about this type of experience that confirms these preconditions have been met would give us evidence that this process of aesthetic reflection was indeed the indirect object of our examination. Thus we have here both a description and a prescription of how consciousness is structured in judgment in general and in aesthetic reflection in particular. 
      A consequence of these conditions is that an imbalanced attention placed upon the artwork as an object, e.g. would disestablish this experiential dynamic equilibrium and weaken the aesthetic process, in this case creating the materialization of the artwork so that its resultant status is now no better than that of any other object in the world for sensory investigation. On the other hand an excessive attention placed upon the conceptualized associations personally evoked by the artwork would likewise disestablish their aesthetic connection with the artwork and thence remove them from experiencing its particular aesthetic merit. It also follows that as aesthetic reflection arises above perceptual and conceptual modalities of consciousness that the aesthetic process demands a deeper concentration and integration of the psyche.
      The point of my anecdote about the artform of pins and needles is to merely highlight this fact that ongoing balance pertains not only to the content of the aesthetic experience as the formal structure of the artwork but also to the experiential structure of the aesthetic process properly conducted. Whether this artform of aesthetical acupuncture exists or not is irrelevant to the object of this exercise. By setting up my account in a slightly bizarre fashion it was my hope that I could make this point more easily.

      To conclude this paper I feel I have now arrived at a point where I can discuss the question of the subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the objectivity of the aesthetic experience? 
      The subjectivity of my own experiences cannot be easily denied, on the other hand, can someone claim that my experience can be duplicated by some other person when neither they nor I can normally experience the same experience. When one person has a headache another person doesn't take an aspirin for it. I like to think that when I have a headache that I only take medication when I am about to induce in some other person the same. That aside no one would sensibly claim that when they have a headache and they take an aspirin that they also take the same tablet or capsule as that administered to or by someone else. Yet in one respect with regard to the chemical constitution of this medication people can claim to be taking the same medication. In a like fashion phenomenology claims, or assumes, that people can entertain effectively similar mental processes and content and that the essential structure of the same can be examined and delineated. The successfulness of phenomenology as a methodology, witness this conference here today, must surely point to an intersubjectivity claimed for and by this research.
      As an introduction to the nature of the aesthetic my paper hopefully as a phenomenological exploration of this field has possibly revealed something of this intersubjective structure that seems to underly peoples' experience of the aesthetic, their appreciation of artworks and their language reports about the same. Assuming the intersubjectivity of experience; as witnessed by language and social interaction, it must surely be but one small step for the phenomenologist to extract that structure from this sea of relational intersubjectivity and pronounce a provisional and qualified objectivity to their research. Perhaps the phenomenologist could be compared to a philosophical pharmacist who from some book of essential formulae based on their research, could conceivably propose some appropriate methodological pill or potion for the resolution of every major type of philosophical headache that would otherwise interminably confront us.
      This analogy is another fruitful one to explore. I certainly don't entertain the foreseeable end of philosophy as we know it but I do perceive that it should take a more exact form and that in this regard I have found much inspiration in the work of Edmund Husserl.

             Noël Tointon, Macquarie University, (24/3/86).

Edited: 15.10.99